THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

THE COLD WAR

A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY

VOLUME 1 A-C

SPENCER C. TUCKER, EDITOR

FOREWORD BY JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER

COLD WAR

A Student Encyclopedia

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A Student Encyclopedia

VOLUME I: A–D

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ABC CLIO

Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cold War: A Student Encyclopedia
/ Spencer C. Tucker, editor.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-85109-701-2 (hard copy : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-85109-706-7 (ebook)
1. Cold War—Encyclopedias. 2. World politics—1945–1989—Encyclopedias.
3. World politics—1985–1995—Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937–
D840.E63 2008
909.82′5—dc22 2008009681

10 09 08 07 06 05 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an ebook.
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ABC-CLIO, Inc.
130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911
Santa Barbara, California 93116–1911

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Manufactured in the United States of America

This encyclopedia is dedicated to my daughter,
Mary Mikel Stump

About the Editors

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Contents

Volume I: A–D

List of Entries, xi
List of Maps, xxv
Preface, xxvii
General Maps, xxix
Introductory Essays, 3
A–D Entries, 51
Index, I-1

Volume II: E–L

List of Entries, vii
List of Maps, xxi
General Maps, xxiii
E–L Entries, 597
Index, I-1

Volume III: M–R

List of Entries, vii
List of Maps, xxi
General Maps, xxiii
M–R Entries, 1239
Index, I-1

Volume IV: S–Z

List of Entries, vii
List of Maps, xxi
General Maps, xxiii
S–Z Entries, 1761
List of Editors and Contributors, 2317
Index, I-1

Volume V: Documents

List of Documents, vii
Documents, 2327
Rank Structures, 2869
Country Profiles, 2895
Cold War Chronology, 2911
How to Read a Primary Source, 2925
How to Read a Map, 2927
How to Read a Chart, Table, or Graph, 2929
Glossary, 2931
Selected Bibliography of the Cold War, 2947
Web Site List, 2955
Categorical Index, 2957
Index, I-1

List of Entries

General Essays
The Cold War: A Personal Perspective
Origins of the Cold War to 1950
Course of the Cold War (1950–1991)

Entries
Abdullah, King of Jordan (1882–1951)
Abel, Rudolf (1903–1971)
Abrams, Creighton Williams (1914–1974)
Acheson, Dean Gooderham (1893–1971)
Adams, Gerard, Jr. (1948–)
Adenauer, Konrad (1876–1967)
Afghanistan
Afghanistan War (1979–1989)
Africa
Africa, Soviet Interventions in
Africa, U.S. Interventions in
African National Congress
Aideed, Mohamed Farah (1934–1996)
Air Burst
Aircraft
Aircraft Carriers
AirLand Battle
Albania
Albert II, King of Belgium (1934–)
Algeria
Algerian War (1954–1962)
Alia, Ramiz (1925–)
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973)
Alliance for Progress
Allied Control Council of Germany
Alsop, Joseph Wright (1910–1989)
Americans for Democratic Action
Americas
Amin, Idi (1924?–2003)
Andreotti, Giulio (1919–)
Andropov, Yuri (1914–1984)
Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis (1951–1953)
Antall, József (1932–1993)
Antarctica and Arctic
Antiaircraft Guns and Missiles
Anti-Americanism
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)
Anticolonialism
Anti-Semitism
Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946)
ANZUS Pact (1 September 1951)
Aquino, Benigno, Jr. (1932–1983)
Aquino, Corazon (1933–)
Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1973)
Arab Nationalism
Arafat, Yasir (1929–2004)
Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971)
Argentina
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (1953–)
Armenia
Arms Control
Arms Sales, International
Artillery
Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in
Assad, Hafez (1930–2000)
Atomic Bomb
Atomic Energy Commission, United Nations

Atomic Energy Commission, United States
Atoms for Peace Proposal (8 December 1953)
Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl (1883–1967)
Aung San Suu Kyi (1945–)
Auriol, Vincent (1884–1966)
Australia
Austria
Austrian State Treaty (15 May 1955)
Ayub Khan, Muhammad (1907–1974)
Azerbaijan

Baker, James Addison, III (1930–)
Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio (1906–2002)
Ball, George Wildman (1909–1994)
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
Bandaranaike, Sirimavo (1916–2000)
Bandung Conference (18–24 April 1955)
Bangladesh
Barre, Mohammed Siyad (1919?–1995)
Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio (1901–1973)
Baudouin, King of Belgium (1930–1993)
Bay of Pigs (17 April 1961)
Beatles
Beatrix, Queen of the Netherlands (1938–)
Begin, Menachem (1913–1992)
Beijing Meeting (21–27 February 1972)
Belarus
Belgium
Benediktsson, Bjarni (1908–1970)
Beneš, Edvard (1884–1948)
Ben-Gurion, David (1886–1973)
Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953)
Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949)
Berlin Crises (1958–1961)
Berlin Wall (13 August 1961–9 November 1989)
Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984)
Berman, Jakub (1901–1984)
Bessarabia
Betancourt, Rómulo (1908–1981)
Bevin, Ernest (1881–1951)
Bhumipol Adulyadej, King of Thailand (1927–)
Bhutan
Bhutto, Benazir (1953–)
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali (1928–1979)
Biafra War (1967–1970)
Bidault, Georges (1899–1983)
Bierut, Bolesflaw (1892–1956)
Bikini Island Atomic Tests
Biological and Chemical Weapons and Warfare
Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr. (1909–1994)
Black Panthers
Blum, Léon (1872–1950)
Bo Yibo (1908–2007)
Bodnăraş, Emil (1904–1976)
Bogotá, Act of (13 September 1960)
Bohlen, Charles Eustis (1904–1974)
Bokassa, Jean-Bédel (1921–1996)
Bolivia
Bombers, Strategic
Bonner, Yelena Georgievna (1923–)
Bosch Gaviño, Juan (1909–2001)
Botha, Pieter Willem (1916–2006)
Botha, Roelof Frederik (1932–)
Bourguiba, Habib (1903–2000)
Bradley, Omar Nelson (1893–1981)
Brady Plan (March 1989)
Brainwashing
Brandt, Willy (1913–1992)
Brabtianu, Gheorghe Ion (1898–1953)
Braun, Wernher von (1912–1977)
Brazil
Bretton Woods System
Brezhnev, Leonid (1906–1982)
Brezhnev Doctrine
British Commonwealth of Nations
Browder, Earl Russell (1891–1973)
Brown, Harold (1927–)
Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este (1898–1977)
Brunei
Brussels Treaty (1948)
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1928–)
Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich (1895–1975)
Bulgaria
Bunche, Ralph Johnson (1904–1971)
Bundy, McGeorge (1919–1996)
Bundy, William Putnam (1917–2000)
Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy (1911–1963)
Burma
Bush, George Herbert Walker (1924–)
Byrnes, James Francis (1879–1972)

Caetano, Marcelo José das Neves (1906–1980)
Callaghan, James (1912–2005)
Cambodia

Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of (1978–1992)
Cambridge Five
Camp David Accords (September 1978)
Camp David Meeting (25–26 September 1959)
Camus, Albert (1913–1960)
Canada
Carlucci, Frank Charles (1930–)
Carrero Blanco, Luis (1903–1973)
Carrillo, Santiago (1915–)
Carter, James Earl, Jr. (1924–)
Carter Doctrine (23 January 1980)
Casey, William Joseph, Jr. (1913–1987)
Castro, Fidel (1926–)
Cavaco Silva, Aníbal António (1939–)
Ceauscescu, Nicolae (1918–1989)
Central Intelligence Agency
Chad
Chambers, Whittaker (1901–1961)
Chang, John Myon (1899–1966)
Chapultepec Conference (21 February–8 March 1945)
Charter 77
Checkpoint Charlie
Chen Yi (1901–1972)
Cheney, Richard B. (1941–)
Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (1911–1985)
Chernobyl (26 April 1986)
Chile
China, People's Republic of
China, People's Republic of, Air Force
China, People's Republic of, Army
China, People's Republic of, Navy
China, Republic of
China, Republic of, Armed Forces
Chinese Civil War (1945–1949)
Chirac, Jacques (1932–)
Churchill, Winston (1874–1965)
Civil Defense
Civil Liberties in the United States
Clark, Mark Wayne (1896–1984)
Clay, Lucius DuBignon (1897–1978)
Clayton, William Lockhart (1880–1966)
Clifford, Clark McAdams (1906–1998)
Cohn, Roy Marcus (1927–1986)
Cohn-Bendit, Daniel Marc (1945–)
Colby, William Egan (1920–1996)
Cold War Study Centers, Non-U.S.
Cold War Study Centers, U.S.
Collins, Joseph Lawton (1896–1987)
Colombia
Colombo Plan
Comecon (1949–1991)
Cominform (1947–1956)
Communist Control Act (1954)
Communist Fronts
Communist Revolutionary Warfare
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (2 October 1986)
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Republic of the
Congo Civil War (1960–1965)
Constantine II, King of Greece (1940–)
Constructive Engagement
Contadora Group
Containment Policy
Contras
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990)
Costa Rica
Council of Europe
Council on Foreign Relations (1919–)
Cousins, Norman (1915–1990)
Couve de Murville, Jacques Maurice (1907–1999)
Craxi, Benedetto (1934–2000)
Cuba
Cuba and Africa
Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)
Cultural Exchange
Cultural Revolution (1966–1969)
Cunhal, Álvaro (1913–)
Curcio, Renato (1941–)
Curzon Line
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia

Dalai Lama (1935–)
Debray, Régis (1940–)
Declaration on Liberated Europe (February 1945)
Decolonization
Defections
De Gasperi, Alcide (1881–1954)
De Gaulle, Charles (1890–1970)
Demirel, Süleyman (1924–)
Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)
Denmark

DePuy, William Eugene (1919–1992)
Détente
De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975)
Dewey, Thomas Edmund (1902–1971)
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of (13 March–7 May 1954)
Dillon, Clarence Douglas (1909–2003)
Dimitrov, Georgi Mikhailovich (1892–1949)
Dirty War (1974–1983)
Displaced Persons
Distant Early Warning Line
Djilas, Milován (1911–1995)
Dobruja
Dobrynin, Anatoly Fyodorovich (1919–)
Doe, Samuel Kanyon (1951–1990)
Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in
Domino Theory
Double-Track Decision, NATO
Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander Frederick (1903–1995)
Drabghici, Alexandru (1913–1993)
Drug Trafficking
Dubchek, Alexander (1921–1992)
Duck and Cover Drill
Duclos, Jacques (1896–1975)
Dulles, Allen Welsh (1893–1969)
Dulles, John Foster (1888–1959)
Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)
Duvalier, François (1907–1971)

Eanes, António (1935–)
East Asia
East Berlin Uprising (16–17 June 1953)
East Timor
Ecuador
Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon (1897–1977)
Egypt
Egypt, Armed Forces
Einstein, Albert (1879–1955)
Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890–1969)
Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)
Elizabeth II, Queen of Great Britain (1926–)
El Salvador
Ély, Paul (1897–1975)
Élysée Agreement (8 March 1949)
Entebbe Raid (3–4 July 1976)
Erhard, Ludwig (1897–1977)
Eritrea
Erlander, Tage (1901–1985)
Espionage
Estonia
Ethiopia
Eurocommunism
Europe, Eastern
Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in
Europe, Western
European Coal and Steel Community
European Defense Community
European Economic Community
European Integration Movement
European Parliament
European Union
Existentialism
Explorer I (31 January 1958)

Faber, Mient Jan (1940–)
Faeroe Islands
Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia (1921–2005)
Failsafe
Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia (1905–1975)
Falklands War (1982)
Fallout Shelters
Farouk II, King of Egypt (1920–1965)
Faure, Edgar Jean (1908–1988)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fermi, Enrico (1901–1954)
Figl, Leopold (1902–1965)
Figueres Ferrer, José (1906–1990)
Film
Finland
First-Strike Capability
Flexible Response
Fonda, Jane (1937–)
Food for Peace Program (1954–)
Foot, Michael (1913–)
Force de Frappe
Ford, Gerald Rudolph (1913–2006)
Formosa Doctrine (1955)
Forrestal, James Vincent (1892–1949)
France
France, Air Force
France, Army
France, Navy
Franco, Francisco (1892–1975)

Franco-German Friendship Treaty (22 January 1963)
Frei Montalva, Eduardo (1911–1982)
Fuchs, Klaus (1911–1988)
Fujiyama Aiichirom (1897–1985)
Fukuda Takeo (1905–1995)
Fulbright, James William (1905–1995)

Gagarin, Yuri (1934–1968)
Gaither Report (November 1957)
Gaitskell, Hugh (1906–1963)
Galbraith, John Kenneth (1908–2006)
Gandhi, Indira (1917–1984)
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)
Gandhi, Rajiv (1944–1991)
Gavin, James Maurice (1907–1990)
Gehlen, Reinhard (1902–1979)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (January 1948)
Geneva Conference (1954)
Geneva Conference (1955)
Geneva Conference (1959)
Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan (21–22 November 1985)
Genocide
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich (1927–)
Gensuikyom
George VI, King of Great Britain (1895–1952)
Georgia
German Democratic Republic (1949–1991)
German Democratic Republic, Armed Forces
Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II (1945–1948)
Germany, Federal Republic of
Germany, Federal Republic of, Armed Forces
Germany, Federal Republic of, Rearmament and NATO
Gerő, Ernő (1898–1980)
Ghana
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe (1901–1965)
Gibraltar
Gierek, Edward (1913–2001)
Ginsberg, Allen (1926–1997)
Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry (1926–)
Glasnost
Glassboro Summit (23–25 June 1967)
Glemp, Józef, Cardinal (1929–)
Glenn, John Herschel, Jr. (1921–)
Goldwater, Barry Morris (1909–1998)
Gomuflka, Wfladysflaw (1905–1982)
González Márquez, Felipe (1942–)
Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–)
Gorshkov, Sergey Georgyevich (1910–1988)
Gottwald, Klement (1896–1953)
Gouzenko, Igor (1919–1982)
Governors Island Meeting, Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush (7 December 1988)
Greece
Greek Civil War (1946–1949)
Greenland
Grenada
Grenada Invasion (25 October 1983)
Gromyko, Andrey (1909–1989)
Grósz, Károly (1930–1996)
Grotewohl, Otto (1894–1964)
Ground Burst
Groza, Petru (1884–1958)
Gruber, Karl (1909–1995)
Guantánamo Naval Base
Guatemala
Guatemalan Intervention (1954)
Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto (1928–1967)
Gulags
Guyana

Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr. (1924–)
Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia (1892–1975)
Haiti
Hallstein, Walter (1901–1982)
Hallstein Doctrine (1955–1970)
Hammarskjöld, Dag (1905–1961)
Hardened Sites
Harmel Report (December 1967)
Harriman, William Averell (1891–1986)
Hassan II, King of Morocco (1929–1999)
Hatoyama Ichirom (1883–1959)
Havel, Václav (1936–)
Hawke, Robert (1929–)
Healey, Denis (1917–)
Heath, Edward (1916–2005)
Heinemann, Gustav (1899–1976)
Helms, Richard McGarrah (1913–2002)
Helsinki Final Act (1975)
Herter, Christian Archibald (1895–1966)

Heseltine, Michael (1933–)
Heuss, Theodor (1884–1963)
Hiss, Alger (1904–1996)
Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)
Hoffman, Paul Gray (1891–1974)
Hoffmann, Heinz (1910–1985)
Hollywood Ten
Holt, Harold Edward (1908–1967)
Honduras
Honecker, Erich (1912–1994)
Hong Kong
Hoover, John Edgar (1895–1972)
Hotline
Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985)
Hua Guofeng (1921–)
Huang Hua (1913–)
Hukbalahap
Hull, Cordell (1871–1955)
Human Rights
Hungarian Revolution (1956)
Hungary
Hurd, Douglas Richard (1930–)
Hurley, Patrick Jay (1883–1963)
Husák, Gustáv (1913–1991)
Hussein, Saddam (1937–2006)
Hussein I, King of Jordan (1935–1999)
Hu Yaobang (1915–1989)
Hydrogen Bomb

Iceland
Ikeda Hayato (1899–1965)
Iliescu, Ion (1930–)
Inchon Landing (15 September 1950)
India
India, Armed Forces
India-Pakistan Wars (1947–1949, 1965, 1971)
Indochina War (1946–1954)
Indonesia
Inönü, Ismet (1884–1973)
Intelligence Collection
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (8 December 1987)
Internal Security Act (1950)
International Monetary Fund
Iran
Iran, Armed Forces
Iran-Contra Affair
Iran Hostage Crisis (4 November 1979–20 January 1981)
Iran-Iraq War (22 September 1980–20 August 1988)
Iraq
Iraq, Armed Forces
Ireland, Northern
Ireland, Republic of
Irish Republican Army
Ishibashi Tanzan (1884–1973)
Israel
Israel, Armed Forces
Italy
Italy, Armed Forces

Jagan, Cheddi (1918–1997)
Jakeš, Miloš (1922–)
Japan
Japan, Armed Forces
Japan, Occupation after World War II
Jaruzelski, Wojciech (1923–)
Ji Pengfei (1910–2000)
Jiang Jieshi (1887–1975)
Jiang Qing (1914–1991)
Jinmen and Mazu
Jinnah, Mohamed Ali (1876–1948)
John Birch Society
John XXIII, Pope (1881–1963)
John Paul II, Pope (1920–2005)
Johnson, Louis Arthur (1891–1966)
Johnson, Lyndon Baines (1908–1973)
Jordan
Juan Carlos I, King of Spain (1938–)
Just War Theory

Kádár, János (1912–1989)
Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich (1892–1991)
Kaifu Toshiki (1931–)
KAL Flight 007 (1 September 1983)
Kaliningrad Oblast
Kania, Stanisflaw (1927–)
Karelia
Kashmir Dispute
Kaunda, Kenneth David (1924–)
Kekkonen, Urho (1900–1986)
Kelly, Petra Karin (1947–1992)
Kennan, George Frost (1904–2005)
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald (1917–1963)

Kennedy, Robert Francis (1925–1968)
Kenya
Kenyatta, Jomo (1889?–1978)
Kerouac, Jean Louis (1922–1969)
Khmer Rouge
Khomeini, Ruhollah (1900–1989)
Khrushchev, Nikita (1894–1971)
Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg (1904–1988)
Kim Dae Jung (1926–)
Kim Il Sung (1912–1994)
Kim Young Sam (1927–)
King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
Kinnock, Neil Gordon (1942–)
Kirkpatrick, Jeane Jordan (1926–2006)
Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987)
Kissinger, Henry (1923–)
Kitchen Debate (24 June 1959)
Kohl, Helmut (1930–)
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, Armed Forces
Korea, Republic of
Korea, Republic of, Armed Forces
Korean War (1950–1953)
Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich (1906–1966)
Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich (1904–1980)
Kovács, Béla (1908–1959)
Kreisky, Bruno (1911–1990)
Krenz, Egon (1937–)
Kubitschek, Juscelino (1902–1976)
Kurile Islands
Kuwait

Laird, Melvin (1922–)
Landsbergis, Vytautas (1932–)
Lansdale, Edward Geary (1908–1987)
Laos
Latin America, Communist Parties in
Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in
Lattimore, Owen (1900–1989)
Latvia
Launch on Warning
Leahy, William Daniel (1875–1959)
Lebanon
Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in
Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe (1902–1947)
Le Duc Tho (1911–1990)
LeMay, Curtis Emerson (1906–1990)
Lend-Lease
Leopold III, King of Belgium (1901–1983)
Le Pen, Jean-Marie (1928–)
Li Guangyao (1923–)
Li Peng (1928–)
Li Xiannian (1909–1992)
Liao Chengzhi (1908–1983)
Liberia
Liberman, Evgenii Grigorevich (1897–1983)
Libya
Lie, Trygve (1896–1968)
Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich (1920–)
Lin Biao (1907–1971)
Lippmann, Walter (1889–1974)
Literature
Lithuania
Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969)
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. (1902–1985)
Lon Nol (1913–1985)
Lovett, Robert Abercrombie (1895–1986)
Luce, Clare Boothe (1903–1987)
Luce, Henry Robinson (1898–1967)
Lumumba, Patrice Emery (1925–1961)
Luxembourg
Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich (1898–1976)

MacArthur, Douglas (1880–1964)
Machine Guns
Maclean, Donald (1913–1983)
Macmillan, Maurice Harold (1894–1986)
Madman Strategy
Magsaysay, Ramon (1907–1957)
Maizière, Lothar de (1940–)
Makarios III, Archbishop (1913–1977)
Malan, Daniel François (1874–1959)
Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)
Malaysia
Malcolm X (1925–1965)
Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich (1902–1988)
Malik, Jacob Aleksandrovich (1906–1980)
Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967)
Malraux, Georges-André (1901–1976)
Malta
Malta Meeting, Bush and Gorbachev (2–3 December 1989)

Mandela, Nelson (1918–)
Mann, Thomas C. (1912–1999)
Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil, Baron (1867–1951)
Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
Marcos, Ferdinand Edralin (1917–1989)
Mariel Boatlift (April–September 1980)
Market Socialism
Markos, Vafiades (1906–1992)
Marshall, George Catlett (1880–1959)
Marshall Mission to China (1945–1947)
Marshall Plan
Masaryk, Jan (1886–1948)
Massu, Jacques (1908–2002)
Mau Mau
May, Allan Nunn (1911–2003)
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz (1927–)
McCarthy, Eugene Joseph (1916–2005)
McCarthy, Joseph Raymond (1908–1957)
McCarthy Hearings
McCarthyism
McCloy, John Jay (1895–1989)
McGovern, George Stanley (1922–)
McNamara, Robert Strange (1916–)
Medvedev, Roy Aleksandrovich (1925–)
Medvedev, Zhores Aleksandrovich (1925–)
Meir, Golda (1898–1978)
Menderes, Adnan (1899–1961)
Mendès-France, Pierre (1907–1982)
Mengistu, Haile Mariam (1937?–)
Menon, Vengalil Krishnan Krishna (1896–1974)
Menzies, Robert Gordon (1894–1978)
Mexico
MI5
MI6
Michael I, King of Romania (1921–)
Middle East
Middle East Regional Defense Organizations
Miki Takeo (1907–1988)
Mikoflajczyk, Stanisflaw (1901–1966)
Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich (1895–1978)
Military Balance (1945–1990)
Military-Industrial Complex
Miloshevica, Slobodan (1941–2006)
Mindszenty, József (1892–1975)
Mines and Mine Warfare, Land
Mines and Mine Warfare, Sea
Missile Gap
Missiles, Antiballistic
Missiles, Cruise
Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic
Missiles, Pershing II
Missiles, Polaris
Missiles, Poseidon
Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Mitterrand, François (1916–1996)
Mobutu Sese Seko (1930–1997)
Modrow, Hans (1928–)
Moldavia (Moldova)
Mollet, Guy (1905–1975)
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich (1890–1986)
Molotov Plan (1947)
Mongolia
mongoose, Operation
Monnet, Jean (1888–1979)
Monnet Plan
Monrovia Group
Moro, Aldo (1916–1978)
Morocco
Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon (22–30 May 1972)
Moscow Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan (29 May–2 June 1988)
Moscow and Yalta Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon (27 June–3 July 1974)
Mossadegh, Mohammed (1882–1967)
Mountbatten, Louis, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma (1900–1979)
Mozambique
Mozambique Civil War (1977–1992)
Mugabe, Robert Gabriel (1924–)
Mulroney, Martin Brian (1939–)
Multilateral Force, NATO
Multiple Reentry Vehicles
Munich Analogy
Murphy, Robert Daniel (1894–1978)
Music
Muskie, Edmund Sixtus (1914–1996)
Mutual Assured Destruction
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (1973–1989)
Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.–Republic of China (December 1954)

MX Missile System
My Lai Massacre (16 March 1968)

Nagorno-Karabakh
Naguib, Mohammed (1901–1984)
Nagy, Ferenc (1903–1979)
Nagy, Imre (1896–1958)
Nakasone Yasuhiro (1918–)
Namibia
Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)
National Cold War Museum and Memorial
National Intelligence Estimate
National Security Act (26 July 1947)
National Security Agency
National Security Council Report NSC-68
National Security Study Memorandum 39 (10 April 1969)
Nationalism
Navarre, Henri (1898–1983)
Ne Win (1911–2002)
Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)
Németh, Miklós (1948–)
Nenni, Pietro (1891–1980)
Nepal
Netherlands
Neutron Bomb
New Look Defense Policy
New Thinking Policy
New Zealand
Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963)
Nguyen Cao Ky (1930–)
Nguyen Van Thieu (1923–2001)
Nicaragua
Niebuhr, Reinhold (1892–1971)
Nigeria
Nitze, Paul Henry (1907–2004)
Nixon, Richard Milhous (1913–1994)
Nixon Doctrine (3 November 1969)
Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)
Nobel Peace Prize
Nomenklatura
Non-Aligned Movement
Noriega, Manuel (1938–)
Norstad, Lauris (1907–1988)
North American Aerospace Defense Command
North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, History of (1948–1990)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of
Norway
Nosek, Václav (1892–1955)
Novotnya, Antonín (1904–1975)
Nuclear Arms Race
Nuclear-Free Zones
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1 July 1968)
Nuclear Tests
Nuclear Weapons, Tactical
Nyerere, Julius Kambarage (1922–1999)

Obote, Apollo Milton (1924–2005)
Office of Strategic Services
Ogaden War (1977–1978)
Olympic Games and Politics
Open Skies Proposal (21 July 1955)
Oppenheimer, Julius Robert (1904–1967)
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
Organization of African Unity
Organization of American States
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Orwell, George (1903–1950)
Ostpolitik
Outer Space Treaty (10 October 1967)
Owen, David (1938–)
Özal, Turgut (1927–1993)

Paasikivi, Juho (1870–1956)
Paisley, Ian (1926–)
Pakistan
Pakistan, Armed Forces
Palestine Liberation Organization
Palme, Olof (1927–1986)
Panama
Panama, U.S. Invasion of (20 December 1989)
Panama Canal Treaties (1977)
Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi (1900–1990)
Papadopoulos, Georgios (1919–1999)
Papagos, Alexander (1883–1955)
Papandreou, Andreas Georgios (1919–1996)
Papandreou, Georgios (1888–1968)
PAPERCLIP, Operation (1946–1954)

Paraguay
Paris Conference (May 1960)
Paris Peace Conference and Treaties (29 July–15 October 1946)
Park Chung Hee (1917–1979)
Partial Test Ban Treaty (5 August 1963)
Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich (1890–1960)
Pauker, Ana Rabinsohn (1893–1960)
Paul VI, Pope (1897–1978)
Peace Corps (1961–)
Peace Movements
Peaceful Coexistence
Pearson, Lester Bowles (1897–1972)
Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)
Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich (1919–1967)
Perestroika
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier (1920–)
Perón, Eva (1919–1952)
Perón, Juan Domingo (1895–1974)
Persian Gulf War (17 January–28 February 1991)
Peru
Petrov, Vladimir Mikhailovich (1907–1991)
Pflimlin, Pierre (1907–2000)
Pham Van Dong (1906–2000)
Philby, Harold Adrian Russell (1912–1988)
Philippines
Picasso, Pablo (1881–1973)
Pieck, Wilhelm (1876–1960)
Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto (1915–2006)
Pius XII, Pope (1876–1958)
Pleven, René Jean (1901–1993)
Pleven Plan (1950)
Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich (1903–1983)
Point Four Program (1949)
Pol Pot (1928–1998)
Poland
Poland, Armed Forces
Pompidou, Georges (1911–1974)
Porkkala
Portugal
Powers, Francis Gary (1929–1977)
Prague Spring (1968)
Present Danger, Committee on the
Profumo Affair (1963)
Protest Movements
Pueblo Incident (23 January 1968)
Qadhafi, Muammar (1942–)
Qian Qichen (1928–)
Qiao Guanhua (1913–1983)

Raab, Julius (1891–1964)
Rabin, Yitzhak (1922–1995)
Race Relations, United States
Radical Islam
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
Rahman, Mujibur (1922–1975)
Rahman, Tunku Abdul (1903–1990)
Rajk, László (1909–1949)
Rákosi, Mátyás (1892–1971)
RAND Corporation
Rapacki, Adam (1909–1970)
Rapacki Plan (1957)
Reagan, Ronald Wilson (1911–2004)
Reagan Doctrine
Red Army Faction
Red Brigades
Refugees
Refuseniks
Religious Right, United States
Renner, Karl (1870–1950)
Republic of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty (1953)
Reuter, Ernst (1889–1953)
Revolt of the Admirals (1949)
Reykjavík Meeting (11–12 October 1986)
Reza Pahlavi, Mohammad (1919–1980)
Rhee, Syngman (1875–1965)
Ridgway, Matthew Bunker (1895–1993)
Rio Pact (September 1947)
Rochet, Waldeck (1905–1983)
Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich (1908–1979)
Rogers, William Pierce (1913–2001)
Roh Tae Woo (1932–)
Roman Catholic Church
Romania
Rome, Treaty of (25 March 1957)
Roosevelt, Eleanor (1884–1962)
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1882–1945)
Rosenberg, Julius (1918–1953)
Rumsfeld, Donald (1932–)
Rusk, Dean (1909–1994)
Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970)

Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr. (1897–1971)
Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich (1929–)

Saar
Sadat, Anwar (1918–1981)
Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989)
Salan, Raoul Albin-Louis (1899–1984)
Salazar, António de Oliveira (1889–1970)
San Francisco Peace Treaty (8 September 1951)
Sandinistas
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)
Satom Eisaku (1901–1975)
Saudi Arabia
Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro (1934–2002)
Scandinavia
Scheel, Walter (1919–)
Schlesinger, James Rodney (1929–)
Schmidt, Helmut (1918–)
School of the Americas
Schriever, Bernard Adolf (1910–2005)
Schröder, Gerhard (1910–1989)
Schumacher, Kurt (1895–1952)
Schuman, Robert (1886–1963)
Schuman Plan
Schweitzer, Albert (1875–1965)
Securitate
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on (1973–1990)
Service, John Stewart (1909–1999)
Sétif Uprising (8 May 1945)
Shehu, Mehmet (1913–1981)
Sherman, Forrest Percival (1896–1951)
Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–)
Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887–1957)
Shining Path
Shultz, George Pratt (1920–)
Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)
"Sinews of Peace" Speech (March 1946)
Singapore
Sinn Féin
Sino-Indian Border Confrontations (1959–1988)
Sino-Soviet Border Incident (2 March–11 September 1969)
Sino-Soviet Split (1956–1966)
Sino-Soviet Treaty (14 February 1950)
Sino-Vietnamese War (17 February–5 March 1979)
Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference
Slánskya Trial (1952)
Small Arms
Smith, Ian Douglas (1919–)
Smith, Walter Bedell (1895–1961)
Smuts, Jan Christian (1870–1950)
Soares, Mário (1924–)
Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897–1968)
Solidarity Movement
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr (1918–)
Somalia
Somoza Debayle, Anastasio (1925–1980)
Somoza García, Anastasio (1896–1956)
Song Meiling (1897–2003)
Song Qingling (1892–1981)
South Africa
South African Destabilization Campaign
South Asia
Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
Souvanna Phouma, Prince (1901–1984)
Souvannaphong, Prince (1909–1995)
Soviet Union
Soviet Union, Army
Soviet Union, Army Air Force
Soviet Union, Navy
Soviet-Yugoslav Split (1948)
Spaak, Paul-Henri (1899–1972)
Space Race
Spain
Spiegel Affair (1962)
Spinola, António de (1910–1996)
Sputnik (4 October 1957)
Sri Lanka
Stalin, Josef (1879–1953)
Stasi
Stepinac, Aloysius, Archbishop (1898–1960)
Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr. (1900–1949)
Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II (1900–1965)
Stimson, Henry Lewis (1867–1950)
Stockholm Document (1986)
Strategic Air Command
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Treaties

Strategic Defense Initiative
Stratemeyer, George Edward (1890–1969)
Strauss, Franz Josef (1915–1988)
Students for a Democratic Society
Suárez González, Adolfo (1932–)
Submarines
Sudan
Suez Crisis (1956)
Suharto (1921–)
Sukarno (1901–1970)
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich (1902–1982)
Svoboda, Ludvík (1895–1979)
Sweden
Sweden, Armed Forces
Światło, Józef (1915–1985?)
Switzerland
Swords to Ploughshares Movement
Syria

Taft, Robert Alphonso (1889–1953)
Taiwan Strait Crisis, First (1954–1955)
Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second (1958)
Tanaka Kakuei (1918–1993)
Tank Warfare
Tanks
Tanner, Väinö Alfred (1881–1966)
Tanzania
Taylor, Maxwell Davenport (1901–1987)
Teller, Edward (1908–2003)
Templer, Sir Gerald (1898–1979)
Territorial Changes after World War II
Terrorism
Tet Offensive (1968)
Thailand
Thatcher, Margaret (1925–)
Thompson, Sir Robert (1916–1992)
Thorez, Maurice (1900–1964)
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974)
Tiananmen Square (4 June 1989)
Tibet
Tildy, Zoltán (1889–1961)
Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)
Todorov, Stanko (1920–1976)
Tökés, László (1952–)
Tomáshek, Frantishek (1899–1992)
Tonkin Gulf Incidents and Resolution (August 1964)
Touré, Ahmed Sékou (1922–1984)
Triad
Trieste
Trudeau, Pierre (1919–2000)
Trujillo, Rafael Leónidas (1891–1961)
Truman, Harry S. (1884–1972)
Truman Doctrine (12 March 1947)
Truman Loyalty Program (1947)
Tuđman , Franjo (1922–1999)
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkey, Armed Forces
Twentieth Party Congress (February 1956)

U Nu (1907–1995)
U Thant (1909–1974)
U-2 Incident (May 1960)
U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union
Uganda
Ukraine
Ulbricht, Walter (1893–1973)
United Kingdom
United Kingdom, Air Force
United Kingdom, Army
United Kingdom, Navy
United Nations
United States
United States, Air Force
United States, Army
United States Commander in Chief, Europe
United States Information Agency
United States–Japan Security Treaty (8 September 1951)
United States, Marine Corps
United States, Navy
Uruguay

Vance, Cyrus Roberts (1917–2002)
Vandenberg, Hoyt Sanford (1899–1954)
Vandenberg Resolution (11 June 1948)
Van Fleet, James Alward (1892–1992)
Vatican City
Vatican Council II (1962–1965)
Venezuela
Venona Project
Vienna Conference (3–4 June 1961)
Viet Minh

Vietnam
Vietnam War (1957–1975)
Vietnam War Protests
Vo Nguyen Giap (1911–)
Vogel, Hans-Jochen (1926–)
Voice of America
Vorster, Balthazar Johannes (1915–1983)
Vranitzky, Franz (1937–)
Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuarevich (1883–1954)

Waldheim, Kurt (1918–2007)
Waldheim Affair (1986)
Waflecsa, Lech (1943–)
Walker, Edwin Anderson (1909–1993)
Walker, John Anthony, Jr. (1937–)
Wallace, Henry Agard (1888–1965)
Wang Bingnan (1906–1988)
Warsaw Pact
Warships, Surface
Washington Summit Meeting, Nixon and Brezhnev (16–25 June 1973)
Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev (7–10 December 1987)
Watergate (1972–1974)
Weathermen
Weinberger, Caspar (1917–2006)
Welch, Robert Henry Winborne, Jr. (1899–1985)
Western European Union (23 October 1954)
Western Sahara
Westmoreland, William Childs (1914–2005)
Wheeler, Earle Gilmore (1908–1975)
Whisky on the Rocks Crisis (27 October 1981)
White, Thomas Dresser (1902–1965)
Whitlam, Edward Gough (1916–)
Wilson, Charles Erwin (1890–1961)
Wolf, Markus (1923–)
Woodstock (14–16 August 1969)
World Bank
World Council of Churches
World Peace Council
World War II, Allied Conferences
World War II, Legacy of
Wu Xiuquan (1908–1997)
Wu Xueqian (1921–)
Wyszynaki, Stefan, Cardinal (1901–1981)

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad (1917–1980)
Yang Shangkun (1907–1998)
Yao Wenyuan (1931–2005)
Yeltsin, Boris (1931–)
Yemen
Yemen Civil War (1962–1972)
Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967)
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia, Armed Forces

Zápotockya, Antonín (1884–1957)
Zhang Hanfu (1905–1972)
Zhang Wentian (1900–1976)
Zhao Ziyang (1919–2005)
Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich (1896–1948)
Zhivkov, Todor (1911–1998)
Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)
Zhu De (1886–1976)
Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich (1917–1974)
Zia ul Haq, Muhammad (1924–1988)
Zimbabwe
Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich (1902–1986)

List of Maps

General Maps
East Central Europe, 1945: xxxi
Global Division at the Height of the Cold War, 1962: xxxii
Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990: xxxiii
Cold War in the Caribbean, 1960–1990: xxxiv
Cold War in the Far East, 1945–1990: xxxv
Cold Ear in the Middle East, 1945–1990: xxxvi
East Central Europe, 1992: xxxvii
Global Relationships, 1990s: xxxviii

Maps within Entries
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979: 63
African Independence, 1951–1968: 67
Arab-Israeli War, 1948: 154
Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961: 237
Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949: 259
Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, 1978: 358
China Civil War, 1945–1950: 427
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: 505
Cultural Revolution in China: 516
Sinai Campaign, 1956: 619
Soviet Territorial Gains, 1946: 662
Falklands War, 2 Apr–14 June 1982: 707
German Occupation Zones, 1945: 804
Breakup of Soviet Union, 1989–1995: 842
Greece and Turkey: 850
Hungarian Revolution, 1956: 940
Indochina War, 1946–1954: 981
Six Day War, 1967: 1026
October War, 1973: 1034
Korean War, 1950–1953: 1152
Libya, 1981–1986: 1207
Malayan Insurgency, 1948–1960: 1256
Marshall Plan Aid: 1289
Nicaragua, 1979: 1483
Nuclear Arms Race, 1945–1985: 1524
U.S. Invasion of Panama, 1989: 1576
Disposition of Forces in the Gulf War, 1991: 1621
Ground Operations in the Gulf War, 1991: 1622
Sino-Vietnamese War, 1979: 1830
Somalia and Eritrea: 1849
CENTO and SEATO: 1878
Succession States of the Soviet Union: 1887
Suez Crisis, 1956: 1967
Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–1955 and 1958): 2000
Tet Offensive, 1968: 2034
The No-Fly Zone War, 1991–2003: 2137
Ho Chi Minh Campaign, 1975: 2187
Vietnam War, 1964–1967: 2197
Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: 2227

Preface

The Cold War was, simply put, the single most important event of the second half of the twentieth century. For the purposes of the encyclopedia we have included some background information on World War II, such as the Allied conferences. We have chosen to end the entries within the encyclopedia in 1991, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact. A number of entries, however, including biographies and those treating particular countries, continue past that date.

While the Cold War period was marked by diplomatic and military confrontation (although fortunately no major war of the superpowers involving nuclear weapons occurred), it also shaped the lives of the billions of people who lived through it in many countless ways. We have tried, therefore, to address its social and economic impact, not only in the individual country entries but by including entries on such topics as literature, music, film, and religion. Members of the editorial advisory board and individual contributors suggested additional entries, and we incorporated many of their ideas. Many entries were updated shortly before publication.

The encyclopedia contains entries treating most of the world's nations, and we have included separate entries on the most important military establishments. Other categories emphasized are individuals, diplomacy (conferences as well as treaties), weapons systems, wars, and important battles. Obviously, even in an encyclopedia of a million words it is impossible to include every individual or event, but we hope that we have treated the most influential.

I have been ably assisted on this project by associate editor Dr. Paul P. Pierpaoli Jr. and assistant editors Dr. Timothy C. Dowling, Mr. Gordon Hogg, and Dr. Priscilla Roberts. Editorial Advisory Board members assisted in special ways. I would especially like to recognize Shawn Livingston and Law Yuk-fun, who were quick to answer highly esoteric inquiries. Dr. Pierpaoli and I did all preliminary editing, and the assistant editors each read the entire copy and made editorial suggestions.

This encyclopedia contains the widest range of international contributors than any I have previously edited. Included are scholars from such

nations as Australia, Austria, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Poland, South Africa, Turkey, and the United States.

I am especially pleased to work again with Dr. Roberts on the documents volume. We have been associated with a number of encyclopedia projects, and there is simply no more professional, reliable associate than Dr. Roberts. Her specialty is the Cold War, and she has an amazing grasp of its documents.

I am, as always, indebted to my wife Beverly for her patience and her unfailing support.

Spencer C. Tucker

General Maps

East Central Europe, 1945

Global Divisions at the Height of the Cold War, 1962

Cold War in Europe, 1945 – 1990



Cold War in the Caribbean, 1960 – 1990

Cold War in Far East, 1945 – 1990

Cold War in Middle East, 1945 – 1990

East Central Europe, 1992

Global Relationships, 1990s



General Essays

A Personal Perspective

It seems paradoxical when we stop to consider how rapidly the period we call the Cold War, the forty-five years during which the United States and the Soviet Union faced each other in a potentially deadly standoff, has nearly faded from our memories. Although the two nations were officially at peace during that time, their very survival was in peril of nuclear destruction. That fact was well known in all circles. "Don't talk to me about restoring the dollar after a nuclear exchange," I once heard President Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower say in a cabinet meeting. "We'll be grubbing for worms." Yet today the Cold War is hardly mentioned.

It is difficult to identify exactly when the demise of the Cold War occurred because it came in steps. The tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled that the Soviet Union was willing to relax its control over Eastern Europe, but it was not until the USSR as an empire collapsed in 1991 that the transformation from Cold War to uneasy peace was complete.

It is also difficult to pinpoint exactly when it began. Some place the date as early as August 1945, when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, acts that the Soviets supposedly interpreted as a threat to them. The adherents of that theory underrate the extent of the American determination to end the long and bitter struggle they had waged against their Japanese enemies. The possible effect on the Soviets was not part of the decision to drop the bomb. A Russian friend whom I highly respect has given a more plausible theory. The Soviets, he says, viewed the Cold War as beginning with Sir Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. It was at that time, my friend says, that the Soviets began to feel threatened by the West. Up to that time, he says, the tight control that the USSR exercised over Eastern Europe was seen by the Soviets as an inevitable sequel to the end of the war in Europe.

Relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union had always been shaky. Admittedly, the Russian Revolution that overthrew Nicholas II in March 1917 was at first viewed favorably by Americans, who bore no love for any absolute monarch. But the moderates who took power were soon themselves toppled by the Bolsheviks in a second revolution. The

Bolsheviks withdrew Russia from the war with Germany and threatened to spread their communist doctrine to other countries. At that point, all the West became alarmed. When the German emissaries met with the Allies at Compiègne in November 1918 to conclude the armistice that ended World War I, they warned Marshal Ferdinand Foch, obviously as a ploy, of possible Bolshevik revolutions in France and Britain if the terms were too harsh on Germany.

The Americans shared the distrust of Bolshevism so prevalent in France and Britain, but to a lesser degree. The United States supplied troops to the ill-fated Allied occupations of Vladivostok, Archangel, and Murmansk in the later days of World War I, but we got out as soon as possible. Yet it was an astonishing fifteen years after 1918 before the United States, under the newly inaugurated President Franklin D. Roosevelt, recognized the Soviet government. The general Western mistrust of the Bolsheviks did much to engender suspicion of continued Soviet hostility.

During the six years after extending diplomatic recognition the Americans paid little attention to the Soviet Union, principally because of the expansionist policies of Adolf Hitler. In late August 1939, however, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression treaty that gave Hitler free rein to launch an attack on Poland. A week after that pact was signed, Hitler sent German troops into Poland, and on 3 September 1939 France and Britain declared war. On 16 September, acting under secret terms of the nonaggression pact, the Soviets invaded Poland from the east. Hitler and Josef Stalin then divided the country between them.

Eight months later, freed by the pact with the USSR from the danger of a two-front war, German troops overran Norway and Denmark and then France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, thus occupying most of Western Europe. The Americans, who viewed this with dismay, blamed Hitler above all but also blamed Stalin, as Hitler's accomplice, almost as much.

World War II (1939–1945)

The German-Soviet alliance did not last. In mid-1941, Stalin was suddenly thrust into the position of a hero in the United States. His newfound popularity did not stem from any virtuous action on his part but rather on the fact that in late June, Hitler's massed armies crossed the border into Belarus, the Ukraine, and Russia in an unprovoked attack. Stalin was caught much by surprise, but the Soviet people sprang to the defense of Mother Russia and put up stiff resistance, paying dearly in the process. Americans watched the heroic Soviet performance of the Red Army and Soviet peasants with profound admiration. Stalin appeared twice on the front of *Time* magazine as "Man of the Year."

Six months later, in December 1941, the United States found itself the Soviet Union's actual ally in the war against Hitler. Japanese carriers attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December, and Hitler declared war against the United States a few days later. We were all in the same boat, to quote Roosevelt: Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States fighting a common enemy.

It was and remained an uneasy alliance. The Soviets could never quite accept the idea that the West was attempting to aid them in their struggle for

survival against Germany without harboring some ulterior motives of their own. Yet the Allies, and certainly the Americans, were sincerely doing everything in their power to come to the aid of their beleaguered ally. Even while the Americans and British were undergoing costly and humiliating defeats at the hands of the Japanese in early 1942, General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army chief of staff, was advocating an Anglo-American invasion of France with the object of forcing Hitler to withdraw vital divisions from the Eastern Front. Although that operation was never executed, the Allies sent supplies to Archangel and Murmansk in dangerous and costly convoys. We managed to deliver a great deal—for example, a half million General Motors 2½-ton trucks. The Lend-Lease supplies we sent may not in themselves have saved the Soviet Union from defeat, but they went a long way to help.

Throughout the time they fought as allies, the United States, Britain, and the USSR attempted to coordinate their war efforts. The relationship between the United States and Britain was extremely close, and the Soviets cooperated as best they could within the restrictions imposed by their secret society. It is important to note that American political policy, laid down by President Roosevelt, was one of complete friendship with the Soviets in their joint war against Germany. That policy explains many actions the Allies later took that appeared naive once the spirit of wartime cooperation ended.

It is interesting to note Roosevelt's exaggerated confidence in what he was sure would be his ability to contend with the Soviets after the shooting stopped. "Don't worry," he promised, "I'll take care of Uncle Joe." That bit of hubris has usually been quoted in a humorous context. And yet it is intriguing to conjecture whether the Cold War might have been averted had Roosevelt survived. As it was, he died at Warm Springs on 12 April 1945, just a month short of victory in Europe.

The Honeymoon

The end of the war in Europe witnessed a strong but brief era of goodwill among the three principal victors. I personally was a witness, both at the working level and in the halls of the powerful.

My personal exposure to the Soviets started out on a rather frightening note. As a lieutenant in the 1st Infantry Division in Czechoslovakia, I joined four other officers a few days after the end of the war for a joyride to Carlsbad, behind Soviet lines. As we drove into the town and turned a corner, we encountered a handsome but very dirty young Russian soldier, who although drunk was sober enough to recognize our party as Americans. Exuberantly, he tried to kiss all five of us. I was spared because of my position in the jeep. But we were careful. He was brandishing a Luger, and a dead German civilian was lying in a pool of blood beside us.

Later exposures were more pleasant. In August, three months after V-E Day, my father, General Eisenhower, was invited to visit Moscow in his capacity as supreme commander for the Western powers in the war just finished. He sent for me to accompany him as his aide.

The striking aspect of the visit was the lavish reception the Russians gave the commander of a foreign nation's army. Georgi Zhukov, General

Eisenhower's Soviet counterpart in Berlin, met us at Tempelhof Airport for the flight to Moscow in Ike's C-54 (DC-4) four-engine aircraft. Zhukov, as the official host, was the soul of hospitality and congeniality. By this time the two commanders, Eisenhower and Zhukov, had been representing their countries in the four-power government of Germany, and they had become friends—as close of friends as public life permits.

In Moscow the party first attended a parade. Significantly, my father was invited to undergo a four-hour ordeal atop Vladimir Lenin's tomb with Zhukov and Stalin. He was, I later learned, the first foreigner ever accorded that honor. One evening, the entire party was entertained at dinner, with Stalin himself officiating, acting friendly enough but mysterious as always. During the following three days, there were tours of collective farms, aircraft factories, and even the Moscow subway. Together at the American embassy during the evening of 15 August (V-J Day), Soviets and Americans celebrated the news of Japan's surrender. In Leningrad the ceremonies drew to a close.

As a final gesture, my father invited Zhukov to pay a return visit to the United States. Ike could not accompany the marshal, he said with regret, but he would provide his personal airplane and send me along as Zhukov's aide. Zhukov was delighted. "If Lieutenant Eisenhower goes along with me," he said, "then I know the plane will not go down in the Atlantic."

It was not to be. In mid-September 1945, almost the day of the scheduled departure, word came from the Soviets that Marshal Zhukov had become sick and could not make the trip to the United States. To my mind, although the term "Cold War" had not yet been invented, this represented the end of the honeymoon.

The Early Days of the Cold War

With the cancellation of Zhukov's trip to the United States, we in Europe were concerned, but we could not foresee how serious the rift between East and West was to become. Before my father left Germany to become army chief of staff in late 1945, we mused together over the new developments and expected only a reasonably short period of tension. We were, of course, worried about the fate of Zhukov and conjectured that he had overplayed his hand. His popularity perhaps had gone to his head, and Stalin, who brooked no competition, had put his foot down.

Early 1946 saw the forces in Europe preoccupied with the trials and execution of the top Nazis in Nuremberg. In the United States, however, the big news was Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton. The United States continued to enjoy a monopoly on the atomic weapon, and we unrealistically hoped we could keep that monopoly indefinitely. In fact, the Soviets had begun working on the project and tested their first weapon in 1949.

The year 1946 also witnessed another event: the formulation of American policy for dealing with the Soviets during the years ahead. Based on a telegram by George Kennan from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, it visualized simply holding the communist world within the borders it then occupied. The West would not attempt to take aggressive action against the Soviet

empire but would do everything possible to prevent its expansion, even in countries outside its borders. The world would live for years in a state of tension.

Exactly what accelerated the tensions is unclear, at least to me. The Soviets certainly had nothing to fear from the small U.S. and British occupation forces in Europe. After the mad rush to bring our soldiers home from overseas following the war, we finally left only one American infantry division, the 1st, to occupy the American zones of both Germany and Austria. That division was supplemented by a constabulary about the size of a combat command of an armored division, but together they constituted little threat. The United States possessed the atomic bomb, to be sure, but nobody outside the inner circles of government knew how many atomic bombs. Had war come, we presumably could have destroyed Moscow, but the powerful Red Army in Eastern Europe could overrun all of Western Europe with no difficulty. At the same time, psychological factors were at work in the form of books and other information leaking out of the Soviet Union. Books such as Viktor Kravchenko's *I Chose Freedom* and Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* revealed aspects of the inner Soviet Union that Americans in general had not previously known. The tensions between the two societies were now ideological as well as military.

In 1948 the Soviet Union had its first real confrontation with the United States and Britain. Red Army forces cut off all ground communication between the Western sector of Berlin and the part of Germany occupied by Western forces. Although it can be argued that the occupation of Berlin had become an anachronism, the Western powers had developed an obligation to the people of West Berlin to protect them from the Soviets, and the Allies decided that they had to stay.

President Harry S. Truman, with the advice and counsel of Marshall, the great soldier-statesman, took a moderate course. Although the United States was still the sole possessor of the atomic weapon, Truman and Marshall decided to wait out the siege and feed the population in the western zone of Berlin by supplies sent in by aircraft.

The result, which comprises a story in itself, was a spectacular feat. For eleven months, planes flew into Tempelhof Airport around the clock; a major city was fed and provided coal by air. The Soviets, unwilling to push the Allies further, raised the siege after eleven months. The world was astounded, although many of our citizens had a feeling that the United States was being pushed around and that the initiative in the East-West confrontation belonged to the East.

In 1949 China joined the Soviet Union, adding millions of people to the communist bloc. The corrupt regime of the Nationalist Chinese President Jiang Jieshi fell to Mao Zedong's communist regime. Although the partnership between the Soviets and the communist Chinese regime was never as close as the West imagined, they comprised, in the Western mind, a solid bloc. This supposition did much to affect the actions of the West in dealing with both countries.

The Korean War (1950–1953)

On Sunday 25 June 1950, forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) crossed the artificial border between North and South Korea, the 38th Parallel of latitude, invading the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). The North Koreans, armed with Russian weapons, easily overran most of South Korea that half of the peninsula sponsored and once occupied by American forces.

President Truman acted promptly. He committed American air and sea power immediately to lend support to the South Koreans, and a couple of days later he sent the ill-fated U.S. 24th Infantry Division from occupation duty in Japan across to join the battle. The 24th Infantry was nearly wiped out, and its commander was captured by the North Koreans.

Like the Berlin airlift, the Korean "police action" constitutes a story in itself. Both sides built up strength, and the North Koreans were finally stopped in the southeast corner of the Korean Peninsula. They were then roundly defeated by a breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, coupled with an amphibious landing at Inchon, near Seoul. It seemed as if the war was over until the Chinese intervened and pushed back United Nations (UN) forces from North Korea. After three years, two of them being fought while peace talks were on, the two sides wound up along a line almost identical to the original 38th Parallel. Others may argue, but to me the Korean War was a success. The objective had always been professed as being only to liberate South Korea.

The Korean War, however, produced consequences of great political import. The overt communist aggression demonstrated to the West that serious consequences could result from lack of preparedness. Congress gave the president authority to raise American ground forces in Europe from one division to six divisions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), previously a pact of little consequence, was transformed into a military organization with headquarters in Paris, with General Eisenhower called from retirement to command it. The United States had been restrained in its policy for fighting the war in Korea for fear of drawing the Soviet Union into a third world war if we bombed its ally, China. For dissenting against national policy in public, General Douglas MacArthur was removed from the Korean command, with serious consequences for the remaining eighteen months of the Truman administration. What had begun with tensions after World War II had now grown into a life-and-death affair.

The Crisis Years (1950s)

The world was to enjoy no respite from tension with the end of the fighting in Korea. No sooner had an armistice been signed at Panmunjom in July 1953 than the West learned that the Soviets had now tested an operational thermonuclear bomb, commonly called a hydrogen bomb. Soon thereafter it became known that the Soviets had developed long-range aircraft, Bears and Bisons, capable of hitting the United States. Thus, the crisis of the Korean War was supplanted by a threat of an entirely new and intensified dimension.

The period of greatest danger, therefore, coincided almost exactly with the presidency of Eisenhower.

A word of explanation is in order for my contention that the 1950s were the most dangerous years. Those were the years in which the two blocs—East and West—were developing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction, but strategists on both sides were considering the possibility of winning a war using a first strike by aircraft and missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Winning, however, meant completely destroying the enemy while at the same time having a part of one's own country survive. That hope, ridiculous as it was, was held by some people, and that is what made the 1950s such a dangerous period.

The immediate danger was drastically reduced, however, not by a reduction of terror but by the invention of a new weapon, the virtue of which eliminated any hope of survival of an atomic exchange, even by the aggressor. By 1960, the United States had developed an operational submarine-launched atomic missile that was capable of being deployed anywhere on the seven seas and firing missiles to hit targets thousands of miles inland while at the same time remaining virtually invisible under water. Thus, any unrealistic dreams that a preemptive strike could leave an attacker with "acceptable" losses disappeared. A new term, "mutual assured destruction," eventually grew from this new development.

Fortunately, during this period of greatest danger, the leaders of both the Eastern and Western blocs were sane men, and mutual assured destruction as well as mutually assured unacceptable losses had been quietly recognized early. But the danger arose from the combination of conventional and atomic wars. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a war that was initially confined to conventional weaponry, the eventual use of nuclear weapons seemed inevitable. If the survival of one or the other nation was deemed to be doomed in a conventional war, that nation might use the nuclear weapon as a last resort. For that reason, the Western nations and the Soviets never fought directly throughout the entire Cold War. Surrogates such as Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan did fight, however.

President Eisenhower attempted to deal with the Cold War in two ways. The first was his sincere effort to develop understanding between the two nations by means of cultural exchanges. The other was to keep America (and the Western Allies) protected against a surprise Soviet attack. (It would also protect the Soviets from surprise attack from the West.) With the death of Stalin in early 1953, Eisenhower held hopes that Stalin's successor—whoever he might turn out to be—might feel a little less hostile to the West and be willing to find a reasonable way of approaching the problem. In one respect, Eisenhower was right: the Soviets desired a conference as well. Therefore, as a token of mutual trust, the four powers occupying Austria—the United States, the USSR, Britain, and France—agreed to neutralize the country by withdrawing all their military forces from it. With that visible evidence of mutual goodwill, the four powers met at Geneva, Switzerland, in the summer of 1955.

The Geneva Conference produced much rhetoric, but Eisenhower put forth one concrete and dramatic suggestion commonly called the Open Skies Proposal. Both East and West, according to this scheme, would exchange blueprints of their armed forces. In addition, both sides would be cleared to make extensive aerial reconnaissance over the other's territory. In that manner, surprise attack would be at least deterred.

Three of the four members of the Soviet delegation stalled briefly, expressing interest. One man, Nikita Khrushchev, did not. Although theoretically only one of the four so-called equals—the Soviets were supposedly being governed by Khrushchev, Zhukov, Nikolai Bulganan (nominal chief), and Vyacheslav Molotov—Khrushchev refused outright, almost angrily. Eisenhower was not overly surprised. Much of what would be disclosed on the Western side was already easily available to anyone; the Soviets were unwilling to give up their secret society. But at least the West had found out who was in charge of the Soviet government—Khrushchev.

After his Open Skies Proposal had died at Geneva, Eisenhower resorted to unilateral action. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) completed development of a high-altitude reconnaissance plane called the U-2. A remarkable aircraft, it flew at such a high altitude that for a time, at least, it was deemed safe from known Soviet antiaircraft missiles. During the years it operated, the U-2 Program carried out overflights of Russia and provided much valuable intelligence. In so doing, it enabled Eisenhower to conduct foreign affairs in a more daring manner than would have been the case had he not possessed that intelligence.

The U-2 Program was illegal from the viewpoint of international law. President Eisenhower, however, deemed it essential. Furthermore, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had always insisted that even if a U-2 were to be shot down, Khrushchev would never admit that flights had been going on for some time over Soviet airspace.

Those years were fraught with secondary confrontations and scares. The crisis over the Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, just off the coast of the mainland but occupied by Jiang's Republic of China (Taiwan) seemed touch-and-go. Of more public notice was the Soviet launching of the first Earth satellite, *Sputnik,* in late 1957. That feat, which proved that the Soviets had developed missiles of greater thrust than any developed by the United States, caused a near panic in the public. Eisenhower assured the public that the satellites bore no relationship to our national defense, which was based on smaller missiles posted in European locations. Before the furor had calmed down, Eisenhower had organized NASA, the Marshall Space Center at Huntsville, and the Science Advisory Council in the White House.

The greatest East-West crisis of the 1950s, however, was the confrontation over the status of West Berlin, an issue then more than ten years old. At Thanksgiving 1948, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum for the withdrawal of Western troops from the city of Berlin; the consequence for failure to do so could mean war. He gave a deadline of six months.

Here Eisenhower realized that the West could never win a conventional war in Europe against the gigantic Soviet force deployed there. The Soviets

surrounded Berlin, so the West's occupation forces in the city were insignificant. Eisenhower therefore made it known, sometimes subtly, that the United States had no intention of fighting a conventional war in Europe. He would respond to a Soviet move to cut off the city by using atomic weapons. In early March 1959, I attended a White House meeting with congressional leaders during which Ike assured his astonished and frightened audience that he was going through with a prearranged, scheduled cut of 30,000 men despite the current tensions. If Khrushchev went through with his threat, we would unleash the Strategic Air Command's bombers—or so the tea leaves read.

The meeting had a sobering effect on the assembled participants, and frankly it frightened me. I have mulled the matter over in my mind many times and have never been certain whether the president would have gone through with that threat. After long consideration, I have concluded that he would not. It would be better to lose not only Berlin but even all of Western Europe than to destroy Earth. But Ike was a great poker player, and the deterrence worked. Khrushchev could not have been unaware that his six-month ultimatum had slipped by while the diplomats exchanged words around the conference tables.

For a while it appeared that a real understanding might be developed between Khrushchev and the West. A visit of the Soviet premier to the United States resulted in a temporary era of good feeling between the two superpowers. But that period came to an end when the unthinkable occurred: a U-2 was shot down over Sverdlovsk, near Moscow. The results were severe, although we never came close to going to war. After much furor, including a shoe-banging exhibition by Khrushchev in the UN, the international situation calmed. The chance for détente was gone, but Khrushchev's ultimatum over Berlin had been neutralized.

One more major crisis, perhaps the most serious, was yet to be played out, however. In January 1961, President John F. Kennedy came into office. Although inexperienced, he was determined to take action. His first target was Fidel Castro's Cuba. In April, Cuban rebels, openly trained and supported by the United States, landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's southern coast only to be overwhelmed and captured by Castro's troops. The resulting embarrassment to the United States, reinforced by the lack of Western resistance to his building the Berlin Wall in December 1961, apparently gave Khrushchev an unrealistic confidence that he could bulldoze Kennedy under any circumstances. In late October 1962, Khrushchev decided that he could take the bold step of installing missiles, supposedly nuclear-armed, on the soil of his ally Cuba.

In this instance, however, conventional military forces proved their supremacy in a practical world. President Kennedy proclaimed a blockade of Cuba and ordered the U.S. Navy to intercept the Soviet ships carrying the missiles. Ultimately Khrushchev backed down, and both sides made concessions. But both powers felt a relief. They had stepped up to the brink, and both now realized that they had been spared Armageddon. The Cold War continued formally for almost two more decades, but from then on it was defanged.

The Years of Confrontation (1962–1989)

The world, or rather the East and West, learned the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis well. Although the two sides remained implacable enemies—or seemed to—the fear of instant annihilation was largely gone. No longer did schoolchildren undergo atomic air raid drills; no longer did people build fallout shelters in their basements. Military threats gave way to diplomatic activity and clandestine spying.

Within a year or two of the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, the attention of the United States turned from the large-scale threat of general war to what was, by comparison, a small war, the American misadventure in Vietnam. This was not the kind of war for which the American arsenal of superweapons had been designed. Yet it was, in a way, an auxiliary part of the Cold War, because it was waged between a communist nation—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam)—and the United States. More important, it was perhaps the last military action based on the basic American policy of containment, set forth in 1946. The United States lost the Vietnam War without suffering defeat in any pitched battle. It all came about by an American misunderstanding of the Vietnamese. In Vietnamese minds, it was not a war of ideology; it was a war simply of national independence.

In 1979, the reverse occurred when the Soviet Union made the error of invading Afghanistan with similar disastrous results. Again, that conflict was not strictly a part of the Cold War, although the United States unabashedly armed the Afghans against the Soviet invaders, hardly an act of friendship toward the Soviet Union.

At the time of the end of the Vietnam War, I had an experience that gave me some idea of the reasons for the mistrust of the Soviets by the West, perhaps only one of many causes for the beginning of the Cold War.

On 8 May 1975, I was a member of a diplomatic delegation to Moscow headed by former Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. The purpose was to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Nazi surrender in Europe. The Western delegations were studded with prominent military leaders: Generals Alfred M. Gruenther and Lyman L. Lemnitzer, both former supreme commanders in Europe under NATO, and Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, one of the most prominent British figures of the war.

In most respects, the diplomatic visit was both routine and pleasant. The memorable moment, however, came at the ceremony itself. Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, before an audience of thousands, spent what seemed like an interminable time berating the Western powers for their supposed delay in crossing the English Channel in World War II. The Soviets, in desperate straits in early 1942, had believed that the Allies could have come to their aid much earlier than they did. In their minds, the Allies, Winston Churchill in particular, were indifferent to the prospect of the Soviets being bled white.

In a way the scene had slightly amusing aspects. The most notable memory, to me, is that of Lord Mountbatten, up on the stage, resplendent in a white uniform and every decoration imaginable. He was forced to sit unhappily and listen to the tirade with no prospect of replying. Yet outside the Great Hall, the atmosphere was relatively friendly. I, for one, was happy

to have a short visit with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, whom I had come to know slightly from other diplomatic encounters. Those of us present had no idea that a period of relaxation of tension—détente—was about to begin.

In July 1975, only a month after the visit to Moscow, the Western powers and the Soviets signed a treaty in Helsinki, Finland, that was destined to produce serious and unexpected consequences. The purpose of the treaty was to create some stability in Europe, and to that end both sides reluctantly made uncomfortable concessions. The West agreed to language that seemed to recognize the permanency of Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe (which everyone at that time knew was a hard fact of life). The Soviets, on the other hand, allowed a paragraph to be included that mentioned human rights, apparently in the hope that such an innocuous and general paragraph would go unnoticed.

Neither concession went unnoticed. Many Americans and British were enraged at our officially recognizing the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. In the USSR, where ferment was already beginning, the language of that one paragraph encouraged dissent. Boris Pasternak in 1948 and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1974 had been persecuted for their Nobel Prize-winning books about the abuses of the Soviet regime. But neither had been exterminated. That would not have been the case under Stalin. The movement toward individual freedom in the Soviet Union was under way.

In the period of confrontation, both sides made efforts to ease the tension. As early as 1969, East-West talks on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) were begun, followed some time later by SALT II. These disarmament talks, in themselves, were forlorn efforts—both sides had far too many deliverable thermonuclear weapons, and neither could be expected to leave the other side at an advantage. Nevertheless, the spirit behind the talks—the realization that a nuclear exchange would be insanity—made holding them worthwhile.

In 1986 an event occurred at Chernobyl in the Ukraine that did more, in my view, than any other to bring the Cold War to an end. A nuclear power plant there began a meltdown that besides taking many lives affected much of Europe, reaching all the way to Denmark, and cast atomic energy in a new light. The Chernobyl reactor was small, only a twenty-kiloton plant, and the contrast of that small nuclear explosion with a single (one-megaton) thermonuclear weapon, of which each side had thousands, apparently helped the world to come to its senses. The Cold War could not go on forever.

Although it was not readily apparent to observers in the West, the Soviet Union's control over occupied Eastern Europe was far from uniform. The country enjoying the greatest latitude within the Soviet Union was Poland, where trouble began fermenting at about the time of the Helsinki Accords. There an obscure electrician by the name of Lech Wałęsa began organizing resistance in the Gdansk shipyards.

In June 1979, Pope John Paul II, a Pole, paid a visit to his native land. The fact of his being permitted into a nominally atheistic country seemed a sure indication that Soviet control over its satellites was loosening even more.

And so it did. The next year Wałęsa and two other men organized a trade union called Solidarność (Solidarity), which survived. His activities became known in the West, so much so that Wałęsa was named "Man of the Year" by *Time* magazine in 1980.

Wałęsa's rise in Poland was paralleled by that of Mikhail Gorbachev, the man who shares the credit with Wałęsa as being most responsible for the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev became secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1986. Long aware of the weakness in the Soviet economy and political structure, Gorbachev initiated two programs: glasnost, meaning openness, and perestroika, meaning restructuring. He initiated his reforms gradually. Perhaps his most important single act was taken in June 1988, when the CPSU launched radical reforms to reduce party control over the governmental apparatus. He also renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, thus allowing the East European nations more latitude in determining their own affairs.

The loosening up of the Soviet Union—and therefore the end of the Cold War—was prompted by economic difficulties in the Soviet Union. The peoples who had heretofore been held under rigid control were now enjoying new freedoms, but the pressures of a collapsing economy encouraged Georgia, the Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) to make further moves toward true independence. Gorbachev's attempt to establish a voluntary federation failed. On 13 November 1989 the Berlin Wall was broken down, and Brandenburg Gate was officially opened the next month.

Though Gorbachev was—and still is—a hero in the West, he was removed from power by a more aggressive Boris Yeltsin in 1991. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a thing of the past, and the Cold War was over.

Retrospect

In looking back at the years of the Cold War, one's first and overriding reaction to its end is one of relief. Considering the magnitude of the tragedy that would have befallen the whole human race in the event of a single mistake, one can only be thankful that the world survived at all.

There are secondary questions, however, such as who was responsible for the Cold War—the Soviets, the West, or both? It is not a matter of fixing blame. The answer is of importance simply as a guidepost to the future. We must ensure that such a confrontation does not occur again. Unfortunately, we cannot disinvent thermonuclear weapons. (In fact, there are nations today, far less reliable than the old Soviet Union, that now possess them.) Nations that have them in their arsenals are never going to destroy them as long as other nations still have them. It is necessary, then, that policies affecting the family of nations must be such that the world will never again come to the brink of nuclear war.

In the early days of the Cold War, beginning in 1945, there was no doubt in the minds of the Western nations that the instigators were the Soviets. After all, U.S. policy (and to a lesser extent British policy) was to extend the hand of friendship to our Eastern ally. During World War II we sent vast

quantities of supplies to the Soviet Union. Sometimes the West made concessions that have been criticized from a political perspective, as with General Eisenhower's decision, late in World War II, to halt the Western armies on the lines of the Elbe and Mulde Rivers rather than race the Soviets to Berlin. Regardless of military considerations, that decision was totally consistent with President Roosevelt's desires. Since the West was generous, we argued, that fault must lay with the Soviets.

Some years after the war, however, some historians came up with the revisionist view that trade policies and other considerations forced the Soviets' hands and made them feel on the defensive. So the blame was laid, at least for a while, on the West. And later still, a group of postrevisionists, led by the prominent historian John Lewis Gaddis, have come to lay the causes at the feet of both sides, although they emphasize the belligerent attitude of Stalin as being a major factor.

The important thing right now is the future. Happily, the West has joined the Russians in working together in many fields. Russian acceptance of NATO expansion to the East, including even the Baltic states, is a development unthinkable only a few years ago.

We should not, however, view the end of the Cold War as a Western triumph in the spirit of winning or losing a football game. I understand that some years ago a NATO commander, visiting the Soviet Union, boasted about how the West had "won" the Cold War. Such an attitude can be nothing else than counterproductive.

In these pages I have said little about the role played by the U.S. government, particularly the presidents and the troops who held the line in Europe, in bringing the Cold War to an end. I have avoided that issue principally because it is loaded with American politics, and in my opinion the Western nations did little of a positive nature to accelerate the march of change in the Soviet Union. The idea has been touted that President Ronald Reagan's promotion of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the ambitious and expensive antimissile program, frightened the Soviet leaders so as to bring about their economic collapse. I reject that theory. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had begun too long before.

This introduction has attempted to furnish an outline only. The entries in this encyclopedia will provide the reader with discussions of detailed facets of the problems of the Cold War. In many cases the experts will disagree with my thoughts, which are admittedly affected by my own experiences. But this much is certain: the fact that the world survived the Cold War has made it possible for all of us to study it and express our views on it frankly.

John S. D. Eisenhower

Origins of the Cold War to 1950

The deadlock between East and West was the single most momentous development in the post–World War II period and dominated the next half century. The term "Cold War" apparently originated in 1893 with German Marxist Edward Bernstein, who used it to describe the arms race in pre–World War I Europe in which there was "no shooting" but there was "bleeding." Its usage for the East-West confrontation, however, seems to have originated with the British writer George Orwell in an article of 19 October 1945. More famously, American financier Bernard Baruch used the phrase in the course of a speech in 1947. Put in its simplest terms, the Cold War was the rivalry that developed between the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States—as each sought to fill the power vacuum left by the defeat of Germany and Japan. Leaders on each side believed that they were forced to expand their national hegemony by the "aggressive" actions of the other. Misunderstandings, bluff, pride, personal and geopolitical ambitions, and simple animosity between the two sides grew until the struggle became the Cold War.

At the end of World War II, Washington, D.C., and Moscow each had different views of the world. The United States sought a system based on the rule of law and placed high hopes on a new organization of states known as the United Nations (UN), which took its name from the victorious powers of World War II. The UN closely resembled the old League of Nations, the organization that President Woodrow Wilson had championed at the Paris Peace Conference following World War I and that the United States had then refused to join.

Typically for the United States in wartime, leaders in Washington had paid scant attention to trying to shape the postwar world. During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt had not greatly concerned himself with postwar political problems, working on the assumption that the UN could resolve them later. Washington's preoccupation throughout the conflict was winning the war as quickly as possible and at the least cost in American lives. This frustrated British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who, as was the case with his Soviet counterpart Josef Stalin, sought to establish spheres of

U.S. President Harry Truman (*center*) shakes the hands of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (*left*) and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin (*right*) on the opening day of the Potsdam Conference in Germany, 17 July–2 August 1945. (U.S. Army, Harry S. Truman Library)

influence. U.S. leaders held—at least overtly—to the Wilsonian position that a balance of power and the spheres of influence were both outdated and immoral.

At the end of the war, a power vacuum existed throughout much of the world. In defeating Germany and Japan, the United States had in fact destroyed traditional bulwarks against communist expansion, although the fact was largely unappreciated at the time. In Europe there was not a single strong continental state able to bar Soviet expansion. In the Far East there was only China, which Roosevelt had expected to be one of the great powers and a guarantor of a peace settlement, but China had been badly weakened by the long war with Japan and was in any case about to plunge into a full-scale civil war of its own.

Americans assumed that wars ended when the shooting stopped, and thus domestic political considerations compelled the rapid demobilization of the armed forces before the situation abroad had stabilized. Although the Soviet Union was actually much weaker in 1945 than was assumed at the time, Churchill expressed the view that only the U.S. nuclear monopoly prevented the USSR from overrunning Western Europe.

In 1945, though, the Soviet Union had just emerged from a desperate struggle for survival. The German and Soviet armies had fought back and forth the western USSR and had laid waste to vast stretches of the region. Twenty-five million people were left homeless, and perhaps one-quarter of the total property value of the country had been lost. The human costs were staggering, with as many as 27 million dead. The effects of all this upon the people of the Soviet Union can scarcely be comprehended. Certainly for the indefinite future whatever government held power in Moscow would be obsessed with security. This, rather than expansion, was the Kremlin's paramount concern in the immediate postwar years.

Despite all the destruction, the Russians emerged from the war in the most powerful international position in their history. The shattering of Axis military might and the weakness of the West European powers seemed to open the way to Soviet political domination over much of Eurasia and the realization of long-sought aims.

Stalin, who had seen the Western powers after World War I erect a *cordon sanitaire* in the form of a string of buffer states against communism, now sought to do the same in reverse: to erect a *cordon sanitaire* to keep the West out. This was for security reasons, as Russia had been attacked across the plains of Poland three times since 1812, but it was also to prevent the spread of Western ideas and political notions. To Western leaders, the Kremlin seemed to have reverted to nineteenth-century diplomacy, establishing spheres of influence, bargaining for territory, and disregarding the UN. West-

ern leaders did not appreciate the extent to which concerns over security and xenophobia drove this policy.

Finally, there was the ideological motivation. Although its leaders had soft-pedaled it during World War II, the Soviet Union had never abandoned its goal of furthering international communism. Irrespective of security concerns, the Kremlin was ideologically committed to combating capitalism. It is thus inconceivable that Stalin would not have attempted to take full advantage of the opportunities that presented themselves at the end of the war.

As with the United States, Soviet foreign policy was closely tied to domestic needs. The Cold War would aid in enforcing authority and cooperation at home. The communist world had to appear to be threatened by encircling enemies. By the close of the war, millions of Soviet soldiers had been in the West and had seen the quality of life and amenities there. They found their own system sadly wanting by comparison, and clearly they expected a better quality of life with the end of the war. Only a new announced threat from abroad would cause them to close ranks behind the Soviet leadership. Playing the nationalist card would enable the Kremlin to mobilize public effort and suffocate dissent.

Although for different reasons, Roosevelt shared with Stalin a strong antipathy toward European colonialism, and Washington encouraged the disintegration of the European colonial empires. While idealistic and correct morally, this stance nonetheless reduced the strength of U.S. allies such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands and helped ensure that ultimately the United States would have to carry most of the burden of defense of the noncommunist world.

Roosevelt gambled his place in history in part on the mistaken assumption that he could arrange a détente with the Soviet Union. His optimism regarding "Uncle Joe" Stalin was ill-founded, however. By mid-March 1945 it was patently obvious, even to Roosevelt, that the Soviets were taking over Poland and Romania and violating at least the spirit of the Yalta agreements regarding multiparty systems and free elections.

Roosevelt died in April 1945. His successor Harry S. Truman insisted, despite Churchill's protests regarding the mounting evidence that the Soviets were not keeping their pledges, that U.S. forces withdraw from areas they had occupied deep beyond the lines assigned to the Soviets for the occupation of Germany. The American public clearly did not want confrontation or a global economic and political-military struggle with the Soviet Union. Americans were limited internationalists who merely wanted to enjoy their economic prosperity.

The Soviets, however, were already angry over Washington's abrupt termination of World War II Lend-Lease aid on 21 August 1945, regardless of the terms of the original law. Russian ill will was also generated by the usually smooth cooperation of the Anglo-Saxon powers and Moscow's belief that the two constantly combined against the Soviet Union. The U.S. monopoly on the atomic bomb also aroused fear in the Soviet Union as a small but vocal group of Americans demanded preventive war. Soviet concerns increased

when the United States retained bomber bases within striking distance of Soviet industrial areas and undertook naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea.

The USSR, however, rejected a plan put forth by the United States to bring nuclear weapons under international control; instead, it proceeded with its atomic research (aided by espionage) and exploded its own bomb in September 1949. The atomic arms race was under way.

Certainly American and British attitudes toward Soviet activity in Eastern Europe and the Balkans exasperated Moscow. Having accepted Soviet hegemony there, why did the West continue to criticize? Initially Moscow permitted political parties other than the Communist Party, and now it seemed to the suspicious leaders in the Kremlin as though the West was encouraging these parties against Soviet interests. At a minimum the USSR required security, while the United States wanted democratic parties in a Western-style democracy. In only one country, Finland, did the Soviet Union and the West achieve the sort of compromise implicit in the Yalta agreements. In countries such as Poland and Hungary, noncommunist parties were highly unlikely to ensure the security that the Soviet Union desired, and Western encouragement of these groups seemed to Moscow to be a threat.

On the American side, the Russian moves kindled exasperation and then alarm as the Soviet Union interfered in the democratic processes of one East European state after another. In addition, the UN seemed paralyzed as the Soviet Union, in order to protect its interests when the majority was consistently against it, made increasing use of its UN Security Council veto. Despite this, Western pressure in the UN did help secure a Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran in 1946 in what was the first major test for the international body.

This did not mean that the West was unified. In Britain, left-wing Labourites criticized American capitalism and wanted to work with the Russian communists. The French, especially interim President Charles De Gaulle, made vigorous efforts to build a third force in Europe as a counterbalance to the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union. It is thus tempting to conclude that only Moscow could have driven the West to the unity achieved by 1949. As Belgian diplomat Paul-Henri Spaak put it, Stalin was the real founder of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The British bore the brunt of the initial defense against communism. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin took up Churchill's role as a voice of Western democracy against totalitarianism and fought many verbal duels with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov in the Council of Foreign Ministers. But for a variety of reasons, chiefly financial, Britain eventually had to abandon its role as world policeman.

Churchill sounded the alarm regarding the Soviet Union in a March 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri. With President Truman at his side, Churchill said that "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent." The peril would not be surmounted by ignoring it or following a policy of appeasement. Churchill called for a "special relationship" between Britain and the United States to meet the chal-

lenge. Americans were not enthusiastic. Ten days later, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes declared that the United States was no more interested in an alliance with Britain against the USSR than in one with the Soviet Union against Britain. Churchill's words, however, proved prophetic.

Germany was the principal tinderbox of the Cold War, and by September 1946 the collision of interests there led Byrnes to tell an audience of military government officials and Germans in Stuttgart that the Americans would not withdraw from Germany under pressure and that the Germans would soon be receiving additional self-government.

By early 1947, when peace treaties were finally signed in Paris with other defeated states, the time had arrived to begin work on peace arrangements for Austria and Germany, but talks soon deadlocked. By the spring of 1947, East and West were approaching a complete break over the German question. The Soviets were stripping their zone of anything movable and failing to supply food to the western zones as promised. Facing increasing costs and difficulties caused by a lack of Soviet cooperation, the British and the Americans merged their zones into Bizonia at the beginning of 1947. General of the Army George C. Marshall's first appearance as secretary of state at a major conference marked a hardening American reaction, as Washington reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union's actions were aggressive and not defensive.

In addition to its demands on Iran, Moscow pressured Turkey to return land lost by Russia at the end of World War I and also to permit the USSR a share in the defense of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. There was also trouble in Greece, where communist guerrillas were at war against the royal government. Civil war began there because of a rightist victory in the Greek elections, the return of the unpopular King George II, and intransigence on both sides. Fighting flared at the end of 1946, and the Greek communists secured material support from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania—all communist bastions. The communists seized control of large portions of northern Greece. Athens appealed to the UN, but the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution based on an investigative commission's report of evidence of support from the neighboring communist states.

In February 1947 the British government publicly informed the United States that it could no longer afford to support the Greek government, news of which Washington had been forewarned. Still, this came as a shock and a surprise to Washington. On 12 March 1947, therefore, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and announced what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. Stating that "we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way," he promised that the United States would "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The United States now took up the burden of being the world's policeman.

In a remarkably short time, the U.S. Congress appropriated $400 million for Greece and Turkey, somewhat over half of this in military aid. This U.S. attempt to draw a line against communist expansion was successful, helped

along by Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito's break with Moscow, which cut off most of the aid to the communist rebels. By the end of 1949 the Greek insurrection had been contained. There was trepidation in the United States over the Truman Doctrine, but the alternative of giving in seemed far more perilous. The Truman Doctrine was a momentous step; it led directly to the Marshall Plan and NATO.

By the spring of 1947 the United States had distributed about $16 billion in emergency relief, most of it to European states, but no general economic recovery had taken place, and in fact Britain, France, and Italy were still in serious distress. The winter of 1946–1947 had been particularly severe, and strikes were widespread, especially in France and Italy. In France, the communists controlled the huge General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and threatened to bring the country to a standstill and perhaps even seize power. U.S. policymakers reasoned that if Italy and France, with large communist parties, could be taken, then perhaps all of Europe would fall under Soviet influence.

To prevent such an alarming scenario, a more sustained and better-organized reconstruction effort was needed. Thus, the Marshall Plan was born. In a speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State Marshall announced a plan for the reconstruction of Europe. He promised that the United States would undertake financial assistance to Europe but only if the nations of Europe got together, devised long-range assistance plans for economic recovery, and concentrated on self-help and mutual assistance.

Poster supporting the Marshall Plan is titled "Whatever the weather we only reach welfare together." (Swim Ink 2, LLC/Corbis)

Behind this initiative lay the fear that continued economic troubles would weaken the resistance of the surviving Western nations to communism. Of course, continued American prosperity was also tied to a European economic revival. Indeed, without an economically strong Western Europe—historically the largest trading partner with the United States—the future of American economic prowess and of capitalism in general might be seriously jeopardized.

A U.S. State Department planning group headed by George F. Kennan had sketched out the Marshall Plan. It was announced as open to all, but the plan was devised so that the Soviet Union would have to reject it and thus ensure congressional passage. Without Soviet participation, the probability of its success would also be greatly enhanced.

The plan called for a joint effort by the countries concerned and a strict accounting of aid to ensure that it would go not only to alleviating distress but also for constructive measures to restore economic stability. Molotov insisted on bilateral agreements in which the United States would give money to each country separately, with sums determined according to their proportionate shares in helping to defeat Germany. He claimed that American oversight of

spending constituted interference in the internal affairs of the countries concerned. The Soviet Union feared that economic aid to the satellite countries might draw them to the West and for that reason did not permit them to participate.

In December 1947, the U.S. Congress passed an Interim Act for $522 million in aid; the following April it approved the Foreign Assistance Act and appropriated $6.8 billion for the first fifteen months of a program slated to run for four years. This came just in time to influence crucial elections in Italy, where the communists were making a bid for power; with American aid a reality, on 18 April 1948 the Christian Democrats won an absolute majority there.

Two days before this, on 16 April 1948, sixteen noncommunist European states signed a convention establishing the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in preparation for Marshall Plan assistance. During the next four years, Congress appropriated $13.2 billion in aid plus an additional sum for Asia, bringing the total to $14.2 billion. Marshall Plan aid was almost completely nonmilitary. Through 1949 the United States spent $20.5 billion on economic aid and only $1.2 billion in military aid. The Korean War, however, proved to be a watershed. From 1950 through 1954 the United States expended $14.1 billion on nonmilitary aid and $10.9 billion on military assistance.

Whatever the motives behind these developments in U.S. policy, the Marshall Plan made the recovery of Western Europe possible and began the process of spectacular growth that characterized the West European economies over the next two decades. It was also a strong impetus to economic unification, creating the momentum for European economic cooperation and leading to the European Common Market.

Both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were early manifestations of the containment policy against communist expansion. Writing in an unsigned ("Mr. X") article in the July 1947 issue of the influential *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, Kennan stated that U.S. policy "must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." However, even Kennan did not visualize as total an implementation as occurred.

Communist reaction to the Marshall Plan went beyond rejecting it for Eastern Europe. A wave of communist-inspired strikes hit West European countries in protest against the plan and because communist ministers had been dropped from both the French and Italian cabinets in May 1947. The Soviet Union also began to rearm.

In October 1947 the Soviets established the nine-nation Communist Information Bureau, also known as the Cominform. It took the place of the old Communist International (Comintern), which had been abolished in 1943 in order to show solidarity with the Soviet Union's allies. The new agency had as its goal the propagation of communism throughout the world.

In January 1949 Moscow established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as Comecon. It was intended as an organization parallel to the OEEC for integrating the national economies of the satellite

nations with that of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin also announced its own program of economic assistance, known as the Molotov Plan, but under it the Soviet Union received more than it gave, as raw materials were exchanged for shoddy and unwanted Soviet products.

In late November and early December 1947, the Council of Foreign Ministers (composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) made a final attempt at resolving the deadlock over Germany. It ended in total impasse. The lines had hardened, and the Soviets tightened their control in the satellite states. One by one, surviving opposition leaders were purged. In February 1948 Czechoslovakia fell to a communist coup d'etat. This sent a shock wave through Western Europe but also marked the zenith of communist expansion in Europe.

In early 1948 the three Western powers began discussing the establishment of a German government for their combined zones. The Western zones of Berlin seemed vulnerable, as they were an island deep within the Soviet zone of Germany. The Kremlin reasoned that if it could seize West Berlin, this might dishearten and intimidate the West. It might also discourage American adventures on the European side of the Atlantic. Beginning on 1 April 1948, little by little the Soviets cut off surface access to the city. A week later the Western governments introduced new currency for their zones. This was the signal for the blockade to begin in earnest. By early August it was complete.

Direction of this first major "battle" of the Cold War fell to the U.S. military governor in Germany, Lieutenant General Lucius Clay. He informed Washington that, were the United States to withdraw, "our position in Europe is threatened, and Communism will run rampant." Clay said that there were three alternatives: to withdraw from Berlin, to attempt to push an armored column up the autobahn, or to organize an airlift to try to supply the city by air. Truman's reaction was, "We shall stay, period." He opted for the third choice as least likely to lead to a shooting war with the Soviet Union.

While it would not be hard to supply Allied personnel by air, providing for more than 2 million Germans in the Western zones of Berlin seemed impossible. The airlift went on for 324 days. In it, the United States, Britain, and France flew 278,118 flights and transported more than 2.326 million tons of cargo.

The Russians expected to push the West out of Berlin without war and, despite numerous threats, never did challenge the aerial supply system. Both sides in effect drew back from a shooting war. By early 1949, however, the Russians were forced to conclude that the blockade was a failure. A counterblockade of East Germany by the West deprived the Soviet Zone of essential goods, and this put pressure on the Russians. The Soviet representative on the UN Security Council, Jacob Malik, finally dropped a hint to his American counterpart, Philip Jessup, that the Russians were prepared to end the blockade. On 12 May 1949, land traffic to Berlin resumed. During the blockade, however, a new Basic Law (an ersatz constitution) for the West German Republic was approved.

By its pressure the USSR had forced the West Europeans to face up to the necessity of greater unity. This led to a whole series of treaties and organ-

Berlin children play Luftbrucke (air bridge) during the Berlin Airlift of 1948–1949. They used model American planes sold in German toy shops throughout the western sector of Berlin. (U.S. Air Force)

izations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Common Market. Militarily the emergency quickly brought about the Brussels Pact and the formation of NATO.

France and Great Britain had already signed a military alliance at Dunkirk in March 1947. A year later these two countries, along with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, joined forces in the Treaty of Brussels. Fundamentally an agreement for social, economic, and cultural collaboration, it was also a military alliance of the five nations that inevitably took on the character of a defensive alliance against the Russians. Because the Treaty of Brussels (Brussels Pact) countries would obviously not be able to defend themselves without U.S. assistance, discussions were soon under way for a broader alliance.

In June 1948 there was a significant break with tradition in American foreign policy. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican and chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, drafted a resolution that was approved by the Senate. It reaffirmed the U.S. policy of working with the UN. It was the sense of the Senate that the veto should be removed from all

questions involving international disputes and the admission of new members. It also associated the United States "with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, as affect the national security." This ran counter to George Washington's admonition against "entangling alliances," which had been heeded since 1796.

Talks began between the West European allies and the United States and, on 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Pact was signed in Washington by the United States, Canada, Britain, France, the three Benelux states, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy. By this treaty, the twelve nations declared that "an armed attack against one or more . . . shall be considered an attack against them all," and each would assist the attacked in whatever fashion it deemed best, including by armed force. The resultant NATO would be headed by a council and a defense committee; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was ultimately set up outside of Paris. The treaty went into effect, after ratification, on 24 August 1949 for a twenty-year period. As one pundit put it, "NATO was created to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." It could be argued, however, that the new American policies, so far removed from the public mood in 1945, were more the result of perceived Soviet pressure than any initiative from Washington.

Thus the opening round of the Cold War ended in stalemate, with each side entrenched in its half of the continent. For the time being, however, Europe had a breathing spell. But the status quo was about to change. In late August 1949 the USSR exploded its first atomic bomb, an event that shocked Washington and shattered the U.S. atomic monopoly. In October 1949 the communists were victorious in China, and on 25 June 1950 war broke out in Korea. The Cold War was entering a new and far more dangerous phase.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bevin, Ernest; Brussels Treaty; Byrnes, James Francis; Churchill, Winston; Clay, Lucius DuBignon; Comecon; Cominform; Kennan, George Frost; Malik, Jacob Aleksandrovich; Marshall, George Catlett; Marshall Plan; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Molotov Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Paris Peace Conference and Treaties; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; Vandenberg Resolution; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Course of the Cold War (1950–1991)

Although the Cold War began earlier and certainly was under way with the Soviet Union's decision to institute a blockade of the Western zones of Berlin in June 1948, the struggle between East and West took a decisive turn in June 1950 with the beginning of the Korean War (1950–1953), the first real shooting war of the Cold War.

There is little doubt that Soviet leader Josef Stalin was heavily involved in authorizing the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) by forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). North Korean leader Kim Il Sung met twice with the Soviet leader and secured his approval for the invasion, but Stalin insisted that Kim also secure the blessing of People's Republic of China (PRC) leader Mao Zedong. Stalin promised to support the invasion and supplied substantial material and military assistance, including Soviet aircraft and pilots who actively flew against United Nations Command (UNC) bombers and fighters in far North Korea. Although Soviet aviators trained Chinese pilots and then turned over their aircraft to them, Stalin never would allow the Soviet Air Force to carry out ground support missions or protect Chinese communist forces on the ground. Mao Zedong was bitter over this, claiming that Stalin had extended that pledge before China's entry into the war in October 1950.

South Korea appeared quite vulnerable in June 1950. With the Japanese surrender, the Soviets had occupied northern Korea above the 38th Parallel, while U.S. forces had occupied the southern half of the country. Efforts to reunify the two halves of Korea foundered on the rocks of the Cold War, with the Soviets refusing to allow elections sponsored by the United Nations (UN) in their zone. Stalin and Mao undoubtedly believed Kim's assessment that the United States would not fight for Korea (U.S. leaders, including Far East commander General Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, excluded South Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter in public pronouncements) or that even if it did fight, the war would be over before the United States could intervene in force. Fearful that South Korean leader Syngman Rhee might unleash hostilities in an attempt to reunify Korea, the United States had provided only defensive weapons to South Korea, and very

Withdrawing United Nations (UN) forces cross the 38th Parallel from the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) into the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) at the end of 1950 during the Korean War. (National Archives and Records Administration)

few at that. The North had fighter and bomber aircraft, tanks, and heavy artillery. The South had none of these.

U.S. military intelligence failed to give sufficient weight to the massive North Korean military buildup. Analysts assumed that because the United States possessed the atomic bomb, North Korea would never invade the South. Kim almost succeeded. In what Harry S. Truman said was the most difficult decision of his presidency, he decided to fight for Korea. American forces arrived from Japan just in time and in sufficient numbers to stave off defeat. The UN also intervened, thanks to the poorly timed Soviet boycott of the Security Council demanding that the PRC receive the seat held by the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). The Inchon invasion of September 1950 and concurrent UNC breakout from the Pusan Perimeter led to a UNC invasion of North Korea in an effort to reunify the nation. The Truman administration ignored Chinese warnings of possible intervention. As UNC forces drove to the Yalu River, the Chinese entered the war, and in November they smashed a UNC offensive and pushed south of the 38th Parallel. Gradually UNC lines stabilized, and the Chinese were driven north again.

The war then changed from a contest of movement to one of position. The Western powers, and especially the United States, concluded that restoration of the prewar status quo would be sufficient and that reuniting Korea was not worth the cost or risk of wider conflict. In Washington's view, it was the "wrong war, in the wrong place, with the wrong enemy." Peace talks dragged on, hampered by the issue of prisoner exchanges; the fighting finally ended with the signing of an armistice in July 1953. Throughout the rest of the Cold War and beyond, Korea remained one of the world's flashpoints.

The Korean War affected the Cold War in a number of other places. It led to the institutionalization of the military-industrial complex in the United States and raised fears that the nation was morphing into a garrison state. After all its previous wars, the United States had disarmed. The U.S. military underwent a massive expansion during the Korean War, however, and remained strong thereafter.

The Korean War brought the Cold War to Asia, turning the region into one of the main battlefields of Cold War rivalry. It also led the Truman administration to extend direct military assistance to the French in Indochina, where they had been fighting the communist-led Viet Minh since 1946. The French claimed that their war pitted democracy against communism and that Indochina and Korea were in this sense related. Policymakers in Washington professed to believe the French argument that they had indeed granted independence to the state of Vietnam and that their struggle was about anticommunism rather than recognizing the true anticolonial motivation of the war there.

The Korean War also fed anticommunist paranoia in the United States that found expression in McCarthyism. And it had a pronounced impact on developments in Europe, especially the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). Many leaders saw direct parallels between the divided Korea and a divided Germany. In this way, as in many others, the end of the Korean War in 1953 marked a turning point in the nature of the Cold War.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States had new leadership in 1953. Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in January as president of the United States, with John Foster Dulles as his secretary of state. Stalin died in March and was followed by a collective leadership that ultimately gave way to rule by Nikita Khrushchev.

Fear of thermonuclear war dominated the 1950s. The Soviet Union exploded its first hydrogen bomb in 1953, and Americans worried that the Soviets might strike the American heartland with long-range bombers. Revelations of Soviet spies in the U.S. nuclear program led to witch-hunts and the belief that communist spies were everywhere. On the Soviet side, leaders were deeply concerned about the proven strategic bombing capability of the United States and the ring of U.S. overseas bases that surrounded the Soviet Union. A diplomacy of stalemate, based on mutual fear of destruction through nuclear weapons, held sway.

In January 1954 Dulles announced the Eisenhower administration's policy of "massive retaliation" with heavy reliance on nuclear weapons in the

event of a Soviet attack. The European allies of the United States worried about American saber-rattling and feared that Washington might unwisely unleash a nuclear war, particularly as Dulles made much of going to the "brink" of war in order to confront the communist states. Such a prospect was particularly worrisome, as the most likely location for a military confrontation was the European continent. Throughout the Cold War, much of official Washington professed to believe in monolithic communism—the idea that all communist states moved together in lockstep, with Moscow calling the shots. This proved to be a mistaken notion, and it ignored the traditional antagonism between China and Vietnam as well as other rivalries.

In 1954 France suffered a resounding military defeat in a remote valley in northeastern Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu. The Indochina War had never been popular in France, and this defeat enabled the French politicians to shift the burden of blame to the military and extricate their nation from the war. Not coincidental to the timing of the battle, a conference was under way at Geneva to discuss problems in Asia. The resulting Geneva Accords of July 1954 provided for the independence of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Vietnam was "temporarily" divided at the 17th Parallel with elections to take place throughout the entire country in two years to reunify it.

Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) President Ngo Dinh Diem refused to permit the elections, however, and the Eisenhower administration firmly supported Diem. Washington pointed out that communists ruled the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and that communists, once in power, had never allowed truly free elections that might unseat them. Nevertheless, Diem's decision led to a renewal of the struggle to unify Vietnam that became the Vietnam War (1957–1975).

Meanwhile, French Army regulars found themselves immediately transported to fight in Algeria, where nationalist agitation led to the outbreak of violence in November 1954. The Algerian War simmered for a time but then grew in intensity and claimed increasing numbers of French soldiers including draftees, although the brunt of the fighting on the French side was carried by the professionals. Ultimately, fears among the French settlers in Algeria and professional army officers that they were again going to be sold out by the Paris government led to a military putsch. This ended the French Fourth Republic in May 1958 with the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle, who proceeded to establish the Fifth Republic with a greatly strengthened presidency, tailor-made for the general himself.

In the 1950s a group of nations was emerging as a self-proclaimed neutralist or nonaligned bloc—also known as the third world or developing world to distinguish it from the Western powers and the communist bloc. India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru became its leader, but other prominent spokesmen were Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. In April 1955 representatives of twenty-nine African and Asian states held a major conference at Bandung in Indonesia to set out the guidelines for nonalignment. For Washington at least, this brand of neutralism—laced with a strong condemnation of colonialism and imperialism promoted by leaders of the developing world—often seemed to favor the Soviet Union.

In Europe, the major problem was the ongoing impasse over the settlements with Germany and Austria. In January 1954 the foreign ministers of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States met in Berlin, but there was no progress on fundamental issues. The United States insisted on free elections throughout Germany, which was to the advantage of the West, while the Soviet Union preferred direct talks between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The Soviets also made it clear to their Western counterparts that the price for the reunification of Germany and Austria would be the permanent demilitarization of both states. Washington, however, firmly supported the creation of a West European army that would include the FRG. This became known as the European Defense Community (EDC). In August 1954, however, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC, effectively killing it. A formula was then found for the FRG to rearm within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In 1955 the Soviet government made a number of moves to ease the Cold War. The USSR established diplomatic relations with West Germany and agreed to release the last German prisoners of war from World War II. Finland received the territory of Porkkala near Helsinki, which the Soviet Union had secured at the end of World War II. The Soviets also evacuated their naval base at Port Arthur in the Far East. Finally, the Soviets agreed to the Treaty of Belvedere that ended the occupation of Austria and restored it to full sovereignty, on the pledge of permanent Austrian neutrality and economic concessions.

In these circumstances, the leaders and foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France met in Geneva in July 1955 in a new effort to resolve the impasse over Germany. President Eisenhower, Premier Nikolai Bulganin, Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, and Premier Edgar Faure met in a cordial atmosphere. Eisenhower issued his Open Skies Proposal to prevent surprise aerial attack and to pave the way for wide-scale disarmament. The Soviet leaders, however, had no intention of opening Soviet territory to foreign inspection and thus rebuffed the proposal. Nor were the Soviets interested in a mutual security pact between the U.S.-sponsored NATO and its counterpart, the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Pact (created in May 1955). Both sides also refused to budge from their previous positions regarding Germany, and the result was impasse. In October 1955 the foreign ministers again met in Geneva and again failed to find common ground. Hopes for a settlement regarding Germany had disappeared.

The continuing threat posed by the Soviet Union greatly boosted the movement toward European unification. Only the continuing military threat posed by the Soviets could have caused the West European states to come together. The Council of Europe had been established in 1949. It was followed by the 1953 European Coal and Steel Community, and although efforts by the West European states to create a European army that included West Germany failed, the European Economic Community (EEC) came into being in 1957. In 1959 Britain took the lead in forming a counterpart, the European Free Trade Association.



Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, French Premier Edgar Jean Faure, and British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, shown here during the 1955 Geneva Conference in the garden of the Palace of Nations on 20 July 1955. (Library of Congress)

The year 1956 saw two watershed events of the Cold War occur simultaneously: the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution. To try to meet a perceived growing threat by the Soviet Union in the Middle East, the United States had promoted the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Iraq and Turkey were the original signatories, soon followed by Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. Many in the Arab world, especially the Egyptian leader Nasser, saw this treaty as nothing less than an attempt by the West to reassert its old colonial control over the Middle East.

In 1956 Nasser sought funding for a long-advocated project—construction of a high dam at Aswan on the upper Nile. The Egyptian leader saw this as a means of improving the Egyptian standard of living and strengthening his standing in the Middle East. At the same time, however, Nasser sought to secure new weapons that would place the Egyptian military on a par with that of Israel. Dulles promised U.S. assistance for the dam but refused the Egyptian request for advanced weaponry, and Egypt turned to the Soviet bloc for the new weapons. This along with Nasser's diplomatic recognition of the PRC incensed Dulles, who then withdrew the offer to assist in financing the dam.

To pay for the dam, Nasser therefore nationalized the Suez Canal, a step that he had already been contemplating.

Nasser's actions led to the formation of a coalition of Britain, France, and Israel against him. The British government had the largest stake in the Suez Canal Company and in its operations, and Prime Minister Eden developed an almost pathological hatred of Nasser and was determined to topple the Egyptian leader. The French believed that Egypt was actively supporting the Algerian rebels, while the Israelis were angry over Nasser's decision to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba (Israel's entry into the Indian Ocean) as well as Egyptian sponsorship of fedayeen (Arab commando) raids against the Jewish state. Leaders of the three powers therefore concluded an agreement whereby Israel would invade the Sinai and give Britain and France an excuse to intervene militarily to "protect" the canal.

The Israelis moved at the end of October, and the French and British governments demanded the right to occupy the canal zone. When the Egyptian government rejected the ultimatum, on 5 November 1956 French and British forces striking from Cyprus invaded and occupied Port Said at the Mediterranean end of the canal.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States demanded that the British, French, and Israelis withdraw from Egyptian territory. While the Soviet Union threatened to send "volunteers," it was the position of the United States that was critical. President Eisenhower, livid that Eden had not informed him beforehand, put heavy economic pressure on Britain, obliging the allied forces to withdraw.

The Suez Crisis was a major event in the Cold War. Israel and Egypt were the chief winners. The blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was ended, and UN observers were brought in to police the frontier between Egypt and Israeli. Nasser found himself a hero in the Arab world; his prestige soared on the retreat of the British and French. The Soviet Union and the UN also benefited. Britain was the chief loser. The Suez Crisis marked the effective end of Britain as a world power. And it shattered the solidarity of the major Western powers. Unfortunately for the West, the crisis came at the worst possible time, diverting attention from the concurrent Soviet action against the Hungarian Revolution.

The Hungarian Revolution of late October and early November 1956 was one of the most dramatic events of the Cold War, although it was not the first sign of restiveness within the Soviet bloc. In June 1953, after the death of Stalin, worker unrest led to rioting in East Berlin and across the Soviet Occupied Zone, which was crushed only by Soviet tanks. Khrushchev's moves toward de-Stalinization in early 1956, particularly his "secret speech" revealing the dictator's crimes, led to unrest in Poland in June 1956. There were demonstrations in Poznań, with industrial workers demanding redress of grievances. Order was restored only by deploying large numbers of security police.

Similar protests in Hungary that October became revolution, however. Encouraged by events in Poznań and by the limited reforms subsequently introduced in Poland, student demonstrators in Budapest protested the wide

gulf between the stated goals of the communist regime and the reality of its rule. This demonstration led to widespread demands for democratic reform, an end to the hated security police and censorship, and Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, brought to power in an effort to accommodate the reformists, found himself swept along by a revolutionary tide. He announced a host of changes that included free elections, an end to press censorship, and reform of the hated security police.

The Soviets had already decided to intervene before Nagy's demands rose to include a Soviet troop withdrawal and the announcement that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. The Kremlin found Nagy's commitment to democratic reforms unacceptable. If the situation in Hungary was allowed to stand, Soviet leaders feared that the movement would surely spread to other satellites.

On 4 November 1956, Khrushchev sent 200,000 Soviet troops and 2,000 tanks into Hungary. Nagy called for resistance, and the Hungarians fought as best they could. Over the next several weeks thousands of people died; 200,000 Hungarians fled to neighboring Austria.

There was near universal condemnation of the Soviet action, but no action was taken, in part because the Soviet move was made while the Western powers were embroiled in the Suez Crisis. There was much criticism of the United States among Hungarians and a corresponding loss of faith regarding both Dulles's frequent talk of "rolling back communism" and prior pledges of U.S. assistance toward this end. The lesson of the Hungarian Revolution for the peoples of the Soviet bloc was that the Kremlin could do as it pleased within its existing sphere of influence.

The Cold War appeared to spread in the late 1950s with increasing Soviet challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, especially in its support for so-called "wars of liberation." In an effort to reassert U.S. influence in the Middle East, the American president announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957. It pledged the United States to support the independence of Middle Eastern countries against the threat of communism. Washington intended this to underline the importance of the Baghdad Pact, to which the United States was not a signatory. The Eisenhower administration also continued to send significant economic and military aid to the Diem government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).

The Soviet challenge also spread to space, as Khrushchev was keenly interested in his nation's space program. On 17 August 1957 the Soviets fired the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—the United States did not fire its first ICBM until the next year—and on 4 October 1957 the Soviets launched the first satellite into Earth's orbit. *Sputnik 1* was especially embarrassing to the United States, as it was seen as a sign of Soviet scientific prowess, and became more so when in December a much smaller U.S. rocket exploded on the launch pad. The United States did not place its first satellite into orbit until January 1958, and it was still far smaller than those launched by the Soviets. *Sputnik 1* also marked the start of the Space Race between the two superpowers.

Nikita Khrushchev during a visit to the Simferpol space center in the Crimea, probably during the Vostok 3/4 mission in August 1962. On the right is Major General Pavel A. Agadzhanov, flight director of Soviet manned space missions in the 1960s. (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)

Many in the West questioned whether the United States still held an edge in military technology, and the notion spread that there was a so-called missile gap in which the Soviets held a sizable lead. Although Eisenhower knew, thanks to U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union, that no missile gap existed, he could not make this information public. Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy's charges of a missile gap therefore might have swayed a close presidential election in November 1960, lost by Republican Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's vice president.

For NATO, the new missiles posed serious problems. In order to offset its far smaller manpower strength, NATO members agreed to the placing of missiles on their soil. This elicited fears in Europe that a Soviet preemptive strike or counterstrike might wipe out sizable population centers. At the same time, other Europeans questioned whether the United States would actually risk nuclear attack on its own soil in order to defend Western Europe. There were frequent protests against the placement of U.S. missiles in Europe. Often these took on an anti-American tone, while the threat from the Soviet Union was overlooked.

The irony was that at the same time Khrushchev trumpeted "peaceful coexistence," he also embarked on a period of "missile rattling," threatening on at least 150 different occasions the use of nuclear weapons against the West. This included specific threats, such as noting that only ten nuclear

warheads would render the entire island of Britain uninhabitable and threatening the destruction of the Acropolis. Many feared that the unpredictable Khrushchev might precipitously launch a catastrophic war.

In 1958 Khrushchev ushered in a period of acute tension when he resumed the pressure on the Western powers over Berlin. Believing that he was dealing from strength, he attempted to secure a Western withdrawal from Berlin. The Soviet leader referred to the city as "a bone stuck in my throat," knowing that he could never stabilize East Germany until he could stop East Germans from fleeing to West Berlin. Because the autobahn leading across East Germany to the Western zones of Berlin was the one place in the world where armed Soviet and U.S. forces faced one another, the situation was very tense indeed.

In November 1958 the Soviets simply informed the Western occupying powers that they considered the agreements governing postwar Germany to be null and void. Khrushchev demanded that Berlin be turned into a demilitarized free city, and he gave a deadline of six months—to 27 May 1959—for resolving the situation. In February 1959 he threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany that would give it control of access routes into the divided city. East Germany might then choose to close the routes, setting up the possibility of war should the West attempt to reopen them by force.

To Western leaders, Khrushchev's threats and posturing seemed reminiscent of Adolf Hitler's threats before World War II, and they were determined not to yield to such pressure. In May 1959 the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France met in Geneva where, until August, they endeavored to find a solution. Again there was no common meeting ground, but the three Western powers stood united, which may have given the Soviets pause. Khrushchev let his May deadline pass without taking action. The world breathed a collective sigh of relief as the Soviet leader probably lost his one chance for nuclear blackmail.

Khrushchev was somewhat mollified by an invitation from Eisenhower to visit the United States. The Soviet leader arrived in September 1959, just as the USSR landed a probe on the moon. Khrushchev and Eisenhower held extensive talks and actually generated a cordial, friendly atmosphere—the so-called Spirit of Camp David. Khrushchev, for his part, denied that there was ever any deadline over settling the Berlin issue. The two leaders also agreed to hold a summit in Paris in May 1960 to discuss Germany. Eisenhower was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union shortly thereafter.

This thaw in the Cold War proved short-lived, if indeed it existed at all. In any case, it was formally broken by the Kremlin following the 1 May 1960 U-2 Crisis, in which the Soviets shot down one of the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that had been making regular overflights of the Soviet Union. Assuming that the plane and its pilot had not survived, Washington put out the story that a "weather aircraft" had gone off course and was missing. The Soviets then produced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, trapping Washington in a lie. An angry Khrushchev stormed out of Paris, torpedoing the summit only a few hours after it began.

Neutralist leaders such as Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno of Indonesia attacked the West in the UN. Khrushchev also delivered a speech before that body in September 1960. Strangely, he attacked the authority of the UN and particularly Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, demanding that the position of secretary-general be made into a troika of three individuals: one representing the West, another the communist bloc, and the third the neutralists. Such an arrangement would no doubt have weakened the authority of the UN to act in crisis situations, and Khrushchev's stance ended up alienating the neutralists.

Khrushchev's frantic leadership also created friction within the communist bloc. By 1960, a simmering dispute between the Soviet Union and China erupted into full-blown antagonism—the Sino-Soviet split. Chinse leader Mao Zedong had dutifully followed Moscow's lead during the first decade of the Cold War, but cracks then began to appear in the relationship. For one thing, following the death of Stalin in 1953, Mao believed that he and not the new Kremlin leaders was the logical spokesman for international communism. Mao was much more confrontational toward the West than were the new leaders of the Soviet Union. Also, the Soviets had refused to share advanced nuclear technology with China and expand military aid. Then there was their 2,000-mile frontier—the longest in the world—and disputes over Mongolia.

In the confrontation between the two largest communist powers, most of the world's communist states lined up behind Moscow. In Europe, Beijing enjoyed the support only of Albania. By the spring of 1961 the split was sufficiently pronounced for the Soviet Union to withdraw all its technicians from China and cut off assistance to the PRC.

While this might have benefited the United States, leaders in Washington were in no position, either mentally or politically, to take advantage of the split in the communist world. President Kennedy, who took office in January 1961, almost immediately faced a series of international challenges. The first was the outbreak of fighting in Laos, where communist, neutralist, and rightist factions vied for power. Then in April 1961, U.S.-trained and -sponsored Cuban exile forces landed on that island in an attempt to overthrow its now avowedly communist leader, Fidel Castro. The operation, conceived and largely planned under Eisenhower, was incredibly botched. Without air cover, which Kennedy refused to provide, the Bay of Pigs invasion was doomed to failure, and Kennedy was forced to take responsibility.

An apparently weakened Kennedy met with Khrushchev in June 1961 in Vienna, where the Soviet leader renewed his pressure on Berlin. Attempting to test the new U.S. administration, Khrushchev intimated that he wanted the issue settled by the end of the year. Yet Khrushchev merely trotted out the same demands, with the sole concession that Berlin might be garrisoned by UN or neutralist troops. This time the Soviets began harassment of some Allied air traffic into the city, and the East-West German border was for a brief period almost completely closed. Again, the Soviet leader threatened the use of nuclear weapons, asking the British ambassador why 200 million people should have to die for 2 million Berliners.

Khrushchev was determined to stabilize East Germany, which was fast hemorrhaging its population. By the summer of 1961, some 3.5 million people, among them the young and best educated, had fled through the escape hatch of West Berlin to West Germany. The communist response came on 13 August with the erection of the Berlin Wall, the initiative coming from East German boss Walter Ulbricht rather than from Khrushchev. The escape hatch was at last closed, and East Germans were now walled in.

Kennedy stood firm. In a speech to the American people, he characterized the Soviet position as "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." Kennedy called for a sizable increase in defense spending, a reinvigorated civil defense program, and mobilization of some reserve and National Guard air transport units. The only military action undertaken by the United States, however, was to send 1,500 reinforcing troops along the autobahn and into the city. Kennedy later went to Berlin and delivered one of the more memorable (and grammatically incorrect) phrases of the Cold War when he said, "Ich bin ein Berliner" (I am a Berliner). The ugly concrete barrier remained, however, symbolizing both the failure of communism and the unwillingness of the West to take action against those regimes.

In the fall of 1961, the Soviet Union broke a three-year moratorium on nuclear testing to explode a series of large bombs. This set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the single most dangerous confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States of the Cold War and the closest the two sides came to thermonuclear war.

Castro had come to power in Cuba in early 1959 and soon transformed the island into a communist state. Increasingly dire conditions on the island, in large part the consequence of U.S. economic policies designed to unseat Castro, forced the Cuban leader to turn to the Soviet Union for economic and military aid. Anxious to secure his ally and buttress his own popularity at home, Khrushchev responded. Cuba, so close to the United States, appeared to Khrushchev in the spring of 1962 as the ideal means by which to offset the heavy advantage in long-range nuclear weaponry enjoyed by the United States.

The high-rolling Khrushchev ordered the secret placement of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles on the island, hoping to present Kennedy with a fait accompli. Despite the contrary opinion of some key Soviet military officers, Khrushchev and Minister of Defense Marshal Rodion Malinovsky persisted in the belief that this could be accomplished without American detection. U.S. U-2 surveillance flights over Cuba, however, soon discovered the operation.

On 22 October 1962, in a dramatic television address to the American people, Kennedy revealed the presence of the missiles and demanded that they be removed. He ignored certain of his advisors who urged a preemptive military strike on the island, announcing a naval quarantine of Cuba instead. Peace hung in the balance for a week as Soviet ships carrying missiles continued toward the island nation.

On 27 October a U-2 was downed over Cuba by a surface-to-air missile, apparently on the orders of a Soviet general on the spot. The occurrence shocked even Khrushchev and may well have marked a watershed in his

John F. Kennedy delivers his famous "Ich Bin Ein Berliner" speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, 26 June 1963. (John F. Kennedy Library)

thinking. U.S. contingency plans called for an air strike if a U-2 was shot down, but Kennedy countermanded the order just in time.

Khrushchev's hand was weak, for the Soviet Navy was in no position to run the blockade, but he played it to the end. Convinced that the United States was about to invade Cuba, the Soviets arranged a face-saving compromise in which Castro, who had sought a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike on the United States, was all but ignored. Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles along with jet bombers and some Soviet troops from Cuba. In return, the United States pledged not to invade Cuba and to withdraw its (obsolete) Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Massive Soviet economic assistance to Cuba continued, however. Khrushchev's misstep here was one of the chief

causes of his ouster from power less than two years later. It greatly strengthened Kennedy's hand, however, and encouraged a stronger response to communist aggression elsewhere.

The United States had become increasingly involved in Vietnam, supporting the government of the South Vietnam against an insurgency supported by North Vietnam that aimed to reunify Vietnam under communist rule. U.S. strategy in Vietnam was prompted by the containment policy and by the domino theory—the mistaken belief that if South Vietnam fell to the communists, the rest of South Asia would automatically follow. This U.S. policy toward Vietnam began in the Eisenhower administration, but the communist Viet Cong were apparently on the brink of winning the war in 1961–1962.

President Kennedy therefore increased the American involvement by dispatching both helicopters and additional American advisors. Both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union supported North Vietnam, although at considerably lower levels than the United States provided to the South Vietnam.

As each side raised the stakes, the Vietnam conflict slowly escalated. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy's successor, began bombing North Vietnam and introduced U.S. ground troops into the RVN. Troop numbers steadily increased as North Vietnam sent its regular forces south. Following the costly but ultimately unsuccessful communist Tet Offensive of January 1968 and a sharp drop in American public support for the war, Washington sought a way out.

The war cost Johnson the presidency. With the polls showing plummeting public approval ratings and with Johnson facing sharp challenges from within his own party, he decided not to run again. Republican Richard Nixon won a very close race against Johnson's vice president, Hubert Humphrey.

Nixon, who was president from 1969 to 1974, accelerated the Johnson administration's policy of Vietnamization, or turning over more of the war to the South Vietnamese. But the war dragged on, with more U.S. casualties under Nixon than during the Johnson years, until a peace settlement was reached at Paris in January 1973 that enabled the United States to quit Vietnam "with honor." South Vietnam, largely abandoned by the United States, fell to a communist offensive in April 1975.

Even as the war in Vietnam wound down, other events were moving the Cold War from confrontation to cooperation, or détente. The policy of détente originated with de Gaulle's return to power in France in 1958. Uncertain that the United States would risk nuclear retaliation on its own soil to defend Europe, de Gaulle sought to develop a French nuclear deterrent and the means to deliver it (the Force de Frappe). He also wanted to organize Europe as a third force between the United States and the Soviet Union. De Gaulle negotiated independently with the Soviets and made well-publicized trips to Poland and Romania appealing for European unity. Soviet leaders were quite content with de Gaulle's attacks on the United States, but they had no intention of giving up their hold on their satellites. In 1966, angry because the United States and Britain would not share control of nuclear

weapons within NATO, de Gaulle nonetheless withdrew France from NATO military command.

West Germany was the next country to venture into détente. In the late 1960s, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt instituted what became known as *Ostpolitik*. This reflected a shift in attitude in West Germany regarding relations with East Germany. Under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, West Germany had embraced the Hallstein Doctrine, refusing diplomatic relations with any nation that recognized East Germany. This policy had in part isolated West Germany as well as East Germany, however, and it had cost West Germany trading opportunities with East Germany. Brandt believed that trade and recognition would help facilitate rather than impede German reunification.

The Czech government also attempted to take advantage of the new, more flexible attitudes brought by détente in 1968. Under the leadership of Alexander Dubček, the regime introduced "socialism with a human face," a host of reforms that ultimately included free elections and an end to censorship. Dubček, himself a communist, claimed that these steps would in fact preserve communism.

The Soviet reaction was swift and decisive. In August 1968, an estimated 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops (primarily Soviet Army but including units from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) invaded Czechoslovakia, where they met only minimal resistance from a stunned population. The so-called Prague Spring was over. The Czechs did not fight, for to do so would have been futile.

To justify the action, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. This held that whenever a communist regime was threatened, other communist states had the right and indeed the obligation to intervene. This doctrine would later be invoked to justify the Soviets' 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as well.

The Brezhnev Doctrine understandably alarmed the People's Republic of China. Strictly interpreted, the Brezhnev Doctrine could be applied against the People's Republic of China itself, for it had "strayed from the path" of Soviet-style communism. Indeed, at the end of the 1960s the Soviets assembled considerable forces along their long common border with China, and Moscow did nothing to dampen rumors that it was contemplating a preemptive nuclear strike against China. In 1969 and 1970 there were actually armed clashes along the border that easily could have escalated into full-scale war.

Such Chinese concerns were a key factor leading to a thaw in relations with the United States. Since the communist victory in China in 1949, the People's Republic of China, even more than the Soviet Union, had been the bête noire of the conservative right in the United States, which regarded the "loss" of China as nothing short of a "sellout." The United States and the People's Republic of China did not have formal diplomatic ties, and their only talking ground was the UN or through third parties. That ended in February 1972 with the dramatic state visit of President Nixon to Beijing. Nixon, with impeccable Cold Warrior credentials from the 1950s, was perhaps the only U.S. president of the era who could have carried this off. The United States

nonetheless moved cautiously, fearful of alarming the Soviet Union and disturbing détente. U.S. negotiators also ran up against the stone wall of Chinese insistence on the return of Taiwan, which Washington had, since the Chinese Civil War and in defiance of most of the world's states, regarded as the true representative of China. Finally, in 1978 under President Jimmy Carter, the United States established full diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China, necessitating a severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan although not an end to U.S. support. The U.S.-People's Republic of China thaw was one of the more interesting events of the Cold War and served somewhat to inhibit Soviet aggressive behavior.

Another significant part of détente was the extension of Ostpolitik by Brandt. When he became chancellor of West Germany in 1969, he decisively changed relations with the Soviet bloc nations. Brandt jettisoned the Hallstein Doctrine and in 1970 concluded a treaty with Moscow whereby West Germany recognized the existing border between East Germany and Poland, implicitly recognizing East Germany itself. West Germany also extended considerable loans to the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

At the same time, even as the war in Vietnam continued, U.S. Presidents Johnson and Nixon endeavored to engage the Soviets in a range of discussions. They even raised the possibility of improved relations with the Soviets, to include access to Western technology, if the Vietnam War could be settled. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger went so far as to declare the world to be multipolar, with East-West relations no longer the central issue in international affairs.

Nixon did not let substantial Soviet aid to North Vietnam interfere with efforts to strengthen détente. Traveling to Moscow in May 1972, he signed two major agreements with Brezhnev: the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, which came to be known as SALT I, and an agreement of principles to regularize relations between the two superpowers. The document held that as each power possessed the capability to destroy the other and much of the rest of the world besides, there was no alternative to the two powers conducting their relations on the basis of "peaceful coexistence." The two powers pledged to do their "utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war." They also pledged to resolve their differences "by peaceful means."

To no one's surprise, this agreement did not usher in an era of perpetual peace. The Soviet side, for one thing, had entered into the agreement in the hopes of securing Western trade, investment, and badly needed technology. In the new era of détente, the Soviet leadership hoped to achieve its ends while also supporting communist expansion in the developing world by means of proxy forces. Nixon, for his part, announced the Nixon Doctrine in 1973, a rough parallel to Soviet policy whereby the United States would assist other nations in defending themselves against communist aggression but would no longer commit American troops to this effort.

Following the end of the Vietnam War, the United States reduced defense spending to about 5 percent of gross national product (GNP), while the Soviet Union's defense expenditures rose to more than 15 percent of GNP. The Soviet Union also obtained less for its defense spending than the United

States and thus was less able to bear the burden of this expense. Certainly the heavy claim of defense spending played a role in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, but it is by no means clear that this alone brought an end to the Cold War.

Détente led to a tremendous increase in trade between Western nations and the Soviet bloc and greatly aided the communist bloc economies. West European nations and Japan gave extensive loans to the Soviet Union and its dependencies, most of which were used to prop up these communist regimes with short-term spending on consumer goods rather than to invest in long-term economic solutions. Much Western technology also flowed to the Soviet Union. The hope of those supporting détente was that improved trade and economic dependence on the West would discourage aggressive actions by the communist states.

While direct diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and United States decreased in the period of the 1970s, both sides pursued the same goals by supporting proxy states, especially in the Middle East and in Africa, the scene of a number of civil wars, including one in Namibia. The late 1970s saw not only an Angolan civil war fueled by support from both the Soviets and from the West but also the actual intervention of Cuban troops in that African nation. The Soviets also benefited from the overthrow of key American ally Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran in 1979. Soon the new Iranian regime had seized as hostages U.S. embassy personnel, beginning a protracted standoff with the United States.

Although President Carter met with Brezhnev in Moscow to approve yet another strategic arms reduction agreement (SALT II) in June 1979, Soviet leaders sent troops into Afghanistan to protect the pro-Moscow communist government there only five months later, sending U.S.-Soviet relations plummeting. Ultimately the Soviets dispatched to Afghanistan some 150,000 men as well as substantial numbers of aircraft and tanks.

Instead of rolling to victory, however, the Soviets came up against tough Afghan guerrilla fighters, the mujahideen, who received aid from the United States through Pakistan. The most important U.S. assistance was probably in the form of Stinger shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles that neutralized Soviet ground-support aircraft and helicopters. It seemed a close parallel with Vietnam, where the Soviets kept an insurgency going against the United States and its allies for more than two decades with only a modest outlay of its own. Relations between the two superpowers suffered further when, to punish the Soviet Union for its actions in Afghanistan, President Carter imposed a boycott on U.S. participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympics and then began a substantial U.S. military buildup that was continued under his successor.

The cost of globalism for the Soviet Union was high too, as it turned out. With the strain of Afghanistan, international aid commitments, and massive defense spending brought on by the large U.S. buildup and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, Star Wars) initiated by President Ronald Reagan, the Soviets simply could not keep up. Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, who took power in March 1985, therefore had to deal with the consequences of decades of economic mismanagement.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Red Square in Moscow, 31 May 1988. (Ronald Reagan Library)

A committed communist, Gorbachev nonetheless believed that the Soviet Union would have to reform itself if it was to compete with the West. His programs of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (transformation) were designed to rebuild the Soviet economy while maintaining communist control over the political life of the state. Unfortunately, his economic reforms produced scant improvement, and his moves to ease censorship often led to civil unrest and ethnic strife within the Soviet Union as well as national and regional independence movements.

Even as the Soviet Union slid toward chaos domestically, however, Gorbachev scored successes in foreign policy. In the course of two summit meetings with Reagan, he offered concessions and proposed sometimes striking solutions in a manner that led to improved U.S.-Soviet relations and agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons, including the first agreement in history to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. In 1988, Gorbachev ordered the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. He also promised publicly to refrain from military intervention in Eastern Europe, and he encouraged open elections in the states of the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

After the surprising collapse of the government of East Germany and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989, Gorbachev also agreed to the reunification of Germany and the inclusion in NATO of the new united Germany. Most observers credit Gorbachev, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, with being the driving force behind the end of the Cold War.

Although the Soviet leader's foreign policy was widely hailed abroad, the situation within the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate. Old-line communists considered Gorbachev's policies equivalent to treason. In 1990 several Soviet republics, including the Russian Soviet Federal Republic led by Boris Yeltsin, declared their independence. Gorbachev tried to stem this tide and preserve the Soviet Union, but he was unsuccessful. Talks between Soviet authorities and the break-away republics resulted in the creation of a new Russian federation (or confederation) in August 1991.

Also in August 1991, a number of high-ranking officials representing the rightist faction in the Communist Party—including the chief of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), the defense minister, the prime minister, and the vice president—placed Gorbachev under house arrest and attempted to seize power. Faced with Yeltsin's personal and courageous intervention on behalf of opposition groups, the coup collapsed after two days. Gorbachev returned to Moscow but was now dependent on Yeltsin, who banned the Communist Party from the new Russian republic. Gorbachev resigned as general secretary of the Communist Party in August 1991.

In December 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus created a loose confederation known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Eight other republics subsequently joined, and the CIS formally came into being that same month. Gorbachev resigned as president on 31 December, and the Soviet Union was officially dissolved.

The Cold War ended—fortunately—with a whimper rather than a bang. Few knowledgeable observers predicted that it would occur as it did. Most assumed that the Soviet Union was incapable of reforming itself and saw the Cold War ending only after the military defeat of the Soviet Union or if some sort of internal, violent revolution were to occur in the USSR. Almost no one had perceived the fragility and weakness of the economic and social structures in one of the world's superpowers that ultimately led to its demise.

Different dates have been advanced as the end of the Cold War. One is November 1990, when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Paris and signed the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. All European states were represented at the conference, save Albania. In July 1991 the Warsaw Pact officially disbanded. Another possible ending date for the Cold War is 1991 in general, when events in the Soviet Union, including the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow and the December dissolution of the Soviet Union, destroyed the political structures of Soviet communism. Finally, an argument can also be made for a date of November 1992, when William J. Clinton defeated George H. W. Bush, the last Cold War president, in the U.S. presidential election. Clinton's elevation to the presidency marked a political shift in emphasis away from foreign affairs to the resolution of domestic problems.

One of the great ironies of the Cold War was the rapid rebuilding of Japan and Germany. These two well-disciplined, hardworking peoples profited handsomely from the Cold War in the sense that the Western powers needed them as allies against the Soviet Union and therefore encouraged their rapid economic development. In West Germany's case, this need was so great as to allow the rearmament of that nation in 1955, which would have been considered far-fetched in 1945. By the end of the Cold War, Germany was the dominant economic power in Europe, while Japan occupied the same position in Asia.

Of course, the end of the Cold War did not extinguish international tensions and bloodshed. Problems in the Middle East remained unresolved; Yugoslavia broke apart in bloodshed that threatened to erupt into wider conflict and eventually triggered armed NATO intervention; Iran and Iraq were continuing concerns; civil war and famine remained endemic on the African continent already being ravaged by AIDS; nuclear proliferation widened, especially with the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the danger of terrorists securing nuclear weapons intensified; violence continued to plague Sri Lanka; and dalliance with nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained an ongoing source of concern for the West. If anything, the breakup of the bipolar world increased, rather than lessened, challenges facing the world's diplomats.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Afghanistan War; Bay of Pigs; Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Brezhnev Doctrine; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Carter Doctrine; Castro, Fidel; China, People's Republic of; Cuban Missile Crisis; De Gaulle, Charles; Détente; Dubček, Alexander; Dulles, John Foster; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; Eisenhower, Dwight David; European Defense Community; European Economic Community; Geneva Conference (1954); Geneva Conference (1955); German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hungarian Revolution; Indochina War; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Kim Il Sung; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Mao Zedong; McCarthyism; Nagy, Imre; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nixon Doctrine; Ostpolitik; Perestroika; Powers, Francis Gary; Prague Spring; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Rhee, Syngman; Sino-Soviet Split; Soviet Union; *Sputnik;* Stalin, Josef; Strategic Defense Initiative; Suez Crisis; Tito, Josip Broz; Truman, Harry S.; U-2 Incident; United Nations; United States; Vietnam War; Warsaw Pact; Yeltsin, Boris

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COLD WAR

A

Abdullah, King of Jordan
(1882–1951)

Soldier, diplomat, and king of Jordan. Born in Mecca on 12 September 1882, the second son of Hussein ibn Ali, sharif of Mecca, Abdullah studied in Istanbul, Turkey, and later became an Arab nationalist. During World War I, with British assistance, he facilitated the Hussein-MacMahon Correspondence that launched the 1916 Arab Revolt.

In the 1930s, King Abdullah conducted secret talks with Zionist leaders about a Jewish homeland in a Palestinian-Jordanian kingdom. In 1947 he told Jewish leaders that he would not oppose the creation of a Jewish state but planned to annex the West Bank area of Palestine. When other Arab countries learned of the clandestine agreement, they immediately opposed it, forcing a war with Israel.

During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Abdullah served as the commander in chief of Arab forces. As such, he sent his Arab forces into Palestine, occupying areas that he wished to annex. He avoided, however, attacking Jewish areas in the United Nations' partition plan, but his army did battle unsuccessfully for control of Jerusalem.

In 1950 Abdullah signed a nonaggression pact with Israel after secret negotiations, but he was forced to renounce it when threatened with expulsion from the Arab League. In return, the other Arab states accepted the annexation of Arab Palestine by Jordan. Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem on 21 July 1951.

Andrew J. Waskey



Abdullah, king of Jordan from 1946 until his assassination in 1951. (Corbis)

See also
Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Israel; Jordan

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Abel, Rudolf
(1903–1971)

Pseudonym of Vilyam (Willie) Genrikovich Fisher, the chief Soviet undercover agent in the United States from 1947 to 1957. The alias "Rudolf Abel" was adopted at the time of Fisher's arrest in the United States in 1957. Born on 11 July 1903 in Newcastle upon Tyne, England, Fisher at age sixteen passed an entry exam to the University of London. Two years later he went to the Soviet Union, where he served first as a translator for the Comintern before a stint in the Red Army's Radio Battalion during 1925–1926.

Fisher then served as a Soviet spy in the German Army before being assigned to New York City under the code name "Mark" in 1947. There he posed as a freelance artist known as Emil Robert Goldfus. In 1949, he assumed control of the Volunteer spy network headed by American communist Morris Cohen. The network included Theodore Alvin Hall, a nuclear physicist at Los Alamos and the youngest of the spies who passed information on the atom bomb to the Soviets. The network had also included atomic spies Julius Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs.

In 1957 Fisher's chief assistant, the alcoholic Reino Hayhanen, betrayed him to American authorities. Arrested and sentenced to thirty years in prison, Fisher served only four years at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary before he was exchanged on 10 February 1962 for downed American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers on the Glienicke Bridge in West Berlin, ever after known as "the bridge of spies." The drama of the exchange and the book by Fisher's lawyer, *Strangers on a Bridge*, cemented Fisher's reputation as a master spy, even though his American residency had not produced any great intelligence coups. Fisher spent the remainder of his career working at the KGB Illegals Directorate in Moscow. He died of lung cancer in Moscow on 15 November 1971.

Vernon L. Pedersen

See also

Espionage; Fuchs, Klaus; Powers, Francis Gary; Rosenberg, Julius; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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Abrams, Creighton Williams
(1914–1974)

U.S. Army general, celebrated combat leader, and army chief of staff (1972–1974). Born in Springfield, Massachusetts, on 15 September 1914, Creighton Abrams graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1936 and was posted to the 7th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas. When World War II loomed, he volunteered for the newly formed armored force.

Abrams first rose to professional prominence as a lieutenant colonel and commander of a tank battalion that often spearheaded General George Patton's Third Army in the drive across Europe. Abrams led the forces that punched through German lines to relieve the encircled 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, earned two Distinguished Service Crosses and many other decorations, and received a battlefield promotion to full colonel.

After World War II, Abrams served as director of tactics at the Armor School, Fort Knox (1946–1948); was a corps chief of staff late in the Korean War (1953–1954); and from 1960 to 1962 commanded the 3rd Armored Division in Germany, a key post during the Cold War. A year later he took command of its parent V Corps. In mid-1964 he was recalled from Europe, promoted to four-star general, and made the army's vice chief of staff. In that assignment (1964–1967) he was deeply involved in the army's troop buildup for the war in Vietnam.

U.S. Army General Creighton Williams Abrams commanded U.S. forces in Vietnam during 1969–1972. (Herbert Elmer Abrams/Center for Military History)

In May 1967 Abrams was himself assigned to Vietnam as deputy commander. In that position he concentrated primarily on improvement of South Vietnamese armed forces. During the 1968 Tet Offensive when the forces involved performed far better than expected, Abrams received much of the credit. He formally assumed command of American forces in Vietnam in July 1968. A consummate tactician who proved to have a feel for this kind of conflict, he moved quickly to change the conduct of the war in fundamental ways. His predecessor's attrition strategy, search and destroy tactics, and emphasis on body counts as the measure of battlefield success were all discarded.

Abrams instead stressed population security, the new measure of merit, as the key to success. He prescribed a "one war" approach in which combat operations, pacification, and upgrading South Vietnamese forces were of equal importance and priority. He cut back on multibattalion sweeps, replacing them with thousands of small unit patrols and ambushes that blocked communist forces' access to the people and interdicted their movement of forces and supplies. Clear-and-hold operations became the standard tactical approach, with expanded and better-armed Vietnamese territorial forces providing the hold. Population security progressed accordingly. Meanwhile, U.S. forces were incrementally withdrawn, their missions taken over by the improving South Vietnamese.

Abrams left Vietnam in June 1972 to become U.S. Army chief of staff. There he set about dealing with the myriad problems of an army that had been through a devastating ordeal. He concentrated on readiness and on the well-being of the soldier, always the touchstones of his professional concern. Stricken with cancer, Abrams died in office in Washington, D.C., on 4 September 1974. He had set a course of reform and rebuilding that General

John W. Vessey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later recalled in a letter to the publisher Simon and Schuster: "When Americans watched the stunning success of our armed forces in Desert Storm, they were watching the Abrams vision in action. The modern equipment, the effective air support, the use of the reserve components and, most important of all, the advanced training which taught our people how to stay alive on the battlefield were all seeds planted by Abe."

LEWIS SORLEY

See also

AirLand Battle; Persian Gulf War; United States Army; Vietnam War

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Acheson, Dean Gooderham

(1893–1971)

U.S. secretary of state (1949–1953) and chief architect of U.S. foreign policy in the formative years of the Cold War. Born on 11 April 1893 in Middletown, Connecticut, to British parents, Dean Acheson attended the prestigious Groton School and graduated from Yale University in 1915. He earned a degree from Harvard Law School in 1918 and went on to serve as private secretary to Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis from 1919 to 1921. After his Supreme Court stint, Acheson joined a Washington, D.C., law firm. He entered public life in 1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt named him undersecretary of the treasury. Acheson resigned soon thereafter, however, over a disagreement concerning gold and currency policies. In 1940 he authored a key legal opinion that led to the Lend-Lease program. In 1941, he became assistant secretary of state and then undersecretary of state in 1945.

The possessor of a brilliant legal mind, a regal bearing, and a biting wit, Acheson initially favored a policy of postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union. But he quickly reversed his view and, along with George F. Kennan,

became one of the chief proponents of the Cold War containment policy. Unlike Kennan, who believed that the contest with the Soviet Union was primarily political in nature, Acheson stressed the military dimension. Sobered by the failure of democratic nations to halt the Axis powers in the 1930s, Acheson advocated a policy of developing military strength before negotiating with the Soviet Union. After the USSR detonated its first atomic bomb in September 1949, he played a leading role in persuading President Harry S. Truman to move ahead with the development of the hydrogen bomb.

Acheson also played a critical role in implementing major Cold War initiatives in Europe. When the British informed the United States in early 1947 that they no longer possessed the financial means to support Greece and Turkey, Acheson pushed the Truman administration to take quick action, warning that if the United States did not supplant British power in the eastern Mediterranean, the result would likely be Soviet control of the region. Truman then announced his Greco-Turkish aid package and enunciated the Truman Doctrine to augment the containment policy. Acheson aggressively promoted the 1947 Marshall Plan to aid West European recovery efforts and to resist pressures that might lead to communist regimes there. Despite his role in creating the United Nations (UN), Acheson did not believe that it could prevent Soviet aggression or the spread of militant communism. Instead, he trusted military power and saw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the best means of defending the West from the Soviets. NATO had the added benefits of strengthening U.S. ties with Europe, quelling internal unrest, and binding West Germany to the alliance.

As U.S. secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, Dean Acheson played a key role in formulating American foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. (Library of Congress)

When Acheson was sworn in as secretary of state on 21 January 1949, he was already recognized as the key architect of postwar foreign policy. As such, Truman, a great admirer of Acheson, gave him wide latitude in foreign policy matters. During his tenure in office, Acheson pushed through the implementation of NSC-68 and won Senate approval for continued stationing of American troops in Europe and for extensive military aid to the NATO allies. He failed, however, to secure European approval for German rearmament, which was stymied by French opposition.

Acheson's tendency to view international affairs largely from a European perspective hampered his efforts to deal with rising nationalism in the developing world. His attachment to a world united by imperial prosperity and order created unnecessary problems for the Western Allies as well as for emerging nations. Asia, possessing no significant industrial base outside of Japan, ranked low among Acheson's priorities. He based American policy on the tenuous—and as it turned out faulty—premise that communist China was the puppet of the Soviet Union. He sided with the French regarding

Indochina, advising Truman to make what proved to be a fateful commitment of American assistance to anti-Viet Minh forces in 1950. Acheson all but ignored Africa and Latin America, mainly because neither region was as yet on the front lines of the Cold War. Like those who preceded him, Acheson viewed Britain as an indispensable American ally and partner.

A primary target of Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist witch hunt, Acheson was lambasted for being friendly with alleged spy Alger Hiss, "losing" China to communism, and being unable to end the Korean War, which Acheson's enemies wrongly believed he provoked by publicly excluding it from America's "defense perimeter" in a January 1950 speech. Acheson also provided fodder for other Republicans, namely Richard M. Nixon, who in 1952 derided Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson for having graduated from "Dean Acheson's College of Cowardly Communist Containment."

In the 1960s, Acheson returned to public life as the head of NATO task forces, special envoy, diplomatic troubleshooter, and foreign policy advisor for Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

Acheson retired from public life in 1953 but was not disengaged from public policy. He soon became the main Democratic critic of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's foreign policy. Acheson regarded NSC-68, which advocated the strengthening of conventional military forces to provide options other than nuclear war, as the foreign policy bible for the Cold War era. When the Eisenhower administration committed itself to a policy of massive retaliation that emphasized nuclear responses over conventional responses to crises, the former secretary of state reacted with utter disbelief to what he termed "defense on the cheap."

In the 1960s, Acheson returned to public life as the head of NATO task forces, special envoy, diplomatic troubleshooter, and foreign policy advisor for Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Acheson was noted for his hawkish advice to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Acheson died of a heart attack on 12 October 1971 in Sandy Spring, Maryland.

Caryn E. Neumann

See also

Containment Policy; Cuban Missile Crisis; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hiss, Alger; Indochina War; Kennan, George Frost; Korean War; Lend-Lease; Marshall Plan; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; National Security Council Report NSC-68; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United Kingdom; United Nations

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Adams, Gerard, Jr.
(1948–)

Irish politician and Sinn Féin party leader in Northern Ireland. Born on 6 October 1948 in Belfast, Northern Ireland, Gerard "Gerry" Adams Jr. left school early and worked as a bartender. In 1964, he joined Sinn Féin, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Although Adams has always denied being a member of the IRA, British and Irish official sources suggest otherwise. Incarcerated in 1972 under the Special Powers Act, he was set free for peace talks that same year. However, he was imprisoned again from 1973 to 1977 and for a brief period in 1978.

After his release from prison in 1978, Adams assumed the vice presidency of Sinn Féin. As early as 1979, he tried to convince his party to give up violence and turn to political action. In 1983, the year he was elected to the House of Commons, he and the northern cadres took control of the republican movement. As the new president of Sinn Féin, Adams ended the party's policy of abstention so that party representatives could be seated in Parliament. A skillful political tactician, Adams has since managed to steer his followers toward a peaceful solution to the Northern Ireland conflict without causing the party to break apart. Although by no means an uncontroversial figure, he is viewed as one of the major engineers of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Matthias Trefs

See also

Ireland, Northern; Ireland, Republic of; Irish Republican Army; Paisley, Ian; Sinn Féin; United Kingdom

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Adenauer, Konrad
(1876–1967)

German politician, mayor of Köln (Cologne) from 1917 to 1933, chancellor of the Prussian State Council from 1922 to 1933, and first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) from 1949 to 1963. Born 5 January 1876 in Köln, Konrad Adenauer studied law in Freiburg, Munich, and Bonn. In 1897 he began his long career in government service in the Prussian justice administration before spending a brief time as an attorney in private practice. Sponsored by the Catholic Center Party, he was elected to the Köln city council in 1906; by 1909, he had become deputy lord mayor of the city. After being assigned oversight for Köln's food supplies from 1914 to



One of the greatest German statesmen, Konrad Adenauer presided over the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) after World War II and served as its first chancellor during 1949–1963. (Library of Congress)

1917, he moved on to assume the post of lord mayor of the city in 1917, a post he held until the advent of Nazi rule in 1933.

Adenauer flirted with the idea of a separate Rhenish state during the early troubled years of the Weimar Republic. But he subsequently adopted a position similar to that of Gustav Stresemann, who viewed Weimar Germany as a "republic of convenience." Adenauer added the post of chancellor of the Prussian State Council to his portfolio in 1922. In 1933, he was imprisoned by the Nazi regime for his opposition activities and narrowly escaped death.

Returned as mayor of Köln by British authorities in March 1945, Adenauer clashed with them over priorities, and the British dismissed him from that post in October 1945. This freed him to take a leading role in national politics, and he became a cofounder and the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Elected the first chancellor of the FRG in September 1949 by the Bundestag (lower house of parliament) by a majority of one vote, he was largely responsible for facilitating its recovery and reconstruction efforts and for moving the new state into the Western orbit during the formative years of the Cold War. His credentials as a strong opponent of the Nazi regime allowed him to resist the pressures to reunify Germany as a neutral, socialist state.

Adenauer was already convinced of the need for cooperation if Germany were to avoid renewed political chaos. At the same time, he maintained tight control over his new party and refused to enter a "Grand Coalition" with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) after the 1949 elections elevated him to the chancellorship. He chose instead to bring the smaller Free Democratic Party and the more conservative Bavarian counterpart of the CDU, the Christian Social Union, into his cabinet. When the Western powers decided to allow the FRG to establish its own Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1951, Adenauer took that position himself.

This combination proved stable enough to survive the initial challenges of statehood. To the dismay of many in Germany, Adenauer supported the rejection of the Soviet note proposing that Germany be neutralized and reunified in 1952. His statecraft and the growing threat of the Soviet Union eventually reconciled France to the idea of an independent West Germany. The FRG was allowed to rearm and join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955. Adenauer also played a key role in ending the longstanding animosity between Germany and France. At the same time, he was able to maintain reasonable and effective relations with the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern bloc. He successfully negotiated the return of the last prisoners of war from the Soviet Union even as the FRG entered NATO. Adenauer always insisted, however, that the FRG was the only legitimate

German state, a policy later formalized as the Hallstein Doctrine. He also supported German aid for Israel.

Adenauer's increasingly autocratic rule, however, eventually led to turmoil. In 1962, several journalists were arrested on charges of treason on orders from Adenauer's cabinet. The resulting scandal, known as the *Spiegel* Affair, led Adenauer to promise to step down as chancellor in 1963. Yet Adenauer still managed to retain a great deal of influence in the government of the FRG. He remained chairman of the CDU, and Ludwig Erhard, his loyal lieutenant, was chosen from the party ranks to succeed him as chancellor. Erhard had served in Adenauer's cabinet from the outset and followed fundamentally similar policies during his term as chancellor.

Adenauer died in Rhöndorf, near the West German capital of Bonn, on 19 April 1967 with his legacy as one of Germany's greatest politicians essentially intact. Erhard and the CDU lost the elections of 1969, handing power over to the SPD, but the foundations of an independent, pro-Western FRG had been firmly established.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Erhard, Ludwig; Franco-German Friendship Treaty; Hallstein Doctrine; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Afghanistan

A landlocked nation of 252,000 square miles in South Asia with a population in 1950 of some 8.2 million people. Afghanistan borders Iran to the west; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north; China to the northeast; and Pakistan to the east and south. This geographically forbidding nation, almost half of which is more than 6,500 feet in elevation, with extensive desert regions and mountains exceeding 16,000 feet, is no stranger to international intrigue.

Afghanistan became a center of the so-called Great Game, an imperialist rivalry between Britain and Russia, in the nineteenth century. The struggle

ended before the turn of the century, however, with the establishment of an independent Afghanistan that divided the regional ethnic groups in the area between Russia, British India, and Afghanistan. As elsewhere in the world, artificial borders mandated by European empires left residual problems that festered throughout the twentieth century.

The Cold War caught Afghanistan between the Soviet Union, naturally interested in a country on its southern border with ethnic connections to Soviet Central Asian republics, and the United States, which was fearful of communist expansion. The American containment policy sought to encircle communist Russia and China with an interlocking system of alliances including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and so Afghanistan found itself wedged between the West and the East.

After 1933, Afghanistan's King Muhammad Zahir had tried to enhance his position by dealing with the Soviets as a counter to the British in India. After World War II, the United States displaced Britain as the Western force in Asia, and Afghanistan continued to court the Soviets as a counter to Western imperialism. An agreement with the Soviets in 1950 provided Afghanistan with substantial economic support and promises of oil shipments, albeit interrupted by disputes over the Pashtun border with Pakistan.

At the time, proponents of containment envisioned an interlocking system of alliances to surround the communist world. NATO was the first in 1949 to secure Western Europe. In 1954 CENTO and SEATO surrounded the southern and eastern flanks of the communist bloc. Never fully realized, the idea was to link the three through multilateral collective security guarantees. CENTO included Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and the linchpin Turkey, which was also a part of NATO. Pakistan was also a member of SEATO and thus tied to NATO through Turkey. Afghanistan was not included in any of these mechanisms.

In 1953 Mohammad Daoud Khan, a member of the Afghan royal family, became prime minister. Daoud secured a Soviet economic development loan of $3 million in 1954 that preceded a 1955 visit by Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, who promised another $100 million. The United States refused military aid to Afghanistan but did assist in improving the Qandahar Airport. The Soviets then promised military aid and a military aircraft facility at Mazir-e-Sharif. For a time, it seemed that Afghanistan was the fortunate beneficiary of Cold War rivalries.

Daoud's tenure ended in 1963 when Zahir resumed direct rule. The details of Daoud's fall are not entirely clear, although several factors were involved including inflation, continued tensions with Pakistan, popular opposition to Daoud's secular government, and the king's desire to broaden participation in government. The king ruled directly for a decade, during which time a leftist political opposition movement gained momentum, led by Babrak Karmal of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDA). Political unrest and a severe drought resulted in a military coup in 1973 that placed Daoud back in power, now as head of a republic with support from Karmal.

Daoud, a moderate leftist, surprised many by seeking U.S. financial aid through the shah of Iran. The Soviets were also providing aid; Daoud visited the Soviet Union in 1974 and again in 1977.

Daoud continued to play both superpowers against each other and in the meantime developed closer ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia. By 1978, Daoud lost Karmal's support on the Left and the Islamist fundamentalists' support on the Right. That same year, Daoud's government was overthrown. Karmal and Nur Muhammad Taraki now led a new government with strong ties to the Soviets. The two Afghan leaders soon split, however, and in 1979 the Soviet Union sent troops to support Karmal.

Meanwhile, local tribal leaders took advantage of the turmoil, as did Islamic fundamentalists who feared that Soviet rule would result in a wholly secular regime. This dynamic forced the Soviets to back Karmal's regime with 150,000 troops and massive military aid. Sensing Soviet vulnerability, the United States provided arms and covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen (guerrilla insurrectionists). The parallel to Vietnam is not without merit. In Vietnam the communist power provided sufficient aid to the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies to keep the United States bogged down in

Afghan resistance fighters return to a village that has been destroyed by Soviet forces, 25 March 1986. (U.S. Department of Defense)

a protracted struggle until 1973. In Afghanistan, the United States supplied aid to keep the Soviets pinned down until 1989, when they gave up and withdrew.

In neither case was the outcome predictable, however. The North Vietnamese united Vietnam but then gradually moved closer to the United States. Afghanistan was plunged into a long civil war that ended in 1996 when the repressive Taliban regime came to power, cultivating ties to the terrorist al-Qaeda movement. Ironically, the Taliban and al-Qaeda had received training and arms from the United States during the Afghanistan War. Ultimately, Afghanistan became a tragic victim of the Cold War, with implications that went far beyond the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Daniel E. Spector

See also

Afghanistan War; Containment Policy; Middle East Regional Defense Organizations; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pakistan; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Soviet Union; United States; Vietnam War

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Afghanistan War
(1979–1989)

War that destroyed the U.S.-Soviet détente of the 1970s; inaugurated a new, dangerous stage in the Cold War; and badly weakened the Soviet military and economic establishments. The Soviet-Afghan War represented the culmination of events dating to April 1978, when Afghan communists, supported by left-wing army leaders, overthrew the unpopular, authoritarian government of Mohammad Daoud and proclaimed the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Although the extent of Soviet involvement in the coup remains unclear, Moscow certainly welcomed it and quickly established close relations with the new regime headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was committed to bringing socialism to Afghanistan.

With the ambitious, extremely militant foreign minister Hafizullah Amin as its driving force, the Taraki regime quickly alienated much of Afghanistan's population by conducting a terror campaign against its opponents and introducing a series of social and economic reforms at odds with the religious and cultural norms of the country's highly conservative, Muslim, tribal society. Afghanistan's Muslim leaders soon declared a jihad against "godless communism," and by August 1978 the Taraki regime faced an open revolt, a situation made especially dangerous by the defection of a portion of the army to the rebel cause.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979



As Afghanistan descended into civil war, Moscow grew increasingly concerned. Committed to preventing the overthrow of a friendly, neighboring communist government and fearful of the effects that a potential Islamic fundamentalist regime might have on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia, specifically those in the republics bordering Afghanistan, the Soviets moved toward military intervention. During the last months of 1979, the Leonid Brezhnev government dispatched approximately 4,500 combat advisors to assist the Afghan communist regime while simultaneously allowing Soviet aircraft to conduct bombing raids against rebel positions. Although Soviet Deputy Defense Minster Ivan G. Pavlovskii, who had played an important role in the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, counseled against full-scale intervention in Afghanistan, his superior, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, convinced Brezhnev to undertake an invasion, arguing that only such action could preserve the Afghan communist regime. He also promised that the Soviet presence there would be short.

Brezhnev ultimately decided in favor of war, the pivotal factor arguably being the September 1979 seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin, who had ordered Taraki arrested and murdered. Apparently shocked by Amin's act of supreme betrayal and inclined to believe that only a massive intervention could save the situation, Brezhnev gave approval for the invasion. Beginning in late November 1979 and continuing during the first weeks of December, the Soviet military concentrated the Fortieth Army, composed primarily of

Soviet soldiers and a BMD-1 airborne combat vehicle in Kabul, Afghanistan, in March 1986. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Central Asian troops, along the Afghan border. On 24 December, Soviet forces crossed the frontier, while Moscow claimed that the Afghan government had requested help against an unnamed outside threat.

Relying on mechanized tactics and close air support, Soviet units quickly seized the Afghan capital of Kabul. In the process, a special assault force stormed the presidential palace and killed Amin, replacing him with the more moderate Barak Kemal, who attempted, unsuccessfully, to win popular support by portraying himself as a devoted Muslim and Afghan nationalist. Soviet forces, numbering at least 50,000 men by the end of January 1980, went on to occupy the other major Afghan cities and secured major highways. In response, rebel mujahideen forces resorted to guerrilla warfare, their primary goal being to avoid defeat in the hopes of outlasting Soviet intervention.

Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan had immediate and adverse international consequences, effectively wrecking détente that was already in dire straits by December 1979 thanks to recent increases in missile deployments in Europe. Having devoted much effort to improving relations with Moscow, U.S. President Jimmy Carter believed that he had been betrayed. He reacted swiftly and strongly to the Afghan invasion.

On 28 December 1979, Carter publicly denounced the Soviet action as a "blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior." Three days later, he accused Moscow of lying about its motives for intervening and declared that the invasion had dramatically altered his view of the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals. On 3 January 1980, the president asked the U.S.

Senate to delay consideration of SALT II. Finally, on 23 January, in his State of the Union Address, Carter warned that the Soviet action in Afghanistan posed a potentially serious threat to world peace because control of Afghanistan would put Moscow in a position to dominate the strategic Persian Gulf and thus interdict at will the flow of Middle East oil.

The president followed these pronouncements by enunciating what soon became known as the Carter Doctrine, declaring that any effort to dominate the Persian Gulf would be interpreted as an attack on American interests that would be rebuffed by force if necessary. Carter also announced his intention to limit the sale of technology and agricultural products to the USSR, and he imposed restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. In addition, he notified the International Olympic Committee that in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, neither he nor the American public would support sending a U.S. team to the 1980 Moscow Summer Games. The president called upon America's allies to follow suit.

Carter also asked Congress to support increased defense spending and registration for the draft, pushed for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force that could intervene in the Persian Gulf or other areas threatened by Soviet expansionism, offered increased military aid to Pakistan, moved to enhance ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), approved covert CIA assistance to the mujahideen, and signed a presidential directive on 25 July 1980 providing for increased targeting of Soviet nuclear forces.

Carter's sharp response was undercut to a certain extent by several developments. First, key U.S. allies rejected both economic sanctions and an Olympic boycott. Second, Argentina and several other states actually increased their grain sales to Moscow. Third, a somewhat jaded American public tended to doubt the president's assertions about Soviet motives and believed that he had needlessly reenergized the Cold War.

Ronald Reagan, who defeated Carter in the November 1980 presidential election, took an even harder stand with the Soviets. Describing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" that had used détente for its own nefarious purposes, the Reagan administration poured vast sums of money into a massive military buildup that even saw the president push the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—labeled "Star Wars" by its critics—a missile defense system dependent on satellites to destroy enemy missiles with lasers or particle beams before armed warheads separated and headed for their targets. The Soviet response was to build additional missiles and warheads.

Meanwhile, confronted with guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, the USSR remained committed to waging a limited war and found itself drawn, inexorably, into an ever-deeper bloody quagmire against a determined opponent whose confidence and morale grew with each passing month. To make matters worse for Moscow, domestic criticism of the war by prominent dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov appeared early on, while foreign assistance in the form of food, transport vehicles, and weaponry (especially the Stinger antiaircraft missile launchers) from the United States began reaching the mujahideen as the fighting dragged on.

The mujahideen resorted to guerilla warfare, their primary goal being to avoid defeat in the hopes of outlasting Soviet intervention.

Neither the commitment of more troops, the use of chemical weapons, nor the replacement of the unpopular Kemal could bring Moscow any closer to victory. Accordingly, by 1986 the Soviet leadership, now headed by the reformist General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, began contemplating ways of extricating itself from what many observers characterized as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam."

In April 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a United Nations mediation proposal providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops over a ten-month period. One month later the departure of Soviet military forces, which had grown to an estimated 115,000 troops, commenced—a process that was finally completed in February 1989.

Although the Soviets left Afghanistan with a procommunist regime, a team of military advisors, and substantial quantities of equipment, the nine years' war had exacted a high toll, costing the Soviets an estimated 50,000 casualties. It seriously damaged the Red Army's military reputation, further undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet system, and nearly bankrupted the Kremlin. For the Afghans, the war proved equally costly. An estimated 1 million civilians were dead, and another 5 million were refugees. Much of the country was devastated.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also

Afghanistan; Brezhnev, Leonid; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Carter Doctrine; Détente; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Olympic Games and Politics; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Soviet Union; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Strategic Defense Initiative

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Africa

The Cold War in Africa commenced with the end of the colonial era, continued through Africa's independence movements, and finally ended in the postcolonial period. The Soviet Union linked African national liberation movements to its own Marxist-Leninist ideology in order to gain a foothold in the continent. The United States, on the other hand, responded fitfully and belatedly to African decolonization. In 1945 the African continent contained a population of perhaps 224 million people.

African Independence, 1951 – 1968



Individual African states—and regions—were an important component in the geopolitical chess match between the United States and the USSR, but not until later in the Cold War. From the late 1950s to the late 1970s, the United States purposely played a secondary role to that of the Europeans in Africa. During President Dwight D. Eisenhower's second term (1957–1961), the U.S. National Security Council proposed a "division of labor" for the developing world; the Europeans would be responsible for Africa, while the United States would play the dominant role in Latin America. The White House, in particular, expected France to police francophone Africa, while Great Britain would take the lead in southern Africa. Nonetheless, it was also the Eisenhower administration that created the Bureau of African Affairs within the U.S. Department of State. In 1957, Senator John F. Kennedy presciently warned of growing communist influence in Africa. As the Cold War advanced, African countries became labeled as either pro-Soviet or pro-American. A shorthand for this dichotomy was membership in either the relatively radical Casablanca Group, led by Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, or membership in the more pro-West Monrovia Group.

From 1981 to 1988, U.S. military aid to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to about $1 billion. During the latter days of the Cold War, American aid became indistinguishable from U.S. geopolitical aims. Pro-Western governments such as the one in Senegal under President Abdou Diouf received aid, for instance, while Marxist governments such as President Didier Ratsiraka's of Madagascar did not. The United States routinely tied its aid to African nations to their geopolitical importance.

Generally speaking, America's Cold War geopolitical interests in sub-Saharan Africa were narrow in scope, but where the commitment existed it ran deep and often manifested itself in covert activity. Three regions deserve special mention: the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia), where an intense superpower rivalry played out; Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), one of the earliest battlegrounds of Cold War rivalry; and southern Africa, where the superpowers fought a proxy war in Angola and where they were directly or indirectly involved in an intricately latticed struggle for independence and freedom in Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa.

The Horn of Africa is comprised of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti. Because it adjoins the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, flanks the oil-rich states of Arabia, controls the Bab-el-Maneb Straits (an important choke point for oil), and overlooks the passages where the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean converge, it was a very important piece in the Cold War geopolitical chess game. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Horn was intense, and their policies were analogous, if obviously in direct competition. American policy there was grounded on four principles: the economic security of the West (i.e., oil), stability and security in the Middle East and in the Horn, the ability to block Soviet attempts to choke Western oil lanes, and keeping the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean open for Israeli and Israel-bound shipping. The Soviet strategy in the Horn was predicated upon strategic deterrence, naval presence, sea denial or sea

control, and projection of power. The geopolitical competition between the United States and the USSR revolved around the Ethiopian-Somalian conflict.

America's foothold in the Horn was Ethiopia, where it had maintained a presence since 1953. The Soviet Union initially had a strong presence in Somalia. Between 1953 and 1974, when Ethiopian ruler Haile Selassie was overthrown, the United States supplied more than $200 million in military aid to Ethiopia, which in 1970 comprised almost half of all aid to sub-Saharan Africa. In 1953, an American military base opened at Kagnew Station in Asmara, Ethiopia, for, among other purposes, tracking space satellites and relaying military communications. More than 3,200 U.S. military personnel were stationed there. The United States also supported counterinsurgency teams fighting the Eritrean Liberation Movement. American support of Ethiopia was largely a response to the regional machinations of the Soviet Union. General Barre, the head of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia (an overtly socialist organization), had by 1977 received more than $250 million in military aid from the Soviets. The Soviet Union also helped construct port facilities at Berbera, overlooking the Red Sea, as well as communication facilities. This base was strategically situated almost directly opposite the Soviet naval facilities in South Yemen's port of Aden.

The strategic equation in the Horn took a strange twist beginning in the mid-1970s. With the weakening and then the collapse of Selassie's regime in Ethiopia, the United States was forced to abandon its base in Asmara and moved its base of operations to the island of Diego Garcia (1,500 miles off the African coast in the Indian Ocean). Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of the Derg military junta, ruled Ethiopia under a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship from 1974 until 1991. This provided a window of opportunity that the Soviets could not resist, but they had to be careful not to alienate their Somali allies.

The Soviets responded to the new Ethiopian government's request for assistance (which the United States was no longer willing to provide) just as the Eritreans and Somalis were enjoying more success in Ethiopia. In September 1977, the Soviet Union began the delivery of approximately $385 million in arms, including 48 MiG jet fighters, 200 T-54 and T-55 tanks, and SAM-3 and SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles. The Soviet Union had gambled that its new relationship with Ethiopia would not affect its relationship with Somalia, a bet that it lost. The Soviet Union was expelled from Somalia in 1977. It also failed to achieve its aims in Ethiopia, for after seven years of civil war the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) from far southern Ethiopia entered Addis Ababa in May 1991, overthrowing the Marxist regime. Meanwhile, the United States had become the major patron of Somalia, supported Barre throughout the 1980s, and inherited the strategic base in Berbera once held by the Soviets.

During the 1960s, Washington ordered a series of covert actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, Zaire). The DRC was a flashpoint in the Cold War almost from its inception. Three central events in its history punctuate the role it played in the U.S.-USSR geopolitical competition in

Volunteers with the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) during the 1960s. Established in 1960 by the United Nations Security Council to assist the newly independent Congo by restoring order and providing technical assistance, the ONUC operated until 1964. (Corel)

sub-Saharan Africa: the defeat of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and rise of Mobutu Sese Seko, the first secessionist crisis in Katanga (renamed Shaba in 1971) in 1960, and the second secessionist crisis in Shaba in 1978.

The first and most significant result of such actions was the assassination of Lumumba and the subsequent rise of the pro-Western Mobutu. Mobutu, who ran what became commonly known as a kleptocracy, received approximately $1.5 billion in economic and military aid over the course of nearly twenty-five years. The United States considered Mobutu a vital cog in its global anticommunist network as well as a supplier of important strategic minerals (cobalt, copper, diamonds, gold, cadmium, and uranium).

In June 1960, the Belgian Congo gained independence and was renamed the Republic of Congo, with Joseph Kasavubu as its first president and Lumumba as its first prime minister. Lumumba, a leftist, almost immediately faced a secessionist crisis in the mineral-rich Katanga province. At the request of the Congolese government, United Nations (UN) troops were sent in to restore order. The United States opposed Lumumba's nationalist and nonaligned policies and his implicit support of the Soviet Union. In September 1960 President Kasavubu, along with the army, dismissed Lumumba and in January 1961 delivered him to the secessionists in Katanga province who then executed him.

From 1961 until 1964 (when Belgian paratroopers finally restored order), there was fighting between rival secessionist groups. American-educated Moise Tshombe then emerged as the leader of the Katanga secessionists. After a short period of exile, Tshombe was named the premier of the Government of Reconciliation by Kasavubu in 1964. Two years later Tshombe was dismissed and accused of treason and again went into exile. He was kidnapped and imprisoned in Algeria, where he died in prison in 1969. President Kasavubu was ousted in a second Mobutu-led coup in November 1965. By 1967, the pro-Lumumbist elements had been effectively defeated. Zaire then became a staging area for neighboring Cold War struggles.

Mobutu's involvement in neighboring Angola's civil war resulted in the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) invasion of Zaire's Shaba region in March 1977, known as the Shaba I Crisis. Included in the invading force was a small remnant of the Katangan rebels. The FLNC quickly captured several towns and gained control of the railroad to about thirty kilometers from the copper mining town of Kolwezi. The dissidents aimed to take over the entire country and depose Mobutu. Their advance and the threat to Kolwezi forced Mobutu to appeal for international assistance. Thus, Belgium, France, and the United States responded to Mobutu's request by immediately airlifting military supplies to Zaire. Other African states, namely Egypt and Morocco, also supported Zaire during the crisis. By the end of May, the joint force had regained control of Shaba. The FLNC then withdrew to Angola and Zambia.

Government reprisals after Shaba I drove 50,000–70,000 refugees into Angola. Also, Zaire's continued support for Angolan dissident groups ensured continued Angolan government support for the FLNC. The Shaba II Crisis was triggered in May 1978 when the FLNC launched its second invasion of Zaire in a little over a year. During early May 1978, ten FLNC battalions entered Shaba through northern Zambia, a sparsely populated area inhabited by the same ethnic groups (Lunda and Ndembu) that made up the FLNC. A small group went toward Mutshatsha, about 60 miles west of Kolwezi, to block the path of Zairian reinforcements that threatened to move into the area. During the night of 11–12 May 1978, the remainder of the force moved to Kolwezi, where it joined with the rebels who had earlier infiltrated the town. The town of Kolwezi was lightly defended, and the rebels quickly gained a foothold in the mineral-rich Shaba (formerly Katanga) province, thereby controlling about 75 percent of the country's export earnings. The French and Belgian governments requested U.S. help in putting down the rebellion.

The administration of President Jimmy Carter viewed Shaba II as an instance of Soviet expansionism. Subsequently, in a total of thirty-eight flight missions, U.S. planes transported roughly 2,500 French and Belgian troops and supporting equipment to the region. The American commitment to Mobutu and Zaire was consistent with its long-standing support of Mobutu and with the U.S. concern over Soviet/Cuban influence in neighboring Angola. President Carter, in fact, rebuked Cuban leader Fidel Castro for supporting the FLNC attack launched from Angolan territory. Carter's national

security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, claimed that the invasion was launched with Moscow's blessing. The Carter administration believed that it had to respond to aggressive Soviet/Cuban penetration of Africa (15,000 Cuban troops and Soviet advisors were already in Ethiopia). By the end of May 1978, the second Shaba invasion was all but over. Belgian forces began to withdraw, leaving a battalion in Kamina, and the French Foreign Legion departed by the end of May.

Southern Africa was the third African hot spot during the Cold War. The epicenter of American-Soviet conflict was Angola, but Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa also featured prominently in the latter years of the Cold War. Each of these countries, with the notable exception of South Africa, was seen as aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Namibia, under tight South African control, was linked to the Angolan civil war. Mozambique, which gained independence on 25 June 1974, was a self-designated Marxist-Leninist regime led by Samora Machel, chairman of the Frente Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) and president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and joined the Soviet-led Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. In turn, Frelimo, with the backing of the Soviet Union and other communist states, supported Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe national liberation struggle against the settler regime of Ian Smith, leader of the Rhodesian Front (RF).

The United States was almost completely dependent on southern Africa for its uranium supply and was willing to go to great lengths to secure the critical fuel for its nuclear arsenal.

The RF had declared Rhodesia's independence from Great Britain in 1965, triggering a fifteen-year-long civil war. A second insurgency group in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe led by Joshua Nkoma's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) along with its armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), was supported by the Soviet-aligned Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In an important subplot during the era, the United States was almost completely dependent on southern Africa for its uranium supply and was willing to go to great lengths to secure the critical fuel for its nuclear arsenal.

In March 1975, a civil war broke out in Angola. The United States initially supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) as a counter to the Marxist MPLA. After the FNLA fell apart, America switched its support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The United States refused to support the de jure MPLA government, and what followed was a quarter century of civil war. The Soviets and Cubans intervened in Angola in support of the Marxist MPLA regime, which subsequently developed close military ties with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO, Namibia) and the socialist regime in Mozambique as well as with Zambia and the African National Congress in South Africa. American involvement in Angola was seriously inhibited by the U.S. Congress's Clark Amendment of 1975, which banned military aid to any Angolan party. For a decade, direct U.S. involvement in southern Africa was minimal. The election of President Ronald Reagan, however, changed that.

Jonas Savimbi, leader of the [União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola] (UNITA, [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]), one of the chief forces in the Angolan Civil War, which began in 1975. (Patrick Chauvel/Sygma/Corbis)

In July 1985, Congress repealed the Clark Amendment. Thus, the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, became a primary recipient of U.S. paramilitary aid under the Reagan Doctrine, which argued that the USSR should not only be contained but that its influence and gains abroad (such as in Angola) should be rolled back. Zaire was a major conduit (along with South Africa) for U.S. covert assistance. At the peak of America's clandestine operations, Reagan labeled Savimbi a "combatant for liberty."

In 1981, under the stewardship of Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, the United States announced a policy of constructive engagement for southern Africa. This was the endgame for U.S.-Soviet competition in the region. Crocker linked the independence of Namibia (from South Africa) to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This entailed a quasi-alliance with South Africa's apartheid government but not support for the regime in Pretoria per se. To some, this disinterred what was called the Tar Baby Option, President Richard Nixon's secret policy of rapprochement with Smith's white minority regime in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe embodied in Option Two of the National Security Study Memorandum 39, a review of U.S. African policy ordered by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The United States became one of three UN members (along with Portugal and South Africa) that allowed trade with Rhodesia from 1971 to 1977 under

the Byrd Amendment, which circumvented UN sanctions against Rhodesia by permitting importation of Rhodesian chrome.

Nevertheless, following eight long years of negotiations, constructive engagement led to the 1998 New York Accords and the subsequent exit from Angola of Cuban and South African forces aligned, respectively, with the MPLA and UNITA. The Cold War in southern Africa was over.

James J. Hentz

See also

Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Barre, Mohammed Siyad; Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Constructive Engagement; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia; Lumumba, Patrice Emery; Mobutu Sese Seko; Mozambique; Namibia; Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro; Somalia; South Africa; Zimbabwe

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Africa, Soviet Interventions in

Soviet interventions in Africa, mostly by military means, were largely a product of its Cold War rivalry with the United States. Africa received relatively little attention from Soviet foreign policymakers until the advent of widespread decolonization in the early 1960s. The growing number of newly independent states in Africa attracted the attention of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was anxious to extend Soviet influence in the region. New and independent African nations such as Ghana and Guinea turned to the Soviet Union to help balance Western influence and, in some cases, to strengthen their regimes.

Soviet military intervention in Africa began on a modest scale in the Congo (formerly Zaire) in 1960. But in January 1961 Soviet aid to the Congo

began to dwindle as its attention shifted elsewhere, particularly to neighboring Angola.

As early as 1961, the Soviet Union began establishing tentative ties with Agostinho Neto and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and supported Neto in his struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. During Neto's struggle against South African troops in the early 1970s, the United States supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Soviet support in Angola remained minimal until the Portuguese revolution of 1974, which brought an end to its African empire. The Soviet Union also seemed increasingly willing to take advantage of the American retreat in Vietnam and U.S. congressional demands for an end to the covert aid program being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Angola. With Soviet military aid and Cuban troops, Neto won control of the capital of Luanda and became president in 1975. Even though civil war continued, he set about building a socialist government. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union was providing the Neto regime with nearly $200 million a year in military aid.

Soviet and Eastern bloc military advisors in Angola, 1 April 1983. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Soviet success in Angola spurred Premier Leonid Brezhnev to additional involvement in the Horn of Africa. In 1974 the overthrow of Haile Selassie's monarchy in Ethiopia by the socialist junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam opened the door for Soviet influence there as well. As Soviet relations with Ethiopia improved, those with neighboring Somalia worsened.

In 1977 Somalia abrogated its treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, closed the naval base at Berbera, and formed an alliance with the United States, which had only recently terminated its aid program to socialist Ethiopia. With this abrupt change, a border war between Ethiopia and Somalia broke out over the region of Ogaden. Soviet aid flooded Ethiopia, reaching well over $2 billion by 1982, and Somali forces were driven from Ogaden. Yet Soviet policy always contained a degree of caution, and it thus remained silent on Ethiopian efforts to subjugate Eritrea.

Intervention in southern Africa was not as direct but was nonetheless important for Soviet foreign and strategic policy on the continent. Aid to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) in Mozambique and the socialist government of Samora Machel provided a base from which to attack white supremacists in Rhodesia and South Africa. Soviet assistance to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was not very effective, as the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) loosely allied itself with the People's Republic of China (PRC). In allied states such as Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania, the Soviet Union helped to arm and train soldiers from the African National Congress (ANC) and the Southwest African

U.S./Soviet Interventions in Africa, 1960s–1990s

Intervention in	*Intervention by*	*Years of Intervention*	*Result of Intervention*
Angola	Soviet Union	1961–1980s	Agostinho Neto became president of Angola in 1975
Mozambique	Soviet Union	1962–1980s	Aid to the socialist regime of Samora Machel provided a base from which to attack white supremacists in Rhodesia and South Africa
Zimbabwe	Soviet Union	1971–1980s	Aid to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union did not prevent Zimbabwe's alliance with the People's Republic of China
Zimbabwe	United States	1975–1979	Unsuccessfully covertly aided the white Rhodesian regime
Angola	United States	1975–1980s	Tried to prevent the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Independence of Angola from coming to power
Ethiopia	Soviet Union	1977–1982	Somali forces were driven from Ogaden
Mozambique	United States	1979–1990	Supported anticommunist group RENAMO in guerrilla raids against the existing infrastructure

People Organization (SWAPO). While Soviet military aid was substantial, it was not sufficient to prevent counterrevolutionary movements in the region.

Both American and Soviet interventions in Africa during the Cold War gave many African leaders the opportunity to find outside support and, for a time, boosted Africa's international stature. Soviet relations with African states usually began with economic and cultural agreements and then were followed by military aid to bolster friendly leaders in important states. In return, the Soviet Union sometimes asked for maritime agreements to increase its fleet presence and urged African governments to take a socialist orientation. When Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, African intervention was no longer a priority, as Moscow turned its attention to mending its own ailing economy.

Soviet and American intervention in Africa increased the number of arms on the continent, as each side continued to support strong men who would defend their interests and influence in the region. At their height, arms transfers to Africa probably reached $4 billion per year.

Lise Namikas

See also

Africa; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Congo, Republic of the; Ethiopia; Mozambique; Namibia; Somalia; Tanzania

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Africa, U.S. Interventions in

During the Cold War, U.S. intervention in Africa took many different forms. American intervention was shaped in part by history, as the nation had experienced varied economic and cultural ties with different parts of Africa over a long period of time. Freed slaves from the United States settled in Liberia in the early nineteenth century, and so that country became a virtual American colony. Much of the continent, however, was ruled by European colonial powers and therefore had been long off-limits to American influences.

By the 1940s American economic and cultural ties to South Africa were significant, and in the early Cold War period the United States relied heavily upon South African uranium deposits for its nuclear programs. At the same time, the United States continued to make clear its opposition to formal colonialism and welcomed Africa's independence movements in the 1950s, hoping that newly independent nations would not slide into the Soviets' orbit of power.

The strongest initial African ally in this period was Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who allowed the United States to build a major communications facility in his country. Direct U.S. political involvement in Africa was, however, quite unlikely. When the Congo crisis erupted in 1960, the United States remained determined to exert influence via the United Nations (UN), despite evidence of Soviet and Cuban involvement there. President John F. Kennedy was concerned that America should not be seen as actively supporting the apartheid regime in South Africa and so, despite that country's strategic significance, American policymakers began to take measures to express their displeasure with apartheid. In general, however, Africa remained low on the list of U.S. priorities, and under President Richard M. Nixon American policy again swung behind the white minority regimes of southern Africa, on the grounds that the existing liberation forces were unlikely to overthrow them.

In the 1970s, however, the continent underwent significant changes. In 1974 the United States lost a key ally when Selassie was overthrown. Then, with the approach of Angola's independence in 1975, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided to intervene covertly to prevent the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from coming to power. The Ford administration provided the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with funding to work with the South Africans to support the two rival Angolan political movements, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). But after the arrival of Cuban forces in Angola, the CIA operation collapsed in disaster, and the Clark Amendment passed by the U.S. Congress forbade the use of funds for further covert operations in that country. The CIA then sought to recruit mercenaries for use in Angola and to aid the increasingly beleaguered white Rhodesian regime in Zimbabwe's liberation war. These measures proved equally ineffective, however.

The Clark Amendment was repealed in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan hoped to dislodge the pro-Soviet MPLA government in Angola by supporting UNITA. Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi was invited to

Washington and hailed as a "freedom fighter." At the same time, Reagan's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, was trying to secure the linkage of the complete withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola with the independence of Namibia. In 1988, through active mediation in a series of meetings among the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, Crocker was at last able to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Namibia issue, and the Namibia/Angola accords were signed at UN headquarters in December 1988. This was perhaps the U.S. government's most successful intervention in Africa, although by that point the United States was working together with the Soviet Union rather than against it.

Christopher Saunders

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Central Intelligence Agency; Ethiopia; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kissinger, Henry; Namibia; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; South Africa; Zimbabwe

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African National Congress

Black national liberation movement in South Africa. Long before the advent of the Cold War, the African National Congress (ANC), formed in 1912 by a group of black South Africans headed by Pixley Seme, had links with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which was formed in 1921. Black Africans could be members of both, but until the 1950s the two remained distinct organizations with different philosophies, as the ANC was, as its name suggested, a black nationalist organization. After the white-majority National Party came to power in 1948 and established a harsher form of racial segregation known as apartheid, the CPSA was forced to go underground in 1950. At that juncture, links between the ANC and CPSA became closer.

Former CPSA members along with the Congress of Democrats, an all-white organization established in 1950, worked closely with the ANC leadership in the antiapartheid Congress Alliance of the mid-1950s. Members of the newly formed South African Communist Party (SACP) played a leading role in the creation of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), which engaged in sabotage from 1961 and in time became the armed wing of the ANC. In the beginning, a young Nelson Mandela was the commander of the MK.

Supporters of South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) gather on 12 August 1952 in Johannesburg as part of a civil disobedience campaign to protest the apartheid regime of racial segregation. The protesters were later arrested. (AFP/Getty Images)

The ANC itself, banned in April 1960 by the white Afrikaner National Party, was forced to work underground and in exile. This drew the ANC and the SACP closer still, to the extent that some have claimed that the exiled ANC leadership was dominated by the SACP. This is an exaggeration. The leading figures in the ANC—including Albert Luthuli, the ANC leader who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961; Oliver Tambo, the leader in exile from 1960 who succeeded Luthuli as ANC president; and Nelson Mandela, who with the other leading members of MK was sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island in 1964—were not communists.

Thabo Mbeki, who would ultimately succeed Mandela as South Africa's president in 1999, was a member of the ANC for a time and went to Moscow for military training along with many other ANC members. Whereas the ANC's rival, the Pan-Africanist Congress, established relations with China in the 1960s, it was the Soviet Union that provided the ANC with the bulk of its funding and all its military support and hardware. In South Africa itself, many underground or imprisoned ANC members were, in the 1970s, influenced by the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). Adherents of the BCM who joined the ANC tended to oppose the organization's close ties with the SACP.

From a Cold War perspective, the United States long viewed the ANC as pro-Moscow and a "terrorist" organization, and it was not until the late 1980s that an ANC leader was invited to Washington. The ANC and MK always maintained that throughout their armed struggle they only targeted government structures and not civilians, although by the mid-1980s they were forced to admit that civilians sometimes got caught in the cross fire. Many young ANC members were radicalized by the repression meted out by the South African government from the Soweto Uprising of 1976 on, especially during the People's Uprising of the mid-1980s. The ANC then began to talk of ending both apartheid and capitalism by establishing a socialist state in South Africa.

The ANC leadership in exile was more attuned to international currents, however, and by the mid-1980s conceded that if the ANC came to power it would do so in the context of a multiparty system and would not be able to introduce socialism, at least in the short run. As the Cold War began to wind down, important voices in both the SACP and ANC renewed the call for a negotiated settlement.

The governmental ban of the ANC and SACP was lifted in February 1990 by South African President F. W. de Klerk. By then, with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the whites' fear of communism had waned, and within the ANC itself the influence of communism had greatly diminished. With the Cold War virtually ended, Mandela toured the United States after his release from prison in February 1990 and received a rapturous reception. He would not, however, visit the former Soviet Union until many years later. Since the establishment of majority rule in March 1994, the ANC has been the governing party in South Africa. Although its alliance with the SACP has endured, its policies have been far removed from socialism.

Christopher Saunders

See also

Botha, Pieter Willem; Mandela, Nelson; South Africa

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Aideed, Mohamed Farah

(1934–1996)

Controversial Somalian warlord who opposed the United Nations' peacekeeping mission in Somalia of 1992–1995. Born Mohamed Farah Hassan on 15 December 1934, probably in the central highland region of the former Italian Somaliland, Hassan preferred the moniker of "Aideed," a childhood

nickname. After joining Somalia's Police Corps in 1954, he attended infantry school near Rome and soon after became chief of police in Mogadishu. Following his promotion to lieutenant in 1960, he spent three years in Moscow at the Frunze Military Academy. He later served as chief military advisor to Mohammed Siyad Barre's regime and then as Somalia's ambassador to India during 1984–1989.

In January 1991 Aideed successfully led opposition forces in deposing Barre and then embarked on a brutal military campaign to overthrow the interim government that resulted in a full-blown civil war and ignited intraclan hostilities that soon turned Mogadishu into a shattered war zone. The mounting crisis was magnified by the onset of a severe drought in the region, which prompted the United Nations (UN) to intervene in Somalia in April 1992. Aideed responded to the UN presence by ordering his militia to seize all foreign food aid shipments meant for the starving population. In May 1993, after the successful relief efforts of Operation RESTORE HOPE, UN peacekeeping forces were ordered to police the region and maintain stability.

Aideed's militia fought back viciously, repeatedly wounding UN troops. On 3 October 1993, a bloody confrontation between Aideed's militia and U.S. military forces resulted in heavy casualties for both sides. The high-profile battle led the United States to withdraw from Somalia, allowing Aideed to consolidate his power for a time. In September 1995, shortly after the complete departure of UN personnel, Aideed declared himself president of the Somali Republic. He was, however, under constant threat from rival clans, and on 2 August 1996 he died in southern Mogadishu from a gunshot wound following an intraclan skirmish.

SCOT D. BRUCE

See also

Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Barre, Mohammed Siyad; Somalia

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Air Burst

Term used for a nuclear warhead detonation in the atmosphere. In nuclear weapons doctrine, air bursts are usually reserved for use against populated areas, where the effects of the blast and spread of radiation are maximized by an above-ground detonation. Air bursts can also be used to increase the damage caused by the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) created by a nuclear weapon. EMP is an electromagnetic charge somewhat similar to a solar flare that can

cripple or destroy electronics of all types. Thus, a nuclear air burst can readily render communications, vehicles, ships, computers, and missile guidance systems unusable.

The first atomic bomb, dropped over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, was an air burst, exploding some 1,890 feet over the city. The blast obliterated 4 square miles of Hiroshima, destroying 62,000 buildings. More than 71,000 Japanese died; another 20,000 were wounded, and 171,000 were left homeless.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Atomic Bomb; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical

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Aircraft

Having benefited greatly from the technological leaps made during World War II, aircraft emerged as vital military, political, and socialization tools for both sides of the Cold War divide. Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft were developed and fielded at a phenomenal pace and emerged as key components of geopolitical policies and ambitions.

The close of World War II saw the beginning of the end of the era of piston-powered fighter aircraft, as both Germany and Great Britain fielded jet-powered aircraft in combat. Building largely on German research, both the United States and the USSR unveiled seminal jet-powered models in the years immediately after the war. Soviet production began with the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 Fagot, of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation, that saw service in 1948 and stunned U.S. pilots in the early days of the Korean War. The MiG-15's primary U.S. counterpart in the skies above the Korean Peninsula was the North American F-86 Sabre, which utilized the latest in swept-wing technology and could achieve transonic speeds in level flight while protecting American pilots through the use of the first production aircraft ejector seats. Although the F-86 was marginally inferior to its Soviet nemesis, the model enjoyed stunning success in Korea due largely to the superior training and tactics of American pilots over their Soviet and Chinese counterparts.

Although test pilot Chuck Yeager had piloted the Bell X-1 *Glamorous Glennis* through the sound barrier in 1947, the title of the world's first truly supersonic war-fighting machine resided with America's next production model jet fighter, the F-100 Super Sabre. Debuting in 1954 as the first in the

During the Korean War, U.S. Operation MOOLAH offered $100,000 and political asylum to the first communist pilot to defect with an undamaged MiG-15. The United States wanted the Soviet-built aircraft for assessment and evaluation. Shown here is the MiG-15 flown by North Korean defector pilot Lieutenant No Kum Sok to Kimpo Airfield in South Korea on 21 September 1953. He claimed that he had not been aware of the financial incentive. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Century series of U.S. fighters, the Super Sabre can be more accurately labeled as an interceptor/fighter/bomber.

Utilizing two Tumanskii turbojets to reach Mach 1.36 speed, the MiG-19 Farmer became the first supersonic fighter produced outside the United States when it entered service in 1955. The MiG-19 saw extensive use during Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. Plans for the MiG-19 were also exported to China, where by the late 1950s the model was produced by the Shenyang Aircraft Factory for the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) under the designation of J-6.

France's ability to keep pace in the Cold War's rapidly evolving fighter industry was maintained almost solely by designs fielded by the firm of Marcel Dassault. The Buchenwald survivor's Mystère II joined the Armée de l'Air in 1954 and after only a year's time was joined by the Mystère IV. The latter model was also exported to Israel, where it quickly saw action against Egyptian MiG-15s during the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Britain's entry into the realm of the supersonic fighter began with the English Electric (later British Aircraft Corporation) Lightning, which Fighter Command declared operational in 1959. The single-seat Lightning's distinctive, vertically stacked engine configuration allowed the aircraft to reach speeds that would break the then-current air-speed record of Mach 1.72 during

U.S. McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II fighter aircraft shown in flight over Florida. (U.S. Air Force)

flight testing in 1957. The idiosyncratic design would also prove to be the model's downfall, however, as the twin engines left scant room in the fuselage for fuel, limiting the Lightning to a range of under two hours.

The U.S. Navy responded to the demands and restraints of carrier-based flight by continuing to employ piston-powered fighters well after the land-based services had switched to jet power. Models such as the Vought F4U Corsair and Douglas AD Skyraider saw action during the Korean War, and the versatile Skyraider remained operational in Vietnam into the 1970s. Naval turbojet models were produced beginning in the mid-1950s, most notably with the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk and F4D (later F-6) Skyray, the navy's first supersonic jet.

The navy caught up with its land-based contemporaries with the 1961 service debut of the McDonnell (later McDonnell-Douglas) F-4 Phantom II, which proved so successful that the U.S. Air Force began land-based use of the F-4C model in 1963. The Phantom became the premier U.S. fighter/bomber in Vietnam after 1965, providing air cover for and later replacing the less capable F-100s and F-105s. F-4s notched the first air-to-air kills against the North Vietnamese Air Force for both the U.S. Navy and Air Force in June and July 1965, respectively, by downing MiG-17s over Gen Phu and Hanoi.

The United States also exported the F-4 in large numbers to ten allied countries, most notably Australia, Britain, Israel, Iran, Japan, South Korea,

and West Germany. In all, approximately 1,000 airframes were sent abroad, complementing a tally of more than 4,000 for domestic use and making the Phantom the most-produced Western fighter aircraft in the postwar period.

Although prolific by any standard, F-4 production numbers were dwarfed by the MiG-21 Fishbed, which entered Soviet service in 1959 and was produced by the USSR, several Warsaw Pact countries, India, and China in numbers exceeding 10,000 units over the next forty years. With a length of 51 feet 8 inches and a wingspan of only 23 feet 5 inches, the Fishbed was much more compact than any of its contemporary Western adversaries. Although its size limited the aircraft's range, its light weight allowed speeds surpassing Mach 2 and provided the first successful fighter and interceptor combination in the Soviet air fleet. The PLAAF also made extensive use of the Fishbed (designated J-7) after it was licensed by the Soviets in 1961. Although early production numbers were kept low by deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, production of the delta-winged fighter began again in earnest in the late 1970s and early 1980s and continued to the conclusion of the Cold War.

Taking on the true interceptor role was the MiG-25 Foxbat, which entered service in 1970 specifically to counter the threat of Mach 3 U.S. bombers that, although they never came into existence, were presupposed to be the next logical step in aircraft development on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Although the MiG-25 could generate enough thrust to propel the aircraft to speeds upwards of Mach 3.2, unknown outside Soviet circles, structural limitations meant that reaching speeds higher than Mach 2.8 would almost certainly result in complete engine failure. Also unknown to the West at the time was that the Foxbat had negligible maneuverability and close combat potential; thus, Western air analysts found themselves presented with an aircraft that they assumed could beat all challengers. This scare, later proven to have been unfounded, resulted in increased research and development into what would become the F-15 and F-16 programs.

The early 1970s saw a flurry of fighter deliveries to both camps in their efforts to maintain an edge in air superiority. The MiG-23 Flogger and its eponymous ground attack counterpart, the MiG-27, entered service in 1973 and 1975, respectively. In the United States, 1972 marked the operational introduction of the Grumman F-14 Tomcat, which, when coupled with the newly designed AIM-54 Phoenix missile, provided the U.S. Navy with a formidable interceptor. The F-14 would prove a major success worthy of replacing the aging F-4. The F-14 also became the premier Iranian fighter.

January 1976 saw the first delivery of an operational McDonnell-Douglas (later Boeing) F-15 Eagle, which set the standard in tactical fighter design through the closing years of the Cold War. The Eagle amassed an enviable no-loss record in air-to-air engagements, most often in the hands of Israeli pilots fighting Syrian-flown MiGs. Following on the heels of the F-15 were the General Dynamics (later Lockheed-Martin) F-16 Fighting Falcon in 1979 and the U.S. Navy's McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18 Hornet in 1983.

With the skyrocketing costs of modern fighters, some West European countries decided to keep pace with U.S. advancements by combining research and funding. The result of a consortium among Britain, Italy, and

Germany was the Panavia Tornado, a multirole combat aircraft (MRCA) that first flew in 1974 and would enter service in its interdiction and strike configuration with each of its sponsor nations as well as in an air defense variation in Britain. Dassault Aviation maintained its primacy within the French aerospace industry when its futuristically named Mirage 2000 gained operational status with the Armée de l'Air in 1983.

Both the 1983 Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum and the 1986 Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker were developed out of the Soviet-advanced tactical fighter initiative, which called for direct counterparts to fourth-generation U.S. aircraft. Although potentially equal in raw technical capability to the U.S. models, the Fulcrum and Flanker were costly to produce and effected limited results in combat, due largely to the widening gulf in pilot proficiency between the East and the West.

As the Soviet military had concentrated almost exclusively on tactical airpower during World War II, at the end of the conflict the Allies had a near total monopoly on strategic bombers. Foremost among these was the venerable Boeing B-29 Superfortress, which had been employed solely in the Pacific theater and was best known for the delivery, by the *Enola Gay*, of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima in August 1945. The B-29 continued active service throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, most notably as President Harry S. Truman's nuclear ace against the Soviets during the Berlin Blockade as well as during the Korean War. The Superfortress proved so successful, in fact, that Soviet leader Josef Stalin ordered clones produced by reverse engineering from those that had been forced to land in Soviet territory in 1945. The resultant aircraft, known as the Tupolev Tu-4 Bull, entered service in 1949 as the Soviet Air Force's first nuclear-capable bomber and was rumored to be true to its American antecedent right down to the bullet holes found in one of the recovered B-29s.

The Soviets were not content to see the United States maintain heavy bomber superiority. One of the first designs was the Tupolev Tu-14, a twin-engine jet aircraft of traditional appearance produced from 1947 in a variety of models and remaining in service until the 1960s. The first successful Soviet bomber design, however, was the superb twin-engine Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle, which first appeared in prototype in 1948. It remained in first-line service for some twenty years and flew in the service of the People's Republic of China (PRC) throughout the Cold War. It was the counterpart to the British Canberra and U.S. North American B-45. More than 10,000 Il-28 bombers were built and distributed to Soviet bloc nations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) obtained a number of Il-28s from the Soviets and flew them against the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) at the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950.

The first Soviet giant bomber was the huge Myasishchev Mya-4 Bison swept-wing turbojet bomber, developed on the orders of Stalin beginning in 1949 as a plane that could reach the United States and return to base. It first became known to the West in 1955 when, much to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's satisfaction, a scheme of repeatedly flying the limited stock of Mya-4 Bisons over the reviewing stand at the Moscow air show achieved its

desired effect: U.S. military leaders within the Strategic Air Command (SAC) loudly pronounced the need for increased funding to reduce the so-called bomber gap. Such pessimistic claims were later found to have as much to do with SAC self-aggrandizement as with actual Soviet capabilities. The Bison entered service in 1956, but only about 150 Mya-4s were produced. The Bison was, in fact, a strategic white elephant with a maximum range of 7,700 miles, far short of intercontinental round-trip flight. Bisons were, in fact, employed largely as tanker and reconnaissance aircraft.

More successful was its turboprop contemporary, the Tu-95 Bear of 1955. Conspicuously employing four sets of 18-foot diameter contrarotating propellers, the Bear was the world's fastest propeller-driven aircraft, capable of cruising speeds of more than 500 mph. It had a range of 9,000 miles with a payload of up to 25,000 pounds. The Bear was intended as a nuclear bomber.

This design was countered by the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. This phenomenal aircraft joined SAC in 1955 and become the enduring long-range strategic bomber of the U.S. fleet throughout the entire Cold War. Continued upgrades allowed the B-52 to continue as the workhorse U.S. strategic bomber into the twenty-first century. With a range of 8,800 miles, the B-52 could carry a phenomenal 40,000 pounds of bombs or missiles. B-52s played a leading role in the Vietnam War, flying in direct support of ground forces in South Vietnam and, in December 1972, bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. In January 1991 a B-52H flew nonstop from Louisiana to Baghdad to drop cruise missiles and return, the longest bombing mission in history.

After successfully developing a nuclear weapon in 1952, Great Britain sought to maintain parity with the two superpowers by fielding a series of nuclear-capable bombers, known collectively as the V-bombers. The sequence began with the Vickers Valiant in 1955, which released Britain's first air-dropped nuclear weapon in a test over Australia in 1956. The Valiant was followed in quick succession by the Vulcan and Victor, although the V-bombers lost their strategic role to the Royal Navy's Polaris submarines as early as 1968. Indeed, the only bombs dropped in anger by the later models came well after the series had lost its nuclear mandate when, in 1982, Vulcans were enlisted to bomb the Falkland Islands, with Victors providing aerial refueling support en route.

The 1956 arrival of the Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker, a dedicated aerial refueling aircraft, meant that strategic bombers had ranges limited only by crew fatigue. In accordance with the policy of mutual assured destruction (MAD), SAC Commander General Curtis LeMay kept a certain number of nuclear-equipped B-52s airborne at all times. Given their now seemingly

Aircraft Types by Country

Model	*Produced By*	*Year*
Fixed-wing		
I-28 Beagle	Soviet Union	1948
Tu-4 Bull	Soviet Union	1949
Mya-4 Bison	Soviet Union	1949
Mystère II	France	1954
U-2 Dragon Lady	United States	1954
Tu-95 Bear	Soviet Union	1955
Vickers Valiant	Britain	1955
B-52 Stratofortress	United States	1955
KC-135 Stratotanker	United States	1956
C-130 Hercules	United States	1956
Lightning	Britain	1959
MiG-21 Fishbed	Soviet Union	1959
F-4 Phantom II	United States	1961
ak-25RD Mandrake	Soviet Union	1963
SR-71 Blackbird	United States	1966
MiG-25 Foxbat	Soviet Union	1970
IL-76 Candid	Soviet Union	1971
Panavia Tornado	Britain, Italy, Germany	1974
MiG-23 Flogger	Soviet Union	1975
F-15 Eagle	United States	1976
F-16 Fighting Falcon	United States	1979
F/A-18 Hornet	United States	1983
MiG-29 Fulcrum	Soviet Union	1983
Su-27 Flanker	Soviet Union	1986
B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber	United States	1989
Rotary-wing		
Sikorsky R-5	United States	1946
UH-1 Iroquois	United States	1956
Mi-6	Soviet Union	1956
CH-47 Chinook	United States	1961
S-64	Soviet Union	1962
AH-1 HueyCobra	United States	1966

limitless range, the sole remaining hindrance to bomber dominance was the ability to avoid interception by enemy fighters or antiaircraft missiles. In response, both sides in the Cold War shifted their attention to speed in the 1960s and 1970s, often with limited results. The first to arrive was the Mach 2 Tu-22M Backfire that, like its MiG-23 and Su-17 fighter counterparts, used variable-geometry wings to achieve high-speed, low-level flight. Variable geometry was also used on the Rockwell (later Boeing) B-1B Lancer that, although originally conceived in 1965, took twenty years to emerge from its incubation period, the A-model having been shelved entirely in 1977. Even less timely was the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, which made its inopportune entrance on 17 July 1989 and shortly thereafter, with the end of the Cold War, lost its primary adversary and mission while racking up a final cost of more than $2.2 billion per airframe.

The bomber gap and the later missile gap reinforced America's need for actionable intelligence in the form of aerial espionage. To this end, President Dwight D. Eisenhower requested what came to be known as the Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady in 1954, and the plane conducted its first operational mission on 4 July 1956 by overflying Leningrad and Moscow. Overflights of Soviet airspace continued until 1 May 1960, when a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk. In 1966 Lockheed followed the U-2 with the remarkable SR-71 Blackbird, which continues to hold the world speed record of 2,193 mph. Both planes enjoyed operational lives spanning the remainder of the Cold War.

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The primary British contribution to the reconnaissance effort came in the form of the Hawker-Siddeley (later BAe Systems) Nimrod, which was derived from the de Havilland Comet airliner and began service in 1969 in maritime signals intelligence and antisubmarine roles.

Soviet efforts at a dedicated aerial reconnaissance platform emerged only after Powers's downing in the form of the Yakovlev Yak-25RD Mandrake, which entered into service in April 1963 and achieved only limited success. More frequently used by the Soviets were reconnaissance-adapted fighters and bombers, including the Tu-95, Tu-160, MiG-21, and MiG-25.

Despite the often hot engagements between pilots on either side of the Cold War divide, the first post–World War II test for Western airpower came not in the form of outright battle but rather in an uneasy test of resolve between Stalin and Truman over the Berlin Blockade and subsequent airlift beginning in June 1948. Operation VITTLES and its British counterpart PLAINFARE began on 26 June when eighty U.S. Air Force Douglas C-47 Gooney Bird cargo planes lifted milk, flour, and medicine to the citizens of Berlin. With a maximum load capacity of just three tons, the twin-engine C-47 could not carry the goods necessary for an operation that would last until May 1949, and soon the Allies enlisted the help of the four-engine C-54 Skymaster, which had a nine-ton capacity.

Tactical airlift was redefined in 1956 with the advent of the Lockheed C-130 Hercules (also known as Herc). Capable of short takeoffs on dirt runways and equipped with four turboprops mounted high on the wings for maximum ground clearance, the Herc proved to be an exceptionally capable

Equipment belonging to the 32nd Combat Mobility Hospital being loaded into a Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft during Exercise REFORGER 81. (U.S. Department of Defense)

and resilient cargo platform. In addition to its primary transport role, the C-130 served throughout the Cold War in roles ranging from command and control to airborne hospital. It was exported to more than fifty countries. Although not as prolifically produced, the Antonov An-12 Cub provided the Warsaw Pact with a similar tactical airlift capability and mirrored the C-130 in size, capability, and breadth of mission.

The Lockheed C-141 Starlifter and, after 1970, the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy provided the United States with its strategic heavy lifting. The Galaxy was designed to carry 500,000 pounds of cargo, including the U.S. Army's bulkiest vehicles. Not to be outdone, the Soviets matched the C-141 with the Ilyushin IL-76 Candid in 1971 and the C-5 with the Antonov An-124 Condor in 1982, the latter of which remains the largest military aircraft ever mass-produced.

The civilian air transport sector mirrored the advancements pioneered within the military over the course of the Cold War. Through the 1950s, U.S. dominance in the industry was challenged only by the British, epitomized by the latter's development of the world's first turbojet-powered airliner, the de Havilland D.H.106 Comet, in 1949. Although significantly faster than its American piston-powered counterparts, the Comet could carry only thirty-six passengers and demonstrated a structural weakness that led to calamitous midair disasters. Although later variants of the Comet would double the

number of passengers and prove to be much safer, the model never recovered from its initial weaknesses in the public's eye and was quickly outclassed when Boeing released its Model 707 turbojet in 1958. The Soviet design bureau Tupolev introduced several airliners in the 1950s based on its bombers: the Tu-16 Badger accommodated passengers as the Tu-104, while the Tu-95 Bear was reclassified as the Tu-114.

Short- and medium-range airliners thrived in the U.S. market in the 1960s, particularly the Douglas DC-9 and Boeing Models 727 and 737. Longer-range mass transport was provided by the 747 jumbo jet, which first flew in February 1969 and could accommodate up to 500 passengers over a maximum distance of 6,200 miles. Supersonic travel became a mark of prestige, if not commercial success, for each bloc by the 1960s and 1970s: the Soviets produced the Mach 2.3 Tu-144 in model form at the 1965 Paris Air Show, while a collaborative Anglo-French program generated the Mach 2.2 BAe/Aerospatiale Concorde in 1976.

Rotary-wing aircraft did not make the substantial gains in technology and capability experienced by their fixed-wing counterparts during World War II. The first military helicopter with more than limited operational aptitude was the Sikorsky R-5, which entered service in 1946 and was used for observation, communications, and search and rescue during the Korean War. In 1956, the Bell Company established itself within the rotary community with the noteworthy UH-1 Iroquois, better known as the "Huey." UH-1 variants saw action in a variety of transport and attack roles in the Vietnam War and beyond.

Helicopter production became more specialized as it slowly advanced, leading to dedicated transport and gunship designs only by the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1957, the Soviet Mil design bureau unveiled the Mi-6 heavy-lift chopper, while the U.S. inventory remained devoid of medium and heavy lifters until the debut of the Boeing-Vertol CH-47 Chinook in 1961 and Sikorsky S-64 in 1962. Twenty years after the Mi-6, Mil followed up with the even larger Mi-26, which operated with a unique configuration of eight rotors and was the heaviest rotary-wing aircraft to achieve flight during the Cold War.

Bell created the first dedicated helicopter gunship in 1966 with its Model 209, fielded under the moniker AH-1 HueyCobra and later simply Cobra. Although the U.S. Army continued to use the AH-1 throughout the Cold War, the Hughes (later Boeing) AH-64 was introduced in 1975 as a replacement for the earlier model. Soviet attack capability was entrusted largely to the gunship versions of the Mi-8 Hip and Mi-24 Hind in the 1960s and 1970s and to the Mi-28 Havoc in the 1980s. Aircraft, both fixed-wing and rotary, enjoyed tremendous advances in the period of the Cold War.

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See also

Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bombers, Strategic; Korean War; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Mutual Assured Destruction; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; Strategic Air Command; U-2 Incident; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union; United States Air Force; United States Navy; Vietnam War

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Aircraft Carriers

Aircraft carriers were first utilized in combat in World War I. During that conflict, the Royal Navy converted a merchant ship, the *Argus*, into the first carrier with an unobstructed flight deck, but the war ended before it could be put into action. The U.S. and Japanese navies soon followed the British example. The first U.S. aircraft carrier was the *Langley*, commissioned in 1922. Japan's first carrier, the *Hosho* (1922), was also the first such vessel designed as a carrier from the keel up. Nevertheless, carriers still remained largely experimental and had yet to be fully tested in war. That all changed in World War II.

On 10–11 November 1940, during a British attack on Taranto, and on 7 December 1941, with a Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor, aircraft carriers proved their worth and opened a dramatic new era at sea. Carriers played leading roles in almost all of the major sea battles of the Pacific theater during the war, including the Coral Sea, Midway, and Leyte Gulf. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first engagement that pitted fleets in battle out of sight of the other, the fighting being carried out by aircraft alone. Aircraft carriers could deliver more firepower than even the largest battleships. During World War II, carriers came to replace battleships as the indispensable capital ships of modern naval warfare.

In the post–World War II period, aircraft carriers were both enlarged and improved technologically. But because of the great expense involved in building and maintaining carriers, some U.S. policymakers, still skeptical of their true value, sought to limit their production. President Harry S. Truman's administration, for example, canceled construction of the carrier *United States* in 1949, leading to the so-called Revolt of the Admirals. But little more than a year later, aircraft carriers in the Far East proved invaluable in projecting U.S./United Nations airpower into the Korean War. Carriers again proved

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* (CVAN-65) in the Gulf of Tonkin on 28 May 1966, during the Vietnam War. With Douglas A-4 Skyhawk fighter bombers at its bow, the *Enterprise* is ready to recover additional strike aircraft. (National Archives and Records Administration)

their worth during the Vietnam War, providing floating air bases from which to launch air combat missions well inland.

During the Cold War, U.S. carriers served two primary functions, first as a weapons system for land attacks and second as a defensive system to protect the larger fleet from submarine, surface, and airborne threats from both aircraft and missiles. Generally, a larger carrier costs less per aircraft embarked than a smaller one, and it can also launch larger aircraft, which themselves can dominate wider areas. Moreover, such aircraft carriers usually deliver a lower cost per unit of ordnance or per unit of defensive capability. The larger carriers can also carry more ammunition and fuel, are outfitted with more sophisticated electronic countermeasures, and have more armor protection than the smaller aircraft carriers.

In wartime, power projection and naval striking capacity are integral to naval strategy. Aircraft carriers are routinely deployed as a show of force to an area of potential conflict and can also be rapidly deployed to another region of the world should a crisis erupt, ready to operate as a navy's most credible, sustainable, and independent base to launch everything from unobtrusive surveillance to devastating air strikes. A carrier with a complement of fifty attack aircraft can deliver more than 150 strikes per day against littoral targets. Together with their onboard air wings, aircraft carriers play vital roles across the full spectrum of naval strategy, deployable worldwide in support of national interests or allied combat missions.

It is important to note that the ability of an aircraft carrier to remain on station in international waters for extended periods of time is dependent upon naval support forces. Although large aircraft carriers can carry great quantities of fuel, food, and spare parts for sustained, unsupported operations, these stocks must still be replenished on a periodic basis.

Carriers built during the Cold War were larger than their World War II predecessors. They also featured armored flight decks. The introduction of jet aircraft posed potentially serious problems because they possessed heavier weight, slower acceleration, and higher landing speeds and had greater fuel consumption than piston-driven aircraft. A number of British innovations contributed to the solution of these problems: the steam-powered catapult, the angled flight deck, the mirrored landing-signal system, and the ski-jump deck and V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) airplane. The ski-jump carrier permits a small ship to operate V/STOL aircraft, such as the Hawker-Siddeley Harrier, at the limits of its lifting potential. In September 1960, the United States launched the world's first nuclear-powered carrier, the *Enterprise.* Nuclear engines made voyages of up to 1 million miles possible without the need for refueling. When commissioned, the *Enterprise* was the

largest warship in the world, and it was the second nuclear-powered surface warship to enter service behind the U.S. cruiser *Long Beach*.

The immense cost of such large super aircraft carriers has essentially put them out of reach of the British, Russians, and French. The small V/STOL carrier is all the sea-based air capability that most navies can afford, and the United States is alone in its use of the super multipurpose carriers.

Carriers may be roughly segmented into three classifications: the super carriers, such as the U.S. Navy's CNV Nimitz–class (102,000 tons, fully loaded) and CV Kitty Hawk–class (93,960 tons); the middle class, such as the French *Charles de Gaulle* (42,000 tons) and the Russian *Admiral Kuznetsov* (58,500 tons); and the V/STOL-class, exemplified by the British *Invincible* (20,600 tons), the Italian *Giuseppe Garibaldi* (13,850 tons) and *Andrea Doria* (26,500 tons estimated, under construction), the Spanish *Principe de Asturias* (17,188 tons), the Indian *Viraat* (ex-Royal Navy *Hermes*, 28,700 tons) and *Vikrant* (38,000 tons reported, under construction), the Russian modified Kiev-class *Vikramaditya* (ex-*Admiral Gorshkov*) (23,900 tons), and the Thai *Chakri Naruebet* (11,485 tons).

Hirama Yoichi

See also

Aircraft; France, Navy; India, Armed Forces; Italy, Armed Forces; Royal Navy; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Navy

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AirLand Battle

In the development of military doctrine, victory in war is usually followed by a period of complacency and stagnation, while defeat spurs a period of critical self-examination and robust internal debate that often leads to dramatic doctrinal innovations. This was true for the United States following the Vietnam War. For the U.S. military, the trauma of the loss in Vietnam was compounded by the unexpected lethality of modern weapons witnessed in the short but violent 1973 Yom Kippur War. That in turn led to an increasing recognition that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could not rely on battlefield nuclear weapons to offset the overwhelming numerical advantage of the Warsaw Pact in any future war on the European continent.

Working through the problem, American military thinkers identified two types of wars that the United States could face in the future: a heavy

mechanized war in Europe or a light infantry war in some other part of the world. Although the mechanized war in Europe was the least likely scenario, it was also the most dangerous. U.S. military doctrine had to be revised to be able to defeat America's strongest and most dangerous enemy.

Initially, the sights of the American military were fixed at the tactical level—"Win the First Battle"—with little consideration beyond that. There also was a recognition that the next major conflict would be a "Come As You Are War." Under the direct guidance of General William E. DePuy, the first commander of the newly established U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the initial expression of this doctrinal rethinking was the 1976 edition of *FM 100–5, Operations*. The new manual introduced the notion of active defense, a highly questionable substitute for the tested defensive concepts of mobile defense and defense in depth. In focusing on the lethality of modern weapons, the new doctrine stressed the effects of firepower by devoting the preponderance of space to a discussion of its effects. The new *FM 100–5* did not ignore maneuver, but it did relegate that element of combat power to the mere function of movement to deliver firepower rather than gain positional advantage.

The 1976 edition of *FM 100–5* was wildly controversial even before it had been fully distributed to the field. The critics of DePuy's doctrine rejected it as too mechanical, too dogmatic, and too mathematically deterministic. Nonetheless, DePuy's efforts were a major contribution to the post-Vietnam U.S. Army because, for the first time in many years, officers were again thinking and writing about doctrine. The resulting debate fueled a renaissance in American military thinking.

The immediate reactions to the 1976 edition resulted in the notion of follow-on forces attack (FOFA), which in turn led to recognition of the operational depth of the battlefield. That led directly to the final acceptance by the American military and NATO of the concept of the operational level of war, as distinct from the tactical or the strategic. The Soviets had formally recognized this level of warfare as early as the 1920s and had aggressively worked to define and expand the theory of operational art ever since. The West had long rejected the concept as little more than yet another crackpot element of Marxist thinking, but the Soviets had been right all along on this point.

The principal guiding force behind the development of AirLand Battle doctrine was General Donn A. Starry, who assumed command of TRADOC in July 1977. Working directly under Starry, Major General Donald R. Morelli, TRADOC's deputy chief of staff of doctrine, closely supervised the team of doctrine writers, which included Lieutenant Colonels Leonard D. Holder, Huba Wass de Czega, and Richard Hart Sinnerich. Classical German military thought had a great deal of influence on the development of the new doctrine. Even in the 1976 edition of *FM 100–5*, General DePuy had instructed the doctrine writers to study carefully the current capstone doctrinal manual of the West German Bundeswehr. That manual, *HDv 100/100, Truppenführung* (Command and Control in Battle), was based closely on the manual of the same name first introduced in 1932 with which the German Army

fought World War II. Through the influence of the German manual, such standard German doctrinal concepts as *Auftragstaktik* (mission orders) and *Schwerpunkt* (center of gravity) became firmly embedded in American military thinking.

The 1982 edition of *FM 100–5* marked the U.S. military's first formal recognition of the operational level of war and introduced the concepts of AirLand Battle and Deep Battle. AirLand Battle doctrine took a nonlinear view of combat. It enlarged the battlefield area, stressing unified air and ground operations throughout the theater. It recognized the nonquantifiable elements of combat power and restressed that maneuver was as important as firepower. Most significantly, the doctrine emphasized the human element of war, "courageous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, effective leaders." An undercurrent to this last theme, of course, was the fact that the United States had only recently abolished conscription and was then in the process of building an all-volunteer, professional army. AirLand Battle doctrine identified the keys to success in war, which included indirect approaches, speed and violence, flexibility and reliance on the initiative of junior leaders, rapid decision making, clearly defined objectives and operational concepts, a clearly designated main effort, and deep attack.

Depth was one of the keys. A commander had to fight and synchronize three simultaneous battles: close, deep, and rear. The deep battle, of course, would be the enemy's rear battle, and vice versa. A well-coordinated attack deep in an enemy's rear might in fact prove decisive. This marked the first recognition in American military doctrine that the battle might not necessarily be decided along the line of contact.

One of the most controversial features of the 1976 edition of *FM 100–5* had been the elimination of the venerable Principles of War, first adopted by the U.S. Army in the early 1920s. The 1982 edition restored the Principles of War but then went one step further by introducing the Four Tenets of AirLand Battle: initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. Initiative is the ability to set the terms of the battle by action and was identified as the greatest advantage in war. Depth has components of time, space, and resources. Agility is the ability to act faster than the enemy to exploit his weakness and frustrate his plans. Synchronization ensures that no effort will be wasted, either initially or as operations develop.

Some critics complained that the Four Tenets of AirLand Battle were unnecessary additions to the Principles of War or were ultimately an attempt to replace them. But as other analysts pointed out, the Four Tenets were for the most part combinations of two or more of the Principles of War. Synchronization, for example, combined economy of force and unity of effort. Initiative combined offensive, maneuver, and surprise.

The 1982 *FM 100–5* was a major milestone in American military thought, but it was far from a perfect document. After its release to the field the debate continued, and the doctrine writers continued to refine the document. The 1986 edition of *FM 100–5* contained no significant changes or innovations, but it presented a far better discussion of the doctrine and corrected some of the minor errors in the 1982 edition. Some errors still remained, however. The

1986 edition used the German concept of the *Schwerpunkt* interchangeably as either the center of gravity or the decisive point. As defined originally by nineteenth-century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, however, the center of gravity and the decisive point (*Entscheidungsstelle*) were two distinct and separate concepts. The confusion was not corrected until the 1993 edition of *FM 100–5*, which stated clearly: "Decisive points are not centers of gravity, they are the keys to getting at the centers of gravity."

NATO never fully embraced the AirLand Battle doctrine, and, ironically, neither did the U.S. Air Force. In any event, the new doctrine never had to be used in an actual war against the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Northern Europe. AirLand Battle, however, greatly concerned the Soviets and was just one more element of pressure in the 1980s that eventually contributed to the collapse of the communist Soviet Union. The overwhelmingly successful prosecution of the First Gulf War in 1991 was based on the 1986 edition of *FM 100–5*, which was arguably the single best official articulation of American war-fighting doctrine ever published.

The overwhelmingly successful prosecution of the First Gulf War in 1991 was based on the 1986 edition of *FM 100–5*, which was arguably the single best official articulation of American war-fighting doctrine ever published.

The 1993 edition of *FM 100–5* actually shifted the emphasis away from operations and conventional war fighting toward strategy and operations other than war (OOTW). Even the term "AirLand Battle" was dropped in favor of "Army Operations," but that was more the result of bureaucratic infighting between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force. A new edition of *FM 100–5* in 1998 was supposed to shift the emphasis back to the operational art, but the final coordinating draft caused considerable internal controversy. The new manual was finally issued in June 2001, under a new numbering system, as *FM 3–0 Operations*. Although the term "AirLand Battle" is no longer officially in use, the U.S. Army continues to train and operate in accordance with its principles.

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See also

Artillery; DePuy, William Eugene; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Albania

The Balkan nation of Albania is located on the southeastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. It is bordered to the north and east by Serbia and Montenegro, due east by the former Yugoslavian republic of Macedonia, and to the southeast by Greece. Albania, with a 1945 population of some 1.1 million people, comprises 11,000 square miles. During 1941–1944, Albanian nationalist and communist forces fought against one another as well as against German and Italian troops in a struggle for control of the country. Between September 1943 when the Italian fascist regime was overthrown and Italy surrendered to the Allies and November 1944 when Germany withdrew from Albania, the communists slowly ground down nationalist forces in a brutal civil war. The communists, rather ironically backed by the United States, Britain, and Yugoslavian guerrillas led by Josip Broz Tito, established de facto control over southern Albania by January 1944.

Enver Hoxha, a former French teacher and longtime Albanian communist, became chairman of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, an arm of the Albanian National Liberation Front, in January 1944. By May 1944 he was also the supreme commander of the National Liberation Army (NLA). With the aid of British arms and Allied air cover, in October 1944 the NLA moved north and captured the capital of Tirana. Hoxha was then named prime minister, and in December 1944 he repaid Tito for his help by sending Albanian forces to fight alongside Yugoslavian communist forces to defeat ethnic Albanian forces in Kosovo.

During the early years of the Cold War, Hoxha systematically consolidated his power and took on the added posts of foreign minister, defense minister, and army commander in chief. He and his second-in-command, Mehmet Shehu, terrorized remnant nationalist holdouts, stamped out any potential opposition, and established a totalitarian communist government that was among the most oppressive in the world. By mid-1946, all Albanian industries had been nationalized. The Agrarian Reform Law led to the seizure of the lands of large landowners and their redistribution to the peasants, and the economy was fully centralized.

In July 1946 Albania signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Yugoslavia, but within a year the alliance collapsed in part because of Hoxha's fear that his nation would be annexed by Yugoslavia. When the Soviet-controlled Cominform expelled Yugoslavia in June 1948 because of Tito's independent streak, the Hoxha regime became rabidly Stalinist and turned to the Soviet Union for economic assistance. At the same time, Albanian relations with the West deteriorated, especially after two British ships struck Albanian mines in the channel between Albania and Corfu in October 1946. Britain and the United States spent the next seven years trying in vain to overthrow the Hoxha regime. These efforts only increased Albanian xenophobia and convinced Hoxha that the West was not to be trusted.

In February 1949 Albania joined Comecon and began to trade exclusively with Eastern bloc nations. Following the Soviet Union's lead, Hoxha

Women picking cotton in Albania, 1956. (Library of Congress)

initiated a series of Five-Year Plans designed to take advantage of Albania's abundant natural resources, including oil, copper, and coal. The plans also included an ambitious program to modernize the country's electrical and transportation infrastructure.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's speech of February 1956, in which he denounced Stalin and his policies, further deepened Albania's distrust of the outside world. Hoxha and Shehu condemned Khrushchev's concept of peaceful coexistence, choosing to maintain their strict Stalinist stance. At the same time, Albania condemned Tito's overtures to the West, and state-sanctioned political repression increased with the establishment by 1961 of some fourteen gulag-style camps for political prisoners. Many of the prisoners were used as slave laborers in nearby mines and industrial centers, leading one historian to dub Albania "the Mediterranean Gulag."

Between 1958 and 1960 Albania further ostracized itself by becoming a player in the emerging Sino-Soviet split. Albania tilted toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) and again condemned the notions of peaceful coexistence, de-Stalinization, and Titoism. At the November 1960 Moscow conference of world communist representatives, Hoxha verbally attacked the Soviet Union's policies. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets ended their technical and economic support of Albania. The PRC then stepped in and became Albania's new patron.

True to form, Albania followed China's lead when Chinese leader Mao Zedong announced the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In 1965 Hoxha initiated his own Cultural and Ideological Revolution. The already-oppressive nature of Albanian life became even more entrenched as government authorities sought to eliminate "professionalism" in the nation's bureaucracies, including the army, and forcibly transfer white-collar workers to the industrial and agricultural sectors. In 1967 the government prohibited all aspects of religion in the public sphere. As a result, mosques and churches were seized and transformed into warehouses and workshops as the Hoxha regime declared Albania "the world's first atheistic nation." Meanwhile, Hoxha's portrait and alleged writings were plastered throughout Albania, mimicking Stalin's and Mao's cults of personality. In 1968, after the Prague Spring and subsequent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania cut its last remaining ties with the Soviets by withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.

China's diplomatic overtures to the United States, which began in 1971, led to a decrease in U.S. commitments to Albania. When U.S. President Richard M. Nixon made his historic visit to China in February 1972, Albania pointedly refused to publicize it. To compensate for its faltering relations with China, Hoxha then revived relations with Yugoslavia and Greece. During 1972–1975, Albania strengthened its commercial, diplomatic, and cultural ties to Western Europe. But Tirana showed the limits of this by refusing to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Albania became the only European nation to boycott the Helsinki Conference on Human Rights of July 1975.

After Mao's death in 1976, Albania publicly condemned his successors, who responded by welcoming Tito with open arms during a 1977 state visit to China. They then cut off all aid to Albania a year later. As Hoxha continued to improve relations with Western Europe, he launched yet another series of purges, culminating in the alleged suicide of his right-hand man Shehu on 18 December 1981. Historians believe that Hoxha ordered Shehu killed, and in November 1982 Shehu was posthumously accused of being a spy for both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Hoxha's death in April 1985 brought his handpicked successor, Ramiz Alia, to power. Alia had been acting prime minister since 1983. Alia's image soon replaced Hoxha's on Albanian signs and buildings, and he continued Albania's self-imposed isolation even as he established official diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). By the time the Berlin Wall came down in the fall of 1989, Albania was in desperate financial and economic straits, with a repressed and paranoid population barely able to cope in the new era of posttotalitarian Eastern Europe.

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See also

Alia, Ramiz; China, People's Republic of; Comecon; Cominform; Europe, Eastern; Gulags; Hoxha, Enver; Mao Zedong; Prague Spring; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on; Shehu, Mehmet; Sino-Soviet Split; Tito, Josip Broz; Warsaw Pact

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Albert II, King of Belgium
(1934–)

King of Belgium since 1993. Albert Félix Humbert Théodore Christian Eugéne Marie Saxe-Coburg was born on 6 June 1934 in Brussels at the Château Stuyvenberg, the younger son of King Leopold III (1901–1983) and his first wife, Princess Astrid of Sweden (1905–1935). At birth, he was given the title Prince of Liège. When Leopold II abdicated the throne in 1951, Albert's older brother, Baudouin, succeeded as king, and Albert became the heir apparent. In 1959, Albert married Queen Paola, with whom he fathered three children.

Albert became the sixth king of the Belgians on 9 August 1993, nine days after Baudouin's death. Albert II was a consistent supporter of U.S. Cold War policies and a strong proponent of European economic and political integration.

Albert, who served as a vice admiral in the Belgian Navy, was convinced that Belgian (and European) prosperity was threatened by the Soviet Union. Throughout his public career, he has been dedicated to making Europe an economic and diplomatic power. Brussels is the headquarters of the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), two institutions that Albert steadfastly championed. He has also maintained a close diplomatic relationship with the United States. Albert continues to lure foreign investment to Belgium and to promote export opportunities for Belgian products.

In 1984, Albert created the Prince Albert Fund, which provides scholarships for students interested in international trade. In the post–Cold War period, he has encouraged political and economic reform in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Michael R. Hall

See also

Baudouin, King of Belgium; Belgium; Leopold III, King of Belgium

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Algeria

Northwest African nation, almost 920,000 square miles in area, with a 1945 population of slightly over 8 million; originally peopled by Berbers (who still make up a sizable national minority), now predominantly Arab. Algeria is bordered to the west by Morocco and Mauritania, to the north by the Mediterranean Sea, to the east by Tunisia and Libya, to the south by Niger, Mali, and Chad. In 1830 France seized Algiers and from then until 1847 expanded its holdings to the interior in a protracted war that created modern Algeria, which was absorbed into France's metropolitan administrative structure in 1848.

French colonizers and their descendants (known as colons) dispossessed native Algerians of the best arable lands and monopolized political power. The non-European population worked the colons' lands or eked out a meager living in the less hospitable areas. By 1945 Algeria's population included approximately 900,000 colons, whose numbers had vastly expanded since the 1920s.

The postwar era saw the rapid growth of a militant nationalist movement that was adamantly opposed by the colons, who were determined that Algeria should remain part of France. In May 1945, Muslims throughout Algeria demonstrated against colonial rule. When French colonial police fired on the protesters in Sétif, they responded by attacking Europeans. In retaliation, the military carried out reprisals that killed thousands of Algerian Muslims. This massacre accelerated the conflict that culminated in the brutal Algerian War during 1954–1962.

From the beginning of the war, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) appealed to the United Nations (UN) for support of the nationalist cause, while France appealed to the United States and its European allies for assistance in its colonial claim. The Americans initially urged a negotiated peace, hoping to avoid a confrontation with France without antagonizing Arab nations. Alarmed at the French role in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the United States then adopted a less compromising line with France, determined to prevent a wider conflict between Arab nationalists and France (and Britain). The war also split the communist bloc, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) supporting the Algerian nationalists and the Soviet Union keeping its distance.

The war actively influenced French politics and led to social and political turmoil in metropolitan France that toppled the Fourth French Republic in 1958 and brought to power General Charles de Gaulle, who created the Fifth French Republic. In 1962 de Gaulle, then president of France and having exhausted other options, signed the Évian Agreements of March 1962 that granted Algeria its independence effective 3 July 1962. Tens of thousands of colons immediately immigrated to France. The FLN-led Algerian government, headed by Prime Minister Mohamed Ben Bella, promptly confiscated the colons' abandoned property and established a decentralized socialist economy and one-party state. Upon independence, Algerian military forces numbered around 125,000 men, including various irregular militias that were gradually eliminated or integrated into the national force.

Crowds in Algiers celebrate their country's independence on 4 July 1962. A referendum held three days earlier secured Algerian independence from France after eight years of one of the longest and bloodiest wars to overthrow European colonial rule in Africa. (Central Press/ Getty Images)

Ben Bella's attempt to consolidate his power, combined with popular discontent with the economy's inefficiency, sparked a bloodless military coup by Defense Minister Houari Boumédienne in June 1965. In 1971, the government endeavored to stimulate economic growth by nationalizing the oil industry and investing the revenues in centrally orchestrated industrial development. Boumédienne's military-dominated government took on an increasingly authoritarian cast over the years. The military expanded rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, with the army numbering 110,000, the air force 12,000, and the navy 8,000 by 1985.

Algeria's leaders sought to retain their autonomy, joining their country to the Non-Aligned Movement. Boumédienne phased out French military bases. Although Algeria denounced perceived American imperialism and supported Cuba, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, Palestinian nationalists, and African anticolonial fighters, it maintained a strong trading relationship with the United States. At the same time, Algeria cultivated economic ties with the Soviet Union, which provided the nation with important military matériel and training. When the Spanish relinquished control of Western Sahara in 1976, Morocco attempted to annex the region. This led to a twelve-year war with Algeria, which supported the guerrilla movement fighting for the region's independence. Diplomatic relations with the United States warmed after Algeria negotiated the release of American hostages in Iran in 1980 and Morocco fell out of U.S. favor by allying with Libya in 1984.

In 1976, a long-promised constitution that provided for elections was enacted, although Algeria remained a one-party state. When Boumédienne died in December 1978, power passed to Chadli Bendjedid, the army-backed candidate. Bendjedid retreated from Boumédienne's increasingly ineffective economic policies, privatizing much of the economy and encouraging entrepreneurship. However, accumulated debt continued to retard economic expansion. Growing public protests from labor unions, students, and Islamic fundamentalists forced the government to end restrictions on political expression in 1988.

The Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) proved the most successful of the host of new political parties founded. After large victories by the FIS in local elections in June 1990 and national elections in December 1991, Bendjedid resigned. A new regime under Mohamed Boudiaf imposed martial law, banning the FIS in March 1992. In response, Islamist radicals began a guerrilla war that has persisted to the present, taking a toll of 150,000 or more lives. Although Algeria's military government managed to gain the upper hand in the struggle after 1998, Islamic groups

continue to wage war on the state, which maintains control through brutal repression and tainted elections.

Elun Gabriel

See also

Africa; Algerian War; France; Morocco; Non-Aligned Movement; Sétif Uprising

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Algerian War
(1954–1962)

Eight-year military effort by France (1954–1962) to maintain its hold on its last, largest, and most important colony. France regarded the Algerian War as part of the larger Cold War and tried unsuccessfully to convince its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners that keeping Algeria French was in the best interests of the alliance. Unsupported by its allies, France found itself increasingly isolated in diplomatic circles. Ultimately, it experienced a humiliating defeat and a colonial exodus.

For 130 years, Algeria had been at the core of the French Empire. France conquered Algiers in 1830 and expanded the territory. Algeria became the headquarters of the French Foreign Legion (at Sidi-Bel-Abbès) and home to the largest number of European settlers in the Islamic world. In 1960 there were 1 million Europeans (colons) in Algeria. Unique among French colonies, Algeria became a political component of France, as Algiers, Constantine, and Oran were made departments of the French Republic and had representation in the French Chamber of Deputies.

Unique among French colonies, Algeria became a political component of France, as Algiers, Constantine, and Oran were made departments of the French Republic and had representation in the French Chamber of Deputies.

Nonetheless, Algeria was not fully three French departments, as only the European population enjoyed full rights there. The colon and Muslim populations lived separate and unequal lives, with the Europeans controlling the bulk of the wealth. During this time, the French expanded Algeria's frontiers deep into the Sahara.

The Great Depression of the 1930s affected Algeria's Muslims more than any experience since their conquest, as they began to migrate from the countryside into the cities in search of work. Subsequently, the Muslim birthrate climbed dramatically because of easier access to health care facilities.

While the colons sought to preserve their status, French officials vacillated between promoting colon interests and promoting reforms for the Muslims. Pro-Muslim reform efforts ultimately failed because of political pressure from the colons and their representatives in Paris. While French political theorists debated between assimilation and autonomy for Algeria's Muslims, the Muslim majority remained largely resentful of the privileged status of the colons.

The first Muslim political organizations appeared in the 1930s, the most important of these being Ahmed Messali Hadj's Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD). World War II brought opportunities for change that increasing numbers of Algerian Muslims desired. Following the Anglo-American landings in North Africa in November 1942, Muslim activists met with American envoy Robert Murphy and Free French General Henri Giraud concerning postwar freedoms but received no firm commitments. As the war in Europe was ending and the Arab League was forming, pent-up Muslim frustrations were vented in the Sétif Uprising of 8 May 1945. Muslim mobs massacred colons before colonial troops restored order, and hundreds of Muslims were killed in a colon reprisal that was termed a "rat-hunt."

Returning Muslim veterans were shocked by what they regarded as the French government's heavy-handed actions after Sétif, and some (including veteran Ahmed Ben Bella) joined the MTLD. Ben Bella went on to form the MTLD's paramilitary branch, the Organization Speciale, and soon fled to Egypt to enlist the support of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Proindependence Algerian Muslims were emboldened by Ho Chi Minh's victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in May 1954, and when Algerian Muslim leaders met Ho at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, he told them that the French could be defeated.

Ben Bella and his compatriots formed the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) on 10 October 1954, and the FLN revolution officially began on the night of 31 October–1 November. The FLN organized its manpower into several military districts, or *wilayas*. Its goal was to end French control of Algeria and drive out or eliminate the colon population. Wilaya 4, located near Algiers, was especially important, and the FLN was particularly active in Kabylia and the Aures Mountains. The party's organization was rigidly hierarchical and tolerated no dissent. In form and style, it resembled Soviet bloc communist parties, although it claimed to offer a noncommunist and non-Western alternative ideology, articulated by Frantz Fanon.

As France increased the number of its military forces in Algeria to fight the growing insurgency, French officials sought support from NATO partners in the Algerian War, arguing that keeping Algeria French would ensure that NATO's southern flank would be safe from communism. As a part of France, Algeria was included in the original NATO charter. Washington's position, nonetheless, was that European colonial empires were obsolete. Furthermore, U.S. officials believed that the United States could positively influence decolonization movements in the developing world.

The Arab League promoted Pan-Arabism and the image of universal Arab and Muslim support for the FLN. The French grant of independence to both Tunisia and Morocco in March 1956 further bolstered Algeria's Muslims. When France, Britain, and Israel invaded Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956, both the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the move, and the French, unable to topple Nasser, were forced to contend with an FLN supply base that they could neither attack nor eliminate.

Members of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) pose before their World War II surplus machine guns in the mountains of Algeria on 6 June 1957. The rebel group was formed by Ahmed Ben Bella and other nationalists in 1954 to fight for Algerian independence from France. That goal was realized in 1962, following nearly eight years of warfare. (Bettmann/Corbis)

On 20 August 1955, the FLN attacked colon civilians in the Philippeville Massacre, and colon reprisals resulted in the deaths of several thousand Muslims. The year-long Battle of Algiers began in September 1956 with FLN operative Saadi Yacef's terrorist-style bombing campaign against colon civilians. Meanwhile, other FLN leaders targeted governmental officials for assassination. The FLN movement faced a setback on 22 October, however, when Ben Bella was captured.

In December 1956 and January 1957, battle-tested French troops with combat experience in Indochina arrived in Algeria to restore order in Algiers. Among them were General Raoul Salan (commander in chief), paratrooper commander Major General Jacques Massu, and Colonels Yves Goddard and Marcel Bigeard, both of whom were adept at intelligence gathering and infiltration. Massu's men made steady headway, and Goddard himself captured Saadi Yacef in September 1957. The Battle of Algiers was now won. The 1965 film *The Battle of Algiers,* produced by Gillo Pontecorvo and Saadi Yacef (with money provided by the FLN), garnered international support for the FLN, as it depicted the French simply as brutal occupiers. The French

employed torture to force FLN operatives to talk, while others were murdered in the process. The FLN, on the other hand, also routinely murdered captured French soldiers and colon civilians.

Despite victory in Algiers, French forces were not able to quell the Algerian rebellion or gain the confidence of the colons. Some colons were fearful that the French government was about to negotiate with the FLN. In the spring of 1958, colon Ultra groups began to hatch a plan to change the colonial government. Colon veteran Pierre Lagaillarde organized hundreds of Ultra commandos and began a revolt on 13 May 1958. Soon, tens of thousands of colons and Muslims arrived outside of the government building in Algiers to protest French government policy. Massu quickly formed a Committee of Public Safety, and Salan assumed leadership of the body. Salan then went before the throngs of protesters. Although the plotters would have preferred someone more frankly authoritarian, Salan called for the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle. Although de Gaulle had been out of power for more than a decade, on 19 May he announced his willingness to assume authority.

Massu was prepared to bring back de Gaulle by force if necessary, but military options were not needed. On 1 June 1958, the French National Assembly made de Gaulle premier, technically the last premier of the Fourth Republic. Algeria had managed to change the political leadership of the mother country.

De Gaulle visited Algeria five times between June and December 1958. At Oran on 4 June, he said about France's mission in Algeria that "she is here forever." A month later, he proposed a budget allocation of 15 billion francs for Algerian housing, education, and public works, and that October he suggested an even more sweeping proposal called the Constantine Plan. The funding for the massive projects, however, was never forthcoming, and true Algerian reform was never realized. It was probably too late, in any case, for reform to impact the Muslim community of Algeria.

Algeria's new military commander, General Maurice Challe, arrived in Algeria on 12 December 1958 and launched a series of attacks on FLN positions in rural Kabylia in early 1959. Muslim troops loyal to the French guided special mobile French troops called Commandos de Chasse. An aggressive set of sorties deep in Kabylia made much headway, and Challe calculated that by the end of October his men had killed half of the FLN operatives in Kabylia. A second phase of the offensive was to occur in 1960, but by then de Gaulle, who had gradually eliminated options, had decided that Algerian independence was inevitable.

De Gaulle braced his generals for the decision to let go of Algeria in late August 1959 and then addressed the nation on 19 September 1959, declaring his support for Algerian self-determination. Fearing for their future, some Ultras created the Front Nationale Français and fomented another revolt on 24 January 1960 in the so-called Barricades Week. Mayhem ensued when policemen tried to restore order, and many people were killed or wounded. General Challe and the colony's governor, Paul Delouvrier, fled Algiers on 28 January, but the next day de Gaulle, wearing his old army uniform, turned

the tide via a televised address to the nation. On 1 February, army units swore loyalty to the government. The revolt quickly collapsed. Early in 1961, increasingly desperate Ultras formed a terrorist group called the Secret Army Organization (OAS) that targeted colons whom they regarded as traitors.

The Generals' Putsch of 20–26 April 1961 seriously threatened de Gaulle's regime. General Challe wanted a revolt limited to Algeria, but Salan and his colleagues (Ground Forces Chief of Staff General André Zeller and recently retired Inspector General of the Air Force Edmond Jouhaud) had all prepared for a revolt in France as well. The generals had the support of many frontline officers in addition to almost two divisions of troops. The Foreign Legion arrested the colony's commander in chief, General Fernand Gambiez, and paratroopers near Rambouillet prepared to march on Paris after obtaining armored support. The coup collapsed, however, as police units managed to convince the paratroopers to depart, and army units again swore loyalty to de Gaulle.

On 10 June 1961 de Gaulle held secret meetings with FLN representatives in Paris and then on 14 June made a televised appeal for the FLN's so-called Provisional Government to come to Paris to negotiate an end to the war. Peace talks during 25–29 June failed to lead to resolution, but de Gaulle's mind was already made up. During his visit to Algeria in December, he was greeted by large pro-FLN Muslim rallies and Muslim anticolon riots. The United Nations recognized Algeria's independence on 20 December, and on 8 January 1962 the French public voted in favor of Algerian independence.

After the failed coup, a massive exodus of colons commenced. Nearly 1 million returned to their ancestral homelands (half of them went to France, and most of the rest went to Spain and Italy). Peace talks resumed in March at Évian, and both sides reached a settlement on 18 May 1962.

The formal handover of power occurred on 4 July when the FLN's Provisional Committee took control of Algeria. In September, Ben Bella was elected Algeria's first president. The Algerian War resulted in some 18,000 French military deaths, 3,000 colon deaths, and about 300,000 Muslim deaths. Some 30,000 colons remained behind, including the socialist mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier. They were ostensibly granted equal rights in the peace treaty but instead faced official discrimination by the FLN government and the loss of much of their property. The FLN remained in power until 1989, practicing a form of socialism until changes in Soviet foreign policy necessitated changes in Algerian internal affairs.

William E. Watson

See also

Africa; Algeria; Anticolonialism; Arab Nationalism; Bandung Conference; De Gaulle, Charles; France; Ho Chi Minh; Murphy, Robert Daniel; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Salan, Raoul Albin-Louis; Sétif Uprising

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Alia, Ramiz
(1925–)

Albanian politician and communist leader. Born on 18 October 1925 in Shköder, Albania, to a Muslim family from the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia, Ramiz Alia joined the Communist Party of Albania in 1943 and served as political commissar with Albanian troops fighting with Yugoslav partisans against Axis forces. After the war, he held leadership positions in the party's youth organization and joined the party's Central Committee and the Politburo in 1948 and 1956, respectively. A protégé of Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, Alia rose through the party ranks, holding various party and governmental positions over the next several decades.

In the early 1980s, Alia became Hoxha's chosen successor. After Hoxha's death in April 1985, Alia became first secretary of the Central Committee and de facto leader of Albania. As such, he pledged to uphold his predecessor's policies. Albania's economic problems and international isolation, however, influenced Alia's pursuit of pragmatic reforms, including easing restrictions on international trade, land ownership, and religion. But these reforms did little to stop the country's downward spiral. By the end of 1990, demonstrations had erupted throughout Albania, and opposition to the Communist Party's monopoly forced Alia to abandon one-party rule. In March 1991 Alia permitted multiparty elections, which the communists nonetheless won. Although Alia lost his seat in parliament, he became president in April 1991 but was forced to relinquish his party posts. In a free election held in March 1992, the opposition routed the communists in the now-renamed Socialist Party. As a result, Alia resigned the presidency on 3 April 1992. In 1994 he was arrested and convicted of political corruption while serving in office. After a year in prison, Alia retired from public life.

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See also
Albania; Europe, Eastern; Hoxha, Enver

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Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana

Peruvian reformist political party. While in exile in Mexico, Peruvian politician Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre founded the Peruvian reformist party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), also known as the Partido Aprista, in May 1924. The revolutionary platform of the APRA called for major social reform, political unification of Latin America, and the establishment of worldwide solidarity of the oppressed. Despite the lower-class, populist overtones of his impassioned oratory, Haya de la Torre maintained that it was the oppressed middle class who would lead the movement.

After his return to Peru in 1931, Haya de la Torre ran unsuccessfully for the presidency. When a radical APRA member assassinated Sánchez Cerro, the newly elected president, in April 1933, the government retaliated with military force to subdue the APRA. Because the APRA was at times guilty of violent radicalism, the authorities outlawed it from 1941 through 1945 and from 1948 through 1956. Nonetheless, the APRA continued to influence politics in Peru. After decades of struggle, the APRA finally succeeded in electing Alan García president in 1985; he went on to lose a subsequent election to Alberto Fujimori in 1990.

Although APRA leaders never controlled the country for any significant period of time, their early activities created consensus within the Peruvian reform movement. Unfortunately, they were not able to foster the continuation of that consensus, and the APRA ultimately failed to achieve its goals.

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See also
Peru

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Allende Gossens, Salvador
(1908–1973)

Left-wing politician and president of Chile (1970–1973). Born on 26 July 1908 in Valparaíso, Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens was of middle-class origins. He trained as a physician but never practiced medicine. Allende was a cofounder, and eventually the standard-bearer, of the Chilean Socialist Party and also served in its militia as a young man. He went on to serve as cabinet minister and president of the Chilean senate.

Chilean President Salvador Allende speaks before a crowd in Santiago, Chile. The leftist Allende was president during 1970–1973 and was overthrown by a U.S.-supported coup led by General Augusto Pinochet in 1973. (AFP/Getty Images)

Allende ran for president four times, finally winning a plurality by 39,000 votes as leader of Unidad Popular (Popular Unity), a leftist coalition, on 4 September 1970. He had been a thorn in the side of several U.S. presidential administrations, as policymakers feared that an Allende presidency would bring about a communist state, open to Soviet influence in the region and a threat to American interests in Chile.

President Richard M. Nixon was a particularly vociferous opponent of Allende and publicly stated as much after the 1970 election. The Chilean constitution stipulated that the Chilean congress must choose the president if no candidate won by a majority. Behind the scenes, U.S. Ambassador Edward M. Korry tried unsuccessfully to assemble a consensus to deny Allende the presidency. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covertly provided weapons to right-wing conspirators to foment a coup, which was also unsuccessful. Allende was inaugurated on 3 November 1970.

As Allende instituted socialist programs and established diplomatic ties with Cuba's communist leader Fidel Castro, Washington simultaneously attempted to squeeze the Chilean economy while secretly giving some $7 million to Allende's political adversaries. Allende's socialist economic policies helped create inflation and shortages in Chile, alienating the middle and

upper classes. Military leaders, led by General Augusto Pinochet, finally toppled the Allende government on 11 September 1973. Allende committed suicide in the presidential palace in Santiago on the same day. Pinochet emerged as the leader of the military junta and ruled Chile until 1989.

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See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Chile; Latin America, Communist Parties in; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto

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Alliance for Progress

A financial aid program devised by the United States in March 1961 to promote social reform in Latin America. The program's architects hoped to curb violence and prevent communist-inspired revolutions in the region. In its dealings with Latin America after World War II, the United States had generally emphasized security imperatives at the expense of social and economic concerns. Two events in the late 1950s, however, demonstrated the risks of this course. First, in May 1958 Vice President Richard M. Nixon's goodwill tour of South America provoked hostile demonstrations and major rioting in Caracas, Venezuela, and Lima, Peru. Second, Cuba's Fidel Castro seized control of that nation's government in January 1959, and by 1960 he was becoming increasingly anti-American and pro-Soviet.

Rejecting the region's pleas for a Latin American plan similar to the Marshall Plan, the United States had endorsed private investment and free trade as the keys to Latin America's socioeconomic development. While this trade-not-aid approach meshed well with President Dwight Eisenhower's efforts to eschew direct aid, it often conflicted with the prevailing economic climate in Latin America.

By the late 1950s, however, the Eisenhower administration did direct more of its attention to Latin America's economic and social problems. Latin Americans had long sought U.S. support for a regional development bank. In August 1958 the United States dropped its long-standing opposition to the bank and in October 1960 supported the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank. This shift in U.S. policy continued at Bogotá, Colombia, in September 1960 at a special meeting called by the Council of the

Patients line up at an impromptu Alliance for Progress clinic set up in a public jailhouse at Potonico, El Salvador, in the 1960s. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Organization of American States (OAS) to study new measures for Pan-American economic cooperation. In signing the Act of Bogotá, the Eisenhower administration laid the groundwork for the Alliance for Progress by pledging $500 million for economic development and social reform in Latin America. In return the Latin American nations agreed to implement sound economic policies and to eliminate obstacles to social and economic progress.

During the U.S. presidential elections of 1960, Democratic nominee John F. Kennedy criticized the Eisenhower administration and Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon for "losing" Cuba and failing to align U.S. policy with the rising aspirations of Latin Americans. After a narrow victory, Kennedy called for an "alliance for progress" between the United States and Latin America in his inaugural address.

In March 1961 the Kennedy administration formally committed itself to an Alliance for Progress with Latin America, a long-term program of U.S. aid linked to social and structural reforms, economic development, and democratization. The program took official form at the inter-American meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961. The conference proclaimed a lengthy list of objectives for the program, including democratization, acceleration of social and economic development, promotion of education, fair wages and working conditions, health programs, tax reforms, agrarian reform, fiscal stability, and the stimulation of private enterprise. To achieve its goals,

the program would need $100 billion during its first decade. External sources would furnish $20 billion of the needed $100 billion, with the United States pledging to provide a major part of that funding. The remaining $80 billion was expected to come from Latin American sources, both public and private. The U.S. preoccupation with containing the communist threat was very much in evidence in its launching of the program, which was designed to provide peaceful, democratic alternatives to violent social revolution and a "second Cuba" in the hemisphere.

Nevertheless, the objectives of the Alliance for Progress soon collided with the harsh realities of international economics and growing domestic pressures in both Latin America and the United States. The program implicitly assumed that most Latin American elites would support reforms to avoid violent revolution. Many of the elites, however, were not serious about implementing major reform, realizing that such changes might strip them of power. With Latin America already experiencing a high level of political instability, U.S. officials hesitated to apply too much pressure for reform, fearing that it would only add to the political uncertainty in the region. And if the program promoted growth but not structural reforms, the traditional elites would naturally reap most of the rewards of increased growth. Much of the Alliance for Progress aid went to paying off earlier loans rather than promoting social modernization and economic development. Rapid population growth in Latin America also undermined potential advances in social and economic reform.

Domestic politics in the United States also hindered the success of the Alliance for Progress program. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 removed the leader most closely connected to the fate of the program. Projected funding for the program was based on capital needs for a decade, but the annual U.S. congressional appropriations process meant that presidents could not guarantee long-term levels of economic aid.

In the United States, a series of problems undercut the Alliance for Progress beginning in the mid-1960s. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, was primarily interested in domestic issues, while in foreign policy he became increasingly preoccupied with the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. The ability of the program to uplift Latin America was oversold from its inception. These exaggerated hopes for the program made later disillusionment with it all the easier. Latin American governments were often unwilling or unable to implement the program's structural reforms. The U.S. Congress cut funding for the program, which quickly lost its reform content and evolved into a conventional aid program. Although there was no officially declared ending of the Alliance for Progress, like many other programs of its time, it became subsumed by political pressures and broader Cold War imperatives and thus never fulfilled its original goals.

Don M. Coerver

See also

Bogotá, Act of; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Marshall Plan; Organization of American States

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Allied Control Council of Germany

Allied administrative body established to govern post–World War II Germany. The Allied Control Council was agreed to by the three victorious World War II allies, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. France became the fourth power to join the council in 1945. The council met for the first time in Berlin on 5 June 1945 and was officially inaugurated on 30 August 1945.

The council was designed to function as the supreme governing, controlling, coordinating, and administrative body cochaired by the four occupation powers on German territory. Headed first by the four supreme Allied military commanders, the council was supported by some 170 separate and subordinate administrative and advisory bodies.

Each of the council's four members held veto powers, and all major decisions had to be reached unanimously. Due mainly to French and Soviet obstructionism, significant decisions became virtually impossible to reach, and the council's administrative efficiency was hopelessly compromised. To make matters worse, the commanders of the four occupation zones exercised absolute and autonomous power on behalf of their governments in their respective designated areas of Germany. By the summer of 1946, the competing and often contradictory interests of the United States and the Soviet Union over war reparations had rendered the council largely dysfunctional.

By 1949, the Allied Control Council of Germany virtually ceased to function due to insurmountable differences among the four powers, diplomatic games, and a stalemate over currency reform in the western zones of occupation. Although the United States introduced a proposal for an all-zonal reform in January 1948 and linked its approval to a sixty-day ultimatum, Washington in fact hoped that the Soviets would reject it. Indeed it was Soviet Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky who first abandoned the Allied Control Council on 20 March 1948, saving American General Lucius D. Clay the embarrassment of having to take this first step. Instead of objecting to currency reform and other occupation issues via the council, the Soviets decided, beginning in April 1948, to initiate a blockade of West Berlin by cordoning off the three western sectors by both land and water routes.

Technically, the Allied Control Council continued to exist for decades, because none of the four nations ever officially canceled its membership.

Attempts to revive the institution in the 1950s proved to be short-lived. Finally, the so-called 2 + 4 Treaties of 1990 between the four Allied powers and the two German states officially terminated the Allied Control Council.

Bernd Schaefer

See also

Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Clay, Lucius DuBignon; Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II; Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich

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Alsop, Joseph Wright

(1910–1989)

Influential American journalist who ardently advocated a hard line toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Born in Avon, Connecticut, on 10 October 1910 into a prominent family, Joseph Alsop graduated from Harvard University in 1932 and then joined the *New York Herald Tribune* as a staff reporter. After World War II, he collaborated with his brother Stewart on the syndicated column "Matter of Fact," which espoused the new internationalism of their generation. The Alsop brothers parted company in 1958 over personal and political differences.

An unabashed member of Washington's cultural and social elite, Alsop often threw elaborate parties at his fashionable home. An acquaintance of George F. Kennan, Alsop was a staunch supporter of Kennan's containment policy toward the Soviet Union. In the 1950s he became particularly critical of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's efforts to restrain defense spending and repeatedly warned of an impending missile gap with the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1957, Alsop communicated his concerns about the alleged missile gap to Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy. In Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign, during which he tried to assert that the United States had not done enough to address Soviet advances, he found a natural ally in Alsop, the man who would later claim to have coined the term "missile gap."

Kennedy's 1963 assassination shattered Alsop, but he nonetheless continued to support Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. Alsop had single-mindedly supported the war in Vietnam from its very start—as early as 1954, when it was still largely a French enterprise—and he continued to do so as Johnson expanded U.S. involvement. But Alsop was profoundly shaken as he witnessed the American defeat there. Indeed, in 1975, five months before

the last U.S. troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, he discontinued his signature column. Alsop died in Washington, D.C., on 28 August 1989.

Christopher A. Preble

See also

Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennan, George Frost; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Missile Gap; Vietnam War

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Americans for Democratic Action

American political organization that lobbied for liberal-democratic values at home while taking a firm anticommunist line abroad. Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) emerged from a January 1947 conference in Washington, D.C., of prominent New Deal activists, leftist intellectuals, journalists, and trade unionists, some of whom had been members of a smaller World War II group, the Union for Democratic Action (UDA). The impetus for their meeting was the recent creation of former Vice President Henry Wallace's Progressive Citizens of America movement, which had clearly staked a bid for the institutional leadership of the American Left.

While there was little disagreement among the ADA founders and Wallace's Progressives on broad questions of domestic policy, they differed sharply on foreign affairs, specifically on the issue of Soviet relations. The ADA's position was that any compromise with a totalitarian state, no matter what its socialist credentials, would bring about the moral corruption of liberal principles championed in the United States. One of the first acts of the group was therefore a strident rhetorical drive against Wallace's third-party candidateship in the 1948 presidential election, with charges that the Progressives were communist stooges. This developed ironic overtones when the ADA was itself accused of being a communist front by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy two years later.

In its early years the ADA had no shortage of high-profile leaders, such as Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Hubert Humphrey, the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and the economist John Kenneth Galbraith. It even boasted as a founding member the well-known Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan, then a liberal New Dealer. The group's difficulty lay in expanding its membership beyond the narrow confines of the upper-middle-class, predominantly East

Eleanor Roosevelt and James E. Doyle at the seventh annual conference of Americans for Democratic Action in Chicago, 1954. (Library of Congress)

Coast elite. Initial collaboration with unions such as the United Auto Workers and the Textile Workers of America faltered in the 1950s as the traditional labor politics (and social conservatism) of the unionists diverged from the civil rights priorities of the ADA's academic and professional supporters. When the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which had given important financial aid to the early ADA, merged with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1955, it rerouted these contributions to its own political action committees. Thus, blue-collar support dwindled, and the group's coffers never recovered from the loss of union contributions.

Perhaps the ADA's biggest challenge was the conflict between its liberal ideals and its party pragmatism. Although officially nonpartisan, in practice the organization operated from the left of the Democratic Party platform, which often meant endorsing electoral candidates and policies with which it disagreed. The ADA found it difficult to strike the right balance between criticizing Democrats who paid insufficient attention to civil rights while at the same time denying Republicans gains at the polls. For example, the group took an ambivalent line on President Harry Truman's 1947 Loyalty Program and was less than supportive of the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision ending school segregation for fear of scaring away Dixiecrats (Southern Democrats) from the national party.

As with so many other American Cold War institutions, however, it was the Vietnam conflict that brought the ADA's internal contradictions into full-blown crisis. The group had been a strong supporter of the John F. Kennedy presidency, with several members holding important posts in the administration, and President Lyndon B. Johnson inherited this enthusiastic backing upon his accession in 1963, particularly after the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1964 announcement of his Great Society program. But Johnson's increasingly hawkish line in Vietnam discomfited many members, and disagreement brewed within the ADA between those who saw Vietnam as a cautionary extension of the anticommunist containment policy and others who viewed it as illiberal aggression.

The ADA stuck to the Democratic mainstream in the 1964 election and declined to take part in the following year's antiwar mass protest in the capital. But by 1968 there was little remaining enthusiasm for Vietnam within the movement, and an open split emerged between moderate (though lukewarm) supporters of Hubert Humphrey's presidential candidacy and those reform liberals rallying around Allard Lowenstein, who opted instead for the antiwar campaign of Eugene McCarthy. These internal battles resulted in a transfer of membership, as more traditionalist campaigners left and were replaced by younger but less politically connected radicals. ADA influence within the Democratic Party consequently dwindled, and although the organization survived into the 1970s and beyond, it was henceforth relegated to the political margins.

Alan Allport

See also

Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McCarthyism; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Roosevelt, Eleanor; Vietnam War Protests; Wallace, Henry Agard

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Americas

Latin America, including Puerto Rico, with a 1945 population of more than 144 million, includes territory from the Mexican-American border southward as well as Spanish-speaking Caribbean territories. North America comprises the United States and Canada, with a 1945 population of more than 152 million. The two regions have shared a number of important historical experiences: slavery, the massacre and survival of indigenous peoples, the European settling of open frontiers, republican institutions, and religious zealotry.

U.S. Interventions in Latin America

Where	*Objective*	*Year*
Guatemala	Ousted Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán	1954
Cuba	Undermined the government	1961–2
British Guyana	Undermined the government	1960s
Chile	Undermined the government	1970s
Nicaragua	Attempted to destabilize the nation	1979
Grenada	Sent troops to forestall communist insurgency	1983
Panama	Invasion of the country	1989

Moving into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the two regions' commonality has significantly diverged. Latin America's political pendulum has swung between authoritarianism and democracy. North America's political system, in general, has remained stable and become gradually more egalitarian. In economic terms, during its colonial era Latin America was the wealthier region; however, with the industrialization of the late nineteenth century, North America quickly surpassed its southern neighbors.

The first major U.S. foreign policy pronouncement regarding Latin America was the Monroe Doctrine (1823), which declared the Western Hemisphere off-limits to further European colonialism. Viewed by many as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, the doctrine was cast in negative terms, emphasizing what outside powers could *not* do in the Western Hemisphere. But it was nonetheless reinterpreted by subsequent U.S. leaders in more proactive terms, providing justification for U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs. A second turning point occurred in the 1880s, when American officials, most notably Secretary of State James G. Blaine, called for increased economic cooperation between the two regions.

Increasing U.S. investments in Latin America spawned anti-American sentiments. U.S. military intervention, and later cultural imperialism, confirmed the worst fears of the Latin American nationalists south of the Rio Grande River. Nineteenth-century military intervention, with only one major exception (the U.S. intervention in Brazil in 1893), was confined to the Caribbean region. Washington employed its military forces first in the brief Spanish-American War of 1898. By 1903 the United States had offered support to rebels in Panama (then a renegade province of Colombia), which they accepted, helping them to achieve independence from the South American nation. This also facilitated the construction of the Panama Canal, a U.S. project.

During the Great Depression, sources of capital and finished goods from the industrialized countries were unavailable. To jump-start their own industrialization, the Latin American nations implemented a policy of import-substitution industrialization by raising tariffs on imported items. This flew in the face of what had come to be known in Washington as the inter-American system: a free flow of capital, goods, and ideas between North and South America that would foster harmonious relations between the regions.

Even though U.S. leaders disliked Latin American economic policies that restricted the flow of trade and investment, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his first inaugural address on 4 March 1933, promulgated the Good

A nurse with the Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Publico, a cooperative Point Four Program, visits a family in La Paz, Bolivia, in February 1951. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Neighbor policy. Because various U.S. military interventions in Latin America had strained relations between North and South America by the 1920s, Roosevelt very much wanted to strengthen ties between the regions. The backbone of the Good Neighbor policy was Roosevelt's nonintervention pledge, and it seemed to usher in a new era of friendly relations between the two regions. Moreover, hemispheric solidarity during World War II increased Latin American acquiescence to heavier doses of U.S. cultural imperialism via such media as radio and movies. In retrospect, this period proved to be the high point of hemispheric solidarity.

As the Cold War intensified in the aftermath of World War II, Washington began to fear communist insurgencies taking root in the hemisphere. In 1947 the United States and Latin American nations signed an alliance, the Rio Pact, to ensure that the Americas would remain anticommunist. In 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) implemented the Rio Pact, providing collective security for the Americas. In addition, President Harry S. Truman increased U.S. bilateral assistance to Latin America that had first

been given during World War II. The Point Four Program assisted Latin America and other third world areas with infrastructure needs.

Fearing a communist takeover, Washington reneged on the Good Neighbor policy with a covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intervention in Guatemala in 1954 that organized and supported a band of anticommunist military leaders who opposed Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán's regime. Arbenz, who was portrayed as a communist—or at the very least, a communist sympathizer—was ultimately forced from power that same year. The U.S. effort in Guatemala proved to be a harbinger in that the CIA went on to employ covert activity in the 1960s in Cuba and British Guiana (later Guyana), and in the 1970s in Chile, all in an attempt to undermine governments that allegedly threatened American interests.

With Fidel Castro's 1959 rise to power in Cuba, the Latin American Left grew in prominence. Traditionally, the Left worked to stimulate and focus *antiyanqui* (anti-U.S.) sentiment, and the 1960s proved no different. Castro, who declared in December 1961 that he was a communist, stated categorically that he would attempt to foment revolution in Latin America and other third world areas. The United States responded to Castro's threats by breaking relations with Cuba in January 1961, initiating a propaganda campaign against Castro, secretly trying to undermine his government, invading with a paramilitary force of Cuban nationals in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle, and placing a total trade embargo on Cuba. Cuba soon proved to be a Cold War flash point with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

To prevent the spread of hemispheric communism, the administration of John F. Kennedy organized the Alliance for Progress, a multilateral assistance effort aimed at Latin America to promote economic, social, and political reforms. Although not the first assistance program aimed specifically at the Latin American region—the Inter-American Development Bank dated back to 1958—the program proved historic in its size and goals. Through the program, the Latin American countries agreed to pledge an investment of $80 billion, while the United States pledged $20 billion in aid over the next decade. Observers disagree on why the goals of the program were not achieved, and by the late 1960s the Alliance for Progress had played itself out. Despite this failure, the U.S. policymakers' ideas of granting assistance to promote social and economic reforms and to promote democracy lived on. The Caribbean Basin Initiative of 1981–1982, although it relied significantly less on grant aid, demonstrated that U.S. leaders shared the same assumptions regarding growth and stability as their 1960s predecessors.

Even as American officials saw security threats in a number of Latin American nations in the 1960s, economic relations remained an important part of the North American-Latin American relationship. The pre–World War II conflict between Latin American economic nationalism and U.S. free trade reemerged with a new intensity after World War II. Even before the end of the war, at an important inter-American conference held in the castle of Chapultepec in Mexico City in March 1945, Latin American and U.S. delegates clashed over whether the free flow of goods and services should

characterize inter-American economic policy or—as some Latin American leaders urged—whether individual nations should exert some control over foreign economic activity within their borders. This conflict would remain a fixture of inter-American relations until the 1980s, when economic liberalization (neoliberalism) helped to foster friendlier North-South relations in the Western Hemisphere.

As Latin American nations moved toward democracy in the 1980s, relations between North America and Latin America warmed. Yet the road to harmonious inter-American relations in the 1980s encountered two very serious roadblocks: crises in Central America, the Caribbean, and Panama and the ongoing drug war. As civil wars erupted throughout Central America in the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. leaders feared that Cuban and Soviet aid was supporting the efforts of the leftist guerrillas, who by 1979 had seized control in Nicaragua. The leftist guerrillas in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, had broad support, at least at first, among many Nicaraguans. The United States attempted to destabilize Nicaragua through overt means (economic embargoes and anti-Sandinista rhetoric) and covert means (assistance to Nicaraguan rebel groups who wanted to overthrow the government). Washington's actions toward Nicaragua frayed relations with other nations in the hemisphere that opposed U.S. policy, including Canada, the first significant example of Canadian criticism of Washington's inter-American policy. Finally, the Sandinistas lost a critical election in 1990, defusing the crisis.

The invasion offered a low-risk way for the Reagan administration to display its credentials as a hard-line anticommunist government.

In 1983 President Ronald Reagan's administration was especially suspicious of Cuban assistance to rebel groups in the Caribbean. In 1983, Reagan therefore sent troops into tiny Grenada to forestall a communist insurgency there. The invasion offered a low-risk way for the Reagan administration to display its credentials as a hard-line anticommunist government.

Just as communism crumbled nonviolently in the autumn of 1989 in Eastern Europe, Washington invaded Panama in December 1989, capturing its unpopular leader General Manuel Noriega. American policymakers insisted that military intervention was the only way to remove the autocratic leader—who was also accused of heavy involvement in the drug trade—so that democracy could take firmer root in the Isthmian nation. To some observers, the U.S. invasion of Panama, coming at the end of the Cold War, showed that the diminishing communist threat would not necessarily mean the end of U.S. intervention in the Americas.

As the international narcotics trade grew and as U.S. imports of illicit drugs from Latin America increased, American leaders searched for ways to crush the drug trade. In this endeavor, U.S. law enforcement officials worked with Mexican government officers in particular. Many Mexicans, however, saw such efforts as an intrusion on their sovereignty. Even more controversially, U.S. military personnel trained members of some of the South American militaries in techniques used for destroying the plants that produced the raw materials for certain drugs (coca leaves in the Andes, in particular). In addition, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) stepped up interdiction efforts, trying to reduce the flow of coca leaves from farms to processing plants. Both eradication and interdiction resulted in casualties among Andean coca

U.S. Army M-113 armored personnel carrier guards a street near the destroyed Panamanian Defense Force headquarters building during Operation JUST CAUSE, 21 December 1989. (U.S. Department of Defense)

growers and their supporters. As a result, U.S.–Latin American relations deteriorated. The drug war waxed and waned but still proved a bone of contention among some Latin American nations and the United States into the twenty-first century.

With the end of the Cold War, two important new topics dominated inter-American relations: economic interaction and immigration. In 1994 the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). U.S. leaders also pursued the plan for a free trade area to embrace South America as well as North America.

Latin American immigration to North America, especially from Mexico, began to change the complexion of U.S. and Canadian society, introducing new food, music, and other aspects of Hispanic popular culture. As Latin American immigration to the United States swelled, some Latinos in the United States, in particular the well-organized Cuban lobby in Florida, managed to influence U.S. foreign policy. In the early twenty-first century, rising numbers of immigrants, particularly Mexican immigrants, spurred some observers, such as Samuel Huntington in 2004, to fear that immigrants from south of the Rio Grande would not assimilate into U.S. society. Moving into the twenty-first century, immigration appeared as increasingly important in shaping the contours of U.S.–Latin American relations.

JAMES F. SIEKMEIER

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Alliance for Progress; Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Argentina; Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio; Bay of Pigs; Betancourt, Rómulo; Bolivia; Bosch Gaviño, Juan; Brazil; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Chapultepec Conference; Chile; Colombia; Contadora Group; Costa Rica; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Dominican Republic; Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Duvalier, François; Ecuador; El Salvador; Figueres Ferrer, José; Frei Montalva, Eduardo; Guatemala; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Latin America, Communist Parties in; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in; Mann, Thomas C.; Mexico; Nicaragua; Organization of American States; Panama; Panama, U.S. Invasion of; Panama Canal Treaties; Paraguay; Peru; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto; Rio Pact; Sandinistas; Somoza Debayle, Anastasio; Somoza García, Anastasio; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela

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Amin, Idi

(1924?–2003)

Ugandan politician and military leader. Idi Amin Dada Oumee was born to a Muslim family in either 1924 or 1925 in the Kalwa tribe in Koboko, British Uganda. In 1961 he became one of Uganda's first commissioned army officers. Following Ugandan independence on 9 October 1962, he held the rank of major and worked closely with Prime Minister Milton Obote, who sent him abroad to oversee training programs. By 1970 Amin was head of the army.

After several years of strained relations with Obote, Amin launched a successful military coup on 25 January 1971, with widespread public support. Following several token gestures to make his rule seem more democratic than that of Obote, Amin moved to eliminate political and tribal rivals, many of whom fled to Tanzania. In September 1972 the Tanzanian exiles unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow Amin.

In 1972 Amin expelled all Asians and nationalized British-owned businesses, damaging the Ugandan economy. His policies caused tense relations

with the United States, Britain, and other Western countries, forcing him to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance. After expelling his Israeli advisors, Amin established cordial contacts in the Arab world, particularly with Libya and the Palestinians. In 1976 he conspired with Palestinian terrorists to hijack an Air France jetliner to Tel Aviv, forcing it to land in Entebbe, Uganda. Israeli commandos freed all but one hostage, killing the terrorists and several Ugandan soldiers.

As Amin's murderous wave of terror continued, Uganda's economy and society lay in tatters. Yet as Uganda slid further into chaos, Amin named himself field marshal in 1975 and president-for-life in 1976. In October 1978 he ordered an attack on Tanzania, which retaliated with an invasion of Uganda in early 1979. Aided by Ugandan exiles, Tanzanian forces advanced quickly, taking the capital city of Kampala in April 1979. Amin fled first to Libya and then to Jidda, Saudi Arabia, where he lived in exile and died on 16 August 2003.

Gregory C. Ference

Dictator of Uganda from 1971 to 1979, Idi Amin headed a brutal and lawless regime, the violent effects of which destabilized the East African republic for years. (Reuters/Corbis)

See also

Entebbe Raid; Libya; Obote, Apollo Milton; Qadhafi, Muammar; Tanzania; Uganda

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Andreotti, Giulio
(1919–)

Italian journalist, politician, and premier. Born on 14 January 1919 in Rome, as a youth Giulio Andreotti became active in the Catholic Students' Federation headed by Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini (later Pope Paul VI). In 1941 Andreotti received a law degree from Rome University and then went to work as a journalist for the newspaper *Il Popolo*. During Italy's fascist era, he came to know future Italian Premier Alcide De Gasperi and would later become one of his closest confidantes and collaborators.

Following the Allied liberation of Rome in June 1944, Andreotti was named coordinator of Catholic youth and worked in the Christian Democratic Party with De Gasperi. In 1945 Andreotti was elected to the Constituent Assembly and held elective office thereafter until 1987. From 1947 to 1953, he served as premier undersecretary in four of De Gasperi's governments.

Italian political leader Giulio Andreotti, shown here in May 1979. (Gianni Giansanti/Sygma/Corbis)

Andreotti enjoyed a brilliant political career, having served as minister of the interior in 1954, of finance in 1955 and again in 1958, of treasury during 1958–1959, and then of defense during 1959–1974. He was also minister of industry in 1966 and 1968. In 1972 he became premier of the Italian Republic, a position he occupied seven different times. As Italy's foreign minister from 1983 to 1989, he forged closer ties to Eastern bloc countries and was influential in the fall of communism in Europe in the late 1980s.

On 1 June 1991, Andreotti was named senator for life, but in 1995 he was accused of having had ties to the Italian Mafia and of having planned the assassination of the journalist Mino Pecorelli. After several years and multiple trials, Andreotti was ultimately acquitted.

An able politician and diplomat, Andreotti was considered one of Italy's most powerful men. He maintained Italy's central role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and brokered a deal for the deployment of U.S. Pershing Missiles in Italy in the 1980s, despite public protests. At the same time, he was also able to reach agreements with Arab states and the Soviet Union. It was under his leadership that Italy's Fiat struck an economic deal with the Soviet Union. He also maintained close ties with the Vatican during his tenure in office. In domestic politics, he fought against the Italian Communist Party's influence but was also the man who brokered the so-called Historical Compromise, which supported the government by not opposing the seating of communists after the 1976 elections.

Andreotti was not just the most dynamic Italian politician of the postwar years but was also probably the most influential one during the Cold War era. To this day, he is still highly regarded by many Italians. Throughout his tireless political career, he found the time to write several books about his political experiences and about the people he knew. As a journalist, he headed the Catholic magazine *Concretezze* from 1955 to 1976 and currently edits the magazine *30 Giorni*.

Alessandro Massignani

See also

De Gasperi, Alcide; Europe, Eastern; Europe, Western; Italy; Missiles, Pershing II; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Andropov, Yuri
(1914–1984)

Soviet diplomat, head of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) during 1967–1982, and fifth leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during 1982–1984. Born on 15 June 1914 in Stavropol, Russia, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov dropped out of school when he was sixteen and worked at odd jobs, eventually joining the Komsomol, the communist youth organization. He became a full member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1939 and served in the newly founded Karelo-Finnish Republic from 1940 to 1944 as the first secretary of the regional Komsomol.

During World War II, Andropov was active in partisan guerrilla activities. After the war, he held positions in regional CPSU bureaus before being appointed to the CPSU Central Committee in 1951. In the immediate wake of Soviet leader Josef Stalin's death in 1953, Andropov was appointed counselor to the Soviet embassy in Budapest. Promoted to ambassador in 1954, his tenure witnessed the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Andropov had warned Moscow of growing unrest in Hungary prior to the Revolution and then requested Soviet troop deployments to Hungary after the revolt began. He played a crucial role in establishing the new Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party under the leadership of János Kádár.

Andropov returned to Moscow in 1957 as the head of the Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries. He also succeeded Mikhail Suslov as a member of the Central Committee Secretariat in 1962 and became the head of the KGB in 1967. In 1973, he assumed a permanent membership in the Politburo but continued to serve as KGB leader until 1982.

On 10 November 1982, Andropov was elected the new general secretary of the CPSU, succeeding the late Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. Andropov soon thereafter became the Soviet president and chairman of the Defense Council. During his fifteen-month rule, he sought to improve the Soviet economy by increasing productivity. He gave priority to the fight against corruption in the Soviet bureaucracy and attempted to improve Soviet work habits through vigorous campaigns against alcohol and for the improvement of work discipline.

In foreign policy, Andropov sought to maintain the status quo. He kept Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and despite his efforts to improve his image in the West, relations with the United States continued to deteriorate. He strongly opposed President Ronald Reagan's stationing of Pershing Missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), but Soviet relations with the West took a nosedive after Soviet forces shot down a civilian South Korean jetliner (KAL Flight 007) in September 1983 when it strayed

Yuri Andropov was an important Communist Party official and political figure who became the fifth leader of the Soviet Union during 1982–1984. (Bettmann/Corbis)

into Soviet airspace. All 269 passengers perished. The Soviets claimed clumsily and falsely that the jetliner was designed to spy on Soviet installations.

After months of poor health, Andropov died on 9 February 1984 in Moscow. He had declared Mikhail Gorbachev to be his successor, but on 12 February 1984 Andropov was instead replaced by Konstantin Chernenko.

C. Karadelli

See also

Afghanistan War; Brezhnev, Leonid; Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hungarian Revolution; Kádár, János; KAL Flight 007; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti; Missiles, Pershing II; Soviet Union; Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich

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Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis
(1951–1953)

The Anglo-Iranian oil crisis began on 26 April 1951 when Iran's new nationalist leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, moved to nationalize his nation's oil reserves. The crisis ended on 19 August 1953 when Mossadegh's government was overthrown in a U.S.-sponsored coup d'état. Mossadegh's nationalization measures came largely at the expense of the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had been exploiting Iranian oil reserves for years. The crisis highlighted the differing communist containment policies carried out by the British Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department in the Middle East. It can also be viewed as an early attempt by a developing nation to break free from Western imperialism and colonial control. The fact that the crisis involved oil also showcases just how critical cheap and abundant oil supplies were to the West.

During 1951–1953 there was an ongoing diplomatic crisis among Iran, Great Britain, and the United States over Mossadegh's actions. Beginning in November 1951, Mossadegh requested that Western nations that had purchased Iranian oil in the past confirm their current orders with the newly nationalized Iranian oil industry. The British took immediate action by pressuring purchasing nations not to cooperate with Mossadegh's request.

At first, the United States took a rather neutral stance in the crisis, siding completely with neither London nor Tehran. The Americans' chief concern was keeping Iranian oil out of Soviet control rather than saving the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson urged Britain to accept Iran's nationalization and instead aim at maintaining control over the technical aspects of oil production. Throughout much of 1951, the United States regarded Iran's continued alliance with the West as a priority over British economic interests.

Demonstrators in Tehran, Iran, most of them students, confronting police and soldiers during a protest rally against the British government in 1951. (Library of Congress)

President Harry S. Truman sought to broker a settlement between Tehran and London based on the acceptance of Iranian nationalization in return for British control over oil production and drilling. At the same time, British officials were divided over whether launching a war against Iran was a viable option to ending the standoff. The British Foreign Office seemed willing to entertain the idea of military force, while British Prime Minister Clement Attlee steadfastly opposed it.

Nevertheless, the British government refused to negotiate with the Iranians and instead opted to impose economic sanctions on Mossadegh's regime. On 10 September 1951, Britain took measures to prevent purchases of Iranian oil on the international market.

Meanwhile, the United States and Britain were moving closer together on ending the crisis. Throughout the autumn of 1951, the Truman administration became less neutral. As time went on, the U.S. State Department trusted Mossadegh less and less. From January 1952 on, the United States became increasingly concerned about Iran's internal economic stability. America maintained that Mossadegh was now increasingly likely to turn to Moscow

to stabilize Iran's economy. By the spring of 1952, these concerns led the Americans to view regime change as a viable path to ending the crisis. Between the end of 1951 and July 1952, the Americans hoped that this would happen as a result of the dispute between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran and Mossadegh over which of the two would control the Persian Army. In the fall of 1952 Tehran broke diplomatic relations with London.

In January 1953 Dwight D. Eisenhower became president of the United States. The failure of diplomacy coupled with the Eisenhower administration's eagerness to end the crisis opened the door for the coup d'état of August 1953. The Eisenhower administration supported regime change in Iran in a coup organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). U.S. policymakers were particularly alarmed at the possibility that Mossadegh would bring the communists to power in Iran. Supported by the British government as well and carried out on 19 August of that year, the coup returned Shah Pahlavi to power. The British and American governments then established an Anglo-American oil consortium on 12 April 1954.

Simone Selva

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl; Central Intelligence Agency; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Iran; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Mossadegh, Mohammed; Truman, Harry S.; United Kingdom; United States

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Antall, József

(1932–1993)

Historian, politician, and the first freely elected, post–Cold War prime minister of Hungary. Born on 8 April 1932 in Budapest to a politically active family, József Antall studied at the University of Budapest, went on to become a high school teacher, and participated with his students in the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. He was then involved in the Smallholders Party's negotiations with the Communist Party to help form a coalition government. When the negotiations broke down in 1957, Antall was arrested and removed from his teaching job. After working as a librarian for two years, he committed himself to the history of medical science and in 1964 became a researcher, then the deputy director, and finally director of the Semmelweis Museum of Medical Science.

In 1988 Antall returned to politics and became involved in the growing Hungarian reform movement, joining the newly created Hungarian Demo-

cratic Forum (HDF). He represented the party at the National Round Table Negotiations between the governing Socialist Party and the new reform parties. In October 1989 he assumed the presidency of the HDF and became its candidate for premier. The HDF won Hungary's first democratic elections in April 1990, and the Hungarian parliament elected Antall premier on 23 May 1990.

Antall's adherence to such values as democracy, conservatism, Christian morality, and social awareness were the by-products of his upbringing and education. Even in his teens, he was convinced of the necessity to abandon the communist system. At the Round Table Negotiations, his main objectives were the restoration of democracy and the rule of law. As premier, he moved swiftly to promote internal reform and took the first steps toward Hungarian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Antall died in Budapest on 12 December 1993 following a short illness.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Europe, Eastern; Grósz, Károly; Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Kádár, János; Németh, Miklós; Tökés, László; Warsaw Pact

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Antarctica and Arctic

The continent of Antarctica and the Arctic Ocean, both approximately 8.7 million square miles, cover the southern and northern polar regions, respectively, and have held economic and geopolitical interests for many countries. During the 1930s, scientific research and political rivalry in Antarctica began to supplant discovery and mapping operations. Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, and Great Britain established year-round national research stations there, both to maintain territorial claims and to conduct scientific research. In November 1946, the United States conducted Operation HIGHJUMP, the largest Antarctic expedition to date, involving intensive exploration by means of ships, aircraft, and temporary land stations. The main goal of the operation was to give U.S. military forces experience in polar conditions. Set against the backdrop of the Cold War, this was seen as a necessary means to prepare for a potential confrontation with Soviet troops in the northern Arctic region, the shortest distance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Ice covers the water and land of Antarctica. (Corel)

The Arctic Ocean was a contested place as well. However, it was less a question of territorial claims than of geopolitical dominance. The United States, Canada, Russia, and several northern European countries all border this polar region. Nuclear submarines of both superpowers played a dangerous game of cat and mouse beneath the shifting polar ice, while slight changes in water temperature disguised huge ships by diffusing enemy sonar. The proximity to each other's country was a source of constant concern during the Cold War. Security interests dominated in the Arctic, but economic activities also had a geostrategic component in terms of oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits. On a political level, the end to the Cold War has had a profound effect on the Arctic. Because of the radioactive contamination of the waters caused by leaking Soviet submarines and discarded reactors, the region has emerged as an area of environmental cooperation involving all Arctic-border nations.

The various territorial claims in Antarctica, however, created an atmosphere of tension that threatened scientific cooperation. The International Geophysical Year (IGY), from July 1957 to December 1958, was the first substantial multination research program that coordinated geophysical research and proved a useful step in resolving political disputes. Twelve nations (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand,

Norway, South Africa, the United States, and the USSR) agreed that their political and legal differences should not interfere with the research program. More than 5,000 scientists and support staff served at forty-nine international Antarctic stations. Research projects included studies of atmospheric physics, meteorology, oceanography, glaciology, seismology, and geology. The international cooperation and overall success of the IGY led the governments of the twelve nations to establish the Special (later Scientific) Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) in 1958, a group designed to coordinate additional research that exists to this day.

This was followed up with the Antarctic Treaty, signed on 1 December 1959 and entered into force on 23 June 1961. The treaty stipulates that Antarctica be used only for peaceful purposes, prohibits militarization and weapons testing, requires freedom of scientific investigation, provides for exchanges of scientific results, and allows mutual inspection of stations, ships, and aircraft. The treaty prohibits nuclear explosions and disposal of nuclear waste in the area south of latitude 60 degrees. The treaty also addressed long-standing territorial conflicts in Antarctica. It made no ruling on the validity of existing claims by seven nations (Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand, and Norway) and stated that no member nation was required to recognize the claims of other nations. Although the United States and the Soviet Union reserved the right to stake future claims of their own, the indefinite freeze on territorial claims served to ease Cold War suspicions of each other's activities in Antarctica.

The nations that signed the treaty became Antarctica's governing body, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). The treaty also provides that any member state of the United Nations (UN) can attain membership in it. At the end of 2004, there were forty-five ATS member nations. The treaty has been recognized as one of the most successful international agreements in modern history. Differences over territorial claims have been effectively set aside, and as a disarmament agreement the treaty has been very successful. In 1991, ATS members recognized the enduring strength and relevance of the treaty by adopting a declaration proclaiming their determination to maintain and strengthen it and to protect Antarctica's environmental and scientific values.

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See also

Soviet Union; United States

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Antiaircraft Guns and Missiles

Weapons designed to attack and destroy aircraft from the ground or sea, deployed throughout the Cold War. Such weapons were used in combat in Vietnam and elsewhere, although many were never fired in anger. Nonetheless, many countervailing technologies and changes to military doctrine were spurred by the development of such arms.

At the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. military was equipped with small numbers of antiaircraft guns remaining from World War II. When the Korean War began in June 1950, some of these weapons were dispatched to the war zone, but they ultimately encountered few targets. Others were hurriedly situated at strategic locations in the United States because American leaders feared that the Korean conflict might presage a surprise Soviet bomber attack, an especially disturbing possibility because the USSR had recently acquired nuclear weapons. Even after the Korean hostilities ended, concern about a Soviet strike grew with the advent of higher and faster jet aircraft requiring more capable antiaircraft weapons.

Initially, the United States fielded radar-aimed antiaircraft guns, which were better than previous antiaircraft weapons. However, a faster, self-propelled, maneuverable projectile capable of reaching high altitudes was necessary for defense against strategic bombers. Consequently, the U.S. Army oversaw the development of a relatively complex system that utilized radars, rudimentary computers, and other equipment to locate and track distant targets and to direct missiles at them. Because missiles received electronic guidance commands after launch and could alter their course as they flew, they were capable of reacting to a target's evasive actions. The Nike-Ajax missile's 25-mile range, high speed, and maneuverability made it considerably more capable than antiaircraft guns. Beginning in 1954, these missiles were deployed at 222 specially constructed locations across the United States, and within four years an improved version (dubbed Nike-Hercules), which flew farther and faster, replaced the earlier model at many sites.

The Nike-Hercules carried a relatively low kilotonage nuclear warhead meant to provide the greatest practical blast at the interception point, thereby obviating the need for a direct hit and ensuring destruction of all aircraft in the target area. After 1964, when the Nike-Hercules defenses were joined by two launch facilities for nuclear-equipped BOMARC antiaircraft missiles in Canada and six more manned by the U.S. Air Force, the substantial commitment to defending North America against bomber raids was most evident. Many of these weapons had been decommissioned by 1974, although some remained operational until 1979.

Other nations including the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France developed similar surface-to-air (SAM) antiaircraft networks during the Cold War. The Soviet Union's elaborate antiaircraft effort was obviously influenced by the size and capability of U.S. strategic bomber forces and by persistent U.S. and British reconnaissance overflights of Soviet territory. After the Soviets developed sophisticated antiaircraft technologies—best demonstrated when a Soviet SA-2 missile downed an American U-2 reconnaissance plane

Two vehicle-mounted Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, 1 January 1977. (U.S. Department of Defense)

at high altitude in May 1960—the tactics and armaments considered for use in the event of nuclear attack on the Soviet Union changed accordingly. The British, by turning to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the early 1960s as the mainstay of their nuclear strike force, seemed to suggest that bombers were becoming obsolete. The Americans disagreed, however, and prepared to fly above or below the effective altitude of the antiaircraft weapons or to release payloads before coming within their range.

Alternatively, the Soviet Union never built large numbers of long-range bombers, but it is not entirely clear why this was so. More than likely, however, it was because the number and type of SAMs in North America discouraged the use of long-range bombers in a nuclear exchange.

In addition to defending against strategic bombers, Cold War adversaries equipped their naval and ground forces with antiaircraft guns and missiles for shipboard or tactical or field use. Some were mobile or seaborne versions of antibomber weapons. Others were sufficiently small and lightweight to be transported and operated by one or two soldiers. Generically termed MANPADS (for Man Portable Air Defense Systems), these small SAMs were typically guided by radio command or were drawn automatically to a target's hot exhaust. Like antiaircraft guns, MANPADS had a relatively short range, were simple to operate, and could be lethal when employed properly. This made them ideally suited for protecting troops on the battlefield and minimizing attacks by forcing the enemy to strike from greater distances and at higher speeds. In 1986, guerrillas fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan began to use MANPADS provided by the United States and Britain. Within

An Afghan mujahideen demonstrates the firing of a surface-to-air missile in 1988. The United States supported the Afghan resistance against the Soviets, who had occupied Afghanistan. (U.S. Department of Defense)

months they had inflicted sufficient losses to retard helicopter gunship attacks and to reduce the efficacy of certain aerial resupply efforts.

Similar Soviet SA-7 portable MANPADS were used against the Americans years earlier during the Vietnam War with somewhat less significant results. In this and other ways, that conflict exemplifies the Cold War role of antiaircraft weapons and their influence on military doctrine. When the United States initiated sustained bombing of North Vietnam beginning in 1965, more than 1,500 airplanes were shot down. Many more helicopters were also lost, almost all of them in South Vietnam and most of these to small arms fire. The overwhelming majority of losses were inflicted by North Vietnam's arsenal of more than 7,000 radar- and optical-sighted guns, many surrounding the especially well-defended cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. The lethality of these weapons forced U.S. pilots to attack from higher altitudes and limited their time over a target. In July 1965, however, the North Vietnamese downed their first American aircraft with a Soviet-made SA-2 missile, causing planes to fly at lower levels where they became vulnerable again to antiaircraft guns. Between 1965 and 1972, more than 9,000 SAMs were launched, destroying 150 American aircraft, including 18 during the eleven days of the LINEBACKER II bombing campaign of December 1972.

The overwhelming majority of losses were inflicted by North Vietnam's arsenal of more than 7,000 radar- and optical-sighted guns.

In this and other engagements, however, some agile fighter aircraft managed to survive by outmaneuvering or outpacing the missiles. In other situations, planes emitted electronic signals, decoy flares, or metallic strips to jam

or confuse SAM guidance systems. SAM attacks were also thwarted by firing on an antiaircraft site when its radar signals or combat preparations were first detected but before a missile was launched. Regardless of these actions, the antiaircraft forces marshaled by the North Vietnamese caused the Americans to alter their tactics and design appropriate countermeasures throughout the conflict. Many aircraft, antiaircraft guns, and SAMs that were subsequently deployed during the Cold War reflected the lessons learned in Vietnam.

Christopher John Bright

See also

Afghanistan War; Missiles, Cruise; North American Aerospace Defense Command; Soviet Union, Army; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Navy; Vietnam

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Anti-Americanism

The term "anti-Americanism" developed during the Cold War period and was regularly used in public, political, and academic discourses. It refers to an encompassing critique and rejection of various aspects of American foreign and domestic policies. In those parts of the world that were within the American sphere of influence during the Cold War, anti-Americanism was expressed by collective entities such as intellectuals, political parties, religious groups, and, at times, ruling elites. In communist or nonaligned nations, by contrast, anti-Americanism was usually part and parcel of official state propaganda.

Anti-Americanism as a concept of historical and contemporary analysis, however, is not an uncontested one, and many authors have noted the dangers of the politically biased usage of the term. Anti-Americanism should be placed in a broader context and understood in terms of the American sense of exceptionalism, anti-European sentiments in the United States, and finally the allure of communist regimes such as those in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Cold War anti-Americanism in Western Europe drew on older criticisms and rejection of the United States as a political, socioeconomic, and cultural model, although America's status as a world superpower after 1945 only

reinforced these sentiments. In political terms, anti-Americanism corresponded with the diminution of West European power on a global level, due not only to the Cold War constellation but also to the end of the colonial era in which European powers such as France and Britain had been major players. In cultural terms, anti-Americanism resulted from the rapid and pervasive Americanization of West European societies and their economies in the aftermath of World War II. Criticized by some historians as American cultural imperialism, the American model for modernization was often lambasted for its overreliance on individualism and glorification of mass consumerism and attendant homogeneity.

Anti-Americanism was particularly strong within the political Left in Western Europe, especially in countries such as France and Italy. It interacted with a preference toward socialist or communist models of modernization, along Soviet, Maoist, or Trotskyist lines. This was at times actively supported by communist regimes, in particular the Soviet Union and China. Leftist anti-Americanism became increasingly widespread during the 1960s in the context of escalation of the Vietnam War. In the 1970s, however, East-West détente had been translated into arms limitation agreements and peaceful coexistence, which tended to take the wind out of the sails of anti-Americanism among the West European Left.

Anti-Americanism outside Europe frequently reflected and accelerated trends that predated the Cold War. In the nonaligned world, particularly Latin America, widespread animosity toward the United States across various strata of society frequently represented a reaction to American economic and military hegemony and exploitation that manifested itself well before 1945. Events of the Cold War that conformed to preexisting perceptions of the nature of American foreign policy, such as the 1954 CIA-backed coup in Guatemala, American opposition to Fidel Castro, or efforts by President Ronald Reagan's administration to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, both reinforced and fueled anti-Americanism.

Even in Canada, traditionally a close American ally, the anti-Americanism that existed there was based on pre–Cold War concerns about American economic and cultural domination. Perceived American injustices, such as the Vietnam War, only served to reignite these feelings.

Maud Bracke and Steven Hewitt

See also

Americas; Canada; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Détente; Europe, Eastern; Europe, Western; Guatemalan Intervention; Nicaragua; Non-Aligned Movement; Sandinistas; United States; Vietnam War

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Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)

Soviet-American agreement limiting antiballistic missiles (ABMs). Developments in ABM technology in the 1960s prompted fears of a new arms race in defensive weapons that might undermine nuclear deterrence. Such concerns led to negotiations on their limitation. The ABM Treaty emerged from the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and was signed by President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin on 26 May 1972 during the Moscow Summit.

The agreement banned the nationwide deployment of ABM systems by either party but permitted each side a limited deployment of one hundred fixed ABM launchers at each of two sites: the national capital and one

President Richard Nixon and a Soviet official sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on 26 May 1972. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev stands in the background. The ABM Treaty was the first significant arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and represented a major, if temporary, thaw in the Cold War. (National Archives and Records Administration)

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) base. These deployments were considered small enough to be insufficient to defend against a massive offensive strike, thus preserving deterrence. The treaty also banned ABM systems based on technologies other than interceptor missiles as well as ABM systems that were "sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." It further forbade rapidly reloadable and multiple-missile ABM launchers and prohibited the upgrading of other air defense systems to ABM capability. The agreement also placed restrictions on nonsite radar systems to limit their utility in an ABM capacity.

Verification of the agreement was to be through national-technical means. Thus, compliance of one side would be determined through a variety of sensor systems, to include satellites, radars, and seismographs operated by the other party. This was necessary because of Soviet rejection of provisions for on-site inspection. Finally, the ABM Treaty established the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva to oversee implementation of the agreement and resolve any disputes that may arise. The treaty was to be of unlimited duration, although either party could withdraw after six months' notice should it deem the treaty a threat to its "supreme interests."

The ABM Treaty was ratified by both signatories, and entered into force on 3 October 1972. A protocol to the ABM Treaty, signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974, reduced the number of ABM sites allowed each side from two to one, with a total of one hundred launchers. The site could protect either the national capital or an ICBM base, but not both. The USSR opted to keep its site outside Moscow. The United States maintained its site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but later deactivated the site in 1976.

Compliance with the agreement was excellent, with the notable exception of the Soviet construction of a phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk in 1983, which was ultimately dismantled after U.S. protests. President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) presented a serious challenge to the treaty's ban on the development of ABM systems based on technologies other than missiles. As a result, the Americans reinterpreted the agreement to permit the development and testing, but not the deployment, of ABMs based on lasers, particle beams, and other "exotic" technologies. This approach was rejected by Congress, although Reagan and President George H. W. Bush continued to press for revision of the treaty to permit SDI technologies. Problems with many of these technologies combined with President Bill Clinton's commitment to the ABM Treaty provided a reprieve throughout the 1990s, but President George W. Bush's push for a National Missile Defense Program, an updated SDI, prompted U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty effective 13 June 2002.

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See also

Bush, George Herbert Walker; Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich; Missiles, Antiballistic; Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nuclear Arms Race; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Strategic Defense Initiative

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See Missiles, Antiballistic

Antiballistic Missiles

Anticolonialism

Anticolonialism is defined as hostility toward the domination of one nation or territory by another, usually for exploitative purposes. The Cold War era, particularly from the mid-1950s on, witnessed an explosion of anticolonialism, resulting in the creation of a host of new and independent states, especially in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. As many nations struggled to gain independence from European control during the Cold War, the two superpowers competed for their loyalty by proclaiming dedication to anticolonial principles. In practice, however, the superpowers often compromised their alleged principles by replacing European colonialism with new types of external control that limited the ability of developing-world nations to exercise self-determination.

Resistance to foreign rule by colonized peoples runs as far back as ancient history. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, anticolonialism began to take shape as an element of Western political discourse. Enlightenment thought, with its emphasis on self-determination and mutual obligations between the government and the governed, gave rise to a liberal strand of anticolonialism that underpinned the American Revolution. In later years, Marxism inspired a more radical form of anticolonialism. The Russian Vladimir I. Lenin gave that view its fullest articulation in the early twentieth century, describing colonialism as a by-product of capitalism and calling for its destruction through communist revolution.

Both the liberal and radical variants gained strength following World War I. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson made self-determination a central part of his plan to establish a new global order rooted in democracy, free trade, and collective security. Meanwhile, nationalist leaders of colonial territories, frustrated by the unwillingness of the European powers to cede control, increasingly concluded that they could achieve their liberation only through protest, confrontation, and war. Anticolonial agitation gained considerable momentum

during the interwar years even as European empires reached their greatest geographical extent.

World War II marked a major turning point by opening new opportunities for the expression of anticolonialism. In part, the war itself played a role by severely weakening the European colonial powers. German victories over France and the Netherlands, combined with Japanese occupation of French, Dutch, and British territories in the Far East, disrupted or destroyed colonial administrations and emboldened nationalists by crushing the myth of colonial invincibility. Nationalists stepped into the vacuum and asserted themselves with unprecedented power and conviction.

In part, too, World War II sparked a surge of anticolonialism by pulling the United States into the forefront of international politics. Even before it joined the fighting, Washington revived old Wilsonian rhetoric and placed decolonization high among Allied war aims. At their meeting at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in August 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt convinced British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to sign the Atlantic Charter, which pledged respect for "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." During the war, Roosevelt demanded steps toward the gradual dissolution of European empires, especially in South and Southeast Asia, and the establishment of a new world system based on self-determination and free trade.

Following the war, U.S. policymakers recognized powerful incentives to stick to the course of gradual anticolonialism charted by Roosevelt. Given the apparent inevitability of decolonization around the globe, it made good sense to position the United States on the side of nationalists who would one day control vast resources crucial to the U.S. economy. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a rival beyond the European theater only heightened Washington's concern about maintaining friendly relations with nationalists in the developing world.

These anxieties were offset, however, by another dynamic that led the United States to back away from its avowed anticolonial principles in the first decade of the Cold War. While American leaders understood the desirability of cultivating partnerships in the developing world, they set a higher priority on the need to form robust coalitions among industrial nations to resist Soviet aggression. In this effort, Washington's partners were precisely those countries that controlled colonial empires. Anxious to bolster Britain, France, and other colonial powers as alliance partners, the United States soft-pedaled its anticolonial agenda, advocating compromise solutions that stopped short of full independence for colonial territories. Such halfway solutions disappointed nationalist leaders, who often came to view the United States as a force of repression more than one of liberation.

Historians have suggested other reasons for America's failure to translate anticolonial ideals into support for developing-world nationalism during the Cold War. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams argued that U.S. declarations of anticolonialism masked Americans' own ambitions to control the destiny of other parts of the world in order to serve American interests. Since the nineteenth century, Williams argued, the United States had sought

to replace autarkic colonial relationships with the so-called open door, the notion of equal economic opportunity for all nations. While Americans congratulated themselves on the liberality of this agenda, in practice it often drove Washington to forge partnerships with authoritarian regimes willing to serve American interests rather than those of their own people.

Historian Michael H. Hunt stresses not economic but rather ideological limits on American anticolonialism. Surveying two centuries of American history, Hunt contends that U.S. support for decolonization abroad had always been tightly circumscribed by a racist skepticism about the abilities of non-European peoples to govern themselves and by a deep-seated fear of radicalism, which Americans often judged to be a likely consequence of giving free rein to the nationalist passions of foreign peoples.

Whatever the cause of American behavior, Washington showed little consistency in coping with colonial problems during the Cold War. In the late 1940s, Washington risked its relationship with the Dutch government by exerting pressure on The Hague to concede independence to Indonesia. More famously, in 1956 President Dwight D. Eisenhower used economic coercion to force the traditional colonial powers in the Middle East, Britain, and France to back down when they attempted to reassert control over the Suez

An Egyptian boy near a British tank amid the rubble of destroyed buildings at Port Said, Egypt, in November 1956 during the Suez Crisis. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Canal. At other times, however, the United States set its alliance obligations well ahead of its anticolonial ideals and distanced itself from colonial repression. In the 1970s, for example, Washington supplied military aid to Portugal despite knowledge that the Lisbon government would use that aid to suppress anticolonial agitation in Angola, Mozambique, and other Portuguese territories in Africa.

Communist propaganda routinely pointed out American hypocrisy and denounced the United States as the heir to the repressive practices of its European partners. But the Soviet Union had itself been slow to champion anticolonialism after World War II. Under Josef Stalin, Moscow backed away from Vladimir Lenin's earlier anticolonial enthusiasm and concentrated on European problems. In the 1950s and especially the 1960s, however, new Soviet leaders revalidated Lenin's interest in anticolonial revolution and sought closer relationships with developing-world nationalists. The Soviets and their allies gave political and economic support to Egypt, Indonesia, India, North Vietnam, and other young states. In the 1960s and 1970s, Moscow increasingly supported anticolonial movements in Africa.

Soviet enthusiasm for anticolonialism during the 1960s partly reflected pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC), which repeatedly accused Moscow of halfhearted efforts to spread communist revolution. The PRC also launched rival efforts of its own to support anticolonial struggles in Asia and Africa. Ever since their 1949 triumph in the Chinese Civil War, PRC leaders had viewed their country's revolution as a model for other oppressed peoples around the world. For a decade thereafter, however, Beijing avoided a bold independent role in developing world affairs, insisting that Moscow was the leader of world communism. Only with the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s did China loudly proclaim its dedication to promoting anticolonial revolution. China sent matériel and other supplies to help sustain Left-leaning regimes and liberation movements in Africa, but its most spectacular efforts came in Southeast Asia, where North Vietnam and later Cambodia benefited from massive amounts of Chinese aid.

Soviet and Chinese efforts to position themselves as champions of anticolonialism achieved success in parts of Asia and Africa, where statist economic models and revolutionary politics held strong appeal. Over the long term, however, the communist powers were no more successful than the United States in seizing the high ground of anticolonialism. Just as in the American case, the Soviet and Chinese governments often proclaimed their hostility to European imperialism even as they established domineering relationships with postcolonial states, carried out under the banner of anticolonialism. Late in the Cold War, the Soviet Union and China propped up repressive political regimes in desperately poor states such as Cambodia, Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Angola. On the communist side as on the capitalist side, developing-world nations may have been the biggest losers in the Cold War.

Mark Atwood Lawrence

See also

Africa; China, People's Republic of; Churchill, Winston; Decolonization; Middle East; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Sino-Soviet Split; Southeast Asia; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Suez Crisis; United States

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Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism, or hostility and animosity toward Jewish people, played a significant role in the diplomacy and geopolitics of the Cold War. European anti-Semitism has its roots in medieval religion and culture; Jews suffered persecution and prejudice in Eastern and Western Europe right through the twentieth century. The Nazi extermination of 6 million Jews during World War II represents the most heinous expression of European antipathy toward Judaism. Revulsion at the atrocities of the Nazis resulted in a subsequent decline in anti-Semitism in Europe. However, the end of the Holocaust did not mean an end to anti-Jewish feeling in the world. The status of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union remained an important issue throughout the late twentieth century, and the establishment of Israel in May 1948 resulted in the growth of anti-Jewish sentiment throughout the Arab world and the global Muslim community, sentiments that remain strong today. Cold War anti-Zionism, the rejection of the Jewish claim to Israel/Palestine, often included elements of anti-Semitism and attacks on the Jewish people themselves.

The rise of modern European secular culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not result in the disappearance of anti-Semitism. Indeed, it remained an ugly part of the European cultural landscape. In fact, Theodore Herzl's Zionist movement grew as a response to the continued exclusion of Jews from late nineteenth-century European culture. In the 1890s, Herzl's arguments for a separate Jewish state proceeded from his realization that Jews would always be regarded as alien in Europe. Fifty years later, the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust focused world attention on the plight of the European Jewish community, and the state of Israel was established in November 1948 as a Jewish homeland.

A French police officer surveys the wreckage after a bomb explosion at a synagogue in Paris that killed four people on 3 October 1950. (AFP/Getty Images/Georges Gobet)

Zionism was not the only response of European Jews to anti-Semitism. Many embraced socialism and communism as ideologies that held the promise of acceptance and equal treatment. Indeed, Zionism and socialism were often linked. In Russia, many Jews actively supported the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and embraced the resulting Soviet state. However, traditional Russian anti-Semitism often flared in the Soviet Union and was remolded in Soviet terms. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin grew frustrated with the support of Soviet Jews for Zionism and contemplated the creation of a separate enclave for them in eastern Siberia; he also acted to limit Jewish educational and professional opportunities. Soviet limitations on Jewish identity continued in the 1960s, and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War many Soviet Jews—known as refuseniks—wished to emigrate but were denied permission, ostensibly because of their knowledge of state secrets. During the 1970s, the United States made Jewish emigration a priority in negotiations with the Soviet Union, and many Jews left Russia. Jewish dissidents such as Natan Sharansky continued to pressure the Soviet leadership in the late 1970s and 1980s, often to their peril. However, it was not until the advent of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that Soviet Jews received the freedom to depart.

The Zionist movement, begun by Herzl and his followers in the late nineteenth century, had sought to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine through land purchases and emigration from Europe (to increase the Jewish community already present). The first Jewish kibbutzim, or collective farms, were established in the first decades of the twentieth century. Jewish immigration continued unabated as the region passed from Ottoman Turkish to British control after World War I. The increase in the Jewish population of Palestine resulted in considerable Arab resentment and anti-Jewish sentiment. From the Arab point of view, the Jewish presence would unjustly result in the displacement of Arabs and in the reduction of Arab power and influence in the region. Anti-Jewish riots took place several times in the 1920s, as the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, encouraged action against Zionism. A general Arab uprising in 1936 contributed to a change in British policy, and in 1939 the British drastically cut Jewish immigration.

The establishment of Israel transformed the situation. While the global Jewish population viewed Israel as a haven in their ancestral homeland, the Arabs considered it an unjust seizure of Arab territory by the Western powers on behalf of European Jews. Arabs questioned why European atrocities against the Jews should result in a loss of Arab sovereignty over Arab land. None of the newly formed Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon—voted for the United Nations (UN) resolution that created Israel. The state was created in the Middle East over Arab objections. When the new nation was proclaimed in May 1948, all five of these states immediately invaded Israel, initiating half a century of Arab-Israeli warfare.

As Israel fought successfully in the various conflicts of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, anti-Jewish feelings among the Arabs increased. Anti-Zionism represented the core of the Arab position. Indeed, none of the Arab nations of the Middle East recognized the right of Israel to exist until the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1978. Anti-Zionism, however, was often combined with anti-Semitism, as Arab rhetoric attacked Judaism and the Jewish people. For example, Lebanese and Syrian cartoons at the time of the 1967 War depicted caricatured Jews being expelled from Israel and mounds of Jewish skulls in the streets of Tel Aviv. At the same time, Israeli rhetoric vilified the Arab people. The existence of Arab refugees fanned the flames. Such refugees, mostly Palestinian Arabs who had fled Israel during the 1948 War, lived in a number of large camps located in Syria, Gaza, Jordan, and the West Bank. Dispossessed by the Israelis and not accepted by any of the Arab states, the refugees seethed with anti-Jewish sentiment. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, drew its members largely from their ranks.

While some anti-Jewish rhetoric during the Cold War had a religious overtone and called on Arabs to fight the enemies of Islam, the Arab governments largely adopted the socialist, anti-imperialist positions of Arab nationalism. Zionism and Judaism were attacked as racist and imperialist, and Israel was denounced as part of an American imperial plot for global domination. With the Israeli victory in the 1967 War and the seizure and occupation of Arab territories in the Sinai, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, such charges

intensified. Much of the developing world, recently liberated from European colonialism, responded to such Arab views; Muslim nations already had an obvious reason to sympathize with the Palestinian refugees and with the Arab cause in general. The Soviet Union cleverly fostered anti-imperialist arguments as a way to reduce American influence among developing nations. The trend resulted in the global isolation of Israel, best illustrated by the 1975 UN General Assembly's resolution defining Zionism as a form of racism and recognition of Yasir Arafat and the PLO. Global anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism continued to grow, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 accelerated its pace.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the accompanying decline in global socialist movements, Islam has become an increasingly important source of identity in Arab resistance to Israel. Anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist views in the Middle East and around the world have acquired a more religious character in the years since the end of the Cold War.

Robert Kiely

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Israel; Middle East; Palestine Liberation Organization; Refuseniks

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Antonescu, Ion
(1882–1946)

Romanian marshal and dictator (1940–1944). Born to a prominent military family at Piteşti on 14 June 1882, Ion Antonescu graduated from Romanian military schools in Craiova (1902) and Iaşi (1904). A cavalry lieutenant during the 1907 Peasant Revolt, he fought in the second Balkan War and in World War I. From 1922 to 1927 he was military attaché in Paris, Brussels, and London. He was named chief of the General Staff in 1933, but his opposition to King Carol II's corrupt and sycophantic cabal led him to resign in December 1934. In 1937, Antonescu became minister of national defense in the short-lived government of Octavian Goga, a German-backed regime with strong links to the Romanian fascist organization the Iron Guard. When King Carol announced a royal dictatorship in 1938 and took action to squelch the Iron Guard, Antonescu retired from public life for two years.

In 1940, regional crises climaxed with the Soviet Union's seizure of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, Bulgaria's retrieval of southern Dobruja, and, with the Vienna Award of 30 August 1940, Hungary's reannexation of northern Transylvania. Before abdicating in favor of his son, Michael, King

Carol was obliged to recall Antonescu to form a government. Initially, Antonescu's National Legionary regime was a coalition dominated by the Iron Guard, which, however, soon lost popular support through its incompetence and violence that culminated in an attempted coup in January 1941.

Antonescu then moved in, supported by Romanian and German military forces. The Iron Guard leaders fled to Germany, where they were interned. On Antonescu's invitation, German troops arrived on 10 October 1940, ostensibly to train the Romanian Army but, more important, to guard the Romanian oil fields and to launch the Balkan and Soviet campaigns the following spring.

Antonescu, convinced that Germany would win the war, hoped that German leader Adolf Hitler would revise the Vienna Award in return for Romania's military support. Viewing Operation BARBAROSSA (begun on 22 June 1941) as an opportunity to regain Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, he commanded Army Group Antonescu and reclaimed the territory in question within a month of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. He then commanded the Romanian Fourth Army's assault on Transnistria, a region that came under Romanian administration and to which some 100,000 Bessarabian and Bukovinan Jews were deported. Despite Antonescu's refusal to participate outright in the German Final Solution, at least 250,000 Jews and Gypsies died as a result of his policies.

Ion Antonescu became prime minister of Romania in 1940. His fascist pro-German government was popular in the early years of World War II, but he was eventually deposed in a coup d'état and executed as a war criminal. (Library of Congress)

Soon after the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad in early 1943, Antonescu authorized contacts with the Allies for Romania to leave the war. Their answer was clear: Romania would have to negotiate this with the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov announced Soviet conditions on 2 April 1944. These called for Romania to switch sides and join the Allied war effort, relinquish Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, and pay reparations to the Soviet Union. The Vienna Award would be nullified, and northern Transylvania would be returned to Romania. Antonescu foolishly refused these conditions and resumed direct command of his troops shortly after the Soviet offensive along the Romanian border on 20 August 1944. Returning briefly to Bucharest, Antonescu was summoned to the royal palace on 23 August, where King Michael asked him to sign an armistice. Antonescu refused and was arrested. He was then transferred to the Soviet Union. Brought back to Romania, he was tried on war crimes charges during 4–17 May 1945 before a People's Court. Found guilty, he was executed at Jilava prison near Bucharest on 1 June 1946.

ANNA WITTMAN

See also

Bessarabia; Dobruja; Romania

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ANZUS Pact
(1 September 1951)

Collective security agreement among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS). The ANZUS Pact was concluded on 1 September 1951 in San Francisco and went into force on 29 April 1952. This marked the first time that Australia and New Zealand participated in a security treaty in which the United Kingdom did not also participate.

At the time the pact was drafted, its aims were to prevent the expansion of communism into the region and to prevent the resurgence of Japan as a military threat (a specific concern of Australia and New Zealand). These anti-Japanese sentiments gradually diminished as time passed, and thus the main thrust of the pact was on the containment of communism. Australia and New Zealand, in alliance with the United States, participated in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the foundation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954.

The Australian commitment to ANZUS has been maintained in principle across various governments; however, New Zealand's commitment waxed and waned with internal political shifts. New Zealand's Labour government (1972–1975) adopted an antinuclear policy, which temporarily strained relations with the United States and called into question New Zealand's commitment to ANZUS. New Zealand's policies were reversed when the Labour Party lost power in 1975. However, Labour returned to power in 1984 and implemented its antinuclear policy again.

The New Zealand government, led by Prime Minister David Lange, banned nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships from entering New Zealand ports and in 1985 refused port access to the destroyer USS *Buchanan*, which was capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Diplomatic relations with the United States were greatly strained as a result of the Lange government's policies. In August 1986 the U.S. government finally suspended its ANZUS defense obligations to New Zealand.

This crisis wrought serious consequences on New Zealand, such as the restriction of intelligence information provided from the United States. However, New Zealand steadfastly maintained the antinuclear policy and adopted the Nuclear Free Zone and Disarmament and Arms Control Act in 1987. Although foreign and military relations between America and New Zealand have been gradually improving since the mid-1990s, New Zealand has yet to return to ANZUS.

The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 gave occasion for the first official invocation of the ANZUS Pact by Aus-

tralia, which stipulates mutual assistance when any signatory comes under attack.

SATORU YAMAGUCHI

See also

Australia; New Zealand; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

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Aquino, Benigno, Jr.

(1932–1983)

Filipino politician and opposition leader during the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos. Born on 27 November 1932 in Concepción, Tarlac Province, to a prominent family, Benigno "Ninoy" Simeon Aquino Jr. became the youngest mayor in Filipino history when he was elected to that post in his hometown in 1955. In the same year he married Corazon Cojuangco, a member of another powerful local family. Aquino's political star continued to rise with his election as governor of Tarlac Province in 1961, his appointment in 1966 as secretary-general of the Liberal Party, and his 1967 election to the Senate. Aquino was the leading candidate to succeed President Marcos in 1973 when the latter's second term was due to expire.

The Filipino constitution placed a two-term limit on the presidency. But, determined to stay in power beyond a second term, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, imprisoning Aquino and other political opponents for their alleged involvement in a communist-inspired plot to overthrow the government. In November 1977, a military tribunal found Aquino guilty of subversion and sentenced him to death. Because of Aquino's international reputation, however, Marcos stayed the execution and in 1980 allowed Aquino to go into exile in the United States, where he would receive badly needed heart bypass surgery.

In 1981 Marcos lifted the martial law decree, and by 1983 his deteriorating health had weakened his grip on power. At that point, Aquino decided to return to the Philippines to work on the 1984 legislative elections and prepare for a post-Marcos return to democracy. Immediately upon his arrival at the Manila International Airport on 21 August 1983, Aquino was gunned down and murdered by a member of his own military escort, probably not on the order of the ailing Marcos but certainly on the command of someone else in his regime. Massive public demonstrations followed Aquino's assassination, as a growing number of Filipinos demanded an end to Marcos's brutal and corrupt rule.

In the wake of Aquino's murder, the administration of President Ronald Reagan, previously a strong Marcos proponent, began to withdraw support, calling for an investigation into the assassination, canceling a planned presidential trip to the Philippines, and urging free and fair elections. Although the United States never formally broke ties with Marcos, it allowed a popular rebellion to sweep him from power in February 1986 following his electoral defeat by Aquino's wife.

ELUN GABRIEL

See also

Aquino, Corazon; Marcos, Ferdinand Edralin; Philippines

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Aquino, Corazon
(1933–)

First woman president of the Philippines (1986–1992). Born in Manila on 25 January 1933 into a family of wealthy landowners, Maria Corazon "Cory" Cojuangco was educated at the Ravenhill Academy in Philadelphia, the Notre Dame Convent School in New York, the College of Mount Saint Vincent in New York, and the Far Eastern University in the Philippines. She married Philippine opposition leader Benigno Aquino in October 1954.

Cory Aquino entered politics six months after her husband's assassination in August 1983. The military, media, and religious establishments all supported Aquino, who held President Ferdinand Marcos personally responsible for her husband's death. Popular Filipino opinion and U.S. government pressure forced Marcos to advance the national elections to February 1986. Aquino united the opposition to the Marcos regime, contesting the election as the presidential candidate of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Marcos, who had manipulated the election, claimed victory, prompting key military leaders to revolt. In these circumstances, Philippine Cardinal Jaime Sin broadcast an appeal for "people power." Although Marcos sought to crush the ensuing popular response, opposition to his rule was such that he was eventually forced to leave the country, and Aquino assumed the presidency on 25 February 1986.

As president, Aquino restored constitutional democracy to the Philippines after the long dictatorial regime of Marcos and also combated communist and Muslim insurgencies. Much was expected of Aquino, whom Filipinos viewed as morally upright and scrupulously honest. But Marcos's hopelessly corrupt regime had left a troublesome legacy, including an entrenched bureaucracy and landed gentry elite, graft, foreign debt, and communist and Muslim insurrections.

Aquino ruled by decree until a new constitution was ratified in a 1987 referendum. She immediately undertook steps to make public policy more democratic and less corrupt. Previously, Marcos had enjoyed a pivotal role in a unicameral parliament. A new, bicameral legislature came into being with a multiparty base instead of the two-party system of the Marcos period. Nonetheless, remnants of the old order largely prevented Aquino from pushing reform initiatives through the legislature.

In office, Aquino's personal reputation suffered because of financial malfeasance on the part of her relatives. She also had to face repeated military coup attempts. Aquino survived a December 1989 coup attempt only through U.S. intervention. She was faced with growing factionalism, entrenched cronyism, and political infighting, and her conciliatory stance projected her as a vacillating and indecisive leader. Aquino chose not to seek reelection and left office in June 1992.

Udai Bhanu Singh

Swept into power in 1986 following the assassination of her husband Benigno Aquino, Corazon Aquino was the first woman president of the Philippines. She survived a half dozen assassination attempts and public unrest related to the slow pace of political reform and economic change. (Embassy of the Philippines)

See also

Aquino, Benigno, Jr.; Marcos, Ferdinand Edralin; Philippines

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Arab-Israeli Wars
(1948–1973)

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations (UN) voted to partition the British mandate of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. This arrangement could not be worked out peacefully and led to the first of four major wars between the Israelis and the Arabs. Fighting erupted in May 1948 upon the founding of the State of Israel. The three other conflicts ensued in 1956 (the Sinai War or Suez Crisis), 1967 (the Six-Day War), and 1973 (the October War, Ramadan War, or Yom Kippur War). In each of these four conflicts, Israeli forces eventually triumphed. Each threatened to bring about superpower intervention, and the four wars had profound implications throughout the Middle East and beyond.

The 1948 war began on the eve of the UN General Assembly's endorsement of Resolution 181 on 29 November 1947, which stipulated the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab areas and states. While the Jews endorsed

Arab-Israeli War, 1948



the resolution, the Arabs—both the Palestinians and the Arab League—rejected it. In response to the rejection, Arabs began attacking Jews throughout Palestine, and the incidents expanded so that from December 1947 to May 1948 an intercommunal war raged between the Jewish and the Arab residents of Palestine.

The Jewish community numbered some 600,000 people, while the Palestinian community consisted of more than 1.2 million. However, the Palestinian numerical advantage counted for little on the battlefield. The Palestinians had no national institutions of any kind, let alone a cohesive military. They were also fragmented and divided. The decision to go to war rested in the hands of one man, former Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al Husayni.

Most Palestinians, more than likely, did not want to go to war, preferring instead to seek peace and truce agreements with their Jewish neighbors. But al Husayni was able to use his religious authority to dictate a greater Palestine agenda. Without political institutions, the only way Palestinians could express their support of al Husayni's action was by individual action, and only 5,000 Palestinians took part in the fighting against the Jews. These essentially guerrilla forces were poorly trained and equipped and ineffectively organized. The Arab League pledged to support the Palestinians but, through its Military Committee, actually usurped the conflict from the Palestinians.

The Military Committee and the mufti argued over the conduct of the war, as each sought to control operations. The Military Committee failed to provide the Palestinians with the money and weapons that the Arab rulers had pledged, and it sent its commanders to Palestine to oversee the war. Such internal conflicts further weakened the Palestinian war effort.

The Jews, on the other hand, were much more organized and better equipped. Jewish society was both Westernized and industrialized, having all the institutions of a modern state. In fact, structurally, the establishment of the Jewish state required only the formal transformation of the prestatehood institutions to government entities: parliament, political parties, banks, and a relatively well-developed military, known as the Hagana. The Hagana was organized during the civil war as a full-fledged army, with nine brigades consisting of some 25,000 conscripts. By May 1948 there were eleven brigades, with nearly 35,000 men. Jewish forces took the offensive in early April 1948; the Palestinians had no chance to counterattack, and by early May they had been defeated.

During this time, and even before the Jews' final campaign, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled their homes and became refugees. By the end of the war, there were 750,000–1 million or more refugees. Many of them escaped from the battle zone, but others were expelled and deported by Jewish forces during the actual fighting.

With the official termination of British rule in Palestine on 14 May 1948, the next day David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first elected prime minister, declared the establishment of the State of Israel. This was followed by the advance of four Arab armies toward Palestine bent on a campaign to destroy Israel. On 15 May, Israeli forces secured control over all the territory allocated to the Jewish state by the UN, in addition to a corridor leading to Jerusalem and the

Jewish part of Jerusalem that, according to the Partition Resolution, was to have been internationalized.

The resulting war was, in many respects, primitive. Some 35,000 Israeli soldiers faced 35,000–40,000 Arab soldiers. Both sides were subjected to a UN Security Council arms embargo, but it was the Arabs who suffered most from this. The Arab armies had secured their weapons from Britain. Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq were forced into this arrangement under treaties with Britain and had no access to other markets. With the embargo in place, the Arabs were unable to replace damaged or destroyed weapons, and they had only limited access to ammunition. While the Israelis (at this point) received no military equipment from the West, they did manage in early 1948 to sign a major arms contract with the Czech government, thereby purchasing various weapons but mainly small arms and ammunition.

The strength of the Arab armies was infantry. Their few tanks were mostly Egyptian. Even then, only a few dozen were operational. Despite an initial effort to create a unified command structure, the movements of the four Arab armies toward Palestine were not coordinated. In April 1948 General Nur a-Din Mahmud, an Iraqi officer, was appointed by the Arab League to command the Arab forces. Mahmud then submitted a plan of action, the focus of which was to be northeastern Palestine, where the invading forces

Israeli forces in Galilee near the Arab village of Sassa during the Israeli War for Independence, 1 January 1948. (Israel Government Press Office)

would try to sever eastern Galilee from the Huleh Valley to Lake Kinneret (the Sea of Galilee) from Israel. That would be achieved through the coordinated advance of Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, and Jordanian forces in the northern part of Palestine, while the Egyptian Army would move northward to Ibneh, which was inside the designated Arab state. The Egyptians were not to advance into the Jewish state's territory, at least not in the first stage, but rather were to create a diversion that would lure Israeli forces into their sector and reduce Israeli pressure on the main Arab push in the north.

Jordan's King Abdullah had different plans for his army, however. He had no intention of fighting the Jews. Instead, he planned to occupy the area designated for the Palestinian Arab state, west of the Jordan River, and annex it into his kingdom. For that reason he rebuffed Mahmud's plan and ordered the commander of the Arab Legion to act independently and occupy the West Bank. That was done, with the Arab Legion completing its mission in a few days. With that, each Arab army acted in isolation, while at the last minute Lebanon refrained from participating in the war. Syrian and Iraqi forces fought in the northern part of Israel, the Jordanian Arab League in the central sector, and the Egyptian Army in the south.

The Egyptian government dispatched to Palestine 5,500 soldiers organized into two infantry brigades, accompanied by nearly 4,500 irregulars. The Iraqi Army sent to Palestine some 4,500 soldiers, while the Syrians dispatched 6,000. Jordan deployed almost all of its army, some 6,500 men. In addition, some 3,000 irregulars fought alongside the Arab armies.

At that time, Israel had fielded more than 30,000 soldiers. The fighting was divided into two parts: the first from 15 May to 10 June and the second from 9 July to the end of the war. The first stage saw the Jews on the defensive, while in the second half of the war they took the offensive. In the indecisive first phase, small Iraqi and Syrian forces invaded Israel in the north but were repelled following a few days of fighting. Jordanian forces concentrated on the occupation of the West Bank, while the main Egyptian expeditionary force moved northward along the coastline, reaching its final staging area near Yibne, within the area designated to the Arab state. Another part of the Egyptian force crossed the Negev Desert from west to east, moving toward Samaria through Hebron up to the southern outskirts of Jerusalem. Neither Egyptian force encountered any Israeli forces during their movements.

In this initial stage, the Israelis were concentrated along the road to Jerusalem. Both the Jordanians and the Israelis completely misread the other's intentions. The Israelis assumed that the Arab Legion planned to invade Israel, and the Jordanians feared that the Israelis intended to drive the Arab Legion from the West Bank. In fact, all the Israelis sought was to bring the Jewish part of Jerusalem under Israeli control and toward that end to gain control over the road from the coast to Jerusalem. The Israelis feared that the Arab Legion would cut the road to Jerusalem and occupy all of Jerusalem, and to prevent this from occurring they reinforced Jerusalem. The Jordanians interpreted the dispatch of Israeli troops to Jerusalem as an attempt to build up a force to take the offensive against them. This mutual misunderstanding was the cause of the fierce fighting between Israeli and Jordanian forces that

Belligerents of the Arab-Israeli Wars

Year	*War*	*Israel's Opponents*	*Force Strength*
1948	Israeli War of Independence	Palestine and Arab League	55,000 Arabs vs. 108,300 Israelis
1956	Sinai War	Egypt	300,000 Egyptians vs. 254,000 Israelis, British, and French
1967	Six-Day War	Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq	280,000 Arabs vs. 264,000 Israelis
1973	Yom Kippur War	Egypt, Syria, and Iraq	1,100,000 Arabs vs. 415,000 Israelis

ended with the Jordanians repulsing the Israeli troops and holding on to bases in the Latrun area, the strategic site along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road.

Israeli-Jordanian fighting ended when the Israeli government acknowledged its inability to drive out Jordanian forces that blocked the road to Jerusalem and when the two governments realized that the other posed no risk. In November 1948, Jewish and Jordanian military commanders in Jerusalem concluded an agreement that formalized the positions established with the de facto cease-fire of the previous July.

With the end of the fighting with Jordan, the Israelis launched the next and final phase of the war. In a two-stage operation in October and December 1948, the Israeli Army drove the Egyptian forces from the Negev. The Israeli effort to force out the Egyptians along the coast was only partially successful, however. The Egyptians remained in control of the Gaza Strip; indeed, it continued under Egyptian control until 1967.

Concurrent with the October operations in the south, other Israeli troops stormed the high ground in central Galilee, controlled by the Arab League's Arab Liberation Army. After brief fighting, the Israelis occupied all of Galilee. In early January 1949 a cease-fire came into effect, and shortly thereafter negotiations on armistice agreements began.

The second major confrontation between Israel and the Arabs was the Sinai War or Suez Crisis of October 1956. This time, only Israel and Egypt were involved in the fighting. The Israeli-Egyptian war, which in Israel was known as Operation KADESH, was only part of a larger picture, as Britain and France were also involved in the conflict. During 1949–1956, there was constant unrest along the Israeli-Egyptian demarcation lines. Infiltrators regularly crossed the border from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip and from the Sinai. Some were Palestinian refugees wanting either to return to their homes or to visit relatives who remained inside Israel, some hoped to harvest their fields on the Israeli side of the border, some came to steal, and a few went to launch terrorist attacks against Israeli targets.

These infiltrations had an enormous impact on Israel. Economic damage mounted, and border-area residents, many of them newly arrived immigrants, were unprepared for the challenge. Israel feared the political implications of the infiltrations, as estimates of their numbers were thousands per month.

Consequently, Israeli security forces undertook harsh measures against the infiltrators, regardless of their motives for crossing the border. Israeli soldiers often ambushed infiltrators, killing them and launching reprisal attacks. As a result, tensions along the Israeli borders increased, chiefly along the frontiers with Jordan and Egypt.

While the cross-border tensions provided the background context, the war occurred for two main reasons. First, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, a fervent Arab nationalist, aspired to lead and unite the Arab world, which deeply troubled Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. He attributed the Arab defeat in 1948 to a great extent to their divisions. Thus, he was fearful of a unified Arab world under Nasser's leadership. The second immediate reason for the war was the Egyptian-Czech arms deal announced in September 1955. The agreement assured Nasser of the modern weapons he would need to carry out an all-out attack against Israel.

The Israelis' fears were mitigated by an Israeli-French arms agreement that tilted the military equilibrium in their favor before September 1955. In June 1956, however, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, provoking an acute international crisis that culminated with the 1956 war. Shortly after the beginning of the crisis, France invited Israel to take part in planning a joint military attack on Egypt.

Tensions between Israel and Egypt had significantly diminished. In the summer of 1956, exchanges of fire along the armistice line had largely ceased. More important, expecting a fierce Anglo-French reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Nasser reduced the Egyptian troop deployment along the Israeli-Egyptian border to reinforce along the Suez Canal. Although Egypt had blockaded the Straits of Tiran, closing it to Israeli ships, this alone could not be reason for war, as there was no Israeli commercial maritime transportation along that route. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion feared that Nasser was planning to unite the Arab world against Israel, and thus the invitation from a great power to take part in a joint war was too much to resist.

In a meeting at Sèvres during 22–25 October 1956, French and Israeli negotiators worked out the details of the war. The British also joined the endeavor. According to the plan, Israeli parachutists would land a few miles east of the Suez. France and Britain would then issue an ultimatum to both parties to remove their military forces from the canal. Expecting an Egyptian refusal, French and British forces would then invade Egypt to enforce the ultimatum. In the meantime, Israeli forces would storm the Sinai Peninsula. Their goal was to join up with the parachutists in the heart of the Sinai and open the Tiran Straits.

Israel deployed the 7th Armored Brigade, with two tank battalions; the 27th and 37th Mechanized Brigades; the 202nd Parachute Brigade; and the 1st, 4th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Infantry Brigades. The agreement with the British and French was the determining factor in the Israeli plan of attack. Instead of storming the Egyptian positions in front of them, a paratroop battalion was dropped on 29 October 1956 at the eastern gates of Mitla Pass, some 30 miles east of the Suez Canal. Simultaneously, the paratroop brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ariel Sharon, moved into the Sinai to

Egyptian prisoners of war during the Suez Crisis, 3 November 1956. Their steel helmets are in the foreground. (Israel Government Press Office)

join with the battalion waiting deep in the Sinai. The other Israeli forces had to wait until the Anglo-French attack on Egypt began.

Israeli commanders in the field were unaware of the agreement with the British and the French. Fearing for the parachute brigade and seeking a resolute and decisive victory over Egyptian forces, Major General Assaf Simhoni, head of the southern command, ordered his forces to move ahead, with the armored brigade leading. The brigade stormed the Egyptian positions, with the remainder of the forces ensuring the defeat of the Egyptians. Israeli forces completed the occupation of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip within three days. During the fighting, nearly 170 Israeli soldiers were killed and 700 were wounded. The Egyptians sustained thousands of deaths, far more wounded, and more than 5,500 troops taken prisoner.

Israel did not enjoy for long the territorial achievements it gained in the war, however. Under enormous pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, it was compelled to remove its forces from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. However, the terms of the Israeli evacuation of the Sinai aimed to provide it with the security it was lacking: UN observers were deployed along the armistice demarcation lines to ensure that they would not be crossed by infiltrators. One result of the stationing of UN forces was the near-complete cessation of infiltration from the Gaza Strip to Israel. It was also agreed that the Sinai would be demilitarized, thus removing the threat of an Egyptian

surprise attack against Israel. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration provided assurances that it would no longer allow closure of the Tiran Straits. Finally, the performance of Israeli forces in the war marked a dramatic change in the history of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It went from being an unsophisticated, infantry-based army to an efficient, modernized, and mechanized military force. The lessons of the Sinai War certainly paved the way toward the Israelis' impressive achievement in the Six-Day War of 6–11 June 1967.

While the immediate cause of the Six-Day War may be unclear, the long-term catalysts are more obvious. On 15 May 1967, Nasser sent his army into the Sinai. This set the stage for a dramatic three weeks that culminated in an Israeli attack and the total defeat of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian forces. It also resulted in the loss of territories by these three Arab countries.

Tensions along the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Jordanian borders provided the long-term cause of the war. There were three issues of contention. The first was the Israeli-Syrian struggle over the sovereignty on several pieces of land along their mutual border. According to the Israeli-Syrian armistice agreements, these areas were demilitarized. The Syrians insisted that sovereignty of the areas was still undecided, while Israel believed that because the areas were on their side of the international border, they were under full Israeli sovereignty. Consequently, Israel insisted that it had the right to cultivate the controversial pieces of land, to the Syrians' dismay. In a number of instances the Syrians tried, by armed force, to prevent Israeli settlers from farming the land.

The second point of controversy lay in Syrian attempts to prevent Israel from diverting water from the Jordan River. Encouraged by the Arab League, the Syrians had tried since 1964 to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River inside Syria. Israel reacted fiercely to this, and until the final Syrian abandonment of the project, many clashes took place between the two nations' armed forces.

The third issue was the revival of the Palestinian cause. After nearly two decades of silence, the Palestinians again were in the forefront of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the late 1950s, Palestinian engineer and nationalist Yasir Arafat established al-Fatah, an underground organization dedicated to liberating Palestine, and in 1964 the Arab League established the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Over the next few years, other militant Palestinian organizations were established. In January 1965 al-Fatah planted a bomb near an Israeli water-pumping station. The Israelis defused the bomb, but al-Fatah celebrated this as the first Palestinian terrorist attack. Palestinian attacks continued throughout 1965, 1966, and 1967.

Despite the relatively small scale of the attacks, Israel responded aggressively, blaming Jordan for hosting the terrorists and Syria for harboring and encouraging them. The extent and ferocity of Israeli-Syrian clashes increased in early 1967, culminating in an aerial battle between Israeli and Syrian forces in April 1967. Israeli pilots shot down six Syrian planes during one of the dogfights. In the course of a public address, IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin threatened war against Syria.

With a crewman on alert, an Israeli gunboat passes through the Straits of Tiran during the Six-Day War, 8 June 1967. (Israel Government Press Office/Yaacov Agor)

A month later, in May 1967, Nasser ordered his forces into the Sinai. The reasons for this action are unclear. The common assumption is that Moscow warned both the Egyptian and Syrian governments that Israeli military forces were deployed along the Israeli-Syrian border. Because Egypt and Syria were bound by a military pact signed on 4 November 1966, Nasser sent his army into the Sinai to force the Israelis to dilute their forces in the north and to forestall what he assumed was an imminent attack on Syria.

The Israelis responded to the entry of Egyptian forces into the Sinai by calling up IDF reserve forces. Nasser subsequently increased Israeli concerns when he ordered the UN observers along the Israeli-Egyptian border to concentrate in one location. UN Secretary-General U Thant responded by pulling UN forces out of the Sinai altogether. Next, Nasser again closed the Tiran Straits—yet another violation of the agreements that had led to the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 1957. Besides that, Jordan and Egypt signed a military pact on 30 May 1967. This further increased the Israeli sense of siege.

Israeli military doctrine called for preemptive strikes in case of a concentration of Arab forces along its borders. All that was necessary was U.S. permission, and President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration gave that in early June. The war began at dawn on 5 June 1967, with Israeli air strikes first on Egyptian and then on Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi air bases. The purpose

of these attacks was to neutralize the Arab air forces and remove the threat of air strikes on Israel. This would also, at a later stage, allow the Israeli Air Force to provide close air support to its forces on the ground.

Catching the vast bulk of the Egyptian aircraft on the ground as their pilots were at breakfast, some 250 Israeli aircraft destroyed the backbone of the Arab air forces within an hour. By the end of the day they had been almost completely wiped out. More than 300 of a total of 420 Egyptian combat aircraft were destroyed that day. The Israelis then turned to destroy the far smaller Jordanian and Syrian air forces.

About an hour after the start of the air raids against Egypt, at about 8:30 A.M. Israeli time, the IDF launched its ground offensive. Three Israeli divisions attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and within four days they had destroyed the Egyptian Army in the Sinai and occupied the peninsula. Israeli operational plans were initially restricted to the Egyptian front. The IDF high command had developed plans to take the fighting to the Jordanian and Syrian fronts, but on the morning of 5 June it had no wish to go to war with these two Arab states.

There were, however, unexpected developments. As the Israeli troops stormed into the Sinai, Jordanian artillery shelled the suburbs of Jerusalem and other targets in Israel. The Israeli government had hoped that Jordan's King Hussein would stay out of the fray and refrain from engaging in serious fighting. That did not happen. Jordanian troops stormed the UN Headquarters in Jerusalem, inducing fears that the next step would be an attempt to take over Israeli-held Mount Scopus, an enclave within a Jordanian-held territory that overlooked Jerusalem. To prevent that, Israeli forces moved ahead to secure a road to Mount Scopus, and the Jerusalem area became an unplanned battlefield. In addition, Israeli troops moved in northern Samaria, from which long-range Jordanian artillery was shelling Israeli seaside cities.

A full-fledged war was now in progress. It lasted two days and ended with the complete Israeli victory over Jordanian forces. Israel then occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River and eastern Jerusalem.

In the north, Syrian forces began to move westward toward the Israeli border but did not complete the deployment and, for unknown reasons, returned to their bases. For five long days the Syrians shelled Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights overlooking the Jordan River Valley. Hoping to avoid a three-front war, the Israelis took no action against the Syrians, despite the heavy pressure from the settlers who had come under Syrian artillery fire. It was only in the last day of the war, with the fighting in the south and center firmly under control, that Israeli troops stormed the Golan Heights, taking it after only a few hours of fighting.

The end of the war saw a new Middle East in which Israel controlled an area three times as large as its pre-1967 territory. Israel had also firmly established itself as a major regional power. It found itself in control of nearly 2 million Arabs in the West Bank, many of whom were refugees from the 1948 war. Militarily, the 1967 war marked a major military departure. First, it was a full-fledged armored war, in which both sides, but chiefly the Egyptians and Israelis, deployed hundreds of tanks. Second, Cold War imperatives were

The end of the war saw a new Middle East in which Israel controlled an area three times as large as its pre-1967 territory. Israel had also firmly established itself as a major regional power.

clearly evident on the battlefield, with Israel equipped with sophisticated Western weapons and enjoying the full political support of the United States, while the Egyptians and the Syrians had the military and political support of the Soviet Union.

The next major Arab-Israeli conflict occurred six years later: the 1973 October War, also known as the War of Atonement, the Yom Kippur War, and the Ramadan War. The years between 1967 and 1973 were not peaceful ones in the Middle East. Nasser refused to accept the results of the Six-Day War and rejected Israeli terms for negotiations in direct talks for a peace agreement in return for giving up the Sinai. The Jordanians and the Syrians, as well as the rest of the Arab world, also rejected Israel's terms, instead demanding compliance with UN Resolution 242 (22 November 1967) that called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area."

UN Resolution 242 became the main reference for any agreement in the region but was missing two things, which made it a source of conflict. First, it called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "territories occupied" and not from "the territories occupied." This slight semantic difference was at the heart of Israel's claim that it was not called upon to return to all the pre–6 June 1967 lines, as the Arabs argued. Tel Aviv held that this was a matter for discussion with the Arab states involved. Second, the resolution did not call for the parties to begin direct peace talks, as Israel consistently demanded. The result was stalemate.

Israel launched settlement endeavors, seeking to perpetuate its hold on the occupied territories, by placing Jewish settlers in the territories, and the Arab side again resorted to violence. The first to endorse violence were the Palestinians. Disappointed by the Arab defeat, the Palestinians changed their strategy. Prior to 1967 they had used terror attacks as a trigger that might provoke war, which they hoped would end in an Arab victory. Now they decided to take their fate into their own hands and launch their own war of liberation against what they called the Zionist entity. That is, their struggle was not against Israeli occupation of Arab territories but rather against the very idea of Israel. The result was a sharp increase in both the extent and ferocity of Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israel.

In 1968 the Palestinians internationalized their struggle by launching terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets all over the world. Nasser now also decided on a path of aggression. Frustrated by his inability to bring about a change in Israel's position, he began a campaign under the slogan of "what was taken by force would be returned by force." Following low-level skirmishes along the Suez Canal and adjoining areas, from June 1968 Egyptian forces began shelling and raiding Israeli troop deployments across the Suez Canal. The Israelis responded with artillery fire and retaliatory attacks. The violence escalated as Israel struck deep inside Egypt with its air force.

With the growing intensity of Israeli air attacks on Egypt, pilots from the Soviet Union took an active part in the defense of Egypt. The increased

involvement of the Soviet military in the conflict deeply worried both the Israelis and the United States. Through the mediation of U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, a cease-fire agreement was concluded in August 1970, and the fighting subsided. Shortly after the signing of the agreement, however, the Egyptians began placing surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries throughout the canal area, paving the way for the next major conflict, the October War. During 1970–1973, Rogers and UN mediator Gunnar Yarring introduced peace plans that were rejected by both the Israelis and the Egyptians. Following Nasser's death in September 1970, his successor, Anwar Sadat, was determined to change the status quo. Toward that end he acted on two fronts: he called for a gradual settlement that would lead to Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai without a full peace agreement, and he expelled the Soviet advisors brought in by Nasser while resuming negotiations with the United States, which Nasser had ended in 1955.

The failure of Sadat's diplomatic efforts in 1971 led him to begin planning a military operation that would break the political stalemate along the Israeli-Egyptian front. Sadat believed that even a minor Egyptian military success would change the military equilibrium and force a political settlement that would lead to a final settlement. In devising his plan, he carefully calculated Israeli and Egyptian strengths and weaknesses. He believed that Israel's strength lay in its air force and armored divisions, well-trained for the conduct of maneuver warfare. Egyptian strengths were the ability to build a strong defense line and the new SAM batteries deployed all along the canal area and deep within Egypt. Sadat hoped to paralyze the Israeli Air Force by using the SAMs. He hoped to counter the Israelis' advantage in maneuver warfare by forcing them to attack well-fortified and well-defended Egyptian strongholds.

In an attempt to dilute the Israeli military forces on the Sinai front, Sadat brought in Syria. A coordinated surprise attack on both the Syrian and the Egyptian fronts would place maximum stress on the IDF. Above all, the key to the plan's success lay in its secrecy. Were Israel to suspect that an attack was imminent, it would undoubtedly launch a preemptive attack, as it had in 1967. This part of the plan was successful.

A combination of effective deceptive measures undertaken by Egypt combined with Israeli arrogance contributed to Tel Aviv's failure to comprehend what was happening. One deception consisted of repeated Egyptian drills along the canal, simulating a possible crossing. The Israelis thus became accustomed to large Egyptian troop concentrations at the canal and interpreted Egyptian preparations for the actual crossings as just another drill. Even the Egyptian soldiers were told that it was simply a drill. Only when the actual crossing was occurring were they informed of its true nature. Even during the actual attack, however, the real intent of Egyptian and Syrian forces remained unclear to the Israelis, and they initially refrained from action.

Beginning at 2:00 P.M. on 6 October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian artillery and aircraft, and later their ground forces, launched major attacks along the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. On the Israeli-Egyptian front, Egypt amassed a force of nearly 800,000 soldiers, 2,200 tanks, 2,300 artillery pieces,

150 SAM batteries, and 550 aircraft. Egypt deployed along the canal five infantry divisions with accompanying armored elements, supported by additional infantry and armored independent brigades. This force was backed by three mechanized divisions and two armored divisions. Opposing this force on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal was one Israeli division, supported by 280 tanks.

This Israeli force was no match for the advancing Egyptian troops. The defenders lacked reinforcements, as reserves were called on duty only after the outbreak of the war. They also did not have air support, as Egyptian SAMs proved effective against Israeli aircraft.

The attacking Egyptians crossed the canal and swept over the defending Israelis. It took less than forty-eight hours for the Egyptians to establish a 3- to 5-mile-deep penetration on the east bank of the Suez Canal. They then fortified the area with more troops. Two divisions held the seized area, which was also defended by the SAM batteries across the canal. With that, the Egyptians had achieved their principal aims.

The Israelis rushed reinforcements southward and launched a quick counteroffensive on 8 October in an attempt to repel the invading Egyptians troops. Much to the Israelis' surprise, it was a failure. Undermanned, unorganized, and underequipped Israeli troops moved against a well-organized, well-equipped, and far bigger force protected by handheld, highly effective antitank missiles. The Egyptians crushed the Israeli counteroffensive.

Following this setback, the Israeli General Staff decided to halt offensive actions on the Suez front and give priority to the fighting to the north on the Golan Heights, where in the first hours of the war little stood between massive numbers of invading Syrian armor and the Jewish settlements. Syria deployed two infantry divisions in the first line and two armored divisions in the second. This force had 1,500 tanks against only two Israeli armored brigades with 170 tanks. The Syrian forces swept the Golan Heights, crushing the small Israeli forces facing them. The few Israeli forces here fought desperately, knowing that they were the only force between the Syrians and numerous settlements. They slowed the Syrians and bought just sufficient time for reserves of men and tanks to be brought forward. The Syrians also had an ineffective battle plan, which played to Israeli strengths in maneuver warfare. After seven days of fighting, Israeli troops thwarted the Syrian forces beyond the starting point of the war, across the pre–October 1973 Purple Line, then drove a wedge into Syrian territory. Only then did the IDF again turn to the Egyptian front. Here the goal remained that of driving Egyptian troops from the Sinai.

Sadat overruled his ground commander and continued the advance. This took his forces out of their prepared defensive positions and removed them from the effective SAM cover on the other side of the canal, working to Israel's advantage. Israeli troops also soon located a gap between the two Egyptian divisions defending the occupied area that had gone unnoticed by the Egyptian command. Israeli forces drove through that gap and crossed the canal.

The IDF hoped to achieve two goals. The first and immediate goal was to create a SAM-free zone over which Israeli aircraft could maneuver free

Israeli Centurion tank moving into position on the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War, October 1973. (Israel Government Press Office/Haris Eitan)

from the threat of missile attack. The second goal was to cut off Egyptian troops east of the canal from their bases west of the canal. After nearly a week of fighting, the Israelis had accomplished almost all their objectives. Nonetheless, Soviet and U.S. pressure led to a cease-fire before the Israelis could completely cut off the two Egyptian divisions in the east from their bases. The war ended with Egyptian forces on the eastern side of the canal and Israeli troops on Egyptian soil. Neither the Soviets nor the Americans wanted to see the Egyptians completely defeated. The leaders of the two superpowers also assumed that the Egyptian achievement would allow progress in the political process, just as Sadat had sought.

Syrian President Hafez Assad's chief motivation in joining Sadat in the war against Israel was to recapture the Golan Heights. Assad had no diplomatic goals and no intention of using the war as leverage for a settlement with Israel. The fighting in the north with Syria ended with the IDF positioned only about 25 miles from Damascus, while no Syrian forces remained within Israeli-held territory. It was only in 1974, after a disengagement agreement, that Israeli forces withdrew from Syrian territory beyond the Purple Line.

The 1973 war, in effect, ended in 1977 when Sadat visited Israel and set the stage for the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Turmoil continued, however, chiefly over the Palestinian problem, which was at the root of the

Police clear the remains of shattered Bus No. 18, bombed by terrorists in Jerusalem, 6 December 1983. (Israel Government Press Office/Sa'ar Ya'acov)

Israeli-Arab conflict. Militant Palestinians refused to recognize the existence of the state of the Israel, while Israel refused to deal with the Palestinians. Terrorist attacks against Israel continued, and with a sharp increase in those against the northern settlements from Lebanon, the Israeli government ordered IDF invasions of southern Lebanon in 1977 and 1982. The twin goals of ending the terrorist attacks on Israel and eliminating the Palestinians as a political force failed, leading eventually to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in 1993. Despite this, mutual Palestinian-Israeli violence continues, placing serious obstacles in the path of a general Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

David Tal

See also

Abdullah, King of Jordan; Arafat, Yasir; Assad, Hafez; Ben-Gurion, David; Hussein I, King of Jordan; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization; Rabin, Yitzhak; Rogers, William Pierce; Sadat, Anwar; Suez Crisis; U Thant

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Arab Nationalism

Notion of unity among Arab states, sometimes referred to as Pan-Arabism, that became popular in the 1950s and 1960s, often combined with the advocacy of socialism and Islamic religious tenets. Arab nationalism rose as a response to European imperialism after World War II and stressed unity of purpose among the Arab countries of the Middle East. While respectful of Islam, Arab nationalist movements were mainly secular in tone and drew heavily upon socialist economic principles and anti-imperialist rhetoric. While the socialist, anti-Western character of Arab nationalism attracted Soviet political and military support and increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, Arab leaders avoided domination by the Soviet Union and found common cause with the nonaligned nations of the third world. Political and military opposition to the State of Israel served as a focal point of Arab nationalist movements, although repeated Arab military defeats contributed to the decline of such movements. Nevertheless, Arab nationalist parties continue to play a dominant role in the politics of Syria and, until recently, Iraq.

Arab nationalism has its roots in the late nineteenth century, when European ideas of nationalism affected the Ottoman Empire. After World War I, as the British and French acquired mandate authority over various Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalist sentiment was divided between unifying notions of Pan-Arabism and individual independence movements. Such thinking contributed to the formation of the Arab League on the one hand and the growth of numerous regional nationalist groups such as the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Étoile Nord-Africaine in Algeria on the other. These and similar groups combined nationalism with strong Islamic identity in their drive for independence from Britain and France.

In the years following World War II, most Arab states gained their independence yet were ruled by governments sympathetic to the interests of the European powers. Political crises in the late 1940s and 1950s, including the Arab defeat in the first war with Israel (1948), resulted in the overthrow of many of these governments and the establishment of new regimes willing to challenge the West, particularly in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. These nations lay at the heart of the Arab nationalist movement during the Cold War. Ongoing

conflict with Israel would play a major role in the growth of Arab unity. The common Israeli enemy provided the Arab states with a greater cause that overshadowed their individual differences.

Opposition to Israel and support for Palestinian refugees also served to link the resources of the newly wealthy oil states of the Persian Gulf to the larger Arab cause. Finally, the conflict with Israel, combined with the importance of petroleum resources, made the Middle East a region of great strategic interest to the United States and the Soviet Union, and the two superpowers would have a substantial effect on the development and destiny of Arab nationalism.

Arab nationalism during the period of the Cold War stressed Arab unity, but not necessarily in the form of a single Arab state; different states could act in concert to achieve goals that would benefit the entire Arab world. In addition, Arab nationalist movements fit into a broader picture of postcolonial political ideologies popular in the developing world. Such ideologies stressed national or cultural identity, along with Marxist or socialist ideas, as a counter to Western influence. Promoted by the Soviets, socialism served as a reaction among developing nations to their former experiences with European imperialism.

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The two most important Arab nationalist movements that took root were Baathism and Nasserism. The Baath (or Resurrection) Party became prominent in Syria after World War II. One of its founders, Michel 'Aflaq, a Syrian Christian, conceived of a single Arab nation embracing all the Arab states and recapturing the glory of the Arabian past. While the movement was respectful of Islamic tenets, its rhetoric and agenda were largely secular and socialist. This socialism grew partly as a response to Western imperialism and partly as a result of increasing Soviet political and military support of Baathist Arab states. The Baath Party increased in influence in Syria and Iraq throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. In Syria, it came to dominate the country's turbulent politics by the early 1960s and continued to do so throughout the regime of Hafez al-Assad (1971–2001). In Iraq, the party rose to power in 1963 and remained the predominant political force until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Nasserism reflected the agenda and the political prowess of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's leader during 1952–1970. Raised amid British domination in Egypt, Nasser combined his rejection of imperialist influence with socialist principles and progressive Islam. Although he used religious rhetoric to appeal to the Egyptian people, his outlook, like that of the Baathists, was primarily secular. Nasser stressed modernization, state ownership of industry, and Egypt's role as the "natural" leader of the Arab world. His suspicion of the West, socialist economic prescriptions, and acceptance of Soviet military aid after 1955 drew him toward the Soviet sphere, but he nonetheless avoided subservience to Moscow and supported the Non-Aligned Movement among developing nations. Nasser actively sought the leadership of a unified Arab world. The temporary union of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic (1958–1961) illustrated his nationalist vision and the overlap of Nasserist and Baathist ideologies.

Cheering crowds surround the car carrying Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (*right*) and Syrian President Shukri el-Quwatli (*left*) on their way to signing the papers to finalize the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Israel, of course, served as a focal point for Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism; he viewed the defeat of Israel (never achieved) as an expression of Arab unity and a rejection of imperialist interference in the Middle East. In addition, Egyptian leadership in the struggle with Israel contributed to his stature in the Arab world as a whole. Nasser's position in Egypt and among Arab nations was further enhanced by the 1956 Suez Crisis. However, Egypt's attempted military intervention in Yemen (1962–1967) brought Nasser's vision of Arab nationalism into conflict with the royalist, Islamic views of Saudi Arabia and demonstrated the limits of his influence. Further, Egypt's disastrous defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel in June 1967 dealt a crippling blow to his power and prestige. Nasser's authority survived the 1967 War, and the overwhelming popular rejection of his resignation testified to the scope of his popular appeal, but the 1967 defeat ultimately signaled the end of the Nasserist vision of Arab unity. From that point onward, Baathism remained as the strongest single force of Arab nationalism.

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See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arafat, Yasir; Assad, Hafez; Egypt; Hussein, Saddam; Hussein I, King of Jordan; Iraq; Jordan; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Non-Aligned Movement; Suez Crisis

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Arafat, Yasir
(1929–2004)

Palestinian nationalist and leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (1969–2004). Born Mohamed 'Abd ar-Ra'uf al-Qudwa al-Husayni on 24 August 1929 in Cairo, Egypt, Yasir Arafat as a teenager in Cairo became involved in smuggling arms to Palestinians who were fighting the British and the Jews. He fought against the Jews in Gaza in 1948, a struggle that the Arabs lost.

Arafat studied briefly at the University of Texas before completing his engineering degree at the University of Faud I in Egypt, from which he graduated in 1956. As a student, he served as president of the Union of Palestinian Students; in 1952 he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. After a brief stint in the Egyptian Army during the 1956 Suez Crisis he moved to Kuwait, where he formed his own contracting company.

In 1958 Arafat founded al-Fatah, an underground guerrilla group dedicated to liberating Palestine. In 1964 he left his job, moved to Jordan, and devoted all his energies to organizing raids against Israel. That same year, the PLO was formed. Arafat fought in the 1967 Six-Day War, allegedly escaping from Israel disguised as a woman. Gradually, al-Fatah came to dominate the PLO, and in February 1969 he became chairman of the PLO.

After skirmishes with Jordanian authorities, Arafat was forced to relocate the PLO to Lebanon in 1970. During much of the 1970s he spent considerable time reorienting the PLO's emphasis from Pan-Arabism to Palestinian nationalism. During the Lebanese Civil War that witnessed brutal fighting between Lebanese Muslims and Lebanese Christians, the PLO sided with the Muslims. Arafat moved the PLO to Tunisia in 1982. In the 1980s he regrouped his organization, which had sustained heavy losses during the fighting in Lebanon. The PLO received important monetary aid from both Iraq and Saudi Arabia during the 1980s, and in 1988 Palestinians declared a formal State of Palestine. With that, Arafat announced that the PLO would renounce all forms of terrorism and would recognize the State of Israel, a radical departure in the organization's philosophy.

In 1993 the PLO participated in the Oslo Accords and hammered out a peace deal with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The PLO located to

the West Bank in 1994, an important first step toward the creation of an autonomous Palestinian state. In 1996 Arafat was elected head of the new Palestinian Authority, which was to provide governance, security, and other services to Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly upon the 1996 election of the rightist Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Despite efforts by President Bill Clinton to preserve peace between Israel and the PLO in the summer of 2000, negotiations broke down, and radical groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad commenced a second Intifada. This began four years of violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Arafat was increasingly marginalized, and in 2004 President George W. Bush declared that the PLO leader was ineffective and that it was impossible to negotiate with him.

Arafat developed a mysterious illness and went to Paris for medical treatment, where he died on 11 November 2004. As of this writing, the future of the Palestinian cause remains very much in question, although Arafat's successor, Mahmoud Abbas, has taken tentative steps toward reaching some common ground with Israel.

Amy H. Blackwell

Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat gives victory sign from a window in Amman, Jordan, on 6 August 1970. (AFP/Getty Images)

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Israel; Middle East; Palestine Liberation Organization

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Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán
(1913–1971)

President of Guatemala (1951–1954). Born in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, on 14 September 1913, Jacobo Arbenz graduated from the Guatemalan National Military Academy in 1935 and subsequently taught science and history there. He took part in the 1944 overthrow of dictator Jorge Unbico, which inaugurated a period of democratization and social reform. During 1944–1950, Arbenz served as minister of defense under Juan José Arévalo.

In November 1950 Arbenz was elected president of Guatemala, ushering in four years of continued reform. Agrarian reform was the linchpin of

Arbenz's agenda. Enacted in 1952, this saw more than 100,000 peasants receive land confiscated mainly from Guatemalan hacendados (large landowners) and, most significantly, from the American-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO). Arbenz also encouraged unionization among agricultural workers.

Only a few communists played a part in the reform process, and the Arbenz government saw itself as merely bringing a semifeudal society into the twentieth century. Seen through the prism of the Cold War, however, it appeared to Washington that Arbenz was flirting with socialism, if not communism. Early in the Arbenz presidency, Guatemala became the first major laboratory for what would later become known as political destabilization. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and State Department, headed by Allen W. and John Foster Dulles, respectively, brothers who had ties to UFCO, undertook a disinformation campaign that undermined Arbenz's legitimacy among the country's upper and middle classes and, especially, the armed forces.

A shipment of Czechoslovak arms to Guatemala in May 1954 provided the United States with "evidence" that Arbenz was tilting toward the Soviet bloc and, therefore, had to be removed from power. The United States helped train a contingent of Guatemalan exiles in Honduras who, in June 1954, invaded Guatemala and forced Arbenz's resignation on 27 June. A pro-American military regime led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas then came to power. Arbenz left Guatemala, eventually settling in Mexico. He died in Mexico City on 27 January 1971.

Barry Carr

See also

Americas; Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Dulles, John Foster; Guatemala

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Argentina

South American nation with an area of 1.068 million square miles. Argentina borders Chile to the west, Bolivia and Paraguay to the north, Brazil and Uruguay to the northeast, and the Atlantic Ocean to the east and south. Its 1945 population was approximately 17 million people. It is predominantly of European descent—principally Spaniards and Italians—and Roman Catholicism is the preponderant religion. Argentina is home to the largest Jewish population in Latin America.

Argentina pursued a policy of neutrality during World War II. However, the military government at the time tilted more toward the Axis than the Allied powers. In fact, during the war the country maintained relations with Nazi Germany. Argentina's reluctance to declare war on the Axis had negative consequences, as the United States imposed an economic boycott against the country that lasted until 1949. This did not prevent Argentina from receiving a number of Nazi war criminals.

With the advent of the Cold War, Argentina inaugurated the new political phenomenon of Perónism. The government of Argentine Army General President Juan Perón (1946–1955) sought to maintain an independent foreign policy, the so-called third position between capitalism and communism. Perón's third position was exemplified by his decision to support the United States in the event of a hemispheric threat while at the same time resuming relations with the Soviet Union and concluding important trade agreements with the Soviets. Argentina had not signed the Rio Pact by 1950, but the outbreak of the Korean War that June and a new $125 million loan from the Export-Import Bank led Perón to do so. Scholars have suggested that the ratification of the Rio Pact was a U.S. condition for the approval of the loan.

After 1950 Perón's foreign policy became openly anti-American and focused on criticizing American economic imperialism, the negative consequences of the Marshall Plan for the Argentine economy, and the anti-Argentina campaign in the U.S. media (especially after Perón shut down the newspaper *La Prensa*). Perón's government came to an end in 1955, overthrown by a military coup. For the next thirty years, Argentina's politics would be bitterly divided between Perónists and anti-Perónists. In that same time frame the nation would have a succession of civilian and military governments, the latter seeing themselves as the guardians of constitutional order.

After the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the government of Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962) attempted to maintain a neutral position toward the island nation. At the 1962 Punta del Este Conference, Argentina abstained from the vote to suspend Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS). Under pressure from the military, however, Frondizi broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in February 1962.

Relations between the United States and the government of Arturo Illia (1963–1966) had two dynamics. First, Illia decided to cancel oil contracts granted by Frondizi. That infuriated the United States, which eventually decided to suspend its economic aid to Argentina. Illia's oil policy generated sufficient backlash that both the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Developed (USAID) refused to grant credits to Argentina for two years.

Second, bilateral relations improved in the military arena. In 1964, Argentina signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States in which both countries agreed to cooperate in defense of the hemisphere. Along with Peru, Bolivia, the United States, Colombia, Paraguay, and Venezuela, Argentina participated in a joint military exercise that simulated a counterinsurgency war. Despite the military agreements, however, Argentina did not send troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965. During this

time, Argentina continued its commercial agreements with the Soviet Union, although it condemned the Soviet-Cuban attempt to "export revolution."

The 1960s and early 1970s were characterized by the emergence of guerrilla movements. The Montoneros and the Revolutionary People's Army (ERP) were the most important of these. Clashes between the guerrillas and the military government during 1966–1973 put Argentina on the edge of civil war. The return of Perón in 1973 polarized the Argentine society even more, and upon his death in 1974 the country witnessed the installation of one of the most repressive regimes in Latin America.

The military junta that took power in 1976 was determined to eradicate alleged subversion, and toward that end thousands of people simply disappeared. The magnitude of human rights violations was condemned worldwide, and in 1978 U.S. President Jimmy Carter ordered an arms embargo against Argentina.

Until 1981, Argentina continued its nonaligned foreign policy, more for convenience than anything else. But when Ronald Reagan assumed the U.S. presidency, the Argentine military turned its attention to the United States. Argentina cooperated with the United States in training the Nicaraguan Contras and the Salvadoran army in counterinsurgency techniques.

By 1982 Argentina's economy had all but collapsed, and the military regime was completely discredited. On 2 April 1982, Argentine troops disembarked on the British-controlled Falkland (Malvinas) Islands located off the coast. The dispute over the islands dated back to 1833, when Great Britain had taken them by force. In the 1960s, the United Nations (UN) recognized Argentine sovereign rights over the islands. But diplomatic talks between Argentina and Great Britain at the UN came to a halt in 1982, and President Fortunato Galtieri approved the use of force to occupy the islands. Argentine military leaders believed that Britain would not react with force, and they saw playing this nationalist card as a means to boost their sagging popularity. The UN, Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, and the U.S. government tried to mediate a peaceful solution, but the war was already being fought in the South Atlantic. On 14 June 1982, Argentine forces in the Falklands surrendered to British forces. With this defeat, the Argentine military regime collapsed.

The democratic government of President Raul Alfonsin (1983–1989) opted for an independent foreign policy. At least three areas of tension marked U.S.-Argentine relations: the negotiation of the foreign debt, tension in Central America, and the Argentine nuclear program. Alfonsin believed that the foreign debt should be decided at the multinational level between creditor and debtor nations, while the United States wanted negotiations between the debtor nation and creditor institutions. After a failed effort to create a debtor club, Argentina finally accepted the U.S. position. Alfonsin was also at odds with the United States over Nicaragua, where he supported the Contadora Group's peace efforts. A final source of tension between Washington and Buenos Aires was the decision of the Argentine government to continue development of the Condor II intermediate-range ballistic missile in association with Egypt and Iraq. Argentina also continued in its refusal

to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With regard to Chile and Brazil, in 1984 Alfonsin initiated talks with Brazil that led to cooperation in nuclear and economic development. Under President Saul Menem's administration (1989–1999), Argentina aligned its foreign policy with that of the United States.

Carina Solmirano

See also

Americas; Castro, Fidel; Contras; Cuba; Falklands War; Organization of American States; Perón, Eva; Perón, Juan Domingo; Rio Pact

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Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (1953–)

Oft-overthrown president of Haiti. Born in 1953 in Port Salut, Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide studied theology and was ordained in 1983. He became the first freely elected president of Haiti in 1990 after the end of military rule that followed the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986. Aristide's term in office lasted less than a year before the generals seized power again in September 1991. With the help of the U.S. government, he was returned to power in 1994 and General Raoul Cedras was exiled. Aristide left the priesthood in 1995 and the next year married Mildred Trouillot, a U.S. citizen.

Aristide served as president until 1996, when he stepped aside after losing his claim that the years spent in exile should not count as part of his five-year term. (The 1987 Haitian constitution prohibits the president from running for consecutive terms.) His handpicked candidate, René Preval, succeeded him in the presidency. Aristide ran again for president in 2000, won, and was sworn in for the third time. Unrest over his failure to reform Haiti's economy and allegations of corruption led to his second exile in 2004.

As an advocate of liberation theology, the controversial Catholic doctrine advocating advancement for the poor and fighting oppression, Aristide naturally came into conflict with the Duvalier government. Liberation theology was equated with communism throughout the 1980s and was therefore suspect to allies of the United States. Aristide promised to reform the nation and aid the poor, which led to grassroots support for his first election in 1990. He did not keep his promises and, in fact, proved to be as addicted to cronyism and the amassing of personal power as any of his predecessors. The failure to

deliver on these pledges led to his being overthrown in February 2004. From exile in South Africa, Aristide maintained that he was still the legitimate president of Haiti and that U.S. forces had kidnapped him and spirited him out of the country.

Elizabeth Pugliese

See also
Haiti

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Armenia

A Soviet republic since 1920, when Russian troops invaded and annexed it, Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 23 September 1991. Located in Transcaucasia, at the geographic crossroads of Europe and the Middle East, landlocked Armenia has borders with Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey, and Georgia. It was the smallest of the Soviet republics, comprising roughly 11,506 square miles and a population of approximately 1.3 million in 1945. Throughout its history, Armenia's position as a frontier region has resulted in numerous invasions and shifting borders, while competing cultural influences have left their mark on Armenian society. The most enduring historical legacies include Armenia's distinction of being the first nation to adopt Christianity (in the early fourth century) and the unique Armenian alphabet, both of which helped Armenians maintain a distinct national identity. Throughout the Cold War, the Armenian Apostolic Church and its spiritual head, the Catholicos of All Armenians, played a leading role in the country, despite the Soviet Union's official opposition to organized religion.

The pre–Cold War history of Armenia and its strategic geographic position on the southern border of the Soviet Union conditioned its role during the Cold War. Although Armenia was not a direct theater of operations during World War II, Armenians were concerned with the possibility of Turkish intervention against the Soviet Union. When the war ended, Soviet leader Josef Stalin laid claims, on behalf of Armenia and Georgia, against Turkey for the return of the eastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet jurisdiction. These claims were enthusiastically embraced by Armenians both in Soviet Armenia and in Armenian diaspora communities worldwide, largely because of the still-fresh memories of the massacres of Armenians by the Turkish government a generation before. Soviet pressure on Turkey combined with Soviet aid to communist guerrillas in Greece and the continuing Soviet occupation of northern Iran, however, prompted a strong response

from the United States in the form of the Truman Doctrine, which called for extensive aid to Turkey and Greece in their struggle against communist aggression. While the attempt to reclaim Kars and Ardahan was not successful, it did lead to a large-scale repatriation of Armenians from around the world to Soviet Armenia.

Beginning with the death of Stalin in 1953 and continuing throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Armenia saw significant economic, social, and political changes, including the rise of a new generation of intelligentsia to replace those killed in the 1930s during Stalin's Great Terror. In 1965, Armenian intellectuals raised the issue of commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the 1915 Armenian genocide in Turkey. Demonstrations took place but were dispersed with water cannon and repressive police actions. In response to this unprecedented action, Soviet authorities acquiesced to Armenian demands to acknowledge the genocide and agreed to erect a monument in Erevan to the victims of 1915.

These unsanctioned political activities in Armenia led to the formation of an organized Armenian dissident movement in the late 1960s and 1970s. Soviet authorities broke up several organizations advocating Armenian independence and imprisoned their members in gulags. The most prominent incident took place in 1977 when a bomb exploded in the Moscow subway. Although there was no clear evidence of their involvement, several Armenians were arrested, tried, and executed. Among those protesting this Soviet action was the human rights activist and dissident Andrei Sakharov. In 1978 when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev suggested changes to the Soviet Armenian constitution that would have eliminated the protected status of the Armenian language, Armenians took to the streets in protest, and intellectuals decried the proposed measure. Brezhnev dropped the idea, and the Armenian language maintained its official status in Armenia.

Armenian political activism during the Brezhnev era took place within the context of improving standards of living and rising expectations. These expectations further increased when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985. Soon after assuming power, Gorbachev embarked on an ambitious program of rehabilitating Soviet society and the economy through his glasnost and perestroika reforms. By 1987 Armenians, fearful of a repetition of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident at the Armenian nuclear reactor located at the convergence of several fault lines, began to raise questions about the state of the environment.

Within a short period of time, however, environmental concerns were overshadowed by the struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian enclave situated within the borders of the neighboring Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In February 1988, the local legislature of Nagorno-Karabakh voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia, a move condemned by Moscow and Baku. A pogrom against Armenians in the Azerbaijani industrial city of Sumgait followed. For several days, mobs hunted down and killed Armenians until Soviet forces reestablished order. This led to escalating violence in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and to hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from both republics.

Collapse of an old stone masonry Armenian church in Leninakan, Armenia, following a catastrophic earthquake on 7 December 1988 that killed between 25,000 and 50,000 people. (C. J. Langer, U.S. Geological Survey)

The shock of Sumgait reverberated throughout Armenia, with massive protest demonstrations taking place in Erevan. These spontaneous demonstrations soon became coordinated and led by the Karabagh Committee, a group of intellectuals who articulated the Armenian people's dissatisfaction with the existing situation. The Karabagh Committee transformed itself into the Armenian National Movement (ANM) in 1989 and became a driving political force in the republic, challenging the hegemony of the Communist Party. In the Supreme Soviet elections of summer 1990, the ANM succeeded in dominating the legislature and in having its leading activist, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, elected to the chairmanship.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was briefly overshadowed on 7 December 1988 when a massive earthquake struck northern Armenia, flattening the country's second largest city and killing between 25,000 and 50,000 people while leaving half a million homeless. Gorbachev, who was in the United States at the time, rushed back home and allowed foreign humanitarian assistance into the affected areas of Armenia. This marked the first time since World War II that such large amounts of Western aid were permitted inside the Soviet Union and was a major turning point in the Cold War.

By the end of 1990 democratic reforms had progressed considerably in Armenia to include agriculture, politics, and the economy. The Armenian Supreme Soviet decided not to participate in Gorbachev's March 1991 refer-

endum on the future of the Soviet Union and instead scheduled a referendum on Armenia's political future for September 1991—all in accordance with the Soviet constitution. In the intervening time period, the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev failed, and when Armenia went ahead with its referendum on 21 September 1991, the result was an overwhelming vote for independence. Independence was declared two days later, and in October 1991 Levon Ter-Petrosyan was elected the first president of an independent Armenia.

Robert Owen Krikorian

See also

Azerbaijan; Brezhnev, Leonid; Chernobyl; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gulags; Nagorno-Karabakh; Perestroika; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Truman Doctrine; Turkey

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Arms Control

Disarmament evolved over the ages to imply the entire range of efforts, both cooperative and imposed, to limit military capabilities. Early practices began largely as postconflict impositions of limitations on military force by the victor upon the vanquished. There were also examples of efforts to avoid conflict by cooperating to demilitarize likely regions of contact and to restrict the use of new and destructive technologies. Arms control was adopted to capture cooperative efforts to contain the nuclear dangers of the Cold War, and it subsequently became more narrowly focused to describe the drawn-out negotiation process addressing superpower strategic nuclear weapons. Against that concept of bilateral arms control, broader efforts continued in the multilateral arena and were aimed at limiting and sometimes banning other weapons and systems, ranging from biological and chemical weapons to antipersonnel land mines.

Efforts to impose some degree of order on international conflict have always been a feature of international relations. The AD 989 Peace and Truce of God proclaimed in the Synod of Charroux established noncombatant status for civilians. The 1675 Strasbourg Agreement between France and Germany outlawed poison weapons. Efforts to demilitarize colonial forces and avoid distant conflicts included the 1814 agreement between Great Britain and Spain restricting trade with rebels in Spain's American colonies.

The period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by dramatic increases in the lethality of warfare and concomitant efforts to ban the use of certain munitions, to limit the number of advanced

systems deployed, and to restrict the geographic employment of forces. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration prohibited explosive projectiles such as dum-dum bullets, and the 1899 Second Hague Convention outlawed chemical, bacteriological, and biological weapons. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty limited the size of naval fleets of signatory nations.

The impact of destructive technologies and practices during World War I spurred a flurry of activity across the interwar period to limit or prohibit certain weapons. Part of this activity was undertaken in the League of Nations. Much of the focus fell on limiting battleships and other major naval combatants and on outlawing poison gas. While the overall effectiveness of many of these efforts can be questioned, the establishment of an international process for disarmament negotiations left a strong legacy as the foundation for Cold War efforts.

Traditionally, the term "disarmament" was used to indicate the full range of historical endeavors to reduce and restrict military weapons and forces. The concept was broadly used as an umbrella under which multiple and varied arrangements and means of implementation could reside. The centrality of the concept of disarmament was supplanted by the term "arms control" early in the nuclear age. In the mid-1950s policymakers began rethinking an approach that had emphasized general and complete disarmament and instead considering limited, partial measures that would gradually enhance confidence in cooperative security arrangements. Thus, more modest goals came to replace the propaganda-laden disarmament efforts of the late 1940s and early 1950s. International security specialists began using the term "arms control" in place of "disarmament," which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The fundamental books on the subject published in the early 1960s all preferred "arms control" as a more comprehensive term.

Just as advances in military technologies and lethal practices had spurred an increased focus on disarmament following World War I, World War II saw the introduction of what many considered the ultimate weapon as well as a near-global means of delivery. With the failure of early proposals to eliminate or internationalize control over atomic weapons, the focus shifted toward limiting their development and spread and controlling their use and effects. Western academics and policy analysts soon realized that disarmament in the literal sense of eliminating nuclear weapons was not going to happen; these weapons had become a long-term reality of the international system. Thus, as they began examining these weapons and nuclear strategy, they adopted a preference for terminology that captured efforts to control these weapons and prescribe their use.

This perspective was perhaps best expressed by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in their seminal 1961 book *Strategy and Arms Control:* "We believe that arms control is a promising . . . enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competi-

tion, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs." These three goals—avoiding war, minimizing the cost of preparing for war, and reducing the consequences if a war occurred—became the shorthand definition of the term "arms control" during the Cold War.

Arms control in the nuclear age was framed first as a component part of an overall military and national security strategy—as an instrument of policy and an adjunct to force posture rather than a utopian or moral crusade. It captured the more cooperative side of policy, focusing not on imposition but on negotiation and compromise, recognizing a shared interest in avoiding nuclear conflict. It was also goal-oriented: avoiding war, limiting the political and economic costs of preparing for war, and minimizing the consequences of any conflict.

Multilateral efforts early in the Cold War sought to control nuclear weapons by limiting the number of delivery systems, restricting testing, and hindering further technological development and proliferation. Multilateral agreements in the nuclear arena prior to the 1970s banned placing nuclear weapons in Antarctica, in outer space, and on the seafloor. Regional nuclear weapon–free zones were also established during this period in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Early restrictions on atmospheric testing were supplemented by efforts to ban all atmospheric tests and eventually underground weapons test explosions. These efforts were capped by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that sought to prevent future additions to the nuclear club. These campaigns framed nuclear control issues for further attention on a bilateral basis and established a structure for multilateral efforts extending to other arenas of arms control.

Multilateral agreements in the nuclear arena prior to the 1970s banned placing nuclear weapons in Antarctica, outer space, and the seafloor.

With the completion of the NPT, the primary arms control focus of the Cold War became centered on bilateral strategic controls between the United States and the Soviet Union. The formal arms control negotiating process was characterized by preliminary steps that set the agenda for negotiations: establishing a level of mutual confidence and inspiring self-assurance of the ability to achieve an adequate level of verification to allow strong consideration of a formal, binding agreement. This was followed by a staged four-part negotiation and implementation strategy.

The agenda was often set by progress in other negotiations—either multilateral nuclear efforts or bilateral relations outside of the nuclear arena—or by triggering events such as international crises that created a sense of urgency to pursue heightened cooperation in the nuclear relationship. In all cases, issues to be addressed in the formal process were defined and narrowed to a range that both sides found it comfortable to address. Formal negotiations were supplemented by a series of confidence-building efforts and agreements that established a cooperative base from which to proceed. The essential enabler for all nuclear control agreements was the guarantee of adequate verification means.

Once the preliminary steps were taken (a process that could take years for a major round of agreements), the negotiation process began. Formal talks were established with large delegations representing the full range of affected agencies and functions on each side. These negotiations focused on

both the substance of the agreement—with a central focus on equitable and stabilizing controls—and on its implementation. Years of effort and many technical sidebar discussions were necessary in most cases to ensure that the eventual agreement and its implementation would hold no surprises for either side. Predictably, the talks would often hang up on a final series of points of contention, and a summit between very senior officials on each side would be needed to reach final agreement. The third stage, the endgame (including the formal signing of the agreement), would be characterized by elevation to the highest government officials, much pomp and ceremony, and formal staging for both international and domestic political effect. The final stage consisted of implementation, compliance verification, and monitoring. Formal mechanisms, often including elaborate procedural and even organizational structures, characterized the last stage, supplemented by unilateral verification mechanisms as the ultimate guarantor of compliance.

The first bilateral U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control endeavor established the process that led to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and ultimately resulted in the SALT I Interim Agreement—with its adjunct Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—and the SALT II Treaty. Cold War tensions and a dangerous and expensive nuclear arms race spurred both sides in the 1960s into a series of small cooperative measures and internal organizational steps toward bilateral cooperation on limiting future strategic systems. With the culmination of the NPT and the almost simultaneous attainment of sufficient capabilities in national technical means for unilateral verification, formal bilateral negotiations on SALT began in 1969 within the framework laid out at the 1967 Glassboro Summit.

Test flight of an LGM-118A Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, 13 November 1985. (U.S. Department of Defense)

SALT I, signed in 1972, froze the total number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles on both sides and limited the total number of maritime strategic systems that each side could deploy. It also limited the development and deployment of future antiballistic missile systems and restricted other defense technologies. The two sides agreed on the outline of a follow-on agreement at the Vladivostok Summit in 1974. Subsequent detailed negotiations led to the culmination of SALT II in 1979, which placed an aggregate limit on deployed strategic launch vehicles and also limited the numbers of systems that could be equipped with multiple launch systems.

The second series of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union (and, after 1991, Russia) addressed force reductions through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)—leading to the START I and START II treaties—and the elimination of an entire class of weapons through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Beginning simultaneously with the first series of bilateral U.S.–Soviet Union negotiations, a broader series of East-West efforts addressed the reduction

Brigadier General Walter T. Worthington (third from right), 186th Air Division commander, watches with members of a Soviet inspection team as a worker cuts a wire harness in a BGM-109G Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, 18 October 1988. Forty-one GLCMs and their launch canisters and seven transporter-erector-launchers will be disposed of at the base in the first round of reductions mandated by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. (U.S. Department of Defense)

of tensions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. While this work addressed trans-European confidence-building measures and conventional force limitations, it also focused attention on the bilateral-theater nuclear systems of the superpowers. By 1987, with the deployment of modern U.S.-theater nuclear weapons under way in Europe (matching earlier Soviet deployments), the INF treaty negotiations came to fruition, and both sides withdrew and destroyed their missiles. A key legacy of this agreement, in addition to its precedent for elimination of an entire category of weapon systems, was its reliance on on-site inspection teams to verify missile removal and destruction on the other side's territory. With on-site inspection as a supplement to national technical means, strategic reduction negotiations could proceed.

The START talks began in 1982 and proceeded throughout the 1980s alongside an extensive series of nuclear confidence-building measures addressing risk reduction and data sharing. The 1992 START I treaty was significant in that it required measured reductions in both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, with intrusive verification provisions to ensure compliance. The bilateral nuclear arms control process was so firmly established by the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 that a brief series

of unilateral initiatives, begun by President George H. W. Bush and reciprocated, in turn, by outgoing Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and incoming Russian President Boris Yeltsin, allowed the START process to continue. The START II treaty was signed in 1993. In this agreement both sides agreed to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. In addition, cooperative efforts succeeded in consolidating control and returning Soviet nuclear systems to the Russian Republic and initiating a broad effort to check the proliferation of former Soviet nuclear capabilities. At the 1997 Helsinki Summit, both countries committed themselves to continue the strategic arms reduction process to even lower levels of nuclear warheads through a START III round. This negotiation never took place; instead, the two sides signed the 2002 Moscow Treaty (officially the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty).

Arms control was not solely focused on bilateral U.S.-Soviet strategic arms during the Cold War, however. At the same time, there was a parallel multilateral effort under way in other fields, often led by the United Nations Conference on Disarmament or by regional organizations. These discussions were usually not as highly charged politically as the bilateral efforts, but they did achieve several notable accomplishments. In 1972 the world agreed to ban the production, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons, for example, and in 1993 it agreed to a similar convention on chemical weapons. NATO and the Warsaw Pact came to an agreement on conventional force levels, composition, and disposition in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in Geneva in 1996 (although it had not yet entered into force as of mid-2005), and discussions are still ongoing regarding a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. Nuclear weapon–free zones essentially denuclearized the entire Southern Hemisphere, and a coalition of states and nongovernmental organizations led the effort to ban land mines in 1997. Also, several informal groupings of states, among them the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, were created to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technologies.

The agenda for arms control remains extensive. The United States and Russia each retain significant nuclear arsenals. There are nine nuclear-armed states in today's world. Remaining nuclear weapons arsenals and the potential for nuclear proliferation—whether materials, components, systems, weapons, or expertise—will keep nuclear arms control on the agenda. In addition, a whole range of conventional arms remains outside of any effective controls. Other weapons with catastrophic potential—particularly biological and chemical—remain a threat for development and proliferation. Far-reaching technological developments have opened up entire new arenas of potential and actual military development and of concomitant arms control interest. Ongoing efforts—unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral; formal and informal; between nations and also including nonstate parties and interests in some cases—are addressing this wide agenda.

In the post–Cold War world, arms control is seen in slightly altered but no less important forms. First, there is likely to be at least another two or

more decades of the U.S.-Russia nuclear reductions implementation process. The cooperative effort to dismantle, control, and destroy the weapons-grade materials from thousands of weapons will be a difficult, expensive, and often contentious process, and it will be compounded and extended with each new round of cuts. The added factor of dealing with strategic defenses will complicate this bilateral endgame, at least in the short term, but it also holds the potential—at least to some observers—of being the only route justifying the continued drawdown of the two strategic nuclear arsenals. In addition, the United States and Russia have yet to address the nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are included in their arsenals. This will even further complicate bilateral arms controls. Finally, similar cooperative efforts to dismantle, control, and destroy former Soviet chemical and biological weapons and capabilities extend the scope and horizons of the bilateral strategic arms control effort. The highly formal bilateral arms control process will certainly be altered, but this series of arms control is far from over.

Second, there is likely to be a continuation of multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts, particularly toward halting and reversing the proliferation and development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Work remains to be done in fully implementing the NPT and the CTBT and in creating an implementation protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. New and emerging arenas for arms control may include efforts to control or ban small arms and land mines, discussion of controls on advanced conventional weapons, and emerging venues of interest in space and cyberspace.

Further, major regional arms control and disarmament efforts are just emerging. Europe has long addressed security cooperation, confidence building, and conventional arms control issues, and that effort will no doubt continue. Other regions have adopted nuclear weapon–free zones, and some have established regional and subregional cooperative programs on a range of economic, political, and security issues. Today, with the emergence of new nuclear states in South Asia and with heightened proliferation concerns ranging from East Asia to the Middle East, efforts will be initiated and intensified to establish regional mechanisms for transparency and security.

International events beginning in late 2001 have had a profound effect on all dimensions of international relations. Global terrorism and actions well outside accepted norms of international behavior by rogue and failing states raise critical challenges to the foundations of cooperation and diplomacy that lie at the heart of arms control. In the short term there is an increased emphasis on strengthened nonproliferation as well as an expressed willingness to pursue active counterproliferation or preemption. At the same time, there is also the ongoing and active agreement on the part of the United States and Russia to enact strategic nuclear weapons cuts to 2,000 or fewer warheads on each side. Given the historical record and the net effect of all of these trends, there is reason to believe that arms control and disarmament will remain relevant into the foreseeable future.

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See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; Glassboro Summit; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Tests; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

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Arms Sales, International

The sale of weapons has been an important political and economic activity for centuries, but it may have reached its height during the Cold War. In this period the United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence around the world, and both countries utilized arms sales to maintain the support of allies and to bring new supporters into their respective spheres of influence. In the 1980s alone, it is estimated that arms transfers amounted to a total of $490 billion. The majority of the arms sold came from the two superpowers, which together accounted for nearly two-thirds of all arms transactions during this time. Most of these sales were directed toward nations of the developing world.

The United States and the Soviet Union regarded arms sales as a primary tool for firming up alliances, acquiring military bases, increasing influence in recipient nations, and maintaining the international balance of power. Both nations sold a variety of weapons to their allies, potential allies, insurgents, and lesser-developed and nonaligned countries. American tanks and jet fighters were sold to Egypt and South Korea, for example, while the Soviets placed tanks in Syria and fighter jets in North Korea.

The U.S. government justified its arms sales by emphasizing the need to halt the spread of communism. Using the rationale that pro-Western, autocratic rulers were better than communists, the United States provided an assorted mix of dictators such as Suharto in Indonesia, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, Mobuto Sese Seko in Zaire, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran with small arms, missiles, tanks, and jet aircraft in order to keep their support. Members of key regional alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) were also recipients of American arms, as were important regional allies such as Japan and Israel.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets supplied arms to anticolonial and independence movements in Asia and Africa, using weapons exports to establish themselves as the leading enemy of imperialism in the developing world. The Soviets provided armaments to a variety of client states including Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Libya, and Syria as well as to Warsaw Pact nations. The Chinese, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese also received Soviet arms. By the mid-1980s, Soviet weapons exports averaged between $15 billion and $20 billion annually.

The governments of neutral nations such as Egypt often took advantage of weapons sales during the Cold War to play the two superpowers off each other. During Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, the ideological implications of the Cold War led to a certain level of frustration with those nonaligned nations that would not take a stand against communism. While the United States did not refuse to sell arms to Egypt in 1955, it proposed terms of payment that were so high that Egypt could not accept them. Cairo then turned to the Soviets, who were more than willing to circumvent the Baghdad Pact and provide weapons to the Egyptians, thereby extending Soviet influence in the Middle East. Countries in the Middle East thus learned that they no longer had to rely on the American-British-French triumvirate as their sole source of weapons. By playing the Russian card, these states could assert their independence from the West. On the other hand, the purchase of Soviet arms by various Middle Eastern nations undoubtedly fueled the increase in American arms sales to Israel. Other nonaligned nations around the world followed suit by soliciting arms from each of the superpowers.

Israel provided training and weaponry to Honduras. Israeli advisors trained the Cobras, an elite counterinsurgency unit. Shown here is a Honduran soldier with his Israeli-manufactured Uzi submachine gun. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Arms sales by both sides in the Cold War certainly contributed to or extended conflicts around the globe. Weapons supplied by both the superpowers and their proxies to one side or the other (and sometimes both) were used in a variety of wars of liberation as well as in the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Afghanistan War. The Soviet shipment of nuclear-tipped missiles to Cuba ultimately led to the most dangerous moment of the entire Cold War, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

For the United States, arms sales also led to a serious political crisis, the Iran-Contra Affair, that occurred during the second term of President Ronald Reagan. In an effort to persuade Iran to use its influence to help win the freedom of American hostages held in Lebanon, the Reagan administration agreed to sell weapons to Iran, which had been at war with Iraq for nearly five years. The proceeds from the sales were then funneled to a Nicaraguan insurgency group, the Contras, who were attempting to overthrow the leftist Sandinista

U.S. Military Aid and Weapons Sales to Latin America (in current millions of dollars)

Country	*1950–1979*	*1980–1993*
Argentina	238.7	68.3
Belize	0.0	4.1
Bolivia	45.6	103.8
Brazil	580.0	393.4
Chile	294.8	30.1
Colombia	140.7	477.0
Costa Rica	2.5	29.4
Cuba	18.6	0.0
Dom. Rep.	27.9	31.1
Ecuador	134.0	85.1
El Salvador	11.0	966.3
Guatemala	55.4	32.6
Haiti	3.9	3.3
Honduras	17.5	440.1
Jamaica	1.3	47.5
Mexico	21.6	215.7
Nicaragua	18.2	0.4
Panama	11.6	31.6
Paraguay	21.4	0.3
Peru	281.6	47.3
Uruguay	80.8	19.8
Venezuela	245.0	713.7
Total	2,252.20	5,071.50

government, which was supported by the Soviets and Cuba. In agreeing to the deal, the administration violated its own stated policy regarding weapons sales and specific congressional legislation that prohibited funding the Contras. The discovery of the arrangement in November 1986 precipitated a serious scandal. It also raised constitutional issues regarding the separation of powers and the president's prerogative in the conduct of foreign policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, arms sales have declined significantly. Transfers of arms during the period 1997–2001 dropped from approximately $46 billion to $25 billion. Despite the general decline of arms sales over the past the twenty years, the movement of weapons between nations remains considerable. Asian nations in particular account for a high percentage of arms purchases, buying some 40 percent of all weapons exports. The Middle East is another significant regional buyer of arms, taking in about 13 percent of exported armaments. Saudi Arabia led the world in arms imports in 2001, followed by China, Taiwan, South Korea, Egypt, Israel, India, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Among arms exporters today, the United States is the leading arms merchant by far. American arms sales in 2001 alone accounted for almost 46 percent of all weapons transfers made in that year. Since 1992, the United States has exported more than $142 billion worth of armaments worldwide. Other leading arms suppliers are Russia, France, Great Britain, China, Israel, the Ukraine, Slovakia, Belgium, Greece, and South Korea.

A. Gregory Moore

See also

Contras; Cuban Missile Crisis; Iran-Contra Affair; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Sandinistas

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Artillery

Between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, artillery went through the most dramatic series of changes in its entire history. In the middle of the Vietnam War, a World War II–era field artilleryman would still have been able to recognize most of what he saw in a typical field artillery

American and Soviet Artillery

American	*Type*	*Soviet*	*Type*
20mm Vulcan	AAA	23mm ZSU-23-4	AAA
155mm SP howitzer M-109	SP	122mm SP howitzer 2S-1	SP
8-inch (203mm) howitzer M-110	SP	152mm SP howitzer 2S-3	SP
175mm SP gun M-107	SP	152mm SP gun 2S-5	SP
280mm M-65 gun	Nuclear	203mm SP gun 2S-7	SP

battalion. By the Persian Gulf War in 1991, he would have been totally lost. For the other branches of artillery, the changes were faster and even more drastic.

By 1948 the United States had abandoned coastal artillery completely, and Britain followed suit in 1956. As early as the late 1930s, it was obvious that carrier-based aircraft were making conventional gun battery coastal defenses obsolete, and in reaction many coastal artillery units started to convert to air defense (antiaircraft artillery, or AAA) missions. Most American air defense artillery (ADA) units today carry the lineage of older coastal artillery units. ADA weapons also went through rapid and radical changes following World War II. Most large-caliber AAA guns were phased out in favor of guided missiles, although some armies still retained machine gun-based systems for low-flying aircraft. Two of the most prominent still in service in the early twenty-first century include the American 20mm Vulcan and the Soviet 23mm ZSU-23–4. Both systems are radar controlled and are mounted on self-propelled tracked carriages.

In the 1960s many armies started introducing shoulder-fired, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs) to extend air defense coverage to lower-level maneuver units in the field. Unfortunately, too many of these weapons were poorly accounted for and were controlled by many armies. During the 1980–1988 period alone, the Soviets delivered 32,210 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) of all types to third world countries; during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the United States supplied the mujahideen resistance with Stinger MANPADs. All too many MANPADs ended up on the black market, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century MANPADs in the hands of terrorists had become one of the worst-case nightmare scenarios.

Antitank artillery units were virtually unique to World War II, and most armies abandoned them completely by the mid-1950s, although conventional Soviet field artillery retained an antitank role in the direct-fire mode. Most antitank guns were phased out in favor of wire-guided antitank missiles, either employed directly by the lower-level maneuver units or later fired from helicopters. When the armed helicopter first appeared in Vietnam firing 2.75-inch unguided rockets, those units initially were designated as aerial field artillery (AFA) because the U.S. Army at that time did not have an aviation branch. As helicopter ordnance became more sophisticated and the first purpose-built attack helicopter, the AH-1 Cobra, was introduced, such units quickly were redesignated as attack aviation. Shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army reintroduced the Aviation Branch that it lost when the U.S. Air Force became a separate service in 1947.

At the start of World War II, the standard divisional support gun in most armies was 75mm. From the latter half of World War II through Vietnam, it was 105mm. In the years since Vietnam it has been 155mm. Although the self-propelled (SP) gun became a standard weapon system in World War II, most field artillery then was still towed. Today most of the artillery of the major armies is SP. The weight of the SP guns, however, restricts their air transportability, and for that reason most armies still have a number of the lighter towed guns, particularly the 105mm, that can be transported by helicopter.

In the early 1960s the United States introduced an entire family of SP guns. The venerable 155mm SP howitzer M-109 was adopted by at least twenty countries. It has undergone constant modification and improvement and still remains in service. The 8-inch (203mm) howitzer M-110 was essentially a World War II weapon mounted on new SP chasses. With a range of 16,800 meters, it reputedly was the most accurate field artillery weapon in history. In the 1970s a longer barrel gave it even more range, but many maneuver commanders disliked it because of its slow speed. It was phased out of the U.S. inventory immediately after the Persian Gulf War, a decision that many artillery experts still believe was a serious mistake because of the weapon's accuracy and unparalleled hitting power. The 175mm SP M-107 was mounted on the same chassis as the M-110. Firing out to 32,700 meters, it had the longest range of any American cannon system. Unfortunately, it was very inaccurate and suffered from the same mobility problems as the M-110. The 175mm SP was phased out in the early 1980s.

The standard artillery calibers used by the Soviet Union, its client states in the third world, and the Warsaw Pact states included 122mm, 152mm, and 203mm, which were first adopted by the emperors' armies and have been used by the Russians up to the present. Initially, the Soviets did not follow the trend toward SP field artillery. From the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s, however, the Soviets conducted an aggressive program of introducing the new 2S family of SP artillery. These included the 122mm SP howitzer 2S-1, the 152mm SP howitzer 2S-3, the 152mm SP gun 2S-5, the 203mm SP gun 2S-7, and the 240mm SP mortar 2S-4.

It is an old adage of the British Royal Artillery that the real artillery weapon is the projectile and that the gun is merely the means of sending it to the target. During World War II, the most common types of artillery ammunition were high explosive (HE), illumination, and smoke. Chemical artillery rounds had been widely used during World War I; all sides still had them in their arsenals during World War II, but they were never used. Nonetheless, most armies during the Cold War stockpiled chemical artillery rounds and trained in their delivery. Chemical agents carried in the artillery rounds included the GB (nonpersistent) and VX (persistent) nerve agents and the HD blistering agent.

During the Cold War period, a wide range of new and innovative artillery projectiles came into service. During the Vietnam War, the United States introduced the antipersonnel round (APERS), commonly called the Beehive round. Designed to defend isolated firebases from human-wave attacks, the Beehive round fired thousands of tiny fléchettes (essentially small nails with

fins) at point-blank range. The Beehive was a return to the concept of the old canister round of muzzle-loading artillery. Also introduced in Vietnam, the Improved Conventional Munition (ICM) was a cargo-carrying round that dispersed antipersonnel submunitions (bomblets) above the target. After the Vietnam War, the United States introduced the Dual-Purpose ICM (DPICM) round, containing a mixture of antipersonnel and antiarmor submunitions. In the 1980s the United States also introduced a laser-guided antitank round, the M-712 Copperhead. Developed to counter the massive Soviet armored formations, the Copperhead was the first field artillery round specifically designed to be fired against a point target rather than an area target.

Another variation on the cargo-carrying round was the late-1970s U.S. introduction of the Field Artillery Scatterable Mines (FASCAM) system, designed to lay minefields deep into enemy territory. FASCAM rounds carried either antipersonnel or antiarmor mines. Each of the mines has a variable active period that can be set prior to firing the round. At the end of the maximum active period the mines automatically disarm, thereby rendering them harmless to friendly troops who might advance through the area in the future.

Fuel Air Explosives (FAE) are powerful conventional explosives, sometimes called the poor man's nuke. The round operates on the same principle as a grain elevator explosion. A preliminary explosion first disperses a cloud of petroleum-based droplets over a large area while the main charge detonates the vapor cloud, producing a huge fireball. The Soviets reportedly used FAE artillery rounds and missile warheads in Afghanistan.

The most defining characteristic of Cold War field artillery was its ability to fire a nuclear round, the so-called battlefield nuclear weapon, also erroneously called the tactical nuclear weapon. The first and only cannon firing of a nuclear round occurred on 25 May 1953 at Frenchman's Flats, Nevada, as part of Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. An 803-pound T-124 projectile with a W-9 warhead was fired to a range of 10,000 meters and detonated 160 meters above the ground, producing a yield of fifteen kilotons. The weapon that fired the round was the superheavy 280mm M-65 gun. Originally designed late in World War II, the weapon was never put into production as originally intended. In the late 1940s the design was resurrected specifically as a nuclear weapon. In battery, the gun weighed 93,800 pounds and fired from a box-trail platform. It was suspended between two specially built tractors. In addition to the nuclear round, it could also fire a 598-pound HE round out to a range of 28,700 meters. Nicknamed "Atomic Annie," the M-65 remained in service a little more than ten years.

The mainstays of the U.S. nuclear field artillery arsenal were the 155mm M-109 and 8-inch M-110 howitzers. Both weapons also fired conventional ammunition and fired many thousands of HE rounds during the Vietnam War and later during the Persian Gulf War. The M-109 was capable of firing the M-454 nuclear round. At 120 pounds, the round's W-48 fission warhead produced a mere 0.1-kiloton blast. It was the smallest U.S. nuclear warhead ever fielded.

Approximately 1,060 M-454 rounds were procured. The other nuclear shell produced in large numbers was the M-422 with the W-33 warhead, fired



The first and only test of the M65 atomic cannon, nicknamed "Atomic Annie," at Frenchman's Flat, Nevada, 25 May 1953. (Library of Congress)

by the 8-inch M-110 howitzer. Three types of the W-33s produced yields between five and ten kilotons. A fourth type produced a forty-kiloton yield. Some 2,000 W-33s were produced between 1957 and 1965. Late in the Cold War the M-753 round with the W-79 warhead was also produced in small numbers for the 8-inch M-110 howitzer. It had only a one- to two-kiloton yield, but its enhanced radiation effect was designed to produce greater human killing with less blast damage.

The logic and even the basic sanity of nuclear weapons with such a short range was debated continually throughout the Cold War.

American officers specially trained as nuclear target analysts carried the additional skill indicator personnel code of 5X. The logic and even the basic sanity of nuclear weapons with such a short range was debated continually throughout the Cold War. In the event of an all-out attack by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations, units such as the 2nd Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery, stationed in Giessen, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), were supposed to deploy to predesignated positions near the Fulda Gap. Once in position, their mission was to fire a single nuclear round from each of the battalion's twelve 8-inch M-110 howitzers. Most American artillerymen who served in Germany during the Cold War understood only too well that it was basically a suicide mission.

An M198 155mm howitzer firing during the multinational joint service Exercise BRIGHT STAR in Egypt, 1 August 1985. (U.S. Department of Defense)

President George H. W. Bush made the unilateral decision to eliminate nuclear field artillery in 1991, withdrawing some 1,300 nuclear shells from Europe. The Soviet Union followed suit in 1992. The United States destroyed its last nuclear artillery round, a W-79 warhead, in late 2003.

Britain's Royal Artillery employed the U.S. M-109 and M-110 howitzers, and as a nuclear power, British forces had nuclear rounds for both weapons. The West German Bundeswehr also used the M-109 and M-110 but as a nonnuclear power did not have nuclear rounds. There was, however, a system in place to issue such rounds to the Bundeswehr in time of war. U.S. Special Weapons units, sometimes called caretaker units, were aligned with and based near designated Bundeswehr artillery units. The American units maintained physical control over the nuclear rounds. Upon receipt of the release authority of the president of the United States and the approval of the West German chancellor, the nuclear rounds would be released to the German units. Fortunately, this mechanism was never tested.

Artillery rockets have been in use since at least the War of 1812, but they only became significant battlefield weapons during World War II. The German V-1 Buzz Bomb was the world's first practical cruise missile. The German V-2 was the first guided missile used as a weapon and the forerunner of today's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The German Nebelwerfers and the Soviet Katyushas were the first practical multiple rocket launchers.

During the 1950s the United States fielded a succession of battlefield rocket and missile systems, including the Corporal, the Sergeant, and the Little John. Introduced in 1962, the Honest John had both nuclear and HE warheads. The 762mm rocket was launched from a rail on the back of a truck and had a range of 37,000 meters. As an unguided, free-flight rocket, it was aimed before firing using fire direction calculations similar to those used for tube artillery. In 1972 the United States replaced the Honest John with the Lance. Designed as a nuclear delivery system only, the 557mm inertial-guided missile had a range of 112 kilometers.

The Pershing, first introduced in 1962 and fielded in Europe in 1964, was the premier U.S. field artillery missile system. An inertial-guided, two-stage missile with a nuclear warhead and a range of up to 750 kilometers, it became the backbone of the nuclear deterrent against attack by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. In March 1964 the West German Air Force's first Pershing wing began unit training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The control system for the warheads in Germany was the same as for the nuclear artillery shells.

The upgraded Pershing Ia, introduced in 1969, had a W-50 warhead with yields of 60, 200, or 400 kilotons. The far more capable and accurate Pershing II, with a range of 1,800 kilometers, was introduced in 1983. Fired from West Germany, the P-2, as it was called, could hit targets with pinpoint accuracy deep in the Soviet Union. Its W-85 warhead produced a 40-kiloton airburst. Basing the P-2 on German soil caused a major political crisis for the government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, but the administration of President Ronald Reagan forced the issue. Some historians have since argued that the deployment of the P-2 was one of the most significant elements of pressure that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the control of the 56th Field Artillery Command, eighty-six P-2 launchers and ninety-one warheads were deployed in Germany as of 1989. Before the Pershings were eliminated in 1991, the U.S. Army had 169 Pershing 1a and 234 Pershing II missiles.

Soviet FROG-7 tactical nuclear surface-to-surface missile and crew, 1 August 1982. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The Soviet 2S family of guns 152mm and larger were all chemical- and nuclear-capable, but the Soviets generally showed less interest than the West in using tube artillery to fire nuclear weapons, preferring instead to rely on rockets and missiles to deliver warheads of mass destruction. The Soviet equivalent of the Honest John was known to NATO as the FROG (for Free Rocket Over Ground). The last model, the FROG-7, had HE, chemical, and nuclear warheads and a range of 42 miles. The SS-1C, known to NATO as the SCUD-B, was a guided missile with a range of 180 miles. During the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi-made crude versions of the SCUD proved widely inaccurate but were a tremendous nuisance to the Coalition, especially when Iraq fired them at Israel in a failed attempt to broaden the conflict. The Soviet SS-21 guided missile was a divisional-level system with a range of only 60 miles.

The SS-23 was an army-level system with a range of 300 miles. The SS-12 was a theater-level system with a range of 540 miles. All these Soviet systems carried nuclear warheads. Under the provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States agreed to eliminate the Pershing and the Soviets agreed to eliminate the SS-12 and SS-23.

As with the Soviets, the French relied primarily on their Pluton guided missile as their primary delivery system for battlefield nuclear weapons. Although Israel is not an officially declared nuclear power, most Western intelligence organizations have assumed since the 1970s that their Jericho missile has a nuclear warhead.

Except in the Soviet Union, multiple rocket launching systems went into an eclipse for almost four decades following World War II. Such weapons never went out of service in the Warsaw Pact armies, and in 1964 the Soviets introduced the BM-21. Basically an upgraded version of the World War II Katyusha, the BM-21 was a truck-mounted system with forty launching tubes that salvoed 122mm free flight rockets to a range of 20,000 meters. The system was not very accurate, but the NATO armies respected and feared its area-saturation power.

In 1985 the United States introduced the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which was quickly adopted by many NATO armies. Based on the fully tracked chassis of the Bradley armored fighting vehicle, the MLRS was a quantum technological improvement over the Soviet BM-21. The MLRS carries twelve 227mm rockets and can fire them by salvo, by ripple, or individually. Although the rockets are unguided, they are essentially as accurate as cannon artillery because each SP launcher system carries its own onboard computer and a Global Positioning System (GPS). This also means that each launcher in a battery can position itself independently in diverse locations yet still mass its fire on a designated target. Each rocket has a range of 32,000 meters and delivers a 320-pound warhead containing 644 DPICM submunitions, capable of defeating 100mm of armor. Once the launcher expends its load, the onboard automatic loading system allows the three-man crew to reload the system in a matter of minutes. The MLRS was used with devastating effect during the Persian Gulf War.

Electronics and computers have also changed artillery in ways undreamed of during World War II. By the latter half of the Cold War, all the NATO and Warsaw Pact armies had sophisticated counterbattery radar systems that could instantly pinpoint the map coordinates of hostile mortars or artillery. (Because of the different angles of fire involved, separately designed radar systems are still needed to locate mortars and artillery.)

Up through the end of the Vietnam War, fire direction calculations were still done manually, using firing charts and graphical firing tables (specially designed slide rules). A well-trained Fire Direction Control (FDC) section could calculate initial firing data in a matter of minutes and subsequent correction data in a matter of seconds.

In the late 1960s the U.S. Army introduced its Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC). The new computer was not really faster than a well-trained FDC section using manual methods, but FADAC's advantages

were that it was more accurate and could compute firing data for up to five different batteries simultaneously. FADAC's main drawback was its poor reliability. It was almost always down for maintenance. The equivalent British system was called Field Artillery Computing Equipment (FACE).

With the widespread commercial introduction of inexpensive handheld calculators in the early 1970s and programmable calculators shortly thereafter, many enterprising FDC crewmen bought their own calculators and programmed them for the gunnery solution. The results were almost as fast and accurate as FADAC and were much more reliable. The U.S. Army eventually bought and preprogrammed the Texas Instruments TI-59 calculator. Meanwhile, the much more reliable and flexible TACFIRE system replaced FADAC in all U.S. artillery units by the 1980s. The system is still in use today, and only a few very old artillerymen at the start of the twenty-first century still remember how to compute the gunnery solution manually.

Accurate artillery fire is absolutely dependent on accurate positioning data for the guns and at least the registration point, if not all the targets. Up through the end of the Vietnam War, artillery survey was still conducted the same way the early colonial surveyors laid out the Mason-Dixon Line, with a tape measure and a transit. In the early 1970s the time- and labor-intensive tape measure gave way to the infrared Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). Shortly thereafter the entire surveying system was completely automated with the introduction of the Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS). Once initialized, the gyro-based PADS could be transported in a ground vehicle or a helicopter to any location, there to produce precise digital readout of the location. When the constellation of GPS satellites was put in orbit, the GPS was able to produce accurate location data anywhere in the world. As with the MLRS, other SP artillery systems have been fitted with their own onboard GPS, allowing the guns of a single battery to be widely dispersed on the ground yet mass their fires on a single target. The widely dispersed guns, of course, offer a far more difficult counterbattery target to the enemy and improve battlefield survivability.

Although conventional tube artillery is nowhere near as technically sophisticated as guided missiles, jet fighter-bombers, or helicopter gunships, it will remain a key element on the battlefield well into the twenty-first century and most probably beyond. Within the arc of its range, field artillery is still the only all-weather, twenty-four-hour, instant-response, close-fire support system that cannot be interfered with by electronic means. As long as the ammunition supply remains constant, artillery also has far greater duration than any of the airborne systems. Those characteristics make field artillery still indispensable to infantrymen in contact.

David T. Zabecki

See also

Antiaircraft Guns and Missiles; Biological and Chemical Weapons and Warfare; Missiles, Antiballistic; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Pershing II; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical

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Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in

Prior to World War II, the United States based its armed forces in Asia on its own territories in the Philippines, in Guam and Hawaii, and also in some other small islands in the Pacific acquired during the late nineteenth century. Following World War II, U.S. forces in Asia maintained army, air force, and navy installations on these Pacific islands as well as in Japan and southern Korea, which the United States occupied. Additionally, the United States had military personnel in China to assist the Guomindang (Nationalist) government. Most of these latter were withdrawn during the civil war with the communists by mid-1948.

The 1947 Truman Doctrine, which pledged the United States to preventing the spread of communism around the world, played a large role in the basing and use of U.S. forces in Asia. The intensification of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the late 1940s, the communist victory in China in October 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 triggered a sizable Cold War buildup of U.S. military personnel and facilities throughout Asia. During the Cold War, the primary goals of U.S. forces in Asia were to prevent the expansion of communist powers, specifically the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), and later the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and to ensure American political influence in and economic access to Asia.

During the early 1950s, the Americans greatly augmented their military presence in Asia. By 1953, the last year of the Korean War, American military personnel in the Far East had grown to nearly 630,000, up from 150,000 in 1950. Another 26,000 personnel (an increase from just 21,000 in 1950) were based in the central and southwest Pacific, mostly in the Marianas and Marshall Islands. Although the Philippines achieved independence in 1946 and the occupation of Japan ended in 1952, the United States made agreements with these nations to maintain

U.S. military advisor Lieutenant Colonel George D. Willets visiting with a Korean near the Demilitarized Zone in 1957. (James Burke/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

U.S. Forces in Asia by Branch

	1960				*1970*			
Country	*Army*	*Navy*	*Marine Corps*	*Air Force*	*Army*	*Navy*	*Marine Corps*	*Air Force*
Hong Kong	9	3,726	6	3	0	12	10	6
Japan	5,528	19,455	5,461	27,433	5,917	33,350	39,267	18,005
Korea (1960) / South Korea (1970)	49,882	312	102	5,652	42,629	320	48	9,286
Laos	11	0	12	0	0	0	15	7
Philippines	737	5,822	1,798	4,920	256	8,682	723	13,779
Ryukyus (Okinawa)	8,995	4,615	15,250	9,965	11,439	2,549	16,158	14,606
Singapore	4	264	5	6	0	4	5	1
Taiwan	1,262	1,306	49	2,276	897	779	23	7,114
Thailand	222	34	19	63	9,055	227	46	29,884
Vietnam (1960) / South Vietnam (1970)	558	98	21	117	294,088	40,097	29,962	46,731

military bases there. In 1954, the United States formalized a security agreement with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to provide military assistance and advice to enable it to repel a takeover by the PRC. By the end of the decade, the number of U.S. personnel in Asia and the Pacific stood at 209,000.

The expansion of forces in Asia transformed the areas surrounding U.S. bases and brought with it tens of thousands of dependents of armed forces personnel. According to the 1960 census, 81,540 military dependents lived in Asia. Many bases became entirely American communities, complete with housing units, commissaries, post exchanges, churches, hospitals, schools, movie theaters, and recreational facilities. But in and around these "little Americas," Americans and Asians interacted quite regularly. Asians worked on American military bases and in American homes, while Americans ventured into off-base communities, spending money in local establishments. Naval personnel also routinely visited port cities on ship visits to numerous countries throughout Asia and the Pacific.

Off-base, Asian-owned businesses offered services and products that they knew would attract American spending. Besides the requisite souvenir shops and eateries, local businesspeople opened bars, nightclubs, and clothing shops, many of which catered specifically to American tastes and proclivities. In some places, even brothels were opened to attract American patrons. While some host nationals welcomed the economic opportunities generated by the U.S. bases, many decried the commercial districts and sex-oriented tourism that sprang up around bases in Okinawa, the Philippines, and South Korea. Servicemen's undesirable and sometimes criminal behavior, which included drunkenness, brawling, vehicle accidents, robbery, sexual assault, and even murder, fueled host nationals' resentment of American bases. Asian sex workers risked venereal diseases, unwanted pregnancies, and ostracism from families and communities. Host societies also struggled with the effects of marriages between American servicemen and Asian women and the attendant births of mixed-race children, some of whom were abandoned. In addition, the social and even legal stigmatization of mixed-race relationships followed American servicemen and their Asian families when they moved back to the United States, especially in states with antimiscegenation laws.

Many such families requested tours of duty in Hawaii, where they believed they would find greater acceptance.

The sharp escalation of the Vietnam War beginning in 1965 brought a huge influx of U.S. forces to Southeast Asia. Major preparations for Vietnam operations were often staged at bases in the Philippines and Okinawa. In 1964, when U.S. military personnel in Vietnam were still designated "advisors," the number of U.S. troops in Asia and the Pacific numbered almost 240,000. By September 1967, with the deployments of combat troops to South Vietnam, American forces in Asia had risen to 759,270. This buildup included more than 37,000 American soldiers in Thailand, where the U.S. Air Force maintained several large bases for bombing missions in North Vietnam. Additionally, the United States deployed B-52s from Taiwan for attacks on Vietnamese communists. Despite several Asian governments' assistance to the United States in Vietnam, the Vietnam War provoked strong anti-Americanism among many Asians. Asians had protested the U.S. military presence since the 1950s—for example, on Okinawa when the U.S. military seized farmlands to construct bases. But opposition to the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s manifested itself in more vociferous demonstrations against the U.S. military in Asia.

Upon coming to office in 1969, President Richard Nixon gradually withdrew combat troops from Vietnam. The decrease in U.S. forces in Asia continued into the 1970s. As part of the normalization of relations with the PRC, President Jimmy Carter withdrew all U.S. military forces from Taiwan in the late 1970s. In 1980, just under 115,000 U.S. personnel were stationed in East Asia and the Pacific, mostly in Japan and South Korea, where there was—and remains—a contingent of some 36,000 U.S. troops, most of whom are based near the demilitarized zone. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the subsequent rise in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the increase in Soviet nuclear arms in Asia and naval forces in the Pacific caused American military analysts to worry that the Soviets intended to expand their influence in the region. Also in the 1980s, rising nationalism and political turmoil in the Philippines resulted in a movement to ban nuclear weapons on the islands and an agreement that the United States would remove its bases by the early 1990s, by which time the Cold War had ended.

Donna Alvah

See also

China, Republic of; Domino Theory; Japan, Occupation after World War II; Korea, Republic of; Korean War; Philippines; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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Assad, Hafez
(1930–2000)

Syrian military officer, defense minister (1966–1970), and president of Syria (1971–2000). Born on 6 October 1930 in Qardaha, Syria, to an impoverished family, Hafez Assad was an Alawite, part of a small sect of Shia Islam. At age sixteen he joined the secular Baath Party, to which he remained loyal throughout his life. In 1955 he graduated from the Syrian (Hims) Military Academy and was commissioned as an air force lieutenant pilot. When Assad openly criticized the union of Egypt and Syria (briefly forming the United Arab Republic), he was forced into exile in Egypt during 1959–1961. Along with other military officers, mainly Baathists, Assad participated in a coup against the Syrian government in March 1963 popularly known as the Eighth of March Coup. The conspirators moved quickly to consolidate power and outlawed all political parties except for the Baath Party. The following year Assad assumed the post of commander of the air force.

Yet another military junta launched a second coup in 1966, this one led by a group of Alawite military officers that included Assad. The new ruling junta purged much of the Baath old guard. During 1966–1970, Assad served as minister of defense. The loss of the Golan Heights in the 1967 Six-Day War seriously undermined Assad's political clout. This resulted in a protracted struggle with his mentor and rival Salah al-Jadid, chief of staff of the Syrian armed forces.



Hafez Assad, president of Syria from 1971 until his death in 2000. Assad was considered a key figure in Middle East politics. (Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic)

A split in the Baath Party between nationalists and progressives provided Assad the opportunity to seize control of the government in November 1970. The prime minister, part of the progressive wing, was arrested along with other key government officials. Assad had engineered a bloodless coup. He took the post of prime minister himself and in 1971 was elected president for the first of five times. To be sure, Assad's reign had a dark side. Under his rule, political rivals and dissidents were subjected to summary arrest, torture, and execution.

On 6 October 1973 Assad and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat launched a joint Syrian-Egyptian sneak attack against Israel (known as the Yom Kippur War). Their goal was to recapture territories lost in the 1967 Six-Day War. Egypt wanted the Sinai back, and Syria sought return of the Golan Heights. After early setbacks, the Israelis were winning the war when a United Nations' cease-fire went into effect on *22* October, but Assad was furious with Sadat, claiming that he had botched the operation.

Assad sent troops to Lebanon in 1976 during the civil war there. Syrian troops thus took up a permanent presence in Lebanon under the auspices of the Arab League, remaining there until 2005.

The only significant internal threat to Assad's iron-fisted rule came in 1982 when the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood rebelled in Hamah. Assad responded with brutal force, ordering security forces to suppress the unrest by using poison gas that may have killed as many as 35,000 civilians.

Assad was a shrewd and ambitious man who made Syria a political and military leader in the Arab world. He died in Damascus on 10 June 2000. His son, Bashar Assad, succeeded him in power.

Richard Edwards

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Egypt; Middle East; Sadat, Anwar; Syria

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Atomic Bomb

An explosive device employing certain radioactive isotopes (uranium-235 and plutonium-239) to achieve a critical mass leading to a chain reaction in which neutrons split the nuclei of atoms. This process, known as nuclear fission, releases mass in the form of tremendous heat energy equivalent to several tons of TNT.

In 1938, German scientists were the first to achieve the fission of uranium, and physicists realized that this process might be used to create a weapon of mass destruction. A number of prominent scientists including Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard had left Europe to live in the United States. Szliard and Fermi convinced Einstein to send a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in August 1939 in which he warned that the Germans could produce an atomic weapon. That same year Roosevelt provided modest research funding, and scientists at five U.S. universities began to conduct experiments related to nuclear energy. On 6 December 1941, Roosevelt authorized $2 billion for the Manhattan Engineering District (Manhattan Project), earmarked for the specific purpose of creating an atomic bomb. U.S. Army Brigadier General Leslie Groves had charge of the project, while physicist Robert Oppenheimer was its scientific leader.

In December 1942 at the University of Chicago, a team of nuclear physicists led by Fermi produced the first controlled and self-sustaining nuclear fission reaction. Project facilities were subsequently constructed in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Hanford, Washington; and Los Alamos, New Mexico. Ultimately, the project involved some 120,000 individuals including scientists, engineers, machinists, and other skilled craftsmen. Oppenheimer and his team successfully constructed and then detonated the world's first atomic bomb on 16 July 1945 at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Smoke rises more than 60,000 feet into the air over Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945 from the explosion of the second atomic bomb. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Roosevelt died in April 1945, and his successor, President Harry S. Truman, authorized the employment of the atomic bomb against Japan. The first bomb fell on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki three days later. While the decision to employ the atomic bomb is now a controversial issue and at the time some U.S. leaders opposed the bomb's use, the American people did not regard it as such in August 1945. Historians now point out that Truman employed the bomb to end the war quickly, and there is every indication that as costly as the two bombs were in terms of human lives lost, their use may actually have saved Japanese lives by giving Japanese Emperor Hirohito the excuse to order his armed forces to surrender. This decision prevented the certain starvation of hundreds of thousands of Japanese and the high cost in casualties of a U.S. land invasion of the Japanese home islands. Needless to say, the decision for peace also saved American lives in regard to an invasion of Japan. Historians estimate that an invasion of the Japanese home islands might have cost 40,000 American lives. Other historians point out that Truman was in part motivated by a desire to warn the Soviet Union against additional territorial expansion and to avoid having to share the occupation of Japan with the Soviet Union.

Atomic weapons took on increased significance in the Cold War period. For four years the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, and some European leaders have expressed the view that this alone prevented the Soviet Union from taking over Western Europe. Efforts to place atomic weapons under the control of the United Nations were unsuccessful.

Truman not only authorized the use of the atomic bomb against Japan but also had a significant impact on American atomic policy in the late 1940s and 1950s. As tensions increased between the United States and the Soviet Union, the U.S. monopoly of the atomic bomb became the cornerstone of American policy designed to contain Soviet expansion. The first U.S. war plan that included the use of atomic weapons was completed in August 1947. Approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was code-named BROILER and called for the dropping of atomic bombs on specific key governmental and other targets within the Soviet Union. The planners assumed that bombs dropped on several high-profile targets would have such a profound psychological impact that the Soviets would surrender.

The United States employed the threat of atomic weapons during the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949. Although Truman met the challenge by ordering the airlifting of necessary food and supplies into West Berlin, he also deployed sixty B-29s to airbases in Great Britain. This deployment clearly implied that Washington was considering their use, although no atomic bombs actually left the United States.

By the end of 1948, the United States had produced about a hundred atomic bombs. It also developed a war plan, FLEETWOOD, that called for a preemptive atomic attack during which the United States would deliver approximately 80 percent of its stockpile of atomic weapons in a single strike. In this Washington planned for a first-strike atomic response to any surprise Soviet attack. The assumption behind this was that employment of atomic weapons would give the United States time to mobilize and deploy its conventional forces. This emphasis on nuclear weapons led to a decision in Washington to invest only minimal sums in conventional forces.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was frantically working to develop its own atomic bomb, an effort accelerated by the activities of its spies in the United States. The USSR detonated its first atomic bomb on 29 August 1949. This development shocked Washington and ultimately led to a nuclear arms race between the two Cold War superpowers. Both sides developed ever more powerful atomic weapons and finally the hydrogen bomb. The United States detonated a hydrogen bomb on 1 November 1952 at Eneweta k, and the Soviets exploded a similar device on 12 August 1953. The Soviet hydrogen bomb was twenty times more powerful than the atomic bomb that the United States had dropped on Hiroshima. The nuclear arms race that ensued included tactical nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately for world security, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting nuclear weapons did not prevent other countries from developing such weapons. During the Cold War, other powers including Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China joined the nuclear club. The dangers of nuclear proliferation continue to pose a significant threat to world stability. Especially worrisome is the threat of a nuclear device in the hands of a terrorist organization.

MELISSA JORDINE

See also

Hydrogen Bomb; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Oppenheimer, Robert; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.

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Atomic Energy Commission, United Nations

Agency established by the United Nations (UN) that undertook the first efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Created on 24 January 1946, the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was charged with developing a plan for the control of atomic energy. Early negotiations on this matter revealed sharp disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On 14 June 1946 at the first meeting of the UNAEC, U.S. representative to the UNAEC Bernard Baruch presented what became known as the Baruch Plan. It called for the creation of an international atomic development agency that would control all military-related atomic work. The agency would survey nuclear raw material worldwide and assume control of all fissionable materials and production plants. Resources would be made available for peaceful use, with the agency to license and inspect all nuclear activities. The agency would also report to the UN any attempt to build atomic bombs, which would result in immediate UN action.

Baruch pledged that the United States would hand over all its atomic weapons and research to such an authority and would halt production of atomic weapons as soon as adequate controls were in place and the information's privacy from the public could be assured. The Baruch Plan specified that members of the UN Security Council not be allowed to use their veto in matters regarding atomic energy and that fixed penalties be adopted for nations violating the prohibition on possession of atomic bombs or fissionable materials.

The Soviet Union opposed the Baruch Plan, calling instead for unilateral atomic disarmament by the United States prior to any agreement. The Soviets also adamantly refused to allow atomic inspectors within their borders, a precondition of the Baruch Plan. The Soviets were, at the time, hard at work developing their own atomic weapons. Despite Soviet opposition, the UNAEC endorsed the Baruch Plan and reported it to the General Assembly, which then voted overwhelmingly to present it to the Security Council, where the Soviet Union promptly vetoed it.

Although other compromise proposals were presented in 1947 and 1948, they too met with Soviet opposition, and at the end of 1948 the UNAEC reported to the Security Council that it had reached a stalemate. In 1952 the UNAEC and the Commission for Conventional Armaments merged into the UN Disarmament Commission. The latter became the chief UN vehicle for pressing nuclear disarmament but had little influence, for nuclear weapons continued to proliferate.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Atomic Energy Commission, United States

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Atomic Energy Commission, United States

Government agency established in 1946 to supervise the development and control of nuclear energy in the United States. The Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) was formally created by the 1946 Atomic Energy Act during a time in which a debate was raging over whether the commission should be run by civilian or military authorities. As it turned out, the USAEC became a five-person body, appointed by the president, that worked in tandem with a separate military board, which dealt strictly with atomic energy as it related to military purposes.

During 1946–1952, a civilian advisory board to the USAEC was chaired by Robert Oppenheimer, lead scientist on the Manhattan Project and an opponent of the hydrogen bomb. Oppenheimer's opposition to the development of more powerful nuclear weapons led to his suspension as a consultant to the commission in 1953. In 1954, amid a storm of controversy, Oppenheimer was refused a renewal of his government security clearance after fellow atomic scientist Edward Teller testified against him at USAEC hearings.

The USAEC's purview was largely that of nuclear weapons design, deployment, and control. However, the commission also supervised the extraction and development of fissionable materials, the development of nuclear reactors, and the use of nuclear energy in such applications as medicine and the hard sciences, such as chemistry, biology, and certain engineering fields. Following the controversy that swirled around the USAEC in the early 1950s, the agency performed diligently—and quietly—as it oversaw myriad projects involving nuclear energy.

The USAEC was organized out of existence in 1974 when it was absorbed into the Energy Research and Development Administration. Since then, further bureaucratic changes resulted in the original USAEC's work being handled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy.

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See also

Atomic Bomb; Hydrogen Bomb; Oppenheimer, Robert; Teller, Edward

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Atoms for Peace Proposal
(8 December 1953)

Atomic energy policy and nuclear arms control proposal presented by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a United Nations (UN) speech on 8 December 1953. Eisenhower's initiative was an effort to shape the international environment, create an opportunity for limiting the development and spread of nuclear weapons, and establish the potential for the peaceful use of nuclear science. He stressed the dangers of nuclear weapons to set the tone for his proposal and to create a general awareness of the realities of the international security situation. His warnings built on his already-established domestic public education program known as Operation Candor.



U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivers his "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations on 8 December 1953. (Corel)

A key element of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal was the pooling of fissionable nuclear materials under a UN organization for atomic energy. This transfer of control would result in a reduction of scarce materials needed to produce nuclear weapons. The collaboration of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in this material transfer would also provide an opportunity to open communications with the Soviets in the area of nuclear issues.

Eisenhower also proposed that the new UN atomic agency retain the responsibility of pursuing peaceful uses of the technology in areas such as agriculture, medicine, and especially electric power generation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957 as a direct result of the Atoms for Peace proposal. The development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology did indeed advance after the speech, but arms control and the reduction of available fissile materials did not meet expectations. Yet the initiative paved the way for subsequent discussions related to nuclear issues. The Atoms for Peace plan has been criticized as a cynical response to the Soviets' recently acquired thermonuclear bomb capability and an effort to place the Soviets in a situation in which they would likely reject the very public American initiative. The United States certainly expected to benefit politically regardless of the Soviet reaction. Eisenhower's intent seemed to include a sincere desire to encourage positive uses of nuclear technologies and to constrain the nuclear arms race.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Arms Control; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hydrogen Bomb; Nuclear Arms Race

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Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl
(1883–1967)

British politician and prime minister. Born in London on 3 January 1883, Clement Attlee was educated at Haileybury College and University College, Oxford, and was called to the bar in 1905. Thereafter, he became a socialist. Abandoning his legal career in 1908, he undertook political work before becoming a lecturer in social administration at the London School of Economics in 1913. Unlike many Labour Party leaders, Attlee saw active service in World War I. Elected to the House of Commons in 1923, he became leader of the Labour Party in 1935. During World War II he held several cabinet positions and was also deputy prime minister.

Labour Party leader Clement Attlee was prime minister of Great Britain from 1945 to 1951. (Library of Congress)

Attlee led the Labour Party to its landslide July 1945 victory, taking over immediately from defeated British Prime Minister Winston Churchill as his country's chief representative at the ongoing Potsdam summit conference. Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, an anticommunist labor leader, soon became strong proponents of a policy of firm resistance to Soviet expansion in Europe. They did so, however, from a position of relative weakness, as Britain ended the war nearly bankrupt and was faced with heavy and expensive military commitments in Germany, Japan, and Greece and around its far-flung empire. In addition, the new Labour government sought to provide old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, free or heavily subsidized housing, health care, and education for all.

Given the Labour Party's long-standing anti-imperialist outlook and India's strong nationalist movement, in February 1946 Attlee announced plans to grant India full independence in the near future. This occurred in August 1947, with the largely Muslim northwestern and northeastern

provinces choosing to separate from the predominantly Hindu remainder in what became Pakistan. Within a few years Burma followed suit, although Britain temporarily retook and retained its Asian colonies in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, whose continued possession and administration remained economically profitable.

Conscious of British weakness, Attlee sought to encourage the United States to maintain a close Anglo-American alliance. By late 1946 budgetary problems left British leaders little alternative to reducing expensive military commitments. Attlee chose to do so in Greece and Turkey. Greece was facing a major internal communist insurgency, and Turkey was under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union to grant it rights to the strategic Dardanelles Straits. Attlee and Bevin privately informed President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall of their intention to withdraw sometime before the public announcement, which became the occasion for Truman's February 1947 speech known as the Truman Doctrine, placing U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey in the broader context of a worldwide anticommunist strategy.

The harsh winter of 1946–1947 caused economic hardship and generated unrest across Western Europe, bringing further British pleas for U.S. aid and helping to generate the Marshall Plan, a coordinated program for European economic recovery. Attlee and Bevin were also instrumental in establishing a Western European Union defense pact that led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949.

By 1950 major differences existed between the Truman administration and Attlee's government on Asian policy concerning Hong Kong, Indochina, anticolonialism, Korea, and the new People's Republic of China (PRC). Britain, unlike the United States, pragmatically accorded the PRC almost immediate recognition and traded extensively with it. The Korean War gave British leaders an opportunity to demonstrate their continuing loyalty and regain the international status that Britain's economic problems had eroded. Due to Bevin's poor health and eventual death, Attlee played a central role in British policy during the Korean War. Urged on by British ambassador in Washington Sir Oliver Franks, in July 1950 Attlee overrode his reluctant chiefs of staff and committed British troops to the American-led United Nations (UN) Command.

British officials welcomed the massive American enhancement of NATO forces that quickly resulted from the Korean conflict. Even so, Attlee was anxious to restrain the United States, fearing that American leaders might escalate the Korean intervention into full-scale war with China and perhaps even the Soviet Union.

Attlee supported the UN decision to cross the 38th Parallel, believing that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would intervene. When the Chinese did so in November 1950, British leaders feared an expanded conflict and especially the potential employment of atomic weapons. In early December, Attlee flew to Washington seeking to reassure the British public, restrain the United States, and reaffirm Britain's status within the Atlantic alliance. Upon his return to Britain he exaggerated his success, and the belief

became widespread that he had prevented further American escalation of the war.

The Chinese intervention in the Korean War split the Labour Party. Many on the Left argued that the war was misguided and that Attlee's government was overly deferential to the United States. The heavy budgetary strains imposed by the Korean intervention and rearmament, which brought higher taxes, cutbacks in social spending, inflation, and an unfavorable balance of payments, played a major role in the Labour Party's October 1951 electoral defeat. After a second election loss in 1955, Attlee resigned as party leader and entered the House of Lords. He died in London on 8 October 1967.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Atomic Bomb; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bevin, Ernest; Brussels Treaty; Churchill, Winston; Decolonization; Greek Civil War; India; Korean War; Marshall, George Catlett; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pakistan; Stalin, Josef; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United Kingdom; Western European Union; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Aung San Suu Kyi
(1945–)

Burmese political opposition leader and founder of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party. Born in Rangoon on 19 June 1945, Aung San Suu Kyi was the daughter of Burmaese national hero of independence General Aung San (1915–1947). In 1960, she left Rangoon and moved to Delhi, where her mother served as Burmese ambassador to India. Aung San Suu Kyi went to England in 1964, enrolled at Oxford University, and graduated in 1967. She went on to work briefly for the United Nations Secretariat in New York before returning to England, where she lived until April 1988 when she returned to Rangoon to care for her ailing mother.

Upon her return to Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi became politically active and took part in the August 1988 mass demonstrations against the nation's authoritarian socialist regime. After the armed forces crushed the prodemocratic

As leader of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest by the Burmese government in 1989. Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, but the resultant international attention failed to win her release. (Reuters/Corbis)

movement and formed a junta in September, Aung San Suu Kyi and other reform-minded politicians founded the NLD. As general secretary of the NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi was deemed a danger to the state and detained by the military junta in July 1989. During her detention, the NLD won a landslide mandate in the 1990 general elections, which the junta promptly nullified.

Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for her contributions to the nonviolent, prodemocracy struggle. The junta released her in July 1995 but refused to open a dialogue with her or the NLD. In September 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi was again detained. She was released in May 2002, but her political activities were severely restricted. On 30 May 2003, a mob allegedly supported by the junta attacked Aung San Suu Kyi and several hundred other NLD members during a rural canvassing drive in Upper Burma, and Aung San Suu Kyi was detained for a third time. As of early 2007, Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest.

Kei Nemoto

See also
Burma

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Auriol, Vincent
(1884–1966)

French socialist politician and first president of the Fourth Republic (1947–1954). Born on 27 August 1884 in Revel, Haute-Garonne, France, Vincent Auriol studied at the University of Toulouse and earned both a doctorate in law and a license in philosophy. He practiced law for a time and joined the Socialist Party in 1905. He won election to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1914 and sided with socialist Léon Blum when the communists split off in 1920. During the Popular Front government of the mid-1930s, Auriol served as minister of finance under Premier Blum in 1936 and as minister of state in 1938.

Auriol was one of eighty deputies who refused to cede executive authority to Henri Philippe Pétain in June 1940. Briefly imprisoned, Auriol escaped

in 1942 and joined the Resistance. A year later he made his way to London to join the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle. Auriol then held a number of government posts in the provisional government.

With his strong reputation as a mediator, Auriol was elected president of both the first (1945) and second (1946) constituent assemblies. He easily won election in January 1947. Although he had earlier advocated abolition of the office of president, he now worked to give it more than a ceremonial function. He used his few powers to the utmost, aided by the considerable factionalism in the National Assembly. He was obliged during his term of office until 1954 to deal with frequent changes of premier for which he solicited replacements. Auriol traveled widely and spoke out on matters of policy, especially foreign affairs. He strongly opposed Soviet expansionism and supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), although at the same time he wished for France to pursue an independent policy. A strong supporter of the French Union, he nonetheless opposed independence for French overseas possessions.

Auriol decided not to seek reelection in 1953. He served briefly on the Constitutional Council of the Fifth Republic but resigned in 1960 because of concerns over the concentration of authority in the hands of Charles de Gaulle. Auriol died in Paris on 1 January 1966.

Elizabeth Pugliese and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Containment Policy; De Gaulle, Charles; France; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Australia

Large, primarily English-speaking nation located due south of Indonesia, surrounded by the Indian Ocean to the west and the South Pacific to the east. Australia, including the island state of Tasmania, is roughly the size of the continental United States and comprises more than 2.97 million square miles. In 1945, it had a population of approximately 7 million people. Australia was founded as a penal settlement for Great Britain in the eighteenth century. In 1901, the six former colonies on the continent united to form the Commonwealth of Australia with a constitution modeled after that of the United States. It remained closely tied to the British Commonwealth through the first half of the twentieth century, after which Cold War realities pushed

the Australians away from their Commonwealth obligations and toward alliance with the United States.

Following World War II, Australia sought to rank among the leading nations in Asia, which sometimes resulted in conflict with U.S. policy. Throughout the Cold War, Australia played a delicate balancing act that allowed it to pursue its own interests while still remaining a key U.S. Cold War ally. Australia was one of the original signers of the United Nations (UN) Charter and greatly contributed to the economic, social, and humanitarian efforts of that organization, including peacekeeping activities, human rights investigations, drug control, and the World Trade Organization. It was also a founding member of the Colombo Plan for the Cooperative Economic and Social Development of Asia and the Pacific and used its economic prosperity to aid in the advancement of its regional neighbors.

The 1951 Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Treaty was the cornerstone of Australia's Cold War policy. The treaty held that an attack on one of the member nations would be considered an attack upon the other two. While ANZUS linked Australia with the United States, thus fulfilling Australia's security needs, it also allowed the nation to pursue its other foreign policy goals. Oftentimes, Australia's objective of being a leader in Asia was intertwined with Cold War conflicts such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

The Cold War helped to shape Australian politics and society as well. The Liberal Party, founded in 1945, had as part of its political platform a deep antipathy toward communism. In 1949, it joined with the Country Party (renamed the National Party in 1982) to decentralize the wartime economy and attempted unsuccessfully to ban the Communist Party. A Liberal-Country coalition ruled Australia for a majority of the Cold War.

Australian Cold War domestic events generally paralleled those of the United States. When Soviet diplomat Vladimir Petrov defected to Australia before the 1954 federal election, Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies used the affair to rekindle anticommunist sentiment. The subsequent Royal Commission that investigated communist influence in Australia, including the leader of the Australian Labour Party, Hebert Vere Everett, took on a conspiratorial atmosphere similar to the McCarthy hearings in the United States.

Australia was never directly threatened during the Cold War. Its Cold War policy was, therefore, one of forward defense. It was an Australian objective to fight communism as far away from its borders as possible. For example, Australia was among many nations that committed troops, via the UN, to the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) when that country was invaded by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) in June 1950. Australia sent approximately 17,000 men to Korea, of whom 339 were killed in action. The Korean War not only solidified Australia's relations with the United States but also proved its mettle in the Cold War.

In 1955, Australia joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and bound itself to a regional security organization, even though it objected

to the fact that SEATO did not have the same guarantees as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From the Australian perspective, a flawed treaty was better than none provided it reaffirmed America's presence in Asia. Following the Korean War and during the formation of SEATO, Australia turned its attention to the West New Guinea controversy that pitted Indonesia against the Netherlands.

While the American containment policy would have sacrificed West New Guinea to save Indonesia from communism, Australia supported the Dutch because they stood between the Australian continent and Indonesia. Australia remained a staunch supporter of the Netherlands until the United States guaranteed protection against future Indonesian aggression in West New Guinea. When the United States offered such assurances, Australia reversed its policy, and West New Guinea was integrated into Indonesia. Once more, agreement with the United States meant compromise on the part of Australian foreign policymakers.

When Indonesia threatened the newly formed country of Malaysia in 1963, Australia found itself on the receiving end of military aid requests from the United Kingdom. Australia held off these appeals, however, opting to support the United States in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Australia tried valiantly to conduct an autonomous foreign policy, but more often than not it subordinated its interests to broader Cold War objectives. Australia's most significant Cold War contribution was in fact its involvement in the Vietnam War.

Australia established diplomatic relations with South Vietnam in 1952 when it opened a legation in Saigon. The exchange of diplomatic missions marked the beginning of a twenty-year involvement in an Asian conflict that would alter the scope and focus of Australian foreign policy and its Cold War experience. The first decade in South Vietnam involved an intense effort of nation building. In 1962, Australia began providing military advisors to the fledgling RVN. Three years later Australia sent the first of three battalions of combat troops. By the end of the war in 1975, Australia had rotated nearly 50,000 troops through Vietnam, with a maximum troop strength of 8,000 in 1968. During the war, 423 Australian lives were lost.

Not all of Australia's Cold War experiences occurred overseas. Australia played an important role in U.S. defense strategy by establishing, in its interior, American-run communications facilities that would warn of nuclear attack or unannounced missile launches from Pacific Rim nations. The United States operated low-frequency transmitter facilities in Australia for communicating with nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean and a high-frequency transmitter linked to a defense satellite communications system. Australia's Pine Gap facility, maintained by American intelligence agencies, also gathered data on Soviet, Chinese, and other Pacific nations' communications.

Upon the establishment of a Labour government in 1972 and the end of the Vietnam commitment, Australia still remained aligned with the West but became a slightly less dependable U.S. ally. Upon the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War in 1980, Australia refused to participate in naval exercises with the United States and the United Kingdom in the Arabian Sea. In the 1980s,

Australia reestablished itself as a preeminent middle power in world affairs. It would not employ its forces in a foreign conflict if other world powers could handle the situation themselves. Australia responded well to President Ronald Reagan's administration and Prime Minister Robert James Hawke (1983–1991), unlike his Labour predecessor Prime Minister Edward Gough Whitlam (1973–1975), reemphasized Australia's partnership with the United States.

As the Cold War waned, Australia began to reexamine its alliances. In 1985 when New Zealand protested the harboring of American naval vessels that carried nuclear weapons or were nuclear-powered, Hawke supported America's position. In August 1986, the United States and Australia agreed to suspend New Zealand from ANZUS. Although the importance of ANZUS had diminished, the American-Australian relationship remained strong.

Upon the end of the Cold War, Australia developed a tripartite strategy designed to realign itself with the new world order. Australia's objectives were to create a stable and secure region in which to live, to continue to fulfill its treaty obligations to the United States and New Zealand, and to develop a military force capable of independent defense of the country and its international interests.

Ronald B. Frankum Jr.

See also

ANZUS Pact; Hawke, Robert; Holt, Harold Edward; Korean War; Menzies, Robert Gordon; New Zealand; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Vietnam War; Whitlam, Edward Gough

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Austria

Central European state comprising 32,377 square miles, making it slightly larger than the U.S. state of South Carolina. Austria is bordered by Germany and the Czech Republic to the north, Slovakia and Hungary to the east, Italy and Slovenia to the south, and Switzerland to the west. As with Germany, at the end of World War II Austria found itself between East and West. While

Germany was divided into two states during the Cold War, Austria, a nation of some 7 million people in 1946, remained intact. Through cautious diplomacy, the renewed Republic of Austria managed to establish itself between the two blocs of the Cold War, beholden to neither side. Nevertheless, the Austrian position was precarious.

In 1938, through the infamous Anschluss, Germany had annexed Austria. Austrian soldiers fought with the German Army, the Austrian economy contributed significantly to the German war effort, and Austria's population had offered little resistance to German occupation. There were, therefore, solid reasons for treating Austria as a defeated nation at war's end.

Early Anglo-American plans called for Austrian war reparations and marked the country for dismemberment. By 1943, however, fears of Soviet expansion changed those plans. In the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, the Allies committed themselves to the reestablishment of an independent Austria. Reparations would be allowed under a complicated formula, but the Allies now agreed that Austria had been the "first victim" of Hitler's aggression and should be treated accordingly.

Austria's restoration proved difficult. The Soviets treated Austria as a conquered nation, although they had no plans to annex it. Upon entering Austria, Soviet soldiers raped and looted with impunity, while Soviet officials concentrated on extracting as much industrial production and wealth as possible from the country. In April 1945 Soviet forces installed Karl Renner, a prewar advocate of Austro-Marxism, as head of an interim government. With no representatives in Austria, the Allies suspected Renner of being a Soviet puppet and refused to recognize the government. Meanwhile, the Soviets pressed Renner to legitimize their plundering of Austrian economic resources, in accordance with their interpretation of the Moscow Declaration. Renner's government resisted, invoking the Allies' interest.

This delicate balancing act became the hallmark of Austrian statecraft during the Cold War. Continued Soviet pressure for reparations—they demanded a sum of $250 million at the Allied Potsdam Conference in July and August 1945—brought an increasing Westward tilt, however. Free elections held in November 1945 returned a solid democratic majority. The conservative People's Party captured almost 50 percent of the vote while the Social Democrats took about 45 percent, leaving the Austrian communists with just over 5 percent.

With the avenue to power apparently closed to the Austrian communists, the United States began to fear that Austria would be the target of a preemptive, external communist takeover. Austria was therefore singled out by President Harry S. Truman's administration as a priority aid recipient in the 1947 European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan). Although the Soviets tried to block Marshall Plan payments to Austria, the country nonetheless received some $1.5 billion in aid from the United States.

When communist-led strikes in Austria coincided with the invasion of South Korea during the summer of 1950, the United States agreed to secretly arm Austria as a preventive measure. The Soviets were in any case covertly arming their own adherents in Austria in similar fashion. The result was a

stalemate in Austria's full reconstitution plan through 1952, as each side suspected the other of attempting to draw Austria into its sphere of influence.

The death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in March 1953, however, opened a new chapter in Austrian history. The Soviet Union's new collective leadership formulated a more flexible foreign policy known as peaceful coexistence, wherein Austria emerged as a test case. Soviet policy now advocated the creation of a neutral, independent Austrian state as a means of preventing it from joining the Western bloc. The United States initially resisted the idea but eventually embraced it on the conditions that neutrality not be linked to demilitarization and that the Austrian settlement not be linked to a German settlement.

This position, after nearly two years of complex negotiations, came to form the basis of the Austrian State Treaty. As part of their peace offensive, the Soviets agreed to accept greatly reduced reparations payments. Signed on 15 May 1955, the treaty established Austria as an independent state with the understanding that it would remain neutral. The Austrian parliament duly passed a measure on 26 October 1955—one day after the last Allied soldier left Austrian territory—making permanent neutrality part of the constitution.

For most of the Cold War, Austria remained inconspicuous and prosperous while scrupulously maintaining its neutrality.

Austria's moment in the spotlight faded as quickly as peaceful coexistence. For most of the Cold War, Austria remained inconspicuous and prosperous while scrupulously maintaining its neutrality. Its location between East and West, together with its official neutrality, made it a convenient meeting spot for spies and diplomats. Vienna, the Austrian capital, hosted a summit meeting between Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President John F. Kennedy in June 1961, and the United Nations opened a third International Center in Vienna in 1980.

Austria's domestic politics were carefully balanced between the Social Democrats and the conservative People's Party, but economically and culturally Austria clearly leaned to the West. When Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, Hungary, to suppress the 1956 revolution there, Austria opened its borders to some 150,000 refugees, much to the displeasure of the Soviet Union. Not coincidentally, it was also the opening of the Austro-Hungarian border on 2 May 1989 that signaled the beginning of the end of the Cold War. The Republic of Austria subsequently joined the European Union and became a member in the Partners for Peace program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1995 but is not a full-fledged member of NATO.

Although it never quite served as the bridge between East and West that the founders of the Second Republic envisioned, Austria prospered as a tourist destination and a symbol of mutual cooperation between East and West.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Austrian State Treaty; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Renner, Karl; Stalin, Josef

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Austrian State Treaty
(15 May 1955)

Formal treaty establishing the Second Austrian Republic as an independent state. Despite Austria's participation on the German side during World War II, the Allies decided at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 to treat Austria as a liberated nation and not a defeated one when the war was over. It took more than a decade, however, to decide exactly what that meant. During that period, Austria remained divided and occupied among the four victorious Allied powers.

Although the Soviets demanded war reparations from Austria, they never considered Austria to be a necessary part of their postwar sphere of influence. The other Allies, on the other hand—and the United States and Britain in particular—viewed Austria's geopolitical position as an essential outpost in the Cold War. They accordingly made massive financial and military investments in the state during the decade of occupation. The Austrian government, led by Dr. Karl Renner and Leopold Figl, carefully and cleverly played upon the East-West divide to gain independence in return for a promise of neutrality in 1955.

The Austrian State Treaty, signed at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna on 15 May 1955, was one of the great achievements of Cold War diplomacy. It resolved a decade-old political and economic standoff among the Austrians, Soviets, and the remaining Allies through a series of resourceful compromises and demonstrated that peaceful coexistence between the Soviets and the West was indeed possible.

It was at the initiative of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that the Austrian State Treaty took form. Once West German forces were incorporated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Khrushchev saw little point in haggling over a divided Austria and instructed his foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, to settle the issue for good. Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab was therefore invited to Moscow on 24 March 1955 to discuss the terms of independence.

Britain and the United States, however, feared that the Austrians would be lured or pressured into becoming a Soviet satellite or that a pending settlement in Austria would be used to draw the Germans out of NATO. But the Soviets were more interested in keeping Austria out of NATO and made generous concessions in return for an Austrian promise of armed neutrality. Without waiving reparations entirely, the USSR accepted a staggered payment schedule of $150 million, a ten-year agreement for oil deliveries from Austria, and a lump sum for the return of Austrian shipping installations.

Western diplomats made few changes to the Austro-Soviet proposal but convinced the Austrians to sign secret agreements protecting Western oil companies prior to the conclusion of the treaty. At the last minute, Figl maneuvered the Allied powers into deleting a clause holding Austria partly responsible for World War II. The treaty thus enshrined the myth of Austrian victimization that would persist until the 1986 Waldheim Affair forced a reexamination of Austria's past. It did not, however, necessarily enshrine Austrian neutrality, nor did the Allied powers guarantee it. Instead, on 26 October 1955, one day after the last Allied soldier left Austrian soil, the Austrian parliament passed a law making permanent neutrality a part of the constitution of the Second Republic.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Austria; Figl, Leopold; Khrushchev, Nikita; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Raab, Julius; Renner, Karl; Waldheim Affair

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Ayub Khan, Muhammad
(1907–1974)

Military leader, Pakistani defense minister (1954–1956), and president of Pakistan (1958–1969). Born on 14 May 1907 in Rehana, Hazara District, India, Muhammad Ayub Khan attended the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in Britain and was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1928. During World War II he saw action in the British Army.

Upon Indian independence and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Ayub Khan assumed command of military forces in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) with the rank of brigadier general. In January 1951 he was appointed commander in chief of the Pakistani Army. During 1954–1956 he served as minister of defense and as such was a key player in Pakistan's decision to join the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliances.

After a military coup overthrew the government, the junta declared martial law on 7 October 1958, and Ayub Khan was appointed president. His regime was acceptable to many Pakistanis because it brought a degree of internal stability after years of unrest that followed the partitioning of India. In February 1960 he won a popular referendum as president.

On 8 June 1962, Ayub Khan lifted martial law. A new constitution was also drawn up, giving the executive vast powers. Having instituted an electoral presidential form of government, Ayub Khan continued in office. In the 1965 presidential elections he handily secured victory amid charges of rigged voting. Ongoing tensions with India over the contested Kashmir region led to war between India and Pakistan during 5 August–22 September 1965. Ayub Khan then negotiated with India and agreed to the January 1966 Tashkent Declaration, which many Pakistanis saw as a sellout to India.

Ayub Khan then implemented a new security and diplomatic arrangement dubbed the "triangular tightrope," which consisted of a delicate balancing act with China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. By 1968, public discontent with limited civil liberties had begun to threaten Ayub Khan's hold on power. In March 1969, as public opposition to his regime mounted, he resigned the presidency. He proclaimed martial law and designated General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan its administrator. Ayub Khan died on 19 April 1974 in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also

India; India, Armed Forces; India-Pakistan Wars; Pakistan; Pakistan, Armed Forces; Rahman, Mujibur; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad

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Azerbaijan

Soviet-controlled republic that gained its independence upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Located in eastern Transcaucasia, Azerbaijan borders Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, and the Caspian Sea and had a 1945 population of approximately 3.3 million people. With a land mass of 33,436 square miles, it is roughly the size of the U.S. state of Maine. Frequently invaded and divided among stronger powers, Azerbaijan's position as a frontier region has resulted in the development of a unique national identity, incorporating various influences—most notably the enduring historical legacies from the Turkic and Iranian worlds—as reflected in its language, religion, and culture. Throughout the Cold War, however, it was the Soviet Union that had the most powerful impact on Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan's role in the Cold War was the result, in part, of its geostrategic position on the southern frontier of the Soviet Union, bordering Turkey and Iran. The large oil deposits in Azerbaijan were also a key strategic interest. During World War II, the Soviets and British occupied Iran. Azerbaijan was



Road to Baku and oil rigs, Azerbaijan, 1957. (Yevgeny Khaldei/Corbis)

an important transit point and communications center for Soviet involvement in Iran.

Despite pledges to withdraw from Iran at the end of the war, Soviet leader Josef Stalin supported the creation of a puppet state in Iranian Azerbaijan as well as one in Iranian Kurdistan. The Soviet Azerbaijani leadership in Baku, with the encouragement of the central authorities in Moscow, undertook a propaganda campaign, portraying Iranian Azerbaijan as lost territory that eventually would be reunited with Soviet Azerbaijan. Soviet Azerbaijani Communist Party officials and security personnel were dispatched to Iranian Azerbaijan to help set up the new pro-Soviet government. The presence of large oil deposits in northern Iran also drew Soviet attention to the area.

Continued Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan as well as Stalin's demands against Turkey and his involvement in the Greek Civil War became important factors in the U.S. decision to announce the 1947 Truman Doctrine, designed to aid countries struggling against communist aggression. As a result of Western pressure and the Soviets' own political calculations, Soviet forces withdrew from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1947, which was soon reoccupied by Iranian forces and reintegrated into the Iranian state.

With the end of the Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan, this chapter of its history closed, and Soviet Azerbaijan underwent critical political, economic, and social changes, along with the rest of the USSR. The republic was ruled for twenty years (1933–1953) by Mir Jafar Bagirov. He was removed upon Stalin's death in 1953 and subsequently tried and executed in 1956.

During Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev's reign, the most prominent Azerbaijani figure was Haidar Aliev, a former Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) general who rose to the position of first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party and eventually to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Aliev ruled Azerbaijan until 1982 and was intimately involved in all aspects of official life in the republic, especially in his native province of Nakhichevan. In general, there was little opposition to Soviet rule during the Brezhnev years. When Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the CPSU in 1985, he embarked upon an ambitious program of renovating Soviet society and the economy through his glasnost and perestroika reform programs, which were slow to reach Azerbaijan and did not, initially, have a great impact on the republic.

That situation changed abruptly in February 1988 when the local legislature of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, populated mainly by Armenians but administratively attached to Azerbaijan, voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia. Moscow and Baku condemned this move, and shortly thereafter a pogrom against Armenians living in the Azerbaijani industrial city of Sumgait took place. For several days, mobs hunted down and

killed Armenians until Soviet police reestablished order. This event led to a crescendo of violence in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing hundreds of thousands of people from both republics.

Beginning in the autumn of 1989, the nationalist opposition organization, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), put increasing pressure on the communist leadership in Azerbaijan to effectively deal with both the Nagorno-Karabakh question and the other major problems facing the country. In September 1989, the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan declared the country sovereign, a move that was rejected by Moscow that November. At the same time, important developments were taking place in the southern part of the country, along Azerbaijan's border with Iran. Demonstrators moved into the restricted border zone and tore down the border posts along the Aras River. They were protesting their separation from Iranian Azerbaijan and were demanding greater access to family members in neighboring Iran.

Azerbaijani intellectuals began comparing the division of their country to the division of Germany and Korea. In January 1990, while disturbances continued along the border with Iran, the large Armenian minority in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku and in other cities and towns became the target of organized violence. The unrest led to many deaths and injuries and to the emergency evacuation of the remaining Armenian population to safe havens in other parts of the Soviet Union. The APF declared its intent to overthrow communist rule in the country, resulting in Soviet armed intervention. Although Gorbachev claimed that the intervention was in response to pogroms against Armenians, violence against the Armenians had ended days earlier. Soviet armed forces assaulted Baku, shooting indiscriminately and in the process killing and wounding hundreds of innocent civilians. They also moved into other parts of Azerbaijan and took control of the southern border with Iran.

Moscow declared martial law, removed the Azerbaijani Communist Party chief, and cracked down on the opposition. These actions, however, served only to further exacerbate relations between Azerbaijan and Moscow. In May 1990, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet elected the communist leader Ayaz Mutalibov as president. Despite these changes, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh continued, with no immediate end in sight.

In August 1991, during the failed coup against Gorbachev, Mutalibov initially supported the plotters but then quickly reversed his opinion when it became clear that the coup would fail. He promptly arranged to have himself elected president in September 1991 and then moved the country toward independence, which the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet had declared in the midst of the coup. Independence was formally secured when the Soviet Union was dissolved on 31 December 1991.

Robert Owen Krikorian

See also

Armenia; Brezhnev, Leonid; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Nagorno-Karabakh; Perestroika; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Truman Doctrine

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B

Baker, James Addison, III
(1930–)

U.S. politician, influential Republican advisor, secretary of the treasury, and secretary of state. Born on 28 April 1930 in Houston, Texas, to a wealthy local family, James Baker III studied classics at Princeton University, graduating in 1952. After two years in the U.S. Marine Corps, he went on to earn a law degree from the University of Texas at Austin in 1957. That same year he began his law career with a corporate law firm in Houston, where he practiced until 1975.

Baker first entered politics in 1970, working for George H. W. Bush's U.S. senatorial campaign—a contest that Bush did not win. Beginning in 1975, Baker spent a year as undersecretary of commerce in President Gerald Ford's administration. Baker then managed Ford's unsuccessful 1976 presidential campaign. After managing Bush's unsuccessful bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980, Baker became a senior advisor to President Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign after Bush withdrew from the race.

From 1981 until 1985, Baker served as White House chief of staff. In 1984, he successfully engineered Reagan's reelection campaign. Reagan subsequently appointed him secretary of the treasury in 1985. In 1988, Baker managed Vice President Bush's presidential campaign and was rewarded by being appointed secretary of state in 1989. In that role, Baker helped reorient U.S. foreign policy as the Cold War ended. He was involved in negotiations that led to the reunification of Germany and the dismantling of the Soviet Union. He also presided over negotiations before and after the Persian Gulf War. In 1992, Bush named Baker White House chief of staff and manager of his reelection campaign, which Bush lost.

After leaving government service in 1993, Baker joined the Houston-based law firm of Baker Botts and become

A prominent Republican strategist, James Baker III served as chief of staff and secretary of the treasury under President Ronald Reagan and as secretary of state under President George H. W. Bush. (U.S. Department of State)

senior counselor to The Carlyle Group, a corporate banking firm in Washington, D.C. In 2000, he served as President-elect George W. Bush's transition advisor during the controversial Florida ballot recount. Beginning in March 2006 Baker cochaired, along with Democrat Lee Hamilton, the ten-person bipartisan Iraq Study Group, charged with recommending changes to deal with the deteriorating situation in the Iraq War. The group presented its report to President George W. Bush and Congress in early December 2006.

John David Rausch Jr.

See also

Bush, George Herbert Walker; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Malta Meeting, Bush and Gorbachev; Persian Gulf War; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio
(1906–2002)

President of the Dominican Republic during 1960–1962, 1966–1978, and 1986–1996. Born on 1 September 1906 in Navarrete, Dominican Republic, Joaquín Balaguer Ricart earned a law degree from the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo in 1929. A prominent government official during the dictatorship of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, Balaguer held positions in both the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Foreign Relations. He ascended to the presidency in 1960 upon the resignation from that office of Trujillo's brother, Héctor, who bowed to U.S. pressure for democratization in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution in Cuba.

After Rafael Trujillo's assassination on 30 May 1961, Balaguer began a reluctant transition to democracy in the Dominican Republic. He was known for his strong support of U.S. Cold War policies. Following political unrest in early 1962, however, he was forced to resign and went into exile in the United States.

In April 1965, a leftist-inspired insurrection in the Dominican Republic, led by Francisco Caamaño Deñó, threatened U.S. foreign policy interests in the Caribbean. To forestall a potential "second Cuba," President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered 22,000 Marines to intervene. In June 1966, Balaguer won election to the presidency, a process supervised by the Organization of American States (OAS). Balaguer governed until 1978, when he lost a reelection bid to Antonio Guzmán Fernández. Balaguer returned to office in 1986 and left again in 1996.

As president, Balaguer relied more on persuasion than force. He maintained order and stability and simultaneously protected American interests

in the Dominican Republic. Although he had an insatiable appetite for power and often resorted to undemocratic practices, unlike many of his contemporaries he did not use public office to enrich himself. As the leader of the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC), Balaguer played a prominent role in Dominican politics until his death in Santo Domingo on 14 July 2002.

Michael R. Hall

See also

Bosch Gaviño, Juan; Dominican Republic; Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Organization of American States; Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas

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Though frail and blind, Joaquín Balaguer Ricart of the Social Christian Reformist Party returned as the president of the Dominican Republic in 1986, at age seventy-nine, and served until 1996. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Ball, George Wildman
(1909–1994)

Prominent Democratic Party operative, diplomat, and presidential advisor. Born on 21 December 1909 in Des Moines, Iowa, George Ball attended Northwestern University, where he received a BA degree in 1930 and a law degree in 1933. Following law school, he alternated between the private sector and government service. During 1942–1944 he served in the Lend-Lease Administration, and in 1944 he was appointed director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in London. Throughout his life, Ball maintained a keen interest in foreign affairs, and he wrote prolifically on foreign policy issues.

Following World War II, Ball became a founding partner of a Washington, D.C., law firm and became active in the Democratic Party. From 1961 to 1966, he was undersecretary of state, served as the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations (UN), and became a close advisor to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson on matters ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis to European integration.

Ball is well remembered as one of the lone voices among Johnson's foreign policy advisors who argued against the escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1965. Ball served briefly as U.S. ambassador to the UN in 1968. He

returned to civilian life and became a senior partner at Lehman Brothers Investors until he retired in 1982. Nonetheless, he remained a respected elder statesman in foreign policy circles. He was highly critical of President Richard M. Nixon's handling of the Vietnam War. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter sought Ball's advice on the revolution in Iran. Ball died in New York City on 26 May 1994.

Brent M. Geary

See also

Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Cuban Missile Crisis; European Integration Movement; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Vietnam War

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Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

Network of three radars designed to provide advanced warning of a ballistic missile attack. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) is operated by the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) for the air defense of Alaska, Canada, and the continental United States. Although NORAD deploys various warning systems, the BMEWS is the northernmost. The U.S. Air Force had sought such a system from 1955, but the impetus for its construction came in the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in August 1957.

Construction on the first site, at Thule, Greenland, began in 1958, and the site became operational in 1960. The two other sites are at Clear, Alaska, and Flyingdales Moor, Yorkshire, England. BMEWS was made possible by electronics advances. BMEWS employs large football field–size radars that can detect a missile at a distance of 3,000 miles. The detection system consists of a combination transmitter-receiver sending out extremely brief bursts of energy many times per second in narrow fans of radio frequency energy. An ICBM passing through the fans reflects energy back to the station, allowing the plotting of coordinates and tracking of the missile to include calculations as to point and time of impact. Estimated warning time under BMEWS for an ICBM launched against the United States via a polar route is approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.

Obviously, the BMEWS sites would be a priority target in a nuclear war. They are also considered highly vulnerable to a nuclear air burst and its resulting electromagnetic pulse emissions. In addition, BMEWS protects only against missiles coming at North America from the north and cannot detect ICBMs approaching from the south. The growing sophistication of infrared

satellites offered a number of advantages over BMEWS for the detection of ICBMs.

In addition to BMEWS and satellites, early warning systems include aircraft radar planes, picket ships, and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line of radars. All are linked by a communications network terminating in the NORAD Combat Operations Center at Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Distant Early Warning Line; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic

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Ballistic Missiles

See Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic

Bandaranaike, Sirimavo (1916–2000)

Sri Lankan political leader and prime minister (1960–1965, 1970–1977, 1994–2000). Born Sirimavo Ratwatte on 17 April 1916 in Ratnapura in southern Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Sirimavo Bandaranaike was the oldest of six children of a wealthy landowning family. A Buddhist, she was educated by Roman Catholic nuns at St. Bridget's convent in Colombo. In October 1940, she was given away in an arranged marriage to Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, seventeen years her senior. An Oxford-educated attorney, he founded the Sri Lankan Freedom Party in 1951, the year Ceylon was granted its independence.

Sirimavo Bandaranaike was suddenly thrust into political leadership when her husband, then prime minister, was assassinated by a Buddhist monk in September 1959. Known as the "weeping widow" by her opponents and critics, she nevertheless proved both skillful and determined as a politician.

When Bandarnaike led her husband's party to general election victory, she became the world's first woman prime minister on 21 July 1960 and pledged to continue her husband's socialist policies. A woman of fierce determination, she rode the tide of nationalism throughout her first two terms in office (1960–1965 and 1970–1977). She emphasized Buddhist and Sinhalese national policies and promoted a new constitution in 1972. She also introduced many social reforms and proclaimed Ceylon a republic. Under her

Sirimavo Bandaranaike was prime minister of Sri Lanka three times. When she first assumed that office in 1960, she was the first woman in modern history to lead a nation. (Embassy of Sri Lanka)

leadership, the state's name was also changed from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, meaning "resplendent island."

Although Bandaranaike took strong steps to control economic problems and ideological differences during her second term, she nonetheless failed to address ethnic unrest. In 1973 her government was almost toppled by a left-wing insurgency that was repressed only with the aid of foreign neighbors. She was defeated in 1977 elections and in 1980 was stripped of her civil rights and expelled from parliament for alleged abuse of power. In 1994 her daughter Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected president, and Bandaranaike again became prime minister, although in a largely ceremonial capacity.

Bandaranaike held office until health problems forced her to resign in August 2000. She died in Colombo on 10 October 2000.

Gary Kerley

See also

Sri Lanka

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Bandung Conference
(18–24 April 1955)

Meeting of twenty-nine Asian and African nations held in Bandung, Indonesia, during 18–24 April 1955. The end of World War II fostered increased nationalist fervor in the developing world, which sought liberation from the Western colonial powers. In December 1954, Burma, Ceylon (from 1972 Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan jointly proposed an Asian-African conference aimed at fostering unity among Asian and African peoples and dialogue addressing nationalist sentiments.

The Bandung Conference included the People's Republic of China (PRC), the government of which was eager to augment its status in the third world. Led by Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, the PRC's delegation would play an important role in reinforcing China's ties with Asia and Africa. On the second day of the conference, Zhou advocated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which outlined the PRC's foreign policy blueprint. The five principles called for the respect of national sovereignty and terri-

torial integrity, nonaggression, nonintervention in internal affairs, equal and mutual opportunity, and peaceful coexistence. Zhou specifically indicted the United States for hindering peaceful coexistence, citing America's "aggressive" actions in the ongoing Taiwan Strait Crisis. His principles were well received, and they successfully cemented Chinese leadership in the developing world.

The conference concluded on 24 April 1955 with a ten-point declaration on the promotion of world peace and cooperation, which was adopted by all participants. The declaration advocated closer political, economic, and cultural ties among the signatories, mutual opposition to imperialism and colonialism, and the promotion of world peace and friendship. These tenets, collectively known as the Bandung Spirit, helped guide politics in the developing world for many years.

The Bandung Conference also eased tensions in the Taiwan Strait. On 23 April 1955, Zhou declared that the PRC was prepared to discuss Asian matters with the United States, including resolution of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. To show its good faith, the PRC stopped shelling the contested offshore islands, which effectively ended the crisis in late April 1955. This led ultimately to the Sino-Ambassadorial Talks, first convened in Warsaw, Poland, on 1 August 1955, that provided the first direct channel for Sino-American communications since the PRC's birth in October 1949.

The five principles called for the respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, nonintervention in internal affairs, equal and mutual opportunity, and peaceful coexistence.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Africa; China, People's Republic of; East Asia; Non-Aligned Movement; Southeast Asia; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Zhou Enlai

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Bangladesh

Southeast Asian nation on the northern coast of the Bay of Bengal, surrounded on all sides by India with the exception of a small common border with Myanmar (Burma) to the southeast. In 1945, Bangladesh had a population of 14 million people. It is a new nation with an old history. The sultanate of Bangala (Bengal) was a wealthy area of the Indian subcontinent for centuries prior to the time it was annexed by the Moghul Empire in 1576. The area remained prosperous as a crossroads of trade and culture under the Moghuls. During 1703–1765, in the years after the decline of the Moghuls

and before Britain consolidated its control in India, Bangladesh enjoyed nominal independence.

From 1765 until 1947, Britain controlled the region. The British presence altered the agricultural and social structure of the province and exacerbated Hindu-Muslim tensions, as the Hindus participated in British educational and cultural opportunities while the Muslims steadfastly resisted English influence, sometimes violently. With the end of World War II, the new Labour government of Britain promised to grant independence to India. In Bengal, Muslim-Hindu conflict was so intense that Britain partitioned the subcontinent into two states—one Hindu and the other Muslim. Upon the 1947 partitioning, millions of refugees fled to both India and Pakistan.

During 1947–1971, East Bengal was part of Muslim-dominated Pakistan. More than 1,000 miles of Indian territory separated Pakistan's major cash crop, jute, from its processing and shipping facilities in the Hindu city of Kolkata. West Pakistan lacked economic ties to East Pakistan, and the western government ignored eastern needs. Such adversity sparked Benghal nationalism, especially when the western government banned Bangla in favor of Urdu as the nation's language. The controversy over language soon developed into a demand for self-government, and the nationalist Awami League (AL) won the 1971 national elections in East Pakistan. The government of Pakistan refused to open the national assembly, causing riots and strikes followed by rebellion.

On 26 March 1971 the People's Republic of Bangladesh declared independence. Pakistan dispatched troops to reverse the secession, resulting in a bloody nine-month war. At the same time, Pakistan attacked India, forcing it to side openly with Bangladesh. Pakistan finally recognized Bangladesh's independence on 24 February 1974.

Bangladesh's first two decades as an independent nation were plagued by martial law, coups, assassinations, social instability, and economic chaos. The first leader of independent Bangladesh was Sheikh Mujib, a founder of the AL. He was assassinated on 15 August 1975. In 1979 Bangladesh experimented with democracy and elected President Zia (Ziaur Rahman), who established cordial ties with the West and the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Zia was assassinated on 30 May 1981, and the country returned to military rule until 1991, when a combination of the AL and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) forced the resignation of General Hossain Mohammad Ershad. On 17 February 1991 Begum Khaleda Zia, widow of the assassinated Zia, was elected prime minister under a parliamentary system. This change did not bring increased political stability, because the BNP and the AL continued their bitter—and often violent—rivalry.

By 1991, Bangladesh had the greatest population density of any country in the world. Bangladesh is 86.5 percent Muslim and 12.2 percent Hindu with a tiny minority of Buddhists and Christians. One of world's poorest nations, its tribal peoples subsist mostly in the country's southeastern hill region. In 1995 approximately half its population was in poverty, with half of these in extreme poverty. In 2000 Bangladesh ranked 132nd of 192 states in the world in quality of life factors such as nutrition, education, life expectancy, hous-

ing, security, and health and sanitation. Its perennial poverty has been largely the result of overpopulation, insufficient natural resources and arable land, lack of educational opportunities, poor government, and an undiversified economy. Regular natural calamities, mainly in the form of flooding monsoonal rains and typhoons, have only added to the nation's deprivation.

Bangladesh has experienced difficulties with three countries: Pakistan, Myanmar, and India. It has established fairly stable relations with Pakistan since 1976 but has experienced two decades of conflict with Myanmar because of Myanmar's treatment of its Muslim minority, most of whom were forcefully expelled in the early 1990s. In 2003, talks with Myanmar eased tension somewhat and produced tentative plans to establish trade and transportation links. Tensions have persisted with India, with Indian rebels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts using Bangladeshi bases in their campaign for autonomy. That crisis has recently abated, but territorial disputes with India persist, and security forces clashed several times into April 2003. Bangladesh played no appreciable role in the Cold War, as the superpowers focused their sights on areas of geostrategic importance and ideological battlegrounds.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Burma; India; India-Pakistan Wars; Pakistan; Zia ul Haq, Muhammad

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Barre, Mohammed Siyad
(1919?–1995)

Founder of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party and Somali dictator from 1969 to 1991. Mohammed Siyad Barre was born around 1919 to nomadic parents, probably in what was then Italian Somaliland. He joined the Somali police force in 1941, achieving the rank of chief inspector in 1950, the highest rank attainable for a Somali. In 1952, he joined the army and attended the Military Academy in Italy. By 1960, Barre was a colonel and second-in-command of the Somali Army; in 1964 he became commander in chief and in 1966 attained the rank of major general.

Seizing power in 1969, Barre established ties with the Soviet Union and founded the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party in 1976. In 1977, however, he broke relations with Moscow because of Soviet displeasure with his invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and soon began to court the United States. Washington provided modest economic and military aid to Barre's regime, but his iron-fisted rule and deplorable human rights record prevented a closer relationship between the two nations.

Mohammed Siyad Barre, Marxist dictator of Somalia during 1969–1991. (Corbis/Kevin Fleming)

The United States kept its distance as opposition to Barre's regime increased, exacerbated by the brutality of his rule, the failed Ogaden campaign, government corruption, clan rivalries, and economic crises. By 1988 the nation was plunged into a bloody civil war. The war raged on as starvation and mass killings increased. With no external support and with opposition forces closing in, Barre fled the country in January 1991. Further chaos ensued as the nation was riven by brutal warfare among its chief warlords. In 1992, the United Nations mounted a multination relief effort to Somalia, which ultimately backfired when U.S. forces came under attack and soldiers were killed in the Somali capital. In 1993, President Bill Clinton pulled U.S. forces out of Somalia, and the nation has struggled under on-again, off-again civil war ever since. Barre died in exile in Lagos, Nigeria, on 2 January 1995.

Donna R. Jackson

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Ogaden War; Somalia

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Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio
(1901–1973)

Authoritarian Cuban president (1940–1944, 1952–1958). Born in Banes, Cuba, on 16 January 1901, Fulgencio Batista joined the army in 1921, eventually becoming a military stenographer. He first emerged on the national scene during the 1933 revolution that deposed the Gerardo Machado dictatorship. During the short-lived Ramón Grau San Martín government (September–January 1934), Batista was the military strongman behind the scenes and was ultimately responsible for the collapse of the Grau government.

Batista was the power behind the throne during a series of puppet governments during 1934–1940. In 1940 he was elected president, and his four-year term was noted for its progressive social reforms, links with the Communist Party, and support for the Allied side in World War II. Batista provided the United States with access to naval and air bases and sold to it nearly all of Cuba's sugar production.

Batista was succeeded by another democratically elected leader, Ramon Grau San Martín, the man he had helped overthrow in January 1934. The increasing corruption of the Grau government and its successor facilitated Batista's return to power in 1952. In March 1952, Batista and elements of the army seized power. The new regime suspended the constitution and declared its loyalty to the United States. Batista now backed away from his earlier reformism and consolidated the anticommunist measures introduced by his predecessors. In the mid-1950s, with support from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Batista established a repressive anticommunist political police force.

Rapid successes in anti-Batista movements, especially among middle-class students and including Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement, led to Batista's fall at the end of 1958. On 1 January 1959, he fled Cuba for the Dominican Republic as Castro's forces closed in on Havana. Batista died on 6 August 1973 in Estoril, Portugal.

Barry Carr

See also
Castro, Fidel; Cuba

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Baudouin, King of Belgium
(1930–1993)

King of Belgium from 1951 to 1993. Born on 7 September 1930 in Kasteel Stuyvenberg, Laeken, Belgium, to King Leopold III and Queen Astrid (formerly Princess Astrid of Sweden), Baudoin Albert Charles Leopold Axel Marie Gustave was educated both privately and at the Collège of Geneva. Following the May 1940 German invasion of Belgium, King Leopold III surrendered the army in violation of pledges made to Britain and France. He also refused to follow his ministers into exile, and during the long German occupation the royal family lived at the royal castle in Laeken. Not popular with his people because of presumed pro-German sympathies and autocratic ways, Leopold compounded the situation by marrying a commoner in 1941 (his first wife had died in an automobile accident). Leopold was removed to Germany in 1944 but, because of his unpopularity, did not return to Belgium and instead took up residence in Switzerland after the war until 1950, when a national referendum allowed him to resume the throne.

Because of continued unpopularity, Leopold formally decided in August 1950 to delegate his powers to his son, who formally became king on 17 July 1951. In 1960 Baudouin married Dona Fabiola de Mora y Aragón of Spain.

Baudouin was king of Belgium from 1951 until his death in 1993. Deeply committed to Catholicism and social justice, he served as an important unifying factor during the often difficult times that marked his reign. (Belgian Embassy)

Although one of the most reclusive of European monarchs, Baudouin remained popular with the Belgian population as a unifying force in an often fractious county. He was also deeply committed to the Catholic religion and to social justice, which was reflected in many policy decisions during his long reign. In March 1990, Baudouin stepped down from the throne for two days to protest parliament's passage of pro-choice abortion legislation, which he steadfastly refused to sign. Even though the monarch's signature was a mere formality, this was the first time that a Belgian monarch had ever refused to sign a parliamentary bill. His ethical views also led him to ease the process for immigrants to become citizens and to fight to stamp out the sex trade in Belgium.

Baudouin's reign was also marked by a number of other key internal and external developments. The most crucial decision in foreign affairs was granting independence to the Belgian Congo in 1960. Internal developments included the transition from a unitary to a federal governmental structure.

Baudouin has been credited with unifying a state riven by ethnic and linguistic factions. Among his other key legacies were the establishment of a charitable organization, the King Baudouin Foundation, and the King Baudouin Prize for International Development to reward organizations and individuals working to ameliorate inequities between developed and developing nations. Baudouin died on 31 July 1993 in the Villa Astrida in Motril, Spain, and was succeeded by his brother, King Albert II.

Bethany Barratt

See also

Belgium; Leopold III, King of Belgium

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Bay of Pigs
(17 April 1961)

An unsuccessful 1961 invasion of Cuba led by Cuban exiles, covertly supported by the U.S. government. Trained since May 1960 in Guatemala by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the approval of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and supplied with arms by the U.S. government, the rebels of Brigade 2506, as they were called, intended to foment an insurrection in Cuba

Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961

and overthrow the communist regime of Fidel Castro, who had deposed the U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959.

Planning for the ill-fated operation began during the last days of the Eisenhower administration in 1960. President Eisenhower had soured on Castro after the latter nationalized a number of Cuban companies and began leaning toward the Soviet orbit of influence. There were also rumors of Cuban involvement in attempts to invade Panama, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. In 1960, the United States turned down Castro's request for economic aid and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. After the American rejection, Castro met with Soviet Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoyan to secure a $100 million loan from the Soviet Union. U.S. policymakers thus decided that Castro was becoming too close to the Soviets and should be overthrown.

In the spring of 1960, President Eisenhower approved a covert operation to send small groups of American-trained Cuban exiles to work in the Cuban underground as insurgents to overthrow Castro. By the fall, the plan, now called Operation PLUTO, had evolved into a full-fledged invasion by exiled Cubans and included U.S. air support. The invasion forces deployed to Guatemala to train for the operation.

When President John F. Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, he could have called off the invasion but chose not to do so. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower's handling of the Cuban situation and so did not find it politically expedient to back down from

Cuban artillery fires on CIA-trained Cuban rebels as they assault a beachhead in Cuba, 17 April 1961. (Bettmann/Corbis)

the invasion. Kennedy was also anxious to prove his hawkish stance toward the Soviets during a period of heightened Cold War tensions. But the new president was not well served by the CIA or its director, Allen W. Dulles, whom he inherited from the Eisenhower administration. Despite evidence that Kennedy was leery about the Bay of Pigs operation, the CIA built a convincing case in support of it that was later determined to be highly suspect. The agency grossly underestimated the effectiveness of Castro's forces and overplayed the extent to which Cubans would rally behind the invasion force.

On 17 April 1961, an armed force of approximately 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the southern coast of Cuba, although the invasion had technically commenced two days earlier when American B-26 medium bombers with Cuban markings bombed four Cuban airfields. On 17 April, the assault began at 2 A.M. when a team of frogmen went ashore with orders to set up landing lights to guide the main landing force. Between 2:30 and 3:00 A.M., two battalions of exiles armed with American weapons came ashore at Playa Giron while another battalion landed at Playa Largas. They hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to attack Havana. Cuban forces reacted quickly, and Castro ordered his air force to halt the invaders. Cuban aircraft promptly sank the invading force command-and-control ship and another supply vessel carrying an additional battalion. Two other ships loaded with supplies, weapons, and heavy equipment foundered just offshore. In the air, Cuban T-33 jets shot down ten of the twelve slow-moving B-26 bombers that were supporting the invaders. President Kennedy, on the recommendation of Sec-

retary of State Dean Rusk and other advisors, decided against providing the faltering invasion with official U.S. air support.

Lacking supplies or effective air cover, the invaders were hammered by Cuban artillery and tank fire. Within seventy-two hours, the invading force had been pushed back to its landing area at Playa Giron, where the troops were soon surrounded by Castro's forces. A total of 114 exiles were killed, while the remainder of the invasion force either escaped into the countryside or was taken captive. In all, 1,189 captured exiles were tried in televised trials and sentenced to prison.

Cuban exile leader José Miro Cardona, president of the U.S.-backed National Revolutionary Council, blamed the failure on the CIA and Kennedy's refusal to authorize air support for the invasion. In December 1962, Castro released 1,113 captured rebels in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine raised by private donations in the United States.

The Bay of Pigs invasion provoked anti-American demonstrations throughout Latin America and Europe and further embittered U.S.-Cuban relations. The poorly planned and executed invasion greatly embarrassed President Kennedy and subjected him to heavy criticism at home. More important, it led directly to increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the invasion, Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev exchanged messages regarding the events in Cuba. Khrushchev accused America of being complicit in the invasion and warned Kennedy that the Soviets would help defend Cuba if necessary. Kennedy replied with an equally strong warning against any Soviet involvement in Cuba. Although the crisis quickly passed, it set the stage for increased Soviet military aid to Cuba, which led ultimately to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

The poorly planned and executed invasion greatly embarrassed President Kennedy and subjected him to heavy criticism at home.

The failure of the invasion led to the resignation of Dulles and opened the way for closer scrutiny of U.S. intelligence gathering. Some historians have speculated that the aborted operation made the White House highly suspicious of the intelligence community and therefore more willing to question the experts, contributing to Kennedy's successful handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis that followed.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Anti-Americanism; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich

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Beatles

Arguably the most successful rock-and-roll group in history and a major influence on popular culture of the 1960s. The musical origins of the Beatles were rooted in working-class Liverpool in the 1950s, which as a major Atlantic seaport offered a fast and cheap conduit for records by pioneering American rock-and-roll artists such as Bill Haley, Chuck Berry, and Elvis Presley. Among the local teenagers who eagerly devoured this new and exciting sound were John Winston Lennon and James Paul McCartney, who met in 1957 and were soon collaborating in writing and performing rock music. Their partnership eventually expanded into a foursome with the addition of George Harrison and Richard Starkey (Ringo Starr) under the keen management of Liverpool businessman Brian Epstein. The band eventually signed a recording contract with EMI's Parlophone label under the direction of George Martin, who subsequently became their producer.

The Beatles' first original recording, *Love Me Do,* was released on 5 October 1962, and the group's premier album, *Please Please Me,* was released in March 1963. The Beatles quickly achieved mass acclaim in Britain, and this success was transformed into international stardom on 9 February 1964 when they performed live in the United States for the first time on *The Ed Sullivan Show* television program. For the next six years, the Beatles were considered the vanguard of the so-called British invasion of the American music charts. The teenage hysteria that accompanied their every public engagement, appropriately named Beatlemania, puzzled the older generation, who had grown up on bland pop music and earlier swing music.

For the next six years, the Beatles were considered the vanguard of the so-called "British invasion" of the American music charts.

Stylistically the band went through two stages. Until 1966 it churned out catchy but largely anodyne boy-meets-girl love songs such as "She Loves You" and "I Want to Hold Your Hand," while the Beatles' reputation was that of a cheeky but essentially harmless group of scamps. The more sophisticated orchestrations of their album *Revolver* portended a shift in mood, however, and this was solidified in 1967 by the revolutionary conceptual work *Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band,* which signaled the Beatles' emergence as a major player in the youth-oriented anti–Vietnam War and counterculture movements. Epstein's 1967 death and increasing friction among the band members took their toll, however, and after five more studio albums they split up, somewhat acrimoniously, in 1970.

Each former member went on to a solo recording career, but hopes for an eventual reunion ended on 8 December 1980 when Lennon was gunned down in New York City by a deranged fan. Harrison died in 2001 of cancer. To this day, the Beatles have career accomplishments unparalleled by any other musical group. In the United States alone they boasted twenty singles and nineteen albums that reached the top of the Billboard charts.

Alan Allport

See also
Music; Vietnam War Protests

English rock and roll sensations the Beatles—John Lennon, George Harrison, Paul McCartney, and Ringo Starr (*foreground*)—wave to several hundred screaming fans before climbing aboard their airplane and leaving Miami, 21 February 1964. (Bettmann/Corbis)

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Beatrix, Queen of the Netherlands (1938–)

Born on 31 January 1938 in Palace Soestdijk in Baarn, the first daughter of Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard zu Lippe-Biesterfeld, Beatrix Wilhelmina Armgard passed her early childhood in Canada with her mother and sister as a World War II refugee. She graduated with a degree in law from Leyden University in the Netherlands in 1961.

In March 1966 Beatrix wed Claus-George von Amsberg, a minor German prince and diplomat. Claus's German heritage and questionable activities in

Nazi Germany caused considerable public unrest. Following the birth of their son, Prince Willem-Alexander, in 1967, popular distaste for the monarchy diminished, and Claus was accepted—if not embraced—as a member of the royal household.

On 30 April 1980, Beatrix was crowned queen amid violent protests by squatters angry over a shortage of housing. As queen, Beatrix has demonstrated no small amount of leftist sympathies. In 1982 she visited the United States and warned Congress not to ignore the dismay of the Dutch people over the deployment of additional nuclear missiles in the Netherlands. A year later, U.S. presidential candidate Jesse Jackson revealed that Beatrix had expressed to him her aversion to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Double Track decision.

Beatrix has exerted considerably more influence over Dutch politics than did Juliana. She has won the favor of her people through conscientious hard work and her reputation as "the smiling queen." Beatrix has also earned renown as a firm supporter of the European Integration Movement.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Double-Track Decision, NATO; European Integration Movement; Faber, Mient Jan; Netherlands; Peace Movements

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Begin, Menachem
(1913–1992)

Commander of the pre-1948 Zionist militia Etzel, Israeli prime minister, Nobel Peace Price recipient. Born in Brest-Litovsk, Poland, on 16 August 1913, Menachem Begin attended Warsaw University, where he received a law degree in 1935. An ardent Zionist, he became active in the Revisionist Zionist Movement of Jabotinski, in both Eastern Europe and then Palestine. Begin was involved in the East European resistance effort against the German occupation and helped various Zionist groups infiltrate British-controlled Palestine. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, he joined the Polish Army, was posted to the Middle East, and wound up in Palestine.

He assumed command of Etzel in 1943, directing operations against the British occupation of Palestine.

During the battles that led to the establishment of Israel in 1948, Begin's militancy resulted in conflict with mainstream Zionists headed by David Ben-Gurion. Begin and his partisans established the Herut Party in 1948 to foster the Revisionist Zionist program for a Greater Israel that included territories east of the Jordan River. Herut was later broadened to include other political sentiments opposed to Ben-Gurion's Labour Zionism. The Herut Party was renamed the Likud Party in 1973.

Part of a National Unity government in the mid-1960s, the Likud Party won a majority of seats in the Knesset (parliament) elections of 1977 and formed a government with Begin as prime minister the same year. As prime minister, Begin actively promoted immigration to Israel, particularly from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and sought to move the Israeli economy away from the centralized, command-style policies of the Labour Party. Begin's six-year tenure as prime minister was marked by a number of important events. In addition to his economic restructuring agenda, he pursued a vigorous foreign policy.

Begin's foreign policy achievements began in 1977 when he participated in the groundbreaking Camp David peace talks with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, sponsored by President Jimmy Carter. The talks led ultimately to the 1978 Camp David Accords, followed by a formal Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, signed in 1979, that ended thirty years of war between the two nations. Begin and Sadat shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for their work toward the Camp David Accords.

Menachem Begin was a militant Zionist guerrilla who ultimately became the prime minister of Israel and a peacemaker. He is best remembered for his part in the Camp David Peace Accords (1978), which brought peace between Egypt and Israel. (Israel Government Press Office/Sa'ar Ya'acov)

Despite his peace overtures, Begin did not hesitate to exercise Israeli military force when he believed it necessary for national security. In 1981, he ordered an air attack against an Iraqi nuclear power plant near Osirak that destroyed the facility. He also ordered the Israeli military to retaliate against Palestinian terrorist attacks. The latter effort included sending Israeli forces into Lebanon in 1977 and 1982. The death of his wife Aliza and his own declining health prompted Begin to retire in September 1983 to his home in Yafeh Nof, near Jerusalem. He died in Tel Aviv on 9 March 1992.

Daniel E. Spector

See also

Camp David Accords; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Egypt; Israel; Sadat, Anwar

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Beijing Meeting
(21–27 February 1972)

Summit meeting in Beijing, China, during 21–27 February 1972 between U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and People's Republic of China (PRC) leader Mao Zedong. This important meeting ended more than twenty years' of Sino-American confrontation and opened the way toward the normalization of relations between the two nations. The establishment of the PRC in October 1949 had deepened the Cold War in East Asia. At that time Mao announced to the world that he would adopt the lean-to-one-side policy, which signaled his alliance with the Soviet bloc. The United States responded with its nonrecognition policy and by refusing to allow the PRC to be seated in the United Nations (UN). This deep divide was greatly exacerbated by the Korean War, in which American forces directly battled PRC forces when China intervened in the war. The two Taiwan Strait crises and the Vietnam War also hindered Sino-American relations throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

By the late 1960s, however, both nations understood the need to reconcile their differences and normalize their relationship. America's ongoing quagmire in Vietnam prompted Nixon to reduce his country's global military commitments. Thus, détente with the communist bloc, promulgated in the Nixon Doctrine, was deemed the most effective means by which to reduce military costs and to preserve world peace. The PRC's border disputes with the Soviet Union, which resulted in armed confrontation in March 1969, rendered it a potentially new and ready American ally that U.S. policymakers hoped might counter Soviet influence in Asia. The PRC in turn was eager to improve Sino-American relations to diminish its isolation after the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution.

Shortly after Nixon's 1968 election, the PRC proposed resumption of the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, which had begun in 1955 but were suspended during Mao's Cultural Revolution. The desire of both nations to achieve rapprochement helped pave the way for Nixon's visit to Beijing. Throughout 1970, working with the assistance of Pakistan and Romania, the PRC and the United States secretly opened a dialogue on issues of common interest, so as to set a mutually acceptable agenda for future discussion. In December 1970, both sides agreed to a high-level meeting in Beijing between their leaders.

On 6 April 1971, the PRC invited an American table tennis team to play exhibition matches in China in what came to be called ping-pong diplomacy. On 27 April 1971, the PRC signaled that it was ready to receive Nixon's special envoy to prepare for the forthcoming summit. Nixon responded by promising to visit Beijing to resolve contentious issues such as Taiwan and



President Richard Nixon meets with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong during his historic 1972 China trip. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Vietnam. U.S. National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon's envoy, made a clandestine visit to Beijing in early July 1971 to discuss with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai Nixon's pending visit. On 15 July, Nixon announced publicly that he would make a historic trip to Beijing, the first high-level visit since 1949.

On 21 February 1972, Nixon, accompanied by Kissinger, arrived in Beijing, where he received a warm welcome by Mao and Zhou. Their seven-day meeting covered a number of issues, in particular Taiwan and Vietnam. On 27 February 1972, upon the meeting's conclusion, both sides issued a joint communiqué in Shanghai stating that it was in the best interest of all nations to normalize the Sino-American relationship, it was mutually desirable to reduce military conflicts, and it was mutually desirable that neither country seek further hegemony in Asia. On the Taiwan issue, the communiqué restated Sino-American differences, suggesting that this might remain a stumbling block to full Sino-American reconciliation. The meeting was

nonetheless a triumph for both sides, as it marked a true breakthrough in Sino-American relations.

After the Beijing meeting, both sides redoubled their efforts to establish a formal and full diplomatic relationship. Kissinger subsequently visited China with some frequency, resulting in the creation of liaison offices in Beijing and Washington in 1973. In February 1978, the PRC's new leader, Deng Xiaoping, visited Washington and announced that China was willing to peacefully resolve the Taiwan question. On 1 March 1978, the United States accorded full diplomatic status to the PRC; it also abandoned its nonadmission policy by supporting the PRC's seating in the UN Security Council.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Deng Xiaoping; Mao Zedong; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nixon Doctrine; Zhou Enlai

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Belarus

Former Soviet republic that declared its independence on 25 August 1991. A landlocked state, Belarus (Belorussia) is bordered by Russia to the north and east, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the southwest, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. It comprises 80,154 square miles and had a 1945 population of approximately 8.9 million people.

Throughout history, the position of Belarus as a borderland region has resulted in numerous incursions and shifting borders as well as the development of a rich cultural heritage. During the Soviet period, several variations of the country's name were used, the most common being Belorussia or the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. The nation's name was officially changed to Belarus upon independence.

The country's geostrategic location on the western border of the Soviet Union helped define the role of Belarus during the Cold War. The most important aspects of Belarusian history relevant to the Cold War period include its position as a battleground of empires and ideas and its long and close association with the Germanic, Slavic, and Baltic worlds. During the 1917 Russian Revolutions and the ensuing civil war, the Belarusians attempted to establish an independent state but were ultimately defeated by the Bolsheviks. Belarusian lands were thus divided between the newly established Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Poland in the early 1920s. The political, economic, and social upheavals of the revolutionary era in

Belarus were followed by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's brutal forced collectivization of agriculture and extensive purges of the local Communist Party, which led to further population losses, especially among the educated elite of Belarusian society.

In September 1939, in the wake of the German invasion of Poland and in accordance with the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, Stalin moved Soviet forces into eastern Poland, which was largely inhabited by Belarusians and Ukrainians. This situation only lasted until June 1941, when German forces invaded the USSR and occupied Belorussia. For much of the war, the country was turned into a battleground as Soviet partisans fought the Germans and their local allies. By the time Belorussia was reoccupied by the Soviets in 1944, the country had been almost completely devastated, and its population was significantly reduced, including the extermination of the large Jewish minority during the Holocaust. The reunification of the two parts of Belorussia under Soviet rule in 1939 was made permanent at the end of World War II, when the Western Allies acquiesced to Stalin's plan to move Poland's border with Germany significantly westward to compensate for the loss of western Ukraine and western Belorussia.

Once Soviet rule had been reestablished in Belorussia, Stalin instituted widespread purges and mass deportations against various strata of society, especially against those elements deemed "unreliable" by the Communist Party. To help compensate for the resultant population losses, the Soviets resettled large numbers of ethnic Russians and initiated a Russification program throughout Belorussia, especially in the capital, Minsk. This program met with resistance on the part of some intellectuals and students, many of whom were arrested and sentenced to prison terms in the gulags.

Belorussia played an important role in the early stages of the Cold War, as Stalin attempted to ensure a large Soviet presence at the newly created United Nations (UN) in the late 1940s. Despite Western refusal to allow each of the Soviet Socialist Republics to have individual representation in the UN, Soviet Belorussia, as well as Soviet Ukraine, received separate seats in the General Assembly. However, Soviet Belorusian diplomats were completely subordinated to the policies laid down by the central Soviet leadership in Moscow.

Throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s, Belorussia underwent extensive reconstruction as well as broad social, political, and economic changes. Shifting borders, enormous loss of life, and extensive wartime destruction of both the industrial and agricultural infrastructures created difficult living conditions in the countryside as well as in the major cities. Nevertheless, by the 1960s Belorussia had begun to recover economically, and living standards were on the rise.

A woman welds beams at the site of a tractor factory in Belarus, 9 May 1947. The factory construction was part of the post-war Five-Year Plan. (Bettmann/Corbis)

By the 1970s, Belarusian political, social, and economic life mirrored trends elsewhere in the Soviet Union as people suffered from the limitations of Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev's Era of Stagnation. This difficult but relatively stable situation continued well into the 1980s, until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985.

A major catalyst for change in Belorussia was the April 1986 nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in northern Ukraine, near the border with Belorussia, with Belorussia bearing the brunt of the radioactive fallout. The immediate impact of Chernobyl was the irradiation of large parts of the surrounding area and its population, creating a human and environmental tragedy of unprecedented proportions in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's failure to respond immediately to Chernobyl drew heightened attention to the failings of the Soviet system and led to increased calls in Belorussia for reform, including a petition sent by intellectuals in December 1986 criticizing the policies of the government in the cultural sphere.

As Gorbachev's reform policies of glasnost and perestroika developed and as people in the Soviet Union, including Belarusians, became less inhibited in discussing the issues confronting Soviet society, a nascent democratic movement called the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) was formed in June 1988. The BPF led the drive for reform and helped galvanize the population around the issue of Stalinist crimes in Belorussia. In June 1988, mass graves were uncovered at Kuropaty, near Minsk, that contained the remains of hundreds of thousands of Stalin's victims. In June 1990, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet adopted a Declaration of State Sovereignty, following the earlier Russian example.

Despite this upsurge in democratic activism, the majority of the Belarusian population did not appear to be interested in politics. The Belarusian Communist Party won more than 85 percent of the seats in the March 1990 Supreme Soviet election, with several seats remaining vacant because of lack of voter interest. Caution regarding reform was confirmed a year later during the March 1991 all-Union referendum on the future of the USSR, when 83 percent of the Belarusian population voted to remain a part of the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter a series of strikes took place, with strikers calling for economic reform as well as the liberalization of political life in the republic.

The abortive August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev acted as a catalyst for political change in Belarus, just as in the other republics of the Soviet Union. On 25 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet declared independence and officially changed the name of the republic from the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Republic of Belarus. The head of the Supreme Soviet, Stanislaw Shushkyevich, along with the leaders of Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk Agreement in December 1991, formally establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and making the independence of Belarus complete.

Robert Owen Krikorian

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Chernobyl; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gulags; Perestroika; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Territorial Changes after World War II

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Belgium

The West European nation of Belgium is bordered to the northwest by the North Sea, to the west and southwest by France, to the southeast by Luxembourg, to the east by Germany, and to the north by the Netherlands. Belgium has an area of 11,783 square miles and had a 1945 population of about 8.5 million people. This population was divided into roughly 5 million Flemings, 3.5 million French-speaking Walloons, and 60,000 Germans. Belgium has been independent since 1830 and, with its close trading links to Britain, was the first country on the European continent to industrialize. Belgium was long known for family-owned enterprises and strong financial institutions.

Belgium emerged from World War II in a much stronger position than its neighbors. Fighting in Belgium was more fluid than elsewhere, and most of the cities and the countryside escaped extensive damage. The port of Antwerp became a major Allied base in the closing months of the war.

Belgium did not escape political turmoil, however. King Leopold III had concluded an armistice with the Germans on 28 May 1940 after only a brief stand and in violation of pledges given to Britain and France after those nations had come to Belgium's assistance. Leopold also chose not to accompany his ministers into exile in London and remained in Belgium. A popular decision at the time with many Belgians, it nonetheless created a constitutional problem. Many Belgians came to suspect Leopold of pro-German sympathies, and he further angered many Belgians by remarrying in wartime and choosing a commoner.

The German occupiers removed Leopold to Germany in June 1944, and when the country was liberated that fall his brother, Prince Charles, Count of Flanders, became regent. There was strong socialist opposition to a restoration of the monarchy, and it was not until a March 1950 referendum gave Leopold a 58 percent favorable vote that he actually attempted to regain his throne. His return precipitated both massive demonstrations and a political crisis, causing him to relinquish control of affairs to his son, Baudouin, and abdicate altogether in 1951. Baudouin was king until his death in 1993.

The same major parties that had predominated before the war continued afterward. The conservative Christian Social Party (PSC; Flemish name Christian People's Party) drew its greatest support from the Flemings. The

socialists represented the working classes and unions and were strong in Wallonia. The Liberal Party (called the Party of Liberty and Progress after 1961) was strong among the middle class, especially in Brussels, and favored economic liberalism and anticlericalism.

There was little disagreement over postwar foreign policy. Belgium abandoned its pre–World War II neutrality and embraced the 1948 Brussels defense pact with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Britain, and France that was the forerunner of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Belgium also joined. Belgium was also a leader in the European unification movement. It had agreed to economic union with Luxembourg in 1922, and in 1949 Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands agreed to a customs union. In February 1959 the three states signed the Benelux Treaty, which went into effect the next year and provided for the free movement of labor, capital, and trade among the three states. Belgium was also a driving force behind the European economic unification movement that led to the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community and the 1958 European Economic Community. Belgian socialist politician Paul Henri Spaak (foreign minister during 1936–1939, 1947–1949, 1954–1957, and 1961–1966 and premier during 1938–1939, 1946, and 1947–1949) is rightly regarded as one of the fathers of European integration.

In the years immediately after the war, Belgium's African colonies of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi remained calm with little agitation for independence. Belgium had long exploited the raw materials–rich Congo, especially the copper deposits of Katanga province. However, the colony was among the worst-administered of any in Africa. The native population received only limited technical training, and there had been no preparation for independence. There were few native university graduates, doctors, or trained administrators. The calm in Congo was shattered by riots in the capital of Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in December 1959, prompted in large part by the French grant of independence for the neighboring French Congo (Congo-Brazzaville). In January 1960 King Baudouin announced his intention to end colonial rule, leading to Congolese independence in June 1960. Immediately thereafter, the Congo lapsed into a bloody civil war. Belgium dispatched troops to protect its national interests, but these were withdrawn following the arrival of peacekeeping forces mandated by the United Nations (UN). Several years of fighting over the secession of Katanga followed. In 1962 the UN voted to end the Belgian trusteeship over Ruanda-Urundi, established after World War I. This action led to the independent states of Rwanda and Burundi.

The major issue in Belgium during the Cold War era was the linguistics quarrel between Flemings, speaking a dialect of Dutch, and Walloons, who spoke French. After independence in 1830, the Walloons initially dominated both politically and culturally. Following World War I, however, the more rural Flemings of northern and western Belgium began challenging Fleming ascendancy, and both French and Flemish were made official languages for administrative purposes in their respective regions, with the capital city of Brussels to be bilingual.

In the 1960s the Flemish movement, seeking the Dutchification of Flanders, again intensified. Disturbances that year reflected economic as

well as linguistic dissatisfaction. The Walloons lived in the part of the country experiencing the most economic problems, especially with the depletion of the coal mines in southern Belgium. The steel industry was also outdated. New industry tended to locate in the Flemish areas, especially around Antwerp, in part because of better transportation facilities.

The focus of the controversy became the University of Louvain (Leuven) in Flanders. Flemings had long wanted this university exclusively theirs. The issue was settled only by its division into separate Flemish and Walloon institutions. Mostly French-speaking Brussels also figured in the agitation. Many Flemings resented the fact that the national capital remained a Walloon enclave inside Flemish territory.

The linguistic division cut across party lines. In general, Flemings supported the Christian Socialists, while Walloons favored the Socialists and Liberals. By the late 1960s, dual ministers were in place for such areas as education, culture, and the economy. Finally, in 1980 a limited degree of regional autonomy took effect, with each half of Belgium securing its own regional assembly and executives. A federal structure rooted itself with three socioeconomic regions in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels. Constitutional revisions in 1991 and 1994 confirmed this structure, granting the regions limited rights to levy taxes.

Another contentious issue was the political cleavage in Belgium between Catholics and non-Catholics that centered on school financing. The issue was finally settled by a compromise whereby the state would add to teacher salaries in church-sponsored schools but would not subsidize building construction.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Baudouin, King of Belgium; Brussels Treaty; Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Congo Civil War; European Integration Movement; Spaak, Paul-Henri

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Benediktsson, Bjarni
(1908–1970)

Icelandic foreign minister and prime minister (1963–1970). Born on 30 August 1908, in Reykjavík, Iceland, Bjarni Benediksson studied law in Iceland, Denmark, and Germany. As a strong-willed nationalist, he shaped Iceland's foreign policy in the early Cold War and proved instrumental in securing

Iceland's founding membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He rose to prominence within the center-conservative Independence Party and from 1940 to 1947 served as the mayor of Reykjavík.

In 1941 the United States had taken on the protection of Iceland and at the end of World War II wished to continue its military presence there. Most Icelanders, however, longed for a complete return to neutrality. Benediktsson supported a delicate compromise, reached in 1946, that allowed a U.S. civilian firm to continue to operate the airfield at Keflavík, which was crucial for transatlantic air traffic, but disallowed troop deployments.

In 1947 Benediktsson became foreign minister. Although he knew that Icelanders would not tolerate the basing of U.S. troops on their soil, he also knew that the security of Iceland could only be safeguarded by an alliance with the United States. Toward the end of 1948, when it had become clear that Iceland might be invited into a Western defense pact, Benediktsson worked tirelessly toward that end. In March 1949 when Iceland's parliament agreed to join NATO, riots broke out. Protesters, led by pro-Soviet socialists, were particularly resentful toward Benediktsson.

In 1950, increased international tensions because of the Korean War convinced pro-Western Icelandic politicians that the country could no longer go without military protection. Benediktsson thus led negotiations that resulted in the return of U.S. troops in 1951. Ten years later, after having served in several other government posts, Benediktsson was elected chairman of the Independence Party and in 1963 became prime minister. During his tenure, Iceland enjoyed both political stability and economic prosperity.

On 10 July 1970, Prime Minister Benediktsson died in a house fire at Thingvellir National Park in Iceland along with his wife and young grandson. At the time of his death, Benediktsson was hailed for his leadership skills in both foreign and domestic policy.

Gudni Jóhannesson

See also

Iceland; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Beneš, Edvard
(1884–1948)

Czechoslovak politician, foreign minister (1918–1935), and president (1935–1938 and 1948). Born on 28 May 1884 in Kozlany, Bohemia, Edvard Beneš

studied at Charles University in Prague, the Sorbonne in Paris, and then the University of Dijon, where he earned a doctorate in law in 1908. He was appointed a professor of sociology at the University of Prague in 1912 and there became a protégé of Czech nationalist leader Tomáš G. Masaryk.

Beneš was appointed secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council in 1916. This council became the Czech Provisional Government in 1918. Beneš was named foreign minister of the new state of Czechoslovakia, a post he held until 1935. As foreign minister, he worked to strengthen ties with Romania and Yugoslavia, which with Czechoslovakia formed the so-called Little Entente. Beneš was also a tireless advocate of the League of Nations and served as the National Council's chairman five times. When Masaryk resigned as president of Czechoslovakia in December 1935, Beneš replaced him.

The one intractable problem that Beneš and his ministers could not resolve was that of the minorities, especially the Germans. The Nazi government of Germany pushed grievances into calls for annexation. Germany's absorption of the Sudetenland as a result of the September 1938 Munich Conference prompted Beneš to resign in October. He then went into exile in France.

One of the founders of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš worked to preserve the independence of his nation, both as its first foreign minister and then as its president. (Library of Congress)

In July 1940 Beneš became president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London. During the war he worked to preserve an independent Czechoslovakian state. Toward that end he worked to forge close ties with the Soviet Union, hoping that Czechoslovakia might be a bridge between East and West. In December 1943 Beneš concluded a twenty-year treaty of mutual friendship with the Soviets. In April 1945, a new Czechoslovak provisional government was established at Košice, in Czechoslovakia, with Beneš as temporary president.

Beneš was reelected president of Czechoslovakia in 1946. Following Communist Party gains in the December elections that year, he named communist leader Klement Gottwald to head a new coalition government. The Soviets were not content with an independent Czechoslovakia and in February 1948 staged a coup d'état. Embittered by the coup that he had been unable to prevent, heartbroken over the death under suspicious circumstances of his close friend Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk a month after the coup, and in declining health, Beneš resigned as president on 7 June 1948. He died in Sezimovo Ústi on 3 September 1948.

Michael D. Richards

See also

Czechoslovakia; Gottwald, Klement; Marshall Plan; Masaryk, Jan; Stalin, Josef

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Ben-Gurion, David
(1886–1973)

Zionist, defense minister, and prime minister of Israel (1948–1953, 1955–1963). Celebrated as Israel's "Father of the Nation," David Ben-Gurion was born David Gruen in Plonsk, Poland, on 16 October 1886. As a teenager he joined the Workers of Zion (Poalei Zion) while teaching in a Hebrew school in Warsaw. He believed that Zionism could be achieved by Jewish settlement in Palestine and by collective farming and industrialization of the land. Putting his beliefs into action, he moved to Jaffa, Palestine, in 1906 and established the first Jewish workers' commune there. He then began organizing other workers into unions. In 1910 he published his first article on Zionism under the name Ben-Gurion ("son of the lion" in Hebrew). He then moved to Jerusalem and joined the editorial staff of a Hebrew-language newspaper. In 1914 he earned a law degree from the University of Constantinople. He returned to Palestine to take up his union work but was expelled by the Ottomans, who still controlled Palestine, in 1915.



A devout Zionist and head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, David Ben-Gurion delivered Israel's Declaration of Independence and was Israel's first prime minister (1948–1953, 1955–1963). (USHMM)

Buoyed by the 1917 British Balfour Declaration that proposed a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Ben-Gurion organized a volunteer military unit to help the British drive the Ottomans out of the region. In 1920 he returned to union organizing. Indeed, he helped found the Histadrut, a powerful federation of Jewish labor unions. During 1921–1935 he served as Histadrut's general secretary. He worked closely with the British (who now controlled Palestine) as head of the Jewish Agency for Palestine during 1935–1948.

When it became clear after World War II that Britain was not sympathetic to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, Ben-Gurion pursued other avenues to Jewish statehood. He supported the 1947 United Nations (UN) partition plan that called for separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. In May 1948 the UN formally partitioned Palestine, and the State of Israel was born.

Ben-Gurion was concurrently prime minister and defense minister of the new nation. He immediately consol-

idated all defense organizations into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which enabled them to effectively fight both the Arab Palestinians and the surrounding Arab nations. As Israel's first prime minister, Ben-Gurion promoted and increased immigration, established government institutions, advocated compulsory primary education, and created new towns, cities, and settlements. Ben-Gurion retired from politics in 1953 only to return as prime minister and defense minister in 1955.

Ben-Gurion's second stint as head of state coincided with the disastrous 1956 Suez Crisis in which the IDF, working in consort with the French and British, moved into the Sinai Peninsula. Although the IDF performed admirably, the overall operation, by which the British and French planned to seize the Suez Canal, was a dismal failure in terms of international politics.

The last years of Ben-Gurion's premiership were marked by economic prosperity and stalled secret peace talks with the Arabs. He resigned his posts in June 1963 but retained his seat in the Knesset (parliament) until 1970. Ben-Gurion died in Tel Aviv–Yafo on 1 December 1973.

Richard Edwards

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Israel; Middle East; Suez Crisis

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Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich

(1899–1953)

Soviet commissar of internal affairs (1938–1941), general commissar of state security (1941–1953), and member of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's inner circle. Born on 29 March 1899 in the Russian province of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria as a teenager was attracted to Marxism and Vladimir Lenin's leadership. Beria joined the Bolsheviks in March 1917 and became involved in a series of revolutionary activities during which he gained both political and military experience. In 1919 he graduated from the Polytechnical Institute of Baku with a diploma in architecture.

Beria served in a wide range of positions in the Soviet and regional governments as well as in the Red Army during the 1920s. In 1934 his loyalty and talents were rewarded when he was named a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In the mid-1930s Stalin began his purges of the CPSU and military leadership. Genrikh Yagoda was Stalin's primary manager of the purges. Yagoda's excessive zeal and desire to please Stalin resulted in the trials and deaths of thousands, and by the end of the decade Soviet leadership ranks had been greatly depleted. Stalin replaced Yagoda with Beria in August 1938, and Yagoda subsequently disappeared. Beria corrected some of the abuses of the purges

Yagoda's excessive zeal and desire to please Stalin resulted in the trials and deaths of thousands.

As head of internal security in the Soviet Union from 1938 to 1953, Lavrenty Beria was one of the most dreaded and powerful figures in the Soviet Union. He lost influence after World War II and was executed in 1953 by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's successors. (Library of Congress)

and, in doing so, enhanced Stalin's public reputation. By March 1939 Beria had become a member of Stalin's innermost circle.

Beginning in 1938, Beria served Stalin as commissar of internal affairs, a post he held until 1941, and then as general commissar of state security from 1941 to 1953. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Beria further consolidated his powers and became responsible for Stalin's brutal scorched-earth policy as Soviet troops retreated in the face of the German onslaught. During World War II Beria also conducted a reign of terror within the Soviet Union in the name of national security. His distrustful nature was quickly transformed into paranoia, and he lacked even the slightest scintilla of mercy. During the last days of the war, Stalin's recognition of Beria's efficiency and loyalty was manifested when he was assigned to lead the Soviet Union's atomic bomb program.

As the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States became more entrenched, Beria drove his atomic scientists relentlessly for progress, and the first successful Soviet detonation of an atomic weapon occurred in August 1949. In addition to his leadership on the atomic bomb project, Beria reorganized the domestic and foreign intelligence services of the Soviet Union, assisted in creating a Soviet spy network in the United States and other Allied nations, and supported anti-imperialist activities in the developing world. The aging Stalin rewarded Beria by bringing him ever closer to the center of power.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, Georgy M. Malenkov named Beria deputy premier of the Soviet Union. Beria's tenure in that position was exceedingly brief, however. Other Soviet leaders saw him as a great threat and a distinct liability for any post-Stalinist government. Beria personally controlled an armed force of 1.5 million men equipped with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. In July 1953, on the orders of Nikita Khrushchev, Beria was arrested and accused of being a spy and an imperialist. He was neither but was secretly tried nevertheless. Found guilty, Beria was probably shot to death in his jail cell in Moscow on 23 December 1953.

William T. Walker

See also

Gromyko, Andrey; Khrushchev, Nikita; Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Berlin Blockade and Airlift
(1948–1949)

The first serious crisis of the Cold War precipitated by the Soviet Union's attempt to cut off access to West Berlin, which lay within Soviet-occupied eastern Germany. As part of the Potsdam Agreements, Germany and Berlin were divided into occupation zones by the victorious World War II Allies (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain), reaffirming principles laid out earlier at the Yalta Conference. Although the provisions of the agreement allocated occupation sectors of Berlin to the other three Allies, no formal arrangements had been made for access to Berlin via the Soviet zone.

After the war, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West began to deteriorate steadily, as demonstrated by disputes in the United Nations, Winston Churchill's March 1946 "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech), U.S. emphasis on Soviet containment, Soviet hostility toward the Marshall Plan, and a growing Western commitment to consolidate occupation zones in western Germany to form a single, independent state. The Soviets, who had been invaded by Germany twice in the first half of the twentieth century, were alarmed at the prospect of a reunited, independent Germany.

West Berlin from the start of the Cold War had been the best available escape route for East Germans fleeing Communism and Soviet control.

In late 1947, discussions on the fate of Germany broke down over Soviet charges that its former Allies were violating the Potsdam Agreements. After the decision of the Western powers to introduce a new currency in their zones, on 20 March 1948 the Soviets withdrew from the Four-Power Allied Control Council, which controlled Berlin. Ten days later, guards on the eastern German border began slowing the entry of Western troop trains bound for Berlin. On 7 June, the Western powers announced their intention to proceed with the creation of a West German state. On 15 June, the Soviets declared the Autobahn entering Berlin from West Germany closed for repairs. Three days later all road traffic from the west was halted, and on 21 June barge traffic was prohibited from entering the city. On 24 June, the Soviets stopped all surface traffic between West Germany and Berlin, arguing that if Germany were to be partitioned, Berlin could no longer be the German capital.

Located 110 miles inside the Soviet occupation zone, West Berlin from the start of the Cold War had been a Western outpost deep within the communist bloc, a hotbed of intelligence operations by both sides, and the best

Berliners watch a U.S. Douglas C-54 transport land at Tempelhof Airport during the Berlin Airlift, a massive transfer of essential supplies into Berlin by the Western Allies during the Soviet-imposed Berlin Blockade, 1948–1949. (Library of Congress)

available escape route for East Germans fleeing communism and Soviet control. U.S. President Harry Truman was convinced that abandoning Berlin would jeopardize control of all of Germany. He further believed that the Soviets were determined to push the Western powers out of Berlin, thereby discrediting repeated American assurances to its allies and the rest of Europe that it would not allow Berlin to fall.

A military response to the blockade was initially considered but rejected, as the Western powers lacked the manpower to counter the massive Red Army's numerical and strategic advantage. Thus the United States, working with its European allies, undertook to supply West Berlin via air corridors left open to them in a postwar agreement. The Berlin Airlift began on 24 June 1948 and continued uninterrupted for the next 324 days. Western fliers, under the leadership of U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay, made a total of 272,000 flights into West Berlin, delivering thousands of tons of supplies every day.

The airlift was at first meant to be a short-term measure, as Allied officials did not believe that the airlift could support the whole of Berlin for any length of time. The situation in the summer and fall of 1948 became very

Berlin Airlift, 1948 – 1949



tense as Soviet planes buzzed U.S. transport planes in the air corridors over East Germany, but the Allies only increased their efforts to resupply the German city once it became apparent that no resolution was in sight. The Soviets never attempted to shoot down any of the Western aircraft involved in the airlift, no doubt because such a provocation might well result in war.

Hundreds of aircraft were used to fly in a wide variety of cargo items, including more than 1.5 million tons of coal. By the fall, the airlift, called by the Americans "Operation VITTLES," was transporting an average of 5,000 tons of supplies a day. At the height of the operation on 16 April 1949, an aircraft landed in Berlin every minute around the clock.

The airlift was an international effort; airplanes were supplied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, but there were also flight crews from Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. The three main Berlin airfields involved in the effort were Tempelhof in the American sector, Gatow in the British zone, and Tegel in the French sector. The British even landed seaplanes on the Havel River.

The airlift gained widespread public and international admiration, and on 12 May 1949 the Soviets, concluding that the blockade had failed, reopened the borders in return for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, perhaps believing that they could have some influence on the Western Allies' proposed plans for the future of Germany. Even though the Soviets lifted the blockade in May, the airlift did not end until 30 September because the allies sought to build up sufficient amounts of reserve supplies in

West Berlin in case the Soviets blockaded it again. In all, the United States, Britain, and France flew 278,118 flights transporting more than 2.3 million short tons of cargo. Thirty-one Americans and thirty-nine British citizens, most of them military personnel, died in the airlift.

In the end, the blockade was not only completely ineffective but also backfired on the Soviets in other ways. The blockade provoked genuine fears of the Soviets in the West and introduced even greater tension into the Cold War. Instead of preventing an independent West Germany, it actually accelerated Allied plans to set up the state. It also hastened the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an American-West European military alliance.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Containment Policy; Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II; Germany, Federal Republic of; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; "Sinews of Peace" Speech; Soviet Union; Truman, Harry S.; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Berlin Crises
(1958–1961)

Continual disagreement over the control of Berlin between the Soviet bloc and the Western Allies had begun in earnest in the late 1940s, culminating in the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949). Then, following a period of relative—if tense—calm, renewed Cold War tensions transformed the city into one of the world's potential flash points during 1958–1961.

With Soviet prestige dramatically boosted by the launch of *Sputnik 1* in 1957, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to revive the issue of Berlin. On 10 November 1958, he sought to end the joint-occupation agreement in the city by demanding that Great Britain, France, and the United States withdraw their 10,000 troops from West Berlin. He also declared that the Soviet Union would unilaterally transfer its occupation authority in Berlin to the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) if a peace treaty were not signed with both East and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) within six months. West Berlin would then become a free city. Khrushchev

couched his demands by portraying West Berlin's proposed free-city status as a concession because it lay in East German territory and therefore properly belonged to the GDR. None of the Western powers, however, formally recognized East Germany, viewing it as a mere subsidiary of the Soviet Union.

The United States flatly rejected Khrushchev's demands, although other Western powers initially tried to meet some of the Soviet leader's demands by proposing an interim Berlin agreement that placed a limit on Western forces and curtailed some propagandistic West Berlin activities, such as radio broadcasts that targeted East German audiences. These Allied proposals would have given the Soviets and East Germans some measure of power in West Berlin, a concession that many West Berliners viewed as a highly dangerous step toward neutralization and, ultimately, abandonment. In December 1958, the Allies issued a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declaration rejecting Soviet demands and insisting that no state had the right to withdraw unilaterally from an international agreement.

Khrushchev gradually retreated from his hard-line stance on Berlin. American U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union indicated that the West had an accurate count of the comparatively small number of Soviet nuclear missiles, and the Soviet leader obviously feared starting a war that he could not win. The Soviets now envisioned a gradual crowding out of the Western powers without bloodshed. In the meantime, the economic situation in East Germany continued to deteriorate, with vast numbers of refugees continuing to flee to the West.

In 1961, the newly elected U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, abandoned the demand for German unification that had been part of the U.S. policy since the 1940s. His foreign policy team had drawn the conclusion that such a policy was not only impractical but might actually provoke a U.S.-Soviet war. Kennedy and his advisors decided that only three interests were worth the risk of nuclear war: the continued Allied presence in West Berlin, Allied access to West Berlin by land and by air, and the continued autonomous freedom of West Berlin. Realizing that a rather inconsequential event and a sequence of mutually threatening and unnecessary mobilizations had led to World War I in 1914, Kennedy worried constantly that a relatively minor incident in Germany could escalate into World War III.

Meanwhile, GDR leader Walter Ulbricht decided to close the East Berlin borders in an attempt to exercise control over all traffic to and from Berlin, including Allied military as well as German civilian travelers. On 13 August 1961, East German authorities began the construction of the Berlin Wall, essentially sealing off East Berlin from West Berlin and permanently bifurcating the city. Ulbricht sought to control not only what went into East Berlin but also what came out as well, including thousands of East Germans who sought refuge in West Berlin. The Soviets and the East Germans had wagered that the West would not react to the construction of the Wall. Kennedy, in accordance with his policy, offered little resistance. Emboldened, Ulbricht began to take further measures to assert control over Berlin.

Ten days after closing the border, the GDR allowed tourists, diplomats, and Western military personnel to enter East Berlin only via the crossing

Soviet and American tanks face off at the tense Friedrichstrasse checkpoint on the East-West Berlin border, 28 October 1961. Seventeen hours after the confrontation began the two sides disengaged, ending the crisis. (Bettmann/Corbis)

point at Berlin Friedrichstrasse. The only other two checkpoints into East Germany were Helmstedt at the West German–East German border and Dreilinden at the West Berlin–East Germany border. According to the military's phonetic alphabet, the Helmstedt checkpoint became Alpha, Dreilinden was nicknamed Checkpoint Bravo, and the checkpoint at Friedrichstrasse was famously dubbed Charlie. Checkpoint Charlie would soon become one of the best-known symbols of the Cold War.

At all of the East German checkpoints tourists were fully screened, but the postwar occupation agreement prevented East German authorities from checking any members of the Allied military forces. On 22 October 1961 Allan Lightner, chief of the U.S. Mission in Berlin, attempted to pass through Checkpoint Charlie to attend the opera in East Berlin. East German police stopped Lightner and asked him for identification. Lightner, following long-standing instructions, stated that he was a member of the U.S. occupation authority as shown by his U.S. Mission license plate and that he therefore did not have to provide identification. The East German police refused to let Lightner pass. General Lucius D. Clay, the hero of the Berlin Airlift and now President Kennedy's personal representative in West Berlin, immediately dispatched a squad of U.S. soldiers to the site. With that, Lightner's car went through the checkpoint, backed up, and went through it again and again to make the point that U.S. officials were going to move freely. Although Kennedy was reluctant to precipitate a crisis over a somewhat trivial affair, Clay nonetheless ordered tanks to the checkpoint, while the Soviet military brought in its own tanks to oppose them on the other side.

The 1961 Checkpoint Charlie incident thus proved that the Soviets, not the East Germans, were actually in charge of East Germany. The photos of American and Soviet tanks facing each other at the checkpoint on 25 October became one of the most memorable images of the Cold War. The confrontation boosted the morale of West Berliners because it clearly showed that the Allies, particularly the United States, would not yield to East German or Soviet pressure tactics. It also unmasked the charade of an independent and autonomous GDR that could deal on an equal basis with the Western powers.

Caryn E. Neumann

See also

Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II; Germany, Federal Republic of; Kennedy,

John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; North Atlantic Treaty; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union; Ulbricht, Walter

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Berlin Wall
(13 August 1961–9 November 1989)

Barrier first erected in August 1961 by the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) that walled off access to West Berlin from GDR-controlled East Berlin. Officially known in East Germany as the "Antifascist Bulwark," the Berlin Wall was constructed to stop the flood of East German citizens seeking asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). *Republikflucht* (flight from the Republic) created tremendous economic strains.

Most of the people fleeing the GDR were young skilled workers. Between 1949 when the GDR was created and 1952 when the border was sealed off everywhere but in Berlin, almost 200,000 people left for West Germany each year. After the East Berlin Uprising in 1953, the number of refugees doubled—more than 400,000 people left the GDR that year. Although flight from the GDR dropped to normal levels again for 1954, a mild economic crisis in 1956 led to another longer rise in numbers.

Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) that controlled the GDR, proposed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that the border in Berlin be sealed in early 1961. This was a risky move, as Berlin was still theoretically an open city under the control of all four Allied powers. Despite Soviet misgivings, GDR army, police, and volunteer (*Kampfgruppen*) units began the construction of the barrier on the night of 12–13 August 1961. The Brandenburg Gate was closed to traffic the following day, and by 26 August all crossing points into West Berlin had been sealed off. Eventually, twelve checkpoints were established to regulate traffic between the GDR and West Berlin. The most famous, in the center of Berlin, was called Checkpoint Charlie.

The Berlin Wall went through four generations of architecture. Far more than the symbolic barricade that cut through the center of Berlin and was so often photographed by tourists, the wall encircled the western half of the city. Until 1971, when a connecting road was constructed, two western exclaves existed behind the wall and were supplied solely by the American and British military. There were obstacles in canals, sewer lines, and communications and transportation tunnels that formed part of the Berlin Wall

West Germans peer over the Berlin Wall, a barricade constructed by the East German government in 1961 that closed the border between West Berlin and the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany) for twenty-eight years. The wall, a symbol of communist tyranny during the Cold War, was destroyed in late 1989. (Library of Congress)

system. It stretched for 155 kilometers (106 miles) and by 1989 contained ninety-two watchtowers, twenty bunkers, antivehicle trenches, and other advanced defensive systems.

The first two versions of the Berlin Wall consisted of concrete blocks and barbed wire. These were replaced in 1965 with a system of concrete slabs and steel girders topped by a sewage pipe to make scaling the wall more difficult. In 1975, this structure gave way to one made entirely of reinforced concrete some twelve feet high, not including the tube element on top. Behind this was the so-called death strip secured by dogs, tanks, trip-wire machine guns, and guards.

While these measures prevented the flood of refugees like that of the late 1950s, they did not stop people from trying to escape from the GDR to the West. In the early days of the Berlin Wall, people jumped from buildings, used ladders to climb over the wall, or dug tunnels under it. As the system evolved, attempts became more dangerous and more complex. At least

171 people were killed trying to leave the GDR between 13 August 1961 and 9 November 1989, when the wall came down. More than 5,000 East Germans, including 574 GDR border guards, successfully crossed the wall.

East Germans were not the only victims of the Berlin Wall, however. Because the wall was actually built a few yards back from the border, in the early years of the wall West German citizens who strayed too close could be and were sometimes arrested by GDR border patrols. The restricted supplies and claustrophobic atmosphere of West Berlin caused a drop in population of some 340,000 people between 1963 and 1983. To keep the city alive, the FRG encouraged foreign immigration and granted special privileges to West Berliners.

The western half of the city became a symbol of freedom, recognized most famously in the phrase "*Ich bin ein Berliner*" (I am a resident of Berlin) in John F. Kennedy's 1963 speech. A later American president, Ronald Reagan, also recognized the symbolism of the Berlin Wall when he challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this Wall" to prove his sincerity about reform. Soviet pressure for reform in fact did play a part in the fall of the Berlin Wall.

During the transitional crisis of late 1989, the new East Berlin regime lifted travel restrictions to West Berlin. Günter Schabowski, head of the SED's Berlin organization, announced on television on 9 November 1989 that the lifting of restrictions would be effective immediately. East Germans went, cautiously, to test this at the Berlin Wall; lacking specific instructions, border guards let them through. Within hours, Germans from both sides of the wall were sitting atop it, drinking champagne and celebrating the end of the divided city.

Today, the only reminder of the Berlin Wall is a strip of bricks that follows its former path. Most sections of concrete are in museums, many in foreign countries. While it existed, however, the Berlin Wall was one of the most infamous and powerful symbols of the Cold War.

Timothy C. Dowling

In 1975, this structure gave way to one made entirely of reinforced concrete some twelve feet high.

See also

East Berlin Uprising; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Ulbricht, Walter

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Berlinguer, Enrico
(1922–1984)

Italian politician and head of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from 1972 to 1984. Enrico Berlinguer was born in Sassari, Sardinia, on 25 March 1922 to an aristocratic Sardinian family with ties to the fathers of the Italian Risorgimento. His father was a member of the Italian parliament who vehemently objected to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's regime. Berlinguer attended law school at the University of Sassari and in 1937 had made contacts with Sardinian antifascist groups. He joined the PCI in 1943 and soon became secretary of its youth organization Federazione Giovanile Communista Italiana (FGCI). In 1944 he met PCI head Palmiro Togliatti, who helped Berlinguer's ascension to the party's upper echelons as a member of the Central Committee in 1945, director of the youth wing in 1948, and secretary-general of the FGCI from 1949 to 1956.

In 1968 Berlinguer won a seat in parliament and in 1969 was appointed the PCI's general vice-secretary. By 1972, he had become secretary-general of the PCI. As such, he developed a strategy that sought to modernize Togliatti's original plans for Italian socialism, adapting it to the ever-changing context of Italian politics and the international scene of the 1970s. Chagrined by the September 1973 Chilean military coup that ousted Salvador Allende, Berlinguer concluded that the Italian Left could not govern the country alone and instead must forge alliances with progressive, centrist political parties. The core of his new strategy included close cooperation with the Christian Democrats (DC) that was soon dubbed the *compromesso storico* (historic compromise).

Enrico Berlinguer headed the Italian Communist Party (1972–1984), the most powerful in Western Europe. (Gianni Giansanti/Sygma/Corbis)

During a time of economic uncertainty and terrorism, Berlinguer's proposals attracted great interest, particularly among Italians who believed that the current state of affairs offered an opportunity to stabilize Italian politics and transform the PCI into a more moderate party. Berlinguer himself encouraged this view by publicly admitting in 1976 that NATO offered his party a "guarantee" to experiment with socialism by gradually moving away from the pro-Soviet line of his predecessors. Internationally, Berlinguer was crucial in developing the Eurocommunism movement, which linked the PCI not with Moscow but rather with Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon. His strategies paid off, as the PCI won 36 percent of the vote in the 1976 elections. By 1978, the PCI was informally supporting the noncommunist majority in power. When the infamous terrorist organization Red Brigade kidnapped and executed DC Secretary Aldo Moro, Berlinguer immediately denounced terrorism.

Yet Berlinguer's extraordinary efforts to forge a more moderate image for the PCI were never wholly successful. Many still regarded the PCI as too close to Moscow to be trusted, and by the end of the 1970s the *compromesso storico*

had gained little momentum. He had formally abandoned this strategy by 1981 but continued to distance the PCI from Moscow, declaring his criticism of Soviet tactics after the 1981 coup in Poland. Berlinguer died on 11 June 1984 after collapsing during a public speech in Padua.

Leopoldo Nuti

See also

Craxi, Benedetto; Eurocommunism; Italy; Moro, Aldo

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Berman, Jakub
(1901–1984)

Polish politician, Communist Party leader, and deputy prime minister of the Polish Republic from 1954 to 1956. Born on 24 December 1901 in Warsaw to a middle-class Jewish family, Jakub Berman graduated with a law degree from Warsaw University in 1925. In the interwar period he became active in the Communist Party of Poland. In September 1939, when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland, he found himself in Soviet-occupied territory. In the USSR Berman continued to associate with fellow Poles, mainly through the Union of Polish Patriots. In January 1944 he helped found the Central Office of Polish Communists, and in July 1944 he played a prominent role in forming the Polish Committee for National Liberation, a Soviet-style government imposed by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.

From 1944 to 1948 Berman was a member of the Polish Workers' Party politburo. After the party merged with the Polish Socialist Party in December 1948, he held membership in the politburo of the renamed Polish United Workers' Party.

Between 1945 and 1956, Berman fulfilled numerous functions in the Polish government, keeping a relatively low profile. From 1952 to 1954 he was a member of the Council of Ministers, and from 1954 to 1956 he served as deputy prime minister. Berman's power was far greater than his positions might have suggested. He was the ideological leader of the Communist Party and was responsible for Poland's cultural and foreign affairs. Second in power only to Bolesław Bierut, Berman was also largely responsible for Poland's foreign policy in the initial years of the Cold War. In addition, he supervised the Ministry of Public Security and was instrumental in the mimicking of Stalin's terror tactics. Berman personally supervised numerous political investigations and interrogations of opposition activists, some of which included torture and death sentences.

In 1957, after the Soviets' 1956 de-Stalinization campaign, Berman was forced out of the Polish United Workers' Party, which effectively ended his political career. Afterward, he worked as an editor in a Polish publishing house until his 1968 retirement. He died in Warsaw on 14 April 1984.

Jakub Basista

See also

Bierut, Bolesław; Poland; Stalin, Josef

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Bessarabia

Southeast European territory covering some 17,600 square miles in present-day Moldavia and Ukraine, bounded by the Prut, Danube, and Dneister rivers and the Black Sea. Its population in 1945 was approximately 2 million. Moldavians made up about 50 percent of the population, while Ukrainians were 20 percent; the remainder were Russians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Jews.

Until 1812 Bessarabia, which was named for the Bassarab dynasty that ruled much of Wallachia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, formed the eastern boundary of Moldavia, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. In the Treaty of Bucharest of May 1812 Russia annexed Bessarabia, and it remained part of the Russian Empire until 1918. Bessarabia was briefly independent following the end of World War I but chose to join Romania. This decision was confirmed by the Allied powers, which formally awarded the territory to Romania in 1920 as an additional buffer against communist Russia. The Russian government, however, continued to regard Bessarabia as its own territory.

In June 1940, in accordance with the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia and that August formed much of it into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), although portions of it were also awarded to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). The Soviets also deported significant numbers of Bessarabians to Siberia. Romania retook Bessarabia following the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 in which Romanian forces participated. Approximately 65,000 of 75,000 Jews living in Bessarabia perished during the Holocaust.

The Soviet Union regained the region at the end of World War II. Although Romania became a communist state and entered the Soviet bloc after the war, there was continued acrimony between the Soviet Union and Romania over Bessarabia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the MSSR declared itself independent and became the Republic of Moldova.

Many in Romania continued to believe, however, that Moldova should be part of Romania.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Romania

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Betancourt, Rómulo
(1908–1981)

Venezuelan politician, provisional president (1945–1948), and president (1959–1964). Born into a modest family in Guatire, Miranda, on 22 February 1908, Rómulo Betancourt became involved in politics while attending the University of Caracas, where he led student protests against the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez. Arrested in 1928 and released after several weeks in jail, Betancourt was exiled to Costa Rica until Gómez's death in 1935.

A founder of the Costa Rican Communist Party, Betancourt became an admirer of the New Deal policies of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt after pragmatism and nationalism led the Venezuelan to renounce dogmatic, Moscow-directed communism. In September 1941 Betancourt helped establish Acción Democrática (Democratic Action), a left-wing anticommunist party that came to power in Venezuela's October Revolution of 1945. Appointed provisional president, Betancourt established a new constitution and initiated a program of moderate social reforms. He handed power over to a democratically elected president in 1948, but a coup a few months later led by General Marcos Pérez Jiménez forced Betancourt into exile again. He spent the next ten years abroad directing the outlawed Acción Democrática party.

After Jiménez was overthrown in 1958, Betancourt returned to Venezuela and was elected president in 1959. His reformist administration passed an agrarian reform law to expropriate large estates, initiated public works programs, and fostered industrial development to reduce dependence on petroleum reserves. Betancourt exercised greater control over foreign-dominated petroleum companies, increased government tax revenue from oil production, and supported the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Betancourt adopted a policy of nonrecognition of undemocratic governments. He praised President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and supported U.S. efforts to isolate Fidel Castro's Cuba. Beleaguered by forces from both the Left and the Right, Betancourt suppressed an armed insurgency by leftist admirers of the Cuban Revolution, countered rightist military

uprisings, and survived an assassination attempt planned by Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo.

After his presidential term ended in 1964, Betancourt became the first Venezuelan in history to hold the presidency by a legitimate election and to relinquish the office to a popularly elected successor. He then lived for eight years in Switzerland, returning to Venezuela in 1972. Betancourt died on 28 September 1981 while visiting New York City.

David M. Carletta

See also

Alliance for Progress; Americas; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas; Venezuela

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Bevin, Ernest
(1881–1951)

British trade union leader, Labour Party politician, minister of labor, and foreign secretary from 1945 to 1950. Born in Winsford, Somerset, on 9 March 1881, and orphaned at the age of eight, Ernest Bevin left school at age eleven and worked a series of odd jobs to support himself. He eventually worked his way up from dockworker to secretary of the dockworkers' union by age twenty. Bevin continued to rise through union ranks and became general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union in 1931. Influential in Labour Party politics throughout the 1930s, he became minister of labor in Winston Churchill's wartime coalition government in 1940 and was responsible for mobilizing manpower for the war effort. After Labour's 1945 electoral victory, Bevin became foreign secretary to Prime Minister Clement Attlee, accompanying him to the last Allied conference at Potsdam in the summer of 1945.

Bevin's years as a trade unionist ingrained in him a deep distrust of Soviet-style communism. After 1945, he was convinced that the Soviet Union was bent on expanding its influence over the whole of Europe and the Middle East. But a Britain badly weakened by six years of war had to look elsewhere for help in reestablishing world order and stanching Soviet expansionism. Bevin therefore turned over British commitments in the Mediterranean, particularly in Greece and Turkey, to the United States on 21 February 1947. This decision ultimately led in March 1947 to the Truman Doctrine,

which pledged American responsibility for anticommunist and anti-Soviet policies in the region.

Having cast Britain's lot with the United States, Bevin worked tirelessly to convince U.S. President Harry S. Truman of the need for financial and military support for European reconstruction and the unification of Western Europe as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism in what soon became known as the containment policy. A similar consensus was emerging within the Truman administration, and on 5 June 1947 U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall announced that the United States would establish an aid package for both Western and Eastern Europe, known as the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Program. Bevin then turned to military concerns and negotiated the 1948 Brussels Treaty, which was ultimately expanded into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded on 4 April 1949.

Bevin preserved Britain's freedom of action in international affairs, however, by eschewing Anglo-European integration, and he angered the United States by officially recognizing the People's Republic of China (PRC) in January 1950. Health problems forced Bevin to resign on 10 March 1951, and he died in London on 14 April 1951.

Chris Tudda

One of the most powerful union leaders in Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth century, Ernest Bevin was a forceful and effective foreign secretary in Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Labour government during 1945–1951. (Library of Congress)

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl; Brussels Treaty; Churchill, Winston; Containment Policy; Greek Civil War; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine

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Bhumipol Adulyadej, King of Thailand
(1927–)

King of Thailand since 1946. Born on 5 December 1927 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Bhumipol Adulyadej was the third and youngest child of Prince and Princess Mahidol Songkla, both of whom were educated in the United States. The future king was educated in Switzerland, attending the École Nouvelle de la Suisse Romande, earning a degree in letters from the

Bhumipol Adulyadej, King of Thailand, July 1960. (Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Gymnase Classique Cantonal of Lausanne, and attending Lausanne University to study science. His career in science ended when his eldest brother, King Ananda Mahidol, died suddenly, elevating Bhumipol to the Thai Crown on 9 June 1946. In May 1950 he was officially crowned Rama IX of the Chakri dynasty.

As king, Bhumipol played a critical role in shaping modern Thailand, earning an early reputation as a supporter of U.S. and Western Cold War policies in the region. Although his powers were largely ceremonial, the king nonetheless wielded considerable political influence during the Cold War. Profound reverence for the king combined with the Buddhist faith unified Thailand and insulated it from the convulsive nationalism and revolutions that engulfed other Southeast Asian nations. The Thai Army portrayed itself as the defender of traditional Thai culture, protecting it from communist expansion in the region. This rationale helped justify Thai military authoritarianism and a close relationship with the United States, which used Thailand as a major base for operations during the Vietnam War.

King Bhumipol in many ways symbolized the durability of U.S.-Thai relations. He had lived and traveled extensively in the United States and was even an accomplished jazz musician, playing saxophone with many famous American artists. Moreover, he supported the American efforts in Indochina, which endeared him to U.S. policymakers.

Yet Bhumipol was no puppet. The staged American withdrawal from Southeast Asia that began in 1973 precipitated revolution in Thailand. In October 1973 Thai demands for an end to military rule exploded in violence. When the army and the police began using brutal force against demonstrators, the king publicly intervened to stop them. Top military officials were forced to flee the country, and a civilian government came to power. The military returned to govern, however, following another revolution in 1976 and remained behind the scenes of nominally civilian governments throughout the 1980s. When army generals seized power for themselves in the spring of 1992, King Bhumipol again intervened, putting an end to the power struggle and heartily endorsing civilian rule.

Over the course of the Cold War Bhumipol also demonstrated a genuine commitment to improving the welfare of his people by introducing reforms dealing with agriculture, the environment, health care, and education. He still commands the genuine love and respect of the Thai people and remains the symbol of Thai national unity.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Indochina War; Thailand; Vietnam War

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Bhutan

Landlocked South Asian nation covering 18,147 square miles, about half the size of the U.S. state of Indiana. The Kingdom of Bhutan, with a 1945 population of some 300,000 people, is bordered on the north by Tibet, now part of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and on the south by India. It shares historical and cultural ties with Tibet. Predominantly a Lamaistic Buddhist country, Bhutan is the only Buddhist constitutional monarchy in the world, with three kings since 1945: Jigme Wangchuck (1926–1952), Jigme Dorji Wangchuck (1952–1972), and Jigme Singye Wangchuck (1972–). Popular political participation has been limited, and political power has remained in the hands of the royal family and other elites.

Bhutan came into contact with the British as they conquered India in the 1770s. An 1865 treaty transferred some of Bhutan's border territory to the British in return for annual compensation. In 1907 Britain influenced the creation of a hereditary monarchy to replace the dual theocratic-civil government that had been in place since the seventeenth century. Thereafter, the British agreed to refrain from interfering in internal Bhutanese affairs while retaining the right to guide foreign relations.

After the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947, a now-independent India assumed the task of steering Bhutanese foreign relations. This arrangement was formalized in Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, which also recognized Bhutanese independence. In subsequent years, Bhutanese leaders periodically questioned the effect that this treaty had on their sovereignty. From the 1970s on, Bhutanese leaders adopted a broad interpretation of Article 2 and asserted their own right to shape foreign policy.

In the post-1945 period, Bhutan's foreign policy was primarily shaped by its location between two regional powers occasionally in conflict with each other, the PRC and India. This led Bhutan to adopt a nonaligned position between these two in particular and in the wider Cold War generally. While developments such as the 1951 Chinese occupation of Tibet and the 1962 Sino-Indian border clash seem to have prompted a tilt toward India, Bhutan also asserted its independence from India by engaging directly with the Chinese on boundary and refugee issues. At the same time, Bhutan exploited opportunities to end its isolation and its traditional dependence on India with greater involvement in international organizations, such as the 1962 Colombo Plan, the United Nations, and the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1983, Bhutan became a founding member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

Since the 1960s Bhutanese leaders, with economic assistance from India and international institutions, intensified efforts to develop and modernize their country. Such efforts were costly, and the struggle between conservative and progressive forces at times led to internal instability. One such instance was the assassination of the reform-minded prime minister, Jigme Palden Dorji, in April 1964, a murder masterminded by the king's uncle Namgyal Bahadur, the army chief of operations. Bhutan's economy today is largely agricultural and remains one of the less-developed economies in the world, although the government is turning to tourism as a potential source of new revenue.

Soo Chun Lu

See also

Colombo Plan; India; Non-Aligned Movement; Southeast Asia

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Bhutto, Benazir

(1953–)

Leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and prime minister of Pakistan during 1988–1990 and 1993–1996. Born in Karachi, Pakistan, on 21 June 1953, Benazir Bhutto was the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's popular leader and prime minister. Benazir Bhutto graduated from Radcliffe College in 1973 and went on to earn a degree from Oxford University in philosophy, politics, and economics in 1976. She returned to Pakistan that same year.

On 5 July 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by Army Chief General Zia ul Haq. Arrested by the new government, Bhutto was charged with the murder of a political opponent and executed in 1979. Benazir Bhutto, meanwhile, was held under house arrest. She then left for Britain after her father's death as the leader-in-exile of the opposition PPP. Following Haq's lifting of martial law in 1986, Bhutto returned to Pakistan and became the nation's most prominent prodemocracy leader. After Haq's death, Bhutto won the national elections in December 1988, becoming the prime minister and the first female leader of a Muslim nation.

There was initial euphoria in both Pakistan and the West that Bhutto's leadership would bring about substantive reforms. But this optimism did not take into account the scale and scope of the problems she faced, and her first

Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto flashes victory signs to welcoming crowds shortly after her return from exile on 10 April 1986. (Reuters/Corbis)

stint as prime minister witnessed few meaningful changes. In August 1990 she was ousted by a military coup, which claimed corruption on the part of her government. In October 1990, the United States suspended military and economic assistance to Pakistan because of the coup and its ongoing nuclear weapons program. After Bhutto's return to power in 1993 she visited Washington in April 1995, convincing American policymakers to suspend sanctions previously imposed on Pakistan.

During her second term in office, Bhutto made small strides toward reform, mainly in health care and education. Her second term also witnessed the rise of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan, which seized power in September 1996 with financial backing from Pakistan. In November 1996, however, Pakistanian President Farooq Leghari again dissolved Bhutto's government on charges of corruption and financial irregularities.

In 1999 Bhutto and her husband, Ali Zardari, were convicted of corruption. That same year, Bhutto left Pakistan. She has been living in exile in London and in Dubai. Zardari was freed in November 2004 after eight years in jail. Bhutto continues as the leader of the PPP.

Amrita Singh

During her second term in office, Bhutto made small strides toward reform, mainly in health care and education.

See also

Afghanistan War; Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; Pakistan; Zia ul Haq, Muhammad

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Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali
(1928–1979)

Pakistani politician, president (1971–1973), and prime minister (1973–1977). Born on 5 January 1928 in Larkana, Sind, India, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the son of Sir Shahnawaz Khan Bhutto, an influential landlord and politician in British colonial India. Bhutto studied at the University of California, Berkeley, where he earned a BA degree in 1950, and at Oxford University.

Returning to Pakistan, Bhutto practiced law. He also served in 1957 as a member of the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations (UN). Entering politics, from 1958 he held several cabinet posts in the government led by Muhammad Ayub Khan. As foreign minister in Khan's government from 1963 and as prime minister from 1967 to 1977, Bhutto provided a new direction to Pakistan's foreign policy. He secured Pakistan's relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and when the United States sought rapprochement with China, it was Pakistan that acted as the mediator. Bhutto also bolstered relations with the USSR in a bid to forge a more independent foreign policy and to project his country's prominence in the developing world.

Following differences with President Khan in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan War (1965), Bhutto began a mass political campaign. His charismatic personality and talk of social justice met with an enthusiastic response, and in December 1967 he launched the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). In the elections of 1970 Bhutto's PPP won a resounding victory in West Pakistan, but the Awami League of East Pakistan won the majority vote. Bhutto continued to speak of the need for constitutional reform, but talks on the subject went nowhere. Meanwhile, the East Pakistani secession movement was rapidly gaining ground, and General Mohammad Yahya Khan, who had taken over from Ayub Khan in 1970, carried out a military crackdown in East Pakistan.

Pakistan was humiliated after its defeat by India in the 1971 war. The subsequent emergence of Indian-backed Bangladesh added insult to injury. In 1971 Bhutto assumed power with the military's approval. He vowed to rebuild Pakistani morale, and a period of frenetic nation building ensued.

To counter growing opposition due to his heavy-handed rule, Bhutto called for elections in 1977. Although ostensibly victorious, he was accused of electoral fraud and ousted from power by General Muhammad Zia ul Haq on 5 July 1977. Bhutto was later arrested on charges of ordering the murder of a political opponent. He was subsequently convicted and executed in 4 April 1979 at Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Amrita Singh

See also

Ayub Khan, Muhammad; Bangladesh; India; India, Armed Forces; India-Pakistan Wars; Kashmir Dispute; Pakistan; Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad; Zia ul Haq, Muhammad

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Biafra War
(1967–1970)

Nigerian tribal and civilian conflict during 1967–1970. The Biafra War emerged from tribal conflicts in Nigeria that could barely be contained by the poorly functioning federal government established when the country achieved independence from Britain in 1960. The eastern part of Nigeria, under the leadership of the ethnic Ibo (Igbo) Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared itself independent as Biafra in May 1967. The ensuing war caused much suffering, especially among civilians, as the Nigerian military government under the northerner Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon sought to extinguish the rebellion. The war ended with the collapse of Biafra in January 1970.

At the beginning of 1966 a declaration of martial law followed by a military coup had resulted in a military junta led by Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Ibo from eastern Nigeria. Fearful northerners then launched a countercoup in July 1966, establishing the Nigerian military government of Lieutenant Colonel Gowon. This resulted in rioting and violence between northerners and easterners; attacks on Ibos in the north fueled Ibo fears about the intentions of Gowon's federal military government. Through the second half of 1966 it became clear that tribal tensions might culminate in the secession of eastern Nigeria, under Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu's leadership. Despite diplomacy intended to avoid that outcome and declarations by all parties of allegiance to the concept of Nigerian unity, such was the result.

Following the January 1967 Aburi Conference attended by both Gowon and Ojukwu that was called to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis, Ojukwu declared himself dissatisfied with the negotiations, which envisaged a renewed federal structure. Ojukwu then moved toward secession. The secession declaration formally establishing Biafra was made on 27 May 1967. War quickly followed as the Nigerian government sought to defeat the secessionists.

The Biafra War became a major problem for Britain, Nigeria's former colonial ruler, and Labour Party Prime Minister Harold Wilson. While calling for negotiations, peace, and Nigerian unity, Wilson's government decided to supply arms to Gowon's federal government but not to Biafra, on the grounds that the United Kingdom was, in Wilson's words, a "traditional supplier" of

The Biafra War brought untold misery and suffering to hundreds of thousands of Nigerians. Here, an emaciated child waits with others for emergency food and medical shipments that offered some hope of survival to the people of the secessionist province, 13 January 1970. (Bettmann/Corbis)

arms to Nigeria. This stance brought Wilson under fierce attack in the House of Commons and even evoked questions in Washington. Later, when the Nigerian government's blockade of Biafra resulted in mass starvation there, parliamentary criticism of Wilson became even more vociferous.

Wilson's memoirs reveal an abiding sense of hurt at his treatment; he also believed strongly that the media had misrepresented the conflict in Biafra's favor. While hunger and misery on a massive scale were indeed to be found in Biafra, Wilson was not alone in arguing that Ojukwu's policies, which allowed only night relief flights so that he could simultaneously import arms, may have contributed to the humanitarian catastrophe.

Wilson's motives for assisting Nigeria were expressed in terms of seeking to maintain the integrity of the country if possible while limiting Soviet influence in the region. The Nigerian federal government did, ultimately, purchase a limited amount of military hardware from the Soviet bloc but pointedly noted that this did not indicate a change in its general pro-Western orientation. Ironically, Wilson's memoirs are more critical of French arms sales to Biafra than of any communist bloc sales. He even suggested that the war was unnecessarily prolonged as a result of French President Charles de Gaulle's actions.

The stance of the United States toward Biafra was marked by caution and formal neutrality, for several reasons. First, the United Kingdom was the dominant Western power in the region, and the United States acknowledged and accepted that fact. This was not simply an acknowledgment of diplomatic niceties but was also a recognition by American policymakers that their nation had few assets and comparatively little influence in Nigeria. Additionally, the Americans realized that armed intervention in the conflict would require huge resources and carry grave risks. Finally, the United States was already deeply involved in the increasingly unpopular Vietnam War, and President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors did not dare risk another war of intervention. The Americans supported Nigerian unity (in preference to unpredictable disintegration) and pushed for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The United States did not supply arms to either party although some private U.S. citizens did, to the irritation of the U.S. State Department. Interestingly, there was little anxiety in American governmental circles (in contrast to Wilson's anxieties, very much played up in his memoirs) about the possibility of the Soviet Union taking advantage of chaos in Nigeria to extend its regional influence. Indeed, the Soviets were seen by some in the United States as playing a fairly responsible role as the tension increased in Nigeria. A National Security Council (NSC) memorandum of July 1967

declared that "the Soviets have behaved very correctly throughout the crisis, pressing for unity at every opportunity." Even the Soviets saw the risks of being caught up in an unpredictable tribal war and abstained from action that might only have exacerbated the situation. Clearly, neither side wished to transform Nigeria into a Cold War battle zone.

Wilson visited Nigeria in March 1969, but apart from eliciting platitudes from his hosts he was unable to move the conflict toward resolution. Nor was he able to remove the images of death and starvation in Biafra from the front pages of newspapers. The Biafra War ended only with the military defeat of the Biafran rebellion in January 1970.

Paul Wingrove

See also
Africa; Nigeria

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Bidault, Georges
(1899–1983)

French resistance leader, politician, foreign minister, and prime minister in 1946 and again during 1949–1950. Born in Moulins (Allier), France, on 5 October 1899, Georges Bidault was educated at the Sorbonne and became a history teacher. From 1932 to 1939 he edited the Catholic daily *L'Aube*. An active opponent of fascism and Nazism, in 1942 he cofounded Combat, a resistance organization. After the death of Jean Moulin at the hands of the Gestapo in 1943, Bidault followed him as the president of the National Resistance Council (CNR) that coordinated the various resistance movements in France.

In November 1944 Bidault helped found the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), the French centrist Christian democratic party that, along with the communists and socialists, was one of the three largest French political parties. Bidault served as French foreign minister during 1944–1948, first under the provisional government and then in the Fourth Republic. He was again foreign minister during 1953–1954.

Bidault was twice premier of France, from July to December 1946 and from October 1949 to June 1950. As foreign minister and premier he was closely associated with the formation of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Coal and Steel and

Georges Bidault, a leader of the Resistance in World War II, served as both foreign minister and premier during the French Fourth Republic. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

European Defense Communities. As did so many of his countrymen, he greatly feared a resurgent Germany.

Bidault strongly supported the notion of a French empire and authorized French High Commissioner to Indochina Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu to employ force if need be against the Vietnamese nationalists. Although Bidault probably did not understand d'Argenlieu's intent, this led to the outbreak of the Indochina War. From 1949 to 1950 Bidault was again premier and he was foreign minister during 1951–1952 and 1953–1954. He tried but failed to form a government in June 1953 and was an unsuccessful candidate for president of France that December.

Bidault initially supported Charles de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 but broke with him over the issue of Algerian independence. Bidault then headed a new National Resistance Council to maintain French Algeria, and he supported the anti-independence and terrorist Secret Army Organization (OAS). Charged with treason in 1962, Bidault went into exile in Brazil and did not return to France until de Gaulle pardoned him in 1968. During his postexile years, Bidault avidly defended his subversive activities. He died in Cambo-les-Bains, France, on 27 January 1983.

John H. Barnhill and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Algerian War; Council of Europe; Decolonization; De Gaulle, Charles; European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; France; Indochina War; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Bierut, Bolesław
(1892–1956)

Polish communist politician and president of the Republic of Poland from 1947 to 1952. Born to a peasant family in Rury Jezuickie near Lublin on 18 April 1892, Bolesław Bierut participated from his youth in various leftist political activities. In 1918 he joined the Polish Communist Workers' Party (PPR). He was also active in underground leftist activities in Poland in the

1920s, and in 1925 he went to Moscow, where he received training by the Comintern (Communist International), first in the party school near Moscow (1925–1926) and then in the International Leninist School (1928–1930). As a Comintern agent, he carried out a variety of unspecified assignments in Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Bulgaria.

Returning to Poland in 1933, Bierut became the secretary of the International Support Organization for Revolutionaries. As a consequence of his activities, he was arrested in 1935 and sentenced to seven years in prison. He spent much of World War II in the Soviet Union. In 1943 he returned to Poland, and along with Władysław Gomułka he organized an underground communist movement (the PPR). This activity was kept secret, because that same year Bierut was appointed chairman of the National Council of the Homeland, a broadly based and ostensibly noncommunist popular front.

After World War II, Bierut became one of the leaders of the Soviet-imposed Polish communist regime in Poland and was instrumental in introducing Stalinist rule. He was slavishly allied with the Soviets and wholly obedient to the directives emanating from Moscow.

In 1947 Bierut was elected president of the Republic of Poland. Following Gomułka's removal as general secretary of the PPR in mid-1948, the party was merged with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) to form the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), headed by Bierut. He then proceeded to install a communist dictatorship in Poland. He not only led the PZPR but was president and premier. Under the 1952 Polish constitution, the function of president was replaced by chairman of the State Council (premier). Although Bierut had little leadership ability and was not a particularly savvy politician, he was nonetheless an effective executor of Moscow's directives and a faithful agent for Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and forced on Poland the Stalinist state apparatus. Bierut was, without doubt, Moscow's most loyal adherent in Poland. Following Stalin's death, Bierut did not deviate from his policies. Bierut died in Moscow on 12 March 1956 while heading the Polish delegation to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU).

Bolesław Bierut, Polish communist political leader and president of Poland (1947–1952). (Library of Congress)

Jakub Basista

See also

Gomułka, Władysław; Poland; Stalin, Josef

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Bikini Island Atomic Tests

The site of U.S. atomic tests during 1946–1958, Bikini Atoll is located in the westernmost Marshall Islands in the Central Pacific. The Marshalls are about 4 degrees above the equator and 2,000 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Japan had acquired the islands from Germany following World War I, and the United States conquered them in 1944. The Marshalls became a U.S. trust territory in 1947.

In 1946, Bikini was the site for Operation CROSSROADS, a U.S. experiment to gauge the effects of atomic weapons on ships. Vice Admiral William Blandy commanded the joint army-navy nuclear tests. On 1 July 1946, following extensive publicity, the United States exploded the first atomic bomb in peacetime. It was an air burst, dropped over seventy-three unmanned naval vessels at Bikini Atoll with the explosive power of about 20,000 tons of TNT, roughly equivalent to the size of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki in August 1945. Five of the ships were sunk outright, and forty-five were damaged. Ninety percent of the test animals aboard the ships survived the initial blast but died later from radiation exposure.

Atomic bomb explodes during the Baker Day test at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands on 25 July 1946. This ground-level image was taken about six seconds after detonation. (Naval Historical Center)

On 25 July a second bomb was detonated, this one underwater. The blast sent into the air a column of a million tons of water half a mile in diameter and sank ten of seventy-five unmanned ships. Following the initial tests, Bikini and nearby Enewetak Atoll became the Pacific Proving Grounds of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

The United States conducted additional tests at Bikini in 1954, 1956, and 1958, including a hydrogen bomb explosion on 1 March 1954. Unexpected widespread radiation fallout from this test inflicted radiation burns on Japanese fishermen 70–90 miles from the blast site and also affected residents of Kwajalein Island, 176 miles distant. This test triggered widespread alarm, especially in Japan, that helped to bring about the 1958 moratorium on atmospheric nuclear weapons tests.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

Atomic Bomb; Atomic Energy Commission, United States; Nuclear Tests

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Biological and Chemical Weapons and Warfare

Biological and chemical weapons are often associated with nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons, along with many others not so labeled, can indeed create massive casualties, and this led many military planners in the post–World War II era to explore their possible battlefield use.

"Chemical" and "biological" are difficult terms to define. *U.S. Army Field Manual 3–100, NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations* (1991) defines a biological agent as "a micro-organism that causes disease in man, plants, or animals, or deterioration of materiel." A chemical agent is defined as a "chemical substance intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans through its physiological effects." This definition excludes riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame and is a matter of diplomatic debate. Tear gas agents present a special case, as these are now included under the rubric of chemical agents but have been used by military forces in cases that resemble nonmilitary crowd control actions.

The history of chemical warfare goes back for millennia. More than 2,000 years ago, the Chinese used smoke pots and the Japanese used pepper spray as lachrymatory agents. During the sieges of Platea and Belium, the Spartans used burning pitch and sulfur in attempts to overcome the cities' inhabitants. Flaming chemicals such as Greek fire were employed in ancient times. More recently, the British used burning sulfur against the Russians in the 1855 siege of Sebastapol. Similar agents were used by both sides in the U.S. Civil War before the 1907 Hague Conference, over Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's objections, declared chemical weapons inhumane.

Biological weapons have also been used for centuries. Ancient warriors poisoned wells with decomposing bodies of animals, and there is a (possibly apocryphal) story that Mongol soldiers catapulted infected corpses into Genoese trading settlements on the Black Sea and precipitated the first wave of European bubonic plague. Lord Jeffrey Amherst and the British Army have been accused (again, possibly apocryphally) of giving blankets infected with smallpox to North American Indians.

The French were actually the first to use chemical weapons during World War I, having tried grenades filled with the irritant xylyl bromide in August 1914. In October 1914 at Neuve Chapelle and again in January 1915 at Bolimov on the Eastern Front, the Germans tried artillery shells filled with chemical irritants. The first large-scale use of chemical weapons was at the Second Battle of Ypres, when Germany released a cloud of chlorine gas that drifted over British, Canadian, French, and Algerian forces. By September 1915, the British had begun using chlorine as well, although the gas was subject to the vagaries of shifting winds and was generally of limited effectiveness. This disadvantage led to a return to delivery by artillery shells.

Chlorine was soon replaced by the more potent irritants phosgene and mustard gas. Phosgene (coded CX) caused less immediate coughing, so more was inhaled; however, it caused more delayed pulmonary damage than chlorine. Diphosgene (coded DG) and chloropicrin (coded PS) were later pulmonary irritants. Mustard gas (both nitrogen and sulfur variants) was first used against the Russians at Riga in 1917 and was delivered in artillery shells. Unlike the earlier agents, it blistered the skin as well as damaged the lungs and was more difficult to defend against since gas masks alone were insufficient protection. The final blistering agent developed was Lewisite (coded L), a liquid arsenical agent for which Dimercaprol (British Anti-Lewisite or BAL) is an antidote.

Once combatants developed protection mechanisms, gas warfare became relatively ineffective. After May 1915, only about 9 percent of British casualties were from gas, and only about 3 percent of those were fatal, although many victims had permanent disabilities.

Nerve gases act by inhibiting breakdown of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine and cause runny nose, wheezing, drooling, involuntary defecation and urination, and, ultimately, convulsions, coma, and death.

There was a generally negative reaction to the use of chemical weapons, and they were banned by international agreement in the Geneva Protocol on Gas Warfare (signed in 1925) that went into effect in 1928. Nonetheless, America, Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union continued to experiment with chemical and biological weapons. The greatest advances were made by Germany with the development of hydrogen cyanide (which interferes with cellular oxygen metabolism and one form of which, under the name Zyklon B, was used for genocide) and the nerve gases tabun (coded GA by the U.S. military), sarin (GB), and soman (GD). (Since GC was military medical shorthand for gonorrhea, those letters were not used as a gas designation.) The nerve gases act by inhibiting breakdown of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine and cause runny nose, wheezing, drooling, involuntary defecation and urination, and, ultimately, convulsions, coma, and death. Following World War II, the Soviets developed a thickened version of Soman that could be deployed from spray tanks and made it the major part of their chemical arsenal. Sarin was used by Japanese terrorists in the Tokyo subway in the 1990s.

Although Italy employed mustard gas with devastating effect in its conquest of Ethiopia in 1935–1936, the threat of retaliation prevented the use of poison gases against combatants in World War II, with the exception of infrequent use by the Japanese in China.

In 1936 the Japanese Army established its infamous Unit 731 in Manchuria to test and refine chemical and biological weapons. After the war the United States granted immunity from prosecution to the members of this unit in exchange for the information on the experiments, even though a number were conducted on humans. Washington considered this work invaluable in its own biological warfare program, although the Soviet government prosecuted twelve members of the unit in December 1949.

VX gas, a neurotoxin, was developed at the Porton Down Chemical Research Centre in Wiltshire, England, in 1952. The British subsequently traded the technology for VX production with the United States in return for data on production of thermonuclear weapons. Unlike sarin and tabun, VX is a liquid that adheres to surfaces, is difficult to remove, and persists for long

Chemical Agents and Toxins

Chemical	*Classification*	*Symptoms*
Chlorine	Pulmonary agent	Burning in eyes and nose, nausea, pulmonary edema, death
Chloropicrin (PS)	Pulmonary agent	Burning in eyes and nose, nausea, pulmonary edema, death
Diphosgene (DG)	Pulmonary agent	Burning in eyes and nose, nausea, pulmonary edema, death
Hydrogen cyanide	Blood agent	Difficulty breathing, convulsions, organ damage, cardiac arrest, death
Lewisite (L)	Blister agent	Swelling, blistering, liver necrosis, death
Mustard gas	Blister agent	Blistering, respiratory bleeding, pulmonary edema, death
Phosgene (CX)	Pulmonary agent	Burning in eyes and nose, nausea, pulmonary edema, death
Ricin	Cell toxin	If inhaled: difficulty breathing, pulmonary edema, death if ingested: vomiting, diarrhea, convulsions, organ failure, death
Sarin (GB)	Nerve agent	Difficulty breathing, loss of control of bodily functions, convulsions, death
Soman (GD)	Nerve agent	Difficulty breathing, loss of control of bodily functions, convulsions, death
Tabun (GA)	Nerve agent	Difficulty breathing, loss of control of bodily functions, convulsions, death
VX gas	Nerve agent	Difficulty breathing, loss of control of bodily functions, convulsions, death

periods. In liquid form, it is absorbed through the skin and can cause death in one to two hours. In its gaseous form, it causes death almost instantly. It is usually fatal in doses of ten milligrams, although the anticholinergic drug Atropine is an effective antidote and is regularly supplied to troops at risk of chemical attack. Atropine can be applied subcutaneously to counteract liquid VX but must be given directly into the heart to counteract the gaseous form.

A final agent bridges the gap between chemical and biological warfare. Ricin is a protein toxin derived from castor beans that causes respiratory failure thirty-six to seventy-two hours after being inhaled or clotting failure, shock, and multiple organ failure after being ingested or injected. Bulgarian exile Georgi Markov was said to have been assassinated by the Soviet KGB in London using a sharpened umbrella tip contaminated with ricin.

The fact that the Soviets considered chemicals viable weapons became evident during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when the Israelis captured Soviet-manufactured Egyptian tanks that utilized overpressure systems to protect against gaseous agents by maintaining a constant pressure differential between the inside of the vehicle and the outside environment. This information reversed efforts within the U.S. Army to abolish the Chemical Corps, the agency charged with conducting chemical defensive and offensive operations. The Chemical Corps was then directed to enhance defensive procedures and develop new chemical binary weapons. These latter were designed to be safer to deploy for the troops using them, as the lethal gases were not created until the projectiles were actually en route to target, when two chemicals combined within the projectile being fired.

A UH-1D helicopter from the U.S. 336th Aviation Company sprays a defoliation agent on a dense jungle area in the Mekong Delta in South Vietnam on 26 July 1969. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Both sides worked on biological weapons throughout much of the Cold War, the United States at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Soviet Union on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. Fort Detrick was decommissioned in 1970 when President Richard Nixon made a unilateral policy decision to abandon biological warfare. The Soviet facility remained open until 1992, housing a small city of 1,500 people and sophisticated animal testing facilities, although, according to Gennadi Lepyoshkin, who directed the facility until its closure, the majority of research was defensive and was concentrated on protection against bacterial agents such as plague, botulism, and anthrax.

Although smallpox was eradicated worldwide in 1977, both the United States and the Soviet Union retained samples of the organism, and there has been persistent suspicion that one or both might have altered the virus to make it a usable weapon. In 2001, anthrax-contaminated letters were sent to members of Congress in Washington, to television news stations in New York, and to a Florida newspaper, although the source of the agent and the reasons for its use remain unknown. Although neither the Soviet Union nor the United States overtly used chemical agents against humans during the

Cold War, toxic chemicals have been widely used against plants. Between 1962 and 1971, the United States sprayed about 11 million gallons of Agent Orange (a mixture of two phenoxy herbicides) over 6 million acres of Vietnamese forest. There have been persistent claims that either Agent Orange or the dioxin with which it was contaminated caused birth defects, delayed neurological damage, and cancer, although these claims have been difficult to prove definitively.

Since the close of the Cold War, there have been scattered rumored and verified uses of chemical weapons against enemy combatants or civilians including use by Egypt against Yemen, by Iraq against Iran, and by Iraq against its own Kurdish population. The United States maintains an active educational and logistic chemical defense program at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Jack McCallum and Daniel E. Spector

See also
Iran-Iraq War

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Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.
(1909–1994)

Chief administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration and head of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate of Plans from 1958 to 1962. Born on 18 September 1909 in Hartford, Connecticut, Richard Mervin Bissell Jr. graduated from Yale University in 1932 with a BA degree in history, then studied at the London School of Economics before returning to Yale in 1933 and graduating from there in 1939 with a doctorate in economics.

During World War II, Bissell served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), beginning his career in intelligence. After the war, he worked in the Department of War Mobilization and Reconversion from 1945 to 1946 and then joined the Economic Cooperation Administration in 1948, later becoming its head. Bissell joined the CIA in 1954 and was named head of the Directorate of Plans (or covert operations) in 1958.

The operations of the Directorate of Plans were soon dubbed "Black Operations" for their clandestine mandate to eradicate world leaders unfriendly to the United States. Bissell and his deputy, Richard Helms, engineered the ouster of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 and later became nearly obsessed with overthrowing Cuban leader Fidel Castro after his 1959 revolution. During Bissell's tenure with the CIA, he was also instrumental in the development of the U-2 spy plane and the Corona spy satellite. It was, however, the unsuccessful 1961 Bay of Pigs operation for which Bissell gained the most notoriety.

In March 1960 CIA Director Allen W. Dulles was tasked with devising a strategy to remove Castro from power, a mission that he turned over to Bissell and Helms. Code-named Operation MONGOOSE, the plan called for a paramilitary invasion of Cuba that involved nearly 400 CIA officers as well as some 1,400 Cuban exiles, who were to carry out the attack itself. Bissell and Helms devised and organized the strategy, which ultimately ended in disaster. The invasion force, trained and armed by the CIA, landed at Cuba's Bay of Pigs on 17 April 1961. Before long, they had been routed by Castro's forces, blowing the cover on the operation and greatly embarrassing the Kennedy administration. The Bay of Pigs fiasco effectively ended Bissell's CIA career, as he was forced to leave the agency in February 1962. He subsequently worked for a think tank and then held positions in a number of private corporations. Bissell died in Farmington, Connecticut, on 7 February 1994.

VALERIE ADAMS

See also

Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Marshall Plan; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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Black Dragon River

See Sino-Soviet Border Incident

Black Panthers

American militant black power organization. In 1966 in Oakland, California, two Merritt Junior College students, Bobby Seale and Huey P. Newton, both

of whom were black power advocates, founded the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, later known as the Black Panther Party (BPP). The events that triggered the foundation of the BPP were the 1965 assassination of the Nation of Islam's Malcolm X and the 1965 riots in Watts, an impoverished black neighborhood in Los Angeles. The Black Panthers pointedly rejected the nonviolent approach of the mainstream civil rights movement as personified by the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.

The BPP demanded that American society reform and provide equality to black Americans in all spheres as well as freedom and self-determination through United Nations-supervised plebiscites. It also sought restitution for slavery, exemption from military service for black Americans, an end to police brutality, and full employment. The BPP was also bitterly opposed to the Vietnam War.

The Black Panthers believed in self-help; therefore, they set up neighborhood programs that created educational programs, food banks, medical services, and patrols against police abuse. From their base in Oakland, the BPP quickly grew into a nationwide organization. Defenders of the Black Panthers claimed that they talked more violence than they practiced. Critics, however, pointed to their tactics of violence, aimed particularly at the police.

To publicize their militant image, BPP members usually donned black berets, leather jackets, and firearms. Their militancy resulted in repeated

Members of the Black Panthers march in Manhattan to protest the murder trial of Huey Newton, 22 July 1968. (Bettmann/Corbis)

confrontations with police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Fearing a union of black and white radicals, the FBI organized and conducted a counterintelligence program, known as COINTELPRO, that operated from 1956 to 1971 to monitor and control dissent. The FBI infiltrated the BPP, paid informants, and raided Black Panther offices from coast to coast. In 1963, a shootout with police in Chicago killed Fred Hampton, the Illinois BPP leader, while a showdown in Oakland in 1967 left a policeman dead and landed Newton in jail for manslaughter. By the end of the 1960s, twenty Black Panthers had died in such violence, and much of the leadership was behind bars.

Released while his case was on appeal in 1970, Newton focused the BPP strictly on community services such as soup kitchens, free clinics, clothing and food drives, and community patrols of schools. During this period, he also led successful rent strikes and campaigns against drug abuse and crime and published *Revolutionary Suicide* (1973). He was shot dead on an Oakland, California, street in 1989. By 1973, with many of its leaders jailed or dead, the BPP had faded almost into obscurity.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hoover, John Edgar; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Malcolm X; Vietnam War

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Blair, Eric Arthur

See Orwell, George

Blum, Léon
(1872–1950)

French political leader, premier, and man of letters. Born in Paris on 9 April 1872 into a middle-class republican Jewish family, Léon Blum entered the École Normale Supérieure in 1890 but did not pursue an academic career. After obtaining degrees in law and literature at the Sorbonne, he made his mark in literary criticism and law. Politicized by the Dreyfus Affair of 1894, Blum began writing in the socialist daily *L'Humanité* and joined the French Socialist Party (SFIO). Soon he was the party's main theoretician.

A staunch supporter of SFIO leader Juan Juarès who was assassinated on the eve of World War I, Blum in 1919 won election to the French Chamber of Deputies as a socialist. Soon thereafter he drafted the SFIO program. After the communists split off from the socialists at the 1920 Socialist Party Congress, Blum devoted his efforts to reviving the SFIO. His leadership was a major factor in making the party into a formidable political force. This is remarkable given that Blum was an intellectual with no great oratorical skills heading a proletarian party. He also established *Le Populaire*, the new party newspaper.

By the mid-1930s the SFIO was the leading party in the leftist Popular Front, and the 1936 election victory catapulted Blum into the premiership in June. He was both the first Jewish and first socialist premier of France. The Popular Front was not a success, and Blum lasted barely a year as premier, the coalition collapsing under economic pressures and the Spanish Civil War.

Blum's second premiership, March–April 1938, was even less successful. Long an advocate of disarmament, he now championed French rearmament. The defeat of France in 1940 splintered the SFIO. Blum was among those who refused to vote for Marshal Henri Pétain to be premier and courageously chose to remain in France. Arrested by the Vichy government, Blum was brought to trial at Riom, an event that he turned into a major triumph and defense of republicanism that helped inspire the Resistance. He supported General Charles de Gaulle and in 1943 was imprisoned by the German Gestapo at Buchenwald.

After the defeat of Germany, Blum was welcomed back to France, although now his role was that of elder statesman. From December 1946 to January 1947, he headed an all-socialist government. It was during this turbulent period in the new Fourth Republic that events in Indochina reached a point of crisis. A week before taking his position as head of the government, Blum wrote in *Le Populaire* that independence (later qualified to read "independence within the French Union") was the only solution for Vietnam. Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh sent Blum proposals to relieve Franco-Vietnamese tensions, but French military censors in Saigon held up the cable until it was too late to do any good. Even so, it is doubtful that Blum could have carried this off. Since the Liberation the socialists were but one of three major French political parties, locked in uneasy coalition with the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) and the communists. Center and rightist French political factions opposed colonial concessions. And Blum's government was a stop-gap affair designed to bridge the period until the new constitution took effect.

In any case, it was ironic that a long-standing critic of French colonialism should be French premier when the Indochina War began. In responding to the beginning of the war in December 1946, Blum reacted very much as a centrist or rightist leader would have done. He told the Assembly that France was using military force in self-defense. "Before all, order must be established," he said. In January, fellow socialist Paul Ramadier replaced Blum as premier.

After leaving the premiership, Blum carried out a number of important diplomatic assignments. He also continued to write for *Le Populaire* until

his sudden death during a party meeting at Jouy-en-Josas, near Paris, on 30 March 1950.

Spencer C. Tucker

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Bo Yibo
(1908–2007)

Minister of finance and vice premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Dingxiang, Shanxi, on 17 February 1908, Bo Yibo was educated at various universities in Beijing and Hebei. In 1925 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and became an active participant in the party's student organizations. During the Sino-Japanese War, he fought valiantly in his native province and was rewarded with the directorship of the administrative office of southeastern Shanxi in 1943. During the Chinese Civil War, Bo served as the political commissar of the North China Military Region.

After the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, Bo became responsible for financial and economic affairs. He was first appointed minister of finance and then in 1953 vice chairman of the State Planning Commission. In 1956 he became the PRC's vice premier. In 1959 he was also tasked with the deputy directorship of the State Office of Industry and Communications and assumed the full directorship in 1961, during which he was responsible for the Great Leap Forward program.

In mid-1966, as a result of the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution, Bo was branded as a counterrevolutionary revisionist and purged from office. He was thereafter kept sequestered until December 1978, when he was reappointed as vice premier. During his second vice premiership, he headed several delegations to Canada, the United States, and Japan, reinforcing the freshly hewn Sino-American rapprochement. He also served on the State Financial and Economic Commission, assisting China's new leader, Deng Xiaoping, in reforming the Chinese economy with an emphasis on the uniqueness of Chinese socialism. In mid-1982, Bo became vice minister of the State Commission for Restructuring Economic System and actively engaged in promoting Chinese trade. In early 1988, he retreated from the political front line but still held the vice chairmanship of the Central Advisory Committee, in which capacity he supported Deng's military crackdown on student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. Bo died of old age in Beijing on 15 January 2007.

Law Yuk-fun

See also
China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping

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Bodnăraş, Emil
(1904–1976)

Romanian communist and political leader. Born on 10 February 1904 (according to official Romanian records) either in Kolomyya (in the disputed region of Bukovina, now Ukraine) or in Cimpulung Moldovenesc, Romania, into a Ukrainian-German family of modest means, Emil Bodnăraş studied law at the University of Iaşi. During 1925–1927 he attended the artillery officers' academy in Timişoara and was an officer in the Royal Romanian Army from 1928 until he defected to the Soviet Union in February 1932. On one of the clandestine missions he undertook for the Soviet security and intelligence agency, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, he traveled through Bucharest, where he was recognized and arrested in 1934. Tried for desertion and espionage, he was sentenced in May 1935 to ten years' imprisonment, during which time he befriended fellow inmate Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and in 1940 joined the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).

After his early release in November 1942, Bodnăraş kept up contact with Gheorghiu-Dej and continued his undercover work for the Soviets, now as "Engineer Ceauşu," a construction materials merchant whose cover allowed him to purchase German weapons for RCP cells forming in 1944 around Bucharest. Bodnăraş was instrumental in the August 1944 ouster of Romanian strongman Ion Antonescu and worked closely with the advancing Soviets. Honing his connections with both Moscow and Gheorghiu-Dej, Bodnăraş achieved a succession of influential posts in the new communist government, most prominently as minister of national defense from 1947 to 1957, Politburo member from 1948, and vice president during 1954–1955 and 1957–1965. Long regarded as a shadowy but menacing figure in communist Romanian politics, Bodnăraş's fortunes waned as Gheorghiu-Dej steered a course away from Soviet oversight of Romania and especially after the latter's death in 1965. Bodnăraş died in Bucharest on 24 January 1976.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe; Romania

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Bogotá, Act of
(13 September 1960)

Act adopted by the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) on 13 September 1960 in Bogotá, Colombia, and designed to improve living conditions and keep communism at bay in Latin America. The main objectives of the Act of Bogatá were to improve the socioeconomic situation of Latin American peoples, to develop the Latin American economy, and to stanch the threat of communism in the region. These goals were to be achieved by domestic and international financial assistance, social and economic revitalization programs, and the reformation of domestic institutions.

The act's objectives were to be realized through the buttressing of democratic institutions in Latin America. The values promoted by the act were said to "lie at the base of Western civilization" and included political and religious freedom, democracy, and the dignity of the individual. Regional and international cooperation was paramount and required self-help efforts in the areas of taxation, land distribution, education and vocational training, health care, and housing.

The 1960 act was divided into four sections. Section I, "Measures for Social Improvement," was subdivided into five parts. Part A recommended "measures for the improvement of conditions of rural living and land use." These included increased land ownership, the financing of farmers through governmental programs, and the reformation of tax systems to put more land to work. Part B recommended "measures for the improvement of housing and community facilities." These would be met by increasing the availability of low-cost housing, better planning, and the facilitation of public and private investment. Part C recommended "measures for the improvement of educational systems and training facilities" by employing mass education and the development of subjects and specialists in the arts and sciences. Part D recommended "measures for the improvement of public health," which would help eradicate malaria and other infectious diseases, reduce infant mortality, provide health insurance, promote health education, and increase the number of hospitals. Part E recommended "measures for the mobilization of domestic resources," which focused on encouraging domestic savings and sound financial practices, implementing fair taxes, and allocating funds for social development.

In Section II, "Creation for a Special Fund for Social Improvement," the act stipulated that a special inter-American fund would be created by the U.S. government to aid social development. The fund was to be operated by the Inter-American Development Bank. Money would be provided to Latin American nations intent on reforming their institutions in accordance with social and economic development.

Section III, "Measures for Economic Development," declared that the above-listed measures were aimed at economic development whose implementation was promptly required. This was to be achieved through public-private finance that involved the United States, Western Europe, and international lending agencies.

Section IV, "Multilateral Cooperation for Social and Economic Progress," stipulated that multilateral cooperation would be monitored through annual meetings by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. The new council and the OAS would be used to promote trade and increase capital flow from the Western Hemisphere and other international sources.

The Act of Bogotá provided for the creation of the Alliance for Progress, which was confirmed by the Charter of Punta del Este in 1961, and became the vehicle for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs and outreach in Latin America during the 1960s.

Dewi I. Ball

See also

Alliance for Progress; Americas; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Organization of American States

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Bohlen, Charles Eustis

(1904–1974)

U.S. foreign service officer and ambassador. Born in Clayton, New York, on 30 August 1904, Charles "Chip" Bohlen was educated at St. Paul's School in Concord, New Hampshire, and at Harvard University. He joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1929. Here, along with his lifelong friend George F. Kennan, he became one of the small initial group of American diplomats trained as Soviet specialists.

When the United States resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, Bohlen became one of three Russian-language officers in the Moscow embassy. After further assignments in Washington and Tokyo, in 1942 he became assistant chief of the Russian Section of the State Department's Division of European Affairs and in 1944 its chief. He attended the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1943 and the Tehran and Yalta summits of the Allied leaders in 1944 and 1945.

U.S. State Department official and ambassador Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen helped develop the Cold War containment policy. (Library of Congress)

Although later criticized by Senator Joseph McCarthy for his acquiescence in the decisions at Yalta, Bohlen in fact had reservations as to the wisdom of American policies. Like Kennan, he was deeply suspicious of Soviet actions and intentions. Unlike Kennan, who originally recommended acquiescence in the creation of a Soviet sphere of influence, Bohlen advocated firm diplomatic pressure to attempt to win Soviet concessions. Appointed political advisor to the secretary of state in 1946 and counselor to the Department of State in 1947, he helped develop the Cold War containment policy.

In 1953 Bohlen was appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union. McCarthyite attacks on his record held up his appointment until Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, while denying that Bohlen was a security risk, pledged that Bohlen would have little input in the secretary's policies. During 1957–1959 Bohlen was ambassador to the Philippines.

In 1959 Bohlen became special assistant to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter. Preparing for the June 1960 Soviet-American Paris summit, Bohlen advised President Dwight D. Eisenhower to remain resolute over West Berlin, then under considerable Soviet pressure. Bohlen accompanied Eisenhower to this meeting, which was cut short by the U-2 Crisis.

In their first eighteen months in office, President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk relied heavily on Bohlen's expertise. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bohlen counseled a mix of firmness and restraint and recommended a naval blockade of the island. He next served as ambassador to France during 1962–1967.

Appointed deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs in 1967, Bohlen called for the expansion of American trade with the Soviet bloc as a way to weaken Soviet control over Eastern Europe. He failed to anticipate the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 but advised that, given Soviet determination to maintain its hold over Eastern Europe, the United States should restrict its response to diplomatic protests.

Bohlen retired in 1969, warning President Richard M. Nixon not to try using China against the Soviet Union. Bohlen was publicly skeptical of both the emerging American policy of détente and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik opening to East Germany. In retirement Bohlen became president of the investment company Italamerica, wrote his memoirs, and lectured extensively. He died in Washington, D.C., on 1 January 1974.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Containment Policy; Cuban Missile Crisis; Czechoslovakia; Détente; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; France; Herter,

Christian Archibald; Kennan, George Frost; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Ostpolitik; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Rusk, Dean; Soviet Union; Truman, Harry S.; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Bokassa, Jean-Bédel
(1921–1996)

Dictator and self-proclaimed emperor of the Central African Republic (Central African Empire). Born on 22 February 1921 in Bobangui, Moyen-Congo, Jean-Bédel Bokassa was a career soldier. He served in the Free French Forces during World War II, rising to the rank of captain in the French Army before leaving it in 1964 to join the Central African Republic's army. By the end of 1965, Bokassa had achieved the rank of colonel and was chief of staff of the armed forces. On 1 January 1966, he mounted a successful coup against President David Dacko, his cousin, who had plunged the African nation into economic chaos.

Once in power, Bokassa almost immediately abolished the constitution and ruled with an iron fist. He survived two coup attempts, one in April 1969 and another in December 1974, and also an assassination attempt in February 1976. In March 1972 he declared himself president for life; in December 1976 he declared an end to the Central African Republic and in December 1977 had himself crowned emperor of the new Central African Empire. During his despotic reign he managed to forge close ties with France, particularly with its president, Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing, who for a time supported Bokassa's regime. In turn, Bokassa supplied uranium for France's nuclear weapons programs. By January 1979, however, following the massacre of civilians during a protest in Bangui, Giscard came under fire for his military and financial aid to Bokassa.

While Bokassa was visiting Libya, former President Dacko mounted a successful coup and overthrew Bokassa's regime on 20 September 1979, using French troops. After Bokassa's thirteen-year reign that had become increasingly bizarre amid allegations of cannibalism and crimes against humanity, Dacko restored a minimal semblance of order until he too was overthrown—for a second time—in September 1981.

In the meantime, Bokassa went into exile in France before returning to his homeland in 1986 to face charges that included treason, murder, and cannibalism. He was cleared of the cannibalism charges but was found guilty of the others and sentenced to death. In 1988 his sentence was commuted to

life imprisonment; he was eventually freed on 1 August 1993 during a general amnesty. Bokassa died on 3 November 1996 in Bangui.

JOHN SPYKERMAN

See also

Africa; France; Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry; Libya

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Bolivia

Landlocked South American country covering 424,162 square miles, roughly the size of the U.S. states of Texas and California combined. Bolivia is bordered by Brazil to the east and north, Argentina and Paraguay to the south, and Peru and Chile to the west. Bolivia had a 1945 population of 2.56 million people; more than 60 percent were indigenous peoples, mostly concentrated in the western section of the country, known as the Altiplano. Mineral wealth has been at the core of economic activity ever since the Spanish colonial period (when silver ruled) through the era of tin extraction from the beginning of the twentieth century to the 1960s. In the last three decades, tin mining has given way to petroleum and natural gas exploitation. The new hydrocarbon wealth is located in eastern Bolivia, which has become the center of a dynamic agroindustrial complex built around sugar, cotton, and cattle, with the city of Santa Cruz at its core.

Middle-class discontent and a self-confident, armed miners' movement brought on the 1952 Bolivian Revolution. This was only the second social revolution in Latin America and was led by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). In 1953 a radical land reform restored land to peasant communities that had lost out to big estates in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The MNR government also nationalized the tin industry in 1952, and for a short period (until 1964), militias of tin workers and peasants displaced the traditional armed forces.

In 1964, a revitalized national army overthrew the MNR and ruled Bolivia with the help of a military-peasant pact that secured the neutrality of the rural masses and facilitated the army's repression of the militant leftist tin miners. The newly installed government of Rene Barrientos (1966–1969) defeated the insurrection headed by Che Guevara during the 1966–1967 period. The Guevarista effort to establish a revolutionary base, or foco, languished in the absence of peasant support. The traditional centers of the Bolivian Left—the tin miners, the Bolivian Workers Central, and the Bolivian Communist Party—remained on the margins or were actively hostile to Guevara's enterprise. Guevara was killed in 1967 by Bolivian Rangers trained by U.S. military advisors.

From the early 1970s to 1986 Bolivia was ruled by a bewildering series of governments that ranged from the moderate Left to the far Right. After 1986, civilian rule was maintained by a series of governments built around three political parties: the MNR, the Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR), and the Nationalist Democratic Action (AND).

In the 1970s, coca, a traditional part of indigenous culture, became a hugely profitable commercial crop, leading to the corruption of the armed forces and political parties who profited from protecting growers and traffickers. The eradication of coca became the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Bolivia from the 1980s onward. The United States demanded and financed the eradication of coca cultivation and made aid dependent on Bolivia's cooperation in this endeavor. The war on drugs was, in some ways, a replacement of the Cold War, and the sharply increased level of U.S. economic and military intervention in the war pitted the United States and its government allies against nationalist groups, especially the increasingly powerful peasant federations (such as the movement of the coca growers, or *cocaleros*, led by Evo Morales) that challenged the old social order from the 1980s.

Pressure from nationalist and anti-imperialist peasant and urban popular movements angered by the sale of state enterprises (water utilities and petroleum and gas companies) to foreign corporations destabilized governments in the 1990–1995 period. In the three years of 2002–2005, two elected presidents (Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada and Carlos Mesa) were forced to resign under pressure from mass urban and rural mobilizations.

Barry Carr

See also

Cuba; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Latin America, Communist Parties in

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Bombers, Strategic

Bomber aircraft played an important role in the Cold War as the first strategic nuclear delivery systems employed by nuclear-capable nations. Bombers predated nuclear-tipped ballistic and cruise missiles. Unlike ballistic missiles, long-range bombers were both recallable and retargetable and were therefore flexible. Bombers could be more accurate delivery systems than the early ballistic missiles, and in an age before the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), bombers could carry several nuclear gravity bombs and standoff missiles. Bombers could also be used as a show of force in ways that ballistic missiles, whether ground-based or sea-based, could not. Indeed, the forward deployment of long-range bombers was used to signal potential adversaries during crises such as Berlin (1948–1949

and 1960–1961), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1962), and the Yom Kippur War (1973).

Mass production of long-range bombers also stimulated vast expenditures in air defense systems and commands, particularly the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona Strany (PVO Strany), the Soviet Union's national defense system. Aggressive reconnaissance activities involving bomber aircraft, some of which were modified for these missions, constituted an undeclared war of sorts as ferreting flights tested the weaknesses and strengths of the air defense systems. Ferreting was the dangerous and provocative use of reconnaissance aircraft to test the air defenses of a potential enemy in order to gather electronic and signals intelligence. In such operations, many U.S. aircraft were shot down and their crews lost. Low-flying Soviet bombers often observed and disrupted at close ranges U.S. Navy aircraft carrier operations; two of these Soviet bombers lost control and crashed near U.S. ships in 1964 and in 1968.

With improvements in air defense systems by the 1960s, particularly surface-to-air missiles and nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles, the long-range bomber had to evolve to survive.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the use of long-range bombers by the United States and Britain resulted in a number of programs designed to limit their vulnerability to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). For example, the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) implemented a so-called fail-safe system whereby bombers would deploy and then fly to a prearranged aerial holding area to await further orders. SAC also used airborne alert that kept about 16 percent of the bomber force constantly airborne, sustained in this posture using tanker aircraft and rotating aircraft. Upon receipt of orders, the bombers would then proceed to predesignated targets.

In contrast, the Royal Air Force's (RAF) V-Force tended to use a ground alert system and shell-game satellite deployment airfields. In this, several airfields were made bomber-capable, but not all were occupied by V-bombers. The aircraft were then shifted around among the airfields to complicate enemy targeting.

Long-range bombers evolved during the Cold War. The United States entered the Cold War with the Boeing B-29 Superfortress, a piston-driven aircraft. The Soviet Union utilized the Tupolev TU-4 Bull, based on impounded examples of the B-29. Neither aircraft possessed intercontinental range, and both required forward basing to attack enemy targets. The RAF used borrowed B-29s, called Washingtons, until its first long-range jet bomber, the Vickers Valiant, was deployed in 1955. By 1958, the futuristic-looking delta-wing Avro Vulcan and crescent-wing Hawker-Siddley Victor entered service. The U.S. Air Force's intercontinental Boeing B-36 Peacemaker, equipped with both piston-driven and jet engines, took over from the B-29s in the late 1940s. It was in turn supplanted by the Boeing B-47 Stratojet swept-wing jet bomber in the mid-1950s. The B-47s had a shorter range than the B-36s but were capable of aerial refueling. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had deployed the swept-wing jet Tupolev TU-16 Badger by 1955, the swept-wing jet Myasishchev M-4 Bison in 1955, and the huge swept-wing, propeller-driven Tupolev TU-95 Bear in 1958. These aircraft constituted the "golden age" of long-range bomber aviation.

The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strategic bomber first flew in 1954 and remains in active service. It is considered one of the greatest aircraft ever built. The B-52G model shown here was photographed in 1984. (U.S. Department of Defense)

With improvements in air defense systems by the 1960s, particularly surface-to-air missiles and nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles, the long-range bomber had to evolve to survive. During this time, the U.S. Air Force retired its older aircraft and replaced them with a large fleet of Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses. The B-52, like many of the Soviet aircraft such as the Tupolev TU-95, and Tupolev TU-16, was equipped with standoff missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. Standoff missile systems, such as the Hound Dog, could be used to suppress air defenses from a distance, permitting the bomber to carry on to its targets and drop gravity bombs. The British Vulcans were equipped with Blue Steel, an indigenous standoff missile.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union invested heavily in supersonic long-range bombers in the 1960s; the U.S. Convair B-58 Hustler and the Soviet Tupolev TU-22 Blinder were comparable in this regard. The planned replacements for the U.S. Air Force's and Soviet Union's strategic bomber fleets, the North American XB-70 Valkyrie and the experimental Myasishchev M-50 Bounder, were indicators of what direction bomber design was supposed to go, but cost, vulnerability, and technological limitations led to both aircraft being canceled by the 1970s. By the 1980s, the United States produced the Boeing B-1B Lancer, a variable-geometry-wing jet bomber, while the B-52 fleet received improved standoff systems, including the highly accurate air-launched cruise missile with a computer-piloted terrain-following system. Bomber aircraft could carry up to twenty such missiles in

the bomb bays, which would have held only two or four gravity bombs in the 1960s.

Other nations also used long-range bombers, but usually in a conventional role. The United Arab Republic (Egypt), for example, secured from the Soviet Union Tupolev TU-16s, some with conventional standoff systems. In the 1960s the People's Republic of China (PRC) built its own versions of Soviet aircraft and then employed them as nuclear delivery vehicles. Most of the Western Allies, however, did not have a need for long-range bombers given the defensive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) and the comparatively short distances found in Europe. Thus, France used its Dassault Mirage IV as its primary nuclear delivery system, while Canada employed the CF-104 Starfighter based in Europe.

As elements of the nuclear triad developed and improved, specifically submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and MIRV systems, the bomber ceased to be the first line of deterrence for the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, all three nations continued to maintain long-range bombers throughout the last two decades of the Cold War, for a variety of reasons. First, they could be used in a conventional bombing role, as with U.S. aircraft in Vietnam, British aircraft in the Falklands War, and Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan. Second, they remained good signaling tools in a crisis. Finally, they introduced uncertainty and ambiguity into an adversary's defensive strategy in the event of nuclear exchange.

Sean M. Maloney

See also

Afghanistan War; Aircraft; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Falklands War; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Royal Air Force; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; United States Air Force; Vietnam War

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Bonner, Yelena Georgievna
(1923–)

Physician, human rights activist, and prominent Soviet dissident. Yelena Bonner was born on 15 February 1923 in Moscow. Her stepfather was jailed and sent to a Soviet labor camp in 1937 for allegedly treasonous activities. He

later died in internment. Because of her husband's alleged crimes, Bonner's mother was also sent to a labor camp in 1937 for eight years.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Bonner served in the army as a nurse and was partially blinded. During 1947–1953 she studied medicine in Leningrad and earned a degree in pediatrics. She practiced medicine as a district doctor, a maternity home pediatrician, and a foreign aid health worker in Iraq.

In 1965 Bonner joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), but she became disillusioned after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and abandoned the party permanently in 1972. Between 1968 and 1972, she became one of the most active members of the Soviet dissident community. It was also during this period that she met famed Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, whom she married in January 1972. In 1975 Bonner cofounded the human rights organization Helsinki Watch. When she publicly criticized the Soviet regime for human rights violations, she was sentenced to five years of internment in 1984 but was released in 1985.

After Sakharov's death in 1989, Bonner continued her human rights activism, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. She vigorously campaigned against the war in Chechnya and in favor of self-determination for the people in Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed region between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Bonner will always be remembered for having helped push Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev into implementing glasnost and perestroika, policies that ultimately contributed to the end of the Cold War.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

See also

Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Helsinki Final Act; Human Rights; Perestroika; Sakharov, Andrei; Soviet Union

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Bosch Gaviño, Juan
(1909–2001)

Dominican writer, prodemocracy opposition leader, and president of the Dominican Republic during February–September 1963. Born on 30 June 1909 in La Vega, Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch Gaviño was educated at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. During the early years of Rafael Trujillo's long and savage dictatorship, Bosch was arrested for conspiracy against the regime and spent three months in jail. In 1937, he fled the Dominican Republic and spent the next twenty-four years in exile, primarily in Cuba.

In 1939, Bosch helped found the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican Revolutionary Party, PRD). During most of the 1950s he traveled

throughout Latin America, campaigning for democracy in the region and earning a reputation as an accomplished novelist, essayist, biographer, and historian. He returned to the Dominican Republic in 1961 and immediately engaged in politics.

Concerned that the impoverished Dominican Republic would follow Cuba's approach to social and economic change after Trujillo's May 1961 assassination, U.S. President John F. Kennedy sought to bring democracy to the Dominican Republic. In U.S.-supervised elections held in December 1962, Bosch won 60 percent of the vote in what many observers called the first democratic elections in the history of the Dominican Republic. He took office in February 1963. Initially heralded by the Kennedy administration as a promoter of constitutional democracy, Bosch set out to implement sweeping economic and social reforms. In September 1963, however, he was overthrown by a military junta that viewed him as a communist.

Bosch supporters attempted to restore him to power in April 1965, igniting a civil war that resulted in U.S. military intervention. Bosch was defeated by Joaquín Balaguer in a 1966 election. Believing that the PRD had abandoned its reform agenda, Bosch left the party in 1973 and founded the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD, Party of Dominican Liberation). He then ran unsuccessfully for the presidency in 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, and 1994. Bosch died on 1 November 2001 in Santo Domingo.

Michael R. Hall

See also

Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio; Dominican Republic; Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas

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Botha, Pieter Willem
(1916–2006)

National Party prime minister and state president of South Africa. Born in Paul Roux, South Africa, on 12 January 1912, Pieter Botha left the University of the Orange Free State to become a full-time National Party organizer in 1936. He became a member of the South African Parliament from 1948 and was appointed minister of defense by Prime Minister Johannes Vorster in 1966. Botha gained a reputation as being hard-nosed and stubborn; he was later dubbed "the crocodile" by critics because of his thick skin and aggressive behavior.

A staunch anticommunist, in 1975 Botha persuaded Vorster and the cabinet to agree to a South African military invasion of Angola in order to prevent the pro-Moscow Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

Pieter Willem Botha, president of South Africa (1984–1989), speaks to the National Party in Durban, ca. 1986. Unrepentant over his support of apartheid, Botha died in 2006. (David Turnley/Corbis)

from coming to power there. This proved to be an embarrassing failure, for the South African forces had to withdraw. The MPLA took power and then supported the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in its guerrilla war against the South African forces occupying Namibia.

Despite this failure, a scandal in the National Party allowed Botha to take over from Vorster as prime minister in September 1978. With Marxist-Leninist regimes in both Angola and Mozambique, Botha saw a communist threat to the whole of southern Africa.

Botha did urge reform of the apartheid system then in place. One of the major reforms that he pushed through was a power-sharing scheme with two minority groups, the mixed-race Coloreds and the Indians. This split the National Party, but part of Botha's constitutional reform was to create a powerful executive state president, and he was the first to fill that post in 1984. While he continued to denounce the exiled and restricted African National Congress (ANC) as a tool of the South African Communist Party (SACP), he allowed some of his officials to begin covert discussions with Nelson Mandela and other key ANC officials from 1985 on. In July 1989 shortly before Botha left office, he met with Mandela, who rejected release on renunciation of violence. Botha lacked the courage to release him unconditionally.

Under Botha's leadership, apartheid then entered its most brutal phase both at home and abroad. Units in the security forces carried out assassinations,

torture was rampant, and neighboring states were destabilized. Yet when Botha began to introduce reforms, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was prepared to meet him, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan was well disposed toward South Africa as a former ally in World War II. Reagan's constructive engagement policy let Botha off the hook as far as possible sanctions were concerned until the mass uprising of the mid-1980s, when the United States and other countries did begin to impose sanctions.

Botha did agree to withdraw from Namibia in 1988, under pressure from the United States and in the new context of superpower détente. Botha suffered a minor stroke in January 1989 and left office in August that year. It is unlikely that his fierce anticommunism would ever have permitted him to legalize the South African Communist Party as his successor, F. W. de Klerk, did in February 1990. Unrepentant to the last, Botha died in Wilderness, South Africa, on 31 October 2006.

Christopher Saunders

See also

Botha, Roelof Frederik; Constructive Engagement; South Africa; South African Destabilization Campaign; Vorster, Balthazar Johannes

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Botha, Roelof Frederik
(1932–)

South African apartheid diplomat, politician, and foreign minister (1977–1994). Born on 27 April 1932 in Rustenburg, South Africa, Roelof "Pik" Botha studied at the University of Pretoria, where he took a bachelor's degree in 1953 and a postgraduate law degree in 1955. In February 1953 he joined the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, and in June 1956, as a junior secretary, he was transferred to the South African Mission in Stockholm, Sweden. In 1960 he was assigned to South Africa's embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). Three years later he became a member of the South African legal team at the International Court of Justice, The Hague, in a case over the international status of South West Africa (now Namibia).

In 1966, Botha was appointed a law advisor in South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs; during 1966–1974 he attended annual sessions of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. In 1974, a month after presenting his credentials as ambassador to the UN, South Africa was suspended from the body.

Botha's interest in public life mixed diplomacy with politics, and he won a seat for the ruling National Party in April 1970 and again in May 1977. In 1975 he was appointed ambassador to the United States, combining this post

with that of permanent representative at the UN, even though apartheid South Africa had been suspended from fully participating in its meetings and activities.

In April 1977, with his popularity high among white South Africans because of his combative diplomatic style, Botha was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Twice a candidate for the presidency, Botha was on the *verligte* (enlightened) end of the political spectrum. In February 1986 he suggested that South Africa could one day be ruled by a black president.

Botha was instrumental in bringing about the 1984 Nkomati Accord, a nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique that brought him into conflict with South Africa's military and its policy of regional destabilization. Along with U.S. emissary Chester Crocker, Botha ignited a process of dialogue that would eventually prepare the way for the cessation of hostilities in Angola and the independence of Namibia.

When apartheid ended in 1994, Botha became minister of minerals and energy affairs in the government of national unity headed by President Nelson Mandela. In 1996, Botha resigned from government and public life after F. W. de Klerk quit South Africa's postapartheid national unity government.

Peter Vale

See also

Africa; Botha, Pieter Willem; Constructive Engagement; Mandela, Nelson; Namibia; South Africa

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Bourguiba, Habib
(1903–2000)

Tunisian independence leader and Tunisia's first president during 1957–1987. Born on 3 August 1903 in Monastir, Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba was educated at Sadiki College in Tunisia and the University of Paris, where he earned a degree in law.

Upon his return to Tunisia, Bourguiba started the newspaper *l'Action Tunisienne* and in 1934 became head of Al-Destour Al-Gadid (New Constitution Party), which advocated Tunisian independence from French colonial rule. He was arrested three times and imprisoned for his political activities (1934–1936, 1938–1942, and 1952–1954). In 1945, French authorities in Tunisia forced him to seek refuge in Cairo, Egypt. From 1945 to 1950 he embarked on a multination speaking tour in an attempt to garner support for Tunisian independence.

Bourguiba returned to Tunisia in 1950, resuming his campaign to throw off French rule. But in 1952, French authorities jailed him for a third time. After participating in independence negotiations in France upon his release, he returned to Tunisia to a tumultuous welcome in 1955. The following year, Tunisia was granted its independence, and in 1957 Bourguiba was elected president.

As president, Bourguiba was a pro-Western gradualist who sought to modernize Tunisia by reducing the role of religion, guaranteeing the rights of women, and, for a time, guiding an expanding economy. By the 1980s, however, Tunisia's economy was in decline, and Bourguiba was seen as increasingly ineffectual. Citing Bourguiba's failing health and apparent senility, his prime minister, Zine el Abine Ben Ali, ousted him from the presidency in November 1987. Bourguiba was held under house arrest in Monastir, Tunisia, until his death there on 6 April 2000.

Nilly Kamal

See also

Decolonization; France; Tunisia

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Bradley, Omar Nelson
(1893–1981)

U.S. Army general, head of the Veterans Administration (VA), U.S. Army chief of staff, first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and first chairman of the military committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Born on 12 February 1893 in Clark, Missouri, Omar Nelson Bradley graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1915. He first served as an infantry lieutenant with the 14th Infantry Regiment along the Mexican border. During World War I he served in the United States. Promoted to captain in 1920, he held a number of routine assignments, including teaching at West Point. In 1924 he was promoted to major and attended the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. His most significant assignment was at the Infantry School as chief of the Weapons Section while Colonel George C. Marshall was deputy commandant.

Bradley's career accelerated during the 1930s with the support of General Marshall, who became army chief of staff in 1939. Promoted to brigadier general in February 1941, Bradley took command of the Infantry School. Advanced to major general in February 1942, he commanded in succession the 82nd and 28th Infantry Divisions and X and II Corps, leading the latter with distinction in fighting in Tunisia and Sicily. Assuming command of the First Army in October 1943, Bradley led it in the invasion of France in June 1944. During the subsequent campaign in France he performed effectively, and in August 1944 he assumed command of the 12th Army Group. In March 1945 he was promoted to full general.

Following the war, Bradley became head of the VA, significantly reorganizing the sprawling agency. In February 1948 he succeeded Dwight D. Eisenhower as army chief of staff, an appointment that coincided with increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Americans had expected a return to peacetime normalcy after the war, and that meant lower taxes and a smaller military, leaving Bradley with a much-diminished army. In 1949 he was appointed the first chairman of the JCS, which had emerged when the armed services were restructured and consolidated under the new Department of Defense in 1947.



General Omar Bradley commanded the largest field army deployed by the United States in World War II. Following the war, he became the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Library of Congress)

Despite a greatly decreased budget, Bradley successfully lobbied for increased wages for his troops and for the reinstatement of the draft. He also worked to unify the nation's armed forces. He applied his leadership experience in developing the new allied command structure required by NATO, which was established in 1949.

At the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Bradley emerged as one of President Harry S. Truman's closest confidants. In September 1950 Bradley was promoted to the rank of general of the army. He understood and supported the Truman administration's policy of a limited war and defended General Douglas MacArthur's 1951 dismissal, famously saying that an expanded war in Asia would involve the United States "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." Bradley continued as chairman of the JCS under President Eisenhower and retired in August 1953. He went on to work for a number of private corporations and wrote his second autobiography before he died in New York on 8 April 1981.

William T. Walker

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Truman, Harry S.; United States Army

"... The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."
Omar Bradley

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Bradley, Omar Nelson, and Clay Blair. *A General's Life: An Autobiography.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

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Brady Plan
(March 1989)

Debt restructuring plan for developing-world nations implemented by the United States in March 1989. Named after U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, the Brady Plan was developed in the first few months of the George H. W. Bush administration. The plan outlined several methods by which both developing and middle-income nations could reduce their foreign debt load. American and international supporters of the Brady Plan urged commercial banks as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to offer qualifying debtor nations a variety of options for reducing their debt. During 1989–1995, the twenty-one countries that participated in the plan reduced their debt load by $75 billion.

American officials outlined three main programs in the Brady Plan that would allow debtor nations to replace existing debt: debt buybacks, debt conversions, and debt-for-equity swaps. A buyback involved the debtor nation repurchasing some of its existing debt at discounted prices. Because the debt of many countries was valued on open markets far below its face value, nations could reduce their overall debt by borrowing funds from the IMF or the World Bank to purchase their existing debt at deep discounts. Debt conversion involved replacing existing variable interest rate loans with new debt carrying lower fixed rates. Participation in this program required debtor nations to offer guarantees of payment or collateral. For instance, some nations were expected to secure debt repayment with future oil production. In a debt-for-equity trade, a debtor country bought back a portion of its debt with cash reserves. The seller of the debt, the creditor, agreed to reinvest the proceeds of the debt sale in the debtor nation. This reinvestment constituted a new equity position for the creditor in the debtor nation. To participate in the Brady Plan programs, debtor nations pledged to meet certain policy standards for achieving long-term economic stability.

Any middle-income or developing-world debtor nation was potentially eligible to participate in the Brady Plan; however, its implementation is usually associated with Latin America. The four nations participating in Brady Plan debt reduction programs in the first year of its existence were Costa Rica, the Philippines, Mexico, and Venezuela.

Creston S. Long

See also

International Monetary Fund; World Bank

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Brainwashing

Term originating during the Cold War referring to the indoctrination of an individual or a group of people. The U.S. military termed brainwashing "a prolonged psychological process designed to erase an individual's past beliefs and concepts and to substitute new ones." The term "brainwashing" came into general use during the Korean War, when it was used to explain the behavior of a significant number of U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) who chose to collaborate with their communist captors. Indeed, twenty-one U.S. POWs chose to remain after the war in either the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea).

Allegations of brainwashing, which also found their way into such films as *The Manchurian Candidate*, were exaggerated. The North Koreans displayed great brutality toward their prisoners but rarely attempted to indoctrinate them. The Chinese did attempt indoctrination, a process they referred to as *xinao*. It included the same methods employed by communist authorities in the PRC to indoctrinate their own people. Prisoners of the Chinese were segregated by rank, race, and nationality. The Chinese also separated the leaders, introduced informers, disrupted bonding activities, and encouraged collaboration. The authorities also intercepted mail, delivering only that which carried bad news. The reeducation process included lengthy compulsory political lectures as well as self-criticisms and confessions. The Chinese largely ended such practices in 1952. More important in influencing prisoners were the effects of cold, hunger, and illness as well as the threat of violence. U.S. servicemen captured early in the war had received no training in how to resist indoctrination, and many were poorly informed about U.S. foreign policy or the causes of the war.

The Korean experience led to training modifications and, in 1955, the establishment of a six-point code of conduct for American POWs. Filmed appearances by captured U.S. airmen during the Vietnam War and by U.S. and British airmen during the 1991 Persian Gulf War reminded the public that even well-trained personnel could be temporarily persuaded to embrace their opponents' cause. Other Cold War examples of brainwashing can be seen in the confessions of many prominent individuals in Soviet satellite nations who were subjected to show trials and yet were actually completely innocent of the charges brought against them.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Korean War

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Brandt, Willy
(1913–1992)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) political leader, foreign minister (1966–1969), and chancellor (1969–1974). Born Hubert Ernst Karl Frahm in the town of Lübeck on 16 December 1913, Willy Brandt became the most charismatic German politician of the Cold War era. He joined the youth section of the German Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) in 1929 and then briefly became a member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1930 before returning to the more radical SAP in 1931. He adopted the name Willy Brandt in 1933, when the rise of the National Socialists in Germany forced him to flee to Norway.

Brandt spent the war years as a journalist and organizer. He returned surreptitiously to Berlin in 1936 to reorganize the SAP resistance, then went to Spain as an observer reporting from the republican side of the civil war there. The Nazi government stripped him of German citizenship in 1938. When World War II ended, Brandt returned to Germany; among his first jobs was covering the Nuremberg trials for the Scandinavian press.

Brandt became involved in politics again once his citizenship was restored in 1948. As a pragmatic socialist who was also an anticommunist, he was elected to the German parliament in 1949 as a member of the SPD. He served as president of the senate for the City of Berlin during 1955–1957 and, in 1957, won election as mayor of Berlin. Brandt proved his mettle during the crises of 1958–1962 and especially during the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.

The SPD subsequently put Brandt forward as its candidate for chancellor in 1961 and again in 1965. Although both campaigns were unsuccessful, Brandt became foreign minister and vice chancellor in the SPD–Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Grand Coalition government that emerged in 1966. In 1969, when the SPD led a coalition with the Free Democratic Party, Brandt became chancellor.

He quickly set about implementing the policy that would become his legacy: Ostpolitik, or eastern politics. Brandt believed that the path to German success and unity lay in reconciliation with the Soviets and with Eastern Europe. He was particularly concerned with establishing normal relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), a direct contravention of the previous regime's Hallstein Doctrine. Where Adenauer and the CDU had claimed to be the sole legitimate representatives of the German nation, Brandt was willing to accommodate "two states in one nation."

In the wake of the Prague Spring of 1968, moreover, he had openly renounced violence and the threat of violence as political tools in favor of mediation. To that end, he became the first chancellor of the FRG to visit the GDR when he went to Erfurt in March 1970 as part of an exchange of visits with Willi Stoph, chairman of the Council of Ministers for the GDR.

By all accounts, Brandt was received "like a rock star" in East Germany, and he moved quickly to consolidate his position. In August 1970, the FRG concluded a treaty of nonaggression with the Soviet Union, the so-called Moscow Treaty. The FRG recognized the borders of Poland and of the GDR and agreed to make no territorial claims. The Soviets, for their part, recognized that the FRG's position on unification remained unchanged but agreed to work for the normalization of the situation in Berlin. The Four-Power Agreement realizing that goal was signed in September 1971.

West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, 14 March 1961. Brandt was later foreign minister and then chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). (National Archives and Records Administration)

With the groundwork for normal relations with East Germany in place, Brandt signed a similar agreement with the Poles. In the Warsaw Treaty of December 1970, the FRG gave assurances that West Germany would accept the borders established in 1945, but Brandt's performance during the concluding visit was even more spectacular. At a ceremony commemorating the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Brandt dropped to his knees before a memorial to Jews victimized by the SS in 1943 and bowed his head in a gesture that demonstrated to many people that Germany had turned over a new leaf. In addition to being named *Time* magazine's Man of the Year for 1970, Brandt won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1971.

Brandt's achievements were not always readily accepted in the FRG. However, a constructive no-confidence vote forced the issue in April 1972. Brandt and the SPD were returned the following November with 45 percent of the vote, and they forged ahead. In June 1973, Brandt became the first German chancellor to visit Israel, where he offered words of consolation and apology for Germany's actions during World War II. Three months later, he became the first German chancellor to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Brandt's term as chancellor came to an end in 1974, when his loyalty to Gunter Guillaume, an aide who was revealed to be an East German spy, caused a scandal that brought down the government. Brandt continued in politics outside of Germany following his resignation. He was involved in negotiations for peace in the Middle East at several points and worked on nonproliferation issues in a number of capacities. Brandt died in Unkel am Rhein, near Bonn, on 8 October 1992.

Timothy Dowling

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of

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Brătianu, Gheorghe Ion

(1898–1953)

Romanian politician and historian. Born on 3 February 1898 in Ruginoasa, Gheorghe Brătianu was the son of Ion I. C. Brătianu and the nephew of Ion C. Brătianu, both historically prominent figures in Romanian politics. Upon Romania's entry into World War I in 1916, the young Brătianu volunteered for and served in the Romanian Army. In 1921 he attended the Sorbonne in Paris and by 1923 had earned a doctorate in philosophy at Cernăuţi University in Romania. In 1928 he was awarded his doctorate in history from the Sorbonne. He returned to the University of Iaşi in Romania to resume a professorship of world history that he had first held in 1924. In 1940 he joined the history faculty of the University of Bucharest, and in 1942 he became a full member of the Romanian Academy.

By 1930 Brătianu, whose political career paralleled his academic pursuits, had risen to prominence in the National Liberal Party, but he broke ties with that body over its resistance to King Carol II's reinstallation to the throne. Brătianu formed his own splinter party, the National Liberal Party-Gheorghe I. Brătianu, only to rejoin the parent organization in 1938 as its vice president.

During World War II, Brătianu initially sided with Marshal Ion Antonescu in opposing the Soviet acquisition of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, but by August 1944 Brătianu's energies were behind the planners of Antonescu's ouster. After the war, Brătianu opposed the communist takeover of Romania, and in 1947 he was removed from his academic posts by the new government. Brătianu, along with many of his former colleagues in politics, was arrested on 6 May 1950 and imprisoned at Sighetu Marmaţiei, where his death was reported on 27 April 1953.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Romania

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Braun, Wernher von
(1912–1977)

German physicist and rocket scientist who led in establishing the foundations of the U.S. guided missile program. Born in Wirsitz, Posen, on 23 March 1912, Wernher von Braun graduated from the Berlin Institute of Technology in 1932. He then earned a doctorate in physics from the University of Berlin, concentrating on developing liquid-fueled rocket engines.

In 1932 the German military began funding von Braun's work, and he headed a team of engineers building and testing rockets first at Kummersdorf and then at Peenemünde in the Baltic. Von Braun made no secret of his interest in sending rockets to explore space rather than using them as weapons, leading to his arrest for frivolous indulgence. In 1943 Adolf Hitler ordered von Braun's group to develop a rocket as a "weapon of vengeance" to shower explosives on London. Von Braun's colleagues argued that without him they could not accomplish this, so he was freed. The first operational V-2 ("Vengeance") rocket was launched in September 1944.

Fearing for his group's personal safety and the program's future, in early 1945 von Braun led his production team to surrender to U.S. military representatives in western Germany. The Americans seized V-2s, spare parts, and scientific documents from the Peenemünde and Nordhausen facilities and gave von Braun and 126 of his scientists visas for the United States. The group initially settled at Fort Bliss, Texas, and in 1950 transferred to Huntsville, Alabama, where they shared their knowledge with American scientists and laid the foundations of the U.S. rocketry and space exploration programs.

Von Braun's well-publicized suggestions that the United States build a space station and launch manned missions to the moon contributed to the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958 and to Skylab and the Apollo space program during the 1960s. Von Braun retired in 1972 and died in Alexandria, Virginia, on 16 June 1977.

Priscilla Roberts

German scientist Wernher von Braun helped develop the V-2 rocket during World War II. After the war, he immigrated to the United States and developed more advanced rockets. His work was integral to the development of the U.S. space program. (Library of Congress)

See also
Space Race

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Brazil

Latin America's largest nation, Brazil covers an area of nearly 3.3 million square miles and had a 1945 population of about 53 million people. Brazil borders Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, French Guinea, and the Atlantic Ocean to the north; Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay to the south; Bolivia and Peru to the west; and the Atlantic Ocean to the east. Brazil's population is ethnically diverse and includes large numbers of Portuguese, Italian, German, Spanish, Japanese, Arab, African, and indigenous peoples. The official language is Portuguese. Approximately 80 percent of Brazilians are Roman Catholic.

Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy in August 1942 and on Japan in June 1945. The country was an important link in the air route to the Middle East from the United States, and it furnished important raw materials, especially rubber, to the Allied war effort. Brazil was also the only Latin American state apart from Mexico to provide combat units. Some 26,000 men of the Brazilian Army and Air Force participated in the Italian Campaign on the Allied side. Brazil became a large recipient of U.S. military aid during the war, and its economy benefited from American investments that jumpstarted industrialization.

In 1947, Brazil hosted the conference that created the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Rio Pact). Under the administration of President Enrico Dutra (1946–1951), Brazil aligned its foreign policy with that of the United States. The Communist Party was outlawed, and Dutra broke relations with the Soviet Union in 1947. Brazil signed a mutual assistance pact with the United States in 1952.

The government of President Getulio Vargas (1951–1954) pursued nationalist policies designed to strengthen Brazilian control over its natural resources. In 1953, the Brazilian Congress approved creation of the Brazilian oil company known as Petrobras. Originally there was to be both national and foreign investment, but the final bill eliminated the latter, giving the government a monopoly over Brazilian oil reserves.

Vargas's successors adopted a nonaligned foreign policy, maintaining relations with Cuba after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and celebrating Che Guevara as a national hero. In the domestic sphere, Brazil's economic growth slowed; inflation was running at an annual rate of 140 percent in early 1964, and unemployment was rampant. On the other hand, President João Goulart (1961–1964) was unable to reconcile sharp divisions among communists, conservatives, and the armed forces. The military overthrew Goulart in April 1964.

Following the coup, Brazil's foreign policy changed. Washington, concerned about Goulart's leftist policies, had welcomed the coup. The fight against communism became one of the main goals of President Humberto Castelo Branco (1964–1967). In 1964, Brazil decided to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, and in 1965 it supported the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. In fact, Brazil sent troops to the island as part of the Inter-American Force. Castelo Branco's foreign policy adhered to the defense

A convoy of Brazilian Army tanks and other vehicles pauses on the way to Rio de Janeiro on 1 April 1964, after the army high command overthrew the government and forced Brazilian President João Goulart to flee abroad. (AP/Wide World Photos)

of Western democracies, but a certain level of independence was in line with Brazilian national interests. Thus, Brazil maintained commercial relations with the Soviet Union.

In 1964 Brazil and other South American countries implemented the National Security Doctrine (NSD). Created in Brazil's War College, the NSD was anticommunist in essence and saw the military as the guardian of the state and society. Immediately after taking power in 1964, the military regime suspended the Brazilian congress, dissolved political parties and student and union organizations, arrested political leaders, and distanced itself from the Catholic Church. According to the NSD, the armed forces were empowered with internal security functions. In the 1970s other military regimes in the Southern Cone, such as Argentina and Chile, emulated this Brazilian model.

The alliance between Brazil and the United States operated at three levels: military, economic, and technical. The United States continued military assistance, yet it was in the economic arena that Brazil benefited the most. Between 1964 and 1970, Brazil received nearly $2 billion in economic

aid from the United States. U.S. advisors were present in almost every government office.

By the end of the 1960s, however, bilateral relations changed. Brazil was positioning itself as the main economic and military power in South America, and its foreign policy reflected a new pragmatism. While the country continued to maintain good relations with the United States, it also sought to strengthen its ties with developing nations. Brazil was one of the leading nations in creating the Group of 77, a coalition of developing countries at the United Nations; it also opened new markets in Europe and increased its trade with the USSR.

Throughout the early 1970s, Brazil was more concerned with its own economic development than with Cold War ideology. Nevertheless, U.S.-Brazilian relations remained cordial. In the mid-1970s, a combination of inflation, climbing foreign debt, and the effects of the oil crisis (1973–1974) put an end to the Brazilian economic miracle. Two issues also strained U.S.-Brazilian relations during the late 1970s: human rights violations and Brazil's development of a nuclear program. The military junta ruling Brazil was guilty of human rights abuses, including the torture and execution of political prisoners. The Catholic Church was the principal agency condemning the repression, but human rights organizations such as Amnesty International also raised the alarm. Brazilian leaders, however, considered U.S. President Jimmy Carter's defense of human rights an intervention in Brazilian internal affairs. Consequently, President Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979) decided to end the bilateral military pact with the United States that dated from World War II. Because U.S. economic and military aid was suspended, Brazil signed trade agreements with Europe and Japan while continuing to develop its nuclear program in association with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).

The Brazilian nuclear program had begun in 1975, when Brazil signed an agreement with the FRG for reactors and enrichment plants. The nuclear program was not a new Brazilian ambition, but the need to develop new energy sources accelerated the process. The effort by the United States to stop Brazil from developing a nuclear program failed. With the inauguration of democratic governments in the 1980s, Brazil and Argentina did agree to develop nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, to cooperate in nuclear policies, and to exchange personnel at their nuclear plants. Such nuclear cooperation continued during the following decade.

Toward the end of the Cold War, Brazil continued to follow a nonaligned and independent foreign policy. In 1985, President José Sarney (1985–1990) and Argentine President Raul Alfonsin (1983–1989) signed the Iguazu Declaration, by which both countries shared their commitments toward the peace process in Central America, the defense of the Argentine sovereignty rights over the Falklands, and the creation of a peace zone in the South Atlantic. Later agreements were signed laying the groundwork for the creation of Mercosur (Southern Common Market) in 1991.

Carina Solmirano

See also
Americas; Human Rights; Rio Pact

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See Congo, Republic of the

Brazzaville

Bretton Woods System

International monetary system initiated under United Nations auspices at a 1944 conference held at the Bretton Woods resort in New Hampshire. The Bretton Woods System was the first such agreement in history among countries to promote stability in the international monetary system. Negotiated under U.S. leadership, the system was expected to have a broad membership including the Soviet Union, which attended the Bretton Woods conference. In spite of American efforts to involve the Soviet Union in the world economic order, with the deterioration of relations between the wartime allies Moscow decided not to participate in the system. As the Cold War deepened, Moscow denounced the system as an instrument of American imperialism and hegemony.

The Bretton Woods System worked through multilateral lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), better known as the World Bank. The system was also predicated upon certain rules, including convertibility of currencies and fixed but adjustable exchange rates in terms of gold. Under the adjustable peg currency arrangement, governments were obliged to declare to the IMF the parity value (or peg) of their currency and to intervene in the world currency market to maintain fluctuations of the exchange rate within a 1 percent margin above or below parity. The United States defined the value of its dollar in terms of gold, with one ounce of gold equivalent to thirty-five dollars. The United States converted the dollar into gold at this price, while all the other governments defined the value of their currency in terms of gold or U.S. dollars, buying or selling dollars to keep the exchange rate within the range of fluctuation. To keep the exchange rate

Participants of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference meet at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. The result was an agreement among forty-five countries (including the United States) to ensure worldwide financial stability after World War II. (Library of Congress)

within parity range, deficit countries were assured a supply of liquidity via an IMF borrowing mechanism.

As early as 1947 the Bretton Woods System seemed to be somewhat inadequate in managing postwar economic problems. Because their reserves were insufficient and loans could be issued only for financing current account deficits and not capital deficits and reconstruction, the IMF and the World Bank proved unable to finance Western Europe's economic reconstruction and its balance-of-payments deficit. Ultimately, the United States assumed the financial burden of monetary stabilization necessary for the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan through loan and grant programs such as the Marshall Plan and through discriminatory, preferential trade and payment arrangements such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payments Union (EPU). Because economic strength was seen as a bulwark against communism, the United States inter-

vened in ways that sometimes superseded Bretton Woods System institutions. The United States became the residual source of world liquidity—financed by deficits in its own balance of payments—and the linchpin of the monetary regime based on the dollar that, in fact, substituted for gold.

Notwithstanding the success of U.S. policy leading to the economic reconstruction of its allies, after 1958 the persistent American balance-of-payments deficit began to increase dramatically. This development underscored the vulnerability of America's economic position and of the Bretton Woods System. The growing American deficit in the balance of payments and the drain of American gold supplies undermined the credibility of America's pledge to convert dollars into gold because of the erosion of U.S. gold reserves, which in 1960 were less than the amount of dollars in circulation.

Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson linked the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit to the financial burden of the Cold War and the policy of containment. They viewed the deficit as a consequence of the U.S. defense posture in Europe, continued foreign aid, and the American commitment in Vietnam. Therefore, they urged the European allies to assume a larger financial burden in fighting the Cold War by paying a greater share of military expenses for the defense of Western Europe and by holding dollars instead of gold. Because the cost of American troops stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) made up a considerable part of the U.S. deficit, Washington pressed Bonn especially to increase its share of defense costs.

American efforts to convince the Europeans to share the Cold War burden provoked tensions among the United States and its Western allies, each of whom was convinced that the system was asymmetrically favorable to the other. Washington blamed its allies for not reducing the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit by inflating or revaluing their currencies, while the Western Allies, and above all the French, maintained that the role of the dollar as the key currency gave an economic and political advantage to the United States in conducting its foreign and domestic policies, which freed it from the concern of the balance of payments.

After 1965, when President Johnson increased spending for social programs and, to finance the Vietnam War, the balance of payments deficit widened, the American economy began to falter. This caused inflation at home and abroad and increased monetary speculation. Eventually, President Richard M. Nixon, concerned by the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments and the depletion of U.S. gold reserves, unilaterally announced on 15 August 1971 the suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold, a violation of the most basic principle upon which the Bretton Woods System rested. After Nixon's announcement, the dollar was allowed to float freely.

After a last attempt to save the Bretton Woods System with the unsuccessful 1971 Smithsonian Agreement, monetary speculation in 1973 pushed industrialized nations to allow their own currencies to float freely, bringing an effective end to the last vestiges of the system.

Lucia Coppolaro

See also

Europe, Western; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; International Monetary Fund; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Marshall Plan; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Organization for European Economic Cooperation; United Nations; United States; World Bank

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Brezhnev, Leonid
(1906–1982)

General-secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during 1964–1982 and head of state during 1977–1982. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was born in the Ukrainian town of Dneprodzerzhinsk, then called Kamenskoye, on 19 December 1906. The son of a steelworker, he graduated as an engineer in 1935 from the Kamenskoye Metallurgical Institute and worked in the iron and steel industries of the eastern Ukraine. In 1939 he became CPSU secretary in Dnepropetrovsk in charge of the city's important defense industries.

Brezhnev matured as an unquestioning follower of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and gained rapid promotion within the Communist Party hierarchy, especially after the political purges of the late 1930s opened up many positions. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Brezhnev was soon drafted into the Red Army as a political commissar. By the end of the war he was in charge of the Political Administration of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

After the war, Brezhnev's party career gained momentum. During 1946–1955 he served as party first secretary in Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, and then in the republics of Moldavia and Kazakhstan. In 1952 he was also appointed a member of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1957 he joined the Politburo.

Brezhnev's meteoric rise was due in large measure to the power of his new patron, Nikita Khrushchev. Nevertheless, Brezhnev, together with Alexei Kosygin, unseated Khrushchev during a 1964 CPSU power struggle. In the division of power that followed, on 15 October 1964 Brezhnev became first secretary of the CPSU, while Kosygin became prime minister. In 1966 Brezhnev named himself general secretary of the CPSU and began to dominate the collective leadership. In 1975 he was appointed an army general; in 1976 he became marshal of the Soviet Union (the highest military rank); and in 1977 he replaced Nikolai Podgorny as head of state.

During the Khrushchev years, Brezhnev had supported the leader's denunciations of Stalin's arbitrary rule and the liberalization of Soviet intellectual policies. But as soon as he had ousted Khrushchev, Brezhnev began

to reverse this process. The 1966 trials of Soviet writers Yuri Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky marked the reversion to a more repressive policy. The Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB, Committee for State Security) regained much of the power it had enjoyed under Stalin, although there was no recurrence of the political purges of the 1930s and 1940s.

In August 1968, Brezhnev brought communist reforms in Eastern Europe to a halt by ordering the invasion of Czechoslovakia, where the Prague Spring had threatened to dissolve that country's political and military solidarity with Moscow and the Warsaw Pact. This military intervention was afterward justified by the Brezhnev Doctrine, which claimed for the Soviet Union the right to interfere in its client states' affairs in order to safeguard socialism and maintain the unity of the Warsaw Pact.

During Brezhnev's tenure, a nonaggression pact with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) was concluded in 1970, marking the beginning of détente with the West. On a global level, Brezhnev carried out negotiations on arms control with the United States and signed the 1968 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty. On the whole, during the 1970s Brezhnev advocated a relaxation of Cold War tensions, which he also demonstrated by signing the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. This recognized the postwar frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe and in effect legitimized Soviet hegemony over the region. In exchange, the Soviet Union agreed to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, prepares to speak before returning to the Soviet Union from a trip to California in 1973. (Wally McNamee/Corbis)

Relaxation abroad was not matched by liberalization at home. On the contrary, Brezhnev tried to neutralize the effects of détente by expanding the Soviet security apparatus and government control over society. His regime also became synonymous with corruption and the severe repression of dissidents. Urbanization had given rise to an ever-larger number of Soviet citizens, especially from the young and educated groups, hoping to live a Western lifestyle with access to Western culture and a Western middle-class standard of living.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 signaled an end to détente. The Afghanistan War soon deteriorated into a debacle and contributed to the steady decline of the communist regime. Although the Soviet Union was awash in oil dollars, this money was of little help to the civilian economy because the regime frittered its wealth away on construction projects, corruption, and handouts to brother regimes and pumped it into military industries and the Afghan quagmire.

Parallel to the deterioration of the economic and political system, Brezhnev's physical health and mental awareness steadily declined in the late 1970s. The geriatric Politburo, however, with an average age of seventy, feared change and thus kept him in power well beyond his time. Brezhnev died in

Moscow on 10 November 1982 after several years of failing health and was succeeded by KGB head Yuri Andropov.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Afghanistan War; Andropov, Yuri; Brezhnev Doctrine; Détente; Khrushchev, Nikita; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti; Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich; Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich; Ostpolitik; Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich; Prague Spring; Soviet Union; Warsaw Pact

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Brezhnev Doctrine

Policy articulated by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to justify Soviet intervention in its East European client states. The doctrine was used to justify the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which ended the Prague Spring, and also the 1979 Afghanistan invasion.

The Brezhnev Doctrine dictated that whenever socialism was perceived to be in danger in any socialist country, fellow socialist regimes were obligated to intervene. An integral part of the doctrine was that Moscow would determine the timing and extent of intervention. Brezhnev formally defined the doctrine in a speech given in Poland on 13 November 1968, although the policy was already in force. What was most significant about this speech was that it publicly stated what had long been an implicit assumption: that the Soviet Union would intervene in the internal affairs of any nation over which it had exercised control since the end of World War II. Soviet military and political intervention had been used in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in 1953 and in both Poland and Hungary in 1956. A dramatic difference was that the recent Czechoslovak deviation had not been violent but rather was part of a series of internal reforms sponsored by the Czechoslovak communist leadership.

Brezhnev stated that while the individual communist parties and socialist nations had the freedom to reach their own solutions to specific problems, none had the right to make decisions that would either damage socialism in that country or weaken it in other countries. Thus, socialism was an intertwined international movement, and all socialist nations shared an international responsibility. The need to avoid this type of damage led the Soviet Union and other socialist states to stop what Brezhnev called the "antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia."

On 21 August 1968, Warsaw Pact troops had invaded Czechoslovakia for the very reasons Brezhnev cited three months later. While no immediate personnel changes had been made in Czechoslovakia, leading members of Alexander Dubček's regime were eventually removed from their positions, and the government was staffed and led by Czechoslovak communists who had demonstrated their loyalty to Moscow.

The Brezhnev Doctrine was again invoked in 1979. The Afghan monarchy had been overthrown in 1973 and was replaced by a pro-Soviet communist government. Attempting to impose socialist reforms in a traditional nation such as Afghanistan had made the government exceedingly unpopular. A Soviet puppet government had then replaced it and had requested military aid from Moscow. Using this request as justification, Soviet forces intervened in Afghanistan in December 1980 and did not quit the country until 1988.

The looming specter of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the intervention it threatened played a large part in the 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland. During his trial in the early 1990s, Wojciech Jaruzelski, former head of communist Poland, used that fact as part of his defense. He stated that he believed he had no choice but to declare martial law to forestall the Soviets from invoking the Brezhnev Doctrine. The subsequent release of several transcripts of conversations between Jaruzelski and Brezhnev did not, however, prove that an unambiguous threat existed.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev officially repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1989. This came at a time when several East European socialist nations had begun to exercise dramatic independence from Moscow.

Robert N. Stacy

See also

Afghanistan War; Brezhnev, Leonid; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Jaruzelski, Wojciech; Poland; Prague Spring; Solidarity Movement; Warsaw Pact

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See United Kingdom

Britain

British Commonwealth of Nations

A voluntary organization of states connected to Britain through the shared experience of colonialism. The Commonwealth is a loose alliance of countries, with no constitution or binding rules. Its main accomplishment has been to offer a forum for discussion among member nations. It operated on a small budget and only provided a framework for bargaining and for establishing principles and priorities of member states.

Development of the Commonwealth was spurred by both nationalism and the continued decline of Britain as a world power. The Commonwealth began with the recognition of sovereign independence and equality among all British Dominions in 1931. By the end of World War II, Britain, while still nominally a major power, was virtually bankrupt and could no longer defend its empire in the Cold War era of massive military spending. And its colonies wanted independence.

Membership in the British Commonwealth at the end of World War II included Australia (1931, ratified 1942), the United Kingdom (1931), the Republic of Ireland (1931–1949, when it became a republic), Newfoundland (1931, and part of Canada since 1949), New Zealand (1931, ratified 1947), and South Africa (1931). The Commonwealth was originally to be an economic bloc wherein members accorded each other's goods privileged access to their markets (Commonwealth Preference) and had fewer or no restrictions on migration among member countries. In 1950 more than 40 percent of British exports went to Commonwealth countries.

The Commonwealth did not come together for the specific purpose of military alliance, although member states were often involved in other international defensive alliances. During the Cold War, however, the Commonwealth nearly broke apart because of seemingly irreconcilable political differences among certain member states.

The simultaneous Cold War era and worldwide decolonization movement led to the independence of many former colonies and their admission into the Commonwealth, although this also contributed to some tensions. The first occurred in 1950 when newly independent colonies that were republics wanted to join the Commonwealth, whereas other member states were Dominions. The impasse was resolved when Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent proposed a formula whereby India and other countries could remain members if they accepted the British monarch as head of the Commonwealth, regardless of their domestic constitutional arrangements. This compromise is considered by many to be the start of what is called the Modern Commonwealth. Not all issues were so easily resolved, however.

The debate concerning Southern Rhodesia (called Zimbabwe after 1980) was particularly heated. Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) was granted independence and membership into the Commonwealth in 1964, but Southern Rhodesia remained a British colony because it did not have adequate representation for the nonwhite population. On 11 November 1965, Ian Smith, the leader of the white minority government, declared independence. This move was internationally condemned and, upon Britain's insistence, Rhode-

sia was placed under sanctions authorized by the United Nations (UN) Security Council from 1965 until its independence in 1980. Throughout the period, Southern Rhodesia was wracked by a bloody civil war. Britain gained control of the country for a short time in 1979. The new nation of Zimbabwe joined the Commonwealth in 1980, was suspended in 2002, and left in 2003 because of charges of electoral fraud.

The most contentious and well-known conundrum involving the Commonwealth during the Cold War era was South Africa's apartheid government. During 1948–1990, successive white-minority governments enacted policies and laws that legally sanctioned strict racial segregation. A Commonwealth member, South Africa left in 1961 because of widespread international condemnation. During this time there was widespread violence against the black population as state police tried to repress protest movements. In response, both the Commonwealth and the UN passed resolutions condemning South Africa. The 1971 Declaration of Commonwealth Principles denounced racial prejudice, colonial domination, and great disparities of wealth. Yet Britain, among others, desired a moderate and gradual approach to combating apartheid, whereas African states would not accept any compromise regarding racial oppression. This created a rift between white Commonwealth members and the poorer African members.

International economic pressure was applied whereby nations refused to invest in South African businesses or any business that had dealings in South Africa. South African sports teams were barred from international events, and South African tourism was boycotted. These bans, however, were not very effective, and many states did little to enforce them. In 1984 limited reforms in South Africa were introduced, but violence immediately followed when P. W. Botha's government tried to eliminate political opposition and then attempted to conceal its actions by censoring the media. Not until 1994, when Nelson Mandela became president of South Africa, did apartheid end, whereupon South Africa was allowed to rejoin the Commonwealth.

At the end of the Cold War, member states other than Britain had more influence than they did in 1945. The formation of regional groups (usually motivated by economic imperatives) such as the African Caribbean Pacific Group or the Caribbean Community allowed states to support one another in binding agreements. Yet poor countries were still often unable to redistribute wealth among their populations or make international political demands because of their lack of negotiating power when dealing with international financial institutions. The end of the Cold War also meant that the Soviet Union could no longer provide an alternative to capitalism. There was also the realization that many ethnic, political, regional, and religious divisions within former colonies had been overlooked when they were first granted independence. This was especially true in many African states, where the number of human rights abuses was appalling. Nonetheless, in such instances the Commonwealth continued to provide a forum for discussion that, by allowing a place for dialogue, will perhaps result in solutions to the problems that continue to plague Commonwealth nations.

Jonathan A. Clapperton

See also

Africa; Anticolonialism; Decolonization; Mandela, Nelson; Nationalism; Race Relations, United States; Smith, Ian Douglas; South Africa; United Kingdom; Zimbabwe

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Browder, Earl Russell
(1891–1973)

Head of the American Communist Party (CPUSA) during 1932–1945. Born in Wichita, Kansas, on 20 May 1891, Earl Browder received only an elementary school education but later attended business college and was, for a brief time, a bookkeeper. When he was fifteen, Browder joined the Socialist Party of America. During World War I, he was imprisoned from 1917 to 1918 for draft evasion. In 1921 he joined the newly formed CPUSA.

The American communist movement was largely urban- and immigrant-based, with a dearth of members from the interior heartland; thus, Browder was decidedly in the minority. However, overseas assignments with the Communist International (Comintern) helped Browder's rise within the CPUSA. He was appointed general secretary of the party in 1930 and assumed leadership of it in 1932 when its leader, William Foster, suffered a heart attack. Under Browder's guidance, party membership swelled to its peak of 90,000 in 1939.

Between 1941 and 1945, Browder strongly championed the so-called Grand Alliance. When Josef Stalin dissolved the Comintern in 1943 to placate the West, Browder took this as an opportunity to follow a more autonomous path. In 1944 Browder unilaterally announced that communism and capitalism could coexist peacefully. Such ideological heresy caused his immediate ouster as general secretary. In 1946, Soviet officials stripped Browder of his party membership.

In 1944 Browder unilaterally announced that communism and capitalism could co-exist peacefully. Such ideological heresy caused his immediate ouster as general secretary.

In April 1950, Browder was called to testify before Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's House Committee on Un-American Activities. During his testimony, Browder admitted his involvement in the CPUSA and even criticized it, but he refused to incriminate former associates. He was charged with contempt of Congress but was never prosecuted for it. After his brush with McCarthyism, he retreated into obscurity until his death in Princeton, New Jersey, on 27 June 1973. Soviet archives would later suggest that Browder had participated in espionage prior to 1945, but his precise involvement remains in question.

James G. Ryan

See also

Communist Fronts; Communist Revolutionary Warfare; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism

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Brown, Harold
(1927–)

U.S. secretary of defense (1977–1981). Born in New York City on 19 September 1927, Harold Brown was a child prodigy. He graduated in 1945 from Columbia University, which awarded him a PhD in physics four years later. In 1950 he joined the University of California at Berkeley Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and in 1960 succeeded Edward Teller as director of the associated Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory. During the 1950s Brown worked on Polaris missile warheads, serving on the President's Science Advisory Committee from 1958 to 1961, and was a scientific advisor to Geneva talks on discontinuing nuclear testing in 1958 and 1959.

In 1961 President John F. Kennedy appointed Brown director of research and engineering in the Defense Department. From 1965 to 1969 Brown was secretary of the U.S. Air Force, where he spearheaded numerous improvements, especially in the areas of ballistic missile, antimissile, and space technology. He was president of Caltech during 1969–1977, a controversial period of antiwar protests and cuts in higher education funding. During these years he was also a delegate to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that began in Helsinki in November 1969, contributing substantially then and later to the treaties concluded in May 1972 and 1979 and also to the interim November 1974 Vladivostok Agreement.

In 1977 President Jimmy Carter appointed Brown, a fellow Trilateral Commission member who had advised the president during his 1976 campaign, secretary of defense, expecting Brown to upgrade American defenses while eliminating wasteful spending. Carter respected Brown's fairly hawkish views on the need to modernize American strategic nuclear forces by developing and deploying intermediate-range cruise missiles, which were included in the SALT negotiating positions. Brown's views aligned him with the president's hard-line national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in opposition to disarmament advisor Paul C. Warnke. Carter also approved Brown's recommendations to improve the strategic balance by developing the land-based MX missile, which carried ten multiple independently targeted

A respected physicist, Harold Brown was the first scientist appointed U.S. secretary of defense. (U.S. Department of Defense)

reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, and the new Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine and Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

To counterbalance what he perceived as growing Soviet assertiveness in the Horn of Africa, South Yemen, Cuba, Vietnam, and Latin America, Brown strongly supported the further improvement of U.S. ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC); visited that country in January 1980, a year after the United States opened full diplomatic relations; and lobbied in favor of continued American and European weapons sales to China. He initially supported the administration's abortive April 1980 effort to rescue American diplomatic personnel held hostage in Iran since November 1979 but canceled the operation after it encountered mechanical problems and two military airplanes collided. Brown's final report to Congress in 1980 noted that continuing budgetary constraints still hampered the introduction of light and mobile Rapid Deployment Force military units to project American power in the Persian Gulf region and elsewhere.

After leaving office, Brown spent four years as a distinguished visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., and from 1984 to 1992 he chaired that organization's Foreign Policy Institute. He became a director of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1983, sat on several corporate boards, and wrote extensively on U.S. national security policy.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Military Balance; Missiles, Antiballistic; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Multiple Reentry Vehicles; MX Missile System; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Vance, Cyrus Roberts

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Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este
(1898–1977)

U.S. diplomat and ambassador to France (1949–1952), the Federal Republic of Germany (1957–1959), and Great Britain (1961–1969). Born to a well-to-do family in Baltimore, Maryland, on 12 February 1898, David Bruce attended Princeton University from 1915 to 1917 before serving in the U.S. Army during World War I. Following the war he became active in politics, serving as a member of both the Maryland and Virginia houses of delegates. During World War II he headed the London operations of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

In 1949 President Harry S. Truman named Bruce, a Democrat, ambassador to France. Bruce then served as undersecretary of state from 1952 to 1953 and as President Dwight Eisenhower's representative to the European Coal and Steel Community from 1953 to 1954. During 1957–1959 Bruce was ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).

Bruce actively supported John F. Kennedy's successful 1960 presidential campaign and was rewarded by being appointed ambassador to Britain. In this important position, Bruce ardently defended his government's Cold War policies, although on occasion he questioned the wisdom of some of its actions. In 1964 he challenged the validity of reports that led to the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the subsequent U.S. military escalations in Vietnam. Despite a period of rocky relations between the United States and the United Kingdom, during his tenure Bruce nonetheless managed to sustain the special relationship between the two nations.

After President Richard M. Nixon's election, Bruce vacated the ambassadorship in 1969. He resided in London as a private citizen until 1970, when he was asked to lead the American delegation to the Paris Peace Talks with the North Vietnamese. In 1973 Nixon appointed Bruce to lead the U.S. Liaison Office to the People's Republic of China (PRC). A recipient of the Presidential Medal of Honor in 1976, Bruce died in Washington, D.C., on 5 December 1977.

William T. Walker

U.S. diplomat and ambassador David Bruce. (National Archives and Records Administration)

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam War

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Brunei

Southeast Asian nation covering 2,228 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Delaware. Brunei, with a 1945 population of some 43,000 people, is located on the northwestern coast of the island of Borneo and is bordered by Malaysia, the South China Sea, and Brunei Bay. The country is predominantly Muslim and is a constitutional sultanate, with power vested in the hands of Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (since 1967), who is both the head of state and the head of government. Although some constitutional reforms have been introduced in recent years, the Sultan and his family retain a tight grip on power.

A 1906 treaty established a British Residency in Brunei through which Brunei acquired protectorate status but retained nominal independence. Even as a wave of decolonization swept through the Afro-Asian world after World War II, Brunei remained reluctant to sever its ties with the British. In 1959 Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III consented to internal self-government, with the British maintaining control over defense, foreign affairs, and internal security.

In 1961, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed a federation that would have included Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak. While discussions concerning the federation were ongoing, members of the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB, Brunei's People's Party), which favored immediate independence and a northern Borneo federation, launched a revolt on 8 December 1962. Although quickly crushed, the revolt strengthened Omar's inclination to join the federation. Talks, however, broke down, and Brunei opted out in July 1963. The result was strained relations with both Malaysia and Indonesia. PRB leader A. M. Azahari was believed to have received support from Indonesia, whose president, Sukarno, condemned the Malaysian Federation as a neocolonial tactic and subsequently launched the Crush Malaysia campaign. Emergency regulations imposed after the revolt expanded the Sultan's powers and delayed progress toward democratization. During the Cold War, the conservative nature of the sultanate and its reliance on the British placed it squarely in the pro-Western camp.

After formally declaring its independence in 1984, Brunei was welcomed into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Its policies remain oriented toward cooperation with regional and international bodies to ensure regional and internal stability. Since the 1990s, the tiny oil- and gas-rich nation

has also pursued friendly relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the energy needs of which render it an important client.

The history of modern Brunei is also the story of its rulers' efforts to preserve the sultanate and maintain stability. To this end, sultans willingly surrendered territory and even some measure of sovereignty during the heyday of European imperialism. In recent times, Brunei's rulers—the current sultan and his father, Omar, in particular—have used the country's oil and gas revenues to provide a high standard of living to forestall internal dissent. Given that these are nonrenewable resources, however, Brunei's ability to continue along this path is open to question. Mindful of this, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s Brunei has focused on diversifying its economy. Whether its ruler can continue to control the process and pace of democratization also remains to be seen.

Soo Chun Lu

See also

Indonesia; Malaysia; Sukarno

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Brussels Treaty
(1948)

Multilateral treaty of cooperation and collective defense signed on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. Europe was bifurcated after World War II, with the democratic states in Western Europe and the Soviet-controlled states in Eastern Europe. Consequently, there was an urgent need for cooperation among West European nations to counter any future German belligerence and the threat of Soviet communism. The Brussels Treaty, an important event in the context of the emerging Cold War, guarded against Soviet hegemony and allowed the United States to assist Western Europe. The Brussels Treaty was signed in Brussels and consisted of ten articles. The duration of the treaty was to be fifty years; following ratification by the five signatories, the treaty came into force on 25 August 1948. It ultimately served as the precursor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU).

A major goal of the treaty was to supplement the United Nations (UN) Charter, including the enforcement of human rights. In addition, it aimed to fortify the principles of democracy and the rule of law in international affairs. It also sought to establish economic cooperation in Western Europe to bolster reconstruction efforts and provided for collective self-defense.

Article I of the treaty ensured that all signatory nations would cooperate in economic recovery efforts by removing economic and trade barriers. Article II called for the improvement in living standards and social services in member nations. Article III encouraged cultural exchanges among the signatories. Article IV declared that if any of the five nations was attacked, Article 51 of the UN Charter would be invoked to aid the attacked nation. The remaining articles dealt with other collective security issues, conflict resolution, and the particulars of the treaty's ratification and enforcement procedures.

Dewi I. Ball

See also

Europe, Western; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Rome, Treaty of; Western European Union

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Brzezinski, Zbigniew
(1928–)

Prominent international relations scholar, diplomat, and U.S. national security advisor from 1977 to 1981. Born the son of a Polish diplomat on 28 March 1928 in Warsaw, Poland, Zbigniew Brzezinski received his PhD from Harvard University in 1953 and became a U.S. citizen in 1958. Following his graduation, he joined the faculty of Harvard and then moved on to Columbia University in 1960, where he stayed until 1977.

Brzezinski also served as a foreign policy advisor to President John F. Kennedy and as a member of the State Department's influential policy planning staff during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. In 1968 Brzezinski resigned his State Department post in protest over America's Vietnam War policies. He subsequently returned to academia and directed the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976. After serving as foreign policy advisor to Jimmy Carter's successful 1976 presidential campaign, Brzezinski was named Carter's national security advisor in 1977.

As national security advisor, Brzezinski played a critical role in the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as well as in the 1978 Camp David Accords. Most significant perhaps, to both Carter and Brzezinski, was the 1978 Iranian Revolution and the resultant hostage crisis that dominated their last year in office.

Following Carter's defeat in the 1980 election, Brzezinski returned to Columbia University. In 1989 he joined the faculty of Johns Hopkins University. He has written and edited numerous books on international relations.

Brent M. Geary

See also
Camp David Accords; Carter, James Earl, Jr.

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Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich
(1895–1975)

Soviet statesman, deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and premier. Born on 11 June 1895 in Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia, the son of a factory worker, Nikolai Bulganin joined the Bolsheviks as a youth and became a member of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (Cheka, or secret police) in Turkistan in the wake of the 1917 October Revolution. His accomplishments in the ranks of Cheka facilitated his political ascendancy, and in the 1920s he was tasked with managing a large electrical equipment factory in Moscow.

With his continued success and the connections he established among the elite of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Bulganin was appointed mayor of Moscow in 1931, remaining in that post for six years. There he oversaw the construction of the Moscow Underground. He then took over as head of the state bank from 1937 to 1941. During World War II, he served in Soviet leader Josef Stalin's war cabinet and as the chairman of the state defense committee.

In 1947, Bulganin assumed the post of minister of the armed forces, was granted the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union, and a year later became deputy prime minister and a full member of the Politburo. After Stalin's death in 1953, Bulganin assumed the post of minister of defense under Georgy Malenkov. Thus, Bulganin was one of the five central figures who ruled the Soviet Union during the interregnum following Stalin's death. Despite his links to Malenkov, Bulganin supported Nikita Khrushchev in the ensuing power struggle and in February 1955 was rewarded with the post of chairman of the council of ministers, that is, premier of the Soviet Union. He remained in that position until 1958.

During the summer of 1957, however, Bulganin disagreed with Khrushchev on a series of issues. As a result, Bulganin joined forces with Khrushchev's opponents, whose aim was to remove Khrushchev from the top leadership

Longtime communist Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin was prime minister of the Soviet Union during 1955–1958. (AFP/Getty Images)

spot. When the putsch failed, Bulganin was accused of conspiracy, stripped of the rank of marshal, and forced into semiretirement in September 1958. He was expelled from the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1961. Bulganin remained in secluded retirement until his death in Moscow on 24 February 1975.

Cem Karadeli

See also

Khrushchev, Nikita; Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Bulgaria

A Balkan nation slightly larger than the U.S. state of Ohio with a land mass of 42,822 square miles. Bulgaria is bordered by Romania to the north, Greece and Turkey to the south, Macedonia and Serbia to the west, and the Black Sea to the east. In 1945 it had a population of approximately 6.3 million people. Bulgaria was best known during the Cold War for its production of rose oil, the longevity of its orthodox communist dictator Todor Zhivkov, and its unshakable loyalty to the Soviet Union. Bulgarian devotion to Moscow no doubt sprang from Russian assistance in liberating the country from the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s and from the Germans in World War II and was also rooted in the dependence of Bulgaria's communist leaders on Soviet support to maintain their authority. Zhivkov personified such dependence, and while occasionally experimenting with autonomous economic and cultural reforms, he consistently supported Soviet foreign policy and modeled domestic programs on Russian counterparts.

During the prelude to World War II, Bulgaria's ruler Czar Boris III (1918–1943) advocated neutrality but was ultimately forced into an alliance with Nazi Germany. Boris proved a reluctant ally at best and through creative foot-dragging managed to protect the nation's Jewish population from mass extermination at the hands of the Nazis. He also prevented Bulgarian soldiers from serving on the Eastern Front. His untimely death in August 1943 before the war ended deprived the nation of a skilful leader, although it is unlikely, given Bulgaria's strategic importance, that he could have prevented its incorporation into the Soviet sphere.

The Red Army crossed the Danube into Bulgaria on 9 September 1944, greeted by cheering crowds and the small Bulgarian wartime resistance movement. A regency government, ruling in the name of Boris's six-year-old son Simeon II, soon fell in a bloodless coup led by the Fatherland Front, a coalition that included the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), the influential

Agrarian Party, and a number of other small groups. By 1946 the BCP dominated the coalition, but oversight of the country by a joint Soviet-American commission prevented the party from dictating its own terms.

Veteran international communist Georgi Dimitrov, who became prime minister in November 1946, proceeded cautiously at first. He waited until after the termination of the joint commission to seize power openly and promulgate a Soviet-style constitution. Dimitrov died suddenly under mysterious circumstances in Moscow in July 1949. Bulgarian mourners built a mausoleum in twenty-four hours of fevered labor, placing his embalmed body on permanent display in Sofia, like that of Lenin in Red Square in Moscow.

Dimitrov's successor, Vasil Kolarov, a founding member of the BCP, died within a year of Dimitrov, prompting Soviet leader Josef Stalin to select Vulko Chervenkov as prime minister (1950–1956). Later Chervenkov became head of the BCP and president of the National Council of the Fatherland Front. Chervenkov quickly moved to suppress all opposition, sent dissidents and intellectuals to the Bulgarian concentration camp at Kozloduy, collectivized agriculture, promoted the development of heavy industry, and established a cult of personality. Stalin's March 1953 death undercut Chervenkov's authority, however, especially after new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev exposed Stalin's crimes in 1956. Over the course of the next five years, Sofia BCP boss Zhivkov, who was personally acquainted with Khrushchev, removed Chervenkov's supporters from their positions and gradually stripped Chervenkov of his offices.

By 1965 Zhivkov had assumed all of Chervenkov's titles and effectively eliminated all challenges to his own authority. Zhivkov ruled Bulgaria from April 1956 to November 1989, in effect as his personal fiefdom. He built dozens of grand personal residences, many of which were later converted into resort hotels. Although Zhivkov supported Soviet foreign policy, he rarely committed troops abroad. Instead, Bulgaria sent hundreds of physicians and engineers to Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean to provide professional assistance to Soviet friends and allies. Bulgaria also aided clandestine Soviet operations, most notoriously the 1977 assassination of dissident writer Georgi Markov with a poisoned umbrella in London.

In keeping with his personal style, Zhivkov actively promoted the political career of his daughter Ludmillia Zhivkova. Raised under communism and educated abroad at Oxford, she became deputy chair of the Committee for Arts and Culture in 1971 and was appointed to the BCP's Politburo in 1980. Zhivkova cultivated a rather flamboyant and bohemian image, dressing in flowing white robes; publicly displayed an interest in Buddhism and other Eastern religions; and surrounded herself with the best and brightest of her generation. She opened Bulgaria to jazz and abstract art and advanced Bulgarian national pride by sponsoring archaeological investigations of the ancient culture of Thrace. In 1981 she staged a nationwide celebration of the 1,300th anniversary of the founding of the first Bulgarian state. Her premature death from a cerebral hemorrhage that year marked the end of Bulgaria's liberalization. Thereafter, many of her close associates were purged and jailed,

while economic difficulties forced her father into taking increasingly conservative actions.

During much of the 1970s Bulgaria enjoyed good times thanks to cheap energy from the Soviet Union and favorable trading relations with the other nations of the Soviet bloc. By the mid-1980s, however, mounting hard currency debts and the inherent inefficiencies of the communist economy put increasing strains on the population and encouraged dissident activities, resulting in rounds of repression that only inspired more dissent in return. To distract the Bulgarian people from their difficulties, Zhivkov embarked on an ambitious building program by refurbishing regional centers and hosting tours of the international diplomatic community. He also raised an old bête noire by launching a campaign to force ethnic Turks, who had lived in Bulgaria for centuries, to adopt Bulgarian names and renounce their heritage or face deportation.

In 1989 members of the BCP visited Moscow to determine their reaction to the unrest sweeping Eastern Europe. When they returned that November they summarily deposed Zhivkov, changed the name of the BCP to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and held open elections. Although the BSP won the first round of elections, the political situation remained unstable, resulting in the fall of the BSP to the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The BSP returned to power in 1994 but collapsed spectacularly in the wake of hyperinflation and civil unrest in 1997. Disillusioned with the chronic infighting between the BSP and the UDF, Bulgarian voters rejected both parties in 2001 and elected their former king, Simeon II, prime minister. Bulgaria has moved so far toward the West that it formally joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and the European Union (EU) on 1 January 2007.

Vernon L. Pedersen

See also

Dimitrov, Georgi Mikhailovich; Europe, Eastern; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Zhivkov, Todor

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Bunche, Ralph Johnson
(1904–1971)

African American political scientist, civil rights activist, and diplomat. Born on 7 August 1904 in Detroit, Michigan, Ralph Bunche was orphaned in 1917 and moved to Los Angeles, where he was raised by his grandmother. He earned a bachelor's degree in political science and philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1927, and in 1928 he earned an MA degree in political science from Harvard University. Over the next six years, while

working on his doctorate, Bunche taught political science at Howard University. In 1934 he was awarded a doctorate in government and international relations from Harvard University, and he then pursued postdoctoral research in anthropology in the United States, London, and South Africa.

Although Bunche was an expert in African politics, he also studied U.S. race relations and joined civil rights protests on several occasions. During World War II, he worked as a social science analyst for the U.S. government and served as an advisor in the negotiations that led to the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. As a member of the newly created UN Secretariat, he became an expert on Palestinian affairs.

In 1950, Bunche became the first person of color to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his successful efforts in negotiating an armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel after the first Arab-Israeli War. Four years later, he was appointed undersecretary-general of the UN. In 1956 he supervised UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis, and he organized subsequent peacekeeping missions in the Congo (1960) and Cyprus (1962). Bunche died on 9 December 1971 in New York City.

Simon Wendt

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Cyprus; Egypt; Israel; Suez Crisis

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Bundy, McGeorge
(1919–1996)

Foreign policy expert, presidential advisor, and U.S. national security advisor during 1961–1966. Born on 30 March 1919 in Boston, Massachusetts, McGeorge Bundy graduated from Yale University in 1940. During World War II, he served as an intelligence officer and participated in the planning of the invasions of Sicily and France. In 1949, he joined the faculty of Harvard University and was dean of arts and sciences there from 1953 to 1961.

In January 1961, President John F. Kennedy tapped Bundy to become national security advisor. As such, Bundy transformed the post into a powerful policymaking position, and it has remained so ever since. He played a crucial role in major U.S. foreign policy decisions in the 1960s, including the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Berlin Wall Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War.

Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, Bundy was an initial advocate of expanding American involvement in the Vietnam War. In February 1965, while visiting South Vietnam at the time of the Viet Cong attacks on the U.S. barracks in Pleiku, he wrote a crucial memorandum calling for a policy of

National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy was one of the key advisors to President Lyndon B. Johnson in the development of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

sustained reprisal, including air strikes against North Vietnam. By 1968, however, Bundy had come to regret his hawkish views toward Vietnam and was among the so-called Wise Men who in 1968 advised President Johnson to seek a negotiated end to the war and to withdraw U.S. troops.

After he resigned his position in February 1966, Bundy served as president of the Ford Foundation until 1979. Later, he taught at New York University and headed a Carnegie Corporation project studying nuclear proliferation. When Bundy died of a heart attack on 16 September 1996 in Boston, he was working on a book about the Vietnam War. He unabashedly admitted that Vietnam was a terrible mistake and that he personally had made great errors of perception, recommendation, and execution.

Christian Nuenlist

See also

Bay of Pigs; Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Vietnam War

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Bundy, William Putnam

(1917–2000)

Assistant U.S. secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (1964–1969) who helped to propel the United States into the Vietnam War. William Bundy was born in Washington, D.C., on 24 September 1917 into a prominent Boston, Massachusetts, family. During World War II his father, a lawyer, served in the War Department under his mentor Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, whom his children likewise admired and emulated. Bundy attended Groton School in Connecticut, graduated from Yale University in 1939, and studied history and law at Harvard University. In 1941 he joined the U.S. Army. Assigned to the Signals Corps as a specialist in cryptology, from spring 1943 he was sta-

tioned at Bletchley Park, headquarters of the top secret World War II ULTRA project decoding German military communications.

When the war ended Bundy, who married the daughter of future Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1943, completed law school. Bundy practiced law for three years before joining the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1950. Between 1953 and 1955 he successfully weathered charges by Senator Joseph McCarthy that he had contributed to the defense fund of Carnegie Corporation official Alger W. Hiss, accused of spying for the Soviet Union during the 1930s.

In 1956 Bundy became deputy assistant director of intelligence, a position he held until 1960. In 1956 he recommended that the United States assist the anticommunist government of President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vientam (RVN, South Vietnam), a decision that tied successive American administrations to supporting the RVN against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam).

Appointed deputy assistant secretary of defense in 1961, that fall Bundy recommended that President John F. Kennedy deploy U.S. troops to South Vietnam. After three months as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, in February 1964 Bundy became President Lyndon B. Johnson's assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs and an influential policymaker on Vietnam. By 1964 Bundy privately doubted the value and wisdom of further long-term U.S. commitments to the RVN but publicly favored a strong line. In August 1964 he helped to draft the congressional Tonkin Gulf Resolution, granting Johnson virtually unlimited authority to use force in Vietnam. Bundy nonetheless urged—somewhat unavailingly—that besides fighting in order to demonstrate its resolve to win, the United States should concurrently seek to open negotiations to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, a position enshrined in the November 1964 report of the Vietnam Working Group, which he chaired.

From the commitment of U.S. ground forces in spring 1965 onward, Bundy had serious reservations over the Johnson administration's continuing escalation of military commitments in Vietnam, but loyalty inhibited him from publicizing these or resigning, and he remained in office until the president left office in January 1969. As protests over the war intensified, Bundy and his brother McGeorge, national security advisor under Kennedy and Johnson, became increasingly controversial figures. Both featured prominently in journalist David Halberstam's highly critical 1972 account of why the United States had become so deeply involved in Vietnam, a responsibility that Halberstam and others ascribed to the influence of an elitist and activist U.S. foreign policy establishment to which, they alleged, Bundy and many of his colleagues belonged.

For the rest of Bundy's life, his role in Vietnam continued to dog him, provoking protests from influential Council on Foreign Relations members in 1971 when he was named editor of the organization's journal, *Foreign Affairs*. He held that post until he retired in 1984. Perennially wrestling with and seeking to elucidate the past, Bundy wrote but never published a lengthy

memoir of his part in Vietnam policymaking. A lifelong Democrat, in 1998 he also produced *The Tangled Web*, a lengthy, somewhat critical study of President Richard Nixon's foreign policies. Bundy died of heart failure in Princeton, New Jersey, on 6 October, 2000.

PRISCILLA ROBERTS

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Bundy, McGeorge; Central Intelligence Agency; Hiss, Alger; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Laos; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; Ngo Dinh Diem; Rusk, Dean; Southeast Asia; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy

(1911–1963)

British intelligence operative, diplomat, and member of the Cambridge Five spy ring. Born in Devenport, Devon, England, on 6 April 1911, Guy Burgess graduated from Eton in 1930 and went on to study at Trinity College, Cambridge University, where he secretly joined the Communist Party, became associated with the infamous Cambridge espionage ring, and was first recruited by Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) agents. On and off throughout his career, Burgess passed important and classified information to his Soviet contacts.

In 1936 Burgess secured a position as a broadcaster with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in London. This job put him into contact with many top British officials. In 1938 he joined the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). He went on to serve in the British Foreign Office in 1944, during which time he began passing information to the Soviets. In 1947 he was posted to the British embassy in Washington, D.C., where he was in a position to pass more classified intelligence to his Soviet handlers.

While he was in Washington, Burgess became reacquainted with Kim Philby, whom he had known as a student at Cambridge. At the time, Philby was serving as an MI6 liaison with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 1951 Philby learned that the head of the American Department at the Foreign Office, Donald Maclean, who was also a Soviet agent, was about to be interrogated by British intelligence. He had been identified as "Homer," a cryptogram for Maclean contained in the Venona decrypts. At that point, the KGB arranged for Burgess to return to London to warn

Maclean that his cover had been blown. The KGB subsequently ordered both Maclean and Burgess to Moscow in May 1951. Burgess stayed in Russia but never adapted to the austerity of Soviet life. He died in Moscow of liver disease on 19 August 1963.

Ernie Teagarden

See also
Cambridge Five; MI5; MI6

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Burma

Southeast Asian nation comprised mainly of ethnic Burmese. Nearly 90 percent of the population is Buddhist. Slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Texas and since 1989 known as Myanmar, Burma encompasses 261,969 square miles. It occupies the Indo-Chinese peninsula and is bordered by the Andaman Sea, the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh, and India to the west; China to the northeast; Laos to the east; and Thailand to the southeast. Burma's 1945 population was approximately 18 million people. Once expected to be a most promising Asian state, Burma became one of the poorest, most oppressive countries in the world during the Cold War.

Burmese opposition to British colonial rule emerged prior to World War II, but it was not until the Japanese occupation during the war that the drive for independence gained momentum. The Japanese co-opted Burmese nationalists such as Aung San, U Nu, and Ne Win. Some Burmese leaders, particularly Marxists, favored an antifascist alliance with the British. But Aung San—the most influential nationalist in the country—believed that cooperation with the Japanese would best serve Burmese interests. He and other top leaders, the so-called Thirty Comrades, cooperated with the Japanese after securing promises that independence would be granted.

As Tokyo's war fortunes waned, however, in 1944 Aung San turned against Japan and formed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in support of the Allies. Almost immediately, plans for self-government were adopted when the British retook Burma in May 1945. Whereas in most places the British immediately restored their colonial rule, the strength and diversity of nationalist Burmese sentiment discouraged them from doing so in Burma. The July 1947 assassination of Aung San and conflict within Burmese political circles threatened to derail the transition

from colony to nation, but on 4 January 1948 the Union of Burma gained its independence.

Aung San had hoped that Burma would become a republic with a pluralistic society, fully incorporating its diverse array of ethnic minorities. His successor and Burma's first prime minister, U Nu, envisioned a different course, however, trying to synthesize Buddhism with socialism, which alienated many non-Burmese minorities. Further complicating matters, Burmese communists began their own insurrection within a few months of independence. By the mid-1950s Burma faced a multiparty civil war and was rapidly losing cohesion as a nation-state. Amid economic stagnation and growing ethnic insurgencies, in September 1958 General Ne Win and two other senior military officers seized power.

The so-called Bogyoke (General's) government accomplished two important goals. First, it resolved a significant border dispute with China, thereby improving relations with Beijing. Second, the government convinced some ethnic insurgents to quit their war with Rangoon. Still, it was clearly a military government, quick to eliminate dissent and punish opponents. Due to building pressure from the public, the generals finally agreed to hold elections in February 1960, resulting in a landslide victory for U Nu.

Despite the presumed legitimacy of the elections, the generals continued to plot. U Nu immediately revisited policies aimed at establishing majority rule in parliament and making Burma a Buddhist state, moves that again alienated ethnic minorities. By 1961, with the Shan and Kachin forming armies, Burma faced the specter of a civil war even worse than the first. On 2 March 1962 the generals launched another coup, overthrowing U Nu and restoring military rule.

Facing a cascade of economic and political problems, most Burmese accepted Ne Win's rationalization that democracy had failed. Moreover, many believed that ethnic minorities were the chief cause of their country's decline and tacitly endorsed a military solution. As one of the Thirty Comrades and a father of independence, Ne Win commanded great respect. This was especially felt within the army, which he set about rebuilding and expanding. In so doing, he appeased the only segment of Burmese society capable of opposing him.

Ne Win's Revolutionary Council governed the country by decree. The regime was anticapitalist, anti-imperialist, and decidedly undemocratic. Ne Win's policies were fashioned from the so-called Burmese Way to socialism, a bizarre mix of militant nationalism, native religious practices, and a personalized brand of dictatorship predicated on control of the armed forces. Through the strength of the military, Ne Win eliminated much of his opposition. Opposition political parties were forcibly disbanded, leaving only his Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). To deflect public attention from intractable economic problems, Ne Win cultivated an aggressive xenophobia. Foreign businesses and their assets were seized. Anti-Chinese sentiment was particularly strong, frequently developing into purges.

Ne Win also sealed Burma off from the international community, which unquestionably aggravated its economic decline. Equally debilitating were

the Revolutionary Council's largely unsuccessful wars with insurgents that lasted for almost thirty years. By the 1980s Burma had become one of the poorest and most despotic and isolated countries in the world.

Sporadic protests by intellectuals, students, workers, and Buddhist monks against Ne Win's rule did flare up from time to time. There were even occasional plots against him from within the armed forces. In fact, U Nu helped form an opposition movement that fought alongside ethnic insurgents such as the Karen National Union, the Kachin Independence Organization, the New Mon State Party, and the Shan State Army—each boasting armies of several thousand members. In addition, the Communist Party of Burma continued its war against Rangoon with help from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, new groups such as the Muslim Rohingya in Arakan and the Pa'o and Palaung in Shan began fighting for their independence from other ethnic minorities. The result was near chaos along Burma's frontiers.

In 1988 mass demonstrations against Ne Win were launched in Rangoon by the National League for Democracy (NLD). Ne Win resigned in September 1988 but retained influence behind the scenes. The new government,

Burmese demonstrators supporting Aung San and protesting the ruling military regime march along a street in Rangoon, Myanmar (Burma), 8 September 1988. (Corbis/Corbis Sygma)

called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), was dominated by the Burmese Army. One of its first acts was to change the name of the country from the English "Burma" to the Burmese "Myanmar," hoping to instill nationalistic pride in its people. The SLORC also opened the country to limited foreign investment in hopes of alleviating some of its economic problems. With this, there was brief hope that Burma was changing for the better.

But the SLORC's leadership soon revealed itself to be just as brutal and despotic as its predecessor. Antigovernment protests were ruthlessly suppressed, with many opposition leaders jailed. Several hundred protesters were killed in September 1988 alone. Aung San Suu Kyi, the charismatic daughter of Aung San and the leader of the NLD, was put under house arrest in July 1989. Surprisingly confident that it would win, the new government yielded to international pressures and agreed to national elections in May 1990. The NLD swept the polls, but the army refused to yield power, and opposition was again crushed. The Burmese Army, renamed the State Peace and Development Council, continues to dominate the country with little sign of change.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Aung San Suu Kyi; Ne Win; Southeast Asia; U Nu

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Bush, George Herbert Walker
(1924–)

U.S. congressman, ambassador, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), vice president (1981–1989), and president (1989–1993). George H. W. Bush was born on 12 June 1924 in Milton, Massachusetts, to a wealthy and patrician family. His father, Prescott Bush, was a prominent U.S. senator from Connecticut. Educated at the elite Phillips Andover Academy, on his eighteenth birthday Bush enlisted in the U.S. Navy, becoming the navy's youngest pilot. After World War II he married Barbara Pierce, graduated from Yale with an economics degree after two and a half years, moved to Texas, and embarked on a career in the oil business.

Bush entered politics in 1964 as a Republican, winning a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. In 1970 he ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate. President Richard M. Nixon appointed Bush ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in 1971. In this post for two years, Bush fought to preserve Nationalist China's (Taiwan) seat in the UN, an effort that was ultimately unsuccessful.

From 1973 to 1976 Bush held a series of important government posts, including the directorship of the CIA. When he took over the CIA in 1975, the agency was reeling from revelations about its role in assassination plots, coups, and other covert operations conducted in the name of the Cold War. He tried to rehabilitate the CIA during his tenure, and his efforts met with some success.

In 1980, Bush sought the Republican presidential nomination but lost to former California Governor Ronald Reagan, who then named Bush his running mate. The pair went on to win an overwhelming victory in the 1980 elections. As vice president, Bush loyally backed Reagan's hard-line Cold War policies. Military spending increased dramatically during Reagan's first term, and the administration provided considerable aid to foreign governments and insurgents to combat communism.



Before serving as president of the United States during 1989–1993, George H. W. Bush was a congressman, United Nations ambassador, Republican National Committee chairman, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and vice president. (Library of Congress)

Bush bolstered these measures by traveling around the globe soliciting support for Reagan's policies, particularly in Central America. Bush met with Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, who had allied himself with the anticommunist Nicaraguan Contras. The Contras were fighting the Sandinista government and receiving U.S. military and financial aid. After Congress voted to cut off assistance to the Contras in 1983, the Reagan administration began covertly aiding them. Members of the National Security Agency concocted a plan by which proceeds from the sale of weapons to Iran were diverted to the Contra rebels. When the Iran-Contra story broke in 1986, Bush denied any knowledge of the illegal operation. Questions remained about his role in the Iran-Contra Affair when he ran for the presidency in 1988, but he nonetheless secured a sound victory that November over Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis.

When Bush took office in January 1989 the Cold War was winding down. During Reagan's second term, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had improved tremendously, and Bush continued to negotiate with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in his first year as president.

In November 1989, the momentous fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in the end of the Cold War. Bush's reactions to the changes in Eastern Europe were calculatingly restrained. He and his foreign policy advisors were wary of antagonizing the Soviet leadership and were fearful that the Soviet military might be employed to stanch the prodemocracy movements. But Soviet weakness and Gorbachev's promises not to intervene led to a peaceful revolution.

By January 1992 the Soviet Union had been officially dissolved, and later that year President Bush and the new Russian leader Boris Yeltsin declared an end to the Cold War.

After Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in August 1990, Bush successfully mounted an international coalition force that liberated Kuwait and dealt a crippling blow to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's military. The first Persian Gulf War, Operation DESERT STORM, ended in less than one hundred hours of ground fighting after a protracted air war that had begun in January 1991. The war liberated Kuwait and protected Saudi Arabian and Middle Eastern oil supplies but left Saddam Hussein's bloodthirsty regime in place. After the war, Bush enjoyed meteoric approval ratings, but a deep economic recession combined with Bush's inability to offer solutions to the downturn resulted in his losing a presidential reelection bid in 1992 to Democrat William Clinton.

JUSTIN P. COFFEY

See also

Baker, James Addison, III; Berlin Wall; Central Intelligence Agency; Kuwait; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Noriega, Manuel; Panama, U.S. Invasion of; Persian Gulf War; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Byrnes, James Francis
(1879–1972)

U.S. politician, administrator, and secretary of state. Born on 2 May 1879 in Charleston, South Carolina, James Byrnes was the son of Irish immigrants. After qualifying as a lawyer, in 1910 he won election to Congress and in 1930 became senator for South Carolina. A longtime friend of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, from 1933 onward Byrnes deployed impressive negotiating talents in steering New Deal legislation through Congress. In 1941 Roosevelt appointed him to the Supreme Court.

Sixteen months later, in 1942, Byrnes left the bench to head the new Office of Economic Stabilization. The following year he became director of the Office of War Mobilization (from 1944 the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion). In domestic policy, Byrnes, often termed "assistant president," exercised powers second only to those of Roosevelt himself. Responsible for coordinating the work of all domestic war agencies and federal government departments, Byrnes worked closely with both Congress and

the bureaucracy to devise the most efficient arrangements to facilitate the war effort.

Passed over as Roosevelt's vice presidential running mate in 1944, Byrnes, already considered a hard-liner on the Soviet Union, attended the February 1945 Yalta summit conference of the Big Three Allied leaders. Returning to Washington, he successfully lobbied Congress to support the outcome of Yalta, deliberately glossing over outstanding contentious issues dividing the Soviet Union and its Allies. Still disappointed over the 1944 election, he resigned in March 1945.

When Roosevelt died one month later, the inexperienced former Senator Harry S. Truman became president. Truman immediately appointed Byrnes head of a top secret committee on employment of atomic weapons, then in their final stage of development, whose existence Byrnes recommended be kept secret even from American allies until their first use in combat. He believed that American possession of the bomb would make Soviet behavior more malleable.



James F. Byrnes served as a legislator, Supreme Court justice, and secretary of state (1945–1946). He was then governor of South Carolina. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)

In June 1945 Truman made Byrnes secretary of state. Attending the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, he hoped that the speedy employment of atomic weapons against Japan would prevent the Soviet Union from entering the Pacific war and enhance America's influence in Asia. Byrnes also helped to reach a compromise agreement on German reparations. Returning to Washington, in August he helped negotiate the Japanese surrender agreement, implicitly agreeing to retain the emperor. As Soviet-American relations became more difficult after the war, for several months Byrnes sought to negotiate compromise solutions, traveling extensively to meet with other Allied foreign ministers outside the United States. In early 1946 political complaints that he was too conciliatory led Byrnes to assume a harsher rhetorical stance on standing up to the Soviet Union, most notably in a well-publicized speech in Stuttgart, West Germany, in September 1946, when Byrnes proclaimed American determination to restore the German economy and his country's willingness to accept the permanent division of Germany and Europe. Even so, at the end of the year Truman, increasingly irked by Byrnes's policies, secretive conduct of diplomacy, and condescending attitude toward the president, replaced him with George C. Marshall.

Byrnes returned to South Carolina and wrote his memoirs. In 1948 he broke with Truman over civil rights, subsequently serving two terms, from 1951 to 1955, as governor of South Carolina and defending segregationist policies. Byrnes died on 9 April 1972 in Columbia, South Carolina.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Germany, Federal Republic of; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.

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C

Caetano, Marcelo José das Neves
(1906–1980)

Portuguese politician and prime minister (1968–1974). Born in Lisbon on 17 August 1906, Marcelo Caetano studied law at the University of Lisbon, graduating in 1931. He then taught at that university from 1932 to 1968. In 1940 he joined the Portuguese government.

Among other duties, Caetano served as minister of the colonies (1944–1947) and deputy prime minister (1955–1958). In September 1968, after Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar suffered a stroke, Caetano replaced him as premier. Salazar had ruled as de facto dictator of Portugal since 1932.

As prime minister, Caetano attempted to hold together Portugal's rapidly disintegrating overseas empire in Angola, Mozambique, and Cabo Verde. In response to building criticism of the authoritarian government, he instituted modest political reforms known as the Marcelist Spring in 1969. Most notably, he allegedly reorganized the secret police, the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE, International Police State Defense). But the changes amounted to little more than a name change for the agency. As dissent grew in the early 1970s, Salazar loyalists in the government pressured Caetano to crack down, which only fueled more unrest. The colonial situation became ever more critical as antirebellion efforts consumed nearly 50 percent of Portugal's annual budget. In February 1974 Caetano ousted General António de Spínola from the army after he had attempted to liberalize colonial administration. This move set the stage for a military coup. Caetano was ultimately deposed by the army during the Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974. He then fled to Brazil and died in Rio de Janeiro on 26 October 1980. The Carnation Revolution, meanwhile, ended Portuguese authoritarianism and instituted a liberal democracy.

David H. Richards

See also

Africa; Decolonization; Mozambique; Portugal; Salazar, António de Oliveira

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Callaghan, James
(1912–2005)

British Labour Party politician, chancellor of the exchequer (1964–1967), foreign secretary (1974–1976), and prime minister (1976–1980). Born in Portsmouth, Hampshire, England, on 27 March 1912, James Callaghan at age fourteen left school and worked as a tax officer before becoming a trade union official in 1929.

Following service in the Royal Navy in World War II, Callaghan was elected to Parliament in 1945 as a Labour Party candidate. While Labour was in power, he held several minor government posts. After Labour's defeat in 1951, he served as opposition spokesman on colonial affairs during 1956–1960 and as shadow chancellor from 1960 to 1964. In 1963, he ran unsuccessfully for the top Labour leadership spot, losing to Harold Wilson.

Upon Labour's victory in the national elections in 1965, Callaghan became chancellor of the exchequer. But when Prime Minister Wilson was forced to devalue the pound in November 1967, Callaghan resigned and moved to the Home Office. Once more in opposition, in May 1971 he surprisingly opposed entry to the European Community in his "Language of Chaucer" speech.

During Wilson's second administration (1974–1976), Callaghan served as foreign secretary. As such, he renegotiated the terms of Britain's entry into the European Community but was primarily concerned with establishing better relations with the United States and the Commonwealth, both of which, in his view, had been neglected by the previous government. He also established a robust friendship with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, although he was disappointed that Kissinger did not put more pressure on Turkey during the Cyprus crisis of mid-1974. Callaghan assisted the Portuguese socialist leader Mario Soares in nurturing the fragile democratic politics emerging in post-Salazar Portugal.

Upon Wilson's surprise resignation in March 1976, Callaghan succeeded him as prime minister and was almost immediately confronted with severe economic difficulties. In autumn 1976 Callaghan announced that it was no longer possible to "spend your way out of a recession," which prefigured Margaret Thatcher's economic philosophy. At the end of 1976, Britain was obliged to request credits from the International Monetary Fund. Meanwhile, conflicts with trade unions escalated, and the foundering economy led to Callaghan's defeat in the House of Commons on a no-confidence motion in March 1979. In the subsequent national election, the Labour Party was defeated and Callaghan lost office. He resigned as Labour Party leader in 1980 and left the House of Commons in 1987 to take a seat in the House of Lords. Callaghan died in Ringmer, East Sussex, on 26 March 2005.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Cyprus; European Economic Community; Heath, Edward; International Monetary Fund; Kissinger, Henry; Soares, Mario; Thatcher, Margaret; Turkey

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Cambodia

Southeast Asian nation located on the Indochinese peninsula. About the size of the U.S. state of Oklahoma, Cambodia encompasses 69,900 square miles. It is bordered to the northwest by Thailand, due north by Laos, to the east and southeast by Vietnam, and to the southwest the Gulf of Thailand. An overwhelmingly Buddhist nation, Cambodia had a 1945 population of approximately 3.5 million people.

Few countries endured conflict and suffering during the Cold War more than Cambodia. Through the legacy of colonialism, the struggle for independence, untenable neutrality, civil war, genocide, and occupation, Cambodia witnessed some of the worst horrors in modern history.

From ancient times, Cambodia was always at the center of conflict in Southeast Asia. Once the seat of the magnificent Khmer Empire, by the early nineteenth century Cambodia was little more than a tributary state, contested between the Siamese (Thai) and Vietnamese. In 1863 Cambodian rulers agreed to the establishment of a French protectorate, at least in part to rid themselves of Siamese and Vietnamese influences. Rebellions against French rule began almost immediately, culminating with a national uprising in 1884. France, however, maintained control until World War II.

With the fall of France in June 1940, Indochina came under the rule of the collaborationist Vichy government. In August 1940 it was forced to allow access to Japanese troops. By the end of 1940 Vichy Indochina was at war with Thailand, which took advantage of French weakness to reclaim "lost" territory in Cambodia and Laos. The Franco-Thai War was ended by Japanese mediation in February 1941 but had significant effects on Indochina. First, France was humiliated and its rule fundamentally undermined. Second, Thai aggression greatly angered Cambodians. Third, by intervening, Japan demonstrated support for anticolonial movements in Southeast Asia. All of these factors naturally invigorated Cambodian nationalism.

The Japanese did not, however, endorse Indochinese nationalisms as originally hoped. Rather, they allowed the Vichy government to suppress them. Only in March 1945, with the war decidedly against them, did the Japanese take formal control of Indochina, encouraging declarations of independence in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Cambodia's independence

declaration came on 13 March 1945, made by twenty-three-year-old King Norodom Sihanouk. By August, however, French rule had been restored. Anti-French guerrillas, the Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer), assembled a government-in-exile in Thailand, while other Cambodian nationalists joined the Viet Minh, fighting against French rule in neighboring Vietnam.

Weakened by World War II and facing enormous difficulties restoring its empire in the region, by 1949 France moved slowly toward Indochinese independence. Sihanouk took control of the nationalist movement, but in fact Cambodians were deeply divided over their future rule. There was an array of political parties, each with a different approach to independence. The Krom Pracheathipodei (Democratic Party) attracted intellectuals, many of whom had joined the Khmer Issarak. They considered Sihanouk a traitor and a French collaborator. The Kanaq Sereiheap (Freedom Group or Liberal Party) was particularly strong among the conservative commercial elite and favored the status quo and the retention of the monarchy. Communism, represented by guerrillas operating under the banner of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) and controlled by the Viet Minh, also had its appeal.

Amid this divisive confusion, Sihanouk emerged as the only plausible solution, and in early 1953 he began a world tour to generate support for Cambodian independence. When that failed, he dramatically offered his life in exchange for nationhood. When negotiations with the French proceeded too slowly, he went into voluntary exile. With France's war in Vietnam going poorly, the French finally agreed to limited Cambodian autonomy in October 1953.

Cambodia was granted full independence under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords. This, however, did not bridge Cambodia's political divisions. In fact, these became more acute once the French were gone. Encouraged by his early success and yet frustrated by opposition, Sihanouk decided to abdicate the throne in March 1955 and stand for election. Victorious, "Citizen Sihanouk" dominated Cambodian politics until 1970 but was never able to mend Cambodia's fractures, especially as the war next door in Vietnam spilled over into Cambodia.

Sihanouk's party, the Sangkum Reastre Niyum (Sangkum, or Popular Socialist Community), was, in effect, Cambodia's only political party. It revolved exclusively around him and, based on his popularity, won every seat in the National Assembly in the 1955, 1958, and 1962 elections. However, Sihanouk's domination was ultimately Sangkum's downfall. Fissures emerged within the party as the 1960s unfolded, mostly over Cambodia's neutrality in the Vietnam War. By 1967, those on the far Left criticized Sihanouk for not supporting the Vietnamese revolution against Western imperialism, and many defected to join the KPRP. At the same time, those on the Right asserted that Sihanouk's neutrality had become hopelessly compromised by North Vietnamese communists using Cambodia as a sanctuary in their fight against the Americans and the South Vietnamese. Prominent critics on the Right included the Cambodian military, which by 1970 had decided to topple Sihanouk.

The army coup came in March 1970 while Sihanouk traveled abroad. It coalesced around General Lon Nol, Sihanouk's prime minister, with the

blessing of the U.S. government, which had lost patience with Sihanouk and his compromised neutrality. Sihanouk fled to the People's Republic of China (PRC), where he formed an opposition government-in-exile. This put him in a loose alliance with Cambodian communists, many of whom had left the KPRP to join the more radical Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), better known as the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer). The Khmer Rouge had been founded in 1960. Sihanouk had ruthlessly suppressed the movement, and it remained divided and weak throughout most of the 1960s. But the Khmer Rouge, supplied by North Vietnam, began an insurgency in 1968 that intensified after Lon Nol's coup. Bombings of eastern Cambodia and incursions by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces against communist sanctuaries there galvanized Khmer Rouge support. In addition, Lon Nol's government was notoriously corrupt and inefficient, and many Cambodians deeply resented it. By 1973, when the United States withdrew its troops from Vietnam, Lon Nol was already in serious trouble. Even large-scale bombings of Khmer Rouge positions by the Americans could not prevent the collapse of his government.

Lon Nol's government came to an end in April 1975, just two weeks before the North Vietnamese seizure of Saigon. Almost immediately after taking control of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge and its leader, Pol Pot (Saloth Sar), implemented one of the most monstrous regimes in history. Adopting an ultranationalist, radicalized communism, the Khmer Rouge attempted to eradicate from Cambodia any vestiges of its colonial past.

The country was renamed Democratic Kampuchea (DK). In place of the monarchy, the mysterious, distant, and authoritarian Angkar Loeu (Upper Organization) of the Khmer Rouge elite ruled. Sihanouk returned to the country in late 1975 but had no power. Increasingly uneasy in the midst of Khmer Rouge radicalism, he again left for exile in early 1979. Under the Khmer Rouge's brutal rule, millions of Cambodians were forcibly moved from towns and cities into the countryside to work on collective farms. Urban centers, considered obstacles to the so-called people's revolution, were all but abandoned. Severe food shortages caused by the move led to widespread malnutrition and disease, which claimed many lives. Offers of foreign aid were declined, adding to the misery. Private property, money, businesses, and religion were all banned. People who wore glasses or had fair skin were deemed to be capitalists and were severely punished.

Family ties and even individual personalities were considered counterrevolutionary. Wholesale executions were commonplace, especially among former government officials, the military, bureaucrats, intellectuals, businesspeople, and members of the Buddhist clergy. Many Cambodians simply disappeared, their bodies dumped in Cambodia's infamous killing fields. During the period of



Piles of skulls and bones memorializing as many as 2 million victims of the Khmer Rouge killing fields. (iStockPhoto.com)

Khmer Rouge rule between 1975 and 1978, it is estimated that nearly 2 million Cambodians were killed, or approximately one in six Cambodians, making it one of the worst genocides in modern history.

The end of Khmer Rouge rule came in December 1978 when Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia. Communism could not overcome centuries-old tensions between the two nations, and their differences over the Sino-Soviet split had only aggravated matters. Systematic executions of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and heated border disputes were the final sparks that led to war. Internal divisions, which had plagued the Khmer Rouge from the outset, prevented it from mobilizing any real opposition. Moreover, the Cambodian people had suffered so much that there was little resistance. Within two weeks, DK was occupied, and the Khmer Rouge returned to the jungles and guerrilla warfare. Their hopes were briefly lifted when in February 1979 Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed along their common border, ostensibly over control of Cambodia. When the Chinese withdrew after just a few weeks, however, the Khmer Rouge's best chance of restoring its rule faded.

Systematic executions of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and heated border disputes were the final sparks that led to war.

Vietnamese forces occupied Cambodia for nearly fifteen years. They supported a puppet government led by former Khmer Rouge officials who had fled or had fallen out with the Pol Pot clique. Throughout this period the Khmer Rouge launched attacks against the government from bases in western Cambodia, supported clandestinely by China and Thailand. A coalition of other noncommunist opposition groups also fought the occupation, most under the symbolic leadership of Sihanouk—with the blessing of many Western governments. Internationally sponsored peace talks led to the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces beginning in early 1992. But for Cambodia this was only a small step toward peace. Disarming the various factions and establishing a new government were gargantuan tasks. Today, Cambodians are confronting their bloody past and rebuilding a nation ripped apart by the convulsions of the Cold War.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Cambodia; Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom; Sino-Vietnamese War; Southeast Asia; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of
(1978–1992)

On 25 December 1978, Vietnamese armed forces invaded Cambodia, ushering in an occupation lasting nearly thirteen years. This incursion marked the first and only extended war between communist regimes and led to a brief but bloody border war between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Moreover, the occupation added to the tremendous suffering that Cambodia endured during the Cold War and greatly affected Southeast Asia.

The origins of the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict are complex and reach far back into history. The Vietnamese and Khmer (Cambodian) Empires had been bitter rivals for centuries. By the early 1800s, much of Cambodia had come under Vietnamese rule or was forced to pay tribute to it. This gave rise to deep-seated animosities that survived decades of French colonial rule, Japanese occupation during World War II, and two Indochinese conflicts spanning nearly thirty years.

Communist rhetoric and ideology masked these tensions but could not overcome them. Vietnamese and Cambodian communists cooperated in the fight against American-sponsored regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh. In fact, Vietnamese support was essential to the 1975 communist Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer) victory in Cambodia. However, common ideology did not bridge their historical and ethnic divisions. The Khmer Rouge feared that a unified Vietnam, even if communist, would again dominate Cambodia. Leaders in Hanoi worried that the Khmer Rouge was too dependent on Beijing and feared the extension of Chinese power in Southeast Asia.

These anxieties were inextricably linked to international developments. During the 1960s the Sino-Soviet split widened, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) aligned itself more with the Soviet Union, alienating the PRC. After reunification in 1975, Vietnam purged its ethnic Chinese minorities and relied even more on Soviet aid. In this light, the PRC came to consider Vietnam a rival in Southeast Asia and an extension of Soviet power. The United States also played an important role, particularly through détente with the Chinese. Thus, by the late 1970s a bizarre diplomatic arrangement emerged in the region, pitting the Americans and Chinese, formerly fierce enemies in the Cold War, against the Soviets and Vietnamese.

Within this complicated international context, local tensions resurfaced soon after both the Vietnamese communists and the Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975. Hanoi denounced the regime in Phnom Penh as reactionary for its infamous genocide in the killing fields. The Khmer Rouge demanded that Vietnam return historically disputed lands and leveled allegations that Hanoi was plotting to divide Cambodia via the country's ethnic Vietnamese population.

Cross-border raids by poorly equipped Khmer Rouge forces into Vietnam and atrocities committed against ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia worsened the situation between the two countries. Paranoid Khmer Rouge leaders may have believed that war with Vietnam would galvanize Cambodians behind their regime, but the exact opposite happened. When Vietnam

Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, 1978

launched its invasion on 25 December 1978, the Cambodian people offered no resistance. Indeed, after three years of terror under the Khmer Rouge, many Cambodians welcomed the Vietnamese as liberators. Three Cambodian regiments, equipped by the Vietnamese and made up mostly of those who had fled the Khmer Rouge, took part in the invasion.

Some speculate that the Vietnamese invasion was originally designed to stop at the Mekong River, but meeting only sporadic resistance, Hanoi decided to push on. Phnom Penh fell on 7 January 1979, and Khmer Rouge forces withdrew to the west. Operating from the remote jungles bordering Thailand, they carried out guerrilla warfare against the Vietnamese and their puppet Cambodian government led by Heng Samrin.

Alarmed by the prospect of a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina, the Chinese decided to take action. On 17 February 1979, 120,000 Chinese troops attacked Vietnam. After pushing 25 miles into Vietnam, PRC forces then halted. By 16 March, Beijing withdrew, claiming that it had taught Hanoi a lesson. In fact, Vietnamese forces had inflicted considerable punishment on the invading Chinese.

Hanoi maintained that its invasion was humanitarian in seeking to overthrow the genocidal Khmer Rouge, but except for the Soviet bloc Vietnam was condemned by the international community. The United States and the PRC led the condemnations. Together with Thailand, the two powers began supporting Cambodian resistance movements. One, the noncommunist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), was led by former

government minister Son Sann. The other, the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC), pledged allegiance to deposed Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk and postured as the government-in-exile of Cambodia. The U.S. government extended military assistance to these noncommunist groups, but in fact much of the aid reached the Khmer Rouge.

Although these two groups operated independently, they were part of a de facto alliance with the Khmer Rouge, and the three maintained a fierce resistance well into the 1980s. Chinese support of the Khmer Rouge was a key factor in the insurgency. In June 1982, intermediaries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) helped negotiate the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The arrangement made the noncommunist groups the public face of Cambodian resistance, while the Khmer Rouge retained mostly military power.

Substantial Vietnamese forces were committed to fight the CGDK, but from bases in Thailand its guerrillas operated largely beyond reach. Frustrated, in 1985 the Vietnamese tried clearing the jungle and building barriers along the Thai border. They also mined the area and began shelling refugee camps believed to be guerrilla safe havens. There were even clashes between Vietnamese and Thai forces during the late 1980s.

By 1989, however, Hanoi had developed other priorities. The occupation of Cambodia was not only a financial and military drain but was also a

Vietnamese troops departing Cambodia (Kampuchea), 22 September 1989. (Jacques Langevin/Corbis Sygma)

diplomatic liability. Indeed, diplomatic isolation had seriously handicapped economic development, and Soviet support declined as communism in Eastern Europe collapsed. Improving relations with the United States and the PRC, deemed essential to Vietnamese security, became Hanoi's focus, and this necessitated a withdrawal from Cambodia.

In September 1989, following almost three years of gradual withdrawal, Hanoi announced the removal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Despite Khmer Rouge claims to the contrary, most experts agree that by the beginning of 1990 Vietnam made good on the promise. This paved the way for international negotiations that resulted in the October 1991 signing of the Paris Agreements, which provided for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Its difficult mandate involved disarming all factions and securing the country ahead of national elections. Since 1992 Cambodia has struggled under the weight of its internal divisions, trying to cope with its tragic history.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Cambodia; Geneva Conference (1954); Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom; Sino-Soviet Split; Sino-Vietnamese War; Southeast Asia; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Cambridge Five

Group of five British citizens accused of spying for the Soviet Union, so named because they met as students at Cambridge University in the 1930s. Nicholas Elliott, Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) colleague of suspected Soviet spy Harold Adrian "Kim" Philby, was dispatched to Beirut in 1963 to obtain a confession detailing Philby's espionage activities for the Soviet Union. In return, Philby was offered immunity from prosecution. Elliott reportedly told Philby, "You took me in for years. How I despise you now." Elliott failed in his task, for five days after their initial meeting, Philby sailed for the Soviet Union in a Soviet merchant vessel.

Elliott's words could have been applied to any of the Cambridge Five spies: Philby, Anthony Blunt, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and John Cairn-

cross. All had been introduced to Marxism while they were students at Cambridge University in the 1930s, and all were eventually persuaded to work for Soviet intelligence. They became the notorious Cambridge Five of popular Cold War literature. The Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) called them the Magnificent Five.

Blunt entered the British Security Service (MI5) in 1940 and delivered to Soviet intelligence information that he believed would be of importance to the Soviet war effort. After 1945 he did little more than occasional communications work. He became a distinguished art historian, director of the Courtauld Institute, and confidant of the queen as the surveyor of queen's pictures. Burgess, a brilliant student, had a professional career that included work for the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), the MI5, and, finally, the British Foreign Office. Like Blunt, he was homosexual and drank to excess. Burgess passed on to Soviet intelligence information gleaned mainly from friends in high places. Burgess was so flamboyant and gregarious that it is surprising he could keep anything confidential.

Each of the remaining three, Maclean, Philby, and Cairncross, was more valuable to Soviet intelligence than either Blunt or Burgess. They reliably served their two masters during World War II and the Cold War that soon followed. Maclean enjoyed a sparkling academic career and easily gained entrance into the Foreign Office. His postings included the British embassy in Washington, D.C.; he eventually became head of the American Department in the Foreign Office and as such had ample access to Anglo-American military and defense plans. It was said that Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was delighted with Maclean's reports. The most recognized of the Cambridge Five, however, was Philby. At first he worked as a journalist for the London *Times*, but in 1940 he joined the MI6, probably under pressure from his Soviet masters. Philby was credible, socially adept, and professionally respectable. In fact, he was so successful at MI6 that many colleagues expected him to retire as director. During and after World War II, Philby provided the Soviets with large quantities of useful documentation about a wide variety of Anglo-American plans. He was also able to identify various British and American agents in Soviet service. Unlike the other four, Cairncross did not come from the upper middle class. His father was an ironworker near Glasgow. Cairncross matriculated at Cambridge on a scholarship. Once in government employment, Cairncross moved around. He worked for the Foreign Service and then the Treasury, was private secretary to Lord Hankey in Winston Churchill's wartime administration, and in 1945 went back to the Treasury. Cairncross's chief benefactor seemed to be the Soviet armed forces, although much of his espionage work ceased after 1945.

The Cambridge Five functioned well in their dual roles until Igor Gouzenko's defection to Canada in 1945. Gouzenko presented documentation revealing the cryptonyms of hundreds of Soviet agents around the world. The Venona decrypts after 1944 added more evidence of Soviet moles. Fearing arrest, in 1951 Maclean (code-named Homer), accompanied by Burgess, left his American posting and fled to the Soviet Union. Philby,

suspected as the source who had tipped off Maclean of his impending detention, was forced to resign his position with MI6. Philby then joined the news staff of the London *Observer* and relocated to Beirut, Lebanon. Nicholas Elliot's rather inept offer of a British immunity proposal caused Philby to flee Beirut and relocate to the Soviet Union in 1963, assuring that the full extent of the damage done by the Cambridge Five might never be known.

Blunt was knighted in 1956. In 1963 Michael Straight, an American, reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) an attempt by Blunt to recruit him as a Comintern agent in 1937 while both were at Cambridge. The results of this interview, in combination with other evidence, led Blunt, in return for immunity, to confess his involvement with Soviet intelligence. His role was not publicly exposed until 1979. Cairncross fell under suspicion in 1951 after references to him were found in Burgess's apartment following the latter's flight to Moscow. Cairncross then left the Treasury and went abroad, where he held several employments in Rome and Paris. He returned to Britain in 1995 and died the same year. A biography attributed to him (*The Enigma Spy*) was published in 1997.

Burgess was the first of the Cambridge Five to die. He had suffered for a time from heart and liver problems and died in Moscow on 19 August 1963. Maclean, the most Russianized of the three expatriates, also died in Moscow, on 9 March 1983. Blunt died in disgrace on 28 March 1983 in London. Philby died in Moscow on 11 May 1988. His body lay in state for two days at Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) headquarters and was interred at Kuntsevo Cemetary, a KGB burial ground west of Moscow. Cairncross died of a stroke in Longhope in Herefordshire, Britain, on 8 October 1995.

These men may have been the last of the idealistic spies. More recently, money has driven spying activities. Aldrich Ames and Edward Lee Howard of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI sought little else.

Ernie Teagarden

See also

Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy; Espionage; Gouzenko, Igor; Maclean, Donald; MI5; MI6; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell

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Camp David Accords
(September 1978)

Peace agreement reached between Egypt and Israel in September 1978 at Camp David, the U.S. presidential retreat in rural Maryland. During 1977 and 1978, several remarkable events took place that set the stage for the Camp David negotiations. In autumn 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat indicated his willingness to go to Israel for the cause of peace, something that no Arab leader had done since the creation of the Jewish state in 1947. On 19 November 1977, Sadat followed through on his promise, addressing the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and calling for peace between the two nations. The Israelis welcomed Sadat's bold initiative but took no immediate steps to

U.S. President Jimmy Carter stands between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (*left*) and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin (*right*) after the signing of the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978. Forged during an unprecedented thirteen-day negotiating session at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, the accords established a framework for peace between Israel and Egypt. The formal agreement, the Camp David Peace Treaty, was signed on 26 March 1979. (Jimmy Carter Library)

end the state of belligerency, instead agreeing to ministerial-level meetings in preparation for final negotiations.

In February 1978, the United States entered into the equation by hosting Sadat in Washington, with both President Jimmy Carter and Congress hailing the Egyptian leader as a statesman and courageous leader. American adulation for Sadat led to greater cooperation by the Israelis, and they thus agreed to a summit meeting in September at Camp David.

For two weeks in September 1978, Sadat, Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin hammered out a framework for an agreement, but not before both sides were forced to make serious concessions. Begin insisted that Sadat separate the Palestinian issue from the peace talks, something that no Arab leader had been willing to do before. Israel also demanded that Egypt negate any former agreements with other Arab nations that called for war against Israel.

Sadat bristled at Begin's demands, which led to such acrimony between the two men that they met in person only once during the entire negotiation process. Instead, Carter shuttled between the two leaders in an effort to moderate their positions. After several days of little movement and accusations of bad faith directed mostly at Begin, however, Carter threatened to break off the talks. Faced with the possibility of being blamed for a failed peace plan, Begin finally came to the table ready to deal. He agreed to dismantle all Jewish settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and return it in its entirety to Egypt. For his part, Sadat agreed to put the Palestinian issue aside and sign an agreement separate from the other Arab nations. On 15 September 1978, Carter, Sadat, and Begin announced that an agreement had been reached.

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In reality, there were still many details to work out, and Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, made numerous trips to the Middle East during the next several months to finalize the agreement. One guarantee that the United States made was to help organize an international peacekeeping force to occupy the Sinai following the Israeli withdrawal. The United States also promised $2 billion to pay for the relocation of an airfield from the Sinai to Israel and made guarantees of economic assistance to Egypt in exchange for Sadat's signature on a peace treaty.

Finally, on 26 March 1979, in a White House ceremony, Sadat and Begin shook hands again and signed a permanent peace treaty, normalizing relations between their two nations. When the accord was reached, all sides believed that other Arab nations, particularly the pro-Western regimes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, would soon follow Egypt's lead and sign similar agreements. They were mistaken. Other Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denounced the Camp David Accords and Sadat for having sold out the Arab cause. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, and several Middle Eastern nations broke off diplomatic relations with Cairo. Not until the mid-1990s would another Arab nation, Jordan, join Egypt in normalizing relations with Israel. The Camp David Accords were, without doubt, Carter's greatest foreign policy success.

Brent Geary

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Begin, Menachem; Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Egypt; Israel; Palestine Liberation Organization; Sadat, Anwar; Vance, Cyrus Roberts

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Camp David Meeting
(25–26 September 1959)

Summit meeting between U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at the presidential retreat, Camp David, during 25–26 September 1959. The Camp David Meeting, held at a rural retreat of U.S. presidents in Maryland's Catoctin Mountains 60 miles northwest of Washington, D.C., was part of a larger state visit by Khrushchev that had commenced on 15 September. This marked the first U.S. visit ever taken by a Soviet head of state and as such produced a considerable—albeit brief—thaw in the Cold War.

Camp David provided an informal setting for the historic talks between Eisenhower and Khrushchev and the background for a significant turning point in the Cold War. In 1959, the ongoing Berlin Crisis was still at the forefront of U.S.-Soviet relations after Khrushchev's November 1958 pledge to sign a separate peace treaty with the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany). In mid-July 1959, Eisenhower believed that personal diplomacy might ease the tensions between Washington and Moscow. Although he intended to extend an invitation to Khrushchev only after the Geneva Foreign Minister Talks (May–August 1959) had seriously addressed issues surrounding the German question, the State Department issued the invitation on an unqualified basis. Eisenhower was furious about the mistake but could do little to remedy it, as Khrushchev accepted a week later.

On 15 September 1959, Khrushchev began his two-week state visit. The first meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, which lasted ninety minutes at the White House, was merely a prelude and an opportunity for the two leaders to size each other up. As such, it did not produce anything of substance. But Eisenhower did approach Khrushchev privately, trying to persuade him to show more willingness to compromise. Khrushchev shared Eisenhower's desire for peace but emphasized that both sides needed to make an effort to overcome their differences.

On 16 September, Khrushchev visited the U.S. Capitol and met congressional leaders, including Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy. During 17–24 September, Khrushchev toured New York, California, Iowa, and

Dwight D. Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev meet at Camp David in 1959. (U.S. Navy/Dwight D. Eisenhower Library)

Pennsylvania, accompanied by U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Henry Cabot Lodge. On 18 September, Khrushchev became the first Soviet leader to address the UN General Assembly in New York City. There he made a surprise announcement of a Soviet plan for general and comprehensive disarmament, which carried considerable weight with many nonaligned nations.

Eisenhower and Khrushchev flew by helicopter to Camp David on 25 September 1959. The next day, they discussed the prickly subject of Berlin, first in a formal meeting, then more informally during a walk and private discussion between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, speaking through his interpreter Oleg Troyanovski. Nevertheless, the two men failed to reach agreement on Berlin. After lunch, Eisenhower took Khrushchev to his farm in nearby Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The change of venue led to a sudden change of mood. A grandfatherly figure, Khrushchev delightedly interacted with Eisenhower's children and grandchildren. Eisenhower even showed the Soviet leader his prize-winning herd of Angus cattle. By day's end, things were looking considerably brighter.

On Sunday, 27 September, Eisenhower again met privately with Khrushchev, with Troyanovski again interpreting. Finally, the two men arrived at a compromise formula and, ultimately, a breakthrough in the Berlin dilemma. Khrushchev promised that he would not insist on a time limit for negotiations on Berlin. In Eisenhower's mind, Khrushchev's disavowal of a time limit on the Berlin ultimatum had essentially nullified it. Thus, he agreed to Khrushchev's suggestion of a four-power summit conference, to include Britain and France, as a way to further discuss Berlin and other contentious issues.

Both sides considered the visit a great success. Although it did not end the Cold War, tensions between the two superpowers were significantly eased. Eisenhower and Khrushchev each received the minimum concessions they were hoping for. In addition, the talks allowed both leaders to build a personal and diplomatic relationship.

The thaw forged at Camp David, however, was short-lived. Already in difficulty over a lack of forward movement on substantive issues, it collapsed when Khrushchev left the four-power summit in Paris on 16 May 1960.

Christian Nuenlist

See also

Berlin Crises; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Geneva Conference (1959); Khrushchev, Nikita; Paris Conference; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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Camus, Albert
(1913–1960)

French journalist, existentialist novelist, essayist, playwright, and philosopher. Albert Camus was born to a poor family in Mondovi, Algeria, on 7 November 1913. His father died in World War I. Camus received early intellectual encouragement from a primary school teacher and went on to study at the University of Algiers. For a brief time in the 1930s, he was a member of the French Communist Party. In 1938, he moved to Paris and worked as a journalist. During World War II he edited the French Resistance newspaper *Combat*, which he founded with fellow existentialist writer Jean-Paul Sartre.

In postwar France, Camus and Sartre achieved recognition and, eventually, fame as engaged intellectuals. Camus' celebrity rested largely on his two great novels, *L'Étranger* (The Stranger, 1942), a fictional exploration of the utter emptiness and random depravity of modern-day life, and *La Peste* (The Plague, 1947), a nuanced parable of the injustice and absurdity of the German occupation of France. The philosophy inherent in *L'Étranger* was presaged at length in Camus' *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (The Myth of Sisyphus, 1942), which lent him a reputation as an existentialist, a label that Camus himself rejected.

Camus' 1951 book, *L'Homme Révolté* (The Rebel), drew withering, condescending criticism from Sartre. In it Camus condemned revolutionary violence, especially that which justified itself with the idea of history as the moral force. This was not, however, a completely original viewpoint, as the philosopher Karl Popper, in 1945, had argued in similar vein in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Nevertheless, for Camus *L'Homme Révolté* signaled a break from the rigidities and hypocrisy of Stalinist-Marxism that was so popular among certain postwar French intelligentsia. His anti-Stalinism was publicly evident in 1956 when he criticized the Soviet invasion of Hungary and welcomed the Polish revolt. During the Algerian War (1954–1962), Camus was torn between an emotional response to the land of his birth and orthodox leftist political thinking on colonialism. In 1957 he won the Nobel Prize for Literature. Camus died after a car accident on 4 January 1960 in Villeblerin, France.

Paul Wingrove

French author Albert Camus, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature. (Library of Congress)

See also
Sartre, Jean-Paul

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Canada

A large North American nation comprising 3.855 million square miles. Bigger in area than the United States, Canada is bordered to the south by the continental United States, to the west by the Pacific Ocean and the U.S. state of Alaska, to the east by the Atlantic Ocean and Greenland, and to the north by the Arctic Ocean. In 1945 it had a population of approximately 12 million people.

Canada played a supplementary and, at times, important role throughout the Cold War. This role was primarily performed in alliance with the United States and other Western nations and included participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the dispatching of troops to the Korean War (1950–1953); the containment of the Soviet Union; the establishment, with the United States, of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD); and contributing to international diplomatic efforts. Domestically, Canada would undergo considerable change in the Cold War era.

At the end of World War II, Canada was in a strong yet awkward position. Traditionally, it had aligned itself with Britain. The war, however, marked a decisive shift toward the United States as Canada's principal protector and partner. This relationship would both benefit and bedevil Canada throughout the Cold War. The choice to be an active ally of the United States was not one made grudgingly. Canadian policymakers feared America's return to a state of isolation and were also committed anticommunists. And the September 1945 revelations of a communist spy ring in Canada only reinforced the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Domestically, the Liberal Party government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King dealt with reincorporating returning veterans into the economy by introducing several measures. These included a "baby bonus" payment designed to encourage women to return to traditional occupations from jobs they held during the war. The payments also contributed to the baby boom, as Canada experienced rapid population growth into the early 1960s. Canada's economy, fueled by its ties to the United States, grew rapidly in the years after the war, while unemployment remained low. This growth contributed to political stability, as the Liberal Party dominated the federal system until 1957.

Regardless of the government in power, there was no doubt about Canada's commitment to battling communism. In 1950, Prime Minister Louis

St. Laurent's government sent 26,800 troops to fight in the Korean War, in which more than 500 Canadians would die. Ottawa would be first and foremost a loyal American ally but would also try to maintain a degree of independence by encouraging collective security measures, such as NATO, and multilateralism. This emphasis on multilateralism made Canada a strong proponent of and an active participant in the United Nations (UN). In late 1956, then Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for helping to negotiate an end to the 1956 Suez Crisis. Canada would subsequently become a strong proponent of peacekeeping around the world.

Canada's relationship with the United States increasingly dominated domestic issues in the postwar period. Economic integration between the two nations grew rapidly, and Canada supplied such natural resources as uranium for America's burgeoning nuclear arsenal. This economic integration sparked concern about Canadian independence, however, particularly in cultural affairs. In 1949 the Canadian government appointed a special commission to investigate the state of Canada's cultural life. It recommended a much greater government role in supporting and promoting Canadian culture.

Military integration with the United States grew through the 1950s as well. In August 1957, the newly elected Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker announced NORAD, a new defense agreement with the United States. NORAD involved the integration of command structures between the two nations on a continental scale. Despite major implications for Canadian sovereignty, the agreement received little initial debate. Many saw it as a logical continuation of closer defense ties between the two countries that had led to American construction of radar lines to provide advance warning of Soviet bomber or missile attack.

Integrated North American defense included the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil that could be used to shoot down Soviet bombers. By the end of the 1950s, however, this had become a thorny political issue, in the process souring relations with U.S. President John F. Kennedy. U.S.-Canadian relations reached a new low during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Annoyed that Kennedy had not phoned him in advance of publicly revealing the construction of Soviet missile sites, Diefenbaker delayed responding to an American request under NORAD to raise the level of alert of the Canadian military. Eventually, the Canadian defense minister gave authorization for the increased level of alert without the knowledge of the rest of the government.

By the 1960s, Canada increasingly began to distance itself from the United States. In two elections, 1962 and 1963, Diefenbaker successfully drew upon anxiety over Canada's relationship with the United States to first avoid defeat and then to prevent his victorious opponent, the Liberal Party's Lester Pearson, from forming a majority government.

Canada's relationship with the United States formed only part of the disorder of the 1960s, however. The province of Quebec, the center of Canada's French-speaking population, underwent a burst of nationalism that would witness the birth of a peaceful movement toward winning independence for

Quebec Liberal Party leader Claude Ryan voting in the Quebec Referendum in Montreal, Canada, 20 May 1980. Ryan led the forces opposing the Quebec separatist movement. (AP/Wide World Photos)

the province at the ballot box and a violent effort to achieve independence through acts of terrorism. Quebecois nationalism flared first in the 1970 October Crisis when a prominent Quebecois politician was kidnapped and murdered by terrorists. In response, the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who was elected in 1968 in part because he seemed capable of dealing with the Quebec issue, suspended civil liberties in the province. Then, in 1976, a separatist party was elected to power in Quebec. It would twice hold referendums (in 1980 and 1995) in unsuccessful bids to attain independence.

Other turmoil rocked Canada during the 1960s as well. The baby boom generation began to enter the workforce and attend universities in large numbers, causing adjustment tensions and sparking youth protests. Partially as a response to the impact of the baby boomers, Canadian laws governing abortion, divorce, and homosexuality would be liberalized during the 1960s and early 1970s.

A similar pursuit of an independent voice was also apparent in foreign policy beginning in the 1960s. Canada stayed out of the Vietnam War and in 1965 became openly critical of American efforts there. At the same time, Canada welcomed thousands of American draft resisters. To the persistent chagrin of Washington, Canada continued to trade with Cuba and began selling wheat to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the early 1960s. This trend continued in the 1970s under the Trudeau regime. During the same period, his government significantly reduced spending on the Canadian military.

The defense cuts were in part a reaction to the rising economic malaise that struck Canada in the mid-1970s. The energy crisis contributed to high inflation and unemployment and greatly increased public dissatisfaction. Not surprisingly, some of this unhappiness remained focused on American domination. Culturally, measures were taken to ensure a distinctive Canadian cultural voice by, among other things, guaranteeing Canadian programming a fair share of television and radio airtime. These efforts paid off handsomely in the long run by helping to foster a growing arts community that would eventually receive international recognition.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, similar efforts were taken to reduce American hegemony over the Canadian economy. The Trudeau government, which held power during 1968–1984 with the exception of a few months in 1979, spearheaded these efforts. In its final term in office during 1980–1984, to the chagrin of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the Trudeau government instituted the National Energy Program, designed to increase Canadian control over its domestic energy sector. Washington was equally unhappy over another Trudeau initiative. Just before retiring in 1984, the Canadian prime

minister embarked on a quixotic peace mission designed to reduce tensions between the superpowers.

The 1984 election of the Progressive Conservative Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney saw a reversal of the trend of the previous decades and a move toward a closer relationship between Canada and the United States. In the foreign policy arena, there was little substantive change as the Mulroney government rejected participation in the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), continued to enjoy friendly relations with Cuba, and, continuing a trend from the Trudeau era, kept military funding low. The real change occurred economically. In 1987 Ottawa negotiated a free trade agreement with Washington. After considerable Canadian opposition to the agreement, it became an election issue in 1988, with Mulroney emerging victorious. The agreement was subsequently enacted.

Steve Hewitt

See also

Americas; Gouzenko, Igor; Intelligence Collection; Korean War; North American Aerospace Defense Command; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pearson, Lester Bowles; Suez Crisis; Trudeau, Pierre; United States

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Carlucci, Frank Charles
(1930–)

U.S. diplomat, administrator, presidential advisor, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and secretary of defense (1987–1989). Born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, on 18 October 1930, Frank Carlucci graduated from Princeton University in 1952. After two years' service in the U.S. Navy and a stint as a student at the Harvard Business School, he became a foreign service officer in the U.S. State Department.

During 1957–1969 Carlucci was stationed in posts around the globe. In 1969 he left the State Department to work in the Office of Economic Opportunity. During 1971–1972 he was at the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), and during 1972–1974 he served as undersecretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). In the last two posts he served under mentor and future secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger. Carlucci had also become a protégé of future secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld.

In 1975 President Gerald R. Ford named Carlucci to the ambassadorship to Portugal, where he served until 1978. That same year, he became deputy director of the CIA and served in that post until 1981. In 1981 during Ronald Reagan's presidency, Weinberger chose Carlucci to be deputy secretary of defense. Carlucci remained in that post until 1983. He wielded considerable influence, running the Pentagon's day-to-day operations and overseeing the budget and procurement processes. As such, he was a key player in the defense buildup set in motion by President Reagan.

In 1983 Carlucci left government service for the private sector, but he returned to the government in 1986 as assistant to the president for national security affairs and then succeeded Weinberger as defense secretary in November 1987. As the new defense chief, Carlucci worked hard to improve relations with Congress and the State Department, which had not been Weinberger's forte. As with Weinberger, Carlucci was a strong proponent of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Carlucci was intimately involved with the ongoing thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations and took part in arms reduction talks as well as summit meetings between Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

After leaving office in 1989, Carlucci joined the Washington-based investment outfit the Carlyle Group. He has continued to be engaged in defense and national security issues.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strategic Defense Initiative; Weinberger, Caspar

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Carrero Blanco, Luis
(1903–1973)

Spanish admiral, counselor to dictator Francisco Franco, and prime minister during June–December 1973. Born on 4 March 1903 in Santoña, Spain, Luis Carrero Blanco pursued a career in the Spanish Navy. A devout Catholic and conservative monarchist, he was hostile to the Spanish republic established in 1931.

When General Franco launched his right-wing rebellion against the government in July 1936, Carrero, a professor at the Naval War College in Madrid, fled to the Nationalist (pro-Franco) zone, where he served during the Spanish

Civil War (1936–1939). In 1939 he was promoted to chief of operations for the Naval General Staff. Franco promoted Carrero to vice admiral in 1963 and admiral in 1966. In May 1941 Franco appointed Carrero undersecretary of the president, and from that point until his death he remained Franco's closest advisor.

After World War II, the victorious Allies and quasi-fascist Spain viewed each other with suspicion and hostility. As the Cold War progressed, however, Carrero encouraged Franco to pursue a rapprochement with the United States by emphasizing his regime's staunch anticommunist credentials. Spain quickly established close military, economic, and diplomatic ties with the United States and Western Europe as a result of Carrero's policies.

Franco designated Prince Juan Carlos as his successor in 1969, while Carrero was to keep the Falangist political order intact under the reinstated monarchy. In September 1967 Franco appointed Carrero vice prime minister and named him prime minister in June 1973. On 20 December 1973 the Basque separatist organization Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom) assassinated Carrero by detonating a bomb under his car in Madrid. With Franco's ideological successor gone, the Spanish transition to democracy was greatly hastened after Franco himself died in 1975.

Elun Gabriel

See also

Franco, Francisco; Juan Carlos I, King of Spain

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Carrillo, Santiago

(1915–)

Spanish politician and general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) during 1960–1982. Born on 18 January 1915 in Gijón, Spain, Santiago Carrillo joined the PCE during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and presided over security operations in Madrid. He went into exile at the end of the war, spending much of his time in France but also traveling to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Early on Carillo was a committed Stalinist, but during the 1950s his views began to change. He became convinced that for strategic reasons the PCE had to participate in broader coalitions in order to overthrow the regime of Francisco Franco. Consequently, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956 helped secure Carrillo's leadership within the PCE. He assumed the top party spot in 1960.

As general secretary, Carrillo worked to distance the PCE from the Soviets and to forge closer alliances with other West European communist parties,

notably that of Italy. He also supported calls for reform and democratization in Eastern Europe. His final break with Moscow came in 1968 with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

With Franco's death in 1975 and the legalization of the PCE, Carrillo returned to Spain and was elected to the Congress of Deputies in 1977. That same year he articulated his philosophical and strategic views in his major work, *Eurocomunismo y Estado* (Eurocommunism and the State). According to Carrillo, Spain's transition to socialism was to be gradual, cooperative, and democratic. He refused to countenance calls for pluralism within the party itself, though, and opposition by the party faction known as the Renovators grew steadily. Carrillo was forced to step down as general secretary after the PCE's dismal performance in the 1982 elections, and in 1985 he was expelled from the party.

Eric W. Frith

See also

Eurocommunism; Spain

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Carter, James Earl, Jr.
(1924–)

U.S. Navy officer, Democratic Party politician, and president of the United States (1977–1981). Born on 1 October 1924 in Plains, Georgia, James "Jimmy" Carter was raised on his family's farm. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1946, pursued graduate work in physics at Union College, and spent seven years as a naval officer, working under Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover in the nuclear submarine program. Carter eventually served on the nuclear submarine *Seawolf*.

Carter left the navy and returned to Georgia upon his father's death in 1953 to run the family farm, eventually building it into a large and prosperous enterprise. He entered state politics in 1962, serving two terms in the Georgia Senate. He also became a born-again Christian with a profound commitment to his Baptist faith. Carter was elected governor of Georgia in 1970.

In December 1974, amid the fallout of the Watergate scandal and an economy in a deep recession, Carter decided to run for the presidency. He secured the Democratic Party nomination and won the presidential election of November 1976. His first major act as president in January 1977 was to extend a pardon to draft evaders, military deserters, and others who had violated the Selective Service Act from 1964 to 1973 during America's controversial Vietnam War. The psychic and political wounds from Vietnam had

yet to heal, and the nation still remained deeply divided over its involvement in the war and suspicious of the government after Watergate. Carter's move generated controversy among the public and elicited criticism from Congress, which helped contribute to a rift with Congress that only widened during his presidency.

Carter was unable to inspire public confidence or to fulfill his election promise to end stagflation (rampant inflation coupled with economic recession). To solve the ongoing energy crisis, a contributory factor to economic stagnation, Carter proposed energy taxes, limits on imported oil, and greater reliance on domestic sources of energy—plans largely stymied by Congress. The Carter administration also deregulated the nation's airline industry, passed major environmental legislation to encourage cleanup of hazardous waste sites, revamped the civil service, and created the Department of Education.

In 1976, former one-term governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter became the first candidate from the Deep South to win election to the presidency of the United States without the benefit of incumbency since Zachary Taylor in 1848. (Library of Congress)

Carter criticized other nations for human rights abuses, often linking economic and military cooperation to a country's commitment to the American ideals of freedom and equality. Such disapproval of the Soviets' treatment of political dissidents undermined détente and delayed SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) negotiations, which finally resulted in a 1979 treaty never ratified by Congress because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that same year. In response to the Afghan situation, the administration enunciated the Carter Doctrine, which committed the United States to protecting oil interests in the Persian Gulf. Carter also imposed a controversial and ineffective American grain embargo on the Soviets and ordered a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. In January 1979, he also extended full diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC), effectively cutting most American ties with Taiwan.

Carter invited Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Manachem Begin to Camp David in September 1978. After two weeks of intense negotiations, a deal was brokered for a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and signed on 26 March 1979. The Camp David Accords represented a true diplomatic breakthrough, provided a framework for future Middle East peace initiatives, and helped temporarily bolster Carter's sagging popularity. In September 1977 he signed the controversial Panama Canal Treaties, ceding the canal to Panama and ensuring the neutrality of the waterway. Congress narrowly ratified the treaties in March 1978, but Carter came under additional fire for having ceded an important U.S. strategic interest.

The 1979–1980 Iranian hostage crisis ultimately doomed Carter's presidency. In the wake of Iran's ouster of U.S.-supported Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran established an Islamic regime headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In November 1979, radical Iranian students seized the

U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking seventy Americans hostage. Carter's diplomacy was unable to diffuse the crisis, and a failed April 1980 rescue attempt paralyzed Carter as a leader and contributed to his defeat in the November 1980 presidential election. His secretary of state, Cyrus R. Vance, resigned in protest against the operation. The hostages were released on 20 January 1981, after 444 days in captivity, as soon as Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president.

Upon leaving the White House, Carter continued a vigorous public life, acting as a mediator in international conflicts, working on the eradication of poverty, promoting human rights, and writing books and memoirs. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his accomplishments in 2002.

Josip Močnik

See also

Afghanistan War; Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Camp David Accords; Carter Doctrine; Détente; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Olympic Games and Politics; Panama Canal Treaties; Vance, Cyrus Roberts

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Carter Doctrine
(23 January 1980)

U.S. foreign policy enunciated by President James "Jimmy" Carter in 1980 that pledged the nation to protect American and Allied interests in the Persian Gulf. By 1980, the Carter administration, which had been engaged in an ongoing debate over the direction of U.S. foreign policy as détente faded, declared its determination to use any means necessary, including military force, to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf. These interests mainly involved Persian Gulf oil and regional shipping lanes.

On 23 January 1980, Carter, in his State of the Union message, declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." This emphasis on American military power marked a fundamental reorientation in Carter's foreign policy. Since 1977, in response to public disillusionment with the Vietnam War and disgust over the Watergate scandal, Carter had attempted to fight the Cold War with different weapons. While not ignoring the Soviet Union, he determined that U.S.-

Soviet relations would not be allowed to dominate foreign policy formulation, a stance that he saw as having led to the costly containment policy and the tragedy of Vietnam. Instead, other nations, especially those in the developing world, would be considered in a regional rather than a global context. Additionally, the United States would assert its international predominance by emphasizing moral rather than military superiority by focusing on human rights and related humanitarian concerns.

But by 1980, the international climate had changed. On 4 November 1979 Iranian students seized the American embassy in Tehran and took seventy Americans hostage. This precipitated a 444-day crisis during which the Carter administration could do little to free the hostages. Also, on 26 December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, sparking a bloody nine-year war there. Faced with these twin crises—religious fundamentalist terrorism and communist advancement by military force—during an election year, Carter reoriented his foreign policy. Although he did not abandon his commitment to human rights, the issue was accorded a much lower priority in policy formulation and was no longer used as a major weapon with which to wage the Cold War. Instead, the administration's official posture reflected a more customary Cold War policy that emphasized military power and communist containment. In addition, a globalist perspective began to supplant the regionalist outlook, with increased emphasis on East-West issues.

Donna R. Jackson

See also

Afghanistan War; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Containment Policy; Détente; Iran; Soviet Union; United States; Vietnam War

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Casey, William Joseph, Jr.
(1913–1987)

Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1981–1987). Born in Queens, New York, William Casey graduated from Fordham University in 1934 and from St. John's School of Law in 1937. During World War II, he served as a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) helping to supervise its operations in Europe.

Following the war, Casey became a successful tax lawyer in the firm of Hall, Casey, Dickler, and Howler. He then became active in venture capitalism, becoming quite wealthy. A conservative Republican, Casey served in President Richard Nixon's administration as chairman of the Securities and

William J. Casey Jr., director of the Central Intelligence Agency (1981–1987). (Ronald Reagan Library)

Exchange Commission (1973–1974). Casey then headed the Export-Import Bank (1975–1976) before returning to private law practice, this time with the firm of Rogers and Wells.

A longtime acquaintance of Republican Governor Ronald Reagan, Casey directed Reagan's successful 1980 presidential campaign and was rewarded with appointment in 1981 as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), where he succeeded Admiral Stansfield Turner. One of Reagan's most trusted advisors, Casey played a key role in the president's foreign policy, especially regarding the Soviet Union. Casey also worked to improve morale and benefits at the CIA but at the same time tried to reduce congressional oversight.

Casey had a singular passion for covert operations, and many of his undertakings were highly controversial, even illegal. In 1985 he authorized the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent anti-American Hezbollah cleric. President Reagan signed off on the operation. The ayatollah escaped unharmed from the car bomb designed to kill him that, however, killed 85 people and wounded another 175.

Casey also supervised covert assistance to the mujahadeen resistance in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet occupation, and he was the principal architect of the arms-for-hostages deal, which became known as the Iran-Contra Affair and had been approved by both President Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush. It involved the sale of U.S. arms to Iran in return for money that was used to support the Contra rebels fighting to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. This action was undertaken in contravention of U.S. law. Subsequent congressional investigations concluded that Casey had also manipulated intelligence data to fit certain decisions.

Casey suffered a serious stroke in December 1986 shortly after the Iran-Contra Affair became public. He resigned in January 1987 and died of brain cancer in Glen Cove, New York, on 7 May 1987 without revealing details of the Iran-Contra Affair.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Iran-Contra Affair; Nicaragua; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Sandinistas

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Castro, Fidel
(1926–)

Cuban communist revolutionary guerrilla fighter and leader of Cuba since January 1959. Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz was born on 13 August 1926 in the municipality of Mayarí (Oriente Province). His father was a wealthy sugarcane planter of Spanish origin. Castro studied at the University of Havana, earning a law degree in 1950. Here his political formation began in the action-oriented and often violent student politics of the period. As part of the wave of disaffection with government corruption, he joined the new Ortodoxo (Orthodox) Party led by Eduardo Chibás and in 1947 participated in actions to overthrow Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo. In 1948 Castro attended a student congress in Bogotá, Colombia, where major disturbances broke out after the assassination of the popular radical politician Jorge Gaitán.

After the 1952 Cuban military coup carried out by Fulgencio Batista, Castro and his Orthodox Party allies initiated a campaign of resistance against the newly installed dictatorship. On 26 July 1953, the youthful rebels attacked the Moncada military barracks in Santiago de Cuba, the country's second-largest city. The assault failed, and Castro was ultimately imprisoned on the island of Pines. His defense speech at his trial, titled "History Will Absolve Me," was a powerful denunciation of social and economic injustice that would subsequently serve as a rallying cry in his struggle against the Batista regime.

His defense speech at his trial, titled "History Will Absolve Me," would subsequently serve as a rallying cry in his struggle against the Batista regime.

In 1955 Castro was released from prison as part of a general amnesty and took refuge in Mexico. There he and his comrades, who would eventually establish the July 26 Movement, connected with Argentinean physician and revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara. In December 1956 Castro, Guevara, and their followers sailed from Mexico on board the yacht *Granma* and landed in southeastern Cuba. This marked the beginning of a two-year military and political campaign to overthrow the U.S.-supported Batista regime. In the last days of 1958 Batista fled the island, and Castro entered Havana in triumph in January 1959.

From that point on, Castro steadily increased his influence. In February 1959 he made himself premier. Increasingly, he based his regime on anti-Americanism. During 1959–1962 he moved Cuba radically to the Left. Two agrarian reforms—confrontation with the United States over American investments in Cuba and U.S. support for counterrevolutionary movements culminating in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion—led to a break in diplomatic relations with the United States. In December 1961 Castro declared that he was a Marxist-Leninist. Economic, political, and military ties with the Soviet Union strengthened steadily throughout the 1960s.

Settlement of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis led to Cuban anger over what was seen as a Soviet betrayal of Cuban interests. It initiated a



Cuban leader Fidel Castro, 1959. (Library of Congress)

complex period in Cuban-Soviet relations characterized by Castro's suspicion of the Soviet Union's motives tempered by a growing reliance on Soviet economic assistance.

While Cuba became a member of Comecon and received important Soviet military aid in the 1960s, Castro's foreign policy, especially in Latin America, embraced the strategy of armed revolution conducted by guerrilla movements in Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia. This challenged Soviet support for policies of peaceful coexistence with the West.

By the end of the 1960s the failure of the first wave of Castro-inspired guerrilla wars and the collapse of his ambitious plans to industrialize Cuba and produce a record 10 million-ton sugar crop in 1970 led to an accommodation with Soviet economic and strategic goals in the 1970s. Steady economic growth and institutionalization weakened Cuba's commitment to continental and even worldwide revolution. However, adjustment to Soviet economic orthodoxy did not completely erode Castro's commitment to support of socialist liberation movements.

In Bolivia during 1967–1968 with support for Guevara's revolutionary expedition and then in the 1980s in Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, Castro assisted revolutionary movements and left-wing governments. He began sending Cuban military forces to Angola in November 1975, which helped to turn the tide there against South Africa's attempt to defeat the left-wing Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola (MPLA, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in Angola. Some see the Cuban victory in the 1988 Battle of Cuito Carnavale as the beginning of the end of the apartheid regime.

The renewed Cold War of the 1980s ended with the defeat of the Cuban-supported Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the negotiation of an end to the civil war in El Salvador, which pitted Cuban-supported Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FLMN) forces against a series of U.S.-supported governments. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 were serious setbacks for Castro both economically, with a sharp falloff in Soviet aid, and diplomatically. In the 1990s Castro announced the launching of "The Special Period in Times of Peace," which inaugurated a shift away from Soviet-style economic institutions toward a limited tolerance for private economic enterprises. It also embraced tourism and encouraged investments from Europe, Asia, Canada, and Latin America.

The end of the Cold War did not, as most observers anticipated, bring about the demise of Castro's regime. In spite of his adoption of many Soviet models, the indigenous, nationalist roots of Cuba's noncapitalist path since 1959 continued to confound predictions.

Barry Carr

See also

Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio; Bay of Pigs; Comecon; Contras; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Latin America, Communist Parties in; Sandinistas

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See Roman Catholic Church

Catholic Church

Cavaco Silva, Aníbal António
(1939–)

Portuguese politician and prime minister (1985–1995). Born on 15 July 1939 in Boliqueime, Portugal, Aníbal Cavaco Silva graduated with a degree in finance from the Technical University of Lisbon in 1964 and received a doctorate from the University of York, England, in 1976. He subsequently taught economics there.

After the 1978 restoration of the constitutional system in Portugal, Cavaco Silva entered politics as a Social Democrat (PSD). He was appointed minister of finance in 1980 and, seeking to deregulate business, soon gained a reputation as an economic liberal. When the PSD joined with the socialists to form the Center Bloc coalition, Cavaco Silva resigned from the government in 1983. He was elected head of the PSD in 1985, ending the coalition.

On 6 November 1985 the PSD won a sufficient number of seats in parliament to form a government with Cavaco Silva as prime minister. In the 1987 and 1991 elections, he and the PSD won clear majorities. He pushed through tax reform and more business liberalization measures that contributed to rapid economic growth. He also oversaw Portugal's entrance into the European Community in January 1986. He did not seek reelection in 1995, and the PSD lost its majority in parliament. He left office in October 1995 and ran unsuccessfully for the presidency in 1996. Cavaco Silva ran again for the presidency in January 2006. He was sworn in as president of Portugal in March 2006.

David H. Richards

See also

Portugal

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Ceauşescu, Nicolae
(1918–1989)

First secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) during 1965–1989 and president of Romania during 1974–1989. Born the third of ten children to peasant parents on 26 January 1918 in Scorniceşti, Nicolae Ceauşescu received only a rudimentary primary schooling before he moved to Bucharest at age eleven to work as a shoemaker's apprentice. Joining the outlawed Union of Communist Youth (UCY) in 1933, he became a regional secretary in 1936 and secretary of the central committee in 1938. Ceauşescu was first arrested in November 1933, charged with inciting a strike and distributing communist pamphlets. Upon his fourth conviction in July 1940, he was imprisoned until August 1944. In the Tîrgu-Jiu prison camp, he became a protégé of Romanian Workers' Party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and future Premier Ion Maurer.

After the postwar communist takeover, Ceauşescu occupied various party posts. He became regional secretary for Oltenia in November 1946, deputy in the Ministry of Agriculture during 1948–1950, and deputy minister of the armed forces during 1950–1954. Appointed in 1952 to the Romanian Workers' Party (PMR) Central Committee, he was made secretary in 1954 and a Politburo member in 1955. Upon Gheorghiu-Dej's death in 1965, Ceauşescu became first secretary of the renamed PCR, backed by Prime Minister Maurer.

As with Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceauşescu both supported rapid industrialization and minimized Soviet control. In 1967 he established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and maintained relations with Israel after the Six-Day War. Romanian diplomats also acted as negotiating brokers between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the United States. Ceauşescu's popularity rose at home and abroad when he opposed the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, a stance that led to U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's visit to Romania in August 1969 and Ceauşescu's return visits to the United States in 1970, 1973, and 1978. He also visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) in June 1971, followed in April 1972 by meetings with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) head Yasir Arafat. Subsequently, Romania achieved most-favored nation (MFN) trade status with the United States in 1975 and was admitted to international organizations including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Internally, the liberal tendencies of Ceauşescu's early government in freeing political prisoners detained under Gheorghiu-Dej and deposing pro-

Soviet members of the Securitate (the Romanian secret service) soon gave way to nationalism, a personality cult, and even more stringent Securitate surveillance. Upon the retirement of Premier Maurer in 1974, Ceauşescu assumed the newly created office of president of the republic. Natural disasters such as poor harvests and the 1977 earthquake combined with reckless trade practices and economic mismanagement led to an immense foreign debt crisis and domestic shortages. In response, Ceauşescu imposed strict rationing for food and electrical power and, to boost the country's workforce, forbade abortion and contraception. His regime also began a systematization campaign to resettle villagers in agroindustrial centers, a movement that led to massive discontent and the destruction of historical landmarks. As his popular support eroded, Ceauşescu increasingly surrounded himself with sycophants and appointed family members to strategic posts. His wife Elena became a Central Committee member in July 1972, a member of the Politburo and head of the PCR's personnel section in 1973, and first deputy prime minister in 1980.

Romanian communist Nicolae Ceauşescu ruled his nation for nearly twenty-five years. He kept the country relatively free of Soviet domination but led a corrupt, repressive regime that ended in his overthrow and execution in 1989. (Peter Turnley/Corbis)

In the 1980s, Romania's international relations deteriorated as growing condemnation of human rights abuses accumulated. This compelled Ceauşescu to renounce Romania's MFN status in 1988 before it could be revoked by the U.S. government. Unrest spread throughout Romania, marked by brutally repressed miners' strikes (1977, 1983, and 1986), the protest marches of 1987 in Iaşi and Braşov, and, in March 1989, an internationally released letter signed by six senior PCR members in the name of the National Salvation Front (NSF). Shortly after Ceauşescu's November 1989 reelection for another five-year term, antigovernment demonstrations in Timişoara in December 1989 left 122 dead after an army intervention. Returning from a state visit to Iran on 20 December, Ceauşescu denounced the demonstrators and called for a progovernment rally in Bucharest. This evolved into another protest and led to the defection of much of the army. Ceauşescu and his wife fled the capital in a helicopter but were eventually captured and detained in the Târgovişte military garrison. There they were tried by a tribunal of the NSF and executed on 25 December 1989.

Anna M. Wittmann

See also

Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe; Prague Spring; Romania

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Central Intelligence Agency

Primary U.S. intelligence agency during the Cold War. Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in July 1947 to centralize and coordinate intelligence and espionage activities in reaction to the deepening Cold War. Early on, the CIA's main focus was on the Soviet Union and its satellites. The CIA assumed primary responsibility not only for intelligence collection and analysis but also for covert actions. Its origins can be traced to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II that had conducted espionage, intelligence analysis, and special operations from propaganda to sabotage. The main impetus for the creation of the CIA came from the investigation into Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. President Harry S. Truman vowed to prevent a repetition of this massive intelligence failure.

On 22 January 1946, Truman signed an executive order forming a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) modeled after the OSS. Its mission was to provide analysis and coordination of information about foreign threats and to undertake advantageous policy initiatives. Truman signed the National Security Act on 26 July 1947, replacing the CIG with the new CIA as an independent agency operating within the Executive Office.

Truman appointed legendary OSS spymaster William "Wild Bill" Donovan to serve as the first CIA director. The CIA's primary function was to advise the National Security Council (NSC) on intelligence matters and make recommendations for coordination of intelligence activities. To accomplish these goals, the CIA was to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence and perform other services in accordance with NSC directives. Because Congress was vague in defining the CIA's mission, broad interpretation of the act provided justification for subsequent covert operations, although the original intent was only to authorize espionage. The CIA director was responsible for reporting on intelligence activities to Congress and the president. Power over the budget and staffing only of the CIA meant that no director ever exerted central control over the other twelve government entities in the U.S. intelligence community.

Known to insiders as "The Agency" or "The Company," the CIA consisted of four directorates. The Directorate of Operations (DO) supervised official and nonofficial agents in conducting human intelligence collection, covert operations, and counterintelligence. The DO was divided into geographic units and also contained the Center for Counterterrorism. The Directorate of Administration managed the CIA's daily administrative affairs and housed the Office of Security (OS). Created in 1952, the Directorate of Intelligence conducted research in intelligence sources and analysis of the results. It produced the "President's Daily Brief" and worked with the National Intelligence Council in preparing estimates and studies. The Directorate of Science and Technology, created in 1963, was responsible for development and operation of reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, operation and funding of ground stations to intercept Soviet missile telemetry, and analysis of foreign nuclear and space programs. It also operated the Foreign

Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, Langley, Virginia. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which monitored and analyzed all foreign media outlets.

During its first years, the CIA had difficulty prevailing in bureaucratic battles over authority and funding. For example, the State Department required CIA personnel abroad to operate under a U.S. ambassador. Walter Bedell Smith, who replaced Donovan in 1950, was an effective director, but the CIA's power increased greatly after Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, became director in 1953. An 80 percent increase in the agency's budget led to the hiring of 50 percent more agents and a major expansion of covert operations.

The CIA played a key role in the overthrow of allegedly radical governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. With the advice of CIA operative Edward G. Lansdale, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay during 1950–1954 crushed the Hukbalahap uprising in his country. CIA agents in South Vietnam infiltrated the Michigan State University Advisory Group that trained police and administrators during 1955–1962 as a basis for nation building. In Laos, the CIA operated Air America and supported rightist politicians, while Donovan, who became U.S. ambassador to Thailand, organized Thai paramilitary units to fight communist forces in neighboring countries.

President John F. Kennedy lost confidence in the CIA after the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion, which failed to oust Cuba's Fidel Castro in 1961. The

CIA nonetheless continued to devise imaginative but somewhat improbable schemes to assassinate or discredit Castro, efforts suspended during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1961, however, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer began providing the CIA with information on Soviet strategic capabilities, nuclear targeting policies, and medium-range ballistic missiles that would prove critical in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The CIA also penetrated the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry and General Staff, the GRU, and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB). But its covert activities—especially its operations to kill Castro and its involvement in the murders of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem and later the Congo's Patrice Lumumba—soon caused much of the world community to view the agency as a sinister force. Although the agency instigated a rebellion in Indonesia that failed to topple Sukarno's regime in 1958, claims that it engineered his ouster in 1965 were false.

As direct American military action in Indochina grew, covert operations became less important, but by 1968 they witnessed a resurgence in the Phoenix Program that called for assassination of communist operatives. Debate continues over CIA involvement in the 1970 coup in Cambodia but not on its role in ousting Chile's Salvador Allende in 1973.

In 1975 public revelations of CIA assassination plots and an illegal operation to spy on American citizens protesting the Vietnam War led to the creation of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board as well as an Intelligence Committee in each house of Congress. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter increased oversight of the CIA and reduced its budget but reversed course after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the CIA had failed to predict the 1979 rebellion overthrowing Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran.

During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the CIA used its renewed power and clout to undermine communist regimes worldwide, providing support for Afghan rebel forces that included Osama bin Laden. Ignoring statutory limits, the CIA also participated in the secret sale of arms to Iran and used the proceeds to fund covert actions against Nicaragua's leftist government. In 1991 Congress passed a new oversight law to prevent another Iran-Contra Affair.

In 1991, the CIA correctly forecast a coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. But the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union beginning in August 1991 came as a complete surprise. Two-and-a-half years later, in February 1994, the arrest of agent Aldrich H. Ames for selling secrets for many years to the Soviets and compromising operatives provided critics with more evidence to back charges that the CIA had prolonged rather than helped to win the Cold War.

James I. Matray

See also

Afghanistan War; Allende Gossens, Salvador; Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Bay of Pigs; Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Castro, Fidel; Colby, William Egan; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Espionage;

Guatemalan Intervention; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Hukbalahap; Indochina War; Iran-Contra Affair; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Laos; Lumumba, Patrice Emery; Magsaysay, Ramon; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; MONGOOSE, Operation; Mossadegh, Mohammed; Office of Strategic Services; Sihanouk, Norodom; Smith, Walter Bedell; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union; Vietnam War

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Chad

Landlocked nation located in north-central Africa, the continent's fifth-largest country, measuring 495,792 square miles, four-fifths the size of the U.S. state of Alaska. Chad is bordered by Libya to the north, Cameroon and the Central African Republic to the south, Niger to the west, and Sudan to the east. Economically and developmentally poor for much of its history, Chad had fewer than 5 million citizens in 1945. The nation's ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse population straddles three major geographic areas: the sparsely populated northern region across the Sahara Desert, the arid middle Sahel region, and the heavily forested southern third of the country, home to most of its citizens. These divisions sparked a series of battles, coups, and unrest that plagued the country during much of the Cold War.

France began colonizing the region around 1900 along with other large areas of western Africa, bringing together several groups that had previously never been under the same ruler, from nomadic Muslims in the north and east to animists in the south and around Lake Chad in the west. The divide between north and south began early, as southerners were more willing to accept French administration, language, and culture. Southerners also received positions in the colonial bureaucracy, headquartered in N'djamena, which remains the capital today. Pastoral and nomadic northerners, however, largely rejected French efforts to settle in permanent communities.

Chad was the first African colony to join the Allied effort in World War II under its first African governor, Félix Éboué, and won independence in August 1960 even though French military administration continued in the north for five more years. François (Ngarta) Tombalbaye became the country's

first president and premier in 1960, uniting northern and southern factions and isolating the more extremist Muslim groups in the north. Following a brief period of stability, however, dissatisfaction among northerners at Tombalbaye's favoritism toward his native south led to rebellions in the north and east. By 1968, Chad was requesting military assistance from France to help quell the unrest. The French intervened but were unable to effectively stabilize the country.

Meanwhile, the Tombalbaye government became increasingly corrupt and despotic. The Chad military intervened in 1975, fomented a coup, killed Tombalbaye, and installed General Félix Malloum, another southerner, in power. Malloum included more northerners in his government, but by 1978 there was yet another rebellion, with northerners eventually capturing N'djamena. Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to mediate the dispute led to a weak coalition government, which collapsed in 1980. Libya supported northern President Goukouni Oueddei, who eventually consolidated a hold on the capital in March 1979; by March 1980, however, he had been driven from the capital by the defense minister, Hissen Habré. In 1983, Libya annexed the Aozou Strip along its border with Chad and occupied significant areas of Chadian territory while simultaneously trying to keep Oueddei in power. This move drew the ire of France and the United States, who opposed Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. France sent troops to southern Chad, and by 1987 Libyan forces had been largely expelled from the country, although conflict between Oueddei's forces and those of Habré persisted. Thereafter, French military forces and an OAU peacekeeping force (partially funded by the United States) remained largely neutral during the conflict and managed to keep a semblance of order.

Libya's graduated withdrawal had cleared the way for southern leader Habré to gain control of the government by 7 June 1982. President Ronald Reagan openly supported the Habré government, using Chad as a base to train anti-Qadhafi Libyan rebels. Continued French and American aid helped Chad keep Libyan forces from moving beyond the Aozou Strip, which would remain occupied by Libya until 1994. Habré had little success in gaining his people's trust, however, as they had long suffered under his brutal rule. Minor reforms instituted following a 1985 agreement in Libreville, Gabon, momentarily helped bring about a sense of stability, but within a few years opposition leaders began agitating for deeper reforms. Under the leadership of former Chadian General Idriss Déby, rebels with support from Libya deposed Habré on 1 December 1990.

Facing the same ethnic divisions and political divisiveness, Déby himself soon became an autocratic dictator. He remains in office today. Chad held multiparty elections in 2001, won by Déby with more than two-thirds of the vote. Chad remains strategically important as a result of the confirmation of sizable oil deposits in 1996 and the government's inability to control its porous borders, which terrorist organizations operating in North Africa often take advantage of.

John Spykerman

See also

Africa; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; France; Libya; Organization of African Unity; Qadhafi, Muammar

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Chambers, Whittaker
(1901–1961)

American communist, editor, writer, and informant. Born Vivian Jay Chambers on 1 April 1901 in Philadelphia, Whittaker Chambers graduated from high school in 1919, attended but was expelled from Columbia University in 1922, and joined the U.S. Communist Party in 1925. He spent thirteen years in the party, writing for and editing its periodicals. Beginning in 1932, he worked in the party's underground apparatus under various aliases as a courier for a Soviet intelligence network within the U.S. government.

Appalled by Josef Stalin's notorious political purges, Chambers defected from the Communist Party in April 1938. Like many apostates, he veered sharply to the Right; by the time he joined the staff of *Time* magazine twelve months later, he was an ardent anticommunist. In September 1939, he outlined to Adolf Berle, an assistant secretary of state, his allegations about communist espionage in Washington and implicated eight individuals, including Alger Hiss.

During the deepening Cold War and as anticommunist activity in America grew more intense, Chambers appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). On 3 August 1948, Chambers publicly identified Hiss as a communist. In a protracted, controversial, and highly publicized series of hearings and trials, Chambers leveled explicit charges of perjury and implicit charges of Soviet espionage against Hiss, who vehemently denied the allegations. Chambers appeared before HUAC and the various courts fourteen times, attempted suicide once, and lost his job at *Time*.

After the hearings were over and Hiss was convicted and imprisoned for perjury, Chambers drifted, became a Quaker, and wrote his compelling autobiography, *Witness*. Before his death on 9 July 1961 near Westminster, Maryland,

Whittaker Chambers. An American communist and writer, his allegations of communist espionage implicated Alger Hiss. (Library of Congress)

Chambers worked for William Buckley's conservative *National Review*. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan, himself influenced by *Witness*, posthumously awarded Chambers the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Phillip Deery

See also
Hiss, Alger; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthy Hearings; McCarthyism

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Chang, John Myon
(1899–1966)

Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) diplomat, vice president (1956–1960), and premier (1951–1952, 1960–1961). Born in Seoul, Korea, on 28 August 1899, John Chang (Chang Myon) was a devout Roman Catholic. He graduated from Suwon High Agriculture School in 1917, the Seoul YMCA English School in 1919, and Manhattan Catholic College in New York in 1925. Upon his return to Korea, he worked with the Catholic Church in Pyongyang and Seoul during the Japanese colonial period.

Following World War II and the end of Japanese rule, Chang plunged into politics in 1946 and was elected to the National Assembly in May 1948. With the establishment of the ROK in 1948, President Syngman Rhee appointed Chang chief representative to the United Nations (UN). Chang went on to serve as South Korea's first ambassador to the United States from 1949 to 1951, during which time he tried to secure additional U.S. military assistance prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

In February 1951, Rhee appointed Chang premier. Chang resigned in 1952 and then joined the anti-Rhee faction, which organized the Democratic Party in 1955. Chang was elected vice president in 1956 but lost his reelection bid in March 1960.

The student uprisings of April 1960 brought the collapse of Rhee's government, while the subsequent National Assembly elections of 29 July 1960 gave birth to the ROK's second republic, a parliamentary system. Chang was inaugurated as its first premier in August 1960. Park Chung Hee's 16 May 1961 military coup overthrew Chang's government, however, making it the first and last parliamentary government in Korean history. Park subsequently banned Chang from political activities and had him imprisoned. After his release, Chang concentrated on religious activities. He died in Seoul on 4 June 1966.

Jinwung Kim

See also
Korea, Republic of; Park Chung Hee; Rhee, Syngman

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Chapultepec Conference
(21 February–8 March 1945)

Conference convened in 1945 to foster hemispheric cooperation and security. The meeting, held under its full title—the Inter-American Conference on War and Peace—assembled at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City during 21 February–8 March 1945. It was there that the framework for a regional security system in the Americas was formally laid out.

Latin American nations, together with the United States, adopted the Act of Chapultepec; the signatories agreed to a full inter-American consultative process. They also pledged to band together in the application of collective measures, including armed force, in cases of threats or acts of aggression against any American state.

A month later, at the United Nations Conference held in San Francisco in April 1945, the Latin American countries ratified their Chapultepec commitments. Three years later, the Organization of American States (OAS) was formally founded, a direct consequence of the Chapultepec Conference. Together with the Rio and Bogotá Treaties, the OAS and the Chapultepec Conference resolutions formed the foundations of inter-American military and political cooperation during the Cold War.

The Chapultepec Conference also addressed the postwar economic future of the Americas. This subject was controversial, because the United States called for an Economic Charter of the Americas that was opposed by Latin American states anxious to promote industrialization, income redistribution, and increased standards of living.

The clash between Latin American developmentalism and U.S. economic orthodoxy was not resolved at Chapultepec. Indeed, the conference disillusioned the leaders of the Latin American states, who had expected that their efforts supporting the Allied cause in World War II would have resulted in more tangible rewards, including a focusing of U.S. energies on the Americas instead of on Europe.

Barry Carr

See also
Americas; Organization of American States; Rio Pact

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Charter 77

The most significant postwar dissident movement in Czechoslovakia, comprising some 2,000 members who in 1977 called on the communist government to respect human rights. Charter 77 signatories comprised three groups: former elite "reformed communists" who had supported Alexander Dubček's 1968 Prague Spring attempt to liberalize communism; artists, writers, and philosophers; and religious personages and clergy. The Charter 77 movement had at any given time three spokespersons representing each of the three groups. Each spokesperson was appointed for one year (or until arrested) and then replaced by another from the same group. The first three spokespersons were the philosopher Jan Patočka, the playwright Václav Havel, and the reformed communist and former foreign minister Jiří Hájek.

The immediate catalyst for the drafting of the Charter 77 document in January 1977 had been the 1976 arrest and trial of the rock group Plastic People of the Universe. The text of the Charter document demanded that the Czech government abide by its own laws and, above all, uphold international human rights agreements, most notably the Helsinki Final Act. Besides the first three spokespersons, Zdeněk Mlynář and author Pavel Kohout participated in preparing the charter document. To remain within the constraints of the law that prohibited political parties apart from the Communist Party and to accommodate dissidents who spanned the political spectrum, the document specifically stated the nonpolitical nature of the charter. Patočka's philosophy of "living in truth" through sacrifice for "things worth suffering for" offered a nonpolitical foundation in phenomenology. Perhaps because of the influence of reformed communists, the document also called for negotiations with the communist leadership.

President Gustáv Husák had no interest in negotiations with Charter 77 members, however. Instead, the document unleashed repression and reprisals, including arrests, imprisonments, harassment, job losses, and the restriction of educational opportunities. Patočka died following a police interrogation in March 1977. Havel and other spokespersons and signatories were imprisoned. Still others were pressured to emigrate. The regime even initiated an opposing petition, known as the Anti-Charter, to prove the loyalty of its own artists and supporters.

Despite the dreams of some signatories to create a parallel polis, a term taken from the title of spokesperson Václav Benda's famous 1978 essay, the Charter 77 movement was effective only in garnering international support and in preserving Czech high culture through the dreary period of so-called normalization. However, Charter 77 signatories provided most of the leader-

ship for the Civic Forum that negotiated the end of communism in 1989. Consequently, Havel became the president of Czechoslovakia, spokesperson Jiří Dienstbier became its foreign minister, and signatory Petr Pithart became Czech prime minister. Thus, in the end Charter 77 played a profoundly important role in modern Czech history.

Aviezer Tucker

See also

Czechoslovakia; Dubček, Alexander; Havel, Václav; Helsinki Final Act; Husák, Gustáv; Prague Spring

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Checkpoint Charlie

Border crossing point in the center of Berlin. Located on Friedrichstrasse just east of the Brandenburg Gate, Checkpoint Charlie was originally the only crossing point between the U.S. and Soviet zones of Berlin. The Soviets knew it simply as the Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point.

After the government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) closed the border between the communist and Western zones of Berlin on 13 August 1961 and began construction of the Berlin Wall, Checkpoint Charlie became the sole crossing point for diplomats and military personnel as well as businessmen and tourists from abroad from the Western into the communist zone. Two other crossing points were subsequently opened: on the Autobahn at Helmstedt along the West German–East German border and at Dreilinden, where highway traffic connected East Germany and West Berlin. The Helmstedt crossing point was known as Alpha, that at Dreilinden as Bravo, and the Friedrichstrasse point was designated Charlie.

These three checkpoints served as a means for Western military authorities to register and to inform foreigners and military personnel entering East Germany. As such, Checkpoint Charlie figured prominently in many real and fictional accounts of the Cold War, including several dramatic escapes from East to West Berlin.

During 27–28 October 1961, several dozen U.S. and Soviet tanks briefly faced off at Checkpoint Charlie when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev became convinced that U.S. forces were about to try to breach the Berlin Wall. Both sides went to a high state of alert, and each set of commanders had orders to return fire if fired upon. Khrushchev and President John F. Kennedy agreed to remove the tanks, which was accomplished one by one, and the crisis passed.

Checkpoint Charlie was removed on 22 June 1990. Today a short wall of bricks marks its former location. The guardhouses are now in the Allied Museum in Zehlendorf. Copies of the former U.S. guardhouse and the sign that marked the border ("You are leaving the American Sector") were erected on the site in August 2000. A museum about Checkpoint Charlie and the Berlin Wall is located nearby. Developers tore down the last East German watchtower at the crossing point in December 2000.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic; Khrushchev, Nikita

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Chen Yi
(1901–1972)

Chinese communist politician, diplomat, and foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1958–1969. Born in Lezhi, Sichuan Province, on 26 August 1901, Chen Yi went to France in 1919 on a work-study basis. He returned to China in 1921 and joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), engaging in underground activities.

During both the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, Chen commanded the Chinese communist armed forces, fighting in northeastern China. After successfully liberating Shanghai, Jiangsu, in May 1949, Chen became its mayor, a post he held until 1959. Upon the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, he gained membership in both the People's Revolutionary Military Council and the East China Military and Administrative Committee.

Prior to 1954, Chen spent most of his time in Shanghai, where he received a number of foreign visitors and made important diplomatic contacts. In September 1954, he moved to Beijing to assume the posts of vice premier and vice chairman of the National Defense Council. In these capacities he regularly traveled abroad to strengthen the PRC's ties with fellow socialist nations in Africa and Asia. In 1958, he succeeded Zhou Enlai as the PRC's foreign minister and continued to uphold Zhou's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence first enunciated at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

Chen's tenure witnessed a breakthrough in Sino-American relations. In early 1969 he proposed reinstating the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, which had begun in 1955 but were suspended in 1967. Chen sought to end China's diplomatic isolation that had deepened since the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. His proposal was ultimately approved, paving the way for the Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s.

Despite Chen's considerable achievements, however, the leaders of the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution relieved him of all his posts in October 1969, charging him with conducting revisionist foreign policy. Chen died in seclusion in Beijing on 6 January 1972.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Bandung Conference; China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Zhou Enlai

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Cheney, Richard B.

(1941–)

Legislator, administrator, businessman, secretary of defense (1989–1993), and vice president of the United States (2001–). Richard "Dick" Cheney was born on 30 January 1941 in Lincoln, Nebraska. His family moved to Casper, Wyoming, when he was young, and so he spent his formative years there. He earned BA and MA degrees from the University of Wyoming in 1965 and 1966, respectively. He undertook further studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, before departing for Washington, D.C., as a congressional fellow beginning in 1968.

In 1969 Cheney took a post in the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity. He soon caught the eye of the White House, and in 1971 he became a staff assistant for President Richard Nixon. From there Cheney quickly moved up to become assistant director of the Cost of Living Council, a post he held until 1973. In 1974 he was hired to be deputy assistant to President Gerald R. Ford. In 1975 Cheney became White House chief of staff, where he remained until 1977.

In 1978, Cheney was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as Wyoming's sole congressman. He was elected to five additional terms and became a respected and influential legislator in the process. Tapped by President George H. W. Bush to become secretary of defense, Cheney assumed that post in March 1989. He delegated much responsibility for the daily internal workings of the Pentagon to his deputy, Donald J. Atwood Jr. Cheney preferred to handle the larger, more public aspects of the job himself. In 1989 he selected General Colin L. Powell as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The choice proved the right one when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, precipitating the Persian Gulf War. Cheney and Powell helped engineer a masterful international military coalition—backed by the United Nations—that swiftly defeated Iraqi forces and liberated Kuwait in February 1991.

Casualties among coalition forces were extraordinarily light. Indeed, the Persian Gulf War made Cheney and Powell household words and brightened both men's political stars.

After Bush was voted out of office in November 1992, Cheney joined the American Enterprise Institute as a senior fellow. In 1995 he became president and chief operating officer of the Haliburton Oil Company, a major player in the international petroleum market. In 2000, Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush selected Cheney as his vice presidential running mate. Bush and Cheney were sworn into office after a contentious and disputed election in January 2001. Cheney is said to wield enormous influence in the Bush administration, but after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Cheney has kept an exceedingly public low profile.

Paul Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Bush, George Herbert Walker; Persian Gulf War

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Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich

(1911–1985)

While in office, Chernenko escalated the Cold War rivalry with the West while pursuing a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China.

Soviet politician and penultimate leader of the Soviet Union during 1984–1985. Born in Bolshaya Tes, Siberia, on 11 September 1911, Konstantin Chernenko left home when he was twelve and joined the Komsomol (communist youth organization) in 1926 and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1931. He served in the Frontier Guard and in 1948 became head of the CPSU agitation and propaganda (AgitProp) activities in the Moldovian Central Committee. His eagerness and success in AgitProp affairs impressed party operative Leonid Brezhnev, who would become his mentor.

In 1956 Chernenko became Brezhnev's chief of staff and went on to serve as the CPSU's director of personnel in 1965, a position he held for nearly two decades. Chernenko was named a member of the Central Committee in 1971, attained candidate status in the Politburo in October 1977, and earned full membership in November 1978.

Following Brezhnev's death in 1982, Chernenko was the leading candidate to replace him, but party politics, which were then rather divisive, resulted in a compromise. Thus, the sickly Yuri Andropov became the new Soviet leader. Andropov died after less than fifteen months in office, however, and Chernenko became the general secretary of the CPSU and de facto Soviet leader on 13 February 1984, despite concerns over his health and Andropov's clear desire that Mikhail Gorbachev succeed him.

While in office, Chernenko pursued a hard-line foreign policy, unlike his predecessors, and escalated the Cold War rivalry with the West while pursuing a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Domestically, he worked for reductions in the bureaucracy and sought to decrease the party's control over the economy. He also attempted to increase the production of consumer goods while bolstering Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) surveillance of dissident activities.

Chernenko's short tenure in office was plagued by poor health, and he died in Moscow on 10 March 1985. Gorbachev succeeded him as general secretary that same month.

Cem Karadeli

Konstantin Chernenko briefly led the Soviet Union as the general secretary of the Communist Party during 1984–1985. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also

Andropov, Yuri; Brezhnev, Leonid; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Soviet Union

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Chernobyl
(26 April 1986)

Soviet nuclear power plant, site of the worst civilian nuclear reactor accident in history. A routine test at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant conducted between 1:00 and 2:00 A.M. on 26 April 1986 resulted in a massive release of radioactive material into the atmosphere and triggered a conflagration that took days to control. Chernobyl is in Ukraine, approximately 60 miles northwest of Kiev at the confluence of the Pripet and Dnieper Rivers and about 5 miles from the current border between Belarus and Ukraine, although in 1986 this was a part of the Soviet Union.

Considered a risky and controversial design in the West, the Chernobyl plant began operation in 1977. Its fourth reactor, the one involved in the 1986 accident, came on line in 1983. The Chernobyl reactors used graphite to modify the nuclear reaction and water flowing around the channels holding the fuel elements for cooling. There was, however, no containment structure for these reactors.

It has been determined that a combination of design flaws and operating errors caused the 1986 disaster. During the early-morning test, the fuel

Casualties of Chernobyl

Group	*Number estimated*
Instant deaths as a result of contamination	59
Estimated deaths as a result of radiation-induced cancer or leukemia (projected)	4,000
People who contracted thyroid cancer as a result of contamination	4,000
People evacuated from site	350,000
People still living in contaminated areas	5,000,000

elements in the reactor ruptured, causing an explosion that lifted the cover plate off the reactor and forced radioactive steam into the atmosphere in the form of a deadly radioactive cloud.

A secondary explosion then set the graphite afire, releasing more radioactivity as the fire raged for nine days. Estimates hold that the Chernobyl accident released one hundred times more radioactivity than the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945. Most of the radioactive fallout settled to the ground within a few miles of the site, but lighter amounts of radioactive material were carried by wind patterns as far as Scandinavia and to a lesser but measurable extent across the entire Northern Hemisphere.

View of the sarcophagus covering the damaged fourth reactor of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, 26 April 2006. (Gleb Garanich/Reuters/Corbis)

The explosions and fire destroyed Reactor Four and led to the deaths of 30 workers by radiation exposure. More than 100 other workers suffered from radiation poisoning, all of whom recovered from the initial effects. Thousands more, however, were exposed to radiation, either from being in the immediate area or being sent there in response to the accident. By 4 May, more than 160,000 people living within 30 kilometers (18 miles) of the plant were evacuated. Another 210,000 residents outside that radius were later evacuated. The response to the accident in 1986 and 1987 involved about 200,000 people, some of whom received large doses of radiation. These and later responders have been referred to as "liquidators" in the Soviet literature involving the accident.

In later years another 400,000 helped with the cleanup, most receiving low dosages of radiation. In all, more than 1 million people were affected in some way by radiation, and the World Health Organization (WHO) has reported a statistically significant increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer in the affected areas. Scientists also expect an increase in the level of leukemia and congenital anomalies attributable to the accident, although they have not yet occurred with any great frequency.

What made the Chernobyl accident even worse was the Soviet government's lack of immediate candor about the crisis and its inability to respond in a more timely fashion. Unwilling to admit to such a catastrophe, the Soviet

government at first tried to hide the effects of the explosions and fire; not until radioactivity sensors in Scandinavia and Western Europe began registering abnormally high readings did the Kremlin go public with the nuclear nightmare. Chernobyl also laid bare the inferiority of Soviet technology and the government's inability to react to the situation in a more efficacious fashion.

There will likely be a continuing debate over the long-term impact of the Chernobyl disaster. Soviet-era secrecy surrounding issues of health, particularly those involving environmental issues, will make it difficult to establish base data from which to calculate changes after 1986 that can be attributed to Chernobyl.

Daniel E. Spector

See also
Soviet Union

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See Jiang Jieshi

Chiang Kai-shek

Chile

South American nation covering 292,258 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of Montana. With a 1945 population of approximately 5.9 million, Chile borders Argentina to the east, Peru and Bolivia to the north, and the Pacific Ocean to the west.

Chile's historic and commercial ties with Germany influenced its neutrality during World War II. Not until 1943 did the country sever its relations with the Axis powers, and not until 1945 did it declare war on Japan. This diplomatic reorientation was linked to the fact that Chile wanted to participate in the creation of the United Nations (UN). After the war, Chile aligned its foreign policy with that of the United States. In 1947 it signed the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and in 1952 it signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Pact. Chile received U.S. aid to purchase military matériel as well as military training. Chile broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1947, and communists were forced to leave the government. In 1954, Chile

also supported the American intervention in Guatemala, despite domestic opposition.

By the end of the 1950s, two facts determined Chilean diplomacy. First, the reunification of communists and socialists under the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP, Popular Action Front) created concerns within Chilean political parties and abroad when Salvador Allende nearly won the 1958 elections. Second, the 1959 Cuban revolution raised fear that communism might spread throughout Latin America. However, President Jorge Alessandri (1958–1964) pursued a twofold policy toward Cuba. He abstained from the votes suspending it from the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962 and imposing sanctions. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, however, Alessandri decided to support President John F. Kennedy's Cuban quarantine. Although Alessandri abstained again from votes sanctioning Cuba in 1964, Chile finally broke relations with the regime of Fidel Castro that year.

A special chapter in U.S.-Chilean relations began in 1963 when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) embarked on a covert operation in Chile to short-circuit Allende's triumph in the 1964 elections. The CIA sent more than $2 million to support the Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei. The money was primarily used for propaganda, including a leaflet that showed Soviet tanks in Czechoslovakia and warned what could happen to Chile if Allende won. The CIA covert operation continued until 1973, when President Allende was overthrown by a military coup. Despite the American involvement in Chile, President Frei (1964–1970) adopted a more independent foreign policy, especially toward Latin America. In 1965, Chile condemned the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic, criticized the United States for its unilateral actions, and refused to support the empowerment of the OAS to intervene in the internal affairs of a nation. As part of his economic program, Frei authorized the government purchase of 51 percent of Chile's copper mines. Although the American mining interests protested, the U.S. government declined to intervene.

The 1970 presidential elections revived CIA activity in Chile. The CIA spent millions of dollars to support an anti-Allende campaign. Allende won the election, but because he did not obtain the majority of votes, his confirmation remained in the hands of the Chilean congress. For two months, the United States embarked on an aggressive campaign to keep Allende from power. These efforts included bribes to congressmen, economic pressure, and the encouragement of a military coup. Nevertheless, Allende was elected by the Chilean congress.

Allende's foreign policy showed little change from that of Frei. Allende continued to support the principles of self-determination and nonintervention, and he established relations with Cuba, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). He also advanced the nationalization of copper companies and the American-owned International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) and embarked on agrarian reform. The United States responded by imposing an economic boycott, which included the suspension of aid from the Export-Import Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the

Inter-American Development Bank. On 11 September 1973, after three years of socialist government, Allende was overthrown by the Chilean military. That day, General Augusto Pinochet began one of the most repressive regimes in the history of the Americas.

The new military government quickly restored relations with the United States. Soon, U.S. economic aid began to flow to Chile. But these good relations came to an end when human rights abuses became publicly known. In 1976, the U.S. Congress approved an embargo on arms sales and limited economic aid to Chile. In domestic affairs, the so-called Chicago Boys—Chilean economists influenced by the free-market ideas of the University of Chicago School of Economics—instituted a new economic program that reduced inflation and opened the economy to foreign investment. Such policies resulted in an amazing economic boom.

In the 1980s, international pressure to democratize Chile led Pinochet to modify the constitution and call for democratic elections in 1989. They took place that December. Patricio Alwyin, the candidate of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), won 54 percent of the vote. Alwyin was sworn in as president in March 1990, but Pinochet remained commander in chief of the army until 1998, when he became a senator.

Carina Solmirano

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Americas; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cuba; Frei Montalva, Eduardo; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto

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See Cultural Revolution

China, Cultural Revolution

China, People's Republic of

The world's most populous nation, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a large Asian nation with an estimated 1945 population of 529 million. It covers a little more than 3.705 million square miles, just slightly smaller than the United States, and shares common borders with many states. To the north

Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong shown reading a proclamation of the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 on the Tiananmen Gate rostrum in Beijing. (Bettmann/Corbis)

it is bordered by Russia and Mongolia; to the south by the South China Sea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), India, Bhutan, and Nepal; to the west by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; and to the east by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. During the Cold War period, the PRC promulgated several initiatives that led to its emerging from this period in a far more consolidated condition than the Soviet Union. The PRC also developed more flexible external policies, with a strong focus on its relations with the two superpowers but also involving linkages with developing nations. By the late 1960s, the PRC had become a significant player in the international arena. Even as the PRC consolidated internally and sought to secure its borders, it positioned itself for a larger role in Asia and beyond.

The PRC officially came into existence following the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949). On 1 October 1949, the chairman of the Central People's Administrative Council and leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong, proclaimed the PRC. Zhou Enlai became premier and foreign minister. The Soviet Union and its satellites immediately recognized the PRC, followed later by Burma, India, and (on 6 January 1950) Great Britain.

Domestically, the PRC followed varied political and economic polices, combining considerable centralized political control with an increasingly decentralized market economy in the final stages of the Cold War. Helping to drive the Chinese economy was its burgeoning population, which more than doubled during 1945–1991. At the end of the Cold War, China contained nearly 1.1 billion people.

Despite the ideological rivalry with the United States, the CCP tried to convey its message to the American public through progressive writers such as Edgar Snow, Jack Belden, William Hinton, Agnes Smedley, and others even before it came to power in 1949. Nevertheless, with the growing influence of the so-called China Hands and the China Lobby in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s, American administrations supported Jiang Jieshi's rabidly anticommunist Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government.

This and the Korean War (1950–1953) set the stage for a Cold War freeze between the PRC and the United States that lasted for nearly thirty years. The situation was compounded by a series of restrictive trade policies enacted by the United States. As the chances of building understanding with the United States during the last years of the Chinese Civil War declined—despite the U.S. diplomatic missions of General Patrick Hurley and General George C. Marshall—from 1949 onward the PRC looked to the Soviet Union for support.

During and after the Korean War, U.S. trade embargoes on the PRC, troop deployments to East Asia, and security alliances such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) along the peripheries of the PRC made the Chinese even more reliant on the Soviet Union. The 1950s saw massive Soviet arms sales, economic aid, and technical assistance to the PRC. After the United States and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) signed a mutual security treaty in 1954, cooperation between the PRC and the Soviet Union increased again.

The communist Chinese and the Soviets differed on several political and international issues, however. When Soviet leader Josef Stalin cautioned Mao against an open break with the Nationalists, PRC leaders felt slighted by the superior attitude with which the Soviets treated the PRC and other socialist states. The leaders of the PRC and the Soviet Union disagreed sharply over who should lead the world communist movement following Stalin's death. The CCP also sharply criticized the Soviet leadership for its de-Stalinization campaign and for the policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. The Soviet handling of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and its neutral position during the 1962 Sino-Indian border clash greatly exercised the Chinese leadership. Closer to home, Soviet proposals for building a joint PRC-USSR nuclear submarine fleet and the construction of long-wave radio stations along the Chinese coast were seen by the CCP as infringements on its independence and further steps toward full PRC integration into the Soviet orbit. Likewise, the PRC refused to adhere to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, arguing that the treaty would impede the PRC's own nuclear program and make the nation all the more reliant on the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet split, which began in earnest in August 1960, along with repeated Soviet-Chinese border clashes led the PRC to distance itself from the two superpowers. The PRC leadership strongly denounced both of them, accusing the Americans of capitalist imperialism and the Soviets of socialist imperialism. This led the Chinese leadership to identify with nations in the developing world, especially countries in Asia and Africa. In 1964, China exploded its first nuclear weapon and became the world's fifth nuclear power, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. The government communiqué issued on the occasion, while declaring a "no first-use principle," stated that nuclear weapons were necessary to protect the nation "from the danger of the United States launching a nuclear war." The PRC then developed long-range ballistic missiles for countering threats from either the United States or the Soviet Union.

In 1954, China announced a good neighbor policy with the aim of building bridges along its periphery to counter what it saw as American encirclement efforts. In the mid-1950s the PRC, along with other Asian countries, also promulgated "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," which called for mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and economic equality. By the 1960s, the Chinese had signed border agreements with Mongolia,

Nepal, Afghanistan, Burma, and Pakistan. After the Korean War, however, China's military engagements were mainly border disputes, such as in 1962 with India, in 1969 with the Soviet Union, and in 1979 with Vietnam.

During the 1970s, prompted by increasing threats from the Soviet Union, the PRC normalized its relations with the United States under the policy of *yitiao xian* (following one line). U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger secretly visited China in 1971, setting the stage for the Sino-American rapprochement. The following year, President Richard Nixon made a historic visit to Beijing, opening the way for the normalization of relations. The Americans granted formal recognition to the PRC in 1978, and in 1979 both nations exchanged diplomatic legations.

Despite their differences on issues such as democracy, human rights, the environment, and labor standards, the United States and China worked together in opposing the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The 1979 trade agreement between the United States and the PRC granting most-favored nation (MFN) status to each other went a long way in fully normalizing relations in the economic sphere. U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown's visit to Beijing in early 1980 opened the prospects for American arms sales to the PRC, although President Ronald Reagan's 1982 decision to sell arms to the ROC put any such agreement on indefinite hold.

While the United States now recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of the Chinese people, the status of Taiwan remained unclear. A triangular strategic ambiguity thus came to exist in the relationship among the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan. The PRC has codified, as its minimalist policy toward Taiwan, the "three nos": no deployments of foreign troops on Taiwan, no independence movement, and no nuclear weapons on Taiwan. While the 8,000 U.S. troops stationed on Taiwan were withdrawn, the PRC's threats to use force against Taiwan and concerted military modernization efforts with a Taiwanese focus not only increased U.S. arms supplies to the island but also prompted the passage of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act by the U.S. Congress. In the late 1970s, the PRC proposed its formula of one country, two systems, that is, one China and two different systems—socialist and capitalist—for eventual reunification of the PRC. This formula was also applied to Hong Kong and Macao in Chinese negotiations with the British and Portuguese.

The U.S.-Chinese rapprochement also had an impact on the PRC's relations with Japan, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. In August 1978, the PRC and Japan signed a peace and friendship treaty. The PRC leadership was highly critical of Japan's occupation of Manchuria and much of coastal China during World War II, the Nanjing massacre, Japanese history textbooks glorifying Japanese militarism, and visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo to honor the war dead. China badly needed Japanese financial and technological assistance, however, especially during its economic reform and modernization efforts that had begun in the late 1970s. The PRC therefore granted incentives to Japan, as well as to Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), to locate industry in China.

There was a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. China conveyed to the USSR that rapprochement was possible if the Soviets were to withdraw their troop concentrations from the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia, cease their support of Vietnam, and pull out of Afghanistan. After 1989, Sino-Soviet relations continued to warm as some of the Chinese demands were met. Other demands were realized as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In the domestic political, social, and economic spheres, the PRC initially implemented a strong command-style socialist system with the CCP as the driving political force. During the Cold War, the CCP held eight national congresses, from the Seventh Congress in April 1945 to the Fourteenth Congress in October 1992. CCP membership grew from an estimated 1.2 million in 1945 to 39.6 million during the Twelfth Congress in 1982. Still, CCP membership was small compared to the PRC's population. Three generations of top political leaders existed during the CCP's Cold War history: Mao, Zhou, and Zhu De in the first generation; Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun in the second generation; and Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Qiao Shi in the third generation.

Although there were eight other political parties, their role was quite limited. The PRC utilized competing political organizations and their leaders in the early years of postwar reconstruction. A united front of all Chinese parties was reflected in the work of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which was formed in September 1949. It held six conferences between 1949 and 1983, although the CCP was clearly the only party that wielded political and governmental control.

Four constitutions were adopted (1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982) by the National People's Congress (NPC), the highest executive body of state power in the PRC. Six NPC congresses were held during 1954–1987. Delegates to the NPC are elected for a period of five years. They in turn elect the president, vice president, and other high-ranking state functionaries. The State Council is the executive body of the PRC and includes the premier, vice premiers, councillors, ministers, and others. A similar dual political structure is reflected at the provincial levels of the country. There are no direct national elections in the PRC, although at the village and county levels direct elections for some local officials were gradually phased in after the end of the Cold War.

During the Cold War, several political campaigns were launched, which set the PRC's political system apart from other socialist countries and indicated its willingness to experiment. The CCP carried out a campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries during 1951–1953, effectively ending opposition from remnant Nationalists, feudal lords, and other dissident groups. This period also coincided with the campaign against corruption among government officials.

In May 1956, the Hundred Flowers Movement was launched, inviting differing views from Chinese intellectuals. A barrage of criticism, however, led to the end of this program in the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957. As

Chinese poster during the Cultural Revolution showing an artist, peasant, soldier, and Red Guard erasing an image of Liu Shaoqi, represented as a revisionist, hiding inside a crumbling fortresslike structure, 1967. (Library of Congress)

China crushed the Khampa Rebellion in Tibet in 1959, sending the Dalai Lama to exile in India, the Soviets withdrew nearly 10,000 of their engineers and technicians in the latter part of 1960. This coincided with the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward, a massive program of nationwide industrialization launched by Mao in 1958 and sharply criticized by Defense Minister Peng Dehuai at the 1959 Lushan Conference.

The 1960s brought more experiments. In May 1963, Mao began the Socialist Education Campaign to counter the growing influence of capitalism, end the corrupt practices of CCP cadres, and inculcate the idea of self-sacrifice among the population. The ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was launched by Mao via a sixteen-point program that encouraged Red Guards to "bombard the headquarters" of CCP leaders and take out those following the "capitalist road." Many CCP leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Luo Ruiqing, were summarily purged from the party and zealously persecuted.

Although Lin Biao was anointed as Mao's heir apparent, he was killed—probably by design—in a 1971 plane crash in Mongolia. His crime was an alleged coup attempt against Mao. An anti–Lin Biao rectification campaign was launched from 1971 to 1973. The country underwent turmoil following the deaths in 1976 of Zhou in January and Mao in September, when several

demonstrations were held in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, supposedly mourning Zhou but also challenging the political ascendancy of the radical Gang of Four. These leftist extremists, who included Mao's wife Jiang Qing and three Shanghai-based Communist Party members—Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan—initially tried to implement strongly ideological policies harking back to the height of the Cultural Revolution. Within weeks of Mao's death in September 1976, Hua Guofeng, who became premier in April 1976, ordered the arrest of the Gang of Four, who were tried and convicted of antiparty activities in 1981. Deng, who was rehabilitated a fourth and final time, introduced pragmatic policies of "seeking truth from facts" and extensive economic reforms in 1978.

In response to rising prices, increased alienation among the people, and growing corruption among the ranks of the CCP cadre, students, peasants, and workers launched prodemocracy protests leading to the Tiananmen Square Incident of 4 June 1989, which had been triggered by the death that April of a reformist former CCP chairman, Hu Yaobang, whose sympathies with previous prodemocracy groups had caused his expulsion from the CCP. The crisis resulted in scores of deaths, the resignation of Deng as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the appointment of Jiang in his place. An antibourgeois liberalization campaign was launched after this incident.

In the economic arena, for most of the Cold War, China followed Soviet-style centralized Five-Year Plans designed to guide its economic and modernization activities. Given the backwardness and war-ravaged nature of the economy in 1949, when there was rampant and disastrous inflation, the PRC leadership undertook comprehensive measures in the reconstruction of the country. In the industrial sphere, private enterprise was encouraged initially to revitalize production, and 156 major projects were begun with Soviet assistance. The PRC established nearly 4,000 state-owned enterprises during 1949–1989, some allowing for the gradual incorporation of private enterprise in joint firms or state enterprises after paying interest on the private shares.

In 1958, the Great Leap Forward was launched in part to increase iron and steel production by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses. State-controlled industrialization, the construction of transport and telecommunication networks, and trade with other socialist countries based on import substitution have all been part of the Maoist self-reliance model of economic development at various times. While these endeavors greatly enhanced the PRC's economic prowess, they also led to waste and increased bureaucratization. In 1975 China initiated a Four Modernizations Program of opening up to the outside world. The four modernizations dealt with agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense, in that order of priority. It also adopted special policies and flexible measures to attract foreign investments and technology sharing and established special economic zones in the coastal regions for wholly-owned or joint enterprises to promote exports.

In agriculture, the PRC immediately initiated land reform with the Agrarian Law of 1950. The regime seized land from landlords and redistributed it

Banners and a portrait of Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong adorn the front of this strange-looking freight train making its first run in the People's Republic of China on 5 August 1958. Its 125-mile railroad line was built to carry coke to the Yuhsien power equipment plant. The locomotive, powered by a converted automobile engine, pulls six cars, each loaded with three tons of coke. The locomotive and railroad were part of Mao's Great Leap Forward, the disastrous drive for economic self-sufficiency. (Bettmann/Corbis)

to the landless, a process largely completed by 1952. Through this reform, some 300 million peasants acquired 46 million hectares of land. By 1953, after the end of the Korean War, the PRC introduced mutual aid teams and gradually imposed agricultural collectivization. Following the Great Leap Forward, these farming co-ops were converted into People's Communes, combining industry, agriculture, trade, education, and the militia. More than 20,000 such communes were established, although declining production and natural calamities limited their effectiveness.

In the post-1978 reform period, the collectivization and communalization process was reversed, beginning with the institution of household land contracts, rural industrialization, and incentives to private enterprises. The main features of the new reforms included contracting land to private households, which would control land use; increasing agricultural production; raising farmers' income; shifting to commodity agriculture; forming conglomerates; encouraging private enterprises to privately hire labor; and competing in international markets.

Srikanth Kondapalli

See also

China, Republic of; Deng Xiaoping; East Asia; Jiang Qing; Korean War; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.–Republic of China; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations; Sino-Soviet Border Incident; Sino-Soviet Split; Sino-Vietnamese War; Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai

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China, People's Republic of, Air Force

In the initial period of the Cold War, the Chinese Air Force was that of Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) forces. After the end of the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), the victorious communist forces established the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) with the few air assets left behind by the retreating Nationalists. By the last decade of the Cold War, the PLAAF was the third-largest air force in the world in terms of personnel and inventory. A mere 10,000 personnel in 1950, by mid-1952 the PLAAF numbered 1,800 aircraft, including more than 1,000 jet fighters, and 290,000 personnel. With Soviet assistance, by 1957 the PLAAF—although weak in bombers, of which it had only 300—became the world's third-largest air force in terms of personnel and inventory. During the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split, which caused the withdrawal of Soviet advisors in 1960, and the economic rigors of the disastrous 1959–1962 Great Leap Forward brought temporary declines in Chinese airpower. PLAAF strength rose again from 90,000 personnel and 2,000 aircraft in 1963 to 490,000 personnel and 6,000 aircraft in 1988. By 1991 the numbers had diminished to 470,000 men and 4,970 aircraft. As the military reforms of top leader Deng Xiaoping and party chairman

Jiang Zemin emphasized quality over quantity, aviation manpower and equipment declined to 370,000 personnel in 1997 and 330,000 by 2005, equipped with 3,500 aircraft.

Five rounds of reorganizations took place in the PLAAF during 1949–1992. With the exception of its operations in the Korean War (1950–1953), the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958), the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, and occasional contacts with U.S. or the Republic of China's (ROC, Taiwan) surveillance aircraft, the PLAAF was largely an adjunct to ground force operations. Its role and capabilities remained limited.

The Korean War was a major watershed in the development of the PLAAF. After the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered the war, the Soviet Union rotated air units into southern China, trained Chinese personnel, and departed, leaving behind their sophisticated MiG-15 jet aircraft. From the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, the PLAAF became more self-reliant, especially in terms of aircraft production. From the 1980s onward, the PLAAF modernized its inventory, strategies, and organizational structure.

Throughout the period of the Cold War, the PLAAF was organized into five major divisions: antiaircraft artillery, air defense units, surface-to-air missile units, airborne units, and supporting units. Organization followed Soviet lines with headquarters and staff, political and logistics departments, as well as other branches in Beijing. The PLAAF included seven regional commands.

Since the 1950s, the PRC's aviation industry has introduced major innovations in key technologies related to aircraft and equipment. These include modernized aircraft systems, improved design and testing technology and practices, the use of light-weight titanium alloys and other advanced materials, the integration of American fire control technology into recent Chinese F-8 fighter designs, and more efficient manufacturing technology, including the assembly of Soviet-imported aircraft from prefabricated kits and the introduction of precision machine tools into Chinese aircraft production.

Most of the PLAAF inventory was of Soviet lineage, with successive versions of MiG interceptor aircraft, different Sukhoi aircraft, and Tupolev bombers. China produced Soviet MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21 fighters, known as the F-5, F-6, and F-7 (also the J-5, J-6, and J-7), respectively. China also produced its own versions of the Soviet Il-28 and Tu-16 bombers, known as the H-5 and H-6, respectively.

Soon after the introduction of economic reform in 1978, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping emphasized investment in the aviation industry and in developing the air force. To overcome problems in acquiring advanced engine technologies, avionics, and other systems, the PLAAF sent delegations abroad, including to Britain and the United States. China signed agreements for the manufacture of British Rolls Royce Spey jet engines and French Super Frelon helicopters. The United States also promised to upgrade avionics for the MiG-21–based J-8. The 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident postponed such transactions, however. China has also exported aircraft, such as the J-5 and J-6, abroad, particularly to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, and Egypt.

In Cold War confrontations involving the PRC, the PLAAF played a major role only in the Korean War. Even there, although the PRC deployed

some 1,485 aircraft thanks to the Soviet Union, most were employed defensively to attack United Nations Command (UNC) bomber aircraft and their fighter escorts striking targets in North Korea. PLAAF aircraft did not provide protection for the Chinese People's Volunteer Army's (CPVA) supply lines, nor did they provide close air support to Chinese troops on the ground.

To avoid escalation, PLAAF aircraft were not utilized in the 1962 Sino-Indian confrontation, the 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Incident, or the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, Chinese antiaircraft personnel served in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) helping to defend against U.S. air strikes.

Active PLAAF operations centered on homeland defense and the downing of intruding U.S. and ROC reconnaissance aircraft, including ROC-manned U-2s. A major diplomatic incident occurred in 2001 when a collision between a Chinese interceptor and a U.S. EP-3 spy plane forced the latter to land on Hainan Island.

By 1991, however, the PRC's air force evinced an interest in long-range aviation operations over the South China Sea, but its available bomber aircraft, the H-6, was too antiquated to act as an effective nuclear weapons delivery vehicle. Development of bomber forces was also adversely impacted by a Chinese concentration on nuclear missiles.

Srikanth Kondapalli

See also

Aircraft; China, People's Republic of; China, People's Republic of, Army; China, People's Republic of, Navy; Chinese Civil War; Korean War

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China, People's Republic of, Army

During the Cold War, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China was the largest standing army in the world. It took on both external and internal roles. In 1929, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the predecessor of the PLA, numbered 300,000. It was reduced to a mere 25,000 by the mid-1930s following its defeat in the last of five encirclement campaigns by

Goumindang (GMD, Nationalist) forces. After growing to more than 1.2 million by 1945 and 5.2 million at the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the PLA's active troop strength stood at 4.2 million in 1982 and 3 million in 1992.

In the external sphere, Chinese forces fought in the Korean War (1950–1953), skirmished over offshore islands with the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) during the 1950s, waged the 1962 Sino-Indian War, clashed with Russia in the 1969 Sino-Soviet border dispute, and saw battle in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. In addition, the PRC threatened to employ the PLA on several occasions against India during the India-Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971.

Internally, the PLA helped consolidate the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) hold over the country during the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) and the 1951 Tibet occupation. It also oversaw infrastructure development in far-flung areas of China and restored order during the chaotic periods of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident.

During the Cold War, the PLA's defense strategy had two main aspects: "People's War" and "People's War under Modern Conditions." While the former was employed extensively during the period prior to 1949, PLA forces found recourse in the latter in certain wars after 1949. The "early war, major war and all-out nuclear war" slogan of the 1960s gave way to "peace and development" by the end of the Cold War, when the Soviets withdrew nearly fifty divisions from China's northeastern border with the Soviet Union as a part of the thaw in Sino-Soviet relations.

Soon after civil war ended in 1949, the PLA was engulfed in the Korean War under the guise of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA). The CPVA was in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) from October 1950 until October 1958. At the time of the intervention, CPVA forces were primarily infantry units drawn from the Fourth Field Army of the PLA. Peng Dehuai commanded the CPVA. In the fighting in Korea, the PLA encountered the most powerful and technologically advanced military in the world. While it sustained casualties estimated at more than 1 million, with half of these killed, the PLA achieved its objective of preserving the North Korean government. Other wars were less successful, although the PLA achieved certain limited military objectives such as driving back Indian forces from its borders in 1962 and punishing Vietnam in 1979. In the latter conflict, the PLA learned the need for modernization.

Organizationally, the PLA generally followed Soviet practices. Three large general departments oversaw staffing, logistics, and political duties. The PLA controlled a vast military-industrial complex of machine-building industries, ordnance and aircraft factories, and shipyards. Ranks mirrored those of the Soviet Union, as did training manuals.

The Central Military Commission of the CCP is at the top of the PLA's organization, although a similar and parallel nonparty structure was established at the state level in the 1980s. China was divided into military regions (which were reduced from thirteen to eleven to the current seven beginning in 1985), twenty-nine provincial military districts (one for each of China's

A Chinese poster showing a heroic soldier of the Chinese People's Liberation Army charging the enemy "in defense of Chairman Mao and the Motherland," ca. 1970. (Library of Congress)

twenty-nine provinces), one independent military district, and three garrisons. During the modernization drive that began in the mid-1980s, field armies were transformed into twenty-one army groups on the Western concept of military organization. To enhance professionalism, the PLA established a number of military academies, colleges, and schools, with the highest military educational institution being the National Defense University, established in 1985. As the PLA modernized and professionalized, it also downsized. Eight demobilization campaigns of soldiers and officers in the Cold War period brought down the PLA's troop numbers significantly.

During the Cold War, China amassed formidable military capabilities in ground, naval, air, and strategic weapons, although by the end of the Cold War most of the military assets lagged behind newer Western technologies. Initially, many PLA weapons were captured from Nationalist forces, who had been supplied by the United States and other Western nations. The February 1950 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union ensured a constant flow of military equipment, which was considered to be

advanced given the low technology levels of PLA forces at the time. This ended, as did military technology transfers, with the Sino-Soviet split of 1959–1960.

Of the 156 state-run industries created with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, nearly 40 were devoted to military needs. The PRC thus produced an array of military equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, aircraft, engines, submarines, destroyers, frigates, and fast-attack craft. Much of the Chinese Army's equipment was supplied by the Soviets up to 1960. This included JS-2, T-34, and T-54 tanks and 152mm and 203mm artillery. The Chinese also manufactured the T-59 (their version of the Soviet T-54) and the T-60 (PT-76) amphibious tank.

Numbers of army personnel continued to increase for much of the Cold War. In 1965 army strength was estimated at 2.25 million men in 115 divisions (including 4 armored and 1–2 airborne divisions). By 1974 army strength had grown to 2.5 million men in 120 infantry divisions, 5 armored divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 2 airborne divisions. In 1991 at the end of the Cold War, the Chinese Army had been slightly reduced in size, with perhaps 2.3 million men in 84 infantry divisions and 10 armored divisions. In 1991 the Chinese operated some 7,500–8,000 main battle tanks (the bulk of them T-54/T-59s, along with several hundred T-69, T-79, and T-80s reported), some 2,000 light tanks, 2,800 armored personnel carriers, and 14,500 towed artillery pieces.

In addition to conventional deterrence, the PLA pursued nuclear deterrence. In 1964 China exploded its first nuclear weapon, and by the early 1960s the PRC was one of five countries with long-range missile capabilities. In general, these various weapons served the country well. But the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which Chinese-supplied Iraqi military equipment was easily destroyed by coalition forces, showed the glaring technological deficiencies of many PLA weapons systems. Troop enhancements, modernization drives, and equipment acquisitions meant increasing budgetary outlays, which stood at an estimated 2.8 billion yuan (US$340 million) in 1950 and had increased to about 39.5 billion yuan (US$7.56 billion) by 1991.

The first three decades of the Cold War were turbulent ones for the PRC defense forces. The PLA saw the construction of a U.S.-led military alliance system in East Asia—including U.S. troops in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)—and the 1954 mutual defense pact with the ROC as distinct threats. This eased after 1971 with the normalization of Sino-American relations, although Chinese window-shopping in Western arms markets largely came to naught. Institutional linkages and mutual visits among Chinese and Western militaries increased in the 1980s, with enhanced prospects for arms sales under several programs. However, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident brought to an end any significant flow of military technology or hardware from Western nations.

China sent arms abroad both to assist in wars of national liberation, often in opposition to one of the two superpowers, or as straight commercial/political transactions. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) was a major recipient of Chinese weaponry during both the Indochina and

Vietnam Wars. Other groups receiving Chinese arms included the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Pathet Lao in Laos, and the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia procured Chinese intermediate-range Dong Feng-3 missiles (NATO-designation CSS-3). Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and Burma (Myanmar) also purchased Chinese arms, sometimes in defiance of international nonproliferation controls.

Srikanth Kondapalli

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, People's Republic of, Air Force; China, People's Republic of, Navy; Indochina War; Korean War; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations; Sino-Soviet Border Incident; Sino-Soviet Split; Sino-Vietnamese War; Vietnam War

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China, People's Republic of, Navy

All of China's major warships were captured by the Japanese at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, and the only Chinese vessels returned at the end of the war were two gunboats. The navy of the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) in 1945 consisted solely of river gunboats and motor torpedo boats (MTBs). Britain supplied two frigates and several smaller vessels, and the ROC purchased a cruiser as its flagship. The United States provided six destroyer escorts and a large number of patrol boats, minesweepers, and landing vessels. China also claimed as reparations the largest share of remaining Japanese warships, securing in 1946–1947 three destroyers as well as some destroyer escorts and smaller vessels.

American aid to the GMD Navy ended in August 1949, although the U.S. Navy assisted in evacuating ROC forces to Taiwan in 1949 following the

Crewmembers of a Chinese warship honor the first visit by U.S. Navy warships to Mainland China in forty years, 1 November 1986. (U.S. Department of Defense)

communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. The current navy was established in 1949 and is known as the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Traditionally, it has played a secondary role to that of ground forces because of the focus by the People's Republic of China (PRC) on continental defense.

Beginning with the few GMD ships that were captured or defected, by 1950 the PLAN consisted of a cruiser, 7 frigates, 21 smaller escorts, 5 minesweepers, 13 river gunboats, 6 patrol boats, and about 60 landing craft. In major ships only, by 1963 the PLAN consisted of 4 destroyers, 31 submarines, and 500 naval aircraft. By 1991 it numbered 19 destroyers, 37 frigates, 94 submarines, and 880 naval aircraft. The PLAN's manpower grew from 60,000 in 1949–1950 to 136,000 in 1963 and to 260,000 in 1991.

During the PLAN's early years, the navy depended on recruits from infantry units. Professionalization was enhanced with the training of naval officers and cadets at ten newly constructed naval academies, colleges, and schools such as Qingdao, Dalian, Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Wuhan.

During most of the Cold War, the PLAN was geared to coastal defense operations, and ROC forces repulsed the PLAN effort to recover Penghu and Jinmen (known to Westerners as Quemoy) Islands in 1949. Since June

1950, when the U.S. Seventh Fleet was deployed in the Taiwan Strait, China feared amphibious attack and took measures to implement coastal defense. Its efforts to seize Jinmen in 1958 failed with the U.S. deployment of a half dozen aircraft carriers to the area. On 4 September 1958, the PRC unilaterally passed laws claiming 12 nautical miles as its territorial sea limit and incorporated Qionghou Strait and Bohai Bay into its jurisdiction. The Chinese also protected against possible blockade and amphibious threats from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s following the Sino-Soviet split. On 19 January 1974, Chinese naval vessels clashed with Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) forces off the Paracel Islands and claimed these as Chinese possessions. Another clash with the Vietnamese occurred on 14 March 1988 in the South China Sea.

By the early 1980s, concerted naval modernization efforts led to the construction of Luda- and Luhu-class destroyers and the Jiangnan- and Jianghu-class frigates. The PRC also produced Xia-class strategic nuclear submarines equipped with its JL-1 missiles. By the mid-1980s, PLAN leaders had developed an offshore defense strategy that extended naval operations to the high seas, aided by the growing maritime trade interests of China after the economic reforms of 1978. Admirals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Lianzhong were instrumental in charting an ambitious program for PLAN during the latter phases of the Cold War, using elements of U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories concerning power projection.

Organizationally, the PLAN followed the Soviet pattern, divided during the Cold War into staff, logistics, political, equipment and technology, and equipment repair departments and a headquarters. The PLAN had five major arms: surface fleets (three in the north, east, and south), submarine corps, naval air force, coast guard, and Marine Corps.

Following aspects of the Soviet naval-buildup model of constructing subsurface vessels, as propounded by Soviet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, the PRC focused on submarine development with Romeo-, Ming-, and Song-class submarines. The early 1970s witnessed the development of Han-class nuclear attack submarines as well as destroyers and frigates. Apart from the quantitative increase in surface and subsurface vessels, missiles, naval aircraft and systems, qualitatively the PLAN improved its systems. Most of its weaponry was nonetheless obsolete.

At the end of the Cold War, the Chinese began acquiring military technology from abroad, including Dauphin-class helicopters, fire-control radars, and Crotale missile launchers from France. China exported naval technology to numerous countries, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, sometimes helping them to evade international nonproliferation controls.

At the end of the Cold War, however, the PLAN was still largely a coastal defense force made up of ships of obsolete design and dependent for defense on land-based aircraft. This was a situation that the Chinese were determined to change with the creation of a large, modern deep-water navy.

Srikanth Kondapalli

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, People's Republic of, Air Force; China, People's Republic of, Army; Gorshkov, Sergey Georgyevich

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China, Republic of

The Republic of China (ROC) was the recognized government of China until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forced it into exile on Taiwan in 1949. The Cold War prevented destruction of the ROC and then placed it at the center of tension and conflict in East Asia, where it remained even after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The origins of the ROC date from the Chinese Revolution of 1911 that destroyed the Qing Dynasty. Two years later, military leader Yuan Shikai became president of the ROC after outmaneuvering Sun Yixian (Sun Yat-sen), China's most vocal advocate of republicanism. Rising opposition to his dictatorial rule, especially after he had himself named emperor, continued until his sudden death in 1916. During the Warlord Era that followed, local military leaders waged constant warfare with private armies to build regional political power. In 1918, Sun reorganized his Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party at Shanghai and supported protests against the Versailles Treaty during the May Fourth Movement of 1919. He proclaimed reestablishment of the ROC in 1921 at Guangzhou, based on his Three People's Principles of nationalism, democracy, and livelihood. He also formed a political alliance with the CCP and requested military and economic help and advice from the Soviet Union.

Chaos and instability motivated Sun to create a military academy to train officers, appointing Jiang Jieshi as its head. After Sun died in 1925, Jiang became leader of the GMD. In July 1926, he launched the Northern Expedition that reunited China when Nationalist forces marched into Beijing two years later. Not only had Jiang vanquished the warlords, but he had eliminated or undermined the communists after he broke with them in May 1927. In October 1928, following Sun's plan, the GMD adopted a provisional constitution for the ROC as the basis for governing China during a period of tutelage that was to last for six years. With its seat of government at Nanjing,

Jiang Jieshi followed in the footsteps of Sun Yixian, the father of modern China and the creator of the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party. Jiang's determination to go his own way, coupled with neglect of issues important to the peasant majority of China, eventually led to his defeat. (Library of Congress)

the ROC introduced monetary reform to modernize China's financial system and promote modern industrial development. The Western powers recognized the ROC, granting tariff autonomy and revoking many foreign concessions. But the GMD neglected land reform and rent reduction that would have helped the vast majority of the populace escape impoverishment and oppression. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the CCP built support among the disaffected peasants.

In September 1931, Japan began its aggression against China by taking over all Manchuria and transforming it into a puppet state. Instead of defending China, Jiang concentrated on destroying the CCP, launching major assaults against the communists and forcing the CCP to flee to Yan'an in Shaanxi Province. His capture at Xi'an late in 1936 forced Jiang to join a united front against Japan as the price of his release. In July 1937, Japan opened an offensive against Chinese forces that brought it control over much of the coast and major cities, compelling the ROC to relocate westward to the remote Chongqing. After World War II began in Europe in 1939, the

GMD government fought as a partner in the Grand Alliance in World War II. Japan installed Wang Jingwei as president of the ROC at Nanjing, while its troops carried out a repressive campaign against the civilian population.

For the ROC, the war was a disaster. Continual fighting destroyed its best troops and bankrupted the government. Spiraling inflation devastated the urban middle class, eroding the GMD base of popular support. Still, Jiang represented China at the Cairo Conference in 1943, where he met with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In 1945, the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the ROC rather than the CCP, although CCP forces controlled large portions of the country.

The civil war between the GMD and the CCP resumed following Japan's defeat in August 1945. U.S. Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley blamed his failure to arrange a cease-fire and coalition government on treasonous American diplomats in China who wanted a CCP victory. Against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War in Europe, General George C. Marshall's attempt at mediation in 1946 failed as well, creating anxiety for Americans over the prospect of a communist China. Then in 1947, corrupt and incompetent officers further demoralized already-discouraged GMD troops, resulting in a string of communist military victories and causing the United States to reduce assistance to the ROC. Jiang's forces fled to the island of Taiwan after Mao proclaimed the establishment in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Rising friction between the ruling mainland minority and the native majority led to the systematic killing of thousands of Taiwanese leaders in February 1947.

The ROC insisted that it was still the legitimate government of China, but the PRC considered Taiwan a renegade province. Britain, the Soviet Union, and many East European countries recognized the PRC immediately, while India favored seating the PRC in the United Nations (UN). The United States delayed recognition because domestic political critics blamed President Harry S. Truman's administration for allowing the loss of China to the Soviet bloc. But the United States was realistic in accepting as inevitable that the PRC would destroy Jiang's regime.

Taiwan, located one hundred miles off the southeastern coast of China, became a Chinese province in 1885. Ten years later, the treaty that ended the Sino-Japanese War made it part of the Japanese Empire. Following Japan's defeat in World War II, China regained title to Taiwan in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. Celebrating liberation from colonialism, the Taiwanese initially welcomed officials that the ROC sent from Mainland China. But the GMD government treated the island as almost a conquered territory, exploiting its people and resources. Rising friction between the ruling mainland minority and the native majority led to the systematic killing of thousands of Taiwanese leaders in February 1947. Two million Nationalist soldiers and civilians arrived on Taiwan in 1949 and soon depended on government stipends. Jiang Jingguo, Jiang Jieshi's son and chief of the provincial GMD, ruthlessly crushed political opposition and then imposed a rule more harsh, dictatorial, and exploitive than that of the Japanese. The official myth that the ROC was the legal government of China justified a political structure with a national party and government for all China and a separate provincial

party and government for Taiwan. Mainlanders dominated this national government at the capital in Taibei, but Taiwanese held most offices in local government.

Cold War security concerns in Asia caused U.S. military leaders to conclude early in 1950 that the United States must prevent communist China from seizing Taiwan. In June, the outbreak of the Korean War confirmed this emerging commitment when President Truman deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. After the PRC sent troops to Korea, the United States signed a military agreement in 1951 with the ROC, and the 1954 U.S.-China Mutual Defense Treaty provided the GMD government with $2.5 billion in military aid and $1.5 billion in economic aid from 1950 to 1965. In 1954, the PRC began shelling islands that the ROC held just off China's southeastern coast, prompting the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution empowering the president to defend Taiwan and "related positions and territories." Four years later, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis intensified the Cold War in East Asia and caused the United States to strengthen its defense of Taiwan. U.S. opposition, however, did not stop most nations—except for Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), and a few others—from recognizing Beijing rather than Taibei. By contrast, the United States was able to secure enough votes at the UN to allow the ROC to retain its seat as China's representative.

Cold War tensions kept alive Jiang's dream of returning to the mainland but could not prevent change on Taiwan undermining his authority. Taiwanese entered the GMD bureaucracy and gained election to the provincial assembly, but the National Assembly remained composed of legislators elected in Nanjing in 1948. As these aging representatives passed away, replacements were made by appointment, ensuring that the assembly would not oppose the GMD dictatorship and its assertion of authority through various security forces. But economic development and increasing social stability encouraged greater freedom. In 1969, elections filled vacancies in the assembly, and a few Taiwanese won seats. Jiang Jingguo, who became ROC president in 1978, opened the political process further. In 1986, parties other than the GMD were able to run candidates. Forty years of martial law ended in 1987, as did the ban on ROC citizens traveling to the mainland. When the now widely admired Jiang Jingguo died in 1988, Vice President Li Denghui became the first ROC president born on Taiwan, promising more political reform and restored power on the mainland.

Economic growth on Taiwan and failure in Vietnam resulted in the United States ending aid to the ROC in 1968 and reducing its Cold War commitments in East Asia. When President Richard Nixon sought normalized relations with the PRC to gain leverage against the Soviet Union, the ROC was expelled from the World Bank in 1970 and from the UN in 1971. Nixon's visit to the PRC in February 1972, along with issuance of the Sino-U.S. Shanghai Communiqué that declared Taiwan a part of China, sent relations between the United States and the ROC on a downward slide. In 1979, U.S. recognition of the PRC led to abrogation of U.S.-ROC defense treaties and the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel. In April, continuing bipartisan

support for the ROC in the U.S. Congress forced President Jimmy Carter to sign the Taiwan Relations Act, which sought to repair estrangement and build a new relationship based on wider economic ties. But Washington placed increasing importance thereafter on improving its relations with Beijing, advocating steps toward China's peaceful reunification. During the 1980s, the ROC, despite apparent U.S. indifference, improved its international standing as a fledgling democracy with one of the most industrialized and productive economies in the world.

In 1989, the Cold War ended without confirming the status of the ROC as the legal government of China because communist rule on the mainland continued. Moreover, the PRC still claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, although after the death of Mao in 1976 Beijing changed its policy from seeking liberation of the island to calling for voluntary reunification. Within the framework of one China, Taiwan would have autonomy and the right to maintain its own government, military forces, and economic system. The ROC rejected the offer and remained committed to regaining power on the mainland. Meanwhile, unofficial trade between Taiwan and the PRC through Hong Kong grew steadily. Taibei's acceptance of expanded contact with the mainland reflected confidence that its progress toward democratization and socioeconomic opportunity as well as broader material comfort and a thriving cultural life on Taiwan had won the loyalty and support of its citizens. The GMD hoped that the Taiwanese would convey to mainland relatives a belief in the superiority of the ROC's system. But these same factors caused other politicians to argue for declaring Taiwan's status as an independent nation, a course of action that Beijing warned it would prevent with a resort to force. During the 1990s, the ROC was at the center of what had become China's Cold War.

James I. Matray

See also

Beijing Meeting; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Containment Policy; Dulles, John Foster; East Asia; Hong Kong; Jiang Jieshi; Jinmen and Mazu; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Marshall Mission to China; McCarthyism; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; Truman, Harry S.; World War II, Allied Conferences

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China, Republic of, Armed Forces

The Republic of China's (ROC) armed forces trace their origins to the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) military forces that fought against both the Japanese in World War II and the communist forces during the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949). Defeated on the Chinese mainland by communist forces that were better trained and better led, the GMD's army evacuated to the islands immediately off Fujian Province and to Taiwan in October 1949.

A number of GMD political and military leaders settled in Taiwan (Formosa). With the main island of Taiwan protected by the U.S. Seventh Fleet after the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War, throughout the 1950s the ROC's military forces concentrated on protecting the coastal islands against numerous assaults and artillery barrages by the People's Republic of China's (PRC) military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). ROC leader Jiang Jieshi hoped to use the coastal islands as a launching base for returning to the mainland. Although that dream faded as the years advanced, the ROC military benefited greatly from the U.S. commitment to sustaining the ROC as a bulwark against the PRC.

As the 1950s progressed, better ROC training and tactical cohesion enabled its forces to win several significant skirmishes against PRC forces, including the 1956 downing of six Chinese MiG-17 fighters without loss for ROC Air Force fighters. ROC forces maintained their superiority in equipment, maintenance, and training throughout the Cold War but began to lose their edge as the Cold War ended and the PRC threat seemed to recede.

Taiwan's military is based on the nation at arms concept in which all able-bodied males are conscripted into military service for two years. After that, they transfer into the reserves and can be recalled for periodic training and national emergencies until they reach the age of thirty. Generally, the military recalls approximately 10 percent of its reservists annually for training and education. This system enables Taiwan to mobilize up to 4 million soldiers in less than forty-eight hours, with more than 3 million available for service in the army. With each soldier, airman, and sailor receiving up to three times the training of their mainland counterparts and being equipped with more modern weapons and command and control support, Taiwan's military enjoys a significant qualitative advantage over the PLA. More important, the Taiwan Strait provided an all but insurmountable barrier to any Chinese attempt to invade the island nation.

The mobilization system remained largely unchanged throughout the period of the Cold War, although as the immediate PRC threat receded in the late 1970s, the military slowly shifted to a greater reliance on reservists and timely mobilization. Regular army strength declined from its peak of approximately 600,000 men in 1958 to roughly 250,000 by 1991. The transition to a smaller standing army reduced military spending and facilitated Taiwan's impressive economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s. With the reduced emphasis on standing forces came a greater focus on rapid mobilization and improved early warning systems of the PRC's military intentions.

A Chinese Nationalist soldier stands guard on a beach along the Taiwan shoreline during a period of heightened tension when the government of the People's Republic of China was threatening to invade the island, 1 February 1955. (Library of Congress)

Within that context, the Taiwanese Army's hold on the offshore islands of Jinmen, Mazu, and Penghu represented the country's first line of defense. Massively fortified and patrolled by more than 50,000 heavily equipped troops, the islands continue to be important listening posts and house early-warning radar stations, even though they no longer serve as forward staging bases for the GMD's return to the mainland.

The Taiwanese Air Force and Navy formed the country's second line of defense, supporting the army's hold on the offshore islands and ensuring that the PRC's navy could neither blockade the country nor mount an amphibious assault. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and mine countermeasure units were established and maintained to keep open the sea-lanes on which Taiwan's economic survival had become increasingly dependent. Light attack units equipped with the latest antiship missiles were stationed on the Penghu Islands to attack any task groups that might venture into those waters in time of war. The elite Taiwan Marine Corps is stationed in the Penghu Islands, both to prevent their seizure as a forward operating base against Taiwan and

to act as a counterattack or reserve force to recapture or reinforce Jinmen and Mazu if necessary. The ROC Air Force was tasked with maintaining air superiority over Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait in the event of war. The superior quality of Taiwan's aircraft and pilot training was considered more than sufficient to overcome the PRC's numerical advantage.

The army also served as the nation's final defense. It was to provide ground-based air defense of Taiwan's key cities, facilities, and infrastructure as well as to repel any forces that reached the country's shores. The army's three armored divisions and independent mechanized units were expected to drive any invading forces back into the sea. Light infantry and mobile units were to hold key cities, landing beaches, and facilities until the mobile forces and reserves could arrive. Army equipment was the least advanced of the three services, relying mostly on artillery and tanks from the late 1950s and 1960s. Although old and rather obsolete, the army's weapons were still superior to those of the PRC's landing forces, which were equipped with inferior Soviet designs of the same era. In addition, Taiwanese special forces were trained and equipped to conduct special operations in the Chinese rear, including on the mainland itself.

Taiwan's ability to acquire and maintain modern military equipment began to decline in the late 1970s as the PRC gained ground diplomatically and economically and arrived at rapprochement with the United States. Countries once willing to sell arms to Taiwan increasingly refused to do so as the 1980s advanced. Many nations feared losing access to the much larger and more rapidly growing markets in the PRC and were thus reluctant to antagonize the PRC leadership. Having eschewed building its own arms industry in favor of developing a robust civilian economy, Taiwan found it difficult to develop a domestic arms production capability, particularly in high-technology systems that were becoming increasingly important in modern warfare.

More critically, the PRC Air Force and Navy began to acquire newer Soviet-built weapons and Western-made weapons systems as well as electronics from Israel and France. Thus, as the Cold War drew to an end, Taiwan saw its qualitative edge eroding and its opportunities for addressing that challenge diminishing. Initial work on building a technological and defense industry base began in the late 1980s but remained incomplete as the next decade advanced. Today, the country is almost entirely dependent upon the United States for its modern military equipment.

Carl Otis Schuster

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, People's Republic of, Air Force; China, People's Republic of, Army; China, People's Republic of, Navy; China, Republic of; Jiang Jieshi; Jinmen and Mazu

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Chinese Civil War
(1945–1949)

Internecine conflict between China's Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government and supporters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that began immediately after World War II and brought the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The roots of the Chinese Civil War went back as far as the late 1920s. After the foundation of the CCP in 1921, Soviet Comintern representatives advised its members to collaborate with other political groups supporting the Chinese revolution, especially the GMD founded by Sun Yixian, the revered revolutionary leader who was elected provisional president of the new Republic of China (ROC) in 1911. After Sun's death in 1925, military leader Jiang Jieshi won power within the GMD and began to eliminate all potential rivals. In 1926 Jiang, alarmed by abortive but bloody communist uprisings in several industrial cities, began to purge Communist Party members from the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists) institutions in which they had previously been prominent and to suppress them elsewhere. In mid-1927 he made the communist base in the Jiangxi province of south-central China the new target of the Northern Expedition that he had launched the previous year against northern warlords and suppressed several further communist insurrections.

In the December 1936 Xi'an Incident, Zhang kidnapped Jiang and forced him to form a united anti-Japanese front with the communists.

Led by Mao Zedong and fortified by several former GMD military units whose commanders defected to the communists, this rural base developed into the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, whose military forces numbered 200,000 by 1933. Chinese communists also mounted several further urban and rural insurrections, and Jiang regarded them as the greatest threat to his government, more serious than even the Japanese troops who in 1932 established the client state of Manzhouguo in Manchuria and who constantly sought to enhance Japan's influence in North China. Between 1930 and 1934 Jiang waged annual campaigns against the Ruijin base in Jiangxi, in the last of which he succeeded in forcing communist supporters, in the famous Long March, to retreat 6,000 miles to the remote northwestern province of Shaanxi.

During 1935–1936 Jiang ordered troops commanded by his loyal ally, Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang, to attack and, he hoped, eliminate the few thousand remaining communists. The soldiers rejected his orders, arguing that all Chinese should unite to fight the Japanese, not each other. In the December 1936 Xi'an Incident, Zhang kidnapped Jiang and forced him to form a united anti-Japanese front with the communists. The GMD-CCP relationship remained strained, as communists developed their own military



forces, the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Zhu De, and the New Fourth Army under Lin Biao, and retained control of northern Shaanxi.

The following year, a minor clash between Chinese and Japanese troops at the Lugouqiao Marco Polo Bridge, near Beijing in Hebei province, quickly escalated into full-scale warfare between the two countries. Over the following eighteen months, Jiang gradually retreated to Chongqing in the far southwestern province of Sichuan, abandoning northern and eastern China to protracted Japanese occupation. The communists controlled northwestern China. For three months in late 1940, the communists launched the Hundred Regiments campaign against Japan, but their eventual defeat by the better-equipped Japanese convinced them to switch to tactics of establishing guerrilla bases behind Japanese lines in northern and central China. This policy provoked ferocious Japanese reprisals against both the communists and the civilian population, but it proved effective in disrupting Japanese control and in enhancing the communists' reputation as dedicated opponents of Japanese rule and their postwar political position. It did not suffice, however, to defeat Japanese rule.

By 1940 Mao was already making plans for a postwar communist government of China. By this time, both sides anticipated a fierce struggle for power and sought to position themselves advantageously for it. In late 1941 GMD forces attacked and defeated the communist New Fourth Army in the

Nationalist troops man a Japanese-made 155mm howitzer, part of the artillery defenses ringing Shanghai, in the face of a communist advance, 18 May 1949. (Bettmann/Corbis)

lower Changjiang (Yangtze) Valley, an episode marking the fundamental breakdown of CCP-GMD collaboration, although an uneasy alliance continued until 1944. GMD forces possessed superior equipment and funding, but Jiang's abandonment of much of China to Japanese rule and his reliance on a protracted strategy of attrition, together with the corruption that characterized many top officials of his regime, eroded his hold on popular loyalties. Communist morale was high. Their idealistic rhetoric, the Spartan living conditions at their Yan'an base in Shaanxi, their attractive and charismatic leaders, and their dangerous though small-scale partisan operations all caught the popular imagination and impressed many visiting Western journalists and officials.

The war ended in August 1945 with Japanese occupation forces still in place throughout China. CCP membership had reached 1.2 million people, plus military forces of 900,000, and the communists controlled an area whose population numbered 90 million. Despite Jiang's objections, Russian forces entering Manchuria facilitated the surrender of Japanese forces and equipment to communist units. U.S. leaders, especially Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley in late 1945, sought to strengthen Jiang's regime, to promote reform from within, and to encourage Nationalist-communist reconciliation and the formation of a coalition government in which communists would have some influence, albeit as junior partners.

The most sustained such effort was the thirteen-month (December 1945–January 1947) mission to China of former U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, who in January 1946 arranged a temporary cease-fire in the developing civil war, broken later that spring when, as Soviet units withdrew, GMD forces attacked Chinese communist troops in Manchuria, winning control of that region in late May. That same month the communists rechristened their military forces the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It proved impossible to devise any further agreements acceptable to both sides.

Full-scale civil war resumed on 26 June 1946 when Nationalist units launched an offensive against communist-held areas in the Hubei and Henan provinces. The United States continued to provide massive loans and quantities of military hardware to the GMD but prudently refused to commit American troops. As the Cold War rapidly developed, Soviet and American officials clearly backed different parties in the evolving Chinese Civil War, but neither was prepared to run great risks to assist its favored candidate.

By 1947, as inflation and corruption both ran rampant, Chinese businessmen and the middle class began to desert the GMD, and many fled overseas. As they had against the Japanese, the communists frequently employed

guerrilla tactics against Nationalist forces. Their introduction of land reform persuaded many peasants to support them. These tactics supplemented the full-scale military campaigns that they soon became sufficiently strong to launch. In mid-May 1947, Lin and the New Fourth Army opened a major offensive in northeastern China, and six weeks later another large army commanded by Liu Bocheng moved southwest across the Huanghe River, known to Westerners as the Yellow River, into Shandong province. In September 1948 Lin began a massive campaign in Manchuria, capturing Shenyang in Liaoniang province in November, soon after 300,000 GMD troops surrendered to him. In north-central China, the communist Huai River campaign ended victoriously on 10 January 1949 after PLA troops surrounded sixty-six regiments—one-third of the existing GMD military forces. In January 1949 the GMD government fled to Taiwan, and that same month Beijing, China's symbolic capital, fell to Lin's troops, followed by the southern city of Guangzhou (Canton) in Guangdong the following October, as communist forces gradually consolidated their hold over the entire country. On 1 October 1949 Mao proclaimed the new People's Republic of China (PRC).

The Chinese Civil War and American support of the GMD government, which even after its move to Taiwan continued until the 1970s, left a lasting legacy of distrust and suspicion that divided the United States and Mainland China for several decades. American officials viewed the establishment in China of a communist government sympathetic to the Soviet Union as a major Cold War defeat, a perception enhanced by China's November 1950 intervention in the Korean War. For at least two decades, Chinese leaders in turn regarded the United States as their country's most significant international adversary, a perspective that only began to change after President Richard Nixon moved to reopen relations with China in the early 1970s.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Chen Yi; China, Republic of, Armed Forces; Hurley, Patrick Jay; Jiang Jieshi; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Marshall, George Catlett; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De

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Chirac, Jacques
(1932–)

Conservative French politician, mayor of Paris (1977–1995), prime minister (1974–1976, 1986–1988), and president of the Fifth Republic (1995–present). Born on 29 November 1932 in Paris, Jacques Chirac attended the elite Lycée Louis-le-Grand before beginning his studies at the Institut d'Études Politiques in 1954. He left to serve as an army officer in Algeria. From 1957 to 1959 he attended the École Nationale d'Administration and subsequently joined the civil service in the Court of Accounts. In April 1962 he was appointed to Premier Georges Pompidou's staff. As Pompidou's protégé, Chirac successfully ran as a Gaullist in the 1967 National Assembly elections. With the seat came the post of junior minister for social affairs, which made him a central figure in Pompidou's crisis-management team during the student protests of May 1968.

From 1968 to 1971, Chirac worked as a state secretary under future political adversary Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the Ministry of Economy and Finance. In 1972, Chirac was entrusted with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, gaining international attention when he attacked the agricultural policies of other major Western powers as harmful to French interests. In March 1974, he became minister of the interior. When Pompidou's untimely death resulted in early elections and Giscard assumed the presidency, the young Chirac was appointed premier on 27 May 1974. Six months later, he used his position to take over the leadership of the Gaullist party. Differences with President Giscard led to Chirac's resignation in August 1976.

Jacques Chirac, president of France (1995–). He has played a pivotal role in the formation of the European Union and the creation of a single European currency. (Embassy of France/Bettina Rheims)

Chirac used the next several years to form a new, Gaullist-like party, Le Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic). Backed by his new party, he won an easy electoral victory and became mayor of Paris in 1977, an office he held until 1995. In 1978, the Chirac-Giscard feud deepened when Chirac accused Giscard's pro-European party of being "the agent of foreign powers." Chirac ran against Giscard from the Right in the 1981 presidential elections, thus splitting the electorate and paving the way for socialist François Mitterrand's May 1981 victory. When the conservatives won a majority in the 1986 National Assembly elections, however, Mitterrand appointed Chirac premier in March. He remained in office until he ran again in vain for the presidency in May 1988.

Finally, in May 1995 Chirac won election to the presidency, replacing the retiring President Mitterrand. President Chirac surprised the world and angered his European neighbors when he ordered the resumption of nuclear testing in French Polynesia, ending his predecessor's three-year moratorium. Less than a year later, however, he signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996.

Despite subsequent electoral setbacks for his party, Chirac has managed to stay in office. In 1996 he visited Washington, D.C., and strengthened ties to the United States. He broke with the George W. Bush administration over the war in Iraq, however, and U.S.-French relations reached a low ebb by the end of 2003.

Matthias Trefs

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; European Integration Movement; France; Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry; Le Pen, Jean-Marie; Mitterrand, François; Nuclear Tests; Pompidou, Georges

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See Zhu De

Chu Teh

Churchill, Winston
(1874–1965)

British statesman and prime minister (1940–1945, 1951–1955). Born at Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, on 30 November 1874, the eldest son of Lord Randolph Churchill, third son of the Duke of Marlborough and a rising Conservative politician, and his wife Jennie Jerome, an American heiress, Winston Churchill was educated at Harrow and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. From 1895 to 1899 he held a commission in the British Army, seeing active service in India, on the Afghan frontier, and in the Sudan, where he took part in the Battle of Omdurman. Captured by South African forces in 1899 while reporting on the Boer War as a journalist, he won popular fame after escaping.

Churchill entered politics in 1900 as a Unionist member of Parliament. In 1904 his party's partial conversion to protectionism caused him to join the Liberals, who made him president of the Board of Trade (1908–1910) and home secretary (1910–1911) after they returned to power. As first lord of the Admiralty (1911–1915), Churchill sought to modernize the Royal Navy, convert it to oil, and improve its administration. He championed the 1915 Dardanelles expedition against Turkey, the failure of which prompted his resignation. He spent the next six months to May 1916 on active service on

One of the great figures of the twentieth century in a versatile career that spanned four decades, Winston Churchill served Great Britain as a war correspondent, soldier, politician, member of the British Parliament, first lord of the admiralty, and prime minister. (Library of Congress)

the Western Front but regained high office in July 1917, when Prime Minister David Lloyd George made him minister of munitions. In December 1918 Churchill moved to the War Office, where he unsuccessfully advocated forceful Allied action against Russia to eliminate that country's new communist government. In late 1920 he became colonial secretary. In 1924 he returned to the Conservatives, who in November 1924 made him chancellor of the exchequer, a post he held for five years.

By 1928 Churchill believed that the postwar peace settlement represented only a truce between wars, a view set forth in his book *The Aftermath* (1928). When Labour won the 1929 election Churchill lost office but soon began campaigning vigorously for major British rearmament, especially of the Royal Air Force (RAF). From 1932 onward he sounded this theme eloquently in Parliament, but Conservative leaders remained unsympathetic, and throughout the 1930s Churchill held no cabinet position. Churchill also became the most visible and vocal critic of the appeasement policies of the successive governments of Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, who effectively acquiesced in German rearmament and Chancellor Adolf Hitler's deliberate contravention of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

When Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, Churchill resumed his old position as first lord of the Admiralty. On 10 May 1940, the day Germany launched an invasion of France and the Low Countries, Churchill succeeded Chamberlain as prime minister. After the fall of France, and with Britain remaining as Germany's sole major military opponent, Churchill responded vigorously. An outstanding war leader, he delivered a series of rousing and eloquent speeches, affirming Britain's determination to continue the fight and his conviction of ultimate triumph. He also established a close relationship with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and persuaded U.S. policymakers to furnish substantial assistance. Churchill welcomed Japan's December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent German declaration of war on the United States, believing that U.S. participation in the war guaranteed an Allied victory. Britain and the United States now worked closely together, establishing a Joint Chiefs of Staff and agreeing to pool technology.

After Germany invaded Soviet Russia in June 1941, Churchill also welcomed the Soviet Union as an ally, although his relations with Soviet Premier Josef Stalin were never as close as with Roosevelt. Churchill made repeated visits to the United States and met Roosevelt at other venues; all three leaders met at major international summit conferences in 1943 and 1945, and Churchill also met Stalin separately on several occasions. Stalin resented the Anglo-American failure to open a second front in Europe until June

1944, a decision due in considerable part to Churchill's fear that if Britain and the United States launched an invasion of Western Europe too soon, the campaign would degenerate into bloody trench warfare resembling that of World War I. Churchill bristled at growing American pressure to phase out British colonial rule.

Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom during the Cold War

Name	*Party*	*Term*
Clement Atlee	Labour	1945–1951
Winston Churchill	Conservative	1951–1955
Anthony Eden	Conservative	1955–1957
Harold Macmillan	Conservative	1957–1963
Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home	Conservative	1963–1964
Harold Wilson	Labour	1964–1970
Edward Heath	Conservative	1970–1974
Harold Wilson	Labour	1974–1976
James Callaghan	Labour	1976–1979
Margaret Thatcher	Conservative	1979–1990

As the war proceeded and Soviet forces began to push back German troops in the eastern region, Churchill feared that the Soviet Union would dominate postwar Eastern Europe. Soviet support for communist guerrillas in occupied countries and for Soviet-backed governments-in-exile as well as Moscow's failure to aid the uprising of Polish forces in Warsaw in August 1944, reinforced his apprehensions.

In October 1944 Churchill negotiated the informal Percentages Agreement with Stalin whereby the two leaders delineated their countries' respective spheres of influence. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt both acquiesced in Soviet domination of most of Eastern Europe, Churchill most reluctantly. In April 1945 Churchill unavailingly urged American military commanders to disregard their existing understandings with Soviet forces and take Berlin.

From early in the war the Allies had committed themselves to the creation of a postwar international organization to maintain peace, which led to the United Nations (UN) in May 1945. Churchill, however, hoped that close Anglo-American understanding would be the bedrock of the international world order, a perspective intensified by his continuing fears of Germany.

In August 1945 the British electorate voted Churchill out of office, replacing his administration with a reformist Labour government. He was still, however, honored as "the greatest living Englishman" and the war's most towering figure. Churchill's six best-selling volumes of *The Second World War* depicted a rosy view of unclouded and harmonious Anglo-American wartime cooperation, carefully designed to promote the continuing alliance between the two countries that had become his most cherished objective.

Churchill deliberately used his prestige to rally American elite and public opinion in favor of taking a stronger line against Soviet expansionism in Europe and elsewhere, a position he advanced to enormous publicity in his famous March 1946 "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech) at Fulton, Missouri. Although the speech was cleared in advance with both British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and U.S. President Harry S. Truman, at the time many Americans criticized the address as unduly bellicose. One year later, however, the president's Truman Doctrine endorsed this position, and by the end of the 1940s the United States had launched the Marshall Plan to facilitate West European recovery and had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Churchill died at his London home on 24 January 1965, an occasion which for many marked the symbolic final passing of Great Britain's imperial age.

From 1951 to 1955 Churchill served again as Conservative prime minister. Growing Soviet-American tensions and the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons led him to urge U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to negotiate an understanding with the Soviet Union to limit and perhaps reduce stocks of such bombs. Churchill also gave early support and encouragement to the movement for European integration, regarding this as the only means whereby the continent would be able to defend itself against the Soviet Union, become a credible international military and economic force, and avoid future destructive internecine conflicts.

Declining health eventually forced Churchill to resign from office. In retirement, he urged Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to repair Anglo-American relations after the damaging 1956 Suez Crisis, on the grounds that Britain could not afford lasting estrangement from its most vital ally, and offered his assistance in this endeavor. A House of Commons man to the core, Churchill consistently refused the peerage to which his services entitled him. He died at his London home on 24 January 1965, an occasion that for many marked the symbolic final passing of Great Britain's imperial age. An idiosyncratic political maverick whose pre-1939 record was at best mixed, Churchill rose to the occasion to become the greatest British war leader since the eighteenth-century Earl of Chatham. The prestige that Churchill won in this capacity enabled him to have a major impact on the development of the Cold War.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Anticolonialism; Arms Control; Atomic Bomb; Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl; Containment Policy; Dulles, John Foster; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; Eisenhower, Dwight David; European Integration Movement; Germany, Federal Republic of; Lend-Lease; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Marshall, George Catlett; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nuclear Arms Race; Poland; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; "Sinews of Peace" Speech; Stalin, Josef; Suez Crisis; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United Kingdom; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Civil Defense

Civil defense refers to programs and preventive measures to help defend civilian populations from military attack. During the Cold War, these efforts were directed mainly at protecting civilians during a nuclear attack. Two civil defense programs existed that can be regarded as standardized systems, namely those of the Soviet Union and the United States. These nations exported their civil defense organizations to their allies.

Soviet civil defense consisted of a system of state-sponsored measures designed to secure the population and national economy in time of war and to manage rescue and recovery efforts with the purpose of minimizing casualties. The Soviet civil defense apparatus was well organized, thought to be reliable, and based on two primary principles. First, civil defense was organized on a territorial-industrial basis to protect the entire nation. Citizens underwent continuous training in civil defense measures, and high emphasis was placed on fallout shelters, which were designed to safeguard the population from the effects of nuclear detonations. Second, civil defense called upon the mobilization of material and human resources of the nation as a whole.

The Soviet government approached civil defense with four major premises. The first was on the presumption that a well-trained populace would be less prone to injury or death and be less susceptible to panic in the event of a war. Second, adequate training would help the population to deal with dangers contingent upon an enemy attack. Third, people trained in civil defense would be capable of providing aid to the injured and could be mobilized to begin recovery efforts as soon as possible. Fourth, civil defense training would reinforce the defensive capabilities of the country. During the Cold War, some 30 million Soviet citizens and 70 percent of the industrial workforce were directly involved in civil defense programs. It is estimated that the Soviet Union spent $1 billion per year on civil defense measures.

During the Cold War, some 30 million Soviet citizens and 70 percent of the industrial workforce were directly involved in civil defense programs.

Two organizations oversaw the Soviets' civil defense program. The Local Civil Defense (MPVO) system was organized in individual municipalities. The objective of the MPVO was to protect local citizens against enemy attacks of various kinds. In charge of the Municipal Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' Deputies (ECCWD) was the municipal chief. The committee chief exercised the exclusive right to issue direct orders and make decisions in the best interest of the locality. Such committees were responsible for providing a diverse range of services by order of the Soviet government in order to maximize civil defense measures during an attack.

The second civil defense organization was the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF). The objective of DOSAAF was to train people in the basics of military warfare. DOSAAF provided training to the civilian population, especially youth, to develop basic skills in firing weapons, skiing, driving, parachuting, piloting aircraft, and radio communications. In the process, DOSAAF also promoted various sports. DOSAAF fell under the aegis of the National Defense Ministry and worked closely with MPVO units.

In the event of enemy attack, one of nine warning signals would be transmitted to cities and towns by means of siren alarms, loudspeakers, whistles, and radio. The majority of fallout shelters were public; in fact, the construction of family or individual shelters was not encouraged, as the common perception was that an enemy attack would focus on public places such as industrial centers, factories, and motorways. Soviet shelters were classified in numerous ways. These included blast shelters with high-level, industrially manufactured air filtering equipment; blast shelters with simplified filtering equipment; nuclear shelters equipped to handle peacetime accidents (such as nuclear reactor accidents); and simple nuclear shelters fabricated from readily available materials to offer refuge from nuclear attack. Fallout shelters were also classified according to capacity: small-scale (accommodating up to 150 persons), medium (150–450 persons) and large-scale (450 or more persons).

In the event that people could not reach fallout shelters in time, Soviet citizens were trained to wear protective clothing. Usually, they wore suits of rubber or plastic equipped with a breathing apparatus and gas mask, protective gloves, and footwear. Respirators were issued to high-ranking officials and civil defense chiefs. Families and individuals had to obtain protective gear at their own expense.

Civil defense was not nearly as well organized in the United States. Civil defense measures were left primarily to local and state authorities, with the federal government playing a relatively minor role, mainly coordinating and disseminating information. Furthermore, American civil defense emphasized individual self-help, privatization, voluntarism, and decentralization. Unlike Soviet citizens, Americans were routinely prompted to construct their own individual fallout shelters, and many did, particularly in the 1950s.

The first national Cold War civil defense agency was created in January 1951 as a response to the Soviets' first atom bomb detonation in 1949 and to the Korean War (1950–1953). This agency, the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), had a narrow mission, which was chiefly geared to educating the populace on appropriate civil defense measures to take in the event of a nuclear attack. Although the FCDA recommended the construction of fallout shelters as part of a comprehensive civil defense apparatus, the federal government never allowed for the construction of adequate public shelter protection, and no cohesive national civil defense policies were ever implemented. The emphasis remained on regional and local programs.

The U.S. government did, however, develop a civil defense plan aimed at protecting America's industrial base. In August 1951, President Harry S. Truman announced the National Industrial Dispersion Policy, a program designed to decentralize American manufacturing, thereby making it less vulnerable to a concentrated Soviet air attack. The dispersion program was highly decentralized, however, and the onus of implementation was placed on individual localities. Thus, almost no federal funds were allotted to the endeavor, and the policy had little impact on the protection of America's industrial sector. By the late 1950s, with the proliferation of highly destructive hydrogen bombs and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), the

Fallout shelter being dug by a family near Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The program was funded by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Under this program, families were paid to build various kinds of expedient fallout shelters (fast shelters that could be built in a nuclear emergency) to find out how quickly the shelters could be built and to test the adequacy and clarity of shelter plans. (National Archives and Records Administration)

National Industrial Dispersion Policy was rendered largely moot and faded into obscurity.

The closest the United States ever came to duplicating the more ambitious Soviet civil defense efforts was the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), created in 1947 to mobilize national resources and industrial production in time of war. It did not, however, play a large role in more traditional civil defense preparations. In December 1950, in response to the reversal of fortunes in the Korean War, the Truman administration established the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), whose task was to coordinate all military and defense production—much like the War Production Board of World War II. But again, the ODM played almost no role in civil defense procedures. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower combined the NSRB and the ODM into one agency, although its mission did not change. In 1958, U.S. officials decided to merge mobilization and civil defense readiness into one agency when they consolidated the FCDA and the ODM into one unit: the

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). The OCDM went through several permutations over the years and became more of a disaster relief agency than a civil defense apparatus, especially after nearly all military and civilian defense operations were consolidated into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1978.

Most U.S. communities developed their own emergency plans and tasked local civil defense officers with specific functions. Additionally, civil defense volunteers underwent training to complement regular officers. The responsibility of alerting the public of an impending nuclear attack rested with the national, state, and local civil defense offices. These agencies arranged training courses for volunteers who had to be ready to assist authorities in managing existing shelters, decontamination procedures, fire fighting, first aid administration, and recovery efforts.

Adequate advanced warning depends upon the detection of approaching aircraft or missiles as far from the nation's borders as possible. To this end, the National Warning System (NAWAS) was established in 1957. It worked with local warning systems to form the Civil Defense Warning System. Telephones, radios, teletype, and other warning systems were used to transmit urgent civil defense information. Public sirens were also used for early warning. To provide early warning, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) maintains a sophisticated surveillance network including ground radar and radar-equipped aircraft deployed across the entire North American continent. Detection first begins at the Distant Early Warning Line, a radar wall extending some 4,000 miles across the Arctic through the Bering Sea and into the North Pacific.

The United States possessed two civil defense alert warning signals. The first was a steady, three- to five-minute siren that indicated an advanced-warning alert signal. This was used if enough time remained for people to seek protection in public or family fallout shelters. The second, a series of short siren blasts for five minutes, meant that immediate cover should be taken, indicating an imminent attack within minutes.

Local alert transmission systems differ from locale to locale. Two main alarm transmission systems were in place: a National Emergency Alarm Repeater (NEAR) system and a Control of Electromagnetic Radiations (CONELRAD) system. NEAR was designed to provide for almost instantaneous warning of an impending attack for the indoor public. NEAR had the capability of reaching 96 percent of the population in homes, offices, factories, schools, and other indoor public places. This system was especially valuable in that it was capable of transmitting alarm signals to rural areas where installation of outdoor alarm systems would be costly. Meanwhile, CONELRAD was invented to assure radio communications in a national emergency and to prevent enemy aircraft from using radio signals in search of targets. CONELRAD's importance decreased as the potential of attack via ballistic missiles increased, but it is still used to ensure more efficient communications between public officials and civilians.

Cold War fallout shelters in the United States were classified on the basis of their protection factor (100 meant the radiation level outside a shelter could

A volunteer in Battle Creek, Michigan, stands beside the fourteen-day emergency food supply for two persons that she purchased in a 1961 test of how much the food would cost, how much it would weigh, and how much space it would take to store it. Her particular supply consisted of 113 articles of 67 foods, cost just under $28 to buy, and weighed 118 pounds. Such a food supply was recommended by the Office of Civil Defense of the Defense Department. (National Archives and Records Administration)

be 100 times as high as that inside a shelter). During and after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, relaxed civil defense qualifications yielded 110 million shelter spaces, of which more than 70 million had a protection factor of 100 or greater, and an additional 35 million shelters with a protection factor between 49 and 99. The shelters with a protection factor of 100-plus were concentrated in the larger cities of the United States. Only shelters with protection factors of 100 or greater were stocked with food and survival supplies.

Jaroslav Dvorak and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Atomic Bomb; Fallout Shelters; Hydrogen Bomb

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Civil Liberties in the United States

Legally codified rules that protect citizens' basic human rights and guard against the abuse of government power. The United States has long prided itself on its representative government and civil liberties enumerated in the U.S. Constitution. During the Cold War, however, domestic concerns regarding communist subversion culminated in security measures that often contradicted the very principles upon which the United States was founded.

Americans' civil liberties are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, particularly by the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments) and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments. The Bill of Rights guarantees Americans their basic civil liberties including, but not limited to, freedom of speech and association, the right to bear arms, the right against arbitrary search and seizure, and the right not to incriminate oneself. The Thirteenth Amendment outlaws slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment denies the government the ability to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property." The Fifteenth Amendment guarantees every citizen the right to vote regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude"; however, it was not until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 that women were granted the right to vote.

As the Cold War began to affect domestic society during the late 1940s and early 1950s, American politicians became increasingly concerned with the possibility of communist subversion within the United States and, more urgently, within the U.S. government. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) represented perhaps the first overt government institution to challenge the civil liberties of Americans by attacking freedom of speech and association. Established in 1938 to investigate disloyalty and subversion within the government, by the late 1940s HUAC had focused on eradicating domestic communism and in the process fueled the emerging Second Red Scare. The committee became infamous when, in 1947, it attacked Hollywood, accusing some of its more prominent actors, producers, directors, and screenwriters of being communists. After traveling to Washington, D.C., upon being subpoenaed by HUAC, one screenwriter and nine directors refused to respond to the committee's communist allegations. Despite the fact that they cited their Fifth Amendment rights, they were imprisoned for contempt of Congress. Upon their release, the so-called Hollywood Ten found themselves blacklisted and their hitherto promising careers ruined.

In 1948, a conservative Congress pressured the administration of President Harry S. Truman to implement a Loyalty Program applicable to all federally employed personnel. It required that all employees sign a pledge of loyalty to the U.S. government, admit to any past associations with "subversive" organizations, and promise not to join any such organizations in the future. Failure to sign the pledge or to admit to past activities was grounds for summary dismissal. Before long, many state and local municipalities had adopted similar programs, and many people lost their jobs as a result. In the early 1950s, Congress also passed two pieces of legislation containing anticommunist provisions over Truman's veto. The 1950 Internal Security Act required communists to register with the government, and the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act (also know as the Immigration and Nationality Act) specified the ability of the U.S. government to deport or deny entry to immigrants deemed "prejudicial to the public interest" or "subversive to national security."

The most infamous case of a politically motivated communist witch-hunt culminating in blatant disregard of civil liberties occurred during 1950–1954 in what has come to be known as McCarthyism. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy became a household name in February 1950 when, during a West Virginia speech, he waved a document in the air alleging that he had a list of 205 communists in the U.S. State Department. An otherwise obscure Republican senator from Wisconsin, McCarthy was instantly thrust into the national spotlight. Together with HUAC, McCarthy sought to identify suspected communists residing in the United States. In the end, public school teachers, college professors, labor union organizers, radio and television personalities, and even librarians found their careers and reputations ruined by questionable charges of disloyalty or of being a communist.

During the McCarthy era, loyalty oaths were required of immigrants and State Department officials alike. In 1953, even the State Department bowed to congressional pressure and ordered the removal of all books and art by suspected communists from government offices at home and abroad. During this period, basic rights such as freedom of speech, expression, and association were curtailed, and Americans' Fifth Amendment rights were often ignored, all in the name of national security. Although McCarthy was brought down in 1954 during the Army-McCarthy Hearings, the damage he wrought on the American body politic is incalculable.

American civil liberties were repeatedly breached, however, as anticommunism continued to arouse the suspicions of U.S. government officials, especially within J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Of particular interest here is the FBI's Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). The FBI formed COINTELPRO in 1956 after the Supreme Court challenged the constitutionality of several anticommunist measures, including the Loyalty Program, the 1950 Internal Security Act, and HUAC. COINTELPRO was a covert operations program targeted at American citizens believed to be communists or communist sympathizers. The program not only monitored but would also, in the FBI's parlance, "disrupt" or "neutralize" individuals or social groups that the FBI deemed threatening.

However, those whom the FBI deemed threatening were often civil rights advocates, antiwar groups, and student organizations. The FBI justified its actions by claiming that groups such as the Black Panthers and Students for a Democratic Society were communist front organizations.

Often resorting to illegal wire taps, unlawful search and seizure, and unconstitutional invasions of privacy to collect intelligence on its subjects, COINTELPRO operated outside the guidelines established by the U.S. Constitution to protect citizens' rights. Although the FBI terminated the program in 1971, COINTELPRO became the focus of the 1975 Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (also known as the Church Hearings). The Senate committee concluded that the FBI had "conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association."

During the Cold War, the United States was also culpable in repressing the civil liberties of citizens of other nations, particularly in the developing world. Through the U.S. Defense Department's Military Assistance Program and the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety, Washington changed the orientation of many nations' military forces from external defense to internal security in an effort to extinguish potential communist insurgencies. Although these programs frequently succeeded in repressing the Marxist threat, the trade-off was often military governance resulting in repression and gross human rights violations.

R. Matthew Gildner

See also

Black Panthers; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hollywood Ten; Hoover, John Edgar; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthy Hearings; McCarthyism; Truman Loyalty Program

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Clark, Mark Wayne
(1896–1984)

U.S. Army general and commander of United Nations (UN) forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). A third-generation soldier, Mark

Wayne Clark was born on 1 May 1896 in Madison Barracks, New York. He graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1917 and then fought in France, where he met his future mentor, George C. Marshall. During the interwar years, Clark held various command and staff positions. He was promoted to brigadier general in August 1941 and was working on army expansion when the United States entered World War II. Promoted to major general and named chief of staff for U.S. Army ground forces in April 1942, Clark earned a reputation as an effective troop trainer. In the summer of 1942 Marshall, then U.S. Army chief of staff, appointed Clark to command II Corps in England, where he helped plan the invasion of North Africa. His dramatic submarine voyage to Algiers in October 1942 to coordinate the advance surrender of the French garrison earned him a promotion to lieutenant general in November (the youngest at the time) and the position of deputy supreme commander of the Allied invasion of North Africa.

As commander of the Fifth Army in Italy during World War II, Lieutenant General Mark Clark was determined to liberate Rome. During 1952–1953 he commanded United Nations forces in the Korean War. (Library of Congress)

Following the conquest of North Africa, Clark became commander of the U.S. Fifth Army, providing controversial leadership during the campaign in Italy as a headline seeker, especially when he rejected an opportunity to destroy the German Tenth Army in favor of an American liberation of Rome. Following the German surrender in April 1945, Clark's troops occupied the U.S. sector of Austria, where he was high commissioner. Clark fed hungry locals with survival rations and rebuilt the economy with massive U.S. aid. His stormy relations with the Soviet military demonstrated that his talents did not extend to diplomatic poise and patience. After negotiating the Austrian peace treaty in June 1947, he served as commander of the U.S. Sixth Army and then the U.S. Army Field Forces Training Command.

Postponing plans to retire, in May 1952 Clark assumed command of UN forces in Korea, where he soon began complaining about the lack of men and materials. Reluctantly, he followed orders and continued the truce negotiations but also escalated the bombing of North Korea to force a settlement. Before signing an armistice agreement on 27 July 1953, he played a key role in securing the cooperation of President Syngman Rhee in respecting the armistice and improving the training and equipping of the South Korean Army. Clark never accepted the necessity for an armistice in Korea, believing that Americans lacked the will to win that prevented the United States from using atomic weapons to achieve a decisive defeat of the communists.

Clark retired from active duty in 1953. From 1954 to 1965 he was president of The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. He died in that city on 17 April 1984.

James I. Matray

See also

Austria; Austrian State Treaty; Korea, Republic of, Armed Forces; Korean War; Marshall, George Catlett; Rhee, Syngman; United States Army; Van Fleet, James Alward

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Clay, Lucius DuBignon

(1897–1978)

U.S. Army general and military governor of the U.S. occupation zone of Germany (1947–1949). Born on 23 April 1897 in Marietta, Georgia, Lucius Clay was the son of a U.S. senator. After graduating from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1918, Clay entered the army's Corps of Engineers, making his reputation as a strong administrator rather than as a combat general. In 1942 during World War II, he became assistant chief of staff for materials, service, and supply and was promoted to major general. Following the June 1944 Normandy invasion, Clay took charge of reopening the port of Cherbourg for Allied resupply. He subsequently rose to director of materials, responsible for coordinating all logistical details of army war production and assignment, and eventually, in 1944 on leave from the army, was named deputy director of war mobilization and reconversion.

Clay returned to Europe in April 1945 as General Dwight Eisenhower's civilian affairs deputy, with responsibility for feeding and housing the population in the U.S. zone of Germany. Clay was then military governor in the U.S. zone from March 1947 to May 1949 as a lieutenant general. Clay firmly opposed plans to pastoralize the country by destroying its heavy industry, emphasizing the need for timely restoration of civilian government in Germany, and moved steadily toward a divided Germany and the establishment of a separate Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) state. In June 1948, when the Soviet Union interdicted all land movements of supplies into Allied-occupied West Berlin, Clay advocated dispatching an armed supply convoy through Soviet-occupied the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany). His superiors in Washington rejected this forceful advice as overly confrontational but quickly endorsed Clay's independent decision to resupply Berlin by air for almost a year, evidence of America's commitment to the policy of containment of Soviet expansion, which Clay's stance quickly came to symbolize. In May 1949, a few days after the blockade ended, Clay left both the army as a full general and, to rapturous farewells, West Germany, where a civilian high commissioner, John J. McCloy, replaced him.

In retirement Clay served as chairman of Continental Can Company and a senior partner with Lehman Brothers investment bank. Politically active,

in 1952 he helped to persuade Eisenhower to seek the Republican presidential nomination. During the 1961 Berlin crisis President John F. Kennedy dispatched Clay to the city as his personal representative to demonstrate continuing American support for its independence. He died in Chatham, Massachusetts, on 16 April 1978. Clay's career demonstrated both the growing military significance of administrative, organizational, logistical, and engineering abilities within the twentieth-century U.S. Army and the major diplomatic responsibilities increasingly accorded American military representatives.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Crises; Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany, Federal Republic of; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McCloy, John Jay; Military-Industrial Complex; United States Army

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An outstanding U.S. logistician during World War II, General Lucius DuBignon Clay commanded the U.S. occupation zone of Germany during 1947–1949. (Library of Congress)

Clayton, William Lockhart
(1880–1966)

U.S. State Department official; served as assistant secretary of state for economic affairs (1944–1946) and undersecretary of state for economic affairs (1946–1947). Born near Tupelo, Mississippi, on 7 February 1880 to a modest cotton farming family, William Lockhart Clatyon entered the cotton industry at the age of thirteen. In 1904 he and his brother-in-law established a cotton brokerage, Anderson, Clayton & Company, in Oklahoma City, which within twenty years had become the world's largest such firm, trading extensively with Europe and Asia. In 1916 the business moved to Houston, Texas, Clayton's home for the rest of his life.

A dedicated believer in free markets, during the 1930s Clayton supported President Franklin D. Roosevelt's international tariff reductions while opposing the New Deal domestic statism and welfare programs. In 1940 Clayton joined the Century Group, which supported U.S. aid to Britain and intervention on the Allied side in World War II. Clayton served successively as advisor

to Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs Nelson Rockefeller (August–October 1940), deputy federal loan administrator (October 1940–February 1942), and assistant secretary of commerce (February 1942–January 1944), focusing on procuring international strategic materials for the American war effort.

As assistant (December 1944–August 1946) and then undersecretary of state for economic affairs (August 1946–October 1947) and special advisor to the secretary of state (October 1947–1948), Clayton sought to rebuild the international trading system. As such, he was heavily involved in negotiating the 1948 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the beginning of forty years of trade liberalization. A strong Anglophile, in December 1945 he arranged a $3.75 billion loan to Britain, albeit one whose ultimate price was British dismantling of the sterling area in favor of a convertible currency. Clayton's personal observations during a spring 1947 trip to Western Europe impelled him to write a memorandum for Secretary of State George C. Marshall urging a major American economic assistance program for that area, which became an important factor in the secretary's subsequent advocacy of the European Recovery Program (also known as the Marshall Plan).

Retiring to Houston in November 1948, Clayton became a staunch advocate of an Atlantic Union of the Western democracies, while his faith in free trade remained unabated. During the 1950s and 1960s he also repeatedly though unavailingly urged the U.S. government to recognize and trade with the communist People's Republic of China (PRC). Clayton died in Houston on 8 February 1966.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Marshall, George Catlett; Marshall Plan; Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.

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Clifford, Clark McAdams

(1906–1998)

U.S. presidential advisor and secretary of defense (1968–1969). Born in Fort Scott, Kansas, on 25 December 1906, Clark McAdams Clifford earned bachelor's and law degrees from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. After practicing law, he volunteered for the U.S. Navy in 1943. A posting to the White House in 1945 as assistant naval aide led to his appointment as naval

aide, assistant, and finally counsel to President Harry S. Truman, a position he held until late 1949.

Clifford became an early supporter of the containment strategy. He and presidential aide George M. Elsey drafted a memorandum on Soviet-American relations that urged the Western powers to ally against further Soviet expansion. Clifford was largely responsible for drafting Truman's February 1947 speech that outlined the Truman Doctrine and was a major architect of the 1947 National Security Act.

Clifford contributed to drafting the European Recovery Act of 1948 that put the Marshall Plan into effect and to the establishment of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. In 1948 he helped persuade Truman to recognize the new state of Israel. Clifford was one of the planners of the 1949 Point Four Program, whereby Truman promised substantial economic aid to underdeveloped countries.

In early 1950 Clifford left the White House to practice law in Washington, D.C. By 1960 he was widely considered the city's most influential Democratic lawyer. After handling several legal matters for then Senator John F. Kennedy, in late 1960 Clifford headed the president-elect's transition team but refused any formal office. Both Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, however, called upon Clifford for advice on various matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 1961, Clifford advised Kennedy to set up an independent oversight body to supervise the intelligence community. Kennedy then appointed Clifford to the new Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, of which he became chairman in 1963.



Clark Clifford was a trusted advisor in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Clifford served as secretary of defense during 1968–1969 and advised President Lyndon Johnson that the United States could not secure the ends it sought in Vietnam. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

In the early 1960s Clifford did not oppose the initial commitment of U.S. aid to South Vietnam. Together with Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, however, Clifford strongly opposed the major May 1965 deployment of American ground forces in Vietnam. Having lost this argument, Clifford believed that the United States should prosecute the war vigorously.

In late January 1968, Clifford was confirmed as secretary of defense, replacing the conflicted Robert S. McNamara for Johnson's final nine months as president. Clifford set up a Vietnam Task Force to reassess the situation in Vietnam and soon realized that the U.S. military had no concrete plan for victory. In early March 1969, he therefore recommended to the president that the United States commit only those forces necessary to meet immediate needs in Vietnam.

Fearing that victory was unattainable, Clifford summoned another meeting of the so-called Wise Men, most of whom concluded that the United States could not attain its ends in Vietnam and should begin peace negotiations. This contributed to Johnson's public announcement on 31 March 1968 of a unilateral bombing halt and to his decision not to seek the presidency again. Throughout 1968 Clifford battled administration hawks, most notably

National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow and former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, to maintain the bombing halt and continue negotiations with North Vietnam while publicly exerting pressure on South Vietnamese officials to join in peace talks.

In the early months of Richard Nixon's administration, Clifford praised the new president's intention to withdraw American troops. But Clifford alienated both Nixon and Johnson in the summer of 1969 when he publicly urged the unilateral withdrawal of 100,000 American troops by December 1969 and of all ground forces by December 1970. He also condemned the May 1970 U.S. invasion of Cambodia.

Clifford continued to practice law in Washington and play the role of Democratic Party elder statesman. Under President Jimmy Carter, Clifford undertook diplomatic assignments to Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, India, and Pakistan and helped to win Senate ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties. Although he avoided prosecution, in the late 1980s and early 1990s Clifford's involvement with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, which lost billions of dollars in fraudulent dealings, besmirched his reputation, as did his well-publicized negligence as trustee to the family holdings of deceased elder statesman W. Averell Harriman. Clifford died in Bethesda, Maryland, on 10 October 1998.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Ball, George Wildman; Cambodia; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; Harriman, William Averell; Israel; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennan, George Frost; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Marshall Plan; McNamara, Robert Strange; National Security Act; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Panama Canal Treaties; Rusk, Dean; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War

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Cohn, Roy Marcus
(1927–1986)

Influential attorney and Cold War icon who helped fan the fires of McCarthyism in the early 1950s. Born 20 February 1927 in New York City, Roy Cohn

graduated with a law degree from Columbia University Law School in 1947. He immediately began working in Manhattan for the U.S. Office of the Attorney General, a plum assignment for a young lawyer. There Cohn helped win several high-profile anticommunist cases, which would soon become his stock-in-trade.

By 1950 Cohn had become well known and had successfully prosecuted eleven members of the American Communist Party charged with sedition and treason. His work on the Alger Hiss case also highlighted his skills as a manipulative and cunning prosecutor. But it was Cohn's zealous prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1951, in one of the most spectacular trials of the century, that made him almost a household name. The Rosenbergs were both found guilty of selling atomic secrets to the Soviets and were later executed.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover recommended Cohn to Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, who had launched a zealous and reckless anticommunist crusade in 1950. By 1951, McCarthy was holding ongoing hearings intended to grill individuals about their past affiliations and sympathies in an attempt to expose communists of all stripes. He was in need of an effective attorney to assist him and hired Cohn upon Hoover's personal recommendation. Cohn did not disappoint. His penetrating questioning and aggressive tactics were a perfect complement to McCarthy's loutish behavior, and before long Cohn was McCarthy's chief counsel. Cohn thus became a key player in the agony that was McCarthyism. In 1954, when McCarthy overreached and made a fool of himself, Cohn quietly left his employ and began practicing law in New York City. Although Cohn's celebrity would fade in the years to come, he would always hold the dubious distinction of having aided and abetted the debilitating excesses of McCarthyism.

It was Cohn's zealous prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1951 that made him almost a household name.

In private practice, Cohn enjoyed a storied career. His many high-profile clients included the Archdiocese of New York, Donald Trump, and Mafia kingpin John Gotti, among others. Cohn continued to be active in Republican politics and often acted as an informal advisor to Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. But Cohn's apparently unscrupulous practices made him the subject of numerous investigations in the 1970s and 1980s. The New York State Bar Association finally disbarred him just weeks before his death in Bethesda, Maryland, on 2 August 1986.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Hiss, Alger; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; Rosenberg, Julius

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Schrecker, Ellen. *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1998.

Cohn-Bendit, Daniel Marc
(1945–)

Anarchist leader of the French student rebellion of May 1968 and later a prominent European politician and Green Party representative. Born to German-Jewish parents on 4 April 1945 in Montabaun, France, Daniel Cohn-Bendit spent his early years in Paris but at age thirteen moved with his mother to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). He graduated from the liberal Odenwaldschule school in 1965 and then went to the University of Paris at Nanterre to study sociology. There he became involved in anarchist student groups and helped create the March 22nd Movement, which sparked the 1968 May student uprising in Paris. During the students' standoff with the government of President Charles de Gaulle, Cohn-Bendit quickly rose to national prominence as the media spokesperson for the protest movement.

After the protests, Cohn-Bendit was expelled from France and relocated to Frankfurt. He was legally barred from France until 1978. In Frankfurt he became a key figure in the local anarchist scene (Spontis) and cultivated a close friendship with Joschka Fischer, later to become minister for foreign affairs. Both men were outspoken critics of leftist-supported terrorism, particularly that of the Red Army Faction in Germany. Although not a founding member, Cohn-Bendit played an important role in the formation of the German Green Party and was appointed Frankfurt's first city councillor for multicultural affairs in 1989.

Cohn-Bendit later embraced European politics and was the first politician to sit in the European Parliament (EP) as a representative of two countries: West Germany and France. After joining the EP as a member of the German Green Party in June 1994, he led the French Greens to a stunning EP electoral success in 1999. In the June 2004 EP elections, Cohn-Bendit was the top candidate of the newly formed European Green Party.

Jan Martin Lemnitzer

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; European Parliament; France; Red Army Faction

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Colby, William Egan
(1920–1996)

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official and then director (1973–1976). Born on 4 January 1920 in St. Paul, Minnesota, William Egan Colby graduated from Princeton University in 1940 and enrolled at Columbia University Law School before entering the U.S. Army during World War II. Trained as

a parachutist, he began his intelligence career when he was transferred to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Following the war, Colby returned to Columbia, earned his law degree in 1947, and practiced law in New York until 1950. Motivated by the 1949 communist victory in China and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, he decided to join the CIA. During the 1950s he was attached to the U.S. embassies in Sweden (1951–1953) and Italy (1953–1958). A defining moment in his career occurred in 1959 when he was assigned to Saigon as head of CIA operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).

Colby proved to be an aggressive Cold Warrior and was an early critic of RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem's corrupt and ineffectual leadership. Colby returned to the United States in 1962 and served as chief of the CIA's Far Eastern Division from 1962 to 1968. In 1968 he returned to Vietnam, first as deputy director and then director of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), initiated in November 1968. The APC focused on enhanced security and development within South Vietnam's villages and included such components as the Phoenix Program and the People's Self-Defense Force. The Phoenix Program was a CIA-inspired effort to eliminate the communist Viet Cong (VC) infrastructure within South Vietnam. Between 1968 and 1972 the program may have resulted in the capture of some 34,000 VC, of whom 22,000 rallied to the RVN government. The number of those Vietnamese killed may have reached 26,000.

Colby left South Vietnam in 1971 and was promoted to CIA director-controller in 1972 and deputy director of operations in 1973. He became director of the CIA in September 1973 and held that post until his retirement in January 1976. When Colby became director, the agency's reputation and morale had reached a low point. The CIA's failures and abuses abroad, such as those in Vietnam and Chile, combined with its illegal domestic activities associated with the Daniel Ellsberg (Pentagon Papers) case and the Watergate scandal undermined support for the agency. Although Colby struggled under reduced budgets and continuing political difficulties, he did succeed in making the CIA more open and responsive to Congress. Conversely, this openness earned the opposition of many Cold Warriors and helped end Colby's tenure as director. In January 1976, President Gerald R. Ford appointed George H. W. Bush to be the new director. Colby died on 27 April 1996 while on a canoe trip in Rock Point, Maryland.

William T. Walker

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam War

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Cold War Museum

See National Cold War Museum and Memorial

Cold War Study Centers, Non-U.S.

The collapse of East European communist governments in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991 made it possible for scholars from many countries to begin to study the history of the Cold War with the benefit of access to previously inaccessible archives in countries of the former Soviet bloc. Scholars in the former communist countries as well as in Western Europe have created several new centers for the study of the Cold War with the assistance of the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.; the National Security Archive at George Washington University; and other institutions.

The Cold War History Research Center in Budapest, founded in December 1998, supports research on Cold War history in Hungary and assists the integration of Hungarian scholars into the international scholarly community. Besides its collaboration with the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive, the Cold War History Research Center has established cooperation with several research centers in Canada and Western Europe, with the institutes of contemporary history in both Warsaw and Prague, with the Cold War Research Groups in Moscow and Sofia, and with several Romanian researchers.

The Center for Cold War History at the Institute for Contemporary History in Prague, Czech Republic, collaborates with scholars from many countries to conduct research in Czech archives, prepare publications, and host conferences. The Cold War Research Group–Bulgaria in Sofia was established in 1999 with support from the Cold War International History Project and the following year hosted a conference on the Cold War in the Balkans. The group has published the results of its research in Bulgarian archives in a series of CDs.

The Albanian Cold War Studies Center was established in 2001 with support from the Cold War International History Project. The historians and archivists associated with the center contributed to the successful opening of the Albanian archives in the spring of 2005. Translations of the first research efforts will be published by the Cold War International History Project in 2007.

The Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of Economics has a series of research programs dealing with the Cold War in Europe and the third

world and several programs of cooperation with research institutions in Russia and China. The center hosts visiting scholars and research and postdoctoral fellows and cooperates closely with academic and government institutions and Cold War studies centers worldwide. Each year the center joins the University of California–Santa Barbara and George Washington University in Washington, D.C., in organizing a conference on Cold War topics for graduate students from around the world.

In 2001 a group of Italian Cold War historians established the Machiavelli Center (CIMA), an interuniversity center that includes a number of departments from the universities of Florence, Padua, Pavia, Perugia, Rome Three, and Urbino. This project centers around the activities of the Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato of the University of Florence, perhaps the most important academic institution for international studies in Italy and the core of a large network of international academic contacts.

In 1999 the Modern History Research Center and Archives was established at Beida University (Beijing). Housed in Beijing University's History Department, the center has begun to collect Western, Russian, and Chinese archival and other materials on the Cold War, and some of its collections are now part of the Beida Main Library. More recently, the Center for Cold War International History Studies was established at East China Normal University (ECNU). The ECNU Center has begun to publish the *Cold War International Studies Bulletin*, which conveys to a Chinese-speaking audience important findings and developments in Cold War studies and introduces new Cold War scholarship into Chinese research and teaching.

The Cold War Working Group of Mongolia, in Ulaanbaatar, hosted an international conference in 2003 and continues to collaborate with scholars in many countries.

Kathryn Weathersby

See also

Cold War Study Centers, U.S.; National Cold War Museum and Memorial

Reference

Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1998.

Cold War Study Centers, U.S.

Since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent declassification of Russian archives, Cold War scholarship has burgeoned in the United States and abroad. Several centers have emerged with the mission of fostering Cold War studies. One of the first was the National Security Archive, founded in 1985 with its headquarters at George Washington University's Gelman Library. The archive, funded largely by private donations, has concentrated on collecting and making available declassified U.S. government

documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. By 2000, the National Security Archive had consolidated its place as the foremost nongovernmental repository for such materials.

Complementary to the efforts of the National Security Archive has been the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), begun in 1991 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. The CWIHP concentrates in part on accessing the records of former communist regimes as their successor governments open their archives. The CWIHP hosts Cold War conferences, sponsors focused publications, and assembles document collections from both sides of the Iron Curtain on such key events as the Korean War, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the 1980–1981 Polish crisis.

With the end of the Soviet Union and the opening of its archives and those of its satellites, a flood of documentary information has recently become available. To organize this vast body of evidence, Sovietologists founded the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies (HPCWS), which houses the materials at the Widener and Lamont Libraries as well as the HPCWS offices. Seeking to glean lessons for the present from the Cold War era, the HPCWS sponsors a book series that has produced such titles as *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948* (2001) and *Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany, 1945–1955* (2003). In 1999 the HPCWS began publication of the peer-reviewed *Journal of Cold War Studies* that features articles based on newly available evidence from both Eastern and Western sources.

Established in 1996 by Francis Gary Powers Jr., the son of the famed U-2 pilot, the National Cold War Museum and Memorial seeks to preserve records and artifacts from the conflict. A prime objective of the organization is the acquisition of a Nike missile base at Lorton, Virginia, for development as a museum and archive. One early initiative was to send a traveling exhibit of U-2 artifacts on a worldwide tour to attract support for the construction of the museum headquarters.

A number of other organizations look at the Cold War through a narrower lens. Texas Tech University in Lubbock houses the Vietnam Center. Since its beginning in 1989, the center has amassed one of the largest collections of materials on Vietnam, from the early days of French colonial rule to the very recent past. The center catalogs 8 million pages of manuscript materials and 12 million pages of documents on microfilm. It has also conducted hundreds of oral history interviews. To make access easier for scholars, the center has put many of these records on the Internet.

Preserving materials on the Korean War is a similar, albeit smaller, organization: the Center for the Study of the Korean War located at Graceland University in Independence, Missouri. It too gathers manuscript materials and conducts interviews of veterans of the conflict.

In 2001 the Department of History at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia, set up the John A. Adams Center of Military History and Strategic Analysis to "promote innovation in military history and strategic studies." As the center took shape, it began to focus principally on military

aspects, broadly defined, of the Cold War with special emphasis on America's armed forces. Among the center's initiatives have been the organization of conferences on the Cold War, the sponsorship of prizes for Cold War scholarship, and the collection and dissemination of the recollections of Cold War veterans of all U.S. armed forces.

In 2002 the University of Kentucky in Lexington accessioned the Scott Collection, a treasure trove of Soviet military materials. Gathered during two tours of duty in Moscow by Colonel William F. Scott and his wife, Harriet, the collection contains thousands of books and pamphlets on the Soviet defense establishment, doctrine, and equipment.

Malcolm Muir Jr.

See also

Cold War Study Centers, Non-U.S.; National Cold War Museum and Memorial

Reference

Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1998.

Collins, Joseph Lawton
(1896–1987)

U.S. Army general and army chief of staff. Born in New Orleans on 1 May 1896, Joseph Lawton Collins graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1917 and then served at various posts in the United States before occupation duty in Germany. During the interwar years, Collins was an instructor at West Point, the Infantry School, and the Army War College. He also served in the Philippines.

After the United States entered World War II, in 1942 Collins was promoted first to brigadier general and then to major general. From May to December 1942, he commanded the 25th "Tropic Lightning" Infantry Division, leading it with distinction in fighting on Guadalcanal. In December 1943 he went to Britain to command VII Corps, which he led in the landing at Normandy in June 1944. A superior tactician and strategist, Collins was relentless as a battlefield commander, earning the nickname "Lightning Joe."

Promoted to lieutenant general in April 1945, Collins became director of information at the War Department in his first postwar assignment, speaking with force and eloquence to civic groups about military preparedness. He then served as vice chief of staff of the army during 1947–1948. Advanced to full general in January 1948, he became chief of staff of the army in August 1949, replacing Omar N. Bradley who became chairman of the new Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). After the Korean War began in June 1950, Collins was the executive agent for the JCS with responsibility for transmitting instructions to the United Nations Command (UNC) and identifying issues for study or action. Collins conducted regular trips to Japan and Korea to assess manpower and materials requirements, consulting with General Douglas MacArthur and his successors and visiting U.S. commanders in the field. In

A superior tactician and strategist, Collins was relentless as a battlefield commander, earning the nickname "Lightning Joe."

U.S. Army General Joseph Lawton Collins, who served as chief of staff of the army during the Korean War. (Corbis)

the May 1951 Senate hearings that followed President Harry S. Truman's recall of MacArthur, Collins explained that MacArthur's violation of orders undermined the administration's limited war strategy necessary for the adequate defense of Western Europe.

In August 1953, Collins became the U.S. representative to the Military Committee and Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Having worked closely with Collins during World War II, in November 1954 President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent him on a mission to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) to provide a candid evaluation of conditions in order to formulate a program of assistance and military, political, and economic reform. Collins also was to assess the political viability of newly appointed Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. Returning to the United States in May 1955, Collins warned that the chances of Diem creating a strong government were remote, although he favored U.S. aid to South Vietnam. Eisenhower ignored his advice, setting the stage for the eventual conflict in Southeast Asia. Collins retired in 1956 and died on 12 September 1987 in Washington, D.C.

James I. Matray

See also

Bradley, Omar Nelson; Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Indochina War; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Ngo Dinh Diem; Southeast Asia; United States Army; Vietnam

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Colombia

South American country covering 439,733 square miles, roughly four times the size of the U.S. state of Nevada. Colombia borders Panama and the Pacific

Ocean to the west, Venezuela and Brazil to the east, Ecuador and Peru to the south, and the Caribbean Sea to the north-northwest. With a 1945 population of approximately 11 million people, Colombia is an overwhelmingly Catholic nation. Spanish is the official and predominant language.

During World War II, Colombia cooperated closely with the United States in hemispheric defense operations, especially in the Panama Canal area. It was the first South American nation to break diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy. When the war ended, Colombia strengthened its ties to the United States, both militarily and economically.

Colombia was the only Latin American country to send troops to the Korean War as part of the United Nations Command. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the country became one of the main recipients of U.S. military assistance. The Panama Canal was of vital strategic value for the United States, and given Colombia's geographic proximity to the canal, strengthening Colombia's military capabilities was a U.S. priority.

In 1950, Colombia's economy depended primarily on coffee exports, with the United States as its primary market. Other exports such as bananas, gold, and platinum were also exported to the United States in fairly sizable quantities.

In 1948, Jorge Eliézer Gaitàn, a reformist and candidate of the Colombian Liberal Party for the presidency, was assassinated in Bogotá. A wave of violence swept the country, putting it on the brink of civil war. That episode also influenced relations between the United States and Colombia, as leaders in both countries feared that communists had participated in the destabilization effort. Colombia severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and worked with the United States to contain the threat of communism in South America. Because the Colombian Communist Party was not very powerful in the early 1950s, these efforts were concentrated on Colombian labor movements in which both communists and socialists were active. While violence continued for some years, in 1958 conservatives and liberals came together to create the National Front, a power-sharing arrangement that lasted until 1974 and brought some political stability to Colombia.

In the 1960s, the Cuban revolution served as the ideological underpinning of several guerrilla movements. The National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) emerged as the main guerrilla groups in the country in 1964. Both groups remained active thereafter, with the FARC being the more numerous.

Although President Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958–1962) was a critic of the Cuban revolution and ordered the severing of relations with Cuba, he maintained that it was the Organization of American States (OAS) and not the United States that should take action against the Fidel Castro regime. In 1961, Colombia and Peru called for an OAS meeting to analyze possible sanctions against Cuba. This conference, which took place in Punta del Este in January 1962, resulted in the suspension of Cuba from both the OAS and the Inter-American System. Notwithstanding Colombia's preference for a multilateral approach in hemispheric issues, its relations with the United States remained cordial; in fact, under the Alliance for Progress, Colombia

View from the Granada Hotel of Avenida Jiménez de Quesada in downtown Bogotá, Colombia. Looters and rioters set fires and overturned streetcars on 9 April 1948. (AP/Wide World Photos)

received almost $900 million in economic aid, loans, and private investments from the United States.

During the 1970s, Colombia's policy toward communist regimes softened. It reestablished diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and Cuba and recognized the new Angolan government (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The administrations of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974–1978) and Julio Turbay Ayala (1978–1982) sought an independent foreign policy and supported the Non-Aligned Movement, although Colombia did not formally join the latter until 1983.

Turbay shifted his foreign policy in 1981 when he decided to break diplomatic relations with Cuba and aligned his policy with that of the Ronald Reagan administration. This shift occurred chiefly because of alleged Cuban and Nicaraguan support for the April 19 Movement, an urban group that emerged in 1970 and became the second most important guerrilla movement after the FARC. During the Falklands (Malvinas) War (1982), Colombia re-

fused to support the Argentine position in the OAS and abstained on the vote to invoke the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the only Latin American state to do so.

Although during the election campaign the new President Belisario Betanour (1982–1986) had not given any indication of wishing to change Colombia's foreign relations, in his inaugural speech he declared that Colombia would join the Non-Aligned Movement. In sharp contrast to his predecessor, he called for Latin American solidarity and reaffirmed Argentina's sovereignty rights over the Malvinas. Betancourt also became one of the chief opponents of Reagan's Central America policy. Escalation of the conflict there led Reagan to encourage a peaceful settlement for the embattled region. Together with Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, Colombia created the Contadora Group in 1983.

Betanour's active diplomacy in Central America was, however, challenged by domestic realities, particularly drug trafficking and the intensification of guerrilla violence. The connection between the FARC and the drug cartels opened the door for improved U.S.-Colombian relations. In the mid-1980s, drug trafficking replaced other issues in the bilateral agenda. With the end of the Cold War, Colombia's foreign policy turned its focus toward strengthening its fight against drugs.

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See also

Americas; Castro, Fidel; Contadora Group; Falklands War; Organization of American States

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Colombo Plan

Regional development program for nations in South and Southeast Asia conceptualized in 1950 and put into force in 1951. The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia arose from a meeting of British Commonwealth foreign ministers in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in January 1950. Less of a plan than an umbrella under which donor countries developed bilateral aid programs with recipient nations, the idea grew from three interrelated aims: the need to alleviate poverty in Asian nations

during the transition from colonial to independent status, the need to counter the attraction of communism in the region, and the need to provide conditions conducive to stable, moderate regimes.

Initially restricted to members of the British Commonwealth, the Colombo Plan expanded rapidly to include non-Commonwealth nations such as Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines (later extended to the South Pacific) and to donors such as the United States and Japan. Japan's membership in 1954 illustrated briefly held American hopes that the Colombo Plan might become a vehicle for more than bilateral aid projects, in the same way that the Marshall Plan had been in Europe. Washington hoped that Japan's membership would facilitate rapid integration of developing Asian economies with Japan's economy—that is, raw materials flowing into Japan and capital flowing out to developing nations. In the mid-1950s, however, memories of World War II were still vivid, and there was little Cold War consensus among new Asian nations. Thus, Japan's role in the plan remained a minor one.

The Colombo Plan began with two separate operations. One operation was an economic development scheme inviting financial support for developmental projects such as dam and road building. The other operation was technical assistance—the promotion of technical expertise, education, and training in a broad range of activities that logically assisted economic development and sound administration. Separate groups—a Consultative Committee in the case of economic development and a Council for Technical Co-operation for other aid—comprising members of the Colombo Plan met regularly to examine requests for aid and coordinate responses. The development projects were the more expensive, and in the late 1950s and 1960s they included ambitious dam building, agricultural innovations, and other modernizing features. The Canadians built a nuclear power reactor in India, but an even more ambitious plan for a reactor and school in nuclear technology, servicing Southeast Asia and based in Singapore, was not realized.

The Colombo Plan continues today (with twenty-five member countries), but since the 1980s it has become a much-reduced concept, focused on security, drug advisory programs, and the like. It is hard to evaluate its impact up to the 1980s. Most of the more ambitious development schemes depended on U.S. aid that had little to do with the Colombo Plan. In fact, much of the American money labeled as Colombo Plan aid was only loosely associated with it. Some projects made significant differences but, on their own, could hardly be credited with transforming Asian economies. For other donor countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, scholarships granted under the technical assistance side of the plan provided Asian students with study opportunities at a tertiary level and helped foster dialogue while eroding anti-Asian sentiments at home.

David Lowe

See also
South Asia; Southeast Asia

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Comecon
(1949–1991)

Acronym for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA) was founded in January 1949 in Moscow. Its goal was initially to bind the East European satellite states closer economically to the Soviet Union. It was also a response to the U.S.-initiated Marshall Plan. Comecon's timing was critical, as some East European states had shown interest in participating in the Marshall Plan. Overcoming the West's trade restrictions toward the Soviet bloc had been a major goal of Comecon integration since its inception. Among the other stated goals of Comecon were increased trade, extension of technical aid to member states, and the rendering of mutual assistance with respect to raw materials, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, and the like.

The founding Comecon states were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. In February 1949, Albania became a member state (although it became inactive in 1961). In 1950 the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) joined, followed by Mongolia in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in 1978. Yugoslavia retained the status of associate member by participating in twenty-one of thirty-two key Comecon institutions. Other socialist states, including the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), as well as a number of nonaligned developing countries held observer status.

Comecon was united by a common ideological and economic basis, namely a socialist monoparty system based on Marxism-Leninism, and by an economic system based on state-run central planning. It was not homogenous in terms of geography or a common stage of economic development. The most important institution of Comecon was the Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which decided the broad guidelines of Comecon policies. From 1962, the executive committee of the council guided the execution of Comecon work, which was organized by the secretariat of the council. Four council committees, twenty-four standing commissions organized for different economic sectors according to the model of central planning prevailing in the member states, six interstate conferences, two scientific institutions, and a number of associated organizations supplemented the institutional structure of Comecon.

Billboards at Moscow's Economic Achievement Center extol the virtues of the Five-Year Plan of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), 1985. (Brian A. Vikander/Corbis)

The history of Comecon can be divided into several phases. In its first phase, from its founding to 1956, cooperation among member states was relatively loose. From 1956 to the mid-1960s, there was a rapid growth of Comecon activities, especially after the adoption of the statutes of Comecon in 1959. Among the projects of these years were the unification of electrical power systems of the member states, coordination in transport, and, in 1963, the creation of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation to facilitate financial settlements among members. However, plans by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to introduce a Comecon-wide system of central planning were rejected by other member states. Subsequently, a dispute broke out about the role of planning versus market relations among the member states. The adoption of the Comprehensive Program for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Further Development of Socialist Economic Integration in 1971 was a compromise, calling for joint planning as well as stressing the role of money, prices, and exchange rates in relations of member states. The joint projects concentrated on the area of joint exploitation of natural resources, such as the much-acclaimed Friendship pipeline project for the transport and distribution of crude oil from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe. In 1970 the International Investment Bank came into being to finance joint investment projects and to provide cheap credit to developing member states.

Adoption of the phrase "socialist economic integration" pointed to the possible supranational nature of Comecon activities. The early 1980s brought a number of difficulties to the Comecon states, including the Polish and Hungarian debt crisis, the oil price shocks, and the decline of growth rates in centrally planned economies. In 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to revive the Comecon process with the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress, which for the first time included supranational approaches in science and technology policy. However, the decline of Soviet power led to a rapid loss of interest among its member states, and in 1991, when East European states began to redirect their interest toward Western Europe, Comecon was formally disbanded.

From the beginning, there was inherent tension between the so-called sovereign equality of Comecon's member states, which was expressed in equal representation (one country, one vote) in all Comecon institutions, and the hegemony of the Soviet Union. In decision making, this tension was accommodated by a process whereby a country could declare interest in a matter and then abstain from participating in a Comecon policy. In economic matters, the question of economic benefits from Comecon is much disputed. Basically, the Soviet Union provided cheap raw materials and energy to other member states, which then delivered finished goods to the Soviet Union. The opportunity costs of energy subsidies rose for the Soviet Union with the oil price shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s. Likewise, in terms of technology, the Soviet Union almost certainly transferred more to Eastern Europe than it received.

Despite its shortcomings, Comecon was a cornerstone in the Soviet Union's strategy to achieve domination of the European continent. Comecon was from the beginning a response to the nascent European integration process. The international socialist division of labor did not, however, bring the same advantages as the division of labor of capitalist states due to the nonconvertibility of currencies and the resulting necessity of balancing bilateral trade. Because of the limited number of participants and the limited depth of socialist integration, Comecon's efficacy, compared to the West European integration process, was limited.

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See also

European Integration Movement; Marshall Plan; Non-Aligned Movement

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Cominform
(1947–1956)

Western acronym for what was officially known as the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties. The Cominform's creation in the autumn of 1947 was regarded as a crucial event in the onset of the Cold War. The Cominform's inaugural conference, attended by representatives from nine national communist parties—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR—met in western Poland at Szklarska Poremba during 22–28 September 1947. Andrei Zhdanov, arguably second in the Soviet hierarchy only to Premier Josef Stalin, gave the opening address while establishing a new benchmark in Soviet foreign policy.

In what soon became a key communist metaphor of the Cold War, Zhdanov promulgated the two camps thesis, which asserted that a democratic and peace-loving Soviet-led camp was in direct conflict with a warmongering, imperialist camp based in the United States. From 1941 until early 1947, the Soviet Communist Party's official stance had been based upon cooperation with the noncommunist world. But the Cominform jettisoned this position, setting the stage for mutual antagonism between East and West. Zhdanov's postwar division provided the Cominform with its ideological justification: polarized allegiances within social democratic labor movements. It also alarmed the West, which now viewed the Cominform as a resurrected version of the pre–World War II Comintern dedicated to the spread of world communism.

Explanations for the foundation of the Cominform, nominally an information-sharing agency, are in dispute. The prevailing historical interpretation has maintained that it was a response to the introduction of the Marshall Plan in the summer of 1947, which Stalin saw as an attempt by the United States to impose economic and political hegemony in Europe. The formation of the Cominform was the next logical step in consolidating Eastern bloc countries after the Soviets repudiated the Marshall Plan. Recent documents from Hungarian archives suggest, however, that plans to reestablish an international communist organization may have been under way as early as 1946. This would imply that the Cominform was less a response to perceived Western hostility and more a nonmilitary means of Sovietizing Central and Eastern Europe. Whatever motives lay behind it, the Cominform's creation set off alarm bells from Washington to Whitehall in the autumn of 1947. Without doubt, the two camps thesis lent an air of permanency to the evolving Cold War.

The Cominform was initially located in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, rather than in Moscow. This was certainly appropriate given the early and prominent role model provided by Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, although the tacit intention was to obscure the controlling hands of Stalin and Zhdanov. Also influential in promoting adherence to the new communist line was the Cominform's monthly journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* The title was chosen by Stalin himself. The journal was published in fourteen languages and distributed in fifty-seven countries. As the two camps doctrine developed, any nation that supported the United States was deemed to

be allied with American imperialism. Only unwavering support of Soviet foreign policy could prevent such categorization.

Within the so-called people's democracies, the new policy wrought profound consequences. Communist parties discarded any appearance of cooperation with other parties, purged all noncommunists, and seized control of governments. The 1948 coup d'état in Czechoslovakia exemplified this process. The belief that the people's democracies were a new means by which the transition to socialism could be achieved was abandoned. Thus, the notion that different countries could determine their own road to socialism became doctrinal heresy.

On 28 June 1948, Tito's self-declared independence from Moscow triggered the excommunication of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform. Although Yugoslavia had been the most ardent proponent of the two camps thesis, the archetype had now become the pariah. Apart from the demonization of Tito, Yugoslavia's independence opened the first true schism in the international communist movement. The divide meant that neither Bulgaria nor Yugoslavia would continue to support the Greek communists, whose threats had helped convince the Americans in 1947 that the fate of Europe was still precarious. In October 1949, the Greek Communist Party acknowledged military defeat. Less than two months earlier Cominform architect Zhdanov died unexpectedly, and for the next three years the main thrust of Cominform activity became the peace offensive, which was a conduit for Soviet foreign policy. The Cominform did not long survive the Stalinist era. On 17 April 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev dissolved it as part of his reconciliation with Tito.

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See also

Greek Civil War; Khrushchev, Nikita; Stalin, Josef; Tito, Josip Broz; Yugoslavia; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

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Communist Control Act
(1954)

Legislation passed by the U.S. Congress ostensibly designed to outlaw the Communist Party in the United States and to deny its members access to other organizations. The Communist Control Act was passed by the U.S. Senate on 24 August 1954 for President Dwight D. Eisenhower's signature.

The act was an extension in scope of the 1950 Internal Security Act (also known as the McCarran Act). It was also a logical progression in the anti-communist witch-hunt of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy that came to be known as McCarthyism. Perhaps somewhat ironically, the legislation became law only weeks after McCarthy had disgraced himself on national television during the infamous Army-McCarthy Hearings. He was censured by the Senate for his reckless accusations and outlandish behavior. Nonetheless, the fires of McCarthyism still burned with great intensity in the late summer of 1954, and numerous Americans still honestly believed that communists had infiltrated the highest levels of the federal government.

The Communist Control Act built upon the Internal Security Act of 1950, which had been sponsored by staunchly anticommunist Nevada Senator Patrick A. McCarran. The 1950 legislation required, among other things, that all members of or contributors to the Communist Party or like associations be registered with the U.S. Office of the Attorney General. The 1954 act dramatically increased the penalties for those organizations and individuals who failed to register. Although the language of the Communist Control Act was unclear in places, the overall purpose of the legislation was to curtail the activities of the Communist Party. Although the act stopped short of banning communist organizations altogether, it did take away the "rights, privileges and immunities" of the Communist Party as a legal entity, which essentially denied it access to the legal process. In addition, it attempted to keep the party out of politics by forbidding any member of a communist organization to hold public office.

A second component of the Communist Control Act dealt specifically with labor unions, some of which had been infiltrated by communists. Seeking to crush communist influence in the organized labor movement, Congress forbade any member of any communist cause from being employed by a labor organization. It also denied communist-dominated labor unions the right to collective bargaining. Although the act stopped short of banning the Communist Party, it was invoked repeatedly in attempts to harass or bully leftist organizations of all stripes.

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See also

McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism

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Communist Fronts

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the U.S. Congress identified a number of organizations as fronts, or sponsors, of communist activity in the United States

and around the world. Such organizations were often accused of subversive activity and of receiving support from the Soviet Union. In some cases, these accusations proved groundless. In others, the allegations were more or less on target.

While socialist activity and organizations in the United States date back to the nineteenth century, American communism found its roots in the 1917 Russian Revolution and the organization of the Comintern in March 1919. The Comintern, or Third International, claimed leadership of all true revolutionary socialist parties around the world and brought them under Soviet influence. Initially, Soviet-inspired communism met stiff resistance in the United States, as the Red Scare of 1919–1920 associated communism with violence and subversion. However, the onset of the Great Depression in 1930 increased the status of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) and associated organizations.

The Soviet leadership of the Comintern traditionally forbade the formal association of its member parties with other groups on the political Left. This changed in 1935, however, as communist groups were encouraged to work with other sympathetically minded organizations against fascism, forming a so-called Popular Front. In the United States, this resulted in the cooperation of liberals and socialists with the CPUSA. Groups such as the American Labor Party, the American Student Union, and the Workers' Party found common cause with Soviet-sponsored communism. The American artistic and literary communities often demonstrated sympathy for the communist agenda, forming the League of American Writers. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 further enhanced the bond between the various facets of the American Left as they cooperated to foster political and financial support for the republican side in the conflict. During the Spanish Civil War, a varied group of American volunteers (most of them communists), went to Spain to fight the fascists there. The policies of Soviet leader Josef Stalin, however, particularly the August 1939 Nonaggression Pact with Nazi Germany, ultimately alienated many members of the American Popular Front and drove them from continued association with the Communist Party.

The American alliance with the Soviet Union that began in 1940 ensured tolerance for domestic communism during World War II. As tensions with the Soviet Union grew inexorably in the mid- to late 1940s, however, the CPUSA and its associated groups came under great suspicion. In Congress, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) feared the activities of alleged communist subversives in American government and took drastic steps to expose them, despite damage to the reputations of the innocent. In 1949, eleven leading members of the Communist Party were convicted of subversion, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the convictions. The anticommunist accusations of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, beginning in early 1950, further inflamed the situation.

In the atmosphere of this second Red Scare, which soon came to be known as McCarthyism, organizations with any past affiliation to the Communist Party came under intense suspicion as well. Individuals and groups affiliated with the Popular Front of the 1930s were branded as communists

(some justifiably, others not). The Independent Progressive Party, which had run former Vice President Henry Wallace for president in the 1948 election, was suspected. In 1950, despite President Harry S. Truman's veto, Congress passed the McCarran Internal Security Act, making it illegal to combine or conspire to support totalitarianism in the United States. The law was aimed at combating organizations suspected of subversive communist activity. In 1955 the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, established to enforce the McCarran Act, issued a list of eighty-two sponsors of such activity in the United States, including labor organizations, youth groups, academic associations, and literary groups, many of them former Popular Front members.

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See also

McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthy Hearings; World Peace Council

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Communist Information Bureau

See Cominform

Communist Revolutionary Warfare

A form of communist guerrilla insurgency, based upon rural peasant or urban underclass initiatives. The objective of the insurgency is the overthrow of an existing noncommunist regime and the establishment of a communist state. Communist revolutionary warfare in the Cold War context is usually, though not exclusively, associated with the Chinese communist theoretician Mao Zedong and Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap. Based on his experiences in the Chinese Civil War and against the Japanese in World War II, Mao argued that in predominantly rural countries such as China, the revolution of the masses did not have to be led by the proletariat, as Vladimir Lenin had taught. Rather, the peasantry would be in the vanguard. Giap subsequently showed during the Indochina War against the French that Mao's approach could be adapted to more densely populated regions and that they applied as well when the principal enemy was a colonial power. But Giap's chief contribution to revolutionary warfare came in his assessment of the political and psychological difficulties that confront a democracy in waging a protracted war. Giap believed that public opinion would at some point demand an end

to the bloodshed and that political leaders would find themselves forced to promise an early end to the fighting.

Communist revolutionary warfare required that certain conditions develop, which were clearly evident in the wake of World War II. These included a peasantry dissatisfied with the status quo, the discrediting of colonial regimes, and the rise of nationalism. Mao's views received a further boost following the final Chinese communist victory over the Nationalists in October 1949. Communist revolutionary warfare was also an appealing strategy during the Cold War because it provided a means by which the major communist powers—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC)—could support surrogate movements around the world while minimizing the potential for nuclear confrontation with the United States and its allies. Finally, because it relied on guerrilla warfare, the strategy reduced the advantages that a government and its supporting states might have in terms of firepower and technology and placed the conflict in a venue in which that government was less comfortable.

In its orthodox form, Mao's approach set forth a three-stage progressive process by which the Communist Party would ultimately achieve victory. The transition to a higher stage required that certain conditions be met, but such a move was not irreversible in that reversion to a lower stage could occur if a change in the situation so warranted. In the first stage, subversion, the party established and publicized a basic cause for the insurgency and highlighted the government's contradictions—that is, its weaknesses and inability to meet the needs of the people. It built cells and arms stores, organized and trained guerrilla units, carried out acts of sabotage and terrorism, and generally attempted to reduce public confidence in the regime's ability to both handle the situation and govern the country.

In its orthodox form, Mao's approach set forth a three-stage progressive process by which the Communist Party would ultimately achieve victory.

Once insurgency leaders believed that the party had become strong enough to confront the government directly, the second, or guerrilla, stage began. Beginning in remote areas where government control was weakest, the party focused on building up its base areas—a communist underground in the villages—while guerrillas conducted operations, designed to prevent government interference with this process, in the surrounding areas. As success was achieved, the areas under insurgent control expanded, and the costs to the government increased. When these costs began to be unacceptable to the existing government, the insurgents seized the initiative and gained momentum. If the government was unable to reverse the situation, its defeat became inevitable.

Concurrently during the second stage, the insurgents built and trained main force units for commitment during the third stage, the war of movement. When the party leadership believed that the government was on the verge of collapse, the transition to the final stage occurred. Fresh main force units were committed in a general offensive in the expectation that a mass uprising would occur and the government would be overthrown. In sum, communist revolutionary warfare employed the elements of time, space, and cost in protracted warfare to destroy the will and ability of the government to resist. Everything, including military operations, was subordinate to political considerations.

Viet Cong fighters lie in ambush in a lotus field in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, 16 August 1969. (AFP/Getty Images)

The methodical, elastic, and relatively low-cost nature of communist revolutionary warfare provided the insurgents with advantages in dealing with a weak government, particularly if that government was unable to develop the proper counterstrategy. The insurgents were not without challenges of their own, however, and a failure to address these satisfactorily could have fatal consequences. Gaining popular support early on was critical. This required identifying a basic cause that generated widespread appeal and exploiting inequities in the country that could be blamed on the government, even if they were not the government's fault. Selecting the right cause was important because it had to promote national unity, even among those who might not be receptive to the communist message. Successful communist insurgent movements, such as those in Vietnam, solved this potential problem by creating fronts such as the Viet Minh, composed of all political groups, and then controlling the fronts from behind the scenes.

The Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) during the latter half of the 1950s provides a classic situation in which this relationship was ripe for exploitation. President Ngo Dinh Diem's rejection of the elections scheduled under provisions of the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended the Indochina War—a course that had the full support of Washington—led to a resumption of fighting. Diem's actions reinforced the impression that his government could not win the election because it was corrupt and oppressive, was uninterested in correcting long-standing inequities such as land ownership, and was unable to address the growing insurgent threat.

Conversely, the effect of a weak-cause contradictions message can be seen in the Malayan insurgency. There, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) attempted to unite the Malayan people behind an anticolonialist/nationalist banner as well. However, this failed to resonate because the MCP was 93 percent Chinese in an ethnically diverse society where communalism was a deep-seated problem. In addition, the contradictions of the colonial government were offset by the obvious, sustained British effort to prepare Malaya for independence and an effective counterinsurgency campaign.

Success required strong leadership and organization. The presence of a charismatic leader such as Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam was highly beneficial. In addition, the movement had to be well organized and well disciplined, not only to show that it could support a national effort but also to be able to administer territory that came under its control and to demonstrate that it provided a credible alternative to the government. Again, the Malayan communists suffered in this regard because the government's declaration of a state of emergency in the summer of 1948 forced the party to enter the guerrilla stage before it was fully prepared to do so.

The strength of an insurgent movement could be further bolstered if it received outside support. Generally this took the form of political or moral support, infiltration of material and personnel assistance, or access to cross-border sanctuaries. The value of such support depended upon whether the insurgents were able to use it to exploit government weaknesses. British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson argued that infiltrated assistance was only of use if it could be absorbed, which meant that the insurgency had to be growing. Geography could also have a bearing on the potential success of an insurgency. The presence of difficult terrain such as mountains and jungles, for instance, was beneficial because it provided the insurgents with space in which to work and was more difficult for the government to access, especially if its administrative infrastructure and communications systems were deficient.

Unless a government took immediate action to develop and implement the correct counterstrategy, the situation would progressively deteriorate and inevitably lead to an insurgent victory. The most comprehensive counterstrategy to deal with communist revolutionary warfare was that set forth by Thompson, based on his experiences in Malaya and Vietnam, and sometimes referred to as the oil spot theory. Thompson maintained that an effective counterstrategy had to have a clear aim and had to be comprehensive and based on the rule of law, all of which served to reinforce the government's legitimacy and to differentiate it from the insurgents, who employed terror and other extralegal means. As a first step, the government had to secure its own base areas—the population, economic, and communications centers that formed the base of its support. Once this had been accomplished, it should begin to expand its control progressively, first to the immediate outlying areas that were less infiltrated by the insurgents and then into the more heavily infiltrated regions that lay beyond. In doing so it had to place priority on destroying the subversion, the communist underground, and not on the guerrillas, whose purpose was to protect the underground and to disrupt pacification—the government's effort to establish its control over the area.

In Thompson's view, it was essential that the government counterstrategy be closely coordinated as a single effort: its primary aim was both offensive and constructive, that of nation building; its secondary, defensive aim was destruction of the guerrillas; and the two were joined by pacification.

The high point of communist revolutionary warfare coincided with the era of post–World War II decolonization and nation building. However, it was neither the only form of protracted war pursued by insurgents during the Cold War, as illustrated by revolutionary movements such as those in Algeria and Mozambique, nor the only one employed by communists, as demonstrated in Greece and Cuba. Although its proponents frequently tried to surround it with an aura of invincibility, the record shows that communist revolutionary warfare enjoyed only mixed success. Its most notable victories occurred in the Chinese Civil War and in Indochina, but it was defeated in Malaya, the Philippines (Hukbalahap), Thailand, and Peru (Shining Path).

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See also

Anticolonialism; Chinese Civil War; Cuba; Decolonization; Greek Civil War; Ho Chi Minh; Hukbalahap; Indochina War; Malayan Emergency; Mao Zedong; Mozambique Civil War; Nationalism; Shining Path; Terrorism; Thompson, Sir Robert; Viet Minh; Vietnam War; Vo Nguyen Giap

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Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
(2 October 1986)

Act passed by the U.S. Congress on 2 October 1986 to pressure the white-minority South African government to end its policy of apartheid. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which overrode the veto of President Ronald Reagan, who did not approve of the sanctions it imposed, marked a significant shift in U.S. policy toward South Africa. Many welcomed it as the end of the policy of constructive engagement with the South African regime.

It is unlikely that the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act would have been passed had the Cold War not begun to wind down, for the United States had long viewed South Africa as a staunch Cold War ally. By 1986, however, pressures to act against the apartheid regime had become too great to resist. The United States did not want to impose sanctions on South Africa through the United Nations Security Council, fearing a potential veto by the Soviet Union. Thus, Congress took it upon itself to act unilaterally.

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was passed partly in response to the brutal way in which the South African government, headed by President P. W. Botha, repressed the popular uprising known as the Township Revolt that had begun in September 1984 and had continued to spread across most of South Africa even as Congress debated the act. Many American citizens demanded that sanctions be imposed on the apartheid regime. Reagan had enacted some minor sanctions by executive order in 1985, but few regarded them as adequate. The act aimed to achieve its purpose by encouraging the South African government to take specific steps, such as releasing Nelson Mandela and repealing the apartheid laws. The act reflected true

bipartisan opposition to apartheid and was passed with Republicans controlling the Senate.

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (Public Law 99-440) specifically called for an end to the state of emergency and the release of political prisoners; the lifting of a moratorium against dissident South African groups; the revocation of the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act; the granting of universal citizenship to all South Africans, including homeland residents; and negotiations to establish power sharing with the black majority. It also called on the African National Congress to condemn and take effective actions against the practice of people being killed by necklacing, in which those alleged to be cooperating with the apartheid regime had tires placed around their necks that were then set afire.

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act set aside major new funds for the victims of apartheid and for training programs for disadvantaged South Africans. It banned South African Airways from U.S. airports, new U.S. investment in South Africa, arms sales to the police and military, and the issuance of new bank loans unless they were to be used to promote trade. The importation of textiles, steel, iron, uranium, certain agricultural goods, and the products of state-owned corporations was also prohibited.

While South African imports to the United States did decline after the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was passed, by the end of the 1980s they had again increased, probably because the importation rules were not strictly regulated. One of the act's major weaknesses was that it prohibited few exports to South Africa, and thus some critics pointed out that despite its name, it was far from comprehensive. But had President F. W. de Klerk of South Africa not taken steps to end apartheid in 1990, further sanctions would almost certainly have been imposed by the United States. Even before the formal multiparty negotiations began in earnest, President George H. W. Bush issued an executive order in July 1991 declaring that certain sanctions in the act would be lifted immediately.

As South Africa moved toward a multiracial democracy in 1994, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act became largely moot. How much of a role it played in influencing change in South Africa remains contested, but that it had some influence cannot be denied.

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See also

African National Congress; Botha, Pieter Willem; Constructive Engagement; South Africa

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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

See Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on

Congo, Democratic Republic of the

Central African nation. Known as the Republic of Congo-Kinshasa until 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo during 1960–1971 and Zaire during 1971–1997, the Republic of the Congo–Kinshasa covers 905,963 square miles and borders on the Central African Republic to the north, Sudan and Uganda to the east and north, Burundi and Tanzania due east, Zambia to the southeast, and Angola to the southwest and has access to the Atlantic Ocean to the far east. The nation had a 1945 population of approximately 11 million people, some 34,000 of whom were Europeans.

The Congo entered the Cold War era as part of the Belgian colonial empire but gained its independence on 30 June 1960. Hopes for a peaceful transfer of power faded as the divisions among the new political leaders manifested themselves in violence and the country descended into civil war. When Katanga and South Kasai, which contained the copper mines that provided Congo's main export, seceded only weeks after independence, President Joseph Kasavubu appealed for international help, and the United Nations (UN) sent in a peacekeeping force in July 1960. By 1965 the seceded provinces had been restored, but disagreements between Kasavubu and the newly elected prime minister, Moise Tshombe, threatened the fragile peace. Stating his determination to bring order to the Congo, General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, commander in chief of the armed forces, seized power in November 1965.

Fearing that a power vacuum might develop that would provide fertile ground for further Soviet expansionism in Africa, the United States declared its support for the Mobutu junta, as did most other African countries. Mobutu proclaimed himself "Father of the Nation" and consolidated his hold on power by eliminating the office of prime minister in 1966 and by abolishing all political parties except the newly formed Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in 1967. Although elections took place beginning in 1970, the single-party state plus the fear engendered by the brutality of Mobutu's regime ensured his victory in every election until his overthrow in 1997. In May 1967 he announced the fundamental doctrines that would govern policy: authenticity, nationalism, and revolution. African authenticity came from eliminating the remnants of colonialism, particularly from geographical and personal names. In 1971 the Congo became Zaire, for example, and by the following year the capital, Leopoldville, was Kinshasa; Katanga was Shaba; and the president renamed himself Mobutu Sese Seko.

Nationalism meant, in particular, economic independence. Mobutu began in 1967 with a stabilization plan that nationalized the copper industry and

brought the economy under state control. In November 1973 he took economic nationalism to its extreme with the policy of Zairianization, designed to remove all foreign influences and return control of the economy to Zairians. All land, businesses, and industry were initially taken over by the state and then were made available for purchase by Zairian citizens. However, favoritism and corruption governed the reallocation process, and often the new owners engaged in asset stripping, increasing their personal wealth to the detriment of the country. In November 1975 Mobutu attempted to address the problem by allowing foreign ownership again, but with little success. Instead of demonstrating economic independence, Zaire became more reliant on foreign aid and international loans to prevent economic collapse.

Mobutu publicly proclaimed that revolution signified international independence, but he maintained a special relationship with the United States, which valued Zaire's mineral wealth and strategic location. Although Mobutu's dictatorship and abysmal human rights record often tested the relationship, he was expert at playing the Cold War game to ensure continued American support by threatening to align instead with the Soviet bloc. The importance of the Cold War to Mobutu's foreign policy strategy was highlighted when civil war broke out in neighboring Angola in 1975. While most African nations supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Zaire joined the United States in opposition because of the involvement of the communist bloc on the side of the MPLA.

The brutality of Mobutu's dictatorship guaranteed opposition to his rule, and his insecurity was exacerbated by the weakness of the Zairian Army (FAZ), a weakness glaringly apparent when MPLA forces drove the army from Angola in chaos. When in March 1977 the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) invaded Zaire's Shaba province, intent on ousting Mobutu, he feared that the army was incapable of protecting his position. Asserting that the communist-backed MPLA had trained and armed the FLNC, Mobutu demonstrated his competence at playing the Cold War game by successfully appealing for international assistance. The Americans took the lead in providing military aid, while Morocco sent combat troops. In May 1977 a joint Moroccan-Zairian force regained control of Shaba but allowed the FLNC to withdraw to Angola and regroup. A year later, the FLNC invaded Shaba a second time, succeeding in seizing the key mining center of Kolwezi. Again Mobutu received international aid. Troops from Morocco, France, and Belgium helped to repel the invasion, and Morocco agreed to maintain a peacekeeping force in Zaire to deter further attempts.

During the 1980s Mobutu retained U.S. support for his regime, particularly by invoking the Reagan Doctrine, which pledged support to those resisting communism in the developing world, but internal dissent was increasing and, as the Cold War drew to a close, international opposition also intensified. With Soviet expansionism no longer a concern, Congress expressed concern about the human rights record of the Mobutu regime and terminated all but humanitarian aid to Zaire in 1990. With the economy on the brink of collapse and with increasing violence from protesters, Mobutu agreed to political reforms in December 1990, including multiparty elections.

Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko at Kinshasa Stadium presents to a crowd of 60,000 people the first wounded revolutionist prisoners captured by government forces in secessionist Shaba Province, 20 April 1977. (Henri Bureau/Sygma/Corbis)

Thus Zaire entered the post–Cold War era among rumors of democracy, but Mobutu's control deteriorated, and he was ousted in May 1997.

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See also

Africa; Congo Civil War; Decolonization; Mobutu Sese Seko; Reagan Doctrine

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Congo, Republic of the

West-central African nation. A part of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) until 1958, the Republic of the Congo formally achieved independence on 15

August 1960. With a 1945 population of just 800,000 people, the country borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the east and south, Cameroon and the Central African Republic to the north, and Gabon to the west. To the southwest it occupies a short coastline on the southern Atlantic Ocean.

Perhaps the first Europeans to have contact with the region's Bantu kingdoms were the Portuguese, who located the Congo River in 1482. Soon they were trading with local tribes and began exporting Africans to the New World as part of the burgeoning slave trade. When the slave trade ended in the early nineteenth century, the Bantus went into a sharp decline, as they could no longer sell slaves from the continent's interior.

During the mad dash for colonies in Africa in the late nineteenth century, the French staked out a position in the region. In a race of sorts with Belgian King Leopold, who was also establishing colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, France solidified its control over the areas that it wished to influence. In 1908 the French formally organized their regional possessions into the AEF, with its capital at Brazzaville and including the Middle Congo (now the Republic of the Congo), Gabon, Chad, and Oubangui-Chari (now the Central African Republic). France exploited the AEF for its natural resources, while the inhabitants remained mired in poverty and illiteracy.

Local AEF administrators supported the Free French during World War II, the result of which was a significant shift in French colonial policies there. After 1944, local advisory bodies were permitted, colonial subjects received French citizenship, and forced labor was abolished. Partial self-government was granted in 1956, and after the constitution for the new Fifth Republic was approved in 1958, the AEF was dissolved and the four territories became autonomous members of the French Community. This transition brought violence and riots in Brazzaville in 1959 as ethnic tensions became politicized. When independence came in August 1960, severe rioting took place in the neighboring Belgian Congo, ultimately forcing Belgium to also move toward independence for its African colonies.

The National Assembly elected Fulbert Youlou as the Congo's first president. His tenure was brief and riddled with problems, including rising ethnic rivalries and vicious political infighting. Youlou was ousted in August 1963 in a three-day popular insurrection known as Les Trois Glorieuses (Three Glorious Days). The military then installed a provisional government headed by Alphonse Massamba-Débat, a civilian who went on to establish a Marxist-style regime. Massamba-Débat's communist economic policies did little to lift the nation's languishing economy, and he was deposed in a military coup in August 1968. After several months, during which the military sought to aggregate its power under the just-formed National Revolutionary Council, Major Marien Ngouabi, the chief instigator of the coup, became president in December.

In 1969 Ngouabi proclaimed his nation as Africa's first people's republic and changed the name of the lone ruling party to the Congolese Labor Party (PCT). Ngouabi dramatically increased the amount of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric; however, the alleged embrace of the people's best interests usually did

not measure up to expectations. On the other hand, the Left-tilting politics of the Congo attracted both interest and support from communist bloc nations.

In March 1977, Ngouabi was assassinated. An eleven-member military junta became responsible for establishing an interim government under the leadership of Colonel (later General) Joachim Yhombi-Opango, who had been serving as army chief of staff. Less than two years later, in February 1979, Yhombi-Opango was ousted by the PCT's Central Committee. He was accused of having strayed from party directives and of corruption in office. More than likely, his downfall was nothing more than political hardball within the PCT leadership. The constant changes in government, meanwhile, left little time and even fewer resources to devote to economic development or poverty mitigation.

Denis Sassou-Nguesso became interim president in February 1979. He was soon elected president of the PCT Central Committee and president of the republic. For the next decade, the nation's politics remained relatively stable, but the PCT leadership refused to back away from its orthodox Marxist prescriptions, which were proving increasingly ineffective.

The fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union's impending collapse forced major changes in the Congo's political landscape. In July 1990 PCT officials decided to end the one-party political system. The following year, at a national political conference, Marxism was formally renounced, opening the doors to free elections. By then, Congolese leaders knew that their decades-long experiment with orthodox communism had to be aborted. With loss of support from the crumbling Soviet Union and other former communist bloc countries, the handwriting was on the wall—to survive in a post–Cold War world, changes had to be made. The nation's first free elections were held in August 1992. Pascal Lissouba was elected president, defeating Sassou-Nguesso.

The transition to democracy has been anything but easy. After national elections were held in May 1993, the disputed results set off violent protests. In 1997, as the presidential elections neared, strife between the Lissouba and Sassou-Nguesso factions grew ever more bitter. When Lissouba ordered troops to surround Sassou-Nguesso's home in Brazzaville, a four-month civil war ensued that ravaged large parts of the capital city and killed scores of people. The carnage stopped only when Angolan troops intervened. Sassou-Nguesso once again became president in late 1997. Since then, there have been sporadic outbreaks of violence.

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See also

Africa; Decolonization

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Congo Civil War
(1960–1965)

The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union with opposing factions in the Congo Civil War transformed a nationalist struggle for control in the newly independent country into a Cold War battleground. The conflict began in July 1960 and comprised three main phases. The first was the secession of the Katanga and South Kasai provinces and the ensuing struggle to restore them to the nation. The second phase was the battle for control between the opposition governments of Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lamumba, and the third was the fight for power between Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe. Throughout the five-year conflict, the United States supported Kasavubu, while the communist bloc provided assistance to his main opponents. The interlocking conflicts were finally resolved when army chief of staff General Joseph Désiré Mobutu (Mobutu Sese Seko) seized power, with American support, on 24 November 1965, presenting the Americans with a perceived victory.

Hopes of an orderly transfer of power from Belgian colonial rule ended when dissatisfaction throughout the Congo turned violent. An army mutiny on 5 July 1960 was followed by the secession of two provinces: Katanga (Shaba) on 11 July and South Kasai on 8 August. As rioting spread, Belgium sent in troops to protect the lives and property of its citizens. Faced with the disintegration of their country and an unauthorized foreign intervention, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the United Nations (UN). On 14 July 1960, a UN resolution called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and organized a UN military force to restore order. Although the United States supported the UN action, there was increasing concern that Lumumba's leftist political orientation might provide an opportunity for communist infiltration. Thus, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized covert action to oust Lumumba and cultivate pro-Western leaders, such as Kasavubu and Mobutu.

On 5 September 1960 Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as prime minister, initiating the next phase of the war. Asserting that this action exceeded Kasavubu's constitutional authority, Lumumba, in return, dismissed the president. As conflict loomed, Mobutu took control and ordered Lumumba's arrest. In response, Antoine Gizenga, as leader of the Lumumbists, established an alternative government at Stanleyville (Kisangani) in November. By the end of 1960, the Congo was divided into four warring regions: Katanga under Tshombe's leadership, South Kasai led by Albert Kalonji, the western Congo under Mobutu's control, and the eastern regions under Gizenga.

When the world learned in February 1961 of Lumumba's death while in government custody, protests erupted against Mobutu's regime. The USSR formally recognized Gizenga's government, while the United States declared its support for Mobutu's government in Leopoldville

His arms roped behind him, ousted Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba is captured by troops of strongman Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko in 1960. Lumumba was killed in early 1961 under mysterious circumstances, exacerbating the violence that began shortly after independence and continued for years under Mobutu's dictatorship. (Bettmann/Corbis)

(Kinshasa). By the summer of 1961, with direct UN action and indirect U.S. action, Mobutu defeated Gizenga's rebel regime and ended the Kasai secession. Civilian control returned in July when an agreement was reached for the formation of a coalition government containing representatives from all three factions. Kasavubu resumed the presidency, with Cyrille Adoula as prime minister.

Tshombe, however, refused to join the coalition government, continuing to assert Katanga's independence. His recalcitrance encouraged the Lamumbists, and the coalition began to collapse. Gizenga left the government, joined forces with Tshombe, and by November 1962 directly threatened Adoula's rule. When the Soviets offered Adoula military aid, the United States urged the UN to act. On 28 December 1962 Belgian troops supplied and financed by the Americans led the UN operation to restore Katanga to the Congo. On 21 January 1963 Tshombe, realizing defeat was inevitable, surrendered, ending the Katanga secession.

Gizenga, however, continued to oppose the Kasavubu-Adoula regime with support from the communist bloc and by the summer of 1964 controlled more than half of the Congo's territory. Fearing that Kasavubu was not strong enough to withstand the Lamumbist advance, the United States stabilized the government by pressuring Kasavubu to accept Tshombe, a staunch anticommunist, as prime minister while persuading Belgium to provide military support for the Congolese Army, enabling it to defeat the Lumumbist insurgency.

Although 1965 began with a seemingly unified Congo, a power struggle developed between Kasavubu and Tshombe, both of whom wanted executive control. When they attempted to oust each other, civil war again threatened. But on 24 November 1965, Mobutu, allegedly with U.S. support, dismissed all the politicians and assumed power, thereby ending the Congo Civil War.

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See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Belgium; Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Decolonization; Lumumba, Patrice Emery; Mobutu Sese Seko

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Constantine II, King of Greece
(1940–)

King of Greece from 1964 to 1974. Born in Psychiko, Greece, on 2 June 1940, Constantine was the only son of King Paul and Queen Frederica of Brunswick-Hanover. Following the German invasion of Greece in World War II, Con-

stantine went into exile with his parents in South Africa. After returning to Greece in September 1946, he studied at the Greek Military Academy and won a gold medal in sailing at the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome.

On his father's death, Constantine II ascended the throne as King of Hellenes on 6 March 1964. In September 1964 he married Princess Anne Marie of Denmark. A crisis soon developed between the king and Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou over royal prerogatives, especially the king's leadership of the Greek armed forces. On 15 July 1965 Constantine II dismissed Papandreou. The king then appointed a succession of interim prime ministers before the May 1967 elections, which Papandreou's Center Union Party was sure to win. To forestall this, Constantine and his circle planned a military coup, but before the generals could orchestrate it, on 21 April 1967 another military group of younger officers led by Georgios Papadoupoulos executed Plan PROMETHEUS, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation to forestall a communist takeover. The colonels in this group seized power and established a military dictatorship in Greece.

On 13 December 1967, Constantine attempted an unsuccessful countercoup, but the majority of the army remained loyal to the new ruling military junta. The next day Constantine and his family fled abroad, first to Rome and then to London. At first the colonels claimed that Constantine was free to return to Greece, but the king refused to subordinate himself to the ruling regime, and on 1 June 1973 Papadoupoulos abolished the monarchy. A referendum held on 29 June 1973 supported the regime's decision. After the fall of the dictatorship in July 1974, the new democratic government, led by Konstantinos Karamanlis, held a referendum in December 1974 that rejected the monarchy by an overwhelming majority. In April 1994 the Greek government stripped Constantine of his citizenship and seized his properties. Constantine currently resides with his family in London.

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See also

Greece; Papadopoulos, Georgios; Papandreou, Andreas Georgios

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Constructive Engagement

Policy of President Ronald Reagan toward South Africa in the 1980s. As the name implies, the policy called for the United States to engage positively with the South African government to encourage it to end apartheid and the resulting destabilization of its neighbors. This approach was a marked shift from the more antagonistic stance taken by President Jimmy Carter that had

used sticks as well as carrots to influence South African policy. Some critics maintained that the policy of constructive engagement was far too friendly and lenient toward the South African government. Others asserted that the policy was aimed more at Cold War imperatives than anything else.

The main architect of the policy, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, argued that the United States should, for the moment, accept the reality that the South African government was in power and could not be dislodged. He believed that if it were approached in a hostile manner, it would become even more antagonistic to change. In 1981 Crocker linked Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to the independence of Namibia, and in 1984 he welcomed the decision to bring Indians and people of mixed race into South Africa's government. For a long time it seemed that the Namibian issue was deadlocked, and those fighting for liberation there blamed the policy of constructive engagement for the delay in the achievement of independence. In 1988 the tide turned, however, and an agreement was reached on a regional settlement in southwestern Africa that meant South African withdrawal from Namibia. Although Crocker was able to argue that his policy had been successful, by then the U.S. Congress had passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which many saw as a rejection of constructive engagement.

CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS

See also

Botha, Pieter Willem; Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act; Namibia; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; South Africa; South African Destabilization Campaign

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Contadora Group

Organization of Latin American states created in 1983 to advance nonviolent solutions to the conflicts in Central America. The initiative was launched by the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela who met on the island of Contadora (Panama) in January 1983.

The first Contadora peace proposal was presented in September 1983. The 21 Points of Contadora was a document with objectives that each Central American nation and the United States could endorse. It included such objectives as the reduction of military forces in the region, the elimination of foreign military advisors, and the end of support to insurgent groups operating against governments in Central America. Nicaragua accepted the document and agreed to initiate bilateral negotiations with neighboring

countries and the United States. However, Washington ultimately rejected the proposal.

By September 1984, after months of deliberations on the provisions of a peace proposal, the Contadora Group presented a revised draft approved by the five Central American nations. Its content was based on the same security provisions as the previous 21 Points document, together with issues of regional democratization and national reconciliation. However, Nicaragua's acceptance of the draft in its totality and without modifications raised suspicions among its neighbors and the United States. A counterdraft was submitted by El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica (the Tegucigalpa Group) the following month, omitting some of the security provisions of the September proposal.

During U.S. President Ronald Reagan's second term, the diplomatic efforts of the Contadora Group continued as its support increased in both Latin America and the United States. Conversely, American support for the Nicaraguan Contras and a more active military presence in Central America intensified. In 1985, the newly democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay created the Contadora Support Group. In September, the eight Latin American countries produced a new proposal that took into account some of the Tegucigalpa Group provisions and set a deadline for acceptance of forty-five days.

Nicaragua considered the new draft unacceptable because it did not mandate the end of U.S. aid to the Contras. In fact, the main claim of the Sandinistas was that any Contadora proposal should also be signed by the United States. By 20 November, the day of the deadline, no peace agreement had been reached, and the Contadora Group suspended negotiations for five months.

The inauguration of a democratic regime in Guatemala revived the Contadora process. In April 1986, the Contadora Group, the Contadora Support Group, and the governments of Central America met to discuss a new proposal. However, Nicaragua's refusal to sign it without a U.S. commitment to stop aiding the Contras deadlocked the process once more.

After three years of arduous diplomatic negotiations, the Contadora Group unofficially came to an end in June 1986. That same month, the U.S. Congress approved $100 million in aid to the Contras, despite the pressure of the Contadora Group.

Carina Solmirano

See also

Americas; Contras; El Salvador; Nicaragua; Sandinistas

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Containment Policy

Key U.S. foreign policy strategy during the Cold War. It is impossible to understand the origins and course of the Cold War without comprehending the policy, or doctrine, of containment. The concept can be traced back to February 1946 when George F. Kennan, deputy head of the U.S. mission in Moscow, sent an 8,000-word telegram to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. In the message—dubbed the "Long Telegram"—Kennan provided both an analysis of Soviet behavior and a diplomatic strategy to deal with Moscow. Arguing that "at the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is the instinctive Russian sense of insecurity," Kennan went on to suggest that Soviet leader Josef Stalin required a hostile international environment to legitimize his autocratic rule. Kennan also asserted that the Marxist-Leninist ideology upon which Stalin had built his regime contained elements of a messianism that envisioned the spread of Soviet influence and conflict with capitalism. The only way to stop the communist contagion, Kennan opined, was to strengthen Western institutions, apply appropriate counterforce when needed, and wait for the Soviet system to either implode under its own weight or sufficiently mellow so that it could be rationally bargained with. In short, the Soviets were to be "contained." Kennan, however, was not at all specific as to how containment was to be achieved.

Although U.S. policy toward the Soviets had already begun to take on elements of containment, Kennan's missive struck like a lightning bolt in Washington. Indeed, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal immediately took note of the telegram and used it as further justification for his own hard-line views of the Soviet Union. Kennan returned to Washington something of a hero to anti-Soviet hawks in the Harry Truman administration and became the first director of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff. Kennan served in that capacity during April 1947–December 1949.

In the meantime, the containment policy continued to gain traction. The first public invocation of the strategy came in March 1947. Concerned about the communist insurgency in the Greek Civil War and instability in neighboring Turkey, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress, ostensibly to request aid money for Greece and Turkey. Clearly echoing Kennan's Long Telegram, Truman stated in what became known as the Truman Doctrine that we must "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The United States had now taken on the responsibility of helping any nation fighting against communism. Next came the June 1947 announcement of the Marshall Plan (of which Kennan was the chief architect). The Marshall Plan aimed at fostering European reconstruction. But it was also a program clearly aimed at containing Soviet influence and keeping it out of Western Europe. In July 1947 Kennan anonymously wrote an article for the influential journal *Foreign Affairs*. Dubbed the "X" article for its supposed anonymity, it went even further than Kennan's earlier telegram. Using somewhat alarmist language, Kennan asserted that U.S. policy toward the Soviets must be a "patient but firm vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." The "X" article

President Harry S. Truman meets with his foreign policy advisors, 13 November 1947. Shown (*left to right*) are President Truman; Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett; George F. Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department; and Charles E. Bohlen, special assistant to Secretary Marshall. (Bettmann/Corbis)

gave full voice to containment, although Kennan would soon argue that policymakers had unnecessarily militarized the idea.

In November 1948 Truman approved a top secret memo from the National Security Council (NSC-20/4) that made the containment of Soviet influence a key precept of American foreign policy. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949 further entrenched containment. But up until 1950, containment had been largely limited to economic and institutional mechanisms. The Korean War would change that forever. In April 1950 the NSC had produced what is considered one of the seminal documents of the early Cold War. The report, known as NSC-68, was a call to arms. It presented in stark terms the low level of U.S. military capabilities while playing up Soviet motives and capabilities. The NSC claimed 1954 to be the "year of maximum danger," a time during which the USSR would possess sufficient nuclear and conventional military capacity to launch a catastrophic strike against America. The only way to avoid such a possibility was to embark on a massive rearmament program. Truman shelved the project because the political environment would not have tolerated such an expensive program.

After the Korean War began in June 1950, however, the political climate had indeed changed. In September Truman approved NSC-68, and the nation undertook a massive and permanent mobilization, allowing it to react to crises anywhere in the world. Containment was now fully militarized and would remain so (although defense budgets would wax and wane) until the end of the Cold War.

Containment not only produced a permanent and large military establishment—not to mention a constantly expanding nuclear arsenal—but also informed policymakers' thinking toward all type of foreign threats. Indeed, the domino theory, a corollary of sorts to containment, can be traced to the Truman years, although it became de rigueur under Dwight Eisenhower and his immediate successors. Concerned that communist insurgencies in Indochina would result in a domino effect in which one nation after the other would fall to communism, U.S. policymakers decided to hold the line in Vietnam. Ultimately, this thinking led to America's long and tortuous debacle in the Vietnam War. The domino theory was also applied in other areas where communist advances were feared, including Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South America.

During the 1970s, as détente between the United States and the USSR flourished and while the aftermath of Vietnam was still fresh in Americans' minds, containment appeared less attractive. During President Ronald Reagan's tenure in office (1981–1989), containment was virtually abandoned. In its place was the belief that the Soviet Union should be defeated rather than merely contained. Reagan attempted to do this by engaging the United States in a major military buildup, announcing his controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and signaling his intention to employ American nuclear might against any Soviet advance. The theory behind the approach was that the United States would force the Soviets into bankruptcy by forcing them to keep up with U.S. military advances. In the end, the Soviet Union did fall, although it is inaccurate and overly simplistic to suggest that Reagan's policies alone caused the collapse. The Soviet system had within it the seeds of its own destruction. Kennan made that clear fifty years ago. And since Truman's time, every president employed all or part of containment to hasten the demise of the USSR.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Domino Theory; Kennan, George Frost; Korean War; Marshall Plan; National Security Council Report NSC-68; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Strategic Defense Initiative; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War

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Contras

Paramilitary force trained and funded by the United States to challenge Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista regime. The 1979 overthrow of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle regime in Nicaragua resulted in a government committed to socialism and openly allied with Cuba. This government, headed by President Daniel Ortega and leaders of the Sandinista Liberation Front, promised radical social and political reforms. Fearing that leftist and communist regimes would spread revolution across Central America, U.S. President Ronald Reagan created an anti-Sandinista force, known as the Contras. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under authority granted to it by the National Security Decision Directive 17 of 23 November 1981, coordinated the establishment of a force of local combatants capable of carrying out attacks in Nicaragua.

The Contra program had three active fronts. Mercenaries, many of whom were displaced soldiers and officers from the national guard of the deposed Somoza dictatorship, trained in Honduras. Their units, organized as the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN, Nicaraguan Democratic Force), launched raids into northern Nicaragua beginning in August 1981. Also, Miskito Indians were encouraged to wage their own resistance movement along Nicaragua's Caribbean coast. Inside neighboring Costa Rica, a more heterogeneous collection of opposition groups, ranging from ex-Somoza followers to disaffected Sandinistas, formed the Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE, Democratic Revolutionary Alliance) in 1982 and put pressure on the new Nicaraguan government from the South.

The Contras helped drain the military resources of the Sandinista government. By 1984, Contra forces numbered more than 10,000 men. Their leaders promised to overthrow the Sandinista government with help from the United States.

The Contras soon became the target of international protest. Comparing their operations to earlier U.S. interventions in Guatemala and Cuba, the Sandinista government and sympathetic supporters in Canada and Europe challenged the U.S. effort, both in the United Nations (UN) and the World Court. In 1986, the International Court of Justice ruled against the United States and urged it to cease all support. U.S. officials countered that the court had no jurisdiction in the matter, and the U.S. government ignored the verdict.

In the United States, revelations of human rights abuses mobilized opposition to the Contras in Congress. Congress first banned, under the December

1982 Boland Amendment, any funding from the CIA or the Department of Defense for the Contras, and in October 1984 Congress voted to forbid support from any government agency for the Contras. Relying on intermediaries, such as Argentine military officers, to provide training and matériel, the Reagan administration sustained the program for five more years.

To circumvent the congressional restrictions, the Reagan administration developed alternative funding sources, including an exchange of military equipment designated for use by the Israeli Army for cash from Iran. Revenue generated by inflating the price of missiles, spare parts, and other matériel provided profits that staff members in the U.S. National Security Agency diverted to the Contra forces. In 1986, Lebanese press sources revealed this scheme. This forced the Reagan administration to form a special commission, led by ex-Senator John Tower, to investigate and report on the affair in December 1986. Congress conducted its own investigation. The Iran-Contra Hearings concluded in March 1988 with indictments of Oliver North and John Poindexter, who had helped organize the prohibited support of the Contras from their positions within the government.

Despite efforts of Central American leaders to broker a regional peace and despite the Contras' lack of support in Nicaragua, the program remained a core component of U.S. policy in Central America throughout much of the 1980s. The Sandinistas' electoral defeat in 1990 ended their control of the Nicaraguan government. With the raison d'être of the Contras gone, UN peacekeeping forces supervised the disarmament of the Contras.

Daniel Lewis

See also

Costa Rica; El Salvador; Nicaragua; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Sandinistas; Somoza García, Anastasio

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Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
(1990)

Agreement on conventional force reductions in Europe. The failure of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks to achieve agreement after sixteen years prompted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact to agree to initiate new negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in January 1989. The CFE talks began in Vienna on 9 March 1989, with members of both alliances in attendance.

The parameters of the CFE negotiations differed significantly from those of the MBFR. The area of geographic coverage was expanded from Central Europe to the region stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU),

President George H. W. Bush joins other world leaders for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the Elysée Palace, Paris, France, for the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty on 19 November 2000. (George Bush Presidential Library)

which implied greater symmetry in force reductions than was the case in the MBFR, with its focus on East and West Germany. Finally, the CFE talks would deal with reductions in equipment rather than personnel, with the goal of parity between the two sides requiring disproportionately deeper cuts in the more numerous Warsaw Pact forces. By the end of May 1989, both sides agreed on the categories of weapons to be cut. The categories included tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and attack airplanes and helicopters. Most subsequent sessions dealt with technical issues on the specific weapons to be included in each category, how different weapons in each category would be equated, and compliance verification.

While the CFE talks were under way, the political environment in Europe changed dramatically with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in late 1989, which could have ended the negotiations. Unwilling to sacrifice the progress made and recognizing that an agreement could help stabilize the political situation, however, both sides resolved to continue the talks and worked through 1990 to resolve the remaining technical issues. The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990.

The agreement restricted each side to a total of 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 land-based attack aircraft, and 2,000 land-based attack helicopters in the ATTU region. Specific

caps on each category were established for the United States and the Soviet Union within these limits. Personnel were not limited, but the treaty called for future discussions on the matter. Withdrawal of equipment in excess of the limits would be accomplished in stages over thirty-six months beginning in November 1995, with mandatory on-site inspections. A Joint Consultative Group was established to resolve any disputes that might arise.

The CFE Treaty resulted in significant force reductions in the ATTU area. For example, the number of tanks was reduced by 40 percent for the Warsaw Pact and by 20 percent for NATO. With the CFE Treaty completed, a new round of talks on personnel limits was begun. These negotiations resulted in the CFE-1A Treaty, signed on 10 July 1992 in Helsinki, that placed ceilings on the number of troops allowed in the ATTU region for each of the twenty-nine signatories. Together, the two treaties provided for a significant reduction in armed forces in Europe and helped stabilize the continent's transition to a post–Cold War world. An updated agreement, the Adapted CFE Treaty, was signed on 19 November 1999 and abandoned alliance-based limits in favor of national ceilings.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Warsaw Pact

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Costa Rica

Spanish-speaking Central American nation covering 19,730 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of Maryland. Costa Rica, with a 1945 population of some 750,000 people, is bordered by Nicaragua to the north, Panama to the south, the Caribbean Sea to the east, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. The country's population is mostly of mestizo descent, with several

ethnic minorities, including Nicaraguans and English-speaking descendants of Jamaican immigrants.

A Spanish colony until 1 September 1821, Costa Rica became part of the Mexican Empire. In July 1823, the United States of Central America (USCA) was founded, which included Costa Rica. When Honduras left the USCA in 1838, leading to the unraveling of the union, Costa Rica became a stand-alone entity. During 1880–1940 Costa Rica slowly evolved into a fledgling democracy.

In 1940 Costa Ricans elected Dr. Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia as president, and he began to institute land and economic reforms. Although initially successful, Calderon's popularity declined over the next eight years. To bolster his support, he entered into an alliance with the Costa Rican Communist Party and the conservative Costa Rican Catholic Church.

Despite this unusual coalition, Calderon's United Social Christian Party lost the presidential election of 1948. But Calderon refused to step down. This precipitated a coup after which José Figueres Ferrer became provisional president in May 1948. In short order, Figueres banned the Communist Party as part of a purge against Calderon's supporters and undertook extensive social and political reforms. Figueres gave women the vote, granted full citizenship to African Caribbeans, abolished the armed forces, established a presidential term limit, and nationalized banks and insurance companies. He also founded the Partido de Liberacion Nacional (PLN, National Liberation Party). His socialist leanings, however, made relations with the United States very touchy.

Figueres handed over power to the rightful winner of the 1948 election, Otilio Ulate, at the end of 1949 but then won the presidency in his own right in 1953. Figueres was defeated for reelection in 1958 but regained the presidency in 1970.

From the 1950s through the 1970s, Figueres and other Costa Rican presidents expanded the role of the government, making Costa Rica a model welfare state for Latin America. However, a deep recession during the late 1970s and early 1980s strained Costa Rica's ability to provide expanded state services. During the late 1970s neighboring Nicaragua was embroiled in a civil war that drew the attention of the United States. Costa Rica thus found itself forced to choose between the anti-Anastasio Somoza forces, which it had supported for many years, and the Contras, whom the Americans supported.

In 1982, Luis Alberto Monge Álvarez was elected president. Under increasing pressure from the United States, Monge agreed to let the Americans build airstrips in northern Costa Rica and to allow the Contras to receive training in Costa Rica. Monge lost a reelection bid in 1986, in part because of growing fear among Costa Ricans that U.S. policy would drag the country into the Nicaraguan Civil War.

By 1987, those fears came to pass. The civil war in Nicaragua spilled over into Costa Rica as both the Sandinistas and the Contras set up bases there. Going against American wishes, President Óscar Arias Sánchez embarked on a peace process, establishing the Central American Peace Plan that ended

conflicts in both Nicaragua and El Salvadora. Sanchez was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Over the last fifteen years, Costa Rica has enjoyed a relatively stable political climate and encouraging economic growth.

David H. Richards

See also

Americas; Contras; Figueres Ferrer, José; Nicaragua; Sandinistas

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Council for Economic Mutual Assistance

See Comecon

Council of Europe

Intergovernmental organization established to promote European unity, human rights, democracy, standardized legal practices, and social progress. The Council of Europe was implemented on 5 May 1949 by the Treaty of London and signed by ten states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The council chose Strasbourg, France, as its headquarters. It was formed chiefly to act as an additional buttress against communist encroachment in Western Europe by fostering mutual interdependence. The Council of Europe, along with other Cold War organizations, was to provide a united front against internal communist subversion as well as external pressure from the Soviet Union during a time of heightening Cold War tensions. By 2004 the council contained forty-five member nations, including twenty-one from Central and Eastern Europe. The Vatican, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Japan retain observer status. Belarus became a candidate member in 1993.

On 4 November 1950 the Council of Europe initiated the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the first international guarantee of human rights. On 18 September 1959 the council established the European Court of Human Rights to guarantee the observance of the council's human rights convention. In January 1957, the council organized the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities that has since developed into the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of

Europe, which has attempted to guarantee the rights of territorial ethnic and linguistic minorities in Europe. In October 1961, the council's newly created European Social Charter began serving as the economic and social counterpart to the human rights convention. In November 1987 the council's efforts to protect human rights were expanded by the implementation of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

As the communist bloc began to disintegrate in 1989, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly began reaching out to establish links with the parliaments of countries in Central and Eastern Europe that were moving toward democracy. In June 1990 Hungary was the first former Soviet bloc country to be admitted to the Council of Europe, followed by Poland in November 1991.

Bernard Cook

See also

Europe, Eastern; Europe, Western; Human Rights

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Council on Foreign Relations
(1919–)

Influential U.S. think tank, founded at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference after World War I. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a New York group of foreign policy experts, was originally the American Institute of International Affairs, one of two parallel organizations, the other being the London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs, founded by the British and American experts gathered at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. In 1921 it merged with and took the name of the Council on Foreign Relations, a foreign policy discussion group established by New York bankers and lawyers in 1918. Members included an elite group of government officials, prominent businessmen, media representatives, and academics.

The CFR's series of meetings featuring prominent American and foreign speakers, discussion groups, conferences, and publications, including its influential journal *Foreign Affairs*, established in 1922, soon made the council the leading foreign policy think tank in the United States. Although supposedly committed to no one viewpoint, between the world wars it functioned

as a nexus for those Americans who believed that their country should take a greater and more assertive role in world affairs.

Before U.S. intervention in World War II, several CFR officials were heavily involved in leading pro-Allied and interventionist groups, working closely with the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even before Pearl Harbor, in collaboration with the State Department the CFR launched a major project, the War-Peace Studies, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, to begin planning for the postwar world, working on the assumption that the United States would take a far more activist international role than in the pre–World War II years.

From 1945 onward the CFR set up numerous study and discussion groups to craft recommendations on U.S. policy regarding international issues, groups whose members included leading government officials such as George F. Kennan, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allen W. Dulles, Dean Acheson, and John J. McCloy. Topics covered included aid to Europe, American-Russian relations, Europe's economic and political reconstruction, economic aspects of American foreign policy, and the United Nations (UN). These groups, meeting in strict confidentiality, helped to hammer out an elite consensus on Cold War foreign policy, developing the initiatives that would bear fruit in the Marshall Plan, the regeneration of Germany, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), American rearmament, and U.S. support for European economic union.

Functioning like a comfortable club, the CFR was a well-connected and unobtrusively elitist organization that provided a springboard for the careers of such academic foreign policy operatives as future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. During the 1950s a CFR study group produced Kissinger's best-selling study of nuclear strategy. In the next decade a major study group on China chaired by Dulles recommended that the United States reopen relations with the communist mainland.

During the 1960s, the CFR began to attract extensive public attention. Like other American institutions, it was fiercely divided over the Vietnam War. In 1972 the decision to appoint a major architect of U.S. policies toward Vietnam, former undersecretary of state for East Asia William P. Bundy, as editor of *Foreign Affairs* provoked fierce though ultimately ineffective protests from CFR members critical of his stance on Vietnam.

Finding the CFR somewhat stuffy, in 1970 younger foreign affairs writers and intellectuals established the rival journal *Foreign Policy*. The CFR, meanwhile, launched initiatives to broaden its membership to include minorities, women, and other underrepresented sectors of the American population who were increasingly engaged in international policymaking. Increasingly facing competition from new rival think tanks of both rightists and leftifts, such as the Institute for Policy Studies, the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the Heritage Foundation, in the early 1970s the CFR opened a Washington office to facilitate communication with government officials.

Throughout the Cold War and beyond, the CFR continued as perhaps the most prestigious American foreign policy think tank. Ironically, it was also a favorite target of fierce criticism from populist extremists and conspiracy theorists on both the Right and the Left, who regarded it as the home of an undemocratic elite committed to promoting the interests of international capitalism and global world government.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Bundy, William Putnam; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennan, George Frost; Kissinger, Henry; Marshall Plan; McCloy, John Jay; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Cousins, Norman
(1915–1990)

Editor, writer, and activist. Born in Union Hill, New Jersey, on 24 June 1915, Norman Cousins graduated from Columbia University Teachers College in 1933. After a period of writing for numerous publications, in 1940 he became editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature* and its editor-in-chief two years later. This publication provided both a base and a forum for his activism. Cousins remained editor of the *Saturday Review* until 1977, with a stint at *World* magazine earlier in the 1970s.

As an activist Cousins had many causes, but much of his work stemmed from his horror at the prospect of nuclear war. He saw disarmament and world government as two means of avoiding that catastrophe. This worldview informed both his writing and his activities, which included founding both the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and the Dartmouth Conference. He also served as president of United World Federalists. Cousins played a small but significant role in making possible the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by carrying a message from President John F. Kennedy to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1963.

After becoming ill in Moscow in 1964, Cousins healed himself with laugh therapy. His experience resulted in his best-selling book *Anatomy of an*

Illness: As Perceived by the Patient and an appointment to the faculty of UCLA's School of Medicine. He continued to write and remained associated with the Dartmouth Conference until his death in Los Angeles on 30 November 1990.

James Voorhees

See also

Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Partial Test Ban Treaty

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Couve de Murville, Jacques Maurice

(1907–1999)

French diplomat, foreign minister (1958–1968), and premier (1968–1969). Born in Reims on 24 January 1907 to a prominent Protestant family, Jacques Maurice Couve de Murville studied literature and law in Paris and earned a diploma from the École des Sciences Politiques before joining the French civil service in 1932. After rising to a high position within the civil service, in 1943 during World War II he broke with the collaborationist Vichy government, fled to Algiers, and became a leader of the Free French movement and a close associate of General Charles de Gaulle.

In 1944 Couve de Murville began his diplomatic career by serving as the French representative to the Allied Consultative Council for Italy. In 1945 he entered the Foreign Ministry and during the Fourth Republic served as secretary-general for political affairs and ambassador to Egypt, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).

In 1958, President de Gaulle chose Couve de Murville to be the first foreign minister of the newly established Fifth Republic, a post he occupied until 1968. As a faithful adherent of de Gaulle's enlarged vision of France's role in the world, Couve de Murville took the lead on such major initiatives as decolonization, the development of the European Community, diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and France's 1966 withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) integrated military command. Couve de Murville shared de Gaulle's concept of a France capable of operating independently of the two Cold War blocs, a stance that often led to friction with Washington.

In May 1968, following the student riots that shook the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle transferred Couve de Murville from the Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Economics and Finance. In July 1968, Couve de Murville was named premier, a post he held until June 1969 when Georges Pompidou was elected president. Couve de Murville was subsequently elected to the Senate in 1973, where he served until 1995. He died in Paris on 24 December 1999.

John Van Oudenaren

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; European Economic Community; France; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pompidou, Georges

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Craxi, Benedetto
(1934–2000)

Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) from 1976 to 1993 and premier of Italy during 1983–1987. Born in Milan on 14 February 1934, Benedetto "Bettino" Craxi took part in socialist youth organizations, worked as a journalist, and in 1957 was elected to the Central Committee of the PSI. He soon became a loyal follower of Pietro Nenni's faction, known as the Autonomists.

Craxi was appointed secretary of the PSI in July 1976 after the PSI had reached the nadir of its fortunes in national elections. He rescued the party from the political doldrums and succeeded in turning a shaky political force into one that was coherent, united, and firmly oriented toward the West. Craxi failed, however, in his more ambitious design of positioning the PSI as the main party of the Italian Left.

In 1983 Craxi became the first Socialist Party premier in Italian history and presided over one of the Italian republic's longest-lasting governments. As premier, he tried to implement modernization plans that were aimed primarily at overcoming Italy's entrenched economic and political problems of the 1970s. This implied stabilization of the country's domestic politics, based on renewed cooperation between the Christian Democratic (DC) Party and a stronger PSI. Craxi's plans also included a high-profile foreign policy designed to bolster Italy's status among the major Western powers. Craxi was thus responsible for some truly remarkable foreign policy choices, including his decision to allow deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in Italy and the reintroduction of majority voting in the European Council in 1985, which set up an intergovernmental conference tasked to draft the European Union Treaty. In spite of his strong pro-Western orientation, Craxi is also remembered for his spirited clash with the U.S. government over the handling of the terrorist hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in October 1985, which resulted in the murder of an American passenger.

Benedetto "Bettino" Craxi, leader of the Italian Socialist Party and premier of Italy. (Gianni Giansanti/Sygma/Corbis)

When the PSI became involved in a series of scandals that rocked Italian politics in the early 1990s, Craxi was singled out and became the main subject of popular

resentment and judicial investigations. Embittered by what he perceived as unfair persecution, he returned to private life at his home in Hammamet, Tunisia, where he died on 19 January 2000.

Leopoldo Nuti

See also

Berlinguer, Enrico; European Union; Italy; Missiles, Cruise; Nenni, Pietro; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Cruise Missiles

See Missiles, Cruise

Csermanek, János

See Kádár, János

Cuba

Caribbean island nation comprising 42,803 square miles, about the size of the state of Ohio. The largest and westernmost island of the West Indies chain, Cuba is in the Caribbean Sea, west of Hispaniola and 90 miles south of Key West, Florida. It had a 1945 population of approximately 5.68 million people.

By the early sixteenth century, Spanish conquistadors and traders had already recognized Havana as an ideal port for trade with Spain. Beginning in the early 1800s, sugarcane production boomed, ensuring a huge influx of black slaves and the institution of a plantation economy. During the 1860s–1870s, a growing independence movement brought armed revolt against Spanish rule. Slavery was outlawed in 1886, and in 1895 Cuban nationalist and poet José Martí led the final struggle against the Spanish, which was fully realized as a consequence of U.S. involvement in the 1898 Spanish-American War.

The Spanish-Cuban-American War marked a watershed in Cuban-American relations, as it greatly enhanced American influence on the island. However, the event was controversial because Cuban independence fighters

saw the island's newfound freedom as an outcome of their thirty-year struggle against Spain, whereas many Americans saw Cuban independence as an American victory. The result was an uneasy compromise by which Cuba became an independent republic with limitations to its sovereignty embodied in the 1901 Platt Amendment, an appendix to the Cuban constitution authorizing U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs at its own discretion. Cuba became a politically independent state on 20 May 1902.

The duality of opinions as to Cuban sovereignty was at the heart of the crisis that brought down the Cuban republic. For the first half of the twentieth century, the United States set the standards to which the Cuban population aspired. In this context, the crisis of the Cuban economic model of dependence on the sugar industry was accompanied by a sympathetic attitude in Washington toward anticommunist dictators.

General Fulgencio Batista's military coup on 10 March 1952 occurred only two months before an election in which nationalist forces were within reach of the presidency. In the context of McCarthyism in America, the destruction of the Cuban democracy by Batista's rightist junta did not generate significant opposition in Washington. Indeed, the United States backed Batista as an ally in the Cold War. For its part, the Cuban authoritarian Right manipulated the West by presenting itself as a bulwark against communism. In practice, the Batista government was actually undermining democracy with its repressive policies. And all along, Batista's regime did little to improve living standards for poor Cubans, while the middle class and elites enjoyed a close and lucrative relationship with American businesses.

Followers of Fidel Castro posing on a monument in Matanzas, Cuba, 1959. The sculptures are of the leader of the Cuban independence movement José Martí and a female allegorical figure of liberty brandishing broken chains. (Library of Congress)

A potent popular insurrection against Batista's regime had grown in the eastern and central parts of Cuba by 1958. The leaders of the revolution, Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, questioned Cuban dependence on the United States as well as market economy principles. They perceived their movement as part of a developing-world rebellion against the West and as a natural ally of the communist bloc.

The United States was not prepared to deal with the charismatic and doctrinaire Castro. After his takeover, the United States underestimated the profound grievances provoked by American support for the Batista regime. Some of Castro's early measures such as land reform, the prosecution of Batista's cronies (with no guarantee of due process), and the nationalization of industries were overwhelmingly popular, but at the same time they met stiff U.S. resistance.

Against this backdrop, Castro approached the Soviet Union for support, and in February 1960 a Soviet delegation led by Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba and signed a trade agreement with Castro's government.

After Castro's takeover, the United States underestimated the profound grievances provoked by American support for the Batista regime.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at the United Nations in New York, 1960. (Library of Congress)

The Soviets then began to replace the United States as Cuba's main trade and political partner. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev soon promised Cuba new machinery, oil, consumer goods, and a market for Cuban products now subject to American sanctions.

In April 1961, U.S.-Cuban relations collapsed completely, thanks to the abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The assault was condemned to failure, given Castro's popularity and the lack of U.S. air support for the rebel force. The botched attack only encouraged closer relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. Khrushchev subsequently proposed installing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba to ensure a better bargaining position with the United States and as a means of offering protection to Cuba. Castro was elated. Khrushchev naively assumed that the missiles could be installed without U.S. detection. U.S. intelligence quickly discovered the activity, however, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous confrontation between the two superpowers of the Cold War. President John F. Kennedy declared a naval quarantine against the island in October 1962. For nearly two weeks the world stood at the edge of a nuclear abyss. In the end, Kennedy and Khrushchev worked out an agreement in which the Soviets withdrew the missiles in return for U.S. promises not to invade Cuba and to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

The end of Kennedy's quarantine did not conclude the strife between Cuba and the United States, however. In addition to an embargo that continues to this day, the United States launched additional covert operations against Castro's government. The most important one, Operation MONGOOSE, included fourteen CIA attempts to assassinate Castro. American hostility was reinforced by the Cuban revolution's transformation from a nationalist rebellion against authoritarianism to a totalitarian state aligned with the Soviet Union, with serious shortcomings in civil and political liberties.

The solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis also created serious strains between Havana and Moscow. Cuba's foreign policy was made in Havana, and therefore Castro refused to accept Moscow's or Beijing's directives. In 1968, he cracked down on a group of Cuban communists, accusing them of working with Soviet agents in Havana. In the end, he used the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia against the Prague Spring to broker a compromise by which Cuba preserved its autonomy but promised not to criticize the USSR publicly. Cuba thus became a Comecon member and received significant additional economic aid from the communist bloc.

In Latin America, the Cuban government actively supported revolutionary movements with leftist or nationalist agendas, especially those that challenged American hegemony in the region. But the 1960s witnessed successive failed Cuban attempts to export revolution to other countries. Gue-

vara's 1967 murder in Bolivia concluded a series of subversive projects encouraged by Havana. Cuban revolutionary attempts were part of Cubans' core revolutionary beliefs and also a response to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Havana by all the Latin American countries except Mexico.

From the 1970s to 1990, as part of the Cold War conflict, Cuba played a major role in the international context. A high point of Castro's foreign policy came at the 1979 Sixth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana. Cuba became a major conduit of alliance between the developing world and the communist bloc. Havana's diplomatic success and military involvement were accompanied by a massive civilian involvement in aid programs to African, Latin American, and Asian countries in the areas of health and education.

Cuba adopted a foreign policy suited to a medium-sized power. Castro sent 40,000 troops to Angola to support the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government in its struggle against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces backed by South Africa and the United States. Cuba also dispatched troops to aid the pro-Soviet government of Ethiopia. In all, Cuba deployed more than 300,000 troops or military advisors to Angola, Ethiopia, the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Algeria, Mozambique, Syria, and South Yemen. The fight in southern Africa was ended through a skillfully designed tripartite agreement signed by Cuba, Angola, and South Africa and mediated by President Ronald Reagan's administration that led to the independence of Namibia.

Paradoxically, due in part to these Cold War commitments, Cuba missed its best chance to solve its conflict with the United States. During 1970–1980 the Americans sought serious negotiations with Cuba. This began under Richard Nixon's presidency and saw the most promise during Jimmy Carter's presidency (1977–1981). Carter demonstrated that he was serious in his desire to improve relations among the nations of the hemisphere and promote human rights. In 1977, Carter went so far as so say that the United States did not consider a Cuban retreat from Angola a precondition for beginning negotiations. Castro, however, insisted on continuing what he defined as "revolutionary solidarity" and "proletarian internationalism."

The Cuban government was interested in negotiations with the Americans but insisted on a radical leftist solution to problems. Castro took significant steps in releasing political prisoners and allowing visits to the island by Cuban exiles as goodwill gestures to the United States. In the international arena, Cuba informed the Americans about the Katanga rebellion in Zaire. Nevertheless, Cuba gave priority to its relations with other revolutionary movements, especially in Africa. In 1977, Castro sent 17,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia to support dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in his territorial conflict with Somalia. This development, despite the progress in several bilateral issues, represented a major blow to the prospect of improved Cuban-U.S. relations, as did Castro's support for the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980s.

A new development came in 1976 when Ricardo Boffill, Elizardo Sanchez, and Gustavo Arcos founded the first human rights group in Cuba since

1959. A new generation of opposition groups based on strategies of civil disobedience slowly emerged, gaining strength in the 1990s. Equally, during the 1970s Cuban civil society began to emerge from totalitarian ostracism that had reduced its religious communities to a minimum. This evolution continued, and at the end of the 1980s the religious groups were growing at a fast pace.

The collapse of the communist bloc beginning in 1989 was a major catastrophe for Castro's government, as Cuba lost its major benefactors. At the same time, the international community, particularly Latin America and the former communist countries, adopted general norms of democratic governance opposed to the goals and behavior of the Cuban leadership. Without Soviet backing, Cuba adjusted its economy and foreign policy to survive in a world that was no longer safe for revolution. In 1988 Castro withdrew Cuban troops from Angola and reduced the Cuban military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Cuba's gross domestic product fell by almost one-third between 1989 and 1993. The collapse of the Cuban economy was particularly hard on imports, which fell from 8.6 billion pesos in 1989 to about 2 billion pesos in 1993. In response to the economic collapse, Castro permitted limited private enterprise, allowed Cubans to have foreign currencies, and pushed for foreign investment, particularly in tourism. His reforms, however, did little to stop the economic hemorrhaging. In addition, Cuban troops were withdrawn from wherever they were posted. More than fifteen years after the Cold War wound down, Castro remains one of the last leaders of the old-style communist order.

Arturo Lopez-Levy

See also

Americas; Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio; Bay of Pigs; Castro, Fidel; Comecon; Cuba and Africa; Cuban Missile Crisis; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Human Rights; McCarthyism; Non-Aligned Movement

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Cuba and Africa

After Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, Cuba began to identify with radical African regimes, especially those in Egypt, Ghana, and Guinea in West

Africa. Africans began to go to Cuba to study and for military training. Until the mid-1960s, however, Cuba's interest in Africa was relatively minor. It was only in 1964 that Cuba's attention began to shift from Latin America to Africa, which was now seen as the continent most ripe for revolution. Castro's close associate Ernesto "Che" Guevara began a three-month visit to eight African countries at the end of 1964, and in Congo Brazzaville he met with leaders of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Soon afterward, the first Cubans joined the MPLA guerrillas fighting the Portuguese, and a Cuban force fought in eastern Zaire in support of rebels opposing the government of Moise Tshombe, who was supported by the United States. To the Cubans, Zaire seemed the most ripe for revolution and was significant because of its geographical position at the center of the continent. But Cuba began to lose men in Zaire, and by the end of 1966 the small Cuban force had been withdrawn.

For nearly ten years the only Cuban military presence was in Guinea Bissau in West Africa, where from 1965 the Cubans worked closely with the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in its struggle against the Portuguese. Cuba sent doctors, nurses, and other volunteers to half a dozen other African countries and gave financial assistance, most notably to Tanzania, in the interests of solidarity with the developing world and the spreading of anti-Western revolution.

It was the collapse of Portuguese rule in Africa in 1974 that led to the most important Cuban intervention on the continent. As the United States and South Africa intervened in Angola on the side of the opponents of the MPLA in late 1975, Castro responded when the MPLA asked for military assistance and sent thousands of Cuban troops whose intervention saved the MPLA from defeat. In sending troops, the Cuban leader did not act on Soviet orders but rather acted independently, although the Soviet Union supported his move. The Cuban forces halted the South African advance on Luanda in November 1975 and then remained in the country after the MPLA had taken power. This dramatic and successful Cuban intervention shocked the United States, which for a time feared that Cuba might also intervene in the guerrilla war then being fought in Rhodesia. The Cuban intervention in Angola therefore pushed the Americans into trying to resolve other African conflicts to head off further Cuban interventions.

The next major Cuban military intervention was not, however, in southern Africa but far to the northeast, in Ethiopia, where the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, which proclaimed itself Marxist and revolutionary, was being threatened by neighboring Somalia, which was backed by the United States. This time the Cubans did coordinate their actions with the Soviet Union. In 1978 some 16,000 Cuban combat troops helped the Ethiopians beat back the invading Somali army in the Ogaden and consolidated Mengistu's hold on power. Although Cuban forces in Ethiopia then withdrew, those stationed in Angola remained and were augmented by an additional 15,000 men in 1987, bringing the total to more than 50,000. From 1981, President Ronald Reagan maintained as a major goal the total withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, although ironically some of the Cuban forces were deployed to

protect American oil interests in the Cabinda enclave. Reagan's assistant secretary for African affairs, Chester Crocker, advocated linking a Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a South African withdrawal from Namibia. For many years this seemed impossible to achieve, in part because Angola and Cuba refused to link the two issues and insisted that the Cuban presence in Angola was a matter solely for the two countries.

It was when Castro escalated the Cuban presence in Angola in late 1987, in response to a South African incursion, that Cuban forces, fighting alongside their Angolan allies, prevented the South African army from capturing Cuito Cuanavale and at the same time moved south, close to the Namibian border. By building new airfields there, the Cubans ensured that the South Africans lost air superiority in the border area. This military pressure helped force the South Africans to the negotiating table, and in December 1988, after lengthy negotiations, the South Africans agreed to withdraw from Namibia in return for the withdrawal of all Cuban forces from Angola. This agreement was seen as a major victory for the United States in the waning years of the Cold War.

Cuba then helped supervise the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia by serving on a joint commission along with the United States and the Soviet Union. A United Nations mission monitored the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and the last contingent left Africa in 1991. After that, Cuba's role on the continent was chiefly diplomatic, although it continued to supply medical and other personnel to a number of African countries.

Christopher Saunders

See also

Castro, Fidel; Cuba

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Cuban Missile Crisis
(October 1962)

This international crisis was the closest that the two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, came to full-scale nuclear war. In 1958 an indigenous revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro seized power from Fulgencio Batista, a U.S. client who since 1933 had been dictator of the Caribbean island of Cuba, less than a hundred miles from the American coast. Although Castro initially declared that he was not a communist, in the spring of 1959 he covertly sought Soviet aid and military protection. American economic pressure and boycotts quickly gave him an excuse to move openly into the Soviet camp. In response, the Central Intelligence

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

Agency (CIA) planned to assist Cuban exiles to attack the island and overthrow Castro. Initiated under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and inherited by his successor John F. Kennedy, the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion attempt proved a humiliating fiasco for the United States. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara continued to develop plans for a second invasion, and their advisors also devised various ingenious and often far-fetched schemes to overthrow or assassinate Castro, who not unnaturally sought further Soviet aid.

In mid-1961, as the concurrent Berlin Crisis intensified and culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall, military hard-liners in the Kremlin, frustrated for several years, succeeded in implementing a 34 percent increase in spending on conventional forces. Both the Bay of Pigs and Kennedy's bellicose inauguration rhetoric that his country would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty," may have energized them. Despite claims of a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States, in practice the strategic missile imbalance greatly favored the United States, which had at least eight times as many nuclear warheads as its rival. Even American leaders were unaware of just how lopsidedly the nuclear situation favored them, believing the ratio to be only about three to one. The recent U.S. deployment of fifteen intermediate-range missiles in Turkey, directly threatening Soviet territory, further angered Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Communist Party's general secretary, making him eager to redress the

balance. It seems that he also hoped to pressure the United States into making concessions on Berlin while he rebutted communist Chinese charges that the Soviets were only paper tigers who were unwilling to take concrete action to advance the cause of international revolution. In addition, Khrushchev apparently felt a romantic sense of solidarity with the new Cuban state, which reassured him and other old communists that their cause still possessed international vitality.

Early in 1962, Khrushchev offered Soviet nuclear missiles, under the control of Soviet technicians and troops, to Castro, who accepted and oversaw their secret installation. Khrushchev apparently believed that these would deter American plans to invade Cuba. Rather optimistically, he calculated that Kennedy and his advisors would find the prospect of nuclear war over the Cuban missiles so horrifying that, despite their chagrin, once the missiles were in place they would accept their presence in Cuba.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco followed by Khrushchev's June 1961 summit meeting with Kennedy at Vienna apparently convinced the Soviet leader that Kennedy was weak and would be easily intimidated. So confident was

Aerial view of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile launch site number two, Cuba, 1 November 1962. (U.S. Air Force)

Executive Committee of the National Security Council meeting on 29 October 1962. Clockwise from President John F. Kennedy: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Deputy USIA Director Donald Wilson, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson (*hidden*), Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William C. Foster, CIA Director John McCone (*hidden*), Undersecretary of State George Ball, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. White House, Cabinet Room. (John F. Kennedy Library)

Khrushchev that when Kennedy administration officials warned in July and August 1962 that the United States would respond strongly should the Soviets deploy nuclear or other significant weaponry in Cuba, he implicitly denied any intention of doing so. Admittedly, by this time the missiles had already been secretly dispatched, and their installation was at least a partial fait accompli. At this stage of his career, moreover, Khrushchev's behavior tended to be somewhat erratic. In any case, he miscalculated. Instead of treating the Cuban missiles as deterrent weapons, the Kennedy administration regarded them as evidence of Soviet aggressiveness and refused to accept their presence.

In October 1962, U-2 reconnaissance planes provided Kennedy with photographic evidence that Soviet officials had installed intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Cuba. When the president learned on 16 October 1962 of the presence of the missiles, he summoned a secret Executive Committee of eighteen top advisors, among them chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor, CIA Director John McCone, Secretary of State Dean

Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, and the president's brother and closest advisor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, to decide on the American response. President Kennedy also included senior members of the broader foreign policy establishment, including former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Whatever the logical justification for Khrushchev's behavior, politically it would have been almost impossible for any American president to accept the situation. The American military calculated that the missiles would increase Soviet nuclear striking force against the continental United States by 50 percent. Since U.S. officials underestimated their numbers, in reality they would have doubled or even tripled Soviet striking capabilities, reducing the existing American numerical advantage to a ratio of merely two or three to one. Kennedy, however, viewed the missiles less as a genuine military threat than as a test of his credibility and leadership. Taylor, speaking for the U.S. military, initially favored launching air strikes to destroy the missile installations, a course of action that would almost certainly have killed substantial numbers of Soviet troops, was unlikely to eliminate all the missiles, and might well have provoked full-scale nuclear war. So might another option, that of invasion by U.S. ground forces. Discussions continued for several days. Eventually, on 22 October, Kennedy publicly announced the presence of the missiles in Cuba, demanded that the Soviet Union remove them, and announced the imposition of a naval blockade around the island.

Several tense days ensued, in the course of which on 27 October Soviet antiaircraft batteries on Cuba shot down—apparently without specific authorization from Kremlin leaders, whom this episode greatly alarmed—a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Seeking to avoid further escalation of the crisis, Kennedy refused to follow Taylor's advice to retaliate militarily and deliberately refrained from action. After some hesitation, Khrushchev acquiesced in the removal of the missiles, once his ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, secretly obtained an unpublicized pledge from Robert Kennedy that his brother would shortly remove the missiles in Turkey. Provided that the Soviet missiles were removed and not replaced, the United States also promised not to mount another invasion of Cuba.

Recently released tapes of conversations among President Kennedy and his advisors reveal that to avoid nuclear war, he was prepared to make even greater concessions to the Soviets, including taking the issue to the United Nations and openly trading Turkish missiles for those in Cuba. In so doing, he parted company with some of his more hard-line advisors. Showing considerable statesmanship, Kennedy deliberately refrained from emphasizing Khrushchev's humiliation, although other administration officials were privately less diplomatic and celebrated their victory to the press.

Newly opened Soviet documentary evidence has demonstrated that the Cuban situation was even more dire than most involved then realized. Forty-two thousand well-equipped Soviet troops were already on the island, far more than the 10,000 troops that American officials had estimated. Moreover, although Kennedy's advisors believed that some of the missiles might

already be armed, they failed to realize that no less than 158 short- and intermediate-range warheads on the island, whose use Castro urged should the United States invade, were already operational and that 42 of these could have reached American territory. A bellicose Castro was also hoping to shoot down additional U-2 planes and provoke a major confrontation. The potential for a trigger-happy military officer to set off a full-scale nuclear war almost certainly existed, retrospectively chilling evidence of the dangers inherent in these weapons.

The Cuban Missile Crisis had a sobering impact on its protagonists. Humiliation at American hands was among the factors that compelled Soviet leaders to undertake an expensive major nuclear buildup to achieve parity with the United States, reaching this in 1970. Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964 was probably at least partly due to the missile crisis. Soviet officials also felt that they had come dangerously close to losing control of the actual employment of nuclear weapons in Cuba, either to their own military commanders on the ground or even potentially to Castro's forces. Even though the settlement effectively ensured his regime's survival, Castro, meanwhile, felt humiliated that the Soviets and Americans had settled matters between them without regard for him. Before Khrushchev's fall from power, the two men were reconciled, and Soviet-Cuban relations remained close until the end of the Cold War. To the chagrin of successive U.S. presidents, however, Castro remained in power into the twenty-first century, eventually becoming the doyen among world political leaders.

The Cuban Missile Crisis tested and perhaps weakened the Western alliance. West European political leaders, including Harold Macmillan of Britain, Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), and most notably Charles de Gaulle of France, felt some discomfort that although Kennedy dispatched Acheson to brief them on the crisis, American officials had not consulted them on decisions of great importance to their own countries' survival. This may have been one factor impelling de Gaulle to follow a highly independent foreign policy line in subsequent years.

The crisis exerted a certain salutary, maturing effect on Kennedy, making the once-brash young president a strong advocate of disarmament in the final months before his untimely death in November 1963. His stance compelled the Soviet leadership to establish a hotline between Moscow and Washington to facilitate communications and ease tensions during international crises. The two powers also finally reached agreement in 1963 on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which halted nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in space. From then on both superpowers exercised great caution in dealing with each other, and on no subsequent occasion did they come so close to outright nuclear war.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Adenauer, Konrad; Arms Control; Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio; Bay of Pigs; Berlin Crises; Bundy, McGeorge; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; De Gaulle, Charles; Dobrynin, Anatoly Fyodorovich; Eisenhower, Dwight David;

Gromyko, Andrey; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Khrushchev, Nikita; Lovett, Robert Abercrombie; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; McNamara, Robert Strange; Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich; Military Balance; Missile Gap; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Nuclear Arms Race; Partial Test Ban Treaty; Rusk, Dean; Soviet Union; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; United Nations; United States; Vienna Conference

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Cultural Exchange

Cultural exchanges between East and West were an important part of the Cold War. Some 50,000 Soviets went to the United States on exchanges

between 1953 and 1988, and thousands more went to Western Europe. These individuals were scholars and students, scientists and engineers, writers and journalists, government and party officials, musicians, dancers, athletes, and more than a few Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) officers. These exchanges prepared the way for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost, perestroika, and the end of Cold War. The exchanges were conducted by the United States openly, under agreements concluded with the Soviet government. The result was an increase in Western influence among the intelligentsia as well as the general populace.

Under Soviet leader Josef Stalin, the Iron Curtain was nearly impenetrable. Information about the West was tightly controlled. Foreign travel for Soviet citizens was rare, and few foreigners visited the Soviet Union. Most of Soviet territory was closed to foreigners, except for a few large cities.

Stalin died in March 1953, and three years later Nikita Khrushchev announced a new policy of peaceful coexistence. The Soviets reached out to the West, signing cultural agreements with Norway and Belgium in 1956, the United Kingdom in 1957, and the United States in 1958. Agreements with other countries followed.

The initial U.S.-Soviet agreement, which was valid for two years, later three, and then periodically renewed, provided for exchanges of graduate students, senior scholars, performing artists, motion pictures, exhibitions, and delegations in industry, agriculture, and medicine. Exchanges in the basic sciences began in 1959 with an agreement between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Exchanges in atomic energy followed with a Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the USSR State Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

U.S. objectives were to involve the Soviets in joint activities and develop habits of cooperation, broaden contacts with people and institutions, end Soviet isolation and inward orientation by giving it a broader view of the world and itself, improve U.S. understanding of the USSR through access to its institutions and people, and obtain the benefits of cooperation in culture, education, and science and technology.

Soviet objectives were to obtain access to Western science and technology, support a view of the Soviet Union as equal to the United States by engaging Americans in bilateral activities, portray the Soviet Union as a peaceful power seeking cooperation with other countries, demonstrate achievements of the Soviet people, and give vent to the pent-up demand of its scholars, scientists, performing artists, and intellectuals for foreign travel and contacts.

Détente brought a major expansion of exchanges. At the summit meetings of 1972, 1973, and 1974 between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, eleven agreements were signed for cooperation in science and technology, environmental protection, medical science and public health, space, agriculture, world ocean studies, transportation, atomic energy, artificial heart research, energy, and housing and other construction. In these agreements, each government would designate a lead agency, and a joint committee would

be established to meet annually to review ongoing work under the agreements and to plan for future activities. Altogether, some 240 working groups were established, and some 750 Americans and an equal number of Soviets were exchanged annually for one or two weeks to consult on work performed in each country under the agreements. Following the lead of the government, many U.S. nongovernmental organizations also initiated Soviet exchanges.

For most Soviet citizens, foreign travel was a form of shock therapy. The early exchange students, when shown their first U.S. supermarket, saw it as a Potemkin village, a façade designed to deceive them. But the most important impression they brought back from travels in the United States was not amazement at consumer goods but a redefinition of what constituted "normal," a word with special meaning for the Soviet citizens who wanted to live in normal society.

For most Soviet citizens, foreign travel was a form of shock therapy. The early exchange students, when shown their first U.S. supermarket, saw it as a Potemkin village, a façade designed to deceive them.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was a strong advocate of such exchanges in his people-to-people approach. In 1958, he wanted to bring 10,000 Soviet students to the United States and pay all their expenses, with no reciprocity required. But the State Department, then negotiating with the Soviets, was trying for 100 students, and eventually the Soviets agreed to only 20 students a year. Nevertheless, over the next thirty years, several thousand Soviet graduate students and young scholars came to the United States to study, and an equal number of Americans went to the Soviet Union, although the number agreed to for the official exchange was never more than fifty a year. The exchanges created a pool of American and Russian scholars knowledgeable about the other country and able to distinguish fact from fiction.

Aleksandr Yakovlev is best known as the godfather of glasnost, Gorbachev's policy of openness in Soviet society. Yakovlev was Gorbachev's link to Soviet intellectuals and protector of the editors who gave the Soviet Union its first independent press, and he was at Gorbachev's side in five summit meetings with President Ronald Reagan. In 1958 Yakovlev was one of four Soviet graduate students at Columbia University in the first year of the new cultural agreement. He spent most of his time in the library, where he read more than 200 books that he could not read in the Soviet Union. He returned to Moscow, still a convinced communist but deeply influenced by his year at Columbia. He has described it as more meaningful to him than the ten years he later spent as Soviet ambassador to Canada.

Oleg Kalugin, who studied with Yakovlev at Columbia, would later reach the rank of KGB major general before aligning himself with the Democratic Platform of the Communist Party, winning election to the Soviet parliament, and then defecting to the United States. In his memoirs Kalugin writes: "Exchanges played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system. They opened a closed society. They greatly influenced younger people who saw the world with more open eyes, and they kept infecting more and more people over the years."

For Soviet performing artists and their audiences, isolated from the West since the 1930s, visits by Western performers brought a breath of fresh air as well as new artistic concepts in music, dance, and theater to a country where

Touring band leader Benny Goodman smiles following two solos on his clarinet during an outdoor concert in Red Square in Moscow. Goodman led the first American jazz band to visit the Soviet capital, June 1962. (Bettmann/Corbis)

orthodoxy and conservatism had long been guiding principles in the arts. Among the American ensembles that performed in the Soviet Union under the cultural agreement were symphony orchestras, dance groups, and jazz orchestras. Benny Goodman's highly successful thirty-two-concert tour in 1962 signaled Soviet official acceptance of jazz. For Duke Ellington's Moscow performances in 1971, tickets sold on the black market for eighty rubles, when the usual price for a theater ticket was seldom higher than four.

"Of all the arts," wrote Vladimir Lenin, "the most important for us is the cinema." But the founder of the Soviet state did not foresee the influence that foreign films would have on the Soviet Union. From foreign films, Soviet audiences learned that people in the West did not have to stand in long lines to purchase food and did not live in communal apartments. People in the West dressed fashionably, owned cars, and lived the normal life so sought by Russians. Audiences were not so much listening to sound tracks or reading subtitles as watching the daily lives of people in the films: their homes, the clothes they wore, and the cars they drove. And when refrigerators were opened in Western films, they were always full of food. Such details were very revealing.

Four or five American films were purchased by the Soviets each year. Most were pure entertainment—comedies, adventure stories, musicals, and

science fiction—that met the interests of Soviet audiences. Among the more popular were *Some Like It Hot, The Apartment, The Chase,* and *Tootsie.* Although few were purchased, hundreds of copies were made for distribution to cinemas throughout the Soviet Union. And many foreign films, although not purchased, were copied and screened at closed showings for high officials and their spouses. The intelligentsia also viewed foreign films at members-only showings at professional clubs for writers, scientists, architects, journalists, cinematographers, and other privileged people of the Soviet Union.

Another means of reaching the Soviet mass audience was the month-long showings of thematic exhibitions that displayed life in America and recent developments in specialized fields, among them medicine, architecture, hand tools, education, outdoor recreation, technology for the home, photography, and agriculture. Russian-speaking American guides answered questions from the crowds. For most Russians, it was their first and only opportunity to talk with an American. The exhibitions were seen, on average, by 250,000 visitors in each city. All told, more than 20 million Soviet citizens saw twenty-three U.S. exhibitions over a thirty-two-year period.

Exchanges enabled the United States and the Soviet Union to learn more about each other. That knowledge provided some assurance that the two governments would not misjudge each other's actions and intentions, as they had so often in the past. Exchanges also provided a framework for increased bilateral cooperation. Each country learned that it could accept large numbers of foreign visitors without threat to its national security. Were it not for the experience of exchanges, there probably would have been no intrusive military inspections under arms control agreements. And as more and more Soviets traveled to the West and made the inevitable comparisons with their own country, the Soviet media had to become more honest with their readers and viewers at home.

Exchanges encouraged pressure for reform. They prepared the way for Gorbachev's reforms and the end of the Cold War. And they cost the United States next to nothing compared with its expenditures for defense and intelligence over the same period of time.

Yale Richmond

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Film; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Music; Nixon, Richard Milhous

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Cultural Revolution
(1966–1969)

Political movement launched in the People's Republic of China (PRC) by Chinese leader Mao Zedong during 1966–1969, although its influence was felt into the mid-1970s. Mao termed the Cultural Revolution (CR) his "lifetime achievement" apart from leading the successful 1949 revolution. Some have compared its significance to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, but it has also been seen as a clash of personalities, ideologies, and policies between Mao and President Liu Shaoqi, the second most powerful figure in the PRC. Mao sought to use the CR to enhance his authority. High-ranking CR proponents included Mao, Premier Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, and Defense Minister Lin Biao. On the other hand, the so-called capitalists who opposed the CR dominated the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Politburo, Central Committee, regional bureaus, and provincial party committees, including the crucial Beijing unit. They included Liu, General Secretary of the CCP Deng Xiaoping, Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen, chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Luo Ruiqing, and Marshal He Long.

These groups differed over the handling of contradictions inside and outside the CCP in regard to society, culture, and the economy. Among the contentious issues was whether the CCP should be revived with new socialist ideals or maintained predominantly as a bureaucratic entity. The two sides also clashed on the collectivization of agriculture, moral/material incentives, and self-reliance versus free markets. The rift also pitted the Maoist mass line model advocating a continuing class struggle against those capitalists who advocated economic development and modernization as a means to achieve superpower status.

External factors also drove the CR, including the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union's revisionism peaceful coexistence with the West, and antipathy toward supporting developing nations. Liu was labeled a "Chinese Khrushchev" during the CR, in reference to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's reforms of the 1950s.

The sixteen-point guidelines issued on 8 August 1966 initiated the CR, although the more immediate catalyst was Beijing Vice-Mayor Wu Han's play *Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office*, an allegory about a Ming Dynasty official's vindication after being forced from his post. The play indirectly referred to former Defense Minister Peng Dehuai's 1959 removal from office following the Lushan Conference, when Peng criticized Mao for the disastrous Great Leap Forward. Radicals within the Politburo, including the Gang of Four clique comprising Mao's wife Jiang Qing and Shanghai-based Communist Party members Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, responded in late 1965 with countercritiques, one by Yao to the Shanghai newspapers and a literary critique from Jiang, that rallied the opponents of Peng.

Once Mao in August and September 1966 accorded legitimacy to the CR through the medium of the big-character poster, the movement spread across the PRC. Soon, a three-in-one system was formed, comprised of the military, revolutionary cadres, and representatives of the masses. In March 1967, they were tasked with carrying forward the revolution. The CCP's Central

Cultural Revolution in China

Committee thereby lost its influence to the Central Cultural Revolution Small Group—radicals loyal to Mao. The so-called Red Guards, tasked with replacing "old world with new world," were one of the main proselytizers of the CR movement.

Beginning in August 1966, the Red Guards carried out actions against the Four Olds: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. In the process, they condemned, humiliated, and often brutalized or killed Communist Party cadres and corrupt revisionist authorities accused of taking the capitalist road and criticized petit bourgeois teachers. PRC military and security forces were ordered to support the revolutionary masses of the Left and, in the latter phases of the CR, to restore order in the chaotic society and economy. In January 1967, Mao pressed the PLA to restore order in the country, and by April 1969 the CCP's Ninth Congress declared the CR at an end.

The effects of the CR were numerous. Liu, in ailing health, was imprisoned and denied medical treatment. He died in prison of diabetes in 1969. Peng, Luo, and others were purged. Many students were sent to rural outposts to learn from peasants in 1968. Thousands of households considered bourgeois were ransacked and their occupants killed. Priceless cultural artifacts, regarded as feudal or capitalist anachronisms, were smashed or otherwise destroyed. Over the long term, the CR also led to the erosion of the CCP's political authority. The CCP's 27 June 1981 Resolutions on Questions of Party History stated that the CR imposed a "severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the party, state, and the people" since 1949.

Srikanth Kondapalli

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of, Armed Forces; Soviet Union

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Cunhal, Álvaro
(1913–)

Portuguese writer, communist, and general secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) from 1961 to 1992. Born on 10 November 1913 in

Coimbra, Portugal, Alvaro Cunhal studied law at the University of Lisbon and, in 1931, joined the PCP, then an illegal organization. The PCP, established in 1921, was dedicated primarily to overthrowing the right-wing dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar, who rose to power in 1932.

In 1935, Cunhal graduated from the University of Lisbon and was elected general secretary of the Portuguese Communist Youth. Because of his political activities, he was arrested in 1937 and imprisoned until 1940; in 1949 he was once again sent to prison for his political proclivities. In 1960, Cunhal escaped from prison, fled Portugal, and went on to live in Moscow and Paris. In 1961, while living in exile, he was appointed general secretary of the PCP.

After the Carnation Revolution of April 1974, Cunhal returned to Portugal, now free from Salazar's oppressive rule. The revolution precipitated a two-year period of communist-dominated military governments that transformed Portugal from an authoritarian dictatorship to a liberal democracy. Cunhal's charismatic leadership, strongly influenced by orthodox Marxist-Leninism, set the agenda for the PCP during much of the Cold War. Cunhal served as a minister without portfolio in the transition governments.

During the 1970s Cunhal supported Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's political agenda and during the 1980s strongly opposed Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika policies. Although Cunhal no longer held office within the PCP, he continued to be an influential member of the party. He died in Lisbon on 13 June 2005.

Michael R. Hall

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Portugal; Salazar, António de Oliveira

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Curcio, Renato

(1941–)

Italian leftist agitator and founder of the terrorist organization Red Brigades. Born in Monterotondo, Italy, on 23 September 1941, Renato Curcio attended Catholic primary schools and high school at Albenga. He then studied sociology at the University of Trentino, where he immersed himself in the writings of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong. Curcio urged his fellow students to form a new proletarian party and reject the revisionist philosophy of the Italian Communist Party.

In 1966 Curcio became involved in protests against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. In 1969 he refused to apply for a degree from the uni-

versity, married fellow leftist Margherita Cagol, and went to Milan, where he and his wife joined the violent extremist organization the Metropolitan Political Collective (MPC). Embracing the idea of armed revolt against the state, Curcio, Cagol, and Alberto Franceschini formed the Red Brigades in 1970. It would become Italy's major leftist terrorist organization in the postwar years.

The Red Brigades was a highly secretive and well-structured organization. Its activities included bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and maiming as terror weapons against the government. The Red Brigades' terrorist tactics reached a peak with the kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi, who was later freed without any concessions being granted the terrorists. On 8 September 1974, Curcio was arrested as part of an undercover sting. But in February 1975 a commando-like operation led by Cagol succeeded in freeing him.

Police activity against the Red Brigades became more effective following the kidnapping of industrialist Vallarino Gancia on 5 June 1976; the following day a Carabinieri raid freed the hostage and killed Cagol. In January 1976 Curcio was wounded, captured by police, and jailed. With its leader and ideological head in captivity, the Red Brigades went into decline. Curcio remains in prison but in 1994 was allowed to take up day work as a publisher in Rome, infuriating many Italians.

Alessandro Massignani

See also
Italy; Red Brigades

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Curzon Line

Boundary between Poland and Russia drawn after World War I that figured in discussions during and after World War II over Poland's eastern frontier. The Curzon Line was a major factor in the tangled issue of Poland's post–World War II borders.

In the fluid situation in the East following World War I, leaders of the Big Four powers of Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, meeting at Paris, decided to leave the boundary between Poland and Russia to subsequent demarcation. In December 1919, a commission headed by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon proposed a boundary line. Known as the Curzon Line, in the north it divided Suvalki Province between Poland and Lithuania, then extended southward toward Grodno before running west to the Bug River. It followed the Bug past the great city of Brest-Litovsk to Sokoly,

then ran west around Przemysl before heading south to the Carpathians and the border of the new state of Czechoslovakia.

Neither Poland nor Russia accepted the Curzon Line. Poland won the Russo-Polish War (1919–1921) and, in the resultant Treaty of Riga of March 1921, pushed its eastern border well to the east of the Curzon Line, near to what had been the Polish-Russian frontier of 1792. Recovering territory to the Curzon Line was a major goal of post–World War I Soviet diplomacy.

In late August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a nonaggression pact that made it possible for Germany to invade Poland, beginning World War II. The treaty also included a territorial division of Poland and the Baltic states in which the Soviet Union received much of eastern Poland. Soviet troops invaded and seized this territory in mid-September 1939, but the Germans then took it during their June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.

In subsequent discussions between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, Soviet leader Josef Stalin insisted that the Curzon Line be the western boundary for the Soviet Union. It was difficult for the Western powers not to agree with this, for the line had been drawn by the Western powers themselves, but such an agreement would sanction Soviet incorporation of its 1939 gains at the expense of Poland. At the Tehran Conference of November–December 1943, there was much discussion of Poland's borders. Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt all agreed on the Oder River as the future boundary of Poland with Germany. There was, however, no agreement by the Western leaders on a tributary of the Oder, the Western Neisse River, as the southern demarcation line. Nor did the West sanction Poland taking from Germany the important port of Stettin on the west bank of the Oder. The three did agree that Poland would receive most of East Prussia, although the Soviet Union claimed the Baltic port of Königsberg (later renamed by them Kaliningrad) and land to the northeast. There was no major opposition from Western leaders to the Curzon Line as the eastern boundary of Poland, although the British did object to Soviet seizure of the predominantly Polish city of L'viv.

Stalin insisted that the Soviet Union required security against a future German attack. Obviously, a Poland that would be compensated for the loss of eastern territory to the Soviet Union by being given German territory in the west would necessarily have to look to the USSR for security, and Churchill had the difficult task of having to sell all these arrangements to the Polish government-in-exile in London. Stalin refused normal diplomatic relations with the so-called London Poles because no independent Polish government could ever concede changes that put the country at the mercy of the USSR. But a Polish government subservient to Moscow proved inevitable.

The Yalta Conference of February 1945 confirmed the decisions reached early at Tehran regarding Poland's eastern border, with but slight modification. This meant the loss to Poland of some 52,000 square miles of territory in the east. The Allies were more strenuous in objecting to the Oder-Neisse Line as its western boundary, and there was no agreement on this matter at Yalta.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Churchill, Winston; Poland; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Stalin, Josef; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Cyprus

The island of Cyprus is situated in the eastern Mediterranean Sea about 40 miles south of Turkey and 60 miles west of Syria. Inhabited by both Greeks and Turks, it covers a land mass of 3,572 square miles and in 1945 had a population of some 460,000 people, 80 percent of them Greek.

The Turks conquered Cyprus and a large, separate Turkish community developed there. In 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire placed Cyprus under British administration in return for British support against Russia. In 1914 Britain annexed Cyprus outright, and in 1925 it became a Crown colony. Until 1960, Cyprus was under British rule and was an important strategic base for defense of the Suez Canal in both world wars. During the Cold War the West used the island to monitor Soviet activities in the Middle East. Britain launched its 1956 abortive Suez invasion from Cyprus.

Under British rule, the movement for enosis, or union of the island with Greece, spread among the majority Greek population. The island's Turkish population, supported by the Turkish government, vowed to resist any such step. At first the Greek agitation was aimed at ending British control. Greek Orthodox Archbishop Makarios III became the leader in this effort, condoning terrorism and reprisals against the British. General Georgios Grivas led the terrorist campaign to expel the British. Born in Cyprus, Grivas had fought against both the Germans in World War II and the communists in the Greek Civil War. Beginning in 1955, his National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) launched widespread terrorist attacks against the British. The terrorist activity expanded, especially after 1956 when British authorities exiled Makarios to the Seychelle Islands in the Indian Ocean. Negotiations in 1955 between Britain, Greece, and Turkey broke down completely, abetted by Ankara's demands for partition of the island.

British soldiers stand behind a barbed-wire barricade during an imposed curfew in Nicosia, Cyprus, in 1956. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Finally, in the Zurich Agreement of 1959, a settlement was reached for a new constitution for Cyprus. On 16 August 1960, the island became the Republic of Cyprus, an independent state with two distinct ethnic entities. Britain, Greece, and Turkey retained limited rights to intervene in Cypriot affairs in order to guarantee the basic rights of both ethnic communities.

Archbishop Makarios became the first president of Cyprus, and in 1961 the island state became a member of the United Nations (UN). The Cypriot constitution provided for a presidential system of government with independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches as well as a complex system of checks and balances, including a weighted power-sharing ratio designed to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The executive, for example, was headed by a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president, elected by their respective communities for five-year terms and each possessing a right of veto over certain types of legislation and executive decisions. The House of Representatives was elected on the basis of separate voters' rolls, but since 1974 the Turkish seats in the House have been vacant.

Originally, there were two Communal Chambers, but the Greek Cypriot Chamber was abolished in the 1960s. In 1962 and 1963, Greek and Turkish leaders held a series of meetings but were unable to resolve their differences in terms of taxation, municipal councils, and local government. In 1963, the Green Line was established in the capital city of Nicosia to separate the Greeks and Turks. In November 1963, Makarios proposed a series of constitutional amendments designed to restrict the rights of the Turkish community. The Turkish Cypriots opposed these changes, and consequently, widespread intercommunal fighting began in December 1963. Turkish Cypriot participation in the central government ceased, and the Turkish parliament voted in favor of occupying Cyprus in 1964.

Turkey could not find support for its occupation plans from either the UN or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson warned Turkish premier Ismet Inönü that his country would resist a Turkish occupation. Turkey did not make good on its threat. In March 1964 the UN Security Council established the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to ward off potential trouble, although fighting continued between the Greeks and Turks. Following another outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1967–1968, a Turkish Cypriot provisional administration was formed, and by the early 1970s Makarios had resigned himself to a separate Cypriot state not directly tied to Greece, which infuriated many Greek Cypriots.

On 15 July 1974, a coup fomented by disaffected Greeks overthrew Makarios. A puppet regime, under control of the junta in Greece, was imposed under Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA fighter. Rauf Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot leader, called for joint military action by the United Kingdom and Turkey as a way to prevent the unification of Cyprus with Greece. Although Turkey agreed to intervene, Britain could not be persuaded to follow suit, so on 20 July 1974 Turkey landed 40,000 troops on the northern coast of Cyprus.

The Turkish force occupied 37 percent of the island in the north. To date some 30,000 troops remain in northern Cyprus. Turkey described its occupation as a "peace operation" to restore constitutional order and protect the Turkish Cypriot community. The ensuing UN-led talks failed to resolve matters, and the Turks continued to control the northern parts of the island, forming a de facto Turkish Cypriot state there.

The area occupied by the Turkish Army proclaimed its independence in 1975 under the name of the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus. Denktaş became its leader. Some 20,000 people, mainly subsistence farmers from mainland Turkey, were brought in to settle and work the underpopulated land. Those who stayed more than five years were granted citizenship in the Turkish Federated State. In the Karpaz region, located on the Turkish side of Cyprus, a Greek-speaking minority remains under UN supervision.

In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established to replace the Federated State. But it was only recognized as a legitimate independent state by Turkey and members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In the period since the Turkish invasion, the northern third of

Cyprus has become almost exclusively Turkish while the southern two-thirds is almost exclusively Greek, so the territories are now sometimes referred to as the "Greek part" and the "Turkish part" of Cyprus. Except for occasional demonstrations and infrequent confrontations between border soldiers, few violent conflicts took place after 1974.

In 1975, the Cyprus issue caused the U.S. Congress to impose an embargo on the sale of military equipment to Turkey, which badly strained Turkish-U.S. relations. The embargo lasted until 1978 and was lifted by President Jimmy Carter. In November 1993, Greek Cypriots formed a Joint Defense Pact with Greece following the election of Cypriot President Glavkos Klerides. Turkish Cypriots responded by entering into a joint defense and foreign policy program with Turkey. In May 2004, the Greek two-thirds of the island became a member of the European Union as the Republic of Cyprus.

Cem Karadeli

See also

Greece; Makarios III, Archbishop; Turkey; Turkey, Armed Forces

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Czechoslovakia

Central European nation covering 49,383 square miles bordering on Germany and Poland to the north, Austria and Hungary to the south, and Ukraine to the east. Czechoslovakia had a 1945 population of 14.2 million people (10.7 million in the Czech lands and 3.5 million in Slovakia). In 1947, however, the population had fallen to 12.2 million people as a result of the expulsion of Germans. Czechoslovakia was dissolved on 1 January 1993.

Constructed from the ruins of Austria-Hungary at the end of World War I, Czechoslovakia was composed of Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Germans, Jews, Hungarians, and Roma (Gypsies). Between the two world wars, Czechoslovakia was a liberal democracy with an advanced industrial economy. The British, French, and Italian attempt to appease German dictator Adolf Hitler by sacrificing Czechoslovakia in the 1938 Munich Accords led to the dismemberment of the country and, consequently, to the popularity of the Communist Party in the reconstituted postwar Czechoslovakia, ultimately controlled by the Soviets.

Czechoslovakia was liberated at the end of World War II by the Red Army to the east and American forces to the west. It became a binational Czech and Slovak state because most of the Jews and many of the Roma had been exterminated by the Nazis. The Ruthenian part of eastern Czechoslovakia was annexed by Soviet Ukraine, and the Sudeten Germans were expelled following the Edvard Beneš decrees of 1946.

Czechoslovak democracy was limited after the war to a handful of parties within the Soviet-backed National Front, led by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz). In October 1945 the National Front nationalized all enterprises that employed more than fifty workers. In the May 1946 elections, the CPCz won a plurality of the popular vote with 38 percent. CPCz leader Klement Gottwald thus became prime minister and consolidated power by controlling key ministries, the police, and mass media as well as the Communist People's Militia (supported by 1.5 million party members, about 10 percent of the population).

In February 1948, Gottwald implicitly threatened civil war and Soviet intervention to pressure President Beneš to accept the resignation of noncommunist ministers. Later that year, when Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was found dead and Beneš died, nobody of stature was left to oppose the communists, who built a Soviet-style state.

The communists established a political monopoly by absorbing the Social Democrats and turning the few parties not already banned into their puppets. Favors and threats increased membership in the CPCz to 20 percent of the population and led to a large influx of communists into governmental institutions. Five-year plans redirected the nationalized Czechoslovak economy toward heavy industry and integrated it into the Comecon system of production and trade.

Soviet advisors instructed Czechoslovak communists and established direct control over security services and the armed forces. Ideological dogma dictated the purging of prewar culture from schools, art, and books. Political control of educational institutions ensured that only the children of politically reliable (communist) parents would have access to the professions. A system of terror and labor camps was established, most notoriously in uranium mines where many thousands became terminally ill. Initially, the terror campaign was directed at political opponents, organized religion, prewar elites, independent intellectuals, bourgeois peasants, and soldiers who had fought with the Allies during the war. Eventually, however, the communists turned on themselves according to the demands of the Kremlin. Show trials of leading communists, mostly of Jewish descent, led to their execution in 1952. Such random purges continued until the late 1950s.

A system of terror and labor camps was established, most notoriously in uranium mines where many thousands became terminally ill.

After Antonín Novotný succeeded Gottwald in 1953, the Czech communist leadership managed to remain united and survived the winds of change blowing from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's Moscow. A new constitution was introduced in 1960, marking "the end of class struggle" and the achievement of a socialist society.

From the mid-1960s, growing discontent manifested itself among communist and intellectual elites. A new generation that had grown up under

communism found its upward mobility blocked by the revolutionary generation that became the elite in 1948. Middle-aged communists who became disillusioned with the system also began to agitate for liberalization. Czechoslovak economists sought to decentralize the failing system of central planning without abolishing it and introduced confused and inconsistent experimental measures. Influential writers such as Milan Kundera, Pavel Kohout, and Václav Havel began to criticize the regime publicly. Others called for the release of political prisoners. In January 1968, a broad coalition of anti-Novotný party functionaries finally replaced him with Alexandr Dubček, leader of the Slovak branch of the CPCz. Thus, the Prague Spring went into full bloom.

On 25 February 1968 Major General Jan Šejna, a high official in the Czech Ministry of Defense and a friend of Novotný, defected to the United States, one of the greatest successes of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War. This revelation unleashed a new wave of public criticism of the regime's corruption, inefficiency, and Stalinist tactics. Growing divisions among the communist elite paralyzed their decision-making abilities, and they soon lost control as the reformers demanded complete political and press freedoms.

In March, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pressured the Czechoslovak leadership to reestablish control of the press and quash the Prague Spring. Czech reformers believed that the Soviets would not intervene. But conservative leaders invited the Soviets to intervene and, in the Soviet embassy in Prague, prepared plans for an invasion.

The Soviet leadership concluded that the Czechoslovak communists could not control the situation. A final meeting on 29 July failed to bridge the differences between the reformers and conservatives. Consequently, Brezhnev lost all confidence in Dubček and ordered an invasion.

On 21 August 1968 a mostly Soviet force of 165,000 soldiers and 4,600 tanks invaded Czechoslovakia. The Soviet-led invasion force eventually numbered 500,000 soldiers and 6,000 tanks. While Czechoslovak radio broadcast protests against the invasion, the party leaders were detained and taken to Moscow, prompting more resistance and protest. Under enormous pressure, the Czechoslovak leadership acceded to Soviet demands to normalize the situation in Czechoslovakia according to the Soviet model, purge the party and the security services, muzzle the press, and reassert control. As a result, some 500,000 of the most reform-minded citizens crossed the still-open borders to the West. In October the Czechoslovak communist leadership agreed to the indefinite stationing of 75,000 Soviet troops in the country. Consequent public protests were violently suppressed by the Czechoslovak police.

The communist leadership was divided between reformers and realists, the latter of whom accepted the Soviet invasion and made the best of it for themselves and their clique. After Dubček's April 1969 resignation, Slovak Communist Party boss Gustáv Husák emerged as the realist leader, becoming first secretary and then president. He held power for twenty years. Under Husák's normalization policy (1969–1970), 20 percent of the Communist Party was purged. During the 1970s, the party attracted 500,000 new (and younger)

members. Without gulags but also without any prospects for influencing their society, Czechoslovaks increasingly turned inward. Family became very important, and the average age of marriage and motherhood declined. A culture of weekend recreation in the country also evolved, while the stagnating centrally planned economy offered opportunities for personal enrichment through widespread corruption.

The main voice of protest amid the general passivity of the population was the 2,000 dissident signatories of Charter 77, which encompassed a broad coalition of former reform communists, artists and intellectuals, and religious dissidents. They frequently suffered sanctions such as professional demotions and exclusion from higher educational opportunities. Top dissidents were jailed or expelled from the country. But they nevertheless managed to keep Czechoslovak culture alive. The stale Husák regime was ill-prepared for the glasnost and perestroika reforms that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev initiated beginning in 1986. Tentative liberalization in later 1988 gave way to renewed repression of dissidents and civil protest in early 1989.

The beginning of the end of communism in Czechoslovakia came on 17 November 1989 when a student demonstration was violently suppressed. This led to large protests and the creation of the Civic Forum, an umbrella group of anticommunist Czechs, and the corresponding Slovak group, Public Against Violence. No longer able to rely on Soviet troops, the communist elite was virtually powerless to stop the growing anticommunist fervor. On the 20 November, 150,000 people demonstrated in St. Wenceslas Square in

Mass demonstration in Prague against the communist regime in Czechoslovakia during the Velvet Revolution, 25 November 1989. (Peter Turnley/Corbis)

Prague. Similar nightly mass demonstrations followed, culminating in a demonstration of 750,000 Czechs in Letna fields and a two-hour mass strike on 27 November. By 10 December, when Husák resigned, the CPCz was falling apart and losing control over the country.

A new, pluralistic government was rapidly put in place, headed by Slovak communist Marián Čalfa. The border with Austria was thrown open, censorship was ended, and all of the main figures of normalization were purged from the party. When Charter 77 leader Havel was elected president on 29 December by the partly reconstructed parliament, the revolution was all but complete. It was legitimized by democratic elections in June 1990. The Czechs and Slovaks subsequently embarked on the bumpy road of reform that led them eventually to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The two peoples arrived there separately, however. Growing nationalist sentiment in Slovakia led to the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993.

Aviezer Tucker

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Charter 77; Dubček, Alexander; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Havel, Václav; Husák, Gustáv; Perestroika; Prague Spring

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D

Dalai Lama
(1935–)

Tibetan head of state in exile and Buddhist spiritual leader. His Holiness the Dalai Lama was born on 6 July 1935 in Taktser, Tibet, the fourth child of a peasant family. His birth name was Lhamo Dhondrub. In 1937 he was recognized by Buddhist monks as the reincarnation of the thirteenth Buddhist Lord of Compassion, and on 22 February 1940 he was enthroned as the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, beginning his reign in the Potala, a 1,000-room palace in Lhasa, Tibet. The Dalai Lama's education began when he was six years old, directed by Buddhist monks. It ended in 1959 when he was awarded the Geshe Lharampa degree (doctorate of Buddhist philosophy).

In 1950 Mao Zedong's Chinese communist forces invaded Tibet. By late 1950 a guerrilla war had erupted there as Tibetans resisted coercive modernization efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On 17 November 1950, the Dalai Lama was called upon to assume the role of Tibetan head of state in order to give voice to Tibetan demands for political and religious autonomy. Until 1959 the Dalai Lama engaged in a careful policy aimed at preserving Tibet's traditional religious and political structures while attempting to negotiate with CCP leaders. In March 1959, however, the Tibetan capital of Lhasa erupted in violence after a huge anti-Chinese demonstration was savagely crushed by the Chinese Army. Fearing for the Dalai Lama's life, his advisors counseled him to flee Tibet, which he reluctantly did. He took up residence in Dharamsala, India, the official seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile.



The Dalai Lama is greeted upon his arrival at Tezour, India, after fleeing from Tibet following the crushing of an anti-Chinese demonstration there by the Chinese Army, 1959. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Since his forced exile, the Dalai Lama has constantly sought to focus the world's attention on the plight of the Tibetan people, even appealing to the United Nations for support. He has also encouraged Tibetans to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience against Chinese communist rule. He displayed considerable diplomatic and political

In 1989 the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent opposition to the Tibetan occupation.

skill in presenting Tibet's case on the international stage and won widespread respect. In 1989 the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent opposition to the Tibetan occupation. He has been widely received in capitals around the world and has met with all of the world's major religious leaders, including Pope John Paul II five times during 1980–1990.

The numerous publications of the Dalai Lama—both political and spiritual in nature—as well as his constant travel to make personal appeals for support and his nonconfrontational approach began to bear fruit in 2002. That year he again undertook negotiations with the Chinese government for Tibetan autonomy that are still ongoing.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also

China, People's Republic of; Tibet

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Debray, Régis
(1940–)

French revolutionary theorist, writer, and presidential advisor. Born in Paris on 2 September 1940, Régis Debray graduated from the École Normale Supérieure in 1965 with a degree in philosophy. In 1961 he visited Cuba and volunteered to teach in a rural education program. Because of a close association with Jean-Paul Sartre, Debray was able to secure lengthy interviews with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. These led Debray to become a supporter of revolutionary movements in Latin America.

In 1966 Debray became a professor of philosophy at the University of Havana, and he began to write at length about the foco theory of revolution, based on guerrilla bands. Debray gained international recognition when he went to Bolivia to interview Cuban revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara. After interviewing Guevara, Debray was arrested by Bolivian authorities, tried, and sentenced to thirty years in prison. He is best known for his book *Revolution in the Revolution?* (1967).

Upon his release from prison in 1970, Debray went to Chile and there interviewed Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens. This led Debray to conclude that radical socialist reform was possible through democratic, parliamentary systems.

Returning to France, in 1974 Debray joined the Socialist Party headed by François Mitterrand. Debray also served as an advisor to Mitterrand's presi-

dential campaign of the same year. Debray then returned to writing, producing on average more than a book a year. His works included commentaries on revolution as well as fiction and works of philosophy.

On the election of Mitterrand to the presidency in May 1981, Debray was named a special assistant in the Office of the President, responsible for advising Mitterrand on policy toward the third world and especially Latin America. The next year Debray also became advisor to Mitterrand on cultural matters. By the 1990s, however, Debray had moved considerably to the Right politically. Among other indications, he wrote favorably about Charles de Gaulle's presidency in *À démain, de Gaulle* (1990). More recently, he presented a critical portrait of Guevera, seemingly rejecting the revolutionary icon he had done so much to help create.

Michael D. Richards

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Bolivia; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Latin America, Communist Parties in; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in

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Declaration on Liberated Europe
(February 1945)

Proposed by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and accepted by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin at the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the Declaration on Liberated Europe pledged the three governments to aid all peoples liberated from Nazi German control. In it the three leaders pledged that the provisional governments of liberated areas would be "representative of all democratic elements" and that there would be "free elections . . . responsive to the will of the people." But such lofty phrases were, of course, subject to different interpretations.

Drafted by the U.S. State Department, the declaration represented Roosevelt's response to the situation in Eastern Europe, where Red Army advances had virtually guaranteed that Stalin would determine the political futures of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Although it is difficult to determine whether Roosevelt actually expected Stalin to allow free elections and self-government in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, took the declaration seriously and held the Soviets accountable for fulfilling its provisions. Stalin's subsequent imposition of pro-Soviet regimes throughout Eastern Europe during 1945–1948 elicited charges from Washington that the Soviets had violated commitments undertaken at Yalta. This

situation greatly accelerated the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations and the onset of the Cold War.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also
World War II, Allied Conferences

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Decolonization

Decolonization was the process by which European nations granted independence to their colonial possessions. Much of this occurred during 1945–1960. In 1945, when the United Nations (UN) came into being, roughly one-third of the world's population—750 million people—resided in non-self-governing colonial dependencies. By the end of the twentieth century, fewer than 2 million of the world's 6.1 billion people remained in colonial territories. The former colonies varied greatly in their ability to overcome entrenched social and political problems.

During the era of mercantilism, empire building appeared desirable as a means of building up a nation's wealth. In addition to economic motives, colonies were held to be useful for naval bases and as a sign of national prestige. The impulse peaked in the eighteenth century and waned on the impact of free enterprise economics. Colonies were found to be an economic burden and of scant benefit to the mother country. Late in the nineteenth century a new age of imperialism began. Much of the impulse was geopolitical, based on the desire to control key resources, geographical locations, and populations and deny these to a rival. The first colonial era had generated extensive migrations of Europeans. The second wave, however, was more along the lines of a commercial and political arrangement. Europeans exploited their colonies as they were; they usually did not seek to make them over in the image of the homeland. This was particularly true of the British, but the French did at least profess to believe in their civilizing mission, and Germans spoke about exporting their *Kultur*. Investments in infrastructure and social programs were limited, and the co-option of elites was a preferable means of gaining local cooperation in exploiting a colony's natural resources. When the Europeans, Japanese, and Americans largely concluded the race for empire by 1914 or so, almost all of Africa and much of Asia were under the control of colonial powers. European states had approximately eighty colonies, with the British Empire far and away the largest and the only one that really formed anything approaching an economic unit.

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Colonies with Dates of Independence

Colony	*Original Mother Country*	*Year of Independence*
Canada	England	1931
New Zealand	England	1931
South Africa	England	1931
Australia	England	1931
India	England	1947
Burma	England	1948
Sri Lanka	England	1948
Cambodia	France	1954
Laos	France	1954
Vietnam	France	1954
Egypt	England	1956
Morocco	France	1956
Tunisia	France	1956
Ghana	England	1957
Malaya	England	1957
British-administered Togoland	England	1957
Nigeria	England	1960
Congo	Belgium	1960
Somaliland	England	1960
French-administered Togoland	France	1960
French-administered Cameroon	France	1960
Tanzania	England	1961
Sierra Leone	England	1961
British-administered Cameroons	England	1961
Tanganyika	England	1961
Jamaica	England	1962
Trinidad	England	1962
Uganda	England	1962
Western Samoa	England	1962
Algeria	France	1962
Rwanda-Urundi	Belgium	1962
Kenya	England	1963
Zanzibar	England	1963
Malawi	England	1964
Zambia	England	1964
Gambia	England	1965
Lesotho	England	1965
Cook Islands	England	1965
Guyana	England	1966
Barbados	England	1966
Botswana	England	1966
Mauritius	England	1968
Swaziland	England	1968
Nauru	Australia, New Zealand, England	1968
Fiji	England	1970
Angola	Portugal	1975
Mozambique	Portugal	1975
Portuguese Timor	Portugal	1975
New Guinea	Australia	1975
Tuvalu	England	1978
Kiribati	England	1979
Zimbabwe	England	1980
Vanuatu	England	1980
Micronesia	United States	1990
Marshall Islands	United States	1990
Northern Mariana Islands	United States	1990
Palau	United States	1994
Hong Kong	England	1997

World War I encouraged nationalist forces in colonies around the world, who took inspiration from U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech on war aims, while World War II broke the existing system apart. Colonial powers such as France and Britain emerged from World War II in a greatly weakened state and with their prestige in tatters. The war also heightened nationalism in the colonies, as it severed or severely weakened ties with the mother countries. The defeat of France by Germany in 1940 sent shock waves through the French Empire, and Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle acknowledged that there would have to be a new relationship after the war between Metropolitan France and its overseas empire, which had helped keep the struggle against Germany alive in the name of France. The Japanese, who brought their own form of colonial domination, nonetheless skillfully exploited resentment of European control in such places as Malaya, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies. The emergence, for very different reasons, of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet leader Josef Stalin as staunch opponents of colonialism also did not help the colonial powers.

In many colonies by the 1940s and 1950s, elites seized the opportunity to play the nationalist card. Often the colonizing power simply granted independence and the transition was peaceful, as in the case of the United States and the Philippines. The UN 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples stated that all people have the right to self-determination. A Special Committee on Decolonization came into existence in 1962 to observe its implementation and recommend ways to apply the declaration.

The British had already begun decolonization well before the UN declaration. In the 1931 Statute of Westminster, Britain had granted virtual full independence to the self-governing dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Egypt received nominal independence in 1922, although the British continued to dominate Egyptian affairs until after World War II, and the last British hold on that country did not end until after the 1956 Suez Crisis. Indian independence came in 1947, but only amid sectarian Muslim-Hindu religious bloodshed and considerable chaos that produced India and Pakistan, states that remained bitter rivals thereafter. Burma and Sri Lanka became independent in 1948. Ghana and Malaya followed in 1957. British decolonization accelerated after 1960, the focus switching primarily to Africa as the following nations became independent: Nigeria (1960); Sierra Leone and Tanzania (1961); Jamaica, Trinidad, Uganda, and Western Samoa (1962); Kenya and Zanzibar (1963); Malawi and Zambia (1964); and Gambia, Lesotho, and the Cook Islands (1965). Guyana, Barbados, Lesotho, and Botswana were decolonized in 1966, and Mauritius and Swaziland were decolonized in 1968. Next came Fiji in 1970, followed by Tuvalu in 1978, Kiribati in 1979, Zimbabwe and Vanuatu in 1980, and finally Hong Kong in 1997.

Because Britain had prior experience and less at stake in its overseas possessions, decolonization was usually a matter of negotiation, transfer of sovereignty, and little resistance. Europeans recognized that negotiation was

Jomo Kenyatta, newly elected prime minister of Kenya, waves to his supporters on 19 June 1963. (Library of Congress)

more palatable than forced decolonization through internal resistance. Generally, the transfer was gentle enough in the British Empire that a representative of the royal family could attend the ceremonies.

Indicative of this process was the new appellation that the British had for their holdings. Previously the British Empire, during World War II it became the British Commonwealth of Nations, and in 1945 it became simply the Commonwealth of Nations. This implied that Britain was merely one member.

Similarly, the French Empire became the French Union in 1945. Under President de Gaulle in 1958, it became The Community. But French decolonization was far more turbulent than its British counterpart. The French controlled their possessions tightly from Paris, whereas the British tended to grant considerable self-government and autonomy. The French attitude toward decolonization was colored in part by their defeat by Germany in 1940 and the belief among many French leaders that only with its empire could France continue to be counted as a major power. Thus, Paris declined to recognize the inevitable in Indochina. The French refused meaningful concessions to the new government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

(DRV, North Vietnam) led by veteran communist Ho Chi Minh. Mistrust and miscalculation led in November 1946 to the eight-year Indochina War. The 1954 Geneva Conference called for independence for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, with elections set to occur in a divided Vietnam two years later.

In 1956 France gave independence to Morocco and Tunisia, but no peaceful transition occurred in the case of Algeria. The French had acquired Algeria in 1830, and the modern Algerian political entity was largely their creation. Algeria was technically an integral part of France, formed into three French departments, but the Muslim Algerians did not have full rights, and Algeria was in effect controlled by the European minority there. The French had crushed an Algerian nationalist outbreak at Sétif in 1945, but in November 1954 the National Liberation Front (FLN) began a guerrilla war against the French to bring about Algerian independence.

The ensuing Algerian War was long and bloody. Successive French leaders were determined to hold onto this possession, seeing it, as Premier Guy Mollet put it, as "France's California." The French Army was also determined that it would not again be betrayed by the politicians, and when it appeared as if Paris might open negotiations with the FLN, the army professionals teamed up with the Europeans in Algeria to overthrow the Fourth Republic and bring de Gaulle back to power. De Gaulle announced an ambitious developmental program for Algeria known as the Constantine Plan, but it came too late. Finally, he entered into negotiations with the FLN that saw Algeria independent in 1962.

Portugal also fought long, costly colonial wars in Africa, for Portuguese dictator António Salazar was determined to maintain control of his nation's considerable overseas empire. Fighting began in Angola in 1961, in Guinea in 1963, and in Mozambique in 1964. Ultimately, Portugal committed a sizable force of manpower and routinely spent half of its national budget on the fighting. In consequence, pressing problems in Portugal itself went unaddressed. A revolution in Portugal in 1974 brought about by younger army officers who were convinced that the colonial struggles could not be won led, by the end of 1975, to independence for its two giant African colonies of Angola and Mozambique as well as for Portuguese Timor in Southeast Asia.

In 1945 Belgium still retained control of the mineral-rich Belgian Congo in central Africa. The colony was among the worst-administered of any in Africa, and virtually nothing had been done to prepare it for independence, with few university-educated native doctors and lawyers or trained administrators present. In December 1959 riots broke out in the capital of Leopoldville (Kinshasa), sparked by the French grant of independence for the neighboring French Congo (Congo-Brazzaville). In January 1960 King Baudouin of Belgium announced his intention to end colonial rule, leading to independence for the Congo in June 1960. Soon the Congo lapsed into a bloody civil war.

The UN played an important role in the decolonization process. Articles 73–74 of Chapter XI of the UN Charter called for self-determination and set guidelines for decolonization. The UN set up a new format of trust territories to replace the mandate system set up after World War I. These included

Congolese parade through the streets in Leopoldville in the Belgian Congo celebrating their coming independence, 1960. (Library of Congress)

territories taken from the Axis powers or placed into the trusteeship system voluntarily. The term "trust" implied that these territories would work their way toward self-rule.

Nations administering trusteeships had an obligation to help the territories develop self-government and educational institutions as well as to foster social and economic development. Periodically the UN received and reviewed reports on the trust territories and their progress toward self-rule. Trusteeships that became independent included British-administered Togoland, which joined the Gold Coast in 1957 to form Ghana; Somaliland, which joined British Somalia in 1960 to create Somalia; French-administered Togoland, which became Togo in 1960; French-administered Cameroon, which became independent under the same name in 1960; and the British-administered Cameroons, which split in 1961, with the north combining with Nigeria and the south joining Cameroon.

Tanganyika won independence in 1961 and combined in 1964 with Zanzibar, independent in 1963, to create the United Republic of Tanzania. Belgian-administered Ruanda-Urundi split into the independent Rwanda

and Burundi in 1962. In the Pacific, Western Samoa became Samoa in 1962. Nauru became independent in 1968. New Guinea joined with Papua to become Papua New Guinea in 1975. Micronesia (1990), the Marshall Islands (1990), and Palau (1994)—three states of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands—became self-governing in free association with the United States in the 1990s. The Northern Mariana Islands became self-governing in commonwealth with the United States in 1990.

Decolonization left a mixed legacy. During the Cold War years, in Asian nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and China and also throughout much of Latin America, the United States was often perceived as seeking to substitute its own brand of anticommunist imperialism in place of Western colonialism. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, sought to encourage and align itself with nationalist movements in the developing world and to win the loyalties of such nations once they gained independence.

Some of the new states prospered, while others remained poor and backward. India and some Pacific Rim states such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia adjusted well and played important economic roles in the 1980s and 1990s. Poverty continues to plague the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, where the states are often artificial constructs carved out by the European imperialist powers with no regard for tribal or cultural boundaries and with few or no economic resources. Often the leaders of such states were able to work the Cold War to their advantage, playing the superpowers against one another. After the end of the Cold War, the Americans and Russians lost interest in the developing world, and long-standing rivalries reemerged as foreign aid was sharply reduced. Often civil war and famine were the result.

The postcolonial era saw the developing world's debts grow at a rate that made them impossible to repay. Much of the debt was owed to the most powerful states economically, the so-called G-8 countries. Nations in the developing world faced soaring oil prices in the 1970s, and they were forced to borrow heavily to stay afloat. Debt during 1973–1993 grew at more than 20 percent a year. With compound interest, the area's total debt by 1993 was $1.5 trillion. After renegotiation in 2000, the debt was still $350 billion. Only in the first decade of the twenty-first century did the G-8 states begin to take steps toward canceling that debt and developing coherent aid programs that had the potential to lift much of Africa from poverty and end the negative legacy of decolonization there.

John H. Barnhill and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Africa; Algerian War; Anticolonialism; Belgium; East Asia; France; Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Middle East; Portugal; Race Relations, United States; South Asia; Southeast Asia; United Kingdom; Vietnam War

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Defections

The term "defector" came into practical use after World War II to distinguish Soviet soldiers moving to the West from civilian refugees and often carried with it an ambiguous and negative connotation, suggesting that the person was "defective." The context often determined how a person was categorized, whether as a displaced person, refugee, or defector. Defectors were often viewed as traitors, political opportunists, or less-than-forthright individuals.

The first wave of Soviet defections began prior to World War II, primarily in response to Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's political purges. One of the earliest Soviet defectors was Boris Bajanov, once Stalin's personal secretary, who fled to France in 1928. A key early Cold War defector was Igor Gouzenko, who in September 1945 left his job as cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Canada and afterward revealed secrets about the Venona code used for sending Soviet diplomatic cables. He also exposed a Soviet spy ring operating in Canada and brought to light Soviet atomic espionage activities.

The total number of Cold War defectors from the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries remains to be determined. It has been estimated that about 50 Soviets successfully defected each year, the majority seeking political asylum in the United States. According to a sketchy report issued by the Jamestown Foundation to the U.S. Senate in 1986, however, in the four decades following World War II, there were 434 defections from the Soviet Union. The same report tabulated other Eastern bloc defection figures for the period 1946–1986: the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany), 431; Poland, more than 900; Hungary, 176; Czechoslovakia, more than 1,300; Bulgaria, 42; and Romania, 144. These numbers do not include the 3.5 million who fled East Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) between 1949 and 1961 or the 80,000 Czechs who fled their country or stayed abroad during the Prague Spring of 1968.

The Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), China, Vietnam, and Cuba also suffered defections. Conservative estimates, covering the period from the end of the Korean War in 1953 to 1989, reveal more than 600 defectors from North Korea, with a majority settling in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Following the final prisoner exchange at the end of the Korean War, 14,200 Chinese prisoners of war (POWs) chose not to return to their country. In November 1982, after completing his studies at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, Wang Bongzhang defected from China in order to stay in the West and to agitate for greater freedom in his homeland. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre in June 1989, a number of Chinese

Cuban defectors picked up by the Coast Guard, 1980. During the Mariel Boatlift, 125,000 Cubans defected to the United States. (U.S. Coast Guard)

dissidents, such as the prodemocracy activists Wuer Kaixi and Li Lu, escaped arrest by fleeing via Hong Kong to the West. Between 1975 and 1989, more than a million Vietnamese left their country in three different waves, some 275,000 finally settling in the United States. Cubans escaping Fidel Castro's regime also headed for America's shores, most notably 125,000 in the 1980 Mariel Boatlift.

In the West, defectors from communist countries were cast as symbols of ideological disillusionment. So it happened with Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, who during a 1967 trip to India obtained American asylum. Western nations viewed high-profile defectors such as diplomats, artists, musicians, athletes, and authors as proof of Marxist failings. This mind-set of Western superiority suffused the film *Moscow on the Hudson*, which portrays a Soviet circus saxophonist who defects inside a New York City department store.

However, not all defectors went from East to West. Even some Americans switched sides. During the prisoner exchange at the end of the Korean War, twenty-one American POWs reportedly elected to stay. Later, a small number of American soldiers crossed the demilitarized zone and defected to North Korea, including Charles Robert Jenkins, who remained there during 1965–2004. In 1985, Edward Lee Howard, a spurned CIA analyst, defected to the Soviet Union after evading the FBI in New Mexico and flying to Europe.

Relaxed Cold War tensions during détente prompted some American officials to advocate turning away Soviet defectors. This happened in November 1970 to the Soviet fisherman Simas Kudirka, who was returned after he boldly leaped from his fishing vessel onto the deck of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter off the coast of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. Defectors were still warmly received when state secrets were involved, as in September 1976 when President Gerald R. Ford granted asylum to Lieutenant Viktor Belenko after he flew his Soviet MiG-25 jet fighter to Japan. These and other defection dramas were part of the larger Cold War political and ideological struggle in which the two superpowers vied for world supremacy.

Roger Chapman

See also

Espionage; Mariel Boatlift; Refugees; Refuseniks

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De Gasperi, Alcide
(1881–1954)

Italian politician, leader of the Christian Democratic Party, and premier (1945–1953). Born in Pieve Tesino, Trento, on 3 April 1881, when that region was still part of the Austrian Tyrol, Alcide De Gasperi graduated from the University of Vienna in 1905. He founded the Partito Popolare Trentino (PPT, Trentine Popular Party) and was elected to the Austrian parliament in 1911. When Trentino became part of Italy in 1919, De Gasperi joined Luigi Sturzo's Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian Popular Party). De Gasperi was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1921 and emerged as one of Italy's foremost antifascist leaders. In 1927 he was incarcerated by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's government, but intercession by the Catholic Church secured his release. De Gasperi was allowed to live in the Vatican and worked in its library, under surveillance, until 1943.

With the end of fascism, De Gasperi became the undisputed leader of the Democrazia Cristiana (DC, Christian Democratic Party), which replaced the Partito Popolare and established itself as a pivotal force in Italian politics. From December 1944 to December 1945 he was foreign minister in the governments of Ivanoe Bonomi and Feruccio Parri. In December 1945 De Gasperi replaced Parri as premier, a position he retained until 1953. A moderate, centrist politician with a clear vision of Italy's future as a pro-Western country, De Gasperi skillfully led Italy through postwar reconstruction and the early years of the Cold War.

As Italian premier, De Gasperi immediately began the hard work of transforming a defeated nation into a legitimate member of the international system. His 1947 state visit to the United States earned him the political and economic support of President Harry S. Truman. In May 1947, De Gasperi's decision to form a new cabinet without the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) broke the wartime antifascist coalition and ushered in a period of strong disagreement between the DC and the communist-led opposition. De Gasperi led the DC to an undisputed victory in the dramatic elections of April 1948.

Alcide De Gasperi, leader of the Christian Democratic Party and prime minister of Italy (1945–1953). (National Archives and Records Administration)

De Gasperi signed on to the 1947 Marshall Plan but in early 1948 exhibited hesitation in joining the Brussels Treaty. He also authorized Italy's inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. His efforts to rebuild Italy's international reputation were matched by his interest in the early stages of European integration. After Italy joined the European Coal and Steel Community (EEC) in 1950, De Gasperi became a leading proponent of European unity.

De Gasperi's concerns over the growing tensions in Italian politics led him to propose an electoral reform that was defeated at the polls in June 1953, thus ending his political career. He died in Pieve, Tesino, on 19 August 1954.

Leopoldo Nuti

See also

Brussels Treaty; European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; European Integration Movement; Italy; Marshall Plan; Nenni, Pietro; North Atlantic Treaty

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De Gaulle, Charles
(1890–1970)

French Army general, head of the French government-in-exile during World War II, provisional president of the Fourth Republic (1944–1946), and president of the Fifth Republic (1958–1969). Born in Lille, France, on 22 November 1890, Charles André Marie Joseph de Gaulle was arguably France's greatest statesman of the twentieth century.

In 1909 de Gaulle joined the French Army and three years later graduated from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr. He fought in World War I and was severely wounded twice. Promoted to captain in September 1915, he was wounded a third time and then captured by the Germans at Verdun in March 1916. He was a prisoner of war for the remainder of the conflict. Following the war, he returned to Saint-Cyr as professor of history. Later he taught at the École de Guerre, the French war college, then served as aide-de-camp to French Army commander Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain. De Gaulle also became an important theorist of armored warfare and in 1934 published a book on the subject, arguing for a fully motorized and mechanized professional army with organic air support. Had his ideas been implemented, the 1940 defeat of France might never have occurred.

When the May 1940 battle for France opened, de Gaulle received command of the 4th Tank Division. It achieved one of the few successes scored by the French Army in the campaign, bringing him promotion to brigadier general on 1 June. Within a week Premier Paul Reynaud brought de Gaulle

into his cabinet as undersecretary of state for national defense.

Reynaud rejected de Gaulle's advice to fight on, and on 17 June the general left Bordeaux for London. A day later he spoke over the British Broadcasting Company and urged his countrymen to continue the war against Germany. He headed the French Resistance in World War II, but his wartime relations with the British and Americans were strained and often difficult. De Gaulle acted as if he were a true head of state, while the British and Americans persisted in treating him as an auxiliary. He was embittered by blatant British efforts to dislodge the French from prewar positions of influence in Syria and Lebanon and by the failure of the Anglo-American powers to consult him in matters regarding French national interests.

From late August 1944 de Gaulle ruled France as provisional president. He was determined that France would retain its role as a great power and serve as a bridge between East and West, a point that he stressed during a week-long meeting with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in Moscow in December 1944. De Gaulle also concluded a twenty-year treaty of alliance and mutual security with the Soviet Union. At the same time, he sought to reassert French control over Indochina. In August 1945 he sent an expeditionary corps of two divisions under General Jacques Philippe Leclerc as well as a naval squadron to Indochina and appointed Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu high commissioner to Indochina to restore French sovereignty over its colonial territory.

One of the greatest French statesmen of the twentieth century, Charles de Gaulle led the Free French against the Axis powers during World War II and was provisional president of France during 1944–1946. In 1958 he established the Fifth Republic and served as its president until 1969. (Library of Congress)

In January 1946 when a French constitutional convention rejected de Gaulle's calls for a strong presidency, he abruptly resigned. He spent the next years writing his war memoirs as the French Fourth Republic stumbled from one crisis to another. In May 1958, having survived the long and unsuccessful war in Indochina, the Fourth Republic finally collapsed under the weight of another war, this time in Algeria. De Gaulle then returned to power, technically as the last premier of the Fourth Republic.

Although at the time there were serious doubts in France and abroad about the general's intentions, de Gaulle's preservation of the democratic process was in fact his greatest legacy to France. His Fifth Republic ushered in the strong presidential system and political stability that he had long advocated as well as a degree of domestic tranquility.

The most intractable problem facing de Gaulle, however, remained Algeria. The army had brought de Gaulle back to power ostensibly to maintain Algeria as a French territory. But in a convoluted process, options for the disposition of Algeria were systematically eliminated. There were terrorist activities in France itself as well as several revolts by the generals and Algerian

settlers and attempts on de Gaulle's own life. Algeria became independent in 1962.

In international affairs de Gaulle was arguably less successful, largely because he sought to reassert a French greatness that had vanished. He saw France as leader of a third European force between the two superpowers. He pushed the development of a French atomic bomb and then the nuclear strike force, the Force de Frappe, to deliver it. De Gaulle's entente with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) was a significant achievement, and it was de Gaulle who began the process of détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. More questionable was his withdrawal of France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military command, although he gave strong support when the West was pressured by the Soviet Union. De Gaulle twice vetoed British entry into the European Common Market, and he cut France's close ties to Israel and called on Quebec to secede from Canada. De Gaulle also lectured the Americans on Vietnam, warning President John F. Kennedy that intervention in Indochina would be "an endless entanglement."

With the defeat in 1969 of a national referendum on administrative reform, which de Gaulle made a litmus test of his leadership, he again resigned and retired to write his final set of memoirs. De Gaulle had completed two volumes and part of the third when he died at his home at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises on 9 November 1970.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Algerian War; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; Force de Frappe; France; Franco-German Friendship Treaty; Indochina War; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Stalin, Josef; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

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Demirel, Süleyman
(1924–)

Turkish politician, prime minister, and ninth president of Turkey (1993–2000). Born on 6 October 1924 into a peasant family in İslamköy, Isparta, in

southwest Anatolia, Süleyman Demirel received his bachelor's degree in civil engineering from Istanbul Technical University in 1949 and pursued postgraduate studies in the United States during 1950–1951. Upon his return to Turkey, he served as the head of the department of dams and director of the department of irrigation. In 1962, he joined the center-rightist Justice Party and became its chairman in 1964.

Demirel's life vividly exemplified the chaotic, unstable nature of Turkish politics during the Cold War. From 1965 to 1980, he formed six coalition governments, all of which had to be disbanded because of parliamentary politics or military coups. His three administrations during the 1970s were plagued with high inflation, trade deficits, and either leftist or rightist extremism. In 1971, Turkish military leaders demanded his resignation, claiming that he was unable to suppress escalating civil strife. In 1980, the military intervened once again for similar reasons and placed Demirel under house arrest in Zincirbozan. He was forbidden from participating in politics for the next ten years.

When the political ban was lifted after a popular referendum in 1987, Demirel became chairman of the True Path Party and was elected to parliament. In 1991 the party won a majority of seats in parliament, elevating Demirel to the premiership for the seventh time. Upon the sudden death of President Turgut Özal, Demirel was elected president in 1993. He served a full seven-year term and left office in 2000.

As prime minister, Demirel implemented developmentalist agricultural and economic policies and pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, advocating the strengthening of Turkey's ties to the Western alliance. As president, he fostered the smooth functioning of the government through an effective coordination of public institutions. Demirel now resides in Ankara.

Burcak Keskin-Kozat

See also

Özal, Turgut; Turkey

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Deng Xiaoping
(1904–1997)

Vice premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Born in Guang'an, Sichuan Province,

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping speaks at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. (Wally McNamee/Corbis)

China, on 22 August 1904, Deng Xiaoping traveled to France in 1920 on a work-study basis, and there he joined the CCP in 1922. In 1927 he returned to China and was assigned to oversee the CCP's political operations. During the Chinese Civil War (1947–1949), Deng, as political commissar of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), fought hard in central China, ensuring the CCP's victory over the Nationalist forces.

After the PRC's birth in October 1949, Deng became a member of the Central People's Government Council and the Revolutionary Military Council. He also became vice chairman of the Southwest China Military and Administrative Council, responsible for reorganizing southwestern China. In August 1952 Deng became vice premier and the next year finance minister and chairman of the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee. He was instrumental in preparing the first Five-Year Plan (1953–1958) to reform the Chinese economy.

In May 1954, Deng was identified as secretary-general of the CCP's Central Committee, a post that brought him to the command level of the party's hierarchy. Until the mid-1960s he assumed more posts, including membership in the Politburo. He was also active in foreign affairs, accompanying a number of delegations abroad. His tenure witnessed the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split.

Deng was purged three times during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) on charges that he was a bourgeois reactionary. He eventually reassumed the

vice premiership in mid-1977 when Hua Guofeng, the new PRC chairman, called on him to rehabilitate the Chinese economy. Returned to power, Deng inaugurated the Four Modernizations of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology. In foreign matters, he was equally innovative. In February 1978, he visited the United States, which resulted in full U.S. diplomatic recognition of the PRC on 1 March 1978. In terms of the PRC's reunification project, Deng developed the one country–two systems model, to be applied to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.

Beginning in 1981, Deng retreated from the limelight, first resigning the vice premiership, then succeeding Hua as chairman of the Central Military Commission, a post he held until 1990. During his tenure as chairman, he ordered the crackdown against demonstrators in the June 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Deng died on 19 February 1997 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Cultural Revolution; Hua Guofeng; Tiananmen Square

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Denmark

Constitutional monarchy situated in northern Europe. Denmark proper has a land area of 16,639 square miles. The Kingdom of Denmark also includes the Faeroe Islands in the North Atlantic (540 square miles) and Greenland (839,900 square miles). Denmark is bordered by Germany to its south; the remainder is surrounded by the North Sea to the west, north, and east and the Baltic Sea to the southeast. As a European frontline state, Denmark, with a population of only some 3.8 million people in 1945, was hesitant to take sides during the Cold War but, as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member from 1949, generally supported NATO policies including détente and disarmament. A consensus on Denmark's position in the Western alliance, in military, political, and cultural terms, included most mainstream political parties.

In 1945, Denmark strongly supported a collective security system within the framework of the United Nations (UN). When relations between the great powers began to sour in 1946, however, it became clear that the UN would not be able to fulfill this role. At the same time, communist takeovers in Central and Eastern Europe were, by 1948, worryingly close to Denmark.

A division of Europe into two rival blocs would place Denmark on the front lines of the Cold War. Although both the Soviet Union and the Western powers saw Denmark within the Western sphere, Danish postwar governments attempted to maintain a third position between the emerging blocs. Danish military participation in the administration of Britain's German occupation zone and, later, acceptance of the Marshall Plan did, however, position Denmark unequivocally in the Western bloc well before Denmark signed on with NATO in 1949.

Nevertheless, Danish membership in NATO was contested. During 1948–1949, Danish Social Democratic Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft worked hard to establish a Scandinavian Defense Union that would have maintained a somewhat neutral status. Only when this failed did he favor the NATO solution. Danish membership was opposed not only by the Communist Party but also by the Social Liberal Party, which traditionally had strong links to the Social Democrats. Thus, the emerging Cold War not only forced the Danish government to give up a long tradition of neutrality but also placed long-established alliances in Danish politics under considerable strain.

There were a number of areas where Danish governments were at odds with the Americans. In 1953, the government vetoed the establishment of NATO bases in Denmark. In 1957, it refused to allow nuclear weapons on Danish territory. From the mid-1950s, Danish military expenditures were cut, and the Danes had strong reservations about a joint German-Danish Command within NATO before finally acceding to it in 1961.

There are more nuances to the Danish position, however. Although Danish governments often disagreed with their American counterparts and preferred détente to rearmament during the Cold War, Danish membership in NATO was never questioned. Furthermore, Denmark proved amenable when it came to U.S. demands regarding Greenland. Especially in the 1950s, Danish governments clearly used the American interest in military bases in Greenland as part of the U.S. polar strategy to negotiate for political concessions in other areas. Finally, Denmark waged an efficient struggle against local communists in the first decades of the Cold War.

By the 1950s the Danish Communist Party became marginalized in Danish politics and society. A relentless Social Democratic campaign against communist strongholds in the Labor Movement is one explanation. Another is that Danish communists closely followed Moscow's line, which made them vulnerable to criticism. The making of a modern welfare state in Denmark also made the Soviet Union much less of a role model to Danish workers. When the social security of the welfare state was supplemented by the development of an American-style consumer society beginning in the early 1960s, only a small and isolated congregation continued to look eastward for salvation.

From the 1950s to the early 1970s, Denmark experienced high economic growth rates and almost full employment. During this period, Denmark was gradually transformed from an agrarian-based economy to a modern industrial society. In the same years, a series of reforms in social policy transformed Denmark into a modern welfare state with a strong public services sector. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, Danish domestic policies came under

increasing debate from all political parties due to the economic pressures caused by rising unemployment.

Although international tensions began to decline in the 1960s, such was not the case in the Baltic Sea, where Danes were alarmed by growing Warsaw Pact activity. Consequently, Denmark became more closely integrated militarily within NATO. Cooperation within the Baltic Sea Command was strengthened, and Denmark's NATO membership was renewed without debate in 1969. In 1973 and 1977 new defense budgets and agreements underlined the importance of the NATO membership, and the Danish military was modernized with new weapon systems, such as American F-16 fighters. On the other hand, Denmark in the same period was actively trying to formulate new security policies focusing on disarmament and détente. Thus, Denmark was a strong supporter of the Helsinki Process, which culminated with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

The general climate of détente made Danish alliance policies less controversial domestically and at the same time offered more space for maneuvering internationally. Danish criticism of American foreign policy in Vietnam was especially pronounced, although this did not engender anti-Americanism per se. Indeed, most criticism was based on the Danish perception that the United States did not live up to its professed democratic ideals.

When the Cold War intensified beginning in 1979 and détente between the Americans and Soviets seemed all but over, domestic political conflicts in Denmark also grew. The Danish peace movement gained momentum and was committed to setting a new security policy agenda. The Social Democratic government at first backed NATO's official policies (including the Double-Track Decision of 1979). After losing power in 1982, the party adopted a more critical line, which during 1982–1988 became so influential that Danish security policy toward NATO was decided by opposition parties rather than by the Conservative-Liberal minority government. The breakdown of a broad national consensus on security policy forced the government —on more than twenty occasions—to emphasize Danish disagreement with NATO policies, especially those concerning nuclear weapons. NATO membership as such was never questioned, however, and the issues involved were mainly ones that represented a domestic political struggle for power.

The end of the Cold War offered new opportunities to small nations with big ambitions such as Denmark. Building on NATO as the cornerstone of Danish security policy, Denmark has been active in developing closer cooperation with former adversaries such as Poland and the Baltic states. Denmark also became a compliant member of NATO activities in out-of-area operations such as the interventions in the former Yugoslavia. The heretofore "reluctant ally" has thus become one of America's closest allies.

Klaus Petersen and Nils Arne Sørensen

See also

Détente; Double-Track Decision, NATO; Faeroe Islands; Greenland; Helsinki Final Act; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Scandinavia

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DePuy, William Eugene

(1919–1992)

U.S. Army general who played a pivotal role in rebuilding the army following the Vietnam War. Born in Jamestown, North Dakota, on 19 October 1919, William DePuy joined the National Guard before World War II and later graduated from South Dakota State University with an ROTC commission as an infantry officer. Assigned to the 90th Infantry Division, he initially served as an operations officer during the division's landing on Utah Beach on 8 June 1944. Shortly before the start of the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, DePuy became a battalion commander at age twenty-five. By the end of the war, he had earned the Distinguished Service Cross, three Silver Stars, and two Purple Hearts.

Following World War II, DePuy studied the Russian language, served several tours as an attaché, and was attached to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) working in China operations. He went to Vietnam in May 1964 as the chief of operations (J-3) at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In March 1966, as a major general, he assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division ("The Big Red One"), quickly establishing the division's reputation for agility and rapid response with airmobile assets to overwhelm the Viet Cong. DePuy led the division through the critical battle of Ap Tau O and Operations GOLDEN STATE and ATTLEBORO. He earned his second Distinguished Service Cross in Vietnam.

In February 1967 DePuy returned to Washington as the assistant to the vice chief of staff of the army. He was one of the key promoters of the Big Five Weapons Systems—the Apache attack helicopter, the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley armored fighting vehicle, the Patriot air defense system, and the Blackhawk utility helicopter—that proved so successful in the Persian Gulf and Iraq Wars.

DePuy's greatest influence on the post-Vietnam army came with the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in July 1973 and his appointment to head it as a full general. He forced the army to examine thoroughly and overhaul completely its war-fighting doctrine. The resulting 1976 edition of the capstone manual *FM 100–5 Operations* reoriented the army from fighting a guerrilla war in Asia to fighting and winning on the continent of Europe against Warsaw Pact forces that were overwhelmingly superior in numbers of equipment and men.

DePuy's concept of active defense was highly controversial and was widely criticized as being too mechanistic and dependent on firepower at the expense of maneuver. Nonetheless, his reforms and the debate that surrounded them generated a renaissance in American military thinking that very shortly led to the recognition of the Operational Level of Warfare and the AirLand Battle doctrine with which both Gulf wars were fought. DePuy retired from the army in July 1977 as a full general. He died in Arlington, Virginia, on 9 September 1992.

David T. Zabecki

See also
AirLand Battle

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Détente

Period of relaxed Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union that began in the late 1960s and ended by 1980. A French word, "détente" originally referred to the slackening of tension on the string of a crossbow. To release the tension on the string meant that the crossbow could not be fired quickly, as it would have to be cranked up again before it could be used. This explains the application of the term to warfare and to the Cold War.

Although President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger rightfully laid claim to the implementation of détente, a Cold War thaw was clearly well under way as early as 1967, the year that President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin met at Glassboro, New Jersey, in a summit that produced little of substance but was nonetheless hailed as a breakthrough in superpower diplomacy. That same year saw the superpowers sign the Outer Space Treaty, which forbade the placement of nuclear missiles and other weapons of mass destruction in space.

When Nixon took office in January 1969, he and Kissinger immediately began to sketch out their grand design for the recasting of East-West relations. Part of the plan was to engage the Soviets in trade agreements, increased cultural exchanges, and arms limitation negotiations. Another piece of détente would capitalize on the growing Sino-Soviet split by simultaneously reaching out to the People's Republic of China (PRC), which the United States had heretofore refused to officially recognize. Nixon and Kissinger hoped to play

the Soviets and Chinese against one another in order to entice both nations to alter their policies toward the West and its proxies.

Larger international developments also played a part in the development of détente. Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–1974) of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and his successor Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982) helped ease East-West tensions with Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik, which sought to smooth relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and the Soviet Union. Ostpolitik successfully drew West and East Germany closer together and undoubtedly added urgency to Nixon and Kissinger's détente. The fact that the Soviets and Americans had reached rough nuclear parity by 1968 and were both eager to implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which went into effect in March 1970, suggested that détente was a necessary and desirable progression for both sides.

Clearly, both the United States and the Soviet Union stood to gain from détente. The Soviets saw it as a way to boost East-West trade and to buy badly needed agricultural products, particularly grain, from the Americans. The Americans in turn viewed détente as a way to seal lucrative, large-scale trade deals and to lessen the burden of high defense budgets resulting from the Vietnam War. Obviously, all benefited by reducing Cold War antipathies that might escalate to nuclear war. For his part, Nixon used détente for political gain. Seeking a way to boost his reelection chances in 1972, the president employed his high-profile trips to Beijing and Moscow to focus public attention on foreign policy triumphs during a time in which the economy was faltering, the backlash against Vietnam was increasing, and race relations were still at a slow boil. Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev also employed détente for political expediency. Indeed, given the rocky relations with China, Brezhnev saw in détente a way to boost his popularity at home, elevate the Soviet position within the communist bloc, and consolidate his power within the Kremlin.

Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972, a widely publicized spectacle in which two former enemies—Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong—were seen amiably toasting one another. That the opening of relations with China began before Nixon first visited Moscow was not lost on the Soviets, who showed a renewed commitment to détente, fearing that the Americans and Chinese would conspire against them.

Nixon and Brezhnev's first summit took place in Moscow in May 1972. The meeting was a cordial one that resulted in concrete diplomatic achievements. Altogether the two leaders arrived at seven separate agreements ranging from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) Interim Agreement and the beginning of SALT II talks to expanded commerce, limiting the likelihood of accidental war, and promoting cooperative research projects. That summer, the U.S. Congress approved the SALT I accords and a three-year grain deal with the Soviets. In the meantime, both nations became signatories to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Biological Warfare Convention in 1972. Brezhnev visited Washington in June 1973 for the second summit. The meeting was a generally productive one, and both men

Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Richard M. Nixon meet during Brezhnev's 1973 visit to the United States. (National Archives and Records Administration)

had obviously developed a considerable personal rapport. Both sides agreed to redouble their efforts in negotiating a second SALT agreement, which had run into technical problems over the existence of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

The third and last summit between Nixon and Brezhnev—occurring in June 1974—was the least productive. By then, Nixon's personal and political fortunes as well as other roadblocks conspired to work against a broadening of détente. Although the Americans and Chinese continued to inch their way toward normalized relations, after 1974 the forward momentum of the U.S.-Soviet détente began to falter. By the summer of 1974, Nixon was clearly preoccupied with the Watergate crisis, which was about to doom his presidency; he was a lame duck. The SALT II talks were stalled, and neither side seemed willing to break the logjam. The U.S. Congress, which already had its sights on Nixon, balked at making any further trade or arms deals with the Soviets as long as they continued to mistreat their Jewish population.

Nixon's successor, Gerald R. Ford, was committed to détente. But his uneasy and brief term, seen by many as a caretaker presidency, did not give him much clout with a hostile and Democratically controlled Congress. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, he too supported détente. However, his administration's emphasis on human rights soon strained relations

The 1979 Iranian Revolution hamstrung Carter, compelling many Americans to conclude that America had become a toothless tiger.

with Moscow. Détente came unglued in 1979. The 1979 Iranian Revolution hamstrung Carter, compelling many Americans to conclude that the United States had become a toothless tiger. Deteriorating relations with the Soviets became a full-blown crisis when they invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Carter, now under enormous pressure to act tough, condemned the Afghanistan invasion, initiated a substantial military buildup, and pointedly boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Détente was all but finished.

When Ronald Reagan came to office in January 1981, he took a hard-line stance with the Soviets. He engaged the nation in a massive conventional and military buildup, resorted to bellicose anti-Soviet rhetoric reminiscent of the early Cold War, and refused to negotiate with the Soviets. The doomed SALT II Treaty was abandoned, and U.S.-Soviet relations reached a nadir not known since the early 1960s. Only after Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in late 1985 did superpower relations improve, beginning the final phase of the Cold War that ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 31 December 1991.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Brandt, Willy; Brezhnev, Leonid; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; China, People's Republic of; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Glassboro Summit; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Ostpolitik; Outer Space Treaty; Sino-Soviet Split; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

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De Valera, Eamon
(1882–1975)

Irish politician, founder of the Fianna Fáil party, and prime minister (1932–1948, 1951–1955, 1957–1959) and president (1959–1973) of Ireland. Eamon De Valera was arguably one of the most important politicians in twentieth-century Irish history, a leading figure in the Irish struggle for independence, and one of the architects of the Republic of Ireland. Born Edward George De Valera on 14 October 1882 in New York City, he went to Bruree, Ireland, at age two with his parents. Educated in Charleville and Dublin, he became

a mathematics teacher. In his twenties, he became involved in Irish nationalist politics.

De Valera joined the Gaelic League as well as the Irish Volunteers on its creation in 1913. In April 1916, he commanded a unit of the Irish Volunteers in the Easter Uprising in Dublin, for which he was arrested and imprisoned. Released in 1917, De Valera, now president of Sinn Féin, entered the British House of Commons in the 1918 general elections. Following another short imprisonment during 1918–1919, he assumed the office of president of the Dáil Éireann (Irish parliament), of which he was a member until 1959.

During the Anglo-Irish War (1919–1921), De Valera's task was to raise funds among Irish Americans to support Ireland's fight for independence. Shortly after his return to Ireland, the war ended with the establishment of the Irish Free State (which became Eire in 1937). This dominion status was bitterly opposed by De Valera and his republican followers in the ensuing Irish Civil War (1922–1923). After another brief period in prison, De Valera and his supporters gave up their fight and formed a new party, Fianna Fáil, in March 1926. Upon accepting the de facto existence of the Free State, it entered the Dáil in August 1927. In February 1932 the party won a majority, and De Valera became prime minister in March 1932. That same year he also became president of the Council of the League of Nations, and in 1938 he assumed the presidency of the league's assembly. De Valera's international reputation, combined with skillful politics, helped him realize Ireland's de facto independence by passing a new Irish constitution in 1937.

Determined, resourceful, and stubborn, Eamon De Valera was an important leader in Ireland's fight for independence during the first half of the twentieth century. He served extended terms as both prime minister and president. (Library of Congress)

De Valera kept Eire strictly neutral during World War II, in part because of a fear of German invasion. The inability of the Royal Navy to use Irish ports was a serious blow to the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. Protests by De Valera also prevented the British government from introducing conscription in Northern Ireland. De Valera's stance may have prevented reunification of Northern Ireland with Eire in return for Eire's participation in the war. In 1948 the last ties with Britain were severed, and Eire became the Republic of Ireland. After sixteen consecutive years in power, De Valera stepped down following defeat in the Irish elections of February 1948.

De Valera headed two further governments (1951–1955 and 1957–1959) and was president of Ireland from June 1959 to June 1973. Successful in his goal of ending all ties with Britain (which many Irish would later question), he had failed in his other two chief tasks of reunifying the island and making Gaelic the official language of the republic. His influence had helped keep hatreds inflamed for too long and had retarded the modernization of his country. De Valera died in Dublin on 29 August 1975.

Matthias Trefs

See also

Ireland, Northern; Ireland, Republic of; Irish Republican Army; Nationalism; Sinn Féin; United Kingdom

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Dewey, Thomas Edmund
(1902–1971)

Attorney, governor of New York (1943–1955), Republican leader, and unsuccessful presidential candidate (1944, 1948). Born in Owosso, Michigan, on 24 March 1902, Thomas Edmund Dewey received his undergraduate degree in 1923 from the University of Michigan and earned a law degree from Columbia University in 1925. As special prosecutor for New York, he soon earned a reputation as a tenacious fighter and an extraordinarily well-disciplined public servant. He also became famous for taking on organized crime and other illegal syndicates.

Elected governor of New York three times and twice the Republican candidate for president of the United States, Thomas E. Dewey is remembered for his unexpected presidential election loss to Democrat Harry Truman in 1948. (Library of Congress)

In 1937 Dewey was elected district attorney of Manhattan, arguably the most prestigious district in the nation. He continued his efforts to clamp down on organized crime, and in 1938 he ran unsuccessfully for the governorship of New York. In 1942 his perseverance paid off when he was elected governor of New York on the Republican ticket. This was no small feat in a heavily Democratic bastion. Dewey, a progressive Republican, introduced the nation's first civil rights legislation and earmarked substantially more money for education.

In 1944 Dewey won the Republican presidential nomination. He waged a valiant campaign that year and managed to garner 46 percent of the vote. But it was unlikely that any candidate would have unseated President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a native New Yorker, during World War II.

Undeterred, Dewey again ran for president in 1948 against President Harry S. Truman. Dewey's only strong foreign policy difference with the president was over the extent of U.S. aid to the Republic of China (Nationalist China), which Dewey sought to expand. He refused to attack Truman on foreign policy issues during the campaign, however, believing that this would only work to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Dewey was expected to

win the election, but Truman came on strong at the end and defeated him, albeit with just 49 percent of the vote.

Dewey turned his energies back to the New York State House, which he ran until 1955 when his third term ended. He subsequently practiced law in the private sector and remained fully engaged in Republican politics. Dewey died on 16 March 1971 in Bal Harbour, Florida.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.

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Dien Bien Phu, Battle of
(13 March–7 May 1954)

One of the most decisive battles of the twentieth century, signaling the end of the Indochina War and of Western colonialism in Asia. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, lasting from 13 March to 7 May, pitted the Vietnamese nationalist forces, the Viet Minh, against the French Army and allied indigenous forces.

In early 1954 Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap planned to invade Laos with five divisions. He hoped to take all of Laos and perhaps Cambodia and then link up with Viet Minh forces operating in southern Vietnam. In response, French commander in Indochina General Henri Navarre implemented Operation CASTOR, the establishment of a base in the village of Dien Bien Phu in far northwestern Vietnam. Navarre hoped to use this as a blocking position astride the chief Viet Minh invasion route into northern



A French paratrooper packs up his parachute upon his landing in the area of Dien Bien Phu, 25 November 1953. The French Indochina fortress fell to the Viet Minh on 8 May 1954 after a bloody fifty-five-day siege. (Staff/AFP/Getty Images)

Laos but also as bait to draw into battle Viet Minh forces and destroy them with superior French artillery and airpower.

Located in a remote valley some 200 miles by air from Hanoi, Dien Bien Phu had a small airstrip. On 20 November 1953, 2,200 French paratroopers dropped into the valley and easily swept aside a small Viet Minh contingent. Navarre assumed that at most Giap would commit one division to Dien Bien Phu. The French were confident that in any case, the garrison could easily be evacuated. Navarre did not worry about controlling the hills around Dien Bien Phu because, as he pointed out, the Viet Minh did not have any artillery there. This turned out to be a serious misapprehension.

Colonel Christian de Castries commanded the French forces at Dien Bien Phu. The men there were entirely dependent on air supply by some 75 C-47 Dakotas. For ground support, the French could call on 48 B-26 and Privateer bombers, 112 Bearcat and Hellcat fighter-bombers, and several helicopters. Castries established his central command post in the village and ordered construction around it of a series of strong points, reportedly all named for his mistresses: Beatrice, Gabrielle, Anne-Marie, Dominique, Huguette, Françoise, Elaine, and Isabelle. The location of Isabelle was unfortunate; it was 3 miles to the south, separated from the others. Easily cut off, it also tied

down a third of the French forces. The French fortifications were also inadequate (all equipment had to be brought in by air), but Castries assumed that his artillery could quickly knock out any enemy guns that could be brought against him. By mid-March the French had nearly 11,000 men in the valley, a third of them ethnic Vietnamese. Ultimately the French committed 16,544 men there.

Giap accepted the challenge, but there was political pressure on him to do so. A diplomatic conference among the great powers to discuss Asia was about to begin in Geneva, and Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh believed that a major military victory might force the French into negotiations to end the war. Giap committed four divisions of some 49,500 combat troops, along with 31,500 support personnel.

The siege opened on 13 March 1954 with a heavy Viet Minh bombardment. Although the French added 4,000 men during the battle, Giap more than offset this with increases of his own and steadily strengthened his artillery, with thousands of porters dragging the guns by hand there. Ultimately the Viet Minh deployed more artillery pieces at Dien Bien Phu and fired more rounds than did the French. The French possessed only four 155mm howitzers, twenty-four 105mm howitzers, and four 120mm mortars. The Viet Minh deployed twenty to twenty-four 105mm howitzers, fifteen to twenty 75mm howitzers, twenty 120mm mortars, and at least forty 82mm mortars along with eighty Chinese-crewed 37mm antiaircraft guns, one hundred antiaircraft machine guns, and twelve to sixteen 6-tube Katyusha rocket launchers.

On the very first night of the siege, 13–14 March, the Viet Minh took Beatrice. Gabrielle fell two days later. The Viet Minh also shelled the airstrip, destroying or driving away French aircraft and knocking out the radio direction beacon, which was critical for aerial resupply. C-47s still flew in supplies and evacuated wounded, but at great risk. The last flight in or out of the fortress occurred on 27 March. During the battle, the Viet Minh shot down forty-eight French planes and destroyed another sixteen on the ground.

On 22 March the French used the last four of their ten U.S.-supplied M24 Chaffee light tanks to counterattack Viet Minh troops that had cut off Isabelle. The first French success of the battle, it also claimed 151 French dead. The arrival of the rainy season made conditions miserable for defender and attacker alike. Heavy casualties from costly Viet Minh human-wave tactics created morale problems and forced Giap to call a halt and then shift to classic siege warfare of trenches inching ever closer to the French lines. The final assault occurred on 6 May, and the last French troops surrendered on the evening of 7 May.

In the battle the French sustained some 20,000 casualties: 2,242 killed, 3,711 missing, 6,463 wounded, and 6,500 prisoners, not counting those forces lost in relief operations. The Viet Minh took some 22,900 casualties: 7,900 killed and 15,000 wounded. A plan to rescue the garrison or to break out came too late. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh immediately sent their 6,500 prisoners off on foot on a 500-mile trek to prison camps from which fewer than half would return.

Although the battle had tied down Viet Minh resources, it had not helped the French situation elsewhere in Indochina. The outcome of the battle also allowed French political leaders to shift the blame for the defeat in Indochina to the French Army. Pierre Mendès-France became premier and announced his intention to secure a peace settlement at Geneva. Although the peace agreement was reached that July, it proved to be only a truce.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Mendès-France, Pierre; Navarre, Henri; Vo Nguyen Giap

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Dillon, Clarence Douglas
(1909–2003)

Influential financier, diplomat, undersecretary of state for economic affairs (1959–1961), and secretary of the treasury (1961–1965). Born in Geneva, Switzerland, on 21 August 1909 to the immensely wealthy and powerful financier Clarence Dillon, Clarence Douglas Dillon attended the exclusive Groton School and graduated from Harvard University in 1931. That same year, his father gave him $185,000 to buy a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. In 1936 he began serving as director of the United States and Foreign Securities Corporation. Later he was its president. In 1938 Dillon joined his father's New York investment firm of Dillon, Read & Company.

During World War II, Dillon served in the U.S. Navy. In 1946 he was selected chairman of the board of Dillon, Read & Company. In the late 1940s, he became active in Republican politics. His many contacts with Washington power brokers resulted in his being named ambassador to France in 1953. Beginning in 1957 he began consulting with the State Department on economic matters. In 1959 he resigned his ambassadorship to become undersecretary of state for economic affairs. In this capacity he directed the Mutual Security Program and played a key role in the creation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), formed in 1961. He was also a founder of the Inter-American Development Bank. Dillon's work did not go unnoticed by incoming President John F. Kennedy, who took the unusual step of appointing Dillon, a Republican, to head the U.S. Treasury.

Dillon pursued aggressive economic policies that paid handsome dividends in the long term. He was a strong proponent of free and unfettered

trade and championed European economic integration. Indeed, under his direction the United States worked more closely than ever with the European Economic Community (EEC). Dillon's policies also produced an overhaul of U.S. trade policy. In addition, he became the chief point man for Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Dillon stayed on after Kennedy's 1963 assassination but decided to leave his post in April 1965. He went on to serve on many corporate boards, remained active in Republican Party politics, and became a major patron of the arts, donating $20 million to the New York Metropolitan Museum. To this day, Dillon's policies during the early 1960s are credited with helping to create the tremendous economic boom that the United States enjoyed throughout the 1960s. Dillon died in New York City on 10 January 2003.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Alliance for Progress

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Dimitrov, Georgi Mikhailovich
(1892–1949)

Controversial Bulgarian patriot, founder of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and Bulgaria's first post–World War II prime minister (1946–1949). Born on 18 June 1892 in Kovachevsti, Bulgaria, Georgi Dimitrov began his storied career as a typographer at age fourteen, soon becoming active in the labor union movement and the Bulgarian Social Democrat Party. At the age of twenty-one he was instrumental in forming an offshoot party that favored Leninist organizational ideology over milder socialist prescriptions. A member of the Bulgarian parliament since 1913, Dimitrov was briefly jailed for his vehement antiwar stance during World War I. In 1919, he helped found the Bulgarian Communist Party, which gave the impression that he was closely tied to Moscow, but he was, in fact, more in line with the growing agrarian-populist movement. Dimitrov became a forced expatriate after having led a failed communist coup against the Bulgarian government in 1923. He spent his exile in both Yugoslavia and Austria.

By the 1930s Dimitrov had become an ardent opponent of Nazism and after nearly a decade of antifascist agitation finally sought refuge in the Soviet Union. He gained Soviet citizenship in 1934 and served as the general secretary of the Cominterm during 1935–1943. Still the titular head of the Bulgarian Communist Party, during this period he enjoyed a meteoric rise to power under Soviet leader Josef Stalin's tutelage and ultimately became a member of the Supreme Soviet just prior to World War II.



Georgi Dimitrov, founder of the Bulgarian Communist Party and his nation's first post–World War II prime minister (1946–1949). (Library of Congress)

After the war, Dimitrov's patriotism drew him back into Bulgarian politics. He was soon elected to parliament and in July 1946 moved to liquidate the country's monarchy. In November 1946, he was elected Bulgaria's new prime minister. Although he preferred a federation of Balkan states only nominally controlled by the Soviets, Moscow pressured him not to follow in the path of Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito. Thus, Dimitrov was compelled to denounce all social-democratic ideas as well as the so-called Yugoslav alternative. In so doing, he embraced Stalinist policies against his will at the cost of true Bulgarian independence. Embittered and disillusioned by his forced sellout to the Soviets, he was summoned to the Soviet Union. Dimitrov died a suspicious death in Moscow on 2 July 1949.

Luc Stenger

See also

Bulgaria; Europe, Eastern; Stalin, Josef; Tito, Josip Broz; Todorov, Stanko; Zhivkov, Todor

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Dirty War
(1974–1983)

Campaign launched by the Argentine military against its political opponents during 1974–1983. The roots of the Dirty War (Guerra Sucia) stretch back to the early 1930s, when the military became active in Argentine politics. Ultraconservative elements within the Argentine Army argued that the political process was beyond redemption and that elections and political pluralism threatened to move Argentina in the wrong direction. General José Félix Uriburu's dictatorship (1930–1932), which openly embraced such antidemocratic viewpoints, appears to have foreshadowed the Dirty War.

The Perónist movement, led by President Juan Perón, emerged out of a military dictatorship beginning in 1946 and helped polarize Argentine politics and society. After a military coup forced Perón from power in 1955, his supporters fought successfully to limit the ability of any party, group, or force to rule effectively in Argentina. Anti-Perónist factions within the military became increasingly frustrated with decades of struggle against the Perónist forces, which dominated labor unions.

As the military became more involved in Argentine politics, the political scene became increasingly violent and unstable. Student groups, Catholic reform groups connected to working-class and rural communities, and factions within the Perónist movement became radicalized. Influenced by successful guerrilla strategies in other settings—most notably the 1959 Cuban Revolution as assessed by Ernesto "Che" Guevara—opponents of the Argentine military armed themselves and trained for battle in the 1960s.

With the political process wholly discredited, groups on the Right and Left clashed violently beginning in 1969. On the Left a number of groups, led by the Montoneros and the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP, Revolutionary Army of the People), kidnapped business leaders and government officials, robbed banks and businesses, attacked government sites, and challenged the authority of the military and its civilian allies. On the Right, groups such as the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, with ties to the military, police force, and conservative factions within the Perónist movement, also emerged.

The political chaos and violence had reached a crucial point by 1972. Pressure from all sides forced government authorities to allow Perón's return from exile, as activists across the political spectrum had fought to bring the ex-president back to power. The polarization of the political process had frustrated anti-Perónist elements in the military. Having failed at their attempts to rule without the Perónists, they accepted his return and inevitable election in 1973.

Perón's return brought no solution. Political and economic mayhem continued as rival factions fought for positions within the Perónist movement after 1973. Perón's 1974 death only added to the volatile environment. Behind the scenes, the military once again moved to take control of the country.

The Dirty War began in earnest with military-sponsored campaigns against guerrilla operations in northwestern Argentina in 1974. Combining political and security operations, military commanders seized authority across provinces and systematically detained, interrogated, and killed thousands of "subversives" whom its officers had identified as "enemies of order."

By 1975, using clandestine operations against real and suspected terrorist cells, the military had neutralized guerrilla forces throughout the country. At this juncture a second phase of the Dirty War began. Commanders of the armed forces deposed María Estela Martínez de Perón's government in 1976. The army, navy, air force, and police throughout the country then deployed antisubversive units that targeted enemies of the state for detention. The ensuing kidnappings, tortures, and murders launched a wave of state-sponsored terrorism that aimed at "disciplining" the population.

It is estimated that as many as 40,000 Argentineans may have been murdered in the Dirty War during 1974–1983. Working with military officials in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, the Argentine military dictatorship shared intelligence and coordinated actions against targeted enemies who had fled across borders to avoid capture. The military junta speciously justified its abhorrent actions as a broad and just campaign against international communism and in support of Christian civilization.

Hundreds of parents whose children disappeared during the Argentine armed forces' Dirty War against terrorism march from Congress to the palace in Buenos Aires to demand that the government reveal what happened to as many as 20,000 people who disappeared during 1976–1979. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Understandably, the Dirty War generated significant domestic and international opposition. Although many of the dictatorship's officers had received training at the U.S.-backed School of the Americas, U.S. President Jimmy Carter cited human rights violations as justification for limiting aid to Argentina. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, an organization of mothers of victims of the regime's policies that held silent marches near the presidential palace, led a growing domestic opposition that pressured the dictatorship.

Ultimately, economic mismanagement and military blunders forced the dictatorship from power and ended its campaign of political violence in 1982. Already by 1980, its misguided fiscal policies created inflation and capital flight that had destroyed Argentina's economy. In the hopes of distracting popular attention, the armed forces launched an expedition that captured the Falkland and South Georgian Islands in 1982. Believing that Great Britain lacked both the will and the interest to contest this move, Argentine military commanders hoped to build national support for their evolving political ambitions.

Before the dictators could capitalize on their "liberation" of these islands, however, the British government mounted a methodical campaign to take back the Falklands. The decision by U.S. President Ronald Reagan to assist the British with logistical support for their transatlantic campaign surprised

the Argentine dictatorship and demoralized the operation's commanders. The success of the British invasion both discredited the regime and forced the military to accept a return to civilian rule.

Efforts to bring those involved in the Dirty War to justice continue. In turn, the term "Dirty War" has developed a broader connotation as revelations of government actions against political opponents in other Latin American countries during the 1960s–1980s have come to light.

Daniel Lewis

See also

Argentina; Falklands War; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in; Perón, Juan Domingo

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Displaced Persons

Refugees are defined by various international agreements as those people forced by war, human rights abuses, or political repression to flee their home nations. Those people who leave their homes for the same reasons but remain within their home country are now defined as displaced persons (DPs). Because international laws are often not applied within nations, DPs often lack the protection to flee a nation because of war, human rights abuses, or political repression. Although the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention established the universal right of asylum and defined the legal status of refugees, protections afforded to refugees do not apply to DPs, more recently called internally displaced persons (IDPs). When not ignored by one or more of the 140 signatory nations, the UN Refugee Convention applies to those who cross an international border. DPs remain subject to the laws of their particular country. All they can hope for is that the country will honor their basic human rights, either voluntarily or under pressure from world opinion.

Of the 7–9 million people dislocated by World War II, most returned home. But some 1.5–2 million DPs remained homeless in 1945. Among the DPs were Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, East Europeans whose countries were being overrun by Soviet-imposed communism, and people who simply had no place to go. DP camps were located in factories, army barracks, and even concentration camps. The camps were crowded and unsanitary and were plagued by food and clothing shortages. The UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) helped DPs in the immediate aftermath of the war, but it shut down its own camps in early 1947, forcing DPs to fend for themselves.

Among the DPs were Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, eastern Europeans whose countries were being overrun by Soviet- imposed communism, and people who simply had no place to go.

The conditions in the camps came to the attention of U.S. President Harry S. Truman, who sent Earl G. Harrison to Europe in June 1945 to

German displaced persons, carrying their few belongings, crowd behind a rope and double strand of barbed wire as they wait in Berlin's Anhalter Station to leave the German capital in 1945 after the end of World War II. (Library of Congress)

investigate conditions. Harrison reported two months later that conditions were comparable to the Nazi concentration camps, except for extermination. The Harrison Report led Truman to demand changes in the way the camps operated. Jews were later separated from non-Jewish Poles and Germans.

In 1946 the DP population doubled because of difficulties in Eastern Europe, with 150,000 Polish Jews repatriating from the Soviet Union to where they had escaped at the war's onset. By the winter of 1946, Europe had about 250,000 DPs, with more East Europeans than Jews. Truman loosened U.S. immigration laws, giving priority to orphans. During 1946–1950, 100,000 Jews made their way to the United States. The United States further modified its immigration laws with the 1948 Displaced Persons Act, which allowed 341,000 immigrants into the country during 1948–1952.

For many Jewish death camp survivors, the desired solution was emigration from Europe to Palestine. Thus, the Harrison Report recommended the relocation of 100,000 Jewish DPs from Europe to Palestine. But this created significant problems. The British feared alienating the Arabs and losing con-

trol over Middle East oil, and Palestinians living in the British mandate were hostile to the Jewish immigrants. London placed the conundrum in the hands of the UN, which sought to partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. Meanwhile, Britain maintained the Jewish immigration quota to Palestine of 18,000 people per year through 1948. After the British left their Palestinian mandate and Israel became an independent nation in May 1948, 13,500 Jewish immigrants per month entered Israel through the end of the year.

The many Cold War armed conflicts led to a change in the treatment of those uprooted by violence. Millions of Koreans, Vietnamese, Palestinians, Lao, and Congolese fled to refugee camps in neighboring countries, there to remain for years if not longer. When late in the Cold War many nations experienced internal wars, the neighboring states closed their borders instead of accepting refugees as they had done in the past. In the 1970s the international community began applying the term "internally displaced persons." International agreements dealing with refugees did not apply to IDPs. This meant that the developed world could ignore the 1949 Geneva Conventions, two 1977 protocols pertaining to victims of armed conflict, and the mandate of humanitarian organizations to safeguard IDPs.

The UN attempted to define the status of IDPs under international law in 1992, and in 1998 the UN established a special advisor for IDPs and attempted to expand authority to aid refugee-like situations. It allowed the same level of support for DP camps as for refugee camps, but it failed to establish any basis in international law for protecting the DPs or the camps themselves.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II; Israel; Refugees

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Distant Early Warning Line

A string of radar stations stretching just above the Arctic Circle and extending from Alaska to Greenland, positioned to provide warning of an intercontinental ballistic missile or bomber attack from the Soviet Union against North America. U.S. President Harry S. Truman approved construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in late 1952. Following considerable public debate, the initial line of fifty-seven sites came into operation in 1957.

The U.S. Air Force Continental Air Command hoped that the DEW Line would provide five to six hours' warning of a bomber attack from the

Soviet Union. Such time would allow U.S. interceptors to scramble and meet the attackers and would also permit the dispersal and protection of U.S. Strategic Air Command bombers. The DEW Line was constantly upgraded during the course of the Cold War and reached its maximum extent in the early 1960s with seventy-eight radar stations. Supplementing the DEW Line were the Mid-Canada and Pinetree radar nets as well as seaward extensions in the form of platforms known as Texas Towers, navy picket ships, and aircraft. The DEW Line remained in place during the entirety of the Cold War, but from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s it was gradually replaced by the North Warning System, which actually made use of many of the DEW Line installations.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Aircraft; Ballistic Missile Early Warning System; Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Strategic Air Command; Truman, Harry S.; United States Air Force

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Djilas, Milován
(1911–1995)

Yugoslav communist revolutionary, advisor to Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia's press czar in charge of propaganda, writer, and noted dissident. Born to a Serbian family on 12 June 1911 in Podbišće in Montenegro, Milován Djilas studied law and philosophy at the University of Belgrade, became a communist student leader, and was imprisoned during 1933–1935 for his radical politics. In 1937 he met Josip Broz Tito, then head of the illegal Communist Party, and soon became his chief assistant and close friend. Tito appointed Djilas to the Yugoslav Communist Party Politburo in 1940.

During World War II, Djilas played a major role in organizing the Partisan Uprising and took an active leadership role in the resistance to the German Army occupation. In 1944 he traveled to Moscow, where he held the first of a series of meetings with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Djilas later described these in his dissident manifesto *Conversations with Stalin* (1962).

In Yugoslavia's postwar government, Djilas became a cabinet minister in charge of propaganda and was noted for his ruthless imposition of cultural subjugation. He greatly influenced Tito's 1948 decision to break with the

Soviet Union in order to pursue an independent, socialist path. But by the end of the decade, Djilas had grave doubts about both Stalinism and Yugoslavia's ability to implement self-managed socialism.

Because of his calls for increased liberalization and his criticism of the Communist Party that were published in the party daily *Borba* in April 1954, Djilas was ousted from the party and received an eighteen-month suspended sentence. However, when his article "The Storm in Eastern Europe" appeared in a major American magazine supporting the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, he was imprisoned for three years. In 1957, his prison sentence was increased to seven years after the manuscript of his book *The New Class* was smuggled to the West and published. This work was the first authentic exposure of Eastern bloc communists as a "new elite" dedicated to self-aggrandizement and power and therefore not so different from the capitalists they had replaced. Djilas was released in 1961 but imprisoned again in 1962 after the publication of the disdainful *Conversations with Stalin*. He received a pardon in 1966, was allowed to travel, and held a visiting professorship at Princeton University in 1968.

Djilas renounced communism entirely in *The Imperfect Society*, published in 1969, and became a hero among communist dissidents. During the 1990s he opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia and decried the fervent nationalism that precipitated the bloody Balkan conflicts that soon ensued. Djilas died in Belgrade on 20 April 1995.

Josip Močnik

See also

Cominform; Hungarian Revolution; Soviet-Yugoslav Split; Tito, Josip Broz; Warsaw Pact; Yugoslavia

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Dobruja

Balkan territory located between the lower Danube River and the Black Sea. Dobruja's 9,000 square miles are today divided between Romania and Bulgaria. In 1945 the aggregate area held some 860,000 people. The population is principally Romanian in the north and Bulgarian in the south, with pockets of Turks and Tartars dispersed throughout. The principal city of Dobruja is Constanţa (population of 79,000 in 1945), Romania's principal port. Always of strategic importance, the area was in dispute between the Byzantine and Bulgarian Empires but fell to the Turks in 1411. It remained part of the Ottoman Empire until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. The Treaty of

Berlin in 1878 assigned the bulk of Dobruja to the Kingdom of Romania and a smaller southern section to the new autonomous Principality of Bulgaria.

While Bulgaria was hard-pressed by the Serbs during the Second Balkan War in 1912, Romania occupied the southern section to a line between Silistra and Balchik. The Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 confirmed Romanian control over all of Dobruja, but Bulgaria refused to reconcile itself to the loss of the southern portion, the richest agricultural land of Bulgaria. When Romania joined the Entente in 1916, Bulgaria, one of the Central Powers, invaded Dobruja with the intention of regaining its lost territory. The defeat of the Central Powers, however, thwarted Bulgarian hopes, and Dobruja remained Romanian.

Romania lost 2,970 square miles and 875,000 people of the Dobruja to Bulgaria.

On 7 September 1940, Bulgaria, with the backing of Nazi Germany, was able to regain southern Dobruja. The Germans forced Romania to accept the Treaty of Craiova but mandated an exchange of population. Some 110,000 Romanians were forced to relocate from the south to the north, and 62,000 Bulgarians were forced to leave their homes in northern Dobruja and resettle in the south. Overall, Romania lost 2,970 square miles and 875,000 people of Dobruja to Bulgaria.

Bulgaria, which had not declared war on or participated in the invasion of the Soviet Union, joined the Soviet military campaign against Nazi Germany in the fall of 1944. Although Bulgaria was not recognized as a cobelligerent, Soviet treatment of Bulgaria differed from the treatment of Romania and Hungary. Reparations were demanded of both, and Romania was forced to return Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. With the support of the Soviet Union, the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 confirmed Bulgaria's retention of the territory it had gained in southern Dobruja through the Treaty of Craiova. During the policy of forced collectivization and Bulgarization under Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov in the early 1950s, more than 100,000 Turks were displaced from Dobruja and immigrated to Turkey.

Bernard Cook

See also

Bulgaria; Paris Peace Conference and Treaties; Romania; Soviet Union

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Dobrynin, Anatoly Fyodorovich

(1919–)

Soviet diplomat and ambassador to the United States. Born on 16 November 1919 in Krasnaya Gorka, Anatoly Dobrynin studied engineering at the Ordzhonikidze Moscow Aviation Institute and worked as a designer at Experimental Aircraft Plant No. 115 in Moscow before being selected by the Personnel Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

Central Committee to attend the Higher Diplomatic School in 1944. He joined the CPSU the following year. In 1946 he graduated with a doctorate in history, having written a thesis on U.S. policy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 that was published in 1947.

Dobrynin joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as assistant chief of the Education Department while also serving as an assistant professor of U.S. foreign policy at the Institute of International Relations. From 1947 to 1952 he worked on the staff of Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, ultimately becoming his first assistant. Dobrynin was posted to Washington as counselor at the Soviet embassy in 1952 and served as minister-counselor from 1954 to 1955. Returning to Moscow in 1955, he was promoted to the rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the Foreign Ministry before becoming an assistant to Foreign Minister Dmitri T. Shepilov. In 1957, Dobrynin was posted to the United Nations (UN) Secretariat as an undersecretary-general, becoming director of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs the next year.

In February 1960 Dobrynin was recalled to Moscow to head the Foreign Ministry's American Department, where he served until January 1962. He returned to the UN briefly in the summer of 1960 to help Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko lodge complaints regarding American U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union. In January 1962 Dobrynin was appointed Soviet ambassador to the United States. He presented his credentials to President John F. Kennedy on 31 March. Dobrynin served in this post until 1986, playing a critical role in the Cold War era and in almost every aspect of Soviet-American relations. His private discussions with U.S. Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy were instrumental to the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. During Richard Nixon's presidency, Dobrynin worked with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to resolve disputes in the SALT I negotiations and became an informal channel for American communications with North Vietnam leading to the Paris Peace Talks. During the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, Dobrynin provided a degree of stability in the deteriorating Soviet-American relationship that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Dobrynin became a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1966 and a full member in 1977. In March 1986, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recalled Dobrynin to join the CPSU Central Committee as secretary for foreign affairs and head of the International Department. He was also elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet, serving until 1989. Dobrynin retired from the Central Committee in 1988 but continued to serve as a foreign policy advisor to Gorbachev until the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Beginning in 1995, Dobrynin became a consultant to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Cuban Missile Crisis; Détente; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gromyko, Andrey; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard

Milhous; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; U-2 Incident; Vietnam War; Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich

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Doe, Samuel Kanyon
(1951–1990)

Liberian dictator. Born on 6 May 1951 to a poor family of the Krahn tribe in Tuzon, Grand Gedeh County, in southeastern Liberia, Samuel Kanyon Doe dropped out of high school in 1967 and two years later joined the army. In October 1979 he was promoted to master sergeant.

A career soldier who seized power in a bloody coup in 1980, Samuel Doe was president of Liberia until his murder in 1990 by rebel forces. He is shown here during a state visit to Washington in 1982. (U.S. Department of Defense)

On 12 April 1980 Doe led a military coup of enlisted soldiers against President William R. Tolbert Jr. The coup toppled the Liberian government and murdered Tolbert. A brutal purge of Tolbert's cabinet and the senior ranks of the military soon followed. Doe established himself as chairman of the People's Redemption Council, which promised to free the nation from the dominance of the nation's minority Americo-Liberians (descendants of the former U.S. slaves who founded the nation in 1847).

Doe adopted a strong pro-American stance, and President Ronald Reagan rewarded him with substantial economic and military aid. Doe even received an invitation to the White House. Despite Liberia's abysmal human rights record, lack of democratic institutions, and increasing political instability, Doe continued to enjoy U.S. support throughout his rule.

Doe promised to relinquish power to a popularly elected government, and in 1984 a new constitution was drafted. When the elections were held in October 1985, however, Doe engaged in widespread fraud to guarantee his victory, which was nevertheless embraced by the United States and much of the international community. Over the next several years, increasing disaffection with Doe's rule led to the formation of several regional and tribal rebel groups. On 24 December 1989, these groups, allied with disaffected Americo-Liberians led by Charles Taylor, launched a well-coordinated uprising that Doe could not quell.

As Doe's government lost control of the country, he appealed to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to help stabilize the situation. In response, ECOWAS sent a peacekeeping force of 4,000 men to Liberia in August 1990. On 9 September 1990, as fighting continued, Prince Yormie Johnson's rebel group captured Doe in Monrovia, where he was tortured and, in the early morning hours of 10 September, killed.

Elun Gabriel

See also
Africa; Liberia

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Dominican Republic

Spanish-speaking Caribbean nation occupying the eastern two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola. The Dominican Republic, with an area of 18,815 square miles, is bordered by Haiti to the west, the Atlantic Ocean to the north and east, and the Caribbean Sea to the south. It had a 1945 population of 1.8 million people. The United States was long involved in Dominican affairs. Both security and economic concerns compelled President Theodore Roosevelt to send U.S. military forces to the nation in 1904, as Washington feared that European nations would capitalize on instability there. In December 1904 Roosevelt issued his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, namely that the United States had an obligation to prevent chaos (while ensuring a pro-American order) in the Western Hemisphere. During 1916–1924, U.S. military forces again occupied the Dominican Republic, aiming to foster stability but instead creating *antiyanqui* hostility.

General Leonidas Rafael Trujillo Molina, who came to power in 1930, sought a close relationship with the United States. Trujillo had entered the Dominican National Guard in 1919, quickly working his way up through the ranks. Beginning in 1933, with President Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, U.S. policymakers pledged not to intervene in Latin America. U.S. officials instead chose to depend on strongmen such as Trujillo, whose rule often rested on repression, self-aggrandizement, and militarism, to ensure stability and prevent communist insurgencies.

Although U.S. policy toward Latin America in the 1950s included support for anticommunist dictators, Trujillo's brutality ultimately coerced both Washington and the Organization of American States (OAS) to consider ways of undercutting his regime. With Fidel Castro's 1959 triumph in Cuba, U.S. policymakers were concerned that Washington's support for dictatorships such as Trujillo's would foster Castroism in the region. Trujillo incurred the ire of many by sponsoring an attempt to assassinate Venezuelan President

Rómulo Betancourt in late June 1960. For the first time the OAS, which normally hewed to a strict noninterventionist line, imposed sanctions on the military strongman. In addition, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Trujillo regime in August 1960 and added a punitive surtax on imported Dominican sugar. In early 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided small arms and other matériel to a Dominican opposition group in hopes that it would oust the dictator. Trujillo was assassinated on 30 May 1961, although it remains unknown whether the dissidents who killed the aging dictator actually used the CIA-provided weapons.

After Trujillo's murder, U.S. warships hovered off the Dominican coast while American officials discussed with various Dominican groups the formation of a new government, helping to set up the 1962 elections. President Juan Bosch, a left-wing nationalist, won the presidency and took power in February 1963, but he was ousted by a right-wing cabal in September 1963. Bosch had incurred the wrath of the Dominican elite and many members of the military and did not endear himself to Washington with his call for land reform and his support of strong labor organizations. After Bosch's ouster, Donald J. Reid Cabral's Constitutionalist government briefly held power, a nominal civilian government installed by military leaders. Continued economic and political problems led to civil war, and on 24–25 April 1965 the Cabral government was toppled. Pro-Bosch and anti-Bosch groups sprung up, each vying for power.

In early 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided small arms and other materiel to a Dominican opposition group in hopes that it would oust the dictator.

Fearing even more instability, President Lyndon B. Johnson deployed a contingent of U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic on 28 April 1965. In all, 23,000 troops from OAS nations were sent. Because a congressional investigation at the time revealed that the Dominican Republic's communist movement was small and inconsequential, some members of Congress severely criticized the intervention, which was the first time U.S. troops had occupied a Latin American nation since the early 1930s. After the troops pulled out in early 1966 and moderate Joaquín Balaguer took office on 1 July 1966, U.S.-Dominican relations remained generally cordial.

Balaguer, who stayed in power until 1996, often resorted to Trujillo-style authoritarianism, and the Dominican economy remained unstable, particularly during the late 1970s and 1980s. Political stability during the Balaguer years remained somewhat precarious, although he was able to exert enough influence to maintain a certain modicum of control and, to placate the Americans especially, to keep left-wing movements at bay.

James F. Siekmeier

See also

Betancourt, Rómulo; Castro, Fidel; Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Latin America, Communist Parties in; Organization of American States; Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas

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Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in

Occupying the eastern two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic has witnessed two large-scale U.S. military interventions. The first occurred during 1916–1924 and the second in 1965. The first American intervention, when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson sent U.S. Marines to the island nation in 1916, was justified as being necessary to terminate lawlessness and Dominicans' failure to meet their financial obligations to the United States. As early as 1905, the Americans had taken over the receivership of the Dominican Republic's customs, which lasted until 1940.

While the military occupation improved the island republic's infrastructure to some degree, nationalist opposition to U.S. rule was especially focused on the U.S.-established National Guard, which oftentimes acted with considerable brutality. When the United States withdrew its forces from the country, it left power in the hands of the National Guard, led by Rafael Trujillo. Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic for more than three decades, from 1930 until his assassination in May 1961.

During World War II the Dominican Republic was one of the first Latin American countries to declare war on the Axis powers, and Trujillo paid brief lip service to democratic principles. After the war, however, beginning in 1947 he moved to reverse his toleration of opposition parties and for the next twenty years relied on his powerful allies in Washington to neutralize international opposition to his regime.

Trujillo ruled with considerable savagery, using the National Guard and his feared secret police force to suppress and eliminate any political dissent. Meanwhile, he treated the Dominican Republic as his personal fiefdom. Until the late 1950s, Trujillo enjoyed the uncritical support of the United States. He also quickly learned how to exploit Cold War fears of communism in the Caribbean to secure favors from Washington.

The removal of Trujillo in May 1961 was partly assisted by the growth of inter-American and U.S. opposition to his brutal rule and a decision by the John F. Kennedy administration to reduce American support and impose economic sanctions. The period between Trujillo's assassination and the 1965 U.S. military intervention was marked by a complicated history of attempts to create a stable political climate in which Trujillo's cronies and relatives tried, unsuccessfully, to continue the dictator's rule.

In national elections in 1962, the first democratic elections in nearly four decades, a nationalist-reformist coalition, the Dominican Revolutionary Party

(PRD), came to power with the support of middle-class sectors and some populist movements. The new government was headed by the Dominican novelist Juan Bosch. After an initial honeymoon period in which the Kennedy administration responded warmly to the new government, relations with Washington began to deteriorate, especially when Bosch made clear his intentions to recognize the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. Bosch's economic reforms, which included modest land reform and the nationalization of several major enterprises, further aroused anticommunist fear within the Dominican Republic and in the United States.

With signs of U.S. approval, in September 1963 elements of the nation's armed forces led by archconservative General Elias Wessin y Wessin overthrew Bosch, who went into exile in Puerto Rico. The coup installed a military triumvirate headed by businessman Donald Reid Cabral.

The leaders of the new regime abolished the constitution, but nearly two years of corruption and brutal internal repression produced a popular uprising on 24 April 1965, which restored Bosch and his Constitutionalist

A U.S. Army soldier patrols the streets of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, on 9 May 1965 during a period of civil unrest. The message "Yankees come back" is scrawled on the wall of a building where food is being distributed. (National Archives and Records Administration)

movement to power. For four days the Constitutionalists and their military and civilian supporters, led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, fought to prevent a counterattack led by Wessin y Wessin.

The fighting in Santo Domingo soon took on the characteristics of a popular insurrection and began to spread to other regions of the country. Despite their use of tank assaults and aerial bombing, the Wessin-led forces were on the verge of defeat. The impending collapse of the Wessin forces and faulty intelligence supplied by U.S. Ambassador William Tapley, who reported to the U.S. State Department that the lives of American citizens were imperiled by communist-led hordes, set the scene for a full-scale U.S. intervention.

On 28 April 1965, a clearly panicked President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered 20,000 U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic. The Americans' official rationale was that the action was needed to prevent a communist takeover of the country and the emergence of a "second Cuba." Evidence of communist influence within the insurrection was, however, very thin. The Communist Party's small number of militants and the members of the Castroite June 14 Movement certainly played a role in the Constitutionalist resistance, but the popular insurrection was overwhelmingly made up of the urban poor of Santo Domingo. The American intervention in practice seemed designed to prevent a return to Constitutional government by Bosch and to block radical social and economic change in the island republic.

U.S. intervention forces were soon aided by an Organization of American States (OAS) intervention peace force. The OAS force was the result of vigorous U.S. lobbying and was in violation of inter-American prohibitions on foreign military intervention in the affairs of the region. American and OAS forces took a month to defeat the Constitutionalist insurrection and impose an interim administration before new elections were convened. In the elections of June 1966, a large majority of voters elected Joaquín Balaguer, a former Trujillo loyalist, and his Reformist Party. Balaguer remained in power for most of the next twenty-eight years. Systematic police terror, an astronomical increase in political corruption, and the transformation of the Dominican Republic into a secure location for foreign investors were the main legacies of the U.S. intervention.

Barry Carr

See also

Americas; Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio; Bosch Gaviño, Juan; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Dominican Republic; Organization of American States; Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas

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Domino Theory

American theory of international relations first publicly propounded by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1954 as a corollary of sorts of containment. According to the domino theory, nations in a given region are inextricably linked to others within that region. If one were to fall to communism, then the others would fall one after another, like dominoes. The theory was a guiding force for several American overseas interventions, especially in Vietnam. It has also been applied to the Middle East. The U.S. containment policy, as the name implies, was designed to contain or quarantine the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. It dates to 1946, when American diplomat George F. Kennan wrote his Long Telegram. Thus, through containment the much-feared falling dominoes would be prevented by the rigorous application of containment.

As the Cold War progressed, the two monoliths of the Soviet bloc and the Allies faced one another, each unable to confront the other directly without potentially triggering a nuclear Armageddon. They thus battled indirectly, using surrogates and proxies and jockeying for world position and control of the emerging nations of the postcolonial era. The Americans sought to contain communism by propping up potential dominoes, such as Greece in 1947 to safeguard neighboring Turkey and the Middle East.

At the outset, American liberals and conservatives alike accepted the domino theory. During a 1954 press conference, President Eisenhower defined Indochina in terms of the domino theory, which quickly became part of the U.S. foreign policy lexicon. In October 1949, one Asian domino had already fallen, namely China and its 450 million people. Adjacent Indochina, where nationalists and communists were engaged in a power struggle with France, would be the next domino that could well topple Burma, Thailand, and then Indonesia. The West stood to lose millions more people to communism as well as access to important sources of raw materials were this to occur. As communism toppled more dominoes, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines might have been next, in turn making Australia and New Zealand vulnerable. To head off this perceived catastrophe, the Eisenhower administration believed that the United States had no choice but to support France in its struggle against the Viet Minh.

In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy viewed Laos as such a domino. Its loss to communism would put pressure on first Thailand, then Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

President Ronald Reagan used the domino theory to justify efforts to topple the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and President George H. W. Bush employed it in the Persian Gulf War.

John Barnhill

See also

Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Middle East; Southeast Asia; Viet Minh

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Double-Track Decision, NATO

December 1979 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision to deploy U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe to counter Soviet SS-20 missiles. The decision was a carrot-and-stick approach to arms reduction. NATO threatened to deploy 572 theater nuclear-force missiles in Europe while at the same time trying to coax the Soviets to engage in negotiations over medium-range arms in Europe. The aim was to eliminate all such missiles from the continent. If arms talks failed, the NATO missiles would be deployed in 1983. The situation was risky, as NATO was essentially trying to persuade Moscow to dismantle its SS-20 missiles by bargaining with missiles that had yet to be deployed.

The moving force behind the policy was Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who in a 1977 speech had warned NATO about the political pressure arising from the Soviets' SS-20 deployment. After NATO announced the Double-Track Decision (DTD), mass protests against it spread across Europe, most notably in the FRG and the Netherlands. The ensuing antinuclear movement mobilized hundreds of thousands of people, including many in Schmidt's own party, against the NATO deployment. The FRG nevertheless began deployment of missiles in 1983, and the Soviets consequently broke off arms talks. In December 1987, however, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, effectively reversing NATO's Double-Track Decision.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Peace Movements

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Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander Frederick
(1903–1995)

British Conservative Party politician, foreign secretary, and prime minister (1963–1964). Born into an aristocratic family in London on 2 July 1903, Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home was educated at Eton College and Christ Church, Oxford University. In 1931 he stood for Parliament and was elected as a member of the Conservative Party. From 1935 to 1940 he served as parliamentary private secretary to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Douglas-Home was defeated in the 1945 elections but won back his seat five years later. In 1951 he resigned his parliamentary seat following the death of his father and his becoming the 14th Earl of Home. Over the next decade he held a variety of ministerial posts, including lord president of the council and commonwealth secretary.

In 1960, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan appointed Home foreign secretary. A committed anticommunist, Home harbored deep suspicions of détente with the Soviet Union. He also championed close U.S.-British ties and was a proponent of a modernized and expanded British nuclear arsenal.

Home succeeded Macmillan as prime minister in October 1963 following the Profumo Affair, which had driven Macmillan from office. John Profumo, secretary for war, had had an illicit affair with Christine Keeler, a young woman with romantic links to a Soviet embassy attaché. Profumo resigned after it emerged that he had lied about his relationship with Keeler on the floor of the House of Commons, and Macmillan, under heavy pressure from his Conservative Party, was forced to resign. Following a bitter political battle, Home was elected as a compromise choice.

Sir Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home, leader of the Conservative Party and prime minister of Great Britain (1963–1964). (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

As prime minister, Home's first order of business was to heal the divide in the Conservative Party and restore public faith in the government. He had only a year until the next general election. During that time, he had difficulty accomplishing anything of substance, as his own party remained hopelessly divided and the opposition Labour Party took the high ground in cultivating popular support. In the October 1964 general elections, Labour won a majority, pushing Home and the Conservatives out of office. In 1965, he ceded leadership of the Conservative Party to Edward Heath.

When the Conservatives returned to power in 1970, Prime Minister Heath appointed Home foreign secretary, a position he held until 1974 when he left the House of Commons. In 1975 Queen Elizabeth II named him Baron Home of the Hirsel, a peerage that carried a seat in the House of Lords. Home died in Coldstream, Berwickshire, Scotland, on 9 October 1995.

Justin P. Coffey

See also

Heath, Edward; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Profumo Affair; United Kingdom

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Drăghici, Alexandru
(1913–1993)

Romanian interior and state security minister (1953–1965). Born in the Wallachian town of Tisău on 27 September 1913, Alexandru Drăghici attended primary school until the age of eleven and within a few years found work as a railway locksmith. He took part in the Griviţa railway strike at Galaţi on 2 February 1933, which ignited industrial action also in Cluj and Iaşi. He joined the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) in 1934 and in 1936 was imprisoned as a "notorious communist" along with Ana Pauker, among others, and became a close associate of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

Following his release in August 1944 from internment at Tîrgu-Jiu, Drăghici served briefly as a public prosecutor, and in October 1945 he joined the RCP Central Committee, becoming a full member in 1948. In December 1950 he was appointed head of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. In May 1952 he became interior minister and in September 1952 head of the new Ministry of State Security (the Securitate) as well. The power of these combined positions allowed Drăghici a free hand in undertaking a massive search for enemies of the state at Gheorghiu-Dej's behest, during which about 100,000 persons were arrested and imprisoned by 1958. Drăghici's fortunes were directly linked with those of his patron, so when Gheorghiu-Dej died in March 1965 and was succeeded by Nicolae Ceauşescu, Drăghici was removed from his ministerial posts and replaced by Ceauşescu protégé Ion Iliescu. Ceauşescu began a campaign critical of the alleged abuses of the interior ministry during the former regime, and implicitly of Drăghici, so that by 1967 Drăghici was thoroughly discredited, finally giving up his Presidium seat on 26 April 1968.

Just after Ceauşescu's death in December 1989, Drăghici and his Hungarian wife Marta quickly left Romania, taking up residence in Budapest, where he died on 12 December 1993, bringing to an end efforts by the new Romanian regime to extradite him.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also

Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe; Iliescu, Ion; Romania; Securitate

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Drug Trafficking

The Cold War played a direct and prominent role in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Indeed, the financing of many anticommunist covert operations, such as those led by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), relied on the drug economy of various proxy states in which drug trafficking was often condoned and even encouraged. Specific historical cases illustrate how the anticommunist agenda of the CIA played a decisive role in spurring the global illicit drug trade. These include the French Connection and the role of the Corsican mafia against communists both in France and in Southeast Asia (Laos and Vietnam), the propping up of the defeated Chinese Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists) in northern Burma, the Islamic mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan, and the Contras in Nicaragua.

The United States, as the leader of the global struggle against communism, largely used its special services and intelligence agencies to conduct covert operations worldwide. To contain communism, however, local aid was needed and was widely found in local criminal organizations. In the early 1930s, organized crime kingpins Charles "Lucky" Luciano and Meyer Lansky trafficked heroin exported from China to support Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang in the civil war there. In 1936 Luciano was jailed, and trafficking in Chinese heroin was considerably disrupted by World War II.

The Cold War played a direct and prominent role in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs.

It was during World War II that the American Office of Naval Intelligence cooperated with Luciano. He was to be freed after the war provided that he order his thugs to watch U.S. docks and ports to protect them from Nazi saboteurs. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA, thus used Mafia assistance in the Allied invasion of Sicily. Such activities initiated what was to be a long-term feature of covert operations led by American intelligence services when consent of the U.S. Congress could not be obtained: the enlistment of nefarious groups engaged in illicit activities in order to wage secret wars through both proxies and alternative funding. Basically, drug traffickers were useful to special services and politicians, and they relied on such connections to expand their activities.

Luciano was freed in 1946 and was sent to Sicily, where he was to cooperate with the CIA. Indeed, to counter the growing communist influence in France and Italy, the CIA turned to the Mafia and condoned its drug-trafficking activities. The CIA soon asked Luciano to use his connections in France to break the strikes led by socialist unions in Marseille's docks, from which arms and supplies were sent to Indochina. The sometimes-violent assistance of Corsican mobsters in cracking down on the unions was notably motivated by their involvement in the opium business in Indochina and in the smuggling of raw opium from Turkey to Marseille, where it was refined into heroin for export to the United States. Luciano took advantage of such high refining capacities and helped turn Marseille into the heroin capital of Europe. These Marseille syndicates, dubbed the French Connection, supplied the American heroin market for two decades.

The CIA most significantly influenced the drug trade in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Latin America. Its anticommunist covert operations

benefited from the participation of some drug-related combat units who, to finance their own struggle, were directly involved in drug production and trafficking. Considering the involvement of different groups in the drug trade (for example, the Hmong in Laos, the Guomindang in Burma, and the mujahideen in Afghanistan), their CIA backing implied that the agency condoned the use of drug proceeds and considerably increased opiate production in Asia. However, no evidence has surfaced to suggest that the CIA condoned or facilitated the exportation of heroin to the United States or Europe, as happened with the Nicaraguan Contras.

In October 1949, the communists defeated the Nationalist Guomindang in China, and in the years that followed they cracked down on what was then the world's largest opium production network. Opium production then shifted to the mountainous and frontier areas of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, where Guomindang remnants had fled and had become deeply involved in drug trafficking. Beginning in 1951, the CIA supported the Guomindang in Burma in an unsuccessful effort to assist it in regaining a foothold in China's Yunan province. Arms, ammunition, and supplies were flown into Burma from Thailand by the CIA's Civil Air Transport (CAT), later renamed Air America and Sea Supply Corporation, created to mask the shipments. The Burmese Army eventually drove the Guomindang remnants from Burma in 1961, but the latter resettled in Laos and northern Thailand and continued to run most of the opium trade.

CAT not only supplied military aid to the Guomindang but also flew opium to Thailand and Taiwan. There is no doubt that the CIA sanctioned both the Guomindang's opium trade and the use of CAT, and later Air America aircraft, in that trade. The Guomindang would eventually increase its role in the opium trade after the CIA withdrew its financial and logistical support, and Burma eventually became one of the world's two main opium producers.

Following the 1954 French defeat in Indochina, the United States gradually took over the intelligence and military fight against communism in both Laos and Vietnam. It also took over the drug trafficking business developed by the French by buying the opium produced by the Hmong and Yao hill tribes to enlist them in counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Minh. To meet the costs of this war, the French Service de Documentation Extérieur et de Contre-Espionnage (External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service) allied itself with the Corsican syndicates trafficking opium from Indochina to Marseille in order to take over the opium trade that the colonial government had outlawed in 1946. The CIA ran its secret army, composed largely of Hmong tribesmen led by General Vang Pao, in Laos. Air America would fly arms to the Hmong and take their opium back to the CIA base at Long Tieng, where Vang had set up a huge heroin laboratory. Some of the heroin was then flown to the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam), where part of it was sold to U.S. troops, many of whom became addicts. After the Americans pulled out of Vietnam in 1975, Laos became the world's third largest opium producer.

However, Vietnam was not the only battleground of Cold War drug operations. The CIA launched a major new covert operation in Southwest Asia in the early 1980s to support Afghanistan's mujahideen guerrillas in their fight

A young Lao girl sells bundles of marijuana and opium on the street in front of the Pathet Lao embassy in Vientiane, April 1970. (JP Laffont/Sygma/Corbis)

against Soviet occupation. U.S. President Ronald Reagan was determined to counter what he viewed as Soviet hegemony and expansionism, a goal shared by his CIA director, William Casey. To support the mujahideen with arms and funds, the CIA resorted to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that chose which Afghan warlords to back and used trucks from Pakistan's military National Logistics Cell (NLC) to carry arms from Karachi to the Afghan border. However, the ISI not only chose Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a leading opium trafficker, as its main beneficiary, it also allowed NLC trucks to return from the border loaded with opium and heroin. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, U.S. aid to the mujahideen stopped, and the internecine conflict that ensued in the country favored an increase in opium production in order to maintain rival warlords and armies. Afghanistan eventually became the world's biggest opium-producing country, a situation that still existed in 2007.

In Europe and in Southeast and Southwest Asia, the Cold War saw many drug-related covert operations and secret wars in which the CIA clearly and deliberately ignored evidence of drug production and trafficking by its allies. South America, however, was not to be excluded, and when Reagan vowed to topple the pro-Marxist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, Vice President George H. W. Bush approved the creation of the anti-Sandinista Contra force to which the CIA allied itself. Of course, the CIA had full knowledge that the Contras were involved in drug trafficking and that the planes bringing them arms were returning to the United States loaded with cocaine. However, the Boland Amendment of 8 December 1982 effectively cut off funding to the Contras. This led the Reagan administration to undertake arms-for-drugs deals that involved illegal weapon sales to Iran.

Illicit drug production and trafficking increased during the Cold War. During this period, the U.S. government was less interested in waging the so-called war on drugs begun in 1971 than in using drug traffickers to support its wars abroad. Indeed, had the CIA cracked down on drug trafficking during the Cold War, it would have forgone valuable intelligence sources, political influence, and much-needed funding for its covert, and sometimes illegal, operations. Ironically, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union or its intelligence service, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), resorted to drug sales to fund activities during the Cold War.

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy

See also

Afghanistan; Burma; Central Intelligence Agency; Contras; Laos; Pakistan; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Southeast Asia; Thailand; United States; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Dubček, Alexander
(1921–1992)

Czechoslovakian politician and first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) during 1968–1969. Alexander Dubček presided over the 1968 Prague Spring, a brief era of liberalization quashed by a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact intervention.

Dubček was born on 27 November 1921 in Uhrovec, Slovakia, in the state of Czechoslovakia. His father, a dedicated socialist, moved the family to the Soviet Union in 1925. There the Dubčeks remained until spring 1938, when they returned to Czechoslovakia just as the Germans invaded.

During World War II, Dubček joined the underground Slovak Communist Party, committed acts of sabotage against the collaborationist regime headed by Monsiegneur Tiso, and participated in the Slovak national uprising against the Germans in August 1944. After the communists assumed power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Dubček entered the party bureaucracy and rose rapidly through its ranks, his ascent interrupted only by three years of study at Moscow Higher Political School during 1955–1958.

In 1963 Dubček was elected first secretary of the Communist Party in Slovakia. In this position, he championed societal reform and allowed limited criticism of the rigid Stalinist policies of Antonín Novotný, longtime first secretary of the ruling CPCz. On 5 January 1968, Dubček became first secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. In March 1968 Novotný, stripped of his power, was ousted from the party. Although committed to maintaining Czechoslovakia's relationship with Moscow and its place in the world socialist system, Dubček spoke of "socialism with a human face" and implemented political, social, cultural, and economic reforms first enunciated in his Action Plan of 9 April 1968. This plan included greater personal liberties, tentative moves toward a multiparty political system, reductions in censorship, and economic liberalization. His efforts were known as the Prague Spring, a time of unprecedented freedom in the history of communist-ruled Czechoslovakia.

Although Dubček assured Moscow that his reforms should not be construed as anti-Soviet and that he had no intention of withdrawing Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets grew increasingly concerned, as did leaders in other Warsaw Pact countries, who feared that Czech reforms might snowball into a larger uncontrollable liberalization movement. When Dubček

Czechoslovak Premier Alexander Dubček smiles as he speaks to Communist Party leaders in Prague. Dubček tried to reform socialism in the country, but the so-called Prague Spring of 1968 was crushed by Soviet intervention. (Bettmann/Corbis)

refused to abandon reform, Soviet leaders took matters into their own hands. On 20 August 1968, approximately 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia.

Arrested and transported to Moscow on 21 August, Dubček gave in to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's demands that he halt the reform movement. Returning to Prague on 27 August, a tearful Dubček informed the Czech people that the Prague Spring was over.

Replaced as first secretary in April 1969 by Gustáv Husák, Dubček presided over the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly until September 1969, when he was named ambassador to Turkey. His tenure in Ankara lasted only until June 1970, when he was recalled to Prague and unceremoniously expelled from the party. For the next two decades, Dubček languished as a forestry official in Bratislava. He returned to political prominence in 1989 during the Velvet Revolution that toppled the Czech communist regime and spoke at mass prodemocracy rallies. On 28 December 1989 he was elected chair of the Czech Federal Assembly, retaining that post until June 1992, when he was elected to parliament. Dubček died in Bratislava on 7 November 1992 from injuries sustained in a car crash. Not only a national hero but the embodiment of humanity and courage within the communist bloc, Dubček, had he lived, might have been able to prevent the subsequent breakup of Czechoslovakia.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Brezhnev Doctrine; Czechoslovakia; Husák, Gustáv; Novotný, Antonín; Prague Spring; Warsaw Pact

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Duck and Cover Drill

Civil defense training exercise to prepare U.S. civilians to respond to nuclear explosions as part of the American Civil Defense preparedness activities of the 1950s and early 1960s. The drill required individuals to find potential shelter, such as a wall or a desk, and curl up with their faces down and away from the direction of the initial flash that immediately precedes a nuclear detonation. The duck and cover maneuver was intended to reduce the potential injuries from the heat, blast, and flying debris created by a nuclear explo-

sion. The drills were designed to develop awareness of warning alarms, including civil defense air-raid sirens, and to condition individuals to react to an unexpected flash, which could be the initial indication of a surprise nuclear strike.

The duck and cover concept is most famously remembered through the 1950 U.S. government-released training film *Duck and Cover*, which featured an animated character named Bert the Turtle. The film was designed to teach schoolchildren about the protective procedure as well as civil defense activities in general. As part of the Federal Civil Defense Administration's education program, the technique and the training were part of a serious effort to reduce injuries during a nuclear attack; however, the concept clearly had limited value and has served as a source of many jokes. Duck and cover drills were most notably lampooned in the 1982 film *The Atomic Café*. Antinuclear activists and critics of civil defense often used the drill as a symbol of the futility of preparing for a nuclear conflict, especially when policymakers debated whether a nuclear war could be fought and won. Critics of the duck and cover training also expanded their argument, claiming that the drill was intended to induce fear in the population, produce compliance with government security programs, and influence American behavior.

American schoolchildren practicing duck and cover during a Civil Defense drill, 1 February 1951. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Civil Defense; Fallout Shelters; Nuclear Arms Race

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Duclos, Jacques
(1896–1975)

French Communist Party leader. Born on 2 October 1896 in Louey-par-Jullan (Hautes Pyrénées), Jacques Duclos was apprenticed at age twelve to a pastry cook. Duclos fought in World War I at Verdun, where he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Germans.

Returning to his profession as a pastry cook after the war, Duclos became active in the left-wing Association Républicaine des Anciens Combatants

Jacques Duclos, a leader of the French Communist Party, remained a staunch Stalinist who preached subservience to Moscow. (Bettmann/Corbis)

(ARAC), in which he rose to a leadership position. He then joined the new French Communist Party (PCF). In 1924 he went to work for the PCF full time, and in 1926 he was elected as a Paris representative to the French Chamber of Deputies.

Increasingly active in antimilitarist activities, by 1928 Duclos had received jail sentences totaling forty-seven years and heavy fines, although he was freed by parliamentary immunity. He won reelection to the Chamber in 1928 (against socialist leader Léon Blum) but was defeated in the March 1932 elections and lost his parliamentary immunity. He then worked for the Comintern's West European bureau in Berlin and in 1935 was elected to the Comintern's Executive Committee.

In November 1932 the leftist French government annulled Duclos' sentences, and he resumed his political activities in France. By 1935 he had become the most powerful figure in the PCF after Secretary-General Maurice Thorez. When the government outlawed the PCF shortly after the start of World War II and Moscow ordered Thorez to come to the Soviet Union, Duclos became the party's principal leader in France, first in opposing the war and then, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, in resistance to the Germans.

Following the war, Duclos was elected to the two Constituent Assemblies as well as to all National Assemblies during the Fourth Republic. Upon Thorez's return from Moscow, Duclos resumed his place as the number-two man in the PCF, although he was again acting head of the party during Thorez's illness and absence in Moscow during 1950–1953. On Thorez's return, he and Duclos rejected suggestions from Moscow that they de-Stalinize the PCF. Thorez moved Waldeck Rochet into the number-two position in the PCF, and Rochet succeeded Thorez on the latter's death in 1964. Duclos, a senator since 1959, led the Stalinists in the party who sought to keep it closely allied with Moscow. Despite Duclos' reputation as a Stalinist, the PCF chose him as its candidate to run for president of France following the resignation of Charles de Gaulle in 1969. Although Duclos failed to make it into the second round of voting, he received more than 21 percent of the vote, more than socialist candidate Gaston Defferre. Duclos remained faithful to the Soviet doctrine of obedience to Moscow until his death in Paris on 26 April 1975.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Blum, Léon; De Gaulle, Charles; France; Rochet, Waldeck; Thorez, Maurice

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Dulles, Allen Welsh
(1893–1969)

Office of Strategic Services operative during 1942–1945 and director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1953–1961. Born in Watertown, New York, on 7 April 1893, Allen Dulles obtained BA and MA degrees in international law from Princeton University and in 1916 joined the U.S. Foreign Service. Assigned first to Vienna, by the time the United States entered World War I Dulles was in Berne, Switzerland, where he nurtured U.S. embassy contacts with Austro-Hungarian and Balkan exiles. He served on the U.S. delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and in various positions overseas, but in 1926 financial considerations caused him to join the prominent New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, where his brother John Foster Dulles was a leading partner. Allen Dulles remained deeply interested in foreign affairs, focusing on international business and becoming active in the New York–based Council on Foreign Relations.

A strong supporter of American intervention in World War II, in 1942 Dulles joined the newly created American intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), headed by Colonel William J. Donovan, and spent most of the war based in Berne in neutral Switzerland. Here Douglas ran a network of intelligence agents in Germany who brought him clandestine copies of numerous secret documents. In spring 1945 Dulles helped to negotiate the surrender of Germany's remaining forces in northern Italy, an operation independently initiated by American and British forces that alarmed Soviet leader Josef Stalin, who feared that his allies intended to negotiate a separate peace with Germany, and that has sometimes therefore been perceived as the opening move of the Cold War.

By 1944 the prospect of communist and Soviet expansion in Europe troubled Dulles. Shortly after he returned to the United States in summer 1945, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS. Dulles remained a strong advocate of a permanent U.S. foreign intelligence service, and he helped to draft the 1947 National Security Act that created the CIA.

From 1950 Dulles was CIA deputy director, and from 1953 to 1961 he served as the agency's third director. He deliberately publicized his agency's existence and accomplishments and was responsible for building its permanent



Allen Dulles played a major role in the creation and organization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and served as the first civilian director from 1953 to 1961. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library)

headquarters in Langley, Virginia. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1953 appointment of John Foster Dulles as secretary of state, a post that he held until his death in 1959, further enhanced the CIA director's official influence.

Among the CIA's better-known successes under Allen Dulles was the Anglo-American construction of a tunnel in Berlin that for more than a year (1955–1956) allowed Western intelligence operatives to eavesdrop on Soviet military communications. Besides analyzing intelligence, under Dulles the CIA mounted extensive covert operations, among them successful antileftist coups against the governments of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Dulles later authorized a similar effort to overthrow the radical new regime headed by Fidel Castro in Cuba. In March 1961 a poorly planned and botched U.S.-backed invasion attempt by Cuban exiles landing at the Bay of Pigs ended in highly publicized failure, a major international humiliation for the United States. President John F. Kennedy publicly accepted full responsibility but privately blamed Dulles, who resigned a few months later. In the early 1970s congressional investigations uncovered evidence on some of the CIA's past excesses overseas during the Dulles years that severely damaged the organization's reputation.

Dulles subsequently served on the Warren Commission that investigated Kennedy's assassination, undercutting the credibility of its testimony when he admitted that in the interests of what they considered to be national security, CIA operatives might well lie even when giving evidence before the commission. In retirement Dulles wrote several books on intelligence. He died in Washington, D.C., on 7 April 1969.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Bay of Pigs; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cuba; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Espionage; Guatemala; Guatemalan Intervention; Iran; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Mossadegh, Mohammed; National Security Act; Office of Strategic Services; Truman, Harry S.

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Dulles, John Foster
(1888–1959)

U.S. secretary of state (1953–1959). Born in Washington, D.C., on 25 February 1888, John Foster Dulles studied under Woodrow Wilson at Princeton University and at the Sorbonne, earned a law degree from George Washington University, and in 1911 joined the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. Appointed to the U.S. delegation at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Dulles unsuccessfully sought to restrain Allied reparations demands on Germany.

Active between the wars in internationalist organizations, Dulles initially opposed American intervention in World War II. Once American belligerency seemed probable, however, he focused intensely on postwar planning. A prominent Presbyterian, in 1941 he became chairman of the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, established by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing 25 million American Protestants. Its blueprint for international reform, finished in 1943, urged the creation of international organizations to facilitate peaceful resolution of disputes among states, economic integration, arms control, and religious, intellectual, and political freedom, objectives all consonant with the 1941 Atlantic Charter.

Dulles also became prominent in Republican politics, advising presidential candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey on international affairs. Seeking to secure bipartisan political support for his foreign policy, President Harry S. Truman included Dulles in virtually all major international meetings, beginning with the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drafted the final United Nations Charter. Briefly appointed Republican senator for New York in 1948–1949, Dulles strongly supported creation of the North Atlantic Security Organization (NATO). He also supported European integration as a means of strengthening the continent's economies and militaries, a policy advocated by his friend, Frenchman Jean Monnet.

Dulles rhetorically threatened to wreak "massive retaliation" against American enemies, tactics nicknamed "brinkmanship."

By the late 1940s Dulles had become a dedicated anticommunist. When Chinese communists won control of the mainland in 1949, he advocated American backing for Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (Nationalist) regime on Taiwan. In June 1950, when the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), Dulles urged U.S. intervention and the extension of protection to Taiwan. As a foreign affairs advisor to the Republican presidential campaign in 1952, Dulles argued that the Truman administration had been timorous in merely containing Soviet communism when it should have moved to roll back Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

Named secretary of state by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, Dulles deferred to the president's leadership, although the two men were very different in style. A supporter of Eisenhower's New Look defense policy of heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, Dulles rhetorically threatened to wreak "massive retaliation" against American enemies, tactics nicknamed "brinkmanship." In practice, however, he was often more cautious. Although Dulles's bellicose anticommunist rhetoric alarmed many European leaders, his policies proved pragmatic, effectively respecting established Soviet interests

John Foster Dulles was a U.S. diplomat and senator. He is best remembered as secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration, where he was well known for his strong anticommunist views. (Library of Congress)

in Europe. When discontented East Berlin workers triggered an uprising in the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany) in 1953 and again when Hungarians rebelled against Soviet rule in 1956, Dulles and Eisenhower welcomed refugees but offered no other support.

Dulles and Eisenhower ended the Korean War in 1953, pressuring both sides to accept an armistice, and established a series of alliances around Asia, supplementing the 1951 United States–Japan Security Treaty and Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) Pact with bilateral security treaties with South Korea and Taiwan and with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). When possible, Eisenhower avoided direct major military interventions, preferring to rely on covert operations orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headed by Dulles's younger brother Allen. The CIA played key roles in coups that overthrew Left-leaning governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954.

In Indochina in 1954, Dulles and Eisenhower withstood pressure from U.S. military leaders and, after Britain had declined to assist, refused to authorize air strikes to rescue French troops surrounded by insurgent Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles attended the 1954 Geneva Conference but would not sign the resulting accords that partitioned Vietnam but called for countrywide elections within two years, a contest that Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh was widely expected to win. Instead, Dulles and Eisenhower broke the accords and provided economic aid to the noncommunist Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam), seeking to build it up to ensure its independence.

Dulles and Eisenhower considered strengthening America's West European allies as their first priority. In March 1953, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin died, and new Soviet leaders advanced suggestions for German reunification and neutralization. Distrust on both sides made such proposals ultimately fruitless, although the former World War II allies agreed on a peace treaty with Austria that left that state neutral throughout the Cold War. Seeking to reinforce NATO, Eisenhower and Dulles backed proposals for a multinational European Defense Community (EDC), a plan that France vetoed in 1954.

Dulles's relations with Britain and France, whose imperialism he deplored, reached their nadir in 1956. In 1953 Egyptian nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power. Initially, he sought military and economic aid from the United States, but the Israeli lobby prevented such aid. He then obtained arms from the Soviet bloc. This, in turn, led Dulles in 1956 to rescind an earlier American pledge to provide Nasser with funding for his Aswan Dam project, whereupon Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, co-owned by the British and French governments. While openly joining Dulles in negotiations with Egypt, Britain and France covertly agreed with Israel on war against Egypt to regain the canal, mounting an invasion in early November 1956 just before the

U.S. presidential election. Dulles and Eisenhower strenuously pressured all three powers to withdraw, which they eventually did, but the episode soured Anglo-American relations. Although Dulles hoped to align the United States with nationalist forces around the world, the open growth of Soviet interest in the Middle East brought the announcement the following spring of the Eisenhower Doctrine whereby the United States claimed the right to intervene militarily against indigenous or external communist threats in the region. This provoked significant anti-Americanism throughout the world.

The emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as top Soviet leader in the mid-1950s seemed to promise a relaxation of Soviet-American tensions, as Khrushchev openly repudiated Stalinist tactics and called for peaceful coexistence between communist and noncommunist nations. Eisenhower hoped to conclude substantive disarmament agreements with Khrushchev. In practice, however, Khrushchev was often far from accommodating. The USSR's success in launching the first space satellite (*Sputnik*) in 1957, Soviet possession of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and Khrushchev's seeming readiness from late 1958 onward to provoke an international crisis over Berlin all alarmed American leaders, including the ailing Dulles, diagnosed in 1957 with cancer.

Although American nation-building efforts in both Taiwan and South Vietnam enjoyed apparent success, during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958) Dulles was notably more cautious about gratuitously challenging either communist China or possibly, by extension, the Soviets. When his cancer worsened, he resigned as secretary on 15 April 1959. Dulles died in Washington, D.C., on 24 May 1959.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

ANZUS Pact; Arab-Israeli Wars; Berlin Crises; Containment Policy; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; Egypt; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Eisenhower Doctrine; European Defense Community; European Integration Movement; France; Geneva Conference (1954); Guatemalan Intervention; Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Iran; Israel; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Korean War; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Monnet, Jean; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; New Look Defense Policy; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Peaceful Coexistence; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Soviet Union; *Sputnik;* Stalin, Josef; Suez Crisis; Truman, Harry S.; United Kingdom; United Nations; United States–Japan Security Treaty; Vietnam

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Dutschke, Rudi
(1940–1979)

Leader of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Sozialistischer Deutscher Studenenbund (SDS, German Socialist Students Federation) and arguably the most prominent figure in the German New Left during the 1960s. Born on 7 March 1940 in Schoenfeld, later part of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Rudi Dutschke turned against Soviet-style Stalinism and toward Marxist socialism as a consequence of the 1953 East Berlin Uprising and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. In 1960 Dutschke escaped East Germany to West Berlin, where he took up studies at the Free University. There he cofounded SDS and became head of its West Berlin chapter.

By 1965 Dutschke had achieved a reputation as a charismatic speaker and radical thinker. He campaigned against the authoritarianism of universities, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the conservative German press, and the Establishment. He termed democracy in West Germany a hoax. After a student was shot dead by police during demonstrations against a visit by the Shah of Iran to West Germany in 1967, Dutschke took center stage in the increasingly radical German student movement. On 11 April 1968 he was shot and seriously wounded by a neo-Nazi fanatic in West Berlin.

Dutschke spent the rest of 1968 and 1969 recovering. In 1970 he enrolled at Cambridge University but was deported in 1971 because of his radicalism. He then went to Denmark, where he taught sociology at the University of Aarhus. By the late 1970s his radicalism had faded somewhat, and he became drawn to the environmental politics of the Green Party. Never fully recovered from the wounds he suffered during the 1968 assassination attempt, Dutschke lost consciousness in his bathtub and drowned on 24 December 1979 in Aarhus, Denmark.

Michael D. Richards

See also

East Berlin Uprising; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hungarian Revolution; Vietnam War Protests

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Duvalier, François
(1907–1971)

Haitian dictator and president (1957–1971). Born in Port-au-Prince on 14 April 1907, François "Papa Doc" Duvalier received a medical degree in 1934 from the University of Haiti. He served as a hospital physician until 1943, when he became politically active.

Duvalier became a leading proponent of black nationalism in Haiti during the 1940s and early 1950s. He strongly criticized and derided Haiti's light-skinned elite for repressing the black—or dark-skinned—population, which far outnumbered the elite then in control. Backed by the army, Duvalier came to power in 1957 via a fraudulent election in which he promised honesty in government and policies that would benefit the country's black population at the expense of the light-skinned ruling elite.

Duvalier rapidly established the trappings of a personalist dictatorship, silencing the press and courts, neutralizing the army, and creating a secret police made up of plainclothes thugs, the notorious Tontons Macoutes, to enforce his often brutal rule. Duvalier sought and received political and military support from Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy. The United States believed that supporting Haiti's right-wing regime would ensure regional political stability and block the spread of Cuban influence after Fidel Castro's successful January 1959 revolution.

The Eisenhower administration provided significant economic aid to Duvalier and sent a U.S. Marine mission to train the Haitian Army. U.S. policymakers hoped that a stable, black-ruled state in the Caribbean would win the United States valuable diplomatic leverage in the developing world. This was especially the case in Africa, where decolonization had created a fierce Soviet-American rivalry.

Increasing criticism of Duvalier's authoritarian policies led the Kennedy administration to reduce the scale of its aid to Haiti and to pressure Duvalier to leave office. In 1963 the United States cut off most of its assistance to Haiti. But in the absence of alternative liberal or democratic figures to replace Duvalier, the Americans subsequently tempered their insistence on reform and continued to provide support for Duvalier, even as he groomed his son Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc") as his successor. Upon Duvalier's death on 21 April 1971 in Port-au-Prince, the transition to rule by Baby Doc occurred peacefully, and full U.S. military cooperation with Haiti resumed.

Barry Carr

See also

Decolonization; Haiti

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E

Eanes, António
(1935–)

Portuguese military officer, key participant in Portugal's revolutionary Armed Forces Movement (MFA), and two-term president of Portugal (1976–1986). Born in Alcains, near Castelo Branco, on 25 January 1935, António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes enrolled in the Colégio Militar (Military College) in 1953. After graduation, he attended Lisbon Faculty of Law and the Institute for Applied Psychology. As with most Portuguese Army officers, he spent many years abroad in Portugal's shrinking empire. He served in Portuguese Goa just before it was lost to India and spent much of the 1960s and early 1970s in Portuguese Africa, including Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola, largely before those regions attracted significant attention from the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, or China.

Eanes played important roles both in the MFA, which toppled Marcelo Caetano's dictatorship in the so-called Revolution of Carnations in 1974, and in the defeat of a leftist military coup the following year. Consequently, in December 1975 he was promoted to general and named chief of staff of the army. In 1976 he was elected president and was reelected in 1981. Following the MFA's widely popular coup, he helped to reestablish a subordinate role for the military in Portuguese politics. It was also during his tenure as chief of staff and during his presidential administration that Portugal committed to complete and unconditional withdrawal from its African colonies. Subsequently, these conflicts, especially the Angolan civil war, became extensively internationalized.

Eric W. Frith

See also
Portugal

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East Asia

East Asia comprises the major powers of China, Korea, and Japan. The region was the scene of major confrontations and armed conflict in the Cold War. On the one side, there were the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). On the opposing side were the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and Japan. Post–World War II East Asian history can be divided into three phases, based on changing regional and global geopolitics: V-J Day to mid-1950, a period of uncertainty and frustration; mid-1950 to mid-1969, during which East-West confrontation was intertwined with the growing independence of client states; and mid-1969 to 1991, which featured an easing of tensions through détente and the triumph of East Asian independence movements.

From V-J Day to June 1950

Wartime discussions regarding the post–World War II East Asian order had been brief and amorphous. Nevertheless, there was a general agreement that Japan, once defeated, would be stripped of its overseas territories and placed under foreign occupation. China, at that time the Republic of China (ROC) under Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party and identified as one of the Big Five powers, would assume Japan's former role in enforcing Asian stability and order.

Because of the Allies' Germany First strategy, the end of the war in the Pacific in August 1945 left many issues regarding the postwar order in East Asia undecided, including Korea's postwar disposition. According to the 1943 Cairo and 1945 Yalta agreements, Korea, which had been annexed by Japan in 1910, would again become independent under the guidance of an Allied trusteeship. When Japan surrendered, the Allies hastened to cobble together an interim agreement regarding Korea. Soviet and U.S. troops would take the surrender of Japanese forces, Soviet troops north of the 38th Parallel and U.S. troops south of it. This division was to be temporary, pending the independence of Korea.

On 2 September 1945, Japan formally surrendered. According to the August 1945 Potsdam Protocol, the Soviet Union took possession of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands (the latter never having been Russian before). The United States assumed responsibility for the occupation of the Japanese home islands, with General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), supervising the occupation and implementation of the Potsdam directives governing Japanese disarmament, demilitarization, and democratization.

MacArthur, supported by 350,000 U.S. troops, installed a temporary military government. Japanese armed forces and national police forces were dissolved, the zaibatsu (military-industrial companies) were dismantled, and war criminals were tried and executed. In 1947 a new constitution, along a British-style constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system, came into force. Under MacArthur's guidance, a peace clause was incorporated into the constitution forbidding Japan from waging war and restricting military expenditures to no more than 1 percent of its national budget.

In light of the onset of the Cold War in Europe, Japanese occupation policy was modified. A reverse course was set into motion by 1948, halting dissolution of the zaibatsu and relying upon rapid economic recovery to keep communism at bay. U.S. authorities also carried out drastic reforms in education, land redistribution, and economic liberalization to ensure that Japan would remain firmly in the Western bloc.

The occupation of the Korean Peninsula was, by contrast, frustrating. Because Japan had invaded the Asian mainland through the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union sought a pro-Soviet satellite to safeguard its security, as it had sought a cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union installed veteran communist and anti-Japanese guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung, who had fought with the Red Army as an officer in World War II, to head the provisional government in its zone. The Soviets also helped organize the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), which ultimately became the sole political party of North Korea.

In their zone, American occupation forces worked to install in power the staunchly anticommunist Syngman Rhee, who had spent a number of years in the United States. Both Kim and Rhee wanted to reunify Korea but under their own leadership. Conflicting ideologies and strategic concerns thus conspired to doom efforts to reunify Korea. In September 1947, the United States handed over the Korean question to the United Nations (UN). In accordance with a November 1947 UN resolution, elections were held in South Korea in early summer 1948 (North Korea refused to admit the UN team), leading to the establishment of the ROK in August 1948, with Rhee as the first president. In response, the Soviets helped create the DPRK that September, with Kim as premier. The birth of these new nations marked the end of the joint occupation, followed by the pullout of Soviet and U.S. occupation forces in the winter of 1948–1949. With European concerns paramount and anxious not to provide Rhee with sufficient arms by which he might begin a war of reunification, the United States pursued a hands-off policy toward Korea. Kim, meanwhile, embarked on an arms buildup using Japanese arms and weapons left behind by the departing Red Army.

Under MacArthur's guidance, a peace clause was incorporated into the constitution forbidding Japan from waging war and restricting military expenditures to no more than 1 percent of its national budget.

Postwar developments in China were both troubling and disappointing. The Allies' vision of a strong, united, and democratic China quickly faded. Indeed, as soon as the war had ended, Jiang renewed the decades-old struggle against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), headed by Mao Zedong. As V-J Day approached, Jiang secured a U.S. pledge to extend Lend-Lease aid in the name of postwar reconstruction. To secure Soviet leader Josef Stalin's neutrality, Jiang made critical concessions to the Soviets in September 1945, including the granting of de facto Soviet control over key industries and communication lines in Chinese northeastern and western provinces, and recognition of Mongolian independence, a buffer between the ROC and the Soviet Union. Having secured support from both the United States and the Soviet Union, Jiang renewed his anti-CCP campaign, culminating in a full-scale civil war (1947–1949).

Most of China's former allies adopted a neutral stance toward the civil war except for the United States, which provided additional assistance to

Chinese demonstrators holding posters of Stalin during the anniversary celebration of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 1951. (Library of Congress)

Jiang under the Economic Cooperation Act of April 1948. By late 1948, however, the Americans were convinced that Jiang would lose the war due to his unpopularity, dictatorial nature, lack of meaningful reforms, and the corruption in the GMD government. The CCP, meanwhile, was able to win mass support. Concurrently preoccupied with the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949) and believing that it had done enough, Washington refused to provide additional assistance to Jiang. Beginning in early 1949, the United States withdrew its personnel from China, and in August 1949 it declared a hands-off policy.

On 1 October 1949, Mao proclaimed the PRC, which was immediately followed by Soviet recognition and the conclusion of the February 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. The defeated Nationalists fled to the island of Taiwan, refusing to concede defeat and acting as if they were still the legitimate rulers of China.

June 1950–mid-1969

On 25 June 1950, having secured the approval of Stalin, Kim ordered his troops to cross the 38th Parallel to bring South Korea under his control, provoking the Korean War. When U.S. and UN forces defeated the invading

North Koreans and then began their own invasion of North Korea, the PRC entered the war. The war soon became a protracted three-year-long military confrontation between the United States and the PRC. The Korean War came to a halt on 27 July 1953 when both sides signed an armistice that virtually restored the status quo ante bellum. No peace settlement has yet been concluded.

The Korean War, widely perceived as an unanticipated hot war in an area of peripheral concern, dramatically polarized East Asia into another Cold War front. Perceiving Kim's attack as the beginning of Soviet expansionism in Asia, Washington drastically reoriented its Asian foreign policy, which evolved from indifference into overt commitment and even military activism. Japan was assigned a new strategic role as a military base and arsenal for U.S. forces and as a bastion to contain communism. As a consequence, the United States hastened a peace treaty with Japan, culminating in the 8 September 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty that ended the occupation in 1952 and granted full Japanese sovereignty. Later the same day, the United States–Japan Security Treaty was signed. Japan was now required to rearm to cope with internal threats and disorder, while the United States maintained the right to deploy military forces on Japanese soil. As a sovereign power, Japan was entitled to seek out foreign and collective defense assistance in case of external invasion. By these terms, the Americans assured themselves of a military presence in East Asia.

Regarding South Korea, the United States also reversed its previous policy of disengagement. The Americans extended substantial military assistance to enhance the ROK's armed forces. In October 1953 the two states concluded the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty, the terms of which were similar to those of the U.S.-Japan pact. This in effect shifted the U.S. defensive perimeter onto the East Asian mainland to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the 38th Parallel of Korea, part of a forward deployment strategy to contain communism.

The Korean War simultaneously consolidated Soviet-PRC-DPRK ties. Although Soviet wartime contributions were limited to small-scale aircraft and air force assistance, the Soviets nonetheless solidly confirmed their commitment to their socialist allies in Asia. Stalin had encouraged Mao and the Chinese to intervene when the war had turned sour for the DPRK in the fall of 1950. During the war, the Soviet Union greatly accelerated its assistance to North Korea and the PRC.

This solidarity began to recede following the Korean War, however. Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Stalin, who died in March 1953. The new Soviet leader's policies of peaceful coexistence with the West, de-Stalinization, collective leadership, and economic liberalism deeply irritated both Mao and Kim. Perceiving Khrushchev as a revisionist, both the PRC and DPRK decided to pursue their own paths. While Kim kept a low profile, Mao chose to openly compete with the Soviet Union as leader of the communist bloc, sowing the seeds for the Sino-Soviet split.

To enhance its international standing and to lessen its reliance on the Soviets, the PRC sought diplomatic relationships with nonsocialist nations.

At the 1955 Bandung Conference, the PRC cultivated ties with the developing world and opened a dialogue with the United States to discuss the Taiwan issue. At home, Mao accelerated the socialist transformation, ending the First Five-Year Plan a year ahead of schedule.

Responding to the growing stature of the PRC, in 1957 Khrushchev promised to share nuclear technology with that country. Mao, however, continued his antipathy toward the Soviets. In 1958, without consulting the Soviet leadership, Mao provoked the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and launched the Great Leap Forward program to accelerate socialization. These actions enraged Khrushchev, who then withheld nuclear and other technology. In 1960, Khrushchev withdrew all Soviet personnel from the PRC. Mao continued to challenge the Soviet Union by provoking a border crisis in 1960, establishing private trade ties with Japan in 1965, and intensifying attacks on Khrushchev's revisionism while waging the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Kim, on the contrary, preferred self-reliance, an ideology known as *juche* that is built on four principles: ideological autonomy, political independence, economic self-sufficiency, and military self-reliance. Kim's first goal was to tighten his control over North Korea. Countering de-Stalinization and collective leadership, Kim carried out massive political purges in 1956 to eliminate communist Chinese and Soviet elements. This upset Mao, who in 1958 withdrew troops stationed in the DPRK, an act that only reinforced Kim's streak of independence.

To achieve self-sufficiency and independence, the DPRK adopted a neutral stance in the developing Sino-Soviet split, intending to play one nation against the other. During 1956–1959, North Korea secured several agreements from the Soviets and Chinese to develop nuclear power. In 1961, when the Sino-Soviet split became permanent, Kim negotiated separate mutual security treaties with the PRC and the Soviet Union, securing continued economic and technical assistance. When Soviet and PRC aid diminished in the mid-1960s, Kim turned to other nations to obtain nuclear technology. North Korea's neutrality did not last long. In view of the PRC's 1964 detonation of its first atomic bomb and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Kim moved closer to the Soviet Union.

Similar nationalistic sentiments also developed in Japan and in South Korea. Capitalizing on constitutional restraints on rearmament, Japan pursued a course of minimalism in international affairs, allowing the country to concentrate on economic recovery. The Korean War was a tremendous assist in this. During the war, Japanese industrial output doubled. This progress encouraged Japan to adopt an omnidirectional economic foreign policy, enabling it to rejoin the world community and rebuild its international status. During 1954–1959, Japan concluded peace treaties with its former victims, including Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Vietnam. In 1956, Japan restored normal ties with the Soviet Union.

Throughout the 1960s, Japan joined a number of international economic organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Monetary Fund. In 1964 Japan hosted the

Olympic Games, and in 1966 it hosted the inaugural meeting of the Asian Development Bank, which launched the country's status as a regional economic power.

At the same time, Japanese-U.S. relations were showing signs of strain, centering on two issues. First, Japan saw the U.S. military occupation of Okinawa as an infringement of Japanese sovereignty. Moreover, the potential installation of U.S. nuclear facilities there aroused deep resentment among pacifists. Mounting anti-Americanism culminated in large-scale street protests on the eve of the renewal of the United States–Japan Security Treaty in 1960. Given the mutual desire to keep a U.S. military presence in Japan, some revisions occurred to pacify the Japanese public. In the revised January 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan became an equal partner with the United States. Despite U.S. concessions, the treaty nevertheless proved incapable of mollifying the Japanese electorate. The second issue plaguing U.S.-Japanese relations was the Japanese export of textiles to the United States, which accounted for the growing trade deficit between the two nations.

To the South Koreans, American commitments were a blessing. As with Japan, South Korea secured U.S. assistance to build a mighty economic engine while leaving costly defense responsibilities to the Americans. Politically, occasional armed clashes along the DMZ and North Korean subversion and infiltration activities gave ROK presidents the justification to rule in dictatorial fashion, ranging from Rhee's to Park Chong-hee's (1961–1979) authoritarianism.

Having been ruled by foreigners for centuries, the South Koreans were eager to be rid of the Americans.

This bilateral harmony, however, was undermined in the mid-1960s, thanks to America's changing Cold War strategy and growing anti-Americanism among the South Korean public. Owing to American preoccupation with the Vietnam War, the Park government concluded that South Korea should become more self-reliant in defense matters. In 1965, South Korea normalized diplomatic ties with Japan in order to gain Japanese economic assistance and investment especially in steel and chemical production, both of which were sources of national strength.

The second issue straining U.S.–South Korean relations was a growing ROK resentment toward the U.S. military presence. Having been ruled by foreigners for centuries, the South Koreans were eager to be rid of the Americans. To pacify the nationalists, the United States negotiated the 1966 Status of Forces Agreement, which legitimized the deployment of U.S. forces on the peninsula to cope with the threat from the DPRK. Pursuant to this agreement, an ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Committee was established in 1968 that met annually to discuss defense matters of common interest and on an equal basis.

The year 1969 proved difficult for East Asia in that the solidarity of each bloc was on the verge of collapse. First, the Sino-Soviet split culminated in a series of large-scale armed clashes along the Sino-Soviet border. By late summer, these two communist nations were on the brink of a nuclear confrontation, rendering North Korea a likely battlefield. Second,

in the U.S.-led camp, resentment against American troops on Okinawa resurfaced as American-Japanese negotiations for the renewal of the 1960 security treaty were under way.

Mid-1969–1991

The years 1969–1970 also marked the beginning of détente in East Asia, with the initiative coming from the big powers. In September 1969, the Soviet Union reached an agreement with the PRC to settle their ongoing border dispute through peaceful means. The Nixon Doctrine of July 1969 was of far-reaching significance, altering the geopolitics of East Asia.

Because of declining economic performance and military setbacks in the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon intended to curtail America's overseas obligations through a division of defense responsibility, regional alliances, and rapprochement with the communist bloc.

The renewal of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty with Japan was the first U.S. attempt to induce its client states to assume more defense responsibility. In November 1969, Nixon urged Japan to expand its Self-Defense Forces and assume an active part in maintaining East Asian stability. As a gesture of goodwill, Nixon promised to return Okinawa, provided that America retained the right to deploy military forces and introduce nuclear facilities there in case of emergency and after prior consultation. Japan agreed to revise the security treaty as such, and on 15 May 1972 Okinawa was returned to Japanese sovereignty. In return, the Self-Defense Forces were expanded. Nixon had also mentioned the problem of Japanese textile exports during the summit meeting and pushed for the imposition of a voluntary quota. Japan, however, refused to yield. It was left to Nixon's successors to resolve these differences. In 1976, the United States successfully pressed Japan to share patrolling duty in Japanese waters. In 1981, the Americans secured Japan's commitment to defend its sea-lanes up to 100 miles. The dispute over textiles was resolved in 1979 when the Japanese government voluntarily restricted exports.

The Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s did much to stabilize East Asia. On 15 July 1971, after one and a half years of secret contacts with the PRC, Nixon announced his plan to visit Beijing in 1972. To show its sincerity, the United States lifted its veto of the PRC's UN membership and reduced military forces in South Korea by one-third in early 1971. In February 1972, Nixon made the historic visit to Beijing, resulting in the Shanghai Communiqué of 27 February 1972, which pledged the mutual desire to normalize PRC-U.S. relations and to maintain peace and stability in Asia. On 1 January 1979, the two nations established formal diplomatic relations.

The PRC-U.S. détente triggered a reorientation of America's client states' policies toward their neighbors. Following the American lead, Japan sped up its efforts to formalize its ties with the PRC, largely for economic reasons. In September 1972 Japan and the PRC reached an agreement on normalization and in August 1978 concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

The Sino-American rapprochement, on the other hand, alarmed both the North and South Koreans, who felt betrayed and abandoned by their protectors. Both Korean governments then pursued their own course to stabilize

the peninsula. In August 1971 the two sides opened a dialogue through their respective Red Cross societies, resulting in the July 1972 Joint Commmuniqué. They agreed on three principles for reunification: unification by independent effort without foreign interference, denial of the use of force for unification purpose, and mutual respect of the existing differences in ideology.

Regional tensions continued, however, with the major threat coming from the Soviet Union, which found itself in an increasingly isolated position. To counter the PRC-U.S. rapprochement, the Soviet Union accelerated its military buildup along the border of North Korea and in southern Sakhalin. To break their diplomatic isolation, the Soviets renewed their attention on North Korea, which was once again caught between the Sino-Soviet split.

North Korea continued its policy of oscillating between the PRC and the Soviet Union to advance its interests. Earlier in 1971, when the PRC decided to normalize its relationship with the United States, the Chinese assured Kim of their continued friendship by concluding a fifteen-year agreement on military assistance to North Korea. Meanwhile, Kim did not preclude continued cooperation with the Soviet Union in nuclear development. Owing to historical-cultural ties and the Soviet nuclear threat, Kim valued the PRC even more. In 1975, however, Kim reversed his policy by staying close with the Soviet Union and protesting the PRC's refusal to support his decision to renew the Korean War, an ambition inspired by the fall of Saigon and the unification of Vietnam. Beginning in the late 1970s, in line with the *juche* ideology, North Korea launched a nuclear weapons program, seeking aid from the Soviet Union and West European nations.

The DMZ remained a dangerous spot despite the calm brought about by the PRC-U.S.-Japan détente. Beginning in 1974, U.S.-ROK forces discovered several North Korean–constructed tunnels under the DMZ, giving rise to the suspicion that Kim was planning an underground attack. This suspicion became real as DPRK troops intensified disturbances along the DMZ during 1976–1977. In response, U.S.-ROK forces increased their forces along the DMZ and tightened their military alliance. In November 1978, the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command came into being to improve logistics and coordination in case of an invasion. In 1981, the Americans increased their military presence in South Korea. On its own, South Korea expanded its forces and sought cooperation with France to develop nuclear power to counter North Korea. As a result, South Korea's military expenses in 1979 dramatically expanded.

Meanwhile, the PRC touted itself as an "honest broker" between South Korea and North Korea as a way to ease tension on the peninsula, but neither side showed interest. Breakthroughs in resolving North-South differences finally came in the mid-1980s. In 1984, North Korea offered relief assistance to South Korea, which had suffered massive casualties and damage in a disastrous flood. In 1985, both sides exchanged hometown visiting groups. The greatest impetus for the easing of tensions came from the Soviets. In July 1986, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union intended to reorient its East Asia policy. To prevent economic depression at home, Gorbachev slashed Soviet military budgets and overseas obligations



Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) soldiers inspecting one of two tunnels discovered deep in the rugged mountains astride the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ). Illegal under the terms of the Korean armistice, the tunnels extended about 2 miles from North Korea well into the South Korean area of the DMZ. The tunnels were discovered in November 1974, but the North Koreans denied any knowledge of them. (Bettmann/Corbis)

and pursued economic liberalism and détente with the West. In view of its economic success, Gorbachev approached South Korea. To show his goodwill, he had pressured North Korea a year earlier to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby lessening the threat of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.

The new Soviet initiative was welcomed by other East Asian nations. In July 1987, the PRC announced that it would not support any North Korean military action on the peninsula and simultaneously began secret negotiations with South Korea with a view toward speeding up Chinese economic modernization. In South Korea, military rule gave way to a new liberal democracy with the 1987 election of Roh Tae Woo. On assuming the presidency, Roh actively pursued a policy called Norpolitik, or northern policy, that sought détente and cooperation with the communist bloc. In 1989 and 1990, South Korea established formal diplomatic ties with East European nations and the Soviet Union.

Beginning in 1988, South Korea established informal trade ties with North Korea, the economy of which was in serious trouble. At the same time, both the PRC and the Soviet Union stepped up their efforts to persuade North Korea to pursue North-South détente. Finding itself being increasingly isolated, North Korea finally yielded. In December 1988, North Korea and the

United States began nonofficial negotiations in Beijing; the North Korean nuclear weapons program proved to be the most irreconcilable issue.

As the 1990s opened, North Korea made greater progress toward seeking a rapprochement with South Korea. It first lifted its objection to the dual entry of both Koreas into the UN. In September 1991, both North and South Korea were given UN membership, and for the first time each recognized the legitimacy of the other. That same month they opened a dialogue at the prime ministerial level in Seoul that resulted in two understandings: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation—also called the Basic Agreement—and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Progress proved illusory, however. By the end of the decade, with the Cold War but a memory, the DPRK had once again become isolated and increasingly belligerent.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Bandung Conference; Détente; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Sino-Soviet Border Incident

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East Berlin Uprising
(16–17 June 1953)

Mass antigovernment protests in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) during 16–17 June 1953 that triggered Soviet military intervention. The government of the GDR, like all the other states in the Soviet bloc, dramatically altered its policies in the wake of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's death in March 1953. This new course, announced on 9 June 1953, shifted the emphasis in both production and investment from heavy industry to consumer goods and mandated lower prices for those goods. It also rescinded restrictions on religious activities. Most important, however, was the admission by the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) that its previous policies were flawed.

East German demonstrators, some carrying banners, march through the Brandenburg Gate into the western sector of Berlin, 17 June 1953. What began as a general strike because of a rise in production quotas in East Berlin evolved into a protest against the government that spread to many cities in East Germany. (Bettmann/Corbis)

This development opened the door to criticism of the SED and led GDR citizens to demand additional concessions, ranging from the revision of the Oder-Neisse border to the holding of new elections. What actually triggered the East Berlin Uprising, however, was the government's refusal to rescind a recent increase in the production quota for its workers.

In protest, construction workers in East Berlin laid down their tools on the morning of 16 June 1953 and marched to the government building to demand better working conditions. Workers from other areas of Berlin, both East and West, soon joined them. Official announcements that the production expectations had been reduced, however, were ignored. The demonstrations grew larger and continued through the evening. The following day, thousands of workers across the GDR, informed of the developments in Berlin by Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), joined in demonstrations against the SED regime. More than 300,000 citizens of the GDR participated in strikes and marches in some 350 cities and towns, including traditional communist strongholds such as Halle, Leipzig, and Magdeburg.

What had begun as an economic protest quickly took on political overtones. Among other things, protestors called for the release of all political prisoners, a general strike against the government, the resignation of Walter Ulbricht, new elections, and German unification. Some protesters turned to

vandalism and violence, with government and SED offices serving as primary targets. Units of the GDR People's Police (Volkspolizei) that tried to intervene often were chased off; in some instances, the police actually joined the demonstrators.

Only the arrival of Soviet tanks and troops reversed the tide of revolution in many areas. By all accounts, the forces of the Red Army acted with restraint and discipline. Nevertheless, 28 people lost their lives during the East Berlin Uprising, and more than 400 were wounded. Although there were a few wildcat strikes across the GDR the following day, the Soviet action effectively restored order in East Germany on 18 June.

The SED regime denounced the events as the work of fascist provocateurs in the service of the Allies who aimed to bring about the destruction of socialism in Germany. More than 6,000 people were arrested in connection with the East Berlin Uprising, and more than 1,300 eventually received prison sentences. Many SED members participated in the demonstrations, and several party leaders privately acknowledged that, by and large, the protests had been justified.

SED leaders could not, of course, admit these facts publicly. The East Berlin Uprising thus became a Cold War icon for both sides. The SED regime now had "proof" that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) sought to overthrow socialism and restore fascism in Germany. The FRG, meanwhile, mourned the "martyrs" of communist oppression. The street leading west from the Brandenburg Gate was renamed "The Street of 17 June 1953" in their honor. After the collapse of the GDR, that name became the subject of a highly politicized debate, as did the East Berlin Uprising itself, concerning the nature of the Cold War and the justification for the division of Germany.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Stalin, Josef; Ulbricht, Walter

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See German Democratic Republic

East Germany

East Timor

The island of Timor is located at the southeastern edge of the Indonesian archipelago. East Timor became a Portuguese colony in the sixteenth century, while the western portion of the island was controlled by the Dutch. During World War II, East Timor was occupied first by Australia and then by Japan. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Portuguese returned to East Timor. But when the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown in the April 1974 Carnation Revolution, the new military rulers were determined to grant independence to Portugal's colonial possessions, including East Timor. That set the stage for a brief power struggle over who would rule a newly independent East Timor.

The local independence movement was badly split, and the pro-Portuguese conservative Timor Democratic Union (UDT) staged a coup on 11 August 1975, allegedly to preempt a communist takeover. The Left-leaning Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (best known under the name Fretilin, derived from its Portuguese abbreviation) proved ultimately victorious and soon controlled most of East Timor. Because the Portuguese had left the island, Fretilin proclaimed independence on 28 November 1975. The new state was not officially recognized by the United Nations (UN), which still regarded Portugal as the administering power.

Fearing a potentially communist regime in the region, Indonesia sent military forces (Operation KOMODO) to occupy East Timor on 7 December 1975. Recently released documents show that U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had given a green light for the invasion during their visit to Jakarta, Indonesia, the day before. The Indonesian Army encountered fierce and prolonged Fretilin resistance, which was finally broken with brute force. By 1979, official Indonesian figures reported 372,921 civilians in refugee camps, while at least 100,000 people of a population of some 680,000 Timorese had been killed since the beginning of the invasion. The UN Security Council deplored and denounced the situation, calling upon Indonesia to withdraw its troops, but failed to formally condemn the invasion in a December 1975 resolution. While the UN never recognized Indonesian sovereignty, several Arab and Asian states recognized the occupation.

In the years following the invasion, the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia were among powers recognizing de facto Indonesian sovereignty. Australia granted de jure recognition in February 1979 when it opened negotiations for the exploration of oil fields off the Timorese coast. Washington regarded Indonesian dictator General Suharto as a bulwark against Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the Ombai-Wetar Straits off the coast of East Timor permitted undetected submarine passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, an important element in U.S. Navy strategy. Lacking international support, the Timorese resistance movement, led by Xanana Gusmao, had little prospect of winning independence, even after its international spokesmen, José Ramos-Horta and Bishop Belo, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996.

East Timor Falintil (Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor) guerrillas drill at their base in the Viqueque district in East Timor on 7 August 1999. Falintil fought to win independence for East Timor from Indonesia. (Reuters/Corbis)

Subsequent to Suharto's resignation in May 1998, his successor B. J. Habibie surprisingly offered to stage a referendum on the future of East Timor. The vote went ahead on 30 August 1999, and 78.5 percent opted for independence. Only hours after the vote had been tallied, however, pro-Indonesian militias began to engage in violence and looting. After a UN fact-finding mission concluded that the violence had been orchestrated by the Indonesian Army, international pressure persuaded Habibie to accept a UN peacekeeping force; it arrived on 20 September 1999. East Timor was placed under UN supervision and finally achieved independence on 20 May 2002.

Jan Martin Lemnitzer

See also
Indonesia; Suharto

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Ecuador

South American nation. Covering 109,483 square miles, Ecuador is equivalent in size to the U.S. state of Nevada and had a 1945 population of approximately 3.2 million people. Ecuador is bordered by Colombia to the north, Peru to the east and south, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. Its population is composed mainly of mestizos and indigenous peoples. Spanish and Quichua are the two official languages. Ninety-five percent of the population is Roman Catholic.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Ecuador declared war on Japan and granted the United States access to the Galapagos Islands. There the Americans built a military base. From that moment on, Ecuador aligned its foreign policy with that of the United States. By 1950 Ecuador occupied a seat as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, Ecuador voted favorably on the U.S. resolution in the UN to send troops to Korea. Although the government of President Galo Lasso (1948–1952) initially supported the United States, it did not send troops. Relations between the two countries were further tightened in 1952 when Ecuador became the first Latin American nation to sign a mutual defense agreement with the United States. Military cooperation continued until the 1970s, when the United States decided to withdraw its Military Advisory Group from Ecuador because of a conflict involving tuna fishing.

The Guatemalan crisis, however, created a shift in Ecuador's foreign policy. In 1954, President José Velasco Ibarra expressed criticism of the American intervention in Guatemala. During the 1960s, Ecuador sought to maintain neutrality in the East-West conflict but still took part in it. Ecuador's chief concern was not communism in Cuba but rather its own historical border dispute with Peru. Velasco Ibarra wanted a revision to the 1942 Rio Protocol and wanted to take the dispute to the UN. However, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion led the president to condemn the American action and declare his support of Cuba's Fidel Castro. Later in 1961, when Ibarra was ousted in a coup, Carlos Arosema surprised even his own supporters by establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

In 1968, Ibarra won the presidency for a fifth time. Unable to implement an austerity program, in 1970 he assumed dictatorial powers. In 1972, however, the Ecuadorian military intervened. It had originally supported Velasco's dictatorship but had been alienated by his management of Ecuadorian oil resources.

The military junta, led by General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara (1972–1976), initiated a state-run development program. Revenues from oil concessions to multinational companies helped finance this economic modernization program, but when the junta fixed production and prices above the standards of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the companies reduced their exports. Although the junta decided to review its oil policy in the mid-1970s, it had lost support among the population and had to call elections in 1978.

In the 1980s, Ecuador again strengthened its ties to the United States. Neoliberal economic programs were planned by President León Febres Cordero (1984–1988), but the consequences of a debt crisis and the 1987 earthquake made it almost impossible to implement them. Febres-Cordero maintained a dual position in relation to other Latin American nations. In 1985 he visited Castro in Cuba and initially supported the peace process in Central America; months later Febres-Cordero broke diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. The fragile relation between Ecuador and Latin America was reversed at the end of the decade when newly elected President Rodrigo Borja (1988–1992) proclaimed a nonaligned foreign policy.

Carina Solmirano

See also

Americas; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

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Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon
(1897–1977)

British Conservative Party politician, foreign secretary, and prime minister (1955–1957). Born at Windlestone Hall near Bishop Auckland, County Durham, England, on 12 June 1897, Robert Anthony Eden attended Eton during 1914–1915. He then served in World War I. He became an infantry lieutenant and rose to the rank of brigade major in 1918, at age twenty the youngest in the British Army.

Eden then studied Oriental languages at Christ Church, Oxford University (1919–1922), before entering politics in 1923, when he was elected to the House of Commons as a Conservative. Interested in foreign affairs, during 1931–1934 he was undersecretary for foreign affairs. In December 1935 he became secretary for foreign affairs in Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's government.

In May 1937 Neville Chamberlain became prime minister, and before long Eden found himself at odds with what he saw as Chamberlain's appeasement of Nazi Germany and resigned in protest in February 1938. Upon the outbreak of war in September 1939, Eden was recalled to office and took up his former post of foreign secretary in December 1940 under the coalition government of Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Following the Labour Party victory in 1945, Eden served as shadow prime minister. In October 1951 he became foreign secretary for a third time when Churchill led the Conservatives to victory. As foreign secretary, Eden brokered negotiated settlements concerning Trieste and the Anglo-Iranian oil



Anthony Eden was a central figure in foreign policy for Great Britain in the years leading up to and during World War II. He was British prime minister during 1955–1957 and is best remembered for his role in the 1956 Suez Crisis. (Library of Congress)

crisis, thereby helping to heal rifts in the Western alliance. On 6 April 1955, Churchill resigned and Eden replaced him. Eden's secret deal with the French and Israelis to attack Egypt and retake the recently nationalized Suez Canal led to his downfall. From the start, Eden was determined to recover control of the canal and, if at all possible, remove Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser from power.

In November 1956, without consulting any of their allies—including the United States—Israel, Britain, and France attacked Egypt, but they were soon forced to retreat in the face of U.S. pressure. In a private phone conversation, President Dwight D. Eisenhower lambasted Eden for taking such unilateral action, purportedly reducing the prime minister to tears. The Suez Canal thus remained in Egyptian hands, while Eden had suffered a humiliating political defeat. With his reputation in tatters and his health declining, Eden had little choice but to resign from office in January 1957. His fiasco notwithstanding, he was granted the title of Lord Avon in 1961. He wrote several volumes of memoirs while in retirement and died in Alvediston, England, on 14 January 1977.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Suez Crisis

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Egypt

North African nation. Egypt encompasses 386,660 square miles and it also covers the Sinai Peninsula, which is geographically part of Asia. With an estimated 1945 population of 20.5 million people, Egypt is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Libya to the west, Sudan to the south, and the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aqaba, and Israel to the east and northeast. Egyptians call their country the "mother of the world." The nation's ancient civilization was closely tied to the Nile River, which runs from south to north into the Mediterranean Sea.

Egypt was a tributary province of the Roman Empire. Arab armies conquered the country in the seventh century. Various Muslim nonindigenous dynasties such as the Mamluks then ruled Egypt. From the sixteenth century, the Mamluk and Ottoman ruling classes were political leaders, the military, religious leaders, and merchants, who intermarried and were linguistically and ethnically distinct from the masses.

In 1798 Napoleon invaded Egypt, defeating its Mamluk rulers. Upon the French departure, Muhammad Ali Pasha, a military envoy of the Ottomans, gained control over the country. Through the use of conscription, Pasha developed a more disciplined army, bargaining for his right to serve as Egypt's viceroy in return for suppressing rebellions in other Ottoman territories, the Arabian Peninsula, and Syria. His descendants ruled Egypt, modernized Cairo, and built the Suez Canal, thereby acquiring large debts.

The Suez Canal became of immense importance to Britain, and British troops arrived in 1882 to suppress the Urabi revolt, named for one of its instigators. Britain then assumed control of Egypt's finances and bureaucracy and reformed the army. Britain considered Egypt a key economic and strategic base. British textile industries benefited from a monopoly over Indian and Egyptian sources of raw cotton. The Suez Canal was so important to the British that they maintained troops there for decades. The British ceded independence to Egypt in 1922 but received an indemnity payment, kept control over the Sudan, retained troops and bases in the Suez Canal zone, and periodically exerted their will over the Egyptian king and his government. In the twentieth century, Egyptian nationalism took up the theme of resistance to lengthy foreign domination, which prevailed until 1952.

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In World War II, Egypt was technically neutral. But when Italian forces invaded Egypt in 1940, British, Australian, and other Allied forces responded to this and successive Axis campaigns. German General Erwin Rommel drove east all the way to al-Alamein but was forced to retreat west following the British offensive there in November 1942. The expanded presence of Western troops in Egypt and their behavior angered the Muslim Brotherhood, an antisecularist party that struggled with the government.

Requirements that Egyptian officers own property were changed, permitting men such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, the son of a postal clerk, to rise to officer status. Nasser fought along with Egyptian forces in Palestine in 1948. Greatly dissatisfied with the Egyptian monarchy and the defeat of Arab forces in Palestine, he and other officers planned a coup, which they carried out in 1952 in the wake of disturbances in the Suez Canal zone and in Cairo. These so-called Free Officers set up a Revolutionary Command Council and exiled King Farouk. In 1954 Nasser became president in place of a more senior officer, Muhammad Naguib. The military in Egypt has served as the primary source of political leadership ever since; Nasser once explained that the military was the vanguard of a political and social revolution.

Nasser preached a populist, anti-imperialist, pro-Arab philosophy that became known as Arab Nationalism and that was expressed in the policies of Arab socialism. However, he suppressed Egyptian Marxists, the labor movement, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1955, he signed an agreement with

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser gestures to a crowd as visiting Cuban industry minister Ernesto "Che" Guevara (*left*) looks on, Cairo, Egypt, 1959. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Czechoslovakia to purchase $250 million worth of Soviet arms. His 1955 refusal to sign the pro-Western Baghdad Pact and his association with the Non-Aligned Movement ran counter to British aims and to concerned Americans who feared communist influence in the region.

Given Nasser's turn to the Soviet bloc, the United States went back on its pledge to assist in funding for the ambitious plan to build a high dam on the upper Nile at Aswan. Nasser, as with other neutral developing-world leaders, sought to play the Western and communist blocs against each other. When Nasser realized that U.S. aid was not forthcoming, he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The revenues from this would benefit Egypt, enabling development schemes such as the Aswan Dam. This nationalization angered the British, who with France and Israel helped precipitate the 1956 Suez Crisis. The French were upset over Egypt's proclaimed support for rebels in Algeria, while the Israeli government was angry over Nasser's efforts to unify the Arab states, his decision to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba (Israel's entry into the Indian Ocean), and Egyptian sponsorship of fedayeen (Arab commando) raids. Israeli forces then invaded the Sinai. When Egypt refused to allow the British to intervene to protect the Suez Canal, Britain bombed the Egyptian airfields and, together with France, landed troops at Port Said.

The Soviet Union openly supported Egypt, and the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower demanded that the British withdraw. Under heavy U.S. economic pressure, Britain, France, and Israel did so. Far from overthrowing Nasser as they had hoped, the three had made him a hero in the Arab world. Nasser now expelled many foreigners and minorities and seized their property.

Nasser's government turned increasingly to the East for military aid, weapons, and technical expertise. Some 17,000 Soviet advisors eventually arrived in Egypt, and Egyptians received advanced military training in the Soviet Union. In 1958, Syrian officers and politicians prevailed on Nasser to join their country in the United Arab Republic, a three-year experiment in Arab unity. Syria withdrew from the union in 1961. That same year, the Egyptian government pursued more aggressive Arab socialist policies in the form of land reform, government seizure of private holdings, and further nationalizations. After 1962, the Arab Socialist Union, a single political party, dominated Egypt's bureaucratic and governmental structures. It became even more important, for a time, after 1965.

The Egyptian military expanded throughout the Cold War and grew to 320,000 men by 1989. Equipped primarily by the Soviets, Egypt began to replace that weaponry as it turned Westward in the 1970s and 1980s. Egypt's primary military challenge was Israel's better funded and far better trained armed forces. During the Cold War, a struggle between more progressive Arab

states such as Egypt and Western-aligned monarchies such as Saudi Arabia took place; some scholars termed this the "Arab Cold War." The Arab Cold War led Nasser to pursue secondary aims against dominating Saudi proxies such as the royalists in Yemen in 1962. Egyptian forces were not highly successful in their intervention in Yemen, however. Egyptian troops were still bogged down there when the 1967 war with Israel broke out.

An Israeli preemptive strike destroyed most of the Egyptian air force at its bases on 5 June 1967 and defeated the Arab forces in the six-day conflict. Egypt lost the Sinai, and Nasser announced his resignation, setting off mass demonstrations by citizens who refused to let him step down. His primary military commander, Marshal Hakem Amr, also resigned and allegedly committed suicide.

Nasser supported a war of attrition against Israel that continued until 1970. His Pan-Arab ideals also committed Egypt to a key role regarding the Palestinian leadership. Palestinian and Syrian offensives led to an inter-Arab crisis known as Black September (1970) in which the Palestinians were expelled from Jordan. Nasser was personally involved in negotiating the aftermath of this crisis just prior to his death in 1970. Succeeded by President Anwar Sadat, another member of the Free Officers group, Egypt gradually moved away from several of its Cold War ideals, received more Arab aid and tourism in the 1970s, and courted Western powers.

In 1973 Sadat decided to join forces with Syria and launched the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel. This time the Egyptians struck first, catching the Israelis off-guard. Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal, a triumph for them, but the Israelis soon retook the Sinai and crossed the canal themselves, frustrating both the Soviet Union, which backed Egypt, and the United States, which had sent more weapons to Israel. But negotiations at the end of the conflict improved Egypt's strategic position and control over the Suez Canal.

Sadat had already made administrative and political changes, ousting socialist radicals, opening Egypt's closed economy with Law No. 44, and modernizing the military. Because Egypt's army had suffered most heavily from its role in the Arab-Israeli wars, Sadat decided to pursue a different strategy. He traveled to Jerusalem in 1977 to lay the groundwork for a peace agreement with Israel that was ultimately achieved in the 1979 Camp David Accords. This agreement returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control. Egypt's participation in a bilateral agreement with Israel was very unpopular with other Arab nations, however, who promptly cut off aid and tourism to the country for a time and expelled Egypt from the Arab League. Because of other political issues, including factionalism and chafing at the paternalism of the political order, the peace agreement became unpopular with many Egyptians who had not initially opposed it.

Islamic fundamentalist groups began to emerge in Egypt in the 1970s. Elements of the Muslim Brotherhood had been radicalized by exile or imprisonment during the Nasser era. New groups arose too, and one attempted but failed to kill Sadat at the Military Technical Academy. The radical Jihad Organization grew in the late 1970s, and one of its members, an Egyptian army officer, assassinated Sadat at a military review in October 1981.

Under Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, the country continued its economic opening to the West via privatization and joint ventures, stressing defense while maintaining a large army. The most important challenge to the state in the 1980s and early 1990s came from Islamist groups, which mounted attacks against local officials and tourists and opposed normalized relations with Israel.

Sherifa Zuhur

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Camp David Accords; Farouk II, King of Egypt; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Non-Aligned Movement; Sadat, Anwar; Suez Crisis

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Egypt, Armed Forces

In 1823, Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali Pasha established a modern army as well as military schools and missions. After the British took control of Egypt following their 1882 intervention, however, they dismantled and reorganized the army, placing British officers in command. They also maintained their own troops in the Suez Canal region until well after World War II.

In 1952, Egyptian military officers carried out a bloodless coup d'état. They called this event a revolution since it dislodged from power the former regime and the upper class and because they claimed legitimacy in the name of the common Egyptian in place of the elite. Military and security considerations dominated political life thereafter, and the armed forces grew considerably. In fact, since that date all four Egyptian presidents have been military officers.

When he came to power in 1954, President Gamal Abdel Nasser wished to dominate regional politics. Wars with Israel as well as political and military involvement in other Arab states, such as Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and Algeria, and vigorous propaganda were all fueled by this desire. Egypt's anti-imperialist

Sinai Campaign, 1956



Egyptian tanks passing the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier during a military review in Cairo on 6 October 1981. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated on the reviewing stand by participants in the parade. (Kevin Fleming/Corbis)

and anti-Israel crusades as well as American Cold War imperatives meant that until the decade of the 1980s Egypt secured its aid, weapons, equipment, and training largely from the Soviet bloc.

This relationship with the USSR significantly affected the Egyptian armed forces. Officers had attended Western academies in Britain before 1952, but afterward they went to the Soviet Union for training. Some 20,000 Soviet advisors ultimately arrived in Egypt, remaining there until 1971–1972 and serving down to the company level. These advisors were often resented for their patronizing attitudes. Soviet training tended to produce a less flexible military, a problem that Egyptians sought to redress after 1980. For much of the Cold War period, Soviet influence on the Egyptian military produced a Middle East arms race in which Soviet bloc nations supplied Egypt and the United States and Western Europe supplied arms to Israel.

A 1955 Soviet arms deal provided 100 T-54A and PT-76 tanks, 6 torpedo boats, 2 submarines and 200 jet aircraft, including MiG-15 fighters, IL-28 bombers, IL-14 transports, and Yak-11 trainers, at reduced prices to be paid in Egyptian cotton. To help alleviate Egyptian equipment losses following the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Soviets supplied additional equipment: MiG-21 aircraft, T-54 tanks, and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). By the time of the Suez War, Egyptians had built Czech-designed trainer aircraft.

In 1962, Nasser dispatched troops to Yemen to fight royalist forces there. This force grew to 30,000 men, and the Egyptians were still bogged down there five years later when the 1967 war began with Israel. That June, Israel launched a preemptive attack in the form of air strikes that destroyed some 300 Egyptian aircraft, most of them on the ground. Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula the same day. Seven Egyptian divisions of about 100,000 men equipped with 1,000 tanks then fought the Israelis in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, only to be defeated. Soviet T-54/T-55 tanks formed the bulk of Egyptian armor in the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel. Egypt also employed modified former U.S. Army M4 Shermans in both wars and the Soviet T-62 in the 1973 war.

Following the 1967 defeat, the Soviet Union again stepped in and replaced the equipment losses from the war. The defeat of the Arab armies by Israel in 1967 brought a great loss of public confidence and resulted in a purge within the Egyptian military. The army was reorganized, and new educational programs were initiated. The length of service for conscripts was also temporarily extended to up to seven to eight years.

Egyptian morale was, however, subsequently boosted by small victories during the War of Attrition (1967–1970), as in the sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* by Soviet-supplied missile boats. The Soviets also deployed an antimissile system in Egypt in 1970, and the Egyptians used SAMs and antitank missiles with devastating effectiveness at the beginning of the 1973 war.

The Egyptian armed forces consisted of the army, navy, air force, and air defense forces. The army predominated. Recruits, conscripts, or better-paid volunteers could serve in any service, including as police, in the military economic service, or as prison guards. Male conscripts without higher education normally served three years; those with college or vocational degrees served eighteen months. Relatively small reserve forces existed. Military benefits such as partially subsidized housing were introduced in the 1980s. Nonetheless, low salaries were common prior to the 1980s, and soldiers often moonlighted in second jobs. Officer training was provided by the Military Academy in Cairo, the Naval Academy at the Ras al-Tin naval base, the Air Force Academy at Bilbays, the Military Technical Academy at Heliopolis, the Air Defense Academy at Alexandria, the Command and General Staff College in Cairo, and the Nasser Higher Military Academy. Prior to 1967 the army had four regional commands. After 1967, it was organized into two field armies, the Second and Third Armies, both located in Egypt's eastern region, with troops also based in the Delta, near the Libyan border, and in Upper Egypt near the Nile.

The 1973 Ramadan War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, began with a surprise Egyptian attack and crossing of the Suez Canal. Early Egyptian success and the fact that the war was halted before Israel could deliver a decisive blow boosted Egyptian military morale.

Arab socialist policies encouraged defense manufacturing. Five ordnance and two aircraft factories were operating by the mid-1960s. From 1967 to 1970 the Soviets insisted that all maintenance and overhauls be completed

in the USSR. By 1970, the Soviets permitted some licensed production in Egypt of radar systems, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and ammunition. Certain joint Arab efforts faltered after 1979, when the United States began to supersede the Soviets in terms of arms deliveries, military advice, and training.

Egyptian scientists, with some foreign assistance, began working on ballistic missile systems in the 1950s and 1960s. Israel's Mossad allegedly targeted this research and threatened the scientists involved in 1962 and 1963. Covert missile-building programs began in the 1970s, and in the 1980s Egypt and Iraq were cooperating to develop the Badr 2000, a long-range missile based on the Argentine Condor II. Argentina never tested the Condor II and shifted its development to a shorter-range missile. Egypt dropped out of the project in 1989. In 1988, some Egyptian officers, agents, and scientists were arrested for exporting rocket fuel and other materials needed for a Pershing II missile, and in 1990 Egypt reportedly reached agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to produce the DF4 Silkworm antiship missile and three types of Saqr rockets.

Egypt allegedly developed biological weapons by 1973 and employed mustard gas in the Yemeni conflict. Egypt was caught attempting to import feedstock for nerve gas from Canada in 1988, and in 1989 Egypt reportedly ordered pesticides, poisons, and manufacturing elements for what is thought to be a poison gas facility near or at the Ben Youssef Air Base south of Cairo.

At the end of the Cold War, in 1992, the active Egyptian military numbered 420,000–430,000 men, of whom 252,000 were conscripts. The Egyptian Army numbered some 290,000 active personnel and 2,500–3,000 tanks, including 1,100–1,150 T54/T55s, 1,000 M-60A3s, 700 M-60A1s, and 500–600 T-62s. The Egyptian Air Force had 28,000 personnel, and its land-based air defense had another 80,000. The air force had approximately 495 combat aircraft, making it one of the largest in the Middle East. Frontline aircraft include F-16s, Mirage 2000Cs, Mirage 5Es, MiG-21s, J-7s, Mirage 5E2s, F-4Es, Alphajets, and J-6s. The air defense command still operates many outdated SA-2 and SA-3 SAMs as well as SA-6, Hawk, Chaparral, Crotale, and Amoun (Skyguard/RIM75) systems. The navy and coast guard had 19,500 personnel in 1992 manning 1 destroyer, 5 frigates, 21 guided missile patrol craft, 18 patrol boats, and 8 submarines, 4 of which were updated yet unserviceable Romeos and 4 of which were modernized. About half of Egypt's weaponry was Soviet-made at the end of the Cold War, but the nation was converting to U.S.-made military equipment.

Sherifa Zuhur

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Egypt; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Non-Aligned Movement; Sadat, Anwar; Suez Crisis

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Einstein, Albert
(1879–1955)

German-American physicist, developer of the general and special theories of relativity, Nobel Prize winner, and vocal post–World War II peace and nuclear disarmament activist. Albert Einstein was born in Ulm, Württemberg, Germany, on 14 March 1879. When he was fifteen years old, his family moved from Germany to escape a failed business venture. They settled in Pavia near Milan, Italy. At about the same time, Einstein, a Jew, renounced his German citizenship. In 1900, Einstein received his undergraduate degree from Zurich Polytechnic with majors in mathematics and physics. His first few years out of college were unhappy ones during which money was very tight. Einstein became a Swiss citizen in 1901 and finally found work the next year in the Swiss Patent Office. In 1905 he was awarded his PhD in physics from his undergraduate alma mater.

That same year, Einstein authored a series of pioneering articles in physics that would revolutionize the field and science as a whole. In 1908 he became an unsalaried university professor, and in 1911 he became an associate professor at the University of Zurich. From there, he enjoyed a storied academic career, holding teaching positions in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. By the early 1920s he had become perhaps the most famous scientist in the world. In 1921 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics, although he earned this honor not for his theory of relativity but rather for his work on the photoelectric effect.

Einstein reapplied for German citizenship in 1914 to facilitate his work at the University of Berlin. However, the rise of the Nazi regime forced him to flee the country in 1933. He settled in the United States, where he became a professor of theoretical physics at the Princeton University Institute for Advanced Study. He retired from the post in 1945, although he would remain active in the sciences and in various international causes until his death. He was also famous for having given impetus to the Manhattan Project, which produced the world's first nuclear bomb.



Albert Einstein was one of the most renowned scientists of the twentieth century, indeed one of the greatest of all time. His remarkable insights and creative imagination enabled him to bring about great advances in theoretical physics. (Library of Congress)

Using his fame and alarmed at the aggressiveness of the Axis powers, Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939 urging him to explore—for military purposes—the possibility of harnessing nuclear fusion to make bombs. By 1942, the Manhattan Project was in high gear.

After World War II, Einstein became active in both the Zionist cause and the incipient civil rights movement in America. In 1952, the leaders of the newly created State of Israel asked Einstein to be the nation's second president. The famed physicist declined the offer. By the early 1950s, he had come under scrutiny by right-wingers and acolytes of Senator Joseph McCarthy for his leftist political views. These included the advancement of socialist ideals, world government, and the abolition of institutionalized racism. When the civil rights leader W. E. B. Du Bois was accused of being a communist, an outraged Einstein stated that he would be a character witness in any potential trial. The charges against Du Bois were unceremoniously dropped.

Ironically perhaps, Einstein became an ardent proponent of nuclear disarmament after the war. He is famously quoted for having said, "I don't know how the Third World War will be fought, but I can tell you what they will use in the Fourth—rocks!" Einstein joined with social activist Bertrand Russell and noted physician Albert Schweitzer to lobby hard for the abolition of nuclear tests and the immediate dismantlement of all nuclear weapons. Only a few days before his death, Einstein signed the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, which unambiguously called for a halt to all nuclear testing and worldwide nuclear disarmament. The manifesto helped give rise to the ongoing Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Indeed, Einstein lent considerable credence to the postwar peace and nuclear disarmament movements. Einstein died in Princeton, New Jersey, on 18 April 1955.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Atomic Bomb; McCarthyism; Nuclear Tests; Peace Movements; Russell, Bertrand; Schweitzer, Albert

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Eisenhower, Dwight David

(1890–1969)

U.S. Army general and president of the United States (1953–1961). Born in Denison, Texas, on 14 October 1890, Dwight Eisenhower grew up in Abilene, Kansas, and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1915. Posted to France during World War I, he arrived only after the end of combat operations.

Following the war, Eisenhower served in a variety of assignments and attended both the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College. In 1930 he was assigned to the War Department in Washington, D.C. In 1936 he accompanied General Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines to train the new commonwealth's army.

In 1939, Eisenhower became chief of staff to the new Third Army. Transferred to the War Department in Washington following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he held increasingly responsible staff jobs, working in the War Plans Division, where he helped to plan the Europe First strategy before his summer 1942 transfer to London as commander of American and Allied forces in Britain. In November 1942 he organized the North African campaign and in late 1943 launched the invasion of Italy. In December 1943 he was named to command the Allied forces scheduled to invade Western Europe in 1944, and in spring 1945 he was promoted to general of the army.

From 1945 to 1948 Eisenhower served as chief of staff of the army. He was president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1952. During this time he was actively involved with the Council on Foreign Relations and spent time in Washington, informally chairing the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Admiral of the Fleet William D. Leahy's illness. Eisenhower strongly endorsed President Harry S. Truman's developing Cold War policies, including intervention in Korea. Eisenhower's focus, however, remained the European situation and Soviet-American rivalry. In January 1951 he took leave from Columbia to serve as supreme commander of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded the Western Allied forces in the invasion of Europe and defeat of Germany in World War II and was the first supreme commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces (1950–1952). Eisenhower served two terms as president of the United States (1953–1961). (Library of Congress)

In 1952 the Republican Party, desperate to choose a candidate who would be assured of victory, turned to Eisenhower. As a candidate, he promised to end the Korean War but otherwise continued Truman's Cold War policies. Eisenhower won the November elections, defeating Democrat Adlai Stevenson.

Some early scholars of the Eisenhower presidency suggested that Eisenhower ceded responsibility for foreign policy to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but as more archival material became available, it became apparent that Eisenhower was in fact quite actively engaged in foreign policy decisions. Under Eisenhower, U.S. defense commitments around the world solidified into a network of bilateral and multilateral alliances. While maintaining its existing commitments to NATO, the Rio Pact, Japan, and the ANZUS South Pacific alliance, the United States established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, associated itself with the Middle Eastern Baghdad Pact in 1959, and signed bilateral security treaties with South Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan.

United States Presidents during the Cold War

Name	*Party*	*Term*
Harry S. Truman	Democrat	1945–1953
Dwight D. Eisenhower	Republican	1953–1961
John F. Kennedy	Democrat	1961–1963
Lyndon B. Johnson	Democrat	1963–1969
Richard M. Nixon	Republican	1969–1974
Gerald Ford	Republican	1974–1977
Jimmy Carter	Democrat	1977–1981
Ronald Reagan	Republican	1981–1989

A fiscal conservative uncomfortable with high defense budgets, Eisenhower introduced the New Look strategy of relying heavily on nuclear weapons rather than on conventional forces. Critics of the New Look defense strategy complained that it left the United States unprepared to fight limited wars.

In March 1953 Soviet dictator Josef Stalin died, to be replaced first by a triumvirate of Soviet officials headed by Georgy Malenkov and then in 1955 by Nikita Khrushchev. Stalin's death may well have facilitated efforts to end the Korean War, although Soviet proposals in 1953 to neutralize and reunite all Germany proved fruitless. As president, Eisenhower fulfilled his campaign pledge to end the Korean War, seemingly threatening to employ nuclear weapons unless an armistice agreement was concluded.

Alarmed by the increasing destructiveness of nuclear armaments, Eisenhower was the first president to attempt, albeit rather unsuccessfully, to reach arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in office when Eisenhower first became president, strongly urged him to reach such understandings. Eisenhower's efforts began with his "Atoms for Peace" speech of December 1953, developed into his Open Skies Proposal at the 1955 Geneva Conference, and evolved into lengthy negotiations for a treaty to restrict atmospheric nuclear testing, which by the time the 1959 Geneva Conference was held seemed likely to be successful.

In February 1956, Khrushchev repudiated much of Stalin's legacy, including his personality cult and his use of terror against political opponents, a move suggesting that the potential existed for a Soviet-American rapprochement. Soon afterward, Khrushchev expressed his faith that it might be possible for the East and West to attain a state of peaceful coexistence with each other. Progress toward this end was patchy, however. From 1958 until 1961, Khrushchev made repeated attempts to coerce and intimidate the Western powers into abandoning control of West Berlin.

In September 1959, after a protracted Geneva conference on disarmament, Khrushchev visited the United States, a trip that included an address to the United Nations, an apparently fruitful meeting at Camp David, a stay on Eisenhower's Maryland farm, and a presidential tour of the nearby Gettysburg battlefield. The much-vaunted Spirit of Camp David, however, soon evaporated. In May 1960, a long-planned summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev ended in fiasco after Russian artillery shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory on 5 May, shortly before the meeting began. Eisenhower took full responsibility for this event but refused to yield to Khrushchev's demands that the United States apologize and cease all such overflights. In response, Khrushchev angrily canceled the summit.

As the Bandung Non-Aligned Movement gained strength around the developing world, especially in decolonizing Asia, Africa, and the Middle East where nationalist sentiments frequently ran high, Eisenhower sought to entice third world nations into the U.S. camp. In July 1956 the United States

rescinded an earlier offer to grant Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's new and fiercely nationalist president, a loan for the Aswan Dam project, leading Nasser to seize the Suez Canal from France and Great Britain. Eisenhower nonetheless refused to endorse the invasion of Egypt by those two nations, in conjunction with Israel, in late October 1956 and instead put heavy pressure on them to pull their forces back, which soon proved effective.

Shortly afterward, the Soviet Union issued a statement threatening to intervene should there be any further Western threats to Middle Eastern countries. The United States, suspicious of any Soviet initiative that might jeopardize Western control of Middle Eastern oil, responded promptly in January 1957 with the Eisenhower Doctrine, pledging American military and economic assistance to any Middle Eastern country that sought to resist communism. Except for Lebanon and Iraq, few nations welcomed this doctrine, since most countries in the region believed that they had more to fear from Western imperialism than from Soviet expansionism. In 1958 Egypt and Syria encouraged Pan-Arab sentiment by their brief union in the United Arab Republic. Civil war broke out in Lebanon as Muslims sought to replace the predominantly Christian government with an Arab state. Eisenhower responded by landing U.S. Marines on Beirut's beaches to restore order.

As president, Eisenhower was generally cautious in risking American troops in overseas interventions. He boasted proudly that during his presidency no American soldier lost his life in combat duty. Despite Republican claims during the 1952 presidential campaign that they would roll back communism across Eastern Europe, when workers rose against Soviet rule in East Berlin in June 1953 and again when Hungarians attempted to expel Soviet troops in the autumn of 1956, Eisenhower refused to intervene. Although he would not recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC), he reacted cautiously in the successive Taiwan Straits crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, leaving ambiguous the likely U.S. reaction to a Chinese attack on the Guomindang-held offshore Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu islands.

Eisenhower expressed concern that high levels of defense spending had created a military-industrial complex.

In 1954, Eisenhower declined to commit American forces in Indochina after French troops were defeated at Dien Bien Phu. When the 1954 Geneva Accords ending the First Indochinese War and temporarily partitioning Vietnam until countrywide elections could be held were announced, Eisenhower refused to recognize them. His administration encouraged the government of the southern Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) in its refusal to hold the elections mandated for 1956 and provided military and economic assistance to bolster its independence. Eisenhower justified these actions by citing the domino theory—that if the United States permitted one noncommunist area to become communist, the infection would inevitably spread to its neighbors.

Eisenhower also relied heavily on covert activities, authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to back coups in both Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954 and encouraging it to undertake numerous other secret operations. These included plans for an ill-fated coup attempt against Cuba's communist leader, Fidel Castro.

Rather ironically, in his Farewell Address of January 1961 Eisenhower warned that Cold War policies tended to undercut the democratic values that the United States claimed to defend. He also expressed his concern that high levels of defense spending had created a military-industrial complex with a vested interest in the continuation of international tensions. Nevertheless, Eisenhower himself contributed to its development by engaging the United States in the Space Race and mounting a major educational and industrial drive to enable the United States to surpass Soviet scientific achievements.

After leaving office in 1961, Eisenhower backed American intervention in Vietnam, an area that he specifically warned his successor John F. Kennedy not to abandon. In retirement Eisenhower wrote two volumes of presidential memoirs. He died in Washington, D.C., on 28 March 1969.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

ANZUS Pact; Arms Control; Bandung Conference; Berlin Crises; Camp David Meeting; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; Cuba; Decolonization; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Domino Theory; Dulles, John Foster; East Berlin Uprising; Eisenhower Doctrine; Gaither Report; Geneva Conference (1954); Geneva Conference (1955); Geneva Conference (1959); German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Guatemalan Intervention; Hungarian Revolution; Jinmen and Mazu; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korean War; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; McCarthyism; Military-Industrial Complex; Missile Gap; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; New Look Defense Policy; Non-Aligned Movement; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Open Skies Proposal; Peaceful Coexistence; Republic of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Soviet Union; Space Race; *Sputnik;* Stalin, Josef; Suez Crisis; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; U-2 Incident; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union; Vietnam War

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Eisenhower Doctrine
(1957)

Foreign policy position enunciated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower that sought to limit communist influence and the effects of Arab nationalism in the Middle East. On 5 January 1957 Eisenhower addressed a joint session of Congress. In that address, he requested a congressional resolution empowering him to increase economic and military aid to nations in the Middle East. More important, he also asked that he be given the authority to dispatch U.S. troops to any Middle Eastern country that acknowledged a credible threat from communist pressures. On 9 March, Congress passed the resolution, almost unchanged from the original request, thereby codifying what by then had been dubbed the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The main catalyst of the doctrine was the 1956 Suez Crisis. In response to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's July 1956 nationalization of the strategically important Suez Canal, Great Britain, France, and Israel conspired to invade Egypt and retake the canal by force. The invasion, which began on 29 October 1956, infuriated and embarrassed the Eisenhower administration, which immediately pressed for a cease-fire. On 7 November the Israelis, French, and British reluctantly acceded and withdrew their forces. The ignominious end of the Suez Crisis especially humiliated Great Britain. In its aftermath the British lost much of their clout and prestige in the Middle East, an area over which they had long had a dominant role. Concerned that Nasser would continue to tilt toward the Soviets and export his vision of Pan-Arab nationalism to other nations in the region, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided that the United States must supplant the British in the Middle East. Thus, the United States became the preponderant Western power in the region beginning in 1957.

Although the Suez Crisis had directly influenced the enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, other Cold War exigencies were also at play. In a significant way, the doctrine was a key corollary to the U.S. containment policy, which had undergirded American foreign policy since 1946. U.S. policymakers had already demonstrated their willingness to meet communist aggression in Europe and Asia. Now they were making clear their intentions to do the same in the Middle East. At the same time, Eisenhower and Dulles intended to contain Nasser's brand of nationalism, which incorporated alarmingly socialist economic prescriptions. Of course, oil was also a factor in Eisenhower's thinking. Because the Middle East was already supplying Western Europe with much of its energy needs (and a growing amount of that for America as well), U.S. policymakers had to ensure that oil supplies and shipping routes stayed out of the hands of Nasser and the Soviets.

In April 1957, U.S. policymakers put the Eisenhower Doctrine to its first test. When Jordan's King Hussein came under increasing fire from leftist groups, the United States immediately lent him economic and military aid to fend off leftist and ultranationalist threats. But the real test came in 1958. In February of that year, Egypt and Syria, both supported by the USSR, merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). In July, the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy fell to a nationalistic military junta. Indeed, it looked as if

Nasserism were spreading throughout the Middle East. When Lebanon's President Camille Chamoun asked Washington for help in putting down a Muslim insurrection that threatened his regime, Eisenhower dispatched 10,000 U.S. Marines there on 15 July. The revolt was quickly extinguished.

In the immediate term, the events of 1957–1958 and the attendant Eisenhower Doctrine helped the United States to stabilize the Middle East during a tumultuous period. In the longer term, however, U.S. policies alienated many in the Middle East—particularly Muslims—and fanned the flames of anti-Americanism. In recognition of this, by early 1959 the Eisenhower administration changed course. While it would not tolerate further Soviet encroachments in the Middle East, it did decide to seek some accommodation with Arab nationalism, to include dialogue with Nasser himself. The Eisenhower Doctrine largely languished after 1959, only to be partly resurrected again in Lebanon in 1982 when the Ronald Reagan administration dispatched troops as part of a multilateral contingent to oversee the removal of thousands of besieged Palestinians.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Dulles, John Foster; Egypt; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Suez Crisis

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Elizabeth II, Queen of Great Britain
(1926–)

Queen of Great Britain (1953–present). Born in London on 21 April 1926 to the Duke and Duchess of York, Elizabeth Alexandra Mary was not expected to be the future queen, but when her uncle, Edward VIII, abdicated in 1936, her father unexpectedly ascended the throne as King George VI. It was at that point that Elizabeth became the presumptive royal heir. Elizabeth was educated at home, and when it had become clear that she was heir to the throne, she studied constitutional history and law to prepare for her future responsibilities.

In 1944 during World War II, Elizabeth served in the Auxiliary Territorial Service. In November 1947 she married Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten of Greece, who became Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. George VI died in February 1952, and Elizabeth duly ascended the throne and was officially crowned as Queen Elizabeth II on 2 June 1953.

The new queen's reign began with high hopes of a new Elizabethan age. Some of the initial euphoria was dampened by the 1956 Suez Crisis. It was also unclear how much the queen knew about Prime Minister Anthony Eden's secret negotiations with France and Israel prior to the crisis.

As the queen ruled Britain while raising her family, she faced increasing criticism regarding the necessity of the monarchy, discontent fueled by the somewhat scandalous marital difficulties of several of her children. Also, the rise of the Labour Party brought more public scrutiny of wealth and privilege, especially toward excesses of the queen's household.

Although she did not engage directly in politics, Elizabeth II still played a crucial public role, as her royal visits became extensions of British foreign policy. She also took an active role in trying to strengthen the British Commonwealth of Nations. Many former colonies tended to adopt positions more in line with those of the Soviet Union than with the Western democracies, and Elizabeth used royal visits to instill a sense of goodwill, particularly in those countries with geographic proximity to the Soviets. Without doubt, the queen's quiet, determined spirit helped to lead Britain through the Cold War.

Casey Wineman

Elizabeth II became queen of Great Britain in 1953. (Corel)

See also

Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; Suez Crisis; United Kingdom

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El Salvador

Spanish-speaking Central American nation covering 8,124 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of New Jersey. El Salvador, with a 1945 population of nearly 2 million people, is bordered to the west by Guatemala, to the north and east by Honduras, and to the south by the Pacific Ocean. After independence from Spain in 1821, the phenomenal rise of coffee consumption greatly transformed El Salvador in the last thirty years of the

nineteenth century. For much of its subsequent history, the country would be dominated by a small group of wealthy coffee growers and their military allies. Representatives of the Fourteen Families (the economic elite) monopolized politics through the 1920s and retained considerable power until the 1980s.

In 1932, after the collapse of coffee prices precipitated by the Great Depression, a peasant uprising erupted that was supported by the Communist Party of El Salvador. The rebellion was led by Augustín Farabundo Martí. The army's repression of the uprising (known as La Matanza, or The Slaughter) resulted in 30,000 deaths and inaugurated several decades of harsh military rule. Martí was executed by the army, but his name was preserved in the title of the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla organization.

During 1959–1965, modest economic growth increased the size of the Salvadoran middle class. In spite of this modest progress, however, poverty and high unemployment continued to polarize society. The peasantry was especially oppressed, as there was precious little land available to them for independent cultivation. In 1972 the military arrested and removed from power the popularly elected civilian president José Napoleón Duarte. Army repression quickly radicalized the population, and the first armed-struggle movements began to coalesce by the mid-1970s.

In October 1979, alarmed by signs of growing violence and revolutionary upheaval, army officers carried out a coup against the government of General Humberto Romero. The coup brought to power a series of military-civilian juntas whose reformist officers and civilians were weakened after only a few months in power. By the mid-1980s, political power had fallen to conservative military figures in alliance with the Christian Democrats, with Duarte as president.

As the country sank into civil war, the Duarte government implemented wide-ranging social and economic reforms. These focused particularly on land and agrarian reforms. However, Duarte was unable to control the paramilitary terror waged by the armed forces against civilians suspected of sympathizing with the FMLN. On 28 March 1980, a right-wing death squad murdered Catholic Archbishop Oscar Romero, who had criticized the military's terror tactics and the U.S. support for the government.

With the advent of Ronald Reagan's presidency in 1981, the civil war in El Salvador became a central piece in what became known as the Second Cold War in the Americas. The U.S. government accused Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the newly installed Sandinista government in Nicaragua of supporting and arming FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. To counter this, the Reagan administration provided the country with $6 billion in military and economic aid during 1981–1992.

The growing evidence linking the Salvadoran military and government to the death squads led to widespread criticism of U.S. policy in El Salvador. The uproar over the army's murder of six Jesuit academics in November 1989, the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and the sense that a stalemate had

Civilians running from clashes between FMLN guerillas and the Salvadoran Army in San Miguel, El Salvador, 18 November 1989. (Patrick Chauvel/Sygma/Corbis)

been reached in the civil war encouraged moves for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In April 1990 the United Nations (UN) began to supervise negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN, and a cease-fire was signed in January 1992.

Under the UN-brokered end to hostilities, the Salvadoran Army and police forces were purged of their worst human rights violators, and the FMLN became a legalized political party. Measures to achieve national reconciliation and to reincorporate FMLN guerrilla and army forces into civilian life have only been partially successful, however. The end of the civil war has not been able to resolve the conflicts created by a legacy of more than 75,000 war-related deaths.

Barry Carr

See also

Americas; Latin America, Communist Parties in; Nicaragua; Sandinistas

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Ély, Paul
(1897–1975)

French Army general, army chief of staff (1953–1954, 1956–1958), high commissioner and commander in chief of French forces in Indochina (1954–1955), and chief of National Defense Staff (1959–1961). Born on 17 December 1897 in Salonika, Greece, where his father was a French civil servant, Paul Henri Romuald Ély spent much of his early childhood in Cyprus, where he learned Greek and developed an interest in the culture and literature. In March 1915 during World War I he enlisted in the French Army. Wounded in battle, he won the Croix de Guerre with two citations for bravery.

In 1917 Ély entered the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, from which he graduated in 1919 as a second lieutenant. Assigned to the army General Staff, in 1928 he attended the École de Guerre. He was promoted to captain in 1930 and major in 1939.

State of Vietnam premier Ngo Dinh Diem and French high commissioner and commander of French Forces in Indochina General Paul Ély during ceremonies marking the end of French administration in Vietnam, 1954. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In June 1940 during the Battle for France, Ély was so severely wounded in his right hand that it was permanently disabled. Again awarded the Croix de Guerre for bravery, he joined the Resistance in 1942, becoming a lieutenant colonel and deputy head of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), the military arm of the French underground. In 1944 he was promoted to colonel and served as liaison between the National Resistance Council in France and Charles de Gaulle's Free French government, making a number of hazardous cross-Channel trips carrying military intelligence vital to the Normandy invasion.

In 1945 Ély was promoted to brigadier general, and in 1947 he was advanced to major general in command of the 7th Military Region. In 1948 he became chief of staff to the inspector-general of the French Army, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. In 1949 Ély was advanced to lieutenant general and was sent to Washington as the French representative to the three-man Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In August 1953 he returned to Paris as chief of staff of the French Army. That December he also became president of the military committee of NATO.

In February 1954 Ély and Defense Minister René Pleven undertook a fact-finding mission to Indochina. Convinced that France could not win the war there without massive military assistance, Ély arrived in Washington on 20 March 1954 in an effort to secure that aid. He candidly informed his American counterpart, Admiral Arthur W. Rad-

ford, of the likely fall of the French fortress of Dien Bien Phu and the dire consequences that this would have for the Indochina War and perhaps for all of Southeast Asia. It quickly became apparent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower that the only way to save the French would be massive U.S. military intervention, possibly including nuclear weapons. With the British government opposed and the battle apparently too far gone, Eisenhower decided against U.S. intervention, although he did agree, after Ély's return to Paris, to supply twenty-five additional B-26 bombers.

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Ély again went to Indochina with Generals Raoul Salan and Pierre Pélissier to prepare a military report on which the French government might base requests to its allies for aid. Ély returned to France three weeks later to recommend that France immediately evacuate northern Vietnam and replace General Henri Navarre as commander in chief. On 3 June 1954 the French government named Ély to succeed both Navarre as military chief and Maurice Dejean as French high commissioner. On 11 June French and Vietnamese troops in the southern Red River Delta began Operation AUVERGE, the last major battle of the war, in which they fought their way toward the Hanoi-Haiphong lifeline. On 17 June 1954 Ély returned to France to present alternate military plans to the government of Premier Pierre Mendès-France and then returned to Indochina. The 21 July 1954 Geneva Accords brought the Indochina War to an end.

The pro-American Ély contributed much to State of Vietnam Premier Ngo Dinh Diem's consolidation of power, and the training of the Vietnamese Army came under Ély's overall authority. But friction between the French and Americans as well as the presence of French troops wounded the nationalist sensibilities of the Diem government. Ély departed in 1955, and the last French troops left Vietnam in April 1956.

During 1956–1958 Ély was president of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In 1958 during the Algerian War (1954–1962) when French settlers and army professionals in Algiers made common cause against the French government in order to keep Algeria an integral part of France, Ély resigned to resolve his conflict of loyalties. De Gaulle brought Ély back as chief of the National Defense Staff in 1960 and sent him to Algiers to sound out French Army leaders there about a truce and proclamation of an autonomous Algerian government. Ély retired in 1961, the year before Algeria became independent. He died in Paris on 16 January 1975, widely respected for his high principles, modesty, ability to work with others, and capacity for hard work.

SPENCER C. TUCKER

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Mendès-France, Pierre; Navarre, Henri; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pleven, René Jean; Salan, Raoul Albin-Louis; Vietnam War

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Élysée Agreement
(8 March 1949)

Treaty during the Indochina War (1946–1954) signed at the Élysée Palace in Paris on 8 March 1949 between French President Vincent Auriol and Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai. In the Élysée Agreement, France recognized Vietnam as an associated state within the French Union and promised to support its application for membership in the United Nations. The treaty was formally ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies in January 1950. Under the agreement's provisions, France promised to incorporate within the new State of Vietnam the Republic of Cochin China, which it had created out of Vietnamese territory in 1946. Paris lauded the agreement as proof that Vietnam was independent, and it no doubt helped achieve one of its goals of convincing U.S. officials that the war in Indochina had been transformed from a colonial conflict into a civil war between Vietnamese democrats and Vietnamese communists.

The reality was quite different. Under the constitutional framework of the French Union, Vietnam could receive only autonomy rather than full independence. France recognized Vietnam's right to have diplomats only in a few specified countries: China, Thailand, and the Vatican. (Because of the subsequent victory of the communists in China, India was substituted for China, but India did not recognize the Bao Dai regime.) Proof that the new State of Vietnam was not independent was seen in the fact that it recognized Paris's right to control its army and foreign relations, and French economic domination of Vietnam was preserved.

Stanley Karnow quotes Bao Dai as remarking soon after the treaty was signed that "what they call a Bao Dai solution turns out to be just a French solution." Indeed, Bao Dai was unable to offer Vietnamese nationalists any alternative to the communists. The French had, however, recognized the territorial unity of Vietnam. By the end of 1949 Laos and Cambodia signed treaties similar to the Élysée Agreement.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

France; Indochina War

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Entebbe Raid
(3–4 July 1976)

Successful Israeli hostage rescue resulting from a 1976 airliner hijacking. On 27 June 1976, Air France Flight 139 from Tel Aviv to Paris made its usual

stop in Athens to refuel and pick up passengers. Lax airport security failed to detect four well-armed terrorists (three men and a woman) who boarded the flight. All claimed membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), although the woman and one of the men, Wilfried Boese, were former members of Germany's Baader-Meinhof Gang.

Once airborne, the terrorists produced weapons and hijacked the plane and its 246 passengers and 12 crew members, ordering the pilot to Benghazi, Libya. Following refueling, the plane flew to Entebbe, Uganda, leaving behind 1 passenger who had feigned illness.

Six additional terrorists boarded the plane at Entebbe as Ugandan troops surrounded it. Ugandan dictator Idi Amin visited the hostages and announced his support for the PFLP. The terrorists released one hundred non-Jewish passengers on 1 July but threatened to kill the remainder unless Israel and other nations released fifty-three convicted terrorists.

While the Israeli government negotiated with the terrorists, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) planned a rescue. Spearheaded by members of Sayeret Matkal, Israel's elite counterterrorism force, the assault team commanded by Jonathan Netanyahu left Israel and flew to Entebbe in four C-130 Hercules aircraft on the night of 3–4 July. At Entebbe, the first C-130 cut its engines and glided to a quiet landing. Netanyahu and his team then raced to rescue the hostages in two land rovers and a black Mercedes, disguised to resemble those driven by Ugandan officials, with which they hoped to bluff their way past any guards. The other C-130s then landed with more soldiers who secured the airport, refueled the planes, and destroyed several Ugandan aircraft to prevent pursuit.

Netanyahu's ruse failed, however, and after sentries challenged them, the Israelis fought their way to the old terminal building where the terrorists were holding the hostages. In several intense firefights, the Israelis killed nearly forty Ugandan soldiers and six terrorists, including Boese as he attempted to murder the hostages. Netanyahu and two hostages were fatally wounded in the fighting, and a third hostage, Dora Bloch, remained behind in a hospital where the terrorists had moved her after she became ill. Amin later ordered her murdered. Ninety minutes after landing, the IDF soldiers and rescued hostages took to the air and flew to Israel after refueling in Nairobi, Kenya.

This daring mission, originally code-named Operation THUNDERBOLT but renamed Operation JONATHAN in honor of Netanyahu, established the standard for long-range hostage rescue operations that other nations would seek to emulate.

STEPHEN K. STEIN

See also

Israel; Israel, Armed Forces; Terrorism

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Erhard, Ludwig
(1897–1977)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) politician, minister of economics (1949–1963), vice chancellor (1957–1963), and chancellor (1963–1966). Born on 4 February 1897 in Fürth (Bavaria), Germany, Ludwig Erhard was educated at the commercial college in Nuremberg and at the University of Frankfurt, where he received a doctorate in political science in 1925. Influenced by ideas of liberal socialism and by his own experiences with the crisis economy of the Weimar Republic, he became convinced that the political economy of a state should form a cohesive whole but with economic considerations taking precedence. During 1928–1943, he was a research assistant at the Nuremberg Institute for Economics.

Ludwig Erhard was a German politician and economist who oversaw the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG, West Germany) postwar economic recovery and also served as West Germany's second chancellor. (Library of Congress)

In April 1945 Erhard went to work rebuilding the German economy, and in September 1945 he became the first minister of economics of Bavaria. In winter 1947 he headed an expert commission on money and credit in the financial division of Bizonia, the authority for the British and U.S. zones of Germany that was preparing to implement currency reform.

Erhard's principles of a so-called social market economy, based on a free-market system combined with social welfare responsibility, were introduced in June 1948. The following month, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) under Konrad Adenauer's direction implemented Erhard's economic principles in the party platform. Erhard entered the Bundestag in September 1949 and was a member of the Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CSU) group until his death. Chancellor Adenauer appointed him minister of economics that same year, a post he held until 1963. Erhard became vice chancellor in October 1957.

When Erhard's book *Wohlstand für alle* (Prosperity for Everyone) was published in February 1957, he was already regarded as the father of West Germany's "economic miracle" and enjoyed great popularity. Upon Adenauer's resignation, Erhard was elected chancellor on 16 October 1963. Four major concerns marked his tenure. First, Erhard's hands-off leadership style tended to leave problems unresolved, which encouraged a lack of discipline in his cabinet. Second, new international realities, especially the reorientation of American foreign policy, led to the diminution of FRG influence among the Western Allies. Third,

economic problems in the mid-1960s, which Erhard was unable to resolve, precipitated an acute recession. The public's reaction resulted in the loss of power for the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia in July 1966. Finally, the relentless political intrigues of Adenauer, Franz Josef Strauss, and others, coupled with growing tensions between the CDU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), demonstrated signs of disarray inside the long-governing CDU.

Despite Erhard's electoral success in September 1965, the CDU regained some of the ground it lost without winning a majority. Thus, his second term was under constant pressure from those in his own party, and his election as CDU chairman in March 1966 did not prevent the waning of his personal authority. When FDP ministers refused to compromise over tax increases and resigned on 27 October 1966, the CDU, without consulting Erhard, designated Kurt Kiesinger to succeed him as party chief and initiated negotiations with the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Pressure on Erhard intensified after November 1966 when the CDU lost the regional elections in Hesse. The beleaguered chancellor resigned on 1 December 1966. Erhard died in Bonn on 5 May 1977.

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II; Germany, Federal Republic of; Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg; Schröder, Gerhard; Strauss, Franz Josef

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Eritrea

East African nation, formerly part of Ethiopia, with a land mass of 46,842 square miles, roughly the size of the U.S. state of Mississippi. Eritrea is bordered to the west by Ethiopia and Sudan, to the east by the Red Sea, and to the south by Djibouti. In 1945 it had an estimated population of 1.1 million. An Italian colony during 1889–1941 and under British-administered control during 1941–1952, Eritrea became federated with Ethiopia in September 1952 but lost all autonomy in 1962, when it was reduced to province status. Several armed groups ideologically committed to the communist bloc fought for independence from 1952 until the fall of Addis Ababa and Asmara in 1991.

An Eritrean provisional government was then established until 1993, when a referendum granted the country official independence.

Disagreement over the 1945 United Nations provisions for Eritrean sovereignty and a desire for independence resulted in the creation of the Muslim League (ML) in 1946. The ML was replaced by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), formed in 1961, and the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), a secular movement founded in 1958 by activists in neighboring Sudan.

From the beginning, Osman Solih Sabbe was a key figure in the ELF. He secured financial assistance from states hostile to Ethiopia. To drum up support, the ELF emphasized Ethiopia's links to the United States and, subsequently, Israel. This strategy resulted in the perceived association of Eritrean nationalism with Islam.

A 1974 coup in Ethiopia overthrew the pro-Western Emperor Haile Selassie. Replacing Selassie's government was a nominally socialist-oriented military junta called the Derg (Committee) chaired by Colonel Mengitsu Haile Mariam. This also meant a change of policy for Sudan, which had supported Ethiopia since the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (leading to a period of peace in Sudan).

Following this radical change in regimes, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was established in 1975 in the province of Tigray in northern Ethiopia, while by 1974 the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) emerged from disenchanted members of the ELF. Disagreements between existing armed groups led to a civil war in 1972–1973 and eventually, by 1981, to expulsion of the ELF from Eritrea, making the EPLF the dominant military and political force there. Both the TPLF and EPLF were Marxist in orientation and opposed the Mengitsu regime, but while the EPLF favored independence, the TPLF remained undecided between independence and a role within Ethiopia.

Organizational and leadership differences eventually led to a three-year breach between the two organizations in 1985, when the TPLF began supporting Eritrean opposition movements against the ELPF's perceived hegemony. Disagreements escalated after the creation of the Derg and as the result of Soviet support for Ethiopian military offensives against the Eritrean independence groups, especially during 1977–1979. In this period the EPLF carried out a strategic withdrawal from central and southern Eritrea into the northern province of Sahel, while the TPLF continued to fight the Ethiopian Army, despite the latter's initial victories.

From the beginning, the TPLF was more sympathetic to an Albanian model of self-reliant communism, whereas the EPLF continued to regard Soviet-style communism with favor. In addition, the TPLF interpreted the independence struggle within a neo-Marxist-Leninist framework, with differences based not on class but rather on ethnicity. It also favored an ethnic federal system, which the EPLF sought to avoid.

From 1978 onward the EPLF consolidated its position until in 1980 it drove back Ethiopian forces on all fronts. Finally, in March 1988 the EPLF defeated Ethiopian forces at Afabat. Within a year the Ethiopian Army had evacuated Tigray province. The EPLF conquered the northwestern part of

Eritrea, and it took the port of Massawa in 1990 and entered Asmara in May 1991. The same year, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an umbrella organization founded in 1989 gathering all anti-Derg movements, captured the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, imposing its rule and forcing Mengitsu to flee the country.

In May 1991 a conference was held in London to resolve the situation. It was chaired by the United States, which held out the promise of aid. The conference was successful, formally ending the war. That July in another conference, at Addis Ababa, an Ethiopian provisional government was established, and Eritrea was granted the right to hold a referendum on independence, with the EPLF as the provisional government. In 1993, 99.8 percent of the population voted for Eritrean independence, whereupon the EPLF transformed itself into the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and became the sole legal and ruling party of Eritrea.

Abel Polese

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Ethiopia; Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia; Mengistu, Haile Mariam; Sudan

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Erlander, Tage
(1901–1985)

Swedish prime minister and head of the Social Democratic Party (1946–1969). Born on 13 June 1901 in Ransäter, Sweden, Tage Erlander studied natural and social sciences at the University of Lund, graduating in 1928. He was elected to parliament in 1932. Beginning in 1937, he held a succession of posts in the Ministry of Social Affairs. In 1944 he became a minister without portfolio and in 1945 the minister of education.

Erlander was unexpectedly elected prime minister in October 1946 and also became chairman of the Social Democratic Party. Having been responsible for Sweden's security police during World War II, he took a decidedly tough anticommunist stance in domestic affairs. He adhered to the idea of Swedish armed neutrality and coined the concept of a "strong society," referring both to a robust welfare state and strong national security.

In the 1960s Erlander left Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson and intellectual sparring partner and protégé Olof Palme responsible for developing

more activist foreign and domestic policies. Erlander's years in office constituted the heyday of the Swedish welfare state. At the same time, Sweden retained its neutrality policy while Erlander's government maintained a cautious and informal entente with the West. After having served in office longer than any other democratically elected prime minister in the twentieth century, in 1969 Erlander left office, handing over the post to Palme. In 1970, Erlander won election to the new single-chamber legislature, which he had supported. He resigned from the Swedish parliament in December 1973. Erlander died in Huddinge, Sweden, on 21 June 1985.

Norbert Götz

See also

Palme, Olof; Scandinavia; Sweden

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Espionage

During the Cold War, the shifting fronts of espionage extended over both the industrialized and the developing worlds, going beyond the traditional roles of intelligence, that is, information derived from either human agents (HUMINT) or technical means (TECHINT) and counterintelligence. Disinformation abounded, and covert operations demonstrate that intelligence often became paramilitary in nature. In spite of the expanded role of espionage, intelligence failures were common during the Cold War. Undue reliance on TECHINT, failings in HUMINT, and analysis influenced more by ideological preconceptions or political aims than by objective assessment are evident, and frequent information leaks suggest that secret operations were far from secret.

Major Intelligence Agencies

East-West tensions well before the end of World War II prompted the Allies to revamp their intelligence organizations during the early Cold War.

The United States. After the abolition of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), in January 1946 President Harry S. Truman established the Central Intelligence Group under the direction of the National Intelligence Authority. These were replaced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC) via the September 1947 National Security Act. Responsibility for domestic counterintelligence fell on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),

President Harry S. Truman with members of the National Security Council, 19 August 1948. From left to right, clockwise around the table: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Sidney Souers, National Security Resources Board Chairman Arthur M. Hill, Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, President Truman, and Undersecretary of the Navy W. John Kenney. (Harry S. Truman Library)

founded in 1961, controlled military intelligence, while the National Security Agency (NSA), formed in 1952, dealt with foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT). All services were subordinated to the NSC.

The United Kingdom and Canada. Cold War reorganization in the United Kingdom (UK) began in the summer of 1944, when Secret Intelligence Services (SIS, MI6) set up an anti-Soviet section and recruited new agents, absorbing some members of the disbanded wartime Special Operations Executive (SOE). While MI6 was responsible externally for intelligence, counterintelligence, covert action, and clandestine communications support, the Security Service (MI5), responsible for domestic security, evolved from the Home Section of the Secret Service Bureau, and the Special Branch of Scotland Yard was made its executive arm. The British code-breaking organization, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), emerged from the control of SIS to become an independent service, answerable to the Foreign

U.S. Citizens Convicted of Espionage Activities during the Cold War

Name	*Trial Date*	*Initial Sentence*
David Greenglass	1951	15 years imprisonment
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg	1951	executed by electrocution
Morton Sobell	1951	30 years imprisonment
Vilyam Fisher (Rudolf Abel)	1957	30 years imprisonment
John Walker	1985	life imprisonment
Ronald Pelton	1987	life imprisonment
Clayton Lonetree	1987	30 years imprisonment
Richard Millar	1991	life imprisonment
Aldrich Ames	1994	life imprisonment
Earl Pitts	1996	27 years imprisonment
Robert Hanssen	2001	life imprisonment

Office and responsible for armed services' signals interception. The 1947 British-American Security Agreement, or Secret Treaty, formalized collaborative signals communication among the British and American intelligence organizations.

In Canada, counterintelligence was largely handled by the Intelligence Section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Criminal Investigation Branch from 1946 to 1981, when the civilian Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was established.

Other Western-allied agencies. Secret services among other Western countries included the French Service de Documentation Extérieur et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE, External Documentation and Counterespionage Service) and the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG, West Germany) Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, Federal Intelligence Service of the Republic of Germany). Chief among pro-Western nations, the newly formed State of Israel reorganized its defense systems and formed the Mossad in 1951.

Soviet networks. Unlike the CIA, Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence networks were of long standing, with sweeping powers domestically and abroad. Descended from the Cheka, Soviet security services had undergone a complex series of organizational and name changes. In 1946, the Stalinist Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD, People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) had been transformed into the Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD, Ministry of Internal Affairs), which in turn evolved into the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB, Committee for State Security) after the 1953 death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. From 13 March 1954 to 6 November 1991, the KGB was responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and countersubversion. The MVD remained in charge of internment camps, known as gulags, and border and domestic troops. In 1957, control of border forces reverted to the KGB. A smaller military intelligence body, Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie (GRU), was responsible for signals and overhead intelligence.

Among the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Poland maintained from three to four secret police and intelligence organizations, the chief of which was Informacja (Military Counterintelligence), later called Wojskow Sluzba Wewnetrzna (WSW, Military Internal Service). Other Soviet bloc intelligence

services included Romania's Securitate (Security Service); Czechoslovakia's Státni Tajna Bezpecnostni (STB, State Secret Security Forces) and the military secret service, Obranne Bezpecnostni Zpravodajstvi (OBZ, Committee of Defense Security Information); Hungary's Allamvedélmi Hivatal (AVH, State Security Authority); and Bulgaria's Durzhavna Sigurnost (DS, Security Service). The Soviet bloc's best-known and most effective intelligence service was the German Democratic Republic's (GDR, East Germany) Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Stasi, Ministry for State Security), established on 8 February 1950 and modeled after the then-operating NKVD. Its foreign wing, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA, Information Headquarters), was headed by Markus Wolf.

Other agencies. In the developing world, Soviet- and Western-backed governments alike had active intelligence services, including the security forces of the Ngo Dinh Diem administration in South Vietnam (among these the American-backed Military Security Service and the Office Six of Diem's Army of the Republic of Vietnam) and the North Vietnamese Cong An Vu Trang Nhan Dan (PASF, People's Security Force), a border gendarmerie and security network that linked remote villages.

1945–1960: Spy Scandals, Defectors, and Covert Operations

Venona, Chambers, Bentley, and Gouzenko. The suspicion that marked the Soviet-Allied relationship during World War II only deepened during the Cold War. Venona, a collaboration between American and British intelligence agencies, had been launched on 1 February 1943 to gather and decrypt Soviet messages. Human error—the Soviet agents' reuse of one-time pads—led cryptanalysts almost two years later to make breakthroughs in the code, which aided in identifying a number of spies. These discoveries overlapped with other major counterintelligence revelations in 1945, developments that involved or affected Venona.

First, the FBI followed up on a 1942 interrogation of Whittaker Chambers, whose accusations centered on Alger Hiss, soon to be director of the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs. Venona documents later indicated that "ALES," a code name for Hiss, had been working in the communist underground since 1935. Second, Elizabeth Bentley, formerly connected with Jacob Golos, U.S. Chief of Soviet Espionage Operations, approached the FBI and later the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to name Julius Rosenberg among others, an accusation later backed by Venona decryptions. Third, in September 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a GRU code clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, defected to the RCMP. His revelations exposed the Soviet spymaster in Ottawa, Colonel Nicolai Zabotin, and led to sweeping arrests in Canada. More important, Gouzenko informed on Operation CANDY, an NKVD/GRU attempt to gain information on the Manhattan Project, which had developed the atomic bomb. His information exposed the British nuclear scientist Dr. Alan Nunn May and led to the conviction of Klaus Fuchs, a physicist in Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Gouzenko's revelations were reinforced in 1948 by further Venona deciphers. Subsequent FBI arrests included those of Harry Gold (Fuchs's courier),

Whittaker Chambers (*right*), senior editor for *Time* magazine, takes the stand before the House Un-American Activities Committee on 25 August 1948. In his testimony, Chambers identified Alger Hiss, a State Department official, as a member of the American Communist Party assigned to infiltrate the U.S. government. (Library of Congress)

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and David Greenglass. On the evidence of Greenglass and Gold, the Rosenbergs were executed by means of electrocution on 19 June 1953 for espionage. Also convicted were Theodore Hall, who leaked Manhattan Project plutonium details, and aeronautical engineer William Perl. Another scientist, Bruno Pontecorvo, fled to the Soviet Union.

The Cambridge Five. Perhaps the most notorious spy ring of the Cold War was the Cambridge Five, which included Kim Philby, an MI6 agent; Donald Maclean, a British Foreign Office secretary; Guy Burgess, MI6 agent and Foreign Office secretary; Anthony Blunt, art historian; and John Cairncross, a member of the Defence Division of the Treasury who was concerned with the Radioactive Substances Act. By the summer of 1944, Maclean had already supplied atomic and political intelligence to Moscow and, until exposure, had access to details of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the British atomic bomb project. Philby was doubtless the most useful to the Soviets. As early as September 1945, he ensured that Konstantin Volkov, deputy resident in Turkey, was abducted before his would-be defection; in Washington during 1949–1951 Philby furnished CIA as well as British information; and in Albania he alerted Soviet intelligence to SIS-sponsored seaborne landings and of a CIA parachute drop in November 1950. The spy

network fell apart in 1951, when Venona evidence exposed Maclean. Warned by Philby, he fled with Burgess to Moscow. Philby's recall and dismissal culminated in his 1963 defection.

Intelligence failure in Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) in June 1950 highlighted Western intelligence shortcomings. Although reports had noted the North Korean troop buildup, CIA analysts discounted their significance. A similar lapse occurred in November 1950, when United Nations (UN) forces under General Douglas MacArthur had pushed the North Koreans toward the Yalu River and discounted the possibility of Chinese intervention, ignoring the data of Chinese spies regarding troop buildups on the North Korean–Chinese border. Consequently, UN forces were overwhelmed by a Chinese offensive in late November.

The Berlin Tunnel and George Blake. One of the earliest major intelligence initiatives in Berlin was compromised by a mole in MI6, George Blake, who had also reported the earlier Operation SILVER, the wiretapping of Soviet lines in Vienna, to his KGB controllers. In the spring of 1954, a joint SIS/CIA venture launched Operation GOLD to build a 500-meter tunnel to Stasi-KGB headquarters in Karlshorst. The project was completed on 22 February 1955 and provided what appeared to be a fruitful yield of information on Soviet military movements until its "accidental" discovery in April 1956. In 1961, evidence from a defector revealed that Blake had informed the Soviets of the operation from its inception, but the KGB apparently failed to pass on this information to the Soviet military.

Other Soviet penetrations in Europe and North America. In France, a strong postwar Communist Party facilitated infiltration, and many moles were not caught. The most important conviction, that of Georges Pâques, occurred only after a twenty-year career of passing on defense secrets, particularly during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958–1969) onward.

In the FRG, floods of East European refugees made Soviet penetration relatively easy. No sooner had the Gehlen Organization been established than it was riddled with Soviet agents, a situation that continued after the organization's restructuring into the BND. Although two former Nazi SS officers, Hans Clemens and Heinze Felfe, were acclaimed for their anti-Soviet espionage, they were simultaneously forwarding copies of BND documents to Stasi headquarters in Karlshorst. Apart from the KGB and Stasi, other Soviet bloc nations also deployed spies in the West. For example, Alfred Frenzel transmitted FRG and American defense data to the STB until his arrest in 1960.

Spies and moles also continued to target the UK. Konon Trofimovich Molody ran a number of agents, including the Americans Peter and Helen Kroger (formerly part of the Rosenberg spy ring) and a British pair, Harry Houghton and Ethel Gee, who transmitted information on antisubmarine warfare and nuclear submarines. A lead from a CIA mole in Poland led to the conviction of the group, but Molody was freed in a spy exchange in 1964.

Although the Soviet Union lacked the technical resources of the West, TECHINT nevertheless posed a formidable threat. The U.S. embassy in

Moscow, constructed in 1953, was riddled with electronic listening devices, as were other embassies, notably that of Japan. In addition, by 1960 three agents were monitoring NSA cryptanalysis at Fort Meade.

The mole and spy hunts. After Yugoslavia's break with Moscow in 1948, the Soviet world became obsessed with the search for moles and spies. Show trials abounded, such as that of Hungarian interior minister László Rajk, who was accused in 1948 of subversive connections with Yugoslavia, and that of Noel Field, an alleged CIA agent. The hunt for subversives took an anti-Zionist bent, as in Stalin's 1951 removal of Rudolf Slánský, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. At the climax of Stalin's anti-Jewish witch-hunt during 1952–1953, many Soviet Jewish doctors were accused of being foreign agents.

In the United States, espionage fears culminated in an almost simultaneous Red Scare, marked by HUAC hearings and McCarthyism. Shortly after Congressman Richard Nixon's appointment to HUAC, Hollywood fell under investigation; the ten who refused to answer questions about their political allegiances were jailed for contempt of Congress. The Red Scare reached a new level with Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's February 1950 charge that 205 communists or communist sympathizers were in the State Department. The hunt extended to writers, teachers, academics, and UN personnel, and it stopped only in 1954 when McCarthy falsely claimed that the U.S. Army had been infiltrated.

Covert operations. After the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), American intelligence was active overseas in a series of covert operations: influencing the 1948 Italian elections to ensure the defeat of the communists, intervening in Iran in 1953 to overthrow Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, assisting in the election of Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines (1953) through disinformation campaigns, and backing the 1954 coup to overthrow Guatemala's President Jacobo Arbenz. The most devastating consequences of these operations occurred in Hungary during the revolution of 1956. Under Frank Wisner, the CIA had begun Operation RED SOX-RED CAP to train an army of East European refugees. The group was not ready for action when the Mossad supplied CIA Director Allen Dulles with the text of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, which condemned Stalinism. The text was leaked to the *New York Times* and then broadcast on Radio Free Europe to the Soviet bloc, which helped convince Hungarian revolutionaries of Western support for an anti-Soviet uprising. On 4 November 1956, Soviet tanks moved into Hungary, but no help came from the West.

Aerial photo reconnaissance: The Powers Case. After CIA-SIS reconnaissance flights of RB-57 aircraft over the Soviet nuclear test site at Kapustin Yar had proved nearly disastrous, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft took to the air and initially proved immune to Soviet attack. Then on 1 May 1960, a U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union. Two NSA moles, Bernon Mitchell and William Martin, had probably warned the KGB in December 1959 about forthcoming U-2 flights. Soon thereafter, Soviet and Western satellite space surveillance replaced aerial reconnaissance.

Hollow nickels connected to the espionage case involving Colonel Rudolf Abel. The nickels carried codes inside. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Reino Hayhanen, hollow coins, and Colonel Abel. On 10 February 1962, Colonel Rudolf Abel (Vilyam Genrikovich Fisher) was traded for U-2 pilot Powers. The investigation that led to Abel's October 1957 espionage conviction began as early as 1953, when an American paperboy discovered a hollow nickel containing an encrypted message. Five years later, defecting KGB agent Reino Hayhanen supplied the key to the code and led to the FBI's arrest of one of Hayhanen's controllers, code-named "Mark."

1960–1975: The Crisis Years

The Cuban Crises, Bay of Pigs, and Operation MONGOOSE. Fidel Castro's January 1959 seizure of power in Cuba ushered in the turbulent 1960s. In May 1960, Khrushchev announced that he would defend Cuba against "American aggression"; this was followed two months later by Castro's trip to Czechoslovakia to purchase arms. Meanwhile, since March 1960, the CIA had been engaged in the ZAPATA Plan, a CIA-backed invasion force of expatriate Cubans. The resultant April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was a disaster that discredited the CIA and embarrassed President John F. Kennedy.

Nevertheless, covert action against Cuba continued with Operation MONGOOSE, launched in November 1961 to overthrow Castro through such bizarre methods as injecting a cigar with poison or placing a booby-trapped seashell on the ocean floor to explode while the dictator scuba-dived.

Berlin standoff. Shortly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a Berlin crisis caught Western and Soviet intelligence off guard. American intelligence sources were unaware of the decision to construct a wall in August 1961; similarly, Soviet military intelligence, after monitoring the American exercise that preceded

Soviet citizen Oleg Penkovsky shown as his sentence of death by firing squad is pronounced on 11 May 1963. Penkovsky admitted to collaborating with British businessman Greville Wynne in spying for British intelligence. Wynne received an eight-year prison term. (Bettmann/Corbis)

the tank standoff of 27 October 1961, were mistaken in assuming that U.S. objectives were offensive. An armed clash was averted by a diplomatic channel in the form of GRU Colonel Georgi Bolshakov, who informed Kennedy that, thanks to Soviet intelligence, Khrushchev was aware of America's nuclear superiority. Consequently, both sides drew back their tanks.

Aerial reconnaissance, Oleg Penkovsky, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. A full-scale superpower conflict was again averted some months later by aerial reconnaissance and the reports of Soviet informant GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. In mid-July 1962, American intelligence learned of Soviet cargo vessels bound for Cuba and evacuations from the port of Mariel. On 29 August 1962, aerial photographs revealed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. CIA analysts at first viewed these as purely defensive, reinforced by Soviet disinformation. Later analysis of U-2 photographs, however, showed intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites. On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy threatened a U.S. response if the nuclear-tipped missiles were not dismantled and withdrawn. Vital intelligence underlay Kennedy's threat. Two years earlier, Penkovsky had offered to work for the British SIS as a Soviet mole. His U.S. intelligence debriefing had confirmed that the Soviet Union had several thousand fewer intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) than previously believed. Subsequently, the Soviets withdrew the IRBMs from Cuba.

Vietnam: Ignored intelligence and covert activity. A less-positive intelligence outcome ensued in Vietnam, where the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence and Board of National Estimates had warned against escalating involvement, predicting that it would spur the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) infiltration of the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam). The Kennedy administration ignored this warning, and subsequently CIA personnel were involved in questionable covert operations, such as the ouster of President Diem and Operation PHOENIX, a program to eradicate the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Other covert operations. During the 1960s, the CIA was involved in coups in the Dominican Republic (1963, 1965), Ecuador (1963), Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965), the Congo (1965), and Greece (1965, 1967). Covert actions continued in 1970 with the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, a 1971 coup in Bolivia, and the 1973 overthrow and assassination of Chile's Salvador Allende.

The CIA discredited: James Angleton, Watergate, Operation CHAOS, and the Middle East. After the Philby case, the CIA head of counterintelligence, James Angleton, became obsessed with the idea that moles had penetrated the CIA, a view reinforced by Anatoly Golitsyn, who had defected from the KGB in 1961. In addition, Yuri Nosenko, a KGB defector in 1964, claimed that

John Vassal, assistant to the UK naval attaché in Moscow, was a spy. Nosenko also revealed that the U.S. embassy in Moscow was bugged and provided clues that led to Sergeant Robert Johnson, a Soviet mole at NATO headquarters in Paris.

Soon, however, Angleton was to be fired in the wake of developments that greatly discredited the CIA. Negative publicity from the involvement of former CIA agents in the Watergate wiretapping of Democratic Party headquarters in 1972 mounted with journalist Seymour Hersh's coverage of Operation CHAOS, which revealed CIA surveillance and infiltration of antiwar and civil rights groups. At the end of 1974, articles accusing the CIA of domestic surveillance, mail interception, wiretapping, and break-ins appeared in the *New York Times*, a leak from a list known as the "Family Jewels," which CIA director William Colby had been preparing since 1973. Angleton's fate was sealed with the CIA's failure to predict the outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Disquiet in the Soviet bloc. While scandal rocked the American intelligence establishment, the Soviet Union faced unrest in Czechoslovakia. The 1968 Prague Spring led to increased KGB surveillance, a steady flow of SIGINT from diplomatic missions, and the infiltration of agents posing as Western tourists. KGB analysts attributed unrest to the CIA. In the wake of the Warsaw Pact invasion on 20 August 1968, STB and KGB officials arrested leading reformers, reinstalled KGB intelligence heads, and purged the Communist Party, professionals, and universities.

Soviet involvement in Asia, the Middle East, and the third world. After the Sino-Soviet split began in the late 1950s, little intelligence emanated from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Soviet advisors and KGB agents were recalled. Stringent controls during the 1960s' Cultural Revolution only reinforced the lack of intelligence. Nevertheless, satellite reconnaissance revealed that the Chinese were developing their own satellite, launched in 1970.

India, where the KGB distilled disinformation during the 1967 election campaign, served as a somewhat more fertile intelligence field. A friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and India in 1971, alongside India's lax security, enabled the influx of KGB and GRU officers.

Meanwhile, Soviet intelligence focused on the Middle East, encouraged by growing American unpopularity in that region and the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli failure to control the Suez Canal. Egyptian intelligence officers went to Moscow for training, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser appointed a Soviet agent, Sami Sharaf, as his intelligence head. These intelligence inroads were not reliable, however, as the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 demonstrated. Although reports claimed that Soviet equipment and training had transformed the Egyptian Army, the first three hours of Israeli air raids determined the outcome of the Six-Day War. Soon after Nasser's death in 1970 and the succession of President Anwar Sadat, Soviet intelligence suffered a major setback with the arrest of pro-Soviet agents and the installation of a CIA-backed director of intelligence. Following the Kremlin's estrangement from Egypt, the Soviet sphere of influence moved to Palestine, and the KGB began training guerrillas of Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

During the 1960s, the CIA was involved in coups in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Brazil, Indonesia, the Congo, and Greece.

Soviet influence in Africa during the 1970s extended to Angola, where KGB talks led to Soviet arms deliveries and the arrival of Cuban troops. In the Sudan, a Soviet-backed coup failed in July 1971 and led to the discovery and flight of CIA agent Vladimir Sakharov. Moscow also sent arms to Mozambique and in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) backed first Robert Mugabe and then Joshua Nkomo. In South Africa, Moscow supported the South African Communist Party, which played a key role in the African National Congress (ANC).

Soviet involvement in the UK and Europe. As in the earlier years of the Cold War, Soviet intelligence in the UK focused on defense-related science and technology. Intelligence officers flooded the country, and three Labour Party members of Parliament—Will Owen, John Stonehouse, and Tom Driberg—were recruited to provide classified information. Three British spies convicted during the early years of the Soviet Leonid Brezhnev era included Frank Bossard, for passing on secrets of guided weapon development (1965); Douglas Britten, for providing Royal Air Force (RAF) signals intelligence (1968); and Sub-Lieutenant David Bingham, for filming secret documents at the Portsmouth naval base (1972).

Defections of Soviet agents continued during the 1960s. Three occurred in Berlin. The most notable was that of Oleg Lyalin, who provided MI5 with sabotage plans for Western capitals.

John and Arthur Walker and Geoffrey Prime. The KGB recruited its two most important SIGINT spies early in 1968: Corporal Geoffrey Prime of RAF SIGINT in Berlin and a few days later U.S. Navy Chief Warrant Officer John Walker, connected with submarine forces in Norfolk, Virginia. For the next eighteen years, Walker sold decoded communications and encryption material to the Soviets, also recruiting Michael Walker, his brother Arthur, and a friend, Jerry Whitworth, all military personnel with access to various levels of secure information. These agents helped the KGB to reorganize SIGINT and to separate ciphers and communications security in separate departments. The Walker spy group, perhaps the most damaging to the West in the entire Cold War, was sentenced in 1985, and Prime was sentenced in 1982.

1976–1991: Further Intelligence Failures

Détente, escalation, collapse, and the Iranian hostage crisis. The flight of the Shah of Iran and the ensuing Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 reinforced charges that American intelligence focused too much on TECHINT and too little on HUMINT and analysis. The discovery that secret documents in the seized U.S. embassy had fallen into the hands of militants evoked charges of incompetence, as did the CIA's role in EAGLE CLAW, the abortive operation to rescue the American hostages.

Soviet intervention: Afghanistan and Poland. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the end of East-West détente. Throughout the occupation, the KGB maintained a steady presence, sending detailed reports and setting up an Afghan security service, Khedamat-e Etela'at-e Dawlati (KHAD). Meanwhile, the CIA provided funds and arms to anti-

Soviet rebels, and matériel from both sides left rival factions in the subsequent civil war well armed after the last Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.

Poland's Solidarity movement exacerbated the USSR's problems abroad and further heightened East-West tensions. As earlier in Czechoslovakia, the KGB sent in agents posing as tourists, while Polish security services sent detailed reports to the KGB. Still, realizing that armed intervention would destroy all hope of superpower arms control, Moscow did not resort to invasion; instead, a coup supported by the KGB and Polish security forces installed General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who imposed martial law on 13 December 1981.

American covert operations. American intelligence continued to focus on South and Central America beginning with Nicaragua in 1979, where Marxists had just ousted Anastasio Somoza II. To arm the anticommunist Contras and skirt a congressional mandate forbidding intervention in Nicaragua, the CIA began arms sales to Iran in 1981 to raise money covertly. Shortly after a U.S. cargo plane was shot down over Nicaragua on 5 October 1986, the Iran-Contra Affair erupted, embarrassing the Ronald Reagan administration. In El Salvador, right-wing leader Roberto D'Aubuisson's assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero led to civil conflict in 1980, with the CIA providing equipment and intelligence to D'Aubuisson. After Operation URGENT FURY, which deposed Grenada's Marxist government in 1983, in 1989 U.S. forces invaded Panama and overthrew Manuel Noriega, who allegedly had been on the CIA payroll since 1966.

PSYOPS, Operation RYAN, and Star Wars. With the rise of Cold War tensions in the early 1980s, disinformation took on a prominent role when the Reagan administration adopted psychological warfare, or PSYOPS, consisting of air and naval operations designed to confuse the Soviets and to probe for deficiencies in the Soviet early warning intelligence system. Subsequently, KGB chief Yuri Andropov announced in May 1981 a worldwide intelligence operation code-named RYAN (Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie, or Nuclear Missile Attack), whereby the KGB and GRU were to monitor and provide early warnings of U.S. preparations for a nuclear attack. The Stasi's HVA, headed by Wolf, played a prominent role in this undertaking.

Reagan's get-tough stance continued with the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as Star Wars), which foresaw the use of space-based laser technology to destroy Soviet missiles in flight. In addition, during 2–11 November 1983 NATO's Able Archer 83, war games intended to practice nuclear release mechanisms, may also have served as disinformation, an attempt to convince Soviet forces that the West was ready to strike should the need arise.

Spies, defectors, and double agents to 1991. As the Cold War wound down, spying continued. The focus of Soviet espionage shifted from the military to the technological, with California's Silicon Valley technology companies a priority; a second focus monitored European integration in the European Community; and a third evaluated the Arctic fringe, where oil and natural gas resources attracted Western interest after the 1973–1974 oil crisis. The U.S. embassy in Moscow continued to be vulnerable, confirmed by the 1987

discovery of an American informant, Sergeant Clayton Lonetree, who gave KGB agents access to the mission. Bulgarian intelligence joined forces with the KGB in a bizarre espionage development in October 1978, murdering the Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov with the poisoned tip of an umbrella. In 1989, Felix Bloch, a former high-ranking Foreign Service officer, was accused of having spied for the KGB, but the charge was dropped.

Defectors continued to move westward. One of the most valuable double agents proved to be KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky, who began spying for SIS in 1974. Called back to Moscow on a pretext after American spy Aldrich Ames had identified him, Gordievsky was briefly held until his extradition to London in 1985. A. G. Tolkachev, an electronics expert at a Moscow military-aviation institute, was a valuable CIA mole in the early 1980s until former CIA officer Edward Howard exposed him in 1985. Vitali Yurchenko, KGB security officer in Washington during 1975–1980, was a short-term defector who, before returning to the USSR in 1986, informed on two moles: Ronald Pelton, who provided intelligence on NSA SIGINT for some six years until his arrest in 1985, and former CIA trainee Edward L. Howard. Angry at his dismissal by the CIA, Howard had offered his services to the Soviet Union in 1984 and compromised several agents. Fleeing arrest, he received asylum in the USSR in 1986.

The collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 took the worldwide intelligence community by surprise. And as with earlier failures to assess the military situation in Korea and Vietnam or the deposal of the Shah of Iran and the hostage crisis (1979), the CIA again came under attack.


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One of the spy messages in the Aldrich Ames case. (Corbis Sygma)

Post-1991: The Legacy

The legacy of Cold War espionage still casts long shadows. Richard Millar, an FBI member, received a life sentence on 4 February 1991, as did Ames, arrested in 1994. Ames, a thirty-one-year veteran of the CIA, was blamed for causing the deaths of at least nine agents whom he exposed and for divulging vital covert operations and counterintelligence measures. His wife Rosario, also a CIA employee, was found guilty of direct involvement in her husband's activities and was sentenced to sixty-six months in prison.

Two FBI agents, first Earl Pitts and then Robert Hanssen, were sentenced for espionage in 1996 and 2001, respectively. Pitts was sentenced to twenty-seven years for having turned over secret documents to the KGB, and Hanssen, who received a life sentence, was found guilty of having compromised a large number of intelligence agents and turning over sensitive intelligence and counterintelligence documents. Both men had served both the KGB and its successor, the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossii (SVRR, Russian Defense Intelligence Service).

In Britain, post–Cold War spy exposures took a dramatic turn when, on 24 March 1992, Vasili Mitrokhin, a former member of the KGB's First Directorate, contacted the British and offered to turn over a number of volumes detailing KGB activities from 1948 to 1984, some of them listing hundreds of agents and contacts. The British Labour government commissioned Christopher Andrew, a prominent Soviet historian, to research and collate the archive, but before the book was released *The Times* serialized a number of chapters. A furor erupted with allegations that two British spies for the Soviets—Melita Norwood and John Symonds—were still alive and had never been prosecuted.

Anna M. Wittmann

See also

Abel, Rudolf; Allende Gossens, Salvador; Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Bay of Pigs; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Chambers, Whittaker; Contras; Defections; Détente; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Fuchs, Klaus; Gouzenko, Igor; Gulags; Hiss, Alger; Hollywood Ten; Intelligence Collection; Iran-Contra Affair; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti; Maclean, Donald; MI5; MI6; Missile Gap; MONGOOSE, Operation; Mossadegh, Mohammed; National Security Agency; Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell; Powers, Francis Gary; Rosenberg, Julius; Securitate; U-2 Incident; Walker, John Anthony, Jr.

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Estonia

East European nation, formerly part of the Soviet empire. The Republic of Estonia covers 17,462 square miles, which includes 1,520 islands in the Baltic

Sea. It is bordered by Latvia to the south, Russia to the east, and the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland to the west and north, respectively. The country's terrain is made up of lowlands that are flat in the north and rolling in the south. Estonia's official language is Estonian, a Finno-Ugrian language that is closely related to Finnish. Estonia had a 1945 population of 854,000 people. In that year the ethnic composition was 97.3 percent Estonians. By 2002, that figure had dropped to 65 percent Estonians, with Russians comprising 28.1 percent and the remainder Ukrainians, Belarusians, Finns, and others. Since its independence from the USSR in 1990, Estonia has been a parliamentary republic divided into fifteen counties.

Estonia was first settled in approximately 2,000 B.C. and remained an independent nation until the thirteenth century, when it was overrun by crusading Danes and Germans. The Swedes controlled Estonia from 1561 to 1710, when the Russian empire took over. Estonia gained its independence in 1918, but in August 1940, thanks to the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of the year before, it was taken over by the Soviet Union.

The Cold War was a difficult period for Estonians. Estonian politics, society, and the economy were all controlled by Moscow. Contact with the outside world was sharply limited, and arrests and the sudden disappearance of people—which had actually begun with the mass deportation of Estonians in 1941 to prison camps in Serbia—were common.

During the time Estonia was under Soviet rule, unemployment rates remained astronomically high, approaching the entire population in some areas. Politics greatly affected job opportunities. In Estonia's industrial plants, both raw materials and workers were brought in from other parts of the Soviet Union, and the vast majority of finished goods were exported. In 1947, Moscow began a policy of forced collectivization, along with the liquidation of what remained of the private sector. Russian culture predominated. In 1953 Estonian partisans carried out attacks in retaliation for the collectivization and the deliberate destruction of Estonian cultural treasures.

After Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's 1953 death and especially during 1956–1968, Moscow allowed some economic liberalization and decentralization. Guaranteed prices enabled farmers to receive monetary payments instead of payments in kind, which slightly improved the economy. Estonians who had survived earlier deportations were allowed to return, and attempts were made to restore some Estonian culture. Society also became a bit more open.

Moscow, however, made several attempts to reinforce more orthodox policies in Estonia after 1968. As a result, the economy began to stagnate, and foodstuffs and consumer goods became increasingly scarce. During the tenure of reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991) and his glasnost and perestroika policies, a movement for independence quickly gained ground in Estonia. By late 1989, a free press had been established, new political parties had been formed, and free elections had taken place. On 11 March 1990, the Estonian Supreme Court declared that Soviet rule in Estonia was illegal; one day later, Estonia announced its independence.

Although Moscow initially resisted this move, it was practically powerless to stop it and came under considerable international pressure not to do so. In September 1991, Moscow officially recognized Estonia's independence.

Estonia is now a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and on 1 May 2004 it became a member of the European Union (EU). In April 2004, Estonia became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since its independence Estonia has rapidly transformed itself into a pro-Western democracy fully engaged in regional and global politics, although difficulties remain, especially with the substantial Russian minority.

Arthur M. Holst

See also

European Union; Glasnost; Perestroika; Soviet Union

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Ethiopia

East-central African nation. Ethiopia, with a 1945 population of 8 million, covers 435,184 square miles, about four times the size of the U.S. state of Arizona. It is bordered by Sudan to the west, Somalia and Djibouti to the east, Kenya to the south, and Eritrea to the northeast. Because of its strategic location and position within the African community, Ethiopia was considered the prize of the Cold War as it played out in the Horn of Africa. Following World War II, Emperor Haile Selassie established close ties with the United States, but after the 1974 revolution that unseated Selassie, the new Ethiopian leader, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, reoriented Ethiopia toward the Soviet bloc. The Soviets provided Mengistu with military and financial aid, enabling him to repulse the 1978 Somali invasion and maintain his hold on power during the 1980s. However, the demise of the USSR in 1991 ultimately contributed to the collapse of Mengistu's authoritarian regime and its replacement by a representative government.

Ethiopia's proximity to the oil-rich Arab states and its prestige within the African continent made it strategically important. Thus, Selassie persuaded the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to base their headquarters in Addis Ababa. Anxious to strengthen relations with Ethiopia, in 1953 the United States offered economic and military aid to the country in return for access to military facilities, beginning a special relationship that would endure for more than twenty years.

Ethiopia benefited from Agency for International Development (AID) programs, a large Peace Corps contingent, and advanced American training of Ethiopian military personnel, while one of the most significant American gains was access to a communications facility at Asmara. Named Kagnew Station in honor of the Ethiopian legion that fought as part of the UN force in the Korean War, it provided important intelligence until the 1970s, when technological advances made it obsolete.

The Soviet Union also recognized the strategic importance of Ethiopia and thus attempted to court the Ethiopian emperor. Selassie accepted $100 million in Soviet aid in 1959 but maintained his alignment with the West. Hopeful that new leadership might prove more receptive to Soviet overtures, the USSR attempted to generate change by aiding internal opposition movements. The Ethiopian population is ethnically diverse, so secessionist movements flourished. The most serious one was in Eritrea, which the UN federated with Ethiopia in 1952. As Eritrea provided the only access to the sea, however, Selassie wanted complete control of the area. Consequently, in 1962 he made the region an Ethiopian province, igniting an Eritrean struggle for independence that would last for thirty years.

Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopian head of state from 1977 to 1991. Photo taken on 30 June 1977 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (William Campbell/Sygma/Corbis)

Soviet hopes of gaining a foothold in Ethiopia were boosted in September 1974 when social problems, exacerbated by famine the previous year, and discontent within the military over pay and working conditions provoked the overthrow of Selassie. Ethiopia was then ruled by the provisional military government, led by the provisional military administrative council known as the Derg, the Amharic word for "committee." In December 1974 the Derg announced a program of Ethiopian socialism. This included the nationalization of industries, the closing of schools and universities, and land reform.

Committee rule ended in February 1977 when Mengistu seized sole control of the government by having his political rivals shot. The same month, the new U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, sharply condemned the Ethiopian government-sponsored violence and suspended military aid to the nation. Mengistu used the American action to sever ties with the United States in April and then turned to Moscow for support.

The onset of the Ogaden War with Somalia (1977–1978) consolidated the relationship between Ethiopia and the USSR, as the Ethiopian victory was a direct result of communist bloc support. The war also resulted in a vast increase in the size of Ethiopian armed forces. Until 1977 the Ethiopian military had been relatively small, but during 1977–1980 it increased from 53,000 to 229,000 men. By 1987, with continued Somali incursions as well as internal unrest, that figure grew to 320,000.

Meanwhile, Mengistu created a Soviet-style state, culminating in the 1984 creation of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia. He launched the new party with great ceremony as part of the festivities celebrating the tenth anniversary of his coup. *Time* magazine estimated that the total cost of the celebrations was upwards of $150 million. Days later, journalists broke the news of the famine that had gripped the northern part of Ethiopia for months, which Mengistu had attempted to conceal. In February 1985, he publicly admitted the crisis and announced a major resettlement program, financed by increased taxes. Dissent against Mengistu intensified as the truth about his lavish spending in a time of famine became widely known. In 1984 the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) had regrouped, while farther south the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were among the main opposition movements.

A common determination to oust Mengistu from power led the EPLF and TPLF to coordinate their activities beginning in 1988, while increasing dissatisfaction within the army resulted in an aborted coup in 1989. Mengistu responded by executing or imprisoning a number of army officers but nonetheless agreed to make some concessions to the growing opposition. He abandoned Ethiopian socialism and introduced free-market principles, but the economy continued to deteriorate, exacerbated by a drop in the price for coffee (Ethiopia's main export) and increases in the price of oil.

In 1989 the TPLF led a coalition of resistance forces to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Over the course of the next two years, the EPRDF took control of the countryside, then advanced on Addis Ababa. With little internal support and no external support (Soviet military aid had ceased that year), Mengistu fled the country on 21 May 1991. On 23 May the besieged Ethiopian army in Asmara, cut off since the EPLF had seized Massawa in 1990, surrendered, giving Eritrea de facto independence. Five days later, leaders of the EPDRF entered Addis Ababa and, in a move endorsed by the United States, set up a new democratic government comprised of representatives from the major ethnic groups and political organizations.

Donna R. Jackson

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Eritrea; Mengistu, Haile Mariam; Ogaden War; Organization of African Unity; Somalia

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Eurocommunism

Political movement initiated by the communist parties of France, Italy, and Spain in the second half of the 1970s. Eurocommunism aimed at boosting the appeal of communism to the West European electorate by attempting to reconcile its tenets with democratic values and the rules of Western-style parliamentary politics. It also touted the three parties' autonomy from the Soviet Union and the larger international communist movement. In spite of the efforts to unify the parallel, but somewhat diverse, initiatives of its French, Italian, and Spanish parties, the movement eventually ground to a halt, and by the end of the 1970s it petered out, with each party reverting to a national strategy designed to fit its own political agenda.

The term "Eurocommunism" itself was not coined by any of the three parties; it is supposed to have been invented by the Italian journalist Franco Barbieri in order to describe the almost simultaneous attempt of the three West European communist parties to redefine their identity. Stirrings inside the Italian Communist Party (PCI) became more conspicuous after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in the following years the PCI stepped up its efforts to renovate its political image at both the domestic and international levels. Beginning in 1972 a new party secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, intensified these initiatives while at the same time trying to establish closer contacts with other West European communist parties. By the mid-1970s, the end of the Francisco Franco dictatorship in Spain provided an opportunity for the PCI to link up with the Spanish Communist Party, which its secretary, Santiago Carrillo, was struggling to reestablish as a legitimate political force in the new regime. During 1974–1976, the leaders of the two parties discussed their strategies among themselves and with the secretary of the French Communist Party, Georges Marchais, to work out a common position. In 1975, for instance, a joint Franco-Italian declaration described the need for "continuous democratization" of political and economic conditions in France and Italy in order to build up a socialist society in the two countries.

Behind these somewhat vague statements, however, it was sometimes easier to define what the three parties were against rather than to state what they were for. They openly criticized the Portuguese Communist Party, which, in the wake of the 1974 regime change, restated its allegiance to the traditional tenets of the revolutionary approach to power. Some conspicuous differences emerged, however, when the time came to identify a common platform or to define an overall relationship with the Soviet bloc. The Spanish Communist Party, in particular, was in the forefront of the effort to maintain distance from the Soviet model and as such came under strong criticism from Moscow. The French, on the contrary, followed a more ambiguous path, often taking a more pro-Soviet line than either the Italians or Spaniards. The Italians tried to steer a middle course, gradually moving away from Moscow without breaking relations altogether.

The United States initially exhibited much interest in Eurocommunism, hoping that it might further weaken Moscow's grip on the three parties. But it also ultimately took a more defensive position and retained a deep suspicion

that if successful, the movement might bring the communist parties into the governments of West European countries and eventually weaken the Atlantic Alliance. Both the Ford and the Carter administrations repeatedly warned West European governments against such a danger. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger displayed his strong dislike for the ambiguities of the movement, openly cautioning in 1975 that the domestic evolution of a number of European countries might become a major problem in transatlantic relations. The Carter administration was somewhat less blunt in its official statements but nonetheless remained strongly skeptical about the real intentions of Eurocommunists. Privately, U.S. diplomats were instructed by the Carter administration to convey to their European counterparts the concern of their government about any possible cooperation with communist parties.

In a paradoxical mirror image of American suspicions, Soviet leaders also seem to have been very apprehensive about Eurocommunism. They evidently feared a destabilizing domino effect among their East European satellites if the Eurocommunists succeeded in loosening their ties with Moscow and in providing an alternative, more liberal model to the other communist parties. In 1976 a conference of all European communist parties was held in East Berlin to display the unity of the communist movement, but it ended up revealing the increasing cleavage between Eastern bloc and Eurocommunist parties. While Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev preferred that the Soviet Union maintain a reserved attitude toward the movement, the task of displaying Eastern bloc antipathy was assigned to hard-liners such as the Bulgarians and the East Germans, who were encouraged to adopt an openly hostile attitude toward Eurocommunism. Eurocommunism thus ended up being opposed by both Cold War superpowers, as it was intrinsically linked to a progressive vision of détente that implied the gradual loosening of both blocs, obviously a prospect that neither Washington nor Moscow relished.

Leopoldo Nuti

See also

Berlinguer, Enrico; Carrillo, Santiago; Détente; France; Italy; Spain

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Europe, Eastern

During 1945–1989 the term "Eastern Europe" generally described the countries with Soviet-controlled regimes in Europe. After 1945, the term gained

Soviet Territorial Gains, 1946

common currency with the Soviet domination of much of Central Europe. Therefore, this term included not only former Mitteleuropa, or Central Europe, but also Balkan nations such as Albania and Bulgaria. During the Cold War, Eastern Europe consisted of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. This area stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Eastern Europe had traditionally occupied a region located between Germany, Russia, and the former Ottoman Empire, with prominent geographic features such as the Danube and Vistula Rivers and the Carpathian Mountains cutting across it rather than defining it.

Politically, the Cold War defined the borders of Eastern Europe. Cultural unification of Eastern Europe proved more difficult, however. Soviet-supported regimes introduced communist holidays as well as the Sovietization of cultural life, including schools and universities. But beneath this veneer, national traditions remained and throughout the years grew even stronger. Social and cultural transformation was perhaps most thoroughly accomplished in the artificially constructed GDR and in Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania.

The political reshuffling of Eastern Europe also brought economic restructuring. Moscow established the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1949 with the aim of creating economic autarky within its sphere of influence and sealing its empire off from the forces of capitalism. All Comecon members were united by a commonality of fundamental class interests and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and took common approaches to economic ownership (state versus private) and management (planned versus market-driven). By the end of the 1970s, with the exception of Poland's agricultural sector, all Comecon countries had converted to a socialist system.

Soviet domination of Comecon was a function of its economic, political, and military power. The Soviet Union possessed 90 percent of Comecon's land and energy resources, 70 percent of its population, and 65 percent of its income as well as industrial and military capacities second only to those of the United States. The location of many Comecon committee headquarters in Moscow and the large number of Soviet nationals in positions of authority also testified to the power of the Soviet Union within the organization. In addition, from 1955 on East European Comecon members were also militarily conjoined with the Soviet Union via the Warsaw Pact.

Nevertheless, trade between East and West never completely stopped. The GDR was indirectly connected to the West European Common Market through its ties with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). The Hungarian economy also became intertwined with the global market in the years after 1956. Beginning in the 1960s, other Comecon members developed economic relations with the outside world, especially with the industrialized West.

Thus, from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, during a time in which there was no world shortage of energy and raw materials, the Soviet Union inexpensively supplied its East European clients with hard goods in exchange for finished machinery and equipment. This indirect subsidization ceased in

the 1970s, when oil prices soared. The Soviet Union decreased its exports to Eastern Europe and increased its purchases of soft goods. This policy forced Eastern Europe to turn to the West for hard goods despite the fact that they had fewer goods to export in return for hard currency. Both economic interdependence with and indebtedness to the West grew enormously and in the end contributed to the economic and political collapse of the Soviet bloc.

Moscow's political control of Eastern Europe was the decisive factor in defining the region. World War II also brought societal transformation to Eastern Europe. The Yugoslavian revolutionary Milován Djilas recalled that Soviet leader Josef Stalin once said to him during the war that the victors' armies would bring their social systems to the territories they occupied. In Eastern Europe, communist parties (usually backed by the Red Army) began nationalizing industry and dividing up large estates among the peasantry as soon as the war ended. The implementation of Stalinist rule was completed throughout Eastern Europe during 1944–1949, but not to the same extent in each country.

Immediately after the war, indigenous communist regimes in Yugoslavia and Albania were installed without any serious resistance and without the need for Soviet support. In Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, communist-dominated states were set up with substantial help from Moscow. Poland was not only occupied by the Red Army in 1944–1945, but its borders were also redrawn by the Soviet Union. Moscow claimed the eastern territories and extended the western boundary at the expense of Germany. These border changes were accompanied by the forced resettlement of 4.5 million Poles, more than 8 million Germans, and thousands of Ukrainians.

Visitors at the fruit and vegetable stand of the Krasny Partizan collective farm during an agricultural exhibition in Kishinev, Moldova, 1949. (Library of Congress)

In Bulgaria, a new communist-dominated republic was proclaimed in September 1946 after which the royal family was forced to flee. Industrialization and agricultural collectivization there made the country one of the most prosperous in the Soviet bloc. In Romania, it took until 1948 before the monarchy was abolished and a communist Romanian People's Republic was proclaimed. Industrialization was forced upon this mainly agricultural country, leading to serious food shortages and widespread deprivation. In Germany, the Red Army had to deal with the Allies, which delayed Sovietization of their occupation zone, partly to keep safe access to the coal mines of the Ruhr area and to postpone Anglo-American control of West Germany. Only in 1949, after the FRG came into being, did Stalin approve the proclamation of the communist-dominated GDR.

In Hungary and Czechoslovakia it took until 1947–1948 before a single-party state was created. Czechoslovakia was an especially uneasy Soviet ally. Klement Gottwald, chair-

man of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, became prime minister in 1946, but a power struggle had already developed between communist and democratic forces in early 1948. This struggle ended with the communist-staged and Soviet-backed coup d'état that February. Gottwald remained in power.

Beginning in 1947, a clearly visible rift between East and West had emerged. Comecon and the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan divided Europe economically into two camps. Militarily, Western Europe sealed its alliance against the Soviet bloc in 1949 with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These developments and the explosive 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav split compelled Moscow to stage a fierce campaign against Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. In its wake, all socialist regimes were purged of revisionist elements, and the Kremlin tightened the reins of its client states. In the following years, harsh repression and purges were common in most East European states, during which thousands were imprisoned and executed.

The years 1953–1956 saw a process of de-Stalinization across the region, which ended with violence. In October 1956 student demonstrators in Budapest demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops and were fired upon. Imre Nagy, the Hungarian reformist minister of agriculture, was named prime minister and tried to establish peace. He promised to abolish the hated secret police. The conflict intensified, Hungarian military forces joined the rebels, and Nagy announced that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact. Soviet troops then moved into Budapest and crushed the uprising. Some 25,000 people were killed in the fighting, and 2,000 more, including Nagy, were executed in subsequent reprisals. Another 200,000 fled the country. Following the revolt, the Hungarian Communist Party reorganized, and János Kádár became party head and premier. After 1956, Hungary maintained the party line politically but abandoned strict central economic control in favor of a limited market system.

The Berlin Wall, built in 1961, effectively sealed off the GDR from the West. Because the Berlin question was now resolved but painfully so, the focus of the Cold War shifted to other areas. Eastern Europe literally disappeared behind a wall.

There was nevertheless maneuvering room within the Eastern bloc. Soviet troops withdrew from Romania in 1958, and after 1960 Romania adopted an independent foreign policy under two leaders, Georghe Gheorghiu-Dej and his protégé Nicolae Ceauşescu. Albania too loosened its close collaboration with the USSR after a conflict with Moscow over a submarine base. Albania broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviets in 1961 and reoriented itself toward the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1968, Albania also left the Warsaw Pact.

The Prague Spring constituted the last hope for many sincere adherents of socialism. In April 1968, the new first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubček, introduced "socialism with a human face," an attempt to liberalize the regime. The Prague Spring provoked Moscow, leading to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by 200,000 Warsaw Pact

Shipyard strikers hoist Lech Wałęsa on their shoulders after the official founding of the independent trade union Solidarnoćś (Solidarity) in Warsaw, Poland, on 24 September 1980. (Alain Keler/Sygma/Corbis)

soldiers on the night of 20 August 1968. The Prague Spring was crushed. Renewed dictatorship resulted in the removal of thousands of communist officials. Many party members, intellectuals, and educated professionals lost their jobs.

A decade later, in 1977, this repression led to the formation of a Czechoslovak citizens' movement, Charter 77. This human rights group explicitly linked itself with the outcome of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. This small group of Prague intellectuals functioned as an underground opposition throughout the 1980s.

In the meantime, in Poland, waves of strikes and protests in 1970, 1976, and 1980 signaled growing dissatisfaction with the communist-dominated regime there. Polish officials responded with coercion and concessions but became more and more isolated from the Polish population. This culminated in the strikes of 1980–1981, led by the Solidarność (Solidarity) Movement. The regime survived only by imposing martial law in 1981, thereby preventing a Soviet military intervention. The opposition, backed by the large nationalist Catholic Church, grew more confident.

From 1985 on, the USSR's new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, implemented a process of fundamental restructuring, known as perestroika (reform) and glasnost (openness). This political change was most visible in Hungary. In June 1987 Károly Grosz took over as Hungary's premier. After Kádár's forced

retirement in 1988, Grosz also became party secretary-general. Hungary then began moving toward full democracy, and communists gave up their power monopoly in February 1989. Hungary was the first country to literally cut through the wire fences of the Iron Curtain in May and September 1989, thereby allowing East Germans and others to flee to Austria. The democratic opposition won elections in March 1990, and Hungary changed political systems with little turmoil.

In Poland, the opposition was able to force the regime to hold free elections in June 1989. The communists failed to win even one seat, while Solidarity became the political embodiment of Polish independence and nationalism. These elections triggered a succession of events that soon brought about the collapse of the entire Soviet bloc.

The opening of the Berlin Wall on 9–10 November 1989 symbolically and definitively tore down the Iron Curtain. In the GDR after 1953, the population never again had dared to stand up against the regime. In the summer of 1989, the exit of thousands of refugees via Hungary to the West and the GDR's civil rights movement together created a momentum that grew into mass demonstrations. On the eve of 7 October 1989 the regime celebrated its fortieth anniversary. But Gorbachev, who was present at the celebration, no longer assured GDR leader Erich Honecker of Soviet backing. Without this support and in the face of mounting protests, the regime could not survive, and a peaceful dissolution took place.

Gorbachev's reforms and the fall of the Berlin Wall raised expectations elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A student march in Prague on 17 November 1989 was smashed, however, by the Czechoslovakian police. Finally, daily demonstrations and a general strike on 27 November culminated in the wholesale resignation of the Communist Party. This Velvet Revolution brought opponents of the regime to power in June 1990.

In Bulgaria, an internal communist coup in November 1989 led to the resignation of President Todor Shivkov. The Communist Party subsequently abandoned its monopoly on power and changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party. In the first parliamentary elections in 1990, the former communists were elected to power again.

Only after the death of Premier Enver Hoxha did Albania revise its isolationist path, and under Ramiz Alia it began a liberalization program. In June 1990 student protesters and refugees incited the collapse of the regime. In December, the government allowed the formation of opposition parties. The March 1992 elections finally ended forty-seven years of communist rule.

Romania was the last Soviet satellite to fall. Ceauşescu, president since 1974, conducted a chaotic and megalomaniacal domestic policy characterized by nepotism. The West had always regarded Romania as an ally, however, because of its independence within the Soviet bloc. Only in the late 1980s did the United States withdraw Romania's most-favored nation trading status. On 15 December 1989, Father László Tökés ignited an uprising, causing Ceauşescu to proclaim martial law. The same month, demonstrators urged the police to arrest the dictator and his wife, who were summarily executed

by a firing squad. In May 1990, however, former communists were elected back into power.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Albania; Berlin Wall; Bulgaria; Charter 77; Comecon; Czechoslovakia; Europe, Western; German Democratic Republic; Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Poland; Prague Spring; Romania; Solidarity Movement; Soviet Union; Soviet-Yugoslav Split; Warsaw Pact; Yugoslavia

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Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in

U.S. military forces in Europe formed the central military element of the defense of Western Europe during the Cold War. These forces symbolized not only America's commitment to the defense of Europe but served as a forward defense for the United States itself. The United States contributed to the region substantial ground, naval, and air forces capable of both conventional and nuclear operations.

The American presence in Europe was a consequence of World War II. When the fighting in Europe ended in May 1945, some 2.6 million U.S. troops occupied much of Western Europe, including the former Axis territories of Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), and part of Austria. Although American military planners had foreseen the need for a limited occupation, they had not anticipated the antagonisms that would develop into the Cold War with the Soviet Union, nor had they envisioned that U.S. forces would assume a role far beyond that of short-term occupation and constabulary duties or that these troops would still be in Europe more than a half century after the end of the war.

After May 1945, the United States removed significant numbers of men from the continent for the anticipated Allied invasion of Japan. Following the Japanese surrender that August and given the worsening of relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, the United States re-

U.S. Armed Forces in Europe

	1960				1970			
Country	*Army*	*Navy*	*Marine Corps*	*Air Force*	*Army*	*Navy*	*Marine Corps*	*Air Force*
Austria	7	0	15	10	0	0	15	2
Czechoslovakia	1	0	0	1	0	0	5	2
France	26,045	774	69	13,679	9	6	33	20
Hungary	4	0	0	2	0	0	4	1
Iceland	15	1,129	6	2,747	0	2,215	133	809
Netherlands	80	18	8	671	305	19	5	1,274
Poland	7	3	9	4	0	0	9	4
Soviet Union	20	7	11	9	0	3	12	15
United Kingdom	595	2,825	87	30,077	293	2,145	147	18,583
West Germany	197,840	634	151	33,631	169,386	1,001	130	32,418

deployed considerable military assets to Europe, including B-29 strategic bombers and naval units. A year after the end of the war, U.S. forces in Europe numbered some 278,000 men.

The first major European crisis faced by American forces in Europe came with the Soviet imposition of a blockade of West Berlin in June 1948. Rather than risk a shooting confrontation with the Soviets, U.S. President Harry S. Truman decided to airlift supplies into the city. When the Soviets raised their blockade and the airlift ended in September 1949, some 2.3 million tons of supplies had been delivered, and the West had registered a significant victory. That same year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into existence.

In June 1950 the Korean War (1950–1953) began, imposing a severe strain on already-stretched U.S. resources. The Truman administration made the political calculation that it could not afford to maintain as large a presence in Europe as its allies would have preferred, although in December 1950 President Truman pledged to send four additional divisions to Europe to bolster NATO defenses. That deployment began the next year. At the same time, Truman named General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a post he took up in January 1951.

Part of the American solution to defend Europe with reduced strength was President Eisenhower's New Look defense posture. This policy, also known as "more bang for a buck," was opposed by General of the Army Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It placed greater reliance on nuclear weapons in the event of war with the Soviets. Beginning in 1955, nuclear weapons were stored in Germany, Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Ten years later these weapons numbered slightly more than 7,000 warheads. That number would remain constant until 1979, when it began to decline; by 1986 about 4,500 remained.

Following the Korean War, Washington demonstrated the primacy of Europe in its military policy. U.S. troop strength increased so that by 1955, the American commitment stood at 356,800 men, a dramatic difference from the low of 80,000 troops deployed there in 1950. In the early 1960s, flexible

response replaced the New Look. Flexible response held that the deployment of a larger number of ground troops would permit more options in the decision-making process before the employment of nuclear weapons. One consequence of this policy was that until 1968, troop levels never went below 300,000 personnel.

The late 1960s saw substantial changes in the American military presence in Europe and in European attitudes toward the Americans. The war in Vietnam became the first priority. By 1968, with troop levels in Europe at 268,000 personnel, below-strength units endured maintenance and supply problems, low morale, heavy drug use, and racial conflict. At the same time, the crime rate, especially violent crimes against local civilians, increased dramatically. During this time, changes in the U.S. economic situation became apparent. The value of the dollar declined vis-à-vis many local currencies. The standard of living and contributions to the local economy were declining, and many soldiers and their dependents lived in near poverty. In addition, organized opposition from peace activists protesting the deployment of nuclear weapons as well as terrorist bombings of military facilities seemed to demonstrate that Americans were not as welcome as had once been the case.

A. U.S. Army M-113 armored personnel carrier mounting a 12.7mm machine gun passing a German road sign during the multinational NATO exercise REFORGER 82. (Department of Defense)

In the 1980s, the deployment of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles led to increased hostility toward the American military presence on the part of many West Europeans. Although nuclear weapons had been in Europe for almost thirty years and Pershing missiles had been deployed since 1965, deployment of the improved Pershing IIs in the early 1980s proved controversial. The government of West Germany, however, approved deployment of Pershing missiles in 1983.

Before the year's end, the first units were declared combat-ready. The number of Pershing IIs, all positioned in Germany, reached a maximum of 118 until 1990, when their mission was considered completed. The Pershing missiles were not the only source of controversy, as the United States also stationed cruise missiles in West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Belgium. These deployments were vocally opposed by a number of people in the localities of the deployments.

Military dependents were an important part of the American presence, whether they lived on base or off the economy. In the mid-1980s, half of the approximately 326,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe had dependents there. While there were many benefits to families being located with the military, there were also problems. Not the least of these were concerns over the evacuation of military dependents in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion.

U.S. military strength did not match that of the Warsaw Pact or even its Soviet elements. In the mid-1970s,

Americans fielded 9,000 tanks against the Soviets' 40,000, 22,000 armored vehicles against 40,000, and 6,000 artillery pieces as opposed to 18,000 Soviet guns. The one area of American quantitative superiority was in tactical helicopters: 9,000 American attack helicopters to 2,000 for the Soviets. In the areas of tactical attack airplanes, the United States maintained in Europe only some 300 (about 15 percent of the NATO total). These faced more than 7,200 Warsaw Pact airplanes. In the same time frame, the disparity in manpower was even more stark. To oppose the total American force of more than 300,000 personnel, the Soviets deployed 825,000 men in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. This was in addition to 425,000 indigenous soldiers from those countries. It was for that reason that nuclear weapons early on became and remained an integral part of American strategy during the Cold War.

Robert N. Stacy

See also

AirLand Battle; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Crises; Clark, Mark Wayne; Clay, Lucius DuBignon; Collins, Joseph Lawton; Military Balance; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Pershing II; Multilateral Force, NATO; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; Warsaw Pact

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Europe, Western

World War II dramatically influenced the history of Western Europe. Wartime damage, particularly from bombing, had been uneven but was nonetheless severe. Particularly hard-hit were transportation systems. Many people had been displaced from their homes, and food shortages plagued the cities. During the Cold War, the threat of Soviet expansion generally led West European states, with the exception of neutral Switzerland, toward alliances with the United States.

The end of World War II presented Western Europe with Herculean challenges. War casualty estimates suggest that in addition to some 4.5 million military deaths, Western Europe suffered more than 1 million civilian deaths. The Holocaust also claimed the lives of several hundred thousand West European Jews.

Conditions were made worse at the end of the war by a mass influx of displaced persons and refugees, many of them Germans and Poles from Eastern Europe, who had fled the advancing Soviet armies. These people often had only the clothes on their backs and required food and shelter as well as employment. Although damage from bombing was not as severe as it seemed at the time, factories would have to be put back into operation and people given work. The job of rebuilding was the preeminent task occupying most West European nations in the first half decade or so of the Cold War.

In the immediate postwar period, the political Left was in power. For the most part, the rightist parties had been largely discredited by their association with fascism. But the broad coalition of the leftist parties soon fractured, and bright hopes of the resistance were soon quashed as the old vested interests reasserted themselves. Nonetheless, in the immediate postwar years, socialists and communists attracted considerable electoral support in Western Europe. Italy and France were home to the region's two largest communist parties, while the Labour Party came to power in Britain.

The Americans, British, French, and Soviets occupied vanquished Germany. Wartime agreements had divided Germany and the city of Berlin into four occupation zones. With the coming of the Cold War these divisions became permanent. In 1947 and 1948, the British and Americans (Bizonia), followed by the French (Trizonia), combined their zones economically. This move and the deadlock over reparations and other issues prompted the Soviet Union to blockade West Berlin in June 1948. The Soviets hoped to drive the Western powers from the city, which lay deep inside their zone of Germany. The United States responded to the blockade with a massive airlift. The blockade, which Soviet leader Josef Stalin lifted in May 1949, was tangible proof to many West Europeans of the Soviet threat.

The Berlin Blockade hastened the establishment in 1949 of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). The proclamation of a West German state in turn led directly to the creation of the Soviet-sponsored German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Konrad Adenauer, a Christian Democrat, served as chancellor of West Germany from 1949 to 1963, whereas Walter Ulbricht dominated the GDR from 1949 to 1971.

In Britain, the wartime coalition came apart even before the end of the war, with the Labour Party demanding new elections after the defeat of Germany. Labour won the July 1945 elections by focusing on domestic issues that had been ignored during the war, and Labour leader Clement Attlee replaced Winston Churchill as prime minister. To Churchill's chagrin, Labour's anti-imperialist stance led to the dismantling of much of the British Empire and resulted in precipitous and bloody departures from both India and Palestine. Attlee and Labour introduced the cradle-to-grave welfare state and nationalized the Bank of England; coal mines; the electric, iron, and steel plants; and other industrial sectors.

In France, General Charles de Gaulle governed by general consent, the rightist parties having been discredited by their support for the wartime Vichy regime. The vote in the first postwar elections was evenly split among the

new Popular Republican Movement (MRP), the socialists, and the communists. Despite de Gaulle's pleas for constitutional reform that would bring a strong presidency, the new Fourth Republic emerged as a near carbon copy of the flawed Third Republic. De Gaulle resigned in protest over developments in January 1946. Major changes were undertaken, however, in centralized economic planning, in the nationalization of certain industries, and in improving social services.

In Italy, the involvement of King Victor Emmanuel III with Benito Mussolini's fascist regime brought a postwar referendum on the monarchy in which the republican north overwhelmed the monarchist south. Italy officially became a republic on 10 June 1946. The new Christian Democrats emerged as the leading political force in Italy, but the communists remained influential and continued as the largest communist party in Western Europe. As in France, however, much of its appeal was on domestic issues, particularly demands for improved worker benefits.

The Benelux states—Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—established a close relationship at the end of the war. Wartime damage was particularly severe in Belgium, although there had been considerable damage through flooding in the Netherlands. Belgium abandoned neutrality, and the three states worked to enhance regional economic cooperation and were at the forefront of European integration and the establishment of NATO.

Spain emerged from the war as a pariah state not only because of the Nationalist defeat of the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) but also because of Head of State General Francisco Franco's support for Germany in World War II. The attitude of the United States toward Spain changed with the coming of the Cold War, however, when Washington provided extensive aid to Franco's regime in return for air and naval bases. Many Spaniards were angry at the United States, believing with some justification that this policy helped continue Franco's authoritarian rule.

Western Europe rebuilt rapidly after the war. Emergency economic assistance, particularly under the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), helped, and prompted by state economic planning such as the Monnet Plan in France, Western Europe began to approach prewar economic levels by 1947. But recovery depended on continuing American assistance, including food, fuel, and raw materials. Concerned that long-standing economic turmoil could bring the communists to power and believing that a healthy European economy would be to the benefit of the United States, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced a program of American economic assistance in June 1947. In this program the United States insisted that recipient states work out internal reform programs of their own and cooperate economically. This and the perceived Soviet threat were key factors promoting European economic integration.

European culture in the immediate postwar years reflected profound disillusionment with societies that had given birth to fascism, Nazism, and the Holocaust. The existential movement, responding to a feeling of moral bankruptcy, argued that all knowledge was relative and that man lived and made decisions in a world without meaning. The chief proponents of existentialism

The existential movement, responding to a feeling of moral bankruptcy, argued that all knowledge was relative and that man lived and made decisions in a world without meaning.

French existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the most visible and influential French intellectuals of the twentieth century. (Library of Congress)

were two French writers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus.

Soviet threats and bellicose behavior ensured continued close cooperation between Western Europe and the United States. Among events unnerving West Europeans were the establishment of the people's democracies in Eastern Europe, the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the June 1953 Soviet crackdown in East Berlin, and the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

As the economies of most of Western Europe continued to improve and wartime memories receded, moderate and even rightist political parties reappeared and vied for power. Adenauer's right-of-center Christian Democratic Union (CDU) dominated the early decades of the FRG. Adenauer held power from 1949 to 1963, reaching out to both France and Israel. German hard work (*fleiss*), the CDU's social-market approach to the economy, and U.S. assistance combined to produce a West German "economic miracle."

The most fractious domestic issue in the FRG in the Adenauer years was German rearmament, which was strongly opposed by the Social Democrats, who feared that it would prevent German reunification. The Korean War (1950–1953) drove the United States in particular toward this solution to countering the seemingly monolithic and overwhelming global communist threat. Efforts to subsume German rearmament within a West European military structure, however, were torpedoed when the French National Assembly failed to approve the European Defense Community (EDC). The FRG was then permitted to rearm within NATO.

Adenauer resigned in 1963. In 1969 Social Democrat Willy Brandt became chancellor of the Grand Coalition between the socialists and the CDU; his most striking achievement was to continue and extend the trend of Ostpolitik that he had pursued as foreign minister. Brandt fostered better relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, especially Poland and the GDR.

France experienced considerable political turmoil in the 1950s, with frequent changes of government under the Fourth Republic. The principal shocks to the political fabric came from abroad, however. From 1946 to 1954, France fought a war to retain Indochina. The defeat of French forces in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu allowed the politicians to shift the burden of failure onto the military. The 1954 Geneva Conference extricated France from what had become a very unpopular war.

Almost immediately thereafter, fighting broke out in Algeria. The Algerian War became a vast imbroglio, with Paris unwilling to grant independence to what was, technically, an integral part of France. In May 1958, fearful that the politicians in Paris were about to sell them out, French Army leaders and

European colons in Algeria combined to topple the Fourth Republic and bring de Gaulle back to power.

Under de Gaulle, France adopted a new constitution with a strong presidency, a system tailor-made for its new leader. Whereas the Fourth Republic had seen twenty-five cabinets between 1946 and 1958, the Fifth Republic marked the beginning of great political stability, with just three cabinets in its first eleven years. Chief among de Gaulle's accomplishments were the new political framework for France, détente with Adenauer's FRG, and the ending of the Algerian War. This torturous process involved the elimination of options until Algeria received full independence in 1963.

De Gaulle remained controversial, however, as he sought to carve out a major role for France in world affairs. Although a strong supporter of the Western alliance, he took France out of the NATO military command and built an independent nuclear strike force (the Force de Frappe), vetoed British membership in the Common Market, and reached out to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. France also extended full diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

In Britain, Labour lost its majority in Parliament in 1951, and the Conservatives governed for the next thirteen years. Britain continued to experience financial problems and imperial decline. The 1956 Suez Crisis was a watershed in British history. Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden worked with France and Israel in an attempt to topple Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and restore British control of the Suez Canal, which Nasser had nationalized. When U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower opposed the British action, however, Eden was forced to back down and, indeed, soon resigned. The Suez Crisis marked the end of Britain's pretensions as a major power.

Meanwhile, the economic unification of Western Europe proceeded apace. West European leaders sought to improve the economies of their states by opening a wider free market that would both compete more effectively internationally and prevent Germany from being able to go to war independently. The easing of trade restrictions prompted economic growth, larger markets, and increased prosperity. The six nations (France, the FRG, Italy, and the Benelux nations) that had signed on to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 initialed the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, creating a free-trade area known as the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market. Demographic changes also allowed for rapid industrial growth. Between 1940 and 1970, the population of Western Europe grew from 264 million to 320 million.

Culturally, the 1960s movement known as structuralism replaced the existential pessimism of the immediate postwar years. Claude Levi-Strauss, an anthropologist and the father of the movement, argued that studying relations among the various units in society, social myths, and underlying conditions present in all societies would allow human beings to understand greater truths. The response to his theses, called poststructuralism, or postmodernism, concentrated on language, time, and existence. Among the leading poststructuralists were Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Roland Barthes. None of these philosophers believed in a universal, timeless structure or truth.

Marxism also reemerged as an intellectual force in the 1960s, although West Europeans for the most part rejected Stalinist Marxism in favor of humanistic Marxism.

Popular European music exerted a powerful international influence in the 1960s. Rock bands such as the Beatles, the Kinks, and the Rolling Stones dominated the music charts and set trends in fashion, lifestyle, and sexual attitudes. Although the most successful rock bands hailed from the United Kingdom, they attracted legions of fans worldwide.

Europe also experienced a film renaissance that included directors Jean-Luc Godard, Federico Fellini, Eric Rohmer, François Truffaut, and Wim Wenders. Godard, Rohmer, and Truffaut epitomized the French New Wave movement of 1958–1964. Drawing on existentialism, French New Wave films often portrayed characters who rejected societal conventions and played by their own rules. These young loners symbolized the amoral antihero, who flagrantly broke the law. A less influential New Wave movement also occurred in Britain, where directors created stark, working-class cinema that eschewed the gloss of Hollywood productions.

In the late 1960s, popular dissatisfaction with postwar society boiled over into the streets. German students and intellectuals who believed that the FRG was dominated by the same interests that had given rise to the Third Reich took to the streets in large numbers. Some eventually formed terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction that would be prominent in the 1970s. It was France, however, that experienced the greatest popular discontent.

In May 1968, students at the University of Paris at Nanterre demonstrated against proposed changes in French higher education. The Events of May soon spread, leading to widespread strikes and street rioting. Ultimately, more than 10 million French workers went on strike. France appeared poised on the brink of revolution, but a popular backlash, skillfully managed by Premier Georges Pompidou in a snap election, led to a Gaullist triumph at the polls.

The 1970s and 1980s were a period of difficult transition for Western Europe. Although women had long had the vote in most West European countries, women's movements became more radical in the 1970s, fueled in part by the fact that women's salaries were usually about half those paid to men. Inflation and the economic downturn that increased the need for two wage earners persuaded women to increase their efforts to achieve equal pay and other rights. Women made up a surprisingly large percentage of the terrorists who emerged in West Germany during this time. Problems also abounded over immigration issues such as the influx of Turkish workers in the FRG and of North Africans in France.

The 1970s saw Europe's position as a capital of art, fashion, and culture fade, but European artists continued to make major contributions. In film Jean-Jacques Beineix led an international postmodern movement that juxtaposed the past and the present and high culture with pop culture.

Pop culture influenced art and music, creating new genres. An anti-authority, antimilitary movement that glamorized narcotics and championed

sexual liberation emerged. Artists reacted against abstractionism by using strong colors and returning to art in which objects were clearly represented. Classical music continued to decline in popularity, as a new generation embraced punk, hip-hop, and other forms of popular music, much of it drawn from the United States. More West Europeans watched American television programs because, aside from Britain, European countries produced few shows of their own. To the chagrin of many Europeans, American culture became pervasive.

In major political developments, Margaret Thatcher became the first woman to serve as British prime minister. Holding office from 1979 to 1990, she reenergized the Conservative Party and in 1983 took the nation to war to retain possession of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). The war was expensive but nonetheless emotionally satisfying to the British people.

Thatcher also established a close relationship with U.S. President Ronald Reagan, whose conservative beliefs mirrored her own. She forged strong ties with French socialist leader François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany. Despite her firm anticommunist stance, Thatcher established cordial relations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s.

Mitterrand was the first of his party to hold the presidency of the Fifth Republic (1981–1995). National elections in 1986, however, forced him to share power with conservative Premier Jacques Chirac. The French Communist Party continued to decline in importance. A greater threat came from the National Front, a racist, chauvinistic party that espoused anti-immigration policies and was led by Jean-Marie Le Pen.

In Italy the communists distanced themselves from Moscow and adopted a policy of operating within established parliamentary procedures. Eurocommunism was born. Italians enjoyed an improved standard of living, but growth was uneven, with the agricultural south lagging behind the industrial north.

Spain also underwent significant change after Franco died in November 1975. He was succeeded by King Juan Carlos I, who played a pivotal role in both the restoration and survival of democracy in Spain. Spain still suffered from serious economic problems, terrorism by Basque separatists, and attempted coups from the political Right, however. Juan Carlos's strong support for democracy was vital in surmounting these threats, and Spain eventually became a European success story.

Dictatorship also ended in Portugal, which had to undergo the difficult challenge, following costly colonial wars, of divesting itself of its overseas empire. Belgium survived considerable ethnic tension in the period as agitation increased between Flemings and Walloons.

Thousands of people fill the Île de France in central Paris on 1 May 1988 to show their support for the right-wing National Front and its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. (Corbis Sygma)

In the FRG, Brandt resigned in 1974 and was succeeded by fellow Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt was more conservative economically but failed to secure the coalition with the Free Democrats in the 1982 elections. The Free Democrats transferred their support to the CDU, elevating Kohl, leader of the CDU, to the chancellorship. Among Kohl's challenges were maintaining a strong economy and confronting growing concerns over the placement of Pershing missiles in the FRG.

By the 1980s, West European per capita spending on social programs far exceeded that of the United States. Britain's Thatcher privatized state-owned industries, undertook policies that sharply reduced inflation, and also reduced the power of labor unions. Mitterrand in France and Kohl in Germany struggled with many of the same problems, seeking to curb unemployment and curtail the growth of the welfare state, but with only mixed success.

European integration affected the economic policies of all West European countries. In 1973, having overcome French opposition, Britain joined the EEC, along with Ireland and Denmark. But discussions regarding closer economic union often faltered on individual, national agendas. Only after

Londoners read newspaper headlines announcing Great Britain's entry into the Common Market, January 1973. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Jacques Delors became president of the EEC in 1985 did that organization make progress toward greater cooperation and fewer trade restrictions.

Delors' efforts resulted in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, which bound member countries to the goal of creating a single EEC market. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany added unforeseen dimensions to the debate over the direction the EEC should take. EEC members met in Maastricht, the Netherlands, and signed a treaty on 11 December 1991. It renamed the EEC the European Union and offered three principles upon which further European integration would be based: continued economic integration including the introduction of a common European currency (the euro was introduced in 1999), the development of a common foreign and security policy, and increased cooperation in justice and internal security issues.

In the 1990s, Germany took center stage. On 3 October 1990 the Cold War division of Germany ended as the two German states merged into one. Hopes for a quick and easy reunion were dashed by the tremendous costs and cultural shocks of bringing together two societies that had gone separate ways for nearly half a century.

At the end of the Cold War, West Europeans enjoyed a high standard of living, and democracy was strongly entrenched throughout the region. Problems remained, including questions over the degree of political integration within the EEC, agitation over the end of subsidies, and social services issues. Nonetheless, West Europeans had come a long way since 1945.

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See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Belgium; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Brandt, Willy; Czechoslovakia; De Gaulle, Charles; Displaced Persons; East Berlin Uprising; Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; European Union; France; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Italy; Kohl, Helmut; Marshall Plan; Mitterrand, François; Netherlands; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Ostpolitik; Poland; Portugal; Spain; Thatcher, Margaret; United Kingdom

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European Coal and Steel Community

Organization established on 18 April 1951 among France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Benelux) to place coal and steel production under a supranational Common High Authority. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) became Western Europe's first supranational arrangement, beginning the process of European integration and essentially ending the state of war between France and Germany. By providing for industrial and economic cooperation between France and the FRG particularly, the ECSC removed the bitter rivalry and tense relations between the French and Germans that could be traced as far back as the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. The ECSC was the logical result of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's May 1950 proposal, the Schuman Plan, that called for the pooling of French and German coal and steel industries.

In many ways, however, the ECSC was more wish than reality, for the six member nations soon discovered that they could find little common ground. First, and perhaps most critically, the Common High Authority could not solve the problem of the future of the Saar. As with the Ruhr, the Saar was rich in coal. Both France and the FRG sought the Saar, and they were unable to reach agreement concerning it.

Second, when the foreign ministers of the six signatories met on 25 July 1952 to decide on the location of the seat of the Common High Authority, they almost deadlocked. After fourteen rancorous hours of debate, the ministers finally agreed that Luxembourg would temporarily serve as headquarters of the community, but the die had been cast. Problems and disagreements such as these continued to flare as the idea of integration took a backseat to the reality of nationalistic competition.

Further complicating matters, each nation had its own intricate, internal controls that resisted quick transformation to the new ECSC. Currencies, taxation, credit, wage levels, general business and union practices, and government subsidies differed widely across national barriers. All of these factors made setting and controlling prices next to impossible. The ECSC failed to dissolve the more than eighty coal and steel cartels that dominated the industries, and the goal of establishing free movement of labor within the ECSC remained an ideal at odds with the reality that individual unions remained strong enough to veto any such moves. Thus, the establishment of a truly market-oriented community remained a grand concept rather than a solid actuality.

Studies have shown that the ECSC had little if any economic impact. Nor did coal or steel production rise appreciably above prewar levels in spite of pledges of cooperation. Trade increased among the six nations, but in all probability this was due to the continent-wide economic recovery, particularly in the FRG, that proceeded throughout the 1950s.

Despite these failures, the ECSC symbolized two important new realities that were directly related to Germany's defeat in World War II. First, integration, not nationalism, became the accepted ideology and practice of post-

war European politics. Second, a Germany integrated within the larger European community could not dominate the continent. The ECSC thus naturally complemented the European Defense Community (EDC), which sought to integrate German defense forces into a supranational defense organization. Tying German armed forces as well as Germany's industrial production to a larger entity would serve as a powerful impediment to a revival of German militarism. Germany's vast industrial resources and technical know-how would thus become the engine that drove the West European economic recovery while preserving political, economic, and military equality among European nations. As one historian has noted, the ECSC symbolized "the success of a failure" because in the long term it moved Europe toward true integration.

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See also

Adenauer, Konrad; European Defense Community; Monnet, Jean; Saar; Schuman, Robert; Schuman Plan

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European Defense Community

Proposed multinational West European military force consisting of six members: France, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). The European Defense Community (EDC) originated amid the backdrop of growing Cold War tensions in the early 1950s. One of the thorniest military issues of the time was the rearming of West Germany to share the burden of West European defense. The Korean War (1950–1953) added new urgency to this difficult decision, for a divided Germany appeared to resemble a divided Korea. In late 1950 Washington suggested that the FRG be admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). France, however, was especially wary of an autonomous West German army and did not support the admittance of the FRG into NATO.

In 1952 the French government unveiled the Pleven Plan, which called for a multilateral European military force that would help protect Western Europe from attack. The military forces of all six members of the European

Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would thus be integrated into a single-force structure under supranational control. The Pleven Plan was endorsed by NATO in May 1952, despite the grave reservations of the Pentagon. In addition, Great Britain distanced itself from the concept of a West European military force.

On 27 May 1952, the six ECSC members signed a treaty to create the EDC based on a plan that anticipated six divisions under NATO command. In 1953 the Council of Europe proposed the creation of a European parliament, whose members would be elected directly, that would supervise the ECSC, EDC, and the incipient European Economic Community (EEC). It was clear, however, especially to the Americans, that the EDC would only be duplicating NATO's military command structure. The FRG and the Benelux countries ratified the treaty almost immediately; however, France and Italy demurred. Italy refused to ratify the treaty before knowing what the French planned to do. In France itself, the EDC met stiff resistance. Many French politicians were wary about joining a military enterprise that did not include Great Britain or the United States, and many more were increasingly preoccupied by colonial insurgencies in French North Africa and, of course, in Indochina. The last thing the French wanted was to dilute their military forces when they were concerned with holding on to the last remnants of their empire.

French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France finally—and reluctantly—presented the EDC Treaty to the French National Assembly in the summer of 1954 but without endorsing it. The Assembly unsurprisingly defeated it on 30 August 1954. After the defeat of the EDC, German rearmament was achieved through existing NATO structures via the European Union (EU), a by-product of the 1948 Brussels Treaty. The EU was an alliance consisting of France, Britain, and the Benelux countries to provide for the general defense of Western Europe, although it had been largely subsumed by NATO in 1949. Upon the recommendation of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, Italy and the FRG were admitted to the EU. Its name was changed to the Western European Union (WEU), and it was incorporated into NATO. The WEU and NATO would supervise West German rearmament and would stipulate the size and strength of its forces. When the British agreed to keep troops in West Germany, French fears were allayed, allowing the FRG to be rearmed and admitted into NATO.

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See also

Brussels Treaty; European Coal and Steel Community; European Parliament; European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pleven, René Jean

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European Economic Community

The European Economic Community (EEC) was created in 1958 and comprised France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. These six countries came together to establish a customs union and a common external tariff. The EEC, commonly known as the Common Market, was formed during the height of Cold War tensions. In the 1960s, many Europeans wanted to distance themselves from the United States, resulting in even closer economic integration through a common agricultural policy for the member countries of the EEC.

While the EEC did not result in political cooperation as some had hoped it would, it was certainly the most successful of the three European communities formed during the early days of the Cold War. As a result, the six member countries merged the other two European communities—the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)—into a single European Community in 1967. The emphasis on intergovernmentalism became the model for further economic integration, such as the December 1991 formation of the European Union.

The foundation of the EEC was laid in the late 1940s and early 1950s, a time of profound Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Wanting Europe to become responsible at least partially for its own defense, the United States proposed the creation of a West German army. This led the six countries of the ECSC (France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) to consider forming a community for defending Western Europe from advances of the Soviet Union. France was particularly alarmed about the prospects of German rearmament, and it vetoed the European Defense Community (EDC). One motivation for the subsequent EEC was the desire to integrate the West German economy into that of Western Europe, lengthening the odds of Germany going to war again on its own.

Following defeat of the EDC, ECSC members began discussing a common market during 1956–1957. EEC negotiations occurred in the midst of the Suez crisis. At the same time that British Prime Minister Anthony Eden telephoned French Premier Guy Mollet in Paris to notify him that the British had agreed to a cease-fire, Mollet and FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer were meeting to discuss the formation of a common market. Four months later, in March 1957, France, the FRG, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Italy signed the Treaty of Rome, creating a new economic bloc in Europe.

The 1957 Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the EEC, created four new institutions designed to govern relations among the FRG, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The four institutions were the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Assembly, and the European Court of Justice. Although the Council of Ministers contained national representatives and was designed to act as the main coordinating body among the six EEC states, it was the Commission that quickly emerged as the most dynamic branch of the EEC structure. It could initiate new policy

Ministers from six European nations sign the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957 that established the European Economic Community. The agreement was the first step toward the creation of the European Union. (Bettmann/Corbis)

and also had the responsibility of ensuring that agreed-upon treaties were enforced. The nine commissioners were not representatives of their states and indeed took an oath of loyalty to the EEC. Under the leadership of its first president, Walter Hallstein, the Commission became an active force in European politics.

In January 1959, the EEC took the first step toward implementing a common tariff by reducing intracommunity tariffs by 10 percent and increasing quotas by 20 percent. However, the first true test of the Common Market involved negotiations over a European free trade area. The British launched this idea in an effort to lure the FRG and the Netherlands away from the EEC, which London opposed. In early 1959 the British invited the six non-EEC states of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland to begin negotiations to establish a rival trade bloc, the European Free Trade Association.

The United States strongly supported the EEC. Washington hoped that it would anchor the FRG in Western Europe, strengthen Western Europe's ability to withstand communist subversion and Soviet pressure, and bring the EEC to stand with the United States in a strong transatlantic community.

In the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the EEC countries agreed to develop common approaches to such areas as commerce, transportation, fair competition in trade, monetary policy, and the coordination of macroeconomic policy. Although the Rome Treaty did not mention a common agricultural policy, this was the most successful area of cooperation among the EEC states. French President Charles de Gaulle was the strongest proponent of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), because France produced more food than it consumed. De Gaulle could not afford to offend the powerful French agricultural lobby by reducing subsidies to farmers. France sought to export its agricultural surplus; however, its subsidized products were not competitive internationally. France therefore needed either export markets with guaranteed high prices or generous export subsidies to bridge the gap between higher French prices and lower international prices. France could get both through the CAP: an EEC-wide market with guaranteed high prices and subsidies for exports outside the EEC. Thus, de Gaulle pursued the formation of a CAP even though the Treaty of Rome did not provide for such a policy.

The CAP ultimately set France on a collision course with the FRG and the United States. Not self-sufficient in agricultural production, the FRG therefore sought to import significant amounts of agricultural products at the lowest possible price. France wanted to sell its agricultural products to the FRG but was stymied by cheaper imports from other countries including the United States, which did not wish to be excluded from EEC markets.

The West German government finally acquiesced to a common agricultural policy even though it did not make economic sense for them to do so. The West Germans wanted further economic integration because of their policy of Westpolitik, linking their policies to the alliance with the United States. The West Germans also subordinated their economic interests to the larger geopolitical interests of further European economic integration.

Cold War politics again impinged on EEC development when Britain applied for membership in August 1961. Britain sought easy access to West European markets and could get it only by entering the EEC. Britain's application happened to coincide with U.S. President John F. Kennedy's Grand Design for transatlantic relations. This plan sought to mollify Europeans' resentment of America's preponderant power while strengthening the Western alliance's political cohesion. Thus, the United States wanted a strong EEC to emerge as part of a stronger Western Europe, which in turn would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.

De Gaulle, however, had a radically different understanding of the European union and the transatlantic partnership. He envisioned a Europe based on intergovernmentalism rather than supranationalism, a Europe of the states rather than a federal Europe, and a Europe genuinely equal with the United States in NATO rather than militarily subservient to Washington. The British government agreed with de Gaulle's antipathy toward supranationalism, but it shared Washington's vision of the transatlantic relationship. Yet the United States viewed Britain's absence from the EEC as politically awkward. The Americans were thus pleased when the British government signaled in early 1961 its intention to apply for EEC membership.

In December 1962, Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan struck a deal that would provide U.S. missiles for Britain's supposedly independent nuclear force. De Gaulle saw this as further evidence of British subservience to the United States. At the time the missile program was announced, negotiations over British admission to the EEC were at a critical stage. The British had made many concessions but were unwilling to accept the principle of supranationalism or a CAP. In January 1963, de Gaulle abruptly announced at a press conference that France would veto the British application.

The political consequences of de Gaulle's action were profound. A week after the press conference, de Gaulle and Adenauer signed a treaty on Franco-German cooperation. The United States saw this as a rejection by de Gaulle of its Grand Design and of the Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle's vision of France and Europe placed him on a collision course with Washington. Despite the difficulties between Paris and Washington, the customs union remained intact, and European integration remained on course.

The CAP provoked another crisis that was even more significant to further European integration. The so-called Empty-Chair Crisis began over EEC Commission proposals for a new financial arrangement for the CAP for the period after July 1965, when the existing system of national contributions would expire. In 1970, following completion of the third stage of the transition to the customs unions, the EEC was supposed to acquire its "own resources," consisting of duties from agricultural and industrial imports, from which the CAP would be permanently funded. The Commission proposed moving the budgetary authority up to 1965. As this would result in the transfer of power from national parliaments to the Commission, de Gaulle opposed the Commission's proposal. Because the negotiations for the added budget authority for the Commission went past the deadline of 30 June 1965, de Gaulle's foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, abruptly ended the meeting in the early hours of 1 July.

France then withdrew its representation from the Council of Ministers but pointedly continued to participate in routine Community business. In a September 1965 press conference, de Gaulle declared his refusal to accept policies that were to come into force in January 1966. He had two objections: on principle, he refused to countenance qualified-majority voting, which smacked of supranationalism; in practice, he feared the impact of qualified-majority voting on French agricultural and trade interests (under qualified-majority voting, a coalition of liberal member states could alter the CAP and thwart French efforts to protect agriculture in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT). De Gaulle threatened to continue the boycott until member states agreed on a new financial regulation for the CAP, the Commission curbed its "political ambitions," and provisions for qualified-majority voting were dropped from the Treaty of Rome. The EEC Council of Ministers agreed to a member state's right to veto legislative proposals, which became known as the Luxembourg Compromise. With that, France agreed to take its seat again in the Council of Ministers.

Resolution of this crisis cleared the way for negotiations of a new financial arrangement for the CAP. As part of the deal, France agreed to a West German request that all remaining intra-EEC tariffs on industrial goods be abolished by July 1968, when the common external tariff would take effect. Thus, the customs union would come into being eighteen months ahead of schedule. In 1967, the institutions of the other two European Communities were folded into the EEC.

After 1967, these institutions were known as the European Community (EC). The combination of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism embodied in these institutions became the basis of the EC. So successful was the EC that Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom decided to join it. This first enlargement, from six to nine members, took place in 1973. At the same time, the EC took on new tasks and introduced new social, regional, and environmental policies. In the early 1970s, EC leaders realized that they had to bring their economies into line with one another and that, in the end, what was needed was monetary union. In 1979, the member states of the EC introduced the European Monetary System to help stabilize exchange rates and encouraged the member states to implement strict monetary policies.

Further enlargement of the EC occurred throughout the 1980s. In 1981 Greece joined, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. This enlargement placed further pressure for structural reform on the EC. Meanwhile, the political shape of Europe was changing with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the coming of democracy to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of the EC signed a new treaty at Maastricht in December 1991. This treaty came into force on 1 November 1993. It added areas of intergovernmental cooperation to the existing EC system, creating the European Union (EU).

The EU expanded in 1995 to include three more countries: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. In 2004, the EU welcomed ten additional countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This enlargement ended the traditional split separating the free world from the communist world. It also brought pressure on the EC to consider the application of Turkey, the first non-European country that might join. This raised questions about how large the EC could become as well as where to draw the boundaries of the EU.

Current members of the EC are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (Greek part), the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Michael McGregor

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; De Gaulle, Charles; European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; European Integration Movement; European Union; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Germany, Federal Republic

of; Mollet, Guy; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Rome, Treaty of; Schuman, Robert; Suez Crisis

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European Integration Movement

The European Integration Movement, which really began in the aftermath of World War I but reached fruition in the 1950s, has as its purpose the integration of the West European states into a unified, supranational bloc. The nature of this effort has varied greatly, for European integration encompasses many facets and describes attempts to unify Europe economically as well as integrate the European states politically, judicially, socially, and culturally. Immediately after World War II, a strong movement emerged proposing the establishment of a "United States of Europe"; however, it was the economic efforts that were initially the most successful.

Visions of a unified European continent are as old as the political organization of the continent itself. Since the times of Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Empire, visionaries had called for some form of European unity. Pierre Dubois, a courtier of Phillip IV of France, called for a military confederation of European kingdoms to reconquer the Holy Land in 1306. Thomas Campanella proposed a European union for security and prosperity in 1620, while William Penn advocated a federated Europe in 1693. Over the next 250 years, the philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Claude-Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, Pierre-Joseph Prudhon, and José Ortega y Gasset all developed plans for the political and economic unification of Europe. So too did French writer Victor Hugo, Norwegian explorer Fritjof Nansen, and the Bohemian aristocrat Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, among many others. Nationalism, statism, and politics always triumphed over internationalism, however; it took the devastating effects of World War II to secure serious, concerted action toward this goal.

While the sense of a need for cooperation among European states remained alive after World War II, the wartime unity of resistance forces proved to be fragile and nonenduring.

World War II, in large part, resulted from the fundamental inability of European states to achieve cooperation; as Frenchman and European visionary Jean Monnet put it, "Europe was not built, and we had war." At the same time, the war was the chief catalyst for cooperation, first among the governments-in-exile in London of a number of European states but also among national resistance movements opposing the Axis powers in many European states. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, at least nominally a supporter of Coudenhove-Kalergi's 1923 plan for a "Pan-Europe," had called

for a Franco-British union just before the French defeat of 1940. Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986), an Italian radical politician, convened the Movimento Federalista Europea (MFE, European Federalist Movement) in Geneva in July 1944 and became an outspoken proponent of European unity. While the sense of a need for cooperation among European states remained alive after World War II, the wartime unity of resistance forces proved to be fragile and nonenduring.

Nevertheless, a number of organizations were founded after the war with the goal of promoting European unity and some form of a supranational organization in Europe. Among the first was the United Europe Movement (UEM) in Great Britain, organized by Churchill and Duncan Sandys. In a speech in Zürich in 1946, Churchill again argued for a "United States of Europe." The UEM was primarily an Anglo-French organization designed to coordinate various national groups that advocated some form of European union. On 17 July 1947 the UEM convened the congress of the Committee for the Co-ordination of the European Movements in Paris. The congress, which included representatives from La Liga Europeenne de Cooperation Economique, l'Union Europeenne des Federalistes, and l'Union Parliamentaire Europeenne, met again in November 1947, this time as the Joint International Committee for European Unity. In May 1948, the organization convened the Congress of Europe at The Hague, the Netherlands.

The first meeting of the Congress of Europe, which took place in the Ridderzaal (the Hall of Knights), the castle in The Hague, Netherlands, on 29 May 1948. The interior of the meeting room is draped with a large "E" for Europe to mark the historic occasion. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/ Corbis)

The meeting was attended by some 800 delegates from sixteen West European states, including occupied Germany. The United States and several East European nations sent observers. Sandys was the official president of the congress, while Churchill served as an honorary president along with politicians Léon Blum of France, Alcide de Gasperi of Italy, and Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium. Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom and Paul von Zeeland of Belgium chaired most of the plenary sessions. The primary political debate concerned what form a unified Europe should take: a federation or a union of national governments.

The congress dealt not only with the political or economic organization of Europe but also with European cultural and social unity. The congress's cultural committee demanded a European charter of fundamental rights and advocated the creation of a European center for youth, education, and culture. The congress as a whole adopted a resolution stating that "unity, even in the midst of our national, ideological and religious differences, is to be found in the common heritage of Christian and other spiritual and cultural values and our common loyalty to the fundamental rights of man."

Although the Congress of Europe was not a resounding success, it did realize some of its goals. In October 1948, the Joint International Committee

for European Unity changed its name to the European Movement (EM) and became a permanent organization, based in Geneva, Switzerland. Sandys now assumed the presidency of the organization, with the honorary presidents from the Congress of Europe continuing their roles as well. The European Center for Culture (ECC), the College of Europe, the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), and the Assembly of the Council of Europe were all established within a year after the congress, with the EM coordinating the work of several national committees for European unity. The ECC, located in Geneva, was the first of many think tanks established to create and express a common European identity. The Council of Europe was founded in May 1949 with the aim of creating a federal European union.

Since then, the EM has played an important role in European integration on the national and supranational levels. EM leaders have campaigned for direct elections to the European Parliament, assisted in the effort to create a European constitution, and worked in support of the Treaty of European Union. As of 2004, the EM was active in forty-one European nations and represented twenty international associations. José Maria Gil-Robles, a Spanish politician who had previously served as president of the European Parliament, chaired the EM.

Yet the role of the EM in the political and economic integration of Europe was limited. The British Labour government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee was wary of any Pan-European organization and offered only lukewarm support to the EM. Great Britain focused instead on its relationship with the Commonwealth and on fostering the so-called special relationship with the United States during the first twenty-five years of the Cold War. British leaders believed, by and large, that these relationships offered a security that a European union could not, and the aim of European federalists to create an entity that would, ultimately, compete with the United States—at least in economic terms—therefore tempered British enthusiasm for the project.

The interplay of politics and economics in the Cold War era was the most important driving force for European integration, particularly as the United States grew to see the importance of West European solidarity. When in 1947, for instance, the British government announced that it could no longer bear the costs of maintaining Greek democracy in the face of a rising communist insurgency, the United States responded with the Truman Doctrine, which pledged political (and financial) support for "free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The United States thereby confirmed its commitment to a free and capitalist Western Europe. However, this required the stability of West European governments, which in turn depended on success in rebuilding their war-torn economies.

European reconstruction thus became the primary focus of the United States, with European cooperation as the first building block. The 1947 Marshall Plan, which followed logically from the Truman Doctrine, explicitly called for coordination of activities between those states receiving U.S. financial assistance. This led directly to the creation of the Conference for European Economic Cooperation, which took permanent form in April 1948 as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Based in Paris,

the OEEC's main function was to coordinate Marshall Plan aid, although it also acted as a clearinghouse for inter-European payments via the 1950 European Payments Union. Mainly because of British concerns, the OEEC acted only by unanimous decision. When that task came to an end, the OEEC was transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961. The OECD, operating largely through a council of ministers representing its member states, concentrated more on developing free and efficient markets in Europe as well as fostering continued growth and inter-European trade.

Both the OEEC and the OECD, because they acted more as regulatory bodies than governmental ones, had only limited effects on integration. The movement for European union went forward in other areas, however. The Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) already had shown the possibilities for integration by creating a customs union on 1 January 1948. This was followed in May 1950 by a proposal, put forward by Maurice Shuman, the French state secretary for foreign affairs, to merge French and German steel and coal resources under a single authority in order to create a more efficient distribution network and resolve disputes over the resources. This proposal, known as the Schuman Plan, became the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in April 1951, with Italy and the Benelux nations joining the Franco-German organization.

This seemingly small step established several important principles and was the beginning of a long process of European economic integration that extended from the ECSC through the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957, to the Treaty of Maastricht of 1991, and to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. With the ECSC, economic cooperation and Franco-German coordination were established as the basic tenets of integration. The organization brought Germany back into the European and international communities while still offering France security guarantees. With its intergovernmental council and supranational High Authority, the ECSC also offered a model for resolving international disputes. In addition, it demonstrated the utility of an incremental approach to integration, and the incorporation of Italy and the Benelux nations created a geographic core that was economically viable without the participation of either Great Britain or the United States. This step-by-step approach made it possible for European integration to survive even a major failure, such as the 1954 rejection of the European Defense Community (EDC).

The ECSC and the integration process it catalyzed were not without flaws, however. While some provisions of the ECSC treaty aimed at ensuring fair competition, the organization's main goals were defined largely by market

Signing of the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union with twelve founding member countries, Maastricht, Netherlands, 7 February 1992. (European Community, 2006)

results. This allowed governments to establish price controls, investment controls, and quantitative planning. In later years, these policies would result in serious imbalances in the coal and steel sectors. Even at the time, many economists—including Wilhelm Röpke and Friedrich August von Hayek—doubted the value of integrating specific sectors of the economy in fostering European integration.

With the elaboration of sectoral planning in national economies, especially in the French system of indicative planning (*planification*), the conflict between planning and competition as guiding principles of the European integration process intensified. While French General Commissioner for Planning Étienne Hirsch envisioned the extension of French planning methods to a common market, for instance, West German economic minister Ludwig Erhard, a proponent of the social-market economy, warned that integration could not be achieved by administrative harmonization. He advocated abandoning the existing national regulations in favor of new European regulations. By and large, Erhard's ideas have prevailed. Macroeconomic planning has been largely discarded in Western Europe, while the market economy is enshrined in the European treaties. The degree of harmonization on the European level, however, has remained a contentious issue in the European Integration Movement.

The second sector to be integrated on a large scale was agriculture; its governing principles, defined by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), are a vivid example of this discord and one of the prime causes of Euro-skepticism (i.e., frustration with the integration process) during the 1970s. The CAP remains a major bone of contention to this day. As European economic integration moved forward, however, more and more areas of agreement emerged. The Single Market Program of 1985, for example, listed more than 400 national regulations that were slated to disappear by 1993. The successful completion of this project gave a significant boost to the economies of Western Europe and helped create a more positive attitude on the part of citizens, politicians, and business interests toward European integration. The dynamism of the Single Market Program, together with the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe since 1989, not only made the decision for the EMU possible but also renewed the drive for closer political integration, resulting in the establishment of the European Union (EU) in 1991.

After the end of the Cold War, not only did the formerly neutral states of Europe (Austria, Sweden, and Finland) join the EU, but immediately after freeing themselves from Soviet domination, Central and East European states applied for membership in the EU. The first enlargement of the EU saw ten former Central and East European states become members in May 2004. A second round of enlargement is scheduled for 2007, with even further expansion on the table.

While overcoming the divisions of the Cold War, the European Integration Movement today must cope with the increasing problems of governing a greater Europe. Institutions originally planned for six states now have to accommodate three times that number and must be prepared to handle half again as many in the future. This has raised questions of efficiency in policy

making at the European level. Processes must also be found so as to balance the competencies of various levels of governance as well as allow for greater institutional diversity in the form of institutional competition in order to reduce the rise of centrifugal forces inherent in the process of widening and deepening the area of integration.

The European Integration Movement was pivotal in mastering the great challenge to unite a war-torn and antagonistic Europe, increasing its strength, and even overcoming the Cold War division of Europe. It remains to be seen if it is equally successful in maintaining the political stability and economic dynamism of the new united Europe.

Bernhard Johannes Seliger

See also

Comecon; European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; European Economic Community; European Parliament; European Union; Marshall Plan; Schuman Plan; Truman Doctrine

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European Parliament

One of the five original institutions of the European Union created in 1952 to represent the populations of the six West European states—France, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany)—in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). When the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were formed by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European Parliament (EP) was expanded to include the ECSC, EEC, and

EURATOM, now known collectively as the European Union (EU). The 1987 Single European Act finally formalized the term for Parliament members (MEPs) at five years.

With enlargement of the EU in 2004, 732 MEPs are now elected to represent twenty-five member states. Since 1979 the MEPs have been elected through universal suffrage every five years, and seats are distributed proportionally among the EU member states based on their respective populations. Members are grouped in seven transnational European political parties, the most important ones being the center-rightist Popular Party and the leftist Socialist Party. Female members currently make up approximately 30 percent of the MEPs. The EP holds plenary sessions in Strasbourg, France, while several of its seventeen committees meet in Brussels, Belgium. The general secretary of the EP, along with most of the secretariat staff, is based in Luxembourg.

The powers of the EP are limited by the more powerful Council of Ministers and the European Commission, which are the legislative and executive branches of the EU's system, respectively. Nevertheless, the EP's powers have increased in recent years, especially after the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, which gave the EP joint legislative powers with the Council of Ministers, although final decisions are still left to the latter. The EP has budgetary powers and is empowered to dismiss the commission, although this has occurred only once. The legislative authority resulting from the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty gives the EP the power to force a second reading of legislation proposed by the commission and voted on by the council, binding the latter to approve a law by a full majority if the EP rejects the law. The EP also exerts a joint decision-making process on accession treaties and association agreements with non-EU countries. Finally, budgetary control over the commission (which presents some 5,000 questions yearly) has been tightened due to poor administration and scandals. The main limit on the EP's power is the fact that final decision-making power is in the hands of the national states and, therefore, in the Council of Ministers.

Alessandro Massignani

See also

European Coal and Steel Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; European Union; Rome, Treaty of

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European Recovery Program

See Marshall Plan

European Union

An international organization of twenty-five European states, established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), also called the Maastricht Treaty, in December 1991. The European Union (EU) member states have set up common institutions to which they delegate part of their sovereignty in specific fields of common interest.

The EU has its roots in the European Community (EC), composed of three originally separate organizations: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), created in 1951, and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), both established in 1957. These three institutions merged in 1967, creating the EC and setting up headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

French statesman and European integrationist Jean Monnet, along with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, believed that France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) might cooperate economically to avoid future conflict, so on 9 May 1950 Schuman proposed the creation of a common authority to regulate the coal and steel industries of West Germany and France that would be open to other West European nations. Thus West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, along with France, signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The ECSC was formally established in August 1952.

In June 1955 the foreign ministers of the ECSC promoted a better integration of the six economies, which resulted in the two Treaties of Rome of March 1957, forming the EEC and EURATOM. The basic economic features of the EEC treaty were gradually implemented, and the three communities (the EEC, the ECSC, and EURATOM) merged in July 1967 under one umbrella institution, the EC.

The Single European Act (SEA), introduced in December 1985 and approved by all twelve members by July 1987, established the first major changes to the EC structure since 1957. Among these was the introduction of the weighted-majority system that helped speed up implementation of the single market.

Representatives from each of the EC countries negotiated the Treaty on European Union in 1991, and in December the European Council met at Maastricht, the Netherlands, to finalize the treaty. The treaty mandated that the population of each member state had to approve the EU by popular referendum. The treaty was duly ratified by all members in October 1993, and the EU was established on 1 November when the treaty went into effect.

Initially, the EC consisted of just six countries: Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. Austria, Finland, and Sweden voted in 1994 to enter the EU and did so in 1995, while Norway failed twice by popular referendum to enter. Norway's economic strength was one reason for its decision to remain independent, although the country entered the Schengen Treaty and adopted

Flag of the European Union (EU). Formed by twelve nations in 1991, the EU is a powerful economic and political bloc promoting European unity. The list of member states has grown since the EU's formation, but the process of securing entry involves meeting rigorous economic and political conditions. (European Community, 2006)

the EU legislation. Ten more European countries began membership negotiations for entrance into the EU in 1996.

Other potential EU applicants included members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In 1991 the EC and the EFTA completed an agreement to establish the European Economic Area (EEA), which would provide a single, unified market for goods, services, and capital. The EEA, which took effect on 1 January 1994, eliminated trade barriers between the EU and the EFTA, each of which is the other's largest trading partner.

In 2004 the EU's greatest enlargement took place with the admittance of ten new countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The treaties signed by the member states ensure that the rule of law is fundamental to the EU and member states and give force to all EU decisions and procedures.

The EU has five main institutions: the European Parliament (EP), elected by the people of the member states every five years; the Council of the European Union, representing the governments of the member states; the European Commission (CEC), acting as the executive body; the Court of Justice, ensuring that the various bodies act according to the European

law; and the Court of Auditors, tasked with budget management. To these should be added the European Central Bank (ECB), responsible for monetary policy within the Eurozone; the European Economic and Social Committee (ESC), representing the opinions of civil society on economic and social issues; the Committee of the Regions, which gives voice to the local authorities; the European Ombudsman, to whom the European citizens may direct complaints; and the European Investment Bank, used to finance capital investment to further European integration policies.

From the beginning, cooperation among EU states was focused on trade and economic issues, building a single European market, and launching the Euro, the single European currency to ease money transfer and free flow of capital. The cooperation among the member states ensured half a century of peace during the Cold War and stability in Europe, but the EU now must deal with several problems, including the development of economically indigent regions, environmental protection, and internal security.

The EU is a major economic rival to North America and Asia, and the establishment of an EU military force rivaling the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is also in the works.

Alessandro Massignani

See also

European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; European Parliament

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Existentialism

Philosophical construct and corpus of ethical thought developed in the nineteenth century and expanded upon in the twentieth century. Existentialism explores both the solitude and uniqueness of the human condition within a universe that is unconcerned—or even antagonistic—toward humankind. Existentialism holds that the reason and purpose for human life is unknowable and thus that free will and personal responsibility govern the consequences of one's actions. In its broadest application, existentialism has been embraced in some form by twentieth-century theologians (Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr), psychologists (Viktor Frankl and Rollo May), writers (Albert Camus and Franz Kafka), and philosophers (Simone de Beauvoir,

Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre). Existentialism has its roots in the thinking and writings of such nineteenth-century luminaries as Friedrich Nietzsche, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Søren Kierkegaard, among others.

Existentialism, like its immediate philosophical predecessors, is a sharp departure from traditional Western thought that holds that rationality and consciousness are paramount to understanding the human condition. According to Sartre, "existence precedes and rules essence." Otherwise stated, there is no preexisting, predefined nature to humanity other than what the individual creates for himself. And because existentialism does not acknowledge God or a supreme, all-knowing entity, human beings are free to make their own choices and will be judged exclusively by the actions and choices they take.

In the 1950s and 1960s, existentialism experienced a resurgence with the popularity of Camus' writings (although Camus eschewed the use of the term "existentialism" to describe his work). Also influential at this time were the so-called Beat writers and poets such as Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, and Lawrence Ferlinghetti who borrowed heavily from existentialist thought. Finally, the idea of random absurdity that existentialists see as part and parcel of the human condition became the subject of many influential plays and films during the Cold War period. Some of the more influential playwrights who explored the theater of the absurd included Alain Robbe-Grillet, Eugene Ionesco, Samuel Beckett, Luigi Pirandello, and Edward Albee.

Existentialism became a powerful force during the Cold War. It certainly is not difficult to understand how the onset of the Cold War that brought with it the constant threat of almost instantaneous annihilation might have given impetus to existentialist thinking.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Camus, Albert; Ginsberg, Allen; Kerouac, Jean Louis; Sartre, Jean-Paul

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Explorer I
(31 January 1958)

First successful U.S. Earth-orbiting satellite, launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on 31 January 1958. *Explorer I* was launched just 119 days after the Soviets launched *Sputnik I*. The thirty-pound satellite was boosted by a Jupiter C rocket, an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), also known

as *Juno I* when used as a launch vehicle. The Jupiter-class rocket was developed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) team under the directorship of Dr. Wernher von Braun. *Explorer I* carried a variety of scientific instruments, and its readings contributed to the identification of radiation belts around Earth.

The *Explorer I* system was a backup to the primary American satellite effort, *Vanguard I*. President Dwight Eisenhower gave the Vanguard system priority in large part because of its civilian nature and his desire to showcase the peaceful uses of space flight. He also sought to establish a precedent for orbital overflights of other nations. Forming legal rights for orbital overflights was important for the reconnaissance satellites then being developed.

The launch was planned to be part of the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year research effort, although the motivation increased with the successful Soviet *Sputnik* launches. When the Vanguard system exploded on the launch pad on 6 December 1957, the Explorer team was allowed to proceed with its already-established military rocket design. The successful *Explorer I* mission and the valuable scientific results that stemmed from it helped restore some of America's confidence and prestige that had been lost to *Sputnik*. Explorer marked the initial American engagement in the emerging space race between the two Cold War superpowers.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; PAPERCLIP, Operation; Space Race; *Sputnik*

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F

Faber, Mient Jan
(1940–)

Secretary-general of the largest Dutch peace organization, the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV). Born on 14 December 1940 in Coevorden, Mient Faber studied mathematics and physics at the Free University of Amsterdam and graduated in 1968. In 1974 he obtained a doctorate from the same university. Also in 1974, Faber became secretary-general of the Interchurch Peace Council, a peace organization founded in 1966 by the Roman Catholic Church and mainstream Protestant churches.

In 1977 the IKV began a campaign for multilateral nuclear disarmament. Two years later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The IKV succeeded in mobilizing huge demonstrations against nuclear weapons in general and the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands in particular. As a consequence, the Dutch government was forced to postpone the deployment decision in December 1979. Faber addressed a gathering of an estimated 400,000 people in Amsterdam in 1981 and a demonstration of 550,000 in The Hague in 1983.

Faber not only inspired anti-NATO protests but also declared solidarity with East European dissidents. In 1981, after martial law was declared in Poland, the IKV grew into a lobbying organization for freedom and human rights in Eastern Europe. This approach was called Détente from Below. Because of his advocacy activities, Faber was banned from the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and Czechoslovakia, and he was viewed with misgivings by many Western peace activists.

After 1989, Faber's involvement in human rights activities became even stronger. Together with Charter 77 and European Nuclear Disarmament (END), the IKV founded the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (HCA), a human rights organization. The HCA campaigned for safe havens in Bosnia (1992–1993) and supported humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Faber retired as secretary-general of the HCA in 2003.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Charter 77; Détente; Double-Track Decision, NATO; German Democratic Republic; Human Rights; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Pershing II; Solidarity Movement

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Faeroe Islands

An archipelago of eighteen small islands and a few islets located in the North Atlantic, almost midway between Iceland and Norway and 200 miles north of Britain. A Danish autonomous dominion with no military forces of their own, the Faeroe Islands (in Danish, Færøerne, and in Faeroese, Føroyar) are just 540 square miles in area, less than half as big as the U.S. state of Rhode Island. Seventeen of the islands are inhabited, and in 1945 they had a combined population of 29,178 people.

British forces occupied the Faeroes during World War II, both to prevent Germany from capturing them and to aid Allied operations in the North Atlantic. A Loran-A (Long-Range Navigation) communications station was built on the Faeroe Islands during the war. Danish authorities maintained it following the end of the war.

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949, the United States concluded that Danish membership was crucial in part because the Faeroe Islands would be included. Yet in the first few years after the war, the islands were not deemed to be of great strategic importance. That changed by 1950, however, because various technological advances made them important in communications, radar, and advanced-warning system applications. Fear that the Soviet Union might wish to gain a foothold there also made them strategically vital.

In 1959, the United States funded and oversaw the construction of a Loran-C station on the Faeroe Islands in connection with the planned introduction of the submarine-launched Polaris missiles. The station was operated by Danish personnel and was used for both civilian and military aviation and navigation. It also served as a master station for other Loran-C installations in Iceland, Norway, and later on the island of Jan Mayen. In addition, a NATO-operated radar station was built in the Faeroe Islands.

Immediately after World War II, Faeroe Islanders narrowly defeated a bid to gain full independence from Denmark, settling instead for home rule that kept foreign affairs and defense in Danish hands. During the Cold War, Copenhagen and Washington sometimes worried that nationalist tendencies in the Faeroes might lead to calls for secession from Denmark and even a claim of official neutrality. Friction with Britain over fishing limits (fishing

is the chief industry of the Faeroe Islands) also caused concern. While a number of Faeroe Islanders did at times protest against military installations on the islands, the danger of secession was never that great. Throughout the Cold War, the Faeroe Islands remained an important surveillance and communications post for the United States and NATO.

Gudni Jóhannesson

See also
Denmark; Missiles, Polaris

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Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia
(1921–2005)

King of Saudi Arabia from 1982 to 2005. Born in Riyadh in 1921, Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz was the eleventh son of the founder of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. He was educated at the Princes School in Riyadh and later at the Religious Knowledge Institute in Mecca, where he studied the Islamic faith and the traditions and culture of Arabia. In 1969 he became deputy prime minister of Saudi Arabia, and in 1975 he was named crown prince when his elder brother Khlalid became king.

Upon Khalid's death in 1982, Fahd became king of Saudi Arabia. During the 1980s, King Fahd established closer ties to the United States in response to perceived threats that included the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War. Partly because of this shift toward the West, Fahd and the Saudi royal family came under increasing criticism from outspoken Muslim clerics. In 1986, Fahd adopted the title "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques" (referring to Mecca and Medina) in an effort to add legitimacy to his rule.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led to an even stronger U.S.-Saudi relationship with the stationing of several hundred thousand American troops on Saudi soil. This resulted in even greater criticism from Muslim clerics and further challenges to the royal family, including a protest in November 1990 by more than forty Saudi women who illegally drove cars in the streets of Riyadh.

In 1992, Fahd initiated a series of reforms aimed at bolstering the credibility of the royal family as well as appeasing religious critics. The reforms included the creation of a Consultative Council to ensure that secular legislation remains in line with the requirements of Sharia, or

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, pictured here in 1951. Fahd oversaw his country's transformation as a consequence of the post–World War II oil boom. (United Nations/DPI Photo)

Islamic law. In 1995, Fahd suffered a debilitating stroke, and his half brother, Crown Prince Abdullah, assumed control of day-to-day affairs in the kingdom. Fahd died in Riyadh on 1 August 2005.

Brent M. Geary

See also

Iran-Iraq War; Middle East; Persian Gulf War; Radical Islam; Saudi Arabia

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Failsafe

Term used to describe techniques put in place to avoid the start of an accidental nuclear war. These include safeguards to prevent the accidental launch of nuclear weapons as well as the means to abort missions in progress. The term also means a secondary method for accomplishing a given goal.

In seeking to prevent accidental nuclear war, failsafe involved double checks at various stages to ensure that a valid order had indeed been issued to begin a nuclear exchange. The most visible sign of this was at the strategic level, via the hotline connecting U.S. and Soviet leaders.

On the operational level, bombers responding to a perceived enemy attack might be authorized to fly only to a certain point without further approval. This allowed the nation's leaders to determine both that an enemy attack had indeed occurred and that the nature of the response was warranted. The United States also required approval of two separate officers to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Once the ICBM was fired, regular computer checks determined whether the mission should be aborted.

Such procedures varied widely, however, depending on the nation involved. Concerns over failsafe practices intensified with the proliferation of nuclear powers—in part the consequence of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the dispersal of its nuclear weapons beyond Russian territory.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Hotline; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic

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Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia
(1905–1975)

King of Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975. Born in 1905 in Riyadh, Faisal ibn Abdul al-Aziz ar-Rahman al-Saud was the fourth son of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. In 1927 King Saud appointed Faisal the governor of the Hijaz, and in 1928 he was made head of the Council of Ulama, a body of Islamic scholars that acted as an advisory council to the state. Faisal often represented the kingdom in foreign affairs. He served at the 1945 United Nations Conference and later as ambassador to the United Nations (UN).

King Saud died in 1953 and was succeeded by his eldest living son, Prince Saud, Faisal's half-brother. Faisal was then duly designated crown prince and appointed deputy prime minister and foreign minister. In 1958 a power struggle ensued within the royal family, and Saud was forced to give Faisal control over Saudi fiscal, internal, and foreign affairs. Faisal was appointed prime minister in 1962, effectively stripping King Saud of power. In 1964 Saud demanded the restoration of his power, but on 2 November 1964 the Council of Ulama issued a fatwa to depose Saud, who then went into exile. Faisal was thus proclaimed king.

In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Faisal supported the Arab cause. His reign witnessed the development and modernization of Saudi Arabia, mainly accomplished with the nation's vast oil revenues. The educational system was greatly expanded; however, other social reforms were few and far between in the ultraconservative Wahhabi theocracy.

In 1973 Faisal promoted the Arab oil embargo against the United States, the Netherlands, and other Western nations for their support of Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This action strengthened his position and increased the prestige of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. It also solidified the Saudi dynasty's legitimacy as the guardian of the holy cities of Islam.

On 25 March 1975, Faisal was hosting a reception in the royal palace at Riyadh when he greeted his twenty-seven-year-old nephew, Saudi Prince Faisal ibn Musad Abdel Aziz. When King Faisal bowed to receive the traditional kiss of greeting, his nephew shot him in the face, killing him instantly. The assassination was apparently motivated by revenge for the death of ibn Musad's older brother, who had been killed by Saudi police in an armed attack on a television station. Ibn Musad was subsequently tried in an Islamic court and publicly beheaded.

Andrew J. Waskey

During his reign as king of Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975, Faisal raised his country from near feudal status to a modern society that still adhered to the teachings of Islam. (Library of Congress)

See also
Arab-Israeli Wars; Middle East; Saudi Arabia

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Falklands War
(1982)

A seventy-two-day war between Argentina and Great Britain over control of the Falkland (Malvins) Islands. The Falklands War officially began on 2 April 1982 when Argentina landed thousands of troops on the islands and ended on 14 June 1982 when Argentina surrendered to British forces. The war was the product of a long-running dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, or the Malvinas as Argentina called them. The Falklands are a rugged collection of islands in the South Atlantic some 300 miles off Argentina's coast. Various nations—Spain, England, France, and Argentina—had vied for control of the islands since the seventeenth century. Britain frequently intervened in the region in the early 1800s and had been in continuous possession of the Falklands since 1833. Argentina repeatedly protested the British presence, although the Argentine dictator of the 1830s and 1840s, Juan Manuel de Rosas, offered to sell the Falklands to Britain. Britain refused to pay for what it already possessed.

Through the decades, Argentina never renounced its claim to the Falklands, even coaxing the United Nations (UN) in 1965 to classify the islands as a colony of Great Britain. Sporadic negotiations between Britain and Argentina in the 1970s yielded some progress but no substantive agreement on the key issue, namely sovereignty over the islands.

The United States never played a major role in the Falklands controversy. The Argentine government attempted to entice the United States into backing its position by claiming that British possession of the Falklands violated the Monroe Doctrine; however, the United States rejected the application of the doctrine to the Falklands case, arguing that Britain had a claim that antedated its seizure of the islands in 1833. During much of the twentieth century, the United States maintained only a marginal interest in the controversy.

The United States played an even smaller role in the dispute in the 1970s as U.S.-Argentine relations deteriorated. Because of the Argentine military regime's continued violation of human rights, U.S. President Jimmy Carter publicly criticized Argentine leaders and cut aid to the nation. When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, Argentina had hoped for better relations with the United States. Reagan indicated that he was willing to improve U.S.-Argentine relations in return for Argentina's support of America's tougher anticommunist policies, particularly in Central America.

The dispute over the Falklands came to a head in 1982. Argentina had long expressed disenchantment with what it considered the slow pace of negotiations with Britain. The approach of the 150th anniversary of the British

Falklands War, Apr 2 – Jun 14, 1982

Signaling the end of the Falklands War, British troops raise the British flag over Port Howard, West Falkland, for the first time in more than two months, 16 June 1982. (UPI/Corbis-Bettmann)

takeover also played a part in the Argentine decision to resort to force. Growing domestic opposition to military rule encouraged some in the military leadership to conclude that a move against the Falklands would help unite the country behind the regime. Military action would also be a distraction from the sorry state of the Argentine economy. The Argentine leadership doubted that Britain would move militarily to prevent seizure of the islands.

In late March 1982, U.S. intelligence reports indicated that Argentine forces appeared to be preparing for an invasion of the islands, prompting a lengthy telephone conversation on 1 April between Reagan and the Argentine President, General Leopoldo Galtieri. Reagan warned Galtieri that an invasion would compromise U.S.-Argentine relations and provoke a military response by Britain. Nevertheless, Argentina invaded on 2 April, quickly subduing a small detachment of British Royal Marines.

Britain responded diplomatically and militarily. The British convinced the European Economic Community (EEC) to impose economic sanctions on Argentina and the UN Security Council to condemn the invasion and call for an Argentine withdrawal. Britain dispatched a large military contingent to retake the islands by force, if necessary.

The United States responded with a spurt of shuttle diplomacy led by U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Haig made the diplomatic rounds of

London and Buenos Aires trying to broker an agreement based on a cease-fire, Argentine withdrawal, and a commitment to negotiate on the long-term status of the islands.

Argentina mounted its own diplomatic offensive, calling for a meeting of consultation under the provisions of the Rio Pact of 1947. The meeting produced only a tepid resolution criticizing the economic sanctions of the EEC and calling for an end to the fighting. During the meeting Haig characterized Argentina as the aggressor in the crisis.

Haig's shuttle diplomacy soon unraveled as the negotiations demonstrated America's pro-British position. American efforts at mediation ended on 30 April when the United States announced that it was imposing economic sanctions on Argentina and would provide military assistance to Britain, although there would be no direct U.S. military involvement.

British forces landed en masse in the Falklands on 21 May 1982, resulting in another meeting of consultation under the Rio Pact. The meeting passed a resolution—with the United States abstaining—that condemned Britain for its "unjust attack on Argentina" and called upon the United States to lift its economic sanctions on Argentina and end its assistance to Britain. With little substantive diplomatic action, the struggle for the Falklands would be determined by military action alone. The lopsided conflict came to a predictable conclusion with the surrender of Argentine forces on 14 June 1982. Argentina sustained 655 killed in action, while Great Britain suffered 236 killed in action.

The Falklands War was more a colonial war than a Cold War conflict, but it certainly had Cold War implications. First, the Reagan administration lost one of the strongest supporters of its anticommunist policies in Central America. Second, the crisis strengthened ties between Argentina and Cuba, which had prominently supported the Argentine position. Finally, the crisis produced widespread doubts about the role the United States played in mediation efforts, especially given the rapid U.S. switch from quasi-impartial mediator to supporter of Britain. Many Latin Americans were horrified at the prospect of the United States actively aiding a European country in an attack on a Latin American nation. In addition, in the wake of the war two of its most prominent players lost their positions. The Argentine military regime was humiliated, bringing a return to civilian rule in 1983 and the prompt resignation of President Galtieri. Secretary of State Haig resigned on 25 June 1982, partially as a result of his controversial role in the crisis. Only British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher benefited politically from the war, as it raised her sagging popularity and ultimately led to her success in upcoming elections.

Many Latin Americans were horrified at the prospect of the United States actively aiding a European country in an attack on a Latin American nation.

Don M. Coerver

See also

Americas; Argentina; Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.; Organization of American States; Rio Pact; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Royal Navy; Thatcher, Margaret; United Kingdom

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Fallout Shelters

A civil defense measure intended to protect civilian populations from atomic or hydrogen bomb blasts and the attendant toxic radioactive fallout caused by nuclear explosions. Civil defense simply refers to nonmilitary activities designed to protect civilians and their property from enemy actions in times of war. Civil defense measures such as blackouts were common during World War II. Civil defense took on newfound urgency upon the advent of the Cold War.

After the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon in August 1949, the concept of civil defense was transformed from localized protection from enemy attack to the survivability of the human race. Be that as it may, the U.S. government provided little more than literature and instructive film shorts concerning civil defense in the nuclear age. Civil defense measures were left primarily in the hands of local and state authorities, and civil defense efforts in general stressed self-help, privatization, decentralization, and volunteerism. After the Bravo tests of the hydrogen bomb in 1954, however, radioactive fallout became a significant public concern. Debates grew louder as to what the proper role of the federal government ought to be in terms of civil defense and, in particular, in building shelters.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) was created in January 1951 to educate the public about what type of civil defense measures could be taken in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack. The FCDA recommended fallout shelters as part of a comprehensive civil defense program. Despite FCDA recommendations, however, civil defense always took a backseat to broader national security imperatives, and no coherent national policy on civil defense was ever promulgated.

Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower both believed that the costs involved in passive defense measures such as blast or fallout shelters were simply too high. Even when President John F. Kennedy coaxed $207 million from Congress to reinforce existing community fallout shelters, he quickly retreated from his initial proposal of a five-year shelter-building program designed to protect the entire population because of the prohibitive costs. He instead continued Truman's and Eisenhower's policy of encouraging citizens to take up a shovel and build home shelters themselves, which many Americans had begun to do in the early 1950s.

Kennedy did this, in part, via a letter he wrote for the 15 September 1961 issue of *Life* magazine. The story headline in that issue read "How You Can Survive Fallout" and included within its pages Kennedy's letter encouraging Americans to build their own fallout shelters. The article, which even included

sets of blueprints for the do-it-yourself homeowner, coincided with increased tension between the two superpowers over the fate of Berlin. Once the tension eased, particularly after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Americans were less inclined to build fallout shelters. In fact, construction of homemade fallout shelters peaked in 1961. The introduction of ever more powerful nuclear weapons and the use of ballistic missiles, which could reach their targets in a matter of minutes, also rendered fallout shelters and duck and cover drills hopelessly inadequate.

Valerie Adams

See also

Atomic Bomb; Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Duck and Cover Drill; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hydrogen Bomb; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Truman, Harry S.

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Farouk II, King of Egypt
(1920–1965)

King of Egypt from 1936 until 1952, when he was ousted by a military coup. Born on 11 February 1920 in Cairo, Faruq Al-Awwal (Farouk) was the son and successor of King Ahmad Fuad I. Farouk was just sixteen years old when his father died and he ascended the throne, although a regency council ruled for him until July 1937. As king, Farouk continued his father's policy of opposing the popular Wafd Party and was usually successful in keeping it from power.

During World War II Farouk, who was anti-British, sought to keep Egypt neutral. Nevertheless, Britain pressured him to honor Egypt's 1936 treaty obligations to lend it wartime support and to dismiss profascist sympathizers from the government and army officer corps. In 1942 the British forced him to accept as prime minister Mustafa an-Nahhas Pasha, a Wafd Party leader sympathetic to their interests. In October 1944 an-Nahhas helped to negotiate the Alexandria Protocol as a step toward the creation of an Arab league of states. Farouk, seeking to head the movement himself, promptly dismissed an-Nahhas.

Farouk's reign and reputation were seriously compromised by defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Revelations of rampant corruption in the palace and in the Egyptian bureaucracy also discredited him with the Egyptian military. Farouk's position was further damaged by his reputation as an inveterate womanizer and playboy who amassed fantastic wealth but was never quite

satisfied with what he had. He owned hundreds of thousands of acres of land, dozens of palaces, and hundreds of automobiles. He was known as a hard-driving gambler and a man of the nightclub circuit, and his apparent kleptomania earned him the nickname "The Thief of Cairo." These excesses would be a major catalyst to his downfall.

In 1952 Farouk sponsored unpopular candidates for minister of defense and other key positions. On 23 July 1952 the clandestine Free Officers organization, led by General Muhammad Nagib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, forced Farouk to abdicate and sent him into exile in Monaco. His infant son was immediately proclaimed King Fuad II, but the monarchy was formally abolished in 1953 when Egypt was declared a republic.

In exile Farouk continued to lead the high life. His love of food and drink rendered him dangerously obese, and by the time he collapsed after a heavy meal on 3 March 1965, he weighed almost 300 pounds. He died on 18 March 1965 in Rome.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Egypt; Nasser, Gamal Abdel

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Faure, Edgar Jean

(1908–1988)

Prominent French politician, cabinet minister, and premier of France (1952, 1955–1956). Born in Béziers, France, on 30 March 1908, Edgar Faure studied legal history at the Sorbonne and Russian at the Paris École des Langues Orientales. He was admitted to the bar at age twenty and then practiced law in Paris, focusing on Russian émigrés and the petroleum industry. In 1938 he published his doctoral thesis on the French petroleum industry.

Rejected for military service because of a minor heart defect, Faure practiced law in Paris. In late 1942 he immigrated to Tunis and shortly thereafter became chief of legislative services in the provisional French government in Algiers headed by General Charles de Gaulle. Returning to Paris at the end of the war, Faure served in the new Ministry of the National Economy under his friend Pierre Mendès-France. In November 1946, Faure won election to the National Assembly as a deputy from the Jura. He was either a deputy or senator from 1947 to 1980.

As finance minister during 1953–1954 and as premier in 1955, Faure played a major role in shaping the economic and social policies of the Fourth Republic. In 1950 he helped secure funding for the Monnet Plan to rebuild the French economy and to bring inflation under control. In 1953 he drastically cut expenditures and government benefits, precipitating the worst strikes

in French history since 1936. In 1954 he helped stimulate the economy with government initiatives in such areas as housing construction and the restructuring of the tax system.

As premier, Faure played an important role in colonial affairs, agreeing to grant independence to both Tunisia and Morocco, although public pressure forced him to take a hard line regarding Algeria. His own Radical Party expelled him from membership after he dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and scheduled new elections for January 1956 (the first time a premier had invoked this right since 1877). Faure then allied his followers with the conservatives but lost to a leftist, Republican Front coalition that brought socialist Guy Mollet to power. Faure did not return to the cabinet until a brief tenure in 1958.

Elected a senator in 1959, Faure represented the Jura in the new Fifth Republic. Never a member of the Gaullist party, Faure was nonetheless French ambassador to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the early 1960s, minister of agriculture (1966–1968), and minister of education following the student riots of May 1968. In this post, Faure was responsible for a series of educational reforms during 1968–1969 by which twenty-three existing French universities were broken up into seventy-six. Faure then returned to the National Assembly and served as its president during 1973–1978.

An active writer, in addition to his memoirs Faure wrote several historical studies as well as detective stories (under the nom de plume Edgar Sunday) and was elected a member of the Académie Française. At the time of his death in Paris on 30 March 1988, Faure was chairing the French Revolution Bicentennial Commission.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; France; Mendès-France, Pierre

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chief domestic law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agency of the federal government of the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originated in 1908 when a group of special agents in the U.S. Department of Justice were organized to investigate federal crimes. These agents became prominent during the First Red Scare (1919–1921) that followed World War I and played an important role in identifying and arresting

In this official photo, FBI agents receive training in defensive tactics at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. (National Archives and Records Administration)

scores of Americans—mostly resident aliens—for alleged subversive and communist activities. At the same time, the First Red Scare brought to the fore a young and ambitious law enforcement bureaucrat by the name of J. Edgar Hoover who would lead the special agent division beginning in 1924 and went on to serve as director of the FBI until 1972, acting as head of domestic U.S. law enforcement for forty-eight years. The Department of Justice's legion of special agents officially became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1936. FBI personnel engaged in intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence activities in addition to law enforcement. Under the directorship of Hoover, the FBI pursued communists and other purported subversives in the United States well before the Cold War and often trampled constitutional rights and civil liberties while doing so. During his long tenure, Hoover became one of the most powerful—and feared—men in Washington, cloaking many of his directives and FBI operations in secrecy.

During the 1930s, Hoover worked diligently to professionalize FBI agents, many of whom were trained as attorneys and accountants rather than detectives or policemen. Hoover's enforcement of Prohibition (until it was nullified in 1933) and the FBI's apprehension of several high-profile criminals in the 1930s lent him and the agency an air of invincibility and respect. They also allowed Hoover entrée to the highest levels of power in the Amer-

ican government. It was not at all unusual, in fact, for Hoover to meet with the president on a regular basis.

World War II and the early Cold War brought dramatic expansions in the FBI's personnel and operating costs. During 1936–1945, the number of FBI agents grew from approximately 600 to nearly 4,900. To maintain a sizable postwar force and budget for the FBI, Hoover contended that the Cold War confronted the United States not only with the external threat of a Soviet attack but also with an internal threat of communist subversion. He asserted that there were operatives within the United States who were conducting espionage for the Soviets and scheming to overthrow the U.S. government and that communists and communist sympathizers held jobs in the federal government. The advent of McCarthyism, a four-year-long anticommunist witch-hunt (1950–1954), only added to the urgency of Hoover's exaggerated warnings. By 1952, the FBI had more than 7,000 agents.

The FBI investigated federal employees suspected of belonging to or supporting the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) in addition to many other citizens who were neither members of the Communist Party nor connected to it in any way. Frequent targets of investigation also included labor unions and civil rights organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The FBI helped investigate and take into custody Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who in 1951 were convicted and sentenced to death for conspiracy to commit espionage by allegedly passing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. The Rosenberg case fueled Americans' fears that domestic subversives were indeed plotting against the nation and bolstered public support for the FBI.

To counter the alleged domestic Red menace, FBI agents sometimes engaged in illegal activities, many of them conceived and authorized by Hoover, including break-ins, use of secret listening devices, mail searches, and the leaking of confidential information about subjects under surveillance to the press and congressional representatives, such as members of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). HUAC interrogated Americans who were currently or formerly associated with the Communist Party or who had supported liberal causes or criticized the U.S. government.

In 1956, the FBI launched a counterintelligence program, known as COINTELPRO, to infiltrate and sabotage organizations that Hoover regarded as national security threats. Although in the 1960s the FBI did investigate certain right-wing associations such as the Ku Klux Klan, it chiefly targeted a wide array of liberal and left-wing groups and individuals, including civil rights organizations, free speech advocates, Vietnam War protesters, black nationalists, women's rights activists, and student radicals. Hoover believed that such individuals and groups aided communist subversion by destabilizing and attempting to destroy American society. One of COINTELPRO's most notorious cases was the clandestine surveillance and harassment of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. Hoover discontinued COINTELPRO in 1971.

Over the years, Hoover helped cultivate popular support for the FBI by encouraging favorable portrayals of agents in the press and in literature, film,

During his long tenure, Hoover became one of the most powerful—and feared—men in Washington, cloaking many of his directives and FBI operations in secrecy.

and television. But in the Watergate era of the mid-1970s, many of the FBI's abuses of power came to light through citizens' activism, the news media, and the 1975 U.S. Senate investigations of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Americans were shocked to learn of decades of surveillance of millions of U.S. citizens deemed subversive, thereby denying them their constitutional rights. They also discovered that both Democratic and Republican presidents, beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt, had used the FBI to investigate critics of their administrations. Detractors of the FBI charged that Hoover's obsession with communists and alleged communist sympathizers had resulted in the FBI violating the rights of the citizenry it was supposed to protect. Hoover died in 1972 and was succeeded by a host of directors, none of whom proved to be as tenacious or controversial as he. After Hoover's death, subsequent directors worked to purge the FBI of the excesses of the Hoover era. Hoover's successor, L. Patrick Gray, ordered the FBI to hire its first female agents, a notion that would have been anathema to the old-school Hoover.

Increases in federal oversight of FBI activities in the late 1970s were partially lifted during Ronald Reagan's administration (1981–1989). Cold War concerns about leftist insurgencies in Central America in the early 1980s led the FBI to investigate the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, a social justice organization, and to assert its involvement in terrorism, which later proved to be unfounded. The capture of several FBI agents who had spied for Moscow during the 1980s and 1990s further marred the FBI's image.

Donna Alvah and John H. Barnhill

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Civil Liberties in the United States; Hoover, John Edgar; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; McCarthyism; Rosenberg, Julius; Vietnam War Protests; Weathermen

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Fermi, Enrico
(1901–1954)

Nuclear physicist, atomic scientist, and one of the lead scientists involved in the Manhattan Project. Enrico Fermi was born in Rome, Italy, on 29 September 1901, the son of an Italian government official. His great aptitude for mathematics and physics manifested itself at an early age, and encouraged



Enrico Fermi seated at the control panel of a particle accelerator, the world's most powerful atom smasher. A Nobel laureate, Fermi refined the process of nuclear fission. His work led to the development of nuclear reactors and the Manhattan Project, which produced the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. (Library of Congress)

by his father he received a scholarship at the age of seventeen to the University of Pisa. In 1922, at only twenty-one years of age, the brilliant Fermi had earned a doctorate in physics from the University of Pisa.

Fermi went to work in Germany until 1924 and then took a position as a lecturer at the University of Florence. In 1926 he discovered the statistical laws governing particles, also known as Fermi Statistics. In 1927 he was elected to the prestigious post of professor of theoretical physics at the University of Rome. He stayed in that post until 1938, when he won the Nobel Prize in physics. By then, he was the world's undisputed expert on neutrons. That same year, he fled fascist Italy for the United States and assumed a professorship at Columbia University, a post he held during 1939–1942.

In 1942 Fermi began work on the top secret Manhattan Project, which produced the world's first atomic bomb in 1945. Under Fermi's direction, the first controlled nuclear chain reaction was achieved at the University of Chicago in December 1942. He went on to help lead the quest for an atomic weapon, which was finally achieved in July 1945. Less than a month later,

the United States dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, hastening the end of World War II.

In 1946 Fermi accepted a faculty position at the University of Chicago and turned his attention to high-energy physics. In 1946 he was appointed to a panel charged with advising the newly established Atomic Energy Commission. In 1949 he joined a number of other scientists in voicing opposition to the development of a hydrogen bomb, but a year later he assisted in that project although continuing to raise concerns about the efficacy of employing such a weapon. Fermi died on 28 November 1954 in Chicago.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Atomic Bomb; Hydrogen Bomb; Nuclear Arms Race

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Figl, Leopold

(1902–1965)

Austrian chancellor and foreign minister. Born in Rust in Lower Austria on 2 October 1902, Leopold Figl studied at the College of Soil Sciences and became a secretary for the Lower Austrian Association of Farmers in 1927. He rose to deputy director of that organization in 1931 and became director in 1933. In 1937 he accepted appointment as director of the Federal Farmers' Union. He also served as a member of the Federal Economic Council from 1934 to 1938, helping organize a Pan-European economic conference in Vienna in 1936. Arrested in 1938 and sent to Dachau, Figl was released in May 1943. He was rearrested in October 1944 and sent to Mauthausen, where he remained until the war ended in April 1945.

After the war, Figl resumed his political activity, leading the drive to reinstate the Austrian constitution of 1929. As governor of Lower Austria and president of the reformed Farmers' Union, Figl helped relieve the postwar famine in Vienna. He became undersecretary without portfolio and a member of President Karl Renner's Political Cabinet Council in the Provisional Government. A sophisticated negotiator and political improviser with close ties to the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ), Figl was elected to parliament as a representative of the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and named chancellor of Austria in December 1945.

Figl's program as chancellor emphasized cooperation in the name of Austrian unity and independence. He stressed democracy, de-Nazification and the depoliticization of the police and the judiciary. Although he approved the formation of Austro-Soviet joint-stock companies in July 1945, Figl resisted Soviet pressure to legitimize the transfer of Austrian properties in 1946, protesting the Soviet usurpation of control over the Danube Steamship Com-

pany in particular. During his term as chancellor, he was also instrumental in establishing a neutral, independent identity for Austria. Figl resigned under pressure in 1953, but he immediately became foreign minister and served in that post until 1959. The crowning achievement of his political career was the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. Following his party's defeat in the 1959 elections, Figl served briefly as president of the Austrian parliament before becoming governor of Lower Austria. He died in Vienna on 9 April 1965.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Austria; Austrian State Treaty; Renner, Karl

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Figueres Ferrer, José

(1906–1990)

Key Costa Rican political figure for more than half a century and president during 1948–1949, 1953–1958, and 1970–1974. Born on 25 September 1906 in San Ramon, José "Don Pepe" Figueres Ferrer took up university studies in Costa Rica and, briefly, in the United States at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) but did not earn a degree. During the 1930s, he farmed a small mountain plantation. In 1942 Figueres was exiled to Mexico by the National Republican Party (PRN) after he criticized President Calderón Guardia in a radio address.

Figueres was allowed to return in 1944 and emerged as the leader of the National Liberation Party (PLN). In 1948 the PRN lost the presidency but attempted to remain in power. Figueres and other PLN leaders led an insurrection against the PRN government and quickly won a brief civil war. Figueres and a military junta assumed power at the end of the war. Despite having banned the Communist Party, Figueres led Costa Rica through a mild socialist reformation, abolishing the army in 1948 and introducing social welfare, education, and land reform programs. He also nationalized banks and insurance companies, which paved the way for state intervention in the economy. After eighteen months in office, Figueres handed over the presidency to Otilio Ulate, the rightful winner of the 1948 election. Figueres returned as president during 1953–1958 and 1970–1974 but remained politically influential until his death.

During the Cold War, Figueres received backing and support from both Cuba and Guatemala, and he continued to push for mild socialist reforms, much to the consternation of the United States. Nevertheless, he was able to advance his reform agenda while maintaining relatively cordial relations with Washington. Figueres died in San José on 8 June 1990.

David H. Richards

See also
Costa Rica

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Film

Throughout the Cold War, the grand ideological struggle between communism and capitalism raged with particular intensity in motion pictures. During this period, several national cinemas came to challenge Hollywood's dominance. In particular, postwar Italian, French, British, and Swedish films added significant artistic touches to the Cold War film genre. While U.S. films tended toward stereotyping and even mild anticommunist hysteria in the late 1940s and early 1950s, West European films took a more nuanced and introspective look at the times. Most East European films suffered from heavy censorship, with a few notable exceptions.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) shook the U.S. film industry. There were genuine concerns at the time that communists had infiltrated the industry, and congressmen seeking the political limelight found Hollywood to be a perfect foil. The film industry also attracted the most notorious of all anticommunists, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Screenwriters in particular had been notably leftist in their sentiments, and some actors had flirted with the Communist Party in the 1930s. Now all were being called to account for past affiliations, however fleeting and uncommitted they might have been.

Lillian Hellman, a major dramatist, managed to salvage her career with self-serving newspaper editorials and a highly publicized letter to HUAC, despite evidence of past Soviet sympathies. Actors such as Sterling Hayden, José Ferrer, Lucille Ball, and Edward G. Robinson survived their HUAC encounters. Others were not so fortunate, as a blacklist of writers, directors, and actors expanded. The careers of many who found themselves on the list were derailed for a decade or more, and others never found high-profile work again.

Because no Hollywood experience is truly assimilated until it has served as a subject for films, it is not surprising that blacklisting has been the theme

Selected U.S. Films of the Early Cold War, 1948–1965

Film	*Year Produced*	*Director*
The Iron Curtain	1948	William A. Wellman
The Red Menace	1949	R.G. Springsteen
The Red Danube	1949	George Sidney
The Woman on Pier 13	1949	Robert Stevenson
The Big Lift	1950	George Seaton
It Came from Outer Space	1951	Jack Arnold
The Day the Earth Stood Still	1951	Robert Wise
Walk East on Beacon	1952	Alfred L. Werker
Them	1954	Gordon Douglas
Strategic Air Command	1955	Anthony Mann
On the Beach	1959	Stanley Kramer
The Manchurian Candidate	1962	John Frankenheimer
From Russia with Love	1963	Terence Young
Dr. Strangelove	1964	Stanley Kubrick
Moscow on the Hudson	1964	Paul Mazursky
Doctor Zhivago	1965	David Lean

of several movies. *The Front* (1976) featured comedian Woody Allen as a saloon cashier and numbers runner drafted by an old school friend to serve as a front for several blacklisted television writers. In a later film, *Majestic* (2001), actor Jim Carey played a blacklisted screenwriter suffering from that old radio soap opera affliction, amnesia.

As the Cold War deepened, Hollywood's tendency to stereotype became more prominent. Before World War II, Russians had been portrayed with something akin to veiled admiration as people willing to make sacrifices for the greater good of their homeland. During the Cold War, however, Russians appeared on screen in a very different light. They now were depicted either as sinister figures intent on forcing communism upon the world or as political prisoners through accidents of birth. Even American communists featured in Hollywood films were portrayed as shady, mentally unstable underworld characters.

Comedic films were generally more sympathetic to Russians than were dramatic ones. *The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming* (1966) was a lighthearted farce about a Soviet submarine that ran aground on American soil. After a period of initial suspicion, the Russians gain the affections of the locals by rescuing a child dangling precariously from a church steeple. In *Moscow on the Hudson* (1984) Robin Williams played a Russian circus performer who defects while discovering the delights of American consumerism in Bloomingdale's.

A more serious attempt to convey the Russian character to Western audiences came with *Doctor Zhivago* (1965), adapted from Boris Pasternak's autobiographical novel. Pasternak was already a martyr-hero in the West because the Soviet government had forbidden him from accepting the 1958 Nobel Prize in Literature. His novel outlined the struggle of a sensitive, gifted individual against a ruthless government machine. The film, a smash hit, featured a cast of glamorous actors and a haunting though not very Russian musical score.

In the early Cold War period, Hollywood produced several openly propagandistic films designed to persuade Americans to view the Soviet Union

as a menacing threat instead of a former wartime ally. *The Iron Curtain* (1948), based loosely on the memoirs of a Soviet dissenter, unconvincingly featured Dana Andrews and Gene Tierney as struggling Russians. *The Red Menace* (1949) engaged in crude propaganda and hyperbole. *The Red Danube* (1949) was the only film in this group with artistic merit. Ethel Barrymore, Walter Pidgeon, and Janet Leigh headed the cast. The film's German-expressionistic cinematography was exactly right for a tale of the forced repatriation of ethnic East Europeans scattered about postwar Europe.

The Big Lift (1950) was less melodramatic as it portrayed the peril and heroism of the hugely successful Berlin Airlift. Montgomery Clift and Paul Douglas were the only professional actors used in the military scenes; the rest were real soldiers filmed on location in war-torn Berlin, giving the film a documentary feel. In the same self-congratulatory category was *Strategic Air Command* (1955), a patriotic look at the supremacy of U.S. airpower.

As Hollywood embraced the Cold War, screenwriters and directors exploited every film genre. By its very nature, the Western was a forceful declaration of rugged individualism, self-reliance, and the American Way. In film noir, sinister communists replaced gangsters, and double agents took the place of the private eyes who had previously darkened film noir alleys and back streets. Horror films replaced Frankenstein, werewolves, and Dracula with mad nuclear scientists. Espionage became a chief subject for screen thrillers, and science fiction films often featured atomically mutated monsters and alien invaders who represented either internal or external communist subversion. Cinema farces sometimes tried to lighten the mood, assuring audiences that communists were ultimately more bumbling clowns than serious threats, while black comedies encouraged audiences to "stop worrying and love the bomb."

Orson Welles appears out of the shadows as Harry Lime in a publicity still for the film *The Third Man*. (John Springer Collection/Corbis)

The Cold War produced new grist for film noir. "The city that never sleeps," film noir's familiar setting, became the lair of those who wished ill to America in such films as *Walk East on Beacon* (1952), *I Was a Communist for the FBI* (1951), and *The Woman on Pier 13* (1949). One particular film from this genre, *The Third Man* (1949), quickly became a true classic. With ruined Vienna and zither music in the background, the picture featured Orson Welles as a murderous black marketeer moving between the American, British, French, and Soviet occupation zones and playing each off against the other. The city's serpentine sewers and the Riesenrad—the giant Ferris wheel in the Prater—provided powerful visual symbols.

During the Cold War, several science fiction films highlighted fears of the atomic age. In *Them* (1954), exposure to atomic radiation creates giant ants that threaten the human race. *It Came from Outer Space* (1951) showcased well-meaning Martian visitors horrified by the human propensity for violence. *The Day the Earth Stood Still* (1951), the

most durable of these films, featured a wise interplanetary visitor arriving as a peace missionary to Earth.

Closely related to science fiction were apocalyptic films. *On the Beach* (1959) told a chilling tale of a group of Australians awaiting the deadly fallout from nuclear war that had already exterminated the rest of the world. Stanley Kubrick's outrageous dark comedy *Dr. Strangelove* (1964) is the recognized masterpiece of apocalyptic Cold War films. Its veiled caricatures of Henry Kissinger, Edward Teller, and Wernher von Braun are no doubt overdone, although audiences savored the performances of Peter Sellers, George C. Scott, and Keenan Wynn in roles influenced by the clash of military, political, and scientific personalities. General Jack D. Ripper, portrayed by Sterling Hayden, lover of all bombs, is generally assumed to represent General Curtis Le May, whose notable contribution to the Cold War was the development of the Strategic Air Command. Americans and Soviets alike appear either unhinged or inebriated in *Dr. Strangelove*, with the world unsafe in any hands. The film ends with global annihilation.

Actor Slim Pickens sits atop a nuclear weapon prop during production of the movie *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, directed by Stanley Kubrick. (AP/Wide World Photos)

The Cold War proved an effective subject for pure thrillers. In *From Russia with Love* (1963), James Bond dealt with Russian villains and sensual yet sneaky Russian women. *Gorky Park* (1983) was a convoluted tale of murder and collusion between American criminals and the KGB. In *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962), a taut political thriller, a Korean War veteran is cleverly brainwashed by communists and programmed to kill on command so that his buffoonish stepfather, a caricature of Joseph McCarthy, can take over the American government. Alfred Hitchcock made several films against the backdrop of the East-West struggle, including *Torn Curtain* (1966) in which Paul Newman played an atomic scientist pretending to defect to the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany) to uncover communist military secrets.

The cinematic scene in Cold War Europe was markedly different from that in the United States. Postwar Italian movies gained distinction by adopting a documentary-like neorealism in pictures such as *Rome Open City* (1945) and *Umberto D.* (1952) that were filmed in demolished cities or among the haunts of societal loners and the poor. Film directors such as Federico Fellini and Michelangelo Antonioni were obsessed by the malaise and decadence of the rich. Italian films tended to reflect the currents of Marxism, existentialism, socialism, and psychoanalysis. Two of Italy's most gifted filmmakers, Luchino Visconti and Pier Paolo Pasolini, were ardent communists.

French cinema of the time devoted itself mainly to juxtaposing human relationships against changing moral codes and social conditions. A good number of French films dealt with the residue of guilt stemming from Nazi collaboration and were often preoccupied with wartime occupation and liberation. Greatly influenced by the film noir sensibility of American B movies

from the 1930s and 1940s, the so-called New Wave directors such as Claude Chabrol and François Truffaut introduced heavy doses of existentialism into their movies. Although intellectuals much admired the New Wave, a group called Communist Travail et Culture spoke of the need to deliver film sophistication to French working-class people, who preferred American escapist movies.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, British movies were chiefly noted for their distinctive comedies, Hammer Studio horror films, and a British New Wave. The British New Wave was the chief domain of the so-called Angry Young Men, whose narratives of drab, working-class lives had distinctly Marxist undertones. Films such as *Room at the Top* (1950) viewed life in British industrial towns with a grim realism sometimes referred to as the kitchen-sink school of British drama.

Swedish films of the period were dominated by the chilling images of Ingmar Bergman, the ultimate auteur. He was preoccupied by things philosophical and metaphysical rather than sociological. Although they were not overtly political, the films of former Bergman assistant and protégé Vilgot Sjoman explored the seamier side of postwar Swedish life.

Stanley Kubrick's outrageous dark comedy Dr. Strangelove (1964) is the recognized masterpiece of apocalyptic Cold War films.

East European movies were hampered by Cold War censorship. Adaptations of national classics, sometimes with subtle political messages embedded, competed with scenarios based on popular but innocuous novels. Only after the Cold War thaw was Polish filmmaker Agnieszka Holland able to bring to the screen her powerful, fictionalized account of events that had transpired in Poland in the early 1980s. Her film *To Kill a Priest* (1988) was based on the brutal murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko and the persecution of the Catholic Church in Poland.

The Russians had always been celebrated for their cinematic feats, but the heavy hand of state censorship loomed large. Sergei Eisenstein, one of the great geniuses of film history, was forced to suppress his *Ivan the Terrible, Part II* (1958) until after Stalin's death in 1953. The Soviet government tended to demand patriotic films or narratives that faithfully followed the principles of so-called socialist realism. These pictures glorified life on collective farms, extolled factory labor, or celebrated Soviet heroes. Sporadically, however, some Soviet Cold War filmmakers were able to produce a few masterpieces, sometimes even indulging in social criticism under the guise of allegory, parable, or historical narrative. Grigory Kozintsev released brilliant interpretations of *Hamlet* (1961) and *King Lear* (1971) based on Pasternak's translations. Sergei Bondarchuk's multifilm magisterial adaptation of Tolstoy's *War and Peace* (1956–1967) was one of the most ambitious film projects ever and one of the most successful, too. Equally impressive—and still daring—was Andrei Tarkovsky's *Andrei Rublev* (1971), a historical study of the most famous painter of Russian religious icons.

Internationally, both popular and artistic filmmaking is flourishing, now liberated from Cold War pressures. India is churning out its Bombay talkies, while Japan is using the cinema to reexamine its past and to reconcile tradition with modern life. Performers, directors, and film locations have shifted rapidly from place to place as a truly international cinema scene has emerged

in the wake of the Cold War. Still, movies of the Cold War period will offer new audiences key insights into the social, political, cultural, and moral conditions of this critical era in twentieth-century history.

Allene Phy-Olsen

See also

Atomic Bomb; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Communist Fronts; Defections; Hollywood Ten; Kissinger, Henry; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Literature; McCarthy Hearings; McCarthyism; Strategic Air Command; Teller, Edward

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Finland

Scandinavian nation covering 130,127 square miles, about three times the size of the U.S. state of Ohio. Finland, with a 1945 population of approximately 3.8 million people, is bordered by Sweden and the Baltic Sea to the west, Russia to the east, Norway to the north, and the Baltic Sea/Gulf of Finland to the south. World War II, in which Finland at first fought against the Soviet Union alone and then alongside Germany, came to an end for the Finns in September 1944, followed by the short Lapland War. The terms of the treaty with the Soviets were considered harsh by contemporaries, yet Finland did not lose its independence. Finnish President Juho Paasikivi (1946–1956) initiated a so-called Russian policy as a way of dealing with the Soviets while maintaining a modicum of independence. The most compelling reasons for this policy were the military superiority of the Soviet Union and the new Cold War environment.

Finland narrowly escaped becoming a Soviet satellite in the fashion of the states of Eastern Europe. The strong showing in the March 1945 elections of the Finnish People's Democratic Union (SKDL)—an alliance of the Communist Party and leftist socialists—gave it an important role in the coalition government. The communists planned to seize power in 1948, but President Paasikivi placed the army and police in the Helsinki area on alert and prevented the attempt. He also persuaded the Soviet Union to accept Finland's neutrality between the two states in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

The Paris Peace Treaty, signed on 10 February 1947 between Finland and the USSR, imposed significant military constraints on the Finnish armed forces. Finland was permitted only 34,400 army personnel, 10,000 tons of naval ships, and no more than 60 aircraft for the air force. The treaty also included a provision for the signatories to refrain from attacking one another or forming an alliance aimed against the other.

The second cornerstone of Finland's new Soviet-friendly foreign policy was the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which formally integrated Finland into the Soviet Union's external security sphere. However, any assistance from the Soviet Union would have had to be agreed upon separately. In spite of the treaty, Finland was in fact considered a neutral nation in the Cold War. To avoid conflict with the Soviet Union, Finland refrained from joining international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), up to 1955, and initially the Nordic Council as well.

Finnish foreign policy assumed a more active role after Uuho Kekkonen became president in 1956. Foreign policy initiatives during his twenty-five-year presidency included the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapon–free zone and organization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), culminating in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975 with the consent of the Soviet Union. Whereas the beginning of Kekkonen's lengthy presidency was marked by various crises in Soviet-Finnish relations (such as the 1958 Night Frost Crisis and the 1961 Note Crisis, both of which were linked to Finnish domestic politics), the late 1960s and 1970s were clearly, as the CSCE initiative demonstrates, a time of decreasing international tensions, which provided the Finns more room to maneuver.

The Soviet Union applied more pressure to break the Finnish doctrine of neutrality in the 1970s. Kekkonen, however, was adept at preserving Finnish neutrality. In fact, while Finland often favored the Soviet Union's strategic interests in the 1970s, it attempted to further its own goals at the same time and gain more recognition for its Cold War neutrality. Overtures toward the West, whether political or economic, were nonetheless difficult in practice. Moreover, Finnish trade policy was in reality subjugated to security considerations.

The Finish economy recovered relatively quickly after the war, with exports and imports reaching prewar levels by 1950. Finland developed extensive commercial ties with the Soviet Union following its payment of war reparations to the Soviets, most of which were in the form of metal goods. While the early Cold War years were a time of developing trade links, Finnish trade with the Soviet Union grew especially strong during the 1970s. This growth was related to the more hostile international economic environment and new trade agreements. Oil was central in Finnish-Soviet trade and comprised roughly 74 percent of Soviet imports from Finland. Soviet-Finnish trade peaked during the oil crisis of 1979–1989. The oil trade also opened up possibilities for Finnish companies operating inside the Soviet Union.

Finland was among the Soviet Union's most important Western trading partners. In 1987 Finnish trade with the Soviet Union was second among Western countries to that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West

Germany). Finnish trade was export-oriented, although exports to the Soviet Union were declining already by 1987.

Finnish foreign policymakers and business elites, however, viewed the downward spiral of the Soviet economy in the 1980s with some trepidation. Under the leadership of President Mauno Koivisto (1981–1993), Finland responded with great caution to the dissolution of the Soviet Union during 1990–1991. Only when that was a reality did Finland renounce the restrictions imposed by the 1947 and 1948 treaties and provide unofficial encouragement to Baltic independence. Similarly, many Finnish companies continued to hedge their bets on the Soviet markets in the late 1980s, which declined sharply and contributed to the onset of a deep economic depression in Finland.

Often, the Finnish experience during the Cold War has been linked with the notion of Finlandization, a pejorative term implying subservience to the needs of the Soviets. The reality of the foreign policy environment and Finnish-Soviet business links were much more complicated. Usually, the Finns were engaged and alert negotiators, and it is often argued that they simply had to adjust to the geopolitical realities at hand.

Jari Eloranta

See also

Helsinki Final Act; Scandinavia; Soviet Union

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First-Strike Capability

"First strike" refers to the strategy whereby a nation seeks to stage a preemptive military attack that will wipe out its opponent's strategic offensive capability. The term has come to be applied almost exclusively to nuclear attacks. With the development of allegedly invulnerable second-strike missiles in hardened sites, the term has come to be applied to an attack on those forces of another power capable of an attack in kind—the expectation being that one's own secure second-strike forces would deter the decision by an enemy power to launch a preemptory retaliatory strike.

The United States enjoyed first-strike capability against the Soviet Union in the years immediately after World War II, until the Soviets developed their own atomic bomb and the long-range strategic bombers capable of delivering it. By the 1950s, the U.S. advantage in numbers of atomic bombs had largely disappeared. A so-called balance of terror existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, with both sides reluctant to consider a first strike for fear of a devastating, retaliatory second strike by the other power.

First-strike capability came into play during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the John F. Kennedy administration concluded that if the Soviets were allowed to install their offensive missiles in Cuba, they would be able to wipe out 85 percent of U.S. offensive strategic capability. This led to plans to develop the MX missile system—a mobile ballistic missile program—and later the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cuban Missile Crisis; Hardened Sites; MX Missile System; Strategic Defense Initiative

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See Abel, Rudolf

Fleischfarb, Izak

See Światło, Józef

Flexible Response

Military strategy prescribed by U.S. Army General Maxwell D. Taylor pertaining to the development and equilibration of both nuclear and conventional military forces, subsequently adopted by President John F. Kennedy.

The term "flexible response" was first popularized in Taylor's book *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1959). In it, Taylor issued a scathing critique of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's New Look defense posture as he described the internal military debates that raged within the Eisenhower administration.

Taylor proposed a new military strategy that would enable the United States to continue to compete with the Soviet Union at a time of approaching nuclear parity. Flexible response would provide the United States with more options in future crises by downplaying the concept of massive nuclear retaliation, which was clearly not applicable to many military confrontations. Critics of Eisenhower's New Look policy argued that it actually made the nation less safe, increased the likelihood of a nuclear exchange, and presented only two options in a face-off with the Soviets: surrender or suicide.

Taylor was particularly incensed about the disparity in spending among the various branches of the military that had developed under Eisenhower's tenure. The army's share of military spending had declined precipitously during the 1950s as Eisenhower shifted resources to nuclear deterrence via the air force and, later, the navy. Accordingly, although flexible response called for maintaining and modestly expanding the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal, the strategy expected that conventional military forces would be used in instances and in places where nuclear weapons might not provide a decisive military victory or would be disproportionate to the situation at hand.

By supporting a substantial increase in spending for conventional arms, flexible response implicitly rejected the economic principles that underlay Eisenhower's New Look strategy. Eisenhower had argued that the United States could not sustain a level of military spending in excess of 10 percent of gross national product; thus, the New Look policy sought to achieve and maintain a stable deterrent to the Soviet Union without bankrupting the economy. By contrast, in advocating flexible response, Taylor maintained that the U.S. economy could sustain higher defense expenditures, and he specifically called for tax hikes to pay for these increases.

Kennedy believed that relative nuclear parity between the two superpowers had given cover to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's "wars of national liberation."

Flexible response was put into practice in early 1961 under the direction of President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Believing that relative nuclear parity between the two superpowers had given cover to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's "wars of national liberation," Kennedy expanded conventional forces and also encouraged unconventional and counterinsurgency military forces, including the U.S. Army's Special Forces and the U.S. Navy's Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams.

Forces created under the guise of flexible response largely failed to play a decisive role during Kennedy's administration, but a newly expanded army was increasingly deployed in Southeast Asia in the late stages of Kennedy's term. Flexible response was given its greatest practical test during Lyndon B. Johnson's tenure as president. Constrained in the use of nuclear weapons by Soviet and Chinese threats, Johnson and Taylor prosecuted a conventional war in Vietnam using the very forces and weapons that had been constructed as part of flexible response. Aircraft designed to drop nuclear weapons rained conventional bombs on Vietnam, and naval forces patrolled the waters of the South China Sea.

Flexible response was never formally abandoned as military policy, but the fallout from the Vietnam debacle prompted future presidents to adopt alternative strategies for competing with the Soviet Union.

Christopher A. Preble

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; McNamara, Robert Strange; New Look Defense Policy; Soviet Union; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; United States Air Force; United States Army; Vietnam War

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Fonda, Jane

(1937–)

American film star, fitness guru, and controversial anti–Vietnam War icon. Born the daughter of the legendary American actor Henry Fonda on 21 December 1937 in New York City, Jane Fonda spent two years at Vassar College and brief periods in Paris and New York before enrolling in the Actors Studio in 1958. She made her film debut in *Tall Story* (1960) and in 1968 played the title role in *Barbarella*, a film directed by Roger Vadim who later became her first husband. In 1971 she starred in *Klute*, for which she won an Academy Award.

Jane Fonda came to be more infamously known as "Hanoi Jane" for her illegal 1971 trip to Hanoi, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), during the Vietnam War. In Hanoi she made a series of propaganda broadcasts to American servicemen. She came under intense criticism for her actions, which many Americans, especially Vietnam War veterans, viewed as treasonous. After a second trip to Hanoi with Tom Hayden, at the time her husband and a leftist, counterculture figure, Fonda made a documentary, *Introduction to the Enemy* (1974). In 1978 she starred in *Coming Home*, an anti-war film that dealt sympathetically with the struggles of severely wounded soldiers. She won her second Academy Award for the film. In 1988 she apologized for her earlier actions in Vietnam on the ABC television program *20/20*.

Still politically active in the 1980s, Fonda reinvented herself as a fitness master through her *Jane Fonda Workout* videotapes. She also reemerged as a major film star, making *The China Syndrome* (1979) and *On Golden Pond* (1981). In the 1990s she was perhaps best known as the wife of her third husband, media mogul Ted Turner, whom she divorced in 2001.

Michael D. Richards

See also

Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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Food for Peace Program
(1954–)

U.S.-sponsored program employing American economic might and agricultural surpluses to foster international trade and increase humanitarian efforts, mainly in the developing world. In 1954, the U.S. Congress initiated an effort aimed at using American surplus agricultural commodities to bolster allies and counter communist influence. Over the years, the program evolved and was renamed Food for Peace, with the proceeds from sales of commodities used for educational, scientific, and humanitarian purposes as well. By 2004 the focus of the program was mainly on food aid for developing nations.

During debate in the House of Representatives in 1954, the legislation was hailed as an important weapon in opposing communist expansion. Public Law 83-480, or PL 480, was signed into law on 10 July 1954 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Among other objectives in the original legislation, Congress declared its intention to expand international trade among "friendly nations," facilitate currency convertibility, and make maximum use of American agricultural commodities to further U.S. foreign policy objectives. A "friendly nation" was defined as any country other than the Soviet Union or a nation dominated by the world communist movement.

The act authorized the president to negotiate agreements with foreign countries to provide for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities, to be paid in foreign currencies. These agreements would be used to purchase strategic materials, satisfy U.S. obligations abroad, "promote collective strength," and further the foreign policy of the United States. The Commodity Credit Corporation was directed to carry out Food for Peace agreements.

Other provisions of the act provided for international famine relief and domestic disaster relief. Congress provided $700 million to carry out the program over three years, plus an additional $300 million for emergency assistance.

In the years since it was initiated, the program has been amended numerous times. In 1958 it was expanded to cover the collection of scientific and technological information and the support of scientific endeavors overseas. That part of the program was moved from the Department of State to the Smithsonian Institution in 1966. Early in his administration, President John F. Kennedy renamed the program Food for Peace and placed it in the newly formed U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

A nun distributes food donated by the U.S. Food for Peace program to the poor of Recife, South Africa, ca. 1955. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

USAID celebrated the half-century anniversary of the program in 2004. By that time, 135 countries had received food aid under the program. The agency now works in partnership with 35 organizations and focuses primarily on sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

William O. Craig

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David

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Foot, Michael
(1913–)

British journalist, socialist politician, and Labour Party leader (1980–1983). Born on 23 July 1913 in Plymouth, Devon, England, the son of Liberal member of Parliament Isaac Foot, Michael Foot joined the Labour Party at an early age and became president of the Oxford Union while studying at Wahdam College, Oxford. Much of his life was devoted to leftist journalism. He first gained journalistic notoriety in 1940, when he coauthored a blistering denunciation of the British prewar policy of appeasement toward Nazi Germany in a tract published as *The Guilty Men*. Elected to Parliament in 1945, Foot was an ardent supporter of the left-wing Welsh politician Aneurin Bevan, whose biography he would later write. Foot would remain a Labour member of Parliament until his 1992 retirement, except for the 1955–1960 period. He was a founding member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, established in 1958.

In February 1974, Foot was appointed secretary of state for employment and in 1976 stood unsuccessfully against James Callaghan for the leadership of the Labour Party. The victorious Callaghan named Foot deputy leader of the party that same year. Foot won the party leadership spot in 1980, taking the post when the party had moved to the Left, with calls for withdrawal from the Common Market (European Union, EU), abandonment of Britain's nuclear arsenal, and opposition to the basing of U.S. cruise missiles in Britain—policies that very much reflected Foot's political values. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's charisma and confidence after victory in the Falklands War (1982), combined with Foot's clumsy leadership style and commitment to nuclear disarmament, resulted in Labour's crushing electoral defeat in 1983. Foot subsequently resigned as party leader and was replaced by Neil Kinnock.

Foot retired from the House of Commons in 1992 but remained politically active. He defended the novelist Salman Rushdie, the subject of a fatwah by Ayatollah Khomeini, and argued strongly for intervention in the Balkans against Serbia and on behalf of Croatia and Bosnia. Foot also remained active in the nuclear disarmament campaign. A distinguished author, he has written highly regarded biographies of British Labour leader Aneurin Bevan and novelist H. G. Wells.

Paul Wingrove

See also
Callaghan, James; Falklands War; Kinnock, Neil Gordon; Thatcher, Margaret

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Force de Frappe

French term for "Strike Force" to deliver French nuclear weapons. On 13 February 1960, France exploded its first atomic bomb in the Sahara desert. This event led directly to the development of a delivery system.

Development of a nuclear deterrent was one of French President Charles de Gaulle's principal policy goals when he returned to power in 1958. On 3 November 1959, at the École Militaire, de Gaulle publicly announced his intention to create a nuclear strike force. There was sharp criticism by Washington of de Gaulle's decision, chiefly because U.S. policymakers did not believe that France had the means to develop a strategically effective nuclear force. They also contended that France was already protected by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and no country was directly threatening France. De Gaulle, however, was angered by the close cooperation on nuclear weaponry between the United States and Britain and by their nuclear monopoly within the Western alliance but also because the two powers had refused to share atomic secrets with France. (In the early 1990s it was revealed that the U.S. government did assist French scientists indirectly by providing hints in nuclear weapons development that enabled them to realize substantial savings in both money and time.)

De Gaulle rejected an appeal from U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower for an integrated NATO military command as well as efforts by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to get France to forego the development of nuclear weapons. On its part, the United States rebuffed de Gaulle's calls for a NATO tridirectorate of the United States, Britain, and France to oversee defense policies. De Gaulle believed that no such arrangement was possible without France possessing nuclear weapons.

Harking back to mistrust beginning in World War II, de Gaulle believed that France could not count on Britain and the United States. He and many other French citizens saw Britain as an unreliable ally that was not committed to Europe. De Gaulle also believed that the United States would not risk a Soviet nuclear attack on its own soil to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe, a position strengthened by the failure of the U.S. government to consult with France during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

De Gaulle insisted that "the defense of France must be French." His intense nationalism played an important role, but de Gaulle also saw French possession of nuclear weapons as helping to establish a new geopolitical dynamic, with France the leader of a "second" Western force that would include Eastern Europe and operating in partnership with, and not as a pawn of, the United States.

On 25 July 1960, after two successful French atomic bomb tests, Premier Michel Debré presented to the National Assembly a four-year, $2.3 billion plan for a nuclear bomber force. A bill providing $1.2 billion through 1964 passed the National Assembly on a close vote. The Senate twice rejected the legislation but was prohibited by the constitution from preventing the third passage of a bill in the Assembly. The legislation became law on 6 December 1960.

The Force de Frappe was, nonetheless, one of the most fractious issues in French domestic politics during the de Gaulle presidency. There was general agreement in France in favor of such a program (even the French

Communist Party went on record as favoring an independent French nuclear deterrent). The opposition occurred primarily because of its high financial cost and because it became a rallying point to attack de Gaulle personally.

Beginning in 1962 the French armed forces were reshaped into an interior defense force intended solely for the defense of France, an intervention force for emergency deployment beyond the French borders, and the Force Nucléaire Stratégique, a strategic nuclear force of fifty Mirage IV bombers. The first French nuclear bomber units became operational in 1964. On 7 March 1966, de Gaulle announced the withdrawal of French forces from NATO. Development of the Force de Frappe was sped up and included sixty Mirage IV aircraft, each capable of delivering a 60-kiloton nuclear bomb. In 1967 France launched its first nuclear submarine. In August 1968 France achieved its first thermonuclear explosions in a series of South Pacific tests. Nuclear ballistics missiles in underground silos became operational in 1971, while submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) completed the triad.

Although the end of the Cold War diminished the justification for the Force de Frappe, which became the Force de Dissuasion (deterrent force), it continues in place and is supported by virtually the entire French political spectrum.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

De Gaulle, Charles

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Ford, Gerald Rudolph

(1913–2006)

Prominent U.S. congressman, vice president (1973–1974), and president (1974–1977). Gerald Ford, born Leslie Lynch King Jr. on 14 July 1913 in Omaha, Nebraska, was brought up by his mother and stepfather in Grand Rapids, Michigan. After graduating from the University of Michigan, where he was a star football player, Ford received a law degree from Yale University in 1941. He served in the U.S. Navy in World War II, attaining the rank of lieutenant commander.

Ford returned to Grand Rapids to practice law before entering politics and was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1948. He remained in the House for twenty-five years and became an influential force among

Gerald Ford was a congressman and then vice president. He became president of the United States following the resignation of Richard Nixon and served during 1974–1977. (Library of Congress)

moderate Republicans in Congress. From 1965 to 1973, he was House minority leader.

When Vice President Spiro T. Agnew was forced to resign from office after being charged with tax evasion, President Richard M. Nixon appointed Ford to the vice presidency on 10 October 1973. By that time, Nixon was already embroiled in the Watergate scandal, which in turn would force his own resignation less than a year later. When Nixon resigned the presidency on 9 August 1974, Ford automatically succeeded him to become the thirty-eighth president of the United States.

A plainspoken and unassuming man, Ford's immediate goal as president was to restore public confidence in the presidency, which had been badly shaken by Watergate and the executive excesses of the Nixon presidency. Lacking a broad political base and with no popular mandate, Ford tried, without great success, to bolster the spirits of a nation left deeply divided and scarred by both the Vietnam War and the debilitating Watergate political crisis. He also attempted to revive the faltering economy, which had been seriously weakened as a result of the first energy crisis that had begun in 1973. The crisis had brought about the quadrupling of oil prices in less than a year's time.

The American economy was plagued by galloping inflation combined with a stubborn recession and high unemployment, phenomena dubbed "stagflation." Without doubt, stabilizing the nation's economic woes was Ford's primary domestic imperative. Neither the president nor Congress, which reduced the federal budget, was able to remedy the economic situation.

Ford's most controversial act as president was his issuance of a full and unconditional pardon for Nixon, which he announced on 8 September 1974. Ford defended his action by arguing that he was bringing closure to the Watergate affair. Much of the public was embittered by the pardon, which ironically occurred just a week before Ford granted only a partial pardon to Vietnam War resisters and military deserters.

Ford lost the 1976 election to former Georgia governor Jimmy Carter by one of the narrowest margins in U.S. history.

In foreign affairs, Ford continued to pursue the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente with the Soviets, managing to reach a new arms limitation agreement during his short tenure in office. He also helped stabilize the Middle East by providing aid to both Egypt and Israel and by brokering an interim truce agreement between the two nations. Finally, he was proactive in maintaining America's international standing and prestige after the humiliating collapse of both the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) and Cambodia.

Ford lost the 1976 election to former Georgia governor Jimmy Carter by one of the narrowest margins in U.S. history. Ford then went into retirement. Despite his limited successes, he provided a measure of stability to a nation shell-shocked by political scandal and economic turmoil, which in itself was

no easy task. Ford died at his home in Rancho Mirage, California, on 26 December 2006.

Josip Močnik

See also

Détente; Helsinki Final Act; Kissinger, Henry; Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on; Vietnam War

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Formosa Doctrine
(1955)

Resolution passed by the U.S. Congress on 29 January 1955 in response to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955), empowering President Dwight D. Eisenhower to fully defend the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), historically known as Formosa, to include the dispatch of troops there. It is also known as the Formosa Resolution.

In August 1954, Nationalist China leader Jiang Jieshi sent more than 50,000 ROC troops to the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu, which the People's Republic of China (PRC) claimed as its own. Within days, PRC leaders announced plans to retake Taiwan and the surrounding islands by force. The Eisenhower administration bluntly warned Beijing not to attempt its so-called liberation of Taiwan. Nevertheless, on 3 September the PRC began shelling Jinmen, precipitating a full-blown crisis.

On 12 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) counseled Eisenhower that nuclear weapons should be used against the PRC if it launched a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, and the Eisenhower administration made certain that Beijing knew of this plan. In November the Chinese sentenced twelve American airmen held since the Korean War to long prison terms, which only increased the pressure on Eisenhower to launch a nuclear strike on Mainland China. Eisenhower rebuffed such drastic action, and on 3 December the U.S. government hastily concluded the United States–Republic of China Mutual Security Treaty as a show of solidarity with Taipei. The U.S. Senate ratified it in early February.

Meanwhile, PRC and ROC forces continued to clash in the Taiwan Strait, with Jiang's forces taking heavy casualties. To send an even stronger signal to

Beijing and empower the president to take any action necessary to defend Taiwan, both houses of Congress passed the Formosa Resolution on 29 January 1955. The act essentially broadened the scope of the Mutual Security Treaty by extending U.S. commitments to defend from PRC incursions the offshore islands in addition to Taiwan. In early spring, as the crisis continued, the United States warned publicly of the potential use of nuclear weapons against the PRC. In May 1955 the PRC halted its shelling and agreed to a negotiated truce.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Dulles, John Foster; Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.–Republic of China; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First

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Forrestal, James Vincent

(1892–1949)

U.S. secretary of the navy (1944–1947) and first secretary of defense (1947–1949). Born in Beacon, New York, on 22 May 1892, James Forrestal enrolled at Dartmouth College in 1911 and transferred to Princeton University, which he left before receiving a degree. In 1916 he found work as a bond salesman on Wall Street. In 1917 he enlisted in the U.S. Navy, serving in the new Naval Aviation Department.

Following World War I, Forrestal returned to Wall Street, and in 1923 Dillon, Read & Company named him a firm partner. In 1937 he became the company's president. In June 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt recruited Forrestal as a special assistant. Two months later Roosevelt appointed him undersecretary of the navy. In May 1944 Forrestal became secretary of the navy.

Although Forrestal objected to a proposed postwar army-navy merger, he did support the unification of the armed services championed by President Harry S. Truman. In September 1947, Truman appointed Forrestal secretary of the new Department of Defense, created by the sweeping 1947 National Security Act. Forrestal worked diligently to forge cohesiveness among the armed forces. As an anticommunist hard-liner, however, Forrestal was frustrated by the draconian cuts in military spending in the immediate postwar era. At the time, both Congress and the Truman administration were loath to increase military spending in the face of strained budgets, large war debts, and the U.S. monopoly in atomic weapons.

In 1948 Forrestal was criticized for his inability to stem air force intransigence in the controversy involving manpower needs and budget allocations within the Defense Department. Air force proponents had been beating the drums for more manpower and money at the expense of the other military services. The secretary also fell out of favor because of his pro-Arab views and opposition to the 1948 U.S. recognition of the State of Israel. By late 1948, Forrestal grew increasingly despondent over what he saw as unfair criticism and a lack of congressional and administration support.

As a result of these intense conflicts, his growing fears of the Soviet threat, and his increasingly precarious mental state, Forrestal resigned on 28 March 1949 after suffering what was then termed a mental breakdown. Shortly thereafter he was admitted to the Bethesda Naval Hospital. On 22 May 1949, Forrestal committed suicide by jumping from a sixteenth-story hospital window. Praised for his distinguished service to the U.S. armed forces, he was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.

Michael E. Donoghue

James Forrestal was secretary of the navy from 1944 to 1947 and was the first U.S. secretary of defense, entering office in 1947 and resigning in 1949. As the secretary of defense, Forrestal guided the National Military Establishment at the dawn of the Cold War. (Library of Congress)

See also

Containment Policy; Israel; Kennan, George Frost; National Security Act; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United States Navy

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See Brandt, Willy

Frahm, Hubert Ernst Karl

France

West European nation covering 211,208 square miles, roughly twice the size of the U.S. state of Nevada and somewhat smaller than Texas, with a 1945 population of 40 million. France is bordered to the west and northwest by

the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel; to the northeast by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany; to the east by Switzerland and Italy; and to the south by the Mediterranean Sea and Spain. In June 1940, Germany defeated and occupied France. The collaborationist Vichy regime notwithstanding, the country emerged as one of the victors of the war in 1945. This was mainly because of the resistance movement that was coordinated and conducted by France Libre (Free France), initially established and led from London by General Charles de Gaulle.

In the postwar period, France became one of the pillars of West European cooperation and integration and was an important component of the Atlantic Alliance. From 1958, however, France embarked on a more independent foreign policy. The former French Empire was dismantled through a difficult process of decolonization and in some cases, such as Indochina and Algeria, only after protracted wars. Constitutionally, France passed through the interregnum of the institutionally weak Fourth Republic (1946–1958) to the Fifth Republic (since 1958), created by de Gaulle and disposed to be a far more stable and enduring political system than the one it replaced.

The transition period between the August 1944 liberation of Paris and the establishment of the Fourth Republic was characterized by major structural reforms and a complicated process of constitution making. The reforms were implemented mainly during 1945–1946, among them the nationalization of key sectors of the economy and industry, improvement of the social welfare system, and the introduction of centralized economic planning.

Disagreements over constitutional issues and economic policy led to the breakup of the tenuous coalition of the Left and Center parties, with de Gaulle resigning in January 1946. The biggest conflict resulted from differing constitutional concepts. De Gaulle favored a strong presidency overseeing a powerful central government, while political parties fought for a constitution that gave party politics the dominant role in the political system. The parties prevailed, but three referenda were necessary in order to promulgate a new constitution. On 21 October 1945, an overwhelming majority voted against reinstating the constitution of the Third Republic. In May 1946 the first draft of a new constitution was rejected. Finally, on 13 October 1946, a second draft was accepted, with more than 32 percent of the voters abstaining.

The constitution of the Fourth Republic aimed at giving the premier considerable power, but as it turned out the main winners were actually the National Assembly and the political parties. At the beginning of 1947, with the institutions of the Fourth Republic established, the parliament elected the first president, Vincent Auriol, on 16 January.

The Fourth Republic produced decidedly mixed results. On the one hand, it laid the foundations for success in both domestic and foreign affairs. Internally, however, it was subject to revolving-door governments that in the long run brought gridlock and instability. The main achievements of the Fourth Republic were related to economic development. Efficient use of foreign aid, especially Marshall Plan assistance, accelerated recovery from the war. The combination of centralized planning, an end to protectionism, and

a disciplined focus on investments over consumption all led to impressive growth rates and unprecedented industrial expansion in the 1950s. Although inflation remained a constant concern, the overall economic policies of the Fourth Republic created a solid basis upon which the economic successes of the 1960s were built.

Externally, the Fourth Republic's main accomplishments were related to the strategic orientation of its foreign policy, especially concerning West European and Atlantic affairs. From the start of the Cold War, France placed itself firmly in the Western camp, and the representatives of the French Communist Party were ousted from government in May 1947. France enthusiastically supported the Marshall Plan; joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), established in April 1948 to distribute U.S. aid; and was one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), chartered in April 1949. With respect to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), initial efforts to pursue a harsh occupation policy and detach the Saar gave way to close cooperation, which became a pillar of the West European Integration Movement. Following France's proposed May 1950 Schuman Plan, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formally established in April 1951. France played an active role in the preparation of the Treaty of Rome (25 March 1957), which founded the European Economic Community (EEC) and included the Common Market and the European Atomic Community (EURATOM).

Despite these successes, the Fourth Republic was unable to overcome its institutional deficiencies or cope with the problems created by decolonization. The political system remained highly unstable, thanks to the inherent structural weaknesses of the executive branch. Contrary to the intentions of the constitution, governmental power was severely restrained by a preponderant National Assembly and its many shifting coalitions. The result was a series of governmental crises accompanied by constantly changing cabinets; the average tenure of a government during the Fourth Republic was slightly more than seven months. The deplorable state of political affairs was particularly evident in December 1953, when the National Assembly required thirteen ballots before finally electing René Coty president of the Fourth Republic.

These institutional weaknesses affected the French colonial system, and vice versa. France was forced to retreat from Indochina after a bloody, unpopular eight-year war (1946–1954) that culminated in the ignominious defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. Barely half a year later, in November 1954, Algerian rebels began an armed struggle against their colonial French rulers. Fearing a possible domino effect, France granted Morocco and Tunisia independence in 1956. But the attempt to hold on to Algeria, France's most important North African colony where almost 1 million Frenchmen had settled, proved futile, even with 500,000 ground troops by 1958.

Finally, the combination of a new government crisis in Paris in April 1958, riots by French nationalists in Algiers in May, and a rebellion of part of the French Army including high-ranking officers led to the fall of the Fourth Republic. President Coty informed the National Assembly and the Senate



French Premier Charles de Gaulle makes the V-sign with his arms raised as he addresses the crowd gathered on 4 September 1958 at the Republic Square in Paris to promote his project of the new constitution, which would establish the Fifth Republic. (AFP/Getty Images)

on 29 May that because the country was "on the brink of civil war," he had asked de Gaulle to take charge of the formation of a new "government of national salvation."

On 1 June 1958, the National Assembly elected de Gaulle head of a provisional government for six months. Granted immense power, the general initiated the drafting of a new constitution that was adopted by referendum on 28 September 1958. The constitution of the Fifth Republic gave the executive branch—especially the president—much broader powers, mainly at the expense of the National Assembly. The president selected the prime minister and generally played the leading role. The government would continue to be responsible to parliament, but the president had the authority to dissolve the National Assembly. And instead of the National Assembly alone choosing a leader, a college of deputies, senators, and local representatives, comprising more than 80,000 persons, would elect the president for a seven-year term. On 21 December 1958, de Gaulle was elected president of the Fifth Republic by a clear majority of the college.

First and foremost, de Gaulle had to find a way out of the Algerian War. However, neither the Algerian independence movement nor the colonists demanding the defense of French Algeria were willing to accept his initial plans for a compromise, which called for an autonomous Algeria with continuing special ties to France. Disturbances both in mainland France and in Algeria, and particularly the abortive April 1961 military putsch in Algiers led by General Raoul Salan, accelerated the trajectory of Algerian independence. Other options were gradually eliminated, and on 8 April 1962 the Évian Accords of 18 March between the French government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic were approved by an overwhelming majority in a national referendum. However, repercussions of the Algerian conflict continued to affect politics and society in France. The army insurgents in Algiers had formed the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS, Secret Army Organization), which turned into a purely terrorist force that tried repeatedly to kill de Gaulle and destabilize the government. And the country had to absorb almost 1 million refugees from Algeria.

Despite the preoccupation with Algeria, de Gaulle managed at the same time to lay the most important foundations of a stable Fifth Republic. The new institutions set in place proved as viable as the constitution, which was amended once in October 1962, providing for election of the president by direct universal suffrage. A program of inflation control and austerity measures strengthened the economy and the currency, with a new franc being introduced in 1960. Political stability, economic success, and the solution of the colonial conundrum allowed de Gaulle to pursue his ambitious foreign

policy plans. These elements also contributed to his victory in the December 1965 presidential elections.

De Gaulle aimed at forging an independent, middle-course foreign policy and strengthening France's role in world affairs. He pushed successfully for the implementation of an independent French nuclear deterrent (Force de Frappe). In February 1960 France tested its first atomic bomb, and in August 1968 it detonated a thermonuclear bomb, thus achieving the basis of an independent nuclear force. Without giving up the global orientation in Atlantic or in European affairs, de Gaulle changed foreign policy priorities and approaches. In March 1966, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command and gave notice that it was terminating the stationing of U.S. and Canadian forces in the country. But the nation remained a NATO member, and de Gaulle, often perceived in the United States as anti-American, remained a reliable U.S. Cold War ally.

De Gaulle's European policy combined the intensification of West European integration efforts with initiatives for détente and cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The main pillar of integration remained the EEC, with the ongoing French-German entente as the driving force. With respect to the development of the EEC, de Gaulle favored intergovernmental cooperation and the supremacy of national interests over supranational ones. He also vigorously demanded a Common Market for agricultural products. In addition, he twice blocked the entry of Britain into the EEC, fearing that its membership would undermine established West European positions.

In the spring of 1968, a serious rebellion against the French political and social order erupted, beginning with student protests and followed by massive labor strikes. The crisis came to a head in the last week of May 1968 and resulted in bloody confrontations between police and protesters. The political leadership, caught by surprise by the Events of May, vacillated for some time. Obvious differences emerged between President de Gaulle and Premier Georges Pompidou. Although the government restored order by June 1968, de Gaulle never fully regained his former authority. On 27 April 1969, his proposals for constitutional amendments of minor importance were rejected in a referendum. Having publicly announced the issue as a referendum on his leadership, de Gaulle resigned the following day.

The continued development of France after de Gaulle's departure confirmed the long-term efficacy of his political and institutional leadership. The Fifth Republic, attacked as tailor-made for its creator by many of its critics, nonetheless remained intact. It also proved quite amenable to the change in leadership.

De Gaulle's first two successors had served in government during the 1960s. Pompidou, prime minister during 1962–1968, was elected president on 15 June 1969. Following his death in April 1974, former finance minister Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing became president, having defeated socialist François Mitterrand in a close second ballot in May 1974. Pompidou was inclined toward a more liberal leadership style and to a less state-oriented economic policy than his predecessor, but in general terms he adhered to Gaullism.

The army insurgents in Algiers had formed the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS, Secret Army Organization), which turned into a purely terrorist force that tried repeatedly to kill de Gaulle and destabilize the government.

A crowd views cars destroyed in the May 1968 Paris riots, when angry students and workers took to the streets to protest against widespread poverty, unemployment, and the policies of the government of President Charles de Gaulle. (Alain Nogues/Corbis Sygma)

During the premiership of Jacques Chaban-Delmas (1969–1972), important social reforms were introduced under the banner of the "new society." Pompidou's most important foreign policy change was the lifting of the veto against Britain's entry into the EEC. His proposal was approved by referendum in April 1972.

Giscard distanced himself more clearly from the Gaullist tradition, announcing the establishment of an "advanced liberal society" that first and foremost was meant to implement radical economic reform based on the classical principles of a free-market economy. But the consequences of the world economic crisis of the mid-1970s restrained further reforms, and France entered the late 1970s in a prolonged economic crisis with sinking industrial production, rising unemployment, and rampant inflation. Giscard's main achievements in foreign policy were his initiative for meetings among representatives of the most industrialized countries (G7) and the establishment of the European Monetary System.

During the 1970s, the formerly amorphous and atomized political party system became more stable and coherent because of the coalescence of five organizations. The Communist Party continued to represent the traditional far Left, albeit with declining influence. The Socialist Party was revitalized by its merger with several small groups in 1971 and restructured under the

leadership of Mitterrand. The Center-Right was divided mainly between the Union pour la Democratie Française (UDF, Union for the French Democracy) and Gaullism's Rassemblement pour la République (RPR, Rally for the Republic), which was nearer to the political philosophy of de Gaulle and was founded in December 1976 by Jacques Chirac. During the 1980s, a new party emerged on the far Right, the nationalistic and xenophobic Front National (National Front) led by Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Thanks to a quasi coalition of the Left and severe friction between Giscard and Chirac, Mitterrand defeated Giscard in the second round of presidential elections in May 1981. For the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic, the Left came to power. The new government formed by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy included four ministers from the Communist Party and began with an ambitious program of social reforms and economic nationalization. But a deteriorating economic situation soon forced Mitterrand to adopt a radical change. He turned to a program of austerity measures and in July 1984 replaced Mauroy with Laurent Fabius. The Communist Party ministers left the government following these actions.

Institutionally, no major developments emerged after 1981 except for one: the so-called cohabitation. The authors of the constitution obviously had not foreseen the possibility that the president and the government could belong to different parts of the political spectrum. This happened for the first time in 1986, when the RPR and UDF won a clear parliamentary majority, forcing Mitterrand to appoint Chirac as prime minister. This first cohabitation lasted until 1988, and in the 1990s two similar situations followed. Nevertheless, the functioning of the Fifth Republic was not substantially altered by this new phenomenon.

In foreign affairs, continuity was even more evident in the 1980s. By and large, Mitterrand stuck to the main principles of Gaullist foreign policy: defending the independence and national interests of the country but remaining a reliable member of the Atlantic Alliance, concentrating on the Franco-German entente as the main pillar of West European policy, and enhancing détente but firmly supporting the United States in crisis situations. Together with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Mitterrand was instrumental in paving the way for the 1991 Maastricht Treaty leading to the European Union (EU).

During the Cold War, France remained one of the pillars of the Western alliance and a driving force behind West European cooperation. De Gaulle pursued an independent course in foreign policy, leading at times to sharp differences with the United States, but this was designed to enhance the position of France and Western Europe and did not represent a repudiation of basic Western interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

See also

Algerian War; Anticolonialism; Chirac, Jacques; Cohn-Bendit, Marc Daniel; Decolonization; De Gaulle, Charles; Détente; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Eurocommunism; Europe, Western; European Coal and Steel Community; European

Defense Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; European Union; Force de Frappe; France, Air Force; France, Army; France, Navy; Franco-German Friendship Treaty; Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry; Indochina War; Le Pen, Jean-Marie; Mitterrand, François; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pleven, René Jean; Pleven Plan; Pompidou, Georges; Schuman, Robert; Schuman Plan; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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France, Air Force

Despite the poor state of the French Air Force at the end of World War II, it was to play a significant role in the Indochina War (1945–1954), the Algerian War (1954–1962), and the Suez Crisis (October–November 1956). Most important, after France successfully tested its first atomic bomb on 13 September 1960, the air force began exercising a nuclear deterrence role. French aircraft by the 1960s were regarded as some of the world's most advanced, a legacy of substantial military spending during the early Cold War years.

At the end of World War II, France had to reconstruct its entire military, including the air force. During the war the air force, consisting of approximately 145,000 personnel, had been attached to American, British, and Soviet flying units. There had been only one large French air unit, the First Air Division, which at the end of the war was stationed in Germany. Upon liberation, the French government began the task of revamping its air force by ordering more than 6,000 new aircraft, including light planes (primarily Moranes), light twin-engine planes (including NC 701s, SO 91s, and C499s), transport planes (primarily Bloch 161s and Ju-52s), and warplanes (VB 10s, B1 175s, and MS 472s). By the close of 1945, some 900 new planes had been delivered. These aircraft helped equip a force that during the latter part of the war was flying aircraft provided by its allies and making use of captured German planes. Air force personnel were initially cut to below 60,000, but beginning in 1952 those numbers significantly rose.

Although French Air Force officers felt vindicated by the importance of airpower in World War II, there was no unanimity on the future role of airpower, and many military leaders continued to view the air force as auxiliary and subservient to land forces. Much of this debate on the role of the air

Two French Air Force Dassault Mirage F-1C aircraft armed with Matra 550 Magic air-to-air missiles on the wing tips and Matra R.530 air-to-air missiles under the fuselage, May 1986. (U.S. Department of Defense)

force became moot with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, which obligated France to assign two wings of its air force to the Western alliance.

France began the Indochina War with a modest air element of a dozen ex-RAF Spitfire and some ex-Japanese Oscar III fighters, eighteen U.S.-built C-47 transports, and four U.S.-built PBY patrol bombers. Junkers Ju-52s, Siebels, and Martinets were soon added to the inventory, which grew throughout the conflict. By 1948, France had committed about 10 percent of its total aircraft to the conflict. In late 1949, the United States provided P-63 King Cobra, F6F Hellcats, and F8Fs Bearcat fighters as well as B-26 Invader bombers, the latter the first purpose-built bomber used in the war. The air force made an important contribution to the war, primarily in providing aerial transport to remote areas, including both parachute and resupply operations. Because of the difficult mountain and jungle terrain, the air force also acted as flying artillery. In 1950, the French began using helicopters in the war; Hiller UH-12As, H-23As, H-23Bs, and Sikorsky S-51s and S55s proved highly effective in troop transport and medical evacuations. The French fleet of forty-two helicopters evacuated 10,000 people and rescued 38 downed pilots.

In both the Algerian War and the Suez Crisis, the French made extensive use of aircraft. In the Algerian War, the French relied on 700 American

T-6 Texans, but these aircraft proved vulnerable to ground fire and were later replaced with armored planes, including A-1 Skyraiders. Helicopters (Bell 47s, H-19s, and H-34s) flew highly effective troop transport, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, and close-air-support missions. The French also employed their new U.S.-built F-100 Super Sabre attack aircraft in Algeria.

In the 1956 Suez operation, the French employed U.S.-built F-84F Thunderjets, some of which were flown out of Cyprus and Malta. These destroyed much of the Egyptian bomber force based at Luxor. Nord 2501s dropped French paratroopers in two airborne assaults on 5 October. Also, during the last week of October the French turned over to Israel eighteen F-84Fs and some Noratlases to buttress that country's air defense.

A new era began in the late 1950s when Charles de Gaulle questioned American resolve to use its nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack against Western Europe. France withdrew from the NATO military command structure and developed its own nuclear strike force, the Force de Frappe. From 1964 to 1974, three wings of Dassault Mirage IV supersonic bombers, based in nine different locations, provided the delivery capability for France's 70-kiloton free-fall nuclear bombs. By the mid-1970s, with the advent of missile delivery systems with 150-kiloton nuclear warheads, the French bomber force was reduced in number. Intermediate-range S-2 ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 2,000 miles, were housed in underground silos at Saint Christol. Beginning in May 1980, the S-2s were replaced with S-3s capable of carrying a 1.2-megaton thermonuclear warhead.

By 1990, with 93,100 active personnel and more than 500 combat aircraft in service, France's Air Force provided a strong air defense. Although its participation was limited, French airpower deployed in the Persian Gulf War was the third largest. But it was its strategic forces of 18,710 personnel maintaining a modest nuclear arsenal that constituted France's most significant contribution to the Cold War.

Roger Chapman

See also

Aircraft; Aircraft Carriers; Algerian War; Atomic Bomb; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bombers, Strategic; De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Force de Frappe; France; Indochina War; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Suez Crisis

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France, Army

During the Cold War the French Army concentrated on two primary missions. The first was to maintain the peace in Western Europe; the second focused on reconstituting the French colonial empire. These two missions were at times contradictory because effort in one took away from the other. Immediately after World War II, the French Army was the only significant West European ground force. Although France sent troops to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in occupation duties and as a deterrent to a Soviet invasion, increasingly its resources were committed to the fight to maintain France's overseas empire, first in the Indochina War (1945–1954) and then in the Algerian War (1954–1962). France also provided a small ground contingent to the Korean War (1950–1953), and French forces, both ground and airborne, participated in the Suez Crisis (October–November 1956) and made a significant contribution to the Persian Gulf War (January–February 1991).

With the end of World War II, France reduced troop levels from 1.3 million men to only 460,000. Much of France's military hardware had been provided by the United States, although the French Army made use in the immediate postwar period of some captured German equipment. Postwar military expenses nevertheless were large, constituting one-third of France's total budget between 1952 and 1954. The army's manpower went up again during the Cold War, peaking at 829,000 personnel in 1957. In March 1966 France officially withdrew from the military command structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), recalling two army divisions and seven tactical air wings. Under President Charles de Gaulle the country pursued a policy of military independence in both conventional and nuclear capability.

The French Army spent much of the Cold War fighting overseas. In September 1945, French forces arrived in Indochina to reclaim control of the region, which was contested by Vietnamese nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh. War broke out there in late 1946 and continued with growing intensity until 1954. The French Foreign Legion played a key role in the war. In 1948, the Foreign Legion formed parachute units: the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the Regiment Étranger de Parachutiste (REP). In 1948 the French Army deployed the 1st and 2nd REP to Indochina, while the 3rd was dispatched to Algeria. In Indochina, France used parachute battalions of both the regular army and Foreign Legion extensively, resulting in high casualty rates.

The Indochina drama came to an end in May 1954 with the French defeat in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. This military defeat enabled French politicians to shift responsibility to the military and extract the country from an unpopular war through negotiations at the Geneva Conference. Although Viet Minh and Vietnamese fighting on the French side sustained many more casualties, the war claimed some 20,000 French dead, with an especially heavy toll in officers and noncommissioned officers. The war had been fought largely by the professional army and the French Foreign Legion, since no draftees were ever sent to Indochina.

France participated in the Korean War, but its numbers were small because of its commitment to Indochina. The French government regarded

French troops in Inchon, Korea, waiting to board a ship to take them to Indochina, 1953. (Library of Congress)

the fronts of Indochina and Korea as mutually supporting and so sent the highly effective Battalion de Corée (Korean Battalion), numbering 1,185 men. It was attached to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and fought in a number of hard battles, winning three U.S. Presidential Unit Citations. In Korea, France lost 271 men killed and another 1,008 wounded.

Almost immediately after the end of the Indochina War, the French Army was transferred to fight in Algeria. Algeria had been French since 1830 and was held to be an integral part of France, formed into three French departments. French leaders, and especially the French Army, were determined that this time there would be no defeat. At the war's onset, the French had 57,000 men in Algeria, but in the course of the war the ground commitment grew to more than 500,000. Army leaders, believing that they were about to be sold out by the government in Paris, played a key role in May 1958 in the return to power of de Gaulle. Although he initially pledged no retreat from a French Algeria, as the military options closed he gradually moved away from this position and toward negotiation with the rebels formed as the National Liberation Front (NFL). A faction of several hundred army officers then tried to topple de Gaulle and, when this failed, formed the Secret Army Organization (OAS) to wage a terrorist campaign. This failed to win support among the French public, and in 1961 the revolt was broken. In

1962 Algeria received its independence. The war had claimed the lives of some 17,000 Frenchmen.

In the postcolonial era, France continued to exert great influence in the third world, most notably in its former empire in Africa, where it claimed that it helped to curtail interventionist policies by the Soviet Union. During the 1970s French forces were stationed in Chad (2,500 troops), Gabon (400 troops), the Ivory Coast (600 troops), Senegal (1,450 troops), the Malagasy Republic (1,250 troops), and former French Somaliland (3,600 troops). In Africa the French Army operated a total of 1,400 aircraft, including 400 Alouette helicopters. French military intervention in Africa occurred frequently during the Cold War period: Cameroon (1959–1964), Mauritania (1961), Senegal (1959–1960), the Congo (1960, 1962), Gabon (1960, 1962), Chad (1960–1963, 1977–1980, 1983–1984), Djibouti (1976–1977), Zaire (1977, 1978), and the Central African Republic (1979).

During the Cold War the independence of the French military proved problematic for NATO strategists as well as for their Soviet counterparts. Since French and Western strategy was based on the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), a great deal of the French Army's effort was concentrated there. Late in the Cold War, the French military command, confident of its nuclear capability, believed that any conflict with the Soviets would be of short duration. In contrast, the U.S. military planned for protracted combat. If the French lack of integration in the NATO force inconvenienced Western leaders, it proved equally difficult for the Soviets, who had to formalize a strategy that took into account this unpredictable element of the Western alliance. The chief French Army weakness during the Cold War came in the deployment of large forces. This was the consequence of its emphasis on small-scale operations. Thus, during the Persian Gulf War in 1990 the French Army was only able to deploy an armored division consisting of two brigades, which had to be augmented with U.S. infantry and field artillery.

In 1988 the French Army created the Force d'Action Rapide, a rapid response force of 47,000 personnel designed for quick deployment to Central Europe or other hot spots. At the same time, a joint French-German brigade was based in West Germany. By the late 1980s, the French Army numbered 342,000 men, of whom 114,000 were regulars.

Roger Chapman

At the war's onset, the French had 57,000 men in Algeria, but in the course of the war the ground commitment grew to more than 500,000.

See also

Algeria; Algerian War; Anticolonialism; Decolonization; De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; France; France, Air Force; France, Navy; Geneva Conference (1954); Ho Chi Minh; Hydrogen Bomb; Indochina War; Korean War; Massu, Jacques; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Salan, Raoul Albin-Louis; Suez Crisis

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France, Navy

The French Navy was in considerable disarray at the end of World War II. Little remained of the powerful fleet with which the nation had begun the war. Two battleships, the *Richelieu* and the incomplete *Jean Bart*, and a few cruisers, destroyers, and submarines had escaped the German occupation of France in 1940. Most of these ships had been widely dispersed and later rejoined the war with the Allies. Most of the fleet had been scuttled at Toulon at the end of 1942 rather than have it fall into the hands of the Germans.

As a consequence, France relied heavily on its allies, Britain and the United States. These two powers provided ships that were surplus to their own requirements and also supplied to France, German, and Italian prize vessels. The Italian ships in particular were modern, powerful ships. But this also meant a logistical nightmare, with a profusion of incompatible systems and ordnance. Equipment was also difficult to maintain due to a shortage of spare parts. Repairs to French ships taxed the resourcefulness of French Navy dockyard repairmen at Brest and Toulon.

In April 1945 Britain transferred to France the U.S.-built escort carrier *Biter*, which the French renamed the *Dixmude*. It saw service off Indochina. In August 1946, Britain also transferred the carrier *Colossus*, renamed by the French the *Arromanches*. During the postwar years France added a number of modern French-built warships to its fleet, including the light carriers *Foch* and *Clemenceau* (for fixed-wing aircraft), *Jeanne d'Arc* (for helicopters), the antiaircraft cruisers *De Grasse* and *Colbert*, and the destroyer/command ship *La Galissonnière*. In 1960 naval manpower stood at 62,000, but by the late 1980s that number had been cut to 32,804 (of which three-fourths were regulars). In the twilight years of the Cold War, the French fleet consisted of three carriers, forty-two surface combat vessels, twenty-nine mine hunters and minesweepers, fourteen patrol craft, sixteen attack submarines (of which three were nuclear-powered), and seven ballistic-missile nuclear submarines.

The modest naval resources available to France at the onset of the Cold War were placed under great strain as the nation attempted to reassert control over its colonial holdings. Although there was no enemy fleet to contend with in Indochina, France nonetheless utilized its navy to combat Viet Minh forces. On 23 November 1946, on the orders of French high commissioner to

Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu, the cruiser *Suffren* shelled Haiphong, killing between 200 and 1,000 Vietnamese and effectively beginning the Indochina War. During the eight-year-long Indochina War, the navy played an important role especially in riverine warfare, supporting army operations ashore and conducting amphibious operations. Junks and river craft as well as landing craft were brought in from Singapore.

Because of its heavy commitment to the fighting in Indochina, France contributed only one ship to assist the United Nations Command (UNC) during the Korean War. The frigate *La Grandière* performed patrol and blockade duties off the Korean coast.

In 1951, the United States transferred to France the light carrier *Langley,* renamed the *Lafayette.* Its sister ship, the *Belleau Wood* (renamed the *Bois Belleau*), joined the fleet two years later. In addition to the two aircraft carriers, Britain provided its share of captured German vessels, including four large destroyers and four torpedo boats. The navy used many of these ships, including the carriers *Lafayette* and *Bois Belleau*, in Indochina. The *Lafayette*, flying F4U-7 Corsairs, completed the last naval mission of the war.

By the mid-1950s, a new French-made navy took shape. The French naval command decided to scrap the old German ships while retaining the ex-American and ex-British ships for training purposes. France's respectable fleet of warships included two aircraft carriers, a cruiser, seventeen large destroyers, eighteen frigates, and fourteen submarines.

The battleship *Richelieu* was little altered. It served in Indochina and was hulked in 1959. The *Jean Bart*, which had been extensively damaged in the Allied landing at Casablanca in November 1942, underwent considerable renovation. New antiaircraft armament was installed in 1951–1952. The *Jean Bart* was stricken from the navy list in 1960.

French naval aviation played an important role in the Algerian War (1954–1962), providing both transport and close air support. In November 1957, the navy formed a special helicopter group that worked closely with four commando units of the French Special Naval Forces. The French pressed the *Jean Bart* into service during the 1956 Suez Crisis as a fire support ship, while aircraft from the *Lafayette* also participated.

On his return to power in 1958, Charles de Gaulle sought to strengthen the navy. De Gaulle saw the navy as playing an important role in a foreign policy independent of both Washington and London. Believing that he could not rely on the United States to risk its own nuclear destruction to defend Europe with nuclear weapons against a Soviet attack, de Gaulle gradually separated France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1959 he withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from the alliance's command. In 1963, France also withdrew ships from NATO's Atlantic command. Hand in hand with de Gaulle's decision to separate France from the NATO military command structure came the decision to develop a submarine nuclear deterrent, the Force de Dissuasion, similar to the U.S. Polaris. France's augmented fleet also possessed a considerable intervention capability, including colonial sloops, amphibious assault ships, and minesweepers. Despite these developments, the French Navy continued to maintain direct links with NATO.

The French nuclear deterrent force, known as the Force de Frappe, consisted of land, air, and sea-based delivery systems. In 1967, France launched the *Redoubtable*, the country's first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The Redoubtable class of submarines was designed to carry sixteen French underwater launched Mer-Sol-Balistique-Stratégique (MSBS) missiles, with a range of 1,900 miles. Each MSBS was designed to carry a nuclear warhead of 0.5 megatons.

By the end of the Cold War there were serious doubts about the ability of the French Navy to fulfill its worldwide policing commitments. New programs were also under way to replace aging vessels with new vessels, such as the Floréal-class frigates. The end of the Cold War brought retrenchment for the French Navy. This meant cuts and delays in ship construction programs, including that of the new aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*.

Roger Chapman and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Algerian War; De Gaulle, Charles; France; Indochina War; Korean War; Missiles, Polaris; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Submarines; Suez Crisis

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Franco, Francisco
(1892–1975)

Spanish Army general and fascist dictator of Spain. Born into a middle-class family in El Ferrol in Galicia on 4 December 1892, Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo Bahamonde Franco did not enter the navy, as was family tradition, but instead joined the Infantry Academy at Toledo in 1907. Graduating in 1910 in the bottom third of his class, Franco was commissioned a second lieutenant and was posted to Spanish Morocco.

Franco's leadership, courage, and absolute ruthlessness were demonstrated during the Riff Rebellion in Morocco. Seriously wounded in 1916, he won battlefield promotions for bravery. In 1920 he became deputy commander of the Spanish Foreign Legion in Morocco. In June 1923 King Alfonso XIII personally promoted Franco to lieutenant colonel and gave him command of the Foreign Legion. That same year the young colonel married María del Carmen Polo y Martinez Valdés, from one of Spain's most influential families, with the king serving as best man by proxy. In 1925 Franco won

promotion to colonel and, the next year, to brigadier general. At age thirty-three, he was the youngest general in any European army.

An archconservative, Franco was closely identified with General Miguel Primo de Rivera, who governed Spain in the name of Alfonso XIII during 1923–1930 and who in 1928 appointed Franco commander of the General Military Academy of Zaragoza (Saragossa). In 1931, upon the proclamation of a republic, the Left came to power and the government transferred Franco to the Balearic Islands, where he served during 1931–1934. He gained some credit with the government by refusing to join an abortive coup led by General José Sanjuro in 1932, but this was probably because he thought that the attempt would be unsuccessful. Promoted to major general, Franco returned to Spain to play a role in crushing a miners' revolt in Asturias in 1935, then accepted the post of chief of staff of the army from the new conservative government of Spain later that year.

The leftist Popular Front won the hotly contested national elections of February 1936, and the new government sent Franco to command the Canary Islands garrison. As expected, the conservatives defied the mandate, and Franco was in the forefront of the revolt that began in July 1936. The untimely deaths of Generals José y Sacanell Sanjurjo and Emilio Mola Vidal left Franco as the Nationalist military leader. Thanks to German aircraft, he was able to airlift units of the Foreign Legion from Morocco to Spain. In September 1936 he became chief of the Nationalist government, and in April 1937 he assumed leadership of the Falange party. He became de facto head of Spain with the fall of Madrid in March 1939, marking the end of the civil war. Franco then carried out a ruthless purge of the opposition. Throughout his long years in power, Franco remained true to his mission of preserving traditional Catholic Spain.

One of the most durable of twentieth-century dictators and perhaps the most dominant figure in Spanish history since the sixteenth century, Francisco Franco commanded the Nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War and was then de facto ruler of Spain from 1939 until his death in 1975. (Illustrated London News Picture Library)

With the beginning of World War II, Franco openly sided with fascist dictators Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. The Caudillo (leader), as Franco became known, met with Hitler in October 1940 and pledged his loyalty. Much to the Führer's intense irritation, Franco then refused to bring Spain into the war because he believed that Spain was better served in nonbelligerency. But Spain was hardly neutral. Franco sent the 18,000-man Blue Division to fight in the Soviet Union. He also provided the Germans with observation posts in Spanish Morocco to monitor Allied ship movements, and he allowed Axis submarines to be serviced in Spanish ports.

After the Allied landings in North Africa, however, Franco shifted to a strictly neutral stance. When Mussolini fell from power, Franco concentrated on winning the sympathy of the Allies. He pushed the Falange into the

background and "Franco the Caudillo," smacking of fascism, was replaced in official usage by "Franco the Chief of State."

After the war the Allies punished Franco's wartime conduct with quarantine treatment. Spain was kept out of the United Nations and was condemned for its fascist nature and close association with the Axis states, but with the coming of the Cold War, Washington came to regard Franco's regime as a bulwark against communism. In the revisionist version, Franco became the shining knight who had saved Europe from atheist communism. The United States established air and naval bases in Spain, and U.S. aid propped up the regime—a policy remembered with bitterness by many Spanish democrats. In 1953 Franco secured a Concordat with the Vatican, and in 1955 he won Spain's admission to the United Nations.

Franco declared Spain a monarchy in 1947. The Law of Succession of that year declared Franco chief of state for life and established a Council of the Kingdom to deal with any future questions of succession. Franco relaxed his authoritarian regime somewhat in the 1950s, but unrest in the 1960s led to renewed repression. Having selected Prince Juan Carlos de Bourbon, grandson of Alfonso XIII, as his heir, Franco died in Madrid on 20 November 1975.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Juan Carlos I, King of Spain; Spain

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Franco-German Friendship Treaty
(22 January 1963)

Treaty signed between French President Charles de Gaulle and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Paris on 22 January 1963. De Gaulle sought to end the FRG's military dependence on the United States and bring West Germany into a special relationship with France that would lead to a general European defense arrangement under the French nuclear deterrent. Adenauer sought a visible sign of Franco-German reconciliation.

The treaty is often viewed as having resulted from de Gaulle's initiative, but that really rested with Adenauer. In September 1962 de Gaulle had met

with the German chancellor in Bonn, and the two men discussed a wide range of issues. In the course of the meetings, Adenauer had expressed doubts about British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). On his part, de Gaulle saw Britain as a rival to France for European leadership and sought to exclude it from Europe. De Gaulle saw a British-dominated and English-speaking EEC as a distinct possibility. In the course of their talks, Adenauer committed himself to supporting France in keeping Britain out of Europe in return for a Franco-German treaty of cooperation that would be his crowning achievement as chancellor.

De Gaulle sought to move swiftly, as Adenauer was committed to leave his post by the autumn of 1963. The signing of the treaty followed de Gaulle's most sensational presidential news conference on 14 January 1963, which marked a major turning point in his foreign policy. Angry over the British-U.S. meeting at Nassau to resolve the Skybolt Affair, in which he had not been consulted, de Gaulle turned his back on the British and Americans. He announced that he was vetoing British membership in the EEC. He rejected U.S. President John F. Kennedy's offer of Polaris missiles in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force and announced that France would go its own way as a nuclear power. He also said that France would develop its special relationship with the FRG. While he did not declare at this time that France and the FRG would sign a special treaty, as much was implied.

On 21 January 1963, Adenauer traveled to Paris and the next day signed the treaty. The treaty provisions called for regular consultation between the heads of state of France and the FRG, with in-person meetings at least twice a year and meetings between the two foreign ministers and defense ministers at least four times a year. Officials from key ministries would meet monthly. The two leaders also pledged consultation on all important foreign policy matters with a view toward working out common policy positions. They also promised that their two countries would work closely on defense matters, would exchange personnel, and would draw up appropriate armament plans and plans to finance them. Finally, the two leaders promised to promote the teaching of the other's language and to promote cultural and educational exchanges. De Gaulle was not pleased about Adenauer's insistence that the treaty be ratified by the German Bundestag and that it contain a preamble that specified that the treaty would not militate against German commitments to the Western alliance.

Although other Western leaders criticized the pact as weakening NATO and the Western European Union, it did not have that effect. Cooperation between the two states did continue, and on 22 January 1988 French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl marked the treaty's twenty-fifth anniversary by signing a new treaty that established joint councils on both economic and defense issues. It established a 4,000-man Franco-German brigade stationed in the FRG.

The 1963 Franco-German Friendship Treaty was an important event in European history. While more symbolic than substantive, the treaty nonetheless marked the end of centuries of rivalry and hostility between the two

states and their intention to take the lead in the creation of a united West European community.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; De Gaulle, Charles; European Economic Community; France; Germany, Federal Republic of; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference

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Frei Montalva, Eduardo
(1911–1982)

Chilean politician and president (1964–1970). Born in Santiago on 11 January 1911, Eduardo Frei Montalva earned a law degree from the Catholic University in Santiago in 1933. He then entered the Conservative Party, helping to organize the National Movement of Conservative Youth. After a falling out with Conservative Party leaders because of his ideas for social reform, he helped establish the Falange National and was elected president of that organization in 1941. He then led the Falange National in supporting the Radical Party, under which he began his political career as a federal government minister of public works in late 1945. Then, in 1949, he won a seat in the Chilean Senate.



Eduardo Frei was a key politician in mid-twentieth-century Chile. As president after 1964, he sought a middle course between capitalism and communism that satisfied neither the Left nor the Right of Chile's political spectrum. (Government of Chile)

Frei ran for president on the new Partido Demócrata Christiano (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) ticket in 1958 but garnered only 20.7 percent of the vote. Undeterred, he carefully prepared for the 1964 election, summoning some of Chile's top intellectuals and professionals to his cause. The PDC's political platform, "Revolution in Liberty," called for land reform, legalized unionization of rural workers, partial nationalization of Chile's mining industry, and tax reform. Fearing a victory by Salvador Allende Gossens's left-wing coalition, Washington policymakers gave covert assistance to the PDC. Frei won the 1964 election, and as president he implemented part of the PDC program.

The United States viewed Frei's Chile as a model and thus provided the nation with considerable economic assistance under President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program. Slow economic growth and persistent inflation hurt the PDC in the 1970 elections, however, and Allende won a three-way race with a slim plurality (the PDC came in third). As dictated by the Chilean constitu-

tion, the Chilean Congress chose among the top two candidates, a process in which it normally chose the winner according to the popular election. U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward M. Korry unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Frei to throw his support behind second-place conservative Jorge Alessandi Rodríguez in a bid to prevent the Congress from choosing Allende, who was subsequently elected.

In March 1973 Frei was elected to the Senate. Following a military coup in September 1973 that propelled General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte into power, Frei became a vocal critic of the resulting dictatorship. He died in Santiago on 22 January 1982.

James F. Siekmeier

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Alliance for Progress; Chile; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto

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Fuchs, Klaus
(1911–1988)

British scientist who passed atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. Born in Rüsselsheim, Germany, on 29 December 1911, Klaus Emil Julius Fuchs was the son of Emil Fuchs, a socialist and leading figure in Germany's Quaker movement. Klaus Fuchs studied physics and mathematics at Leipzig and Kiel. A member of communist youth organizations, he fled Nazi Germany in 1933, first to Paris and then several months later to Britain, where he studied physics at the University of Bristol and then earned a doctorate in advanced physics at the University of Edinburgh.

As a resident alien, Fuchs was sent to an internment camp in Canada in 1940 but was released in 1941 as the result of the intercession of one of his former teachers. In May 1941 he began work at the University of Birmingham on the Tube Alloys program, the British project to build an atomic bomb. He also made contact with a German communist émigré who introduced him to Simon Kremer, the Soviet military attaché and spy in London. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Fuchs began passing secrets to the Soviets. He never accepted payment for his spying activities, which he claimed that he undertook purely out of ideological conviction.

He never accepted payment for his spying activities, which he claimed he undertook purely out of ideological conviction.

Overlooking his former communist connections in Germany, the British government granted Fuchs citizenship in August 1942 as a reward for his scientific services. In 1943, he left for the United States with a number of other British scientists to work on the American atomic bomb, first at Columbia

Klaus Fuchs, British atomic scientist and spy who supplied information on the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union, helping to speed its own development of that weapon. (Library of Congress)

University in New York City and then at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Fuchs immediately began channeling information on the project to the Soviet Union. Although other spies also provided useful information, Fuchs's espionage was by far the most important. He furnished precise drawings and measurements of the Fat Man bomb. Nuclear scientist Robert Oppenheimer estimated that information provided by Fuchs saved the Soviet Union ten years in the development of its own atomic bomb, although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put it at only several years.

Fuchs returned to Britain after the war and headed the theoretical division of the Harwell Atomic Research facility. When his treason was revealed in the Venona intercepts (not deciphered until 1949), Fuchs admitted to his role and was arrested in 1950. He pled guilty and was sentenced in March 1950 to fourteen years in prison. Released in June 1959, he immediately moved to the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), where he was granted citizenship and headed its Institute for Nuclear Physics until his retirement in 1979. Fuchs died near Dresden on 28 January 1988.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Atomic Bomb; Espionage; Teller, Edward

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Fujiyama Aiichirō
(1897–1985)

Japanese businessman, politician, and foreign minister (1957–1960). Born in Tokyo on 22 May 1897, Aiichirō Fujiyama attended Keio University and became an influential representative of big business in prewar Japan. In 1944, he helped to precipitate the fall of wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō's government. Fujiyama was then purged from public life for three years following Japan's surrender. He subsequently returned to the business world and undertook several diplomatic missions, including participation as a member of the Japanese delegation to the 1951 United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conference in Paris and the 1955 Bandung Conference.

In July 1957 Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke unexpectedly asked Fujiyama to serve as foreign minister. In this post, Fujiyama believed that Japan should serve as a mediator between the communist and capitalist states and that Japan should reach out to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Fujiyama viewed Japan's relationship with the United States in strictly utilitarian terms, arguing that Japan should provide basing rights to the United States in return for security guarantees. Hence, he undertook the delicate task of renegotiating the United States–Japan Security Treaty in January 1960, fully expecting restored relations with the PRC to follow. However, the popular crisis sparked by the undemocratic ratification of the treaty forced Nobuske's cabinet to resign on 19 July 1960, effectively ending Fujiyama's diplomatic career. He remained in parliament, however, concentrating his political energies on winning diplomatic recognition for the PRC. Fujiyama retired from politics in 1975 and died on 22 February 1985 in Tokyo.

C. W. Braddick

See also

Bandung Conference; Japan; Japan, Occupation after World War II; Kishi Nobusuke; United States–Japan Security Treaty

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Fukuda Takeo
(1905–1995)

Japanese politician, bureaucrat, and prime minister (1976–1978). Born in Gunma Prefecture, Japan, on 14 January 1905, Fukuda Takeo, the son of a wealthy farmer, graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and entered the Ministry of Finance in 1929. Implicated in a political scandal, he resigned his ministry post in 1948 and entered electoral politics. As a financial specialist in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), he held important party positions and finally became prime minister in December 1976 after a power struggle forced Prime Minister Miki Takeo to resign.

As prime minister, Fukuda advocated his omnidirectional peace diplomacy, which aimed at adjusting Japanese foreign policy to détente, although détente was gradually fading during his tenure in office. He also enunciated what was termed the Fukuda Doctrine in August 1977, which was designed to fortify Japan's relations with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. He expressed his concern over U.S. President Jimmy Carter's controversial proposal to withdraw American troops from Korea but

did not formally challenge Carter's policy. Fukuda tried to strengthen U.S.-Japanese defense mechanisms and increased the budget for aid to American military bases in Japan. As a result, the two nations issued the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1978.

When Fukuda visited Washington in May 1978, Carter urged him to conclude a peace treaty with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the United States grew closer to the PRC and more wary of the Soviet Union. Fukuda subsequently concluded the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978 in spite of his traditional foreign policy conservatism and relatively close ties to Taiwan. The Soviet Union vociferously criticized Japan for having signed the treaty. Soon thereafter, Fukuda lost his party's leadership to Ōhira Masayoshi in a party election and resigned as prime minister in December 1978. Fukada died in retirement in Tokyo on 5 July 1995.

Iikura Akira and Christopher Braddick

See also

Carter, James Earl, Jr.; China, People's Republic of; Japan; Miki Takeo; Soviet Union; United States

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Fulbright, James William
(1905–1995)

U.S. congressman and senator. Born in Sumner, Missouri, on 9 April 1905, James William Fulbright moved with his family to Arkansas. He was educated at the University of Arkansas and won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, where he studied history. He then earned a law degree from George Washington University in Washington, D.C. During the 1930s, he worked in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and was an instructor at the George Washington University Law School. In 1936 he returned to Arkansas where he taught law, and from 1939 to 1941 he was president of the University of Arkansas.

In 1942 Fulbright won election as a Democrat to the U.S. House of Representatives and in 1944 was elected to the Senate, remaining there for thirty years. Deeply interested in international affairs and in enabling different nations to understand and respect each other, in 1943 Fulbright introduced a resolution calling for U.S. membership in a postwar international organization to maintain peace, an important step in congressional endorsement of the future United Nations (UN). In 1946 Fulbright sponsored legislation that

established an international exchange program for scholars and students that eventually subsidized the studies of several hundred thousand individuals from more than sixty countries. Strongly committed to the UN, Fulbright also sought to preserve Western Europe from the potential Soviet threat by opposing resurgent congressional isolationism and staunchly supporting the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the containment policy.

In the 1950s Fulbright worked to censure and restrain the anticommunist excesses of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and in the 1960s challenged the right-wing John Birch Society. By the late 1950s, Fulbright saw no practical alternative to the policies of peaceful coexistence that both Soviet and American leaders advocated. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) from 1959 to 1975, Fulbright admired John F. Kennedy's relatively flexible responses to Soviet threats in Berlin and Cuba.

In a long and successful career as a U.S. senator from Arkansas, J. William Fulbright became famous for his intellectual criticism of the destructive arrogance of power that guided U.S. policy during the Vietnam War. (Library of Congress)

Fulbright initially supported his longtime Senate colleague, President Lyndon B. Johnson, on Vietnam, voting for the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution that gave the president great latitude to handle the burgeoning crisis there. Soon, however, Fulbright's reading and interviews with journalists and others convinced him that the United States was supporting an unpopular puppet regime against an indigenous and genuinely nationalist revolutionary movement. He clashed repeatedly with Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In 1966 the SFRC held televised hearings on Vietnam in which such misgivings were openly expressed, and the following year further hearings questioned the continuing U.S. nonrecognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1967 Fulbright published *The Arrogance of Power*, a widely read and sweeping critique of American foreign policy.

When Richard M. Nixon became president in 1969, Fulbright applauded his initiatives to improve relations with China and the Soviet Union but quickly parted company with him over Vietnam and Cambodia, deploring his policies even more than Johnson's. Believing that strong Cold War executive leadership had caused growing abuses, Fulbright publicly advocated the passage of congressional legislation curbing presidential power. After losing his 1974 reelection race, Fulbright left the Senate, practicing law and enjoying the role of elder statesman and mentor to his Arkansan protégé, future president Bill Clinton. Fulbright died in Washington, D.C., on 9 February 1995.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Marshall Plan; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond;

McCarthyism; Nixon, Richard Milhous; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Peaceful Coexistence; Rusk, Dean; Soviet Union; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United Nations; United States; Vietnam War

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G

Gagarin, Yuri
(1934–1968)

Soviet cosmonaut and first human in space. Born on 9 March 1934 to a collective farm family in Klushino, 100 miles west of Moscow, Yuri Gagarin developed an interest in flying after observing Soviet pilots during World War II and learned to fly while a student at a four-year technical school in Saratov in the early 1950s. He subsequently joined the Soviet Air Force and studied at the Orenburg Aviation School, from which he graduated as a lieutenant with top honors in November 1957. After spending two years as a fighter pilot, in 1959 Gagarin began cosmonaut training, demonstrating superior physical and intellectual abilities that resulted in his selection by Sergei Korolev, chief designer of the Soviet space program, to pilot the first manned mission into space.

On 12 April 1961, at the controls of the spacecraft *Vostok I*, Gagarin became the first man to orbit Earth, completing his mission in 108 minutes at a speed of 18,000 miles per hour. Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev hailed Gagarin's accomplishment, which came just three and a half years after *Sputnik 1*, another triumph of the alleged superiority of socialism over capitalism. Gagarin's success was a major Soviet achievement and a key propaganda victory in the Cold War space race.

After his mission, Gagarin was promoted to the rank of major and was honored with the Hero of the Soviet Union Medal. From then on, he enjoyed a life of privilege but longed to return to space. In 1967 he commenced training for the *Soyuz* program. Gagarin was killed while piloting a MiG-15 fighter on the outskirts of Moscow on 27 March 1968 and was buried, alongside other prominent Soviet citizens, near the Kremlin Wall.

Bruce J. DeHart

Yuri Gagarin was the first human to travel into space. Gagarin, a test pilot in the Soviet Air Force, and his spacecraft, *Vostok I*, left Earth's atmosphere on 12 April 1961 and circled Earth in less than two hours. (Library of Congress)

See also
Khrushchev, Nikita; Space Race; *Sputnik*

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Gaither Report
(November 1957)

Top secret report issued by a panel of U.S. defense and military experts in November 1957. President Dwight D. Eisenhower commissioned the so-called Gaither Committee, chaired by the RAND Corporation's H. Rowan Gaither, to study the nation's defenses and strategic posture after the launching of the Soviet spacecraft *Sputnik 1* earlier that same year. The rather alarmist report spurred opposition to Eisenhower's New Look defense posture and called for a $44 billion program to bolster conventional U.S. forces and the further development of missile and rocket capabilities.

Eisenhower tasked the Security Resources Panel primarily with studying the nation's civil defense needs. But the hawkish committee members went far beyond their mission and considered all aspects of the nation's defenses. The report was coauthored by Paul Nitze, anticommunist hard-liner and principal author of National Security Council Report NSC-68, and retired Colonel George Lincoln, a West Point professor and respected military planner and strategist.

The report argued that the Soviet Union harbored expansionist intentions and highlighted the alleged widening disparity between American and Soviet weapons programs. It concluded by proposing a $44 billion program of military spending in order to close the unproven gap. The report's proposals were similar to those advocated in NSC-68. But just as Eisenhower had rejected some of the strategic doctrines of NSC-68, he also rejected the Gaither Committee's findings. He objected to the high costs of its proposals and did not believe, as the panelists had argued, that such a dramatically expanded national security program would have no harmful effect on the nation's economy. Moreover, he tended to view the report as an unnecessary knee-jerk reaction to *Sputnik*, which had created panic among some that the United States was not only losing the space race but was also losing ground to the Soviets on the scientific and military fronts.

Although Eisenhower objected to many tenets of the Gaither Report, he did not simply dismiss the recommendations out of hand. In fact, during the late 1950s, he presided over a substantial expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This effort was overlooked by contemporary observers.

Despite Eisenhower's directive that the Gaither Report be kept secret, the contents were widely leaked. The release of this information fed the growing perception of a technological gap between the Soviet Union and the United States, contributing to increased anxiety among the American public and a loss of confidence in Eisenhower's national security policies. Some con-

temporary observers interpreted President John F. Kennedy's November 1960 election victory as a repudiation of Eisenhower's policies and an affirmation of the Gaither Committee's findings. Indeed, Kennedy's campaign rhetoric, which repeatedly cited a missile gap between the two superpowers, was an important part of his campaign strategy, although such a gap never did exist in reality.

Christopher A. Preble

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; National Security Council Report NSC-68; New Look Defense Policy; Nitze, Paul Henry; Soviet Union; Space Race; *Sputnik*

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Gaitskell, Hugh
(1906–1963)

British politician and Labour Party leader (1955–1963). Born in London on 9 April 1906, Hugh Todd Naylor Gaitskell was educated at the Winchester School and New College, Oxford. After leaving Oxford he taught political economy for a time at the University of London. He was inspired to join the Labour Party after witnessing the General Strike of 1926 and working in the industrial region of Nottinghamshire. During World War II, he served in various economic ministries and in 1945 was elected to the House of Commons.

Gaitskell was subsequently appointed parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Fuel and Power by Prime Minister Clement Attlee and held that post from 1945 to 1947. In October 1947 Gaitskell became minister of fuel and power and then went on to serve as minister of state for economic affairs in 1950. That same year he was appointed chancellor of the exchequer and held that post until October 1951. His April 1951 budget included arms spending increases mostly at the expense of social and health programs, which prompted the resignation of Aneurin Bevan, a leading left-wing parliamentarian and social welfare proponent. Bevan was later defeated by Gaitskell in the party leadership contest of December 1955.

Throughout much of the 1950s, the Labour Party was consumed by a Left-Right power struggle that pitted Bevan against Gaitskell, although it did manage to unite in strong opposition to Prime Minister Anthony Eden's role in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Patriotic, pro-American, an advocate of the British nuclear weapons program, and a moderate in economic affairs, Gaitskell clashed seriously with his party in 1959 when he sought to weaken its commitment to public ownership of industry. He again precipitated a row in the

party in 1960 when Labour voted to abandon Britain's nuclear arsenal, a move that Gaitskell vehemently opposed. The vote was reversed the following year. In 1962 Gaitskell opposed British entry into the Common Market (European Union, or EU), which he viewed as the beginning of the end of Britain as an independent state. Gaitskell was the Labour leader for eight years until he died unexpectedly in London on 18 January 1963, never having led his party to victory at the polls.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; European Union; Foot, Michael; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Suez Crisis; United Kingdom

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Galbraith, John Kenneth

(1908–2006)

Well-known economist, U.S. government official, diplomat, and prolific author of groundbreaking books dealing with economics and society. Born on 15 October 1908 in Iona Station, Ontario, Canada, John Kenneth Galbraith received a BA from Ontario Agricultural College (now the University of Toronto) in 1931 and then pursued studies in economics at the University of California at Berkeley, from which he received an MS in 1933 and a PhD in 1934. He taught at Berkeley and then Princeton University before settling in as a professor at Harvard University in 1948. He would remain on the faculty there until his retirement in 1975.

An ardent Democrat, Galbraith became involved in government work and politics at a young age. He was an admirer of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal economic policies and was an adherent of Keynesian economics, which prescribe government spending and periodic intervention in order to keep the economy on an even keel. In the early 1940s, during World War II, Galbraith was recruited as deputy administrator of the Office of Price Administration (OPA). Galbraith—barely thirty-five years old at the time—proved to be an able administrator and an excellent organization man. The OPA managed all prices for consumer goods and other products during the war. In 1945, Galbraith served as the director of the U.S. Bombing Survey.

When the war ended, Galbraith returned to teaching and writing at Harvard, but he was never far away from the politics and power of Washington. He served as an advisor and strategist for Democratic Senator Adlai Stevenson's presidential bids in 1952 and 1956. A true renaissance man, Galbraith authored several novels in addition to his many other works. His most famous books include *The Great Crash* (1955), *The Affluent Society* (1958), and *The New Industrial State* (1967). During the 1960 presidential election, Galbraith served

as economic advisor to John F. Kennedy's campaign. President Kennedy rewarded Galbraith with the ambassadorship to India, a position he held during 1961–1963.

In 1968 Galbraith, as chairman of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), worked feverishly in support of Senator Eugene McCarthy's presidential bid and was instrumental in helping put his name in nomination at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Galbraith had been an early and vocal opponent of the Vietnam War, which earned him no accolades in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Galbraith continued to write, speak, and teach on a variety of subjects well into his nineties. He died of natural causes on 29 April 2006 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Americans for Democratic Action; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McCarthy, Eugene Joseph; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Vietnam War Protests

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John Kenneth Galbraith, noted economist and U.S. ambassador to India under President John F. Kennedy. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Gandhi, Indira
(1917–1984)

Indian politician and prime minister (1966–1977, 1980–1984). Indira Gandhi, born Indira Priyadarshini on 19 November 1917 in Allahabad, India, was the only child of Jawaharlal Nehru, a leader of India's independence movement and India's first prime minister. She was educated at home, at schools in India and Switzerland, and at Somerville College, Oxford University, although she did not earn a degree. In 1942 she married Feroze Gandhi, from whom she later separated.

In 1959 Gandhi was elected president of the ruling Indian National Congress (INC) party for one year. Following the death of her father in 1964, Gandhi joined the government headed by Lal Bahadur Shastri as minister of information and broadcasting (1964–1966) and was elected to the parliament. Following Shastri's sudden death in January 1966, a coterie of senior INC leaders arranged for Gandhi's election as prime minister. Soon, however, she broke free from their control, split the party, and emerged as India's undisputed leader.

In 1971, India faced a major crisis with a revolt in East Pakistan, leading to the Pakistani government's military crackdown there. Gandhi signed the Indo-Soviet friendship pact to balance the U.S. tilt toward Pakistan and led

Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi broke through traditional gender boundaries and helped lead her nation through its formative years of independent, democratic government. (Library of Congress)

India in a successful war against Pakistan in December 1971. In 1972 she signed the Shimla Agreement with a defeated Pakistan, committing both sides to a peaceful solution of their dispute over Kashmir.

Gandhi's populist domestic policies failed to improve India's economy. High inflation, widespread poverty, increasing corruption, and the interference of her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi, in the government began eroding her popularity, and the nuclear tests she ordered in 1974 failed to restore her standing. In the midst of popular unrest against her government, in June 1975 the court annulled her election to the parliament. Rejecting demands for her resignation, she imposed emergency rule and imprisoned her political opponents. In the 1977 elections, Gandhi and the INC were routed. The coalition government that assumed power soon split, however, and she returned as prime minister in 1980.

Following the tradition established by Nehru, Gandhi played an active part in the Non-Aligned Movement. However, her leftist domestic policies and the need to counterbalance what India perceived as a U.S.-Pakistani-Chinese axis gave her foreign policy a pronounced pro-Soviet tilt. Under her leadership, India continued to champion developing-world causes at the United Nations (UN) and elsewhere, often following policies close to the Soviet position. Nevertheless, she was reluctant to be completely tied to the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, India turned to the West for arms acquisitions with the aim of reducing its dependence on the Soviet Union. Following Gandhi's 1982 meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan, Indo-U.S. relations improved.

Gandhi was a supremely gifted politician and was immensely popular at home. However, India's economy continued to stagnate during her period in power. Her authoritarian style and commitment to the maintenance of her family's hold on power also led to the creation of a political culture dominated by sycophancy, nepotism, and the ruthless removal of potential rivals.

During 1980–1984, India faced a secessionist movement by Sikhs in the state of Punjab and militancy in India's northeast. Gandhi's decision to order an army assault on the Golden Temple in Amiritsar, the holiest Sikh shrine, further angered the Sikhs. On 31 October 1984, Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh security guards in New Delhi. She was succeeded by her eldest son, Rajiv Gandhi.

Appu K. Soman

See also

Gandhi, Rajiv; India; India-Pakistan Wars; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Non-Aligned Movement

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Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand

(1869–1948)

Indian spiritual leader and anticolonial activist famous for his philosophy of nonviolent civil disobedience that contributed to India's independence in 1947. Born on 2 October 1869 in Porpandar, India, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was the son of a local administrator. After his father's death in 1885, Gandhi's family provided him with the financial means to receive legal training in Great Britain. In 1888 he went to London, where he studied law at University College until 1891. Upon his return to India, however, he failed to find a viable law practice, and in 1893 he was forced to find employment in South Africa.

Gandhi's experiences with prejudice and racism in South Africa drove him to fight for the rights of the country's Indian minority. Initially, he believed that protesting against injustice through petitions and the press would induce the white government to end its discriminatory practices. By 1905, however, he had achieved few tangible results. Disillusioned with strictly legal means of protest, he developed satyagraha ("truth force"), a form of nonviolent civil disobedience intended to confront the government with the Indian population's grievances. In 1907, Gandhi launched his first nonviolent campaign to protest against discriminatory legislation aimed at South Africa's Indian population. A second satyagraha against discriminatory legislation in 1913 led to the arrest of thousands of protestors and compelled white authorities to repeal the discriminatory laws.

In 1915, Gandhi returned to India to support the struggle against British colonial rule there. In less than two years, he became a prominent figure in the Indian National Congress (INC), a middle-class organization that called for increased Indian autonomy. Also championing the cause of the country's large peasant population, he helped to organize smaller civil disobedience campaigns between 1916 and 1918.

In 1919, Gandhi called for a large-scale satyagraha to protest newly passed repressive legislation. British authorities responded to the demonstrations with brutal force, resulting in the massacre of some 400 Indian protestors in April 1919 in Punjab Province. Although Gandhi canceled the protest shortly afterward, the carnage served only to boost the nationalist movement. By 1920, Gandhi had become a nearly divine figure in India and was frequently referred to as "Mahatma," or Great Soul.

In 1921, Gandhi and the INC launched another nonviolent protest campaign intended to further erode the legitimacy of British rule through boycotts

Independence brought near anarchy to India and Pakistan. Millions of people were uprooted and forced to move from one state to another.



The leader of modern Indian nationalism, Mohandas Gandhi infused the movement with Hindu spirituality. To Gandhi, moral values always superseded material ones, and the improvement of human souls was a necessary precursor to the improvement of India. He was an apostle of nonviolence and civil disobedience, proving that these ideals could unite diverse peoples and bring great accomplishments. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

and other noncooperation campaigns across the country. By early 1922, 17,000 Indians had been arrested for their anticolonialist activities. Frustrated with the seeming failure of satyagraha, some Indians abandoned nonviolence and began a guerrilla war against the British, which was quickly subdued by British colonial troops.

In March 1922, Gandhi was sentenced to six years in prison but was released in 1924 because of deteriorating health. In prison, he completed his most important works on nonviolent protest, *Satyagraha in South Africa* and *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*.

In 1930 as British authorities continued to reject negotiations over India's independence, the INC asked Gandhi to organize yet another civil disobedience campaign. Focusing on an unjust tax code that forced Indians to buy British-produced salt, Gandhi and 78 followers set out on a 241-mile march to the western coast of India in March 1930 to rally supporters before deliberately breaking the so-called Salt Law. Inspired by the Salt March, tens of thousands followed Gandhi's example. By the end of the year, almost 60,000 Indians had been arrested for their defiance. But the movement had secured few concessions, and after the collapse of another round of protests in 1932, Gandhi withdrew from public life and began to champion the unpopular cause of India's caste of untouchables—a large hereditary group in India who, in traditional Hindu belief, are considered impure by birth and should not come in contact with members of higher castes.

During World War II, Gandhi organized his last satyagraha against colonial rule. His 1943 Quit India movement was largely ineffective, however, and it soon degenerated into a violent campaign of sabotage against government buildings. Nevertheless, the series of anticolonial protests begun in the 1920s had seriously eroded Britain's international prestige and indigenous support. By 1944, British authorities finally indicated their willingness to negotiate over India's independence. Three years later, on 14 August 1947, the former British colony was partitioned into the two independent states of India and Pakistan.

Independence brought near anarchy to India and Pakistan. Millions of people were uprooted and forced to move from one state to another. Religious hatred mingled with greed, and perhaps a quarter of a million people died in the violence. In volatile Calcutta, Gandhi kept the peace only by offering his own person as a hostage and beginning a fast unto death. He was assassinated by a Hindu extremist on 30 January 1948 in Delhi. Gandhi was, and continues to be, a powerful, almost mythical figure in civil and human rights circles. Indeed, the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s took many of its cues from his anticolonial movement. Dr. Martin Luther

King Jr., the U.S. civil rights leader, was an ardent adherent of Gandhi's ideal of nonviolent social change.

Simon Wendt

See also

Anticolonialism; Decolonization; India; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Pakistan; South Africa; United Kingdom

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Gandhi, Rajiv
(1944–1991)

Prime minister of India (1984–1989). Rajiv Gandhi, the eldest son of Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi, was born on 20 August 1944 in Bombay (now Mumbai). He was educated at the elite Doon School in Dehra Dun, the University of London, and finally Trinity College, Cambridge University. After his university training, he became a commercial pilot for India Airlines, avoiding the political world entirely. However, when his brother Sanjay was killed in a plane crash in 1980, Rajiv's mother Indira drafted him into politics.

Gandhi then replaced Sanjay as his mother's closest political advisor, and in February 1981 he won election to parliament on the Congress Party ticket. Gandhi was chosen to succeed his mother as prime minister upon her assassination on 31 October 1984. In December, he led the Congress Party to a landslide victory and was duly elected prime minister in his own right.

As prime minister, Gandhi was credited with a significant economic boom, which was achieved by his proindustry policies and his government's encouragement of foreign investment. In foreign affairs, he improved India's relations with the Soviet Union, which in turn strained relations with the United States. Gandhi also increased efforts to suppress Muslim separatist movements in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir, and in 1987 he sent troops to Sri Lanka in a failed attempt to stop the Tamil-Sinhalese civil war there. Amid allegations of government corruption and the waning popularity of the Congress Party, Gandhi resigned his office in December 1989 after his party lost its parliamentary majority. He remained in parliament and was an active member of the opposition until he was assassinated while on the campaign trail by a Tamil suicide bomber seeking revenge for his intervention in Sri Lanka. Gandhi died on 21 May 1991 in Tamil, Nadu.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Gandhi, Indira; India

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Gavin, James Maurice
(1907–1990)

U.S. Army general. Born in Brooklyn, New York, on 22 March 1907, James Gavin enlisted in the army in 1924. He secured an appointment to and graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1929. He served in a variety of postings in the United States and the Philippines and was an instructor at West Point at the start of World War II. He transferred to the airborne infantry, and in August 1942 he took command of the 505th Parachute Regiment. Shortly thereafter he was promoted to colonel. He led the 505th in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. In October 1943 he was promoted to brigadier general and became deputy commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. He assisted in planning the invasion of France and then participated in Operation OVERLORD with the division. In August he took command of the 82nd, at age thirty-seven the youngest divisional commander in the U.S. Army. Two months later he was a major general. He participated in Operation MARKET-GARDEN and ended the war with more combat jumps than any other general officer.

Gavin participated in Operation MARKET-GARDEN and ended World War II with more combat jumps than any other general officer.

Following World War II, Gavin served in various staff positions. These included stints with the Department of Defense Weapons System Evaluation Group and the headquarters of the Allied Forces Southern Europe. He then commanded VII Corps in Germany. In 1954 he returned to Washington to serve as the deputy chief of staff for plans and in 1955 was assigned to the newly created chief of research and development position on the army staff as a lieutenant general, the youngest in the U.S. military.

Gavin was an innovator who advocated exploiting advanced technology to enhance American military capabilities. He conceptualized the use of helicopters to improve army mobility and is regarded as the father of the air assault concept. He criticized the emphasis on the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and long-range nuclear forces during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. Gavin argued for a more flexible force structure that could respond to limited-war scenarios. He strongly supported the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the modern battlefield, and he was also an early advocate of reconnaissance satellites and the military use of space. He was critical of the role played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), urging that it should be limited to planning and that actual operations be carried out by integrated unified command staff, which would ease interservice rivalries.

Despite his criticisms, Gavin was slated for promotion to full general. But in 1958, on the eve of his promotion and assignment as commander of

the Seventh Army in Europe and after thirty-three years in the military, he abruptly resigned from the army in frustration, saying that he would not compromise his principles.

Gavin retired from active duty in March 1958. That same year he published *War and Peace in the Space Age*. A critique of the Eisenhower administration's New Look military policy, it held that the United States needed strong conventional forces to deal with limited wars. Such ideas found credence in the early 1960s during the Kennedy administration.

Gavin was a senior executive for Arthur B. Little, Inc., until 1974, with a brief sabbatical during 1961–1962 when he was the U.S. ambassador to France. He opposed American involvement in Vietnam. Gavin died in Baltimore on 23 February 1990.

Jerome V. Martin and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Flexible Response; New Look Defense Policy; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; United States Army

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Gehlen, Reinhard
(1902–1979)

German Army general and head of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the foreign intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). Born on 3 April 1902 in Erfurt, Reinhard Gehlen completed his secondary education in Erfurt and joined the German Army as a cadet in 1921. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1923. Promoted to captain following graduation from the Army Staff College, he became a general staff officer and held a variety of staff positions.

In April 1942, without any prior experience in intelligence work, Gehlen became head of the Foreign Armies East Department. After initial failures at estimating enemy capabilities, he reorganized his department and created his own espionage organization and a comprehensive information bank on the Soviet Union. He also took a leading role in recruiting more than 100,000 Soviet prisoners of war into the Russian Liberation Army to fight on the German side.

Gehlen's intelligence information was generally accurate, and he directed an extensive network of agents throughout Eastern Europe. In autumn 1944 he was preparing to transfer the military intelligence service to U.S. authorities in case Germany lost the war. In December 1944 he won promotion to generalmajor (equivalent to U.S. brigadier general). Adolf Hitler disliked

Gehlen's accurate but gloomy assessments of Germany's military prospects on the Eastern Front and dismissed him from his post on 10 April 1945. Predicting a postwar rupture between the United States and the Soviet Union, Gehlen had copied his files and planned to offer them to the United States. He surrendered to U.S. forces in Bavaria at the end of the war.

In the U.S. Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps Camp in Wiesbaden, Gehlen was united with a group of his former staff members who were subsequently flown to Washington, D.C., after an initial screening of Gehlen's intelligence material. In July 1946 the group returned to Germany and formed the Organisation Gehlen, an intelligence service under the supervision of the U.S. Army Intelligence Service. The agents' network was soon extended into the Soviet occupation zone. Results were forwarded to the newly established U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 1955, the Organisation Gehlen was taken over by the FRG and renamed the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Gehlen became its first president.

After the German Democratic Republic's (GDR, East Germany) national uprising of 1953 and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the initially favorable situation of sources for the BND sharply diminished, and Gehlen sought to compensate for the lack of agents with enhanced technical reconnaissance. He retired in April 1968. Gehlen died in Berg am Starnberger See on 8 June 1979.

Heiner Bröckermann

See also

Berlin Wall; Central Intelligence Agency; East Berlin Uprising; Espionage; Germany, Federal Republic of

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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(January 1948)

A package of trade rules and tariff concessions that provided the basic legal framework for international commerce throughout the Cold War, from its adoption in 1948 until its replacement by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was

Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (standing, *center rear*) welcomes delegates at the fifteenth general meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1957. GATT, a set of international agreements, was first adopted in 1947. (Bettmann/Corbis)

never intended to be anything more than a temporary arrangement, and its nearly fifty years of life are testament to the difficulties in implementing the ideals of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference.

Representatives to the Bretton Woods Conference envisioned three institutions that would be responsible for the postwar economic order: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which did indeed come into existence shortly after end of World War II; and an International Trade Organization (ITO), an adjunct of the United Nations (UN) that would monitor global trade practices and enforce a sweeping range of business, employment, and investment protocols. Given the devastating effects of protectionism during the Great Depression, a powerful body dedicated to trade liberalization and the reduction—as far as possible—of all remaining tariff barriers held a strong attraction to the Western Allied powers at the end of the war.

Negotiations mapping out the ITO's constitution began shortly after the end of hostilities. As a stop-gap measure until the formal inauguration of the ITO, twenty-three nations met in Geneva in 1947 to pledge 45,000 immediate tariff concessions (affecting approximately 20 percent of all world trade at the time). They also contracted to provisionally accept many of the trade rules embodied in the ITO Charter. This General Agreement came into force

in January 1948. Two months later, the ITO proper was officially unveiled at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, but the optimistic mood at its birth proved short-lived. Ratification of the charter by the U.S. Senate proved impossible because of aggressive lobbying by hostile American corporate interests, and in 1950 the U.S. government formally withdrew from the organization, leaving it moribund. The premature death of its anticipated successor left GATT the only workable instrument of international trade law.

GATT had scarcely any institutional basis or permanent staff, and it was restricted to questions of trade in merchandise only. With its limited structure and scope, it could not provide the permanent settlement of commercial questions that had been envisaged for the ITO, and from 1949 onward a number of follow-on talks, or trade rounds, occurred, resulting in the amendment and extension of the original rules laid down by the founding twenty-three nations. These lengthy negotiations, often lasting several years, produced a series of supplementary agreements on further tariff reductions, and, from the 1960s onward, new procedures regulating subsidies, licensing, and the dumping of cheap exports on vulnerable domestic markets. Most GATT rules were multilateral and binding on all signatories, although a few were voluntary plurilateral arrangements. By the 1973–1979 Tokyo Round, 102 countries were taking part in GATT negotiations, testifying to their success in overall trade liberalization, but the Tokyo talks also underlined the long-inherent flaws in the GATT model. Too many loopholes were being exploited by signatory nations that allowed protection in all but name, the dispute settlement process was patently broken, and, most critically, the unregulated service and intellectual property sectors were now far more important to the world economy than they had been in the 1940s, leaving GATT ill-equipped to oversee the expanding global marketplace.

Prodded by these inadequacies, the Uruguay Round that opened in 1986 saw an attempt to comprehensively revise and modernize GATT. These talks lasted more than seven years (the longest and largest trade negotiations in history) and came to encompass virtually every aspect of international commerce. Ultimately, after a number of false starts and seeming deadlocks, in 1994 the talks resulted in agreement on a World Trade Organization (WTO), established the following year, that finally realized the vision of the ITO.

GATT was then placed in long-overdue retirement. Its limitations were manifest from the outset, but for an intended temporary measure not designed to carry the burden that history placed upon it, GATT made a significant contribution to the long postwar economic boom by keeping trade tariffs low.

Alan Allport

See also

Bretton Woods System; International Monetary Fund; World Bank

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Geneva Conference
(1954)

International conference called to discuss long-standing tensions in East Asia. The Geneva Conference on the Far East opened in that Swiss city on 26 April 1954, with negotiations concentrating on transforming the previous year's armistice in Korea into a permanent peace. Negotiations on that issue produced no results, however. Separate negotiations over the ongoing war in Indochina began on 8 May, one day after the fall of the French bastion of Dien Bien Phu in northwest Vietnam to the Viet Minh. The Indochina talks involved representatives—in most cases the foreign ministers—of France, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Britain, Laos, Cambodia, and the State of Vietnam (later the Republic of Vietnam).

The Viet Minh capture of Dien Bien Phu seemed to offer a perfect opportunity to resolve the long Indochina War. Two days later the Western powers resisted a demand by the communist powers that the "resistance governments" of Laos and Cambodia (the Pathet Lao and the Free Khmer, respectively) be represented at the talks. On 17 June longtime critic of the Indochina War Pierre Mendès-France became French premier and foreign minister. On 20 June he imposed a thirty-day timetable for an agreement, promising to resign if one was not reached. The Geneva Accords were signed on the last day of the deadline, 20 July, but only because the clocks were stopped; it was actually early on 21 July.

Dulles ordered the U.S. delegation not to participate in the discussions and to act only as observers.

The leading personalities at Geneva were Mendès-France, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (Chou Enlai), Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, and State of Vietnam Foreign Minister Nguyen Quoc Dinh. Dulles left the conference after only a few days. He saw no likelihood of an agreement on Indochina that Washington could approve, and he disliked the idea of negotiating with Zhou (the United States had yet to recognize the PRC), whom he deliberately snubbed. Dulles ordered the U.S. delegation not to participate in the discussions and to act only as observers.

The Geneva Conference produced separate armistice agreements for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. But Pham Van Dong found himself pressured by Zhou and Molotov into an agreement that gave the Viet Minh far less than it had won on the battlefield. Pending unification of Vietnam, there was to be a temporary dividing line ("provisional demarcation line") at the 17th Parallel (Pham had wanted the 13th Parallel). A demilitarized zone would

French representative General Henri Delteil signing truce documents at Geneva that ended hostilities between the French and the communist-led Viet Minh forces, July 1954. (Library of Congress)

extend 5 kilometers (3 miles) on either side of the line in order to prevent incidents that might lead to a breach of the armistice. The final text provided that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." Vietnam's future was to be determined "on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity" with "national and general elections" to be held in July 1956. Troops on both sides would have up to 300 days to be regrouped north or south; civilians could also move in either direction if they so desired. An international supervisory and control commission (ISCC) composed of representatives from Canada, Poland, and India (a Western state, a communist state, and a nonaligned state) would oversee implementation of the agreements.

Pham was bitterly disappointed that nationwide elections were put off for two years. Eager to take advantage of the Viet Minh's military successes, he had initially sought a delay of only six months after conclusion of a cease-fire. The DRV accepted the arrangements only under heavy pressure from the PRC and USSR and because it was confident that it could control southern Vietnam. There is every reason to believe that the Chinese leadership was willing to sabotage their ally in order to prevent the formation of a strong regional power on their southern border.

As it worked out, in 1956 the new government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) headed by Ngo Dinh Diem claimed that it was not a party to the Geneva Agreements and was thus not bound by them. Supported by the Eisenhower administration in this stand, Ngo refused to authorize the previously agreed upon elections to reunify Vietnam. This decision led to a resumption of the war, with the Americans taking the place of the French.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cambodia; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Dulles, John Foster; Indochina War; Laos; Mendès-France, Pierre; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Ngo Dinh Diem; Pham Van Dong; Vietnam War; Zhou Enlai

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Geneva Conference
(1955)

Four-power conference among the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France convened to discuss German reunification, the status of East European states, and disarmament. At the invitation of the Soviet Union, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, over the objections of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, agreed to meet with Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin in Geneva to discuss Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's disarmament proposals. Eisenhower shared Dulles's concerns about the efficacy of summit diplomacy and questioned Khrushchev's motives but also believed that the United States must be willing to meet directly with leaders of the Soviet Union.

Coming on the heels of the May 1955 Austrian State Treaty, which provided for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Austria, Washington and Moscow seemed committed to reducing international tensions. Although Bulganin was nominally in charge of the Soviet delegation, the Geneva Conference served as Khrushchev's debut as the real power in the post-Stalin Soviet leadership. Khrushchev's newfound confidence, based upon increased Soviet strength in both conventional and strategic arms, prompted him to call for peaceful coexistence between the Western and Eastern blocs based upon mutual strength and respect.

The Geneva Conference had mixed results for both the Soviets and Americans. On the one hand, in the short term, the summit popularized the so-called Spirit of Geneva, demonstrating the willingness of both sides to at least temporarily suspend belligerent rhetoric, which reassured much of the world. Clearly, both countries recognized the danger that nuclear weapons presented to the rest of the world. Most important, both nations agreed that nuclear war would lead to mutual genocide.

On the other hand, the Soviets rejected Eisenhower's Open Skies Proposal, a plan to open Eastern and Western bloc nations to aerial inspection of military installations; summarily dismissed his rather feeble attempts to establish freedom for Eastern Europe; and refused to support a reunified Germany except on a neutralized basis.

By December 1955 each side had begun to charge the other with violating the Spirit of Geneva. In reality, the Soviets and Americans defined the Spirit of Geneva according to their own interests. For Washington, it meant agreeing to reunify Germany through free elections, upholding the United Nations Charter calling for independence for all nations, and ending Soviet adventurism. For Moscow, it meant acceptance of peaceful coexistence, recognition of a divided Germany, and acknowledgment of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Thus, the Geneva Conference only temporarily reduced tensions between the superpowers.

Chris Tudda

See also

Austrian State Treaty; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Khrushchev, Nikita; Open Skies Proposal; Peaceful Coexistence

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Geneva Conference (1959)

Meeting of the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States intended to relieve Cold War tensions caused by the Berlin Crisis. The major powers had long clashed over divided Germany, and the goal of the conference was to negotiate a reunification of the two Germanies under circumstances agreeable to all.

The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers opened on 11 May 1959 with a statement by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. Opening statements by representatives of the four participant nations came two days later. The principals were Christian A. Herter for the United States, Selwyn Lloyd for Britain, Maurice Couve de Murville for France, and Andrey Gromyko for the Soviet Union. In a preconference compromise, representatives from the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) also attended, although they were seated at adjacent tables rather than at the central table with the Big Four.

The meeting was convened in response to a threat made by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, thereby negating the Allies' legal basis for the occupation of West Berlin. The United States had made clear that it would defend its right to be in West Berlin and that any attempt to force the Western powers from the city would result in war. The situation in Berlin specifically and in Germany generally threatened to spawn a major conflagration.

The framework for discussions, to which the four powers had agreed before the conference, contained two parallel proposals: first, that Germany be unified in stages, concluding in a single German state, and second, that arms limitation agreements should move forward at each stage of the German reunification process. Herter, standing in for ailing U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, offered the initial American proposal, which amounted to a reiteration of the American proposals presented earlier at the 1955 Geneva Conference, now bundled as a package.

Specific proposals included reunification of Berlin and Germany, a peace treaty with the new Germany, and arms limitation for the new state. Gromyko wanted to unwrap the package to deal first with Berlin before moving on to other questions. He was disturbed by the prospect of West Germany joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a possibility not eliminated by the American proposal. As a result, Gromyko rejected Herter's proposal and threatened to renew the six-month deadline for a German peace treaty.

The day the first session ended, 27 May, marked the expiration of the original six-month deadline Khrushchev had set for a solution to the Berlin question. No progress had been made.

During the first session Dulles died, and the ministers soon adjourned to Washington for the funeral and a short break before returning to Geneva for a second session. Negotiations in this session ended almost as quickly as they began because Khrushchev and GDR leader Walter Ulbricht instructed Gromyko to renew the six-month deadline over Berlin.

On 16 June, Herter proposed an amended version of previous offers with similar proposals and new concessions to the Soviets, including promises not to augment existing American forces in Berlin, not to provide the new German state with nuclear weapons, and not to sponsor subversive activities against East Germany. Gromyko rejected this proposal but did extend the deadline for a German peace treaty to eighteen months. On 20 June, the conferees agreed on a three-week recess until 13 July.

Khrushchev provided Gromyko with no real power to negotiate a deal with the West, and Gromyko gave little ground on any issue. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower soon became convinced that only high-level, leader-to-leader talks would yield diplomatic results. In July, Eisenhower duly sent Vice President Richard Nixon to Moscow in the hopes of extracting concessions from Khrushchev and with a note from Eisenhower inviting the Soviet leader to visit the United States that fall. Khrushchev accepted, and when Eisenhower announced the bilateral summit on 3 August, he removed any impetus for the Geneva Conference, which ended on 5 August 1959 having made no progress regarding Germany.

Brian Madison Jones

See also

Berlin Crises; Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II; Gromyko, Andrey; Herter, Christian Archibald

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Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan (21–22 November 1985)

First meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev held on 21–22 November 1985 in Geneva,

U.S. President Ronald Reagan meets with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during the Geneva Summit in Switzerland in November 1985. (Ronald Reagan Library)

Switzerland. The two leaders sought meaningful discussions on arms control, the Afghanistan War, and human rights.

The series of events that led to the Geneva Meeting began in November 1982 with the death of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, who was succeeded by Yuri Andropov. In March 1983, Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a space-based missile defense shield intended to protect the United States from nuclear attack and begin the process toward total nuclear disarmament. In September 1983, Soviet fighters shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan, and two months later the Soviets walked out of arms reduction talks taking place in Switzerland. Meanwhile, the United States followed through with plans to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. Superpower relations had reached a nadir.

Andropov died in February 1984 and was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko. When Chernenko died in March 1985, Gorbachev succeeded him. During Chernenko's funeral, Reagan sent a personal message to Gorbachev through Vice President George H. W. Bush requesting a fresh start in U.S.-Soviet relations.

In frigid weather and without his overcoat, the seventy-four-year-old Reagan met the fifty-four-year-old Gorbachev halfway down the steps of the building in which they held their first discussion. Gorbachev chided Reagan good-naturedly for not wearing a coat. This initial image was, at least, quite positive. The official agenda outlined several items for discussion, mainly SDI, regional conflicts, bilateral relations, and human rights. In their first meeting, which was supposed to last fifteen minutes, the two leaders spoke for an hour.

Through fifteen hours of meetings and an additional five hours of private discussions, the two heads of state covered topics including a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms, an intermediate nuclear forces treaty, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, El Salvador, new consulates in Kiev and New York City, and cultural exchanges between the superpowers. In general, Reagan detailed the problems that divided the two nations, while Gorbachev wished to talk about areas of mutual agreement.

In the end, Reagan and Gorbachev failed to reach any lasting agreements on any of the major issues. The major obstruction was Reagan's refusal to give up his plans for SDI. Gorbachev was wary about SDI and argued that it only made sense if the United States was planning a nuclear first strike. Reagan countered that SDI was vital to American interests and that when it worked, the United States would share the technology with the Soviets and soon nuclear weapons could be eliminated completely. Gorbachev did not believe him and asserted that he would not agree to a reduc-

tion in offensive weapons as long as the United States planned to deploy the missile shield.

The Geneva Meeting, however, was not a total failure. The two leaders agreed on the need to slow the arms race and strengthen nuclear nonproliferation efforts. They also agreed in principle that nuclear wars could not be won. More substantively, they decided to begin serious negotiations for an intermediate nuclear forces treaty even if discussions over heavier weapons were not in the works. Discussions of human rights and regional conflicts were limited.

The great impact of the Geneva Meeting was that Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to future face-to-face meetings. A Reykjavík summit was planned, and Gorbachev pledged to visit the United States in 1986, while Reagan planned to go to Moscow in 1987. Subsequent meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev were first discussed at Geneva in 1985, and those meetings helped to reduce tensions and, ultimately, end the Cold War.

Brian Madison Jones

See also

Afghanistan War; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Reykjavík Meeting; Strategic Defense Initiative

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Genocide

In the aftermath of World War II and the Nazi regime's extermination of approximately 6 million Jews and 5 million other people, the United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution on 9 December 1948 recommending that international attention and cooperation be focused on the prevention of and punishment for genocide. It was, in fact, the horrific slaughter by the Nazis, along with the continuing efforts of jurist Raphael Lemkin (1900–1958), that prompted UN member states to formally recognize genocide as a crime under international law.

From the outset, the development of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNCG) was plagued by great difficulty and controversy. For example, a contretemps erupted over whether to provide protection for political groups under the UNCG. The Soviet Union argued that the inclusion of political groups would not conform "with the scientific definition of genocide and would, in practice, distort the perspective in which the crime should be viewed and impair the efficacy of the Convention."

Similarly, the Polish government added that including political groups would dilute the UNCG's aims. Yet another argument against the inclusion of political groups was that unlike national, racial, or religious groups, membership in political groups was voluntary. In a later session, however, the French argued that genocide might easily be committed on political grounds sometime in the future. As a result of compromise, both political and social groups were ultimately removed from specific protection under the UNCG.

The upshot of the compromise was that the UNCG came to define genocide as constituting any acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The acts specifically listed as constituting genocide were killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The Western world, and in particular the United States, saw the catastrophe that befell the Hutu as irrelevant as far as the bigger picture of defeating communism was concerned.

For all intents and purposes, however, the UNCG became a dead letter of sorts during the Cold War years, a period when the world was confronted by an enormous number of bewildering stresses and strains. Characterizing many of these stresses were the numerous genocidal outbreaks that took place in former colonial territories vacated, sometimes amicably but often violently, by imperial powers in the years following 1945. Nowhere were these played out with such devastating ferocity as in Africa and Asia.

The objectives of those who initially shaped the post-1945 agenda resulted in a mixed bag of idealism vis-à-vis the attempted protection of human rights alongside a continual period of killing in large wars, small wars, civil wars, and sometimes when there was no war at all.

One place in which genocide occurred was the west African state of Biafra. The country had been formed in 1967 when the eastern state of Nigeria broke away to establish itself as an independent nation. The Nigerian Civil War that followed (1967–1970) was the first occasion in which scenes of mass starvation were brought home to a television-dominated West, and millions of people were horrified by what they saw. Less apparent was the reality that lay behind this otherwise simple case of a brutal and bloody secessionist conflict. Some scholars assert that in their determination to defeat the breakaway state, the Nigerians deliberately designed and perpetuated a genocidal policy of enforced famine against the population of Biafra.

The Biafran conflict led to a death toll of up to a million people, most of them of the Christian Ibo ethnic group. The Nigerian Federal Army and the government that supported it ostensibly perpetrated genocide through what many believe were premeditated and strictly enforced policies of starvation and the military targeting of civilians.

Forced starvation was employed as a weapon of war for the purpose of destroying the Biafrans' ability to sustain themselves as a viable nation. Under such conditions, Biafra existed for only two and a half years, until its collapse in January 1970. In recent years, discussion has begun on the extent to which the countries of the West (particularly Britain) and the UN chose to turn a

blind eye to events in Biafra and whether Cold War considerations clouded their judgment as they framed their policies toward the breakaway state.

The year 1971 saw a struggle in which East Pakistan sought to secede from West Pakistan, a move that was resisted with staggering violence. The subsequent emergence of the independent nation of Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan) was accompanied by some 3 million dead and 250,000 women and girls raped, the result of a calculated policy initiated by the government of West Pakistan for the purpose of terrorizing the population of East Pakistan into accepting a continuance of a united Pakistani state.

The following year, 1972, saw another outbreak of genocidal violence, this time in the tiny central African nation of Burundi, where a Hutu-instigated uprising against Tutsi domination resulted in the military subjugation and massacre of thousands of Hutu civilians over a five-month period. The final death toll numbered up to 150,000 people and ushered in a period of Tutsi dominance that was to last for several decades. In the meantime, the Hutu majority population was reduced to a position of institutionalized second-class subservience.

Mass grave containing the bodies of Bengali intellectuals, killed by Razakars during the war for Bangladeshi independence, 18 December 1971, in a clay pit near Dhaka. (Christian Simonpietri/Sygma/Corbis)

It was characteristic of the era that Burundi became (as Biafra and Bangladesh had been before it) a location for Cold War rivalries. The Western world, and in particular the United States, saw the catastrophe that befell the Hutu as irrelevant as far as the bigger picture of defeating communism was concerned. The French government saw the conflict as an opportunity to reinforce its preferred Francophone client state, while communist countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) took the opportunity to assist the Tutsi junta with arms and infrastructural support as a means to coax the regime away from the West.

Just over two years after the worst of the violence ceased in Burundi, the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer) won a bloody civil war in Cambodia. This commenced one of the most radical attempts at remodeling an existing society that the world has ever known. In taking the Cambodian people back to "Year Zero," as Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot put it, at least 1.5 million people (some estimates put the total higher, at between 1.7 million and 2 million) lost their lives. The killing continued for more than three years and did not come to an end until Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and drove the Khmer Rouge from power.

Vietnam's intervention was not based on altruism or concern over the genocide per se but rather was a result of political differences and violent border skirmishes and incursions by the Khmer Rouge. Nations such as the United States, Britain, and Australia looked the other way as the Khmer

Rouge carried out its genocide. In the Cold War environment, the communist Khmer Rouge was seen as the enemy of communist Vietnam, and in a bizarre strategic game of prioritizing, the countries of the West preferred to consider the Khmer Rouge less of a threat than the Vietnamese (and, of course, the United States still harbored great animosity toward Vietnam). This was a case of "my enemy's enemy is my friend" taken to the extreme.

In 1975, yet another Cold War genocide was occurring in Asia, this time in the former Portuguese territory of East Timor. In 1975 the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), one of the political factions jockeying for power in the aftermath of Portuguese decolonization, declared the territory's independence. Within weeks, Indonesia invaded, declared East Timor its twenty-seventh state, and began a systematic campaign of human rights abuses that brought mass murders, starvation, and death by torture of up to 200,000 people, about a third of the preinvasion East Timorese population.

For many years the international response to what was happening in East Timor was one of indifference. Indonesia's neighbor, Australia, was especially keen not to antagonize the populous nation to its north and was the first (and for a long time the only) country to recognize the de jure incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. UN resolutions calling on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor were ignored, and the United States, anxious not to alienate the Indonesians, skirted the whole issue. Only in 1999, after a long period of Indonesian oppression and the threat of another outbreak of genocidal violence (this time committed by Indonesian-backed militias and units of the Indonesian Army), was East Timor freed.

In sum, the Cold War had a devastating effect on post-1945 hopes that a new nongenocidal regime could be imposed across the globe. Not only were peoples and groups in conflict left to fight out their differences unimpeded, but all too often, as capitalist and communist states saw the possibility of achieving an advantage through either action or inaction, those committing genocidal acts were frequently aided and abetted for the most blatant of realpolitik motives. Britain, for example, refused to assist Biafra in alleviating its distress, for to do so would further undermine Nigeria at a time when oil exploration was starting to bear fruit, and a strong Nigeria was needed to keep out Soviet influence in sub-Saharan Africa.

As long as the Cold War continued, there was little chance that the kind of pressures likely to lead to a genocidal situation would find a release valve. The great powers played a leading role in manipulating local conflicts to suit their own needs, after which each side was able to serve as a proxy in the greater ideological conflicts of the time. The Cold War showed with great clarity that the world's major players paid only lip service to their postwar commitment to never again stand by while genocide took place.

Paul R. Bartrop and Samuel Totten

See also

Bangladesh; Biafra War; Cambodia; Human Rights; Indonesia; Khmer Rouge; Pakistan

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Genscher, Hans-Dietrich
(1927–)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) politician, leader of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), minister of the interior (1969–1974), foreign minister (1974–1992), and vice chancellor (1974–1992). Born on 21 March 1927 in Reideburg, Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher studied law and political economy at the universities of Halle and Leipzig, both in the Soviet zone of occupation, during 1946–1949 and became a junior lawyer at Halle after his 1949 graduation. During 1946–1952, he was a member of Germany's Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPD).

Due to rising Cold War tensions, Genscher left Halle in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) for Bremen in the FRG in 1952 and worked as a solicitor. In 1954 he joined the FDP; two years later, he became assistant secretary and in 1959 the secretary of the FDP group in the Bundestag. From 1962 to 1964, he served as FDP party secretary, and in 1965 he was elected to the Bundestag. From 1968 to 1974 he was FDP deputy chairman, and during 1974–1985 he served as FDP chairman.

Genscher was appointed minister of the interior in the Willy Brandt government in October 1969, a post he retained until 1974. In the Helmut Schmidt government, Genscher became minister of foreign affairs and vice chancellor on 16 May 1974. As such, he proved to be a strong supporter of Ostpolitik, the diplomatic effort in Eastern Europe, and of the close alliance of West Germany with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and its European partners. After disputes erupted over economic policies, Genscher and three other FDP ministers resigned from the Schmidt government on 17 September 1982.

A month later, in the new coalition government under Helmut Kohl, Genscher again assumed the posts of minister of foreign affairs and vice chancellor. In the 1980s, he committed himself to a new détente policy and cultivating better East-West relations, intending to take Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and perestroika very

Federal Republic of Germany (FG, West Germany) Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher attending the European Community summit in Brussels, Belgium, 30 March 1985. (Reuters/Corbis)

seriously. During 1989–1990, Genscher and Kohl became the chief political architects of Germany reunification. Genscher reached the zenith of his popularity in September 1989 when he spoke to 6,000 East German refugees who had fled to the West German embassy in Prague and announced that they were allowed to leave for the FRG on the same day.

In May 1990, Genscher chaired the first meeting of six foreign ministers, the so-called Two-Plus-Four Talks, in Bonn, where the international ramifications of Germany's unity were discussed. In mid-July 1990, he accompanied Kohl to his meeting with Gorbachev in the Caucasus, which is regarded as a historic milestone on the road to reunification. In May 1992 Genscher retired from his ministerial posts, but he remained a member of the Bundestag until 1998.

Bert Becker

See also

Brandt, Willy; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Kohl, Helmut; Schmidt, Helmut

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Gensuikyō

Japanese antinuclear weapons congress officially formed in 1955. Gensuikyō (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai, or Japanese Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) began as a petition signed by some 33 million people after the so-called Lucky Dragon Incident of 1 March 1954 in which radiation from a U.S. hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Island fell on a Japanese fishing boat. By the 1960s Gensuikyō had grown into perhaps the greatest grassroots movement in Japanese history and the world's largest antinuclear weapons organization.

Gensuikyō was formally created in September 1955. Thereafter, annual international congresses were held in Hiroshima on the anniversary of the atomic bombing there. However, the organization gradually lost support as it came under increasing Chinese and Soviet influence. Gensuikyō suffered its first major split in 1961, when groups affiliated with the Japanese Democratic Socialist Party established their own antinuclear organization. The 1961 congress witnessed a fierce struggle between members of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) as well as between advocates of total nuclear disarmament and those who viewed U.S. imperialism as the enemy of peace. The JCP's view ultimately prevailed. Henceforth,

Gensuikyō supported Moscow, which it called a "peace force," even after the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing shortly thereafter.

When the 1962 Gensuikyō congress refused to denounce a massive Soviet atmospheric nuclear test, JSP delegates walked out. Disagreements over the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty destroyed any lingering hope of reuniting the Japanese peace movement. When the Gensuikyō congress opened a week after the treaty was signed, Soviet and Chinese delegates clashed bitterly over the treaty, with the JCP adopting the Chinese line. The following year the JCP prevented Soviet delegates from being heard at all, so they subsequently attended a rival JSP congress. By February 1965, with Soviet support, the JSP congress was transformed into the Gensuibaku Kinshi Kokumin Kaigi (Japanese Citizens' Conference for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons). The two rival antinuclear organizations maintained their separate identities into the post–Cold War era.

Christopher W. Braddick

See also

Japan; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Partial Test Ban Treaty; Peace Movements

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George VI, King of Great Britain
(1895–1952)

King of Great Britain (1936–1952). Born on 14 December 1895 in Sandringham, England, Albert Frederick Arthur George was the second son of future King George V and Queen Mary. Called "Bertie" by his family, he was a shy and sickly child who received only a marginal education until he graduated without distinction from the Royal Naval College in 1913. He served in the Royal Navy during 1913–1916, seeing action during World War I at the Battle of Jutland, but ill health ended his naval career. After the war he spent a year at Trinity College, Cambridge; became Duke of York in 1920; and married Lady Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon in 1923. The couple had two daughters, Elizabeth and Margaret.

In 1936, the Duke of York unexpectedly and reluctantly ascended the throne in the wake of the 1936 abdication crisis of his elder brother King Edward VIII. The duke was crowned George VI to maintain a sense of royal continuity. King George VI largely overcame his chronic stammering and shyness to become a much-loved and effective monarch.

George remained in London during the German Blitz of World War II, while Buckingham Palace was bombed nine times. The king regularly visited bombed-out sections of London and visited British troops in the field,

George VI, king of Great Britain from 1936 to 1952. One of the most respected monarchs in British history, he sought to maintain the resolve and morale of his people during the World War II Battle of Britain. (Library of Congress)

greatly endearing him to his people and boosting national morale. His younger brother, the Duke of Kent, was killed in action in the war, creating a bond of sympathy between the royal family and English families who had lost loved ones. The king also converted the gardens of Windsor Castle into crop fields, which he himself tended.

Throughout the war, King George VI maintained a close relationship with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and was disappointed with the Labour Party victory in the 1945 elections. George opposed Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and gave his full support to Churchill's 1947 Fulton, Missouri, "Sinews of Speech" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech). In 1947 George helped facilitate Indian independence. He also backed Prime Minister Clement Attlee's decision to dispatch troops to the Korean War in 1950.

King George's health deteriorated rapidly in the late 1940s. In September 1951 cancer necessitated the removal of his left lung, a procedure from which he never fully recovered. He died at Sandringham on 6 February 1952 and was succeeded by his daughter as Queen Elizabeth II.

Casey Wineman

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl; Churchill, Winston; Elizabeth II, Queen of England; United Kingdom

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Georgia

Former Soviet republic. Located in Transcaucasia at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East, Georgia covers 26,911 square miles, making it slightly larger than the U.S. state of West Virginia. It borders on Russia to the north, Azerbaijan to the east, Armenia and Turkey to the south, and the Black Sea to the west. Its 1945 population was roughly 3.5 million. Frequently invaded and torn between stronger powers, Georgia's position as a border region resulted in the development of a national identity and culture reflecting diverse influences. The most enduring cultural legacies include Georgia's conversion to Christianity in the early fourth century and development of a unique alphabet, both of which contributed to the formation of a strong national identity.

Georgia's role in the early years of the Cold War was influenced, in part, by its geostrategic position on the southern border of the Soviet Union. At the end of World War II, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin laid claim to the provinces of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Turkey, which had been incorporated into the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century and ceded to Turkey after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. These claims were initially made on behalf of Soviet Armenia, but claims on behalf of Soviet Georgia followed shortly thereafter.

Soviet pressure on Turkey combined with Soviet aid to communist guerrillas in the Greek Civil War and the continuing Soviet occupation of northern Iran, however, elicited a strong response from U.S. President Harry S. Truman. The 1947 Truman Doctrine was thereby promulgated to provide aid to Turkey and Greece in their struggle against communist insurrections. This strong rebuff was one of the key factors that induced the Soviets to drop their claims to the disputed provinces.

Soviet Georgia underwent major economic and social changes in the 1950s and 1960s as a period of relative stability took hold in the Soviet Union. In 1956, however, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and began the process of de-Stalinization. Stalin, a Georgian by birth, was viewed by many Georgians as an important national figure and a strong leader who saved the Soviet Union from Nazi Germany. Georgians were alarmed by Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin's memory and took to the streets to express their displeasure. Their protests were violently disbursed by the Soviet security forces, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries.

By the 1970s, life in Georgia under the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Eduard Shevardnadze, who dominated its political life during 1972–1985, was marked by an emphasis on law and order accompanied by several anticorruption campaigns. In 1978, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev recommended changes to the Soviet constitution and corresponding changes for the republics of the Soviet Union. Such changes normally received rubber-stamp approval from the Soviet republics. However, in the new Georgian constitution, the clause maintaining Georgian as the official language was removed. This sparked widespread disaffection and street protests. Brezhnev backed down, and the Georgians were successful in maintaining the official status of their language.

Georgian political activism during the Brezhnev era took place within the context of increasing standards of living and rising expectations. These expectations were further increased when Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet general secretary in 1985. Soon after assuming power, he embarked on an ambitious program of restructuring Soviet society and economy through his glasnost and perestroika reform initiatives. Gradually, glasnost and perestroika reached the periphery of the Soviet Union, and Georgian political and social activists took advantage of the opportunities made available by Gorbachev's policies to push for widespread reforms. Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Georgia led some people to advocate for independence as well.

Soviet armored vehicles in front of the Georgian government building following a demonstration in which eighteen proindependence Georgians were killed by Soviet paratroopers. (AFP/Getty Images)

Various reform groups surfaced with varying political, social, and economic agendas, but gradually those forces advocating Georgian independence became predominant. By early 1989, nationalist forces had begun to hold demonstrations. The turning point of the independence movement took place on 9 April 1989. Georgian demonstrators had initially been protesting against developments in Abkhazia, an autonomous region inside Georgia. Soon, however, their demands broadened, and the demonstrators agitated for independence. Despite the fact that the demonstrations were peaceful and attended largely by women and young people, Soviet troops intervened with gas and sharpened shovels, killing some twenty people and wounding several hundred others. Responsibility for this shocking turn of events, known as the April Tragedy, was debated widely in Georgia and throughout the Soviet Union. Most believed it to be the work of the central authorities in Moscow, and this only served to galvanize opposition to Soviet rule.

Popular pressure, opposition strikes, and other forms of civil disobedience led to multiparty elections for the Georgian Supreme Soviet in October 1990, in which the supporters of the popular oppositionist and Georgian nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia won a majority of the seats, followed by the Georgian Communist Party. Gamsakhurdia was sworn in as chairman of the Supreme Soviet in November 1990. The new Georgian parliament then decided not to participate in Gorbachev's March 1991 all-Union referendum on the future

of the Soviet Union and instead organized a national referendum on independence. In the referendum, more than 98 percent of the population favored independence. On 9 April 1991, the second anniversary of the April Tragedy, the Georgian parliament adopted a declaration of independence and formally seceded from the Soviet Union. In May 1991, Gamsakhurdia was elected president of the Republic of Georgia with 86 percent of the vote.

Despite these sweeping democratic changes, however, Georgian political life was far from stable. Gamsakhurdia's increasingly erratic behavior, accompanied by his stridently nationalist rhetoric, alienated large segments of the population, especially the Abkhazians and South Ossetians, two autonomous non-Georgian ethnic groups. In December 1991 he abolished the autonomy of South Ossetia in response to a local drive for independence from Georgia. Political conflict soon gave way to armed strife, which lasted until a Russian-mediated cease-fire was brokered in July 1992. Tensions in Abkhazia would not result in open warfare until 1992, after the end of the Cold War.

The failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev was a further blow to Gamsakhurdia's credibility when he declined to denounce the plotters. His position deteriorated even further during the fall of 1991, and in December 1991 civil war broke out in Georgia, forcing him to flee the country. Conflict would ravage the country until the return of Shevardnadze to power in March 1992.

Robert Owen Krikorian

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Greek Civil War; Perestroika; Shevardnadze, Eduard; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Truman Doctrine

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German Democratic Republic
(1949–1991)

The German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) was officially created on 7 October 1949 as a direct result of the Cold War. Unable to arrive at a postwar settlement with Great Britain, France, and the United States regarding Germany, the Soviet Union allowed its zone of occupation to become a sovereign state. East Germany's population in 1950 was 18.4 million people.

At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the Allies had agreed to jointly occupy Germany pending the final resolution of a peace treaty. Germany and Berlin, its capital, were divided into four zones to be administered by the

May Day rally in the Soviet sector of Berlin, 1951. (Bettmann/Corbis)

four victorious powers. Although the occupied territories were to be treated as a single economic unit, disputes over the disposition of resources surfaced almost immediately. The future of Germany became an immediate subject of debate, with the Soviet Union pressing for the formation of a communist Germany.

The first steps in this direction were taken even before the war ended. Walter Ulbricht, a German communist who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union training for this eventuality, led a group of exiles back to Germany with the Red Army. With Soviet support, they placed sympathizers in key posts in the new, superficially democratic administration of the occupied territory. The communists' record of resisting the Nazis allowed them to outmaneuver other political parties permitted in the Soviet zone. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD), however, remained a challenge. Backed by the Soviet military authorities, Ulbricht engineered the merger of the eastern branches of the SPD with the German Communist Party (KPD) in April 1946. The resulting Socialist Unity Party (SED) was under communist control by 1948.

Even though Soviet military authorities allowed the so-called Bloc Parties (the Christian Democratic Union, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Farmers' Party, and the National Democratic Party) to operate in their zone, the SED had an effective monopoly on power. The mass organizations that were given a place in the new political system (the Free German Trade Unions, the Free German Youth, the German Women's League, and the Cultural League) were also under the SED's firm control. The German communists, with the aid and support of the Soviets, had thus laid the foundations for a single-party state by the time the disputes between the Western powers and the Soviets came to a head in April 1948, in the form of the Berlin Blockade.

The blockade itself was the result of a series of disagreements over the administration of Berlin as well as over the future development of Germany. Both sides used the process of granting incrementally greater authority to Germans and German institutions as leverage in negotiations. The end result was the 1949 creation of two separate German states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and East Germany.

The Western Allies did not immediately recognize the East German state. The West German state, they contended, was not intended as a permanent solution to the German question. By and large, the Western Allies and the new West German government viewed the division of Germany as the result of deliberate Soviet policy and continued to claim the right to represent all Germans. The Soviets, on the other hand, appeared to consider the question closed. They granted East Germany immediate recognition as a sovereign, constitutional state, whereas West Germany was deemed a self-governing Allied Protectorate.

Despite the appointment of Wilhelm Pieck as East Germany's first president, Ulbricht remained the driving force in the government's development. His policies were slavishly Stalinist. Under the slogan of "constructing socialism," he purged the SED, established the infamous Ministry for State Security (Stasi), and introduced a Marxist-Leninist curriculum in the schools. State investment focused on creating heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods, while collectivization was the goal in agriculture. In addition, the East German government continued to make reparations payments to the Soviet Union in the form of goods and capital stock. Poor economic conditions combined with an increasingly totalitarian political structure caused many East Germans to flee the country. The East German government closed its border with the West in May 1952, but the exodus continued, as Berlin remained an open city. On average, more than 175,000 people per year left East Germany for West Germany between 1949 and 1953.

Open rebellion against the SED regime, however, did not coalesce until June 1953. The failure of the government to rescind an increase in the expected levels of production—in line with Soviet policy since the death of Josef Stalin in March 1953—spurred mass strikes in Berlin. Demonstrations in the capital on 16 June 1953 spread to the rest of the country the following day, until the Soviet Army sent tanks to quell the disturbances. Ironically, the

uprising strengthened Ulbricht's position, as the Soviets were now clearly committed to supporting his regime.

Ulbricht nonetheless instituted limited reforms aimed at placating East Germans. The SED dropped its Five-Year Plan and adopted a more balanced Seven-Year model, collectivization was temporarily abandoned, and the centralized economy shifted its focus to providing more housing and basic consumer goods. Without fundamental reforms, however, the East German economy continued to lag far behind that of West Germany. Ulbricht's solution to this slow growth was to increase the tempo of socialization in the late 1950s, resuming collectivization and pressing business owners into cooperatives. The regime also stepped up its communist indoctrination efforts. East German youths were pressed to join the police and armed forces (East Germany had become part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955) to demonstrate their commitment to socialism. In the meantime, the flow of refugees moving through Berlin from East to West accelerated.

The solution to this problem, proposed by Ulbricht and approved by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, was to close the border in Berlin as well. On the night of 12–13 August 1961, East German police units began constructing the Berlin Wall. Labeled an antifascist bulwark by the SED regime, the wall's construction was seen in the West as an admission of defeat. It served its purpose, however. Not only did it stop the drain of talent and manpower, but it also allowed the East German government room to experiment with reforms.

On the very night that the Berlin Wall went up, Ulbricht initiated a program of de-Stalinization, changing the names of streets, squares, buildings, and factories. By 1963, the regime was comfortable enough to announce the New Economic System (NES). Aimed at improving productivity and making management more responsible, the NES was a limited market-oriented system that brought a short-term surge in growth. In the long run, however, the SED was unwilling to surrender enough control over the economy to make the system work. The NES was abandoned in 1970.

Curiously, in 1968 the SED had promulgated a new constitution that not only cemented the party's leading role in politics but also declared East Germany a socialist state, bringing the construction phase to a close. East Germany, however, could hardly be considered successful. The economy was stagnant, and East Germans continued to seek refuge in the West whenever they could. Pressure from the West, in the form of the Hallstein Doctrine, left the state isolated beyond the Soviet bloc.

Ulbricht, aging and increasingly out of touch, was quietly pushed aside in favor of Erich Honecker, formerly head of the communist youth organizations, in 1971. In Cold War terms, West German politics had shifted decisively as well, as the SPD came to power in 1969. As part of an initiative known as Ostpolitik, Willy Brandt, the new chancellor of West Germany, favored opening relations with East Germany. Honecker spoke of "no taboos," indicating a willingness to open East German society and culture, if not East German politics and the Berlin Wall.

The increased flexibility on both sides paid handsome dividends. Brandt opened his initiative with a visit to East Germany in May 1970 to discuss

intra-German relations. Progress was limited, however, as Ulbricht insisted on linking other issues to the question of West Berlin's status. Under Honecker, representatives of West Germany and East Germany managed to work out new agreements on transit and tourism (part of the four-power Berlin accord of 1971) relatively quickly. On 8 November 1972, after only six months of negotiations, the two states concluded a Basic Treaty that established relatively normal relations between them. While the two Germanies stopped short of full-scale recognition, the Basic Treaty acknowledged the reality of two states.

This was a major triumph for East Germany, as its diplomatic isolation came to an end. Trade with the West grew substantially, and increasing visits from West Germans provided a steady source of hard currency. To a considerable degree, the West underwrote the refurbishment of the East German infrastructure. This allowed Honecker to implement social programs on a grand scale. Between 1971 and 1980, the regime built more than a million new housing units and renovated half a million more. Economic policy centered on the provision of consumer goods, and the East German standard of living, although still lower than West Germany's, was the highest in the Soviet bloc.

Under Honecker, moreover, the SED regime scaled back indoctrination campaigns, accepting public conformity as being sufficient. Most East Germans went along with the bargain, supporting—or at least not opposing—the SED in public and otherwise retreating into their private lives. Those who continued to criticize the regime openly, such as Wolf Biermann and Vera Wollenberger, usually found themselves "exiled" to the West. The Stasi established an extensive network of spies and informants that effectively quashed any nonconformist movements before they could start.

The Stasi established an extensive network of spies and informants that effectively quashed any nonconformist movements before they could start.

Honecker's no-taboos state thus evolved into a stagnant society—a "niche society" as Günter Gaus famously termed it—in which stability and outward conformity were most important. The politics of the East German state were nonetheless hollow. Although the SED professed confidence in its support from the population, it consistently refused to allow citizens below retirement age to travel to the West. Supported financially by West Germany and politically by the Soviet Union, however, East Germany played an increasingly important role in Cold War and international politics. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and the United States came to loggerheads over the deployment of nuclear missiles on German territory. Although Honecker accepted the missiles, he acted as a moderating force in the standoff. He insisted that gains in West German–East German relations would lead to a solution favorable to the Soviets and that the entente therefore needed to be preserved.

The Soviets effectively turned the tables under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. When Honecker steadfastly refused to go along with Gorbachev's radical program for reforming socialism internally (perestroika), the Soviet leader made it clear that support for East Germany would be limited. This along with Honecker's continuing liberalization of intra-German relations —allowing independent political demonstrations in 1987, for example, or

televising debates between East and West German politicians—ultimately led to the collapse of the East German state.

When the Hungarian government removed the fortifications along its border with Austria in May 1989, more than 30,000 East Germans fled along this route in just six months. Honecker refused to acknowledge the mass exodus, and during a visit to East Germany on 7 October 1989, Gorbachev made it clear that the Soviet Union would not intervene as it had in 1953. Two days later, demonstrations against the SED regime began in Leipzig.

Reformers within the SED, led by Egon Krenz, seized the opportunity to oust Honecker at the party plenum on 18 October 1989. On 9 November they announced that citizens of East Germany would be allowed to travel freely. Within days, millions of East Germans had broken through the Berlin Wall, literally in many cases, to visit West Germany. Further attempts at reform by the Krenz government paled against the economic lure of the West, however. On 18 March 1990, East Germans voted overwhelmingly for unity with West Germany. State treaties for the economic (1 July 1990) and political (3 October 1990) union of the two Germanies soon followed. The German Democratic Republic, one of the central players in the Cold War in Europe, had ceased to exist.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Wall; Brandt, Willy; East Berlin Uprising; Germany, Federal Republic of; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hallstein Doctrine; Honecker, Erich; Khrushchev, Nikita; Krenz, Egon; Ostpolitik; Perestroika; Pieck, Wilhelm; Stalin, Josef; Stasi; Ulbricht, Walter

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German Democratic Republic, Armed Forces

The armed forces of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) included the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA, National People's Army), the Grenztruppen (Border Troops), units of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MFS, Ministry of State), the Volkspolizei (VP, People's Police), the Kampf-

gruppen der Arbeiterklasse (Combat Groups of the Working Class), and the Zivilverteidigung (Civil Defense). The NVA was, however, the heart of East Germany's national defense structure. In July 1952 the armed military police force was transformed into the Kasernierte Volkspolizei (KVP, Garrisoned People's Police), predecessor of the armed forces of East Germany.

The rearmament of East Germany was made public in May 1955 in conjunction with the foundation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), which was itself a response to the incorporation of a rearmed Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that same month. On 18 January 1956, the East German parliament, the Volkskammer (Chamber of People's Deputies), established the NVA and the Ministry of National Defense (MFNV). By 1 March 1956, the command authorities of the new army reported their operational readiness.

The NVA was organized in three military services: ground forces, consisting of two armored and four motorized rifle divisions (1987 peak strength of some 106,000 troops); air force/air defense, consisting of three divisions (1987 strength some 35,000 troops); and the People's Navy of three flotillas (1987 peak strength of approximately 14,200 men).

At its inception, the NVA was a volunteer army. Only after the August 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall was the framework for compulsory military service created. It went into effect in 1962. Until spring 1990, there was no specific provision made for conscientious objectors, and all able-bodied East Germans served a minimum and compulsory eighteen-month tour of duty. In 1964, however, it became possible to satisfy the conscription requirement as a so-called construction soldier.

East Germany's close association with Soviet military models and the state's strong desire to establish unquestioned political supremacy quickly transformed the NVA into an army of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). Almost all NVA officers were members of the SED, and a network of political officers and members of the state security apparatus provided the required political indoctrination and supervision of the rank and file.

The NVA was equipped in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Armed Forces Command of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, from 1962 the NVA received Soviet short-range missiles, and although it did have means of delivering nuclear weapons, the nuclear warheads remained in Soviet custody. Also in 1962, the air force became part of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact. Beginning in 1963, the navy was equipped with Soviet missile patrol boats and landing craft capable of conducting offensive operations in the Baltic Sea.

In the prelude to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, several NVA training exercises allowed Soviet forces in East Germany to be deployed elsewhere and provided cover for the general Warsaw Pact troop buildup. Although two NVA divisions were prepared to take part in the actual invasion, they were not requested. NVA participation was limited to a small liaison team at Warsaw Pact headquarters within Czechoslovakia.

The East German minister of defense commanded the Joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers in 1970, code-named WAFFENBRÜDERSCHAFT (brothers-in-arms), which were conducted on East German territory—proof positive that East Germany had been successfully integrated into the alliance.

In spite of the official policy of détente, combat capability and readiness were increased during the 1970s and accelerated in the early 1980s after the end of détente. In case of war, the NVA would reach a personnel strength of some 500,000 troops and would become part of the 1st and 2nd Front within the 1st Strategic Echelon. Under the command of the Soviet main force, attacks were to be launched on the territories of West Germany, Denmark, and Benelux. A special force supported by combat groups, border troops, and police readiness units were to invade West Berlin.

As civil unrest in Poland increased during 1980–1982, one NVA division was kept on alert should an invasion have been required. During the domestic crisis and disorder during the Velvet Revolution in October and November 1989, "groups of one hundred" were formed, comprising a total of 20,000 troops, to support East German police forces. The operation was conducted to secure buildings and institutions from damage or destruction.

Between 1989 and 1991, there was an initial phase of disorientation that in January 1990 was followed by demonstrations and strikes in more than forty garrisons. The NVA leadership stabilized the situation by making concessions and launching reforms. The disbanding of the political machinery within the armed forces and the introduction of democratic structures based on the rule of law after the first free elections in East Germany in March 1990 caused more uncertainty vis-à-vis the role and place of the NVA. Sweeping democratic-style reform was carried out against the backdrop of the still unsolved issue of whether there would be two armies on German territory after the reunification.

After the Soviet Union agreed to the reunified Germany's membership in NATO, the end of the NVA was sealed. On 24 September 1990, it was removed from the military organization of the Warsaw Pact and was officially disbanded on 2 October. On the day of reunification, 3 October 1990, the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces) of Germany integrated more than 89,800 former NVA members and 48,000 civilian employees.

HEINER BRÖCKERMANN

See also

Détente; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Nuclear Arms Race; Soviet Union; Warsaw Pact

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Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II
(1945–1948)

The victorious Allied powers in World War II—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and, belatedly, France—began working out guidelines and structures for the eventual occupation of Germany as early as 1944. Unable to agree on a uniform policy, they resorted to vague compromises in the final declaration at Potsdam on 2 August 1945, some three months after the German surrender.

The Allies established four supposedly temporary zones of occupation. While these largely followed old German state borders, Prussia was dissolved because of its association with militarism. U.S. forces occupied southwestern Germany, including Bavaria, northern Baden, northern Württemberg, and Hesse. The Americans also controlled the North Sea port city of Bremen in order to facilitate supply. The British zone, in northern Germany, included Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Northrhine-Westphalia, and the city of Hamburg. France governed the southwestern German region that abutted it: the Rhine-Palatine and southern Baden. The Soviet zone of occupation comprised Saxony, Thuringia, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and

Acting in accordance with Allied agreements specifying occupation zones for Germany, a U.S. soldier removes a sign in Leipzig to make way for Soviet occupation of the city, July 1945. (National Archives and Records Administration)

German Occupation Zones, 1945

Saxony-Anhalt. American troops had liberated and occupied significant portions of Mecklenburg and Thuringia at the conclusion of hostilities but, despite urging by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to remain in place, withdrew according to the agreements and in exchange for the Soviet handover of portions of Berlin.

The German capital was also divided into four zones of occupation and administration. The city center and the larger eastern portion of the city fell to the Soviet Union, while the three Western Allies divided the remainder. This arrangement left the Soviets in control of 31 percent of the German territory and about half of its resources, according to American estimates at the time. Lieutenant General Lucius Clay, the first administrative head of the American zone, noted that the Soviets had gotten the agriculture, the British received the industry, and the Americans controlled the scenery of Germany.

In theory, Germany was to be administered as a single economic unit according to the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam. Although the Allied military commander in each zone enjoyed virtual autonomy, there was also a four-power Allied Control Commission (ACC) responsible for the administration of all of Germany and a corresponding Kommandantura for Berlin. The Allies agreed in principle on three primary objectives: the deindustrialization, demilitarization, and de-Nazification of German society. The most significant and efficacious joint enterprise in this regard was the International Military Tribunal (IMT) established in Nuremberg to conduct trials of Nazi leaders and high-ranking military officers for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Even this undertaking saw disagreements among the Allies, and the implementation of the so-called 3Ds program varied widely across the zones of occupation. The Americans adopted a strategy of establishing administrative beacons at the state level, while the British attempted to create a single administration for their entire zone and even nationalized some industries. They tended to focus on reeducation with an eye toward creating a democratic German society in the near future. Both the French and the Soviets created strict military regimes that focused on extracting reparations and left Germans little room for initiative.

The Soviets, in fact, were bent on creating an entirely new social and political order in Germany and carried out a program of radical reform without consulting the ACC. German banks were dispossessed in July 1945, all estates over 245 acres were seized without compensation in September, and between October 1945 and November 1946 the Soviet military authorities confiscated all industrial enterprises in their zone. The Soviets disassembled almost 1,500 factories and shipped them back to the USSR as reparations. They also took the lion's share of remaining industrial and agricultural production.

Although the British and Americans had agreed at Potsdam that each power might take reparations from its own zone and allowed that the Soviets might claim another 10 percent of Germany's industrial production from their zones without payment, Clay felt that this went beyond the spirit of the agreement. On 4 May 1946, he suspended economic exchanges with the

French and Soviet zones on grounds that they were not treating Germany as a single economic unit. He also suspected that the new Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED)—a forced fusion of the German Social Democrats in the Soviet zone and the German communists—was intended as an instrument for controlling German politics as a whole.

U.S. policy shifted to counter these moves and to sidestep the continuous French objections to reestablishing German administration. In July 1946, U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes announced that the United States was prepared to join forces and zones with any other power in order to ease the burden of occupation. The British cabinet accepted the offer on 25 July. By 1 January 1947, the British and Americans had established a unified economic administration for Bizonia, which included half of all German territory and almost two-thirds of the German population. A German Economic Council was given day-to-day authority over the region's economy, although the Allies retained all practical political power.

The separation of economy and politics quickly became impractical when the United States announced its intention to aid in the reconstruction of Europe through the European Recovery Program (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan. This necessitated currency reform in Germany, as the reichsmark had become useless and the German economy survived largely via black market activity. The Soviets, however, refused to participate in either the currency reform or the ERP. When a final attempt at compromise collapsed at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall informed the Soviets that the Americans and British intended to forge ahead even if it meant the creation of a separate West German state.

The Soviets responded in January 1948 by claiming all of Berlin as part of their zone because the Western powers had violated the occupation agreements. To counter the West German Economic Council, the Soviets granted their own East German Economic Council (created in June 1947) the right to exercise governmental authority in the Soviet zone on 12 February 1948. A month later, they oversaw the creation of a preliminary German parliament in Berlin. The Soviet representative, Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovski, left the ACC on 20 March 1948, declaring that it held no authority over the Soviet zone. On 16 June, the Soviets abandoned the inter-Allied administration of Berlin as well and began to restrict the exchange of goods between West Berlin and the Soviet zone of occupation. They implemented a full blockade on 24 June 1948, four days after the Western powers went ahead with the currency reform.

Germany was now divided into two virtual states, the French having agreed to join their zone to a federal West Germany at the London Six-Power Conference held from 23 February to 6 March 1948. Both sides moved quickly to formalize the arrangement.

On 1 July 1948, the Western powers instructed the minister-presidents of the West German states to convene a national constituent assembly. Instead of a constitution (which they felt would preclude unification), the resulting German Parliamentary Council drafted the Basic Law in September 1948. It

was approved on 10 May 1949 and promulgated on 23 May 1949, with the first elections for a West German parliament following in August 1949. Allied high commissioners replaced the Allied military government, which was suspended. An occupation statute limiting the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in matters of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and currency exchange remained in effect until 9 May 1955.

In the Soviet zone, a parallel People's Parliament passed a draft constitution in November 1948. This was confirmed on 30 May 1949 and was put into effect on 7 October 1949, officially creating the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The Soviets, like the Western Allies, remained in Germany as an occupying power, and there was no formal peace treaty following World War II until the Two-Plus-Four Treaty of 12 September 1990 officially brought it to a close. The burden of occupation was, however, gradually lessened over the years. The Soviets renounced further reparations from Germany in 1953 and declared hostilities at an end in 1955, the same year that East Germany joined the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets dissolved their Kommandantura in Berlin in 1962 and, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, refused to intervene when antigovernment protests that would eventually lead to the collapse of the East German state broke out in the autumn of 1989.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Allied Control Council of Germany; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Clay, Lucius DuBignon; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich; Warsaw Pact; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Germany, Federal Republic of

Central European nation that during the Cold War covered 96,019 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Oregon. With a 1948 population of 50 million people, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) bordered the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and Czechoslovakia to the east; Austria and Switzerland to the south; France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands to the west; and the North Sea to the north. The Allies created West Germany because of increasing Cold War tensions in the late 1940s.

At Yalta in 1945, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily divide and occupy Germany until a final settlement could be reached. The British, Americans, and Soviets augmented this understanding at the Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945) with a stipulation that Germany be treated as a single economic unit during the occupation.

Economics—specifically the issue of war reparations—drove a wedge between the Soviets and the Western powers even before Potsdam. The British and Americans believed that Soviet occupation was exploitative at the expense not only of the Germans but also of the other occupying powers as well. Because of this, the Americans suspended reparations deliveries to the Soviet zone in May 1946. Deliveries soon resumed, but when the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers deadlocked over the same issue, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes approached the British and French about merging their zones into a single economic and administrative unit. The British accepted the offer in July 1946, and Byrnes announced the new policy during a speech in Stuttgart in September 1946. The two zones officially merged into Bizonia on 1 January 1947.

The administration of Bizonia effectively provided for a separate state in all but name. The occupying powers created an Economic Council of fifty-two deputies to take care of day-to-day affairs and added the Landrat (Council of States) to deal with legislative matters. They also established the Executive Committee that did the work of a cabinet, although the ultimate power still lay with the Allied military governments.

Differences over economic policy, while inextricably linked to political issues, remained the leading edge of the divide between the Soviets and the West. The announcement of the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan in June 1947 proved a decisive turning point. The offer of aid was open to the Soviets and their client states, but all recipients had to agree to a program of reconstruction that had clear political overtones. The USSR therefore rejected the offer.

The London Conference of Foreign Ministers held in December 1947 not only failed to heal the breach but also essentially sealed the division of Germany. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov demanded assurances that the Western powers were not going to form a separate state; U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall replied that they had already decided to take steps toward unification rather than continue to argue. In February 1948 British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin accordingly convened a six-power conference, which included Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, to discuss the creation of a western German state. To that end, the French agreed to join Bizonia. To protest, in March 1948 the Soviets withdrew from the Allied Control Council charged with the administration of occupied Germany. They also temporarily halted military trains moving between the Western zones and Berlin.

When a second six-power meeting laid out concrete principles for the new western German state in June 1948 and then proceeded to initiate currency reform in their zones, however, the Soviets revived the blockade. When the British and Americans responded by airlifting supplies to the city and counterblockading the Soviet zone, the communist leadership of eastern

Germany attempted to claim authority over all of Berlin. They succeeded only in forcing the city administration to seek refuge in the Western zones of the city. The year-long stalemate, however, convinced both sides that political division was the only solution.

The Western military governors formally proposed terms for a western German state in 1 July 1948. After much wrangling, the minister-presidents of the western German states accepted, although they insisted on crafting a Basic Law rather than a constitution so as not to preclude future unification.

The final draft of the Basic Law approved by the minister-presidents in February 1949 contained several important clauses. First, it set a threshold of 5 percent of the vote for a party to be admitted to representation in the new parliament. Second, it required any vote of no-confidence in a government to be accompanied by the simultaneous election of a new one. Third, it set strict limits on the powers of the head of state, although it stopped short of reducing the office to purely ceremonial status. Finally, in Article 23, it specifically provided for other German states to join at a later time. In discussions held during April 1949, the Western foreign ministers agreed to accept the German draft, although the Allies retained the right to veto any legislation that conflicted with occupation policy and to resume full authority in case of emergency. The Basic Law was accordingly ratified by the three Western military governors, the German Parliamentary Council, and nine of the German states in early May 1949. The Basic Law came into force on 23 May 1949, officially establishing West Germany.

West Germans line up in front of currency offices on 20 June 1948 waiting to get new deutsche marks. The military government in the three Western zones of occupation replaced the old reichsmark, rentenmarks, and military marks with the new deutsche mark on that date. The new currency became the foundation of the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). (dpa/Corbis)

The first West German elections were held in August 1949, with Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) gaining 31 percent of the votes against 29 percent for the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The German Communist Party (KPD) won only 5.7 percent of the vote, while the Free Democratic Party (FDP) took 11.9 percent. On 15 September 1949, the new parliament (Bundestag) elected Adenauer chancellor by a single vote—his own. Six days later the new, simpler occupation statute entered into force, and West Germany officially became an independent state, albeit with limited sovereignty.

Adenauer and the CDU dominated the first fifteen years of West Germany's existence. Their program was essentially conservative but turned on two crucial points. The first was the acceptance of the social-market economy, a mix of socialism and capitalism crafted by Ludwig Erhard, who had been minister of economics in Bizonia. The second was anticommunism, or anti-Sovietism. While the SPD, led by Kurt Schumacher, had campaigned for nationalization of industry and a socialist, centralized economy and believed

that unification was the overriding goal, the CDU portrayed itself as the only reasonable bulwark against Soviet domination and was willing to sacrifice unity in the short term. Adenauer's first goal was to reestablish Germany as a reliable, democratic partner in West European affairs. Only then, Adenauer felt, could Germany take steps to regain true independence and, eventually, unity.

Crafty politics and favorable circumstance helped Adenauer achieve his first goal with amazing speed. In November 1949 West Germany signed the Petersberg Agreement, entrusting control of the production and distribution of coal and steel in the Ruhr Valley to an international authority in exchange for a more rapid end to the Allied dismantling program. This led to German membership (along with France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), formed in April 1951 and one of the cornerstones of the European Economic Community (EEC) created six years later.

Attempts to integrate West Germany into a joint European army had already begun in 1950, when the outbreak of the Korean War caused concerns about low troop levels in Western Europe. Popular sentiment in West Germany was overwhelmingly against rearmament, but Adenauer cleverly tied the issue to German sovereignty. While telling his countrymen that rearmament was a safeguard against Soviet dominance and a step toward true independence, he also pointed out to the Allies that an occupied Germany would continue to be a drain on their resources.

Crafty politics and favorable circumstance helped Adenauer achieve his first goal with amazing speed.

This arrangement was formalized in May 1952 when Britain, France, the United States and West Germany signed the so-called Germany Treaty. This brought an end to the occupation statute in return for a firm German commitment to political, economic, and military alliance with the West. When negotiations on the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) collapsed in August 1954, the Allies invited West Germany to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) when it absorbed the Western European Union (WEU) in October 1954. On 5 May 1955, four days before it officially joined NATO, West Germany gained full sovereignty.

Adenauer was equally successful in domestic politics. While the Marshall Plan had jump-started the economy of western Germany already in 1948, the newborn West Germany still faced a number of daunting economic and social problems in 1949. Unemployment, exacerbated by the presence of nearly 10 million displaced persons in West Germany, hovered around 6 percent. Housing was in short supply, and the shadow of national socialism still hung over a large portion of German society. The Marshall Plan continued to provide capital, and when the Korean War brought a rapid upturn in German exports in 1950–1951, Erhard's social-market economy did the rest. During 1950–1957, the gross domestic product (GDP) of West Germany grew at an average rate of more than 8 percent. By 1960 unemployment was under 1 percent.

This economic miracle made social integration easier, enabling Adenauer's regime to successfully enact the Works Constitution Law of 1952 as

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (*center*) visiting Bundeswehr maneuvers near Kunsterlager, Germany, 15 September 1958. (Library of Congress)

well as the crucial Equalization of Burdens Act of 1953. The former legislation extended the influence of workers' consultative councils in industry and created a framework for relatively smooth labor relations. The Equalization of Burdens Act taxed capital gains at a rate of 50 percent and redistributed the proceeds to the dispossessed and less fortunate over thirty years. In addition, under the Construction Act of 1950, the federal government provided grants to cities for large-scale housing projects that produced some 4 million dwelling units by 1957.

Less visibly but of equal import, West Germany undertook to pay the sizable foreign debts of the National Socialist regime and to pay compensation and make restitution to the victims of Nazi persecution. While this was in part driven by West Germany's claim to be the sole legitimate successor of the historic German state—a claim embedded in West German foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s as the Hallstein Doctrine—Adenauer also had personal and moral reasons for the initiative. Under his direction, the West

German regime agreed to deliver over DM3 billion in goods to Israel over a period of twelve years. Federal indemnification laws provided for roughly DM2 billion per year (through 2005) in payments to individual victims.

Running on this record and with a slogan of "No Experiments," Adenauer and his CDU-FDP coalition easily won reelection in 1957, gaining an absolute majority with 50.2 percent of the vote. This proved to be the apex of Adenauer's achievement, however. The West German economy suffered a slight recession in 1958, and when it recovered in 1960 growth managed only a slower though still significant rate of around 4 percent. Yugoslavia's recognition of East Germany challenged the Hallstein Doctrine and forced West Germany to sever relations with Josip Broz Tito's regime. More important, a prolonged crisis over the status of West Berlin revealed that Adenauer's mastery of Cold War politics was slipping while his rivals in the SPD moved to make themselves more electable.

Encouraged by the success of *Sputnik*, the first satellite launched in October 1957, and by advances in intercontinental ballistic missiles, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev pressed the Allies for a resolution of Berlin's status. On 27 November 1957 he sent a note to the Allies demanding a peace treaty with the two German states within six months and threatened to turn control of the access routes to Berlin over to East Germany if they did not comply. Adenauer called for a firm response, but the British and Americans appeared more willing to either negotiate or accept the consequences of Khrushchev's threat. Only France, led by Charles de Gaulle, fully supported Adenauer.

The Allies did, in December 1958, reject the Soviet demands, yet they also continued to negotiate. Behind the scenes, Adenauer even explored the possibility of accepting a divided Germany as permanent in return for the neutralization of the eastern state—an action that he believed his countrymen would condemn if they knew about it. Once President John F. Kennedy replaced Dwight Eisenhower in 1961, however, Adenauer and West Germany became increasingly marginalized in the negotiations. When the East German government began to construct a wall cutting off West Berlin in August 1961, Adenauer did not even visit the city late in the month. In his absence the city's mayor, the charismatic SPD leader Willy Brandt, rose to national prominence.

Brandt's run at the chancellorship in 1961, however, met with failure. The CDU retained 46 percent of the vote and renewed its coalition with the FDP, but Adenauer's position was severely weakened. It collapsed altogether in November 1962 under the pressure of the so-called Spiegel Affair. The FDP leadership demanded that Adenauer retire if the coalition was to continue. He reluctantly agreed and, after officially recognizing Erhard as his successor, resigned in October 1963.

In his first policy statement, Erhard declared that the postwar period was over for West Germany. This turned out to be a prophetic statement, although not in the ways that Erhard intended. His government lasted only two years, collapsing under the pressure of increasing economic problems in October 1965. Erhard was forced out as leader of the CDU in favor of Kurt-

Georg Kiesinger, who then formed a governing coalition that included the SPD for the first time.

The Grand Coalition ushered in an era of controversy. For one thing, Kiesinger had been a member of the National Socialist Party. His position as chancellor brought to the fore once again debates about the Third Reich, which had been largely ignored in the 1950s, as did the 1963–1965 Frankfurt trial of sixteen former Auschwitz guards.

The Spiegel Affair had also spurred political activism and public debate about the nature of West German government. Prominent academics such as Jürgen Habermas and Theodor Adorno attacked the regime from a Marxist perspective, and some even equated the "Americanized" West Germany with the Third Reich as a state dominated by inhuman capital interests. With no parliamentary opposition to speak of, students took to the streets to voice their discontent, and a broad spectrum of grassroots social movements sprang up in the late 1960s.

This shift to the Left of the political spectrum, along with the successful management of the West German economy during 1966–1969, created the conditions under which Brandt was finally able to lead the SPD to power in October 1969. He was elected chancellor by a margin of only two votes, and the SPD had to govern in coalition with the FDP. Brandt nevertheless embarked on a bold, innovative program in both domestic and foreign policy.

Internally, Brandt's regime oversaw the expansion of the welfare state, reformed pensions and health insurance, liberalized divorce and abortion, updated the criminal code, and relaxed laws on censorship and against homosexuality. By taking advantage of a collapse in the value of the dollar and the end of fixed exchange rates, the SPD was able to curb inflation at the same time. The most important piece of legislation in this regard was the Stabilization Law of June 1967 that allowed the government to significantly increase credit, alter corporate and income taxes, and build reserves for investment if needed in the management of the economic cycle.

It was in foreign affairs, however, that Brandt truly left his mark. As the United States and the Soviet Union opened the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in November 1969 and entered into a period of détente, Brandt decided to try to improve intra-German relations in similar fashion. The aims and outlines of this policy, known as Ostpolitik, were readily apparent in his government declaration of 28 October 1969: the West German government would sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), would enter talks on the renunciation of force, and, most important, would recognize that two German states existed on German soil. Brandt did not offer full recognition to East Germany or surrender the ultimate goal of German unity.

Both the Soviets and the East Germans proved receptive to Brandt's overture. In March 1970, Brandt traveled to the East German city of Erfurt to meet with East German leaders; they reciprocated by visiting Brandt in Kassel, West Germany, in May. Although congenial, the visits proved fruitless in the short term. In the long run, however, they marked the opening of talks that produced a series of treaties normalizing relations between the two German states in matters of trade and transit. On 8 November 1972, the

East German Premier Willi Stoph greets West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in Erfurt, the Democratic Republic of Germany (GDR, East Germany)y, 19 March 1970. (Bettmann/Corbis)

two German states signed the Basic Treaty, which enshrined these arrangements as well as agreements on the status of West Berlin.

Ostpolitik was not universally popular in West German political circles. Many people believed that Brandt had gone too far and had given up on German unity. Similarly, his gesture of apology during a visit to Warsaw—dropping to his knees before the grave of a victim of the ghetto there—proved too much for some members of parliament. Defections from the FDP and the SPD over these issues led Brandt to arrange new elections for November 1972.

The SPD emerged from the campaign with even greater strength, having gained some 3 million votes. Brandt, however, appeared spent. When faced with a mixture of high unemployment and strong inflation in late 1973, his government proved incapable. When his personal assistant was exposed as an East German spy the following spring, the once-dynamic chancellor stepped down.

Brandt's replacement, Helmut Schmidt, was an abrasive but decisive, pragmatic, and able politician. Whereas Brandt had played to the young and

to the left wing of the SPD, Schmidt was more conservative. To end the economic slide, he pursued a cautious policy of moderate expenditure cuts and reductions in tax concessions and took measures to restabilize the exchange rate. Along with French President Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing, Schmidt took a leading role in creating the European Monetary System, and he was a strong supporter of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Schmidt and West Germany also assumed a central role in international relations once again during the late 1970s. Steering a careful course between West German defense commitments and a strong domestic peace movement, in 1979 Schmidt convinced NATO leaders to adopt a flexible two-track approach to countermeasures, for instance. Such conservative policies increasingly alienated the Left and even the Center portions of the SPD, however, and gradually weakened Schmidt's base. Many SPD voters defected to the new Green Party, created in 1980 as an umbrella organization for citizens with environmental concerns. At the same time, conservatives and Schmidt's allies increasingly came to view Ostpolitik as acquiescence in Soviet foreign policy, particularly when Schmidt failed to condemn both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981.

By the summer of 1982, it was clear that the FDP preferred to work with the CDU. On 1 October 1982 the leader of the CDU, Helmut Kohl, engineered a vote of no-confidence that deposed Schmidt and placed Kohl at the head of the new coalition. The CDU-FDP regime took some small steps to return to the social-market economy, cutting taxes and reducing government spending along with economic intervention. Kohl's platform was not much different from that of Schmidt's in many regards, however. The inclusion of the FDP in the ruling coalition ensured that Ostpolitik remained a central if somewhat weakened plank. Kohl also pressed NATO to implement the two-track system for intermediate-range missile deployment and maintained strong European relations.

Kohl's legacy, however, is German unification. His government's implementation of Ostpolitik differed from that of the SPD regimes in insisting on unity as a goal along with self-determination and human rights. The West German government nevertheless provided East Germany with nearly DM2 billion in loans in 1983 and 1984 and extended a further DM7 billion in credits through 1989. While these sums were intended to stabilize East Germany and prevent a catastrophe along the lines of the Prague Spring, they in fact did a great deal to bring about the collapse of the East German state.

The crisis that brought a close to the era of a divided Germany caught Kohl and most Germans by surprise. Politicians on both sides of the Berlin Wall envisioned a gradual confederation of the two states, a vision that Kohl spelled out in his Ten-Point Program in November 1989. Public opinion drove the program further and faster. By the end of April 1990, Kohl and his eastern counterparts had agreed on a political and economic union. The Two-Plus-Four Treaty (the two German states plus France, Britain, the United States, and the USSR) that formalized the arrangement and gave it the sanction of the Allies of 1944 was signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990.

Since then, most of the outward signs of division and the Cold War have been eradicated. The Berlin Wall has been dismantled, and the seat of government has been returned to Berlin. The districts of the former East Germany have been fully integrated into a Federal Republic of Germany that now consists of sixteen states, and a single German state has become a central part of an increasingly united Europe. Unification has proven to be immensely expensive and socially challenging, but by the early years of the twenty-first century, Germany has shown that it was indeed up to the test.

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See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Brandt, Willy; Détente; Erhard, Ludwig; Europe, Western; German Democratic Republic; Hallstein Doctrine; Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg; Kohl, Helmut; Marshall Plan; Ostpolitik; Schmidt, Helmut; *Spiegel* Affair

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Germany, Federal Republic of, Armed Forces

Discussions regarding German rearmament took place as early as 1946, but the British government opposed anything more than an armed and mobile police force, while the French government did not wish to see Germans rearmed in any way. Serious negotiations over the creation of a German military began in 1950, however, when the Korean War stretched Western military resources thin. Once again, French resistance was the major obstacle.

The Paris Accords of May 1955 overcame these obstacles by creating a Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) army, the Bundeswehr, that was firmly under civilian and Allied control. In stark contrast to previous periods in German history, the Bundeswehr was under intense oversight by parliamentary committees and a public wary of military institutions. Soldiers would be subject to civil law in all matters that were not strictly military. All Bundeswehr units were designated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for action, with the German government re-

taining peacetime control. Weapons and military matériel were imported from the United States, Britain, and France on a large scale until the late 1960s, when domestic military production developed.

Under the 1955 agreement, the United States and Great Britain committed themselves to maintaining a troop presence in Germany. NATO's current European partners would provide naval and air forces to complement British and American commitments. In return, West Germany would provide twelve mixed divisions (approximately 340,000 men) for the common defense of Europe by 1959, with a final strength of 500,000. Each infantry division would have three combat commands with three motorized infantry battalions and an armor battalion each; antiaircraft, engineer, communications, and reconnaissance battalions; a company of aircraft; a military police company; and combat support from three light artillery battalions and one medium artillery battalion. Tank divisions contained two armored and three mechanized infantry battalions in each combat command. Two of the divisions would be further specialized for airborne and mountain operations.

A civilian screening process was created to recruit officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from World War II veterans. NATO would be responsible for all war planning and for the direction of all operations. No German general staff was permitted, on grounds that it might revive German militarism. The Bundeswehr was allowed an operations staff but on the condition that officers rotated through such duty periodically. Planners believed that half of the necessary manpower for the divisions would be volunteers, while a draft would provide the remaining numbers.

West German soldiers prepare to fire a mortar during a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise held on the Salisbury Plain Training Area in Wiltshire, Britain, 25 April 1987. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The first West German military volunteers reported for duty in November 1955, and the Law for Compulsory Service passed the West German parliament on 7 July 1956. It required all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to serve for twelve months, with provisions allowing conscientious objectors to fulfill their obligation through alternative means, usually administered at the state and local levels. Further exemptions, thought to include some 10 percent of eligible males, covered the sons of deceased and wounded veterans, economic hardship cases, clergy, and those deemed unfit for service. Men who became officers or NCOs would remain in the reserves, known as the Territorial Army, until age sixty. The term of service was increased to eighteen months in 1962 at the height of the Berlin Crisis (1958–1963). It was then reduced to fifteen months in 1972, as population growth began to provide more than adequate numbers of draftees.

The West German government experienced some difficulty in providing the promised troops. Part of the reason was monetary. Between 1956 and

1989, the share of defense-related expenditures in the West German federal budget never sank below 12 percent. It reached its zenith in the early 1960s when it was one-third of the overall budget, yet most of the money was going to purchase matériel. On average, throughout the Cold War the West German government annually spent about 20 percent of its total budget on defense.

Beyond that, rearmament was never popular in West Germany. In October 1956, West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss announced that manpower targets had been reduced from 96,000 to 80,000 for 1956 and from 240,000 to between 175,000 and 200,000 for 1957 largely because volunteers were not coming forward in the numbers anticipated. Only eleven of the twelve German divisions originally planned for 1959 were filled out and under NATO control by 1963. It took until the mid-1970s before West Germany's armed forces reached the final benchmark of 500,000 troops envisaged in 1955. In 1975, the Bundeswehr contained 345,000 soldiers, 110,000 air force personnel, and 39,000 seamen. At any given time, only 48 percent of the German armed forces were volunteers, far short of the 55 percent target that the West German governments maintained. Recruitment of long-term (twenty-one-month) volunteers and of NCOs in particular continuously fell far short of expectations, although the federal government offered numerous incentives such as vocational education programs and career guarantees.

Popular opposition to the Bundeswehr, although always strong, increased notably in early 1957 when the United States indicated that it would arm its European allies with nuclear weapons as part of a shift in NATO strategy. Before 1957, NATO planned a forward defense along the German frontier. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had pushed for and won the integration of German units all along the line rather than having the Bundeswehr assigned a particular sector. He had also readily accepted a ban on atomic, biological, and chemical weapons for German units in order to make rearmament more palatable to the public and to the Social Democratic opposition. NATO's new strategy of nuclear deterrence, officially adopted on 21 March 1957, thus set off a maelstrom in German politics that continued into the 1960s.

Adenauer renounced German construction of nuclear weapons and declared that Germany would not accept national control over such weapons. NATO responded by introducing the two-key system, whereby German units possessed nuclear capabilities but the nuclear warheads and launchers remained under Allied control. After winning by-elections in Nordrhein-Westfalen in July 1958, Adenauer's government announced that it was prepared to equip the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. German units received Matador rockets and nuclear-capable artillery pieces so that they could fight either a conventional or a tactical nuclear war. Bundeswehr units were also divided into either the six armored infantry or four purely armored divisions to facilitate mobility and, supposedly, increase defense against nuclear attack.

Even before this restructuring was complete, however, NATO, with some prompting from West Germany and led by U.S. President John F. Kennedy's

administration, moved to a strategy of flexible response. This deemphasized the role of nuclear weapons where German forces were concerned by creating a multilateral force that deployed nuclear-armed Polaris submarines. Two of the German armored infantry divisions created in 1957 were reorganized as straight infantry divisions, and the Bundeswehr's deployed division strength was increased by about 10,000 men to compensate for its reduced nuclear role. The question of arming West Germany with nuclear weapons was shelved for good when the coalition government led by Willy Brandt and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in November 1969.

In the late 1970s, however, NATO plans to station intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Germany renewed the debate over atomic weapons. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who had earlier been one of the principal advocates of flexible response in Germany, declared in early 1978 that West Germany would accept nuclear weapons only if other NATO countries did as well. U.S. President Jimmy Carter eventually led a NATO climb-down on the issue, agreeing to a two-track policy that tied deployment in Germany to Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe. In the 1980s his successor, President Ronald Reagan, worked closely with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to manage the deployment of Pershing missiles in Germany. Nuclear weapons always remained under NATO and U.S. control, and the German and American governments continued to cooperate in reducing the number of nuclear weapons stationed in West Germany.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr has changed immensely. Despite the integration of the former East German Army since 1990, overall troop strength has been roughly cut in half. Although during the Cold War West German troops were never deployed on foreign soil except for training exercises and joint NATO maneuvers, the Bundeswehr has undertaken several foreign peacekeeping missions since 1991, most notably in the Balkans. German armed forces now serve as part of different international missions on several continents, most notably in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.

Bernd Schaefer

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Germany, Federal Republic of; Germany, Federal Republic of, Rearmament and NATO; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Schmidt, Helmut

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Germany, Federal Republic of, Rearmament and NATO

Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945 combined with total Allied military control over Germany and widespread physical and economic devastation left the population without any desire to reconstruct military institutions. The victorious Allied powers demilitarized Germany as such, although they clandestinely utilized the professional expertise of some captured German military officers for their own purposes.

With the onset of the Cold War and particularly after 1948, military leaders in the United States, Britain, and France discussed potential West German military contributions to the Western alliance. Given the Red Army's overwhelming numerical superiority, defensive capabilities had to be increased if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was to contain the Soviet Union and its allies without resorting to nuclear weapons. The deliberations were controversial and inconclusive, however, with France being most skeptical and obstructionist about German rearmament so soon after World War II. When the pact establishing NATO was signed on 4 April 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) was conspicuously left out of the alliance.

Attitudes toward German rearmament changed drastically in 1950, however. After the Korean War began in June 1950, the Allies, particularly the United States, believed that it was time for the West Germans to contribute to their own defense. The parallels between a divided Korea and a divided Germany appeared quite obvious. The French were highly concerned about the prospects of a rearmed Germany, but in October 1950 the French government took up an earlier British suggestion that this might be done in the context of a European defense force. From there it was a short step to accepting the integration of German forces within a Western defense pact, at least in principle. It took almost five years to work out the details, however.

The Americans and British hoped to transform West Germany into a partner in the defense of Europe, while France wanted German contributions to European defense without a German military. Konrad Adenauer, chancellor of West Germany, sought a Western guarantee of the security of West Germany and West Berlin in exchange for German military contributions to NATO. Yet within West Germany there was also tremendous popular and political resistance, led by the German Social Democrats (SPD), against the notion of rearmament.

Following nearly two years of negotiation, the Allies and the West Germans appeared to have found a solution in May 1952. The foreign ministers of Britain, France, and the United States signed a treaty that would end the occupation of Germany and allow Germany to rearm. The treaty would only come into force in conjunction with a European Defense Community pact that would be signed in June, and German military contributions would be made within that context rather than independently. These agreements were ratified by the West German parliament in March 1953 after heavy debate, but the French National Assembly rejected them in August 1954, scuttling the entire framework.

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden then proposed that West Germany and Italy be brought into the Brussels Treaty of 1948 with a view toward transforming that arrangement into a European defense pact. At the same time, Britain offered to increase its military commitment to the defense of Europe. This combination appeased the French, who had rejected the European Defense Community (EDC) in part because of its supranational clauses and implications.

The Allies thus agreed at the October 1954 London Conference to lift the occupation of West Germany and incorporate the state into NATO and the European Union (EU). They also agreed to maintain a military presence in West Germany and to carefully supervise and control West German rearmament, which meant denying it atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.

Adenauer gladly accepted these limits along with a ban on German rockets, bombers, and large warships because the limits were helpful in winning public support for rearmament in West Germany. To counter the SPD argument that rearming within NATO would antagonize the Soviet Union, Adenauer's government also pledged not to seek unification or the revision of borders by force. To further placate the French, Adenauer agreed to hold a referendum to consider whether the Saar might be made an independent state with economic ties to France.

These agreements, known collectively as the Paris Treaties, went into effect on 9 May 1955, at which time West Germany became NATO's fifteenth member.

Bernd Schaefer

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Europe, Western; European Union; Germany, Federal Republic of; Germany, Federal Republic of, Armed Forces; Korean War; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Gerő, Ernő
(1898–1980)

Hungarian communist politician, deputy prime minister (1952–1956), general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (1956), and Hungary's last Stalinist leader. Born Ernő Singer on 8 July 1898 in Terbegec, Hungary, he

enrolled in medical school but dropped out when he became interested in politics. Gerő joined the Communist Party and during 1919–1939 held various political assignments in Hungary, Austria, the Soviet Union, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal. He joined the Comintern in 1931. During World War II he was responsible for directing propaganda efforts aimed at prisoners of war.

In May 1945 Gerő became Hungary's minister of trade and transport. In November 1948 he was named assistant general secretary of the Communist Party. A month later he was also appointed finance minister; he continued as trade and transport minister until February 1949. From 1949 to 1952 he served as president of the National Economic Council. During 1952–1956 he was deputy prime minister, and in July 1956 he replaced Mátyás Rákosi as general secretary of the party.

In a radio address the night that the 1956 Hungarian Revolution began, Gerő vehemently refused to negotiate with the insurrectionist reformers. He then asked Moscow to deploy troops to stop the revolution. Two days later, on 25 October 1956, he was relieved of all his posts and fled to Moscow. In 1960 he returned to Hungary on the condition that he be expelled from the Communist Party. As a slavish adherent of Stalinism, Gerő was largely responsible for the outbreak of the 1956 revolution. As president of the National Economic Council, he was the motivating force behind the mass industrialization drive, demanding that Hungary be made "a country of iron and steel." This was an unrealistic goal that unduly taxed Hungarian labor and its industrial resources. Gerő died on 12 March 1980 in Budapest.

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See also

Europe, Eastern; Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Rákosi, Mátyás

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Ghana

Located on the west-central African coast, Ghana, formerly the British colony of the Gold Coast, was the first sub-Saharan African nation to achieve independence from European colonial rule. Just under 150,000 square miles in area, Gold Coast had a population of some 4 million people in 1945 and 6 million when it attained independence on 6 March 1957. The new nation captured the attention of aspiring nationalists, colonial rulers, and leaders in

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, standing on a stool, being sworn in by Arku Korsah as the first president of the Republic of Ghana in Accra in 1960. (Library of Congress)

both the East and West. Each looked to Ghana's experience to predict the impact of African decolonization on the global balance of power.

The push for independence in the Gold Coast began in earnest in 1947 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, founder of the Convention People's Party (CPP). Jailed in 1951 while agitating against colonialism, Nkrumah won the colony's first general election from his prison cell and was released to serve as the leader of government business in the colonial parliament. He became prime minister of the Gold Coast in 1952, won reelection in 1954 and 1956, and became prime minister of Ghana in March 1957.

Ghana emerged from colonial rule with excellent prospects of economic viability. The world's leading producer of cocoa, Ghana also produced nearly 10 percent of the world's gold. Rich in diamonds, bauxite, and timber, the country maintained a low national debt and strong foreign currency reserves. Politically and administratively, Ghana was in good standing, having worked with the British to create a stable parliamentary government and establish an educated and well-trained civil service.

Nkrumah's domestic agenda focused on industrialization and diversification to promote economic growth. The centerpiece of his program was the

multibillion-dollar Volta River Project (VRP), a hydroelectric dam and aluminum smelter. The administration also established new industries in fruit processing, ceramics, wood processing, and gold refining. Farm subsidies encouraged the growth of new cash crops such as sisal, palm trees, and rice. Pursuing socialist goals, the new government built roads, established post offices, and installed telephones in countless villages. These advances accompanied a nationwide program of free and compulsory education and the construction of hundreds of schools. Expanded national health services included modern hospitals in regional capitals and medical clinics in towns and villages.

In international affairs, Nkrumah's policies reflected his commitment to nonalignment and his intention to blend capitalism and socialism. Courting the economic support of the West and the ideological backing of the East, he attempted to steer a path between the two Cold War blocs, keep Cold War geopolitics out of Africa, and lead the continent to a position of respect in the world community. His Pan-African agenda included political and financial support of African states pursuing liberation.

Nkrumah demanded strong, centralized control of Ghana to achieve his goals. Within a year of independence the government passed legislation enabling the prime minister to detain political opponents without trial. Limits on freedoms of speech and the press followed in 1958 as Nkrumah established a dictatorial regime. In 1960, when Ghana became a republic, Nkrumah became president for life. By a 1964 referendum the CPP became the sole party of the state.

Nkrumah's policies and methods created economic crisis and political unrest. By 1960 the increasing costs of development and Pan-African financial commitments depleted foreign currency reserves. Deficit spending became a central feature of government fiscal planning. Nkrumah's response to the financial setbacks, including a national austerity plan and compulsory savings scheme, fostered fresh opposition. As cocoa prices continued to drop in 1963, the government increased taxes to raise revenues. By 1964, with increasing unemployment and with foreign currency reserves virtually gone, Ghana's international credit standing approached collapse. The Finance Ministry nevertheless presented a new budget to the parliament in 1965 calling for increased expenditures.

The failing economy and repressive policies led to the overthrow of the CPP government on 24 February 1966 while Nkrumah was visiting China. He sought asylum in Guinea, where he remained until his death in 1972.

The multiparty National Liberation Council (NLC), headed by Lieutenant General Joseph Arthur Ankrah, administered government until Kofi A. Busia became prime minister in the 1969 elections. Pursuing a conservative fiscal strategy that failed to improve Ghana's economy, Busia's government devalued the currency, triggering massive inflation. In 1972 Colonel Ignatius K. Acheampong led a bloodless coup to oust the Busia government.

Acheampong suspended the constitution and established the military-controlled National Redemption Council (NRC). Military control relaxed in 1974 as the government concentrated on economic development. In 1978, however, the military leadership removed Acheampong from office, giving

power to General Frederick W. Akuffo. Less than a year later, Akuffo was overthrown by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, who, in an effort to do away with the opposition, arranged the public execution of Acheampong, Akuffo, and six additional high-ranking military officers on grounds of corruption. Countless public servants were also summarily dismissed and their assets confiscated. Rawlings stepped down in September 1979, transferring power to civilian President Hilla Limann and the People's National Party (PNP).

Difficulties in the cocoa industry, the mainstay of Ghana's economy, plagued the PNP government. As inflation spiraled, Rawlings led a coup to depose Limann on 31 December 1981. Rawlings's Provisional National Defense Ruling Council (PNDC) instituted liberal economic reform under authoritarian rule. In 1983 Rawlings instituted a structural adjustment plan with the cooperation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. While Rawlings enjoyed popular support as a leader who returned national pride to the people, his government undertook brutal repression against any form of opposition. Allegations of human rights abuses were commonplace. As Ghana's situation improved, popular pressure induced the government to adopt a new multiparty constitution in April 1992. On 3 November 1992 Rawlings, representing the National Democratic Congress (NDC), was elected president.

Rawlings served two consecutive terms as president. In the 2000 elections, John Agyekum Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) won victory over the NDC. Kufuor took office in January 2001, the first peaceful and democratic transfer of power since independence. Kufuor was reelected in December 2004.

Mary E. Montgomery

See also

Africa; Anticolonialism; Decolonization; Nkrumah, Kwame; Non-Aligned Movement

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Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe
(1901–1965)

Romanian Communist Party (PCR) leader (1945–1948), head of the Romanian Workers' Party (PMR) (1948–1965), premier (1952–1954), first secretary of the Central Committee (1955), and president of the State Council (1961–1965). Born to a peasant family in Bîrlad, Moldavia, on 8 November 1901,

Romanian communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901–1965). He dominated the political scene in his country during 1945–1965. An ardent communist, he nonetheless maintained a measure of independence for his nation within the Soviet bloc. (AFP/Getty Images)

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej trained as a railway electrician. He joined the fledgling Communist Party and, because he was a trade union activist, received a punitive transfer from Galaţi to the village of Dej in 1931. His role in the violent Griviţa railway strikes of 1933 resulted in a twelve-year sentence, alongside other prominent Romanian communists, in the Doftana and Tîrgu-Jiu prisons. After his escape a few days before the coup that toppled Ion Antonescu on 23 August 1944, Gheorghiu-Dej served as communications minister in the short-lived government of General Nicolae Rădescu. With the deposition of King Michael I and the full-scale communist takeover under the premiership of Petru Groza, Gheorghiu-Dej was appointed PCR secretary in October 1945, a position he initially shared with Teohari Georgescu and Muscovites Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, who had been repatriated from the Soviet Union after the coup.

Gheorghiu-Dej quickly consolidated his power by removing previous PCR leader Istvan (Stefan) Foris, the Muscovites, and fellow activist Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu. He replaced them with former prison mate Nicolae Ceauşescu and also Alexandru Drăghici, who later became his minister of internal affairs, responsible for the secret police (Securitate). Emulating a Stalinist model of governance, Gheorghiu-Dej's administration created a network of prisons and labor colonies. Under the guidance of Soviet police chief Lavrenty Beria, the Securitate was set up as a secret police service in 1948.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, Gheorghiu-Dej initially gave lip service to new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's policies, allowing a buildup of Soviet troops on the border during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Nevertheless, he negotiated for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Romania in July 1958 and opposed Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program. After Gheorghiu-Dej further tightened his hold on the PMR by restructuring the Politburo and expelling members who supported de-Stalinization, a rift with Moscow emerged. He rejected Khrushchev's suggestion that Romania abandon its rapid industrialization and specialize in supplying agricultural products and raw materials. During 1962–1963, Gheorghiu-Dej criticized Moscow's installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba and, despite the Sino-Soviet conflict, paid state visits to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). Concurrently, Romania began to pursue rapprochement with the West, a tack that his successor Ceauşescu continued after Gheorghiu-Dej's death from cancer in 1965.

Anna M. Wittmann

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Drăghici, Alexandru; Groza, Petru; Romania; Securitate

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Gibraltar

Gibraltar, virtually a city-state, is a 2.5-square-mile rock strategically located at the entrance of the Mediterranean and attached by land to Spain. Known as "the Rock," the British Dominion of Gibraltar has a population of some 30,000 people, no agriculture, and not even a natural supply of fresh water.

The British took Gibraltar in 1704 during the War of Spanish Succession and held against Spanish efforts to reconquer it. It passed to formal British control in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. Gibraltar's population is a melting pot of descendants of immigrants from all over the Mediterranean. Virtually all are bilingual in English and Spanish.

Over the centuries, Gibraltar remained an important base for Royal Navy units operating in the Mediterranean. During World War II the British evacuated its entire civilian population except for some 3,000 adult males involved in essential work. The evacuees were returned to Gibraltar during 1946–1947.

Known as "the Rock," the British Dominion of Gibraltar has a population of some 30,000 people, no agriculture, and not even a natural supply of fresh water.

The Spanish government has repeatedly sought to secure control of the Rock, while successive British governments have vowed to retain control. Public opinion in Gibraltar has been almost unanimous in its opposition to a return to Spain. A 1967 referendum rejected such a course. To bring pressure on Britain, during 1969–1985 Spain closed its land border to the colony and carried out an economic blockade, cutting off the supply of cheap Spanish labor. This backfired, feeding Gibraltarian nationalism.

In 1969, London granted Gibraltar internal autonomy. There is an elected House of Assembly of fifteen popularly elected members. London, however, retains control over foreign affairs.

After 1985, the inhabitants of the Rock were wary over British intentions, a concern reinforced later in the decade by London's refusal to grant British citizenship to Hong Kong residents and Britain's military retrenchment around the globe. By 1991, Britain had little more than 1,000 troops stationed there.

Such British actions prompted Gibraltarians to demand greater political and economic autonomy from Britain. Any movement toward independence was tempered by the awareness that Spain would reject such an arrangement and that Britain would be unwilling to support it militarily.

Gibraltar enjoys special status in the European Community (EC) as a recognized part but not an individual member. This status has allowed it to avoid the tariffs and sales taxes of other member nations. When Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, Gibraltar was

not required to make tax contributions to the EC or follow its customs regulations. Gibraltar was also allowed to write its own banking laws.

Gibraltar reorganized a money-losing shipyard inherited from Great Britain. Tourism is another major industry. Each year millions of visitors come to the Rock, many of them to buy duty-free goods without value-added taxes. A banking secrecy law guarantees confidentiality, although numbered accounts are prohibited. Rapid economic growth enabled Gibraltar to provide excellent social benefits.

By the 1990s inhabitants of the Rock saw themselves first as Gibraltarians and only secondly as Britons. Their principal political challenge remained keeping the Rock free of Spanish control.

Spencer C. Tucker and Elizabeth Pugliese

See also

Franco, Francisco; Spain

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Gierek, Edward

(1913–2001)

Polish communist politician, leader of the Polish Communist Party (PZPR), and Polish head of state (1970–1980). Edward Gierek was born to a working-class family in the village of Porąbka in Upper Silesia on 6 January 1913. Following his father's death in 1917, Gierek's mother remarried and the family immigrated to France. Gierek started work at age twelve, first as a farmhand and later as a miner. At age seventeen he joined the local trade union and the Polish division of the French Communist Party. In 1934 he returned to Poland, married, and three years later left Poland again, this time for Belgium. During World War II he was active in the Belgian resistance. He returned to Poland with his family in 1948.

Upon his return to Poland, Gierek became active in the PZPR. From 1949 to 1954 he was a secretary of the Provincial Committee of the PZPR in Katowice. In 1954 he became a member of the PZPR's Central Committee.

During 1956–1970 Gierek continued his rise in the party, holding a series of increasingly important posts. Following workers' riots in December 1970, he was appointed head of the PZPR and the Polish state.

As Poland's premier, Gierek tried to change the political and economic systems instituted by his predecessor, Władysław Gomułka. Economically, Gierek tried to emulate a Western model that emphasized increased consumption of consumer goods. To cover the cost of his program, he borrowed enormous sums of money from West European countries and private banks. By the mid-1970s, however, the Polish economy had overheated. Capital investments ebbed, leaving myriad factory projects incomplete, while consumer products became scarce. As a result, the government introduced price increases and limited consumption.

Diplomatically, Gierek sought to act as a bridge between the Soviet Union and the West. He initiated and refereed (on Moscow's directives) talks among the Soviets, Americans, French, and Germans. For a time, he had been center stage in détente, which by the mid-1970s had eased Cold War tensions and slowed the arms race. Gierek was also among the politicians who signed the Helsinki Accords, guaranteeing international human rights.

In 1976, consumer price increases precipitated strikes, riots, and demonstrations throughout Poland. They were brutally quashed, and many demonstrators were heavily fined or imprisoned. The signing of the Helsinki Accords and the 1976 riots led to the formation and growth of a strong underground opposition movement. Although Gierek tried to control the opposition, he was never completely successful.

Edward Gierek, Polish communist leader and head of state during 1970–1980, tried to emulate Western economic models. (Reuters/Corbis)

In the summer of 1980 Poland again witnessed widespread unrest after a series of price increases. The turmoil gave rise to the independent trade union Solidarity. Gierek's policies were blamed for the latest crisis, and in September 1980 he was forced to resign. In 1981 he was expelled from the party, forcing him from politics and public life. Thereafter, he retired; however, after the momentous changes of 1989 he initiated a campaign intended to prove that his economic and political policies were misjudged. Gierek died in Warsaw on 29 July 2001.

Jakub Basista

See also

Gomułka, Władysław; Helsinki Final Act; Jaruzelski, Wojciech; Poland; Solidarity Movement; Światło, Józef; Wałęsa, Lech

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Ginsberg, Allen
(1926–1997)

American writer whose poems embodied the values and aesthetic of the Beat generation of writers in the 1950s and 1960s. Born in Newark, New Jersey, on 3 June 1926, Allen Ginsberg graduated from Columbia University in 1948. Until 1956, he worked variously as a dishwasher, a welder at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and a merchant sailor. His association with the novelist Jack Kerouac and others of the so-called Beat generation in Greenwich Village led to appearances as a character in works of fiction by Kerouac and Lionel Trilling even before Ginsberg had earned any literary reputation of his own.

The Beats espoused voluntary poverty and general disaffiliation from society and sought illumination through release from social and literary conventions. In their works, they hoped to capture the process of experience, not just a verbal record.

Ginsberg achieved recognition as a poet with the publication of "Howl," a Beat anthem, in 1956. Written in long lines derived stylistically from Walt Whitman, the poem is a diatribe against a society that Ginsberg saw as militaristic and materialistic. He decries the fate of "the best minds of my generation," leading lives that are self-destructive; they are made outlaws by a false social order. The poet establishes his identification with human suffering and insists that all existence, no matter how limited, is sacred. Ironically, while the poem was carefully structured and the product of a slow gestation, it seemed almost improvisational and came to represent the notion that poetry might be spontaneous.

Ginsberg's book *Howl and Other Poems* (1956) included three other well-known works: "America," "A Supermarket in California," and "Sunflower Sutra." The sutra (Sanskrit for thread or string of precepts) opens with "I walked on the banks of the tincan banana dock / and sat down under the huge shade of a Southern / Pacific locomotive to look at the sunset over the / box house hills and cry." Ginsberg's poems reflect anarchic individualism and a reliance on amplified sensory experience.

After 1956, Ginsberg traveled a great deal, living in the Far East during 1962 and 1963. He became a public figure, a guru of the new generation, appearing frequently at readings and social protest rallies all over the world, and was identified with his advocacy of Zen Buddhism, gay liberation, the drug culture, and pacifism (for which he invented the phrase "flower power"). His poems grew to reflect their function as performance pieces, taking on the incantatory quality of Indian mantras.

Another celebrated Ginsberg poem is "Kaddish" (the Hebrew word for a prayer of mourning), a long prophetic poem focused on the life and death of the poet's mother, which was collected in *Kaddish and Other Poems, 1958–1960* (1961). Sadder in tone than "Howl," the poem is similar nonetheless in that it comprises a long, flowing rush of data, both sensory and intellectual.

Other volumes by Ginsberg include *Airplane Dreams: Compositions from Journals* (1968), *The Gates of Wrath: Rhymed Poems, 1948–1952* (1972), and *White Shroud: Poems, 1980–1985* (1986). *The Fall of America: Poems of These States, 1965–1971* (1973) won a National Book Award.

Ginsberg continued to produce poems throughout the 1980s and during the 1990s, adding to his already enormous poetic output. In 1990 he was presented an American Book Award for his contributions to literature, and in 1995 he was a finalist for the Pulitzer prize in poetry for *Cosmopolitan Greetings: Poems 1986–1992*. That same year, with musical accompaniment by Paul McCartney and Philip Glass, Ginsberg made a recording of his poem "The Ballad of the Skeletons." Ginsberg died of liver cancer in New York City on 5 April 1997.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Literature

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Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry
(1926–)

French politician, minister of finance (1962–1965, 1969–1974), and president of the Fifth Republic (1974–1981). Born on 2 February 1926 in Koblenz, Germany (his father was a civil servant with French occupation authorities in the Rhineland), Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing came from a background of wealth and nobility. He compiled an exceptional academic record at both the École Polytechnique and École Nationale d'Adminstration and then followed his father by joining the prestigious government Inspectorate of Finance.

Giscard's first posting was to the Bank of France, but in 1950 he was invited to join the Ministry of Finance. He held a succession of posts in that ministry until his appointment as minister of finance in the Edgar Faure government in 1962. Giscard simultaneously sought political office and in 1956 won election to the National Assembly from Puy-de-Dôme. He consolidated his political base by winning election to posts in that department. Giscard styled himself an "independent republican," affiliated with the small Independent and Peasant Party (CNIP), but he voted to support the major initiatives of President Charles de Gaulle. Elegant and articulate in speech and manner, Giscard built a national following.

Giscard lost his post as minister of finance in 1965 because his austerity program hurt de Gaulle politically. Giscard then concentrated his activities in the National Assembly to prepare for a run for the presidency. Assiduously employing television to his advantage, he presented himself as a progressive. He also cultivated new President Georges Pompidou (1969–1974), who named him for a second time as minister of finance (1969–1974).

In the special elections following Pompidou's death in April 1974, Giscard won a narrow runoff victory over the leftist candidate, socialist François

Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing was president of France during 1974–1981. He established close ties with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) but pursued an independent course for his country in foreign affairs. (Richard Melloul/Sygma/Corbis)

Mitterrand. Although Giscard had been elected by the Center and Right, he formulated a leftist agenda. In his widely read book *Démocratie française* (1976), he posited a more open, pluralistic society with opportunity for all. Among his domestic accomplishments were lowering the voting age to eighteen, liberalizing divorce laws, and instituting abortion rights. He also sought to modernize education, and he removed restrictions on programming in state-sponsored radio and television. Unfortunately for Giscard, his presidency came at a time of recession, abetted by the 1973 and 1978 oil crises, forcing him to pursue economic austerity.

In foreign affairs, Giscard was a staunch advocate of European integration and a prime mover behind the formation of the European Economic Council (EEC), an annual meeting of leaders of states in the European Common Market. He established a close working relationship with Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. At the same time, however, Giscard clung to the notion of France as an independent force in world politics, and he frequently intervened in the affairs of the former French colonies of Africa. Relations with the United States remained problematic.

Giscard ran again for the presidency in 1981. By now his political base was weakened; he had been forced to share political power with a premier from an opposition party in the so-called cohabitation. He was also handicapped by several scandals and the perception that he was an elitist. In the 1981 election Mitterrand was again Giscard's principal opponent. As in 1974, there was a runoff between the two men, but this time Mitterrand emerged the winner.

After leaving the presidency, Giscard broke with precedent and remained active in public life. In 1984 he won election to the National Assembly, and he also served as a French representative in the European Union (EU) Parliament.

Elizabeth Pugliese and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; France; Mitterrand, François; Pompidou, Georges; Schmidt, Helmut

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Glasnost

An integral piece of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's political and economic reform agenda of the late 1980s. The term *glasnost* is best translated as "openness in public and political affairs." It was part of Mikhail Gorbachev's 1985 perestroika program to reform the Soviet political system and Soviet society. His conceptualization of glasnost was restricted to signify a more democratic and open society and not the endangerment or abandonment of the fundamentals of Soviet communism.

In December 1986 Gorbachev personally asked the internationally known Soviet dissident-in-exile Andrei Sakharov to return to Moscow. Then, in February 1987, Gorbachev called upon the Soviet press to fill in the blind spots in Soviet history. This liberalization prompted the flowering of many new newspapers and journals that reported on previous political repressions, corruption in the Communist Party, and the failures of the Soviet economy. Furthermore, long-suppressed national movements in the Soviet Union's constituent republics used glasnost to advance their independence agendas.

Some conservative Communist Party members warned Gorbachev of the potential repercussions of glasnost, including the dissolution of the USSR. In fact, with Russian reform leader Boris Yeltsin's rise to power in 1987, Gorbachev was forced to choose between the demands of conservatives and the radical reformers' demands under Yeltsin. Glasnost spun out of control in the late 1980s, catching Gorbachev off guard. Instead of reforming the Soviet system by creating a gradual and smooth transition to a system that blended socialism, social democracy, and capitalism, glasnost went far beyond Gorbachev's intended aims and accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union.

Frank Beyersdorf



Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, architect of the glasnost policy, shown here during a state visit to Warsaw in July 1988 in which he supported steps to legalize the liberal Solidarity movement. (Bernard Bisson & Thierry Orban/Sygma/Corbis)

See also

Gorbachev, Mikhail; Nationalism; Perestroika; Sakharov, Andrei; Soviet Union; Yeltsin, Boris

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Glassboro Summit
(23–25 June 1967)

U.S.-Soviet summit meeting held in June 1967. The Glassboro Summit took place at Glassboro State College during 23–25 June 1967 in Glassboro, New Jersey. There, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin met to discuss a host of issues including Arab-Israeli relations in the immediate wake of the Six-Day War of June 1967. Johnson, who at the time was embroiled in the Vietnam War, called the summit with the intention of de-emphasizing Vietnam and focusing on other Cold War issues. The main topics of discussion included Soviet arms sales, nuclear proliferation, antiballistic missile (ABM) development, the Six-Day War, Vietnam, and Fidel Castro's regime.

At the time, neither Johnson nor Kosygin expected to reach any conclusive agreements. The summit's major goal was to keep dialogue open between the two superpowers and to avoid confrontations over contested issues. Johnson hoped that the Soviets would agree to step up efforts regarding nuclear nonproliferation. Kosygin, however, argued that the issue would not be resolved unless the United States ended its bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Johnson was unwilling to do so, and thus little substantive progress was made toward the control of nuclear proliferation or the limiting of ABM systems. Another important topic for discussion was the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Kosygin demanded that Israeli forces pull out of areas formerly controlled by the Arabs. But Johnson refused to pressure Israel on the issue, so the two sides agreed to disagree.

Johnson was also keen on putting an end to Castro's support of guerrilla insurgencies in Central America, but Kosygin remained silent on the issue. Although the Glassboro Summit did not result in any major breakthroughs, it was nonetheless an important step forward in U.S.-Soviet relations. The two leaders made some headway toward arms limitation, although no real advancement occurred on the issue of ABMs. Glassboro was the last major U.S.-Soviet summit to take place between 1967 and 1972, when President Richard M. Nixon began to thaw Cold War tensions through détente. Because of Moscow's crackdown in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the United States declined to hold high-level talks with the Soviet Union until that time.

The house in which the meetings took place still stands today. After a thorough restoration, it is now open to visitors and serves as a museum and memorial to the summit. A statue of a white dove sits in the home's living room, symbolizing the meeting's generally amicable atmosphere and the "Spirit of Glassboro" during the height of the Cold War.

Arthur Holst

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Czechoslovakia; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich; Missiles, Antiballistic; Vietnam War

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Glemp, Józef, Cardinal
(1929–)

Polish Roman Catholic priest, bishop, and primate of Poland (1981–2006). Born on 18 December 1929 in Inowroclaw, Poland, Józef Glemp and his family worked during World War II as conscripted laborers on a farm operated by occupying German forces. After the war, he became interested in the priesthood, completed his theological studies at the seminary in Poznań, and was ordained a priest in May 1956. He then went to Rome, eventually earning doctorates in both civil and canon law from the Lateran University. He served as a secretary to Primate of Poland Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński during 1967–1979.

In March 1979, Glemp was named bishop of Warmia. After Cardinal Wyszyński's death in 1981, Pope John Paul II, himself a Pole, appointed Glemp to succeed Wyszyński. Glemp thus became the archbishop of Gniezno and of Warsaw and the primate of Poland. He assumed his offices on 7 July 1981. That November, he initiated a series of meetings with Polish Communist Party (PZPR) leader Wojciech Jaruzelski and Solidarity labor leader Lech Wałęsa. These conferences were designed to unite the government, the church, and the Solidarity movement in an effort to resolve Poland's ongoing economic and political problems.

On 12 December 1981, in an effort to crush Solidarity, Jaruzelski declared martial law. Archbishop Glemp, with the support of the pope, worked to defuse the crisis and reduce the possibility of violence. His moderation and accommodation led more activist Poles, including some clergy, to refer to him as "Comrade Glemp." The pope pressured Glemp to take a more antigovernment position, but the archbishop resisted, believing that a violently antigovernment movement would increase the chances of armed conflict and, ultimately, the ruination of Solidarity. More recent observers have noted that Glemp's moderation may indeed have helped the government refrain from using violence to extinguish the Solidarity movement. The Jaruzelski-Glemp-Wałęsa discussions eventually led to Poland's democratization in 1989.

Pope John Paul II elevated Glemp to cardinal in 1983. Glemp retired as president of the Polish Bishops' Conference in 2004 but retained the title of primate of Poland until December 2005.

John David Rausch Jr.

See also
Jaruzelski, Wojciech; John Paul II, Pope; Poland; Roman Catholic Church; Solidarity Movement; Wałęsa, Lech; Wyszyńki, Stefan, Cardinal

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Glenn, John Herschel, Jr.
(1921–)

U.S. Air Marine Corps officer and pilot, astronaut, first American to orbit Earth, and Democratic U.S. senator from Ohio (1974–1999). Born on 18 July 1921 in Cambridge, Ohio, John Glenn attended local public schools and enrolled at Muskingum College in Ohio in 1939. In 1942 he interrupted his studies to join the Naval Aviation Cadet Program. He subsequently served in the U.S. Marine Corps, seeing action as a pilot in the Marshall Islands during World War II. During the war, he flew some fifty-nine missions. He subsequently served in the Korean War, flying an F-86 Sabre and completing ninety missions. During the conflict, he downed three Soviet-made MiGs.

Following his Korean War service, Glenn became an accomplished test pilot. On 16 July 1957 he became the first man to complete a supersonic transcontinental flight, flying from California to New York in three hours, twenty-three minutes. In 1959 he joined the fledgling U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to take part in the Mercury program. On 7 February 1962 he became the first American to orbit Earth in the *Friendship 7*. He orbited Earth three times, which bested Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin's one orbit around Earth the previous year, although Gagarin had the distinction of being the first human in space. The flight made Glenn a national hero and earned him a ticker tape parade in New York City. It also raised the stakes significantly in the Space Race.

A former U.S. Marine Corps pilot, John Glenn in 1962 became the first American to orbit Earth. (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)

In 1965 Glenn retired as a Marine colonel and left the space program. He joined the business world and served as the vice president and then president of Royal Crown Cola, where he stayed until winning a seat in the U.S. Senate in 1974.

Glenn enjoyed a successful senatorial career, although he was implicated but later exonerated in the so-called Keating Five scandal of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1984 he ran unsuccessfully for the Democratic presidential nomination. In October 1998, while still a sitting senator, he became the oldest man ever to venture into space, with the crew of the space shuttle *Discovery*. He was seventy-seven years old at the time of his flight, which was in part to test the effects of space travel on elderly people. Glenn

stepped down from the Senate in 1999 and enjoys an active retirement, which includes involvement in numerous causes and organizations.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Space Race

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Goldwater, Barry Morris
(1909–1998)

U.S. senator, 1964 Republican presidential candidate, and one of the founders of the modern American conservative movement. Born on 1 January 1909 in Phoenix, Arizona, Barry Goldwater attended the University of Arizona for one year before leaving to work for his family's Phoenix department store. In 1937 he became president of the firm.

During 1941–1945 Goldwater served in the U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) in the Pacific theater. Leaving the army as a lieutenant colonel, he organized the Arizona National Guard and served as an air force reserve officer, attaining the rank of major general in 1962.

Meanwhile, Goldwater had become politically active. In 1949 he won a seat on the Phoenix City Council and in 1952 was elected to the U.S. Senate, representing his home state of Arizona. As a senator, Goldwater became a champion of the ascendant political views of the conservative wing of the Republican Party. He became known as a plainspoken proponent of smaller government, a hawkish anticommunist, and an opponent of what he termed "creeping socialism" in American society.

In 1964 Goldwater won his party's presidential nomination. Lambasted as a right-wing demagogue for his strident views, he suffered a crushing defeat by the popular Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1964 election. Goldwater's intimations that he might resort to nuclear weapons in a showdown with the Soviets frightened many moderates and led to one of the most infamous Cold War–influenced campaign commercials, the "Daisy Spot" in which a little girl plucking flower petals is overshadowed by a terrifying countdown and then a nuclear explosion.

Despite his defeat, Goldwater was credited with energizing the conservative wing of the Republican Party, which

Leader of the conservative political forces in the Republican Party in the 1960s, Senator Barry Goldwater from Arizona won the party's nomination for president in 1964 but lost by a wide margin in the general election to Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson. (Library of Congress)

Goldwater became known as a plain-spoken proponent of smaller government, a hawkish anticommunist, and an opponent of what he termed "creeping socialism" in American society.

would eventually come to dominate the party and the nation sixteen years later upon Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency. Goldwater's 1964 run also marked the beginning of the end for the Democratic Party's lock on the so-called Solid South, the voters of which increasingly moved into the Republican column over issues of race, defense, taxes, and big government.

Goldwater retired from the Senate in 1987. In his last year in office, he cosponsored the Goldwater-Nichols Military Reform Act that granted military commanders greater latitude on the battlefield and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) more influence as the president's primary military advisor. A conservative firebrand in the 1950s and 1960s, he ended his political career as a mediator and a stabilizing influence within the Senate, criticizing conservatives and liberals alike. Goldwater died in Paradise Valley, Arizona, on 29 May 1998.

MICHAEL E. DONOGHUE

See also

Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nuclear Arms Race; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Gomułka, Władysław
(1905–1982)

Polish communist politician and head of state (1956–1970). Born to a peasant family in Białobrzegi, then Austria-Hungary, on 6 February 1905, Władysław Gomułka as a teenager began working as a journeyman locksmith. In the late 1920s he became an active trade unionist and later joined the underground Polish Communist Party. In the 1930s he worked mainly as a trade union organizer. In 1932 he was shot and wounded during a strike and after his recovery was sentenced to four years in prison. Upon his release, he went to Moscow to study at the International Lenin Institute. In 1936 his Soviet mentors sent him back to Poland, where he was again arrested; he was released at the onset of World War II.

Gomułka fought against the German invasion in September 1939 but then went into hiding in southern Poland until 1941. There he cofounded the Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR, Polish Workers' Party), a revived version of the Communist Party. In 1943 he became the secretary-general of the party's Central Committee.

Following World War II, Gomułka played an active role in establishing a Soviet-style Polish government. He remained the head of the PPR and served as deputy premier of Poland from 1945 to 1949. A Polish nationalist, Gomułka did not view his colleagues who had spent the war in the Soviet

Union with much respect. He also opposed certain Stalinist policies, such as collectivization of agriculture.

Moscow considered Gomułka too independent-minded, and on 3 September 1948 he was accused of "rightist-nationalist heresy" and harboring sympathy for the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. Gomułka was promptly purged from the party. In January 1949 he was arrested and lost his position in the government. He was released from house arrest in 1954 after Josef Stalin's death.

Two years later, following Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's crimes and growing unrest in Poland, Gomułka was readmitted to the Communist Party (PZPR) and in October 1956 was asked by the party leadership to become its first secretary. This move was an unpopular one with the Soviets, who were exceedingly reluctant to accept Gomułka as Poland's leader. It was only after Khrushchev's visit to Warsaw that Moscow accepted Gomułka.



Władysław Gomułka dominated the Polish political scene from 1956 to 1970. (Library of Congress)

From 1956 on, First Secretary Gomułka dominated the Polish political scene. He firmly controlled the government, established slightly more freedom for Poles, and moved away from Stalinist terror tactics. But Poland maintained its close ties with the USSR, as Gomułka did not favor major reform. He reintroduced tight party control over society, and workers' councils organized in 1956 were placed under government surveillance and control. No substantive economic changes were introduced, as Gomułka regarded any major economic reform as an attempt to reintroduce capitalism in Poland.

State relations with the Roman Catholic Church improved and were generally less tense than under Gomułka's predecessors, although secularization remained the official party policy. In March 1968 Gomułka survived a serious crisis that shook Poland and was probably aimed at removing him from leadership. The crisis, which had begun with student demonstrations, evolved into an anti-Semitic hysteria underwritten by the party and the state-controlled media. Several hundred students and professors were purged from universities, and tens of thousands of Polish Jews were forced to emigrate. In the summer of 1968 Gomułka supported the Warsaw Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia, and Polish tanks along with units from other countries entered Prague to bring an end to the Prague Spring.

Neither the crisis nor the Warsaw Pact intervention solved Poland's growing economic or political problems, however. Gomułka's position was weaker than ever, yet he continued to cling to power. He and the party had lost the confidence of the people, and the centrally run economy could not provide even basic supplies. On 13 December 1970 Gomułka was forced to act to stave off a complete economic collapse. When he ordered a wide range of price increases without prior notice, workers went on strike and began mass protests. Gomułka blamed the unrest on "capitalist agents," and he dispatched police and army troops to Gdańsk to quell the protesters. In the

ensuing clash with the authorities, hundreds of demonstrating workers were killed or wounded. The party leadership, now fearing an even larger conflict, replaced Gomułka as first secretary with Edward Gierek.

In early 1971 Gomułka was suspended from the party's Central Committee and was removed from the Council of State. He then lived in relative obscurity, dying in Warsaw on 1 September 1982.

Jakub Basista

See also

Europe, Eastern; Gierek, Edward; Khrushchev, Nikita; Poland; Stalin, Josef; Tito, Josip Broz

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González Márquez, Felipe

(1942–)

Spanish socialist politician and prime minister (1982–1996). Born on 5 March 1942 in Seville, Spain, Felipe González studied at the University of Seville. While at the university he joined the outlawed Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). He graduated in 1966 with a law degree and afterward taught law. During 1969–1970, he served on the PSOE national committee. He was arrested in 1971 during protests against Francisco Franco's rule.

In 1975 after the death of Franco, González became one of the leaders of the legal democratic opposition as a part of the Platform for Democratic Convergence. In March 1976 this group became part of the ruling Democratic Junta of Spain. In 1977 the PSOE was legalized and ran in the June elections, Spain's first since the 1930s. The PSOE gained sufficient seats to become the principal opposition party.

In the October 1982 elections the PSOE won a plurality with 42 percent of votes cast, and González became the first socialist premier of Spain since before Franco. González played a key role in the transition to democracy. He pushed for liberal reforms and a restructuring of the economy, extended social security, and made education free to the age of sixteen. He also greatly expanded the university system. When one of Spain's largest business and banking groups, Rumasa, was threatened with bankruptcy, González authorized its nationalization. This prompted fears of a more aggressive socialist agenda, but González claimed that it was a one-time action to secure the jobs and savings of a large number of Spaniards. Indeed, he dropped the adjective of "Marxist" from the party description and adroitly moved the PSOE toward the center. He also sought membership for Spain in the European Economic Community (EEC).

In 1986 the PSOE held on to the majority in parliament, and González implemented a number of initiatives, some of which were heavily criticized by the Left of his own party. Spain joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community in 1986 and sent troops to the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

González won a third election in 1989 and a fourth 1993. Despite a growing scandal in his cabinet over how Spain had dealt with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Country and Liberty) separatists in the Basque region, González led his party in the May 1996 elections. The scandal, combined with a worsening economy, led to a PSOE loss to the rightist People's Party, and González resigned from the PSOE in 1996. He currently heads the Madrid-based Global Progress Foundation (FPG).

David H. Richards

See also
Spain

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Gorbachev, Mikhail
(1931–)

Last president of the Soviet Union (1988–1991) and general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during 1985–1991. In office, he attempted to reform and restructure the Soviet Union, supported reform-minded leaders in Eastern Europe, abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine, and refrained from using military force when East European communist regimes collapsed in 1989 and 1990. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union significantly improved its relations with the West, particularly with the United States. He was much more successful abroad than at home. His internal reform attempts ultimately proved futile and contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Born on 2 March 1931 in Privolnoye, Stavropol Province, Russia, to a peasant family, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev joined the Komsomol (Communist Union of the Young) in 1946 and in the same year began driving a harvester for an agricultural cooperative. In 1951 he entered the Law Faculty of Moscow State University, where he earned a law degree in 1955.

Returning to Stavropol following his studies in Moscow, Gorbachev enjoyed a remarkably rapid rise within the ranks of the CPSU, first through various posts in the Komsomol and then in the party apparatus in Stavropol in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Gorbachev became a member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1971, a candidate

Breakup of the Soviet Union, 1989–1995

member of the Politburo in 1979, a full member in 1980, and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in March 1985. A keen politician, Gorbachev's political ascendancy was further promoted by Mikhail Suslov and particularly by Yuri Andropov.

Once in power, Gorbachev consolidated his position within the party and proceeded to move forward with internal reforms. He termed his reform agenda perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). What soon became called the "politics of perestroika" was a process of cumulative reforms, ultimately leading to results that were neither intended nor necessarily desired.

Perestroika had three distinctive phases. The first phase was aimed mainly at the acceleration of economic development and the revitalization of socialism. The second phase was marked by the notion of glasnost. During this period, Gorbachev emphasized the need for political and social restructuring as well as the necessity of dealing openly with the past. Media freedoms were enhanced considerably as part of this process. In the economic arena, limited market-orientated elements were introduced, and greater latitude was given to state-owned enterprises. The third and final phase of perestroika was aimed at democratizing the Soviet political process. Reformers created a new bicameral parliament, and new procedures allowed for the direct election of two-thirds of the members of the Congress of People's Deputies. In March 1990, the Congress abolished the CPSU's political monopoly, paving the way for the legalization of other political parties.

Perestroika's third phase was also marked by some incongruous paradoxes. While the power of the CPSU was waning, Gorbachev's power was on the increase. In October 1988, he replaced Andrey Gromyko as head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Seven months later, Gorbachev became chairman of the new Supreme Soviet. Finally, in March 1990, the Congress elected him president of the USSR, a newly established post with potent executive powers. At the same time, Gorbachev's economic reforms were yielding little fruit. Perestroika was already being overshadowed by civil unrest, interethnic strife, and national and regional independence movements, particularly in the Baltic and Caucasus regions.

Gorbachev enjoyed his most remarkable successes in foreign policy. He quickly eased tensions with the West. Two summits with U.S. President Ronald Reagan (Geneva in 1985 and Reykjavík in 1986) paved the way for historic breakthroughs in Soviet-U.S. relations and nuclear arms reductions. On 8 December 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed by both nations, the first agreement in history that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. In the succeeding years, Gorbachev's international stature continued to grow. In 1988, he ordered the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, ending his nation's disastrous decade-long struggle there. He also promised publicly to refrain from military intervention in Eastern Europe. In fact, Gorbachev embraced the new democratically elected leadership in the region. Especially significant was his agreement to the reunification of Germany and the inclusion of the new united Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, Gorbachev is generally considered a driving force behind the end of the Cold War.

With his policies of glasnost and perestroika, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to democratize his country's political system in the 1980s. Although he was ultimately forced to resign from office, his programs led to the downfall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. (Corel)

While Gorbachev's foreign policy was being hailed abroad, problems within the Soviet Union continued unabated. Old-line communists considered Gorbachev's policies as heresy, while economic dislocations multiplied. In 1990, several Soviet-controlled republics, including that of Russia, declared their independence. Gorbachev tried to stem this tide but was unsuccessful. Talks between Soviet authorities and the breakaway republics resulted in the creation of a new Russian federation (or confederation), slated to become law in August 1991.

Many of Gorbachev's reforms were tainted by an attempted coup of reactionary opponents of perestroika in August 1991. Led by high-ranking officials, among them the chief of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), the defense minister, the prime minister, and the vice president, Gorbachev was put under house arrest in his home in Foros after rejecting any negotiations with the putsch leaders. With the courageous intervention

Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, Gorbachev is generally considered a driving force behind the end of the Cold War.

of the Russian Republic leader Boris Yeltsin, the coup collapsed after two days. Gorbachev returned to Moscow but was now dependent on Yeltsin, who banned the CPSU from the Russian Republic. On 24 August 1991, Gorbachev resigned as CPSU general secretary. On 7 December 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus created a loose confederation called the Community of Independent States (CIS). Soon afterward, eight other republics joined, and the CIS treaty was concluded on 21 December. Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president on 25 December, and the Soviet Union became extinct on 31 December 1991.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

See also

Afghanistan War; Andropov, Yuri; Brezhnev, Leonid; Brezhnev Doctrine; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich; Europe, Eastern; Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Glasnost; Governor's Island Meeting, Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush; Gromyko, Andrey; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Malta Meeting, Bush and Gorbachev; Moscow Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Perestroika; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Reykjavík Meeting; Soviet Union; Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich; United States; Warsaw Pact; Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev; Yeltsin, Boris

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Gorshkov, Sergey Georgyevich

(1910–1988)

Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union and commander in chief of the Red Navy while also serving as deputy minister of defense (1956–1985). Born in Kamenets-Pedolsky, Ukraine, then part of the Russian Empire, on 26 February 1910, Sergey Gorshkov was commissioned in the Red Navy on his graduation in 1931 from the Frunze Higher Naval School. He then held a series of posts in the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets. He advanced rapidly in rank and responsibility, in part due to the openings at the top levels created by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's purges of the Soviet military.

Gorshkov developed a strong combat record in the Black Sea Fleet during World War II, leading naval and amphibious operations against German forces and commanding the Danube Flotilla in 1944 during Soviet advances into Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. He was promoted to rear admi-

ral in October 1941. After the war he commanded a squadron of ships and was elevated to chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet in 1948 and then to commander of that fleet as a vice admiral in 1951.

Transferred to Moscow, Gorshkov was promoted to full admiral and became first deputy chief of the Red Navy in July 1955. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev appointed Gorshkov commander in chief of the Red Navy in June 1956, a position he held until 1985. He also held a dual appointment as deputy minister of defense, and in 1961 he became a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). During his long tenure as its commander, he directed the substantial growth of the Red Navy and created a guiding philosophy that was presented in numerous articles and a book, *The Seapower of the State* (1980).

Gorshkov argued that a strong navy was a necessity for a superpower. It served as a symbol of power and as a potent military and political instrument. His leadership moved the Soviet military from an army-dominated structure with a continental orientation to a global military power with a significant maritime component.

Gorshkov developed a naval force that reflected his theories and the realities of Soviet geography and politics. His navy followed the commitment to modern technologies, especially to the missiles and nuclear weapons that came to dominate Soviet military planning in the 1950s. The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) fleet was a key part of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Red Navy also developed an ability to protect the Soviet SLBM fleet operating in sanctuaries near Soviet home waters. This defensive posture was an extension of the traditional role of protecting the borders and coastlines of the homeland.

The Red Navy sustained the ability to support ground force operations, another traditional role of the Russian and Soviet navies. Gorshkov's greatest accomplishment was developing an oceangoing fleet that could project power around the world, showing the flag in foreign ports. He oversaw the creation of the world's second largest navy, establishing a highly visible global presence and challenging the U.S. Navy by threatening logistical routes and SLBM patrol areas. Gorshkov retired in 1985 and died in Moscow on 13 May 1988.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Soviet Union, Navy

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Gottwald, Klement
(1896–1953)

Secretary-general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) and premier of Czechoslovakia. Born the illegitimate son of a peasant in Dedice, in southern Moravia, on 23 November 1896, Klement Gottwald became the leader of communist Czechoslovakia after World War II. He joined the social democratic movement in Vienna at age sixteen. Drafted into the Habsburg armies in 1915, he deserted in 1918 but joined the Czechoslovak Army later that same year. He then joined the CPCz in 1921, working as a journalist.

Gottwald moved to Prague in 1926 and soon became a leader within the party. He was elected secretary-general of the CPCz in 1929 and became a representative in the Czechoslovak National Assembly. A staunch supporter of the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union, he nevertheless moved toward cooperation with the social democratic movement after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933. When Hitler's armies occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939, Gottwald fled to the Soviet Union, where he became a national secretary in the Communist International (Comintern).

When in 1943 the Soviets recognized the Czechoslovak government-in-exile headed by Eduard Beneš, Gottwald quickly became a member of the coalition and of the interim government set up after World War II in Czechoslovakia. After elections in 1946 gave the communists 38 percent of the vote, Gottwald assumed the office of premier in another coalition government.

Klement Gottwald engineered the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948. (Library of Congress)

Relations within the coalition soon deteriorated, however. Facing new elections in 1948, Gottwald engineered a coup d'état and assumed the presidency. An ardent Stalinist, Gottwald oversaw one of the harshest regimes in Eastern Europe, executing hundreds of alleged enemies and sending thousands more to prison camps. Gottwald suffered from poor health, however, and died in Prague on 14 March 1953 just after returning from Soviet leader Josef Stalin's funeral.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Beneš, Edvard; Czechoslovakia; Masaryk, Jan; Stalin, Josef

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Gouzenko, Igor
(1919–1982)

Soviet intelligence operative and defector. Born in Rogachov near Moscow on 13 January 1919, Igor Gouzenko joined the Komsomol (Young Communist League) in 1935 and entered the Moscow Architectural Institute in 1938. In 1941 he transferred to the Military Engineering Academy, where he trained as a cipher specialist and was assigned to Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) in Moscow. As a Red Army lieutenant, Gouzenko was sent to Ottawa, Canada, in 1943. There he began his perilous journey from cipher clerk to Cold War icon in the autumn of 1945 as he was about to be recalled to Moscow.

On the evening of 5 September 1945, Gouzenko stuffed 109 classified documents under his shirt and attempted to defect. It was not an easy defection. Neither the Canadian Ministry of Justice nor the *Ottawa Journal* newspaper, both of which he approached, showed much interest. It was only after a Soviet security unit responded to Gouzenko's disappearance by ransacking his apartment later that night that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police took him seriously. He was granted political asylum soon thereafter.

On the evening of 5 September 1945, Gouzenko stuffed 109 classified documents under his shirt and attempted to defect.

Gouzenko's defection had major repercussions for both Soviet and Western intelligence services. He revealed a major GRU spy ring controlled by the Soviet embassy in Ottawa and provided detailed information on the clandestine activities of the Soviet security and intelligence service. The stolen documents pointed to an elaborate network of espionage that included Canadian civil servants, politicians, and scientists. Consequently, a dozen Soviet spies were arrested, including the infamous Alan Nunn May, virtually paralyzing Soviet espionage activities in Canada. Moscow monitored Gouzenko's betrayal via Kim Philby (head of MI6's, or the external intelligence agency's, Soviet counterintelligence agency), who received regular briefings on the Gouzenko revelations. Gouzenko's evidence also led MI5, the British counterintelligence agency, to the espionage activities of British physicists, including Klaus Fuchs. The Gouzenko affair thereby became closely entwined with the politics of the atom bomb.

Gouzenko's testimony to a Canadian royal commission on espionage was the first significant inside exposure of the methods and motivations of Soviet agents and was sufficiently authoritative to convince the commissioners of the conspiratorial character of Soviet communism. By focusing international attention on issues of loyalty, subversion, national security, and atomic espionage, the Gouzenko affair helped ignite the Cold War. Until his death on 25 June 1982 in Mississauga, near Toronto, Gouzenko lived under police protection, occasionally appearing in public forums with his trademark hood to conceal his identity.

Phillip Deery

See also

Canada; Defections; Espionage; Fuchs, Klaus; May, Allan Nunn; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell

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Governors Island Meeting, Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush

(7 December 1988)

Summit meeting among Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan, and President-elect George H. W. Bush on 7 December 1988. By 1988, U.S.-Soviet relations had improved dramatically, as evidenced by the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Reagan's visit to Moscow in May 1988. Gorbachev, ignoring political opposition and economic difficulties at home as he pushed on with his perestroika and glasnost reforms, went to New York in early December to announce a dramatic international initiative at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. In his address, he first declared it impossible to maintain closed societies in the face of globalization. He went even further by embracing human rights and the need to free international relations from ideological constraints. Finally, he asserted the need to decrease the threat of the use of force. He then announced a unilateral 10 percent reduction in Soviet armed forces (nearly half a million men) to also include 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft, mostly stationed in Eastern Europe. In so doing, Gorbachev sought to give credibility to the idea that the Soviet Union had undertaken a fundamental change of course in the way it viewed and dealt with the world.

Following his UN speech, Gorbachev traveled to Governors Island in New York Harbor to bid farewell to Reagan and to establish a working relationship with President-elect George H. W. Bush. Gorbachev hoped to gain a commitment from Bush to build on his relationship with Reagan, but Bush remained aloof throughout the meeting. When Reagan announced his full support of Gorbachev's troop reduction initiative, Bush merely stated, "I support what the president said." Gorbachev, hoping to draw Bush out of his shell, replied, "That's one of the best answers of the year."

During the luncheon, Gorbachev directed most of his remarks toward Bush, trying to assure the president-elect that he could trust the Soviets, that he would not try to undermine or take advantage of Bush, and that his policies represented "real politics" that were necessary because of revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union. Bush asked Gorbachev what his reforms might produce in the Soviet Union over the next five years, to which Gorbachev replied, "Even Jesus Christ couldn't answer that one." Some discussion took place regarding chemical weapons, but American officials, fearful of surprises, refused to engage in serious negotiations.

In a gracious climax to their relationship, Reagan presented Gorbachev with a picture of their first walk at Geneva, stating that the two leaders had come a long way together to clear a path for peace. Reagan then offered a toast to the Soviet leader celebrating what they had accomplished and express-

ing his hope that such progress would continue once Bush assumed the presidency. Gorbachev, raising his glass toward Bush, declared, "This is our first agreement."

As the luncheon ended, Bush told Gorbachev that he looked forward to working with him "at the appropriate time." The three men then posed for pictures with the Statue of Liberty as a backdrop. Reagan viewed the meeting as a great success, writing in his diary that he believed Gorbachev viewed the United States as "a partner seeking to make a better world." Gorbachev had to rush home, canceling trips to Havana and London, in order to deal with an earthquake in Armenia that had killed 25,000 and left another half million people homeless. This crisis became a symbol of the domestic problems that preoccupied Gorbachev until the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. Such problems made it increasingly difficult for the Soviet leader to undertake any new international initiatives and also influenced his decision not to interfere when Moscow's East European allies broke loose from their allegiance to the Soviet Union in 1989.

Upon assuming the presidency, Bush abandoned his initial caution in dealing with Gorbachev, negotiating agreements that increased Soviet-American trade, reduced chemical weapons and conventional forces in Europe, and achieved further cuts in Soviet and American nuclear arsenals.

Dean Fafoutis

See also

Bush, George Herbert Walker; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Moscow Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Perestroika; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Great Britain

See United Kingdom

Greece

Southeast European nation-state covering 50,942 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Alabama. Greece, with a 1945 population of 7.5 million, lies between the Ionian and Aegean Seas and is bordered by Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria to the north and Turkey to the east. Following its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, Greece expanded territorially,

including the Ionian Islands and Thessaly by the end of nineteenth century; Epirus, Macedonia, Crete, and most of the eastern Aegean islands after 1913; Thrace after World War I; and Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands from Italy by the Treaty of Paris in 1947.

Italy had invaded Greece in October 1940, and when the Greeks drove the Italians back into Albania, the Germans came to the rescue of their ally Italy in April 1941. In June 1941, following the defeat of Greece, the nation came under a tripartite occupation of German, Italian, and Bulgarian forces. King Paul II went into exile.

Resistance to the occupiers began early. In September 1941 Greek communist guerrillas established the National Liberation Front (EAM) with a military component, the National People's Liberation Army (ELAS); most noncommunist resistance groups organized under the National Republican Greek League (EDES). In August 1943 the guerrilla representatives met with King Paul II in Cairo to discuss the country's future. Unfortunately, their failure to reach agreement contributed to tensions between the ELAS and EDES, resulting in civil war from October 1943.

In Moscow in October 1944, Soviet leader Josef Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed that Greece should be part of the British sphere in Southeastern Europe. Georgios Papandreou, a leading Greek politician in exile, formed a government and, following the withdrawal of German forces, returned to Athens on 18 October 1944. When ELAS refused to demobilize, Churchill traveled to Athens on Christmas Day 1944 with Foreign

Secretary Anthony Eden in an effort to broker a deal between the warring parties, under which Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens became regent and General Nikolaos Plastiras replaced Papandreou as prime minister.

Following a cease-fire in January 1945 and the signing of the Varkiza Agreement between the Greek government and the EAM, the government headed by Themistoklis Sophoulis called elections for 31 March 1946. Because the communists abstained on the basis that free elections were then impossible, the right-wing coalition dominated by the People's Party won 55 percent of the vote. A September 1946 plebiscite also reinstated the monarchy.

In October 1946, civil war erupted again between the communist EAM, led by General Vafiadis Markos, and Greek regular troops.

With Greece in civil war and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia supporting the communist side, in 1947 President Harry S. Truman called for $400 million in aid to both Greece and Turkey. Greece began to receive military and economic aid from the United States in March 1947. Changes in EAM's military tactics, the loss of Yugoslavian support in 1948, and growing U.S. military support for the regular Greek forces all brought the defeat of the communists in the summer of 1949.

In February 1950 the Greek government lifted martial law, and the next month new elections were held. The People's Party remained the largest single party, with other important centrist parties being the Liberals, the National Progressive Center Union, and the Georgios Papandreou Party. The 1951 elections were contested by two new political entities: the Greek Rally, led by Marshal Papagos, and the United Democratic Left, composed of former communists. American pressure, however, forced electoral law changes that replaced proportional representation with a majority system. As a result, the right-wing Greek Rally, which won the November 1952 elections, remained in power until 1963.

Economic conditions and unrest led to a sizable Greek migration abroad. During the period 1951–1980, approximately 12 percent of the Greek population immigrated abroad, most of them to Australia, Canada, the United States, and Germany.

Both Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952; however, relations between the two countries remained tense, particularly over Cyprus. There was considerable support on Cyprus from among its Greek majority population for union (enosis) with Greece, which the Turkish minority opposed. Enosis was fanned by Archbishop Makarios III and sustained through political violence coordinated by General Georgios Grivas and the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). Following agreements in Zurich and London in 1959 among the Greek, Turkish, and British governments, Cyprus was declared an independent republic of the British Commonwealth, with Britain maintaining sovereignty over two military bases on the island and Greece and Turkey allowed only a small military presence.

In 1955, Konstantinos Karamanlis became prime minister. He transformed the Greek Rally into the National Radical Union (ERE) and passed legislation that gave women the right to vote in the elections of February

1956. In 1961 Karamanlis secured for Greece associate status in the European Economic Community (EEC). In the Greek national elections of that same year, the centrist parties, grouped into the Center Union under the leadership of Georgios Papandreou, became the main opposition party, with third place secured by the United Democratic Left. Because of a conflict between Prime Minister Karamanlis and the monarchy, especially Queen Frederica, Karamanlis resigned and left the country in 1963, beginning what would be eleven years of exile in France.

In the November 1963 elections, Papandreou obtained a narrow victory. As the United Democratic Left influenced the balance of power, however, new elections were held in February 1964, and the Center Union won with 53 percent of the vote. Papandreou continued as prime minister for the next eighteen months.

Following the death of King Paul II in March 1964, his son Constantine II ascended the throne. Confrontation between Constantine and Papandreou (the prime minister sought to exert control over the Ministry of Defense, and the king refused him permission to do so) led Papandreou to resign in July 1965. His successor as head of the Center Union, Panayoitis Kanellopoulos, led the party into the national elections scheduled for May 1967. Before they could take place, however, in April a group of junior officers overthrew the government in a coup with the aim of preventing a victory by the Center Union. The junta was led by Colonels Georgios Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos and Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos. Papandreou was placed under house arrest until his death in November 1968. Following an amateurish countercoup attempted by King Constantine in December 1967, the monarch fled abroad, and the colonels established a regency.

Colonel Papadopoulos became prime minister, and an authoritarian constitution was ratified in September 1968. After a student occupation of the Faculty of Law in Athens University and a mutiny in the navy, the regime established a presidential, parliamentary republic in June 1973. In July 1973 Papadopoulos was elected president as the only candidate in a plebiscite. Following a brutal repression of the student occupation of Athens Polytechnic in November 1973, the Papadopoulos regime was replaced by a junta led by Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, head of the military police, while Lieutenant General Phaidon Gizikis became president.

The desire of the generals to secure popular support in Greece by consummating enosis backfired. In July 1974 President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III was deposed in a junta-supported coup, but this brought a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and occupation of 40 percent of the island. In Greece the Ioannidis regime collapsed, and Konstantinos Karamanlis was summoned back from exile to form a democratic government. He became prime minister on 24 July 1974.

In the elections of November 1974, Karamanlis's New Democracy Party (ND), successor to the ERE, won 54 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, Andreas Papandreou's new party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), garnered 14 percent of the vote. Under a new constitution ratified in June 1975, a presidential regime came into being. Parliament then elected Kon-

Furniture, burnt-out cars, and other debris litter the square outside Athens Polytechnic following a night of street battles during demonstrations against the military regime of President Georgios Papadopoulos, 20 November 1973. (Keystone/ Getty Images)

stantinos Tsatsos the president. After his five-year term, Karamanlis succeeded him in 1980.

In 1977, under the leadership of Papandreou, PASOK grew to represent 25 percent of the electorate and in 1981 won the national election outright, forming Greece's first socialist government. In January 1981 Greece became the European Community's tenth member. After the northern part of Cyprus declared itself the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey, Greece signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the United States in 1983.

In 1985, at the end of his term, Karamanlis, despite his advanced age, again stood for election. PASOK proposed its own candidate, Christos Sartzetakis, a former judge. After a constitutional crisis led to the resignation of Karamanlis as president, Sartzetakis was elected president after three rounds of voting in March 1985. In the 1989 elections, none of the parties won the majority of votes, leading to a temporary if not strange conservative-communist coalition. Elections in April 1990 represented the end of the PASOK era, bringing the ND back to power. One month later, Karamanlis was elected

president for a second term. Although much of the Cold War period had been turbulent for Greece, calm apparently returned.

Lucian N. Leustean

See also

Constantine II, King of Greece; Cyprus; Greek Civil War; Makarios III, Archbishop; Papadopoulos, Georgios; Papagos, Alexander; Papandreou, Andreas Georgios; Papandreou, Georgios; Truman Doctrine; Turkey

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Greek Civil War
(1946–1949)

Conflict fought between the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and anticommunist Greek nationalists. Greece's civil war was rooted in age-old divisions within Greek society and was complicated by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. The nationalists were strongly supported by Britain and the United States. The war was one of the earliest Cold War tests of will between East and West and claimed the lives of an estimated 80,000 Greeks, a fatality rate that surpassed the suffering of that nation in World War II. Both sides committed atrocities and tried to settle old scores under the guise of conflicting ideologies. The conflict's greatest legacy was the Truman Doctrine, which committed the United States and its allies to come to the aid of any nation threatened by communist takeover. This set the stage for President Harry S. Truman's containment policy.

In the early years of the twentieth century, conservative and liberal parties in Greece struggled for power, engaging in a series of bloodless purges that heightened political instability and created great anger and bitterness. This atmosphere provided fertile ground for authoritarianism, and in 1936 General Ioannis Metaxas established a fascist-style dictatorship, further polarizing the country.

Metaxas's death in 1941 and the flight of the Greek government to Egypt after the German invasion left Greece in virtual chaos. The KKE, persecuted under Metaxas, stepped into the power vacuum by creating the National Liberation Front (EAM), dedicated to the liberation of Greece. By 1944 the EAM boasted nearly 2 million members, and its military arm, the National Liberation Army (ELAS), had enlisted 50,000 fighters.

In October 1944, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, fearful of a communist takeover in Greece and the loss of control over the eastern

Mediterranean, met with Soviet Premier Josef Stalin in Moscow and struck a deal over control of the Balkans. In return for Soviet dominance in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, Stalin ceded Greece to Great Britain and vowed not to directly support the KKE after the war.

Relations between the British-backed Greek monarchy and the EAM quickly soured as the communists suppressed dissent and tried to assert control over the country. In retaliation, the British rehabilitated the collaborationist police, returned monarchist military units to the nation, and demanded that the ELAS disarm. On 2 December 1944 collaborationist police fired on antigovernment demonstrators, triggering the Battle for Athens. It resulted in a victory for the nationalists and the disarming of the ELAS. The EAM splintered as moderates and socialists abandoned it, while KKE membership plummeted from its peak of more than 400,000 to only 50,000. KKE leader Nikos Zachariades attempted to impose tighter party discipline but was stymied by the strength of the nationalist forces.

In an attempt to maintain order, the British strengthened the Greek National Guard and turned a blind eye as security forces conducted a campaign of repression against the communists. In the Greek parliamentary elections of March 1946, the rightist candidates won a landslide victory. The allegedly rigged elections prompted the KKE to declare a state of civil war and reorganize ELAS units as the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). The DSE won notable gains in the first year of fighting due in part to support from the communist governments of Yugoslavia and Albania.

Supporters of Ethnikón Apeleftherotikón Métopon (EAM), the Greek Communist Party, rally in Athens on the eve of the general elections in March 1946. The right-wing coalition won the elections, but civil war erupted by the end of the year. (Library of Congress)

Fearing that the nationalists might indeed lose the war against the DSE, the British appealed for help from the United States. Previous British requests for American assistance in Greece had been rebuffed, but by 1947 American attitudes had begun to change. President Truman's growing antipathy toward the Soviets and their tightening of control in Eastern Europe hardened his stance. On 12 March 1947, he addressed a joint session of Congress, enunciating the Truman Doctrine and requesting a $300 million aid package to support the Greek nationalists and anticommunists in nearby Turkey.

The KKE did not take the Truman Doctrine seriously, believing that the nationalists would capitulate even with U.S. support. By 1948, however, it was becoming clear that the DSE was in dire straits as the American-backed nationalist army grew exponentially. In January 1949, KKE leaders foolishly declared that the goal of the civil war was no longer the restoration of parliamentary democracy, as they had previously stated, but rather the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. The DSE then shifted from a mobile war of attrition to a campaign to defend territory, a tactical miscalculation that played into the hands of the revitalized nationalist army.

In the spring of 1949, the nationalist army cleared the communist rebels out of southern Greece and launched a two-pronged offensive designed to drive them completely out of the country. As the fighting reached its climax, Yugoslavia closed its border and ended arms shipments that had kept the DSE insurgency viable. After sustaining more than 2,000 casualties in the summer of 1949, DSE fighters withdrew into Albania during the night of 29 August 1949, effectively ending the civil war. Although sporadic DSE raids continued into 1950, the victory of the nationalist forces was by then complete.

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See also

Albania; Churchill, Winston; Containment Policy; Greece; Tito, Josip Broz; Truman Doctrine; United Kingdom; United States; Yugoslavia

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Greenland

The world's largest island, located in the Arctic Circle. Greenland covers 836,326 square miles and is bordered by the Arctic Ocean to the north, the Greenland Sea and the Atlantic Ocean to the east, and Baffin Bay to the west. It had a 1945 population of approximately 21,000 people. Greenland was first a Danish colony and then an integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark. On 1 May 1979, Greenland attained home rule under its own parliament, the Landsting, although it still falls under Danish sovereignty. In the Cold War, Greenland became vital for and integrated with American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military strategies because of its strategic location.

When German forces occupied Denmark in April 1940, Danish officials on Greenland turned to the United States for support. The result was a defense treaty signed by Danish ambassador to Washington Henrik Kauffmann but not by the Danish government. In the treaty, the Americans promised to defend and supply the island. In return, the Americans were granted the rights to establish military bases on the island. After 1945, the Danish government (which had finally ratified the treaty in May 1945) tried to persuade the Americans to leave Greenland. They were unsuccessful.

To the Americans, Greenland was of vital strategic importance. First, from a defensive perspective, control of the island could help deter attacks on North America. From the 1950s onward, radar systems in Greenland served as crucial elements in the American early-warning system (especially the radars established at Thule Airbase during 1958–1960 as part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System). Second, from an offensive perspective, Greenland might serve as a base station for launching attacks. The establishment of a polar strategy from the early 1950s gave the U.S. bases in Greenland a new central role. From at least 1961, bombers carrying nuclear weapons in Operation AIRBORNE ALERT passed through Greenlandic airspace. Thule Air Base served as an emergency landing facility for this operation.

Following lengthy negotiations, in April 1951 Denmark and the United States agreed on a new treaty regarding Greenland. The new treaty granted the Americans control of certain defense areas, the most important of which became the Thule Air Base, constructed during 1951–1952. Furthermore, the treaty gave the United States full access to Greenland's airspace. In 1957, the Americans asked the Danish government whether it would accept the storage of nuclear weapons on Greenland. Acceding to such a request, however, would be against an explicitly stated Danish policy forbidding nuclear weapons on Danish soil. Still, Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen responded positively, albeit in a vaguely worded and confidential letter known to only a handful of Danish politicians and civil servants. Recent research has shown that the United States stored nuclear weapons at Thule Air Base during 1958–1965.

For Danish authorities, however, the use of Greenland's airspace by American bombers posed a greater problem. According to official Danish interpretations, the Danish policy of banning nuclear arms on its territory also included the airspace in Greenland. When an American bomber carrying nuclear bombs crashed on Greenland in 1968, it created domestic problems for the Danish government and a crisis in Danish-American relations. Whereas American diplomats claimed that the 1951 treaty and H. C. Hansen's 1957 letter gave them the right to overfly Greenland with nuclear weapons, the Danes insisted that this practice had to end. Ultimately, the United States yielded to Danish pressure, and research has indicated that the Americans respected Greenland territory as a nuclear-free zone.

In Danish-American relations regarding Greenland, the native Greenlanders were reduced to powerless bystanders. This was manifestly demonstrated in 1953, when some thirty Inuit families were removed from their homes close to the Thule Air Base. Their protests and demands for remuneration were unsuccessful for more than fifty years, until a Danish court granted them compensation in 1999. In general, the powerlessness of the local population was compounded by the fact that Greenland was a Danish colony until 1953, when it became fully integrated into the Danish Kingdom. After 1979, when Greenland was granted home rule, foreign and security policies still remained in the hands of the government in Copenhagen. It was only after the end of the Cold War that the local Greenland government, Grønlands Landsstyre, was granted direct input in such matters.

KLAUS PETERSEN AND NILS ARNE SØRENSEN

See also

Denmark; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Grenada

English-speaking island nation located in the southern Caribbean Sea north of Trinidad. A tiny nation of just 133 square miles, Grenada had a 1945 population of approximately 76,000 people. Upon its discovery by Christopher Colombus in 1498, the island was inhabited by Carib and Arawak Indians. It was settled in 1650 by French colonists, who ceded it to the British in 1783.

Grenada gained independence in 1974 but remained a member of the British Commonwealth. On 13 March 1979, Maurice Bishop staged a bloodless coup, promising economic reform and a mildly socialist state. On 13 October 1983 Grenada's former deputy prime minister, Bernard Coard, launched a coup against Bishop's government. Bishop was killed on 19 October, and Coard proceeded to install a hard-line Marxist regime. The new government sought and received help from Cuba in building, among other projects, an airport.

During a period of significant Cold War tensions, President Ronald Reagan's administration was not keen on a hard-line communist government taking root in the region. With the backing of nearby Caribbean states, the United States launched an invasion of the island (code-named Operation URGENT FURY) on 23 October 1983. The invasion took place just two days after the lethal bombing of a U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon. Some commentators saw URGENT FURY as a way for Reagan to divert attention from the Lebanon crisis. The Grenadian Army and a small number of Cuban forces (how many is disputed) put up some resistance, but by December 1983 U.S. forces had withdrawn, having installed an interim pro-American government.

The Grenada invasion can be seen as a successful attempt by the Reagan administration to accomplish several tasks at once: draw a line in the sand over new socialist states after failing to stop Nicaragua's Marxist revolution, strike at Fidel Castro, and provide U.S. armed forces their first clear-cut victory in the aftermath of the Vietnam War debacle.

DAVID H. RICHARDS

See also

Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Grenada Invasion; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Nicaragua; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Grenada Invasion

(25 October 1983)

U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada on 25 October 1983, code-named Operation URGENT FURY. The assault was the culmination of increasing U.S.-Grenadian tensions that began when Maurice Bishop took power through a bloodless coup in March 1979. Bishop, a Marxist, pursued close relations with the Soviets and Cubans. President Ronald Reagan believed that Bishop's policies marked increasing communist penetration of Latin America. A Cuban construction project in Grenada involving a 9,000-foot runway caused U.S. policymakers to worry that the island was being prepared as a base that could interdict U.S. logistical routes in the region. The Grenadian government responded to U.S. diplomatic complaints by explaining that the runway was intended for use by larger airliners in an effort to enhance the island's tourist trade.

On 12 October 1983, a radical anti-U.S. component of the governing party staged a coup, eventually resulting in Bishop's execution. The junta established control via a Revolutionary Military Council headed by General Hudson Austin, the commander of the armed forces.

Following the coup, U.S.-Grenadian tensions grew, and U.S. officials became concerned about the status of the more than 1,000 U.S. citizens on the island, especially some 600 students attending the St. George's School of Medicine. On 19 October, the U.S. military began to develop formal contingency plans to conduct an evacuation of American citizens from the island, with options ranging from diplomatic overtures to a full-blown invasion. The United States was sensitive to the potential of a hostage crisis, so planners emphasized the use of a relatively large force structure to ensure a quick and decisive victory. To support the combat options, naval forces heading to the Mediterranean were diverted to Grenada, and mobile forces in the United States were alerted for a potential mission. Diplomatic efforts continued, with the objective of gaining the release of U.S. citizens or, failing that, to build an alliance that would provide international support for military action. Diplomatic overtures focused on the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which would provide a regional political



Grenadians watch as a U.S. Marine patrols a Grenville street during the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. (U.S. Department of Defense)

cover for the invasion operation and would serve as the source of a multinational peacekeeping force after a U.S. invasion.

American sea-based forces involved a battle group built around the aircraft carrier *Independence* and the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit, supported by the amphibious assault ship *Guam*. Forces deployed from the continental United States included two Ranger battalions, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, and special operations forces. Responsibility for the operation was divided between U.S. Marine forces in the north and U.S. Army forces in the south. Special operations forces were scheduled to land early in order to conduct reconnaissance missions and secure high-value targets. The Marines were tasked with an assault landing at Pearls and Grenville on the northeast side of the island. Rangers were to parachute into the Point Salinas airport, followed by the 82nd Airborne.

The assault began in the early morning hours of 25 October. Weather and mechanical difficulties disrupted some of the early operations, but the plan nonetheless generally unfolded as designed. The Marines encountered only slight resistance and pressed south past the original dividing line on the island. The Rangers and follow-on army forces faced determined opposition at the airfield but quickly overcame Cuban and Grenadian combatants and rescued the medical students from three campus locations, placing them on evacuation flights back to the United States.

Significant combat was over by 27 October, although some sniping continued to occur until 2 November 1983. The U.S. military quickly shifted control of the island to a new civilian government, backed initially by the OECS multinational security force. The American government considered the operation a complete success and used captured documents and large weapons caches to justify the intervention in the face of strong international criticism.

Casualties in Operation URGENT FURY were relatively light: the U.S. military suffered 19 deaths and 116 wounded; Cuban forces saw 25 killed, 59 wounded, and 638 captured; and the Grenadian defense forces sustained 45 deaths and 358 wounded. Postconflict analyses, however, pointed out serious problems with interservice communications and compatibility because of technological glitches and differences in doctrine and training. Combined with issues raised during the failed April 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission, the problems that were highlighted in Operation URGENT FURY contributed directly to the reorganization of the U.S. Department of Defense under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also

Americas; Cuba; Grenada; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Gromyko, Andrey
(1909–1989)

Soviet diplomat, foreign minister (1957–1985), and president (1985–1988). Born on 18 July 1909 to a peasant family in Starye Gromyki, Belorussia, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko studied agricultural economics at the Minsk School of Agricultural Technology, earning a degree in 1936. He also became active as a Komsomol (Communist Youth) official. After working as a research associate and economist at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, he entered the Foreign Affairs Ministry, where he was named chief of the U.S. division of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1939. That same year he began working at the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. In 1943 Soviet leader Josef Stalin appointed Gromyko as Moscow's youngest-ever ambassador to the United States.

Gromyko played an important role in coordinating the wartime alliance between the Americans and Soviets and played a fairly prominent role at



Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko speaks at the United Nations, September 1984. (Jacques M. Chenet/Corbis)

diplomatic events such as the February 1945 Yalta Conference and the July–August 1945 Potsdam Conference. He also attended the conference establishing the United Nations (UN) in October 1945 and became Moscow's UN representative in 1946. He served briefly as the ambassador to the United Kingdom during 1952–1953 and then returned to the Soviet Union.

In 1956 Gromyko attained full membership on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In 1957 he began his twenty-eight-year tenure as foreign minister. In 1973 he ascended to the Politburo.

During his long career, Gromyko became known as an expert and cunning negotiator. In the West he was dubbed "Mr. Nyet" (Mr. No) because of his hard bargaining and staunch communist views. At home, he exhibited a great talent for adjusting to the ruling leaders. Thus, he did not develop a characteristic line of politics of his own. Under Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Gromyko readily adapted to the leader's erratic whims and played a key role in the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. Under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Gromyko reached the apogee of his powers. Brezhnev believed in a system of loyalty combined with freedom to rule one's own destiny. Therefore, he gave Gromyko virtual free rein in setting Soviet foreign policy.

In the West he was dubbed "Mr. Nyet" (Mr. No) because of his hard bargaining and staunch communist views.

During 1973–1975 Gromyko negotiated on behalf of the Soviet Union during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which led to the landmark 1975 Helsinki Final Act. This act recognized Europe's postwar borders and set a political template for further negotiations concerning human rights, science, economics, and cultural exchanges. The Helsinki Final Act marked the full flowering of East-West détente, but because it did not match expectations about liberalization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it precipitated mounting dissent at home and protest abroad.

In 1985 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appointed his own protégé, Eduard Shevardnadze, as foreign minister and named Gromyko president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by then a purely symbolic position. He remained in this post until 1988. Gromyko died on 2 July 1989 in Moscow.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Détente; Helsinki Final Act; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on; Soviet Union

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Grósz, Károly
(1930–1996)

Hungarian politician, general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, and prime minister (1987–1988). Born on 1 August 1930 in Miskolc, Hungary, Károly Grósz worked first as a printer and then became a soldier. He had joined the Communist Party in 1945, and in 1954 he became head of the agitation and propaganda department of the local party committee. In 1961 he graduated from the Political College of the Communist Party. He rose through the ranks and in 1968 was named deputy head of the agitation and propaganda department for the Central Committee of the party; in 1974 he became head of the party's agitation and propaganda department.

From this position Grósz supervised most of the state-controlled media. During the 1970s he also served as first secretary of the party committee in two Hungarian counties. During 1984–1987, he was the first secretary of Budapest's party committee. On 25 June 1987 he was appointed prime minister. Grósz presented a frank appraisal of the deteriorating Hungarian economic situation before parliament, the first time in the communist state that any government official had publicly detailed such problems.

At a party convention on 22 May 1988, Grósz seized the reins of the party from János Kádár, who had been its leader for thirty-two years, and thus became general secretary of the Communist Party. Grósz then announced

an austerity program. As demands for reform in Hungary mounted, he agreed to dissidents' demands that the archives be opened on the secret trial of Imre Nagy. Eventually Grósz, who allied himself with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, gave way to a growing demand for change. He authorized election reform, including a multiparty system. Hungary was the only one of the former Soviet bloc countries where the reformist revolution came from above. Grósz remained prime minister until November 1988 and leader of the party until October 1989. He died on 7 January 1996 in Gödöllö, Hungary.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Europe, Eastern; Hungary; Kádár, János; Németh, Miklós

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Grotewohl, Otto

(1894–1964)

German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) minister-president (1949–1964). Born in Braunschweig, Germany, on 11 March 1894, Otto Grotewohl trained as a letterpress printer and joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1912. During 1920–1926, he was a member of the Braunschweig Diet and served as state minister for domestic affairs and education during 1921–1922. In 1928 Grotewohl entered the Reichstag but resigned after the dissolution of the SPD by the Nationalist Socialist Party (Nazis) in 1933. Compelled by the Nazis to relinquish the presidency of Braunschweig's state insurance company in 1933, which he had held since 1925, Grotewohl moved to Hamburg and joined a resistance group. Arrested in August 1938, he was sentenced to seven months in jail.

After the defeat of Germany, on 17 June 1945 Grotewohl was elected chairman of the central committee of the newly formed SPD in Berlin. Two days later, he signed a common working agreement with the German Communist Party (KPD). However, his proposal to form a union of both parties was rejected by KPD leaders for tactical reasons. When the KPD, under intense Soviet pressure, changed its stance in September 1945 and began to effect a rapid merger, it found the SPD split on the issue. At a joint conference of thirty representatives of each party in Berlin on 20–21 December 1945, the first so-called Sixties Conference, the majority of Social Democrats, includ-

ing Grotewohl, voted for the merger but on the precondition that the fusion had to be carried out nationwide. This proposal was strongly rejected by Kurt Schumacher, leader of the western German SPD. Grotewohl, despite initial hesitation, finally agreed to the merger under enormous pressure from the Soviets, the KPD, and major elements of the eastern German SPD.

Because of Schumacher's resistance, however, the new Socialist Union Party (SED) could only be created in the Soviet zone and in East Berlin in April 1946. Both Grotewohl and Wilhelm Pieck became joint SED chairmen, an arrangement that only lasted until 1954. As a member of a subsequent Sixties Conference and of a study commission to establish the SED party program, Grotewohl soon turned into a radical critic of social-democratic ideas and a strong supporter of Soviet-style socialism. From 1946 to 1950, he was a member of the Saxon Diet. After 1947, he supported the creation of an East German state and was a member of the permanent committee of the German People's Congress, a member of the German People's Council, and finally, from 1948 until 1949, chairman of this council's constitutional committee.

After East Germany was founded in October 1949, Grotewohl joined the Volkskammer (parliament) and was elected minister-president (retitled in 1950 as chairman of the council of ministers), a position he kept until his death in September 1964. His influence steadily declined, with Walter Ulbricht becoming the prominent leader of East Germany. Beginning in September 1960, after the death of President Pieck, Grotewohl was one of the deputy chairmen of the newly created State Council. Despite a severe illness, which began in November 1960, he remained in office but was no longer actively involved in political decision making. Grotewohl died in East Berlin on 21 September 1964.

German socialist Otto Grotewohl was the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) from 1949 until his death in 1964. (AFP/Getty Images)

Bert Becker

See also

German Democratic Republic; Pieck, Wilhelm; Schumacher, Kurt; Ulbricht, Walter

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Ground Burst

A nuclear bomb detonation that occurs at or near ground level or, in some cases, a subterranean detonation. As opposed to an air burst detonation, which can be programmed to occur anywhere from a few hundred feet in the air to many thousands of feet up, a ground burst nuclear detonation is designed to inflict the maximum amount of damage on ground-level structures, military installations, bunkers, fallout shelters, and other vulnerable targets. The overall area of damage is significantly less than an air burst, which unleashes catastrophic damage over a wider area. Had a nuclear exchange occurred during the Cold War, it is quite probable that nuclear bombs and nuclear-tipped missiles aimed at enemy missile installations, air fields, military bases, and surface ships would have been programmed for ground bursts to maximize the bomb's destructive capabilities in a concentrated area. This would have also incapacitated unhardened nuclear missile silos, the missiles of which had not yet been fired.

Structures at or near Ground Zero (the precise spot of the detonation) are wiped out in a fraction of a second, vaporized by heat that can reach as much as 20 million degrees Fahrenheit.

In a ground burst explosion, the signature fireball usually has direct contact with the ground, unlike an air burst detonation. Structures at or near Ground Zero (the precise spot of the detonation) are wiped out in a fraction of a second, vaporized by heat that can reach as much as 20 million degrees Fahrenheit. A 10-kiloton (equivalent to 10,000 tons of TNT) nuclear ground burst explosion would create a crater 170 feet deep and 600 feet in diameter. While a ground burst generally causes less physical damage than an air burst, the radioactive fallout produced by a weapon detonated at ground level is more pronounced than an air burst explosion. This is because the fireball that forms the familiar mushroom cloud sucks up millions of tons of dirt and debris, which settles back to the earth as lethal fallout. Several nations also developed nuclear bombs designed to penetrate the earth, presumably to destroy underground bunkers and hardened sites. In the late 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union also developed retarded ground bust weapons, also called laydown bombs. These devices lay on the ground for a set period of time before they explode, thus allowing aircraft to flee the area.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Air Burst; Hardened Sites; Nuclear Tests

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Groza, Petru

(1884–1958)

Romanian premier (1945–1952) and president (1952–1958). Born in Bacia in Transylvania (then part of Hungary) on 7 December 1884, Petru Groza studied

law and economics at universities in Budapest (1903–1905), Berlin (1905), and Leipzig (1906). Awarded a doctorate in law in 1907 from the University of Budapest, he then practiced law at Deva in Transylvania and joined the Romanian National Party (PNR).

Groza served in the Austro-Hungarian Army in World War I. In December 1918 he participated in the assembly at Alba Iulia that proclaimed the union of Transylvania with Romania. Elected a deputy to the Romanian parliament in 1919, from 1920 he was a member of General Alexandru Averescu's People's Party. Groza served as minister of public works in 1921 and 1927.

In January 1933, Groza founded and became the leader of the Frontul Plugarilor (Ploughman's Front Party), a left-wing agrarian party that advocated land reform, reduction of peasant debt, improved social services, and heavier taxes on the wealthy. During this time the party, which did not fare well in the elections of 1935, developed close ties with the political Left, including the illegal Communist Party.

An opponent of fascism, Groza was briefly imprisoned during World War II. He revived the Ploughman's Front (abolished in 1938) in 1944, and the Soviets included it in their National Democratic Front of October 1944. Groza's impeccable left-wing credentials made him an attractive choice to be premier in Moscow's communist-dominated front, but he became vice premier in the government established in November 1944.

Appointed premier on 6 March 1945 in a government dominated by the communists, Groza assisted the communists in establishing their dictatorship. Known as the "Red Lion of Deva," he served as premier until 2 June 1952, when he became president of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly, or chief of state, until 7 January 1958.

Groza was a complex figure who is still highly regarded by Romanians. A noncommunist, he nonetheless cooperated in the communist takeover of Romania. He strongly supported the communist land reform policies of March 1945 that limited private holdings to 50 hectares (125 acres). In all, more than 1 million hectares were expropriated and distributed to about 800,000 peasants. Groza also presided over the trial of Romania's World War II leaders; the abolition of democratic political parties (including his own Ploughman's Front) and the monarchy; the concentration on development of heavy industry; the introduction of women's suffrage; Romania's acceptance of to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, including heavy reparations to the Soviet Union and loss of territory; and the nation's complete integration into the communist bloc.

Groza's political influence declined over time, although he was able to slow some radical measures, particularly in education and the economy, and to protect some prominent Romanian intellectuals. He sought a more conciliatory approach toward Hungary but did support the Soviet military intervention there in 1956. Beginning that same year his health rapidly declined. Groza died in Bucharest on 7 January 1958.

Dumitru Preda and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Bodnăraş, Emil; Brătianu, Gheorghe Ion; Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe; Pauker, Ana Rabinsohn; Romania

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Gruber, Karl
(1909–1995)

Austrian foreign minister (1945–1953). Born in Innsbruck on 3 May 1909, Karl Gruber received a degree in electrical engineering from Innsbruck University and then studied political science and law there. Although his parents were Social Democrats, he joined the Fatherland Front in 1936. After the German takeover in 1938, he did research on high-frequency radio in Berlin. Late in World War II, he led the anti-Nazi Tyrolean Resistance Movement.

During the Allied occupation, Gruber served as the first postwar governor of North Tyrol and was a founder of the Austrian People's Party. He served as foreign minister (1945–1953) under Karl Renner, Leopold Figl, and Julius Raab. Dismissed by some scholars as an amateur who concocted fanciful schemes and gave vitriolic, undiplomatic speeches, Gruber is credited by others with making positive contributions to the Second Republic's foreign policy.

The South Tyrol dispute, the restoration of Austrian sovereignty, and Westernization dominated Gruber's agenda. He sought revision of the St. Germain Treaty, which had awarded the South Tyrol to Italy in 1919. The Allies rejected alterations of the Italian border in Austria's favor, however. In the Gruber–De Gasperi Agreement (5 September 1946), Italy conceded limited autonomy for the South Tyroleans. Although the Italians violated its letter and spirit, the agreement acknowledged Austria's interest in the German minority, a starting point for future negotiations.

The goal of restoring full sovereignty through a state treaty proved just as elusive. The treaty's nomenclature derived from Austria's anomalous status as an occupied nonbelligerent under the theory, propounded in the Moscow Declaration, that Austria was Adolf Hitler's first territorial conquest. Under the Potsdam Declaration, the Soviets demanded the expropriation of Austria's German assets and applied a broader definition than the Allies were willing to concede. By 1950, German assets and Cold War conflicts stalled

negotiations. Gruber helped break the stalemate by securing Brazilian sponsorship of a United Nations resolution encouraging the wartime Allies to expedite an Austrian treaty. Its passage in December 1952, with strong non-Western support, persuaded the Soviets that the treaty was more than just U.S. propaganda. In early 1953, Julius Raab sponsored Austro-Soviet talks on neutralization. A scandal over publication of Gruber's memoirs led to his resignation in autumn 1953. During the first of three stints as ambassador to the United States, he helped to win U.S. support for the 1955 Austrian State Treaty.

Gruber played an important role in Austria's economic Westernization. Despite his American sympathies, he nonetheless rejected American political strings as the price for Marshall Plan assistance but served as vice president of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) during 1949–1954. To allay Soviet fears, he rejected Austrian participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.

In 1987, during the Waldheim Affair, Gruber briefly served as special ambassador to the United States. Kurt Waldheim had been Gruber's secretary in the 1940s, and he staunchly defended Waldheim's reputation. Gruber died in Innsbruck on 1 February 1995.

Joseph Robert White

See also

Austria; Austrian State Treaty; Renner, Karl; Waldheim, Kurt; Waldheim Affair

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Guantánamo Naval Base

The only U.S. military base on communist-held territory and the site of much East-West discord during the Cold War. Located on both sides of an impressive harbor on the southwestern coast of Cuba, the Guantánamo Naval Base has been occupied by the United States since the early years of the twentieth century.

U.S. troops first landed at Guantánamo Bay in June 1898 during the Spanish-American War. In a 1903 agreement, the United States leased 28,817 acres, or about 45 square miles of land and water, around Guantánamo Bay from the new Republic of Cuba. A 1934 treaty modified the original lease, stipulating that the base would revert to Cuban sovereignty only if both nations agreed to the change.

U.S. Marine Corps Commandant General David M. Shoup looks through a set of binoculars into Cuba during his inspection tour of the base, 14 November 1967. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Cuba's post-1959 government, led by communist dictator Fidel Castro, has steadfastly refused to accept the legality of the base or the payments provided for in the lease. The Cubans argue that the original lease was forced on a weak, newly independent Cuba as part of the 1902 Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs indefinitely.

U.S. strategic justifications for retaining the base have undergone a number of permutations. Guantánamo was initially built as a coaling station to resupply the U.S. fleet. As coal-fueled ships became obsolete, the United States sought other pretexts to keep the base. Guantánamo, it was subsequently argued, gave the United States control over Atlantic entry to the Caribbean as well as sea routes between its Atlantic coast ports and the Panama Canal. When changes in military technology and the end of the Cold War inspired a debate over the future of the base in the 1990s, Washington argued that the base was vital in U.S. efforts to interdict drug smugglers from Central and South America.

Cuban critics have pointed to the U.S. government's use of the base to interfere in the economic and political affairs of Cuba. Indeed, Guantánamo was used to stage U.S. interventions in Cuba in 1906 and 1912 and during 1917–1919, ostensibly to stabilize political disturbances and to protect U.S.-owned sugar properties in the region.

Following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Guantánamo was at the center of the Cold War conflict between the United States and communist Cuba, sup-

ported by the Soviet Union. Defecting Cubans entering Guantánamo, a 1964 attempt by the Cuban government to cut water supplies to the base, and clashes between U.S. and Cuban troops along the fence surrounding the base all created tension. The Cubans also interpreted naval maneuvers conducted from Guantánamo during the Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush administrations as an assault on Cuban sovereignty.

In 1992, Camp X-Ray was built at the base to house Haitian refugees seeking entrance to the United States. In 1994, Guantánamo received thousands of Cubans who wished to leave the island. Eight years later, the Americans began to ferry prisoners captured in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to the base for indefinite detention. Evidence of Americans' ill treatment of prisoners at the base provoked a wide-ranging debate within the United States and abroad during 2002–2007.

Barry Carr

See also

Castro, Fidel; Cuba; United States Navy

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Guatemala

Central American nation. Guatemala encompasses 43,042 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Tennessee, and had a 1945 population of approximately 2.9 million people. Guatemala borders Mexico to the west and north; Belize, the Caribbean Sea, and Honduras to the east; and El Salvador and the Pacific Ocean to the south. Guatemala's Cold War experience was characterized by frequent coups and the increasing entrenchment of the military in power with near-total control of the political scene. It was also punctuated by U.S. interference, driven by economic and ideological reasons.

On 20 October 1944 in what has come to be known as the October Revolution, armed students and workers as well as dissident military officers ousted the dictatorial Jorge Ubico regime. In its place, an interim regime led by Francisco Arana and Jacobo Arbenz held a presidential election in which Juan José Arévalo won 85 percent of the vote and became president. The revolution and subsequent elections marked the beginning of what has been termed the Ten Years of Spring, lasting from 1945 to 1954.

Arévalo immediately democratized the state by granting universal suffrage to all adults except illiterate women. He also arranged for freedom of speech and freedom of the press, and he permitted all political parties except for the Communist Party to function. He devoted large amounts of government funding to social programs and also improved labor codes, which angered

Guatemala's largest landholder, the American-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO). Although Arévalo was a staunch anti-Liberal individualist and anti-Marxist, the U.S. press quickly labeled him a communist. Indeed, the United States demanded that he modify the labor codes and terminate a number of his cabinet members because of their alleged communist proclivities.

In 1951, after two failed coup attempts, Defense Minister Arbenz was elected president. He proceeded to expropriate nearly 1.5 million acres of land, much of which belonged to the UFCO, and distributed it to roughly 100,000 peasant families. Even though the UFCO received what was arguably fair monetary compensation for the land, it along with Guatemala's landed oligarchy demanded an immediate reversal of the land reforms.

Early in 1953 the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engineered a plan to help overthrow Arbenz. It also trained and equipped a mercenary army of mostly Guatemalan exiles. In June 1954 the self-labeled *liberacionista* (liberationist) army, consisting of between 150 and 200 men, crossed into Guatemala from neighboring Honduras. The army did not press on, however, instead allowing three U.S.-provided planes (flown by U.S. pilots) to menace Guatemala City and other urban centers. Guatemala's army high command feared the United States and forced Arbenz from power. He then went into exile in Mexico. Many of the younger soldiers and officers who were extremely loyal to Arbenz resisted, however, thus beginning a guerrilla war that lasted until 1996.

The army leadership that took power in Guatemala was firmly anti-communist and allowed American personnel to be directly involved in government decision making. In 1956 the military, now in complete control of the government, reversed Arbenz's reforms. The military continued to direct the country even in the face of many (failed) coup attempts and escalated guerrilla warfare. The Pentagon directed the counterinsurgency movement during 1966–1968, at which point almost all political offices in Guatemala were held by military personnel. Under the guise of alleged antiterrorist campaigns, the military suspended all civil rights, carried out mass assassinations and kidnappings, and prevented all opposition parties from participating in the political process. These increasingly brutal tactics led to Guatemala's increasing international isolation as well as staunch civilian resistance.

The years 1980–1983 saw the most intense fighting. Under the leadership of President-General Romeo Lucas García (1978–1983), newly formed death squads attempted to quell guerrilla forces in the cities and the countryside. In rural areas, a scorched-earth policy resulted in the destruction of entire villages—sometimes along with their inhabitants—and decimated jungles and forests. Up to 200,000 civilians may have perished during the forty years of civil war.

By 1982 there were a number of different coup plots in which the CIA was involved. Lucas, realizing that he could not remain in charge, stepped down, and General José Efraín Ríos Montt took over as head of a military junta. He was forced to resign on 8 August 1983, however, because he continued to stall democratic reforms. General Oscar Mejía Victores then took

over. He held the country's first real and free election since 1951, which was supported by the United States.

A civilian, Vinicio Cerezo, was elected president in 1985. Yet during 1983–1989 the military still held the reins of political power and fought against the guerrillas and constant coup attempts. At the end of the Cold War, despite nearly half a century of dictatorial repression, revolutionary movements continued to gain strength in Guatemala. By 1996 the government and military establishment finally realized that it could not win against the guerrilla forces, and a peace accord was signed between the two sides to end the civil war. Nevertheless, political corruption and violence continue to plague the country.

Jonathan A. Clapperton

See also

Americas; Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Central Intelligence Agency; Guatemalan Intervention

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Guatemalan Intervention (1954)

Covert U.S.-sponsored coup against the Guatemalan regime of Jacobo Arbenz, whose policies were deemed communistic and a threat to U.S. interests. The 1954 intervention in Guatemala represented a successful covert operation backed by the United States and engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a region that had often witnessed direct U.S. military intervention in the early twentieth century.

At the beginning of the Cold War, Latin America ranked low on the list of U.S. priorities. In fact, when the newly created CIA evaluated Soviet aims in Latin America in late 1947, it concluded that there was almost no possibility of a communist takeover anywhere in the area. At the same time, there existed a major disagreement over hemispheric priorities between the United States and Latin America. While the United States stressed strategic concerns, Latin American nations constantly pressed the United States to help promote economic development. Although the United States was primarily concerned with promoting stability in the area, it did not automatically oppose major change, as its substantial support for revolutionary Bolivia in the 1950s demonstrated.

The evolving situation in Guatemala, however, provoked a much different American response. U.S. policymakers' concerns with Guatemala began in 1944 upon the overthrow of longtime dictator General Jorge Ubico. The succeeding administrations of Juan José Arévalo (1945–1951), an educator, and Jacobo Arbenz (1951–1954), a reform-minded army colonel, implemented a nationalist, reformist program. These reforms soon led to a conflict between the government and foreign-owned companies, especially the powerful United Fruit Company (UFCO), an American-owned corporation. These companies had influential friends and lobbyists in Washington, and the U.S. government was increasingly concerned about the growing influence of communists in Guatemala, especially in the labor movement and in the agrarian reform program. Arbenz's new labor policy led the UFCO to pressure the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions, but the Truman administration refused to be drawn into the growing controversy. In June 1952 the Arbenz government implemented new agrarian legislation providing for the expropriation of uncultivated lands, with compensation in government bonds. In early 1953, the Guatemalan government used this legislation to expropriate the UFCO's unused land. The new U.S. administration of Dwight Eisenhower vigorously protested the action as discriminatory and the method of compensation as inadequate, although past American administrations had considered payment in bonds as satisfactory.

The Eisenhower administration responded with a two-track policy: a diplomatic track pursued by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and a military track under his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles. Both of the Dulles brothers had connections to the UFCO; John Foster Dulles had worked for a law firm representing UFCO, while brother Allen had served on the company's board of directors. At the diplomatic level, John Foster Dulles moved for action against Guatemala at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March 1954, where he personally headed the U.S. delegation. Dulles, however, encountered the usual Latin American desire to discuss economic problems, not the perceived communist threat to the American republics. After two weeks of negotiations, the conference unenthusiastically passed a resolution classifying international communism as a threat to the independence of American states and calling for a consultative meeting of foreign ministers to deal with specific cases. Neither Dulles nor the resolution specifically mentioned Guatemala, although Guatemala cast the only vote against the resolution.

The resolution of the Guatemalan situation ultimately reflected the second track being pursued by the United States. The CIA had already begun arming and training a group of Guatemalan exiles, led by Guatemalan Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, in late 1953. On 18 June 1954, this force of approximately 150 men invaded Guatemala from neighboring Honduras. Supporting the invasion force were three aircraft based in Nicaragua and flown by civilian pilots, most of whom were U.S. citizens or CIA operatives. The key to the intervention's success was neither the rebel force nor the CIA but rather the attitude assumed by the regular Guatemalan Army, which refused to mount any significant opposition to the invasion. When Arbenz

took matters into his own hands and tried to arm his civilian supporters, the army prevented the move and instead forced the resignation of Arbenz on 27 June. A military junta appointed Armas provisional president on 7 July. Armas indicated the direction that his regime would take when he returned the UFCO lands expropriated under Arbenz. The U.S. government responded by recognizing the new government on 13 July and by providing military, economic, and technical aid to the new regime.

The Arbenz government had initially hoped for international support in the crisis. Guatemala twice appealed to the United Nations Security Council to end the fighting but received only a watered-down resolution calling for an end to any actions that might cause further bloodshed. The Organization of American States (OAS) responded to the Guatemalan situation on 28 June, the day after Arbenz resigned. The OAS Council called for a meeting of foreign ministers in Rio for 7 July, although the rapid consolidation of power by Armas ended the crisis, and the Rio meeting was never held.

Peasant volunteers who comprised the liberation forces of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas march back to the center of Guatemala City after helping to put down an uprising against the regime, 7 August 1954. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The decision by the Eisenhower administration to intervene in Guatemala was influenced by the earlier (August–September 1953) CIA-backed coup in Iran, which had toppled a nationalist regime and restored the pro-American Shah of Iran to power. The lessons of Iran were applied to Guatemala. The lessons of Guatemala would in turn be applied to Cuba with disastrous results during the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961. The United States had successfully kept the Guatemalan crisis a hemispheric issue to be handled by the OAS, but the American role in Arbenz's ouster violated one of the most important provisions of the OAS Charter: the prohibition on intervention. The Eisenhower administration clearly believed that the Guatemalan operation was a major victory in the Cold War and that such covert operations offered an effective and inexpensive way of dealing with similar problems in the future. The intervention itself did little to promote peace or stability in Guatemala. Armas was assassinated in July 1957, and bitter political divisions and the socioeconomic issues behind them continue to haunt Guatemala in the twenty-first century.

Don M. Coerver

See also

Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Dulles, John Foster; Guatemala; Mossadegh, Mohammed

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Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto
(1928–1967)

Argentine Marxist revolutionary and contributor to the doctrine of revolutionary warfare. Born on 14 June 1928 to a middle-class family in Rosario, Argentina, Ernesto "Che" Guevara de la Serna trained as a medical doctor at the University of Buenos Aires, graduating in 1953. That same year he traveled throughout Latin America, witnessing the early months of the Bolivian National Revolution and the last months of the October Revolution in Guatemala during the reign of Jacobo Arbenz. America's covert 1954 opera-

Cuban revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara was a key player in the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship in Cuba. Guevara was wounded and executed by the Bolivian Army while training leftist guerrillas in Bolivia in 1967. (Library of Congress)

tion that ousted the leftist Arbenz from power radicalized Guevara, as did his later encounter in Mexico with several Cuban revolutionaries, including Fidel Castro. Guevara subsequently joined Castro's expedition to Cuba in December 1956 and fought with his July 26 Movement until it triumphed in January 1959.

Guevara became Cuba's first president of the National Bank and then minister of industry in Cuba's early postrevolutionary government, where he espoused unorthodox Marxist economic ideas about the scope and timing of economic transformation. His notion of the "New Man" and his advocacy of centralized planning and the urgency of abolishing capitalist influences pitted him against more orthodox Marxist and Soviet advisors. Guevara's line won out in the early and mid-1960s, leading to a reliance on moral rather than material incentives and experiments with the abolition of currency. What was sometimes called Sino-Guevarism climaxed in the disastrous Ten-Million-Ton Sugar Harvest Campaign of 1968. Following this, Cuba's economic policy retreated from Guevarista utopianism.

Guevara left Cuba in 1965, possibly because of disagreement with its political leadership and certainly because of a long-standing commitment to promoting worldwide revolution. In his early years in Cuba, he had been a proponent of the heretical political and military ideas of what became known as *foco* theory. The *foquistas*, including the French philosopher Régis Debray, challenged the orthodox communist emphasis on parliamentary and legal struggle, advocating instead the establishment of rural, peasant-based centers (*focos*) to foment revolutionary commitments.

Guevara's notion of the "New Man" and his advocacy of centralized planning and the urgency of abolishing capitalist influences pitted him against more orthodox Marxist and Soviet advisers.

Guevara traveled to the Congo in 1965 and then to Bolivia in 1966. It is now believed that Guevara's project to initiate an insurrection there was prompted by a desire to use Bolivia as a focus for the transformation of neighboring countries rather than by a belief in the viability of making revolution in Bolivia itself, where a major social revolution had begun in 1952. Guevara's overwhelming goal was to provide a diversion that would weaken U.S. resolve and resources then dedicated to waging war in Vietnam.

The *foquistas* were aware that postrevolutionary Cuba would increase American efforts to prevent more revolutions by modernizing Latin American militaries and developing modernization and reform projects such as the Alliance for Progress. But they underestimated the speed with which sections of the Bolivian armed forces would be transformed by U.S. aid and training once Guevara had located to Bolivia.

Guevara's revolutionary expedition was also handicapped by tense relations with the Bolivian Communist Party and its leader, Mario Monje, who was offended by Guevara's insistence on maintaining leadership of the revolutionary *focos*. There was also little peasant support for the Guevarista force, which was made up of both Bolivian recruits and experienced Cuban revolutionaries. Difficult terrain also complicated the revolutionaries' work, and eventually they split into two groups.

The most controversial issue surrounding the collapse of Guevara's efforts in Bolivia is whether or not Cuban support for the guerrillas was satisfactory. Some Guevara biographers have suggested that Soviet and Cuban relations

with the revolutionaries were partly shaped by Soviet annoyance at the impact that the new revolutionary front might have on its relations with the United States. Thus far, there is no conclusive evidence to support this line of argument.

A Bolivian Army unit captured Guevara in the Yuro ravine on 8 October 1967 and summarily executed him the next day at La Higuera, Villagrande. One of his hands was removed to facilitate identification by U.S. intelligence. A copy of Guevara's diaries was smuggled to Cuba, where it was published (along with an edition brokered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) as his *Bolivian Diaries*. Guevara's body was uncovered in an unmarked site in Bolivia in 1997 and, together with the remains of a number of other Cuban revolutionaries who died in Bolivia, was repatriated to Cuba for internment in a monument in Santa Clara City.

Barry Carr

See also

Alliance for Progress; Bolivia; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Guatemalan Intervention; Latin America, Communist Parties in

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Gulags

Russian acronym for Glavnoye Upravleniye Lagerey (State Director of Camps), an agency of the Soviet secret police that administered the Soviet system of forced labor camps where political dissenters, dissidents, and other alleged enemies of the state were sent.

The first gulags were established in tsarist Russia and in the early Soviet era under Vladimir Lenin. The gulags reached their zenith in the period of Josef Stalin's rule. Unlike other labor camps before and after, people were imprisoned not just for what they had done but also for who they were in terms of class, religion, nationality, and race. The gulag was one of the means by which to implement Stalin's political purges, which cleansed the Soviet Union of real and imagined enemies.

The first gulag victims were hundreds of thousands of people caught in the collectivization campaigns in the early 1930s. After the Red Army's invasion of the Baltic states and Poland in June 1941, the secret police incarcerated potential resistors. When Adolf Hitler sent German armies into the Soviet Union in June 1941, people of German ancestry in Eastern Europe were incarcerated as well. Following the German defeat at Stalingrad, the Red Army advanced west, capturing and imprisoning enemy soldiers. Stalin also incarcerated partisan groups from all over Eastern Europe.

Barbed wire surrounds the Soviet penal colony at Minsk in the USSR, 16 February 1958. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Following World War II, the Allies agreed that all Russian citizens should be returned to the Soviet Union. This naturally included Soviet prisoners of war held by the Germans. The Western Allies also forced anti-Soviet émigrés, many of whom had fought with Hitler, to return to the Soviet Union. The vast majority of these were either shot or simply disappeared into a gulag. In March 1946, the Soviet secret police began incarcerating ethnic minorities, Soviet Jews, and youth groups for allegedly anti-Stalinist conspiracies as well as people who were viewed as a hindrance to Sovietization campaigns in Eastern Europe.

The juridical process for sentencing people to a gulag comprised a three-person panel, which could both try and sentence the accused or simply rely on Article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code. Article 58 deprived Soviet citizens suspected of illegal activity of any rights and permitted the authorities to send anyone to the camps for any reason, justified or not. The gulag served as an institution to punish people but also was meant to fulfill an economic function, for Stalin sought to deploy workers in remote parts of Russia that had brutal climates but were rich with natural resources.

In the early 1950s, gulag authorities issued reports revealing that the camp system was unprofitable. Stalin, however, commanded further construction projects such as railways, canals, power stations, and tunnels. Thus, thousands of prisoners died, and maintenance costs skyrocketed. To an extent, the situation changed in the gulags after the war because the inmates had

changed. These new politicals were well-organized and experienced fighters who often banded together and dominated the camps. Slowly, authorities lost control.

Immediately following Stalin's death in March 1953, Lavrenty Beria briefly took charge, reorganized the gulags, and abandoned most of Stalin's construction projects. Beria granted amnesty to all prisoners sentenced to five years or less, pregnant women, and women with children under age eighteen. He also secretly abolished the use of physical force against detainees. In June 1953, he announced his decision to liquidate the gulags altogether. However, he was subsequently arrested and executed. The new Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev reversed most of Beria's reforms, although it did not revoke the amnesties.

Because neither Beria nor Khrushchev rehabilitated the political prisoners, they began to fight back with their new and well-organized groups. They killed informers, staged strikes, and fomented rebellions. The biggest of these occurred in Steplag, Kazakhstan, and lasted from spring until late summer 1954. Inmates seized control, but Soviet authorities brutally quashed the revolt.

In the aftermath of the Steplag rebellion, the secret police relaxed gulag regulations, implemented an eight-hour workday, and gradually began to reexamine individual cases. This process was accelerated by Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's rule in February 1956. In the so-called Thaw Era, the gulags were officially dissolved, and the two biggest camp complexes in Norilsk and Dalstroi were dismantled. Despite the Thaw, certain politicals were still incarcerated.

Under Leonid Brezhnev, politicals were renamed "dissidents." In the wake of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) used two camps in Moldovia and Perm to incarcerate dissidents. In contrast to former prisoners, these detainees consciously criticized the government and purposely invited incarceration to gain the attention of Western media. By 1966 Brezhnev, and later Yuri Andropov, then chairman of the KGB, declared these dissidents "insane" and imprisoned them in psychiatric hospitals. When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985 and embarked on reform, perestroika brought a final end to the gulags in 1987, and glasnost allowed limited access to information about their history.

It is impossible to determine just how many people were imprisoned and how many died in the gulags. Conservative estimates hold that 28.7 million forced laborers passed through the gulag system. There were never more than 2 million people at a time in the system, although perhaps as many as 3 million people died during the Stalin era in the camps.

Frank Beyersdorf

See also

Andropov, Yuri; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Brezhnev, Leonid; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Human Rights; Hungarian Revolution; Khrushchev, Nikita; Perestroika; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Guyana

South American nation. Formerly British Guiana, Great Britain's only colony on the South American mainland, Guyana covers 83,000 square miles and is bordered by Venezuela to the west, Brazil to the south, Suriname to the east, and the Atlantic Ocean to the north. It had a 1945 population of some 370,000 people. Guyana's major export is sugar, the cultivation of which has created a multiethnic country as African slaves and then indentured servants from Portugal, China, and India were brought to work on the sugar plantations. By 1960, East Indians made up about 45 percent of the voting age population and Afro-Guianese a little more than a third.

Nationalism in British Guiana took firm hold shortly after the 1943 homecoming of Cheddi Jagan, an Indo-Guianese dentist. Jagan had received his dental training in the United States, where he met and married Janet Rosenberg, a radical activist who had been a member of the Young Communist League (YCL). The Jagans immediately began organizing an anticolonial movement that became the radical and multiracial People's Progressive Party (PPP). Afro-Guianese in the PPP were led by Forbes Burnham, a charismatic lawyer. Under their leadership, the PPP overwhelmingly won the colony's first legislative elections held under universal suffrage in 1953 and was expected to lead British Guiana to independence. Instead, the Jagans and many of the PPP's leaders acted with unexpected radicalism. Convinced that the government was communist, the British government sent a warship to Georgetown, the colony's capital, and removed the PPP from power on 9 October 1953, just 133 days after its electoral victory.

Thereafter, Burnham split with the Jagans, claiming that they were communists, and formed a predominantly Afro-Guianese party. Jagan won the ensuing election with the support of East Indians and radical Afro-Guianese. He was reelected in 1961, and the British implied that he would lead the colony to independence.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy did not want Jagan to lead an independent Guyana. Following the April 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle, the prospect of a "Cuba on the South American mainland" greatly worried the Kennedy administration. After an October 1961 meeting with Jagan, Kennedy concluded that Jagan was a communist (or at least a fellow traveler) under his

wife Janet's control and had to be removed from power. Under much U.S. pressure, the British reluctantly agreed.

In February 1962, Jagan proposed a bill that would raise taxes and institute compulsory savings. The bill would have its greatest impact on urban Afro-Guianese trade unionists and Portuguese businessmen. The labor unions called a general strike centered in Georgetown, and many businesses locked out those who refused to strike. Strikers were soon joined by the opposition parties. Riots broke out on 16 February, which led to arson that burned much of Georgetown's commercial district. Jagan quickly withdrew the bill.

The following year, Jagan proposed a union recognition bill, which he claimed was based on the New Deal's Wagner Act, that would have given his government effective control over the labor movement. Labor responded with an eighty-day general strike that increased racial tensions and violence but forced Jagan to withdraw the bill.

Both strikes received assistance from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), with the AFL-CIO providing approximately $1 million in strike relief in 1963. It was later revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had provided the AFL-CIO with the strike funding. It is unclear what role, if any, the CIA played in the arson and violence and what role British intelligence played.

On 31 October 1963, the British announced that before British Guiana could receive independence, there would be a final election, this time held under proportional representation. The furious Jagan launched a sugar workers' recognition strike in February 1964 in an effort to take over that industry, which primarily employed East Indians. Jagan called off the strike after 161 increasingly violent days, which the British and U.S. governments attributed to Cuban-trained East Indian youths and an Afro-Guianese terrorist cell.

Although the PPP received 46 percent of the vote in the 7 December 1964 election, Burnham was elected prime minister as the head of a coalition. On 26 May 1966, the British granted Guyana its independence. Burnham quickly jettisoned his coalition partner, made himself president for life in a series of rigged elections, and progressively moved to the autocratic Left. While the U.S. government was unhappy with this turnabout, it continued to support Burnham and his successor, Desmond Hoyte, to keep Jagan from power. Only with the Cold War's end did the United States pressure the Guyanese government to democratize. Jagan was elected president in 1992.

Robert Anthony Waters Jr.

See also

Americas; Bay of Pigs; Central Intelligence Agency; Cuba; Jagan, Cheddi; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald

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See Dalai Lama

Gyatso, Tenzin

H

Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.
(1924–)

U.S. Army general, U.S. secretary of state during 1981–1982, army vice chief of staff during 1972–1973, and supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during 1974–1979. Born on 2 December 1924 in Bala Cynwyd, a suburb of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Alexander Haig attended Notre Dame University and subsequently graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1947. He served on General Douglas MacArthur's personal staff in Japan after World War II and saw combat duty during the Korean War. Haig received a master's degree in international relations from Georgetown University in 1961.

Haig then served a tour at the Pentagon. During 1965–1967, he served in the Vietnam War with the 1st Infantry Division, rising to lieutenant colonel. He returned from Vietnam to become deputy commandant at U.S. Military Academy, West Point in 1968.

In 1969 Colonel Haig became military assistant to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Advanced to brigadier general in October 1969, Haig became deputy assistant for national security affairs in 1970. Haig played an important role in Vietnam War planning by participating in the decisions to carry out the secret bombing of Cambodia. He was promoted to major general in March 1972.

In September 1972 President Richard M. Nixon advanced Haig to full general and appointed him army vice chief of staff, bypassing 240 higher-ranking general officers and prompting considerable criticism by many who regarded Haig as a yes-man for the president. Haig retired from the military in 1973 to become White House chief of staff to President Nixon. As such, Haig maintained stability and helped organize a smooth transition after Nixon's August 1974 resignation.

General Alexander Haig was supreme commander of NATO forces and later U.S. secretary of state. (Defense Visual Information Center)

After the 1981 assassination attempt on President Reagan, Haig infamously and erroneously claimed that he was "in command at the White House" in the absence of the vice president.

Haig resumed his military career in 1974 when President Gerald Ford appointed him supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe. In 1979 Haig retired from the military again after disagreeing with President Jimmy Carter's policies toward the Soviet Union.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Haig served as a foreign policy advisor to Ronald Reagan. Appointed secretary of state, Haig served during 1981–1982. He advocated a firm stance against perceived threats posed by the Soviet Union and was an early supporter of aid to guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. After the 1981 assassination attempt on President Reagan, Haig infamously and erroneously claimed that he was "in command at the White House" in the absence of the vice president.

In 1982 Haig engaged in shuttle diplomacy to mediate the growing conflict between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. It became clear, however, that Haig was more sympathetic to the British cause, which engendered bad feelings on the part of the Argentines. Haig's abrasive manner and mismanagement of the Falklands crisis forced his resignation on 25 June 1982. He established his own consulting firm after leaving government service.

John David Rausch Jr.

See also

Falklands War; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Kissinger, Henry; MacArthur, Douglas; Nixon, Richard Milhous; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Vietnam War

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Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia
(1892–1975)

Emperor of Ethiopia (also known as Abyssinia) during 1930–1974. Born at Ejersagoro on 23 July 1892 as Tafari Makonnen, Haile Selassie's father was Ras Makonnen, a Coptic Christian and leading general and political figure. Tafari was a grandnephew of Emperor Menelik II, who ruled during 1889–1913.

Selassie ascended the throne in April 1930. His royal name means "Power of the Trinity" in Amharic. Selassie's reign was marked by modernization programs, the growth and development of the nation's infrastructure, and efforts at increasing the strength of the military.

Despite a valiant resistance effort, Selassie could not prevent the seven-year occupation of his country by Italy beginning in 1935, during which time

he was forced into exile in Britain. In 1942, he returned to power following the defeat of Italian forces by the British Army and the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted Ethiopia full sovereignty and independence. Selassie forged a close relationship with the United States, which established a military command center in Ethiopia during World War II.

By the late 1940s, northern Africa and the Middle East had become a key strategic region in the growing Cold War, and the United States feared Soviet expansion in the area. This threat was magnified by the rising tide of Pan-Arabism, a movement that sought the unification of all Arab countries and an end to the West's exploitation of Middle Eastern oil resources. In May 1953, Selassie signed an economic pact with the United States designed to provide significant developmental and military assistance. This was particularly useful because of the emerging local independence movements in the rebellious provinces of Eritrea, Tigray, and Ogaden, which threatened Selassie's Pan-African vision of a grand Ethiopian union. In the early 1960s, the United States extended an aid package to Ethiopia, a development triggered partly by the burgeoning links between Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) rebels and Pan-Arabic governments in Egypt and Syria as well as the independence of neighboring Somalia.

In 1963, war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia, now in the Soviet orbit, over land disputes in Ogaden. The Somalians were defeated, but at a high cost. This Pyrrhic victory increased domestic discontent with Selassie's leadership. Public disaffection was further heightened by a sharp economic downturn and the advent of several major famines during the early 1970s. Many Ethiopian students and intellectuals, influenced by Marxist-Leninist models of economic development, called for the nationalization of state industry and an end to economic dependency on Western markets. Within this milieu, Selassie became increasingly viewed as an intransigent ideological reactionary, and the pomp and grandeur of his imperial court only enhanced the perception that he was unconcerned about the suffering of his people.

By the early 1970s Selassie's grip on power had sharply eroded, and he was deposed in a coup led by Haile Mariam Mengistu, a radical junior officer, on 12 September 1974. The junta pushed Ethiopia into the Soviet orbit and ended Ethiopia's alliance with the West. In terms of the Cold War, Selassie is an important figure who took advantage of Ethiopia's strategic importance in northern Africa to advance his nationalistic agenda of economic development and territorial expansion. Haile Selassie died in prison in Addis Ababa on 27 July 1975.

Jeremy Kuzmarow

See also

Africa; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Mengistu, Haile Mariam; Middle East

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Haiti

Caribbean nation often the victim of internal violence and external intervention. Haiti, with a 1945 population of approximately 3 million, is located in the Caribbean Sea on the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti occupies the western third of Hispaniola and is bordered by the Dominican Republic to its east. The remainder of the country is surrounded by the Caribbean Sea and lies immediately south and east of Cuba. A small nation, Haiti encompasses just 10,714 square miles, roughly the size of the U.S. State of Maryland. Ninety-five percent of its population is directly descended from African slaves, imported to the island in huge numbers during the seventeenth century.

Beginning in the early sixteenth century, the Spanish controlled Hispaniola and began to populate it with African slaves to work the vast sugar and later coffee plantations that prospered in the island's tropical climate. In 1697 Spain ceded the island to France, and Haiti subsequently became the wealthiest of French colonies by the end of the seventeenth century. That all changed, however, with the Great Slave Rebellion of 1791, led by the Haitian hero Toussaint L'Ouverture, who by 1800 had managed to gain control over most of the island. Although L'Ouverture was captured by French forces and sent to France in 1802, the rebellion continued, and the rebels defeated the French a year later. In 1804 Haiti declared itself an independent republic, making it the second-oldest black republic in the world.

In 1957, Francois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier was elected president, beginning a twenty-nine-year reign of despotic terror. In 1964, he proclaimed himself president for life while ruling the nation with an iron fist.

The nineteenth century was not kind to the tiny nation, as it experienced a series of coups, revolts, and grinding poverty. After an angry mob executed Haiti's leader, the U.S. Marine Corps invaded Haiti in 1915 and occupied it until 1934, in the process establishing a tradition of undemocratic military rule and training a generation of Haitian leaders enamored with strong-arm military tactics. More instability followed the U.S. occupation. There were coups in 1946 and 1950, and in 1957 alone Haiti had six different presidents. In 1957, François "Papa Doc" Duvalier was elected president, beginning a twenty-nine-year reign of despotic terror. In 1964, he proclaimed himself president for life while ruling the nation with an iron fist. Political opponents were murdered, and the population was kept in check by his nefarious militia known as the Tontons Macoutes.

When Duvalier died on 22 April 1971, he was immediately succeeded by his son Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who proved to be just as autocratic as his father. His government terrorized political opponents, quashed public criticism of his rule, was riddled with corruption and cronyism, and kept the population in abject poverty, so much so that Haiti has had the

dubious distinction of being the Western Hemisphere's poorest nation. The United States turned a blind eye to much of the Duvaliers' tactics because they were staunchly anticommunist and kept the population in check. Baby Doc Duvalier hung on to power until February 1986 when, after three months of increasingly violent protests against the government's policies, he fled the country for France.

Between 1986 and 1990 Haiti was ruled by a series of provisional governments while prodemocracy reformers sought to overhaul the Haitian political system. After a new constitution was ratified in 1987, there was a brief glimmer of hope that democracy and stability might finally come to the embattled nation. A national election was held in December 1990 that was internationally supervised and believed to be free and fair. The winner of the presidential race was a young, charismatic Roman Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide, considered a progressive reformer, sought to initiate badly needed land reform and to jump-start the moribund Haitian economy. Yet violence and intimidation persisted in Haiti, much of it directed by the Tontons Macoutes and opponents of Aristide. Less than seven months into his presidency, on 30 September 1991 Aristide was overthrown in a violent coup led by Dr. Roger Lafontant and supported by the military and Haitian elites who feared Aristide's reform agenda.

Haitian dictator President François Duvalier shown in battle dress in his office during operations to put down a rebellion against his regime, 28 July 1958. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In September 1994 Aristide was returned to power with American support, and a U.S.-led international peacekeeping force (MLF) was dispatched to Haiti to ensure the peaceful transfer of power. Although much hope was placed in Aristide's leadership, it soon became apparent that his administration was tolerant if not supportive of corruption and political intimidation. Nor was he able to bring about any substantive improvement to the economy. Aristide attempted to run for the presidency again in the December 1995 elections but was constitutionally forbidden. Instead, René Preval was elected, although Aristide and his supporters attempted to destabilize his government by claiming that the election results were invalid. This led to deep divisions between the executive and legislative branches and eventually to political gridlock. In December 2000 Aristide ran for president again in yet another disputed election and in February 2001 was inaugurated amid much controversy. Three years later, rebellion broke out among Aristide's opponents as tales of widespread government corruption began to circulate. In the meantime, the Aristide government had not ameliorated the abysmal economic situation. Finally, under pressure from the United States and other nations, Aristide left office on 29 February 2004, another sad story in the troubled history of Haiti. Aristide was succeeded by Boniface Alexandre, chief of the supreme court.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand; Duvalier, François

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Hallstein, Walter
(1901–1982)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) academic and politician. Born in Mainz on 17 November 1901, Walter Hallstein studied law in Bonn, Munich, and Berlin, obtaining a doctorate in international law in 1925. Four years later he secured the right to lecture at the university level and taught business law at the University of Rostock (1930–1941) and then civil law at the University of Frankfurt-am-Main (1941–1945). Taken prisoner by the Americans in 1945, he founded a camp university before being released. He returned to Frankfurt-am-Main in February 1946 to help reestablish the law faculty there.

In June 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer chose Hallstein to lead the West German delegation to discuss the Schumann Plan for European integration in Paris. Along with Jean Monnet, Hallstein was one of the key founders of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). When this task was completed in August, Hallstein joined the Chancellor's Office as a state secretary for foreign affairs. Hallstein moved to the foreign office in 1951, and in 1955 he rose to prominence as the creator of the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, which would serve as a foundation for West German foreign policy for the next fifteen years. The Hallstein Doctrine stated that with the exception of the Soviet Union, West Germany would not establish diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany).

Although perhaps not as well known for this as for his doctrine, Hallstein went on to win recognition for his work in the European Economic Community (EEC). He became president of the EEC Commission (EC) in 1958 and unveiled the Hallstein Plan for the EC the following year. His vision of a united Europe clashed with the emerging Gaullist notion of a "Europe of Nations." Hallstein resigned his post in 1967. He returned briefly to German politics as a representative in the Bundestag from 1969 to 1972. Hallstein died in Stuttgart on 29 March 1982.

Timothy Dowling

See also
Adenauer, Konrad; De Gaulle, Charles; European Coal and Steel Community; European Economic Community; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hallstein Doctrine; Monnet, Jean; Schuman, Robert

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Hallstein Doctrine
(1955–1970)

The Hallstein Doctrine, named for Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) official Walter Hallstein, stated that West Germany would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that established or maintained relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The West German government took the position that any attempt by a nation that already had relations with West Germany to establish ties with East Germany would be viewed as an unfriendly act against the German people. The sole exception to this policy was to be the Soviet Union, which, as a victor in World War II, had the power to approve or deny any peace treaty and any eventual German unification. This policy, which remained in effect for fifteen years, was a key part of West Germany's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the German nation (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*).

The doctrine emerged as policy in the aftermath of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's trip to the Soviet Union in September 1955. The negotiations in Moscow brought the release of the last German prisoners of war held by the Soviet Union and established normal diplomatic relations between the two states. Adenauer, determined to build upon this success, therefore adopted the idea developed in 1951 by Walter Hallstein, a member of the German Foreign Office, to isolate East Germany diplomatically and position West Germany as the only viable option for a German state. Adenauer proclaimed this as policy during a conference of ambassadors in Bonn during December 1955.

The Hallstein Doctrine did not sit well with either the Soviets or the Allies, who viewed it as an attempt to impose conditions on Germany's unconditional surrender after the fact. West Germany nonetheless clung to the doctrine until the late 1960s. In 1957 when Yugoslavia recognized the East German government, the West German government immediately cut its ties to Belgrade; Cuba's recognition of East Germany in 1963 brought similar action. East Germany responded in kind. Under the so-called Ulbricht Doctrine, named for East German leader Walter Ulbricht, it cut relations with nations that recognized West Germany but with limited success. Adenauer's successors, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and Ludwig Erhard, were less insistent on enforcing the Hallstein Doctrine as policy. Still, it was only in 1969, with the accession to power of Willy Brandt and the German Social Democratic Party

(SDC) that West Germany dropped its claim to be the sole legitimate state of the German people.

Timothy Dowling

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Brandt, Willy; Erhard, Ludwig; Hallstein, Walter; Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg; Ulbricht, Walter

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Hammarskjöld, Dag
(1905–1961)

Swedish economist, bureaucrat, and United Nations (UN) secretary-general (1953–1961). Dag Hammarskjöld, the son of a Swedish prime minister, was born on 29 July 1905 in Jönköping. He held degrees in law and economics from the University of Uppsala and in 1933 earned a doctorate in economics from the University of Stockholm, where he became an adherent of the so-called Stockholm School of Economics.

In 1935 Hammarskjöld became Sweden's undersecretary of finance and in 1945 was named economic advisor to the prime minister's cabinet. Hammarskjöld joined the Swedish foreign ministry in 1949 and was appointed deputy foreign minister in 1951, choosing to remain aloof from domestic political affairs. He also served for some years as chairman of the National Bank's board, was a member of numerous delegations to international conferences, and served as acting chairman of Sweden's delegation to the seventh General Assembly Conference in 1952–1953.

Hammarskjöld was elected UN secretary-general in April 1953 as a dark-horse candidate known for his technical skills rather than his political prowess. He was unanimously reelected in September 1957. He spent his first years concentrating on strengthening and streamlining the UN's administrative staff and cultivating confidence among UN members. As such, he launched his concept of quiet diplomacy as a complement to the General Assembly's parliamentary diplomacy. His 1955 Beijing mission, which led to the release of fifteen U.S. airmen imprisoned for espionage, demonstrated the inherent efficacy of his quiet diplomacy approach to international issues. His role in defusing the 1956 Suez Crisis helped contribute to the growing prestige and authority of the UN.

During his second term, Hammarskjöld developed an even more active political profile, aimed at preventive measures to deter war and international tensions. As he saw it, one of the secretary-general's tasks was to promote Cold War rapprochement by mitigating outstanding Cold War issues and potential flash points. This implied the safeguarding of newly independent states to prevent them from being drawn into the superpower rivalry. Applying his ideas to the Congo, he came into conflict with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who in September 1960 demanded Hammarskjöld's replacement.

Hammarskjöld remained in office but met with increasing difficulties as he tried to mediate conflicts in the newly independent Congo and as he fought off criticism from some UN members, most notably the Soviet Union. He was killed on 18 September 1961 in a plane crash near the Katanga-North Rhodesia border while on a peace mission to the Congo. In late 1961, Hammarskjöld was the first person to receive the Nobel Peace Prize posthumously. His spiritual journal *Markings,* first published in Swedish in 1963, bears witness to his upstanding character and the centrality of his Christian faith to his life's work.

Norbert Götz

Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld was the secretary general of the United Nations from 1953 to 1961 and died on a mission to the Congo. Hammarskjöld was later awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. (Corel)

See also

Suez Crisis; Sweden; United Nations

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Hardened Sites

Specially constructed areas, usually underground, designed to withstand nuclear attack. Hardened sites are also usually able to withstand biological and chemical attacks. Hardening is also undertaken to guard against the effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a by-product of nuclear detonations that can incapacitate communications and electronic components.

Hardened sites were built with great urgency beginning in the late 1950s, upon the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Hardened sites were also designed to protect key command and control centers. The most common hardened sites are underground silos, covered with many

feet of concrete and topped with massive steel doors. These silos contain intercontinental nuclear-tipped missiles. Command centers for the silos are also hardened. In case of a first strike by the adversary, the hardened missile silos—at least in theory—would protect the site, thereby allowing the nation under attack to launch a credible counterstrike.

Typical of hardened sites is the now-decommissioned Atlas E missile site outside Wamego, Kansas, which was constructed in the mid-1960s and designed to withstand a direct nuclear hit. Deep underground are 16,000 square feet housing the command center, several elevators, living quarters, bathrooms, a kitchen, and recreational facilities. The site contained large stores of food, water, clothing, and medical supplies so that the crew could live underground without additional assistance for a prolonged period. The site was also outfitted with its own electrical generation system and air purification apparatus designed to filter out chemical and biological agents as well as radioactive contamination.

Air bursts are ineffective against hardened sites, which may only be attacked by ground burst nuclear weapons, usually smart bombs aimed to strike the very door of the missile silo and then penetrate and explode. Some hardened sites are currently so deep underground that existing weapons cannot disturb them.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Air Burst; Ground Burst; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic

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Harmel Report
(December 1967)

Officially, the "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance," presented at the 14 December 1967 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) North Atlantic Council and authored by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. The basic premises of the report were predicated upon the parallel policies of maintaining adequate defenses while seeking a relaxation of tensions in East-West relations.

In the second half of the 1960s, NATO faced new and unforeseen challenges. In 1966 France withdrew from the organization's integrated military command. Member nations' decreased financial resources and individual interests had also put NATO's internal cohesion in peril. At the same time,

the opportunity for East-West rapprochement seemed in the offing, as the USSR became more pliable in its foreign policies. This new atmosphere cast doubts on the necessity of NATO's costly defense expenditures and its approach to strategic defense.

The new international environment and the recent changes within NATO made essential a review of its strategic policies. Upon the initiative of Harmel, NATO's North Atlantic Council undertook to examine East-West relations, NATO's internal organizational structure, and its overall defense strategy.

In December 1966 Harmel was tasked with studying the future goals of NATO and the means by which to achieve them. In December 1967, the North Atlantic Council embraced the Harmel Report, together with NATO's new strategic concept of flexible response and a five-year plan for defense policy development. The Harmel Report proposed increased dialogue and consultation to ease East-West relations and the maintenance of NATO's basic defensive capabilities. In essence, the report embraced the concept of détente, which would soon be implemented by the United States under President Richard M. Nixon.

In spite of calls for détente, the report could not rule out the possibility of a future crisis. It therefore suggested that the Allies maintain suitable military capabilities to ensure a balanced response commensurate with the threat that it faced. Thus, the strategic concept known as flexible response was included in the report's recommendations. Flexible response would provide NATO with a variety of military options—from conventional to nuclear—in the event of a future conflict. Perhaps the Harmel Report's biggest achievement was the restoration of harmony among NATO's members.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Détente; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Harriman, William Averell
(1891–1986)

Presidential advisor, roving ambassador, and governor of New York. Born on 15 November 1891 in New York City into a wealthy family, Averell Harriman graduated from Yale in 1913. He entered the banking and shipbuilding businesses and in 1932 became the board chairman of the Union Pacific

Financier, industrialist, diplomat, and governor of New York, W. Averell Harriman had distinguished careers both in the private sector and in government, and was one of the nation's top diplomats. (Library of Congress)

Railroad. During President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, Harriman worked for the National Recovery Administration (1934–1935) before joining the Commerce Department in 1937. In 1941 he became a top administrator in the Lend-Lease program.

In 1943 President Roosevelt named Harriman ambassador to the Soviet Union, a post he held until 1946. Harriman saw clearly the impending conflict with the Soviets over Eastern Europe and urged a firm hand in any negotiations with Moscow. President Harry S. Truman named Harriman ambassador to the United Kingdom in April 1946, a post he held only until October, when he was named secretary of commerce. In 1948 Harriman became chief administrator of the Marshall Plan. In 1950 during the Korean War he became Truman's national security advisor. In 1951 Harriman headed the Mutual Security Agency to coordinate aid programs to Europe, a post he held until 1953.

Harriman unsuccessfully sought the Democratic Party's nomination for president in both 1952 and 1956. He was elected governor of New York in 1954, serving one term. Initially named ambassador at large by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, Harriman became assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs in November 1961, where he played a key role in ending the Lao conflict. In 1963 he became undersecretary of state for political affairs, negotiating the limited nuclear test–ban treaty with the Soviets in 1963.

The expansion of the Vietnam War led to more important postings for Harriman, who was originally a hawk on Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Harriman ambassador at large for Southeast Asian Affairs. He served in that post during 1965–1968, traveling extensively and working to secure support for American involvement in Vietnam. As the war turned into an American quagmire, Harriman searched globally seeking a negotiated peace settlement, becoming a dove on the war. In 1968, President Johnson dispatched Harriman as lead negotiator to the Paris peace talks. Harriman found his efforts hampered by the refusal of Moscow to rein in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), by the unwillingness of Hanoi to negotiate in good faith, by the inability of Johnson to follow through on his proposals, and by the intransigence of the South Vietnamese government. With the election of Richard Nixon as president, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. replaced Harriman as the lead negotiator. Harriman returned to public service again in 1978 during President Jimmy Carter's administration and led the American delegation to the United Nations General Assembly's special session on disarmament.

Harriman wrote a number of books, including *Peace with Russia* (1959), *America and Russia in a Changing World* (1971), and *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946* (1975). He continued to make official visits to the Soviet

Union, his last trip occurring in 1983. Harriman died at his home in Yorktown Heights, New York, on 26 July 1986.

Thomas D. Veve

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Bohlen, Charles Eustis; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennan, George Frost; Laos; Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.; Lovett, Robert Abercrombie; Marshall Plan; McCloy, John Jay; Partial Test Ban Treaty; Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Soviet Union; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam War

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See Aideed, Mohamed Farah

Hassan, Mohammad Farah

Hassan II, King of Morocco
(1929–1999)

King of Morocco (1961–1999). Born Moulay Hassan on 9 July 1929 in Rabat, Hassan was the first son of Sultan Mohammed V and his wife Lalla Abla. He received a classical education at the Imperial College in Rabat and later at the University of Bordeaux in France, where he obtained a law degree in 1952.

Following World War II, which had seen Morocco support the Allied cause with 350,000 troops, the movement in the French protectorate for independence gained momentum. Despite deep ties with the French and with French culture, Hassan and his father were strong nationalists who were eventually forced into exile during 1953–1956. Upon Moroccan independence in 1956 and Mohammad V's return (he began calling himself king in 1957), Hassan was named chief of staff of the royal armed forces and deputy prime minister. More important, Hassan gained the practical political experience to lead the nation through the tumultuous years following independence.

Forging a powerful role for himself and his country through a blend of Islamic traditionalism and Western pragmatism, King Hassan II ruled Morocco for thirty-eight years until his death in July 1999 at age seventy. (Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco)

Upon the unexpected death of King Mohammed V in March 1961, Hassan became king as Hassan II. He ruled Morocco for the next thirty-eight years, surviving two coups and persistent Islamic fundamentalist insurgency. Although ostensibly a constitutional monarch, in reality King Hassan II controlled nearly all sectors of government through strong executive powers, key appointments, and command of the military. He ruled with an iron fist, and those who opposed his policies often suffered repression. In the 1960s he worked to dismantle the opposition leftist National Union Party (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires). His heavy-handedness was especially meted out to those supporting independence for Western Sahara, which Morocco unequivocally claims as its own territory and has sought to annex since Spain abandoned the region in the mid-1970s. For these reasons, Hassan often faced international criticism for human rights abuses.

Nevertheless, Hassan increasingly instituted many democratic principles during his leadership. During his reign, literacy, women's equality, education, and economic well-being in Morocco all increased dramatically. He was a progressive leader who, despite lacking the charisma of his father, led Morocco from rural poverty to urban modernity and prosperity. Hassan's key characteristic was his ability to balance relations with both the West, whose economic and political aid helped modernize his country, and the Middle East, whose Islamic heritage was his basis for power. He was a skilled negotiator who mediated numerous contentious issues among his European and Arab neighbors. One of his most prominent accomplishments in this area was his work in the 1980s, which sought recognition for Israel and an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the Persian Gulf War, he sent troops to defend Saudi Arabia despite public opposition and mass demonstrations.

Hassan II died of a heart attack on 23 July 1999 after an extended illness. At the time of his death, he was the Arab world's longest-reigning monarch. He was succeeded by his son, King Mohammed VI.

Mark M. Sanders

See also

Arab Nationalism; Morocco; Western Sahara

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Hughes, Stephen O. *Morocco under King Hassan*. Reading, UK: Ithaca, 2001.

Hatoyama Ichirō
(1883–1959)

Conservative Japanese politician and prime minister (1954–1956). Born on 1 January 1883 in Ushigomeku, Tokyo, Hatoyama Ichirō was educated at the Tokyo Imperial University, from which he earned a law degree in 1907. He entered politics and was first elected to the lower house of the Japanese legislature (the Diet) in 1915.

Hatoyama was chief cabinet secretary to Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi's government from 1927 to 1929. From 1931 to 1934, Hatoyama served two successive governments as education minister and in the meantime became a leading member of the conservative Seiyukai Party. As proof of his conservative mettle, when a prominent Kyoto Imperial University professor was attacked for his liberal views by right-wing ideologues in 1932, Hatoyama forced him to resign his university position the next year. Hatoyama was also a member of the Taihei Yokusan-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association, IRAA) during 1942–1943.

After World War II, Hatoyama organized the conservative postwar Liberal Party and became its first president. Because of his past right-wing politics, however, he was banned from public life by order of the supreme commander for the Allied powers, General Douglas MacArthur, who controlled the postwar Japanese occupation. Hatoyama was forced to leave his newly formed party in the hands of Yoshida Shigeru. After the occupation, Hatoyama returned to politics in late 1951 and founded the Japan Democratic Party (JDP), becoming its president in 1954. After engineering his own political rehabilitation and with the aid of the JDP, Hatoyama ousted Prime Minister Shigeru's government and became prime minister in 1954.

At the time, a group of leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians sought to revise what they considered to be the coercively imposed MacArthur Constitution. Hatoyama, no fan of MacArthur or of the U.S. occupation, became one of the leading proponents of a constitutional revision. Under Hatoyama's leadership, Japan once again established itself within the international community and in 1954 began making reparation payments to nations it had attacked or occupied prior to its 1945 surrender. In 1956 the Hatoyama government negotiated a termination of hostilities agreement with the Soviet Union, which then dropped its United Nations veto against Japan's membership in the organization.

In failing health, Hatoyama resigned from office in 1956 and was succeeded by Ishibashi Tanzan. Hatoyama died on 7 March 1959 in Bunkyouku, Tokyo.

Nenashi Kiichi

See also

Japan; Japan, Occupation after World War II; MacArthur, Douglas

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Havel, Václav
(1936–)

Czech writer, playwright, philosopher, prominent dissident, last president of Czechoslovakia (1989–1992), and first president of the Czech Republic (1993–2003). Václav Havel was born in Prague on 5 October 1936 to a wealthy Czechoslovakian family that had made its money in the restaurant business. Following the 1948 communist coup d'état, however, the family lost its enterprises, and Havel's educational opportunities were severely restricted. Denied the chance to study his true passions of philosophy, history, and cinema, he received a degree in economics from the Czech University of Technology.

Following military service during 1957–1959, Havel worked as a stage technician in the Prague theater on the Balustrade, which would later stage his early plays, including *The Garden Party* (1963), *The Memorandum* (1965), and *The Increased Difficulty of Concentration* (1968). These plays won him accolades both at home and abroad. Havel's plays, which were squarely grounded in the theater of the absurd, reflected not only contemporary international trends but also life under communist totalitarianism. In concert with other like-minded young intellectuals, Havel coedited Czechoslovakia's only noncommunist magazine of arts and letters, *Tvář*. Following the Warsaw Pact's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia that quashed the Prague Spring, however, *Tvář* was closed down and Havel's plays were banned.

Havel's plays, which were squarely grounded in the theater of the absurd, reflected not only contemporary international trends, but also life under communist totalitarianism.

Havel exhorted his countrymen to resist what he termed "the occupation" and to move beyond the failed ideas of reformist communism. In 1975 he daringly authored a public letter to Czech President Gustáv Husák protesting the government's so-called normalization policies. In 1977, Havel cofounded the Charter 77 movement, which condemned the Czech government for failing to heed the 1975 Helsinki Final Act's conditions for basic human rights. He was jailed for several months after the Charter 77 recriminations were made public. In 1978 he penned his seminal essay, *The Power of the Powerless*, in which he applied phenomenology to understand how societies generate and sustain themselves through alienation and ideology, a totalitarian system that nobody desires or believes in.

The Czech regime subjected Havel to frequent arrests and imprisonment, including four years of hard labor during 1979–1983. His letters from prison to his wife Olga were published in late 1982 by the literary critic Jan Lopatka, who against Havel's initial wishes preserved the personal aspects of the letters to depict a human antithesis to the communist depiction of heroes as perfect caricatures. After his release, Havel moved to his country house in Hrádeček, where he wrote his semiautobiographical play *Largo Desolato* (1986). By the late 1980s, he was meeting frequently with foreign dignitaries and politicians, and he was allowed to address a demonstration for the first time in December

1988. But he was again jailed in January 1989 for having provoked antigovernment protests. Following international outcry over his arrest, he was released in May.

After the student demonstration of 17 November 1989 that put the Velvet Revolution into high gear, Havel returned to Prague as a founder of Civic Forum, which helped bring down Husák's government. Havel became the main speaker in the nightly demonstrations, and on 10 December 1989 he forced the communists' hand by calling for free and unfettered national elections. On 29 December the interim government elected Havel president, and he proceeded to negotiate with the communists over the transfer of power.

Havel's government quickly completed the political transfer of power and negotiated with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev a rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops. Havel's administration also commenced Czechoslovakia's economic transition to a market economy. The new democratic parliament reelected Havel president in July 1990. In 1992 the Slovaks elected a nationalist separatist government. Unwilling to supervise the dismantling of the Czech and Slovak Federation, Havel resigned as the last president of Czechoslovakia in July 1992. After the 1 January 1993 split of the federation, Havel became the first president of the Czech Republic later that month. He was narrowly reelected in January 1998 to another five-year term. As president, he attempted to wield power without direct involvement in party politics, which led to conflicts among himself, the legislature, and the main political parties. In declining health, Havel did not stand for another presidential term when his tenure expired in 2003.

Václav Havel is one of Europe's best-known playwrights and essayists. He was also a leading political dissident under the communist government of Czechoslovakia. During 1993–2003 he was the first president of the Czech Republic. (Embassy of the Czech Republic/Alan Pajer)

Aviezer Tucker

See also

Charter 77; Czechoslovakia; Europe, Eastern; Helsinki Final Act; Husák, Gustáv; Prague Spring

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Hawke, Robert
(1929–)

Australian Labour Party politician and prime minister (1983–1991). Born in Bordertown, Australia, on 9 December 1929 and raised in Perth, Robert Hawke completed his undergraduate degree at the University of Western

Australia. He joined the Labour Party in 1947 and in 1953 was selected as a Rhodes Scholar to Oxford University, where he completed a Bachelor of Letters at University College in 1955.

Returning to Australia, in 1958 Hawke was offered a post as research officer at the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) headquarters in Melbourne. He was selected as the ACTU's president in 1959 despite the fact that he had never held office in a trade union, and in 1973 he became federal president of the Labour Party.

In March 1983 Hawke was elected Australia's twenty-third prime minister. He went on to become one of the most successful Australian leaders of the twentieth century. His policies were moderate and center-leftist, both internationally and domestically. The Hawke government reflected its leader's personal traits of moderation, consensus, and pragmatic compromise. Domestically, the Hawke government enacted several initiatives of the traditional labor Left, such as the restoration of universal health insurance, various environmental initiatives, and the continuation of the reconciliation process between the Australian government and its indigenous constituents. Yet consistent with many reforms associated with rightist governments, he also allowed the Australian dollar to float, privatized state sector industries, overhauled the tariff system, and implemented widespread industrial deregulation.

Hawke's sense for attaining the middle ground became most evident in Australia's foreign policy. Although he was elected with the support of the unionist Left, including unions controlled by the Communist Party, he did not share their anti-American views and never pursued purely socialist positions. He was a strong supporter of both Israel and the U.S.-Australian alliance, and he maintained cordial relations with U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.

The demise of the Hawke government came by way of a severe economic recession in 1991. Hawke's popularity declined, and he lost a no-confidence vote on 20 December 1991. He resigned from parliament shortly thereafter and retired from public life, although he has since supported several Labour figures in federal elections.

Josh Ushay

See also
Australia

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Healey, Denis
(1917–)

British Labour Party politician, defense minister (1964–1970), and chancellor of the exchequer (1974–1979). Born on 30 August 1917 in Etham, Kent, Denis

Healey moved to Keighley, Yorkshire, at age five. He studied at Oxford during 1936–1940. After a brief flirtation with communism in the 1930s, Healey took a center-rightist position in the Labour Party. He saw active service in the British Army during World War II, leaving as a major.

Having joined the Labour Party during the war, from 1945 to 1951 Healey worked as its international secretary. He opposed the spread of communism at home and abroad, and at the same time he sought to assist and encourage European social democratic movements. He was elected to Parliament on the Labour Party ticket in a by-election in 1952.

In the internecine political conflicts of the 1950s, Healey firmly supported Hugh Gaitskell, who was an opponent of the leftist faction led by Aneurin Bevan. In 1959, Healey assumed a spot in the opposition shadow cabinet, concentrating on colonial affairs and defense issues.

After thirteen years in opposition, the Labour Party achieved power in October 1984, and Healey was appointed minister of defense. Serving in that post during 1964–1970, he was compelled to institute large cuts in defense spending, which forced him to cancel the purchase of U.S. F-111 aircraft and the construction of a new aircraft carrier. Continuing economic pressures similarly prompted his July 1967 policy statement, which precipitated the withdrawal of British troops from their traditional role east of the Suez, an announcement that had been delayed by British involvement in the 1963–1966 confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia.

In 1968 Healey, along with other Western defense ministers, agreed to the new defense doctrine of flexible response, designed to give the Allies more leeway in responding to potential confrontations. Upon the fall of the James Harold Wilson government in 1970, Healey resigned his ministry and became shadow foreign secretary during 1970–1972 and then shadow chancellor in 1972–1974.

Upon Labour's return to power in 1974, Healey was appointed chancellor of the exchequer, holding that post until the fall of the Labour government in 1979. In this role, Healey steered Britain through a period of profound economic difficulty and was obliged to accept credits from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in late 1976. Defeated for his party's leadership by Michael Foot in 1980, Healey was deputy leader during 1980–1983. He left the House of Commons in 1992. He also wrote an amusing, if slightly pompous, memoir, *The Time of My Life*, published in 1989.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Bevin, Ernest; Gaitskell, Hugh; International Monetary Fund; United Kingdom

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Heath, Edward
(1916–2005)

British Conservative Party leader (1965–1974) and prime minister (1970–1975). Born in Broadstairs, Kent, on 9 July 1916, Edward Heath was the son of a carpenter and local builder. Heath's intelligence and ambition earned him a spot at Balliol College, Oxford University, where he became president of the Oxford Union and was active in conservative politics. He was called to service duty in 1940, signed on with the army, and saw action in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany during World War II, rising to the rank of major by the end of the war.

Heath was first elected to Parliament as a Conservative in 1950, rising through the ranks to become chief Conservative whip in 1955. In 1959 he was appointed to head the Ministry of Labour. In 1960 he moved to the Foreign Office where, during 1961–1963, he led the negotiations to help secure British entry into the European Union (EU). Heath was elected to lead the Conservative Party in 1965 and won an unexpected victory in the general election of 1970, becoming prime minister.

As prime minister, one of Heath's priorities was to achieve his earlier goal of bringing Britain into the EU; Britain joined on 1 January 1973. Rather unusually, Heath did not place great importance on his nation's special relationship with the United States, although he did support the Americans in their Vietnam struggle and approved of President Richard M. Nixon's 1972 visit to China. However, Heath remained studiously neutral during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.

Severe economic problems, greatly exacerbated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo between 1973 and 1974, placed the British economy in dire straits, and Heath was less than successful in quelling the resultant dislocations. A government dispute with the coal miners' union in late 1973 led to further economic chaos, including rolling electrical blackouts and the imposition of a three-day workweek. These emergencies ultimately led to the Conservative defeat in a 1974 election. The following year, Heath was ousted from the party leadership by Margaret Thatcher. He remained in the House of Commons until 2001. Much to his chagrin, he was not offered ministerial office by Thatcher or her successors. Heath died in Salisbury, Wiltshire, England, on 17 July 2005.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; European Union; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; Thatcher, Margaret; United Kingdom

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Heinemann, Gustav
(1899–1976)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) politician, minister of justice (1949–1950, 1966–1969), and president (1969–1974). Born in Schwelm, Germany, on 23 July 1899, Gustav Heinemann studied law, political economy, and history at the universities of Münster, Munich, Göttingen, and Berlin. He received a doctorate in political science from Marburg University in 1921 and a doctorate in law from Münster University in 1929. During 1928–1945, he served as a legal advisor to and director of a steel company. During the Nazi years, Heinemann became an orthodox Protestant and committed himself to the church's struggle against that regime.

A member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Heinemann entered the Diet of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1947 and was its minister of justice during 1947–1948. Although not a member of the Bundestag, he was nevertheless appointed federal minister of the interior in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's government in September 1949, a tactical move to include the Protestant wing of the CDU in the cabinet. Heinemann resigned from office in October 1950 after a dispute with Adenauer over the chancellor's plan to rearm West Germany. Heinemann left the CDU in 1952 and founded the All-German Peoples' Party, which suffered a major electoral defeat in 1957.

After the defeat, Heinemann joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and entered the Bundestag in 1957. He subsequently served as federal minister of justice in the coalition cabinet of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger from 1966 until his election as president in March 1969; he remained in that office until June 1974. As the so-called citizen president, Heinemann, in his public speeches, repeatedly sought to further develop values such as democracy and individual freedom in West Germany. During several state visits to neighboring countries, he strove to convey the image of a peace-loving and internationally modest new Germany. Heinemann died in Essen on 7 July 1976.

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Germany, Federal Republic of; Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg

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Helms, Richard McGarrah
(1913–2002)

Career U.S. intelligence officer and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1966–1973. Born in St. Davids, Pennsylvania, on 30 March 1913, Richard Helms graduated from Williams College in 1935 and worked for the United Press in Europe during 1935–1937. Returning to the United States, he became director of advertising for the Indianapolis Times Publishing Company.

In 1942 Helms resigned from this position and enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Owing to his fluency in German, he was invited to join the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1943, where he worked with future CIA director Allen W. Dulles. Helms remained with the OSS in Germany after the war and became part of the CIA when it was established in 1947.

During the late 1940s and 1950s, Helms was stationed in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. He also served several years at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. As his influence and stature grew during the 1960s, he became involved in CIA activities that were at least questionably unethical; these included planning assassination attempts on Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the overthrow of Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was subsequently murdered in a generals' putsch in 1963.

After a stint as CIA deputy director during 1965–1966, Helms was appointed director of the CIA in 1966 by President Lyndon Johnson. As such, Helms continued to engage in questionable endeavors. Under his direction, the CIA supported more than one hundred research projects focused on mind control, including experimentation involving illegal drugs on human subjects. He also supported aggressive CIA activities in Vietnam. Under Helms, the CIA engaged in domestic surveillance operations. He launched operations designed to investigate the relationships between American dissidents and foreign governments and to target peace movements and radical college organizations, although these operations were a serious violation of the CIA charter. These lasted until the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973.

Helms also became increasingly concerned over the emergence of left-wing movements in Latin America. In 1973 he directed the CIA-sponsored coup d'état against Salvador Allende, the popularly elected president of Chile. Allende was assassinated, and Chile came to be governed by a rightist military junta under General Augusto Pinochet.

President Richard M. Nixon, under fire for the Watergate scandal, refused to reappoint Helms as CIA director in 1973, allegedly because Helms refused to involve the CIA in Watergate. Helms then became U.S. ambassador to Iran, a post he held until 1976. In 1977, Congress investigated Helms's part in the fall of the Allende regime and determined that he was guilty of perjury for failing to truthfully answer questions posed by Congress. He was fined $2,000 and given a two-year suspended sentence. He then became a consultant for international business. Helms died in Washington, D.C., on 23 October 2002.

William T. Walker

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Chile; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Office of Strategic Services; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto; Vietnam War

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Helsinki Final Act
(1975)

Concluding document of the multilateral Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held during 1972–1975. The Helsinki Final Act was signed by representatives of thirty-five European and North American states on 1 August 1975 in Helsinki, Finland, and was the summation agreement of the CSCE. The act bridged significant differences between Western and Eastern Europe through far-reaching concurrences on political borders, trade and, most notably, human rights. The accord is often described as the high point of détente and was a key diplomatic turning point in the Cold War.

The Helsinki Final Act was not a formal treaty. It was an international agreement to which countries were bound politically but not legally. The act was the result of years of negotiations, first proposed by the Soviets in Geneva in 1954. Discussions commenced in earnest with the Helsinki Consultations of 22 November 1972 and the formal opening of the CSCE on 3 July 1973. The Consultations and talks that followed focused on four baskets of issues. The first dealt with ten principles guiding relations in Europe, including the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The first basket also incorporated confidence-building measures such as advanced notification of military troop maneuvers. The second basket addressed economic, scientific, and technological cooperation among CSCE states, and the third basket concentrated on such humanitarian issues as the reunification of families, improved working conditions for journalists, and increased cultural exchanges. The fourth basket focused on follow-up procedures.

The signing of the Helsinki Final Act was initially unpopular in many Western countries because it conceded Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and formally recognized the Soviet Union's annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Yet the publication of the Helsinki Final Act in Eastern Europe spurred the formation of Helsinki Monitoring Groups, the most prominent of which was founded in Moscow by Yuri Orlov, Yelena Bonner, and nine other Soviet human rights activists. These monitoring groups called upon Eastern bloc nations to uphold their Helsinki commitments and drew international

The signing of the Final Act was initially unpopular in many western countries because it conceded Soviet domination of eastern Europe and formally recognized the Soviet Union's annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

attention to their reports of human rights abuses. These groups became part of a larger political and social movement that ultimately prefigured the end of the Cold War.

The Helsinki Final Act marked the beginning of an ongoing process, known as the Helsinki Process, in which CSCE states convened periodically to review the implementation of the act and initiate further efforts to decrease East-West tensions. In 1989, as the Berlin Wall came down and the Czechoslovakian Velvet Revolution moved into high gear, many East European reformers, including Czechoslovakia's Václav Havel, cited the Helsinki Process as a key part of their success in throwing off the yoke of communist totalitarianism.

Sarah B. Snyder

See also

Bonner, Yelena Georgievna; Détente; Europe, Eastern; Europe, Western; Havel, Václav; Human Rights; Sakharov, Andrei; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on

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Herter, Christian Archibald

(1895–1966)

U.S. secretary of state (1959–1961). Born in Paris, France, on 28 March 1895, the son of Boston Brahmin parents who were expatriate artists, Christian Herter was educated at the Browning School in New York and at Harvard University. He spent a year studying architecture at Columbia University but left in 1916 to join the Foreign Service, serving on the U.S. delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

Herter next worked for Herbert Hoover in the American Relief Association. When Hoover became secretary of commerce in 1921, Herter spent three years as his assistant before returning to Boston. In 1931 Herter began twelve years—four as Speaker—in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, followed by five terms (1943–1953) as U.S. congressman for Massachusetts and two terms (1953–1957) as governor of Massachusetts. An internationalist Republican, Herter strongly supported the creation of the United Nations (UN) and the Marshall Plan.

Named undersecretary of state in 1957 on the recommendation of Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Herter worked well with the formidable secretary, John Foster Dulles, who died of cancer in May 1959 and designated Herter as his successor. Although Herter soon won President Dwight Eisenhower's confidence, his influence never approached that of Dulles. As relations with Cuba deteriorated after Fidel Castro took power in 1959, Herter

counseled restraint but persuaded the Organization of American States (OAS) to pass a censure resolution against Castro.

Herter's most crucial efforts involved Soviet-American relations. Seeking to resolve the crisis that began in November 1958 when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev demanded that Western forces leave West Berlin, at a summer 1959 Geneva conference Herter unsuccessfully put forward proposals to unite both Berlin and eventually Germany under democratically elected governments. Efforts in 1960 to negotiate a Soviet-American arms control and reduction agreement proved equally fruitless, foundering on inspection provisions. When Soviet antiaircraft batteries downed an American U-2 spy plane on 1 May 1960 and the Soviets captured pilot Francis Gary Powers, Herter recommended that Eisenhower accept responsibility for the flights and publicly defended the missions. Khrushchev nonetheless aborted the impending May 1960 summit meeting between himself, Eisenhower, and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.

When President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, Herter retired from public life. In November 1962 Kennedy appointed Herter his chief foreign trade negotiator, a post he retained until his death in Washington, D.C., on 30 December 1966.



Christian A. Herter was secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration during 1959–1961. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library)

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Arms Control; Berlin Crises; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Geneva Conference (1959); Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Conference; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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Heseltine, Michael
(1933–)

British Conservative Party politician, cabinet secretary in various posts, and deputy prime minister (1995–1997). Born in Swansea, Wales, on 21 March 1933, Michael Heseltine graduated from Pembroke College, Oxford University,

where he was president of the Oxford Union. He then worked in a number of fields, including property management and publishing. He became a multimillionaire with his Haymarket Press, which publishes news and trade magazines.

Heseltine was first elected to Parliament in 1966. Over the next decade he advanced in the Conservative Party, and when Margaret Thatcher became prime minister in 1979 she appointed him secretary of state for the environment. In 1983 he became secretary of state for defense.

During the Thatcher years, Heseltine generally supported the government's military buildup and a tough stance toward the Soviet Union. He abruptly left the cabinet in 1986, however, when he found himself at odds with Thatcher for his role in the Westland Helicopter Affair. Heseltine preferred a European merger of the failing Westland firm with Italian and French aerospace companies, while Thatcher sought to join Westland with U.S.-based Sikorsky. Heseltine was also at odds with the Thatcher government on other matters.

Heseltine remained in the House of Commons, and in November 1990 he engineered a challenge to Thatcher's leadership. After one ballot Thatcher stepped aside, but Heseltine still faced two opponents for the party's leadership. Eventually John Major, chancellor of the exchequer, won the party election and became prime minister.

As a consolation, Major named Heseltine environment secretary, a post he held until 1992. Heseltine also served Major as industry secretary during 1992–1995 and deputy prime minister in 1993, a post he held until 1997. After the 1997 Labour victory, Heseltine left the government. He remained in Parliament until 2001, when he was given a life peerage as Baron Heseltine.

Justin P. Coffey

See also

Thatcher, Margaret; United Kingdom

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Heuss, Theodor

(1884–1963)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) politician and its first president (1949–1959). Born on 31 January 1884 in Brackenheim, Germany, Theodor Heuss was educated in cultural and economic studies at universities in Munich and Berlin. He received his doctorate in economics from Munich University in 1905 and taught political science during 1920–1933. He held a Reichstag seat for the leftist-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) during 1924–1928 and again during 1930–1933. Highly critical of German Chancellor

Adolf Hitler, Heuss was dismissed from his lectureship in 1933 and retreated into retirement in 1936, spending his time writing biographies.

In September 1945 Heuss became minister of cultural affairs in Württemberg-Baden but resigned after the November 1946 elections. A cofounder of a new liberal party in Württemberg, he was elected chairman of the regional Democratic People's Party (DVP) in 1946. At the national level, he became cochairman of the Democratic Party of Germany (DPD) in 1947, the major forerunner of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). A member of the Württemberg Diet during 1946–1949, he helped draft the new federal constitution. He also became a member of the Bundestag in August 1949 but resigned in September 1949 when the Federal Council elected him president of West Germany.

During his first term, Heuss was mainly concerned with domestic affairs. Although the office of federal president had minimal political power, he engaged himself in promoting democratic values and in reconciling different groups of German society. Following his 1954 reelection, he turned to foreign affairs and paid state visits to a number of Western nations. His major intentions were to draw a clear distinction between the Nazi state and West Germany and to enhance West Germany's international reputation. His generally cordial relationship with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was shattered in 1959 when Adenauer, wishing to become the next president, indicated his intention to enhance the political power of the office. At the end of his second term in 1959, Heuss retired from politics and resumed writing. He died in Stuttgart on 12 December 1963.

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Germany, Federal Republic of

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Hiss, Alger
(1904–1996)

American midlevel State Department official and alleged Cold War spy. Born on 11 November 1904 in Baltimore, Maryland, Alger Hiss was educated at Johns Hopkins and Harvard universities. He joined the U.S. State Department in 1936. Among several important assignments, he was private secretary to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, secretary to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), and among the U.S. delegation to the 1945 Yalta Conference. Hiss also served as secretary-general of the United

U.S. citizen Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury in 1950 as part of an investigation into an alleged spy ring. Hiss was accused of being a communist and of sharing state secrets with the Soviet Union. The matter of his guilt or innocence is still debated today. (Library of Congress)

Nations' (UN) organizing conference in San Francisco (1945–1946). In February 1947, with support from John Foster Dulles, Hiss became head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In August 1948 Whittaker Chambers, a self-confessed ex-communist, accused Hiss of having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s and of having betrayed State Department secrets to the Soviets. Hiss strenuously denied the charges under oath. He was subsequently indicted by a grand jury for perjury, as the statute of limitations for treason had expired, and was bound over for trial, which resulted in a hung jury in July 1949. Then, in a highly publicized retrial in January 1950, Hiss was found guilty and served forty-four months in the Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary. He continued to assert his innocence and so too did a large and influential body of supporters, which precipitated one of the most intense and enigmatic debates of the entire Cold War.

Archival revelations in the 1990s, including those from Russian sources, vindicated neither Hiss nor his defenders. Historical evidence now seems to suggest that Hiss was indeed guilty of treason. The strange case of Alger Hiss was a defining episode not only in the Cold War but also in modern American politics. It rallied conservatives, gave birth to the excesses of McCarthyism, and spotlighted Hiss's nemesis, the little-known California Congressman Richard M. Nixon, who would later go on to become a U.S. senator, vice president, and president. Hiss died on 15 November 1996 in New York City.

Phillip Deery

See also

Chambers, Whittaker; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthy Hearings; McCarthyism; Nixon, Richard Milhous

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Ho Chi Minh
(1890–1969)

Vietnamese nationalist, founder of the Vietnamese Communist Party (1930), and first president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1946–1969). Ho

is considered the most influential political figure of modern Vietnam. Born Nguyen Sinh Cung on 19 May 1890 in Kimlien, Annam, Vietnam, his father was a Confucian scholar who had served in the Vietnamese imperial bureaucracy but resigned to protest the French occupation of his country. Nguyen received his secondary education at the prestigious National Academy, a French-style lycée in Hue. In 1911 he hired on as a merchant ship cook, traveling to the United States, Africa, and Europe. He then became first a photography assistant and then an assistant pastry chef in London. With the beginning of World War I, Nguyen moved to Paris, where he became active in the French Socialist Party. Changing his name to Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot), he became a leader in the large Indo-Chinese community in France. After the war, he helped draft a petition to the Allied leaders at the Paris Peace Conference demanding self-determination for colonial peoples; the petition was ignored.

When the Socialist Party split in 1920, Nguyen became one of the founders of the new French Communist Party. He spent the early 1920s in Moscow at the headquarters of the Communist International (Comintern). In 1924 he went to Guangzhou (Canton), China, and during the next two years worked to form a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organization in French Indochina. In 1925 he organized the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League as a training ground for the future Vietnamese Communist Party. In 1929 he presided over a meeting in Hong Kong that brought several communist factions together, forming a single Vietnamese Communist Party, later renamed the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP).

Pictured here in 1954, Vietnamese communist and nationalist Ho Chi Minh founded the Indochina Communist Party in 1930 and was president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) from 1945 to 1969. (Library of Congress)

By the early 1940s Nguyen had taken the name Ho Chi Minh (Bearer of Light). He left Hong Kong and returned to Vietnam in early 1941, where he formed a broad nationalist alliance, the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh), to combat both the French and Japanese occupations. The Viet Minh generally downplayed orthodox communist ideology and emphasized anti-imperialism and land reform, although it was dominated by the ICP.

During World War II Ho shuttled between Vietnam and China to build support for his movement. He was held in detention for a year in China by the anticommunist Chinese Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists), who released him in 1944. He had also worked with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the Viet Minh occupied Hanoi, and Ho established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). He became president of the newly formed nation on 2 March 1946. Ho sought to avoid hostilities with France, but differences between the Viet Minh nationalists and the French, who steadfastly refused to give up

By the early 1940s Nguyen had taken the name Ho Chi Minh (Bearer of Light).

their hold on Vietnam, led to fighting and the beginning of the Indochina War in December 1946.

During the eight-year conflict against the French, Ho played an active part in policy formulation, while Viet Minh General Vo Nguyen Giap was chief military strategist. Following the defeat of the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Vietnam was divided along the 17th Parallel, with elections in North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) scheduled for 1956. When South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem refused to accede to the elections, with the blessing of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration, fighting resumed in the south and in 1960 Ho and the North Vietnamese leadership decided to support it. Although Ho was certainly a staunch communist, he was first and foremost a Vietnamese nationalist, determined to see his nation unified no matter the cost.

During the subsequent long war with the United States, Ho remained an important symbol of nationalist resistance and played an active part in formulating North Vietnamese policy. He was primarily responsible for North Vietnamese dealings with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ho did not live to see his dream of a united Vietnam realized. He died in Hanoi on 3 September 1969. In 1975, when North Vietnamese troops were victorious, the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City in his honor. Today, Ho's body is on public display in a mausoleum in Hanoi.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Anticolonialism; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; France; Geneva Conference (1954); Indochina War; Ngo Dinh Diem; Southeast Asia; United States; Vietnam; Vietnam War; Vo Nguyen Giap

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Hoffman, Paul Gray
(1891–1974)

Head of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) during 1948–1950 and first president of the Ford Foundation during 1950–1953. Born on 26 April 1891 in Chicago, Illinois, Paul Hoffman studied one year at the University of

Chicago but left to work in a car dealership, where he prospered. After eighteen months in the U.S. Army during World War I, he bought a Studebaker dealership in southern California, eventually serving as president of that company from 1935 until 1948. A socially conscious businessman, he worked well with labor representatives and instituted social welfare and consumer safety policies.

During World War II, as the first chairman of the Committee for Economic Development (CED), a progressive business organization founded in 1942, Hoffman came to believe that continued postwar economic prosperity depended on the expansion of international trade. Although a Republican, he supported President Harry S. Truman's policies of foreign aid to war-devastated countries. With the passage of the Marshall Plan in 1948, Hoffman somewhat reluctantly agreed to become the first head of its administering body, the ECA. As administrator, Hoffman ran an honest and efficient organization, proved highly effective in providing public justifications of the program, and persuaded European aid recipients to coordinate their recovery efforts.

After leaving the ECA in 1950, Hoffman became the first president of the Ford Foundation, the wealthiest philanthropic organization in America. By now a strong internationalist, he was among those instrumental in persuading General Dwight D. Eisenhower to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 1952. Attacked by political conservatives as unduly liberal, in 1953 Hoffman resigned his Ford position and returned to Studebaker.

Over conservative opposition, in 1956 Eisenhower appointed Hoffman a delegate to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, and from then on Hoffman focused on facilitating economic progress in developing nations. In December 1958 UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld appointed Hoffman to head a new UN Special Fund for this purpose, later renamed the UN Development Program, which he led until 1971. The program eventually raised and distributed about $3.4 billion in seed money. Hoffman died in New York City on 8 October 1974, leaving an outstanding humanitarian record.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Hammarskjöld, Dag; Marshall Plan; Organization for European Economic Cooperation; United Nations

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Hoffmann, Heinz
(1910–1985)

Communist politician and minister of national defense in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) during 1960–1985. Born in Mannheim, Germany, on 28 November 1910 into a working-class family, Heinz Hoffmann became a mechanic, joined the Communist Party's youth section, and was involved in party activities at a young age. In 1935 he immigrated to the Soviet Union. In the late 1930s he fought in the Spanish Civil War, was wounded, and returned to the USSR. Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Hoffman was trained by the Soviet intelligence organization (NKVD) in partisan warfare and was subsequently employed in the indoctrination of German prisoners of war.

In January 1946 Hoffmann returned to Germany, where he worked as an assistant to several communist leaders. After the formation of East Germany, he was appointed deputy minister of interior in 1950. In 1955 he entered the Academy of the Soviet General Military Staff in Moscow and graduated in 1957. Appointed deputy minister for national defense in 1958, he advanced to the ministry's top position in 1960 and remained there until his death in 1985.

Hoffmann was a standing member of the East German politburo during 1973–1985. During his last years, alcoholism and charges of corruption diminished his status, and he eventually became only a figurehead. Hoffman died in Berlin on 2 December 1985.

Bernd Schaefer

See also

German Democratic Republic; German Democratic Republic, Armed Forces

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Hollywood Ten

Ten Hollywood scriptwriters and directors jailed because of their alleged affiliations with the Communist Party and for their refusal to provide information to the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) during the 1950s McCarthy era in the United States.

American films in the post–World War II era had begun to grow increasingly bold, both in their sociopolitical messages and in their depictions of sexuality. Summoned to speak before HUAC, Hollywood artists of all kinds (directors, actors, writers) who had ties to the Communist Party or had simply been leftists or progressives were faced with a daunting challenge: they were

Hollywood writers and producers, known as the Hollywood Ten, stand with their lawyers before their arraignment in U.S. District Court. (Bettmann/Corbis)

expected to admit their guilt but also had to give up names of other Hollywood types who had allegedly participated in communist activities. If they chose not to do so, they faced jail time and banishment from Hollywood through a blacklist generated by frightened movie producers.

Many "friendlies," as friendly witnesses were dubbed, capitulated to save their own careers, among them director Elia Kazan, an ex-communist who benefited greatly from his cowardice before HUAC. But a few defied the McCarthyist witch-hunt at great cost to their lives and careers. The most famous of these became known as the Hollywood Ten. They were Alvah Bessie, Herbert Biberman, Lester Cole, Edward Dmytryk, Ring Lardner Jr., John Howard Lawson, Albert Maltz, Sam Ornitz, Robert Adrian Scott, and Dalton Trumbo. Most were screenwriters whose scripts had dealt with anti-fascist topics.

The Hollywood Ten were accused of writing and producing films that advanced procommunist propaganda. They argued in return that their First Amendment rights were being violated by being forced to speak when their conscience prevented them from doing so. The courts did not agree, and they were subsequently sentenced to prison.

The careers of these men were either ruined or painfully diminished. The solidarity of the Hollywood Ten also crumbled when Dmytryk, a director, turned on his friends and claimed that they forced him to include communist elements in his films. Forgiven by Hollywood, his career actually improved.

Much has been made of the other nine members avoiding the blacklist by writing under pseudonyms. It is often pointed out that Trumbo was able to write Stanley Kubrick's *Spartacus* under his own name in 1960. Nevertheless, the number of scripts they could write and the compensation they received were greatly reduced compared to their pre-HUAC indictments. When contrasted with Dmytryk's career, they undoubtedly suffered for their position.

The Hollywood Ten were among many whose lives were ruined by HUAC's Hollywood witch-hunt. Actors and actresses branded as communists saw their lives destroyed to a greater extent than other HUAC targets. Legendary actor Sam Jaffe, who played such roles as Gunga Din, died in penurious obscurity. Other performers whose livelihoods were virtually wiped out include Zero Mostel, Burl Ives, and Dorothy Parker.

The Hollywood Ten remained in the public eye long after McCarthyism came to an end. In 1970 Trumbo gave a speech when presented with a lifetime award by the Screen Writer's Guild proclaiming that young screenwriters, when looking back upon that time, should not "search for villains or heroes or saints or devils because there were none; there were only victims."

Hollywood's reasons for keeping the blacklist in the public eye have less to do with history and justice than with profiting from a sensational topic. At least ten feature films have been produced dealing with the subject. In the 1970s, *The Front*, a comedy starring Woody Allen, represented the hands-off approach that Hollywood was taking toward the era. The early 1990s produced *Guilty by Suspicion*, a dark drama starring Robert De Niro that portrayed the Hollywood Ten as nothing less than saints. But perhaps the finest balance is struck in the *The Majestic* (2001) that combines the comedy of *The Front* with the drama of *Guilty By Suspicion*, with Jim Carrey playing a blacklisted screenwriter.

Ranjan Chibber

See also

Film; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism

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Holt, Harold Edward
(1908–1967)

Australian Liberal Party politician and prime minister (1966–1967). Born on 5 August 1908 in Sydney, Harold Holt, the son of a well-known theater director, graduated with a law degree from the University of Melbourne and worked for a short time as a solicitor before being elected to the federal parliament in 1935, where he became a protégé of Liberal Party leader Robert Gordon Menzies. Holt briefly served in the Australian Army during World War II.

After eight years in opposition during 1941–1949, the new Menzies government of 1949 named Holt minister for labor and national service. He held this post until 1958. He also served as minister of immigration during 1949–1956. He became deputy leader of the Liberal Party in 1956 and was appointed finance minister (treasurer) in 1958, a post he held until he succeeded Menzies as prime minister in 1966.

The major issue that confronted the Holt government was the Vietnam War. Consistent with the conservative Liberal Party's policies, Holt held fast to the U.S.-Australian alliance and increased troop deployments to Vietnam, which was very controversial. By tapping into the traditional American affinity among the Australian populace, the Holt government continued to maintain its popularity.

On 17 December 1967, Holt drowned while swimming at a resort in Portsea, Victoria. His remains were never found, and he was officially presumed dead on 19 December.

Josh Ushay

See also
Australia; Menzies, Robert Gordon; Vietnam War

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Honduras

Spanish-speaking nation in the north-central portion of Central America. Honduras, with a 1945 population of 1.37 million people, covers 43,278 square miles and is bordered by Guatemala and the Caribbean Sea to the north and east, Nicaragua to the south, and El Salvador and the Pacific Ocean to the south-southwest. Honduras became a key Cold War ally of the United States, serving as a staging area from which insurrections were launched against Guatemala in 1954 and Nicaragua during the 1980s. Despite its close

relationship with Washington, Honduras has remained one of the poorest countries in Latin America.

By 1907, Honduras had endured seven revolutions in fifteen years and was stricken with a foreign debt of $124 million. By the 1920s the all-powerful United Fruit Company (UFCO) had begun to exert strong influence in Honduras and by 1924 owned 88,000 acres of land. In 1929, UFCO paid $32 million to buy out its Honduran competitor, thus completing its takeover of fruit production in Honduras.

By the start of the Cold War, Honduras was the archetypal banana republic, the entire economy of which was controlled by large American fruit companies. In 1954, however, the political landscape in Honduras began to change. UFCO's workers went on strike, marking a significant change in Honduran labor practices. The series of coups and countercoups that followed the strike led to the rise to power of Dr. Villeda Morales in 1957. Modeling himself on Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz and Costa Rican leader José Figueres Ferrer, Morales introduced a labor code, social security, and agrarian reforms. However, the high level of control that U.S. investors held in Honduras stymied many of his reforms.

By the start of the Cold War, Honduras was the archetypal "banana republic," the entire economy of which was controlled by large American fruit companies.

Honduras was critical to the United States in both geostrategic and financial terms, as its location served as an ideal base from which to influence other Central American nations. As such, Honduras was used as a base for the U.S.-armed and -trained forces that would march into Guatemala and overthrow the leftist Arbenz in 1954.

By the time President John F. Kennedy introduced the Alliance for Progress in 1961, Honduras was a key strategic U.S. ally. In 1963 Morales was overthrown and replaced by an army junta, causing great consternation in Washington. Kennedy severed all ties with Honduras, seeking to deter other ambitious militaries in Latin America. Ironically, however, Washington was largely responsible for creating the Honduran Army through a 1954 agreement and was forced to recognize that without the support of the Honduran junta, the Alliance for Progress had little chance of success. The net result in Honduras was to instigate a class war, which was further compounded in 1969 when El Salvador invaded Honduras in the infamous Soccer War, which broke out during a soccer match between the two countries.

By the end of the 1970s, Honduras had become a vast U.S. military base. Consequentially, the Honduran Army became even more powerful, while mounting social and economic ills were overlooked. Honduras had its place in the U.S. world order spelled out when President Gerald Ford's administration offered little help to Hondurans after a 1975 hurricane in retaliation for a proposed land redistribution policy. By the end of the decade, as Washington's policies in Central American began to disintegrate, Honduras again became a critical U.S. ally.

Deteriorating U.S.-Nicaraguan relations only heightened the importance of Honduras in Central America, especially during Ronald Reagan's presidency. During 1980–1984, U.S. military aid to Honduras jumped from $4 million annually to $77.5 million. Washington's focus on short-term strategic and military objectives backfired, however, when political instability in

Honduras threatened to plunge the nation into a civil conflict. By the mid-1980s, Honduras was struck by an economic depression, with some observers fearing that Hondurans were being pushed toward leftist radicalization, similar to what had transpired in neighboring El Salvador.

Nevertheless, Hondurans were compelled to stay loyal to the United States because of its overwhelming dependence on American aid. Throughout the 1980s, the American military presence in Honduras grew exponentially, as Honduras had become a key component in Washington's efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. By the early 1990s and the end of the Cold War, with the Sandinista regime gone, U.S. aid to Honduras dropped dramatically, leaving the nation again in precarious economic straits.

Bevan Sewell

See also

Alliance for Progress; Americas; Contras; El Salvador; Guatemalan Intervention; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Nicaragua; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Sandinistas

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Honecker, Erich
(1912–1994)

Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) during 1976–1989. Born in Neunkirchen, Saar, on 25 August 1912, Erich Honecker was exposed to socialist politics at an early age. He joined the youth section of the German Communist Party (DKP) in 1926 and became a full-fledged party member in 1929. He studied in Moscow for two years and returned to Germany in 1931. He was arrested by the Nazi regime in 1935 and held for two years before being tried and convicted of communist activities.

Released in 1945, Honecker immediately resumed his communist political activity. He was one of the initial members of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of Germany and established a working relationship with Walter Ulbricht, the Moscow-trained leader of the communists in eastern Germany. Honecker had charge of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, the youth section of the SED, and became a candidate member of the party's secretariat in 1950. Elevated to full-member status in 1958, he was charged with the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and established himself firmly as a rising star of the communist elite.

Honecker traded on his support in hard-line circles to organize the ouster of Ulbricht in 1971. Willi Stoph became the titular leader of the East

Erich Honecker, the leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and a staunch Stalinist, pursued hard-line communist policies during the years he was in power (1976–1989). (Peter Turnley/Corbis)

Germany, but Honecker was the real power behind the scenes. He successfully led a drive to win international diplomatic recognition for the East German state and established East Germany as an Olympics powerhouse. Honecker emerged in 1976 to assume Stoph's title as chairman of the Council of State, which he would hold until October 1989.

The East German economy stagnated under Honecker, but he remained committed to hard-line, inflexible communist policies even when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev pressed for reforms in the mid-1980s. The withdrawal of Soviet support, however, proved fatal to Honecker's regime. When public protests emerged in East Germany during 1988 and 1989, Honecker was unwilling to suppress them by force without the support of Soviet forces, and he was forced to resign his offices on 18 October 1989. His successors, Egon Krenz and Hans Modrow, were unable to sustain East Germany as a viable independent state.

With German authorities trying to prosecute him for crimes committed during his reign—charges mainly related to the deaths of persons trying to escape over the Berlin Wall—Honecker sought refuge first in a Soviet military hospital and then in Moscow. He returned to Berlin in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was arrested. Ill health led to his release before he could be tried in 1993, however, and he moved to Chile. Honecker died there on 29 May 1994.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Krenz, Egon; Modrow, Hans; Ulbricht, Walter

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Hong Kong

British colonial port city that functioned as a key strategic Cold War outpost as well as an ideological battleground between Western-style capitalism and communism. Bordering southeastern China and the South China Sea, Hong

Kong is roughly six times the size of Washington, D.C., and was acquired by the British in 1841. The British long considered Hong Kong a logical stepping stone in developing Chinese trade ties and as an entrée to markets throughout Southeast Asia. After World War II, Britain recovered control of Hong Kong from the Japanese and was determined to retain it for commercial as well as strategic reasons. Its population at the time was about 600,000 people.

The establishment of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, which extended Cold War rivalries in Asia, hardened British intentions to retain the colony. Hong Kong's value to Britain's Asian policies was twofold. First, it was the starting point in an effort to contain communism and protect British interests, which ran from Hong Kong through Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, India, and Sri Lanka. Second, the British hoped that retaining Hong Kong would perhaps facilitate Anglo-Chinese trade.

From a broader point of view, Britain entertained the idea that a prosperous and stable Hong Kong might dissuade the PRC from leaning toward the Soviet Union or promoting an Asian-style Titoism. To accomplish this, Britain took great efforts to develop Hong Kong.

The PRC also seemed to realize that a foreign-run Hong Kong would best serve their interests. Despite their one-nation cause, the Chinese communists had no plans to retake Hong Kong. Their policy was summarized as "long-term planning, full exploitation," meaning that there was no urgency to retake Hong Kong, whose colonial status should be utilized to maximize national interests. By 1997, when the British returned the colony to the PRC, Hong Kong had been transformed into an ultramodern city, an international financial center, and a vital seaport.

Hong Kong's value to the PRC was multifaceted. Economically, Hong Kong served as one of the few trading channels for the PRC to buy Western materials and earn coveted Western currencies. This thinking was soon justified when both the United States and the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on China during the Korean War and when the Soviet Union stopped assisting the PRC in the late 1950s. Diplomatically, Hong Kong helped the PRC gain diplomatic recognition from Britain, the first Western country to do so. From a strategic vantage point, by tolerating British control of Hong Kong the PRC hoped to drive a wedge in the Anglo-American alliance, which was at least partially achieved when Britain demonstrated reservations and sometimes opposition to U.S. efforts to place embargoes on Hong Kong and the PRC during the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s. As the only port along the Chinese coast remaining in foreign hands, Hong Kong also became a vital window and observation post for the PRC, allowing it to contact overseas Chinese, promote the PRC's cause, continue the civil war against the Republic of China (Taiwan), and counter American containment efforts.

The United States also found Hong Kong strategically useful. Given the absence of a diplomatic relationship with the PRC, Hong Kong served as the Americans' primary contact point with Mainland China, from which

intelligence gathering could take place with relative ease. Moreover, Hong Kong's port facilities provided the U.S. Navy with a convenient fueling station during military expeditions, especially during the Vietnam War. In view of these advantages, America supported Britain's retention of Hong Kong and encouraged the British to improve the colony's economic and social conditions in hopes of making Hong Kong a free-world outpost that would stand in sharp contrast to conditions on the mainland.

Hong Kong's strategic importance began to recede in the early 1970s when the PRC and the United States normalized diplomatic relations. Hong Kong's diminished value was confirmed in 1984 when the PRC and Britain agreed on the return of the colony to Chinese control in 1997. Hong Kong's Cold War value was briefly revived after the PRC's Tiananmen Square crackdown on 4 June 1989, when Hong Kong's future sovereignty became contingent upon the PRC's international conduct and human rights record. In the end, it is hard to overstate Hong Kong's importance in the waging of the Cold War.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Containment Policy; Human Rights; Korean War; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; United Kingdom; Vietnam War

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Hoover, John Edgar

1895–1972)

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during 1924–1972. Born on 1 January 1895 in Washington, D.C., J. Edgar Hoover studied law at George Washington University and earned an LLB in 1916 and a master of law degree the next year. He went to work for the Department of Justice in 1917.

Beginning in 1919, Hoover spent two years as a special assistant to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Hoover's anticommunist crusade began under Palmer when he assisted in the arrests of more than 4,000 suspected radicals and resident aliens, a number of whom were deported. Following this First Red Scare, the Palmer Raids, and the financial scandals of President Warren Harding's administration, on 10 May 1924 Hoover was appointed director of the Bureau of Investigation (soon to become known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation). He turned his attention to reforming the agency, increasing its professionalism, and, above all, crafting an image of himself as a tough, progressive, and scientific crime fighter.

By the late 1930s Hoover was convinced that communism threatened social values and posed a significant threat to the United States. This attitude hardened in the postwar period when the FBI liaison to the highly secret Venona project, an army intelligence effort to decode thousands of Soviet diplomatic cables, reported the discovery of a Soviet spy ring within the U.S. government.

Hoover's fear that the hidden apparatus of the Communist Party had permeated American liberal organizations set much of the domestic tone of the early Cold War in the United States. His belief that President Harry S. Truman's loyalty program had not gone far enough to stanch the communist threat prompted his testimony in 1947 before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). Hoover also elaborated on the dangers posed by communism in such books as *Masters of Deceit* (1958) and *A Study of Communism* (1962). Under his direction, the FBI arrested the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) utilizing provisions of the anticommunist Smith Act; tracked down secret communists in government, such as Alger Hiss, a former State Department official accused of espionage; and arrested and interrogated Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were accused of betraying the secret of the atom bomb to the Soviet Union.

Hoover's fear that the hidden apparatus of the Communist Party had permeated American liberal organizations set much of the domestic tone of the early Cold War in the United States.

The 1950s perhaps marked the height of Hoover's influence, as he enjoyed the trust of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and lived a privileged life that included the company of millionaires and Hollywood celebrities. By the end of the decade the FBI had broken the back of the CPUSA, which forced the Soviet Union to replace its network of ideologically motivated spies with professionals and paid informants. Hoover nonetheless refused to acknowledge his anticommunist successes and continued to devote FBI resources to fight the CPUSA and other radical groups, often at the expense of emerging hot-button issues such as growing violence against civil rights workers in the South and the continued rise of organized crime.

Hoover had a strained relationship with President John F. Kennedy, but President Lyndon B. Johnson understood Hoover's clout and used the FBI much as President Franklin Roosevelt had, as a tool to advance his political agenda. Johnson pushed Hoover to destroy the network of violent Ku Klux Klan organizations in the South through use of the FBI's counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO). It combined wiretapping with the use of informants and disinformation campaigns designed to disrupt target groups. However, the presence of former and current Communist Party members in civil rights and antiwar groups inspired Hoover to direct COINTELPRO operations against civil rights leader Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., the Black Panthers, the tiny Socialist Workers' Party, and many others groups and individuals who attracted the FBI's attention.

J. Edgar Hoover was the long-serving and controversial director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during 1924–1975. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

Hoover, the longest-serving FBI director in history, died of a heart attack on 2 May 1972 in Washington, D.C. Although still respected at the time of his death, revelations about the extent of his domestic spying and the FBI's illegal activities as well as about the details of his personal life greatly tarnished his reputation.

Vernon L. Pedersen

See also

Black Panthers; Communist Fronts; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hiss, Alger; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; McCarthy Hearings; McCarthyism; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Rosenberg, Julius; Truman Loyalty Program

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Hotline

An instantaneous, point-to-point, secure link between the president of the United States and the leader of the Soviet Union, established in 1963. Sometimes referred to as the "red phone," the direct White House–Kremlin hotline was set up in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The most dangerous confrontation of the entire Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how a simple misunderstanding or delay in communication might result in an accidental nuclear exchange. The hotline was designed to establish instant communications between the leaders of the two superpowers. Actually, the hotline was not a telephone at all but rather a series of quick-printing teletype machines.

At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it took nearly twelve hours for Washington to receive Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's initial 3,000-word response to President John F. Kennedy's ultimatum. By the time the White House had written a response, it had received a second, much tougher response. Convinced that faster, more direct communication might have ended the showdown earlier, Kennedy administration officials proposed the hotline to Moscow, which readily embraced the concept. Although few particulars of the hotline are known, it is believed to have been encrypted with a virtually fool-proof system. The hotline was first used during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War to be sure that each side was aware of the other's military moves in response to the crisis.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Arab-Israeli Wars; Cuban Missile Crisis

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See McCarthy Hearings

House Un-American Activities Committee

Hoxha, Enver
(1908–1985)

Founder of the Albanian Communist Party and Albanian head of state (1944–1985). Born on 16 October 1908 in Gjinokaster, Albania, Enver Hoxha studied at a French secondary school in Korce, Albania, and then at the University of Montpellier in France. While in France, he began writing for a communist newspaper. In 1934 he became a secretary in the Albanian consulate in Brussels, but his consular appointment was canceled in 1936 because of articles he wrote criticizing the Albanian monarchy. He then returned to Albania to teach French in Korce.

In 1939 the Italian Army invaded Albania, ousted the monarchy, and established a puppet regime. Hoxha was fired from his teaching position for refusing to join the Albanian Fascist Party. He opened a retail tobacco store in Tirana that also served as a front for his communist activities. In 1940 he became the founder and head of the Albanian Communist Party, also serving as editor of the party's newspaper.

During World War II, Hoxha assembled a guerrilla force of 70,000 men that fought the occupying Italian Army and then the Germans who arrived to assist their ally. In 1944, the Italians withdrew their forces from Albania. Soon thereafter, the communists established a provisional Albanian government in October 1944 with Hoxha as prime minister and defense minister.

The Western Allies recognized this government in 1945, expecting that Albania would later hold free elections. When elections were held and the communists were the only candidates, Great Britain and the United States rescinded their recognition. The country's leaders proclaimed a People's Republic in Albania in January 1946.

Yugoslav communists had assisted their Albanian comrades during the war, and the two states engaged in a monetary and customs union after World War II. Suspicious of his neighbor's desires to make Albania a province of Yugoslavia, however, Hoxha cut all ties with Yugoslavia in 1948. That same year, he renamed the Albanian Communist Party the Workers' Party. He

Hard-line communist leader Enver Hoxha, who held power in Albania from 1944 to 1985, shown here voting in a 1967 national election. (Bettmann/Corbis)

relinquished the premiership to Mehmet Shehu in 1954 but remained in control as head of the party with the title of first secretary.

In 1961 Hoxha cut his nation's ties with the Soviet Union in response to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign. At about the same time, the Soviet Union severed relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Hoxha then began relying on the PRC for economic support, viewing Mao Zedong as the only true Stalinist remaining in power. Shortly after Mao's death in 1976, relations between China and Albania began to cool as Hoxha criticized the new Chinese leadership. The PRC ended all assistance programs to Albania in 1978.

As Hoxha's health declined in the late 1970s, preparations began for a succession of leadership. In 1980 he appointed Ramiz Alia as the party's first secretary, bypassing longtime Premier Mehmet Shehu. Hoxha tried to persuade Shehu to step aside voluntarily. When this failed, he had the Politburo publicly rebuke Shehu, who allegedly committed suicide in 1981. Hoxha died in Tirana on 11 April 1985, his nation the most cut-off from the outside world in all Europe.

John David Rausch Jr.

See also

Albania; Alia, Ramiz; Mao Zedong; Shehu, Mehmet; Sino-Soviet Split; Tito, Josip Broz; Yugoslavia

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Hua Guofeng
(1921–)

Premier and chairman of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Jiaocheng, Shanxi, in 1921, Hua Guofeng grew up in North Shaanxi, receiving only a rudimentary education. In late 1935 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and served in the Red Army throughout the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Chinese Civil War (1947–1949).

After the PRC's birth in October 1949, Hua was assigned to Hunan, the native province of Mao Zedong, then chairman of both the PRC and the CCP. As the party's secretary from 1949 to 1956, Hua was responsible for land reform and the establishment of rural cooperatives. Among his greatest achievements was the monumental irrigation project in Shaoshan (Mao's birthplace), which later facilitated his ascension to power. In 1958, Hua became Hunan's vice governor.

The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) marked a distinct turning point in Hua's political career. In May 1971, he was transferred to Beijing to investigate the fall of Lin Biao, Mao's heir apparent who was also a prime target of the Cultural Revolution. Hua's pro-Maoist sympathies earned him membership in the Politburo in August 1973 and the vice premiership in January 1975. In April 1976, he became premier upon Zhou Enlai's death. In October 1976, shortly after Mao's death, Hua seized power, ending the Cultural Revolution and assuming the chairmanships of the CCP's Central Committee and Central Military Commission. Together with his premiership, this made him the most powerful political leader in China. During his tenure, Hua completed the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1978 and invigorated the PRC's relationship with the West. To restore socioeconomic order after the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, Hua restored the purged Deng Xiaoping as vice premier. Hua resigned the premiership and the party chairmanship in 1980 and 1981, respectively. He retained only the Central Committee membership, which was terminated in 2002. Since then, Hua has disappeared from public life.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Zhou Enlai

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Huang Hua
(1913–)

Diplomat, foreign minister during 1976–1982, and vice premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1979–1982. Born in Cixian, Hebei Province, on 25 January 1913, Huang Hua enrolled at the Yanjing University in 1935 and then in 1936 joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), engaging in its student movement.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Huang served in Yan'an, Shaanxi Province, where he was involved in organizational and educational affairs. After the war, he concentrated on the party's external affairs. When the CCP's victory in the Chinese Civil War appeared certain by May 1949, he became director of the Nanjing Alien Affairs Office in Jiangsu, taking over the Guomindang's former Foreign Ministry and informing foreign envoys of the CCP's diplomatic principles.

After the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, Huang became director of the Foreign Residence Affairs Department. In January 1953 he was transferred to the Foreign Ministry, where his first task was to participate in the peace talks to conclude the Korean War. He attended the Panmunjom peace negotiations in October 1953 and the Geneva Conference in April 1954. In October 1954 he became director of the West European department of the Foreign Ministry, in which capacity he attended the 1955 Bandung Conference and the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw in 1958. From 1960 to 1976 he served as the Chinese ambassador to Ghana, the United Arab Republic, and Canada successively. Returning to China in late 1976, he became foreign minister and in September 1979 also vice premier. He held both posts until 1982, during which time he led numerous Chinese delegations to United Nations (UN) meetings. His most notable achievement was the establishment of a formal Sino-American diplomatic relationship, when he represented the PRC in signing the Sino-American Communiqué of 17 August 1982.

Beginning in 1982, Huang left the public eye, serving the State Council as councillor, retaining membership in the CCP Central Committee, and occasionally leading Chinese delegations abroad. He is now head of several international friendship and welfare organizations.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Bandung Conference; China, People's Republic of; Korean War

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Hukbalahap

Acronym for the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Anti-Japanese Army) whose members were called Huks. The Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) formed the Hukbalahap on 29 March 1942, although it had its origins in the Filipino peasant movements of the 1930s.

While ostensibly organized to fight the Japanese occupiers, the movement also had a strong socioeconomic program. The Huks gave voice to the grievances of tenant farmers and landless laborers on the sugar plantations of central and southern Luzon. They resented the iniquitous crop sharing, growing indebtedness, and forced labor inherent in the exploitative landholding system of the Philippines. During World War II Huk guerrillas succeeded in killing many Japanese and Filipino collaborators and established their own governments in many barrios (villages) and towns.

In the immediate postwar period, the situation reverted to the status quo ante for the Hukbalahap. The landed elite who had collaborated with the Japanese now turned to the Americans for support. The Americans, because of their antipathy to communism and sporadic but negative wartime experiences with the Huks, backed the landlords and turned against the Huks. Many Hukbalahap squadrons were disarmed, and their contribution to the war effort was denigrated. Local Huk governments were also removed from power, while Huk leaders, including Luis Taruc, were imprisoned.

The Huks nonetheless participated in the April 1946 elections that were held prior to Philippine independence on 4 July 1946. The Huks ran under the banner of the Democratic Alliance Party, which had been formed in July 1945 and combined the peasant movement with the urban Left. However, it was the Liberal Party that emerged victorious. The Democratic Alliance won six seats in Congress representing Central Luzon, but President Manuel Roxas denied the duly elected representatives their seats on charges that they had employed terror tactics during the elections. Hukbalahap leader Taruc was among the six prevented from being seated in Congress.

Finding the constitutional-political channel to realize their aims blocked, the Huks reverted to guerrilla activity. The priority issue was no longer collaboration but rather agrarian reform. There were many reasons for the popularity of the Hukbalahap among peasants, intellectuals, and nationalists. Discontent had been brewing in the countryside for many decades. The peasants rebelled primarily because of repression by both government officials and the landed elite. They viewed their actions as entirely defensive in nature. Taruc demanded immediate enforcement of the bill of rights and revocation

of all criminal charges against the Huks. The Huks also sought agrarian reform, including a more equitable crop-sharing arrangement, and representation in the Philippine Congress.

President Roxas unveiled his iron fist policy in August 1946 by proclaiming his intention to crush the Hukbalahap revolt within sixty days. The resultant repression only fueled peasant anger and further bolstered the Huks' popularity. In March 1948, as the Huk rebellion continued, the Roxas administration outlawed the Hukbalahap. Its leaders responded by changing its name to the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB, People's Liberation Army) in November 1948.

In 1950, during the Elpidio Quirino administration, the Huks threatened Manila itself and the stability of the government. In September 1950, Ramon Magsaysay became secretary of national defense, and U.S. President Harry S. Truman responded to Quirino's appeal for help by dispatching the Bell Mission (headed by Daniel W. Bell) and extending military aid. Meanwhile, Magsaysay's unorthodox methods and experience as a former guerrilla helped check the Huk rebellion. He devised a clever reward system for the identification of Huks and a system for their rehabilitation. In a single raid conducted in October 1950 in Manila, the entire communist-Huk politburo was arrested. Magsaysay also developed a Huk resettlement program in which he used the army under the Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR) to resettle the Huks in Mindanao.

In December 1953 Magsaysay became president of the Philippines. His personal charisma and folksy demeanor appealed to rural Filipinos, helping to short-circuit the Huks' popularity. Magsaysay also introduced agricultural reforms to raise productivity, which helped mollify the peasants. By the mid-1950s, Huk activity had been significantly decreased.

Udai Bhanu Singh

See also

Magsaysay, Ramon; Philippines; Southeast Asia

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Hull, Cordell

(1871–1955)

U.S. secretary of state (1933–1944). Born in a log cabin in Overton (later Pickett) County, Texas, on 2 October 1871, Cordell Hull studied law at National Normal University in Lebanon, Ohio, and the Cumberland Law

School in Lebanon, Texas. In 1892 he entered Tennessee state politics as a Democrat. During the Spanish-American War of 1898, he volunteered for service and spent several months in the army. Elected to Congress in 1903, in 1930 he became senator for Tennessee, a position he resigned in 1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him secretary of state.

An old-fashioned Jeffersonian Democrat and progressive, Hull admired President Woodrow Wilson and after World War I supported American membership in the League of Nations. As secretary, Hull favored free trade, peace agreements, international conferences, and reliance upon legal principles and institutions. During the 1930s he negotiated numerous reciprocal trade agreements with other states. He also devoted particular attention to revitalizing U.S. relations with Latin America through the Good Neighbor policy, whereby his country renounced the right to intervene in Latin America, and related hemispheric security agreements.

President Roosevelt, who preferred to retain personal control of American foreign policy, frequently bypassed Hull, a tendency that became more pronounced as World War II approached and that Hull found both irritating and frustrating. Even so, since the two men fundamentally shared the same perspective on international affairs, Hull chose not to resign. He believed that the European dictators posed a dangerous threat to all free nations. He also believed that arms embargoes were ineffective and generally favored aggressors, and thus he opposed the various American neutrality acts passed between 1935 and 1939. Inclined to be slightly less conciliatory than Roosevelt, Hull was unenthusiastic toward Roosevelt's 1938–1939 peace messages to European powers.

Once war began in Europe, however, Hull staunchly supported Great Britain and France against Germany and Italy, but he was virtually excluded from the Anglo-American destroyers-for-bases deal of summer 1940 and the drafting of Lend-Lease legislation some months later. He also did not attend either the Anglo-American military staff conversations held in Washington early in 1941 or the mid-August 1941 Argentina Conference that drafted the Atlantic Charter.

Preoccupied with European affairs, from April to December 1941 Roosevelt delegated to Hull responsibility for protracted American negotiations with Japan, their objective being to reach a modus vivendi in Asia, where Japan had since 1937 been at war with China, and sought further territorial gains from British, French, and Dutch territorial possessions. Despite the expressed concern of American military leaders that the United States was unprepared for a Pacific war, by late November 1941 Hull—who was privy to intercepted Japanese cable traffic—believed that war was inevitable and refused to contemplate further American concessions to Japanese demands.



Cordell Hull, U.S. secretary of state under Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 to 1944 and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945. (Library of Congress)

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, as before Hull was often excluded from major meetings, including the 1942 Casablanca conference, the 1943 Cairo and Tehran conferences, and the 1944 Quebec summit meeting of Allied leaders. He opposed the Casablanca decision to demand the unconditional surrender of the Axis nations, believing that this would encourage them to continue the war. He also opposed the 1944 Morgenthau Plan to partition a defeated Germany and eradicate its industrial capacity and, with the assistance of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, succeeded in obtaining the scheme's ultimate rejection.

Hull put great effort into establishing the 1942 United Nations (UN) alliance of anti-Axis nations. Following his Wilsonian instincts, he then concentrated on planning for the postwar UN international security organization that would replace the defunct League of Nations. Under his guidance, the State Department drafted the proposals for the UN Charter accepted at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference and adroitly won bipartisan congressional support for these. Addressing Congress in late 1943, Hull overoptimistically stated that the projected new organization would eliminate spheres of influence, the balance of power, and international alliances and rivalries. He shared Roosevelt's anticolonial outlook and also his belief that the United States should treat China as a great power and thereby encourage it to become one.

Increasingly poor health led Hull to resign after the November 1944 presidential election. Consulted on the terms of the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration urging Japan to surrender, he insisted that it include no promise to retain the emperor. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945, he lived quietly in retirement, producing lengthy memoirs. Suffering from strokes and heart problems, Hull died at Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland on 23 July 1955.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Stimson, Henry Lewis; United Nations

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Human Rights

Rights are rule-governed powers of some people to activate duties that others owe them but cannot extinguish unilaterally. Duties may be to act or refrain

from acting. For example, the right to free speech confers the duty on people to refrain from interfering with each other's expression of opinion according to rules that exclude, say, speech that constitutes a clear and present danger.

Some philosophers posit that rights must protect legitimate interests and create an inviolable, morally justified cordon around a person. For example, each person has a legitimate interest in receiving due process; it is morally justified. The right to due process creates a protective cordon around each one of us. By contrast, an effort to silence all people who happen to disagree with a particular person is illegitimate. It is not morally justified, and so there is no protective cordon around that person.

Human rights are those that each person possesses by virtue of his or her humanity; for example, the right to life or free expression. By contrast, civil rights are those that some people retain by virtue of being citizens; for example, the right to vote freely in an election. Special rights are ones that we enjoy because of our particular situation in the world; for example, a right to inherit from our particular parents or wear the specific shirt we bought.

The idea of universal human rights that are equally applicable to all human beings without distinction of citizenship, culture, geographical location, or historical context has been philosophically and politically controversial. The Westphalian Order that ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe in 1648 gave extensive powers to sovereign rulers, most notably to determine the state's religion. Modern state sovereignty resolved the religious conflicts in Europe but also removed the legal grounds for the intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another, particularly in the case of human rights abuses.

The Anglo-American tradition of political philosophy connects the legitimacy of the sovereign state with its duty to guarantee rights. Thomas Hobbes suggested that the state is based on a social contract wherein the sovereign state guarantees to its subjects a right to life in return for all their other native natural rights. John Locke assigned to the state the duty of guaranteeing the rights of its citizens. When the American colonists set out to justify their claim for independence, they formulated their arguments in Lockean terms as a reaction to the king's violation of their rights, the same rights that he was supposed to guarantee. Shortly thereafter, the French Revolution codified human rights for the first time in a political document, the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* (1793). However, this declaration was issued during the Reign of Terror (1793–1794), which witnessed the worst excesses of the French Revolution. For the next century and a half, the concept of human rights hardly played a role in international politics, with the possible exception of certain aspects of the struggle against slavery and the slave trade. Still, the democratic emphasis on rights within the context of the Cold War was a natural development of tradition that did not quite exist in Eastern Europe.

World War II brought human rights to the forefront of international politics. On the one hand, the unique wickedness of Nazism made the war against it a moral one rather than just a clash of nations and their interests. The positive content of that moral struggle was couched, especially by Americans, in terms of universal human rights. On the other hand, the tentative

and ideologically awkward alliance between Western democracies and the Soviet Union required some positive common denominator—good versus evil—that transcended a common enemy. These two trends were further strengthened after the war, when the true scale of Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust became apparent and World War II acquired its established character as a war of good against evil. This good was interpreted by many as human rights. The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals of 1945–1946, presided over by American, British, French, and Soviet judges, introduced the concept of crimes against humanity into international law. Although formulated and applied after the fact, the construct of crimes against humanity set standards of human rights according to which Nazi leaders could be tried and punished not just for atrocities committed in occupied territories but also for those against German citizens on German territory.

The United Nations (UN) went even further to promote the rhetoric, if not the practice, of human rights in its founding Charter and in the December 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The significance of these documents was declarative rather than normative, because no enforcement mechanisms with appropriate powers were created following these declarations. As noted above, there are no rights for some without duties for others. For humans to have rights, some institution must be entrusted with enforcing them; otherwise, declarations remain just that. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a compromise between communist and democratic representatives, it included economic rights clauses that clearly make no normative sense in a universal context; for example, the right of every human to enjoy a paid vacation.

The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals of 1945–1946, presided over by American, British, French, and Soviet judges, introduced the concept of "crimes against humanity" into international law.

The onset of the Cold War stifled attempts to enforce a universal regime of human rights because communist totalitarianism was inherently founded on the state's right to violate any right of its subjects, while Western democracies protected its client states that abused human rights in the developing world, from Iran to Haiti to Latin America. The so-called realist approach to international relations promoted by Henry Kissinger, for example, dictates nonintervention in the internal human rights policies of other countries and the determination of U.S. foreign policy based exclusively on its geopolitical interests. For example, in 1973 the United States supported the Chilean military in deposing leftist President Salvador Allende and instituting a regime that exhibited worse human rights violations than its predecessor. For political expediency, it also engaged in an alliance with Maoist China, although China's Cultural Revolution violated human rights on a scale far greater than in the Soviet Union.

A variety of UN-sponsored human rights covenants and agreements from the 1960s further broadened the rhetorical connotations of human rights to encompass social, economic, and ethnic issues but also deepened the divide between the public rhetoric and actual practices of signatory nations to these covenants. Both sides in the Cold War used human rights rhetoric as a tool in their ideological war. The West lambasted communist states for allegedly violating the liberties of their subjects, while the communists harped on the

A Chinese peasant, bound for execution, kneeling before a tribunal of local communists at an outdoor court at Fukang, Guangdong Province, China, in 1953. The man's crime was owning a small parcel of land. (Library of Congress)

alleged violation of the right to work of the unemployed in free market economies.

The policing of human rights became more effective by the mid-1970s through the introduction of various new methods for enforcement. The United States attempted to use its economic might to pressure human rights violators. In 1973, the U.S. Congress linked foreign aid to the human rights record of recipient countries. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 attempted to use the Soviets' reliance upon American wheat to pressure the Soviet Union to increase Jewish, Baltic, and Baptist emigration by linking free emigration with a most-favored nation (MFN) trade status. However, the generally low volume of trade between the two blocs limited the effectiveness of this kind of leverage. The Soviets reacted by linking emigration to the state of their negotiations with the United States over disarmament and other political issues.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act Covenant on Human Rights was probably viewed by the Soviet leadership as yet another declarative statement of little lasting effect. It included safety clauses that precluded intervention in the internal affairs of Soviet-bloc countries. Yet its ratification by Soviet-bloc

nations provided international legal grounds for East European dissidents to assist their governments in its implementation. The Helsinki Process provided a legal basis for the resurrection of civil society in Eastern Europe, especially through the Charter 77 dissident movement in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Human Rights Committee of Andrei Sakharov and Sergei Kovaljov. Dissident groups were able to pressure their governments to respect human rights through exposure of their violations in the Western media, which were then broadcast back beyond the Iron Curtain via Radio Liberty. Dissidents pressed on to assert their rights to express their opinions in samizdat publications (typed carbon copies that circulated among friends) and in informal gatherings where banned music and theater could be performed and critical lectures could be delivered. The dissidents were supported most effectively by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the West, which put greater pressure on the Soviet regimes than governments ever could.

A somewhat parallel development took place west of the Iron Curtain, where NGOs such as Amnesty International became significant in enforcing human rights through monitoring and reporting and by embarrassing the perpetrating governments in the forum of world public opinion. When U.S. President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he refocused his nation's foreign policy to promote global human rights, although he continued to support some traditional U.S. allies, such as Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, despite their dismal human rights records. Still, the idealistic shift in policy persisted through the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The Reagan administration attempted to improve the human rights situation in nations in Latin America, Indonesia, and East Asia, albeit through private channels rather than public diplomacy and sometimes by utilizing illegal means. In 1985, human rights were one of four items on the agenda of Soviet and American negotiators as the Cold War began to wind down.

In 1987 the Soviet Union moved to improve its human rights record by releasing political prisoners and granting freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and travel, which ultimately led to political freedom and, after 1991, to national self-determination. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies were in large measure responsible for these momentous turns of events. The problem then, as now, has been the lack of institutional guarantees of human rights in the former Soviet states that would systematically enforce rights.

Gorbachev's attempt to reform communism proved that totalitarian communist regimes could not easily introduce human rights into their system. Totalitarianism is, in essence, an all-or-nothing proposition. Once it allows its people to possess rudimentary human rights, it loses its claim to power; the people demand greater distribution of rights from the rulers to the ruled, and totalitarianism ends. This process had already been predicted by Czech dissident Václav Benda in his 1978 essay "A Parallel Polis."

In the closing years of the Cold War, as international tensions subsided, the U.S. interest in supporting regimes that violated human rights for the sake of political expediency waned. Consequently, a wave of democratization

swept Latin America and South Africa. Yet the end of the Cold War also exposed the inability of the international community to enforce human rights even in the most extreme cases of genocide, such as in Rwanda, the Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia.

Aviezer Tucker

See also

Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Charter 77; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Helsinki Final Act; Perestroika; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Sakharov, Andrei; Soviet Union; United Nations

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Hungarian Revolution
(1956)

Hungarian anticommunist uprising (23 October–4 November 1956) brutally suppressed by Soviet military intervention.

By the spring of 1953 the Hungarian economy was in deep crisis. The economic policies of the Communist Party, under the leadership of Ernő Gerő, president of the National Economic Council, were proving unsuccessful. The farms produced by land reform were too small for Hungary's economy, and the government had emphasized heavy industry despite a lack of natural resources to sustain it. Neither Prime Minister Mátyás Rákosi nor the top leadership of the Communist Party dealt effectively with the difficulties. On 4 July 1953 Imre Nagy, with Soviet support, replaced Rákosi as prime minister. Nagy introduced a reform program dubbed the New Course. It included reformation of the administration, an end to or reduction in forced labor, an accommodation with religion, an end to police brutality, curtailment of the power of the secret police, amnesty for political prisoners, allowing peasants to end the collective farms, and relaxation of economic controls and the pace of industrialization. These were also the demands of the rebels in 1956.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev became concerned about these reforms. When the political climate in Moscow changed in favor of the hard-liner Rákosi in the spring of 1955, Nagy was forced to resign. Rákosi's

Hungarian Revolution, 1956

reappointment and the suspension of Nagy's reform program were badly received in Hungary.

The Poznań riots in Poland in June 1956 and Władysław Gomułka's return to power there encouraged the Hungarian reformers. With the situation in Hungary fast deteriorating, Khrushchev ordered Rákosi to resign as party secretary on 18 July 1956. But Rákosi's Stalinist replacement, Ernő Gerő, was not acceptable to party moderates, who favored greater liberalization. Gerő proved just as unpopular as Rákosi.

By 1956 there was widespread dissatisfaction in Hungary. Under Rákosi the economy had deteriorated. A poor harvest and a fuel shortage in the fall of 1956 coupled with events in Poland added to the already serious situation.

At the same time there was rising discontent among Hungary's intellectuals, who had come to enjoy limited freedom in the thaw following the March 1953 death of Josef Stalin. In 1955 nearly sixty of them signed a memorandum that called for an end to rigid state regimentation of Hungarian cultural life. Although most were forced to retract this daring measure, by spring and summer of 1956 there was a rising chorus of protest. The principal outlet for the intellectuals was a debating society known as the Petőfi Club, named for Sándor Petőfi, the young nationalist poet who had died in the Hungarian War of Independence (1848–1849). The dissidents were not anticommunists; rather, they demanded that the government bring its policies and practices into line with stated communist ideals.

All the while, Nagy's popularity was on the increase, and intellectuals and journalists were demanding reinstitution of his reform program. Reformers within the party warned that if he did not return and the government was not reorganized under his leadership, there would be an explosion. The party leadership, however, resisted such steps.

College and university students were now committed to political change. Students from the Technical University founded a new independent youth organization, convening an assembly on 22 October 1956 to finalize their main demands for political and social change. The demands included the withdrawal of Soviet troops, appointment of a new government with Nagy as prime minister, political pluralism, new economic policies, and trials for Rákosi and his fellow communists. The minister of interior authorized the student-led demonstration scheduled for 23 October.

The demonstration began peacefully at the statue of Petőfi. The protesters' next stop was the statue of József Bem, hero of the Polish Revolution of 1830 and of the Hungarian War of Independence. Originally planned as an expression of sympathy for the Polish movement, the march reflected acute dissatisfaction with the Hungarian government. The students then laid a wreath at the Bem statute and read out their list of demands. Emboldened by the growing crowd, the students instead of disbanding moved to Kossuth Square in front of the Parliament building. A series of events that evening transformed the reform movement into rebellion.

Instead of disbanding, the students moved to Kossuth Square in front of the parliament building.

In front of the Parliament building, more than 200,000 people listened to Nagy's speech. In it he agreed to most of the demands, but as a moderate reformer he refused to institute radical changes. Disappointed, the crowd moved on to the building housing the National Radio Network with the objective of announcing their demands on the air. A speech made by Gerő, general secretary of the Communist Party, was broadcast instead. In the speech, Gerő made arrogant and incendiary remarks that enraged the demonstrators and led to an escalation of tensions. Fighting then broke out between the demonstrators and police defending the National Radio complex. When police tried to disperse the crowd with tear gas first and then opened fire, the crowd stormed the radio building and occupied it. On 24 October, Hungarian military officers and soldiers joined the demonstrators. The demonstrators toppled a large statue of Stalin, chanting "Russians go home," "Away with Gerő," and "Long live Nagy."

In an emergency meeting on the evening of 23 October, the party's Central Committee voted to bring back Nagy as prime minister. The appointment was announced the next day, and Nagy delivered a radio speech announcing amnesty for the protesters if they stopped the fighting. Also that day, Soviet troops began moving into Budapest and taking up positions in the city.

The demonstration consequently assumed an anti-Soviet, nationalist character. Over the next four days sporadic fighting occurred between the Soviet troops and the so-called Freedom Fighters, groups of students, workers, and former prisoners. On 25 October in the course of a huge demonstration in front of the Parliament building, Soviet tanks opened fire on the crowd.

Hungarians burn a picture of Soviet leader Josef Stalin during the anticommunist revolution in Budapest in 1956. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Meanwhile, Soviet leaders Anastas I. Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslov arrived in Budapest from Moscow and decided that Gerő would have to go. He was replaced by János Kádár, neither a reformer nor a Stalinist, as general secretary of the party. The Soviet leadership plainly hoped that Nagy and Kádár would be able to control the situation.

The uprising, however, was rapidly spreading throughout Hungary. Nagy announced that negotiations were under way for the withdrawal of Soviet troops once law and order had been restored. On 27 October Nagy finalized his new government, which included noncommunist politicians such as Zoltán Tildy and Béla Kovács. Nagy and Kádár then commenced negotiations with the Soviets on a cease-fire agreement.

During his brief tenure as prime minister, Nagy attempted to bring events under control. He proposed only limited reforms as a start. His ultimate intention, however, was to implement the political program of his first premiership in 1953. He offered a general amnesty to the protesters and promised the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. He soon realized, however, that his 1953 program was out of step when the revolution spread to the rest of the country. Therefore, he acceded to most of the population's wishes, namely the introduction of political pluralism and Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

On 28 October the new government convened for the first time in the Parliament building. The government then ordered the dissolution of the secret police. Meanwhile, the Political Committee of the party agreed to the cease-fire. Nagy also announced that Soviet troops would soon withdraw from Budapest, and on 29 October Soviet troops began to leave the city.

A four-party coalition government was founded on 30 October. As such, the Smallholders' Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the National Peasants Party were all reconstituted. At the same time, the communist Hungarian Workers' Party was dissolved. Nagy freed political prisoners including Cardinal József Mindszenty, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment by Rákosi in 1948. Nagy also informed the people of his government's intention to permanently abolish the one-party system.

This marked a decisive turning point in Nagy's policy. He abandoned his moderate reform agenda and became fully committed to the more radical demands of the population. On 31 October, in a speech on Parliament Square, he announced that Hungary would begin negotiating its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On 1 November Nagy formally declared his intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, proclaimed Hungarian neutrality, and asked the United Nations (UN) to mediate his nation's dispute with the Soviet Union. At the same time, a new communist party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, was founded. On the evening of 1 November, the general secretary of the

new party, János Kádár, went to the Soviet embassy to begin negotiations with Soviet authorities. He was then secretly flown to Moscow, where he met with Khrushchev.

On 3 November the new government began negotiations for the final withdrawal of Soviet troops, and a new coalition was founded that included communists, three members of the Smallholders' Party, three Social Democrats, and two representatives from the National Peasants' Party. General Pál Maléter, the new minister of defense and one of the heroes of the revolution, visited Soviet Army headquarters on the evening of 3 November under a pledge of safe conduct to negotiate for Soviet withdrawal and Hungarian departure from the Warsaw Pact. He was not allowed to leave the headquarters and was kept under house arrest until the end of January 1957, when he was handed over to the new Hungarian authorities. Maléter was tried and executed in the summer of 1958.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership had become increasingly alarmed with the developments in Hungary. While Moscow was willing to make some concessions, a multiparty cabinet and free elections plainly threatened Soviet control over all of Central Europe. Soviet leaders may also have believed, as they charged, that Western agents had been at work stirring up revolt. Military leaders also demanded action to reverse the humiliation suffered by the Red Army in withdrawing its tanks earlier. Nagy's announcement on 1 November 1956 of Hungary's intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact was the straw that broke the camel's back and triggered Soviet military intervention.

At dawn on Sunday, 4 November, Khrushchev sent 200,000 Soviet troops and 2,000 tanks into Hungary. The troops immediately secured Hungary's airfields, highway junctions, and bridges and laid siege to the major cities. Nagy called for resistance to the Soviets. Fighting broke out across Hungary, but the center was in Budapest. Unaided from the outside, the fight lasted only a week. Nagy and some of his associates sought and obtained asylum at the Yugoslavian embassy. Cardinal Mindszenty sought refuge in the U.S. legation, where he remained until 1971.

Kádár immediately denounced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and, with Soviet military backing, took control of the government. On 8 November he announced the formation of the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government and its Fifteen-Point Program. The latter included the protection of the socialist system from all attacks, an increase in living standards, the streamlining of bureaucracy, the augmentation of agricultural production, a justification for the Red Army's intervention, and the withdrawal of troops from Hungary. The last point was rescinded following pressure from the Warsaw Pact.

Thousands of Hungarians were arrested, and an estimated 200,000 others fled the country—many of them young and well-educated—most of them across the western border into Austria. Nagy, promised safe passage from the Yugoslavian embassy, was arrested by the Soviets on 22 November and imprisoned. He was subsequently tried and executed on 16 June 1958. Some 70 other people were also executed.

Hungarian refugees leave Budapest following the failed 1956 Revolution. (National Archives and Records Administration)

One effect of the failure of the Hungarian Revolution was a loss of faith in the West. Hungarians genuinely thought that they had been promised assistance, and many Hungarians and Western observers believed that the United States prolonged the fighting because Hungarian-language broadcasts over Radio Free Europe, then covertly financed by the U.S. government, encouraged Hungarians to believe that either the United States or the UN would send troops to safeguard their proclaimed neutrality. Hungarians repeatedly asked Western journalists covering the revolution when UN troops would be arriving. President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had talked about "liberating" Eastern Europe and "rolling back communism," but this had been intended largely for domestic U.S. political consumption rather than for the East Europeans. U.S. inactivity over the Hungarian situation, however, indicated tacit acceptance of the Soviet domination of their part of the world.

The UN Security Council discussed the Hungarian situation but adjourned the meeting because the Soviets appeared to be withdrawing. Then, in a matter of a few hours, the UN was faced with the fait accompli of 4 November. At the same time, however, UN attention was focused on the Anglo-French Suez invasion. This and the split between the United States and its two major allies effectively prevented any concrete action against the invasion of Hungary. In December 1956 the UN censured the Kádár regime, but this did not in any way change the situation in Hungary.

There was another point worth considering. No matter how the West might have felt about intervening in Hungary, there was no way to get to that country militarily without violating Austrian neutrality. Nonetheless, the West did not come off well in Hungary.

The effects of the Hungarian Revolution were particularly pronounced in Eastern Europe. Any thought that the people of the region might have had of escaping Moscow's grip by violent revolution was discouraged by the example of Soviet willingness to use force in defiance of world opinion. Nevertheless, open rebellion by the very groups upon which the communists were supposedly building their new society was shattering from a propaganda standpoint, as was the crushing of free workers' councils (soviets) that had sprung up in Hungary during the 1956 revolution nearly four decades after the victory of Russian soviets in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The Soviet military intervention did have a considerable impact on West European communist parties. They suffered mass resignations, including some illustrious intellectuals.

The Hungarian Revolution ultimately led to changes in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. Moscow allowed some modifications in economic

planning within the East European bloc to meet the needs of individual countries, including more attention to consumer goods and agriculture and a slowed pace of industrialization. For the time being, however, an opportunity to begin the liberation of Eastern Europe had led to a heavy-handed reassertion of Soviet mastery.

By June 1957 Kádár had stabilized the situation and secured his position as the most prominent Hungarian political leader of the Cold War era. For the next thirty-two years in Hungary, the 1956 revolution was officially referred to as a counterrevolution. It was not until 1989, after the Velvet Revolution began in Czechoslovakia, that it was officially called an uprising. On 23 October 1989 the Hungarian Republic was formally declared. That same year witnessed the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary. In 1991 the Hungarian Parliament declared 23 October a national holiday.

Anna Boros-McGee and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Antall, József; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Gerő, Ernő; Hungary; Kádár, János; Khrushchev, Nikita; Kovács, Béla; Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich; Mindszenty, József; Nagy, Imre; Rákosi, Mátyás; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Suez Crisis; Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich; Tildy, Zoltán; Warsaw Pact

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Hungary

Central European nation with a 1945 population of approximately 9 million people. Hungary covers 35,919 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Indiana. It is bordered by Slovakia to the north, Croatia and Serbia to the south, Austria to the west, and Romania and Ukraine to the east.

In April 1945, the Soviet Army liberated Hungary from German occupation. As Hungary was on the side of the vanquished powers, its future depended on the terms of the cease-fire agreement as well as the peace treaty negotiated among the victorious powers. In an October 1944 meeting in Moscow between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Josef Stalin, the two men had agreed over spheres of influence, with Hungary split 50/50 between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. But the Red Army occupied Hungary, and the political, economic, social, and military development of Hungary in the postwar era was to be largely influenced by the Soviet Union.

The Communist Party in Hungary had been illegal between the two world wars; thus, many party activists spent these years in Soviet exile. When they returned to Hungary with the Red Army at the end of World War II, their chief mission was to grasp political power and introduce a Soviet-style political-economic system. The communist takeover did not occur immediately, however.

In November 1944, Hungarian General Miklós Béla Dálnoki and the Hungarian communists in exile negotiated a cease-fire agreement in Moscow. In return, the Soviets offered Dálnoki the post of premier in the immediate postwar Hungarian government. This Provisional National Government was formed on 22 December 1944 in Debrecen in eastern Hungary, which had already been liberated from German occupation.

As premier, Dálnoki reorganized the public sector, signed the cease-fire agreement with the Red Army, began land reform, modernized elementary education, and called for elections. These elections were held six months after the end of the war, in November 1945. Four major parties participated: the Smallholders' Party, the Social Democrat Party, the Hungarian Peasant Union, and the Communist Party. Of these, the Smallholders' Party was the most popular as well as the most conservative. Subverting the Smallholders' Party was one of the main Communist Party goals.

Although the Smallholders' Party won the November elections with 57 percent of the vote, under Soviet pressure a four-party coalition government was formed with Zoltán Tildy as premier. He held this position until 1 February 1946, when Hungary was declared a republic, whereupon he became its president.

The new premier, Ferenc Nagy, also from the Smallholders' Party, faced three big challenges in inflation, nationalization, and growing pressure from the Communist Party. A new currency was introduced in August 1946, which helped stem inflation, but the other two problems defied solution. The communists, meanwhile, held key positions in the government and used these to undermine the democratic process. Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party and Vice Premier Mátyás Rákosi controlled the police, and Soviet troops remained in occupation. Soviet expropriation of the German monetary assets in Hungary was also a strong economic lever, and the communists claimed credit for restoring the economy and the transportation system.

László Rajk, minister of the interior and head of police, directed a reign of terror, while Rákosi embarked on what he called salami tactics, slicing off one segment of the opposition after another. The communists also moved against the Smallholders' Party. Its leader, Béla Kovacs, was arrested and accused of plotting to restore the Habsburgs. In May, Premier Nagy, on vacation in Switzerland, was forced by threats from Moscow to resign by telephone. The August 1947 parliamentary election, tainted by communist fraud, reduced the strength of the Smallholders, and in March 1948 the socialists were forced to merge with the communists into the Hungarian Workers' Party (MDP). In August 1948 President Tildy was also forced to resign and was placed under house arrest. In 1949 Hungary became a People's Republic.

Soviet tanks parading through the streets of Budapest, Hungary, in 1952. (Library of Congress)

The MDP soon nationalized the banks, factories, private schools, businesses, land, and other properties. Farmers were forced to join collective farms. Resisters were promptly arrested by the State Protection Authority. The party also maintained strict control over education and cultural life. Rákosi, party general secretary and premier during 1952–1953, was the main proponent of these policies.

The Roman Catholic Church opposed the communists. Primate of the Hungarian church Archbishop József Mindszenty refused to recognize the confiscation of Church lands and nationalization of its schools, and he also refused to hide his conservative social and political views. Accused of being a monarchist, he was arrested in December 1948, tortured, tried and found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison.

Within a few months Rajk found himself on trial. A nationalist revolutionary who enjoyed genuine popularity and was not beholden to Moscow, he was found guilty of treason and spying and was executed in October 1949. Rákosi, a pure Stalinist and the most unsavory of communist East European leaders, now assumed formal control of the Hungarian Workers' Party and was the effective power broker until 1953.

Many Hungarians fell victim to Rákosi's excesses, enforced by the dreaded Allamvedélmi Hivatal (AVH, State Security Authority) secret police. By the

summer of 1953, the Hungarian economy was in deep crisis. The party's economic policies carried out under the leadership of Ernő Gerő, president of the National Economic Council, had proven unsuccessful. Forced industrialization and agricultural collectivization combined with unrealistic goals all took a heavy toll. Rákosi, however, failed to deal with the growing problems, and on July 1953 Imre Nagy, now favored by the new Soviet leadership in place following Stalin's death, replaced Rákosi as premier.

Nagy soon introduced a reform program known as the New Course that relaxed the pace of industrialization, allowed peasants to leave collective farms, eased police terror tactics, reformed the bureaucracy, and improved the standard of living. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev became concerned about these reforms, however. When the political climate in Moscow changed in favor of the hard-liner Rákosi, Nagy was forced to resign in the spring of 1955. Rákosi's reappointment and the suspension of Nagy's reforms were greeted with great hostility in Hungary. To stave off widespread general discontent, Rákosi was replaced as general secretary of the party in July 1956 by another hard-liner, Gerő. This was not the best of decisions, as Gerő was just as unpopular as Rákosi. To add to the discontent, the reburial in early October of victims of the earlier purges led to widespread unrest.

All the while, Nagy's popularity was increasing. Intellectuals and journalists demanded the implementation of his reform program. University students were also committed to political change. On 23 October 1956, they scheduled a peaceful demonstration that soon turned violent when shooting erupted between police and the demonstrators. After an emergency meeting of the party Central Committee on the night of 23 October, Nagy was appointed premier. He held this position until 4 November.

During his brief tenure, Nagy attempted to bring events under control, but at first he advocated only moderate reforms. His intention was to implement the political program of his first premiership in 1953. During the first days of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, he offered amnesty to the demonstrators and promised the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary.

Nagy soon realized that his program had been superseded by events when the revolution spread to the rest of the country, with more demands. He therefore agreed to the primary popular demands: the introduction of political pluralism and Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On 1 November he announced that Hungary intended to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and proclaimed Hungarian neutrality. These developments angered Moscow and ultimately provoked a Soviet military intervention. Soviet forces invaded the country on 4 November, following meetings two days earlier between Soviet authorities and János Kádár, the newly appointed general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Meanwhile, Nagy sought asylum in the Yugoslavian embassy in Budapest.

Kádár immediately denounced the plan for Hungary to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and, with Soviet military support, took control of the government. On 8 November he announced the formation of a Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government and its Fifteen-Point Program. The latter included protection of the "people's democratic and socialist system" from

attack, an increase in living standards, reduction of the state bureaucracy, increases in agricultural production, and justification for the Red Army's intervention. Nagy, promised free passage out of the country from the Yugoslavian embassy, was arrested on 22 November and imprisoned in Romania.

By June 1957, Kádár had fully stabilized the situation and secured his position as the most prominent Hungarian political leader for the next thirty-two years. He instituted severely repressive countermeasures against the revolution's leaders. Nagy and his fellow reform communists, including Pál Maléter, the minister of defense in the revolutionary government, were tried and executed on 16 June 1958. This caused an international outcry and resulted in several years of political isolation for Kádár's government.

By the late 1960s, however, Kádár began to implement his so-called Goulash Communism. Begun in 1966, this program of economic liberalism allowed some degree of free enterprise in order to bring about a higher standard of living and improved relations with the West. Everyday life became safer and more pleasant. Of all the postwar-era East European communist leaders, Kádár retained power the longest. During the 1960s and 1970s, he quietly implemented most of the reforms that the revolutionists of 1956 had fought for without evoking a backlash from Moscow. During his reign, Hungary was considered the "happiest barracks" in Eastern Europe. In 1977, Pope Paul VI granted Kádár an audience at the Vatican, which symbolically marked the end of Hungary's moral isolation.

In the late 1980s, however, Kádár found it difficult to adapt to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform initiatives. Indeed, Kádár's presence in the party became an obstacle to reform. Thus, in May 1988 Károly Grósz, a moderate party reformist and Hungary's premier, ousted Kádár and became party general secretary. Kádár was shifted to the ceremonial post of party president.

During his short term in office, Grósz contributed significantly to the transformation of Hungary to a Western-style democracy. In November 1988, Miklós Németh succeeded Grósz as premier. After Gorbachev signaled greater independence for Eastern Europe, Németh began implementing fundamental reforms. His objective was to reintegrate Hungary and the entire region into the world economy and the free market system. He agreed to a state reburial of Imre Nagy and opened the border to East German refugees, triggering a sequence of fundamental international political changes that would bring an end to the division of Germany and an end the Cold War. Németh also decided to order the removal of the barbed-wire fence on Hungary's western border, and he and other party reformers refounded the Hungarian Socialist Party. Németh also signed an agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. During his tenure, a new constitution came into being, Hungary was declared a republic, and a new election system based on political pluralism was implemented. In the spring of 1990, József Antall, whose Hungarian Democratic Forum party won Hungary's first post–Cold War free election, succeeded Németh as premier.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Antall, József; Europe, Eastern; Gerő, Ernő; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Grósz, Károly; Hungarian Revolution; Kádár, János; Khrushchev, Nikita; Kovács, Béla; Mindszenty, József; Nagy, Ferenc; Nagy, Imre; Németh, Miklós; Rajk, László; Rákosi, Mátyás; Tildy, Zoltán; Tökés, László; Warsaw Pact

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Hurd, Douglas Richard

(1930–)

British Conservative Party politician and foreign secretary (1989–1995). Born on 8 March 1930 in Marlborough, Wiltshire, southern England, Douglas Hurd was the son of Sir Anthony Richard, a member of Parliament. Hurd attended Eton College and Trinity College, Cambridge University, receiving his MA in 1952 with first-class honors in history.

During 1948–1949, Hurd was a second-lieutenant in the British Army Royal Horse Artillery. In 1952 he joined the diplomatic service and for the next fourteen years worked in the Diplomatic Corps. He served in various posts, including Beijing, New York, and Rome.

An astute politician, Hurd was known for his skill in strategy, his tolerance, and his self-discipline, although much of the British public perceived him as aristocratic, old-fashioned, and rather aloof. He served as political secretary to Prime Minister Edward Heath during 1970–1974. In 1974 Hurd was elected to Parliament as a Conservative, representing Mid-Oxfordshire.

In 1984 Hurd was Northern Ireland secretary under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. From 1989 to 1995 Hurd was foreign secretary. During these six years, he was a major figure in historic Cold War events, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Dayton Peace Agreement. In November 1990, when Thatcher suddenly withdrew from the Conservative Party, Hurd was nominated to replace her but was defeated by John Major. In 1996 Hurd was made a Companion of Honor and the following year was given a life peerage as Baron Hurd of Westwall in the House of Lords.

Since 1997 Hurd has been the chairman of several British firms, and he remains active in Conservative Party causes. A prolific writer of history and political thrillers, he had published ten books by 2002. In addition, Hurd's diary, kept since he was nine years old, provides valuable insights into his long and illustrious political life.

Gary Kerley

See also
Heath, Edward; Thatcher, Margaret; United Kingdom

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Hurley, Patrick Jay
(1883–1963)

U.S. general and diplomat and ambassador to the Republic of China (1944–1945). Born in the Choctaw Nation, Indian Territory, on 8 January 1883, Patrick J. Hurley graduated from Indian University (now Bacone College) in 1905. He earned a law degree from the National University of Law in Washington, D.C., in 1908 and from George Washington University in 1913. Admitted to the bar, he practiced law in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and was national attorney for the Choctaw Nation during 1913–1917.

Hurley served in the Indian Territorial Volunteer Militia during 1902–1907 and in the Oklahoma National Guard during 1914–1917. He fought in France in the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He then returned to Oklahoma, where investments in oil and banking made him one of the wealthiest men in the state.

Following donations to Herbert Hoover's presidential campaign in 1928, Hurley joined the new Hoover administration first as assistant secretary of war in 1929 and then as secretary of war during 1929–1933. Hurley issued the order to General Douglas MacArthur to evict the Bonus Army from Washington, D.C., in 1932. When Hoover was defeated for reelection, Hurley returned to his business interests in Oklahoma.

When President Franklin Roosevelt sought to broaden his administration with Republicans following U.S. entry into World War II, Hurley was recalled to active duty as an army brigadier general. He served as special emissary to Australia, where he attempted unsuccessfully to secure the relief of U.S. troops besieged in the Philippines. He then held a succession of special assignments for President Roosevelt, including minister to New Zealand (1942) and special emissary to the Soviet Union (1942) and the Near East and Middle East (1943).

In August 1944 Roosevelt named Hurley as his personal representative to China, and three months later he became ambassador. Directed by Roosevelt to secure Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi's cooperation with the communists to form a united front in fighting the Japanese, the uninformed Hurley instead fell under Jiang's sway and became an ardent champion of the Nationalist position of noncooperation with the communists. This put Hurley on a collision course with State Department "China Hands" John Paton Davies and John Stewart Service, who believed that China would fall

to the communists unless Jiang's government underwent major reform and was purged of corruption. Hurley held that only communists could take such a stance.

Promoted to major general in 1944, Hurley returned to the United States in September 1945 and declared in the course of a speech that U.S. diplomats in China were refusing to carry out American policy, while in fact it was Hurley himself who was contravening it. Under mounting criticism he offered his resignation, which to his surprise President Harry S. Truman accepted in November 1945. In his resignation letter, Hurley made the outrageous charge that State Department officials had aided the communists and had prevented him from saving the Nationalist government.

Hurley then returned to New Mexico. An unsuccessful candidate for the U.S. Senate from his native state in 1946, 1948, and 1952, he remained a leading figure in the right-wing China lobby. In June 1950 Hurley accused both Service and Davies of secretly passing information to the Chinese communists that enabled them to subvert the Nationalists. Although both men were cleared of this charge by the State Department, anticommunist crusader Senator Joseph McCarthy picked it up, and both men were driven from the State Department in 1953. Hurley died in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on 30 July 1963.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Chinese Civil War; Marshall, George Catlett; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Service, John Stewart; Truman, Harry S.

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Husák, Gustáv
(1913–1991)

Slovak Communist Party official and president of Czechoslovakia (1975–1989). Born on 10 January 1913 in Dúbravka, now part of Bratislava, Slovakia, Gustáv Husák studied law at Comenius University and joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) in 1933. During World War II the Slovak fascist government jailed him several times for communist activities. Upon his release in 1943, he supported the resistance movement and became a member of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party (SCP). In 1944 he became a leader of the Slovak national uprising, fleeing to the Soviet Union when it failed.

After the war, Husák returned to Czechoslovakia and joined the Central Committees of the CPCz and the SCP while heading the Slovak regional government. He was also instrumental in the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia. In 1951, Stalinist purges removed him from his positions. In 1954 Husák was arrested on charges of treason and bourgeois nationalism and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The government pardoned him in 1960, and his SCP and CPCz memberships were fully restored in 1963.

During the 1968 Prague Spring, Husák became deputy prime minister and head of the SCP, supporting the reforms of Alexander Dubček. Husák worked to federalize the country and urged caution with the reforms in regard to the Soviet Union. He suddenly turned against the reforms when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and he then participated in negotiations with Soviet leaders. Duly impressed, the Soviets installed Husák as first secretary of the CPCz in April 1969, replacing Dubček. Husák then pursued a policy of so-called normalization by sweeping away most of the Dubček reforms, purging the CPCz and SCP, and increasing political and social repression throughout Czechoslovakia. He became general secretary of the CPCz in 1971 and president of Czechoslovakia in 1975.



Gustáv Husák, from Slovakia, was president of Czechoslovakia during 1975–1989. (Miroslav Zajíc/Corbis)

After Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, criticism of Husák's regime increased. In part because of a declining economy, Husák resigned as general secretary in December 1987 but remained president. The Velvet Revolution in November 1989 witnessed the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and when a new Czechoslovak government, the majority of which was noncommunist, was sworn in, Husák resigned the presidency on 10 December 1989. He was replaced by Václav Havel. Husák retired from politics and returned to his hometown. In February 1990 the CPCz expelled him. Husák died in Dúbravka on 18 November 1991.

Gregory C. Ference

See also

Charter 77; Czechoslovakia; Dubček, Alexander; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Havel, Václav; Jakeš, Miloš; Prague Spring

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Hussein, Saddam
(1937–2006)

President and dictator of Iraq (1979–2003). Born on 28 April 1937 in the village of Al-Awja, near Tikrit, to a family of sheepherders, Saddam Hussein attended a secular school in Baghdad and in 1957 joined the Baath Party, a radical secular-socialist party that embraced Pan-Arabism. Although revolutionists, Iraqi Baathists did not support General Abdul Karim Qassim's ouster of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.

Wounded in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Qassim in 1959, Hussein subsequently fled the country but returned after the 1963 Baathist coup and began his rise in the party, although he was again imprisoned in 1964. Escaping in 1966, Hussein continued to ascend through the party's ranks, becoming second in authority when the party took full and uncontested control of Iraq in 1968 under the leadership of General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, a relative of Hussein. The elderly al-Bakr gradually relinquished power to Hussein so that he eventually controlled most of the government.

Hussein became president when al-Bakr resigned, allegedly because of illness, in July 1979. A week after taking power, Hussein led a meeting of Baath leaders during which the names of his potential challengers were read aloud. They were then escorted from the room and shot. Because Iraq was rent by ethnic and religious divisions, Hussein ruled through a tight web of relatives and associates from Tikrit, backed by the Sunni Muslim minority. He promoted economic development through Iraqi oil production, which accounted for 10 percent of known world reserves. His modernization was along Western lines, with limited roles for women and a secular legal system. He also promoted the idea of Iraqi nationalism, emphasizing the roles of Kings Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar.



Saddam Hussein initiated the long Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988) and invaded Kuwait in 1990. He was the dictator of Iraq from 1979 until he was overthrown by the U.S.-led invasion of his country in 2003. (Pavlovsky/Sygma/Corbis)

Before assuming the presidency, Hussein had courted both the West and the Soviet Union, resulting in arms deals with the Soviets and close relations with that country and France. He was also instrumental in convincing the shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, to curb his support of Iraqi Kurds. Hussein's efforts to take advantage of the superpowers' Cold War rivalry, including rapprochement with Iran, fell apart with the overthrow of the shah in 1979. The shah's successor, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a radical, fundamentalist Muslim, bitterly opposed Hussein because of his Sunni background and secularism.

After a period of repeated border skirmishes, Iraq declared war on Iran in September 1980. Hussein's ostensible dispute concerned a contested border, but he also feared Iran's fundamentalism and its support for the Iraqi Shia Muslim majority. Initial success gave way to Iraqi defeats in the face of human-wave attacks and, ultimately, a stalemate. By 1982 Hussein was ready to end the war, but fighting continued. In 1988 the United Nations (UN) finally

brokered a cease-fire, but not before the war had devastated both nations. The war left Iraq heavily in debt, and Hussein requested relief from his major creditors, including the United States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. He also sought to maintain high oil prices. His efforts were in vain. Creditors refused to write off their debts, and Kuwait maintained a high oil output, forcing OPEC to follow suit.

Hussein responded by declaring Kuwait a rogue province of Iraq. He was also enraged by Kuwaiti slant-drilling into Iraqi oil fields. His demands became more strident, and after securing what he believed to be U.S. acquiescence, he attacked Kuwait on 2 August 1990. However, he miscalculated the U.S. reaction. President George H. W. Bush assembled an international military coalition, built up forces in Saudi Arabia (Operation DESERT SHIELD), and then commenced a relentless bombing campaign against Iraq in January 1991. The ground war of 24–28 February resulted in a crushing defeat of Iraqi forces. Although Hussein withdrew from Kuwait, coalition forces did not seek his overthrow. He remained in power, ruling a nation devastated by two recent wars.

Hussein retained control of Iraq for another decade, during which he brutally suppressed Kurdish and Shia revolts, relinquished limited autonomy to the Kurds, acquiesced to the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, and pursued a dilatory response to UN efforts to monitor his weapons programs. Convinced—wrongly as it turned out—that Hussein had been building and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction, President George W. Bush asked for and received authorization from Congress to wage war against Iraq. U.S. and allied forces invaded Iraq in March 2003. Coalition forces took Baghdad on 9 April 2003 and captured Hussein on 14 December 2003 to be brought to trial on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On 5 November 2006, the Iraqi Special Tribunal found Hussein guilty in the deaths of 148 Shiite Muslims in 1982 whose murders he had ordered. That same day, he was sentenced to hang. On 21 August 2006, a second trial had begun on charges that Hussein had committed genocide and other atrocities by ordering the systematic extermination of northern Iraqi Kurds during 1987–1988, resulting in as many as 180,000 deaths. Before the second trial moved into high gear, however, Hussein filed an appeal, which was rejected by the Iraqi Court on 26 December 2006. Four days later, on 30 December 2006, Hussein was executed by hanging in Baghdad.

DANIEL E. SPECTOR

See also

Iran; IIran-Iraq War; raq; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Kuwait; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Persian Gulf War

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Hussein I, King of Jordan
(1935–1999)

King of Jordan (1952–1999). Born Hussein bin Talal on 14 November 1935 in Amman, Transjordan (now Jordan), Hussein was the son of Prince Talal ibn Abdullah. Hussein received his elementary education in Jordan before attending Victoria College in Alexandria, Egypt. From there he transferred to the Harrow School in Great Britain. He finished his education at the elite Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst (also in Britain). In July 1951 Hussein's grandfather, King Abdullah, was assassinated. In September, Hussein's father, Talal, became king. However, Talal suffered from a serious mental illness—probably schizophrenia—and was soon deemed incapable of carrying out his duties. Thus, on 11 August 1952 Hussein was proclaimed king at age sixteen. He formally ascended the throne in May 1953.

When Hussein began his long reign, Jordan was in desperate need of modernization and economic revitalization. In the early 1950s, only 10 percent of Jordan's population had access to running water, modern sanitation, or electricity. By the late 1990s, 99 percent of the population enjoyed these amenities. From the start of his reign, Hussein worked diligently to build a modern economy and industrial infrastructure. In the 1960s a modern highway system was constructed as were many of Jordan's major industries, including phosphate, cement, and potash. Not content with economic advancements alone, Hussein sought to improve the everyday lives of his subjects. The literacy rate increased dramatically beginning in the 1960s, while the infant mortality rate plummeted. Hussein managed to achieve stability and a modicum of prosperity at home without resorting to repression or heavy-handed rule. Indeed, Jordan under Hussein was one of the freest nations in the region and is still considered a model for human rights throughout the Middle East.

In the international area, Hussein was a moderating force in Middle Eastern politics. He had the uncanny ability to maintain generally cordial relations with fellow Arab leaders while at the same time keeping strong ties to most Western nations. Jordanian-American relations were quite cordial for much of the Cold War. Hussein's politics were not without controversy, however. In 1970 he ordered the Jordanian Army to forcefully expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan, where it had set up its headquarters some years earlier. This resulted in considerable violence and the killing of scores of Palestinians. Hussein's aggressive actions against the PLO were deemed necessary because it had begun to cause significant disruptions in the country. Nevertheless, some Arab leaders took a dim view of the forced expulsion.

Hussein hesitated to get involved in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the Israelis sent word that they themselves had no wish to open another front. But emotions swept pragmatism aside. The opening of Jordanian artillery and mortar fire into the Jewish areas of Jerusalem with heavy loss of life and the use of long-range artillery fire that reached the suburbs of Tel Aviv brought Israeli air strikes and the seizure from Jordan of the entire West Bank of the Jordan River and all of Jerusalem.



King Hussein of Jordan shown speaking to journalists during a visit to France. Hussein was king of Jordan during 1952–1999. (Richard Melloul/Sygma/Corbis)

Hussein was, however, a proponent of a permanent Arab-Israeli peace settlement. After the 1967 War, he played a significant role in the drafting of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 242. It essentially called upon the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories in exchange for peace. The resolution and Hussein's vision became the basis for all future Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

During the 1990–1991 Gulf Crisis, Hussein worked tirelessly to avoid war and persuade Iraq's Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. The king's efforts ultimately failed, however, and he defied both the West and many Arab states by staying out of the Persian Gulf War and essentially backing Saddam Hussein. This obviously put Jordanian-Americans relations on ice. But the freeze was short-lived. In 1994, King Hussein had signed the landmark Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace. This made Jordan only the second Arab nation (Egypt was the first) to normalize relations with Israel. Throughout the 1990s, Hussein worked to broker the ever-elusive peace between the Palestinians and Israelis. He was stricken with lymphatic cancer and died in Amman on 7 February 1999. He was succeeded by his eldest son Abdullah.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Jordan; Middle East; Palestine Liberation Organization; Persian Gulf War

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Hu Yaobang
(1915–1989)

Chairman and secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Born in Liuyang, Hunan Province, on 20 August 1915, Hu Yaobang attended school only to age fourteen and then joined the Chinese communists' Youth Works. In 1933 he became a member of the CCP. During the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War he was assigned to party work in central and southwestern China under the tutelage of future PRC leader Deng Xiaoping, which greatly facilitated Hu's later rise to power.

After the PRC's birth in October 1949, Hu followed Deng to southwestern China, heading the North Sichuan People's Administrative Office. In 1952, he transferred to Beijing as director of the New Democratic Youth League. He held this post until 1966, during which time he led several youth delegations abroad to promote the PRC's ties with the socialist bloc. Hu's administrative and diplomatic talents earned him membership in the Congress Presidium, making him the youngest leader in the CCP hierarchy.

As Deng's longtime associate, Hu was purged during the Cultural Revolution. When Deng returned to power in 1977, Hu emerged from political exile as director of both the CCP's Organization Department and the Propaganda Department. He also became a member of the Politburo. In 1980, Hu succeeded Deng as secretary-general of the CCP and was elected CCP chairman the following year. Real power, however, remained in Deng's hands as the chairman of the Central Military Commission. His sole responsibility was to implement Deng's directives, including launching the Four Modernizations policy, restructuring the party apparatus with collective leadership, and promoting the PRC's international reputation. In 1987, Hu was forced to resign over his failure to control prodemocracy student demonstrations in April 1986. Hu's death in Beijing on 15 April 1989 sparked a massive student protest in Tiananmen Square, which ultimately led to the Tiananmen Square incident on 4 June 1989.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping

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Hydrogen Bomb

A thermonuclear weapon that unleashes far more devastating power than an atomic bomb. Hydrogen bombs (also known as H-bombs) rely on the fusion of hydrogen isotopes, unlike an atom bomb that relies on the fission (or splitting) of radioactive isotopes. Fusion occurs when neutrons collide with an unstable hydrogen isotope, causing two lighter isotopes to join together to make a heavier element. During the fusion process, some of the mass of the original isotopes is released as energy, resulting in a powerful explosion. Because of the loss of mass, the end product, or element, weighs less than the total of the original isotopes. H-bombs are referred to as thermonuclear devices because temperatures of 400 million degrees Celsius are required for the fusion process to begin. In order to produce these temperatures, an H-bomb has an atomic bomb at its core. The explosion of the atomic device and the fission process in turn leads to the fusion process in hydrogen isotopes that surround the atomic core.

An H-bomb, depending on its size, can produce an explosion powerful enough to devastate an area of approximately 150 square miles, while the searing heat and toxic radioactive fallout from such devices can impact an area of more than 800 square miles. The explosion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in September 1949 ended the U.S. atomic monopoly and led to a nuclear arms race. The development of more powerful weapons such as the H-bomb and of new methods of delivering nuclear bombs, such as ballistic missiles, were primarily a result of the Cold War conflict and concomitant arms race.

In 1946 the U.S. Atomic Energy Act created the Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC). The USAEC was responsible for the development and control of the U.S. atomic energy program after World War II. The commission consisted of five members appointed by the president. A civilian advisory committee was also created, and Robert Oppenheimer, scientific head of the atomic bomb project, served as its chairman. The USAEC also worked with a military liaison with whom it consulted on all atomic energy issues that had military applications. By 1949, the year the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb, Cold War tensions were running high. Nuclear physicist Edward Teller, USAEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss, and other scientists formed a coalition together with military officials to urge President Harry Truman to initiate a program to construct a superweapon, or H-bomb. This new weapon would be measured in megatons instead of kilotons and could yield an explosion equivalent to millions of tons of TNT. Despite opposition from Oppenheimer and several other nuclear scientists, Truman, under siege



Hydrogen bomb test IVY MIKE, 31 October 1952 (1 November 1952 local time). This photo was taken 50 miles from the detonation site and at a height of approximately 12,000 feet. Two minutes after Zero Hour, the cloud rose to 40,000 feet. Ten minutes later, as it neared its maximum, the cloud stem had pushed upward about 25 miles, deep into the stratosphere. The mushroom portion went up to 10 miles and spread for 100 miles. (U.S. Air Force)

for being soft on communism, authorized an H-bomb program in January 1950.

It took the combined efforts of a number of scientists as well as Stanislaw Ulam, a mathematician, to solve the theoretical and technical problems related to building a hydrogen weapon. They carried out their work at Los Alamos, New Mexico, the same facility that had helped produce the atomic bomb. The prototype H-bomb was first detonated on 1 November 1952 on Enewetak Atoll in the South Pacific. The explosion virtually obliterated the island, creating a crater a mile wide and 175 feet deep. After the detonation of the prototype, scientists constructed an H-bomb that could be dropped by aircraft. That weapon was tested successfully in 1954. The Soviet Union tested its own H-bomb on 12 August 1953. The British also developed a hydrogen weapon, which they tested on 15 May 1957.

Unable to maintain a monopoly on nuclear weapons or to force the Soviet Union to alter its policies through either deterrence or the threat represented by nuclear arms, the United States instead found itself engaged in a nuclear arms race. Despite collective security agreements and pacts such as

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States maintained that only nuclear superiority would guarantee the security of the United States and its allies. The launching of the first satellite to orbit Earth, the Soviet-built *Sputnik 1* in 1957, represented a dual threat to the West. It seemed to suggest that Soviet scientists had pulled ahead of their American counterparts. More critically, it also posed the high probability of delivering nuclear weapons with missiles rather than by planes. As a result, the United States increased funding for its space program and redoubled its efforts to fully develop and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and, later, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons, of course, increased the threat of nuclear war, whether by accident or by choice. With the advent of H-bombs and ballistic missile systems that could hurl bombs at an adversary in a matter of minutes, most civil defense preparations became exercises in futility. The Soviet Union's installation of nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba led to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. President John F. Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine around Cuba and refused to allow Soviet ships through the blockade. Faced with the real possibility of a catastrophic thermonuclear war, both sides engaged in a flurry of diplomacy. The Soviets backed down, dismantling the missiles by the end of the year. The Cuban Missile Crisis, one of the few direct confrontations between the Americans and Soviets, showed the potential peril of the nuclear arms race. After the crisis passed, both U.S. and Soviet officials sought new ways to avoid the unthinkable consequences of a nuclear exchange. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty had been agreed to by both sides, the first small step toward eventual nuclear arms reductions. The threat posed by nuclear weapons did not end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, although reduced tensions have lessened the potential for a full-scale nuclear conflict.

Melissa Jordine

See also

Atomic Bomb; Cuban Missile Crisis; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Oppenheimer, Robert; *Sputnik;* Teller, Edward; Truman, Harry S.

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I

Iceland

Island nation in the north-central Atlantic Ocean covering 39,768 square miles, approximately the size of the U.S. state of Kentucky. Iceland is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the south, the Greenland Sea to the north, the Norwegian Sea to the east, and the Strait of Denmark to the west. Iceland had a 1945 population of 130,350 people. Until it declared its independence in 1944 during World War II, Iceland was an integral part of Denmark.

Until the early twentieth century, Iceland was poor, isolated, and of little concern to European powers. That changed with the two world wars. In 1918, Icelanders gained full autonomy within the Danish Kingdom. World War II brought yet more change. On 9 May 1940, British forces occupied the island, primarily in order to keep Germany from seizing it and to protect shipping routes in the North Atlantic. Although Icelanders protested this action, they preferred a British presence to that of Nazi Germany. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt considered Iceland of vital importance to the security of the United States. Thus, on 7 July 1941, U.S. forces landed in the island Iceland, gradually taking over defense duties. This was done with the full agreement of British and Icelandic authorities, who welcomed the change from occupation to a mutually agreed-upon protectorate. During the war, up to 45,000 American servicemen were stationed on the island. The locals enjoyed an economic boom, but social tensions were also evident.

During the Cold War, Iceland came to occupy an important strategic position. For the West, it was a vital stepping stone for both defensive and offensive military operations. Icelanders, however, were always a reluctant ally. Having so recently gained independence, they were loath to have foreign troops on their soil. When they deemed this to be virtually inevitable, however, they were determined to make the most of the foreign presence materially and politically, sometimes to the chagrin of their allies.

The United States sought to maintain its presence in Iceland following World War II by requesting the right to lease military bases for ninety-nine years. Icelanders flatly rejected the request and sought protection in neutrality. In 1946, a compromise was reached that allowed a U.S. civilian contractor to continue to operate the large airfield at Keflavík, deemed vital for

Herring oil factory in Iceland built with Marshall Plan aid. The factory processed the herring into oil and meal, an important source of foreign revenue for Iceland. (National Archives and Records Administration)

reconnaissance purposes. The following year, Iceland participated in the Marshall Plan.

At this time (and especially after the communist coup in Prague in early 1948), many pro-Western politicians in Iceland began to fear that the security of the island could not be protected by a pledge of neutrality. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949, Iceland decided to join on the condition that foreign troops would not be stationed in Iceland during peacetime. Pro-Moscow Icelandic socialists, who regularly garnered up to 20 percent of the general election vote, condemned the move, and riots broke out when the parliament agreed on Iceland's NATO membership.

In 1950, increased tensions because of the Korean War convinced Icelandic pro-Western politicians that the country could no longer afford to be without military protection. On 5 May 1951 Iceland and the United States signed a defense pact, and two days later U.S. servicemen returned to the island.

In 1956, a left-wing coalition in Iceland declared that the world situation had so improved that American forces could leave. This declaration, which was never codified, was reversed after the Soviets invaded Hungary to quash the Hungarian Revolution. Western loans also helped to bring the Icelanders around. During 1958–1961, a major fishing limits dispute between Iceland and Britain, the first of the Cod Wars, temporarily upset Iceland's relations with its Western allies.

In 1960 all U.S. Army units were withdrawn from Iceland, and the following year the U.S. Navy replaced the U.S. Air Force as the host military service in Iceland. Although the country was no longer as important for offensive and defensive purposes as it had been in the early Cold War, it remained a key stepping stone in communications between the United States and Western Europe and a vital link in the North American Early Warning System (NORAD) and the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, UK) sea-air surveillance barrier.

During 1971–1974, a new left-wing Icelandic regime again declared its intention to expel American forces. As before, however, the effort was half-hearted, and the majority of Icelanders would not have supported it because of both their pro-Western orientation and the economic benefits that sprang from the U.S. base at Keflavík. Still, two further Cod Wars with Britain in the 1970s created strains in the alliance. As in the first conflict, Icelanders made good use of their nation's strategic importance to extract concessions. After the last Cod War in 1976, Iceland's relations with its Western allies were generally trouble-free. An increase in Soviet naval activity ensured the importance of surveillance facilities in Iceland.

The end of the Cold War, however, dramatically reduced Iceland's strategic role. Since the early 1990s, the United States has systematically reduced

its presence in Iceland. By 2004, only some 2,000 U.S. servicemen were based there. Radar stations had been dismantled, reconnaissance aircraft were no longer based permanently at Keflavík, and only four fighter jets were stationed there. In the words of a NATO official, in strategic terms Iceland had moved "to the edge of nowhere."

Gudni Jóhannesson

See also

Benediktsson, Bjarni; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Ikeda Hayato
(1899–1965)

Japanese Liberal Democratic Party politician and prime minister (1960–1964). Born in Hiroshima Prefecture on 3 December 1899, Ikeda Hayato graduated from Kyoto Imperial University in 1925 with a degree in law. He joined the Finance Ministry and served as deputy finance minister during 1947–1948.

In the 1949 general election Ikeda won election to the Diet from Hiroshima Prefecture as a Democratic Liberal. He was a protégé of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Ikeda served twice as finance minister (1949–1952, 1956–1957) and as minister for international trade and industry (1952, 1959–1960). During the Allied occupation of Japan (1945–1952), he was responsible for implementing the Dodge Plan, an economic stabilization program. In 1951 he was a member of the Japanese delegation to the San Francisco Peace Conference, and from 1956 he formed his own faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

In July 1960 Ikeda assumed the premiership, taking over from Kishi Nobusuke, who had split public opinion over revision of the United States–Japan Security Treaty. In contrast, Ikeda pursued a low-profile foreign policy, preferring to focus on domestic issues, above all the economy.

Aiming to turn Japan into an economic great power, Ikeda launched a plan to double Japan's gross national product within a decade. This enjoyed strong support from across the political spectrum. During his premiership, Japan joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) and secured full membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Politically, Ikeda continued the policy of close cooperation with the United States. He saw Japan as constituting one of the so-called three pillars of the free world, alongside the United States and Western Europe. Ikeda also sought to improve relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Economic ties were strengthened, but diplomatic relations were not established.

Poor health forced Ikeda to resign in October 1964. He died in Tokyo on 13 August 1965.

Takemoto Tomoyuki and Christopher W. Braddick

See also

Ishibashi Tanzan; Japan; Kishi Nobusuke; United States–Japan Security Treaty; Yoshida Shigeru

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Iliescu, Ion
(1930–)

Romanian political leader and president (1989–1996, 2000–2004). Ion Iliescu was born on 3 March 1930 in the small town of Olteniţa, Călăraşi County, southern Romania. His father was a railway worker, trade union activist, and leader of the illegal Communist Party. Iliescu attended high school in Bucharest and then studied electric technology of the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest (1949–1950) and at the Energy Institute in Moscow (1950–1954), specializing in hydroelectric power systems and water management.

Iliescu began his professional career in 1955 as a design engineer at the Energy Institute of Bucharest, but his chief interest was politics. He had joined the Union of Communist Youth in 1944 and then the Progressive Youth Association. In March 1949 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Union of Communist Youth, and during his years in Moscow he was secretary of the Romanian Students Committee. A candidate member of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) in 1953, he became a full member in 1955.

Iliescu was one of the founders of and then headed the Communist Federation of Romanian University Students during 1956–1959, participating in many activities of the International Union of Students. In 1960 he was elected to the Grand National Assembly (Romanian parliament). During 1960–1967

he served in the Central Committee's Department for Ideology and Propaganda, and he was minister for Youth Affairs during 1967–1971. He was closely identified with Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu.

In 1971 Iliescu's close relationship with Ceauşescu ended when he criticized the latter for his "Cultural Revolution," a reference to Mao Zedong's policies in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ceauşescu stripped Iliescu of his major party posts and exiled him to western Romania, where he served on the Timiş County Council (1971–1974). Because he was a critic rather than an opponent of the regime, he was soon back in favor as president of the Iaşi County Council (1974–1979). He was then a candidate member of the Executive Committee of the RCP. Iliescu's continued criticism of Ceauşescu's cult of personality, however, led to his removal by 1984 from all his party posts.

Shunted into the position of director of the Technical Publishing House in Bucharest, Iliescu came to be regarded as a communist reformer. He played no role in active plots to overthrow the increasingly dictatorial Ceauşescu but did take part in planning for a governmental structure should the Ceauşescu regime end.

In late December 1989, upon the overthrow of Ceauşescu, Iliescu emerged as the leader of the hastily formed National Salvation Front Council. As a communist reformer, he was acceptable to the various elites in the country. To win over the people who had carried out the revolution, he ended most of the former regime's repressive policies. During this period, he maintained a delicate balance between still-powerful former regime's elites and those desiring complete change.

In May 1990 Iliescu was elected president of Romania with 85 percent of the vote, but he came under considerable criticism in the West for Romanian repression of Roma (Gypsies) and the Hungarian minority and for the violent suppression of demonstrations in Bucharest by Jeu Valley miners. Iliescu won reelection as president in 1992 with 61 percent of the vote, but his party failed to win a majority of seats in parliament. In 1996 he failed to win another presidential term but continued his political career in the Romanian senate (1996–2000).

Iliescu was again president of Romania during 2000–2004, winning election with 67 percent of the vote. He moved Romania increasingly closer to Western Europe and the United States. In 2002 Romania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Fluent in French, English, and Russian, Iliescu has written many books and articles.

Dumitru Preda and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Romania

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Inchon Landing
(15 September 1950)

U.S. amphibious assault during the Korean War (1950–1953). Code-named Operation CHROMITE, the Inchon Landing turned the tide of the conflict. By mid-July 1950, even as Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean) and U.S. troops were fighting in southwestern Korea to defend the vital port of Pusan from Korean People's Army (KPA, North Korean) attacks, General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Far East and United Nations Command (UNC) commander, prepared to present the North Koreans with a two-front war. Confident that his Eighth Army could hold the Pusan Perimeter, he began diverting resources for an invasion force in the North Korean rear.

U.S. Marines of the 1st Division scale a seawall during the Inchon invasion on 15 September 1950. The Inchon Landing was a brilliant strategic coup that turned the tide of the war against the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). (National Archives and Records Administration)

MacArthur selected Inchon. Korea's second largest port, it was only 15 miles from the South Korean capital of Seoul. This area was the most important road and rail hub in Korea and a vital link in the main North Korean supply line south. Cutting it would starve KPA forces facing the Eighth Army. Also, Kimpo airfield near Inchon was one of the few hard-surface airfields in Korea, and the capture of Seoul would be a serious psychological blow for the North Koreans.

Planning for CHROMITE began on 12 August. Only MacArthur favored Inchon. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and most of MacArthur's subordinate commanders opposed it. Tidal shifts there were among the highest in the world. At ebb tide the harbor turned into mudflats, and the navy would have only a three-hour period on each tide to enter or leave the port. The channel was narrow and winding, and one sunken ship would block all traffic. There were no beaches, only twelve-foot seawalls that would have to be scaled.

MacArthur overrode suggestions for other sites, and on 28 August he received formal JCS approval for the landing, to be carried out by X Corps. Activated on 26 August and commanded by Major General Edward M. Almond, it consisted principally of Major General Oliver P. Smith's 1st Marine Division and Major General David G. Barr's 7th Army Division. Vice Admiral A. D. Struble commanded Joint Task Force Seven for the landing; Rear Admiral James Doyle developed the landing plan and was second in command.

More than 230 ships took part in the operation. The armada of vessels, carrying nearly 70,000 men, included ships from many countries. Thirty-seven of 47 tank-landing ships (LSTs) in the invasion were hastily recalled from Japanese merchant service and manned by Japanese crews. Planes from 4 aircraft carriers provided air support.

Although loading was delayed by Typhoon Jane on 3 September, deadlines were met. On 13 September the task force was hit at sea by Typhoon Kezia, although no serious damage resulted. The task force reached the Inchon Narrows just before dawn on 15 September, the fifth day of air and naval bombardment by four cruisers and six destroyers.

At 6:33 A.M., as MacArthur observed events from the bridge of the *Mount McKinley*, the 5th Marines went ashore to capture Wolmi-do, the island controlling access to the harbor. Resistance was light. At 2:30 P.M. cruisers and destroyers began a shore bombardment of Inchon, and at 5:31 P.M. the first Americans climbed up ladders onto the seawall. Fortune had smiled on MacArthur, as the Marines discovered numerous mines at the port waiting to be laid in the water.

The Marines sustained casualties on D-Day of 20 dead, 1 missing, and 174 wounded. The next day as they drove on toward Seoul, Eighth Army began a breakout along the Pusan Perimeter. On 18 September the 7th Infantry Division began landing at Inchon, and on 21 September a remaining Marine regiment disembarked. The Inchon and Pusan forces made contact on 26 September at Osan. Seoul fell on the afternoon of 27 September.

Victory in the Inchon-Seoul campaign greatly increased MacArthur's self-confidence. He believed that the KPA was so badly beaten that the war

for Korea had been all but won and was just a matter of mopping up, an assessment that proved grossly incorrect.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas

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India

South Asian nation with an area of 1.269 million square miles, roughly one-third the size of the United States. The Republic of India, when it received independence in 1947, had a population of some 350 million. It is bordered by Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma) to the east; Pakistan to the west; Bhutan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Nepal to the north; and the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal to the south. Predominantly Hindu, India is a secular, federal republic with a parliamentary form of government. The prime minister, as leader of the majority party in parliament, wields real executive power. Since independence, the Congress Party has been the country's dominant political force.

Indian civilization traces its origins to the ancient Indus Valley settlements around Harappa and Mohenjo-daro (modern-day Pakistan) that flourished more than 4,000 years ago. Successive waves of invaders, from the Indo-Europeans to the Turko-Afghans, added linguistic and religious influences to Indian culture. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive on the coastal regions of India in the late fifteenth century. By the nineteenth century, the British had become the dominant power in India, although their control over the large landmass remained tenuous and uneven. The 1857 Sepoy Revolt prompted the British Crown to take over responsibility for administering British India from the British East India Company.

Resistance to British rule took root among the Western-educated Indian elite in the 1870s. The Indian National Congress, established in 1885, quickly became the voice of Indian nationalism. After World War I, this elite-based nationalism blossomed into a mass movement through the efforts of Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Muslim leaders, especially Muhammad Ali Jinnah of the All-India Muslim League, questioned whether a Hindu-majority state would protect the rights of the Muslim minority. Such doubts led the way to the division of India at independence, creating India on 15 August 1947 and Pakistan on 14 August 1947.

Partition was accompanied by widespread communal and sectarian violence that left many dead. Gandhi was assassinated by fanatical Hindus on 30 January 1948. Moreover, the subcontinent witnessed massive population relocations as Hindus and Muslims scrambled to be on the right side of the partition lines. The Partition Plan allowed rulers of princely states to decide whether to be incorporated into India or Pakistan. The dispute over the accession to India by the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir (commonly known as Kashmir), a predominantly Muslim territory, led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947. A cease-fire supervised by the United Nations (UN) took effect in January 1949, but the dispute would continue to bedevil Indo-Pakistani relations, leading to another outbreak of hostilities in 1965. Indeed, the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved today.

During 1947–1964, Nehru remained at the helm of Indian politics as the first prime minister. Beginning in 1951, the Nehru government launched the first of a series of Five-Year Plans to steer national economic development, increase food production, and alleviate rural isolation and poverty. India received capital and technical assistance from countries such as Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Nehru sought to maintain a nonaligned position in the Cold War and envisioned Indian leadership of an emerging bloc of newly independent Asian and African nations. In 1955, India cosponsored the Bandung Conference. Nehru also cultivated cordial relations with the PRC but received a rude shock when border disputes led to a Chinese invasion of the Northeast Frontier territory in 1962. His neutralist foreign policy found little favor with the United States.

In 1966 Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, emerged victorious from the battle between the conservative and radical wings of the Congress Party to assume the premiership (1966–1979, 1980–1984). Throughout the remainder of her political career, she continued to battle the party's old guard. In 1969 she led a reconfigured Congress (Requisition) Party, and in 1980 she made her political comeback leading the Congress (Indira) Party.

In the area of economic development, Gandhi continued to travel the same socialist path that Nehru had. Government Five-Year Plans continued to guide national economic development. Gandhi's government pushed for land reform, nationalized key economic institutions such as the banking industry, and established control of the wholesale food grain market. In many ways, she relied on this socialist/populist program to win support in her ongoing struggle against opposition within her own party.

In 1971, hostilities once again erupted with neighboring Pakistan. Secessionist pressure in East Pakistan had devolved into civil war, creating a refugee problem for India as Bengalis streamed across the border into the Indian state of West Bengal. Gandhi followed the Indian legislature's declaration of support for the new state of Bangladesh with an invasion of East Pakistan. The war ended quickly in India's favor. To counter any negative reaction from the United States and the PRC, both of which maintained close relations with Pakistan, Gandhi astutely signed a Twenty-Year Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union once the war ended.

Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (*left*) and his daughter Indira Gandhi welcome Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin (*right*) during the Soviet leaders' visit to India in the 1950s. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In the early 1970s, Gandhi, riding a wave of popularity, became increasingly concerned with safeguarding her own power, and her rule grew increasingly personalized. Charges of corruption and favoritism surfaced, and the prime minister was charged with illegal practices during the 1971 elections. At the same time, weather-related crop failures and resulting food shortages and spiraling inflation fueled popular discontent. An increasingly dictatorial Gandhi responded by having President Jayaprakash Narayan declare a state of national emergency, during which opposition leaders were arrested and civil liberties suspended.

In the nationwide elections that followed in April 1977, after the state of emergency had been lifted in January, Gandhi and her Congress Party suffered defeat at the hands of the Janata Party (a coalition of opposition forces),

which won a plurality of the votes. Gandhi's defeat was short-lived. Factional infighting weakened the coalition government that emerged, and the next election in January 1980 returned her to power.

After her political comeback, Gandhi found herself confronted with serious cases of provincial unrest. Such problems were not new, but the outbursts in Assam, calling for greater autonomy vis-à-vis the central government, and in Punjab, which grew into a separatist movement, appeared more organized and involved huge territories. The militant Sikh movement, demanding the creation of a separate Punjabi nation, touched off a series of events that led to bloodshed and a violent end to the Gandhi era. In early 1984, militant Sikhs took over the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Communal violence soon erupted, leaving many dead. In May 1984, Gandhi made the fateful decision to have army troops storm the compound of the temple and impose martial law in Punjab. Thousands of Sikhs perished in the affair. Within months, Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards. This in turn provoked another round of anti-Sikh violence.

Rajiv Gandhi assumed leadership of the Congress Party and succeeded his mother as prime minister. He maintained India's nonaligned position in foreign relations while expanding efforts to rebuild cordial relations with the United States, which his mother had initiated in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, he also continued to benefit from Soviet technical and military assistance.

Gandhi began his tenure with well-intentioned plans to clean up government and hold it accountable for its actions. He and his economic advisors also began to shift away from the socialist model of economic development favored by his grandfather and mother. Tax cuts for the wealthy and a relaxation of government regulations in order to encourage private entrepreneurship reflected a new economic philosophy. Such measures, however, did not produce quick results, and the populace lost faith in Gandhi's ability to meet their needs. His problems were compounded by charges of corruption against his government. The pace of economic liberalization, however, continued through the decade of the 1990s.

While Gandhi worked to reach uneasy accord with Assam and Punjab and hold the nation together, he nonetheless involved the country in the ethnic conflict unfolding in Sri Lanka. Tension between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority resulted in fierce fighting as militant Tamil separatists, organized as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), battled the Sri Lankan government. Many Indians in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu expressed sympathy for their Tamil brothers in Sri Lanka. In 1986, Gandhi's offer to mediate the dispute ended with India being entrusted with the responsibility of disarming the LTTE. The roughly 45,000 Indian troops sent to Sri Lanka to oversee this process were withdrawn only in 1990, a year after Gandhi and the Congress Party were defeated at the polls. In 1991, while campaigning in Tamil Nadu, Gandhi was killed by a suicide bomber affiliated with the LTTE.

The post–Cold War period has witnessed the rise of Hindu nationalism in Indian politics. India's territorial dispute with Pakistan, moreover, remains unresolved. The emergence of a Kashmiri independence movement

complicates the situation, while the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan have added a potentially catastrophic dimension to the conflict.

Soo Chun Lu

See also

Bandung Conference; Bangladesh; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; Gandhi, Rajiv; India, Armed Forces; India-Pakistan Wars; Kashmir Dispute; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Non-Aligned Movement; Pakistan; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations; South Asia

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India, Armed Forces

Following Indian independence in August 1947, partition spilt the military, as it did other institutions, into forces controlled by India and Pakistan. Under terms of the partition, India retained two-thirds of the former Empire of India military assets, although the bulk of preindependence sailors were Muslims and Pakistan secured a majority of the naval vessels. Because all sixteen prepartition armament factories were located in Indian territory and remained under India's control, the agreement provided for India to make a lump sum financial payment to Pakistan so that India might establish its own armament production facilities.

Shortly after independence, fighting broke out with Pakistan over Kashmir at the end of 1947. It was ended by a cease-fire in January 1949. War between India and Pakistan occurred again in 1965 and in 1971. India also fought a war with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1962, when the PRC disputed India's claim to Aksai Chin in northeastern Jammu and to Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh in the east. PRC forces invaded, defeated the Indians, and secured the disputed territory. The Indian military also participated in a number of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, including in Sri Lanka during 1987–1990 and the Maldives in 1988.

Following independence, the Indian military carried out major reforms with only mixed success. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, worried about a threat from the military, insisted on strengthening civilian control. Minister of

Defense V. K. Krishna Menon (1957–1962) oversaw the construction of tank production facilities and the manufacture of the Ichapore semiautomatic rifle. India also acquired the light fleet carrier *Hercules* from Britain, which India rebuilt and renamed the *Vikrant*. Nonetheless, the Indian military was largely caught off guard and did not perform well in the 1962 war with the PRC, for which Menon was widely blamed.

The poor showing of the Indian military in the fighting with the PRC led Nehru to push military expansion. Between 1966 and 1970 India built six British Leander-class frigates at the Mazagon shipyard in Bombay. India also produced other Western ship types as well as Soviet Union types and its own indigenous designs. In addition, India built under license Soviet MiG-23 fighter aircraft. Such programs gave India the edge in the 1971 war with Pakistan. The creation of Bangladesh from the former East Pakistan was a strategic boost to Indian defense planning, allowing India to concentrate the bulk of its military resources against Pakistan. Nonetheless, continuing tensions with both China and the United States led Indian leaders to significantly strengthen the national military establishment. Although India was officially nonaligned, much of this buildup occurred with assistance from the Soviet Union.

By the end of the Cold War, the Indian military was counted as one of the top ten in the world. At the close of the twentieth century, it numbered some 1.173 million men, with an additional 528,000 men in the reserves. The army consisted of 980,000 men organized in three armored divisions, four rapid response divisions, and eighteen infantry divisions as well as in artillery and other support units. Indian main battle tanks (MBT) included the Russian T-72 and the domestically produced Vijayanta, manufactured at great expense for questionable return. Numbering 55,000 men in 1995, the navy was the principal regional sea power. It operated 86 ships and 30 auxiliaries, centered on the former British fleet aircraft carrier *Hermes*, acquired in 1986 and renamed the *Viraat*. The fleet air arm flew 35 combat aircraft, including Sea Harriers obtained from Britain, and 36 helicopters. Its air force of 140,000 men operated 808 airplanes and helicopters. Most of the jet aircraft were Soviet types, a number of them produced under license and including the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29.

India also joined the nuclear club. It first tested a nuclear device in 1974 at Pokharan and then developed atomic bombs in the late 1980s. Indian ballistic missiles allow delivery of nuclear weapons within the region. Overall, at the end of the Cold War India's military establishment was the most powerful in South Asia.

Melissa Hebert and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

India; India-Pakistan Wars; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations

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India-Pakistan Wars
(1947–1949, 1965, 1971)

A series of wars between India and Pakistan, fought for a number of reasons but principally over control of Kashmir. The India-Pakistan wars occurred during 1947–1949 and in 1965 and 1971. There were also a number of smaller border clashes in this period.

India and Pakistan were antagonistic dating from their independence from Britain. Religion was the paramount issue in separation of the two states. The Hindu leaders of India wanted to keep India united, but Muslim leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah insisted on independence and ultimately got his way. On 14 August 1947, the Empire of India was divided into independent India and Pakistan. With a hasty British departure, millions of Hindus and Muslims endeavored to reach their chosen state's territory. Chaos ensued in which perhaps 800,000 Muslims and 200,000 Hindus died.

Indian refugees crowd onto trains. Following the creation of two independent states, India and Pakistan, Muslims fled to Pakistan and Hindus fled to India in one of the largest population transfers in history. Amritsar, India, 17 October 1947. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In addition to this vast sectarian violence, tensions developed over India's blocking of payments that were to be made to Pakistan from joint assets left by the British. Another pressing issue was the future disposition of several disputed territories. The latter included Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir. Junagagh and Hyderabad were predominantly Hindu states with Muslim leaders. They were quicky absorbed by India. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir was not so easily resolved, however. There, the Hindu Maharajah Hari Singh ruled a largely Muslim nation. He vacillated between India and Pakistan before signing the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947 by which he agreed to join Kashmir to India. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepted this arrangement, while Pakistani Governor-General Ali Jinnah refused to do so.

The partition agreement called for the division of military assets on the subcontinent between India and Pakistan. India was to receive two-thirds and Pakistan one-third of these resources. It did not work out that way. India received the vast bulk of the armor and aircraft assets, and Pakistan secured most of the larger naval vessels. The military officers of both states had all been trained by the British, but few had experience at higher command. Technically, British Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck commanded both armies.

Fighting began with an uprising in Kashmir, supported by Pakistani Azad Kasmiri tribesmen. India quickly airlifted troops to Kashmir. At first the Indians were successful, securing the provincial capital of Sringar at Shalateng on 7 November, but with Indian forces overextended, the Pakistanis triumphed at Jhangar on 24 December. By the beginning of 1948 and with the war stalemated, India asked for United Nations (UN) mediation.

As the UN-brokered talks slowly went forward, India made military progress against both the irregulars and increasing numbers of Pakistani regular forces who crossed into Kashmir to take part in the fighting. The Indian Army was victorious at Naushera on 6 February, Gurais on 22–27 May, and Zojila on 19 October. Nonetheless, about 30 percent of Kashmir—some 5,000 square miles—remained in Pakistani hands at the time the cease-fire went into effect on 1 January 1949.

The UN had called for a plebiscite over Kashmir. However, India refused to hold this vote, and tensions over Kashmir continued. Indeed, Kashmir remained the principal cause of animosity between India and Pakistan throughout the Cold War.

The second war broke out in 1965. In April of that year, Pakistan's president and military ruler, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, began military operations in the Rann of Kutch where the frontier was poorly defined. Within several weeks the fighting had escalated into full-scale hostilities in which the Pakistanis appeared to have the upper hand until monsoon rains suspended the fighting. Indian Prime Minister Lal Shastri then agreed to a mediated settlement. Emboldened by this, President Ayub Khan planned Operation GRAND SLAM, an operation to cut the road linking India to Kashmir and isolate two Indian Army coups in the Ravi-Sutley corridor. In August border clashes occurred in both Kashmir and Punjab as both sides violated

the Kashmir cease-fire line. On 24 August, Indian forces launched a major raid across the cease-fire line.

In retaliation for the Indian raid, Ayub Khan launched Operation GRAND SLAM on 1 September 1965. Both sides carried out air attacks against the other, not only in the Punjab but in Indian raids on Karachi and Pakistani attacks on New Delhi. Indian forces soon took the offensive, invading Pakistan. The Indians won a major armored battle at Sialkot and reached Lahore, in the process destroying 300 tanks. There was no fighting at sea during the war.

On 27 September, with the British and U.S. governments undertaking diplomatic efforts and the People's Republic of China (PRC) threatening military attacks on India, both sides agreed to a cease-fire in which Indian forces occupied large stretches of Pakistani territory. In January 1966, both sides agreed to a peace settlement at Tashkent in the Soviet Union that reestablished the cease-fire line as it had been in 1949. However, Pakistan was forced to sign an agreement never to use force against India.

The third war occurred in 1971. Since independence, the more numerous Bengali people of East Pakistan had been dominated by West Pakistan. Increasing violence and unrest in Pakistan led Ayub Khan to resign in March 1969 and turn over power to another general, Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan.

In 1970 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman formed the Awami League, which sought autonomy for East Pakistan. In December 1970, the Awami League won an absolute majority in general elections for a Pakistani National Assembly called to draft a new constitution. Instead of allowing Sheikh Rahman to take power, the Pakistani government of President Yahya Khan jailed him. Rioting broke out in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan declared martial law on 24 March 1971 and began major repression in East Pakistan that, in the view of some observers, amounted to genocide. Perhaps 10 million refugees fled into India.

With Indians demanding that their armed forces intervene, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appealed unsuccessfully to world leaders to end the repression in East Pakistan. During June–November 1971, India and Pakistan exchanged artillery fire and conducted small raids across the border against each other. Meanwhile, on 9 August 1971, India concluded a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Alarmed by the West Pakistani actions in East Pakistan, the United States terminated arms shipments to Pakistan on 8 November.

Meanwhile, East Pakistani refugees calling themselves the Mukti Bahini and supported by India engaged the West Pakistani forces. This goaded Pakistan into taking the first hostile action against India, a Pakistani Air Force strike against eastern India on 22 November, followed by major air attacks from West Pakistan against the principal Indian air bases on 3 December. The Pakistanis hoped thereby to achieve the same surprise garnered by the Israeli Air Force against Egypt in the 1967 War, but the Indians were well aware that they were goading the Pakistanis to war and were well prepared, with the result that the air strikes were largely unsuccessful.

The Pakistani air attacks on 3 December marked the official beginning of the war. India was concerned that the PRC, with which it had fought a border war in 1962, might seek to take advantage of the situation to invade northern

India. Indian forces were ready and had at least three times the strength of the 90,000 West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Moving swiftly and well-supported by air force and naval units, the Indians launched an invasion from the north and west. During 14–16 December, Indian forces captured Dhaka (Dacca).

On the western front, on 4 December Pakistani forces invaded Jammu and Kashmir and registered gains of up to 10 miles into Indian territory until they were halted. During 5–6 December the Soviet Union supported its Indian ally by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire and forcing Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to work through the dilatory UN General Assembly. On 6 December India officially recognized the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. On 15 December, with the fighting in East Pakistan all but over, the UN General Assembly demanded a cease-fire there. An embittered Bhutto left the UN and returned to Pakistan. Indian troops also recaptured some of the territory in Kashmir and the Punjab lost to the Pakistanis earlier, and they invaded West Pakistan in some places in Hyderabad and the Punjab.

Meanwhile, the Indian Navy neutralized Pakistani naval units on the first day of the war. The Indian Eastern Fleet completely controlled the Bay of Bengal, blockading East Pakistan. Indian antisubmarine warfare units sank the Pakistani submarine *Ghazi*, which tried to ambush the Indian aircraft carrier *Vikrant*. The Indian Western Fleet sank the Pakistani destroyer *Khaibar* and a minesweeper off Karachi, in the largest surface action in the Indian Ocean since 1945. Indian surface units then shelled and rocketed the naval base at Karachi. Pakistan's only naval success in the war came when the submarine *Hangor* torpedoed and sank the Indian frigate *Khukri*.

In Dhaka on 16 December Pakistani commander Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi officially surrendered to Indian commander General S. H. F. J. Manekshaw, effectively ending the war. On 17 December both sides accepted a cease-fire agreement. In the war, Indian losses were some 2,400 killed, 6,200 wounded, and 2,100 taken prisoner. India also admitted that it had lost seventy-three tanks and forty-five aircraft. Pakistan, however, lost more than 4,000 dead and 10,000 wounded, along with 93,000 prisoners (the latter figure included some of the wounded). On 20 December Yahya Khan resigned, and Bhutto replaced him as president. Bhutto promptly placed Yahya Khan and senior Pakistani generals under arrest.

The last Indian troops were withdrawn from Bangladesh in March 1972, and on 19 March India and Bangladesh concluded a Treaty of Friendship. On 3 July 1972, India and Pakistan formally concluded peace at Simla, India. President Bhutto signed for Pakistan and Indira Gandhi for India. Both sides agreed to a general troop withdrawal and restoration of the prewar western border but postponed action on settlement of the dispute over Kashmir and the return of Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs). India did not agree to the release of the POWs until August 1973, with the last of them returning to Pakistan in April 1974.

Other crises also threatened to produce wider conflicts. In 1984, war nearly broke out over India's belief that Pakistan was involved in the Sikh

insurgency. This crisis was headed off by diplomacy. Fighting initiated by a local Indian commander also occurred in 1987 but was contained. However, tensions over violence in Kashmir have continued into the twenty-first century.

Melissa Hebert and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Ayub Khan, Muhammad; Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; Gandhi, Indira; India; India, Armed Forces; Kashmir Dispute; Pakistan; Pakistan, Armed Forces

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Indochina War
(1946–1954)

Fought during 1946–1954 between the French and Vietnamese nationalists, the Indochina War was the first phase of what might be called the Second Thirty Years' War and the longest war of the twentieth century. The French had established themselves in Indochina in the 1840s, and by 1887 they had formed French Indochina, made up of the three divisions of Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China) and the kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos. The cause of the war was the French refusal to recognize that the days of colonialism were over. In the aftermath of World War II, a weakened France was determined to hold on to its richest colony.

In 1941 veteran Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh had formed the Viet Minh to fight the Japanese, then in military occupation of Vietnam, and the French. A fusion of communists and nationalists, the Viet Minh had by 1944 liberated most of the northern provinces of Vietnam. The defeat of Japan in August 1945 created a power vacuum (all French troops were in prison camps) into which Ho moved. At the end of August 1945, Ho established in Hanoi the provisional government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and on 2 September 1945 he proclaimed Vietnamese independence.

With no support from either the Soviet Union or the United States, Ho was forced to deal with France. He and French diplomat Jean Sainteny concluded an agreement in March 1946 to allow 15,000 French troops into North Vietnam, with the understanding that 3,000 would leave each year and all would be gone by the end of 1951. In return, France recognized North Vietnam as a free state within the French Union. France also promised to abide by the results of a referendum in Cochin China to determine if it would be reunited with Annam and Tonkin.

Indochina War, 1946 – 1954



The Ho-Sainteny Agreement fell apart with the failure of talks, the Fontainebleau Conference in the summer of 1946, to resolve outstanding substantive issues and with the decision of new French governor-general of Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu to proclaim on his own initiative the independence of a republic of Cochin China. Paris officials were not worried. They believed that the Vietnamese nationalists would not go to war against France and that if they did they would be easily crushed. Violence broke out in Hanoi in November 1946, whereupon d'Argenlieu ordered the shelling of the port of Haiphong, and the war was on.

The French motives were primarily political and psychological. Perhaps only with its empire could France be counted as a great power. Colonial advocates also argued that concessions in Indochina would adversely impact other French overseas possessions, especially in North Africa, and that further losses would surely follow.

The North Vietnamese leadership planned for a protracted struggle. Former history teacher Vo Nguyen Giap commanded its military forces, formed in May 1945 into the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Giap modeled his strategy upon that of Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. Giap's chief contribution came in his recognition of the political and psychological difficulties for a democracy waging a protracted and inconclusive war. He believed that French public opinion would at some point demand an end to the bloodshed. In the populous rice-producing areas, the Viet Minh would



Barefoot villagers wearing shorts perform training drills using bamboo rifles, Batri, Indochina, 1951. (Library of Congress)

employ guerrilla tactics and ambushes. In the less populated mountain and jungle regions, the Viet Minh would engage in large-scale operations.

For eight years the French fought unsuccessfully to defeat the Viet Minh, with a steady succession of French generals directing operations. One French tactical innovation was the riverine division composed of naval and army forces, the Divisions Navales D'assaut, abbreviated as Dinassaut. By 1950 the French had six permanent Dinassauts in Indochina. The French also developed commando formations, the Groupement des Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA, Composite Airborne Commando Groups), later known as the Groupement Mixte d'Intervention (GMI). Essentially guerrilla formations of about 400 men each, these operated behind enemy lines, sometimes in conjunction with friendly Montagnard tribesmen or Vietnamese. By mid-1954 the French had 15,000 men in such formations, but they placed a heavy strain on the badly stretched French airlift capacity.

Sometimes the French cut deeply into Viet Minh–controlled areas, but as soon as the French regrouped to attack elsewhere the Viet Minh reasserted its authority. With their superior firepower the French held the cities and the majority of the towns, while the Viet Minh managed to dominate most of the

countryside, more of it as the years went by. French commanders never did have sufficient manpower to carry out effective pacification. The war was increasingly unpopular in France, and no conscripts were ever sent there, although a quarter of all of France's officers and more than 40 percent of its noncommissioned officers were in Indochina.

With Ho and the Viet Minh registering increasing success, Paris tried to appease nationalist sentiment by setting up a pliable indigenous Vietnamese regime as a competitor to the Viet Minh. In the March 1949 Elysée Agreements, Paris worked out an arrangement with former emperor Bao Dai to create the State of Vietnam (SV). Incorporating Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin, it was to be independent within the French Union. France never did give the SV genuine independence, however. Paris retained actual control of its foreign relations and armed forces. The result was that it was never able to attract meaningful nationalist support. There were in effect but two alternatives: the Viet Minh, now labeled by the French as communists, or the French.

Meanwhile, the military situation continued to deteriorate for the French. PAVN forces achieved their successes with arms inferior in both quantity and quality to those of the French. Disparities in military equipment were offset by the Viet Minh's popular backing.

Until the end of 1949, Washington showed little interest in Indochina, apart from urging Paris to take concrete steps toward granting independence. Washington did not press too much on this issue, however, fearful that it might adversely affect France's attitude toward cooperation in the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Defense Community (EDC). France was then virtually the only armed continental West European power left to stand against the Soviet Union. In effect, Washington supported France's Indochina policy in order to ensure French support in containing the Soviet Union in Europe. The United States underwrote the French military effort in Vietnam indirectly, but leaders in Washington expressed confidence based on assurances from Paris that France was granting Vietnam its independence.

Paris officials believed that the Vietnamese nationalists would not go to war against France and that if they did they would be easily crushed.

The U.S. policy of indirect aid to the French effort in Indochina changed after October 1949 and the communist victory in China. This and the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950 shifted U.S. interest to the containment of communism in Asia. Zealous anticommunism now drove U.S. policy and prevented Washington from seeing the nationalist roots of the problem. With the communist victory in China, in effect the war was lost for the French. China had a long common frontier with Tonkin, and the Viet Minh could now receive large shipments of modern weapons, including artillery captured by the Chinese communists from the nationalists. In 1950, in a series of costly defeats, the French were forced to abandon a string of fortresses in far northern Tonkin along Route Coloniale 4. In these battles, the Viet Minh captured French arms sufficient to equip an entire division. Then in 1951 Giap launched a series of attacks in the Red River Delta area that turned into hard-fought and costly battles during 1951–1952. In these, Giap tried but failed to capture Hanoi and end the war. But as the French concentrated resources in

the north of the country, the Viet Minh registered impressive gains in central and southern Vietnam.

From June 1950 the United States became a major military support for the French in Indochina. This was reinforced by the communist Chinese decision to enter the Korean War. Paris convinced Washington that the war in Indochina was a major element in the worldwide containment of communism. Washington now saw the French effort no longer as a case of colonialism versus nationalism but rather as a free world stand against communist expansionism.

In January 1950 both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union recognized the North Vietnamese government. The next month, the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the SV. U.S. military aid to the French in Indochina now grew dramatically, from approximately $150 million in 1950 to more than $1 billion in 1954. By 1954, the United States was also paying 80 percent of the cost of the war. The French insisted that all aid to Bao Dai's government be channeled through them, frustrating American hopes of bolstering Bao Dai's independence. Even though a Vietnamese National Army was established in 1951, it remained effectively under French control. Meanwhile, the administrations of both President Harry S. Truman and President Dwight D. Eisenhower assured the American public that actual authority in Vietnam had been transferred to Bao Dai.

By mid-1953, despite substantial aid from the United States, France had lost authority over all but a minor portion of the country. In September, with strong American encouragement, France entered into one final and disastrous effort to achieve a position of strength from which to negotiate with the Viet Minh. Under Lieutenant General Henri Navarre, the new commander in Indochina, France now had 517,000 men, 360,000 of whom were Indochinese.

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu from April to May 1954 was the culminating and most dramatic battle of the war. At this remote location in northwestern Tonkin, the French constructed a complex of supporting fortresses, defended by artillery. Navarre's strategy was to entice the Viet Minh to attack this supposedly impregnable position and there destroy them. At best he expected one or two Viet Minh divisions. Giap accepted the challenge but committed four divisions. The French mistakenly assumed that the Viet Minh could not get artillery to this remote location, but eventually the Viet Minh outgunned the French. French air assets also proved insufficient. The surrender of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May enabled the French politicians to shift the blame to the army and withdraw France from the war.

Not coincidental to the battle, a conference had already opened in Geneva to discuss Asian problems. It now took up the issue of Indochina. The 26 April–21 July Geneva Conference provided for independence for Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. Vietnam was to be temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel, pending national elections in 1956. In the meantime, Viet Minh forces were to withdraw north of that line and French forces south of it.

In the war, the French and their allies sustained 172,708 casualties: 94,581 dead or missing and 78,127 wounded. These break down as 140,992 French

Union casualties (75,867 dead or missing and 65,125 wounded) with the allied Indochina states losing 31,716 (18,714 dead or missing and 13,002 wounded). French dead or missing numbered some 20,000; Legionnaires, 11,000; Africans, 15,000; and Indo-Chinese, 46,000. The war took a particularly heavy toll among the officers, 1,900 of whom died. Viet Minh losses were probably three times those of the French and their allies, and perhaps 150,000 Vietnamese civilians also perished. One major issue was that of prisoners, both soldiers and civilians, held by the Viet Minh in barbarous conditions. Only 10,754 of the 36,979 reported missing during the war returned, and some were not released until years afterward.

The Indochina War had been three wars in one. Begun as a conflict between Vietnamese nationalists and France, it became a civil war between Vietnamese, and it was also part of the larger Cold War. As it turned out, in 1954 the civil war and the East-West conflict were only suspended. Ten years later a new war broke out in which the Americans replaced the French.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Geneva Conference (1954); Ho Chi Minh; Vietnam War

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Indonesia

Predominantly Muslim nation straddling the equator in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is an archipelago of 17,000 islands (of which only 6,000 are inhabited) and covers 741,096 square miles, slightly less than three times the size of the U.S. state of Texas. With a 1945 population of approximately 72 million, it sits amid the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean, south of the Philippines and the Indochinese peninsula, and north of Australia. Indonesia's unique position in terms of its size, population, and location gave it a special role in Southeast Asia. It is the largest state in the region in terms of both territory and population, and it borders on many straits (the Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, and Ombai-Wetar), which are vitally important for commercial and strategic reasons.

A principal Japanese goal in World War II was to secure resource-rich Indonesia and especially its oil. Japan's 1942 invasion of Indonesia dealt a blow to white colonial rule there and, in fact, fired the aspirations of nationalists who

would eventually fight against the return of Dutch control during 1945–1949. The Japanese surrender in August 1945 prompted Indonesia to proclaim its independence on 17 August 1945. At that point Indonesia's process of constitutional government began, corresponding with three provisional constitutions prepared in 1945, 1949, and 1950. The Pancasila-based 1945 provisional constitution, reflecting President Sukarno's (1945–1967) political philosophy, was promulgated the day after independence and provided for a strong presidency. However, a shift in the direction of parliamentary government began to occur. Pragmatic considerations, such as the need to cultivate the support of antifascist leaders, prevented Sukarno, who was accused of collaboration with the Japanese, from exercising his full constitutional powers. Initially, however, members of parliament were appointed by the president and were not popularly elected, and thus a full-fledged parliamentary system was not yet in place.

After the war, the Dutch immediately sought to restore colonial rule with the help of the British. The Battle of Surabaya, between British troops and Indonesian nationalists, took place on 10 November 1945. The Dutch launched their first police action in July 1947, which ended with the signing of the Renville Agreement on 17 January 1948 under United Nations (UN) auspices. This agreement established a military truce between the Dutch and the republican government, thus strengthening the Dutch position. On 17 December 1948, a second Dutch police action ensued in utter disregard of the Renville Agreement. Senior republican leaders such as Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta were arrested.

At the same time, nationalist leaders were also confronted by threats from within. The first of these was the 1948 Madiun rebellion in East Java, during which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) proclaimed a People's Republic, which had to be reversed by force. The Darul Islam movement, a militant movement based in Java that sought the establishment of an Islamic state in southern Celebes (Sulawesi), Java, and Sumatra, was another internal threat that distracted the nationalist/republican forces as they fought the Dutch.

International opinion rendered valuable support to the nationalist cause in Indonesia. An international conference on the Indonesian problem held in New Delhi in January 1949 demanded an end to Dutch colonial rule by 1 January 1950. The UN Security Council, via its 28 January 1949 resolution, had already demanded a cease-fire. The Dutch formally transferred sovereignty on 27 December 1949.

The first two decades of Indonesian independence saw economic stagnation, despite initial optimism over a democratic constitution and a brief climb in exports during the Korean War. Sukarno followed a policy of economic nationalism tinged with socialist Marxism and anti-imperialism.

Before departing, the Dutch imposed a federal structure on the republic when they promulgated the second provisional constitution on 2 November 1949. This structure was short-lived, however, as Indonesia reverted to a unitary system under a third provisional constitution enacted on 17 August

1950. Indonesia held its first general elections on 29 September 1955 and assembled its first-ever cabinet on an elected basis. Because no single party secured a majority, a coalition of the Nationalist Party (PNI), Masjumi, Nahdatul Ulama, and other smaller parties was formed. The last parliamentary cabinet fell in December 1956 because the coalition splintered, Vice President Hatta resigned, and rebellion loomed on the outer islands. Sukarno promptly denounced the party system and proclaimed martial law in 1957. In July 1959, he dissolved the Constituent Assembly when it failed to approve his proposal to revive the 1945 constitution. He reinstated this constitution that provided for a strong presidency and introduced his so-called guided democracy policy, which gave to him virtually unlimited power.

On the foreign policy front, Indonesia became part of the Colombo Plan (1950), and Sukarno organized the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung (Java) in April 1955. Sukarno's antipathy toward colonialism was expressed in the 1960s through his idea of Nekolim (neocolonialism, colonialism, and imperialism). He also developed the concept of Oldefos (old established forces) versus Nefos (new emerging forces), defining the Oldefos-Nefos antithesis not in Cold War terms but rather in terms of the continued domination of the emergent nations by the former colonial powers.

Sukarno's reliance on the PKI at the domestic level was reflected at the international level when he moved from Cold War neutrality to the formation of a Peking-Jakarta axis by 1965. Indonesia stayed out of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), although it initially endorsed the idea of Maphilindo, a regional grouping of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia formed to reconcile differences over the proposed formation of the Federation of Malaysia. Sukarno's conception of *konfrontasi* (confrontation) was devised to repudiate the Netherlands' claim over Irian Jaya and was later used by Foreign Minister Subandrio to challenge the legitimacy of the new Federation of Malaysia, provoking Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN in 1964.

On 6 March 1960, Sukarno dissolved the elected parliament provided for under the 1945 constitution and replaced it in June 1960 with one that had appointed members. The Indonesian Army came to play an important role in internal affairs, being co-opted for an administrative role. Sukarno sought to balance the army's support with dependence on the PKI for mass support. But the contradictions between the two organizations became obvious during the abortive coup of 30 September 1965.

The attempted coup, involving leftist junior army officers, resulted in the murder of six right-wing generals. In the anticommunist pogrom that followed, an estimated 500,000 communists and communist sympathizers were killed. Suharto, tasked with suppressing the revolt, quietly utilized the opportunity to push Sukarno aside. Suharto did this first by usurping executive control in March 1966 and then by deposing Sukarno and installing himself as acting president in March 1967. Suharto installed himself as president in March 1968 for a five-year term. He stayed in power until 1998, getting himself reelected by fraud and rigged elections.

Under Suharto's New Order policy, political activity was severely restricted. Political parties were forced to reorganize into three major political parties: the Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). The government-sponsored Golkar effectively manipulated votes in its favor for more than two decades, while parliament was weakened and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) became a virtual rubber stamp for Suharto. Suharto derived his strength from the military, which in turn derived its power from the doctrine of *dwifungsi* (dual function) that extended the military's influence over the socioeconomic and political spheres. In 1987, political parties were forced to accept the state ideology, *Pancasilla,* as their sole guiding principle.

Suharto imposed strict controls on the media and banned the publication of news magazines that did not toe the line. This authoritarianism asserted itself most aggressively in 1975, when Indonesian troops landed in East Timor and later incorporated it as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. Suharto faced serious allegations of human rights abuses in putting down the independence movement in East Timor and in suppressing a separatist movement in the northern Sumatran province of Aceh.

Suharto's foreign policy was calculated to be low profile and pragmatic. He abandoned confrontation with Malaysia, helped found the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, and in 1976 established ASEAN's permanent secretariat in Jakarta. Indonesia became a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1991 just as the Cold War came to an end. Following Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, Indonesia agreed to play the role of mediator in the crisis. Diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) were restored in August 1990 after having been severed in 1965 because of Chinese support for the PKI.

Indonesia's military, which played a central role in Indonesia's freedom struggle, steadily gained influence during the Cold War. It has continued to grow in prominence. This enhanced status is clearly visible in Indonesia's relatively steep defense expenditures (estimated at $6.6 billion in 2002) and its substantial arms acquisitions (including fighter aircraft and submarines). The Indonesian Armed Forces (TNY), known as ABRI during the Suharto era, enjoy a sacrosanct status inherent in the dual-role policy.

Suharto was dubbed the "father of development" as Indonesia's yearly economic growth rate skyrocketed to 7.8 percent in 1996. With the help of U.S.-trained economists, Suharto made Indonesia a welcome destination for foreign capital, and the World Bank held it up as a model borrowing nation. During the 1980s and 1990s, the number of Indonesians living below the poverty line declined substantially. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Indonesia could no longer isolate itself from the forces of political change, which were sweeping away outmoded political and social thinking elsewhere. Soon, new demands for political reforms began to gain momentum. Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie, buoyed by popular support, succeeded Suharto, forced from office in March 1998. Once this initial enthusiasm had subsided, however, Habibie no longer felt pressured to introduce

market reforms or initiate measures to stop government corruption. His immediate successors did not live up to popular expectations.

Udai Bhanu Singh

See also

Bandung Conference; East Timor; Non-Aligned Movement; Radical Islam; Southeast Asia; Suharto; Sukarno; World Bank

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Inönü, Ismet
(1884–1973)

Turkish general, prime minister, and second president of the Turkish Republic. Born on 24 September 1884 in Ýzmir (Smyrna), Ismet Inönü graduated from the Ottoman Military Academy in 1903 and served in Thrace and Syria as a member of the Second Army. After the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I, he commanded the independence forces in the western Anatolia. His military victories quickly ended the armed conflict there, and he was promoted to brigadier general in 1922. His diplomatic skills helped guarantee Turkey's contemporary political boundaries at the Lausanne Peace Conference of 1922–1923.

When Turkey became a republic in 1923, Inönü served as its first prime minister until 1937 except for a brief period from November 1924 to March 1925. He was also the closest confidante of President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (known as the "father of the Turks"). Inönü's policies sought to solidify Turkey as a modern nation but also included ruthless suppression of ethnic and religious rebellions. His economic vision endorsed state-sponsored development, which kept Turkey financially stable during the 1930s and early 1940s.

Upon Ataturk's death in 1938, Inönü led the Republican People's Party (RPP) and was elected Turkey's second president. He maintained Turkey's neutrality until the last days of World War II and also secured U.S. assistance in keeping the Soviets at bay during the early Cold War. In the domestic sphere, Inönü supported, albeit reluctantly, the introduction of free, competitive elections and the establishment of multiparty politics. When the new Democrat Party (DP) won the 1950 elections, Inönü stepped down as president and continued his political career in the RPP.

In the late 1950s, Inönü spearheaded the RPP's opposition to the DP's repressive policies. After the 1960 military coup d'état, which overthrew the DP government, Inönü was again elected prime minister and formed three



Ismet Inönü, president of Turkey (1938–1950). (Bettmann/Corbis)

coalition governments from 1961 to 1965. As the coalitions gradually weakened the RPP's strength, however, he came under increasing criticism by the RPP's center-leftist factions.

When the RPP lost the 1965 elections to the Justice Party, Inönü crafted, with assistance from the RPP's secretary-general, a new action program called the Left of Center. Instead of rejuvenating the party's strength, however, the new platform further alienated party centrists, who later left the RPP to form the Reliance Party in 1967. Inönü remained the major opposition leader until 1972, when he lost control of the RPP. After what he considered to be his final defeat, Inönü retired from politics.

Inönü's life witnessed Turkey's remarkable transformation from a multiethnic empire to a secular nation-state, from an authoritarian polity to a multiparty regime, and from a state-controlled agrarian economy to a liberal industrialized economy. During his presidency in the late 1940s, Turkey joined the United Nations (UN), moved closer to the Allies, and secured U.S. financial aid through the Marshall Plan. Inönü's pro-Western policies paved the way for Turkey's deployment of a 5,000-man brigade to Korea in 1950 and its admittance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Inönü died in Ankara, Turkey, on 25 December 1973.

Burcak Keskin-Kozat

See also

Korean War; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Turkey

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Intelligence Collection

The Cold War era saw revolutionary developments in both the technology and methodology of intelligence collection on both sides of the Iron Curtain. At the end of World War II, the United States and Britain dismantled part of their wartime intelligence operations, including the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). The U.S. government created its first permanent peacetime intelligence organi-

zation in 1947 with the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), part of the sweeping 1947 National Security Act. The Soviets restructured their intelligence agencies as well, but it was not until March 1954 that they consolidated all foreign intelligence into one agency, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB).

During the late 1940s and into the 1950s, U.S. and British intelligence were able to make use of a project that originated during World War II, known as Venona in the United States and Bride in Great Britain. These joint operations targeted encoded Soviet communications to and from the West, and beginning in 1948 a very few of these messages began to be deciphered by the West. These efforts led to the unmasking of numerous Soviet spies and operatives, including the notorious Cambridge Five who had infiltrated the highest levels of British intelligence and the atomic spies Klaus Fuchs in Britain and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in America.

Aerial reconnaissance became very important to the Western powers early on in the Cold War, particularly along the periphery of the communist bloc. Reconnaissance flights searched for electronic intelligence (ELINT) on radar sites, missile tests, and various other activities. The Soviets focused more on naval platforms for espionage, establishing an entire fleet of so-called spy trawlers that they deployed within a few miles of their adversaries' coastlines.

In the 1950s, numerous ground stations were built worldwide to monitor communist bloc communications (signals intelligence, or SIGINT), and aerial reconnaissance (using existing aircraft such as converted cargo planes) was stepped up, which led to several deadly clashes with Soviet air forces. A U.S. project that enjoyed great success for a time was the advanced U-2 spy plane, developed by Lockheed under the code name of Aquatone and first used in June 1956. The U-2 was able to fly directly over the Soviet Union and other communist nations at some 68,000 feet, beyond the range of most antiaircraft weapons or fighter aircraft of the time. The U-2 was equipped with advanced photoreconnaissance capabilities as well as collection devices for atmospheric nuclear debris. Aquatone flights over the Soviet Union came to a dramatic halt on 1 May 1960 when a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down deep inside Soviet territory. However, the venerable spy plane stayed in service into the twenty-first century over various parts of the world, most famously during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and during the Persian Gulf War and its aftermath.

The 1960s saw the creation of the next generation of aerial espionage platforms: Earth-orbiting satellites. The first American reconnaissance satellites (CORONA Program) went into operation in August 1960. CORONA photographs showed that the much-feared missile gap between America and the Soviet Union was grossly inaccurate; in fact, CORONA's camera systems in the first-generation Keyhole satellites proved that the United States had a decisive edge in numbers of missiles. Although the Soviets also deployed reconnaissance satellites beginning in the early 1960s, continued improvements in the Keyhole system are believed to have provided a decisive edge in satellite capabilities to the United States throughout the Cold War.

The onset of satellites did not eliminate the role of more traditional aerial platforms, however. In May 1967, the advanced American spy plane codenamed OXCART, better known as the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, went into operation for the CIA over North Vietnam. Capable of flying at tremendous speeds (up to Mach 3.6 or 2,400 mph) and heights (up to 92,000 feet), OXCART was used extensively throughout the world. Over the next thirty years, more than 1,000 surface-to-air missiles were fired at the SR-71 without a single hit.

In the mid-1960s, the little-known and highly secretive National Security Agency (NSA) took over control of U.S. ground stations around the Soviet periphery and greatly expanded their numbers, most significantly in northern Iran. These assets became the main source of information on Soviet missile tests in Kazakhstan but were lost following the Iranian Revolution of 1979. At about the same time that the NSA was building more observation posts, it was developing (along with the U.S. Navy) its own fleet of spy trawlers similar to the Soviet models.

Beginning with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration, U.S. Navy submarines were deployed deep in Soviet waters to collect information, sometimes even venturing into Russian ports. One such operation, codenamed IVY BELLS, placed a pod of recording equipment on a Soviet undersea communications cable and collected vast quantities of valuable intelligence before an American spy exposed the operation in 1981.

The 1970s witnessed perhaps the last great innovations of intelligence collection during the Cold War. The first was the development of geosynchronous orbital satellites under the code-name RHYOLITE. The first RHYOLITE platform was put into orbit in June 1970. The advantage that RHYOLITE provided was constant, around-the-clock coverage of the desired target. Perhaps most significant, however, was the December 1976 deployment of the KH-11 geosynchronous satellite. Marking a revolution in photoreconnaissance technology, the KH-11 (unlike all previous spy satellites) could transmit images back Earth as it was collecting them, or in real time.

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See also

Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Cambridge Five; Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Espionage; Fuchs, Klaus; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti; National Security Act; National Security Agency; Office of Strategic Services; Rosenberg, Julius; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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See Chapultepec Conference

Inter-American Conference on War and Peace

See Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

See Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(8 December 1987)

Nuclear arms reduction treaty that eliminated an entire class of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and short-range, ground-launched nuclear missiles. On 8 December 1987, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed a treaty that, for the first time in history, ordered the destruction of entire classes of nuclear-capable missiles. The systems involved were primarily Soviet SS-18, SS-20, and SS-21 missiles and American Pershing-class missiles. The USSR also entered into agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) to destroy Pershing systems under German control. The Soviets guaranteed the destruction of treaty-related items in use by their Warsaw Pact allies.

Unlike earlier Cold War arms control agreements, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty stipulated on-site inspection and verification procedures. This breakthrough removed a perennial sticking point in arms control efforts between the two superpowers. As such, the INF Treaty was viewed as a benchmark for all future arms-reduction treaties in regard to inspection and verification protocols.

On 15 January 1988 the United States established the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which was responsible for conducting inspections of Soviet missile sites and escorting Russian inspectors to U.S. and European sites. The initial staffing of the agency was comprised mainly of well-seasoned military officers, although some civilians were also detailed to the OSIA. After the treaty's ratification by the respective governments, it entered into force on 1 June 1988.

Arms Limitation Treaties

Treaty	*Year*	*Current Signatories*	*Function*
Antarctic Treaty	1959	12	Prohibits military bases and nuclear tests and disposal in Antarctica
Limited Test Ban Treaty	1963	116	Prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater
Outer Space Treaty	1967	89	Prohibits placement of nuclear weapons in space
Latin American Nuclear-Free Test Zone Treaty	1967	24	Prohibits manufacture, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons in Central and South America
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	1968	136	Prohibits spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess nuclear weapons
Seabed Treaty	1971	87	Prohibits placement of nuclear weapons on the seabed beyond 12-mile coastal region
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty	1972	2	Limits number of antiballistic missiles and their locations
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I Interim Agreement	1972	2	Froze number of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles for five years
Threshold Test Ban Treaty	1974	2	(Unratified) prohibits certain underground peaceful nuclear explosions
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty	1976	2	(Unratified) prohibits certain peaceful nuclear explosiions
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II	1979	2	(Unratified) places caps on number of nuclear weapons and qualitative restraints on future production
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty	1985	13	Prohibits manufacture, deployment, use, and disposal of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific region
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty	1987	2	Eliminates all intermediate-range missiles (IRMs), shorter-range missiles (SRMs), and associated launchers and equipment
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement	1988	2	Requires the U.S. and Soviet Union to notify each other at least 24 hours before launch of a strategic ballistic missile
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	1991	2	(Unratified) places caps on number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles

The Soviets permitted inspections of approximately 130 sites in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, while the Americans guaranteed access to 31 sites in Western Europe and the United States. The inspection protocols stipulated that there would be both announced and unannounced inspections. When inspectors arrived at a designated location, they would be escorted to verify the type and number of treaty items. At the conclusion of the inspection, the monitors would write a draft report and present it prior to departure. If the inspectors discovered illicit activity or perceived discrepancies in the type and amount of INF items, the treaty called for an immediate resolution.

The INF Treaty also mandated the observable destruction of all applicable missiles. When systems were reported destroyed, close-out inspections of the facilities would be conducted. This was perhaps the most unique feature of the treaty. The treaty was scheduled to be in effect for an initial period of thirteen years. In 2001 both nations were to either renew or renegotiate the treaty or specific provisions contained therein. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, interest in the treaty's inspection provisions waned, however. The INF Treaty stands today as a singular achievement of

the Cold War, which ultimately helped to bring about the end of the forty-five-year struggle.

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See also

Gorbachev, Mikhail; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Pershing II; Nuclear Arms Race; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Internal Security Act
(1950)

Legislation designed to limit the activities and movement of suspected communists and communist sympathizers in the United States. The U.S. Congress passed the Internal Security Act, sometimes called the McCarran Act, on 23 September 1950. Indeed, the assembly overrode President Harry S. Truman's veto of the bill. Truman termed it "the greatest danger to the freedom of press, speech, and assembly since the Sedition Act of 1789." The act was sponsored by Nevada's Democratic Senator Patrick A. McCarran, who by 1950 was already well known for his rabid anticommunism. The Internal Security Act fired the opening legislative salvo of McCarthyism, which had begun in earnest in February 1950 when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy accused the U.S. State Department of harboring communist employees. It is noteworthy—and indicative of the tenor of the times—that both houses of Congress overrode Truman's veto by overwhelming margins, even though Truman was a Democrat and the Democrats controlled Congress.

Among its many terms, the McCarran Act required that the American Communist Party and any organization affiliated with it register with the U.S. attorney general. The bill also made it illegal to establish a totalitarian dictatorship or to conceal membership in a communist organization when applying for government employment or using a passport. In addition, the act stipulated that communists or other people deemed subversive or a danger to the public welfare could be detained or deported. Naturalized citizens who fell into the last category could face denaturalization and, ultimately, deportation. Finally, the legislation established the Subversive Activities Control Board, which was empowered to investigate any person suspected of engaging in un-American activities.

The implications of the act for civil liberties were obviously great. But this was just the beginning of the excesses of McCarthyism. In June 1952, McCarran and Senator Francis Walter introduced the McCarran-Walter Act, which imposed stricter regulations on immigration and tightened laws relating to the admission and deportation of "dangerous aliens" as defined by the Internal Security Act. In August 1954 Congress passed the Communist Control Act, which among other things stiffened the penalties against those who failed to register with the attorney general and deprived the Communist Party of due process of law. Over time and bit by bit, portions of the Internal Security Act were ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. The act was entirely repealed by Congress in 1990.

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See also

Civil Liberties in the United States; Communist Control Act; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism

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International Monetary Fund

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), an arm of the United Nations (UN), aims at global economic prosperity through multinational cooperation in monetary policy, the avoidance of competitive devaluations, and the orderly correction of balance of payments problems. The IMF was conceived at the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire and came into formal existence on 27 December 1945, when 29 nations signed its charter. As of 2006, 184 countries were IMF members.

Participating nations in the Bretton Woods talks discussed ways to avoid repeating the disastrous economic policies adopted after World War I, including competitive devaluations, punitive tariffs, and unrealistic war reparation payments, which contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The conference representatives discussed three pillars of economic cooperation, namely monetary cooperation through the IMF, economic development through the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), and trade cooperation through the World Trade Organization (WTO). Only the IMF and the World Bank ultimately came into being; the third pillar, the WTO, was postponed for another five decades.

Countries joining the IMF originally agreed to keep their exchange rates pegged to the U.S. dollar, which itself was pegged to gold at a fixed rate. This rate could be adjusted only by multilateral agreement. This system con-

tributed to exchange rate stability for almost three decades; however, it also led to constant political pressure for adjustment in the case of nations that entered the so-called Bretton Woods System either with overvalued currencies (such as the United Kingdom and France) or undervalued currencies (such as West Germany). The Bretton Woods System additionally placed a considerable burden on America to synchronize its domestic economic policies with the goal of exchange rate stability vis-à-vis gold. When the U.S. economy began to flounder due to increasing budget deficits and the Vietnam War, President Richard M. Nixon suspended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold in 1971. The unified world monetary system broke down, allowing states to let their currency float, peg it to another currency, or participate in a currency bloc.

In the beginning, the IMF was aimed mainly at cooperation among industrialized nations, but soon other priorities began to take root. Newly independent states, especially those in Africa, required the IMF to play a new role, focusing on structural assistance and later even poverty reduction, tasks that also increasingly preoccupied the World Bank.

The debt crisis of the 1980s, which affected not only Africa and Latin America but also Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, was resolved by involving the private sector in debt repayment plans as well as imposing economic policy guidelines on member nations. The end of the Cold War witnessed a rise in IMF membership; from 1989 to 1991 alone, membership increased from 152 to 172 countries. In the successor states of the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern Europe, the IMF played an important role in easing the transition to market economies, many of which had been hit by hyperinflation.

The IMF faced other challenges as well, most notably the East Asian crisis of 1997 and the 1998 Russian crisis. Critiques from the Left have often held the IMF responsible for poverty and economic inequality, as it often prescribed austerity programs to counter government overspending and inflation. Rightist critics have charged the IMF with distorting financial markets through large-scale bailouts of both countries and creditors. Be that as it may, the overall track record of the IMF has been a positive one, and the absence of 1930s-style economic chaos in the postwar period speaks to the true efficacy of the IMF.

Bernhard Johannes Seliger

See also

Bretton Woods System; United Nations

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Iran

Middle Eastern nation of 636,293 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of Alaska. Iran is bordered by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to the south; Turkey, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Armenia to the north; Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east; and Iraq to the west. Iran, with a 1945 population of some 15.6 million, has long been important because of its strategic location at the geographic nexus of the Middle East, Europe, and Southwest Asia. Iran's location captured the attention of both Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century, each of which sought to control the area and its access to the Persian Gulf. Rivalry over Iran continued in the early years of the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union vied for control of the country's valuable resources (the most important of which was oil) and geostrategic location.

Reza Shah, the founder of the modern Iranian state, resisted Allied influence at the beginning of World War II. Because of this, Iran was invaded and occupied by British and Soviet forces. Iran subsequently became a chief conduit for U.S. Lend-Lease assistance to the Soviet Union. Reza Shah abdicated and his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, became the new shah.

In 1943 the three principal Allied leaders—U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin—met in the Iranian capital of Tehran to discuss military strategy. In addition, they issued the Tehran Declaration, by which they committed their three governments to restore full sovereignty and territorial integrity to Iran after the war. Nonetheless, with the end of the war, both Britain and the Soviet Union were reluctant to withdraw. The Soviet Union established two nominally independent communist states in areas that it occupied. These were the People's Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic. Iran, backed by the United States, protested to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, citing the Tehran Declaration.

In May 1946 the Soviet Union withdrew its troops, following a pledge by the Iranian government to consider oil concessions. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Iranian Army reestablished full Iranian central government control over the northern provinces, and the Iranian parliament rejected oil concessions to the Soviets. This confrontation with the Soviet Union was the catalyst for the strong U.S.-Iranian relationship that lasted until 1979.

Following the war, Iranian nationalism asserted itself, and two rival factions challenged the supremacy of the shah, who was pro-Western. The first was the Thul Party, which was procommunist and backed by the Soviets. The second was the National Front Party (NFP), based on a nationalist-democratic platform and relatively independent of foreign influence. The NFP, led by its eccentric but popular leader Mohammed Mossadegh, dominated Iranian politics through the early 1950s.

When Mossadegh became prime minister in 1951, he nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Britain responded by imposing an embargo on Iranian oil and blocking the export of products from the formerly British properties. Because Britain was Iran's primary oil consumer, the

British blockade made Iran's already weak economy even weaker. As one consequence of the crisis, Mossadegh asked the shah to grant him emergency powers that included direct control of the military. The shah resisted the request, which precipitated a domestic political crisis.

Mossadegh, however, well understood the power of his popularity. He promptly resigned his position in 1952, causing widespread protests and demands that he be returned to power. Now unnerved, the shah reappointed Mossadegh, who then took steps to consolidate his power. This included the implementation of land reform and other measures that to the West seemed socialist. Although Mossadegh had not had any direct contact with the Soviets, the events in Iran were nevertheless of great concern to the United States, which feared a Soviet move on Iran.

As the Anglo-Iran Oil Crisis deepened and Mossadegh implemented more internal reforms while pushing the shah to the sidelines, the United States and Britain decided to take action. The result was the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Operation AJAX. This covert operation employed propaganda, protests, and disinformation to discredit Mossadegh, who responded by seeking greater personal power as prime minister. When the shah attempted to fire Mossadegh in 1953 and he refused to step down, the shah fled abroad.

Riots soon broke out in Iran's major urban centers as pro- and antimonarchy forces mobilized popular support. The communists as well as the religious leadership chose to oppose Mossadegh. With both the CIA and British intelligence funding and advising promonarchy leaders of all stripes, the Iranian Army took control of Tehran in August 1953 and arrested Mossadegh. The shah returned to Iran and appointed a loyalist army officer as prime minister. Some maintain that the CIA's role in the coup was inappropriate and illegal and that U.S. involvement alienated large segments of Iranian society, ultimately fueling virulent anti-Americanism that pervaded Iran by the mid-1970s. The end result, these observers assert, was the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the taking of American hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979. Other analysts, however, have viewed the U.S. effort as an effective means by which to keep Soviet influence out of Iran, which was of vital importance to Western interests. Following the events of 1953, the shah became the staunchest U.S. ally in the Middle East, apart from Israel. Indeed, until 1979 the shah acted as a powerful stabilizing force in the Persian Gulf region and a solid bulwark against Soviet influence extending south out of the Caucasus.

While the return of the shah may have been beneficial to Western Cold War interests, his rule alienated many Iranians. His pro-Western foreign policy irked Iranian nationalists, who were fed up with domination by the great powers. His lavish lifestyle and Westernized dress and manner were also an affront to many Iranian clerics, particularly the more conservative. His autocratic rule and limp efforts to improve the lot of Iranians economically and socially won him few new adherents. By the early 1970s, many Iranians remained poor and underemployed, despite the fact that the country sat atop one of the richest oil and gas fields in the world.

The roots of the 1979 Iranian Revolution lay in domestic unrest and violence that began in 1963. At the time, the leader of the most powerful antimonarchy movement was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a fundamentalist Muslim cleric. The shah responded to the opposition with arrests and sometimes brutal interrogations by the secret police. The army was often used to crush protests by force. Khomeini fled to Iraq in 1964, and government forces crushed public protests, resulting in thousands of deaths. Khomeini continued to agitate against the shah from Iraq and later from France as the symbolic leader of the growing opposition to the shah's religious and economic policies.

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter's administration put pressure on the shah to ease his repressive policies, but as the shah loosened his grip, a broad spectrum of Iranian society began to protest against a variety of grievances. At the core of the antishah forces were the religious student community and its clerical leadership. When the shah declared martial law in September 1978, resistance to his regime culminated in a general strike in October 1978. Under great pressure at home and abroad and in failing health, the shah fled Iran in January 1979.

The departure of the shah precipitated a power struggle that was quickly won by Khomeini and his Islamic fundamentalist followers. Their new government consolidated its power through intimidation and violence. Khomeini was not only an ardent opponent of the shah but was also extremely anti-American, and his youthful followers reflected that. On 4 November 1979, Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took seventy Americans hostage. Over the next fourteen months, the United States applied sanctions against Iran, froze Iranian assets, and attempted a military rescue, all to secure the hostages. All these efforts failed.

In July 1980, the shah died of cancer in Egypt, opening a diplomatic opportunity to resolve the hostage crisis. The hostages were finally released on 21 January 1981. In the meantime, war had begun between Iran and Iraq.

Neighboring Iraq saw in the 1979 Iranian Revolution a chance to rekindle a long-standing border dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway providing Iraq access to the Persian Gulf. On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, beginning an eight-year-long war, one of the bloodiest struggles of modern history. Initially, the Iraqi Army had great success against the disorganized, surprised, and poorly led Iranians. However, Iranian zeal led to counteroffensives in 1982 that pushed the Iraqis back. The war then settled into a bloody stalemate during which the Iraqis for the most part fought from prepared defensive positions in the fashion of World War I and the Iranians endured huge casualties while attempting unsophisticated human wave attacks against prepared enemy positions. Khomeini viewed the war as a jihad, or holy war, and rejected any end to the fighting before the destruction of Saddam Hussein's secular government.

In 1987, with the Cold War winding down, both the Soviet Union and the United States became more involved in brokering an end to the conflict, even as both favored Iraq. The Soviets focused on building up Iraq's conventional military capabilities. The United States provided diplomatic sup-

port and satellite intelligence. It also protected Persian Gulf shipping. In 1988, Iraqi military successes and increasing diplomatic isolation finally convinced Khomeini to agree to a cease-fire.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and the death of Khomeini in 1989, more moderate forces in Iran have attempted to assert influence on the clerical regime. In general, however, Khomeini's Islamic Religious Party continues to dominate the government bureaucracy and the major institutions of state control. In addition, Iran's sponsorship of terrorist activities in Lebanon and against Israel ensured its continued diplomatic isolation.

Louis A. DiMarco

See also

Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Carter Doctrine; Iran, Armed Forces; Iran-Contra Affair; Iran-Iraq War; Middle East; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

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Iran, Armed Forces

Iran's armed forces, which during much of the Cold War were heavily equipped with U.S. weaponry and hardware, served as a symbol of modernism until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. After that, they tended to reflect the new clerical regime's inability, and even unwillingness, to maintain and upgrade technical capabilities as well as the state's emphasis on the personal zeal of military personnel rather than their training and leadership abilities.

From the earliest days of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reign, as early as 1941, Iran's armed forces were vitally important to his rule. Iran's strategic geographical position and the shah's constitutional authority giving him direct control over the armed forces (but not over other matters of state) made military expansion and modernization his single most important program. After the 1953 CIA-led coup that solidified his position, the shah increasingly turned to the Americans for matériel and technical support.

Although the shah was a much-welcomed customer, U.S. presidential administrations up until 1969 expressed concerns that he should channel more efforts toward internal reforms. Washington often did not have complete confidence in the shah's ability to retain control over his nation, and his placing of military objectives above other national interests did not ease apprehensions.

There were caps on both the quantity and types of weapons systems available to Iran, but that changed during President Richard Nixon's administration beginning in 1969. By 1972, the shah could order virtually any type of military technology in whatever quantities he wished. This set a significant

Iranian Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi salutes an honor guard upon his return to Tehran following a five-day exile in Baghdad and Rome, 1953. (Library of Congress)

new precedent, as both the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. State Department had previously sought to limit Iranian weapons purchases. The results were immediate and dramatic. Iranian military purchases from the United States skyrocketed from $500 million per year in 1972 to $2.5 billion in 1973. By 1976, Iran had purchased $11 billion in new weaponry from American suppliers. Weapons acquisitions included helicopters, jet fighters, antiaircraft missiles, submarines, and destroyers. These acquisitions continued until 1977, when President Jimmy Carter's administration reimposed limits on such sales.

The 1970s also marked significant importations of Western technical assistance. Large numbers of military advisors, technicians, and logistics and maintenance personnel arrived in Iran, primarily from the United States. As long as military matériel and spare parts arrived from the West, to be used by nonnative technicians, the military functioned smoothly. If that flow of goods and expertise were to be halted, as it was after 1979, the Iranian military's ability to function would be seriously compromised.

In early 1979 the shah was forced to abdicate and depart the country. The monarchy was replaced by a conservative, Islamic republic. Less than two years later, in September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran. It was a diminished

military, augmented by and sometimes competing with nonprofessional Revolutionary Guard units, that met the first assaults. They performed poorly.

In terms of personnel, upon the creation of the Islamic republic the officer corps of all three Iranian armed services had been purged, followed by a rash of desertions. One estimate holds that 60 percent of the army deserted in 1979 alone. The numbers of qualified pilots and technicians in the air force plummeted, as did the number of naval personnel. One significant exception was an increase in the number of marines, at least until the mid-1980s.

The departure of foreign advisors and technicians who had serviced aircraft, radar, missile, and ground systems had a dramatic effect on the Iranian armed forces. One example of the dangers of relying on technology created and supported by outsiders was the air force's computer-based logistics system. Without the proper technical support, the system was unusable. Procuring spare parts, which grew increasingly scarce, was a slow and laborious process.

At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran could still field an army possessing tanks, aircraft, and the mobility they conferred against an often inept foe. As the war progressed, however, the boycott on Iranian oil, which depleted government funds, forced the Iranians to continually cannibalize their own equipment. This took a heavy toll.

During the 1980–1988 war with Iraq, Iran was forced to seek weapons from sources other than the United States and Western Europe. Iran received war matériel from the People's Republic of China (PRC), Brazil, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), and Israel. It also secured some Soviet equipment, usually purchased through third parties. Most bizarre was the supply of American equipment, especially air-to-ground and antitank missiles. These weapons systems were furnished by the United States in return for cash used to finance U.S. government actions against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair.

At the end of the war with Iraq, Iran sought to both rebuild its military arsenal and correct problems of standardization that had arisen because of its variegated sources of supply. Iran subsequently purchased substantial quantities of weapons from Russia and manufactured its own armored weapons systems and, according to some sources, sought to develop nuclear weapons.

Robert N. Stacy

See also

Arms Sales, International; Iran; Iran-Contra Affair; Iran-Iraq War; Iraq, Armed Forces; Middle East; Radical Islam

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Iran-Contra Affair

Political scandal in President Ronald Reagan's administration involving the illegal sale of weapons to Iran, the proceeds of which were used to illegally fund Nicaraguan Contra rebels. As its name implies, Iran-Contra was the linkage of two otherwise vastly different foreign policy problems that bedeviled the Reagan administration at the beginning of its second term in 1985: how to secure the release of American hostages held by Iranian-backed kidnappers in Lebanon and how to support the Contra rebels fighting against Nicaragua's Cuban-style Sandinista government. In both cases Reagan's public options were limited, for he had explicitly ruled out the possibility of negotiating with hostage takers, and Congress refused to allow military aid to be sent to the Contras.

In August 1985 Reagan approved a plan by Robert McFarlane, National Security Agency (NSA) advisor, to sell more than 500 TOW antitank missiles to Iran, via the Israelis, in exchange for the release of Americans held by terrorists in Lebanon. (Reagan later denied that he was aware of an explicit link between the sale and the hostage crisis.) The deal went through, and as a follow-up, in November 1985, there was a proposal to sell HAWK antiaircraft missiles to Iran. Colonel Oliver North, a decorated Marine attached to the NSA's staff, was put in charge of these and subsequent negotiations. A number of Reagan's senior cabinet members, including Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, began to express reservations about this trade with Iran, for it was not only diametrically opposed to the administration's stated policy but was also illegal under U.S. and international law.

Reagan continued to endorse arms shipments throughout 1986, and in all more than 100 tons of missiles and spare parts were exported to Iran by the end of the year.

Nonetheless, Reagan continued to endorse arms shipments throughout 1986, and in all more than one hundred tons of missiles and spare parts were exported to Iran by the end of the year. The policy's success in hostage releases proved limited, however, because while some Americans were set free as acts of quid pro quo, others were quickly taken captive in their turn.

Meanwhile, North had begun secretly funneling the funds from the missile sales to Swiss bank accounts owned by the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, who used the money in part to set up guerrilla training camps run by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). All this was in direct violation of the Second Boland Amendment, a congressional law passed in October 1984 that specifically forbade the U.S. government from supporting any paramilitary group in Nicaragua. To what extent North's superiors knew of the Contra connection at this stage remains unclear, as is the final amount of money supplied to the Nicaraguans, although it is thought to have been on the order of tens of millions of dollars. Later investigations suggested numerous accounting irregularities by North, but these were never proven.

On 3 November 1986, the affair became public when a Lebanese magazine, *Ash-Shiraa,* revealed that the Americans had been selling missiles to the Iranians. Reagan responded with a televised statement in which he denied any arms-for-hostages deal, and U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese was ordered to conduct an internal inquiry. North and his secretary, Fawn Hall,

immediately began shredding incriminating documents, but on 22 November Meese's staff discovered material in North's office that linked the Iranian shipments directly to the Contras. Meese informed Reagan, and on 25 November the U.S. Justice Department announced its preliminary findings to the press. North was fired, and National Security Advisor John Poindexter, who had replaced McFarlane, promptly resigned.

The following month, Reagan appointed an independent commission to investigate the affair, chaired by former Texas Senator John Tower. The commission's March 1987 report severely criticized the White House for failing to control its NSA subordinates, which led to the resignation of Regan. An apparently contrite President Reagan admitted to having misled the public in his earlier statements, although he pled sins of ignorance rather than design. A subsequent congressional inquiry lambasted the president for failings of leadership but decided that he had not known about the transfers of money to the Contras.

In 1988 independent prosecutor Lawrence Walsh indicted North, Poindexter, and twelve other persons on a variety of felony counts. Eleven were convicted, but North and Poindexter were later acquitted on Fifth Amendment technicalities. At the end of his term in office in December 1992, President George H. W. Bush pardoned six other persons implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal, including Weinberger and McFarlane.

Alan Allport

See also

Arms Sales, International; Contras; Iran; National Security Agency; Nicaragua; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Sandinistas; Shultz, George Pratt; Weinberger, Caspar

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Iran Hostage Crisis

(4 November 1979–20 January 1981)

Diplomatic confrontation between Iran and the United States that lasted 444 days (4 November 1979–20 January 1981) and involved the seizure and captivity of U.S. embassy personnel in Tehran by radical Iranian students. The Iran Hostage Crisis was perhaps the gravest diplomatic standoff of the 1970s. It crippled President Jimmy Carter's administration, led to a second energy crisis (the first having occurred in 1973–1974), and contributed to the election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president in 1980. The genesis of the crisis was internal turmoil in Iran and a popular backlash against the regime of Shah



This photo, taken on the first day of occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, shows the American hostages being paraded by their militant Iranian captors, 4 November 1979. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, which began in earnest in 1978. By January 1979, mass protests and violence threatened to plunge the country into chaos.

In 1953, Shah Pahlavi (who had ruled from 1941 to 1952) had been returned to power by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a bloodless coup against nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Mossadegh had sought to end foreign control of Iranian oil. Ever since, U.S. policymakers viewed the shah as their greatest ally in the Middle East. Accordingly, the United States sold the shah's government billions of dollars of weaponry in return for an Iranian pledge to keep its oil flowing and to prevent destabilization in the region. But the shah's regime was riddled with cronyism and corruption. In spite of his repeated promises to reform Iranian society, government, and politics, little changed in Iran between 1953 and 1979. While the shah purchased billions of dollars worth of military weaponry and lived in luxury, many Iranians were destitute. Opposition encountered a heavy-handed response, as in 1963 when the shah's forces cracked down against protesters, resulting in scores of deaths and deportations. The shah's secular regime was also bent on Westernizing Iran, an Islamic nation. Such efforts did not sit well with conservative Islamic opponents.

In early January 1979, nationwide protests against the shah forced him to flee the country. He departed Iran on 16 January, never to return. A new interim government was established, but it did not win the support of rightist Islamic leaders who hoped to establish an Islamic regime in Iran. Among the most popular of the Islamic fundamentalists was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had spent many years in exile in France.

In February 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran. He refused to cooperate with the interim government and began to stir up popular resentment against the United States. The situation in Iran continued to deteriorate as anti-Western demonstrations—encouraged by Khomeini and his supporters—convulsed the country and rendered the interim government impotent. Gradually, Khomeini's supporters began to act as the de facto government, giving him the power to engage in major policy decisions.

In October 1979, the Carter administration permitted the gravely ill shah to come to the United States for medical treatment. Carter's decision to let the shah enter the country sparked renewed anti-American protests in Iran. Declaring the United States as the "Great Satan," Khomeini incited his followers and other protesters to demonstrate their antipathy toward American interests. On 4 November 1979, a mob of angry protesters, many of them young college students, stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, took control of it, and held some seventy embassy workers hostage. The seizure of the embassy and the taking of hostages were deemed a gross violation of international law, as it is understood that a nation's foreign embassies are extensions of its national sovereignty.

Although Khomeini probably did not order the taking of the embassy, he clearly supported the action as it unfolded and refused to negotiate in good faith with the United States. Thirteen women and nonwhite hostages were released during 19–20 November, and one more was released in July 1980 for health reasons. In return for the release of the remaining hostages, the Iranians demanded that the shah be returned to Iran for trial, that the assets he took with him be immediately returned, and that the United States apologize for its meddling in Iranian affairs. The Carter administration refused the conditions, and a long stalemate ensued. Carter incited more anti-American protests in Iran when he froze several billion dollars of Iranian assets and halted the importation of Iranian oil to the United States. The moratorium on Iranian oil precipitated a full-blown oil crisis in the United States that drove gasoline and fuel oil prices to historic highs and wrecked an economy that was already teetering on the edge of a meltdown. When Carter left office in January 1981, inflation was 13-plus percent, and interest rates on certain consumer loans had skyrocketed to 18 percent or more. Further complicating the Iran hostage crisis was the Soviets' December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, which put Soviet-American relations on hold and upped the ante in superpower control over the Middle East.

Many Americans were deeply frustrated with the hostage crisis, which seemed to showcase American weakness despite its mighty military resources. They were also chagrined at the resultant energy crisis and deep economic

recession. Carter spent much of his time trying to defuse and resolve the crisis, but to no avail. Given the world situation and the worsening relations with the Soviet Union, the United States could ill afford to prompt a war in the Middle East. Indeed, to do so might have resulted in a confrontation with the USSR. In April 1980, a secret operation to free the American hostages ended in disaster when a helicopter developed engine problems in the Iranian desert and two military planes collided in the ensuing chaos, killing eight servicemen.

The aborted mission was made public and served only to deepen U.S. pessimism toward the Carter administration and the ongoing crisis. As Americans placed yellow ribbons around trees in remembrance of the hostages, the 1980 presidential election swung into high gear. Republican nominee Ronald Reagan lambasted Carter's handling of the crisis and his foreign and domestic policies in general. Many Americans, fed up with the long hostage crisis, saw in Reagan an answer to the nation's emasculation. To his considerable credit, Carter chose to greatly limit his campaign appearances to give his undivided attention to the unfolding crisis. Reagan went on to win a relatively narrow victory in November 1980, due in no small measure to the Iran Hostage Crisis.

The shah died in July 1980 in Egypt. That September, Iran invaded Iraq, touching off the Iran-Iraq War. These two events may have been enough to nudge the Iranians into serious negotiations. But the advent of the Reagan administration also helped. Perhaps fearful of what a new administration might do, the students seemed willing to bargain for the hostages' freedom. By early January 1981, Carter had reached an agreement whereby the U.S. hostages would be freed. The United States promised to return some $8 billion in frozen Iranian assets and to lift trade sanctions against the country. Approximately twenty minutes after Reagan was sworn in as president, he announced that the hostages were free and on their way to a U.S. military base in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). The long affair was over, but its impact on American and international politics continues to play out to the present.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Afghanistan War; Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Iran; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Middle East; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Mossadegh, Mohammed

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Iran-Iraq War
(22 September 1980–
20 August 1988)

The Iran-Iraq War began with the invasion of Iran by Iraqi forces on 22 September 1980 and lasted until a United Nations (UN) brokered cease-fire on 20 August 1988 that restored the status quo ante bellum. The issues involved extended back centuries to struggles between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid Empire of Persia. The conflicts were territorial, ethnic, and religious. The territorial issue involved a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway that delivers the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Ethnic controversies included the large Arab and Kurdish populations on both sides of the border. The religious conundrum centered on the fact that there are Shia Muslim Arabs in both nations.

By the 1970s both sides were locked in a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab boundary between the two nations. Iraq was also angry over Iranian support for a revolt by Kurds in northern Iraq against Baghdad. Finally, although the Shia population in southern Iraq constituted a majority of the national population, the minority Sunni Arabs controlled the life of the country. The Shia were restive and hoped for support from fellow Shias in Iran.

Tensions between Iraq and Iran led to the Algiers Accord of 1975 by which Shah Reza Pahlavi II of Iran agreed to end support for Kurdish dissidents in Iraq in return for establishing the navigational center of the Shatt al-Arab as the international border between the two nations. Before this the Iraqi border was the eastern shore, which complicated trade from the Persian port of Abadan on the Shatt to the Gulf. At the same time, Iraq secured control of the waterway from its port of Basra farther up the Shatt. The United States backed Iran, while the Soviet Union had become a major supporter of Iraq.

Any hopes that the Algiers Accord might stabilize the region were soon dashed. Saddam Hussein was expanding his power in Iraq while, despite U.S. support, the shah's hold over Iran was weakening. In 1978 at the request of the shah, Iraq agreed to expel his most fervent opponent, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who had been living in exile in Iraq since 1964). Khomeini moved to France, from where he orchestrated a rebellion against the shah that was successful only a year later. Now dominating Iran, Khomeini nursed deep grievances against Iraq not only for his expulsion but because of the secular nature of the Iraqi regime. The 1975 agreements became moot.

Hussein also believed that he saw an opportunity to regain complete control of the Shatt as well as the Arab portions of Iran, increasing his oil reserves and ending any possibility of Iranian disruption of the transport of oil to the Gulf. He believed that the decimation of the Iranian



An Iraqi soldier accompanies an Iranian prisoner taken on the southern front during the Iran-Iraq War, 18 March 1985. (Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma/Corbis)



military following the 1979 revolution and the termination of American military aid as a consequence of the recent Iranian Hostage Crisis with the United States would bring easy victory. On 18 September 1980, Iraq abrogated the Algiers Accord.

At the outset of the war, Iran had 240,000 men under arms, of whom 150,000 were ground forces. Iraq matched this with 243,000 men, of whom 200,000 were ground forces. Iraq had 2,750 tanks to Iran's 1,735. Iraq also had a slight advantage in artillery pieces (1,240 to 1,000) but about 100 fewer aircraft (332 to 445 for Iran).

Iraq began military operations with four divisions totaling about 45,000 men. The Iraqi Army invaded Iran on three fronts, ranging from the Shatt al-Arab in the south to points east and northeast of Baghdad in order to provide cover for the capital and approaches to Kirkuk. Hussein expected a quick, decisive victory. Although the Iraqis seized some territory east of the Shatt, the Iranian Army simply withdrew into urban areas. Iraq's navy was of little importance and could do little to contest an Iranian naval blockade of the limited Iraqi access to the Gulf; nor could the Iraqi Navy do much offensively against Iranian offshore oil installations. The Iraqi Air Force's attempted preemptive strike was unsuccessful, and Iran retained a credible air capability.

Although Hussein expected to avoid heavy casualties, this was not the case. Taking Khorramshar in the early part of the war cost the Iraqis 7,000 men and 100 tanks. Declining to directly assault Abadan, Hussein decided to lay siege to that important Iranian oil-producing area.

Iran refused to capitulate, and the war settled into a conflict of attrition. This should have been to the benefit of Iran, which was much larger in territory and had three times the population, sizable oil reserves, and an extensive frontage on the Gulf. Iran, however, suffered from poor leadership resulting from ideological purges, serious logistics problems from its international isolation, and a poorly trained if fanatical army.

The attrition phase of the war began in late 1980 and persisted until 1987. During this phase, both sides employed chemical weapons, including both World War I–era mustard gas and post–World War II blood and nerve agents. They were only marginally effective but elicited much condemnation internationally.

This phase also saw improvement in Iraqi military capabilities, especially in the air, where it often achieved superiority at critical times. Hussein also raised the number of his army divisions from twelve to more than forty. On the other hand, Iran was successful in mobilizing and motivating massive numbers of young men in human wave attacks. Iran also had considerable success in reconstituting an effective command structure and securing weapons from abroad, including spare parts to revitalize its U.S.-supplied arsenal. The Iran-Contra Affair was a small part of this, as the administration of President Ronald Reagan secretly diverted Iranian oil money to the U.S.-backed insurgency in Nicaragua in return for critical U.S.-made equipment.

The war also saw two other incidents involving the United States. In the first, on 17 May 1987, Iraqi aircraft attacked in the Persian Gulf the U.S. Navy frigate *Stark*, evidently by mistake, resulting in 37 U.S. dead. In the second, on 3 July 1988, the crew of the U.S. cruiser *Vincennes* mistook an Iranian airliner for an attacking military aircraft and shot it down with a missile, killing all 290 people aboard.

The attrition phase ended in early 1988 with an Iraqi offensive designed to force Iran into negotiations. It included a naval and air attack on Iranian oil transportation facilities and missile attacks on such targets as Tehran, Isfahan, and Qum. A concentrated offensive on the al-Faw Peninsula at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab also included the use of chemical weapons. Hussein was less motivated by decisive victory than by preservation of his rule after years of war and sacrifice. He succeeded, and both sides accepted a UN-negotiated cease-fire on 20 August 1988. The long war brought exhaustion to both sides and finally resulted in the realization that further military action was not likely to turn the tide for either side. No peace treaty has ever been signed.

Casualties were high on both sides, including large numbers of civilians. Even approximate numbers are difficult to come by, but estimates place the number of military and civilian dead at around 300,000. Wounded and captured bring the number of casualties to between 1 and 2 million. Apart from this vast human cost, the war wreaked havoc on the economies of both nations. Some estimates place the total cost of the war at about $1 trillion.

In 1991, the UN Security Council declared Iraq to have been the aggressor in the war, something the Iraqi government publicly admitted only in May 2005.

Daniel E. Spector

See also

Hussein, Saddam; Iran; Iran-Contra Affair; Iraq; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

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Iraq

Middle Eastern nation covering 168,753 square miles, slightly smaller than the U.S. state of California, with a 1945 population of some 4.6 million people. Iraq borders on Saudi Arabia to the west and south, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf to the south, Iran to the east, and Syria and Turkey to the north. Iraq's geographic position in the Middle East and its large reserves of oil made it a

vital strategic interest for both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, volatile domestic politics made it an unreliable ally.

The British received a mandate over Iraq following World War I, working through King Faisal ibn Husayn, one of the key leaders of the Arab revolt against the Ottomans during the war. Faisal established a Westward-focused Iraqi government that dominated Iraqi politics until 1958. This orientation to the West was in conflict with strong Iraqi nationalism beneath the surface, generating constant friction between the government and its opposition.

Iraq achieved independence from Britain in 1932. Faisal's Sunni Muslim–dominated government, backed by the British-trained and -equipped Sunni-dominated military, maintained order. The large Kurdish minority and Shia Muslim majority were, however, sufficiently powerful to threaten the government. Unfortunately for national stability, Faisal, an adroit politician who understood well the challenges of ruling Iraq, died of a heart attack in September 1933. His twenty-one-year-old son, Ghazi, succeeded him. In the first three years of Ghazi's rule the government changed three times: a powerful civilian prime minister was replaced by a Western-oriented military leadership, which in turn was replaced by an Arab nationalist military leadership. When Ghazi died suddenly in April 1939, there was another power struggle between nationalistic military officers and a civilian faction led by the appointed royal regent, Abd al-Ilah. Efforts by the military to wrest control from the regent resulted in Britain's reoccupation of Iraq in 1940, which lasted until 1945.

Iraq emerged from World War II led by the pro-British al-Ilah and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said. Despite economic strides made in the immediate post–World War II period, the political climate in Iraq remained as unstable as ever. The 1948 defeat of Arab forces by Israel, the overthrow of the pro-Western Egyptian King Fahd in 1952, and the rise of the anti-Western Mohammed Mossadegh government in Iran all encouraged anti-Western factions in Iraq. In 1955, Iraq joined the pro-Western Baghdad Pact, allying itself with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in a mutual defense agreement sponsored by the United States.

The Baghdad Pact was one factor setting in motion the forces that drove Cairo and Moscow closer together. More important for Iraqi history, the pact was a direct affront to the long-simmering nationalist sentiments within the Iraqi Army officer corps. It became the catalyst that ignited the 1958 revolution—the first in a string of coups and countercoups that would plague Iraq until the Baathists consolidated power in 1968.

The 1958 coup was led by a secret nationalist organization known as the Free Officers Movement. On 14 July 1958 its members seized control of Baghdad and executed King Faisal II and al-Said. The revolutionaries then abolished the monarchy, proclaimed Iraq a republic, and sought closer ties to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Abd al-Karim Qasim had led the coup, but his policies created a great many internal and external enemies, and in February 1963 a faction of army officers allied with the Baath Party overthrew Qasim. He was replaced

Vice Premier Abd al-Salam Arif addresses a crowd in An Najaf, Iraq, explaining the objectives and reforms of the new government on 9 August 1958. Colonel Arif and General Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew the ruling monarchy in a coup d'etat and took control of the new Iraqi republic. (Bettmann/Corbis)

by his former partner, Abd al-Salam Arif, as president. A Baathist officer, Colonel Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, became premier.

Again, internal dissension among the revolutionaries prevailed. By 1964, Arif had removed the Baathists from positions of authority and had many of them arrested. In September 1965 he appointed as premier the distinguished civilian diplomat and lawyer Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, who formed a new government. His reformist policies were short-lived, however. When Arif was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966, army leaders quickly forced the new president, Arif's elder brother Abd al-Rahman Arif, to oust al-Bazzaz.

In July 1968, a final coup occurred in Iraq. The Baath Party, resurgent after being brushed aside by Arif, joined with a small group of key army officers and laid siege to the Arif regime. Arif was allowed to leave the country in exile. The Baath Party then took over, led by al-Bakr, who had briefly been premier in 1963. His ruthless lieutenant, Saddam Hussein, assisted him. After establishing control of the country, the Baathists eliminated their army rivals by posting them outside of Iraq and threatening their lives. Challenges from the Shia and the Kurds precluded the party from aggressively pursuing domestic social reforms, although it did not stop the leaders from continuing the strong friendship with the Soviet Union. In 1972 the relationship with the Soviets culminated in a treaty of friendship.

In 1979, Iraq underwent the first change of leadership in two decades that was not directly associated with a coup or revolution. Al-Bakr retired and was replaced by Hussein. Hussein's assumption of power was accompanied by a purge of dozens of top party officials; twenty-two members of the leadership were summarily executed. Although the structure of the Baath Party did not fundamentally change, after the events of July 1979 the Baathist rule of Iraq became much more the personal rule of Hussein. The party was reduced to being an extension of his personal power.

The first major test of Hussein's leadership was Iraq's relations with Iran. The new Iranian revolutionary government had become a major source of anti-Baathist agitation and propaganda. The propaganda was particularly effective among Iraq's Shia majority. Border clashes between the two countries increased, and on 17 September 1980 Hussein announced that he was reassuming control of the Shatt al-Arab and abrogating the 1975 agreement with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran. On 21 September, Iraqi forces invaded Iran. Iran's fundamentalist leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, viewed the war in theological and personal terms and was therefore unwilling to compromise. This intransigence resulted in a prolonged war with immense costs in terms of capital and casualties on both sides. An Iranian counteroffensive eventually won back most of the invaded territory, and Iranian forces made significant gains into Iraq. The Iraqis, however, were successful on the diplomatic front. In addition to continued and strong support from their Soviet allies, the Iraqis also managed to build support among the other Persian Gulf states as well as in Western Europe and the United States. The United States and other nations contributed intelligence support, weapons, financing, and technology to the Iraqi war effort.

In 1988, allied help, Iraqi battlefield success, and the deepening isolation of Iran forced the Iranians to agree to a cease-fire. The war effectively ended with a return to the borders and conditions of the 1975 treaty with the shah of Iran. With the conclusion of the war, Iraqi prestige was running high. Its military was formidable, but its economy had been severely damaged by the war, and the country was deeply in debt to many of its Arab neighbors.

Hussein's decision in 1990 to invade Kuwait would lead to appalling living conditions in Iraq and ultimately to the destruction of his regime thirteen years later. He used several pretexts for going to war. The return of the Shatt al-Arab to dual ownership after the Iran-Iraq War effectively denied its use by Iraq. This in turn caused Iraq to renew the traditional dispute over borders and access to the Persian Gulf with Kuwait. In addition, Iraq was facing huge financial deficits, as Hussein's economic and military programs plus the war debt cost much more than Iraqi oil revenue brought in. These conditions caused the Hussein regime to develop an elaborate theory that connected Israel, the United States, and Kuwait in a scheme to thwart Iraq's ability to achieve its goal of economic prosperity and regional military dominance. The solution to this conspiracy was to use Iraq's military capabilities to remove the alleged source of its economic woes by invading and occupying Kuwait. Iraq also accused Kuwait of driving down the price of oil by excessive pro-

duction and of slant-drilling into Iraqi fields. In addition, Iraq claimed Kuwait as a runaway province.

Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The invasion was a demonstration of Hussein's fundamental misunderstanding of the basic changes that had recently occurred internationally. The Cold War was ending and with it the ability of a regional power such as Iraq, with close ties to the Soviet Union, to act with some expectation of protection from its ally. In the face of Iraqi ignorance and intransigence, U.S. President George H. W. Bush obtained United Nations (UN) support, forged an international coalition, and deployed an unprecedented multilateral military force to the region. In January 1991, the U.S.-led force launched a comprehensive military effort with a strategic air campaign that targeted Iraq's command and control, infrastructure, and ground forces. The air campaign was followed by a short and decisive one hundred–hour ground war that not only liberated Kuwait but destroyed the bulk of Hussein's military capability.

Subsequent to the war, Hussein sought to reestablish Iraq as a regional power. This required that he subvert and avoid UN sanctions placed on Iraq as a result of the war. He also ruthlessly suppressed uprisings by both the Kurds and Shiite Muslims. Ultimately, Hussein's miscalculations, disingenuous relations with the United States and the UN, and another change in the international situation caused by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States resulted in a second U.S.-led invasion, the destruction of the Baathist regime in March 2003, and the execution of Hussein in December 2006.

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See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Hussein, Saddam; Iran-Iraq War; Iraq, Armed Forces; Middle East; Persian Gulf War

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Iraq, Armed Forces

Iraqi armed forces at the beginning of the Cold War were equipped and organized on the British model. In the years following, especially from the late 1950s on, other influences shaped their equipage, organization, and doctrine. In addition to external supply and doctrinal influences, Iraq's participation in several wars during 1948–1988 and internal politics profoundly affected military operations, planning, and leadership. While the Iraqi forces were generally well equipped, they displayed serious flaws in all of their performances, even in those instances in which they emerged victorious.

Iraqi soldiers head to the Abadan front during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Basra, Iraq, October 1980. (Francoise de Mulder/Corbis)

Iraq's first conflict in the Cold War era was the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Deployed in western Jordan and fighting in Palestine alongside Jordanians whose training and organization were similar, Iraqi troops did not fare well. The Iraqi force, which eventually grew to about 15,000 men, proved adequate in defensive situations but performed poorly otherwise. One strength was a high standard of unit cohesion that served it well when it was under attack but that it could not translate into efficacious offensive action.

Following the 1948 conflict, the Iraqi government, then still a kingdom, signed the 1955 anticommunist Baghdad Pact, a military alliance that included the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran. Iraq assumed an active role in this organization until its departure in 1959.

In 1958 all British forces left Iraq (although they had effectively ceded their air bases in the country in 1955 with the signing of the Baghdad Pact). This departure marked the end of British involvement and influence in Iraqi military affairs, a relationship dating back to 1919. That same year, a military coup resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy, a change in government, and a significant shift in foreign policy that now tilted heavily toward the Soviet Union. Not long after the change in government, new defensive arrangements resulted in the Iraqis receiving military equipment, including tanks and airplanes, and advisors from the Soviet Union.

During 1961–1970, the Iraqi military was engaged in the suppression of Kurdish rebels in what has been referred to as the First Kurdish War. There was no Iraqi participation in the 1967 Six-Day War. The Iraqis did, however, participate in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. Fighting mainly on the Golan Heights, their performance has been cited as the worst of any of Israel's opponents in that conflict.

In the 1980s the Iraqi military fought two wars. The first began in September 1980 when Iraqi forces attacked Iran. In the same decade, Iraqi government forces fought an internal war in which they brutally suppressed the Kurds in what has been called the Second Kurdish War. Both wars were notable for the extensive use of chemical weapons, in one case against an external enemy and in another case against a domestic civilian population.

In terms of equipment and basic military doctrine, the Iraqis were obviously tied to the Soviets, their mentors and suppliers. During the war with Iran, however, they were aided significantly by American intelligence (mostly through aerial reconnaissance photos) that supported strategic planning and target identification. In 1988, after eight long years of fighting, the Iraqis restored the status quo ante bellum with Iran, although this result can be attributed more to Iranian exhaustion rather than Iraqi brilliance. Even though the Iran-Iraq War wrought significant destruction on Iraqi infrastructure and civilian centers, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein believed that his forces had been battle-hardened and were quite formidable at war's end.

On the eve of the Persian Gulf War, Iraq's armed forces were quite large and, on paper, very impressive. Only two years away from its war with Iran, the Iraqi Army boasted approximately 900,000 soldiers, almost 6,000 tanks, 5,000 armored personnel carriers, and nearly 4,000 pieces of artillery. This force was, however, easily and decisively defeated in a one hundred–hour ground offensive during Operation DESERT STORM in February 1991. Despite its impressive numbers going into the war, the Iraqi military establishment performed very poorly. It was plagued by outdated and substandard equipment, generally poor leadership, low morale, and little unit cohesiveness. In fact, many Iraqi soldiers chose to desert or surrender rather than face the brunt of a massive, well-trained, and technologically advanced American-led multinational contingent of 500,000 soldiers.

Only two years away from its war with Iran, the Iraqi Army boasted approximately 900,000 soldiers, almost 6,000 tanks, 5,000 armored personnel carriers, and nearly 4,000 pieces of artillery.

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See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arms Sales, International; Iran, Armed Forces; Iran-Iraq War; Iraq; Persian Gulf War

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Ireland, Northern

A part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland comprises six counties in the northern part of Ireland. The six counties that make up Northern Ireland, also referred to as Ulster, include Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone and cover 5,452 square miles—about the size of the U.S. state of Connecticut. The 1945 population of Northern Ireland was 1.3 million people. More than 60 percent of those inhabitants were Protestant, with a majority being Presbyterian. Throughout much of the twentieth century, Northern Ireland witnessed violence between its Protestant and Catholic populations, especially after 1968 when the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a militant group of Catholics advocating a union with the Republic of Ireland, launched a terror campaign in Ulster.

The conflict between the Catholics and Protestants stretches back for centuries. In the early seventeenth century the British effectively conquered Ireland and began sending mainly Scottish Protestants to settle in Ulster. For the next three centuries, Catholics in Ireland agitated for independence. In the twentieth century the British began the process of allowing a modicum of home rule for some of Ireland. When the British partitioned Ireland in 1920 under the Government of Ireland Act, six of the nine Ulster counties in the northeastern section were made a separate political entity, with a parliament at Stormont. During 1921–1939 Northern Ireland struggled economically, and unresolved tensions between Catholics and Protestants continued to plague the region.

Northern Ireland became important to the Allied cause during World War II. When hostilities began, the Irish Free State, under the leadership of Prime Minister Eamon De Valera, announced that it would be a neutral power and denied the British the right to use its ports. In Ulster, however, Britain and the United States established bases for the transport of troops and war matériel. Beginning on 15 April 1941 the Germans launched an attack on Belfast. This aircraft bombing campaign extended over several months, killing more than 1,000 people and destroying significant amounts of property.

When the Irish Free State declared itself a republic in 1949, the British responded by passing the Ireland Act, stipulating that Northern Ireland would only leave the United Kingdom by consent. This act also guaranteed the Irish in Ulster the social benefits enjoyed by people in England, Scotland, and Wales. The majority of Northern Ireland's population was Unionist and wished to remain part of the United Kingdom. The opponents, the Republicans, desired the unity of Ireland under one government. This political division was abetted by the Protestant-Catholic feud and economic tensions (Protestants tended to be better off economically).

Tensions between the two sides continued, but in the two decades following World War II there was little violence. During the same period, Northern Ireland experienced unrest because of a stagnant economy and persistently high unemployment. Problems also arose with London over the

cost of social legislation and fears that the British government might agree to Ireland's unification (in which the majority Protestants of Ulster would be subsumed by a largely Catholic Ireland) if the Irish Republic agreed to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

During the 1960s civil rights groups, in particular the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Associations (NICRA), began to demonstrate in Northern Ireland for equal rights for Roman Catholics. Discrimination there against Catholics was widespread, and many professions were closed to them. Modeling their effort after the American civil rights movement, these protestors adopted nonviolent means to achieve their goal of equality for all.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson's Labour government (1964–1970, 1974–1976) in Britain favored improvements for the Catholic population of Ulster, which put pressure on the government at Stormont to establish measures to alleviate the discrimination and poverty faced by many Catholics. Terence O'Neill, Northern Ireland's prime minister during 1963–1969, introduced several measures to aid the Catholic population. These were insufficient to satisfy the Catholics and went too far for many Protestants. Soon, Catholics and Protestants were fighting one another, especially in Londonderry and in the streets of Belfast, Northern Ireland's capital. The bloodshed reached its zenith in 1969, and the Ulster government requested that the British send troops to augment its police forces.

In 1969 Catholic extremists formed the Provisional IRA. Pledged to uniting Ireland by force, the Provisional IRA waged a terror campaign in Ulster. Militant Protestants, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association, fought back against the IRA.

During 1969–1972 violence in Northern Ireland escalated, culminating in an event that became known as Bloody Sunday. On 30 January 1972, members of NICRA planned to march in the city of Derry to protest the arrest of hundreds of Republicans who were being held without trial. However, authorities banned the march. When the protestors went ahead with their plans, British paratroopers opened fire on the crowd, killing thirteen and wounding fourteen others.

The British government responded to the massacre by closing down the Northern Ireland government and assuming control of Ulster. In 1973 the Provisional IRA began launching terrorist attacks in England. In the ensuing violence during the next twenty years, thousands of people were killed and tens of thousands wounded. The British maintained a military presence in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s and found strong support from the United States, particularly during President Ronald Reagan's administration (1981–1989), which supported the British hard line against the IRA.

In the 1990s peace talks between the warring parties yielded some results, and in 1998 the IRA issued a declaration renouncing violence. On 10 April 1998, all parties signed the Good Friday Agreement, establishing a Northern Ireland Assembly and opening up the possibility for a peaceful solution to the sectarian problems of Ulster.

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See also

Adams, Gerard, Jr.; De Valera, Eamon; Ireland, Republic of; Irish Republican Army; United Kingdom

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Ireland, Republic of

Island nation in the northern Atlantic. Separated from England by the Irish Sea to the east, the Republic of Ireland comprises twenty-six counties and covers 27,135 square miles. It had a 1945 population of approximately 2.9 million people. Ireland was a neutral nation during the Cold War and never joined any military alliances.

From the time of the Great Potato Famine of 1845–1849, which decimated Ireland, the country's population remained below 5 million people. That figure declined throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as many Irish left the country for England and the United States. For centuries the British had controlled Ireland, but in the nineteenth century Irish nationalist groups fought for independence. The conflict between the Irish and the British, often a very deadly one, not only focused on the control of the island but also involved religion. The overwhelming majority of the Irish population was Roman Catholic, while the British population was largely Protestant united under the Church of England. One of the dilemmas confronting the British concerned the Irish Protestants, who lived mostly in the northern part of the island. The Protestants did not wish to live in a united Ireland with a Catholic majority. Thus, by the summer of 1914 civil war loomed, but the outbreak of World War I temporarily halted any further violence.

In 1916 Irish nationalists launched the Easter Rebellion in Dublin, an attempt to overthrow English rule by armed force. The revolt was quickly crushed. Following World War I, however, violence resumed as Catholics and Protestants battled each other, primarily in the north. In an effort to help stem the violence, the British Parliament passed the 1920 Home Rule Bill granting separate legislatures to the southern twenty-six counties and the six northern counties. But the Irish Republicans rejected the bill, and the fighting continued. A year later, in December 1921, the British government signed a treaty with Irish representatives that resulted in the creation of the Irish Free State. As part of the agreement, however, the six counties in the north with Protestant majorities could opt out of home rule. They eventually became part of the United Kingdom.

During World War II Ireland remained neutral. Prime Minister Eamon De Valera announced the government's position early in 1940. Irish neutral-

ity sparked a great deal of controversy, but De Valera maintained this policy, arguing that Ireland was best served by staying out of the conflict. In 1949, Irish Prime Minister John Costello withdrew from the British Commonwealth and declared Ireland a republic. The United Nations (UN) formally granted the Republic of Ireland membership in 1955.

During the Cold War the Republic of Ireland maintained its traditional neutrality. In 1949 the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invited Ireland to join the organization. The invitation touched off a fierce debate in the country over whether joining NATO should be linked to an end of the partition of Ireland. The Irish Republicans, or those who supported a united Ireland, believed that an appeal could be made to the United States that might lead to a unification of the six northern Irish counties with the Republic. However, the U.S. State Department informed the Irish government that the dispute was not a matter for the collective security pact. The Americans were worried about offending the British, and President Harry Truman's administration also expressed concern about the Irish government's refusal to allow the Allies to use its ports during World War II. Nevertheless, the United States considered Irish membership in the collective security agreement important because of Ireland's strategic location and the potential of locating military bases there. Ultimately, Ireland elected not to join NATO.

Although the Irish Republic did not formally join the defense pact, Ireland for the most part sympathized with the West in its struggle against the Soviet Union. The people of Ireland, an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic nation, looked unfavorably upon the antichurch policies of the communist governments in Eastern Europe. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established a liaison with Irish intelligence networks in the mid-1950s, and Irish governments supplied the United States with intelligence information throughout the Cold War. In the UN, the Irish delegation generally voted with the United States and the rest of the Western bloc. Ireland also received financial assistance totaling nearly $150 million from the United States through the Marshall Plan.

Because Ireland did not join NATO, defense of the nation fell solely to its own army. Sean MacBride, the minister of external affairs, visited both Great Britain and the United States in 1950 in hopes of gaining some military assistance, but his efforts were rebuffed. The armed forces of Ireland were relatively small because the government could not afford to pay for a large military establishment. Government expenditures were modest, as Ireland was one of the poorest nations in Europe. The nation had never industrialized and lacked many key natural resources, leaving its economy stagnant until the 1970s. Ireland joined the European Union (EU) in 1973 and thereafter began receiving subsidies from the EU, which helped expand its economy.

Irish support of U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union helped Ireland secure from Washington a commitment in the late 1970s that the United States would ensure Ireland's central role in the peace talks concerning Northern Ireland. As the Cold War wound down in the late 1980s, Ireland

began to prosper economically and also took on a greater role in international affairs.

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See also

De Valera, Eamon; Ireland, Northern; United Kingdom

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Irish Republican Army

Irish paramilitary organization whose aim was to force home rule and national unity, often linked with Sinn Féin. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) descends from the Irish Volunteers, a militia group founded by Irish nationalists during the Home Rule Crisis of 1912–1914. In 1914, the nationalists and the Irish Volunteers split over the issue of the recruitment of Irishmen for the British Army. A small group of Volunteers, who had strong ties to the radical Irish Republican Brotherhood, rejected cooperation with Britain and, in 1916, organized the Easter Rebellion. The rebellion failed, but Britain's heavy-handed reaction and, later, its plans to introduce conscription in Ireland eventually gained for republicanism and its political and military institutions—Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army—the popular support that the revolt did not generate.

By 1919, Sinn Féin claimed to be Ireland's legitimate government, while the IRA openly challenged the forces of the British Crown. In 1921, the war-weary British began negotiations with Sinn Féin that produced the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, granting dominion status to an Irish Free State that would govern Ireland except for six Ulster counties. Die-hard republicans, however, led by Sinn Féin leader Eamon De Valera, rejected the treaty as a surrender of republican principles and declared themselves Ireland's only legitimate government. In the consequent civil war (1922–1923) the IRA, loyal to De Valera, was defeated but nonetheless refused to surrender.

Die-hard republicans, however, led by Sinn Féin leader Eamon De Valera, rejected the treaty as a surrender of republican principles and declared themselves Ireland's only legitimate government.

The IRA's fortunes then began a precipitous decline. De Valera abandoned Sinn Féin in 1926 to form Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny), a political party dedicated to advancing republicanism through conventional political arrangements. In 1932 Fianna Fail formed a government under De Valera, who rewarded republicans who accepted his constitutionalism and punished those who did not. He banned the IRA in 1936, and two years later the moribund Sinn Féin ceded its political authority to the IRA leadership. Responding to IRA actions in 1939, governments in Dublin, Belfast, and London



A group of young Irish Republican Army Catholic supporters attack British Army patrol vehicles on a street in the Catholic area of Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1972. (Leif Skoogfors/Corbis)

adopted strong security measures that, by 1945, had pushed the IRA to the verge of extinction.

Over the next decade, strong leadership revived the IRA, but the offensive launched in Northern Ireland in 1956, the so-called Border Campaign, ended ignominiously in 1962. Afterward, a coterie of IRA leaders steeped in revolutionary Marxist theory and attracted to political, not military, action took control of the organization and ousted many of those responsible for the Border Campaign.

The outbreak of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland during the summer of 1969 created another breach in Irish republicanism, yet the IRA's leadership chose to continue in their political direction. In response, those favoring the IRA's traditional military approach—the majority of the IRA, as it turned out—formed the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Féin in December 1969. The Provos, as they came to be called, almost immediately came to dominate republicanism; for its part, the official IRA dumped its arms in 1972 and faded into relative obscurity by the decade's end. After the split, the term "IRA" actually referred to the Provos.

The Provisional IRA launched a far-reaching campaign of violence in the hopes of forcing a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, although a lack of modern weapons and a strong British response hampered this effort. Consequently, the IRA adopted the long-war strategy in the mid-1970s;

thereafter, The Troubles, as the conflict in Ireland and Britain was known, settled into a dispiriting pattern of terrorism, failed negotiations, military operations, and reprisals. In the early 1980s, the IRA adopted a bullet-and-ballot strategy, thrusting Sinn Féin into conventional politics in Ireland and Northern Ireland while continuing its military operations. This shift eventually caused another split in the republican movement, with the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Féin breaking away in 1986.

By the early 1990s, the IRA–Sinn Féin leadership acknowledged that a military victory was unattainable. Encouraged by Sinn Féin's political successes on both sides of the border, the leadership announced a formal cessation of military operations in 1994. In February 1997, the IRA broke the cease-fire but resumed it after only five months. The 1998 Belfast Agreement guaranteed Sinn Féin a place in Northern Ireland's government and provided for numerous governmental reforms. The IRA, however, refuses to disarm completely, and thus the shadow of the gunman still falls across Irish politics as it has for more than ninety years.

Scott Belliveau

See also

Adams, Gerard, Jr.; De Valera, Eamon; Ireland, Northern; Ireland, Republic of; Paisley, Ian; Sinn Féin; United Kingdom

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"Iron Curtain" Speech

See "Sinews of Peace" Speech

Ishibashi Tanzan

(1884–1973)

Japanese journalist, editor, Liberal Democratic Party politician, and prime minister of Japan (December 1956–February 1957). Born in Tokyo on 25 September 1884, Ishibashi Tanzan studied philosophy at Waseda University. He became an editor of the *Tōyō Keizai Shinpō* (Oriental Economic Journal) in 1911 and eventually president of the publishing house of Tōyō Keizai Shinpō. As a journalist deeply committed to liberalism and influenced by Keynesian economic theory, he steadfastly opposed Japan's expansionism and its growing militarism.

In May 1946 Ishibashi became finance minister in the first Yoshida Shigeru cabinet. During his tenure Ishibashi promoted expansionary fiscal policies, which were consequently criticized by the Allied occupation General Headquarters (GHQ) as promoting inflation. Conflict with the GHQ led to his absence from public office during May 1947–June 1951.

Meanwhile, in the face of the 1950–1953 Korean War, Ishibashi advanced the idea of limited Japanese military rearmament. While out of office, his opposition to Yoshida brought him into close association with Hatoyama Ichirō, and in December 1954 Ishibashi was appointed minister of international trade and industry in the Hatoyama cabinet. In this capacity, Ishibashi promoted trade expansion with the People's Republic of China (PRC) by encouraging private trade relations.

After Hatoyama's 1956 retirement, Ishibashi was elected president of the Liberal Democratic Party and formed his own cabinet in December 1956. As prime minister, he proposed further trade with the PRC, with the ultimate aim of normalizing bilateral relations. After only two months in office, however, he resigned because of illness.

Ishibashi continued to maintain his interest in improving Japan's relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union. He visited Beijing in 1959 and 1963 and traveled to the USSR in 1964. In his later years, he advocated a peace alliance that would include China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Ishibashi died in Tokyo on 25 April 1973.

Tomoki Kuniyoshi

See also

Hatoyama Ichirō; Japan; Kishi Nobusuke; Yoshida Shigeru

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Israel

Middle Eastern state covering 8,019 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of Massachusetts. With a 1948 (the year of its founding) population of approximately 1.2 million people, Israel borders on Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea to the west, Syria and Jordan to the east, and Lebanon to the north.

Modern Israel dates from the end of World War I and the resulting defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Based on the secret wartime Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France to partition Turkish Middle Eastern territory, France was to secure control of Lebanon and Syria, with Britain receiving Palestine and Iraq. Following the Allied victory, the Paris Peace

Six-Day War, 1967

Conference awarded these areas as mandates under the new League of Nations, envisioning their ultimate independence.

The war also prompted the Zionist movement of Jews seeking a nation-state in Palestine. In order to enlist the support of international Jewry during the war effort, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917. The declaration announced London's support for the creation of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine. The parameters of this home were not spelled out. In 1922 Britain split Palestine into Transjordan east of the Jordan River and Palestine to the west. The Jewish homeland would be in Palestine. There were several schemes for achieving this while balancing the interests of the Arab population with those of the Jewish minority and the goals of the Zionist movement. Contradictory British assurances to both sides failed to satisfy either the Zionists or the Arabs, however. Meanwhile, increasing numbers of European Jews arrived in Palestine and purchased land there, leading to Arab-Jewish rioting that the British authorities were not always able to control.

Events immediately before and during World War II accelerated the Jewish migration to Palestine. Adolf Hitler's persecution of the Jews in Germany as well as anti-Semitism in Poland and elsewhere led to increasing Jewish migration and interest in a Jewish state. Once the war began, Hitler embarked on a conscientious effort to exterminate world Jewry. During the Nazi-inspired Holocaust an estimated 6 million Jews perished. Late in the war and afterward, many of the survivors sought to immigrate to Israel. The great lesson of World War II for Jews was that they could not rely on other nations; they would require their own independent state. The Holocaust also created in the West a sense of moral obligation for the creation of such a state. At the same time, however, the Arabs of Palestine were adamantly opposed to the implantation of a large foreign population in their midst.

After World War II, Jewish refugees and displaced persons streamed into Palestine, many of them only to be turned away by British naval ships patrolling Palestine's Mediterranean coast just for this purpose. At the same time, the British authorities wrestled with partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Jews and Arabs proved intransigent, and in February 1947 after both rejected a final proposal for partition, Britain turned the problem over to the United Nations (UN). In November the UN General Assembly passed its own resolution to partition Palestine, with Jerusalem to be under a UN trusteeship. While the Jews accepted this arrangement, the Arabs rejected it.

In December 1945 the Arab League council announced that it would halt the creation of a Jewish state by force. The Arabs then began raids against Jewish communities in Palestine. The United States, with the world's largest and wealthiest Jewish population, became the chief champion and most reliable ally of the Jews. This position would, however, cost the United States dearly in its relations with the Arab world and would also influence Cold War geopolitics.

In January 1948 London announced its intention to withdraw from Palestine. This precipitous British policy led to war. The British completed the

A mother flees with her family from a destroyed block of buildings in the Jewish section of Jerusalem during the Israeli War for Independence in 1948. (Library of Congress)

pullout on 14 May 1948, and that same day David Ben-Gurion, executive chairman and defense minister of the Jewish Agency, declared the existence of the independent Jewish state of Israel. Ben-Gurion became the first prime minister, a post he held during 1948–1953 and 1955–1963.

At first, the interests of the United States and those of the Soviet Union regarding the Jewish state converged. U.S. recognition of Israel came only shortly before that of the Soviet Union. Officials in Moscow found common ground with the Jews in their suffering at the hands of the Nazis in the war and also identified with the socialism espoused by the early Jewish settlers in Palestine as well as with their anti-British stance. The Cold War, the re-emergence of official anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, and Moscow's desire to court the Arab states by supporting Arab nationalism against the West would soon change all that.

The Israeli independence proclamation led immediately to fighting. In the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948–1949, hard-pressed Israeli forces managed to stave off the far more numerous and better-equipped but poorly organized and inadequately trained Arab forces. In the process, many Palestinians living in Israel either fled or were forced out of the territory.

Soviet military support for Egypt and Syria led to increased U.S. military support for Israel. The rise of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser only exacerbated the situation. Trumpeting Arab nationalism, Nasser blockaded Israeli ships in the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel's access to the Indian Ocean. Egypt also supported cross-border raids into Israeli territory by *fedayeen,* or guerrilla fighters. Nasser's turn to the Soviet Union for arms led to the withdrawal of U.S. support for his pet project of constructing a high dam at Aswan on the Nile. This led him to nationalize the Suez Canal. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was determined to topple Nasser, and a coalition of Britain, France, and Israel then formed. Leaders of the three states developed secret plans whereby Israel would invade Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and move to the canal. Britain and France would then use this as an excuse to introduce military forces into the canal zone.

At the end of October 1956, Israeli forces swept into the Sinai, easily destroying Egyptian forces there. When Nasser's response to French and British demands proved unsatisfactory, their forces also invaded Egypt from Cyprus. Although the Soviet Union threatened to send volunteers, it was the strong opposition of the United States and heavy economic pressure brought to bear on Britain that proved decisive. All three powers subsequently withdrew their forces, greatly strengthening Nasser despite the abysmal showing of his armed forces. Israel was one of the chief winners of the 1956 war. It had cleaned out the *fedayeen* bases and secured a buffer of UN observers in the Sinai. It also ended the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Soviet Union made good on Egyptian material losses from the war and, over the next decade, sent considerable quantities of additional arms to the Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In May 1967, Nasser moved Egyptian troops into the Sinai and ordered out the UN observers who served as a buffer with Israel. Believing that they would soon be attacked, Israeli leaders ordered a preemptive strike. On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Air Force wiped out most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and then struck the Syrians. Although Israel made a bid for Jordan to stay out of the war, that country joined the fighting against Israel and paid a heavy price for it. The Israelis won the so-called Six-Day War and, in the process, seized the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank of the Jordan River along with Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

On 6 October 1973, at the start of the Jewish holy days of Yom Kippur, Egypt, now led by Anwar Sadat, launched a surprise attack on Israel. Joined by Syrian forces, the Egyptians caught the Israeli government of Prime Minister Golda Meier (1969–1974) by surprise and crossed over the Suez Canal, then took up defensive positions to destroy



A modern view of Jerusalem including the Western Wall, a site holy to Jews as the last remaining wall of the Second Temple, and the Dome of the Rock, a site holy to Muslims as part of the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex. (Corel)

much of the counterattacking Israeli armor with Soviet-supplied antitank missiles. Ultimately, however, the Israelis beat back the Arab attacks. Having recrossed the canal, the Israelis were in position to drive on to Cairo. Both sides then agreed to a cease-fire.

Israel appeared menaced on all flanks except the Mediterranean. But in 1979 Sadat, dismayed by the inability of Washington to pressure Israel into concessions, took the unprecedented step of traveling to Israel in November 1977, eventually leading to the Camp David Agreement of September 1978 and a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel. Begun in 1979, Israel completed a withdrawal of the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. Syria, meanwhile, had moved closer to the Soviet Union, and the Syrians then moved into Lebanon in support of Palestinians there and the Lebanese Muslims. This produced civil war in Lebanon, and following the shelling of Israeli settlements from southern Lebanon, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1982. In September 1983, Israeli forces withdrew to the Awali River. During 1987–1991, Israeli security forces had to deal with a wide-scale uprising by Palestinians known as the Intifada within Israeli-occupied territory in the West Bank and Gaza. The end of the Cold War brought a large influx of hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union. Despite peace between Egypt and Israel, at the end of the Cold War a general Middle Eastern peace agreement remained illusive.

Domestically, the Israeli state was organized along the British parliamentary model, with the executive (cabinet) selected by the Knesset (parliament) and subject to it. Israel also had a system of proportional representation in which seats in the Knesset were based on the percentage of votes received. Even parties receiving relatively few votes had representatives in the Knesset. Such parties included those representing the Arab population, those espousing various degrees of Jewish orthodoxy, the communists, and Revisionist Zionist groups.

Until 1977 the Mapai-Labor Party controlled the Knesset. It had deep roots in the socialist movements in Eastern Europe. Mapai-Labor assumed that the party and state were coterminous. Through control of the kibbutz movement of socialist communes, the massive social welfare system of the Histadrut, the powerful military and paramilitary organizations that became the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the leadership of the Jewish Agency before independence, and sufficient seats in the Knesset, Mapai-Labor leaders such as Ben-Gurion, Meir, and Moshe Dayan dominated Israeli politics for three decades after independence. The party was strongly secular in orientation. IDF chiefs of staff often became prime ministers, and it was common for Mapai-Labor leaders to rotate from military command to seats in the Knesset, leadership posts in the Histadrut, and cabinet ministries.

The chief opposition party in these years was the Likud. It supported a Greater Israel and had strong roots in Zionists opposed to the British mandate. It also espoused capitalism over socialism and was a voice for the growing Jewish immigrant population, including those from the Soviet Union. The religious Jewish parties were the wild cards in Israeli politics. Their agendas included introduction of orthodox Jewish traditions as the basis for Israeli law. These ranged from determinations of who could be defined as Jewish

and thus were entitled to settle in the state, the strict observation of the Sabbath, and such issues as marriage and divorce and exemption from military service. Such parties exercised undue influence because proportional representation required any party with a plurality of seats in the Knesset to obtain the support of smaller parties. Until 1977 Mapai-Labor was able to form governments by making concessions to the religious parties and those farther to the Left. When the Likud Party took control in 1977, it had to form coalitions with minority parties in much the same fashion as had Mapai-Labor. This allowed the religious parties to continue to influence policy. Mapai-Labor continued to be a force as, at times, the Likud had to include Mapai-Labor in its coalition governments.

Israel's international relations did not change much when power passed from Mapai-Labor to Likud to coalition governments. Israel consistently relied on the United States, which regularly made the Jewish state its largest foreign aid recipient. Ironically, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) was an important support for Israel in its early years. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's government extended billions of dollars in assistance in recognition of the crimes that Nazi Germany had committed against world Jewry during World War II. France, which had been a chief supporter and arms supplier to the Jewish state, became estranged from Israel following the 1967 War when an angry President Charles de Gaulle withdrew French military assistance as a consequence of the preemptive Israeli attack.

From an internal perspective, the chief issues for Israel have been disputes over whether Israel should be a secular or religious state (in the West Bank, Jews may soon well be a minority) and over the makeup of Israeli territory. There has also been a continuing war against terrorism and suicide bombers. The 2005 Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip by a government led by the expansionist Likud Party reflects these ongoing debates and concerns. Israeli voters remained keenly interested in such issues as the role of the Orthodox minority, the rights of Israeli Arabs, the fate of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, and the ups and downs of the economy.

Daniel E. Spector and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Begin, Menachem; Ben-Gurion, David; Israel, Armed Forces; Meir, Golda; Middle East; Suez Crisis

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Israel, Armed Forces

Since 1948, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has become one of the most effective and respected military forces in the world. Israel claimed to have no territorial ambitions, and its military strategy during the Cold War was essentially defensive, supported by offensive tactics. The IDF consisted of a regular tactical air force, a regular coastal navy, and a small standing army with a large and well-trained reserve, an early warning capability, and efficient mobilization and transportation systems.

The IDF's approach to war-fighting was based on the premise that Israel could not lose a single war. Given Israel's experience and the intentions of its more hostile neighbors, there can be little doubt of the validity of that assumption. Israel tried to avoid war through a combination of political engagements and the maintenance of a powerful military deterrent.

In six major wars beginning with the 1948 War of Independence and during seemingly never-ending occupation duty and counterterrorist actions into 2005, 21,951 Israeli military personnel have been killed in the line of duty. During that same time period the IDF, always fighting outnumbered, inflicted many times more that number of casualties on its enemies. The IDF continually strove to maintain an advantage in advanced weapons systems, many of which were developed and manufactured in Israel. The IDF's major strategic advantage, however, has always been the quality and discipline of its soldiers.

The IDF was the backbone institution of Israel. Most Israelis were inducted into the IDF at age eighteen. Unmarried women served for two years, while men served for three years. Following initial service, men remained in the reserves until age fifty-one and single women until age twenty-four. Most reservists served for thirty-nine days a year, except during emergencies. More than 10 percent of Israel's gross domestic product (GDP) went to military expenditures.

IDF officers who retired or otherwise left active duty retained reserve commissions and were subject to recall in time of war. Ariel Sharon, for example, commanded a division in the 1967 Six-Day War, retired as a major general in 1973, and was recalled only a few months later and put in command of a division in the Yom Kippur War. IDF general officers were a major force in Israeli society. Many went into politics after retirement. Indeed, several Israeli prime ministers have been IDF generals.

Although Israel never formally admitted to having nuclear weapons, most of the world assumed that it did. With French support, Israel constructed its first nuclear reactor in 1960. The IDF probably acquired nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s. Most estimates place Israel's nuclear stockpile at between 100 and 200 weapons, including warheads for the Jericho-1 and

Israeli troops withdrawing from the Suez Canal area of Egypt in 1974 in accordance with an agreement reached by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. (Corel)

Jericho-2 mobile missiles and bombs for longer-range delivery by Israeli aircraft.

Immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel on 28 May 1948, the government issued the Defense Army of Israel Ordinance No. 4, establishing the IDF and merging all Jewish fighting organizations under it. Immediately thereafter, David Marcus, a U.S. Army Reserve colonel and World War II veteran, received a commission as Israel's first *aluf* (general).

Although the IDF essentially absorbed the General Staff and combat units of the Haganah (the self-defense militia of the Jews in Palestine), the integration of other more radical militias was difficult and protracted. The Stern Gang, also known as Lehi, dissolved itself, and its members joined the IDF individually. Some battalions of the Irgun (also called the IZL) joined the IDF, while others fought on independently. The turning point came when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion ordered the IDF to sink the IZL's arms ship *Altalena* as it approached Tel Aviv in June 1948. It was a defining moment for the new State of Israel and established the authority of the central government. The remaining IZL battalions finally disbanded in September 1948.

The IDF recognizes six major wars for which it awards campaign ribbons. The 1948 War of Independence started immediately after the declaration of statehood, as Egypt attacked from the south, Syria and Lebanon attacked

October War, 1973



from the north, and Jordan—backed by Iraqi and Saudi troops—attacked from the east. Outnumbered almost sixty to one in population, Israel's prospects looked bleak. By the time of the cease-fire in July 1949, however, the IDF had managed to secure all of its major objectives, with the exception of East Jerusalem.

In 1956 the second of Israel's major wars began when the IDF launched a full-scale attack into the Sinai Peninsula. French and British forces then invaded Egypt, having secretly planned the operation with the Israelis to take back control of the Suez Canal from Egypt and topple Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the operation, the IDF captured Gaza and the entire Sinai Peninsula but later withdrew under international pressure.

In 1967 Egypt massed 100,000 troops in the Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships. In response, the IDF launched a preemptive strike on 5 June, virtually destroying the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. The Israeli Air Force then attacked Syria and Jordan. During the Six-Day War, the IDF again captured the Sinai and Gaza. The Egyptians lost some 15,000 soldiers, while only 338 Israelis died. The IDF also captured the strategic Golan Heights from Syria and captured East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank from Jordan. Following the Six-Day War, the war of attrition ground on with the Egyptians along the Suez Canal and with the Syrians along the northern borders.

The Yom Kippur War began on 6 October 1973 when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on the eve of the most important Jewish religious day. Just prior to the start of the war, the active IDF numbered some 75,000 troops, with one-third being regulars and the rest conscripts and reservists undergoing training. The ground forces could field fifteen brigades, but not all were at full operational strength.

Upon mobilization, total IDF strength grew to 310,000, with the army capable of fielding more than thirty brigades, which were combined into divisional task forces for combat. In the Golan Heights, the IDF deployed three divisions consisting of eleven brigades. In the Sinai, it fielded four divisions with seventeen brigades. The combined force of the attacking Arab armies totaled more than 820,000 troops.

The IDF's mixture of major weapons systems was a logistician's nightmare. Almost half of its 2,000 tanks were British Centurions. Another 600 were a combination of more modern American M-60s and older M-48s that had been locally modified and up-gunned. Another 250 were old World War II–era American M-4 Shermans that the Israelis had completely rebuilt and up-gunned to create the Super-Sherman. The IDF also fielded some 250 Soviet T-54s and T-55s, captured from the Arab armies in 1967. The IDF had only 100 antitank guided missiles. The Arab armies had almost 2,100, including the Soviet AT-3 Sagger.

The IDF's 4,000 armored personnel carriers were a mixture of World War II–era half-tracks, modern American M-113s, and various Soviet APCs captured in 1967. The IDF's weakest link was its artillery, which consisted of only 575 tubes (as opposed to 6,700 Arab guns). The IDF mainstay was the 155mm howitzer, either the American self-propelled M-109 or the locally

produced Soltam, mounted on a Sherman tank chassis. The IDF also had captured Soviet pieces plus a few American-built self-propelled, long-range 175mm M-107s.

The IDF had 1,000 air defense guns against 6,000 for the Arab armies. More significantly, the Arabs had almost 5,000 Soviet shoulder-fired SA-7 antiaircraft missiles, while the IDF had no equivalent weapon system. The Israeli Air Force possessed about 500 combat aircraft, including 130 American-built F-4 Phantoms, 170 A-4 Skyhawks, and an assortment of older French Mirages. The Arabs had more than 1,600 combat aircraft. The Israeli Navy at the start of the Yom Kippur War had 5 submarines, 21 coastal patrol boats, and 10 heavy landing craft.

Initially the IDF took heavy losses, but after U.S.-airlifted weapons and supplies started arriving on 14 October, the tide turned. The IDF pushed the Egyptians and Syrians back to their original lines. On the Golan Heights, some 150 Israeli tanks stopped more than 1,400 Syrian armored vehicles. By the time the war stopped under international pressure, the IDF had suffered 2,700 dead while inflicting more than 15,000 deaths on its enemies.

On the Golan Heights, some 150 Israeli tanks stopped more than 1,400 Syrian armored vehicles.

The IDF's most famous special operation came on 3–4 July 1976 when the elite Sayeret Matkal (also known as General Staff Reconnaissance Unit 269) rescued Israeli passengers held hostage at the Entebbe airport in Uganda after their plane was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists. The complex operation managed to save eighty of the eighty-three passengers. The only IDF casualty was the operational commander, Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu, whose brother Benjamin Netanyahu later became prime minister.

On 7 June 1981 the Israeli Air Force destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. Although almost universally condemned in international circles at the time, this preemptive strike almost certainly neutralized Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program.

The IDF's most recent major war during the Cold War era came in 1982 when, in Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE, the IDF invaded southern Lebanon on 6 June in retaliation for Palestinian terrorist and rocket attacks launched from Lebanon's territory against Israeli civilian targets in the north. Although the IDF neutralized the Palestinian threat, it became bogged down in a long and grinding occupation of southern Lebanon that only ended in September 2000. The reputation of the IDF also suffered severely from the 16 September 1982 massacre at the Sabra and Shatilia refugee camps, which many international figures branded as war crimes. During 1987–1993 the IDF also performed stability operations during the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising).

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) was one of the strongest in the Middle East, and with much justification its pilots have been considered the best in the world. Since the IAF began in 1948, its pilots have shot down 687 enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat. Only 23 Israeli aircraft have been shot down in air-to-air combat, giving the IAF an incredible 30:1 victory ratio.

The Israeli Navy, also formed in 1948, operated in two unconnected bodies of water. Its main base on the Mediterranean was Haifa, while its main base on the Red Sea was at Eilat. Its three principal operating units were

the Missile Boats Flotilla, the Submarine Flotilla, and Shayetet 13, a naval special operations force similar to the U.S. Navy's SEALs.

David T. Zabecki

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Hussein, Saddam; Israel; Middle East; Suez Crisis

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Italy

Southern European nation. A long, boot-shaped peninsula, Italy covers 116,305 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Arizona, and includes the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. It is bordered by the Tyrrhenian Sea to the west, the Adriatic Sea to the east, the Ionian Sea to the south, and by France, Switzerland, Austria, and Slovenia to the north. Its 1945 population was approximately 45 million people.

At the end of World War II Italy found itself in political limbo, having entered the war as a German ally in 1940 but having switched sides after signing an armistice with the Allies in September 1943. The collapse of fascism and the chaos and civil war that followed the armistice shattered the already fragile fabric of the Italian political system, strengthening those forces that called for its complete overhaul. With an antiquated economic system still heavily reliant on its agricultural sector, Italy also suffered from a number of structural problems that the war had only compounded. In short, at the end of the war the country was ripe for a major transformation of its economic, political, and social institutions.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) benefited from this situation and by 1948 had become Italy's second largest political party. For the remainder of the Cold War it continued to occupy an important political place, remaining a constant source of weakness in the nation's otherwise Western orientation. Italy's experience in the Cold War can thus be described as an uneasy effort of its ruling class to make up for the defeat in World War II and restore the country's international status, while keeping at bay the PCI's attempt to influence the country's political orientation. As in France, the communist vote

in Italy was more a declaration of dissatisfaction with economic conditions and endemic political instability and corruption than a statement against Italy's Western orientation.

In the immediate postwar years, Italy's primary goals were to redefine its political system and to avoid a punitive peace treaty. The first objective was accomplished with the June 1946 referendum abolishing the monarchy and introducing the republic. The second goal was only partially achieved, as the 1947 Paris Conference produced a treaty that Italians believed too harsh for the nation that after September 1943 had been at war against Germany and whose population, at least in the north, had suffered under the brutality of Nazi occupation.

Until early 1947, the country was run by a government that rested upon a tentative truce between centrist and left-wing political parties—almost a small-scale replica of the antifascist alliance among the great powers. The coalition labored to restore a shattered economy and heal the social and political wounds of the war. By early 1947, however, Italy's Christian Democratic (DC) Premier Alcide De Gasperi believed that his cabinet could not fully tackle the tasks of reconstruction without a clear redefinition of its political orientation, and by May he formed a new government without the communist and socialist parties. His initiative, which almost overlapped the launching of the U.S. Marshall Plan, coincided with the deepening of the Cold War and ushered in a most serious debate over the country's future, which lasted until the crucial elections of April 1948.

Under pressure from Moscow, which had formed the Cominform to galvanize resistance against the Marshall Plan, the PCI launched a wave of protests in the fall of 1947. Rumors of a potential coup began to circulate, and the run-up to the elections took place in a tense climate. Both Moscow and Washington were heavily involved in the electoral campaign, providing covert financial assistance to their Italian allies and also assisting them with propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The 1948 elections therefore became one of the main battles of the early Cold War, and the stunning success of the DC came to be regarded in Washington as a demonstration that covert operations were a successful tool for fighting internal Soviet subversion.

The DC victory at the polls stabilized the domestic front for a few years but above all set the pattern of Italian relations with Washington for much of the Cold War. The Americans came to be seen as an indispensable ally for containing the PCI on the domestic front, providing a military guarantee against the Soviet Union, and balancing Italian power vis-à-vis other West European countries. Concern over a possible increase of communist influence, on the other hand, spurred Washington to retain a deep interest in Italian politics and to provide assistance to the Italian government on both the international and the domestic levels.

After signing on to the Marshall Plan in 1948, Italy was able to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949, thanks to American and French support and in spite of serious skepticism among the other members. Shortly afterward, Italy also joined the Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel Community, and in spring 1951 De Gasperi gave

his support to the French initiative for a European Defense Community. NATO and European integration became the two pillars of Italy's Cold War foreign policy, part of an effort to establish an overall Western identity for a country whose society remained deeply divided. Thus, throughout the Cold War domestic and international politics would remain deeply intertwined, and many foreign policy initiatives were conceived with a keen eye toward stabilizing the domestic scene.

In the 1950s a strong, sometimes virulent, anticommunism on the domestic front was coupled with a high-profile foreign policy that strove to reassert the country's full legitimacy as a Western power. This led to the decisions to join the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in March 1957 as well as to the deployment of the NATO Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in 1955 and to the acceptance of the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in July 1958. These last two choices became the basis for Italy's nuclear policy. Faced with the challenge to its status posed by the diffusion of nuclear weapons, Italy shunned a possible national option and focused on acquiring some form of control over the new weapons in the multilateral context of the Atlantic Alliance.

Fiat Motor Works automotive production in Italy. Postwar manufacturing, including that of the Fiat company, was aided by the Marshall Plan, which helped finance economic restoration in Europe after World War II. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Following a decade of sweeping economic growth that turned Italy into a fully industrialized economy, in the early 1960s the domestic scenario began to change when the DC resolved to accept the Socialist Party (PSI) as a coalition partner. This occurred, however, only after a prolonged debate about the reliability of the socialists because of their previous cooperation with the communists. The new coalition was meant to isolate the PCI by draining it of most of its support through the implementation of much-needed political and social reforms, which would complete the modernization of the country brought about by its stunning economic transformation.

The new center-leftist coalition, however, failed to enact many of the reforms that it had been planning, and by the end of the decade the PCI was stronger than it had been at the beginning. Besides, the new PSI-DC alliance found it hard to adapt to the contradictions of the new international climate of détente: the socialists were critical of the U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam, while the DCs and other moderates found it difficult to accept those aspects of détente that, like the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, implied a second-rank status for Italy in the international system.

In the 1970s the old, rigid certainties of the Cold War gave way to a much more uncertain geopolitical situation. Détente between the superpowers was mirrored by a guarded dialogue between the DC and the PCI, which searched for a political formula to go beyond the shortcomings of the center-leftist faction. They also sought to stabilize a disastrous economic situation and to fight a wave of left- and right-wing terrorism that threatened to break

the foundations of Italian democracy. The PCI strove to present itself as a legitimate Western political force, but the deeply ingrained suspicions—both domestic and international—of its intentions could not be overcome. The so-called historical compromise between the two largest Italian political forces never went beyond its infant stage, and with the refueling of the Cold War in the late 1970s, Italy once again had to adapt its domestic politics to the new exigencies of the international system. A renewed center-leftist coalition based on a DC-PSI alliance and on the exclusion of the PCI as well as a return to a high-profile foreign policy opened a new era of Italian politics. This development was best symbolized by the decision of the Bettino Craxi government to go ahead with the highly contentious deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in Italy in December 1983.

Italy remained a political battleground between East and West throughout most of the Cold War. Although its Western orientation was probably no longer in doubt after the elections of 1948, its reliability often came under close scrutiny because of the presence of the strongest communist party in Western Europe and because of the government's incapacity to reduce communist influence and stabilize the political system. The difficult democracy, however, survived most of its challenges.

Leopoldo Nuti

See also

Craxi, Benedetto; De Gasperi, Alcide; Eurocommunism; European Coal and Steel Community; European Integration Movement; European Union; Italy, Armed Forces; Missiles, Cruise; Paris Peace Conference and Treaties; Red Brigades

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Italy, Armed Forces

The Italian military situation following World War II was problematic. The nation had initiated hostilities in June 1940 as a member of the Axis along with Germany and Japan, but upon signing an armistice in September 1943 Italy joined the Allies in the capacity of cobelligerent. Great Britain and the

United States soon sought to reequip the Italian armed forces—hitherto supplied by an extensive national armaments industry—with matériel largely from Allied sources while undertaking an ambitious restructuring of their former enemy's army, air force, and navy based on their own respective military cultures.

Italy's postwar control over its armed forces, now limited to defending national borders and maintaining internal security, was reestablished in November 1945. As the Allies' ensuing troop reductions led to an increase of their surplus stores depots in the country, some of this matériel, in turn, supplied the now smaller (held to a maximum of 185,000 troops and 200 tanks) Italian Army. The Carabinieri (the state military police corps), still outfitted with Italian equipment, increased its ranks to 65,000 (doubling its 1938 numbers) in anticipation of the task of maintaining civil order. The Italian Air Force (IAF) had received obsolete Allied aircraft as early as April 1944, and by April 1947 it was permitted to maintain a strength of no more than 25,000 men operating 200 fighter planes and 150 unarmed aircraft of British and U.S. manufacture.

The Italian Navy, despite its considerable wartime losses, was still regarded by some Allies as a potential regional threat, so its fleet was subsequently reduced to a total of 67,000 tons (and 25,000 men) by provisions of the February 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, which also called for the transfer of Italian warships as reparations to France, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, plus the disposal of all Italian submarines. Its two newest remaining battleships, the *Italia* (ex-*Littorio*) and the *Vittorio Veneto*, were transferred to Great Britain and the United States, respectively, which sold them forthwith for scrapping, carried out in Italian yards.

During 1948–1954, the Italian armed forces underwent a modest rearmament, facilitated by the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) after Italy's 1949 inclusion as a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Italian Army replaced its obsolete U.S. M-4 tanks with the M-47 model, and British Vampire jets in 1950 replaced the Spitfires, P-51s, P-47s, and P-38s in the air force. In 1951–1952 the United States began supplying Italy with F-84 and F-86 fighters as well as C-119 transports. From 1948, the navy was ceded British and U.S. minesweepers and patrol craft to augment its posttreaty leavings, and in 1952 the Americans transferred to the Italians two destroyers, three destroyer escorts, and an assortment of amphibious vessels.

After 1955 the Italian armaments industry began augmenting U.S.-supplied and -shared NATO military hardware with such products as the FIAT G 91 jet fighter and several license-built versions of the F-104 Starfighter, which would see frontline service with the IAF until joined in 1983 by the Tornado multirole combat aircraft. Italian shipyards by the late 1950s once again built new submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes (also supplying some to NATO and other navies), while converting some older indigenous warships for modern roles as antisubmarine or antiaircraft vessels armed with U.S. launchers and missiles. By 1965 the 40,000-strong navy comprised some 150 units in five divisions.

In 1958 the Italian Army joined the United States in manning Jupiter missile emplacements in Italy, initiating a brief nuclear weapons-sharing arrangement that ended with the withdrawal in 1962 by the United States of the Jupiters from Italian soil. Through 1974 Italy fielded two battalions of Honest John surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), whose nuclear warheads remained under U.S. control, superseded by the Lance SSM. The navy's Alfa Project, begun in 1971 to develop an independent nuclear ship-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), had reached the test phase by 1973–1974, but further development was canceled upon Italy's 1975 signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

By 1985 the army had reached a strength of 270,000 personnel, operating some 1,770 tanks (500 M-47s, 300 M-60s, and 970 Leopards), and in the same year the navy commissioned the aircraft carrier *Giuseppe Garibaldi*, but negotiations to overcome erstwhile IAF proscriptions regarding shipboard fixed-wing naval aviation delayed delivery of its complement of Harrier jets until 1992. During the 1980s Italian warships maintained their NATO tasks of joint operations, patrolling Mediterranean shipping lanes and escorting the U.S. Sixth Fleet in and beyond the area.

Despite its internal political vicissitudes during the period of the Cold War, Italy showed consistent support of U.S. policies and sustained a high level of participation in NATO in spite of its modest defense expenditures relative to other member nations. Italian military support for emergency relief and international peacekeeping included airlift activities during the 1956 Suez Crisis as well as in the 1960–1964 Congo Civil War (where thirteen IAF C-119 crew members were massacred in 1961). Since 1978 Italian troops have been a component of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in 1990, for the first time in forty-five years, IAF aircraft and pilots deployed in military operations, joining coalition forces after the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also

Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in; Italy; Military Balance; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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J

Jagan, Cheddi
(1918–1997)

Guyanese nationalist politician, founder of the People's Progressive Party (PPP), premier of British Guiana (1953, 1951–1964), and president of the independent nation of Guyana (1992–1997). Born at Port Mourant Estate, Berbice County, British Guiana, on 22 March 1918, Cheddi Jagan was the child of sugar estate workers. Humble origins notwithstanding, his family sought higher education for their son. He attended Queen's College, Georgetown, during 1933–1935; received a bachelor's degree from Howard University in Washington, D.C., in 1938; and earned a doctorate in dentistry from Northwestern University in 1942.

While attending dental school in Chicago, Jagan met and married Janet Rosenberg, a leftist activist with ties to the Communist Party. Rosenberg introduced Jagan to Marxism, which gave him a global context for his hatred of the exploitative Guianese sugar economy. After returning to British Guiana in 1943, the Jagans immersed themselves in politics. In June 1948 they took the lead in organizing a mass protest against the police, who had shot and killed five striking sugar workers. For most Indo-Guianese, this solidified Jagan's position as their spiritual and political leader.

In 1950 the Jagans founded the PPP. Led by Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham, a charismatic Afro-Guianese barrister, the PPP came to power in the 1953 legislative elections, the first held under universal suffrage. As premier, Jagan acted with unexpected radicalism and immaturity. Other PPP leaders followed suit. The British government sent a warship to Georgetown and removed the government after only 133 days in power.

By the time the 1957 elections were held, Burnham and many other Afro-Guianese had split from the PPP, claiming that Jagan was a communist. Nevertheless, Jagan won the election in a vote that broke down roughly along racial lines. This time, he governed more responsibly and was reelected in 1961, and the British hinted that he would be the one to lead the colony to independence.

President John F. Kennedy, however, suspected that Jagan harbored communist sympathies. After having failed to persuade the British to prevent Jagan's reelection, Kennedy met with him in person. Jagan made a terrible

impression, and Kennedy believed that his fears had been confirmed. Under tremendous U.S. pressure, the British reluctantly agreed to consider the possibility of removing Jagan from power.

In 1962 and 1963, Jagan's government was hobbled by violent general strikes, funded by secret payments of approximately $1 million from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Financial support also came from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the strikes' aftermath, the British declared that there would be a final preindependence election in 1964, conducted under proportional representation rather than the traditional constituency-based system. Jagan responded by launching a sugar workers' strike that lasted 161 days, turned violent, and was riven by racial tensions. Thereafter he desperately sought to compromise with the United States but was rebuffed.

Burnham won the 1964 election as the head of a coalition, even though the PPP received almost half the vote. Following independence, he grew increasingly autocratic and made himself president-for-life through a series of rigged elections. Jagan continued as leader of the opposition and took the PPP into the Soviet orbit via the communist movement in July 1969.

At the Cold War's end, the United States pressured Burnham's successor, Desmond Hoyte, to democratize, and on 5 October 1992 Jagan was elected president in the country's first free election in twenty-eight years. In the new international climate, he moved quickly from communism to capitalism. Jagan died on 6 March 1997 in Washington, D.C., after suffering a massive heart attack.

Robert Anthony Waters Jr.

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Guyana; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald

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Jakeš, Miloš

(1922–)

Czechoslovakian communist politician and general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) from 1987 to 1989. Born on 12 August 1922 in České Chalupy in southern Bohemia to a peasant family, Miloš Jakeš worked from 1937 to 1950 at the Bat'a factory in Zlín. At the same time he studied electrical engineering at the state trade school. He joined the CPCz in 1945 and subsequently advanced through its ranks, holding various party positions.

During 1955–1958 Jakeš attended the Communist Party Higher School in Moscow, after which he became a member of the CPCz Central Commit-

tee. He served in a number of Czechoslovakian government posts, including deputy chair of local economic development and deputy minister of the interior. During the 1968 Prague Spring, he remained staunchly pro-Soviet and resisted reforms. According to some reports, which Jakeš would deny, he was in the Soviet embassy trying to rally Czech supporters for intervention when the Warsaw Pact armies invaded in August 1968. He was among a small number of CPCz members who immediately embraced the Soviet actions.

After the invasion, Jakeš became chairman of the CPCz Central Control and Auditing Commission. During his tenure (1968–1977), he purged about 500,000 party members who had backed the 1968 reforms. In 1977 he assumed a leadership role in the Central Committee and became chair of its agriculture and food committee, which, under his guidance, increased productivity and the export of agricultural products. Consequently, he became an economic specialist for the Central Committee and, in 1981, chair of the Central Committee's National Economic Commission. That same year he became a full member of the Presidium.

Seen as an economic pragmatist who could introduce Gorbachev-style reforms in Czechoslovakia, Jakeš was elected general secretary of the CPCz on 17 December 1987, replacing Gustáv Husák, who remained president of Czechoslovakia. Despite having implemented a few minor economic reforms, Jakeš essentially maintained strict communist control of the country.

In October 1988 Jakeš forced the resignation of Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal and other officials who advocated the quick introduction of Gorbachev-style reforms. Jakeš replaced Štrougal with Ladislav Adamec, who favored gradual change. In November 1989 police brutally beat student demonstrators in Prague who were demanding free elections and democracy. This precipitated further mass prodemocracy demonstrations throughout Czechoslovakia, leading ultimately to the Velvet Revolution. A group of pragmatic communists, hoping to remain in control of the country, forced Jakeš to resign his post on 24 November 1989, which brought about the end of communism in Czechoslovakia.

The CPCz held an emergency session that expelled Jakeš from its ranks in early December 1989. He subsequently resigned from the Federal Assembly and retired from public life. During the summer of 1995, he was arrested on charges of treason for collaborating with Soviet invaders in 1968. After several trials, he was acquitted in 2001 for lack of evidence. Jakeš currently lives in seclusion in Prague.

Gregory C. Ference

See also

Czechoslovakia; Europe, Eastern; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Husák, Gustáv; Prague Spring

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Japan

East Asian nation with a 1945 population of approximately 82 million people. Japan encompasses 145,882 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Montana. Japan is actually an archipelago separated from the east coast of Asia by the Sea of Japan. The island nation also borders the Pacific Ocean to the east and the Philippine and East China Seas to the south and southwest.

On 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's unconditional surrender to a physically devastated and psychologically exhausted nation. The Allied leaders had earlier reached substantial agreement on the postwar division of the Japanese Empire at the Yalta Conference (February 1945). The Soviets would gain the Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, and a sphere of interest in Manchuria; Outer Mongolian autonomy was recognized; China would receive Taiwan; and the Korean Peninsula would be subjected to a four-power joint trusteeship. Wartime planning had also envisaged applying the German model to the Japanese home islands, but in mid-August 1945 when Soviet leader Josef Stalin requested a separate Soviet occupation zone in Hokkaido, President Harry S. Truman rebuffed him. Despite the subsequent establishment of a multilateral framework to advise the occupation (Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan) and the significant contribution of British Commonwealth forces, the policymaking process was dominated by the United States and in particular by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur.

The U.S.-led Allied occupation set out to transform Japan from a militaristic imperial power to a peace-loving, stable, democratic nation stripped of armed forces and colonies. Within months, Japan was totally disarmed, top military and civilian leaders were purged (some were later put on trial), political prisoners were freed, left-wing political parties and trade unions were legalized, and the emperor renounced his divinity. With the exception of the civilian bureaucracy, which remained largely intact, virtually every aspect of Japanese politics, society, economy, and culture was subjected to fundamental reform. This experimentation reached its high point in 1947 with the implementation of the so-called Peace Constitution, in which the Japanese people forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes (Article 9).

After 1947, Japan experienced a reverse course when American emphasis gradually switched from democratization to economic reconstruction, from ensuring that Japan would never again represent a threat to regional peace and security to building a bulwark against the spread of communism in East Asia. Many of the earlier radical policies were toned down or abandoned altogether, and left-wing sympathizers were suppressed in the Red Purge. Japanese society was marked by a rigid ideological schism, a domestic Cold War.

These developments coincided with heightened Cold War tensions in Europe, major communist advances on the Chinese mainland, and the emergence of communist and noncommunist states on the Korean Peninsula. The vast majority of Japanese people still hoped for a neutral role in international affairs, but external events dragged Japan into the bipolar Cold War

framework, although its absorption was never complete. The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949, the cementing of the Sino-Soviet alliance specifically targeting Japan on 14 February 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, and, most important, Chinese intervention therein forced a major reassessment of Washington's policy toward Japan.

Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru continued to downplay the seriousness of international communist threats to Japan and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Americans to allow Tokyo to maintain a channel to Beijing to accelerate its disenchantment with Moscow. In late 1950, U.S. Special Representative John Foster Dulles embarked on a globe-trotting shuttle diplomacy, preaching a doctrine that exaggerated the communist threat to induce the Allies to accept the generous U.S. version of the peace treaty with Japan.

When the Japanese Peace Conference convened in San Francisco on 4 September 1951, festering Anglo-American differences meant that neither the nationalist nor communist Chinese regime was represented. After the Soviet delegation refused to sign the treaty, forty-eight Western nations signed a separate peace treaty four days later. In return for regaining its sovereignty, Japan renounced claims to 40 percent of its pre-1937 territory (although the disposition of these areas remained unspecified) and promised to pay limited reparations to victims of its wartime aggression. The United States was granted administrative rights over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under a United Nations (UN) trusteeship.

The United States and Japan also concluded a security treaty on 8 September 1951. In essence, it granted the Americans continued access to military bases in postoccupation Japan and, with Tokyo's consent, included the right to suppress domestic opposition. However, lingering fear of Japanese aggression among Japan's neighbors meant that the United States would have to pursue a strategy of dual containment, offering security for Japan as well as security from Japan.

The economic impact of the Cold War and in particular of the hot war in Korea was overwhelmingly beneficial for Japan. After its intervention in the Korean conflict, the United States imposed a total trade embargo on the PRC, which SCAP also applied to Japanese trade with the communist Chinese. American special procurements for the war, which constituted 37 percent of Japan's total foreign exchange receipts for 1952–1953, more than compensated for the loss of the miniscule China trade. It was for this reason that Yoshida referred to the Korean War as "a gift from the gods." In September 1952, Japan joined CHINCOM (the China Committee of the Paris Group), an organization established by the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to enforce strict sanctions on trade with the PRC. Japan's economic relations with the Chinese mainland were maintained through a series of private trade agreements beginning in June 1952.

Yoshida had been leaning to one side in the Cold War since 1949, yet it took an American threat not to ratify the peace treaty before he agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan)

Lieutenant Colonel Omura (*right*), Japan Air Self-Defense Force student officer at Matsushima Air Installation, renders the traditional salute to his American flight instructor, Captain Edward Hartenberger, 12 July 1954. Omura, a 1934 graduate of Japan's Military Academy, had flown more than 5,000 hours in single-engine fighters and heavy bombers, including three-and-a-half years of combat during World War II and, pictured here, completed a refresher course. (Bettmann/Corbis)

rather than the PRC. A treaty was thus concluded on the same day that the San Francisco treaties went into effect (28 May 1952). Yoshida believed that Japan's dependence on the United States was temporary. The Yoshida Doctrine saw Japan maintain minimal military forces in order to focus on economic recovery. However, under intense pressure from Dulles, now secretary of state, Yoshida eventually agreed to an 180,000-man army, only half of what the Americans had requested. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA), signed on 8 March 1954, committed Japan to a significant degree of rearmament, but with American financial aid and under American direction. Shortly thereafter, in July 1954, the Self-Defense Forces were created from the National Police Reserve, although the House of Councilors banned their dispatch overseas.

Reflecting a new emphasis on peaceful coexistence following Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviets took the initiative and announced in Sep-

tember 1954 their readiness to normalize relations with Japan, a proposal confirmed in the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration of 11 October 1954. Yoshida spurned this offer of negotiations, but in December 1954 Hatoyama Ichirō unseated the premier and immediately set out to counteract what he saw as Yoshida's overdependence on Washington. A more nationalistic and anti-communist figure, Hatoyama was nonetheless able to separate ideology from normal diplomatic and economic intercourse. He responded positively to the communist peace offensive and announced Japan's desire to "open a window to the East." The Japanese government was soon pressing the Americans to shorten the list of embargoed goods for the China market, and official negotiations for a peace treaty opened with the Soviet Union on 1 June 1955 in London. After fifteen months of intermittent talks failed to resolve the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands, however, Hatoyama had to settle for a joint declaration ending the state of war in October 1956. Two months later, with the withdrawal of the Soviet veto, Japan gained admission to the UN.

Hatoyama's term in office was also notable for two other developments. First, in late 1955 a major reorganization of the domestic political structure occurred with the consolidation of most progressive forces in the Nihon Shakaitō (Japan Socialist Party, or JSP), the party of perpetual opposition, and of most conservative politicians in the Jiyū Minshutō (Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP), the party of permanent government. This 1955 system, a diffuse but rigid bipolar political structure, was to endure into the post–Cold War era. Second, Hatoyama's administration witnessed the beginning of rapid economic growth. With American assistance, Japan joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on 10 September 1955, significantly improving Japanese companies' access to Western markets.

Hatoyama's successor was the Liberal Democrat Ishibashi Tanzan, who was soon supplanted by the very different figure of Kishi Nobusuke. Although hailing from the same wing of the LDP as Hatoyama, Kishi focused on fighting communism rather than accommodating it. Like Hatoyama, he supported accelerated rearmament and renegotiation of the unbalanced Security Treaty with the United States, but he was also an Asianist of the old school who believed that Japan should resume its place as the natural leader of Asia. In May 1957, in return for an American commitment to withdraw remaining U.S. ground troops from Japan, the Kishi cabinet approved a Basic Policy for National Defense and the First Defense Buildup Plan. This envisaged a continuing, albeit slowly diminishing, dependence on U.S. military protection. On 28 September 1957, the Foreign Ministry announced three principles of Japanese foreign policy that embraced the contradictions in Tokyo's thinking. The declaration reaffirmed Japan's position as a member of the Asian community, stressed that diplomacy centered on the UN, and maintained Japan's position in the free world. On 13 May 1958, Japan launched a major foreign policy initiative that called on the world's three nuclear powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR) to cease all nuclear testing, production, and stockpiling.

Kishi's anticommunism did not extend to obstructing Japan's burgeoning trade relationship with its communist neighbors. Indeed, under the

convenient rubric of *seikei bunri* (the separation of political from economic relations), Japanese trade with the PRC was booming. Following a minor incident in which a PRC flag was attacked in a Japanese department store, however, Beijing suspended all economic transactions with Japan on 9 June 1958.

Japan remained a semidetached ally of the United States, but by the late 1950s it became clear to President Dwight D. Eisenhower that a new treaty was needed to reflect Japan's increasing economic strength and position as a partner with the United States rather than as a subjugated former enemy. After fifteen months of intensive negotiations, the new ten-year Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington on 19 January 1960. In it the United States gave up its right to intervene in Japanese domestic politics and for the first time made an explicit commitment to defend Japan. The revised treaty provoked harsh criticism from Japan's communist neighbors and serious domestic turmoil, bringing more than a million students and others into the streets of Tokyo in postwar Japan's largest political demonstrations. This Anpo Crisis reached its climax in May 1960, when Kishi resorted to strong-arm tactics to secure Diet ratification of the Security Treaty. This forced Eisenhower to cancel a scheduled visit to Japan, threatened party unity, and shortly thereafter caused Kishi to resign.

Kishi's replacement, Ikeda Hayato, turned his attention to economic development at home. An income-doubling plan became the national goal for the 1960s. He kept a low profile abroad while nonetheless broadening relations with both the West and Asia. On 28 April 1964, Japan became the first Asian nation to join the so-called Rich Man's Club, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and to gain Article 8 status in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

With American encouragement, Japan concluded reparations agreements with several Southeast Asian nations that served to restore both trade and diplomatic channels in the region long damaged by memories of the Asia-Pacific War. Despite American objections, unofficial trade resumed with the PRC on 9 November 1962. The 1964 Tokyo Olympics symbolically set the seal on Japan's international rehabilitation. During the 1960s, Japan's average rate of growth was more than 10 percent per year. By the end of the decade, Japan had surpassed the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) to become the world's second-largest capitalist economy.

Ikeda's term also saw the public emergence of the Sino-Soviet rift. This increased polarization within Japan's domestic political structure but strengthened Ikeda's confidence in his essentially pro-Western policies. Despite Soviet and communist Chinese campaigns to solicit Japanese support, active noninvolvement became the cornerstone of Tokyo's policy in the dispute.

Satō Eisaku, another Yoshida protégé, succeeded Ikeda on 9 November 1964 and became Japan's longest-serving postwar premier. After fourteen years of often bitter negotiations, he oversaw the final stages in the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) in June 1965, a development greeted with hostile mass demonstrations on both sides of the Tsushima Straits. Nor were these the only popular

protests that Satō had to contend with, for 1965 also marked the beginning of Japan's anti–Vietnam War movement.

Satō was responsible for formalizing two of the more pacifist aspects of Japanese foreign policy: the total ban on arms exports (21 April 1967) and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting their introduction into Japan) announced on 27 January 1968. This was despite the fact that Satō personally believed that Japan should become a nuclear power.

On 21 November 1969, Satō achieved his primary foreign policy objective when U.S. President Richard Nixon promised to return the Ryukyu Islands, free of nuclear weapons, to Japanese administration in 1972. In return, however, Satō agreed to allow the United States to retain bases on the islands. Even more significantly, he conceded that the security of South Korea was vital, while the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also important to Japanese security. On 23 June 1970, the Security Treaty was automatically renewed despite enormous popular protests, and Japanese-U.S. relations appeared to be closer than ever.

Trade friction had been steadily mounting, however, and on 15 July 1971, without forewarning, President Nixon announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit the PRC. One month later, he imposed a 10 percent import surcharge and floated the U.S. dollar, taking it off the gold standard. This all came as a huge shock for Japan and produced a palpable sense of betrayal. Satō's subsequent efforts to reverse his earlier stance and promote improved relations with the PRC were spurned, and thus it fell to his successor, Tanaka Kakuei, to visit Beijing and normalize diplomatic relations on 29 September 1972. Controversially, the Sino-Japanese joint declaration included a clause opposing hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. This thinly veiled reference to the Soviet Union did not prevent Japanese corporations from subsequently becoming involved in a number of large-scale resource development projects in Siberia.

The Japanese economy received another severe jolt in the oil crisis of 1973–1974, but it recovered quickly when the government broke ranks with the United States and made clear its pro-Arab stance. Thereafter, Japan undertook a major effort to diversify its sources of supply for vital raw materials. This later evolved into one facet of Tokyo's comprehensive security strategy.

Southeast Asia was of growing importance to Japan. After some initial reluctance, Japan had become a strong supporter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and invested heavily in the region. However, in January 1974 accusations of Japanese economic imperialism led to violent protests in Indonesia. Tokyo had already normalized diplomatic relations with the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in 1973, and after the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) in April 1975, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo pronounced the Fukuda Doctrine (August 1977), which was an attempt to mediate between Vietnam and ASEAN. It met with little success, at least in the short term.

Fukuda was more successful one year later, when Japan and the PRC finally signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship (12 August 1978). Now a

Japanese-U.S.-PRC anti-Soviet alignment seemed to be emerging, but Tokyo refused Beijing's request to sell defense technology to the PRC. Instead, in May 1979, the Japanese government for the first time offered the PRC loans to assist with its economic development. It thus became the largest of many recipients of Japanese foreign aid during the last decade of the Cold War as well as a major trading partner and a significant investment destination.

During 15–17 November 1975, Japan attended the inaugural meeting of the Group of Five (G5, later G8), the largest industrialized nations in the noncommunist world. Japan had finally achieved Ikeda's goal of becoming "a pillar of the free world." Japan also played a central role in the development of the concept of an Asia-Pacific region bringing together North America, East Asia, and Australasia via a series of multilateral institutions.

The Japanese government's attitude toward participation in the renewed Cold War of the 1980s proved considerably more enthusiastic than it had been during the earlier period. After Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979, Japan was quick to join the Americans in imposing economic sanctions. The following February, moreover, the Maritime Self-Defense Force participated in the U.S.-led RIMPAC (Pacific Rim) exercises for the first time. By May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō was ready to commit Japan to the defense of sea-lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles and was the first premier to refer publicly to the United States as an ally. His successor, Nakasone Yasuhiro, went even further. He immediately opposed Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Asia, and it was largely at Nakasone's insistence that the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement of December 1987 eliminated all such missiles. In the intervening six years, Nakasone had transformed Japanese foreign policy. On 19 January 1983, he told an American audience that Japan was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," which in the event of war would block Soviet naval access to the Pacific Ocean. In November 1983, he reversed the sixteen-year-old ban on military exports when he signed the Technology Exchange Agreement with the United States. In September 1986, Japan agreed to participate in President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research. The following year saw the 1 percent of gross national product (GNP) limit on defense spending limitation that had been in place since November 1976 exceeded, albeit just barely.

Japan was very slow to acknowledge Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to end the Cold War. By the end of the 1980s, American critics were commenting wryly that the Cold War was over and Japan had won. For Japan, however, the post–Cold War era has thus far been marked by the bursting of the economic bubble and a long period of relative decline.

Maintaining the solidarity of the Western alliance was crucial to the outcome of the Cold War in East Asia, and sustaining Japan's allegiance was vital to maintaining the strength of the Western alliance in the region. Japan was perceived as the key domino whose geostrategic location, industrial base, vulnerability to external pressure, and potential as a role model for the rest of Asia made it a prime target for both sides in the Cold War. Similarly, the Japanese saw themselves as living on the fault line between East and West.

Huddled under the U.S. security umbrella, they were able to concentrate on building their economy without devoting too much attention or resources to their own defense.

Christopher Braddick and Hirama Yoichi

See also

Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in; Dulles, John Foster; Fukuda Takeo; Hatoyama Ichirō; Ikeda Hayato; Ishibashi Tanzan; Japan, Armed Forces; Kishi Nobusuke; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Nakasone Yasuhiro; San Francisco Peace Treaty; Satō Eisaku; Tanaka Kakuei; United States–Japan Security Treaty; Yoshida Shigeru

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Japan, Armed Forces

Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August 1945 and signed the formal surrender document ending World War II on 2 September. Following the arrival of U.S. occupation forces, the first objective of U.S. policy regarding Japan was to ensure that it would never again pose a military threat to the United States or to world peace. Japan was to be completely disarmed and demilitarized, and the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy were to be dissolved. Article 9 of the 1946 constitution renounced "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." In order to accomplish this, Japan was never to maintain "land, sea, and air forces." Japan's security would be guaranteed by the U.S. occupation forces. The navy lived on, however, through a small, demilitarized minesweeping detachment, the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), for the detection of some 100,000 remaining underwater mines in Japanese coastal waters.

U.S. policy regarding Japanese rearmament changed with the Cold War. The major turning point was the beginning of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 and subsequent U.S. concerns over the military threats posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and, primarily, the People's Republic of China (PRC). In order to dispatch U.S. forces stationed in Japan to Korea, on 8 July General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. occupation forces in Japan, ordered the Japanese government

Tanks roll down a Tokyo street on 3 October 1955 celebrating the first anniversary of Japan's Self-Defense Force. Silent crowds watch with decidedly mixed emotions. With U.S. assistance, the Japanese military had been rebuilt to 130,000 ground troops, 16,000 men manning a 70-ship navy, and an air force of 6,000 men and 200 trainer and cargo aircraft. (Bettmann/Corbis)

to organize a National Police Reserve of 75,000 personnel to provide internal security. This led to the decision in December 1950 to establish four district forces (World War II–type infantry divisions). Not generally known at the time, during October–December 1950 virtually the entire minesweeping capacity of the MSA—forty-six minesweepers and a mine destructor ship—were deployed off North Korea at Wonsan, Kunsan, Inchon, Haiju, and Chinampo. There they swept both channels and anchorages. Two minesweepers were lost.

On 8 September 1951, Japan signed both the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the United States–Japan Security Treaty. Japan's Defense Agency came into being on 1 July 1954, and ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces were established. The United States played an indispensable role in building up Japan's defense capability, furnishing both advisors and surplus U.S. World War II equipment. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) was organized through the change from the National Police Reserve and consisted of the Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Eastern Army, Middle Army, and Western Army, comprising 130,000 personnel. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was organized from the small minesweeping detachment and included 115 units totaling some 58,000 tons. Its main combat ships were patrol frigates and amphibious fire support ships supplied by the United States in 1953 to be employed as gunboats. The MSDF won the right to have its own air arm, which began with four helicopters purchased from the United States in 1953. The United States then furnished 217 aircraft. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) possessed some 140 training aircraft and 6,700 personnel in 1954.

Because the island of Hokkaido was perilously close to the Soviet Union, the GSDF attached great importance to the defense of northern Japan. The MSDF had the task of defending the peripheral sea straits and sea-lanes, while the ASDF protected against violations of Japanese airspace.

By the second defense program of 1962–1966, the GSDF consisted of five armies, thirteen divisions, and 171,500 personnel. By that date, most of its basic equipment (small arms, artillery, tanks, and various armored vehicles) were produced domestically. Japan acquired from the United States eighteen frigates (1953) and four destroyers (1954–1959). The MSDF pushed forward with domestic ship production, producing its first destroyer in 1956 and its first submarine in 1960. By 1960 it had in service a dozen domestically built destroyers: 2 Harukaze class, 7 Ayanami class, and 3 Murasame class. Other destroyers and smaller ships followed on a regular basis. By the mid-1960s the MSDF counted 59 surface combatants, 7 submarines, and 230 aircraft.

The ASDF took over from U.S. forces in Japan alert duty by 1960 and air defense control by 1961. By the mid-1960s, the ASDF counted 1,100 aircraft, including training types. It also operated twenty-four radar warning sites. In addition, the Japanese produced under license U.S. Lockheed F-104J Starfighter interceptors and surface-to-air (SAM) Nike missiles.

Japanese forces went on alert when, on 6 September 1976, a defecting Soviet Air Force pilot landed his MiG-25 at Hakodate Airport on Hokkaido. The ASDF scrambled but could not intercept the MiG-25. The Soviet Union threatened military action unless the pilot and aircraft were returned, but the Japanese government delayed until sixty-seven days later, after U.S. experts had dismantled the plane and studied it in detail. The plane was returned in pieces.

The MSDF carried out joint training with the U.S. Navy beginning in 1955 and participated in RIMPAC (Pacific Rim) exercises for the first time in February 1980. Following a conversation with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō declared that Japan would assume the defense of several hundred nautical miles of Japanese peripheral waters and 1,000 miles of sea-lanes. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who took office in 1982, established a particularly close relationship with Reagan and stated that Japan was "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" that would defend the four straits: Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima, and Korea. The MSDF continued to upgrade its equipment and in 1985 numbered 58 surface ships, 14 submarines, and 145 aircraft. During 1984–1985 the MSDF held seven joint exercises with the U.S. Navy in the seas off Japan.

The ASDF also modernized. It deployed its first airborne early warning E-2C aircraft in 1983 and McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle interceptors in 1984. It had 368 operational aircraft in 1985. The ASDF began joint training exercises with the U.S. Air Force in 1978 and assumed responsibility for outer periphery defense in 1984–1985.

The GSDF modernized as well. In 1985 it possessed 1,200 tanks and 1,000 artillery pieces. The GSDF had abandoned at-sea and shoreline destruction of an invading force, most likely the Soviet Union or the PRC, because of a lack of combat capability. The GSDF defensive plan called for survival in the interior, there to await reinforcement by U.S. armed forces. To improve defensive capability against attack, Japan stepped up investment in surface-to-surface missiles, long-range artillery, and multiple-fire rockets. With these, Japan modified its former defensive scheme to engage and destroy any invasion force, first at sea, then on the shore, and as a last resort in the coastal area. The Japanese military gave priority to the defense of the southern coast of the Soya Straits between Hokkaido and Sakhalin. The GSDF began joint exercises with the United States in 1981 and carried out five more joint exercises during 1984–1985. Japan also applied its technological expertise to the development in the late 1980s of high-tech weaponry systems such as the Mitsubishi F-1 jet fighter/ground attack aircraft, improved Tan surface-to-air missiles, and Asagiri-class destroyers.

In the post–Cold War era, Japan reviewed its defense capabilities with the intent to make its forces more efficient and mobile and also to be able to

respond to a variety of natural disasters and international peacekeeping situations. The Japanese-U.S. security arrangement remains the cornerstone of Japanese defense planning.

Nakayama Takashi

See also

Japan; Japan, Occupation after World War II; Kurile Islands; United States–Japan Security Treaty

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Japan, Occupation after World War II

On 2 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, acting in the capacity of Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), gained control over Japan upon its acceptance of unconditional surrender after World War II. Initially, the Americans sought to demilitarize and democratize Japan to prevent a revival of militaristic imperialism. In 1947, however, the reverse course in U.S. policy began to transform Japan into a bulwark against communist expansion in Asia. Early assessments viewed the U.S. occupation as positive, benevolent, and enlightened, building on prewar changes to produce a democratic society in postwar Japan. Later historians would criticize the so-called American Interlude because it integrated Japan into a Cold War strategy in Asia that sought to defeat the goals of revolutionary nationalist movements.

MacArthur seemed to rule Japan like a Tokugawa-era shogun, but in fact Washington had decided upon basic occupation policies beforehand. Moreover, SCAP worked through existing parliamentary institutions and the bureaucracy. General Order Number One assigned the task of demobilizing the armed forces to the Japanese themselves, which they completed in two months. As in Germany, trials punished war criminals, but more significant was the purge of 200,000 military, government, and business leaders who had supported the war. Under SCAP's pressure, the Japanese government abolished the Ministries of War, Navy, and Home Affairs. But MacArthur and his staff were not about to let the Japanese determine the nature and scope of subsequent reform. Japanese leaders prepared a draft providing for modest revisions in the Meiji constitution, for example, but U.S. officials instantly rejected it, formulating a new document and permitting only cursory changes. Effective in May 1947, it swept away all vestiges of elitism, militarism, and authoritarianism.

Five areas of reform would bring fundamental and permanent changes in Japan's economic, political, and social system. First, in October 1946, SCAP forced the Diet (the legislature) to pass a plan for sweeping land redistribution that sought to eliminate large landowners and foster the emergence of yeoman farmers who would be the "bulwark of democracy." Under its provisions, 2.3 million landowners were forced to sell their land to the government at undervalued prices, often for the equivalent of a carton of cigarettes. By 1950, about 4.75 million tenants had bought roughly 5 million acres of land on generous credit terms and at very low prices. Huge demand for food and raw materials in postwar Japan, especially after the Korean War began in June 1950, resulted in rising prices that spurred production, creating an independent, prosperous, and conservative farmer class.

A second thrust of reform established labor unions, again to encourage democratic tendencies. The Trade Union Law of December 1945 made staging strikes legal and mandated joint collective bargaining. Two years later, another law set minimum standards for working hours, safety provisions, and accident compensation. Japanese unions were a startling success. By 1948, there were 6.5 million members comprising about half the workforce. Labor leaders acted with increasing assertiveness to control occupation policies that contributed to a growing pattern of violence and acts of sabotage when U.S. officials would not cooperate. Beginning in 1948, SCAP, in cooperation with Japanese leaders, took strong steps to limit labor's power, gaining passage of a new law aimed at restraining the unions and implementing a new purge of communist leaders.

Third, the United States wanted to eliminate the *zaibatsu* (financial cliques), believing that Japanese megafirms in banking, shipping, international trade, and heavy industry had been willing partners with the military in leading Japan to war. SCAP implemented reforms requiring the sale of *zaibatsu* stock and the dissolution of holding companies, expecting that a more equitable division of wealth and economic power would foster democratization. Freezing the assets of *zaibatsu* families, SCAP purged family members and top executives from management with prohibitions against resuming work with the same firms. Fears of economic stagnation and growing complaints from U.S. business and financial leaders about alleged socialist schemes caused SCAP to abandon plans to break up remaining monopolistic companies.

Education was the fourth area of reform, with the objective of encouraging individualism and creating a genuinely egalitarian society. SCAP abolished educational practices aimed at molding students into willing servants of the state, especially the teaching of morals and history courses that indoctrinated youths to embrace extreme nationalism. Many old-guard teachers were purged after SCAP investigated prewar activities. Militarist propaganda as well as references to Shintoism disappeared from new textbooks in an effort to foster democracy and civil rights. No longer were students confined to prewar channels of vocational, normal, technical, or university training. Insufficient teachers and funds limited the reach of wider educational opportunities, however.

Militarist propaganda, as well as references to Shintoism, disappeared from new textbooks in an effort to foster democracy and civil rights.

Finally, a new constitution assigned sovereignty to the people, while the emperor became the symbol of the state. Citizens at least twenty years of age had the right to vote for members of the Diet without regard to gender, income, or social status. Primary power resided in the lower house, which controlled the budget and ratified treaties. It could override the decisions of the upper House of Councilors. The lower house elected a prime minister, who named cabinet members. The cabinet selected and voters confirmed justices of a supreme court with the power to determine the constitutionality of legislation and name judges to sit on lower courts. Thirty-one articles guaranteed an assortment of "fundamental human rights," among them respect as individuals, freedom of thought, education, sexual equality, and "minimum standards of wholesome and cultural living."

Some reforms were abandoned after the U.S. occupation ended in May 1952, but the Japanese constitution survived without major alterations despite periodic conservative attempts at revision. Those on the Left and the Right acknowledged especially the benefits of Article 9 outlawing war, despite disagreement on how to interpret it. But SCAP's reforms delayed economic recovery. Widespread destitution forced the United States to provide more than $2 billion in food, fuel, and medicine to prevent mass starvation and disease. The termination of war reparations payments in 1949 and the Dodge Plan brought economic stabilization before recovery turned into prosperity in response to the Korean War. During that conflict, the Cold War partnership between the United States and Japan became concrete in 1951 with the Japanese Peace Treaty and the United States–Japan Security Treaty.

James I. Matray

See also

East Asia; Japan; MacArthur, Douglas; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Shigemitsu Mamoru; United States–Japan Security Treaty; Yoshida Shigeru

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Japanese Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs

See Gensuikyō

Jaruzelski, Wojciech
(1923–)

Polish Army general, communist politician, prime minister (1981–1989), and president (1989–1990). Born on 6 July 1923 in Kurów, Lublin Province, Wojciech Jaruzelski was descended from a noble landowning family with strong patriotic and anti-Soviet traditions. Before World War II he attended a secondary school run by priests in Warsaw. At the outbreak of World War II, he fled with his family to Lithuania. When that nation was annexed by the Soviets, he was sent to Siberia, where he worked in forestry. His father did not survive the hardships of Siberian life and died there.

When the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Jaruzelski joined the army formed by Polish communists and finished his schooling at the Military Academy in Riazan. He returned to Poland with the army following the German defeat.

Jaruzelski remained in the army after the war as a professional soldier. In 1956 he was promoted to general of brigade, in 1960 to general of division, in 1968 to *general broni* (equivalent to U.S. lieutenant general), and in 1973 to general of the army. During 1965–1968 he was the head of the General Staff, and in 1968 he became minister of defense. As such, he was responsible for the purging of Polish Jews from the army and for Poland's participation in the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the use of troops in suppressing the December 1970 unrest at Gdańsk. Throughout the 1970s, he was an outspoken critic of Prime Minister Edward Gierek's policies.

Wojciech Jaruzelski, a general in the Polish armed forces and a leader in the Polish Communist Party, played a crucial role in Poland's transition from a communist state to a socialist pluralist democracy. His imposition of martial law perhaps averted a Soviet invasion of his country. (Embassy of the Republic of Poland)

In 1981, during the crisis that ensued from the formation of the Solidarity trade union, Jaruzelski became the first secretary of the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) and prime minister. On 13 December 1981, in an effort to quash the Solidarity movement and placate Moscow, Jaruzelski declared martial law throughout the country. That same month Solidarity was outlawed, and thousands of its members were arrested. Jaruzelski's martial law decree brought condemnation from Western nations, an international trade embargo, and the suspension of all but emergency diplomatic contacts between Poland and many nations of the world. It also may have saved Poland from a Soviet invasion.

Jaruzelski lifted martial law in 1983 but had no idea how to improve the foundering Polish economy. Nor did he show any intention of moving away from traditional Marxist-Leninist principles. Poland was therefore plunged into a period of economic stagnation, with no concrete plans in place to halt the slide. Demonstrations and riots fomented by underground Solidarity units occurred on a regular basis, pushing Jaruzelski to enact minor reforms, none of which had much effect or mollified the restless population.

In spring 1989 Jaruzelski permitted a roundtable meeting of PZPR representatives, government opposition leaders (mainly from Solidarity), and the Catholic Church. In June 1989 a compromise was brokered that allowed for semidemocratic elections to take place. These events led to a chain reaction of resistance, reform, and upheaval that soon engulfed the whole of Eastern Europe, eventually breaking down the Iron Curtain.

Jaruzelski himself did not participate in the historic roundtable talks but tried to control them as head of the PZPR. Following parliamentary elections, in July 1989 a bare majority of the National Assembly elected him president of Poland. A year later, as communism collapsed, Jaruzelski resigned the presidency, paving the way for the election of Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa as Poland's first postwar, noncommunist head of state.

Jakub Basista

See also

Europe, Eastern; Gierek, Edward; Poland; Poland, Armed Forces; Prague Spring; Rapacki, Adam; Solidarity Movement; Soviet Union; Wałęsa, Lech

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Ji Pengfei
(1910–2000)

Chinese diplomat, foreign minister, and vice premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Linyi, Shanxi Province, on 2 February 1910, Ji Pengfei joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1933. During both the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, he served in the Red Army and was responsible for political and health programs.

When the PRC was established in October 1949, Ji was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His first significant mission was to lead a diplomatic delegation to the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), where he stayed for three years, ultimately becoming the first Chinese ambassador to East Germany. In 1955 he returned to China, becoming vice foreign minister and assuming the post of foreign minister in 1972, a position he held until 1974. Throughout his two decades of service in the Foreign Ministry, Ji's most notable achievement was his role as head of the Chinese delegation to the Paris peace negotiations on the Vietnam War in January 1973.

In 1979 Ji became minister of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee and, concurrently, vice premier and secretary-general of the State Council. Another of his important contributions came after 1982, when he became state councilor, deputy head of the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs of the CCP Central Committee, and director of the

Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs. As such, his task was to ensure the smooth implementation of Deng Xiaoping's one country, two systems concept after the China–Hong Kong and the China-Macau reunifications of 1997 and 1999, respectively. Ji also chaired two drafting committees that were responsible for writing the Basic Laws for post-1997 Hong Kong and post-1999 Macau. After the Basic Laws were approved in 1990, Ji retired and returned to private life. He died on 10 February 2000 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Deng Xiaoping; Hong Kong; Vietnam War

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Jiang Jieshi
(1887–1975)

President of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) during 1947–1975 and leader of the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists), also known as the Kuomintang (KMT). Born on 31 October 1887 in Qiguo, Zhejiang province, Jiang Jieshi graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1910. He joined the 1911 Revolution that led to the establishment of the ROC on 1 January 1912. In August 1912 he helped found the GMD and became its leader in 1925. As commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army, Jiang launched the Eastern and Northern Expeditions to unite China in 1925.

When unification was completed in 1928, Jiang named Nanjing, Jiangsu, the new capital of the ROC, with himself as the generalissimo of all Chinese forces and chairman of the new national government. In 1947 he sponsored a constitution that resulted in his de facto and de jure election as president of the ROC.

True Chinese unity, however, had never actually been achieved. In northeastern China in the late 1920s and early 1930s the Japanese firmly established their sphere of influence, waiting to conquer all of China. The former Chinese warlords, who had declared allegiance to the GMD during the Northern Expedition, reemerged as the GMD's enemies because of mutual distrust. In southwestern and western China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Jiang's former ally during the initial phase of the Northern Expedition, lurked menacingly, with its own designs to rule all of China.

For Jiang, the complete elimination of the CCP assumed top priority, especially in view of its growing power and influence in the countryside. This was best exemplified in his first internal pacification, then external resistance policy, adopted in 1931 when the Japanese began to take northeastern China

Jiang Jieshi, the hard-line precommunist leader of China and later longtime ruler of Taiwan, and his Nationalist Party supporters were forced to flee the mainland for Taiwan in 1949 after the victory of Mao Zedong and his communist forces. Jiang ruled Taiwan until his death in 1975. (Library of Congress)

by force. Only in late 1936, as a result of the Xi'an (Sian) Incident, did he agree to stop the undeclared GMD-CCP civil war and lead the nation to fight the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).

As soon as the Sino-Japanese War ended, Jiang resumed the civil war, which was officially declared in 1947. Despite massive U.S. aid dating back to 1941, Jiang lost the civil war and the Chinese mainland to the CCP in October 1949. He was then forced to relocate the GMD to Taiwan.

In Taiwan, Jiang immediately reestablished the ROC and resumed the presidency, still entertaining the idea of controlling the mainland. As he had done in the Sino-Japanese War, Jiang, through his Americanized wife Song Meiling, sought American assistance by presenting himself as the one true leader of China. This effort, however, met no success, as the United States had no overwhelming interest in aiding the ROC.

U.S. assistance finally came in the 1950s, first during the Korean War when America stood ready militarily to defend the ROC's sovereignty and again in late 1954 when the People's Republic of China (ROC) heavily shelled the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait, provoking the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Determined to halt further PRC advances, the U.S. government concluded a mutual security treaty with Jiang on 2 December 1954 that acknowledged the U.S.-ROC alliance and promised U.S. assistance in defending Taiwan. In return, Jiang granted the U.S. rights to deploy military forces on Taiwanese territories, which later facilitated American military actions during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958) and the Vietnam War.

With U.S. aid, Jiang ensured not only the ROC's defense against the PRC but also the rapid modernization and Westernization of Taiwan. These efforts included a Western-style constitution, agricultural reform, and rapid industrialization, which helped raise Jiang's credibility. Diplomatically and politically, Jiang remained the legitimate Chinese leader, retaining the legal seat in the United Nations Security Council as one of the so-called Big Five. Despite his somewhat dictatorial rule in Taiwan, he was still regarded as the leader of free China, competing against the PRC on the mainland.

Jiang died in Taipei on 5 April 1975. Shortly after his death, the U.S.-ROC alliance came to an end as the PRC and the U.S. normalized relations.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Korean War; Song Meiling; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; Vietnam War

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Jiang Qing
(1914–1991)

Communist Chinese political leader and influential wife of Mao Zedong. Born in Zhucheng, Shandong Province, in March 1914, Jiang Qing enrolled at the Experimental Arts Academy in early 1929. To pursue an acting career, she moved to Shanghai, Jiangsu, in 1933. After the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, she fled to the Chinese communist base in Yan'an, Shaanxi. The following year she joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and became the mistress of CCP leader Mao. In the autumn of 1939 Jiang married Mao but was largely kept from public life until the 1960s.

Jiang's political ascendancy began in 1966 when Mao, now the chairman of the Central Military Commission, appointed her the chief cultural advisor of the People's Liberation Army and deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group. Mao's intention was to revive the class struggle so as to assert his monolithic power and leadership within the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the communist bloc as a whole. This sparked the infamous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), an ultraleftist movement aimed at rooting out the petty bourgeoisie, rank privileges, and bureaucracy from China while at the same time building Mao's cult as a true Marxist.

Under Jiang's leadership, a number of senior officials, including Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, and Liu Shaoqi, fell victim to political purges. During the Cultural Revolution, imposing statues and pictures of Mao were erected and ubiquitously posted throughout China, designed to foster the so-called cult of personality that Mao sought. In the cultural realm, Jiang replaced the traditional Beijing Opera with revolutionary ballet and destroyed Chinese museums that memorialized China's feudal past. Jiang's reign of terror ended in October 1976 when she was arrested by Premier Hua Guofeng, who seized control of the PRC upon Mao's death.

In January 1980 Jiang was charged with conducting a counterrevolution and put on trial. She was sentenced to the death penalty, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. Jiang died in Beijing on 14 May 1991.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Hua Guofeng; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong

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Jinmen and Mazu

Two island groups in the Taiwan Strait and the source of military tensions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Jinmen, known to Westerners as Quemoy, and its eleven smaller islands totaling 95 square miles are located at the mouth of the Bay of Xiamen off the mainland's Fujian Province along the southeastern coast, 170 miles northwest of Taiwan's southwestern port of Gao Xiong. North of the Jinmen Islands is Mazu (Matsu) and its smaller eighten islands totaling 18 square miles, situated off Fujian's Min River and 130 miles northwest of Taiwan's port of Jilong.

Finally convinced of its defeat by communist forces in the Chinese Civil War (1947–1949), the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government gave up the mainland and fled to Taiwan in early 1949, the largest and farthest offshore island from Fujian in the Taiwan Strait. The GMD also retained a number of smaller islands, including Jinmen and Mazu, close to the mainland. The GMD held these islands for two main purposes: as a strategic fortress to defend the relocated ROC and as a springboard to retake the mainland in the future. Once settled, the GMD government issued the Emergency Decree, which imposed martial law on all territories under its jurisdiction. Jinmen and Mazu were placed under military administration and were heavily reinforced.

To the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the GMD's continued possession of the offshore islands meant that the PRC's birth on 1 October 1949 was merely a de facto termination of the civil war. Hence, securing the Taiwan Strait became the PRC's primary task, and the first attempt to liberate the offshore islands took place on 25 October 1949 in the Battle of Kunington, when 10,000 PRC troops departed Xiamen and landed on Jinmen's northern shore. They were quickly repelled by GMD troops, however. Half of the PRC troops were killed, while the rest surrendered at Kuningtou, a northern coastal village of Jinmen on 28 October 1949.

The second attempt to liberate the Taiwan Strait was scheduled for October 1950, after the PRC had successfully taken all the islands off Guandong Province in August 1950. This campaign, however, was postponed because of PRC intervention in the Korean War (1950–1953).

The PRC finally launched another attempt to secure the Taiwan Strait in September 1954, when it began the bombardment of Jinmen from the Fujian coast, provoking the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955). Because of the U.S. defense commitment to the ROC in accordance with the Mutual

Defense Treaty signed in December 1954 and because of other diplomatic considerations, the PRC scaled down the shelling, ending the crisis in May 1955. Jinmen and Mazu remained under ROC control.

In August 1958, the PRC began a new massive shelling of Jinmen, leading to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Besides liberation, the PRC manipulated this bombardment to test the U.S.-ROC alliance. Despite its pledge to defend Taiwan, the United States had never clearly stated whether Jinmen and Mazu were entitled to American protection, a question stemming from the vagueness of the 1954 treaty. In the 1958 crisis, however, the Americans finally clarified that both Jinmen and Mazu fell within the U.S. defensive line. Besides providing naval forces to assist the GMD in reinforcing the defensive capacities on the islands, the United States threatened to retaliate with nuclear weapons. With American intentions now quite clear, the PRC's bombardment subsided, ending the crisis in October 1958.

American readiness to defend Jinmen and Mazu was reiterated during the 1960 presidential election. Both Republican candidate Richard Nixon and Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy pledged to use military force, including nuclear weapons, to defend the islands, but this commitment was never tested, as both the PRC and the ROC lost interest in upsetting the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

However, tensions continued between the Fujian coast and Jinmen and Mazu throughout the remainder of the Cold War, including routine and periodic exchanges of bombardment and the conduct of sabotage activities on both sides. Calm in the Taiwan Strait gradually set in during the 1980s after the PRC established a formal diplomatic relationship with the United States and the ROC decided to pursue nonofficial people-to-people diplomacy to improve its relationship with the PRC. As such, the military importance of Jinmen and Mazu was rendered moot. In 1985 martial law was lifted, and in 1992 both Jinmen and Mazu were returned to civilian administration. In 2001, as a result of nearly two decades of consultations, the PRC and the ROC created the so-called Little Three Links, or the Mini Three Links, allowing direct postal, transportation, and trade links between Fujian and the Jinmen-Mazu islands, which established the basis for a future China-Taiwan reunification.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second

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Jinnah, Mohamed Ali
(1876–1948)

Indian lawyer, Pakistani nationalist, founder of Pakistan, and first governor-general (1947–1948). Born on 25 December 1876 in Karachi, Mohamed Ali Jinnah was sent to Bombay to receive his primary education at the Gokul Das Tejpal School. He then attended the Church Mission High School and passed the matriculation examination to Bombay University. In 1892 he elected to travel to England where he studied law, becoming in 1896 the youngest Indian ever called to the bar. He returned to India that same year and worked as an attorney until 1906, when he was appointed advocate of the Bombay High Court. In 1908 he supported the future constitution of India as proposed by the Indian National Congress. He soon came to occupy a unique position as both an important lawyer and ardent nationalist.

In 1909 Jinnah was elected to represent the Muslims of Bombay in India's Supreme Legislative Council. In 1916 he was again elected by the Muslims of his province to the Imperial Legislative Council. Eschewing Mohandas Gandhi's approach of boycotting all aspects of British rule in India as a way to effect independence, Jinnah advocated a moderate approach of cooperation with the British to bring about a gradual transfer of power.



Mohamed Ali Jinnah was the architect of Pakistani independence. The Muslim Jinnah first united with the Hindus in fighting British rule but then opted for a separate Muslim state, a decision that ultimately led to the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan. (UPI/Bettmann/Corbis)

In December 1920 Jinnah resigned from the Indian National Congress to protest Gandhi's call for noncooperation, which Jinnah warned was bound to be counterproductive. Ultimately, he was proven right. For several decades, he labored to unite colonial India's Hindu and Muslim populations into a working democratic union. He was not successful, and he finally became convinced that there was no alternative other than the creation of a separate Pakistani entity.

On 14 August 1947 Pakistan became an independent state, and Jinnah became the nation's first governor-general. At the time, Pakistan was the world's largest Muslim country, with a population of nearly 80 million people. On 15 August, Jinnah outlined his principles of Pakistani governance. They included the preservation of peace and the right of all peoples to live with dignity and honor. Although he was dying from tuberculosis, as governor-general he gave some fifty-five speeches, many of which outlined the future constitution of Pakistan and its policies. After less than a year in office, Jinnah died in Karachi on 7 August 1948.

Nilly Kamal

See also
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; India; Pakistan; United Kingdom

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John Birch Society

Extreme right-wing U.S. political organization founded by Robert Welch in 1958; ostensibly bipartisan but essentially a mouthpiece for archconservatives in the Republican Party. The society was named after John Birch, an American missionary and intelligence operative murdered by Chinese communists in 1945. The organization claims that Birch was the first U.S. casualty of the Cold War.

Welch began the John Birch Society in Indianapolis, Indiana, as a way to fight the threat of communism in America and to champion what he termed the "free-enterprise system." In many ways, the organization was a vestige of McCarthyism, which raged on the U.S. home front in the early and mid-1950s.

A group enamored with wild and convoluted conspiracy theories, the John Birch Society campaigned rabidly against the civil rights movement in the 1960s. It went so far as to claim that the movement was a "communist plot" designed to tear the nation apart. The society is also known for its anti-Semitism. Over the decades the John Birch Society has taken strong stances against globalization, free trade, welfare, immigration, and the United Nations (UN), for which it holds particular antipathy.

By 1961, the John Birch Society may have had as many as 60,000–100,000 dues-paying members. Convinced that the world system was run by a small circle of internationalists and collectivists bent on world domination, the society launched a number of prominent petition, letter-writing, and lobbying campaigns designed to advance its agenda. Welch and other members of the organization denounced President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as vehicles of the "communist conspiracy." The conservative pundit and writer William F. Buckley, a one-time friend of Welch, dismissed such claims as "idiotic."

The John Birch Society reached the peak of its influence during the 1964 presidential campaign. Welch and a number of John Birchers strongly backed Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater's 1964 bid to oust President Lyndon Johnson from the White House. After Goldwater lost the election by an overwhelming electoral defeat, the society lost some of its luster. Rightist Republicans also began to distance themselves from the reactionary movement. Nevertheless, the John Birch Society continued to spin conspiracies and agitate for the far Right. In the 1970s, the society denounced President Richard Nixon's administration for its environmental policies, health and safety laws, and opening of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

By the mid-1980s, the John Birch Society had suffered significant membership losses, although because of its decentralized and secretive makeup it is difficult to say how much. However, by the early 1990s the society was on an upswing. This was fueled by the UN's participation in the Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush's pronunciation of a "New World Order," and the rise of antic, rightist radio talk show hosts. The advent of the Bill Clinton administration gave the society more grist, and it came out vocally in support of his impeachment after the Monica Lewinsky scandal. The John Birch Society continues on, undeterred, and lobbies against free trade and the UN, among other issues.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Goldwater, Barry Morris; McCarthyism; Welch, Robert Henry Winborne, Jr.

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John XXIII, Pope
(1881–1963)

Roman Catholic prelate and pope (1958–1963). Pope John XXIII was born Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli on 25 November 1881 in Sotto il Monte, Italy. The fourth son in a peasant farming family of fourteen children, he entered the Bergamo Seminary at age eleven, studied at the Pontifical Roman Seminary during 1901–1905, and was ordained a priest in 1904. Roncalli served as the secretary to the bishop of Bergamo during 1905–1915 and also served in World War I as a sergeant, first in the medical corps and then as a chaplain.

Following the war, Roncalli was called to Rome to head the Society for the Propagation of the Faith. Named an archbishop in 1925, he was dispatched as a diplomatic representative successively to Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece and then as papal nuncio to France in 1944. In 1953 he was named patriarch of Venice and was made a cardinal.

Elected pope on 28 October 1958, Roncalli took the name John XXIII. He immediately reached out to non-Catholics, advancing the Church's ecumenism with other denominations including Greek Orthodox and the Church of England. He was the first pope in 400 years to meet with the archbishop of Canterbury. Far more approachable and down-to-earth than his predecessor Pius XII, Pope John XXIII embarked on the first official papal act off Vatican property since 1870 by visiting prisoners, telling them that "you could not come to me, so I came to you."

On 25 January 1959, John XXIII announced his intention to convene a council to renew the Church in the modern world, promote diversity within the Church, and consider reforms promoted by modern ecumenical and liturgical movements. Vatican Council II, convened on 11 October 1962, was the first council called not to combat heresy, pronounce new dogma, or marshal the Church against hostile forces. The council revolutionized the Church by making it more open and accepting of varying forms of worship. When it ended in 1965, the legacies of the Vatican Council II were quite clear: Latin was dropped as the official language of liturgical services, the role of music during Mass was reinvigorated, bishops were given more authority to tailor services to meet their unique diocesan needs, and ecumenism became a priority. Vatican Council II was undoubtedly the pope's greatest achievement.

Pope John XXIII's two encyclicals, *Mater et Magistra* (Mother and Teacher, 1961) and *Pacem in Terris* (Peace on Earth, 1963), clearly demonstrated his commitment to international social justice and worldwide peace. His encyclicals advocated social reform, assistance to underdeveloped countries, a living wage for all workers, and equality among all peoples and issued a specific condemnation of racism.

John XXIII, although he had roundly condemned "the mistakes, greed and violence" of Soviet rulers, came to believe by 1962 that communism was no worse than many other problems that the Church had faced in the past. The Soviets were openly grateful for the pope's mediation efforts during the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Reflecting the Vatican's new attitude toward the communist bloc, Russian Orthodox clergy were invited to observe the Vatican Council meetings, and in 1963 the pope granted an audience to Soviet Premier Nikita's Khrushchev's son-in-law. Pope John XXII died in Rome on 3 June 1963. His successor was Paul VI.

John XXIII was only pope from 1981 to 1983, but he had an influential pontificate. He reached out to non-Catholics and called Vatican Council II, which made the church more open and tolerant of different forms of worship. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Luc Stenger

See also

Roman Catholic Church; Vatican City; Vatican Council II

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John Paul II, Pope
(1920–2005)

Roman Catholic prelate and pope (1978–2005). Born in Wadowice, Poland, on 18 May 1920, Karol Józef Wojtyła grew up in humble circumstances and knew hardship as a youth. His mother died when he was just nine years old, and he lost his only sibling—a brother—when he was twelve years old. An engaging young man who was an exemplary student, Wojtyła enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at Jagellonian University in Kraków in 1938. During the 1938–1939 academic year, he joined the experimental theatrical group known as Studio 38, showing great interest in and proclivities toward acting. He began exhibiting a keen interest in the writings of St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa of Avila, which propelled him toward the study of theology and complemented his deep-seated faith. To avoid imprisonment under the German occupation after September 1939, he was forced to work first in a stone quarry beginning in late 1940 and then in a chemical plant in early 1942. That same year he clandestinely entered an underground seminary in Kraków and enrolled in the faculty of theology at Jagellonian University.

Pope John Paul II during a visit to the United States, 4 October 1979. (Library of Congress)

Wojtyła continued to work in the chemical plant while studying. In August 1944 he was transferred to the archbishop of Kraków's residence, where he remained until Poland was liberated by Soviet forces in 1945. In 1946 Wojtyła completed his fourth year of studies, was ordained a priest, and left for Rome for postgraduate studies. In 1947 he earned his licentiate in theology. The following year he earned a master's degree and doctorate in sacred theology from Jagellonian University. In the late 1940s and into the mid-1950s, he served in a variety of pastoral positions in Poland, began to publish, and ultimately was appointed as chair of ethics at Poland's Catholic University in Lublin in 1956. He was named auxiliary bishop in the archbishopric of Kraków in 1958, becoming its archbishop in 1964. He also participated in the proceedings of Vatican Council II during 1962–1965. All the while, he labored under the considerable restrictions of communist-controlled Poland, which was openly hostile toward organized religion, especially the Catholic Church.

Wojtyła was named a cardinal by Pope Paul VI in 1967. During the early to mid-1970s, Cardinal Wojtyła—by now a well-respected philosopher and theologian—continued to publish prolifically on a wide range of scholarly and theological topics. He also traveled extensively and spent many months at the Vatican, where he taught, lectured, and participated in influential synods. On 16 October 1978, following the death of Pope John Paul I, Wojtyła confounded the pundits when he was elected pope on the eighth balloting. In honor of his immediate predecessor, he took the name John Paul II and became the first non-Italian pope in

455 years. At age fifty-eight, he was also an unusually youthful pontiff who was an avid skier and hiker.

From the very beginning of his pontificate John Paul II, who spoke eight languages, eschewed many of the trappings of his office. Instead, he became known as a master communicator who relished personal contacts, wading into huge crowds to kiss babies, hug the young and infirm, and talk with some of the estimated 17.6 million people who visited St. Peter's Square during his twenty-six-year papacy.

Just eight months into his pontificate, John Paul II paid an emotional nine-day visit to his native Poland, the first pope to visit the nation. His sojourn caused great consternation among communist officials, who feared that the pope's strong anticommunist sentiments would result in popular unrest. Although this did not immediately happen, communist officials had much to worry about. By the early 1980s, John Paul II had tacitly aligned himself with Poland's Solidarity movement and, by the early 1990s, was credited with being a key force behind the 1989 Velvet Revolution that swept away communist rule in Eastern Europe and hastened the end of the Cold War.

Pope John Paul II was the most visible and well-traveled pontiff in the 2,000-year history of the Church. During his tenure he completed 104 foreign pastoral visits. He visited places that no pope had ever gone, such as Great Britain and Egypt. John Paul II was also the first pontiff to visit a predominantly Orthodox nation (Romania, in 1999) and was the first pope to visit a Muslim mosque (Damascus, in 2001). It is hard to overstate the impact that John Paul II had on world politics, as he reached out in an unprecedented way to the world's Jews as well as Muslims and non-Catholic Christians.

John Paul II was also the first pontiff to visit a predominantly Orthodox nation (Romania in 1999), and was the first pope to visit a Muslim mosque (Damascus, 2001).

In affairs of social justice, faith, and church governance, John Paul II was at once liberal and conservative. On most social issues, he was considered liberal and was a vocal critic of both communism and the excesses of capitalism. He frequently decried the gap between rich and poor nations and was a champion of the world's impoverished and downtrodden. He had little use for political oppression of any stripe and worked tirelessly to curb politically motivated violence. John Paul II was an ardent foe of the death penalty and of abortion, arguing that the inherent "sanctity of human life" could not be defiled by secular institutions. This stance made him popular with liberals and conservatives around the world. Yet in terms of Catholic doctrine, the pope was conservative, if not orthodox. He steadfastly refused to consider the ordination of women, the abandonment of celibacy for Catholic clergy, or the lifting of the Church's ban on contraception.

John Paul II died in Rome on 2 April 2005 after battling a series of debilitating ailments, some of which were the result of a near-mortal gunshot wound he received during a May 1981 assassination attempt in St. Peter's Square. John Paul II will be remembered not only for his humility and service to humanity—he visited his would-be assassin in prison and embraced and forgave him in 1983—but also for his role in accelerating the demise of communist rule in Europe.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. and Luc Stenger

See also

Roman Catholic Church; Solidarity Movement; Vatican City; Vatican Council II

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Johnson, Louis Arthur
(1891–1966)

U.S. secretary of defense. Born on 10 January 1891 in Roanoke, Virginia, Louis Johnson graduated from the University of Virginia Law School in 1912. Admitted to the West Virginia bar, he established his own firm and served in the West Virginia House of Delegates. During World War I he enlisted in the U.S. Army. Earning a commission through officers' candidate school, he saw combat in France and was a major by war's end. One of the founders of the American Legion and a longtime Democratic Party leader in West Virginia, he served as an assistant secretary of war from 1937 to 1940.

From 1940 to 1949, Johnson practiced law and remained active in Democratic Party politics. In return for his fund-raising efforts during the hotly contested 1948 presidential race, President Harry S. Truman named Johnson as defense secretary, replacing James Forrestal, in March 1949. Looking to reduce military expenditures and pay down the national debt, Truman ordered Johnson to conduct a complete review of the American defense structure. What resulted was the so-called Johnson Axe, which culminated in deep across-the-board military cuts. Johnson believed that Defense Department unification and closer cooperation between the services would reduce needless duplication and that the creation of a strong nuclear deterrent would hold down conventional military expenses.

Johnson's plans for atomic weapons control alienated the U.S. Navy. He advocated giving sole control over American atomic power to the U.S. Air Force and also ordered additional B-36 bombers. In addition, he canceled a key naval program, the 65,000-ton flush-deck aircraft carrier *United States*. When Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan resigned in protest, Johnson replaced him with a fund-raising friend, Francis Matthews, derisively known as the "rowboat secretary" for his complete lack of naval experience. Leading naval officers were outraged, and in congressional hearings during the so-called Revolt of the Admirals, the navy slandered the air force by denigrating the abilities of the B-36. When Johnson promptly sacked Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis Denfeld, other naval officers resigned in acrimonious

protest. Only after much wrangling did the Defense Department reach a consensus that the nation needed multiple nuclear options to deal with the Soviet threat.

Johnson's tenure at the Pentagon proved short and stormy. His legendary acerbity no doubt contributed to his downfall, but his decisions also failed to soothe the interservice rivalries in the formative years of the Defense Department. Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington resigned over budget cuts, and Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall departed because of racial integration of the military, which Johnson strongly supported. Congressmen and senators found their constituents unhappy with the impact of defense cuts on local economies. When the Korean War exposed America's military unpreparedness in the summer of 1950, Johnson became a political liability and a convenient scapegoat. Although Truman himself had pushed for defense cutbacks, at the president's request Johnson resigned his post and left the Defense Department on 19 September 1950. Returning to private life, he practiced law until his death in Washington, D.C., on 24 April 1966.

Thomas D. Veve

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Korean War; Marshall, George Catlett; Sherman, Forrest Percival; Truman, Harry S.

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Johnson, Lyndon Baines

(1908–1973)

Democratic politician, U.S. congressman (1938–1949), U.S. senator (1949–1961), vice president (1961–1963), and president of the United States (1963–1969). Lyndon Johnson was born in Stonewall, Texas, in a farmhouse on the Pedernales River on 27 August 1908. His early life was touched by rural poverty, which would later make him a champion of the poor and underprivileged. He worked his way through Southwest Texas State Teachers College and subsequently taught mostly poor Mexican students in an inner-city Houston high school.

Lyndon B. Johnson, one of the most controversial U.S. presidents of modern times, fought hard for civil rights and education and sought to use the nation's wealth to eradicate poverty. Johnson also increased the U.S. commitment to the Vietnam War, which in the end consumed his presidency. (Library of Congress)

In 1931 Johnson became active in Democratic Party politics and that same year went to Washington, D.C., to serve as secretary to a Texas congressman. A shrewd, brilliant, and sometimes overbearing politician, Johnson honed his political skills early on and successfully won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1937, which he retained until 1949. During World War II he served briefly as a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy.

In 1948 Johnson won election to the Senate and in 1953 became its youngest majority leader in history. As majority leader, he worked with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration to maintain a bipartisan foreign policy. Johnson was instrumental in defeating the proposed Bricker Amendment, which would have prohibited executive agreements with foreign powers, and also supported the Formosa Resolution and the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In 1960 Johnson was elected vice president on the Democratic ticket with President John F. Kennedy. Riding in the Dallas motorcade on 22 November 1963 during which Kennedy was assassinated, Johnson was sworn in as president that same day in Dallas and moved decisively to bring the mourning nation together in the days and weeks after Kennedy's murder. Taking advantage of the outpouring of grief immediately following the assassination, Johnson mustered his pitch-perfect political skills to ensure congressional passage of the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbade discrimination in all public places and in hiring practices based on race, religion, sex, or national origin. This success marked one of the high points in the ongoing civil rights movement. He also pushed through Congress a series of stimulative tax cuts that had originally been proposed by Kennedy. Hugely popular, Johnson won the presidency in his own right in the November 1964 election, handily defeating his conservative Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater, with 61 percent of the popular vote.

Despite the lengthening shadows cast by the Vietnam War, Johnson took full advantage of his electoral mandate by ushering in some of the most far-reaching domestic reforms since the New Deal. After much arm-twisting, Johnson pushed the 1965 Voting Rights Act through Congress and declared that the United States must "build a Great Society" in which poverty and social injustices would be eradicated. His ambitious program called for reforms in education, health care, and urban renewal and also called for the elimination of rural isolation and poverty, among many other reforms. In 1965 Congress passed the Medicare Act, a government-subsidized health care program for senior citizens and the first major initiative aimed at the elderly since the Social Security Act thirty years earlier.



Johnson soon became overwhelmed by the course of events in Vietnam. Ultimately, many of his Great Society programs languished as the war consumed additional resources and more public attention. Upon becoming president, Johnson had informed the South Vietnamese government that he would stay the course and help it secure victory over the communist insurgency. He approved OPLAN 34A, a U.S.-supported series of raids by the South Vietnamese along the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV, North Vietnam) coast. A raid on 31 July 1964, coupled with a signals intelligence–gathering DESOTO patrol by the destroyer *Maddox*, helped precipitate the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and led to the subsequent Tonkin Gulf Resolution, giving the president carte blanche to deploy U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. He used the resolution as legal justification to escalate the Vietnam War.

After the 1964 election, Johnson felt obliged to reverse the deteriorating military and political situation in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam). With the support of most of his civilian and military advisors, he pursued a policy of gradual escalation beginning in 1965. In February 1965 he ordered a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam, code-named Operation ROLLING THUNDER. In March, he deployed the Marines to protect U.S. airbases. U.S. Army troops followed, and Johnson announced an open-ended commitment to South Vietnam in late July. By the end of 1965, he had dispatched 180,000 American troops to Vietnam. He defended his decision to escalate the war as a "political necessity" that he believed was essential to secure passage of Great Society legislation.

Other foreign policy issues came to the fore, including the 1965 American intervention in the Dominican Republic. Johnson dispatched Marines there on 28 April 1965 to protect American lives and prevent a potential communist takeover of the government. In June 1967, Johnson met with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin for two days in Glassboro, New Jersey, to discuss

Vietnam, the impact of the Six-Day War in the Middle East, and the potential for arms control talks and nuclear nonproliferation.

In the end, Vietnam overshadowed everything else. During 1966–1967, American troop strength in Vietnam sharply escalated, bombing increased, casualties mounted, and yet the war ground on without resolution. Johnson grew increasingly frustrated by critics of his Vietnam policies, some of which were from his own party. Public disaffection with the war also increased. Large antiwar demonstrations became commonplace by 1967, some of which resulted in violence and rioting. Meanwhile, as the war siphoned resources away from domestic programs, racial tensions increased dramatically, widespread urban riots and arson plagued the nation, and college campuses became hotbeds of political radicalism and antiwar activism. Johnson, who once seemed politically invincible, appeared incapable of dealing with the mounting crises.

In late January 1968, after the administration had assured the American public that the war was being won, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched the Tet Offensive, a nationwide military operation that destroyed the credibility of the Johnson administration. Although a tactical victory for the Americans and South Vietnamese, Tet 1968 permanently undermined American support for the war and the president who escalated it. With 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam and growing violence and radicalism on the home front, Johnson took the nation by surprise on 31 March 1968, following a setback in the Democratic primary in New Hampshire, by announcing that he would not seek another presidential term. He then authorized exploratory truce talks with the North Vietnamese, which almost immediately stalled as the fighting continued. Johnson left office a broken man, both physically and mentally. He was immensely unpopular by 1968 and would always be associated with America's failure in Vietnam. In retirement, he wrote his memoirs. Johnson died on 22 January 1973 at his ranch in Johnson City, Texas.

Richard M. Filipink Jr.

See also

Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Eisenhower Doctrine; Fulbright, James William; Glassboro Summit; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Rusk, Dean; Tet Offensive; United States; Vietnam War

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Jordan

Middle Eastern nation covering 35,637 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Indiana. Jordan, officially known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, borders Israel and the West Bank to the west, Syria and the Golan Heights to the north, Iraq to the east, and Saudi Arabia to the east and south. During 1516–1919, Jordan remained under the control of the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottoman Empire came to an end as a result of World War I, Transjordan (as it was then known) became a part of Britain's League of Nations mandate over Palestine in 1920. In 1921, Abdullah ibn Hussein—a member of the Hashemite dynasty—became the de facto king of Transjordan. Transjordan became a constitutional monarchy under Hussein, who was formally placed on the throne by the British in 1928 as Abdullah I. Nevertheless, it was still considered part of the British mandate. That changed in May 1946 when Transjordan was granted its independence.

A member of the Arab League when the state of Israel was created in 1948, Abdullah was obliged to fight alongside his Arab neighbors against the Israelis. Like most Arabs, he flatly rejected Zionist ambitions. In 1949 he gained control of the West Bank as a result of the war, and he officially changed his country's name to Jordan to reflect the newfound territories west of the Jordan River. That same year, Jordan signed an armistice agreement with Israel. Months later, Abdullah moved to permanently annex the West Bank, which deeply troubled Arab leaders who believed the territory should be reserved for the Palestinians. In 1951 a Palestinian assassinated Abdullah in Jerusalem, and the following year he was succeeded by his grandson, King Hussein I. Hussein ruled Jordan for the next forty-seven years.

A series of anti-Western uprisings in Jordan combined with the Suez Crisis in 1956 compelled Hussein to sever military ties to Britain. In February 1958 he formed the Arab Federation with Iraq. The king saw this as a countermeasure to the newly formed United Arab Republic (UAR), dominated by Egypt's Pan-Arab nationalist President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Arab Federation fell apart by autumn 1958, however, after the Iraqi king was overthrown in a coup. Later that same year, leaders of the UAR called for the overthrow of governments in Beirut and Amman. Hussein fought back by requesting help from the British, who dispatched troops to Jordan to quell antigovernment protests. The Americans had simultaneously sent troops to Lebanon to bolster its besieged Christian-led government. Jordan's relations with the UAR remained tense. Indeed, in 1963 when a rival Jordanian government-in-exile was set up in Damascus, Hussein declared a state of emergency. The crisis subsided when the Americans and British publicly

King Hussein I of Jordan meets with acting U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter in 1959. (National Archives and Records Administration)

endorsed Hussein's rule. For good measure, the United States placed its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on alert.

After the mid-1960s and more than a decade of crises and regional conflicts, Hussein turned his attention to domestic issues. He was devoted to improving the welfare of his people, so he launched major programs to improve literacy rates (which were very low), increase educational opportunities, bolster public health initiatives, and lower infant mortality rates. In these endeavors he was quite successful. By the late 1980s, literacy rates approached 100 percent, and infant deaths were down dramatically. Jordan's economy also began to expand as the nation engaged in more trade with the outside world and as its relations with Egypt improved. Hussein also began to erect a modern and reliable transportation system and moved to modernize the country's infrastructure. Notable in all of this was that Hussein accomplished much without resorting to overly repressive tactics. Indeed, throughout the Cold War Jordanians enjoyed a level of freedom virtually unrivaled in the Middle East.

By the late 1960s, another Arab-Israeli conflict was in the making. After Egypt blockaded Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967, Hussein signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt. Normally a moderating force in volatile Middle East politics, Hussein sided with Egypt—even as Tel Aviv was imploring him to remain out of the impending war. When the fighting ended, Jordan and the other Arab nations came out on the losing end. Israel took the entire West Bank from Jordan along with all of Jerusalem.

Also as a result of the war, thousands of Palestinians fled to Jordan. By 1970 Palestinian guerrilla groups and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were in open warfare with Jordanian forces, who had unsuccessfully tried to prevent Palestinian attacks on Israel from taking place on Jordanian soil. Hussein also opposed the Palestinian aims of creating a Palestinian state in the West Bank, which he hoped to regain in the future. In September 1970, after ten days of bloody conflict, thousands of Palestinians fled Jordan for Syria and Lebanon.

The early 1970s saw continued unrest. In 1972 Hussein tried to create a new Arab federation, which would have included the West Bank as Jordanian territory. The idea was rejected by Israel and most of the Arab states. In December 1972 Hussein was nearly assassinated by a Palestinian. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Hussein played only a small role, ordering a limited troop deployment to fight in Syria. In 1974, he finally agreed to recognize the Arab League's position that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

Hussein strengthened relations with neighboring Syria beginning in the late 1970s, and he vigorously opposed the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Jordan backed Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). The 1980s was a period of economic chaos for the Jordanian people. This led Hussein to seek U.S. financial aid. When he chose to back Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.S. aid was curtailed. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also withheld financial assistance. The economy went from bad to worse. When some 700,000 Jordanians returned to Jordan because they were unwelcome in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the economic situation became truly dire. Not until 2001 did the economy begin to regain its footing. King Hussein died in February 1999 and was succeeded by his son, King Abdullah II.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Hussein I, King of Jordan; Middle East; Palestine Liberation Organization; Persian Gulf War; Suez Crisis

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Juan Carlos I, King of Spain
(1938–)

King of Spain who guided the return of Spanish democracy. Born in Rome on 5 January 1938 to Juan de Borbón y Battenberg (Don Juan) and Maria de Borbón-Nápoles, Juan Carlos Victor Maria de Borbón y Borbón was the grandson of Spanish King Alfonso XIII, who had been forced into exile in 1931. Alfonso formally abdicated the throne to Don Juan in 1941, but Spain's dictator Francisco Franco, although favoring a return of the monarchy, disliked Don Juan and in any case intended to retain power. In answer to Don Juan's repeated calls that he hand over power, Franco promulgated the Succession Law of 1947. This acknowledged Spain as a kingdom and legitimized royal authority but did not identify the king or the date of his restoration. Franco also made clear that the monarchy would be restored only after his death.

During World War II, Juan Carlos moved with his father and mother to Lausanne, Switzerland, and later to Estoril, Portugal. In 1948 Don Juan met Franco on a yacht off Galicia. Franco insisted that Juan Carlos be educated in Spain if there was to be any hope of the crown prince one day becoming king. Don Juan agreed, and in 1948 Juan Carlos began his education in Madrid. In 1954 Don Juan and Franco met again and agreed on higher education for Juan Carlos, who completed his studies at the University of Madrid. In May 1962 Juan Carlos married Princess Sofia Schleswig Holstein Sondenburg of Greece. Then, in July 1969, Franco officially designated Juan Carlos as his successor and future king of Spain, which was officially approved by vote of the Spanish Cortes (parliament).

King of Spain Juan Carlos I, pictured here in 1978. (Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma/Corbis)

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as Franco's health began to decline, Juan Carlos prepared for the succession, discreetly aligning himself with the Tácito reformist group. Juan Carlos assumed temporary powers when Franco was seriously ill during July–September 1974 and formally assumed power in Spain following the death of Franco on 20 November 1975.

Officially proclaimed king of Spain by the Cortes, Juan Carlos I announced his interest in reform. The first phase of the king's rule under President of the Government (prime minister) Carlos Arias Navarro did not go well, as Navarro sought to pursue a middle course that pleased neither reformers nor conservatives. In 1976 Juan Carlos appointed centrist politician Adolfo Suárez as president of the government. Acceptable to the Francoists, Suárez nonetheless identified with the king's desire for reform. Together they pushed through political changes that included universal suffrage and a system of political parties for the first time in Spain since the Spanish Civil War. The Cortes also became a bicameral, popularly elected parliament, and Juan Carlos announced an amnesty for political offenses. A

new constitution in 1978 saw the king yield sovereignty to the Spanish people, and Spain became a kingdom of autonomous regions.

The king's reforms created a rightist backlash among Francoists. The most serious threat came in February 1981 when rightist elements from the army and Civil Guard attempted to seize power. Juan Carlos played a key role in bringing about the collapse of the coup by immediately voicing his strong support for the constitution. The failure of the coup helped bring the Left to power in 1982, and a socialist government led by Felipe González Márquez marked the final transition to democracy. Juan Carlos I played a critical roles in this crisis and in healing the deep divisions in Spanish national life.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Franco, Francisco; González Márquez, Felipe; Spain; Suárez González, Adolfo

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See Panama, U.S. Invasion of

JUST CAUSE, Operation

Just War Theory

Dating back to Saints Ambrose (d. AD 397) and Augustine (d. AD 430), the just war tradition reflects attempts by theologians, political philosophers, and military leaders to define the requisite conditions that justify armed conflict (*jus ad bellum*) and to establish moral limits on the use of force within a war (*jus in bello*). The Cold War and the advent of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence posed new challenges for the application of just war principles.

The destructive power of nuclear weapons complicated application of the just war insistence on limited warfare, especially in terms of discrimination between combatants and civilians, often referred to as noncombatant immunity. For example, some viewed nuclear warfare as intrinsically opposed to the *jus in bello* criteria. Statements by two of the largest U.S. religious denominations epitomized these concerns. In a 1983 letter, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops began their discussion of U.S. nuclear policy

with a denunciation of any use of nuclear weapons against civilian sites such as cities. They went on to question the very concept that nuclear warfare could be limited or contained in any meaningful sense and called for full nuclear disarmament. Similarly, in 1986 the United Methodist Council of Bishops in the United States wrote *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and Just Peace* in which they too called for complete nuclear disarmament. The council specifically condemned the policy of nuclear deterrence and claimed that instead of encouraging peace, it led to perpetual hostility and encouraged a nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation.

Other theorists, such as the Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey, believed that nuclear weapons could be used within a moral framework given the right conditions. Although Ramsey prioritized discrimination between combatants and noncombatants, for example, he thought that counterforce nuclear targeting (as opposed to counterpopulation targeting) was justifiable based on just war principles. He recognized that some noncombatants would inevitably die in a nuclear attack on military targets. Nevertheless, for Ramsey the rule of double effect as developed by just war theorists during the Middle Ages allowed for the possibility of noncombatant casualties. According to the rule, a soldier could proceed with an attack likely to harm noncombatants provided that the injury to civilians was unintentional and that the good effect of the action outweighed the negative consequences. Ramsey applied similar logic to his understanding of nuclear deterrence. Since a discriminate, proportional use of nuclear weapons was morally justifiable, according to Ramsey, the threat of nuclear retaliation was also justifiable. On the other hand, he argued that the indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons on population centers was immoral, and therefore the threat of indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons was also immoral. Based on these criteria, he repudiated the policy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and urged policymakers to develop a new generation of low-radiation yield, discriminate nuclear weaponry.

Unlike the approach taken by Ramsey and other theological writers, Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* articulated just war principles within the context of an emphasis on human rights. Walzer's theory of supreme emergency in particular left room for immoral acts in extreme circumstances. He suggested that a political community had a right to defend itself and temporarily abrogate the moral limitations on warfare if its very existence was threatened and if all other options had been exhausted. Although not restricted to nuclear warfare, this principle left a narrow opening for counterpopulation nuclear threats and for counterpopulation nuclear warfare.

Just war positions during the Cold War developed around other themes as well. Some condoned the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes but objected to any actual use of the weapons. Others emphasized a no-first-use policy and insisted that nuclear bombs only be used in retaliation for nuclear attacks. Still others saw nuclear weapons as an acceptable response to conventional attacks under certain circumstances. Another area of debate centered on the morality of seeking nuclear superiority.

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War diminished the immediate threat of nuclear attack and signaled a new context for just war theorizing regarding nuclear ethics.

Joseph W. Williams

See also

Human Rights; Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Arms Race; Roman Catholic Church; World Council of Churches; World Peace Council

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K

Kádár, János
(1912–1989)

Hungarian communist politician, general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, and de facto leader of Hungary (1956–1988). Born János Csermanek on 26 May 1912 in Fiume (now Rijeka), János Kádár had almost no formal education. He joined both a labor union and the outlawed Communist Party in his teens. During the next several years he was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for his political activities.

In 1942 Kádár joined the Communist Party's Central Committee and in 1944 became its chief secretary. In 1946 he became deputy general secretary of the party, and during 1948–1950, following the communist takeover, he was minister of internal affairs and head of the Budapest secret police. In 1949 he participated in the show trial of party member László Rajk. Kádár was subsequently arrested in April 1951 on charges of treason against the party and in 1952 was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In July 1954, following the thaw after the death of Josef Stalin the year before, Kádár was released and given new assignments in the party. On 25 October 1956, two days after the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution, he replaced Ernő Gerő as general secretary of the party and retained this position until May 1988. Between 30 October and 4 November 1956, Kádár was the deputy prime minister in Imre Nagy's reformist cabinet. Kádár appeared to support Nagy's liberal reform policies but in fact favored less radical changes. On 2–3 November 1956, Kádár was in Moscow negotiating a reversal of the revolution with Soviet leaders. He then returned to Hungary and at Szolnok, about 80 miles southeast of Budapest, openly denounced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On 4 November Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest. Kádár returned to Budapest on 7 November and, with Soviet support, took control

Longtime communist János Kádár took power in Hungary in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution and remained the most powerful figure in his country until 1988. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

of the government. The next day, he announced the formation of the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government and its Fifteen-Point Program.

By June 1957 Kádár had stabilized Hungary and secured his position as the most prominent political leader in the country. In doing so, he instituted repressive measures under which Nagy and his fellow reformists were ultimately tried and executed in 1958. This resulted in international condemnation and several years of political isolation for Kádár's government. By the late 1960s, however, Kádár began to implement his so-called Goulash Communism that brought improved relations with the West, a rising standard of living, and relative freedom from Soviet interference. In 1977 Pope Paul VI received Kádár at the Vatican, which symbolically marked the end of Hungary's moral and diplomatic isolation.

Kádár was elected general secretary of the party's Central Committee in 1985. However, by the end of the decade he found it difficult to adapt to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's reform initiatives. By then, Kádár's presence in the party had become an obstacle to internal development and reform. In May 1988 he was relieved as general secretary and assumed the mostly ceremonial post of party president. A year later he was removed from the presidency and ousted from the Central Committee. Kádár died shortly thereafter, on 6 July 1989, in Budapest.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Europe, Eastern; Gerő, Ernő; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Grósz, Károly; Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Khrushchev, Nikita; Nagy, Imre; Stalin, Josef

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Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich

(1892–1991)

Soviet leader and close associate of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Born on 22 November 1892 into a working-class Jewish family in Kabanay near Kiev in Ukraine, Lazar Kaganovich did not receive a formal education. As a teenager he worked in a tannery and became a cobbler. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1911 and participated in the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917.

During the 1920s Kaganovich held a succession of important posts in the Communist Party in Ukraine. Called to Moscow, he was appointed first secretary of the party committee in the capital in 1930, in effect mayor of the capital city. Here he supervised construction of the Moscow subway and, later, the purging of the city's party organization. He also became a full member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Kaganovich supported Stalin against his popular rival, Sergei Kirov, who wanted to slow the pace of collectivization and industrialization in the early 1930s. Kaganovich also played a major role in the collectivization of agriculture, which brought the deaths of millions of peasants. A slavish admirer of Stalin, Kaganovich was one of the few "old Bolsheviks" to survive the Great Purges of the 1930s, in which he took an active part. Along with Stalin and Vyacheslev Molotov, Kaganovich signed the death warrants of thousands of Soviet citizens.

Closely identified with Soviet domestic affairs and in particular with the railroads (a traditional Bolshevik stronghold), Kaganovich was minister for transport (1935–1937), heavy industry (1937–1939), and the fuel industry (1939). He became deputy premier in 1938, and during World War II he played an important role as part of the five-man council that supervised the Soviet Union's economy.

A prominent member of the collective leadership after the death of Stalin in March 1953, Kaganovich strongly opposed the de-Stalinization policies of his former Ukrainian protégé, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. In 1957 Kaganovich joined with fellow hard-liners Nikolai Bulganin and Molotov in an effort to unseat Khrushchev in the so-called Anti-Party Affair. In sharp contrast to what would have occurred under Stalin, Khrushchev expelled Kaganovich from his posts and the party and banished him to Sverdlovsk as manager of a cement factory. Kaganovich died in Moscow on 25 July 1991.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Khrushchev, Nikita; Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Kaifu Toshiki
(1931–)

Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician and prime minister (1989–1991). Born on 2 January 1931 in Aichi Prefecture and graduating in 1954 with a degree in law from Waseda University, Kaifu Toshiki was first elected to the Japanese parliament (the Diet) on the LDP ticket in 1960.

Kaifu twice served as minister of education before being unexpectedly elevated to the premiership on 9 August 1989. He was selected for his clean image after a political crisis that tainted most of the LDP leaders. Quick to appreciate the shrinking Soviet sphere of influence, he pursued an active economic agenda in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. When he visited Europe in January 1990, just two months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he promised nearly $2 billion in aid to Hungary and Poland as well as encouraged Japanese investment in Eastern Europe.

Kaifu was slower to embrace the new Russia. At his personal insistence, the Japanese Defense Agency dropped any reference to a Soviet threat in its 1990 annual report. At the July 1990 G7 Summit, he placed the Kurile Islands territorial dispute on the agenda, seeking return of this Japanese territory given to the Soviet Union after World War II. He also resisted large-scale aid to the Soviets.

When Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev visited Tokyo in April 1991, he left empty-handed. At the July 1991 G7 Summit, Kaifu opposed Russia's admission to the G7, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. In sharp contrast, he took the lead in restoring ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) following the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. By January 1991 Japan had lifted its limited sanctions against China, and in August Kaifu became the first G7 leader to visit Beijing.

Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War in August 1990, Kaifu's political stature declined precipitously. A proposed bill to authorize the dispatch of Japan's Self-Defense Forces to the Gulf met with strong domestic opposition and was abandoned in the autumn of 1990. A revised bill was introduced the following year, and in addition to the $13 billion that Japan contributed to the war effort, Kaifu sent a minesweeping flotilla to the Gulf, albeit after the fighting had ended. He resigned as premier on 5 November 1991 after failing to win support for electoral reform from powerful LDP factions. Kaifu left the LDP and became a leading figure in several major opposition parties before rejoining the LDP in November 2003.

Christopher W. Braddick

See also

China, People's Republic of; Japan; Japan, Armed Forces; Kurile Islands; Persian Gulf War; Soviet Union

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KAL Flight 007
(1 September 1983)

Downing of a civilian Korean Airlines (KAL) jetliner by Soviet air defenses that killed 269 people and heightened Cold War tensions. U.S. President

Ronald Reagan condemned the Soviet destruction of KAL Flight 007 in September 1983, pointing to the incident as further proof for his claim that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire." U.S. officials exploited the tragedy to gain leverage in the Soviet-American Cold War confrontation that had been rekindled in the early 1980s. For a decade, bitter accusations and indignant rebuttals only added to the mystery of why a civilian aircraft strayed into sensitive Soviet airspace.

Shortly before 3:30 A.M. on 31 August 1983, KAL 007 departed Anchorage, Alaska, after refueling on the final leg of its New York to Seoul route. On board the Boeing 747 were 269 people. Several minutes after takeoff, the jet deviated from its assigned course, straying twice over the Kamchatka Peninsula and then Sakhalin Island, the location of a major Soviet military installation. Five hours after the flight left Alaska and with the plane approximately 11 miles off Moneron Island, which itself is 30 miles southwest of Sakhalin's southern tip, Soviet Air Defense Force Colonel Gennady N. Osipovich fired two missiles from his SU-15 fighter that struck KAL 007. Minutes later, the jumbo jet plunged into the sea. All aboard perished, including 61 U.S. citizens, among them U.S. Representative Larry P. McDonald, a Georgia Democrat.

President Reagan immediately decried the downing as an "act of barbarism" directed "against the world and the moral precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere." Soviet leader Yuri Andropov insisted that the KAL 007 flight was a deliberate attempt to spy on or provoke the Soviet Union. Reagan ordered the U.S. Eighth Army in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) on full alert, and its commander advised the press that nations of the northern and western Pacific area should prepare for the possibility of war.

Meanwhile, conflicting explanations for the tragedy were emerging. Because an American RC-135 spy plane had flown near Sakhalin earlier on the night of the attack, the incident likely was a case of mistaken identity. But KAL also shared the blame. In 1983, KAL was combating its negative reputation for flight delays with an unusual policy that paid pilots a bonus to arrive on time "any way they can." But uncertainty persisted because the Soviet government, denying any culpability, waged a campaign to keep U.S. investigators away from the crash site.

In 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ended speculation about the doomed flight when he released the in-flight data recordings that the Soviets had discovered amid KAL 007's wreckage. A series of navigational errors shortly after takeoff had taken the airliner some 300 miles north of its intended route. For more than two hours, the Korean flight crew was unaware that the plane was off course and was flying over forbidden Soviet airspace. Soviet air defense, meanwhile, tracked the intruding aircraft and made attempts at identification. The pursuit pilot reported that unlike a spy plane, the aircraft had its navigation lights aglow. Because Soviet rules of engagement required air defense forces to shoot down any intruder that ignored a warning, Colonel Osipovich tipped his wings and fired warning cannons. Apparently, the Korean crew neither saw nor heard these signals. His efforts at identification having failed, the Soviet pilot followed orders to shoot, reporting tersely that "the target is destroyed."

For a decade, bitter accusations and indignant rebuttals only added to the mystery of why a civilian aircraft strayed into sensitive Soviet airspace.

The U.S. Navy submersible *Deep Drone* being readied for deployment from the U.S. Navy fleet tug *Narragansett* during the search for Korean Airlines Flight 007, 1 July 1984. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Soviet leaders soon learned that the intrusion was the result of navigational error, but they refused to admit it. This allowed the Reagan administration to initiate a major public relations effort to discredit the Soviets. On 6 September, the United Nations (UN) Security Council for the first time watched a video supporting the U.S. contention that a Soviet pilot wantonly shot down what he knew was a passenger jetliner. The purpose of the display was to use the KAL 007 incident to undermine Soviet integrity, thereby blunting Moscow's so-called peace campaign to dissuade America's European allies from basing upgraded U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil.

U.S. officials knew the truth, however, because top secret American intelligence stations near the Soviet border had monitored the pursuit of KAL 007 minute by minute, recording how the Soviets believed that the intruder was a military plane but realized their error too late. Reagan and his aides refused to attribute the incident to mistaken identity or bureaucratic rigidity. One reason for this was to keep secret the reach of American intelligence, but more important was scoring a propaganda victory that Reagan defenders would argue helped win the Cold War.

James I. Matray

See also

Andropov, Yuri; Korea, Republic of; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Kaliningrad Oblast

Noncontiguous region of the Russian Republic located on the Baltic Sea and separated from Russia proper by the territories of Lithuania and Belarus. The Kaliningrad Oblast had previously been part of the northern third of German East Prussia. During World War II the area was occupied by the Red Army. In Section V of the Potsdam Protocol at the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, the Allied leaders agreed that "pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement," the city of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) and area adjacent to it would be transferred to the Soviet Union. Moscow was anxious to secure the area as a base on the Baltic Sea.

The Kaliningrad Oblast is 5,830 square miles in area, and Königsberg's 1945 population was 140,000 people. Most of the Germans who had previously inhabited the territory fled the advancing Red Army or were expelled after the fighting in the area ended in April 1945. The city of Königsberg was 90 percent destroyed during a two-month Soviet siege, and civilian casualties were extremely high.

The Soviets began rebuilding the city in 1946 and renamed it Kaliningrad. Historical sites that had survived the fighting, such as Königsberg Castle, were destroyed by the Soviets in an effort to eradicate the former German presence. Kaliningrad, connected to the Baltic Sea by an inland channel, and its nearby port, Baltiysk (Pillau), remain ice-free year-round and served during the Cold War as the Soviet Union's principal Baltic naval base. Until early 1991 the entire region was a restricted military area off-limits to foreigners and nonresident Soviet citizens.

Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the region was attached to the USSR. It is now separated from the Russian Republic by 600 miles of foreign territory, and unimpeded overland communication with Kaliningrad has been a matter of contention between Russia and Lithuania. In 1991 the region had 900,000 inhabitants, of whom 412,000 resided in Kaliningrad. The majority of the residents at the beginning of the twenty-first century are the offspring of Russians who had moved to the region after the war, but there are also inhabitants of Ukrainian and Belarusian descent.

Uncertainty over the future of Kaliningrad accompanied the somewhat chaotic collapse of the Soviet Union. Some nationalist enthusiasts in Lithuania called for the inclusion of what they called "Lithuania Minor" in a Greater Lithuania. Yet some ethnic Germans from the former Soviet republics in

Central Asia moved to Kaliningrad after 1991 and increased the German component of the area. The 1994 official tally of ethnic Germans in the region was 5,000, but the actual figure was probably closer to four times as large. As a result of the growing German population, some Russian and Slavic inhabitants of the territory feared that German investment there might be a prelude to German territorial claims.

Economically speaking, the collapse of the Soviet Union hit the region hard. Subsidies from Moscow were reduced, and Soviet-related defense industries went into a steep decline. Local producers of consumer goods have also suffered as a result of growing competition from goods produced outside Russia. Some two-thirds of consumer goods are imported. In 1991 the province was declared a free economic zone. However, in 1993 a conflict arose between Kaliningrad and the federal Russian government over a new law on customs and tariffs. Kaliningrad certainly harbors economic potential, but much depends upon Russian policy and its relations with the European Union. The region boasts abundant natural resources, including amber, offshore oil deposits, peat, mineral water, salt mines, fish, and timber, and also possesses an educated and low-cost labor force. Switzerland, Lithuania, and Germany have been leading investors and trading nations with Kaliningrad since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Bernard Cook

See also

Belarus; European Union; Lithuania; Soviet Union; Ukraine; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Kampuchea

See Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of

Kania, Stanisław
(1927–)

Polish communist politician and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) during 1980–1981. Born on 8 March

1927 in the village of Wrocanka, Stanisław Kania came from a peasant background and graduated from the Institute of Economy at the Social Sciences College of the party's Central Committee. In 1945 he joined the communist Young Struggle Union and became an official in its successor organization, the Union of Polish Youth, during 1952–1956.

Beginning in 1958, Kania began to hold a series of increasingly important posts in the PUWP apparatus. In April 1971 he was appointed secretary of the Central Committee, after which he dealt chiefly with security, police, military affairs, and relations with the Catholic Church. On 6 September 1980 he became first secretary of the Central Committee, replacing Edward Gierek, who was blamed for the ongoing economic crisis and the outbreak of strikes and protests. A moderate who proposed compromise and cooperation with the Solidarity movement, in December 1980 and again in March 1981 Kania managed to convince Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev to resist using the Red Army or Warsaw Pact troops to quash the Solidarity trade union. In June 1981, Kania survived an attempted coup by communist hard-liners.

Stanisław Kania, Polish Communist Party leader during 1980–1981, was a moderate who urged cooperation with the Solidarity labor movement. (Bettmann/Corbis)

At the Tenth Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP (14–21 July 1981), Kania was once again elected first secretary as the centrist candidate. But three months later, on 17 October 1981, he was dismissed from his post at the Fourth Plenary assembly because of his inability to control Solidarity. General Wojciech Jaruzelski replaced him. In 1982 Kania became a member of the State Council, a rather inconsequential position that he held until 1985. He retired in 1989. In 1991 Kania published a memoir, along with Edward Gierek, in which he steadfastly defended his policies during 1980–1981.

Andrzej Paczkowski

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Gierek, Edward; Jaruzelski, Wojciech; Poland; Solidarity Movement

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Karelia

Region shared by Finland and Russia but mainly inhabited by people of Finnish extraction. The eastern part of Karelia is located in Russia and the

western part in Finland. Karelia was almost entirely ceded to the Soviet Union as a result of World War II, becoming a Soviet republic with its capital at Petrozavodsk, and gained autonomous status within the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Karelia borders on the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, the Ladoga Sea, the Onega Sea, and the White Sea and the northern part of the Gulf of Botten. Its 1945 population was approximately a half million people. Its chiefly Finnish-speaking eastern portion was a target of Finnish irredentist policies, although it never passed into Finnish hands; the western part did belong to Finland until World War II. In the Treaty of Tartu in 1920, Finland expanded territorially up to the Petsamo region, although it continued to harbor ambitions to incorporate the whole of Karelia.

In 1932 Finland and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact that lasted seven years. But in 1939, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets invaded Finland. The Moscow Peace Treaty of 1940 that ended hostilities gave the Soviet Union most of Karelia, including the port of Viipuri (Vyborg).

Finland lost a strategic territory, rich in resources and accounting for 12 percent of Finnish area. Also, more than 400,000 inhabitants (or about 12 percent of the total Finnish population) living in the lost territories had to be evacuated and resettled in Finland proper. The emergency resettlement act of June 1940 allocated 1,274 square miles of land to former Karelian farmers.

From August 1940, the Finnish government negotiated with Berlin regarding military cooperation between Finland and Germany against the Soviet Union. The Finns' goal was to regain the territory lost in the Russo-Finnish War as well as to annex eastern Karelia. Finland received German military assistance in return for facilitating German troop transfers to Norway through its territory and authorizing the stationing of German troops in Finland.

Finland remained neutral until late June 1941, when the German government announced that Finland had aided Germany in its invasion of the Soviet Union. Berlin's action led the Soviets to bomb Turku, Helsinki, and Poryoo. Finland then joined Germany in war against the Soviet Union.

In the second half of 1941, Finland regained its pre–World War II frontiers, including Karelia. The Finns took some additional territory for defensive purposes, but they refused to assist the Germans in taking Leningrad. When the tide of war turned in June 1944, Soviet forces went on the offensive against the Finns, in both the Karelian Isthmus and Lake Ladoga regions. In September 1944 when the so-called Continuation War ended, the Soviets had retaken Viipuri and the territories lost earlier.

Following the resignation of President Risto Ryti in August 1944, the new president, Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, accepted the responsibility of ending the war, risking retaliation by German forces remaining on Finnish soil. As a consequence of the peace settlement with Moscow, thousands of Finns who had returned to Karelia were again forced to relocate to Finland. The Allies concluded formal peace with Finland in the Paris Treaty of 1947. Finland was forced to cede the Karelian Isthmus and also Petsamo and grant an extended lease of the Porkkala peninsula west of Helsinki.

During the Cold War, Karelia became the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. By 1954 Russian had replaced Finnish in the schools, assisted by the settlement of Russians and Belarusians in the area and by intermarriage with the Finns. By 1955 collective farms had been introduced, and many place names had been Russianized.

In 1956, however, the Soviets evacuated Porkkala, and the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic was demoted from the status of a union republic to that of an autonomous republic within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). This move implied that the Soviets no longer harbored the notion of annexing the whole of Finland.

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 abrogated the Soviet-Finnish treaties of 1947 and 1948. Karelia then became the Republic of Karelia within the Russian Federation. Finnish attempts to secure the region met rebuff. Reportedly, in November 1998 a Finnish businessman offered Russian President Boris Yeltsin $500 million to return Karelia to Finland but received no response.

Reportedly, in November 1998 a Finnish businessman offered Russian President Boris Yeltsin $500 million to return Karelia to Finland but received no response.

Abel Polese

See also

Finland; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil, Baron; Soviet Union

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Kashmir Dispute

A former princely Indian state located in southern Asia comprising some 86,000 square miles. Muslims conquered Kashmir in the fourteenth century and forcibly converted its mostly Hindu and Buddhist population to Islam. The British sowed the seeds of the subsequent agitation over control of Kashmir when they placed a Hindu prince on its throne in 1846.

The dispute over the future of Kashmir began in 1947 with the partition of the Empire of India and the creation of independent India and Pakistan. India is primarily Hindu, while Pakistan is mainly Muslim. Under the terms of the 1947 Indian Independence Bill, Kashmir was supposed to determine which of the two nations it would join. Because of Kashmir's Muslim majority, Pakistanis believed that it should be part of Pakistan. Kashmir, however, was led by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. His decision to join his state to India, accepted by the Indian parliament on 26 October 1947, precipitated conflict with Pakistan. This event sparked an uprising in Kashmir

A mountain pass in Kashmir, the object of bitter land disputes between India and Pakistan for more than half a century. (Corel)

by its predominantly Muslim population and Pakistani tribesmen, the Azad Kashmiri, who marched on the provincial capital of Srinigar. The Indian government responded by airlifting troops into Kashmir the next day. Heavy fighting then occurred between Indian Army and Air Force units on the one hand and the rebellious Muslims and their Pakistani supporters on the other.

In November Pakistani troops crossed the border into Kashmir and fought an undeclared war with Indian forces through December 1947. Direct negotiations between India and Pakistan over Kashmir having failed, at the end of December 1947 the dispute was referred to the United Nations (UN). On 20 January 1948, the UN Security Council set up a commission to resolve the dispute. Sporadic fighting between the two sides continued, including a Pathan uprising in Kashmir on 8 February 1948 that was put down by Indian forces. Finally, UN mediation brought about a cease-fire on 1 January 1949. India, however, rejected the arbitration arrangement put forward by the UN, and the continuing dispute over Kashmir rendered close relations between India and Pakistan impossible.

Under the January 1949 agreement, UN observers monitored the cease-fire line. Pakistan was left in control of the north, known as Azad (free) Kashmir. India maintained control of the remainder, including Jammu, amounting to nearly two-thirds of the state. The vote to decide Kashmir's future called

for by the UN never occurred. Negotiations took place intermittently between India and Pakistan over Kashmir but with no tangible result. On 20 August 1953, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the prime minister of Kashmir, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, reached agreement on a plebiscite regarding the future of Jammu, but India then withdrew its pledge and imprisoned Abdullah. On 26 January 1957, India officially annexed Kashmir. Pakistan protested this action, and the UN refused to recognize it.

The dispute continued and was a principal cause of war between India and Pakistan in 1965. Border clashes in August led to major fighting in September. Large tank battles between the two sides resulted in stalemate. In a UN-brokered cease-fire on 22 September, both sides agreed to withdraw to the lines held on 5 August.

On 10 January 1966, India and Pakistan agreed to the Tashkent Declaration, which reestablished the former cease-fire line but failed to provide a permanent solution to the dispute between the two states. Hostilities between India and Pakistan began anew in 1971, this time over the succession of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) from West Pakistan.

Although the war was not fought over Kashmir, fighting did occur along the cease-fire line. The war ended on 3 July 1972 with the Simla Agreement, signed by Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The agreement defined a new line of control in Kashmir, the same basic line as before with only minor deviations. The line of control is roughly 460 miles long and runs over extremely rugged terrain from Jammu in the southwest through the Himalayas in the northeast. Again, this line was monitored by UN observers. The agreement also called for Pakistan and India to refrain from the use of force in Kashmir.

India currently controls 53,665 square miles of Kashmir, while Pakistan administers nearly 32,358 square miles. The line between the two is monitored by members of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). This team has been understaffed and insufficiently equipped since 1950. The UN team has been unable to accurately assess the many cease-fire violations claimed by Pakistan against India. For its part, India has not claimed a cease-fire violation since 1972 and has also severely limited UN observers from inspecting Indian-controlled areas. Violations mainly consisted of small-arms and artillery fire. By 1989, a Pakistan-supported insurgency in Indian Kashmir led to a rapid buildup of Indian forces in the area. The number of forces in the area has been substantially inflated, and India does not release information regarding its military forces. The insurgency and turmoil continue in the region.

Melissa Hebert and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

India; India, Armed Forces; India-Pakistan Wars; Pakistan; Pakistan, Armed Forces

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Kaunda, Kenneth David
(1924–)

African nationalist leader and president of Zambia (1964–1991). Born at Lubwa Mission in Chinsali, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), on 28 April 1924, Kenneth Kaunda attended the Munali Training Centre in Lusaka during 1941–1943 and was a teacher and school headmaster during 1943–1951.

In 1951 Kaunda entered public life through a welfare association affiliated with the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC), a nationalist organization. In 1953 he was elected general secretary of NRANC. Faced with the possible merger of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (now Malawi) under white leadership, he joined other African nationalists in organizing mass demonstrations. In 1953 and again in 1956, he was jailed, albeit briefly, by colonial authorities.

In 1958 Kaunda broke with the NRANC to form the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). In 1959 ZANC was banned, and Kaunda was imprisoned for nine months. He continued his political activities and in January 1964 was elected prime minister following sweeping political reforms and a new constitution that would lead the country to independence. On 24 October 1964, Zambia became independent, with Kaunda as its first president.

A socialist, Kaunda helped unify his country, but his economic policies eventually visited considerable hardship on his people. He was, however, a significant force in southern Africa regional politics and played a major role in efforts to bring an end to the war in neighboring Rhodesia.

Sadly, Kaunda turned toward political repression to retain power. When violence followed the 1968 elections, he banned all political parties except his own, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). In spite of his political orientation, his relations with communist nations were limited mainly to contact with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which helped build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway allowing landlocked Zambia to increase exports of its chief commodity, copper.

By the late 1980s, a faltering economy and calls for pluralistic elections had begun to weaken the Kaunda regime, which had grown corrupt and arrogant. In 1991 multiparty elections were held, forcing Kaunda from office on 2 November 1991.

Peter Vale

See also

Africa; Mozambique; Mozambique Civil War; Tanzania; Zimbabwe

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Kekkonen, Urho
(1900–1986)

Finnish prime minister (1950–1953, 1954–1956) and president of Finland (1956–1981). Born in Pielavesi on 3 September 1900, Urho Kekkonen studied law at the University of Helsinki, receiving a bachelor's degree in 1928 and a doctorate in 1936. He became a successful journalist and for a time worked for the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1933 he joined the Agrarian Party (renamed the Center Party in 1965) and in 1936 was elected to parliament, becoming a cabinet minister the same year.

Kekkonen had been involved in the execution of Red Guard prisoners during the Finnish Civil War in 1918 and thus remained a hard-liner toward the Soviet Union until the early 1940s. However, he realized during the course of World War II that Finland could retain its independence only by seeking accommodation with its powerful neighbor. As a minister of justice after the war, Kekkonen was responsible for the highly unpopular trials of wartime political leaders, which nevertheless helped to save Finland from direct Soviet interference in domestic affairs.

As prime minister during 1950–1953 and again during 1954–1956, Kekkonen developed his own foreign policy trajectory, which combined the paradigm of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union with the rhetoric of neutrality and the promotion of a Scandinavian security community that steered clear of Cold War politics. Kekkonen was elected president in February 1956 and served until October 1981, when poor health forced his resignation.

As president, Kekkonen mastered both the Night Frost Crisis of 1958–1959, when the Finnish Communist Party (SKDL) was prevented from joining the government and the Soviet Union then imposed economic restrictions upon Finnish trade and recalled its ambassador, and the Note Crisis of 1961, when, following the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG, West Germany) rearmament and increasing naval presence in the Baltic, the Soviets demanded military consultations against the alleged threat in accordance with the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. But both instances can also be interpreted as Soviet promotion of Kekkonen as the only Finnish leader capable of handling the difficult bilateral relations. Kekkonen was unsuccessful in his attempt to establish a nuclear weapons–free

zone in Scandinavia, and the Soviet Union refused to support his candidate, Max Jakobson, for secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) in 1971 because this would have raised the stature of Finland in world affairs. Arguably, Kekkonen's greatest success was hosting the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which resulted in the landmark Helsinki Final Act. Kekkonen died in Helsinki on 31 August 1986.

Norbert Götz

See also

Finland; Helsinki Final Act; Scandinavia; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on

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Kelly, Petra Karin
(1947–1992)

German political and human rights activist and leader and cofounder of the German Green Party. Born in Günzburg, Bavaria, then part of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), on 29 November 1947, Petra Karin Lehmann adopted her American stepfather's last name of Kelly as a young girl. First raised in Germany, she moved with her family to the United States in 1960. She studied political science at American University in Washington, D.C., graduating in 1970.

During her time in the United States, Kelly was active in the U.S. civil rights and anti–Vietnam War movements and worked as a volunteer for the 1968 presidential campaigns of first Robert Kennedy and then Hubert Humphrey. In 1971 she received an MA in political science from the University of Amsterdam. Two years later, she joined the administrative staff of the European Community in Brussels. Beginning in the mid-1970s, she became increasingly engaged in environmental, peace, and feminist activities in West Germany.

In 1979, Kelly left the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and became one of the founding members of the Green Party. Elected to the German Bundestag as a Green member in 1983, Kelly became a staunch proponent of environmental policies and vehemently objected to the placement of U.S. nuclear missiles in West Germany. In 1982 she was awarded the annual alternative Nobel Peace Prize.

Kelly had a reputation as a smart and sensitive activist who alternatively confused and dazzled the West German public with her idealism and charisma. She was a prominent fixture in the Green Party and a much-sought-after speaker at peace and antinuclear rallies. Despite her uncompromising stance on matters of disarmament, the environment, and nonviolent

protest, she refrained from endorsing her party's anti-American and pro-socialist leanings.

In the late 1980s, Kelly lost influence with the Greens. In the wake of German reunification, the Greens lost all their parliamentary seats in the 1990 elections, and Kelly became estranged from her political colleagues. After the defeat, she largely withdrew from public life. On 1 October 1992, Kelly's partner, former Green Party deputy Gert Bastian, allegedly shot her to death as she slept in their Bonn home. Bastian then took his own life.

Bernd Schaefer

See also
Germany, Federal Republic of

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Kennan, George Frost
(1904–2005)

U.S. diplomat, Soviet expert, historian, and ambassador. Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on 16 February 1904, George Kennan attended Princeton University and joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1926, undergoing intensive, specialized Russian training at Berlin University and Riga.

As one of the State Department's small coterie of Russian experts, Kennan spent five years in the American embassy in Moscow, returning there in 1944 as minister-counselor. Despite his distaste for the Soviet regime, as World War II ended he recommended reassigning control of Eastern Europe to the Soviets. His influential February 1946 "Long Telegram" argued that the internal dynamics of Russian communism made genuine Soviet-Western understanding unattainable. Widely circulated throughout the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy, it made him an instant celebrity.

From 1947 to 1949 Kennan headed the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, exercising his greatest impact on American foreign policy by enunciating the containment doctrine that became the basis of U.S. Cold War strategy toward the Soviet Union. He later suggested that American officials misinterpreted his original version of containment by overemphasizing the military aspects, which he regarded as secondary. His claim, which has generated substantial historiographical debate, runs contrary to his policy-making at the time, however.

Kennan soon found himself increasingly out of sync with the evolving Cold War policies. In the late 1940s and again during the 1950s, he called for the neutralization and unification of Germany, and he opposed the creation

U.S. diplomat and historian George F. Kennan was an energetic proponent of a containment policy against communist expansion. He was among the most influential foreign policymakers of the post–World War II era. (Library of Congress)

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Although on leave, Kennan initially supported U.S. intervention in the Korean War but regretted the decision to carry the war into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). In 1951 he took part in unofficial negotiations with Soviet diplomats that led to the opening of armistice talks. In 1952 he was briefly ambassador to the Soviet Union, but his criticism of Josef Stalin's regime resulted in expulsion. Kennan then began a lengthy career as a historian and political commentator.

Keen to encourage polycentrism within the communist world, Kennan welcomed his 1951 appointment as ambassador to Yugoslavia, where he remained until 1963. He applauded the manner in which President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handled the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Kennan believed that American preoccupation with Vietnam distracted officials from pursuing détente with the Soviets. He applauded French President Charles de Gaulle's initiatives toward détente and called for Western recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Initially outraged by the 1968 Soviet invasion

of Czechoslovakia, Kennan demanded massive American troop reinforcements in Western Europe but soon endorsed Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik.

Kennan initially showed little interest in Vietnam. In 1950 he had urged American attempts to encourage noncommunist, nationalist "third forces" in Indochina but by 1955 had grown pessimistic that such endeavors would succeed. Despite misgivings, he endorsed President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Johnson's subsequent escalation of the war convinced Kennan that the United States was too heavily involved in a country of relatively slight strategic significance. He suggested that the United States restrict itself to defending strategic enclaves and supporting the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) government. During widely publicized congressional hearings in 1967, he argued that employing the force levels needed to ensure victory in Vietnam would likely trigger Chinese intervention and full-scale, probably nuclear, Sino-American war. By November 1969 he publicly advocated American military withdrawal, notwithstanding the probability that the communists would then take over South Vietnam.

In 1967 and 1972 Kennan published two volumes of best-selling confessional memoirs. He continued to write well into his nineties, frequently warning against the American tendency to intervene in nations and conflicts of little direct strategic interest and suggesting that wider concerns, particularly the environment, population growth, and arms control, were of far greater importance. During the late 1960s he opposed the eastward expansion of NATO, and in 2003 he condemned the forthcoming U.S. invasion of Iraq. Kennan died in Princeton, New Jersey, on 17 March 2005.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Arms Control; Brandt, Willy; Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; Cuban Missile Crisis; Détente; Dulles, John Foster; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korean War; Nitze, Paul Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Ostpolitik; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Kennedy, John Fitzgerald
(1917–1963)

U.S. congressman (1946–1952), senator (1953–1961), and president of the United States (1961–1963). John F. Kennedy was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on 29 May 1917 into a large and wealthy Irish Catholic family. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was a multimillionaire with presidential aspirations, and his mother, Rose Fitzgerald, came from a prominent and politically active Boston family. After attending the elite Choate Preparatory School in Wallingford, Connecticut, Kennedy earned his bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1940. He also spent six months of his junior year working in the U.S. London embassy while his father was U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. His observations during this time inspired his senior honors thesis on British foreign policies, which was published the year he graduated under the title *Why England Slept*. During World War II Kennedy served four years in the U.S. Navy. He was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medals and the Purple Heart for action as commander of *PT-109*, which was rammed and sunk by a Japanese destroyer in the South Pacific.

Kennedy worked for a brief time as a newspaper correspondent before entering national politics at the age of twenty-nine, winning election as Democratic congressman from Massachusetts in 1946. In Congress, he backed social legislation that benefited his largely working-class constituents and criticized what he considered to be President Harry Truman's "weak stand" against communist China. Throughout his career, in fact, Kennedy was known for his vehement anticommunist sentiments.

Kennedy won election to the U.S. Senate in 1952. In 1953 he wed the New York socialite Jacqueline Bouvier. Kennedy had a relatively undistinguished Senate career. Never a well man, he suffered from several serious health problems, including a back operation in 1955 that nearly killed him. His illnesses limited his ability to become an activist senator. While he recuperated from his back surgery, he wrote—with his wife's assistance—his second book, *Profiles in Courage*, for which he won the 1957 Pulitzer Prize in history.

Never a well man, Kennedy suffered from several serious health problems, including a back operation in 1955 that nearly killed him.

Despite his fragile health and lackluster performance in the Senate, Kennedy nonetheless was reelected in 1958 after losing a close contest for the vice presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention in 1956. He now set his sights on the presidency. Four years later, he won the Democratic nomination for president on the first ballot. As a northerner and Roman Catholic, he recognized his weakness in the South and shrewdly chose Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson of Texas as his running mate. As a candidate, Kennedy promised more aggressive defense policies, health care

reform, and housing and civil rights programs. He also proposed his New Frontier agenda, designed to revitalize the flagging U.S. economy and to bring young people into government and humanitarian service. Winning by the narrowest of margins, he became the nation's first Roman Catholic president. Only forty-three years old, he was also the youngest man ever to be elected to that office.

In his inaugural address, Kennedy spoke of the need for Americans to be active citizens and to sacrifice for the common good. His address, which in some respects was a rather bellicose call to arms, ended with the now-famous exhortation "ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country." As president, Kennedy set out to fulfill his campaign pledges. Once in office, he was forced to respond to the ever-more-urgent demands of civil rights advocates, although he did so rather reluctantly and tardily. By establishing both the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps, Kennedy delivered American idealism and goodwill to aid developing countries.

The administration of President John F. Kennedy, famous for its youth and style, ushered in a period of hope, vigor, and commitment for the United States that would be cut short by Kennedy's assassination. (John F. Kennedy Library)

Despite Kennedy's idealism, no amount of enthusiasm could blunt the growing tension of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry. One of his first attempts to stanch the perceived communist threat was to authorize a band of American-supported Cuban exiles to invade the communist island in an attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in April 1961. The Bay of Pigs invasion, which turned into an embarrassing debacle for the president, had been planned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Dwight Eisenhower administration. Although Kennedy harbored reservations about the operation, he nonetheless approved it. The failure heightened already-high Cold War tensions with the Soviets and ultimately set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Cold War confrontation was not limited to Cuba. In the spring of 1961, the Soviet Union renewed its campaign to control West Berlin. Kennedy spent two days in Vienna in June 1961 discussing the hot-button issue with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. In the months that followed, the crisis over Berlin was further intensified by the construction of the Berlin Wall, which prevented East Berliners from escaping to the West. Kennedy responded to the provocation by reinforcing troops in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and increasing the nation's military strength. The Berlin Wall, unwittingly perhaps, eased tensions in Central Europe that had nearly resulted in a superpower conflagration. In the meantime, Kennedy had begun deploying what would be some 16,000 U.S. military "advisors" to prop up Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In so doing, Kennedy had put the United States on the slippery slope of full-scale military intervention in Vietnam.

With the focus directed away from Europe, the Soviets began to clandestinely install nuclear missiles in Cuba. On 14 October 1962, U.S. spy planes

photographed the construction of missile-launching sites in Cuba. The placement of nuclear missiles only 90 miles from America's shores threatened to destabilize the Western Hemisphere and undermine the uneasy Cold War nuclear deterrent. Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba, designed to interdict any offensive weapons bound for the island. The world held its collective breath as the two Cold War superpowers appeared perched on the abyss of thermonuclear war, but after thirteen harrowing days of fear and nuclear threat, the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles. In return, the United States pledged not to preemptively invade Cuba and to remove secretly its obsolete nuclear missiles from Turkey.

Both Kennedy and Khrushchev had been sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis, realizing that the world had come as close as it ever had to a full-scale nuclear war. Cold War tensions were diminished when the Soviets, British, and Americans signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 5 August 1963, forbidding atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In October 1963, the same three nations agreed to refrain from placing nuclear weapons in outer space. To avoid potential misunderstandings and miscalculations in a future crisis, a hotline was installed that directly linked the Oval Office with the Kremlin.

Following the nerve-wracking Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy looked toward 1963 with considerable enthusiasm. He told close advisors that after the election, he planned to draw down U.S. forces in Vietnam. He was also buoyed by his successful efforts to reduce Cold War tensions, and he began planning his 1964 reelection campaign by visiting constituents around the nation. In an effort to mediate between warring conservative and liberal Democratic Party factions in Texas, a state that was vital to his reelection, in November 1963 Kennedy embarked on a whirlwind tour of the state with his wife and vice president in tow. On 22 November in Dallas, Texas, just as Kennedy's motorcade neared the end of its course and as onlookers cheered, shots rang out. Kennedy, riding in an open car, was fatally wounded by an assassin's bullet. In the hours immediately after the murder, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested for the assassination of the president. Two days later, as the president's body lay in state at the U.S. Capitol, Jack Ruby fatally shot Oswald in the basement of the Dallas police station as millions of Americans watched the latest bizarre event on television in dazed horror. In a great national outpouring of grief, Kennedy was laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery on 25 November 1963.

Lacie A. Ballinger

See also

Bay of Pigs; Berlin Wall; Castro, Fidel; Central Intelligence Agency; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Khrushchev, Nikita; Ngo Dinh Diem; Partial Test Ban Treaty; Soviet Union; Vienna Conference; Vietnam War

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Kennedy, Robert Francis
(1925–1968)

U.S. attorney general (1961–1964), U.S. senator (1965–1968), and chief advisor to his brother, President John F. Kennedy (1961–1963). Born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 20 November 1925, Robert F. Kennedy was the seventh child of Joseph P. Kennedy, multimillionaire business tycoon and ambassador to Great Britain. Robert Kennedy served in the U.S. Navy Reserve during 1944–1946 before graduating from Harvard University in 1948. In 1951 he earned a law degree from the University of Virginia. He began his legal career as an attorney in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in 1951.

In 1952 Kennedy managed his brother John's successful U.S. senatorial campaign. After the campaign, he served as assistant counsel and counsel to various U.S. Senate committees and subcommittees before becoming chief counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field during 1957–1960. Kennedy made a name for himself there by doggedly countering the testimony of hostile witnesses, including Teamsters Union leader James "Jimmy" Hoffa.

A canny and scrappy politico, Kennedy left his Senate position in 1960 to manage John Kennedy's successful presidential campaign. Following the 1960 election, President-elect Kennedy appointed his younger brother to his cabinet as U.S. attorney general. Despite charges of nepotism, Robert Kennedy proved to be a forceful and highly effective attorney general. He was especially successful in dealing with a number of potentially explosive situations involving the burgeoning civil rights movement.

Robert Kennedy was also President Kennedy's closest advisor. This relationship proved vital as U.S.-Soviet tensions peaked in 1962. Robert Kennedy played a key role in advising the president on the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the deteriorating military and political situation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).

After President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, Robert Kennedy resigned his cabinet post in the autumn of 1964 to run for a seat in the U.S. Senate, representing New York. Sworn into the Senate in January 1965, he proved to be a vigorous advocate of social reform and minority rights and became particularly well known as a spokesman for the poor and

Robert Kennedy served as campaign advisor and attorney general under his brother President John F. Kennedy. Robert followed in his brother's footsteps by running for president in 1968 but, like his brother, was killed by an assassin's bullet. (Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

underprivileged. Although he had initially supported his brother's increasing military and economic aid to South Vietnam, he became sharply critical of President Lyndon B. Johnson's steep escalation of the war. By 1968, Kennedy was proposing the formation of a new South Vietnamese coalition government that would have included the communist Viet Cong. He also urged the rapid draw-down of U.S. troops in Vietnam, who numbered some 500,000 in 1968.

Urged to run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968, Kennedy declined until Johnson dropped out of the running in early March. On 16 March 1968, Kennedy declared his presidential candidacy. He conducted an energetic and finely focused campaign and won a series of primary victories, culminating in California on 4 June 1968. That night, after addressing his supporters at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, he was shot at point-blank range by Jordanian American Sirhan B. Sirhan. Suffering from a devastating head wound, Kennedy lay in a coma until he died on 6 June 1968. He was forty-two years old. Sirhan was apprehended at the scene and later convicted of murder. As was his brother John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy was interred in Arlington National Cemetery. Included in his many accomplishments are two widely read posthumous publications, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1969) and *To Seek a Newer World* (1969).

Lacie A. Ballinger

See also

Bay of Pigs; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Vietnam War

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Kenya

A nonaligned, developing nation in east-central Africa. With a 1945 population of approximately 5.4 million people, Kenya covers 224,961 square miles, roughly twice the area of the U.S. state of Nevada. It is bordered by the Indian Ocean and Tanzania to the south, Sudan and Ethiopia to the north,

Uganda to the west, and Somalia to the east. Prior to the late nineteenth century, when Britain took control of the region, Kenya was a land with small and scattered tribal groups, including the Kikuyu, Kamba, Luo, and Masai. Although they have become increasingly Westernized, distinct tribal identities persist. At the 1885 Berlin Conference, which established spheres of influence in eastern Africa, Germany received the concession to modern-day Tanzania, while Britain received Uganda and Kenya. Uganda became a protectorate in 1893, and Kenya was classified as a protectorate in 1895.

The British went first to Uganda, using Indian laborers to build a Mombassa-to-Kampala railway for easier movement of natural resources. The British then turned to Kenya, establishing white-owned plantations on former African tribal lands, although only 7 percent of Kenya's land was arable. By 1915, the British owned most of the good land, while the natives were segregated on the largely unusable holdings. The maldistribution of land continues to this day, exacerbating Kenya's intractable unemployment problems.

In the 1920s the economic difficulties of African Kenyans led to the formation of nationalist organizations. Jomo Kenyatta went to England in 1929 to begin negotiating independence on behalf of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). Service in the military during World War II enhanced Kenyan conscripts' political awareness. As a result, in 1944 African Kenyans received the limited right to political participation. Soon after the war, however, guerrilla groups formed, bent on expelling the whites and eliminating all vestiges of colonial rule. The most significant of these was the Mau Mau, who took an oath to forcefully expel British occupiers and eliminate Africans who cooperated with or benefited from colonialism.

The British colonial government declared a state of emergency on 19 October 1952 and arrested Kenyatta, Achieng Oneko, and other nationalists the next day. In response, the Mau Mau uprising began. During the rebellion, 13,423 Africans were killed, with thousands more wounded. Only a few dozen Asians and Europeans died. The African casualty rates were so high because the British employed a Home Guard composed of Kamba and Kalenjin tribesmen against the Mau Mau, who were mostly Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu. Outnumbered and outgunned, the Mau Mau fought a vicious guerrilla war from the shelter of the forests of Mount Kenya and the Aberdare Mountains, slowly gathering support from other tribes. From prison, Kikuyu leader Kenyatta wrote letters that advanced Kenyan nationalism and evoked world sympathy.

Harsh conditions in detention camps also led to many deaths. Among the detainees were leaders of the Kenya African Union (KAU), the organization that replaced the KCA. British-led forces finally killed Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi, and with the movement now in disarray, the British prevailed in 1956.

Although the rebellion failed, it greatly alarmed both the white settlers and the administration, which declared a state of emergency, allowed African access to farmlands, and attempted to create an African middle class. Direct elections to the Legislative Council began in 1957. The British lifted the state of emergency in 1960 and held a conference with African leaders concerning

the country's future. One agreement guaranteed that the Africans would have a voice in their government.

The KAU became the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) under Kenyatta, who had been released from prison in 1961. In a contest with the minority Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which represented a coalition of small tribes who feared domination by the larger tribes, the KANU won the elections in 1963, the same year that Kenya became an independent state, with Kenyatta as its president. In 1964, KADU became part of KANU.

Opposition to Kenyatta's rule came from the Left in 1966, with the formation of the Kenya People's Union (KPU) under the Luo elder Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, a former Kenya vice president. When a visit by Kenyatta to Nyanza Province caused political unrest, he banned the KPU and detained Odinga until he agreed to join KANU, which became the single lawful political party in Kenya after opposition parties were outlawed in 1969. Assassinated opposition leaders included Tom Mboya in 1969 and Kariuki in 1975. Rioting after the assassinations led to government crackdowns.

In 1990 the foreign minister, Robert Ouko, was assassinated after he threatened to name corrupt ministers.

When Kenyatta died in August 1978, Vice President Daniel Arap Moi became interim president. He was subsequently elected head of KANU and then president that October. Moi's rule was autocratic and repressive. When air force officers attempted a coup in 1982, Moi broke up the air force and established a new one, and Kenya became a one-party state. Faced with growing dissent and the threat of a breakaway second party, Moi modified the constitution to specify a single party, formalizing Kenyatta's prohibition. In 1990 the foreign minister, Robert Ouko, was assassinated after he threatened to name corrupt ministers. Because of its corruption and repression, the World Bank and other international donors withheld foreign aid.

After the one-party provision of the constitution was repealed in 1991, multiparty elections took place in December 1992. Although Moi won another five-year term and KANU held parliament, the opposition garnered 45 percent of the vote. Reforms in 1997 expanded the number of parties from eleven to twenty-six, but Moi won yet another term, while his party held on to a narrow majority.

Although Moi improved relations with neighboring Somalia and Tanzania, Kenya failed to prosper economically. Kenya experienced negative economic growth in the early 1990s, an upswing during 1995–1996, then renewed sluggishness despite economic liberalization and assistance from international sources such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Under Moi, Kenya's government was unstable, reform was intermittent, infrastructure was inefficient, and social problems included violence, high birthrates, and an AIDS epidemic.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Africa; Decolonization; Kenyatta, Jomo; Mau Mau

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Kenyatta, Jomo
(1889?–1978)

Educator, anticolonial activist, Kenyan politician, prime minister (1963–1964), and Kenya's first president (1964–1978). Born in Ng'enda in the Gatandu Division of Kiambu, Jomo Kenyatta's exact birth date has never been firmly established, although it is believed he was born on 20 October between the years 1889 and 1893. Kenyatta's birth name was Kamau wa Ngengi. In 1914 he was christened Johnston Kamau, but he later changed his name to Johnston Kenyatta, finally calling himself Jomo Kenyatta. He grew up on a farm in the Kimbu District and was educated at the Scottish Mission Centre in Thogoto.

In the early 1920s Kenyatta moved to Nairobi, where he worked as a storekeeper before securing a position with the Nairobi City Council water department. In 1928 the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), a political organization that called upon Kenya's British colonial rulers to grant more rights to the country's Kikuyu tribe, asked Kenyatta to become its spokesman. As general secretary of the KCA, he edited the organization's newspaper and increased its membership.

Jomo Kenyatta, president of Kenya during 1964–1978. (National Archives and Records Administration)

In 1929, Kenyatta traveled to London on an official mission to discuss the KCA's grievances with the British government. A second trip to Europe in 1931 marked the beginning of a self-imposed sixteen-year exile, during which he continued his education at the Woodbrooke Quaker College (1931–1932) in Birmingham, England; the University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow (1932–1933); and the University of London (1935–1937). During his stay in Europe, he established contacts with numerous African anticolonial activists. In 1938 he published *Facing Mount Kenya,* an anthropological study that refuted the assumption that Kikuyu culture was inferior to that of white Europeans. Seven years later, he attended the fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester as a representative of East Africa.

In 1946 Kenyatta returned to Kenya, where he continued to be involved in politics. In 1947, while working as the principal of Koinange's Teacher Training College at Githunguri, he was elected president of the newly formed Kenya African Union (KAU), a political organization that

called for an end to colonial rule. But Kenyatta's plan to mobilize grass-roots support for KAU's political program failed, as organizers of the militant Mau Mau movement managed to recruit an increasing number of supporters. Although Kenyatta repeatedly denounced the violent strategies of the secretive Mau Mau movement, British authorities arrested him in 1952 for alleged involvement with the militant movement and sentenced him to seven years in prison. Following his release in 1959, the British colonial government nonetheless continued to hold Kenyatta in custody.

In 1961 Kenyatta was finally released and shortly thereafter became a member of the colonial legislative council. By that time, political reforms and the country's growing nationalist movement had finally paved the way for Kenya's independence. Kenyatta led negotiations with British authorities over self-government and became the new nation's first prime minister in June 1963. On 12 December 1964, he became the country's first president, a post that he would retain until his death.

As prime minister and during the early tenure of his presidency, Kenyatta first sought to improve the strained relations between Africans and European settlers. By 1969, when Kenyatta was reelected as president, he had established a one-party state by agreement and a capitalist economy that protected property rights and allowed for foreign investment. He also launched an ambitious program to improve Kenya's educational and medical infrastructure. The president's domestic agenda translated into robust economic growth until the 1970s. In foreign politics, Kenyatta advocated a pro-Western stance and maintained amicable ties with the United States and European nations. During the last years of his life, the aging leader gradually withdrew from the political spotlight. Kenyatta died on 22 August 1978 in Mombasa.

Simon Wendt

See also

Anticolonialism; Decolonization; Kenya; Mau Mau; United Kingdom

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Kerouac, Jean Louis
(1922–1969)

American writer who coined the term "Beat Generation" to describe the restless, discontent group of young intellectuals in the 1950s. Born in Lowell, Massachusetts, on 12 March 1922, Jean Louis "Jack" Kerouac attended Catholic parochial schools and the Horace Mann School in New York City before winning a scholarship to Columbia University in 1940.

Kerouac soon left Columbia to experience a wide variety of jobs, places, and experiences. Throughout his life he often returned to Lowell, where he lived with his mother, who supported him financially. In 1942 Kerouac again briefly attended Columbia, his nearby apartment becoming a meeting place for many promising young intellectuals, including William S. Burroughs and Allen Ginsberg. While Kerouac became the Beat movement's main novelist, Ginsberg went on to become its chief poet.

Kerouac was for a time in the merchant marine. He joined the U.S. Navy in 1943 but was given a psychiatric discharge after several months. During much of 1943–1950 he traveled throughout the United States and Mexico working a variety of jobs and spending time in Lowell, where he wrote a book about his boyhood, *The Town and the City*. Its publication in 1950 earned him literary recognition.

Kerouac had already begun a new book using a more spontaneous process that eschewed the customary practice of writing. Seeking to capture the spontaneity and emotions of his 1943–1950 wanderings, he bought twenty-foot rolls of art paper, taped the ends together, and over a three-week span furiously typed—without editing—until he believed that he was finished. The publication of this work, *On the Road*, in 1957 led to Kerouac being heralded as a major new American writer. His writing style might best be described as a purposeful stream of consciousness. His writings were especially influential among the young and inspired many to drop out of established society and abandon the pursuit of material wealth.

Kerouac's next novel, *The Dharma Bums* (1958), described the years between finishing *On the Road* and its publication. At this point, Kerouac reportedly had six more novels already written, including *The Subterraneans*, *Doctor Sax*, and *Maggie Cassidy*, published in quick succession during 1958–1959. They drew praise for their freshness and criticism for their seeming randomness.

The last decade of Kerouac's life was characterized by hard drinking and fast living, but the author did write other books, including *Desolation Angels* (1966) and *Satori in Paris* (1967). Kerouac died in St. Petersburg, Florida, on 21 October 1969.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Ginsberg, Allen; Literature

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KGB

See Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti

Khmer Rouge

Cambodian communist organization and guerrilla force that ruled Cambodia during 1975–1979. Cambodian Prince Sihanouk originally applied the term "Khmer Rouge" (Red Khmer) to all internal left-wing opponents. The Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) was founded in 1953 under the influence of the Indochinese Communist Party. To escape Sihanouk's suppression of leftist factions, the KPRP resorted to underground activities. In 1966 it changed its name to the Communist Party of Kampuchea but continued to be known as the Khmer Rouge.

Following Cambodian Premier Lon Nol's coup d'état on 18 March 1970, the Khmer Rouge joined Sihanouk's National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) in resisting the new government and received military support from both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Although Sihanouk was the nominal head of the National Unity government of Cambodia, he remained in Beijing. Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan exercised real power.

In November 1973 Khmer Rouge forces blockaded Phnom Penh, but at the end of February 1974 Lon Nol's Forces Armées Nationales Khmer (FANK, National Khmer Armed Forces), secretly supplied by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), pushed them back from the capital. In the second half of 1974, however, the less-well-armed but better-led Khmer Rouge came to control the countryside. With only about 70,000 troops, it lacked the strength for an offensive against the cities. The much larger FANK of some 200,000 men controlled the towns but, plagued by poor leadership, low morale, and corruption, was unable to undertake aggressive action in the rural areas. U.S. congressional restrictions of December 1974 on aid to Cambodia adversely affected FANK's fighting ability.

In January 1975 the Khmer Rouge received sufficient North Vietnamese assistance to launch a major offensive against the FANK and soon had cut off land and Mekong River access to Phnom Penh. Lon Nol resigned, and on 17 April Khmer Rouge troops took control of the city. The economy was in ruins. Few schools and hospitals were operating, and half of the population had been uprooted from their homes. But far worse lay ahead. Khmer Rouge leaders renamed the country Kampuchea, emptied the cities, and attempted to take the country back into the Middle Ages, herding the people into agricultural communes and initiating a reign of terror that has few precedents in history.

Under the leadership of Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan, and others, the Khmer Rouge severely restricted access to medical care, education, and religious observances. Intellectuals and the elite were brutally repressed, and thousands

of people were separated from their families and denied adequate food. The people were forced to perform hard physical labor in agriculture or in the building of waterways, dams, and other infrastructure. Thousands were tortured and then executed. A Yale University study on Cambodian genocide concluded that as many as 1.7 million of Cambodia's 8 million inhabitants died during 1976–1979 in one of the most horrific genocides in history.

Following border clashes between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese troops and atrocities committed against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, on 25 December 1978 Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia and on 7 January 1979 captured Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge then conducted a guerrilla war against the occupiers and the Vietnamese-installed government. Although the Vietnamese occupation ended the wholesale bloodshed in Cambodia, much of the international community, including the United States, condemned it. Only the Soviet bloc recognized the Vietnamese-sponsored People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) under Heng Samrin. The United States and the PRC both supported Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea.

Vietnamese forces finally departed Cambodia in 1989, and in October 1991 a peace agreement, to which the Khmer Rouge was a party, was signed in Paris. However, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the general election carried out in May 1993 under the provisional government, supervised by the United Nations (UN), and continued its guerrilla activities with the support of Thai generals. In 1994 the new Cambodian government declared the Khmer Rouge illegal and within four years had eliminated major Khmer Rouge strongholds. Most of the senior Khmer Rouge leadership surrendered. The government then resisted international pressure to bring them to trial.

Kosuge Margaret Nobuko and Spencer C. Tucker

A Yale University study on Cambodian genocide concluded that as many as 1.7 million of Cambodia's 8 million inhabitants died during 1976–1979 in one of the most horrific genocides in history.

See also

Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of; Indochina War; Lon Nol; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom

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———. *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.

Khomeini, Ruhollah
(1900–1989)

Iranian Muslim cleric, head of the antishah revolution (1979–1980), founder of the first modern Islamic republic (1980), and leader of Iran (1980–1989). Born in Khomein, a village near Tehran, on 17 May 1900, Seyyed Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, as with his father, pursued theological studies, attained the rank of ayatollah, and ultimately became an Islamic jurist.

One of the modern era's most influential revolutionary leaders, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to infuse a fundamentalist Islamic crusading sentiment into the Iranian state. (Bettmann/Corbis)

For decades, Khomeini watched passively as Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi promoted secularization and restricted the influence of clerical powers. Khomeini also remained detached from the crisis of the early 1950s, as the shah turned to the United States for assistance. In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engineered a coup against a popularly elected government and brought the shah back to power.

A disciple of Iran's preeminent cleric Ayatollah Mohammed Boroujerdi, who was a defender of the tradition of clerical deference to established power, Khomeini took over this role in 1962 following Boroujerdi's death and began a sharply antagonistic campaign against the shah. That same year, the shah passed a bill that permitted municipal officials to take oaths of office on whatever holy scripture they preferred. This move deeply offended Khomeini and other Islamic fundamentalists, who considered the Koran to be the only appropriate scripture for such occasions. In January 1963 Khomeini issued a strongly worded declaration denouncing the shah and his plans.

Condemning Iran's ties with Israel, Khomeini also called a proposal to permit American servicemen in Iran to be tried in U.S. military courts "a document for Iran's enslavement." After several arrests, in 1964 Khomeini was finally banished to Turkey. He was then allowed to relocate to the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq. In exile, he became the recognized leader of the antishah fundamentalist opposition. While in exile, he shaped a revolutionary doctrine. Condemning the shah's dependence on the United States and his blatant secularism, Khomeini called for the creation of an Iranian clerical state.

In 1978, unrest began to spread throughout Iran. Islamic fundamentalists were joined by students and others disaffected with the shah's heavy-handed rule, state-sanctioned police brutality, and a corrupt bureaucracy. By the end of the year, a host of student-led protests shook the shah, who was then ailing with cancer. Members of the middle class also began to demand the shah's ouster. On 3 January 1979 Shapur Bakhtiyar of the National Front was appointed prime minister. Ten days later, the shah left Iran.

In February 1979, Khomeini became Iran's unquestioned leader. He ended the brief parliamentary experiment and ordered an Assembly of Experts—a group of high-ranking Islamic clerics—to draft an Islamic constitution that would establish and enforce religious law. In November 1979 Khomeini's partisans, most of them young college students, seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two Americans there hostage for 444 days. The affair led to extremely tense U.S.-Iranian relations and ultimately contributed to President Jimmy Carter's electoral loss in 1980.

In the remaining ten years of his life, Khomeini consolidated his power, proving fully as ruthless as the shah. He instituted a strict regime of Islamic law and suspended the criminal justice system in favor of religious courts.

He also tried to export his revolution by calling for Islamic revolutions throughout the Middle East.

In September 1980 Iraq's Saddam Hussein attacked Iran, hoping for a quick victory and access to Iran's rich oil fields. Hussein believed that the political chaos in Iran would ease both the invasion and occupation, but he badly miscalculated. Khomeini and his followers saw the Iraqi invasion as a holy war and rallied the Iranian people in a fanatical defense of the country. Khomeini was disdainful of Hussein's secular regime. The war dragged on until 1988, bringing staggering casualties and great suffering to both sides.

Meanwhile, life in Khomeini's Iran was repressive, particularly for those who did not subscribe to its fundamentalist tenets. Khomeini encouraged a veritable personality cult by the late 1980s, while harsh punishments were meted out to those who did not adhere to the strict Islamic laws enforced by the state. Reports of wholesale human rights abuses, including torture, were attributed to the Islamic regime. In early 1989, Khomeini precipitated an international uproar when he publicly called for the murder of the writer and novelist Salman Rushdie, who, Khomeini charged, had committed blasphemy in his book *The Satanic Verses*. As the fatwa against Rushdie continued to create controversy, Khomeini became gravely ill and died on 2 June 1989 in Tehran.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. and Luc Stenger

See also

Iran; Iran-Iraq War; Middle East; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Radical Islam

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Khrushchev, Nikita
(1894–1971)

Soviet politician, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during 1953–1954, and premier of the Soviet Union during 1958–1964. Born on 17 April 1894 in Kalinovka, Kursk Province, to a peasant family, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev worked beginning at age fifteen as a pipe fitter in various mines near his home. His factory work exempted him from wartime service. In 1918 he joined the Russian Communist Party.

In 1919 Khrushchev became a political commissar in the Red Army, accompanying troops fighting both the Poles and Lithuanians. In 1922 he returned to school and completed his education. In 1925 he became Communist Party secretary of the Petrovosko-Mariinsk District. Early recognizing the importance of Communist Party Secretary Josef Stalin, Khrushchev nurtured a friendship with Stalin's associate and party secretary in Ukraine, Lars Kaganovich, who helped him secure a full-time party post in the Moscow city party apparatus in 1931.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Rising to the position of leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1953 after the death of Josef Stalin, Khrushchev instituted various reforms and led the Soviet Union through some of the most tense years of the Cold War before being ousted in 1964. (Library of Congress)

By 1935 Khrushchev was secretary-general of the Moscow Communist Party, in effect mayor of the capital. In 1938 he became a candidate (nonvoting member) of the Politburo, and in 1939 he was a full member. He was one of few senior party officials to survive Stalin's Great Purges. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Khrushchev was made a lieutenant general and placed in charge of resistance in Ukraine and relocating heavy industry eastward.

With the Red Army's liberation of Ukraine, Khrushchev took charge of that region. This led to his first clash with Stalin. With Ukraine suffering major food shortages in 1946, Khrushchev concentrated on efforts to increase agricultural production, while Stalin wanted emphasis to be on heavy industry. As a consequence, Stalin demoted Khrushchev. By 1949, however, Khrushchev was back in favor in his previous post as head of the Communist Party machinery in Moscow. In 1952, at the 19th Party Congress, Khrushchev received the assignment of drawing up a new party structure, which led to the replacement of the old Politburo by the Presidium of the Central Committee. Khrushchev benefited from this change as one of the powerful committee secretaries.

Following Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, a brief power struggle ensued, with no one person on the ten-member Presidium dominating. Khrushchev did not appear to be a likely choice for supreme power, but on 14 March, when Georgy Malenkov suddenly resigned as secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev succeeded him. Malenkov, however, retained his post as head of the party. Shortly thereafter, another Khrushchev rival, Lavrenty Beria, was removed from authority and executed. Over the next four years, Malenkov and Khrushchev struggled over who would dominate the Soviet state. Khrushchev had taken responsibility for Soviet agriculture, and by 1953 he registered considerable successes in that vital sector of the economy. His Virgin Lands program the next year opened new agricultural lands in Kazakhstan and western Siberia. Early successes in that region assisted his rise to power, although they were only temporary. Unpredictable climatic conditions and overuse of chemical fertilizers undermined the program after he was in power.

Meanwhile, Malenkov advocated increases in consumer goods to benefit the Soviet people. Hard-liners in the party leadership and military opposed this and sought continued concentration in heavy industry and increases in defense spending. Khrushchev took the tactical decision to side with the hard-liners, and in February 1955 Malenkov was defeated in a party plenum called on this issue and resigned as party chairman. On Khrushchev's recommendation, Nikolai Bulganin succeeded Malenkov. For a time it appeared as if both Bulganin and Khrushchev were running the Soviet state, although

Khrushchev wielded actual power through his control of the party machinery.

Malenkov remained a member of the Presidium, where he continued to intrigue against Khrushchev. In June 1957 Khrushchev took full authority when an attempt by Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Vyacheslav Molotov to unseat Khrushchev miscarried and they themselves were purged. It speaks volumes about the change in the Soviet state under Khrushchev, however, that the three men were not executed.

Leaders of the Soviet Union

Name	*Term*
Vladimir Lenin	December 1922–January 1924
Josef Stalin	January 1924–March 1953
Georgy Malenkov	March–September 1953
Nikita Khrushchev	September 1953–October 1964
Leonid Brezhnev	October 1964–November 1982
Yuri Andropov	November 1982–February 1984
Konstantin Chernenko	February 1984–March 1985
Mikhail Gorbachev	March 1985–December 1991

Indeed, Khrushchev's greatest—and perhaps most risky—achievement as leader of the Soviet Union was the unmasking of Stalin's legacy and his attempt to de-Stalinize Soviet society. The most powerful blow to the Stalinists came during his famous speech at a closed session of the 20th Party Congress on 25 February 1956 in which Khrushchev documented just some of the crimes and purges of the Stalinist period. In fact, the Soviet Union became gradually more liberal under Khrushchev, and it never did return to the kind of oppressive barbarism for which Stalin was known.

Nevertheless, the overall thrust of Khrushchev's policies tended to be ambivalent and was overshadowed by surprising shifts, inconsistencies, and poorly conceptualized initiatives. Success during the 1950s in economic policy, industrial production, and the space program, in which he took special interest, compelled Khrushchev to proclaim that by 1970, the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in per capita production. In 1980, he predicted, America would embrace communism.

In reality, severe economic problems persisted in the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to consumption and agriculture, where the early initiative to develop the Virgin Lands ended poorly. During Khrushchev's reign, the ideological and political atmosphere often changed. To some extent, his orientation in this regard depended upon his standing within the Soviet leadership and the international communist movement. In 1957 he forbade the publication of Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*, whereas in 1962 he allowed the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's (much more critical) novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.

In foreign policy, Khrushchev generally attempted to ease tensions with the West, particularly with the United States. He rejected Stalin's thesis that wars between capitalist and socialist countries were inevitable and instead sought peaceful coexistence. On the whole, up until 1960, Soviet-American relations improved. Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States was a remarkable success. His talks with President Dwight D. Eisenhower produced, at least for a brief time, what came to be called the Spirit of Camp David. Another highlight of improved East-West relations was the 25 July 1963 signing of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

But Khrushchev engaged in some rather dubious and dangerous foreign policy initiatives as well. He initiated the 1958 Berlin Crisis, authorized the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and used the U-2 Crisis in 1960 to provoke a showdown with Eisenhower and torpedo the May 1960 Paris Conference.

Most disturbing of all, in 1962 Khrushchev decided to install intermediate-range ballistic missiles in communist Cuba. After a brief but extremely tense confrontation with President John F. Kennedy's administration in October 1962, during which the superpowers were poised on the abyss of thermonuclear war, Khrushchev decided to remove the weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis was by far Khrushchev's worst foreign policy mistake. Although he did exact a few concessions from the Americans in return for the missiles' removal, the crisis was clearly a humiliating loss of face for the Soviets and for the Soviet leader personally. Ultimately, it became an important factor in his fall from power less than two years later.

Khrushchev's policy toward other socialist states was equally ambivalent. He restored Soviet relations with Yugoslavia in 1955, after the Tito-Stalin break of 1948. He promoted de-Stalinization programs in Eastern bloc states and allowed a certain extent of limited autonomy for communist parties abroad. However, Khrushchev was not above cracking down on dissent when it was in his best interest. When his secret 1956 speech on Stalin and the ensuing de-Stalinization campaign led to revolts in Poland and Hungary, he intervened in both cases. In fact, he ordered the 1956 Hungarian Revolution crushed by brute force. He was unable to head off crises in Soviet-Albanian and Sino-Soviet relations when Albanian and Chinese officials criticized his de-Stalinization policies and rapprochement with the West. Both crises became quite serious by the early 1960s and led to permanent schisms. Particularly noteworthy was the Sino-Soviet split, for which Khrushchev was largely blamed.

Because of the failure of Khrushchev's agricultural policies, the Sino-Soviet split, the debacle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the leader's increasingly unpredictable and unstable leadership, he was ousted by the party's Central Committee on 14 October 1964 and relieved of all his positions. He then wrote his memoirs, which were published in the West beginning in 1970. Khrushchev died in Moscow on 11 September 1971 following a massive heart attack.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

See also

Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich; Camp David Meeting; Cuban Missile Crisis; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Geneva Conference (1955); Hungarian Revolution; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Paris Conference; Peaceful Coexistence; Sino-Soviet Split; Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; U-2 Incident; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union; United States; Warsaw Pact; Yugoslavia

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Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg
(1904–1988)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) politician and chancellor (1966–1969). Born on 6 April 1904 in Ebingen, Germany, Kurt Kiesinger studied philosophy, history, law, and political science at the universities of Tübingen and Berlin. He joined the National Socialist (Nazi) Party in 1933. During 1935–1949 he practiced law in Berlin; in 1940 he became an assistant in the German Foreign Office. He became division head for general propaganda in 1942 and deputy director of the radio division in 1943.

Because of Kiesinger's involvement in the Nazi Party, the Allies interned him for eighteen months after the German surrender in 1945. In 1947, however, he was allowed to establish himself as a solicitor in Tübingen, where he joined the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). He was elected to the Bundestag in 1949 and was one of the earliest supporters of European integration, subsequently driving the integration of West Germany into the Western alliance. During 1958–1966, he served as minister president of Baden-Württemberg.

On 1 December 1966 Kiesinger succeeded Ludwig Erhard as chancellor, forming a coalition of West Germany's major parties. As chancellor, he committed himself to restructuring the federal budget and proposed a draft for a national emergency law, aimed at improving national security, that was passed by the Bundestag in 1968. His strong support of this hotly debated law was certainly a reaction to the student protests of 1967–1968 and the so-called extraparliamentary opposition, which he regarded as a threat to the state. It was also a clear sign of his conservatism. In foreign affairs, Kiesinger and foreign minister Willy Brandt took the lead in applying the Hallstein Doctrine with more flexibility.

Despite opposition from some hard-liners inside his own cabinet, Kiesinger followed Brandt's policy prescriptions. This was most clearly indicated in Kiesinger's Bundestag speech of 12 April 1967, when the chancellor addressed delegates of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) congress, an unthinkable action for his predecessors Konrad Adenauer or Erhard, who had never mentioned the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) so directly in an official speech. When Brandt became chancellor in October 1969, Kiesinger became CDU opposition leader until 1971. He remained in

the Bundestag until 1980. Kiesinger died in Tübingen, Germany, on 9 March 1988.

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Brandt, Willy; Erhard, Ludwig; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hallstein Doctrine

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Kim Dae Jung
(1926–)

Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) prodemocracy activist, politician, and president of the ROK (1998–2003). Born on 6 January 1926 in Haui'do on a small impoverished island off the southwestern Korean coast, Kim Dae Jung graduated from Mokpo Commercial High School in 1943 and entered the shipping business. During the Korean War, he managed a shipping firm that supplied ROK and United Nations (UN) military forces. He entered politics in 1954 but lost a bid for a seat in the National Assembly. In 1960 he won election to the Assembly and was reelected three times.

In the 1971 presidential elections, Kim challenged incumbent President Park Chung Hee as the New Democratic Party's candidate, winning 43.6 percent of the vote in a contest that had been heavily rigged for Park. Kim's strong showing shocked the Park regime. Fearing Kim's popularity, Park embarked on a campaign to silence him. Kim was ceaselessly harassed and narrowly escaped death in a government-sponsored "accident." He was in Japan for medical treatment when, on 17 October 1972, the Park government imposed martial law in South Korea. Kim immediately condemned this decision. On 8 August 1973, Park's Korea Central Intelligence Agents kidnapped Kim in Tokyo and transported him to South Korea, almost killing him. Park placed Kim under house arrest and later imprisoned him for sedition and other spurious "crimes."

Six weeks after Park's assassination on 26 October 1979, Kim was released from prison. Park's successor, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, continued the vendetta against Kim. In May 1980 Kim was arrested and sentenced to death on trumped-up charges but eventually, in a deal with President Ronald Reagan's administration, was allowed to travel to the United States. Kim voluntarily returned to South Korea in February 1985 but was briefly placed under house arrest again. Then, after the 1987 June Resistance for democratization, Kim was cleared of all charges and had his political rights restored.

Following consecutive losses in the 1987 and 1992 presidential elections, Kim finally won election in December 1997 and was installed in February 1998. He ardently supported the establishment of friendlier relations with North Korea, and as such his administration pursued the so-called sunshine policy of rapprochement with Pyongyang. Kim's historic 13–15 June 2000 summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang resulted in his winning the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2000. Kim's sunshine policy profoundly transformed South Korean perceptions of the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). On the other hand, South Korean–U.S. relations deteriorated rapidly, especially after U.S. President George W. Bush refused to support Kim's rapprochement with North Korea, going so far as to label Pyongyang part of an "axis of evil." Anti-American sentiments have since been on the rise in South Korea, potentially jeopardizing a fifty-plus-year relationship and endangering the long-standing U.S.-South Korean security alliance. Kim stepped down as president in February 2003.

JINWUNG KIM

President of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) Kim Dae Jung, pictured here in 2000. (Serra Antoine/Corbis Sygma)

See also

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Park Chung Hee

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Kim Il Sung
(1912–1994)

Founder and president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) during 1948–1994, general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, and instigator of the Korean War. Born Kim Song Ju on 15 April 1912 to a peasant family in Mangyongdae near Pyongyang, he later assumed the name of Kim Il Sung, a legendary hero of the Korean independence movement, and under this name became a well-known anti-Japanese guerrilla commander in the 1930s. During the Japanese occupation, he led his guerrilla forces on raids against Japanese outposts all across northern Korea. Fleeing the Japanese crackdown on guerrillas in Manchuria, he sought refuge in eastern Siberia in the Soviet Union in 1941.

Kim returned to Korea in September 1945 after the end of World War II and used both his guerrilla record and the support of Soviet occupation

Kim Il Sung was the president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. In 1950 he initiated the Korean War. (Xinhua News Agency)

authorities to become the undisputed leader of North Korea. When North Korea was formally established on 9 September 1948, he became premier. The pro-Western Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) had already been established under the leadership of Syngman Rhee.

Kim possessed a burning ambition to reunite the Korean Peninsula under his rule. With Soviet and Chinese acquiescence and support, he launched a surprise military invasion across the 38th Parallel against South Korea on 25 June 1950. After initial success, however, the assault was repulsed by the forces of South Korea, the United States, and other nations under the flag of the United Nations (UN). Only the massive November 1950 Chinese intervention saved North Korea from defeat. The war eventually stalemated and ended with an uneasy cease-fire in 1953 that left the peninsula divided at the 38th Parallel. To this day, North and South Korea are still technically in a state of war, as no formal peace treaty has been signed.

In the aftermath of the Korean War, Kim systematically purged his political opponents, creating a highly regimented and centralized system that accorded him unlimited power and generated a formidable cult of personality. He was referred to by his subjects in North Korea as *suryong*, or "the Great Leader." Kim used *Juche*, or the ideology of self-reliance, to legitimize his regime and to keep foreign influences out of North Korea. Under his rule, North Korea became isolated from the world community and hard-pressed economically. Throughout much of the Cold War and beyond, North Korea remained one of the most enigmatic and closed societies in the world. In particular, after Kim's death in 1994, North Korea became increasingly unable to stabilize its sinking economy and to feed its own people.

Kim had made the United States his primary enemy, blaming Washington for the division of the peninsula in 1945. He also abhorred America for its 1950 intervention, which prevented reunification on his terms, and for turning South Korea into a virtual U.S. colony. Thus, he pursued a consistently hard-line policy toward the United States, as demonstrated by the USS *Pueblo* incident in 1968 and the brutal 1976 ax murders of two American officers in the demilitarized zone. On the other hand, Kim had long sought a dialogue with the United States in hopes of persuading the United States to withdraw its 37,000 troops from the peninsula. He also hoped that a closer relationship with Washington would offset the collapse of the North Korean–Soviet alliance and the weakening of North Korea's relations with Beijing. After March 1993, Pyongyang began using its nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip for recognition, security assurances, and economic aid from the United States and other Western nations. For a failing and isolated regime with few other cards to play, this potentially deadly brinkmanship proved

moderately successful. In 1994, the United States promised North Korea modest aid and help building nuclear power plants that could not be used to produce weapons-grade uranium. In return, the North Koreans were to abandon their nuclear weapons programs, a pledge that they evidently had no intention of fulfilling.

Kim died of a massive heart attack on 8 July 1994 in Pyongyang, just before what would have been a historic South Korean–North Korean summit with South Korean President Kim Young Sam. Kim's son, Kim Jong Il, succeeded his father as absolute ruler of North Korea. Kim Il Sung is as omnipresent in death as in life, and the junior Kim has ruled North Korea in accordance with the teachings of the departed Great Leader.

For the past half century, while Pyongyang has glorified Kim as something akin to a deity, Seoul has portrayed him as a demon, a scoundrel, and a fraud. But South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's tenacious efforts to engage Pyongyang have helped to erode such Cold War–era attitudes in South Korea. As an example, some lines in a newly approved high school textbook in South Korea for the first time credited Kim Il Sung for his role in combating Japanese colonialism. The passages symbolize rapidly changing South Korean views of North Korea.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Kim Dae Jung; Kim Young Sam; Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Korean War; *Pueblo* Incident; Rhee, Syngman

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Kim Young Sam
(1927–)

South Korean politician, cofounder of the Democratic Party, opposition leader, and president of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) during 1993–1998. Born on 20 December 1927 to a wealthy family on Koje Island near Pusan, Kim Young Sam entered Seoul National University in 1947. During the Korean War, he served in the South Korean Army in propaganda activities.

Kim was elected to the National Assembly in 1954 as a member of South Korean President Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party but soon rebelled against Rhee's increasingly dictatorial rule. Kim then helped found the opposition Democratic Party in 1955. As an opposition leader, he was an outspoken critic of the South Korean government yet remained undaunted by the oppression that often accompanied his position. A family tragedy in 1960, in which his mother was killed by an agent of the Democratic People's Republic

Kim Young Sam, opposition leader and one of the founders of the Democratic Party, served as president of South Korea from 1993 to 1998, the first civilian to hold the office since 1960. (Embassy of the Republic of Korea)

of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), shielded him from the Red-baiting commonly used against opposition politicians. His establishment roots and relatively moderate political views also made him acceptable to middle- and upper-class members of Korean society. Kim was elected to head the New Democratic Party in 1974 and again in 1978. In 1987 he was chosen to head the Unification Democratic Party.

Discouraged by his defeat in the 1987 presidential election, Kim joined President Roh Tae-woo's ruling party in 1990. After many years as a political dissident opposed to military rule, Kim finally won election to the presidency in December 1992 as the candidate of the Liberal Democratic Party, then the government political party. He took office in February 1993. He was the first civilian president since the military coup that overthrew the democratic government of John M. Chang in May 1961.

Kim was not well equipped to handle South Korean–U.S. relations or the new opportunities for reconciliation with North Korea. Like many South Koreans, whose sentiments toward North Korea in the early 1990s were a complicated mixture of kinship, disdain, and fear, the president's views were replete with inconsistencies. Kim alternated between taking a hard line against North Korea, calculated to bring about its early collapse, and pursuing an accommodation to bring about a "soft landing," leading to a gradual unification. Because he usually pursued the former and often collided with the United States, which favored the latter, South Korean–U.S. relations were tense during his term of office. Kim has also been blamed for the collapse of the South Korean economy during the East Asian financial crisis. As a result, South Korea had to resort to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout that many South Koreans viewed as a national humiliation. Kim left office in February 1998.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Chang, John Myon; Korea, Republic of; Rhee, Syngman; Roh Tae Woo

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King, Martin Luther, Jr.
(1929–1968)

African American minister, political activist, and U.S. civil rights leader. Born on 15 January 1929 in Atlanta, Georgia, Martin Luther King Jr. graduated from

high school at the age of fifteen and attended Morehouse College during 1944–1948. Following in his father's footsteps, he decided to become a Baptist minister. He subsequently attended Crozer Theological Seminary in Pennsylvania before beginning doctoral studies in systematic theology at Boston University in 1951.

Shortly before completing his doctoral dissertation in early 1955, King accepted a position as minister of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama. In December 1955, Rosa Parks, a young African American seamstress, refused to yield her seat on a Montgomery city bus to a white, thereby breaking the city's segregation ordinance. At the time, nearly all Southern localities—large and small—were strictly segregated according to race. When local African American leaders organized a boycott of the city's buses, King was asked to become the president of the Montgomery Improvement Association, which coordinated the campaign. During the year-long boycott, King, influenced by veteran pacifist activists, developed a nonviolent protest strategy that closely resembled the tactics of Indian activist Mohandas Gandhi.

Martin Luther King Jr. led the African American struggle to achieve the full rights of U.S. citizenship and eloquently voiced the hopes and grievances of African Americans before he was assassinated in 1968. His powerful speeches and message of nonviolence have continued to inspire people of all races and generations. (Library of Congress)

In 1957, after blacks had successfully desegregated Montgomery's buses, King and other civil rights activists formed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) as a platform from which to expand the civil rights struggle. But when African American students initiated a massive sit-in movement to force the desegregation of lunch counters and restaurants that spread across the South in 1960, King and the SCLC remained on the sidelines. Only in 1962 did the SCLC attempt to launch a nonviolent protest campaign in Albany, Georgia, which failed. A year later, King and his supporters used this experience to launch a highly successful protest campaign in Birmingham, Alabama. The violence that white policemen employed to disperse black demonstrators shocked the nation and deeply embarrassed the United States internationally. By then, in fact, it had become clear that America could no longer take the high road in protesting human rights abuses behind the Iron Curtain when it allowed such flagrant civil rights violations on its own soil. The civil rights movement laid bare the hypocrisy of American foreign policy and handed the Soviet Union a perfect propaganda weapon.

In August 1963, 250,000 demonstrators gathered in Washington, D.C., where they lobbied for civil rights legislation and listened to King's deeply moving and memorable "I Have a Dream" speech. The enormity of the event and the attendant emotion that it brought to the movement had deeply impressed President John Kennedy, who until that time had been a rather reluctant partner in the struggle for civil rights. In June 1964, with the full force of President Lyndon Johnson's coercive arm-twisting, Congress finally passed the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbade discrimination

based on race, ethnicity, religion, sex, or national origin in most public venues and in employment. Six months later, King received the Nobel Peace Prize for his civil rights activism.

Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sought to smear King's reputation, especially after he denounced America's Vietnam War policies, his nonviolent rhetoric won him both white and black supporters across the nation. Another successful SCLC campaign for voting rights that began in Selma, Alabama, in 1965 further established King's standing as the most prominent spokesman of the African American freedom struggle. The Selma campaign is credited with contributing to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. By 1966, however, after dozens of race riots had erupted in American cities, many black activists began to denounce King's nonviolent philosophy. That year, younger activists began to call for Black Power, a militant concept that had been influenced by the slain black separatist Malcolm X. By 1967, the civil rights movement had begun to splinter. King no longer commanded the solitary admiration of most blacks as he had in the past, and his anti–Vietnam War stance alienated many whites.

On 4 April 1968 while organizing a strike of sanitation workers in Memphis, Tennessee, King was assassinated. His murderer was James Earl Ray, a career criminal who staunchly opposed racial integration. Ray was apprehended and convicted and spent the rest of his life in prison.

Simon Wendt

See also

Black Panthers; Civil Liberties in the United States; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; Malcolm X; Race Relations, United States; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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Kinnock, Neil Gordon
(1942–)

British politician and Labour Party leader (1983–1992). Born on 28 March 1942 in Tredegar, South Wales, the son of a miner, Neil Kinnock earned a BA degree in industrial relations and history from University College, Cardiff, in 1964.

Kinnock was first elected to Parliament in 1970. Following in the footsteps of other radical politicians from Wales, he strongly supported labor

unionism and the radical Left within the Labour Party. When Labour lost the 1979 general election to Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party, Kinnock served as opposition spokesman for education. He was also a member of the Labour Party's national executive committee. Labour fared no better in the 1983 elections, and its leader, Michael Foot, took the blame for its poor showing. Shortly after the election, Kinnock replaced Foot as party leader.

Kinnock immediately set out to reorganize and reinvigorate the party. Realizing that radical elements within Labour had helped contribute to its years in the political wilderness, he expelled the Militant Tendency Organization, a radical leftist group within the party. He also moderated the party line in order to attract more voters, many of whom had shifted to the Right during the era of Thatcher as prime minister. Although Labour lost the 1987 elections, it did noticeably better than in the previous election.

As the Conservative government began to wane in the late 1980s, many Labourites, including Kinnock himself, thought that they were destined to win in the 1992 elections. They did not. After the 1992 defeat, Kinnock resigned his leadership position. There is little doubt, however, that his reorganization and repositioning of the Labour Party was a significant factor in it attaining victory under Tony Blair. Kinnock went on to serve as transportation commissioner for the European Union (EU) in 1995.

Elizabeth Pugliese and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Foot, Michael; Thatcher, Margaret; United Kingdom

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Kirkpatrick, Jeane Jordan

(1926–2006)

Neoconservative political scientist and outspoken U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN) during 1981–1985. Jeane Kirkpatrick was born Jeane Duane Jordan on 19 November 1926 in Duncan, Oklahoma. Her father was an oil wildcatter, her mother an accountant. She received her undergraduate degree in 1948 from Barnard College and a master's degree in 1950 from Columbia University. She married political scientist Evron Kirkpatrick in 1955, reared three sons, and then began teaching at Georgetown University in 1967. In 1968 she earned a PhD from Columbia and joined the staff of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a Washington, D.C., think tank.

As an active Democrat, Kirkpatrick worked on Vice President Hubert Humphrey's 1968 presidential campaign. Like Humphrey and many others in the party, she favored liberal domestic social programs and a muscular foreign policy to counter the perceived Soviet threat abroad. She opposed South

Jeane Kirkpatrick migrated from the academic world to the diplomatic circles of the United Nations as she shifted her affiliation from the Democratic Party to the right wing of the Republican Party. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Dakota Senator George McGovern's 1972 Democratic presidential candidacy because she disagreed with his dovish foreign policy platform, leading her and nine other party members to form the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) to urge the party to return to its earlier foreign policy positions. In 1976 Kirkpatrick, much of the CDM, and some Republicans advocated increased defense spending and greater scrutiny of arms control agreements and détente by establishing the Committee on the Present Danger. Consequently, as with those with similar backgrounds and beliefs, Kirkpatrick was rather imprecisely labeled a neoconservative.

In a 1979 article titled "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Kirkpatrick charged that Democratic President Jimmy Carter's opposition to right-wing autocrats in Iran and Nicaragua had unintentionally led to their replacement by either radical Muslim fundamentalist or left-wing governments that were hostile to American interests. She advocated democratization while also acknowledging the circumstances of "friendly dictators." The article caught the eye of conservatives running President Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign, and as a result Kirkpatrick was appointed ambassador to the UN in 1981. She became a passionate adherent of the Reagan administration's get-tough policy toward the Soviets and was a vocal proponent of the Republican Party's social and foreign policy agendas.

Tired of the internecine squabbling on Reagan's foreign policy team and disappointed to be passed over for national security advisor, Kirkpatrick resigned in 1985 shortly after formally joining the Republican Party. She then returned to Georgetown University and her post at AEI. In 1993 she cofounded Empower America, a public policy organization. Kirkpatrick died in Bethesda, Maryland, on 7 December 2006.

Christopher John Bright

See also

Carter, James Earl, Jr.; El Salvador; Iran; McGovern, George Stanley; Nicaragua; Present Danger, Committee on the; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Reagan Doctrine; Sandinistas

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Kishi Nobusuke
(1896–1987)

Conservative Japanese politician and prime minister (1957–1960). Born on 13 November 1896 in Tabuse-chō in the Yamaguchi Prefecture, Kishi Nobusuke graduated from the law school of Tokyo Imperial University in 1920. That same year he entered government work in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. In 1936 he was appointed assistant general manager of the government in Manchukuo, an area of Northeastern China annexed by Japan in 1932. Kishi became one of the top economic bureaucrats in Manchukuo. In 1939 he returned to Japan as undersecretary of commerce and industry, and in 1941 General Tōjō Hideki appointed Kishi minister of commerce and industry in his first cabinet. When the Commerce and Industry Ministry was converted to the Munitions Ministry in 1943, Kishi became a minister of state and undersecretary of munitions.

During the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II, Kishi was detained as a suspected "Class-A" war criminal from 1945 to 1948. Ultimately acquitted by the Tokyo Tribunal, he was banned from public life until 1952, when he joined the anti–Yoshida Shigeru faction and became secretary-general of the Democratic Party. Kishi was largely responsible for uniting all of Japan's conservative parties into the powerful Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955 and served as the first head of the LDP.

When ailing Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan resigned in 1957, Kishi assumed the post of prime minister. His first cabinet lasted only until 1958, but he quickly assembled a second cabinet that same year, which lasted until 1960.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, June 1960. (AFP/Getty Images)

As prime minister, Kishi authorized war reparations to Indonesia and authorized the implementation of the Japanese National Defense Plan to fortify Japanese defensive capabilities. He also traveled to the United States in 1957 to talk with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Most notably, Kishi sought renewal of the United States–Japan Security Treaty. He again journeyed to Washington and in January 1960 returned to Japan with a new security treaty. But he was soon overwhelmed by a widespread backlash to the treaty, which many perceived as one that would sublimate Japanese interests to those of the Americans. Amid the growing public uproar, late in the evening of 19 May 1960 Kishi's government rammed the treaty through the Diet (parliament) on a snap vote. On 15 July 1960, he was forced to resign thanks in part to this heavy-handed parliamentary maneuver. Kishi died on 8 August 1987 in Shinjuku, Tokyo.

Nenashi Kiichi

See also

Ishibashi Tanzan; Japan; United States–Japan Security Treaty; Yoshida Shigeru

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Kissinger, Henry
(1923–)

U.S. national security advisor (1969–1975) and secretary of state (1973–1977); together with President Richard Milhous Nixon, devised and implemented a major reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. Of German-Jewish extraction, Henry Alfred Kissinger was born on 27 May 1923 in Fürth, Germany. He left Adolf Hitler's Germany for New York in 1938 and became an American citizen five years later. After serving in the U.S. Army, Kissinger became a professor of government at Harvard University, publishing his doctoral dissertation, *A World Restored* (1955), that focused particularly upon the Austrian Prince von Metternich, whom Kissinger admired and in some ways modeled himself upon. He also published a study of U.S. atomic policy for the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations.

Although his intellectual capabilities were highly respected, Kissinger's real ambitions lay in the practice, not the study, of international relations. He used his Harvard position to meet major political figures and served as an advisor to leading Republicans, including Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York and former Vice President Nixon. Kissinger's efforts won him only minor assignments under President John F. Kennedy, but when Nixon became president he appointed Kissinger as his national security advisor. Kissinger greatly overshadowed William P. Rogers, nominal secretary of state until August 1973, when Kissinger succeeded him, taking virtual control of U.S. foreign policy.

Kissinger's undoubted abilities included an immense capacity for hard work, a talent for grand designs and broad conceptualization, and the imagination to reformulate the international system to accommodate the relative weakness of the United States, de-emphasizing ideology in favor of a balance of power and the pursuit of closer relations with communist People's Republic of China (PRC) and détente with the Soviet Union. This resulted in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that imposed limits on Soviet and American nuclear arsenals and delivery systems; the 1975 Helsinki Accords that normalized relations between Eastern and Western Europe and created the permanent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and a rapprochement between communist China and the United States that Kissinger pioneered with a secret 1971 personal visit to Beijing. He also proved himself to be an excellent negotiator in complicated and protracted shuttle diplomacy designed to resolve long-standing Arab-Israeli tensions and disputes after the October 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Kissinger greatly overshadowed William P. Rogers, nominal secretary of state until August 1973, when Kissinger succeeded him, taking virtual control of U.S. foreign policy.

Kissinger's weaknesses included a penchant for secrecy and intrigue, enormous vanity, and overweening personal ambition, all of which sometimes impelled him to decidedly unscrupulous behavior; an overriding concern to maintain international stability that often led him to endorse brutal right- or left-wing regimes; and a focus on realism in foreign policy to the near exclusion of all considerations of morality. The latter was apparent in his involvement in the secret bombing of Cambodia in the early 1970s, an operation that Congress halted when it became public in 1973, and the 1970–1971 invasion of that country despite Nixon's promise when he took office to end the Vietnam War as soon as possible; acquiescence in a 1973 military coup that brought the death of left-wing president Salvador Allende of Chile; endorsement of Indonesia's military takeover of Portuguese East Timor in December 1975 and the brutal suppression of indigenous resistance there; and readiness to authorize wiretapping against American bureaucrats suspected of leaking official information to the press. These aspects of Kissinger and his failure, constant negotiations notwithstanding, to end the Vietnam War—a conflict that his Cambodian policies effectively broadened—until 1973 made him the bête noire of many American liberals.

Conservative Republicans found equally opprobrious Kissinger's willingness to accommodate the communist Soviet Union and the PRC and, if Sino-American rapprochement required, to jettison the Republic of China

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a principal architect of U.S. foreign policy during the administrations of Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. (Marion S. Trikosko/Library of Congress)

(ROC, Taiwan), a longtime U.S. ally. Under Nixon's successor, Gerald R. Ford, who became president in August 1974 when the Watergate scandal forced Nixon's resignation, both SALT I and the Helsinki Accords on Europe that Kissinger helped to negotiate with the Soviets became targets for attack by such conservatives as California governor and presidential hopeful Ronald W. Reagan, who assailed the Soviet human rights record. The fall of Vietnam to communist forces in April 1975, little more than two years after Kissinger had negotiated the Paris Peace Accords supposedly ending the war, also damaged his credibility. On 3 November 1975 Ford replaced Kissinger as national security advisor, although Kissinger remained secretary of state until Ford left office in January 1977.

Upon leaving government, Kissinger established an influential business consultancy firm. He continued to provide unofficial advice to successive administrations, wrote and spoke extensively on international affairs, and published three weighty volumes of memoirs. He remains a perennially controversial figure. Liberals still denigrate his foreign policy accomplishments, and even decades later journalists including Seymour Hersh and, most notably, Christopher Hitchens argued that Kissinger's past behavior made him liable to trial and conviction for war crimes. It became almost an academic parlor game to point out discrepancies between Kissinger's own account of his time in office and the increasingly available documentary record. Outside the United States, Kissinger was a less polarizing figure, and as he began his ninth decade many in Europe and Asia still admired his achievements.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Arab-Israeli Wars; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Détente; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Helsinki Final Act; Laird, Melvin; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nixon Doctrine; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich; Rogers, William Pierce; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on; Soviet Union; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Vietnam War

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Kitchen Debate
(24 July 1959)

Impromptu exchange between U.S. Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the American National Trade and Cultural Exhibition in Moscow on 24 July 1959. Dubbed the "Kitchen Debate" because the two leaders engaged in a debate over technology and the quality of life in each other's countries in front of a model U.S. kitchen display, the repartee was covered by media throughout the world. Although some of their comments were in jest or were lighthearted, as the discussion progressed both men became more belligerent. Nixon had just begun his visit

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon engage in a vigorous discussion in front of a kitchen display at the U.S. exhibit at Moscow's Sokolniki Park, 24 July 1959. While touring the exhibit, both men kept a running debate on the merits of their respective countries. On the right is Leonid Brezhnev, future Soviet premier. (AP/Wide World Photos)

to the USSR and had started his tour of the exhibit shortly before he encountered Khrushchev. Their encounter had not been preplanned. The debate occurred amid growing U.S.-Soviet tensions that began with the launching of *Sputnik 1* in 1957 and would culminate in the 1960 U-2 Crisis.

Nixon stayed in the USSR for eleven days, and on 1 August 1959 he gave an unprecedented speech on Soviet television in which he criticized communism and warned that its ideology should not be spread abroad. A month later, Khrushchev made his historic visit to the United States, the first for a Soviet leader. The Kitchen Debate not only demonstrated the simmering tensions between the superpowers but also showcased the growing technological rivalry between the two nations, which was most pronounced in the incipient Space Race.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Khrushchev, Nikita; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Space Race; *Sputnik;* U-2 Incident

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Kohl, Helmut

(1930–)

German politician, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) during 1982–1990, and chancellor of the reunited Germany during 1990–1998. A career politician, Helmut Kohl was born in Ludwigshafen, Germany, on 3 March 1930. His father helped found the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Ludwigshafen after World War II, and the younger Kohl became a member of the youth section in 1946. At the age of twenty-three he entered the leadership of the local party organization, and in 1955 he became a member of the party leadership for the state of Rhine-Palatine.

Kohl first studied law at the University of Frankfurt am Main but transferred to Heidelberg University, where he earned a doctorate in history in 1958. His dissertation centered on the revival of political parties in Germany after 1945. By 1966 he was chairman of the state party organization, and in 1969 he became the minister-president of Rhine-Palatine.

Kohl's image as a dynamic reformer helped the CDU win an absolute majority in Rhine-Palatine in the elections of 1971 and 1975. His own career, however, slowed slightly. He failed in his attempt to become the national CDU chairman in 1971. After winning that post on his second attempt in 1973, he then lost the contest for the chancellorship in 1976. He went to Bonn as the leader of the opposition but was forced to allow Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the Bavarian wing of the party, to stand for chancellor in 1980. How-

ever, a constructive vote of no-confidence against the government of Helmut Schmidt allowed Kohl to take the chancellorship on 1 October 1982.

Kohl immediately made his mark, pushing through legislation that allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to place new missiles in West Germany despite the protests of the Soviet Union and the West German peace movement. More important for his continuing success, however, was a steady improvement in the West German economy. Under Kohl, an additional 1.3 million West Germans found work between 1983 and 1989.

Kohl also deepened Germany's involvement with and commitment to Europe. In September 1984, he met with French President François Mitterrand at Verdun for a joint commemoration of the victims of both world wars. The two men also worked together to develop a European defense corps and a European radio station and to lay the foundations for the Treaty of Maastricht and common European currency. Kohl also worked closely with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. While Kohl's joint commemoration with Reagan of the victims of World War II at an SS cemetery in Bitburg created some controversy, the CDU was confirmed in government in the elections of 1983 and 1987.

As chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and later a united Germany from 1983 to 1998, Helmut Kohl presided over the reunification of Germany. (German Information Center)

Kohl was the right man in the right place when the Berlin Wall was finally breached in November 1989. He quickly seized the initiative, surprising the German parliament with a ten-point program for German unity before the end of the month. He promised immediate economic aid to the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), to be followed by political reform. He followed this with a milestone speech on the topic before more than 100,000 people at the Frauenkirche in Dresden, East Germany, on 19 December 1989. Kohl was rewarded with a resounding victory for the CDU in the first (and last) free elections held in the East Germany in March 1990.

Kohl worked to rapidly integrate the two Germanies, at great cost and with mixed success. His government barely won reelection in 1994 and was soundly defeated in 1998 largely because of the economic burdens imposed on Germany by his program of unification. Four years later, he was forced to resign as chairman of the CDU due to revelations that he had known about illegal payments made on behalf of the party. His legacy nonetheless is among the greatest of German politicians. Having served sixteen years in office, he was the longest sitting federal chancellor and ranked behind only Otto von Bismarck in time in office overall. Kohl was honored as an honorary citizen of Europe, only the second time that title was bestowed, for his role in German reunification and is still widely known as "The Chancellor of German Unity."

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Germany, Federal Republic of; Mitterrand, François; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strauss, Franz Josef

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Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti

The main Soviet security and intelligence agency from 13 March 1954 to 6 November 1991. During this period, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB, Committee for State Security) operated as an agency and even a ministry. Its tasks included external espionage, counterespionage, and the liquidation of anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary forces within the Soviet Union. The KGB also guarded the borders and investigated and prosecuted those who committed political or economic crimes.

Soviet security forces have a long history, dating back to the pre-1917 czarist period. Communist predecessors of the KGB were the All-Russian Extraordinary Commissary against the Counterrevolution and Sabotage (also known by its Russian acronym, Cheka), the Main Political Department (GPU), and the Joint Main Political Department (OGPU) headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, the "Knight of the Revolution," during 1917–1926. The name "Cheka" suggested that it was to be only a temporary body, but the agency became one of the principal pillars of the Soviet system. In 1934, the OGPU merged into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), with Genrikh Yagoda (1934–1936), Nikolai Yezhov (1936–1938), and Lavrenty Beria (1938–1945) as its chiefs. Under Yezhov and Beria, the NKVD carried out brutal purges within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). NKVD officers, for example, murdered Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940.

During the rule of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, the security apparatus had achieved almost unrestricted powers to harass, arrest, and detain those who were perceived as class enemies. The Soviet Union thus became a police state in which millions of innocent victims suffered arbitrary and brutal terror. Official figures suggest that between January 1935 and June 1941, some 19.8 million people were arrested by the NKVD and an estimated 7 million were subsequently executed.

Following World War II, in 1946 the NKVD was raised to a state ministry under Beria, who became a member of the Politburo. After the deaths of Stalin (March 1953) and Beria (December 1953), the security services were again reorganized, and on 13 March 1954 the secret police was renamed the KGB. There were a half dozen principal directorates.

The First Directorate was responsible for foreign operations and intelligence-gathering activities. The Second Directorate carried out internal political control of citizens and had responsibility for the internal security of the Soviet Union. The Third Directorate was occupied with military counterintelligence and political control of the armed forces. The Fifth Directorate also dealt with internal security, especially with religious bodies, the artistic community, and censorship. The Ninth Directorate, which employed 40,000 persons, provided (among other things) uniformed guards for principal CPSU leaders and their families. The Border Guards Directorate was a 245,000-person force that oversaw border control. Total KGB manpower estimates range from 490,000 in 1973 to 700,000 in 1986.

The KGB helped and trained the security and intelligence agencies in other communist countries. It was also heavily involved in supporting wars of national liberation in the developing world, especially in Africa. The Soviet Union also maintained a close alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), providing it with arms, funds, and paramilitary training. The KGB mostly avoided direct involvement with terrorist operations, but it played an important role in directing aid to these groups and producing intelligence reports on their activities. Scandals concerning defectors and moles plagued the KGB throughout its existence, but the agency also scored notable successes such as, for the recruitment of the Cambridge Five in Great Britain, atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, and Aldrich Ames, a KGB mole within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Under Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, the terror lessened considerably. Both the security police and the regular police were subjected to a new legal code, and the KGB was made subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, it was allowed to circumvent the law when combating political dissent. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, the KGB waged a campaign against dissidents such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who became worldwide symbolic figures of communist repression. In July 1978 the head of the KGB received a seat on the Council of Ministers.

The KGB had a considerable impact on Soviet domestic and foreign policymaking. Its chief, Yuri Andropov, became CPSU leader in 1982. Under Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies during 1985–1990, Soviet citizens' fears of the KGB diminished, which signaled the erosion of the Soviet system. The KGB was dissolved in November 1991 following the August coup attempt against Gorbachev, which was engineered by KGB chief Colonel General Vladimir Kryuchkov. Its successor organization, the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB, Federal Security Service), bears great resemblance to the old security apparatus.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Andropov, Yuri; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Cambridge Five; Central Intelligence Agency; Defections; Espionage; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gulags; Intelligence Collection; Khrushchev, Nikita; Sakharov, Andrei; Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr; Soviet Union; Venona Project

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Korea, Democratic People's Republic of

East Asian nation with a 1945 population of approximately 8.8 million people. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) was officially formed on 9 September 1948 on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula and covers 47,950 square miles, making it roughly the size of the U.S. state of Mississippi. It is bordered by the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) to the south, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia to the north, the Yellow Sea to the west, and the Sea of Japan to the east.

Japanese colonial rule in Korea ended on 15 August 1945 when Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. Korea was thus liberated but was divided at the 38th Parallel. The United States and the Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula into two temporary occupation zones to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces, but this arrangement soon became permanent. The United States and the Soviet Union administered their respective occupation zones in southern and northern Korea through radically different instrumentalities. In the north, the Soviet authorities made use of the indigenous people's committees, and a policy of communization was enforced.

On 8 February 1946, the North Korean Interim People's Committee was organized as the new governing body, taking the place of local people's committees. With the help of the Soviets, veteran communist and Red Army officer Kim Il Sung was named chairman. In February 1947, a convention of the local representatives elected in November 1946 was held, which in turn elected the Supreme People's Assembly. The assembly approved the creation of the North Korean People's Committee, which became the highest executive governing organization under Kim.

On 16 February 1948, the North Korean People's Committee proclaimed its intention to form a government representing all Korea within the next few months. On 25 August 1948, ten days after the ROK was officially proclaimed, North Korea held an election for the Supreme People's Assembly throughout Korea. Some rightists and many leftists in South Korea participated in the election. The representatives to the Supreme People's Assembly met in Pyongyang on 3 September to ratify a constitution that had been drafted earlier in the year. The DPRK government was officially established on 9 September, with Kim as premier. On 12 October, the Soviet Union officially recognized this new government.

The formation of the ROK and of the DPRK formalized the de facto division of the Korean Peninsula at the 38th Parallel. Each state claimed to represent the entire nation and remained adamantly antagonistic toward the other. Each also worked to unite Korea on its own terms and with the assistance of its principal foreign patron.

Kim remained determined to unify the Korean Peninsula by military means. North Korea's armed forces significantly surpassed the South Korean Army in manpower and equipment. Calculating that the United States would not protect South Korea, Kim persistently pressed Soviet leader Josef Stalin and PRC leader Mao Zedong for permission to reunify the Korean Peninsula by military means. Indeed, Kim began lobbying for an invasion of South Korea as early as March 1949. He proposed it to Stalin and, with Stalin's and Mao's approval and with a Soviet battle plan to guide him, executed it.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched a full-scale attack on South Korea and within three days captured the capital city of Seoul. At that point, it looked as if Kim's ambitions to unify Korea by force under communist rule would be fulfilled. Only then did the United States decide to take military action to save South Korea. The military intervention of United Nations Command (UNC) forces, comprised largely of U.S. troops, completely frustrated the ambitions of North Korean leadership.

The Korean War was quite costly for North Korea. It suffered 523,400 casualties, comprised of 294,151 dead and 229,249 wounded. UNC bombing inflicted heavy damage, turning the North Korean capital of Pyongyang into ruins. On 28 July 1953, a day after the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, Kim claimed a great victory over the "U.S. imperialists, their South Korean lackeys, and the entire imperialist camp" and vowed to continue his struggle for the "liberation of the southern half of the Republic."

During the 1950s and 1960s, North Korea exhibited an extremely hostile attitude toward the United States via harsh verbal attacks, occasionally accompanied by military actions, always demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. During 1966–1969, North Korea waged another Korean conflict, with a large number of border clashes along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the 38th Parallel. In 1967 and 1968 alone, a total of 1,769 border incidents, more than 260 of which were classified as "significant," occurred within the South Korean sector of the DMZ. These produced some 900 casualties among South Korean and American troops. Then on 23 January 1968, North Korean naval ships illegally seized the USS *Pueblo* in international waters off its coast, killing 1 crewman and taking 82 others hostage. On 15 April 1969, North Korean MiG fighters attacked and shot down a U.S. EC-121 surveillance plane, killing all 43 crew members. Then,

North Korean propaganda poster of August 1950 urging citizens to work for victory over United Nations forces. (National Archives and Records Administration)

on 18 August 1976, North Korean guards at the joint security area in the village of Panmunjom attacked a party of U.S. and South Korean soldiers engaged in a tree-trimming operation on the UN side of the area, murdering 2 American officers.

Since the early 1960s, North Korea has pursued its two primary objectives in foreign policy dealing with the United States: the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the establishment of direct contacts with Washington. Thus, Pyongyang practiced a seemingly contradictory foreign policy of antagonism and hostility toward the United States while making seemingly conciliatory gestures with the singular aim of establishing direct contacts with America. The refusal of the United States to respond to Pyongyang's overtures eventually led the North Koreans to play the nuclear card, which succeeded in bringing a reluctant United States to a bilateral conference table in the 1990s. After March 1993, Pyongyang used its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip for security assurances and economic aid from the United States, which proved successful. In early October 2002, North Korea admitted that it had continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program, this time using highly enriched uranium in violation of the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework freezing North Korea's nuclear program. That admission damaged the already-strained relations between the two nations. On 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union address, U.S. President George W. Bush defined North Korea as part of the "axis of evil," along with Iraq and Iran. North Korea has settled on a twofold strategy of keeping its nuclear weapons program even as it seeks to improve ties with Washington.

In the domestic sphere, after the Korean War Kim Il Sung systematically and brutally consolidated his power, making North Korea his own kingdom.

In the domestic sphere, after the Korean War Kim systematically and brutally consolidated his power, making North Korea his own kingdom. Referred to by his people as "Great Leader," he established a formidable cult of personality, outdoing even Stalin and Mao. From the 1950s, Kim developed his own political philosophy of *Juche,* or self-reliance, possibly motivated by unsatisfactory support from the Soviet Union and unwelcome domination by the PRC during the Korean War. The *Juche* philosophy was meant to appeal to deep-rooted Korean resistance to foreign invasion and domination. It quickly became synonymous with North Korea's notorious economic autarchy. *Juche* also developed another peculiar North Korean endeavor: our-style socialism. North Korea shut itself off from the world, maintaining diplomatic relations only with communist bloc countries. *Juche* and our-style socialism helped contribute to the total collapse of the North Korean economy in the 1990s, which led to widespread starvation that the North Korean government vehemently denied.

Kim died on 8 July 1994, and his son, Kim Jong Il, succeeded him as his political heir. The younger Kim had no intention of changing his father's hallmark policies, and the increasingly quixotic quest to "live in our own way" has continued in the world's last unreconstructed Stalinist state. North Korea has also become the center of a major and continuing international crisis through its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile development programs.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Kim Il Sung; Korea, Republic of; Korean War; Mao Zedong; *Pueblo* Incident; Stalin, Josef

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Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, Armed Forces

Known as the Korean People's Army (KPA), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK, North Korea) armed forces have been the backbone of the Stalinist regime dominated by Kim Il Sung and his son and political successor Kim Jong Il. The KPA was established in mid-1946 with the assistance of Soviet occupation forces but was not formally founded until 8 February 1948. Initially, the North Korean armed forces numbered about 30,000 men. But by June 1950, at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, the KPA had expanded to between 150,000 and 180,000 troops.

The Soviet Union actively aided the North Korean military. When the Soviet occupation troops withdrew in December 1948, they left behind as many as 150 advisors in each KPA division for training and organizational purposes. Under the terms of a reciprocal aid agreement concluded on 17 March 1949, the Soviets agreed to furnish North Korea with arms and equipment for six infantry divisions, three mechanized units, and eight battalions of mobile border constabulary. During 1949–1950, the Soviet Union supplied 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 100 Yak fighter planes, 70 attack bombers, and 150 Russian T-34 and T-70 tanks as well as heavy artillery. The North Korean armed forces were thus far superior to the Republic of Korea's (ROK, South Korea) army in training, manpower, firepower, and equipment when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950.

Korean People's Army (KPA, North Korean Army) soldiers in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea in 1998. The 2.4 mile-wide DMZ has separated North and South Korea since 1953. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The KPA was decimated by the U.S.-led United Nations (UN) forces in the early stages of the Korean War. During the war, North Korean armed forces suffered horrendous casualties totaling 294,151 dead and 229,249 wounded. At the end of the conflict, the KPA was less than half the strength of the South Korean armed forces.

After the war, North Korea pursued military augmentation. Kim Il Sung took a militant posture toward South

Korea and the United States, increasing defense expenditures at the expense of economic development. The North Korean armed forces are now estimated to number some 1.2 million people, the fifth-largest military establishment in the world. Following the philosophy of *Juche* (self-reliance), North Korea has developed an extensive defense industrial capacity, although most of its equipment is of outdated Soviet or Chinese design. Some equipment has been redesigned by North Koreans, however, including armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, light tanks, high-speed landing craft, Romeo-class submarines, SCUD-derived surface-to-surface missiles, and antitank missiles (the SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, and possibly SA-2). Aircraft production is believed to have begun in 1995. North Korea operates some 134 armament factories, many of them underground.

The large number of North Korean troops and equipment poses a grave threat to South Korea. North Korean ground forces are composed of 20 corps with 170 divisions and brigades, including 25 SOF (Special Operations Forces) brigades. North Korea has deployed approximately 10 corps and some 60 divisions and brigades in the forward area south of the Pyongyang/Wonsan line and is thus prepared to launch a surprise attack and invade South Korea without further troop deployment. North Korea has some 3,800 tanks, 2,300 armored vehicles, 12,500 artillery, and 13,800 air defense weapons. North Korea has more fighters and bombers than South Korea, but the equipment is old. The North Korean Air Force has 790 fighters, 80 bombers, 520 support aircraft, and 320 helicopters. MiG-19s and MiG-21s make up the core of the aircraft. North Korea is also equipped with some highly advanced fighters such as the MiG-23 and MiG-29 as well as the SU-25. North Korea built underground facilities to store and protect its combat aircraft. Ninety submarines, of which some 70 are coastal or midget craft, form the main component of the North Korean Navy.

Eight different factories in North Korea have produced lethal chemicals such as nerve, blister, and blood agents as well as tear gas. Their quantity is estimated to be 2,500–5,000 tons.

The North Korean government has had the desire and capability to develop nuclear weapons, build and export medium-range missiles, and construct and stockpile chemical and biological weapons. It has exerted full effort in nuclear development since the 1950s, receiving technological support from the former Soviet Union. It is estimated that by the 1990s, North Korea acquired sufficient weapons-grade plutonium to make one or two nuclear bombs. Eight different factories in North Korea have produced lethal chemicals such as nerve, blister, and blood agents as well as tear gas. Their quantity is estimated to be 2,500–5,000 tons. North Korea is also suspected of maintaining numerous facilities for cultivating and producing anthrax and other forms of biological weapons. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has also embarked on the development of ballistic missiles and has already produced and deployed 500km-range SCUD-Cs by upgrading Soviet SCUD-Bs. In 1993, North Korea succeeded in test-firing a 1,300km-range Nodong-I missile and has deployed the missiles for operational purposes since 1997. The maximum ranges of long-range Taepodong-I and Taepodong-II missiles are estimated to reach 2,000–2,500 kilometers and 6,700 kilometers, respectively.

Pyongyang has pursued a military-first policy, and its armed force has been the pillar of the so-called socialist revolution and the main force for its

Juche philosophy. As a result of the steady increase in military manpower and weaponry, North Korea has essentially become one huge armed camp. It is the most heavily armed nation in the world, relative to its size. But the government's efforts to build a powerful military force have greatly taxed the North Korean economy. About 25 percent of its gross national product (GNP) has been allocated to the maintenance of its armed force. Such an emphasis has had seriously adverse effects on the nation's standard of living. Since the Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991, North Korea has had serious problems and has become increasingly isolated internationally. The North Korean armed forces remain potent, but it is unclear how long they can continue to prop up such a repressive regime.

JINWUNG KIM

See also

Kim Il Sung; Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Korean War

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Korea, Republic of

East Asian nation with a 1945 population of approximately 16 million. The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) covers 38,023 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Indiana. It is bordered by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) to the north, the Sea of Japan to the east, the Korea Strait to the south, and the Yellow Sea to the west. South Korea was officially proclaimed on 15 August 1948 under U.S. auspices after a three-year military occupation. In mid-August 1945, when the defeat of Japan was imminent, the United States and the Soviet Union hastily agreed to divide the Korean Peninsula at the 38th Parallel for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces and maintaining security until Korea's future course as an independent nation could be settled. The joint Soviet-American military occupation was intended as a temporary arrangement. As the Cold War deepened, however, the Korean Peninsula became the site of two antagonistic regimes based on diametrically opposed ideological principles and sponsors.

On 8 September 1945, 72,000 American forces of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's XIV Corps arrived in Korea. The American troops quickly occupied their zone south of the 38th Parallel and established the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).

The Cold War had a profound impact on Korea's future. From the outset, Korea's future as a unitary nation depended on the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain friendly relations. But Washington and Moscow began to implement unilateral policies of zonal reconstruction that completely disregarded the interests of the other. The two superpowers established a joint commission in 1946 to produce an independent, unified Korea. Almost from the beginning, however, the commission had little chance of success.

From 1946 on, the United States and the Soviet Union seemed determined to establish client states in their zones that would share their respective ideological and political goals. By 1948 the United Nations (UN), with the active support of the United States, sanctioned elections in Korea that were to produce a free and independent state. Since the Soviets had already indicated that they would not allow such elections to be held in the north, this essentially meant the establishment up a separate government in the south. On 10 May 1948, elections in the south occurred. With all the leftists and most moderates already excluded from the political process, Syngman Rhee and the rightists claimed victory. Three months later, on 15 August, South Korea was formally established with Rhee as president.

The course of events in South Korea brought a prompt response from North Korea. On 9 September 1948 North Korea, led by Kim Il Sung, was proclaimed. On 12 December 1948 the UN recognized the ROK as the only lawfully constituted government on the Korean Peninsula.

South Korea faced a guerrilla insurgency beginning in the fall of 1948, which began with a major rebellion in its own security forces. On 19 October 1948, some 2,000 troops rebelled at the port city of Yosu under communist instigation. The South Korean government ended most of the unrest by late October, but the rebellion was followed by numerous small guerrilla actions designed to topple the Rhee government, although most of them had been ended by May 1950. In the meantime, tensions mounted as U.S. and Soviet troops turned over control of the peninsula to their Korean counterparts.

During 1949, border skirmishes between North and South Korea escalated. The presence of occupation forces had prevented a military confrontation between the two Koreas, but the Soviets had announced that their troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1948, and the United States had begun a quiet pullout, which it completed in June 1949. By now the lines of future conflict were essentially drawn.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched a well-planned, full-scale invasion of South Korea. Only the decision of President Harry S. Truman to commit U.S. troops to the Korean War under UN auspices saved South Korea from defeat. Truman and his advisors were convinced that the outbreak of war in Korea was orchestrated by Moscow. After three years of a bloody war of attrition, on 27 July 1953 the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed by North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and U.S. representatives. Rhee refused to sign. Although the communists had argued for the restoration of the 38th Parallel boundary, the military line became the armistice line, with a demilitarized zone created to extend 2 kilometers along each side of it.

The most important diplomatic action to come out of the war was the 1 October 1953 signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the United States. Rhee had desperately wanted this arrangement, which in fact was part of a larger promise for extensive military and economic assistance that Washington had already given to him in return for his acceptance—if not approval—of the armistice.

The Mutual Defense Treaty had tremendous implications for both South Korea and the United States. The two nations were now bound together as never before, and the United States was legally and publicly committed to the defense of South Korea. As part of that defense, significant numbers of American ground, air, and naval forces would be permanently stationed in South Korea. The U.S. military commitment also implied a major political and economic commitment to South Korea as well.

Since the mid-1980s, however, the international and regional context of South Korean–U.S. relations has undergone great and possibly fundamental changes, at a rate outpacing the ability of officials to deal with them. Domestic changes in South Korea, particularly rapid economic growth, political democratization, and generational change, have triggered a profound transformation in the relationship between the two countries. These changes have encouraged new stirrings of nationalism among Koreans. At the same time, the near-collapse of the North Korean economy and the progress of inter-Korean relations have also affected South Korean–U.S. relations. Many South Koreans no longer regard North Korea as a serious threat, and their perception of the United States, in particular the American military presence, has become jaded. As it has grown in economic wealth and worked toward military self-sufficiency, South Korea has chafed in its role as a junior partner of the United States and has been seeking greater independence within the alliance.

South Korea's fear of the military threat from North Korea has rapidly declined since early 1998, when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated and soon initiated the so-called sunshine policy of rapprochement with Pyongyang, producing a great debate in South Korean society over the U.S. military presence. The 36,500 U.S. troops guarding against another North Korean invasion have been increasingly perceived as a social irritant and a remnant of the now almost-forgotten Cold War. Recent standoffs between Washington and Pyongyang over North Korea's nuclear ambitions have also adversely affected the already-strained relations between Seoul and Washington. Seoul's sunshine policy to actively engage Pyongyang might well foreshadow the sunset of the South Korean–U.S. alliance. There remained a widespread and entirely natural longing in South Korea to end the threat from North Korea and to jettison the burdens that this entails.

In terms of domestic politics, from its inception the South Korean government was dominated by strong, autocratic rulers exercising virtually unchecked powers. Rhee became increasingly dictatorial and corrupt until a student-led revolt forced him to resign in April 1960. A year later his moderate successor, John M. Chang, was ousted by a military coup led by Major General Park Chung Hee, whose iron-fisted rule ended abruptly with his

Student demonstrators during a protest in Seoul on 23 June 1987. Demonstrators protesting throughout South Korea against the political and economic situation eventually brought to an end the regime of President Chun Doo Hwan. In October 1987 a new constitution provided for direct presidential elections. (Patrick Robert/Sygma/Corbis)

assassination in October 1979. Park's successor, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, went on to create another authoritarian regime. Under Park and Chun, South Korea experienced dramatic industrial development and became an economic powerhouse. But the discrepancy between economic prosperity and political backwardness created growing public discontent.

Near the end of Chun's regime, South Koreans demanded an end to military rule. The June Resistance of mid-1987 was a critical turning point for the South Korean government, as it sought to abolish authoritarianism and embrace a civil, democratic society and the rule of law. In the 1990s, under Presidents Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung, South Korea's burgeoning democracy threw off the last vestiges of military rule. But its once-famed economy, the world's eleventh-largest, collapsed in 1997 during the Asian financial crisis, forcing Seoul to seek a bailout loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Contrary to many predictions at the time, the recovery from the economic crisis came quickly and forcefully, once again producing a groundswell of national confidence.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Chang, John Myon; Kim Il Sung; Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of, Armed Forces; Korean War; Park Chung Hee; Rhee, Syngman

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Korea, Republic of, Armed Forces

The Republic of Korea's (ROK, South Korea) armed forces were formed by the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) immediately after World War II. Americans envisioned a national defense force, and the constabulary was seen as the basis of a military force, or national army. By April 1946, the constabulary force in southern Korea numbered just over 2,000 men, armed principally with World War II–era Japanese small arms. On 8 February 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) announced the establishment of the Korean People's Army (KPA), and in March the United States proclaimed its support for a 50,000-man South Korean constabulary.

On 8 April 1948, the U.S. Army ordered that a South Korean armed force be organized, equipped, and trained for internal defense and security. Fearful that the South Koreans might use the force to attack North Korea and embroil the United States in a war, Washington severely restricted the armament of the new army, depriving it of adequate antiaircraft, antitank, and artillery weaponry and denying it tanks altogether. On 5 December 1948, the South Korean government created the Ministry of National Defense as well as an army and navy. Simultaneously, all constabulary brigades were reclassified as army divisions. By March 1949, the South Korean security forces amounted to some 114,000 men, of which 65,000 were army, 4,000 coast guard, and 45,000 police. There was no air force. The South Korean Army had equipment for only 50,000 men, while approximately one-half of the police and coast guard were equipped with American carbines and side arms; the remainder used Japanese equipment of a similar type. On 1 July 1949, the United States organized the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) to train and advise the South Korean Army.

By June 1950, when the Korean War began, the South Korean Army had grown to 98,000 men, but its equipment from the United States was sufficient for only 65,000. There were eight infantry divisions—the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital. Only one, the Capital Division, was near full strength; the others were handicapped because equipment for six divisions had to be allotted to eight. As for the navy, the South Korean Coast Guard had 6,145 men with an assortment of approximately ninety vessels, ranging from Japanese minesweepers to picket boats, of which less than half were

operational. South Korea had practically no air force, because the United States was in no way committed to support one with advisors or materials. The air service numbered only 1,865 men, with fourteen aircraft that had been received in 1948 for liaison purposes only.

Thus, North Korea's armed forces were far superior in military strength when they invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. Even though the South Korean army was only slightly smaller than the aggressors, the fighting capacity of the two forces was incomparable. The halfhearted U.S. support for South Korean forces was revealed in the failure of the army to defend itself successfully against North Korean aggression.

Badly outgunned at the outset of the Korean War and battered repeatedly by enemy offensives throughout, the South Korean military emerged as a significant force by the end of the conflict in 1953. As a result, the South Korean military establishment had a powerful voice in Korean domestic politics from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, mainly as a legacy of the Korean War. Indeed, the war turned the military into the most powerful organization in South Korean society.

During 1965–1973, the South Korean government authorized the dispatch of more than 47,000 South Korean troops to Vietnam at the request of the U.S. government. Because there was an annual rotation of troops, the total number of individual South Korean soldiers sent to Vietnam amounted to approximately 312,000. This was far and away the largest contingent of foreign troops sent to Vietnam outside of American forces. The United States provided offset payments for the Koreans in Vietnam, who gained valuable combat experience and also became proficient in the use of advanced U.S. weaponry.

By the end of the Cold War, although North Korea's weaponry was quantitatively far greater, it was also qualitatively inferior to that of South Korea, which was far more modern. With a 520,000-man ground force, South Korea maintains 1,566 tanks, 1,550 armored vehicles, 4,200 field artillery pieces, and 12 surface-to-surface missiles. The air forces of both Koreas were comparatively equal in quantity and quality. North Korea has more fighters and bombers, but its equipment was much older than that of the South Korean Air Force. South Korea's 40,000-man air force had 385 fighters, 51 special aircraft, 37 transport aircraft, 400 helicopters, and 263 other aircraft. South Korean fighters consisted mostly of F-5s and F-4s. But South Korea also had a number of F-16s, which have proven to be far better performers than North Korea's MiG-29s.

The navies of both Koreas have distinctively different characteristics. The South Korean Navy, consisting of 35,000 men, was centered on 49 destroyers and frigates, while the main component of the North Korean Navy of 40,000 men was 25 patrol submarines.

At the end of the Cold War, South Korea's most vulnerable spot was Seoul, the South Korean capital of more than 13 million people, that lies only 28 miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) line along the 38th Parallel. It is within easy range of North Korea's artillery. Estimates held that North

Korea could rain 300,000–500,000 artillery rounds on Seoul in the first hours of a conflict, inflicting more than 1 million casualties.

JINWUNG KIM

See also

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Korean War; Vietnam War

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Korean War
(1950–1953)

The Korean War was a watershed conflict within the Cold War. The first shooting war of the Cold War, it was also the first limited war of the nuclear age. Korea was long the scene of confrontation among China, Japan, and Russia. Controlled by either China or Japan for most of its modern history, Korea was divided in half after World War II. Wartime agreements called for the United States to temporarily occupy southern Korea up to the 38th Parallel, while the Soviet Union did the same north of that line. The Cold War brought the permanent division of Korea into two states.

Efforts to establish a unified Korea failed, and in September 1947 the United States referred the issue to the United Nations (UN), which called for a unified Korean government and the withdrawal of occupation forces. In January 1948 Soviet authorities refused to permit a UN commission to oversee elections in northern Korea, but elections for an assembly proceeded in southern Korea that spring. By August 1948 the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) had officially formed with its capital at Seoul and was headed by seventy-year-old Syngman Rhee, a staunch conservative. Washington then terminated its military government and agreed to train South Korea's armed forces.

In September 1948 the communists formed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) with its capital at Pyongyang and led by veteran communist Kim Il Sung. Kim had fought the Japanese occupation and ended World War II as a major in the Soviet Army.

Both Korean governments claimed authority over the entire peninsula, but in December 1948 the UN General Assembly endorsed the ROK as the

KOREAN WAR, 1950 – 1953

only lawfully elected government. That same month the USSR announced that it had withdrawn its forces from North Korea. The United States withdrew all its troops from South Korea by June 1949.

Beginning in May 1948, sporadic fighting began along the 38th Parallel. Washington, fearful that the United States might be drawn into a civil war, purposely distanced itself from these clashes. President Harry S. Truman announced that fighting in Korea would not automatically lead to U.S. military intervention. In January 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Korea from the U.S. strategic Asian defensive perimeter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) agreed with this, as did U.S. Far Eastern commander General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Such pronouncements undoubtedly encouraged Kim to believe that the United States would not fight for Korea.

For many years North Korea, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintained that the Korean War began with a South Korean attack on North Korea. This was propaganda. Beginning in late 1949 North Korea prepared for full-scale war. Its Korean Peoples Army (KPA) was well armed with Soviet weapons, including such modern offensive arms as heavy artillery, T-34 tanks, trucks, automatic weapons, and about 180 new aircraft. The KPA numbered about 135,000 men in ten divisions.

South Korea's military situation was far different. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) lacked equipment and trained leaders because of Washington's unwillingness to fight in Korea and because the meager U.S. defense budget would not allow it. ROKA training was incomplete and lacked heavy artillery, tanks, and antitank weapons. South Korea had no air force apart from trainers and liaison aircraft. The South Korean military numbered 95,000 men in eight divisions, only four of which were at full strength.

Washington was aware of the North Korean military buildup but believed that the communist powers would not risk war. Limited war was still a foreign concept to U.S. planners. The U.S. military was also woefully unprepared and ill-equipped. The army numbered only nine divisions and 630,000 men.

Kim planned to use his military superiority to invade and quickly conquer South Korea. Twice he consulted Soviet leader Josef Stalin, promising him victory in a manner of weeks, assuring him that there would be a communist revolution in South Korea, and insisting that Washington would not intervene. Moscow and Beijing were actively preparing for the invasion as early as the spring of 1949, and Russian military advisors assisted in its planning. Stalin concluded that even if the United States decided to intervene, it would come too late.

Stalin pledged military assistance but not direct Soviet military involvement. He also insisted that Kim meet with PRC leader Mao Zedong and secure his assent to the plans. In late 1949, Mao released the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 164th and 166th Divisions of Korean volunteers who had fought against the Japanese and in the Chinese Civil War, providing North Korea with 30,000–40,000 seasoned troops.

On 25 June 1950, KPA forces invaded South Korea. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of North



Korean forces, a resolution that went unchallenged because of a Soviet UN boycott. On 27 June the Security Council asked UN member states to furnish assistance to the South Korea. President Harry S. Truman also extended U.S. air and naval operations to include North Korea and authorized U.S. Army troops to protect the port of Pusan. Upon General MacArthur's recommendation, President Truman committed U.S. Far Eastern ground forces to Korea on 30 June.

The invasion caught both MacArthur and Washington by surprise. Yet U.S. intervention was almost certain, given the Truman Doctrine, domestic political fallout from the communist victory in China in 1949, and the belief that success in Korea would embolden the communists elsewhere. During the three-year conflict, no war was ever formally declared; Truman labeled it a "police action."

At the time of the invasion the United States had four poorly trained and equipped divisions in Japan. By cannibalizing his 7th Infantry Division, MacArthur was able to dispatch the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division to Korea within two weeks. Meanwhile, Seoul fell on 28 June. Most of South Korea's equipment was lost when the bridges spanning the Han River were prematurely blown.

On 5 July the first American units battled the KPA at Osan, 50 miles south of Seoul. Expected to stop a KPA division, Task Force Smith consisted of only 540 men in two rifle companies and an artillery battery. The KPA, spearheaded by T-34 tanks, easily swept it aside.

At the request of the UN Security Council, the UN set up a military command in Korea. Washington insisted on a U.S. commander, and on 10 July Truman appointed MacArthur to head the UN Command (UNC). Seventeen nations contributed military assistance, and at peak strength UNC forces numbered about 400,000 South Korean troops, 250,000 U.S. troops, and 35,000 troops from other nations. Two British and Canadians units formed the 1st Commonwealth Division. Turkey provided a brigade, and there were troops from Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia, Ethiopia, France,

Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Other nations provided medical units.

U.S. forces were unprepared for the fighting. Difficult terrain, primitive logistics, poor communication, and refugees did as much to delay the North Korean offensive as did the defenders. In the chaotic atmosphere of the UNC retreat, both sides committed atrocities. The South Koreans executed some 2,000 political prisoners. U.S. and UNC troops shot a number of innocent civilians as the KPA infiltrated throngs of refugees and used them as human shields. North Korea committed far greater atrocities during its occupation of South Korea, however, slaying an estimated 26,000 political opponents. The KPA also executed American prisoners of war (POWs) in the fall of 1950.

By mid-July UNC troops had been pushed back into the so-called Pusan Perimeter, an area of 30–50 miles around the vital port of Pusan on the southeastern coast of Korea. Here U.S. and ROK forces bought valuable time and ultimately held. This success was attributable to UNC artillery, control of the skies, and Eighth Army (EUSAK, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea) commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker's brilliant mobile defense. The KPA also failed to employ its early manpower advantage to mount simultaneous attacks along the entire perimeter.

Even as the battle for the Pusan Perimeter raged, MacArthur was planning an amphibious assault behind enemy lines. Confident that he could hold Pusan, MacArthur deliberately weakened EUSAK to build up an invasion force. He selected Inchon as the invasion site. As Korea's second largest port and being only 15 miles from Seoul, Inchon was close to the KPA's main supply line south. Seizing it would cut off KPA troops to the south. MacArthur also knew that he could deal North Korea a major political blow if Seoul were promptly recaptured.

The Inchon landing was a risky venture, and few besides MacArthur favored it. Inchon posed the daunting problems of a thirty-two-foot tidal range that allowed only six hours in twenty-four for sea resupply, a narrow winding channel, and high seawalls. On 15 September, Major General Edward Almond's X Corps of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division commenced the invasion. Supported by naval gunfire and air attacks, the Marines secured Inchon with relatively few casualties. UNC forces reentered Seoul on 24 September.

At the same time, EUSAK broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and drove north, linking up with X Corps on 26 September. Only one-quarter to one-third of the KPA escaped north of the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang ignored MacArthur's call for surrender, and on 1 October South Korean troops crossed into North Korea. On 7 October the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, and two days later MacArthur ordered U.S. forces across the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang fell on 19 October as stunned KPA forces fled north.

MacArthur then divided his forces for the drive to the Yalu River. He ordered X Corps transported by sea around the Korean Peninsula to the east coast port of Wonsan. Almond would then clear northeastern Korea. EUSAK

would remain on the west coast and drive into northwest Korea. The two commands would be separated by a gap of between 20 and 50 miles. MacArthur believed, falsely as it turned out, that the north-south Taebaek Mountain range would obviate large-scale communist operations there. The Eighth Army crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju, and by 1 November elements of the 24th Division were only 18 miles from the Yalu. Several days earlier a South Korean unit reached the Yalu, the only UNC unit to get there.

China now entered the war—unofficially. Alarmed over possible U.S. bases adjacent to Manchuria, Mao had issued warnings about potential Chinese military intervention. He believed that the United States would be unable to counter the Chinese numerical advantage and viewed American troops as soft and unused to night fighting. On 2 October Mao informed Stalin that China would enter the war.

Stalin agreed to move Soviet MiG-15 fighters already in China to the Korean border. In this position they could cover the Chinese military buildup and prevent U.S. air attacks on Manchuria. Soviet pilots began flying missions against UNC forces on 1 November and bore the brunt of the communists' air war. Stalin also ordered other Soviet air units to deploy to China, train Chinese pilots, and then turn over aircraft to them.

Although Russian and Chinese sources disagree on what the Soviet leader promised Mao, Stalin clearly had no intention of using his air units for anything other than defensive purposes. China later claimed that Stalin had promised complete air support for their ground forces, but this never materialized.

U.S. Air Force North American F-86 Sabre jet fighters at a South Korean air base in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) June 1951. (National Archives and Records Administration)

On 25 October Chinese troops entered the fighting in northwestern Korea, and Walker wisely brought the bulk of EUSAK back behind the Chongchon River. Positions then stabilized, and the Chinese offensive slackened. The Chinese also attacked in northeastern Korea before halting operations and breaking contact. On 8 November the first jet battle in history occurred when an American F-80 shot down a MiG-15 over Sinanju.

The initial Chinese incursion ended on 7 November. In a meeting with President Truman at Wake Island on 15 October, General MacArthur had assured the president that the war was all but won but that if the Chinese were to intervene, their forces would be slaughtered. UNC airpower, he believed, would nullify any Chinese threat. Yet from 1 November 1950 to October 1951, MiGs so dominated the Yalu River area that U.S. B-29 bombers had to cease daylight operations.

The initial Chinese intervention had consisted of eighteen volunteer divisions. In early November they moved an additional twelve divisions into Korea, totaling some 300,000 men. MacArthur responded by ordering the air force to destroy the bridges over the Yalu. Washington revoked the order, but MacArthur complained that this

threatened his command. Washington gave in. On 8 November, 79 B-29s and 300 fighter-bombers struck bridges and towns on either side of the Yalu. The bombing had little effect. At the time most of the Chinese were in North Korea, and the Yalu was soon frozen.

Meanwhile, Washington debated how to proceed. The political leadership and the JCS under the chairmanship of General Omar Bradley believed that Europe was the top priority. Washington decided that while Manchuria would remain off-limits, MacArthur could take other military steps that he deemed advisable, including resumption of the offensive. The Democrats were reluctant to show weakness in Korea, and the Republicans had gained seats in the November 1950 congressional elections.

While much was being made in the United States about the prohibitions of strikes on Manchuria, the communist side also exercised restraint. With the exception of a few ancient biplanes that sometimes bombed UNC positions at night, communist airpower was restricted to north of Pyongyang. No effort was made to strike Pusan, and UNC convoys traveled without fear of air attack. Nor did communist forces attempt to disrupt Allied sea communications.

MacArthur had made X Corps dependent logistically on EUSAK instead of Japan, and Walker insisted on delaying resumption of the offensive until he could build up supplies. Weather also played a factor, with temperatures already below zero. Finally, Walker agreed to resume the offensive on 24 November. To the east, X Corps was widely dispersed.

MacArthur seemed oblivious to any problems, seeing the advance as an occupation rather than an offensive. It went well on the first day, but on the night of 25–26 November the Chinese attacked the Eighth Army in force. The Americans held, but on 26 December the South Korean II Corps disintegrated, exposing EUSAK's right flank. The Chinese poured eighteen divisions into the gap, endangering the whole Eighth Army. In a brilliant delaying action at Kunu-ri, the U.S. 2nd Division bought time for the other EUSAK divisions to recross the Chongchon. MacArthur now ordered a retirement just below the 38th Parallel to protect Seoul.

Washington directed MacArthur to pull X Corps out of northeastern Korea to prevent it from being flanked. Under heavy Chinese attack, X Corps withdrew to the east coast for seaborne evacuation along with the South Korean I Corps. The retreat of the 1st Marine Division and some army elements from the Chanjin Reservoir to the coast was one of the most masterly withdrawals in military history. X Corps was redeployed to Pusan by sea. On 10 December, Wonsan was evacuated. At Hungnam through 24 December, 105,000 officers and men were taken off along with about 91,000 Korean refugees who did not want to remain in North Korea.

The Korean War had entered a new phase: in effect, the UNC was now fighting China. MacArthur refused to accept a limited war and publicized his views to his supporters in the United States, making reference to "inhibitions" placed on his conduct of the war. UNC morale plummeted, especially with General Walker's death in a jeep accident on 22 December. Not until Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway arrived to replace Walker did the situation improve. In the United States, Truman found himself under heavy

pressure from Republicans to pursue the war vigorously. But the administration reduced its goal in Korea to restoring the status quo ante bellum.

UNC forces again had to retreat when the Chinese launched a New Year's offensive, retaking Seoul on 4 January. But the Chinese outran their supply lines, and Ridgway took the offensive. His methodical, limited advance was designed to inflict maximum punishment rather than to secure territory. Nonetheless, by the end of March UNC forces recaptured Seoul, and by the end of April they were again north of the 38th Parallel.

On 11 April 1951 President Truman relieved MacArthur of command, appointing Ridgway in his stead. Lieutenant General James Van Fleet took over EUSAK. Although widely unpopular at the time, MacArthur's removal was fully supported by the JCS, as MacArthur had publicly expressed his disdain of limited war. He returned home to a hero's welcome, but much to his dismay, political support for him promptly faded.

On 22 April the Chinese counterattacked in Korea. Rather than expend his troops in a defensive stand, Van Fleet ordered a methodical withdrawal with maximum artillery and air strikes against communist forces. The Chinese pushed the UNC south of the 38th Parallel, but the offensive was halted by 19 May.

In August armistice talks broke down, and later that month the Battle of Bloody Ridge began, developing into the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge that lasted until mid-October.

UNC forces then counterpunched, and by the end of May the front stabilized just above the 38th Parallel. The JCS generally limited EUSAK to that line, allowing only small local advances to gain more favorable terrain.

The war was now stalemated, and a diplomatic settlement seemed expedient. On 23 June 1951 Soviet UN representative Jacob Malik proposed a cease-fire. With the Chinese expressing interest, Truman authorized Ridgway to negotiate. Meetings began on 10 July at Kaesong, although hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed.

UNC operations from this point were essentially designed to minimize friendly casualties. Each side had built deep defensive lines that would be costly to break through. In August armistice talks broke down, and later that month the Battle of Bloody Ridge began, developing into the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge that lasted until mid-October. In late October negotiations resumed, this time at Panmunjom, although the fighting continued. Half of the war's casualties occurred during the period of armistice negotiations.

On 12 November 1951 Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to cease offensive operations. Fighting now devolved into raids, local attacks, patrols, and artillery fire. In February 1953 Van Fleet was succeeded as EUSAK commander by Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor. Meanwhile, UNC air operations intensified to choke off communist supply lines and reduce the likelihood of communist offensives.

In November 1952 General Dwight Eisenhower was elected president of the United States on a mandate to end the war. With U.S. casualties running 2,500 a month, the war had become a political liability. Eisenhower instructed the JCS to draw up plans to end the war militarily including the possible use of nuclear weapons, which was made known to the communist side. More important in ending the conflict, however, was Stalin's death on 5 March 1953. As the armistice negotiations entered their final phase in May,

the Chinese stepped up military action, initiating attacks in June and July to remove bulges in the line. UNC forces gave up some ground but inflicted heavy casualties.

The chief stumbling block to peace was the repatriation of POWs. The North Koreans had forced into their army many South Korean soldiers and civilians, and thousands of them had subsequently been captured by the UNC. If all KPA prisoners were repatriated, many South Koreans would be sent to North Korea. Also, many Chinese POWs sought refuge on Taiwan (Formosa) instead of returning to the PRC. Truman was determined that no prisoner be repatriated against his will. This stance prolonged the war, but some U.S. officials saw a moral and propaganda victory in the Chinese and North Korean defections. The communist side rejected the UNC position out of hand.

Following intense UNC air strikes on North Korean hydroelectric facilities and the capital of Pyongyang, the communists accepted a face-saving formula whereby a neutral commission would deal with prisoner repatriation. On 27 July an armistice was signed at Panmunjom, and the guns finally fell silent.

Anticommunist North Koreans wave Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) flags as they arrive in Seoul after being released from prisoner of war (POW) camps. The issue of repatriation complicated the armistice negotiations, as many North Korean POWs desired to remain in South Korea. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Of 132,000 North Korean and Chinese military POWs, fewer than 90,000 chose to return home. Twenty-two Americans held by the communists also elected not to return home. Of 10,218 Americans captured by the communists, only 3,746 returned. The remainder were murdered or died in captivity. American losses were 142,091, of whom 33,686 were killed in action. South Korea sustained 300,000 casualties, of whom 70,000 were killed in action. Other UNC casualties came to 17,260, of whom 3,194 were killed in action. North Korean casualties are estimated at 523,400 and Chinese losses at more than a million. Perhaps 3 million Korean civilians also died during the war.

The war devastated Korea and hardened the divisions between North and South. It was also a sobering experience for the United States. After the war, the U.S. military establishment remained strong. For America, the Korean War institutionalized the Cold War national security state. It also accelerated the racial integration of the armed forces, which in turn encouraged a much wider U.S. civil rights movement.

China gained greatly from the war in that it came to be regarded as the preponderant military power in Asia. This is ironic, because the Chinese Army in Korea was in many respects a primitive and inefficient force. Nonetheless, throughout the following decades exaggeration of Chinese military strength was woven into the fabric of American foreign policy, influencing subsequent U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The Korean War effectively militarized the containment policy. Before the war, Marshall Plan aid had been almost entirely nonmilitary. U.S. aid now

shifted heavily toward military rearmament. The war also marked a sustained militarization of American foreign policy, with the Vietnam War a logical consequence.

Additionally, the Korean War solidified the role of the United States as the world's policeman and strengthened the country's relationship with its West European allies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The war facilitated the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). It also impacted Japan and was a major factor fueling that nation's economy.

Militarily, the war was interesting for the extensive use of helicopters and jet aircraft. The conflict was also a reminder that airpower alone cannot win wars, and it revealed the importance of command of the sea.

No formal peace has ever been concluded in Korea. Technically, the two Koreas remain at war, and the 38th Parallel remains one of the Cold War's lone outposts.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Containment Policy; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kim Il Sung; Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; MacArthur, Douglas; Malik, Jacob Aleksandrovich; Mao Zedong; Rhee, Syngman; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Stalin, Josef; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine

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Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich
(1906–1966)

Founder and director of the Soviet space program. Sergei Korolev was born in Zhitomir, Ukraine, on 30 December 1906. His parents divorced when he was young, and his mother then married an electrical engineer who encouraged his stepson's interest in mathematics. At age eleven, Korolev moved with his family to Odessa.

In 1924 Korolev enrolled at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute in its aviation branch. He also became a glider enthusiast. In 1926 he transferred to the

Bauman High Technical School in Moscow, the top engineering college in the Soviet Union. In 1928 he designed a glider, which he flew in a competition. Graduating in 1929, he joined the Central Aero and Hydraulic Institute, working under the brilliant Soviet aircraft designer Andrei Tupolev. The next year Korolev became interested in the development of liquid-fuel rocket engines. In July 1932 he was appointed head of its Jet Propulsion Group, which the next year became the Jet Propulsion Research Institute with Korolev as its deputy chief. He headed research into cruise missiles and a manned rocket-powered glider.

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's Great Purges of the late 1930s included many scientists among the innocent victims, and in June 1938 Korolev was arrested and accused of subversion, apparently because he advocated development of liquid-fuel over solid-fuel systems. Sentenced to ten years in prison, he was sent to the Siberian gulag. He nearly died in the brutal conditions there, but in March 1940 he was returned to Moscow and was placed in Butyrskaya Prison. That September he was transferred to a *sharashka*, in effect a slave-labor camp for those held to be useful to the state. This *sharashka* was an aviation design bureau prison. There he worked with other aviation engineers, including Tupolev. Released in July 1944 on parole, in September 1945 Korolev traveled to Germany to study and evaluate that nation's V-2 rocket program. The next year he was appointed head of a new agency charged with developing long-range ballistic missiles based on the German World War II advances. In this research the Soviets utilized some 5,000 captive Germans who had worked on the wartime V-1 and V-2 programs.

Over the next two decades, Korolev—the Soviet counterpart to Wernher von Braun in the United States—headed the Soviet development of ballistic missiles, satellite launch vehicles, satellites, manned spacecraft, and interplanetary probes. Korolev's R-1 missile doubled the range of the German V-2 and was the first ballistic missile to have a separate warhead. His R-5, which flew successfully in 1953, had a range of 720 miles. The R-7 of 1957, with a range of 4,200 miles, was the first true intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In 1952 he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), although he was not completely rehabilitated politically until 1957.

Korolev was especially interested in the space program and proposed the R-7 rocket to lift satellites into orbit. Aware of the U.S. space program through press reports, he secured the support of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, against the opposition of military and other political leaders, for the attempt by the USSR to be the first nation to launch an object into space orbit. Korolev achieved this feat in October 1957 with *Sputnik I*. Beginning the next year, he planned a manned mission, achieved with the *Vostok* spacecraft in April 1961.

Korolev advocated a Soviet effort to land a spacecraft on the moon, and for this his team designed the immense N1 rocket and the *Soyuz* spacecraft as well as *Luna* vehicles to land on Mars. He also sought to send unmanned missions to Mars and Venus. He did not live to see his plans come to fruition. Korolev had already suffered a heart attack in 1960. His weakened heart contributed to his death on 14 January 1966, following a botched routine surgical

procedure. Korolev's pivotal role in the Soviet space program was kept secret from the Soviet people and the world and was not widely known until well after his death.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Braun, Wernher von; Soviet Union; Space Race

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Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich
(1904–1980)

Soviet premier. Born in St. Petersburg on 21 February 1904, Alexei Kosygin served in the Red Army during 1919–1921. He graduated from the Leningrad Cooperative Technicum in 1924 and from the Leningrad Textile Institute in 1935, after having joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1927. After directing a textile mill and becoming active in the Leningrad party apparatus, Kosygin began a rapid ascent in the CPSU, facilitated by the removal of many members during the Great Purges of the 1930s.

In 1939, Kosygin was named to head the Soviet textile industry and became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1940 he assumed the post of deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers after 1946), a post he held until 1953. He became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1946 and a full member in 1948. His ties to Andrei Zhdanov, who was purged in 1948, resulted in his demotion to candidate status in the Politburo (now Presidium) in 1952.

Following Premier Josef Stalin's death in 1953, Kosygin's fortunes fluctuated wildly as Stalin's successors struggled for power. Expelled from the Presidium, he was removed from and then regained numerous posts because of his opposition to Georgy Malenkov, who lost the premiership in 1955 but remained a powerful figure in the Presidium. Malenkov's failed attempt to remove First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in July 1957 cost him his seats in the Presidium and Central Committee. In the aftermath, Kosygin was returned to candidacy status in the Presidium and was restored as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1960 he was elected a full member of the Presidium.

Kosygin's disagreements with Khrushchev over economic policies led him to join the faction that ousted Khrushchev from power in October 1964. In the resulting reapportionment of power, Kosygin became chairman of the Council of Ministers (premier) in the new government. As premier, his most significant achievements were in domestic economic affairs. He sponsored the so-called Kosygin Reforms in 1965, which provided individual enterprises

with increased autonomy from party control. They also further centralized control of the economy through the elimination of regional economic councils. Although never fully implemented, the reforms did improve the efficiency of economic planning.

Initially viewed as equal to First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the collective leadership, Kosygin's power was in decline by 1968. The Prague Spring crisis lessened Politburo interest in economic reform, and Brezhnev soon assumed control over foreign affairs. By the early 1970s, Kosygin was in a subordinate position to Brezhnev. Declining health led to Kosygin's retirement in October 1980. He died in Moscow on 18 December 1980.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Khrushchev, Nikita; Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich; Prague Spring; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

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Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin was premier of the Soviet Union during 1964–1980. His most important achievements came in domestic affairs, chiefly economic reforms. (Library of Congress)

Kovács, Béla
(1908–1959)

Hungarian politician, head of the Smallholders' Party, and briefly deputy prime minister in November 1956. Born on 20 April 1908 in Patacs, Hungary, Béla Kovács attended only elementary school and then worked on the family farm. In 1933 he joined the Smallholders' Party and became county general secretary. In 1939 he was chosen as the assistant general secretary of the party, and in 1941 he became head of the Hungarian Peasant Association.

On 15 November 1945, as leader of the Smallholders' Party, the largest Hungarian political party, Kovács was appointed minister of agriculture in the Ferenc Nagy government. In February 1946 Kovács resigned to dedicate more time to the Smallholders' Party, of which he was now leader. Fearing the strength of this party and Kovács's influence, Soviet authorities arrested him on 25 February 1947 and charged him with plotting against the Soviet occupational forces. Without benefit of trial, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in Siberia.

In the autumn of 1955 Kovács was moved to Hungary, but he was not released until the spring of 1956. In the brief reform government of Imre Nagy, Kovács served as minister of agriculture and deputy prime minister (2–4 November 1956). On 3 November 1956, he was elected chairman of the reorganized Smallholders' Party. In 1958 he won a seat in parliament. Within weeks of his election, however, he became seriously ill and was never seated in parliament. Kovács died on 21 June 1959 in Pécs.

ANNA BOROS-MCGEE

See also

Europe, Eastern; Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Nagy, Ferenc; Nagy, Imre; Rákosi, Mátyás; Tildy, Zoltán

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Kreisky, Bruno
(1911–1990)

Diplomat, chancellor of Austria, and notable champion of détente and nuclear disarmament. Born on 22 January 1911 into a well-to-do Jewish industrialist family in Vienna, Bruno Kreisky joined the Revolutionary Socialist Youth Movement in his high school years and in the mid-1930s was jailed by Austrian fascists for his political beliefs. On the day after Nazi Germany annexed Austria (the *Anschluss*), he graduated from the University of Vienna Law School and fled to Sweden for the duration of World War II. After the war, Chancellor Karl Renner drafted Kreisky into the Austrian foreign service. He was first posted to Scandinavia.

In 1953 Kreisky became secretary of state in the Foreign Ministry and was instrumental in negotiating the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. From 1959 to 1966 he served as Austria's foreign minister and made Vienna a premier East-West meeting ground, operating behind the scenes during the summit of June 1961 between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Elected chairman of the Socialist Party in 1966, Kreisky drove it to electoral victory in 1970 and would become Austria's longest-serving chancellor (1970–1983).

As chancellor, Kreisky continued to press for his East-West bridge-building vision of a Cold War détente. He was instrumental in the Helsinki Process and the Helsinki Meeting of 1975, and he also presided over the meeting in Vienna in 1979 between Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Jimmy Carter. As the longtime chairman of the Socialist International, Kreisky was an early visionary in advocating a Middle Eastern policy of a negotiated peace between Israel and the Palestinians. He was one of the

first leaders to recognize Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and was often critical of hard-line Israeli governments. Along with the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG, West Germany) Willy Brandt and Sweden's Olof Palme, Kreisky also championed the North-South dialogue. These three socialist so-called Wise Men of Europe were dominant forces in European politics for much of the 1970s. Kreisky sharply disapproved of U.S. President Ronald Reagan's reignition of the Cold War in the early 1980s yet lived to see the end of it before his death in Vienna on 27 July 1990.

Günter Bischof

See also

Austria; Austrian State Treaty; Brandt, Willy; Détente; Helsinki Final Act; Palestine Liberation Organization; Palme, Olof; Vienna Conference

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Krenz, Egon
(1937–)

Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) during 1989. Born in present-day Kolberg, Poland, on 19 March 1937, Egon Krenz joined the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of East Germany in 1955 and progressed slowly through its ranks. Throughout most of his career, he scrupulously followed the party line.

Krenz became a member of the Politburo in 1983. When public protests forced Erich Honecker to resign on 18 October 1989, Krenz, a virtual unknown at that point, was drafted as his replacement. The hope was that Krenz could promulgate reform while maintaining the political stability and leadership of the SED. One of his first reforms went awry, however, when an easing of travel restrictions mistakenly announced by one of his ministers on television on 9 November 1989 led to the opening of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the SED regime. Krenz resigned on 7 December 1989.

Krenz joined the successor party of the SED, the reformed communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), but his unrepentant attitude led the PDS to strip him of membership in 1990. In 1997, Krenz was tried on charges of electoral fraud and complicity in the deaths of almost one hundred persons who died trying to get across the Berlin Wall. Convicted, he was sentenced to six and a half years in prison. He maintained that events that had taken place in East Germany were not covered by either the West German or the new German code of law since East Germany had been a sovereign

state. He also argued that both he and East Germany were not ultimately responsible, as the superpowers had "dictated actions on both sides." His appeal was rejected in 1999, however, and he entered prison. Released in 2003, Krenz retired to Dierhagen, Mecklenburg.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic; Honecker, Erich

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Kubitschek, Juscelino
(1902–1976)

President of Brazil (1956–1961). Born 12 September 1902 in Diamantina, Minas Gerais, Juscelino Kubitschek moved to Belo Horizonte in 1921 and graduated from Belo Horizonte University with a medical degree, becoming a physician in 1927.

Kubitschek began his political career in 1934 when he was elected to the Brazilian House of Representatives. He subsequently became the chief of staff of the Minas Gerais government. In 1937 Brazilian President Getulio Vargas dissolved the House of Representatives, cutting short Kubitschek's political career. He then returned to his medical practice. In 1940 he was appointed mayor of Belo Horizonte before again being elected to the House of Representatives in 1945. In 1950 he became governor of Minas Gerais.

Standing for the Social Democratic Party, which he had helped form in 1945, Kubitschek ran for the presidency on the platform of "fifty years of progress in five," the centerpiece of which would be the construction of a magnificent new capital at Brasilia. In the 1955 presidential elections, he won a comfortable victory, assuming office on 31 January 1956.

Kubitschek believed that he needed U.S. financial support if he were to achieve his aims, as only U.S. aid could supply the levels of investment and materials needed to drive his economic reforms. Toward that end, he attempted to forge closer ties with the President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration. In hopes of encouraging the United States to commit substantial monetary aid to the region akin to the Marshall Plan, Kubitschek unveiled a plan that he dubbed Operation PAN-AMERICA. However, the Eisenhower administration was unwilling to agree to any proposal that would require large commitments of foreign aid to Latin America. Kubitschek tried to use the negative fallout from Vice President Richard M. Nixon's visit to Latin America in 1958 as leverage to wrest more foreign aid from Washing-

ton but was unsuccessful. In spite of these setbacks, Kubitschek did manage to forge better U.S.-Brazilian relations during his tenure in office.

In 1957 Kubitschek signed into law the relocation of the Brazilian capital to the new city of Brasilia, which consumed much of the government's financial resources. This coupled with a sharp drop in coffee prices led to serious inflationary pressures. Soon thereafter, Kubitschek was forced to adopt more austere economic policies.

Kubitschek left office in January 1961. He had intended to run for president again in 1965, but in 1964 the military regime then in power suspended his political rights. After a three-year exile, he returned to Brazil in 1967 and entered the business world. Kubitschek died in a car crash near the city of Resende on 22 August 1976.

Bevan Sewell

See also

Brazil; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Nixon, Richard Milhous

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Kurile Islands

Archipelago of thirty large and small islands, the sovereignty of which has long been contested by the Russians and Japanese. The Kurile Islands are located between the Japanese territory of Hokkaido and the Russian territory of Kamchatka. Between the Kurile Islands and Hokkaido are islands the Japanese call the Northern Territories (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and Habomai Islands). In the eighteenth century both the Russians and Japanese laid claim to the Kuriles. In 1875, Japan gave up Sakhalin Island. In return, Russia agreed to withdraw from the Kuriles. The Japanese controlled the islands until the end of World War II.

The Soviets entered the war against Japan on 9 August 1945. One of Soviet leader Josef Stalin's key objectives upon entering the war against Japan was to control the Kuriles, which blocked Soviet exits to the open sea. Soviet control of the Kuriles had, in fact, already been arranged at the February 1945 Yalta Conference. There the Allied leaders had approved a plan in which South Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands were to go the Soviet Union. It was codified by the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty that Japan abandon the islands, but the exact terms of the transfer of the islands were not prescribed in the treaty.

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru argued at the San Francisco Conference that the Northern Territories were Japanese lands and were not to be part of the larger agreement concerning the Kuriles. The Soviets refused

to sign the treaty. The United States supported the Japanese position in September 1956, and a formal diplomatic memorandum stating as such was sent to the Soviet Union in May 1957.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō wished to normalize relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in order to settle the territorial problems and to liberate Japanese who were still being detained by the Soviet Union from World War II. Hatoyama visited Moscow, discussed the issues with Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin, and concluded the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration in October 1956. Japan won the release of all the detainees, but the territorial dispute persisted.

Deployment of Soviet forces in the Northern Territories and Kurile Islands waxed and waned over time, but their numbers increased dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s. The island of Hokkaido remained the main focus of Japanese defensive preparations throughout the Cold War in spite of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in 1956. The sovereignty issue concerning the Kuriles continues and is still an obstacle in Russo-Japanese relations, even well after the end of the Cold War.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. and Nakayama Takashi

See also

Japan; San Francisco Peace Treaty

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Kuwait

Monarchy in the Middle East. Kuwait, with a 1945 population of some 100,000 people, occupies 6,880 square miles, including the Kuwaiti share of the Neutral Zone defined by agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1922 and partitioned by mutual agreement in 1966. Kuwait is thus about the size of the U.S. state of Hawaii.

The oil-rich nation of Kuwait is strategically located at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the south, Iraq to the west and north, and the Persian Gulf to the east. The topography is flat, low desert, and the climate is very hot and dry. Over 95 percent of the Kuwait people live in urban areas, mostly along the coast. The nation's major natural resources are oil and natural gas, comprising an estimated 10 percent of the world's known reserves. There is a minor fishing industry, but oil sales make up half of Kuwait's gross domestic product (GDP) and provide 80 percent of the government's yearly revenues. The large oil reserves have sustained a relatively high per capita GDP annually and allow for extensive social services for Kuwaiti citizens.

Oil and geographic location have made Kuwait a crucial strategic state far beyond what might be expected of a country its size and population. Kuwait has been a key to British imperial interests in the Middle East, a major player in regional affairs, a staunch Cold War ally of the United States, the focus of the 1990 Persian Gulf War, and an important staging area for subsequent American-led operations in Iraq.

In contrast to its current prominence, Kuwait was a remote part of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, largely left to manage its own affairs. This earlier insignificance is manifest in the fact that the Utub tribes that settled in the area early in the eighteenth century called their central town Kuwait, the Arabic diminutive for *kut,* meaning a fortress built near water. By midcentury the Utub's al-Sabah tribe, whose descendants still rule Kuwait to this day, had emerged as the most prominent in the area. The al-Sabah focused on developing the local pearl beds and taking advantage of location to promote regional trade.

Recognizing the fact that any increase in the wealth of Kuwait and the al-Sabah family would attract Ottoman attention and invite closer imperial control and higher taxation, Sheik Mubarak al-Sabah sought the protection of Britain, the major European power in the region. The result was an 1897 agreement in which Kuwait ceded control over its foreign affairs and defense to the British. In return, Kuwait agreed to eschew alliances with other powers and promised not to cede any concessions—economic or military—to any other nations. Kuwait thus became a British protectorate. This situation remained fairly static until Britain reduced its imperial commitments after World War II. Kuwait became fully independent in June 1961.

Kuwait then aligned itself with the West—the United States in particular—in regional and international affairs. The 1979 Iranian Revolution served to further strengthen this alliance, and Kuwait became a staunch supporter of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980. That support included nearly $35 billion in grants, loans, and other assistance to the Iraqis. After the war, which ended in 1988, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein demanded that Kuwait forgive its loans, reasoning that Iraq had been the bulwark in the Arab world against Iran and was thus owed monetary concessions. Iraq also accused the Kuwaitis of slant-drilling for oil into Iraqi fields and then claimed that Kuwait was a "lost" Iraqi province, the administrative boundaries of which dated back to the defunct Ottoman Empire.

Angry with Kuwait's refusal to forgive the Iraqi debt and convinced that the kingdom was keeping oil prices artificially low by pumping too much oil, Hussein launched an invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The international response, which was divided into two stages, was strong and swift. The U.S.-led Operation DESERT SHIELD saw a large-scale military buildup in Saudi Arabia. Then in January 1991, when Hussein steadfastly refused to withdraw from Kuwait, Operation DESERT STORM began, during which the United States led an international military coalition, including other Arab nations, to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The brief war ended on 27 February 1991, with Iraq compelled to recognize Kuwaiti independence.

There is a minor fishing industry, but oil sales make up half of Kuwait's gross domestic product (GDP) and provide 80 percent of the government's yearly revenues.

Kuwaiti troops ready for review by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The men were participating in an assembly of coalition forces before Operation DESERT STORM. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Thereafter, Kuwait remained a firm ally of the United States and allowed its territory to be used as a staging area for the U.S.-led effort to oust Hussein from power in spring 2003. In return the United States has been restrained in any criticism of Kuwaiti internal affairs. In May 2005, however, Kuwait's parliament granted full political rights to women. The United States maintains a significant military and naval presence in the region that protects the al-Sabah ruling family of Kuwait, which has had long experience in maintaining its position from the nineteenth century to the present.

DANIEL E. SPECTOR

See also

Hussein, Saddam; Iran-Iraq War; Iraq; Middle East; Persian Gulf War; Saudi Arabia

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L

Laird, Melvin
(1922–)

U.S. secretary of defense (1969–1973). Born in Omaha, Nebraska, on 1 September 1922, Melvin Laird was the son of a businessman with interests in state politics. Laird graduated from Carleton College in 1942 and served in the U.S. Navy during World War II.

Elected as a Republican U.S. congressman in 1952, Laird remained in the House until 1969, becoming one of his party's leading authorities on military affairs and national security. A strong advocate of strategic weapons systems, he feared that President Lyndon B. Johnson had imprudently diverted funds from these to finance both the Vietnam War and Great Society social programs.

In 1969 newly elected Republican President Richard M. Nixon appointed Laird secretary of defense. Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, intended to retain control of foreign affairs themselves and hoped that Laird's excellent congressional connections would defuse potential political criticism of their policies. Much to Laird's embarrassment, Nixon and Kissinger often left him publicly ignorant of their initiatives.

On Vietnam, Laird implemented Nixon's policies of gradual Vietnamization, replacing U.S. military forces there with Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) troops while maintaining American air support. Laird's instincts were nonetheless solidly hawkish. In 1970 and 1971 he defended U.S. military attacks on Laos and Cambodia intended to eliminate enemy sanctuaries in those states, arguing that such measures shortened the war and saved American lives. He also strongly criticized Democratic proposals to extend amnesty to young American draft evaders.

A hard-liner on military spending, Laird strongly supported the development of an American antiballistic missile (ABM) system on the grounds that the Soviets were doing likewise. When the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and



Melvin Laird was a longtime congressman and secretary of defense under President Richard Nixon. (Library of Congress)

the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I placing limits on Soviet and American ABMs were signed in 1972, Laird unsuccessfully urged that the Senate should only ratify them if it were prepared to increase military budgets for other weapons systems.

At the end of Nixon's first term, Laird resigned as secretary. In summer 1973 he briefly assisted Nixon in handling the burgeoning Watergate scandal, unavailingly calling for a speedy impeachment vote to resolve the crisis. In 1976 Laird was an advisor in Gerald R. Ford's unsuccessful presidential campaign and afterward resigned from active politics. In retirement Laird served on several corporate boards.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Kissinger, Henry; Missiles, Antiballistic; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Vietnam War; Watergate

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Landsbergis, Vytautas
(1932–)

Lithuanian politician, leader of the Lithuanian independence movement, and Lithuanian head of state (1991–1992, 1996–2000). Born into a family of intellectuals in Kaunas, Lithuania, on 18 October 1932, Vytautas Landsbergis studied music and then lectured at various music schools and institutions in Soviet-controlled Lithuania. He became a recognized expert in musicology and music history.

Although Landsbergis was never a dissident, he strongly resented Soviet rule in Lithuania, established during World War II. In 1988, he was a founding member and then chairman of the Lithuanian reform movement, Sąjūdis. The following year, Landsbergis was chosen as one of Lithuania's deputies to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, and in early 1990 he was elected to the Supreme Council (parliament) of Lithuania.

Initially, the Sąjūdis movement claimed to support Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reformist perestroika policies, but it soon became clear that most Lithuanians would settle for nothing less than full independence. On 11 March 1990, the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared full and unconditional independence. Landsbergis was then elected president of the Supreme

Council and in effect the head of state. Moscow responded by imposing an economic blockade on Lithuania, and on 13 January 1991 fourteen Lithuanians died during a Soviet crackdown on protesters in Vilnius.

Landsbergis had criticized Western leaders for supporting Gorbachev's policies while at the same time sidestepping Lithuania's rightful claim to independence. His ideological and uncompromising stand caused some irritation in the West, not to mention in Moscow, but in Lithuania it was supported and admired. After the abortive putsch against Gorbachev's regime in August 1991, Lithuania finally achieved unconditional independence.

Following his defeat in the 1992 parliamentary elections, Landsbergis became leader of the opposition. The following year, he was elected chairman of the Lithuanian Conservative Party. During 1996–2000, he was once again president of the Lithuanian parliament and head of state. Landsbergis withdrew from politics in 2002.

Gudni Jóhannesson

See also

Gorbachev, Mikhail; Lithuania; Perestroika

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Lansdale, Edward Geary

(1908–1987)

U.S. Air Force officer, intelligence operative, and purportedly the model for the leading character in Graham Greene's novel *The Quiet American*. Born in Detroit, Michigan, on 6 February 1908, Edward Lansdale graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1931 and was commissioned in the army through ROTC. During the Great Depression, he earned a living selling advertising in California. He went on active duty during World War II in the U.S. Army, serving with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and finishing his wartime service as a major with the U.S. Army Air Forces as chief of the Intelligence Division in the western Pacific. After the war he was stationed in the Philippines with the air force until 1948, when he became an instructor at the Air Force Strategic Intelligence School in Colorado.

In 1950, at the request of Filipino president Elpidio Quirino, Lansdale became a member of the U.S. Military Assistance Group, tasked with operations to suppress the communist Hukbalahap rebellion. In 1953 Washington dispatched Lansdale to join the U.S. mission in Vietnam as advisor on counterguerrilla operations. After a brief tour in the Philippines, he returned to Vietnam in 1954 to serve with the U.S. Military Advisory Group there.

During Lansdale's two years in southern Vietnam, he formed a close relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem, who would soon become president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Lansdale's Vietnam service included supervision of largely unsuccessful covert operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) as well as efforts to train the Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN). In 1955 he advised Ngo on methods to ensure victory in the October 1955 Vietnamese referendum.

After helping to solidify Ngo's rule, Lansdale returned to Washington in 1957 to serve in various military and Defense Department positions. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1960 and major general upon his retirement in 1963. From 1959 to 1961, he played a prominent role in training Cuban exiles for the disastrous April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Until his retirement in November 1963, he also worked with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its attempts to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

Lansdale's convoluted career included two years of service as a consultant to the Food for Peace Program. He returned to South Vietnam in 1965 as senior liaison officer of the U.S. Mission to the Republic of Vietnam and then became assistant to U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in 1967. Lansdale retired for good in 1968, wrote his memoirs, and died in McLean, Virginia, on 23 February 1987.

Daniel E. Spector

See also

Bay of Pigs; Hukbalahap; Ngo Dinh Diem; Office of Strategic Services; Philippines; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Laos

Southeast Asian nation located on the Indochinese Peninsula. Comprising 91,428 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of Pennsylvania, Laos is a landlocked nation bordering on Vietnam to the east, Cambodia to the south, Thailand to the west, and Burma and China to the north. It had a 1945 population of some 1.7 million people. During the Cold War, Laos was consumed by revolution and war. Landlocked by larger neighbors and the buffer between ancient empires, after World War II Laos found itself at the intersection of French colonialism, Indochinese nationalism, communist expansionism, and U.S. containment policies.

Communist Pathet Lao troops during a military exercise in Laos, 1959. (Library of Congress)

Once an ancient Thai kingdom, in 1893 Laos was incorporated into French Indochina. Lao nationalism developed rapidly upon Japan's conquest of Indochina during World War II. Lao King Sisavangvong proclaimed Lao independence in March 1945. But with Japan's defeat shortly thereafter, he renounced the declaration and instead endorsed a French protectorate. His prime minister, Prince Phetsarath, did not agree with this decision and in September 1945 proclaimed Lao independence. The king dismissed him, and Phetsarath joined the dissident Lao Issara (Free Lao) movement.

The Lao Issara was intertwined with the communist-led Viet Minh in neighboring Vietnam. Many Lao nationalists, such as Prince Souvannaphong, were linked to Vietnam by ethnicity or marriage. In March 1946 Lao and Vietnamese guerrillas fought together against French rule. The French prevailed, and the Lao Issara fled in disarray to Thailand. Laos was then reabsorbed into French Indochina. Badly weakened by World War II and conflict with the Viet Minh that included the latter's invasion of Laos, in 1953 France granted the Royal Lao Government (RLG) nominal independence. The independence of Laos was confirmed in the July 1954 Geneva Accords.

The United States began economic and social programs to develop Laos. However, aid created a dependency on the United States that eventually spawned considerable resentment. Prince Souvannaphong and others joined the communist Pathet Lao (Country of Lao), which opposed Western imperialism, including aid from the West. Fearing a civil war, a neutralist solution emerged in the mid-1950s, centered on Prince Souvanna Phouma. Intelligent and mild-mannered, Souvanna was well respected by most Lao.

However, U.S. officials saw him as a communist dupe. Souvanna believed that Laos could survive the Cold War only through neutrality. He also tried to bridge divisions by building coalition governments. In 1956 Souvannaphong and other leftists representing the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX, Lao Patriotic Front) joined Souvanna's coalition.

The success of the NLHX in the 1958 elections alarmed the Americans, leading to the withdrawal of U.S. aid. This action destabilized Souvanna's government and gave rise to Phoui Sananikhone, a pro-American rightist. He became prime minister in August 1958 and brought members of the Royal Lao Army (RLA) into government, notably Colonel Phoumi Nosavan. Phoumi led the RLA against North Vietnamese forces using Lao territory for the Ho Chi Minh Trail into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). When Phoui challenged this, Phoumi took control of the government in a December 1959 coup.

Phoumi was related to Thai strongman Sarit Thanarat and developed links through him to the U.S. military in Thailand. This alienated some Lao, even within the RLA, who resented foreign domination. In August 1960, RLA soldiers led by Captain Kong Le launched a coup of their own to restore Souvanna's neutralist government. Humiliated, Phoumi withdrew to secret bases in northern Thailand. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's administration decided to reestablish aid programs to Souvanna and restrain Phoumi, but Thailand refused to lift its blockades of the Lao border. Souvanna appealed to the Soviet Union, which airlifted supplies to Vientiane. In December 1960, Phoumi's forces drove Souvanna out of Vientiane. Kong Le's men retreated to the Vietnamese border, where they linked up with the Pathet Lao. Phoumi installed yet another government under Prince Boun Oum.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) now feared that Phoumi would shut down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and allow American air bases in Laos. American strategy was to deny communist access through Laos to insurgencies in South Vietnam and northern Thailand, and Laos thus became an important litmus test of America's anticommunist resolve. Washington backed Phoumi and increased aid to Thailand, which became the base for many operations throughout Indochina.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy's administration continued these policies but by 1962 decided to abandon the volatile Phoumi. Instead, Kennedy reluctantly put his faith in Souvanna. After months of negotiations, in June 1963 an international agreement was reached barring foreign military advisors and establishing a neutralist, coalition government in Laos. Souvanna returned as prime minister, with both Souvannaphong and Phoumi serving in his cabinet.

The agreement did not last. North Vietnamese soldiers remained in eastern Laos, while American and Thai operations continued in other parts of the country. Infighting paralyzed the Lao government with assassinations and ceaseless power struggles. Finally, Souvanna abandoned neutralism, convinced that Hanoi controlled the Pathet Lao. In December 1964 he authorized U.S. military operations against communists in the country, drawing Laos ever closer to the war next door in Vietnam.

In Operation BARREL ROLL, the United States routinely bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos, and by 1968 there were between 200 and 300 U.S. air strikes in the country daily. Laos soon became the most heavily bombed country in the history of warfare. As a result, untold thousands of Lao people were killed, with ethnic minorities, comprising 50 percent of the population, caught in the middle. Many minority Hmong, Yao, Akha, and other peoples became refugees. Some joined anticommunist irregular forces under the command of Hmong RLA officer Vang Pao, who was trained and supplied by the Thais and Americans to fight the so-called Secret War in Laos.

By 1970 the communists controlled much of Laos. The Americans responded with more bombing, expanded covert operations, and then a South Vietnamese invasion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All failed. RLG losses were very high, and by 1970 a large number of Vang Pao's men were in fact Thais secretly reassigned to Laos. Facing defeat, in 1973 the RLG secured a cease-fire upon the Paris Peace Accords between North Vietnam and the United States. A new coalition government emerged, dominated by the NLHX.

Communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam did not immediately spread to Laos. Pathet Lao success came from Vietnamese backing and did not translate into wide popular support. Many still favored Souvanna and Lao King Savana Vatthana. Gradually, the NLHX eliminated its rivals. Finally, in December 1975, the communists forced Souvanna and the king to resign their offices. The NLHX took power with Souvannaphong as president and banned all other political parties.

There was, however, no peace for Laos. Armed resistance continued, particularly among the Hmong. Many Lao people died or disappeared in communist reeducation camps, including the royal family. Border clashes with Thailand flared throughout the 1980s, and innumerable economic problems made Laos one of the world's poorest countries. Laos became even more dependent on Vietnam, which itself was isolated from the world community because of its Cambodian occupation. Only very recently has Laos opened up and begun to address the long, painful process of rebuilding.

ARNE KISLENKO

See also

Containment Policy; Domino Theory; Southeast Asia; Souvanna Phouma, Prince; Souvannaphong, Prince; Viet Minh; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Latin America, Communist Parties in

The development of communism and communist party structures in Latin America began well before the Cold War. European immigrants familiar with the writings of Karl Marx and events such as the 1871 Paris Commune began importing communist ideology to Latin America in the late nineteenth century. After the successful Russian Revolution of 1917 and the emergence of the Comintern (Communist International) in the 1920s, many communist organizations in Latin America became aligned with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Throughout the Cold War, communism in Latin America was shaped by several varieties of communist thought, emanating from both international and domestic sources. Most prominent Latin American communist parties took instructions directly from the Soviets. Beginning in the late 1950s, however, many Latin American nations had competing communist factions influenced by Chinese communism. In 1963 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called for the growth of Marxist-Leninist parties independent of Soviet direction. By 1965, there were CCP-style organizations in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. These parties pledged allegiance to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The pro-Chinese organizations remained relatively small, however, often operating in the shadows of the pro-Soviet parties. Only in Peru and the Dominican Republic did pro-Chinese organizations come to outnumber pro-Soviet parties in membership.

Latin America also witnessed a number of indigenous communist movements. One of the most persistent of these was Venezuela's Movement to Socialism (MAS), founded in December 1970. Although some MAS party leaders were defectors from the older pro-Soviet Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), many espoused an ambiguous ideology that viewed international communist parties with indifference. MAS candidates enjoyed modest success in the 1970s, and by the 1980s the party had become a significant force in Venezuelan politics.

Some Latin American communist factions took guidance from the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. Since Castro's successful 1959 revolution and the installation of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) as the nation's only legal party, Cuba attempted to export its revolution throughout the region, encouraging revolutionaries to pursue change through armed insurrection. In the 1960s Cuba sent small numbers of troops to Central America, South America, and elsewhere in the Caribbean to foment rebellion. It was during one such engagement in Bolivia that Cuban revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara was killed in 1967.

Castro and Cuba attempted to export the revolution throughout the region, encouraging revolutionaries to pursue change through armed insurrection.

While the Castro model for seizing power by fighting guerrilla wars in the countryside was strong throughout the 1960s, it was mostly in conflict with the advice coming from the CPSU. The Soviets publicly encouraged working within the apparatus of labor organizations and striving for influence through peaceful means. The most successful effort following the advice of the Soviets occurred in Chile. The Communist Party of Chile rose to power

in the elections of 1970 as the dominant faction in the broader Popular Unity coalition. In a congressional vote, the Popular Unity coalition built support for and elected as president a Socialist Party leader, Salvador Allende. Pro-Soviet communists in Latin America hailed this victory as a model for furthering the spread of communism in the hemisphere.

To the United States, however, the strength of the Chilean communists within the Popular Unity coalition appeared as a threat to hemispheric security. In 1973 a coup backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) succeeded in deposing and killing Allende and installing the strongly anti-communist dictator Augusto Pinochet.

Nicaragua's communist regime under the Sandinistas, in power since July 1979, was a major supporter of communist insurrection in neighboring El Salvador throughout the 1980s. Although the Sandinistas continued exporting arms to communist rebels in El Salvador as late as 1990, the party was voted out of office that same year, leaving Castro the only communist leader in control of a Latin American nation.

By the end of the Cold War the communist parties of Latin America were diminishing in size and influence and had begun to identify ways to continue shaping Latin American politics by working within existing political frameworks. A convention of ten South American communist parties met in Quito, Ecuador, in February 1990. There they pledged support for multiparty systems and agreed to cooperate with social and Christian democratic parties as well as with other reform factions.

Creston S. Long

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Alliance for Progress; Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Castro, Fidel; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto

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Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in

Fidel Castro's successful consolidation of the revolutionary state in Cuba after 1959 encouraged the mobilization of popular resistance movements throughout much of Latin America. These liberation movements generally had two targets: standing governments that repressed popular political ambitions and

aspirations, and the international order that, according to the theoretical assertions of the organizers of the liberation movements, held Latin America in a subordinate position.

The Cuban Revolution did not in itself spark liberation movements in other countries. In fact, efforts by Ernesto "Che" Guevara to sponsor other revolutions through the creation of organizational *focos* failed.

Foco meant literally a focal point of organizational activity, associated with *foquismo,* whereby the term was blown up into a theory of revolution. Guevara and his followers asserted that a small group of committed revolutionaries could, given the circumstances of Latin America's general exploitation and widespread poverty, move into any isolated or impoverished area and generate a community of resistance by providing an example of sacrifice, organization, and ideological commitment. This theory had been extrapolated from the Cuban revolutionary experience in the Sierra Maestra, the highlands of central Cuba, where a small band of committed revolutionaries galvanized popular support for the movement to overthrow Fulgencio Batista. Guevara and his later supporters built up their experience into a general plan for revolutionary struggle and change. Their assertions were particularly influential for rebel efforts in Central America and Chiapas in southern Mexico. In 1967, Guevara himself was captured and executed in Bolivia during such an attempt.

The atmosphere that produced the spread of popular liberation movements was more complex. First, the Cold War fostered the rise of powerful dictatorships in much of Latin America. During the 1940s and 1950s, governments in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela that had mobilized popular sectors with promises of economic and social reform had been forced from power by military coups (often sponsored by the United States), foreign invasion, or interparty strife. By the start of the 1960s, the power of the regimes that had come into being earlier in the Cold War had weakened substantially, and in turn frustration over the lack of substantive reform had grown.

A variety of examples had appeared in and beyond Latin America that helped inspire organized challenges to state power. The defeat of the French in Indochina in 1954 helped demonstrate the potential success of a guerrilla insurgency against a stronger foe. Algerian resistance to French control beginning in November 1954 generated important theoretical and practical lessons. The brief success of the Bolivian Revolution in 1952 and the ability of Castro and his communist rebels to challenge one of Latin America's most entrenched dictatorships demonstrated that a social base for revolution existed within the region.

In the 1960s, two distinct intellectual streams inspired the development of revolutionary organizations. The Marxist tradition, central to the Cuban Revolution, enjoyed broad support among intellectuals, students, and organizations linked to industrial workers. Although communist parties, in existence for decades in almost every Latin American country, remained largely isolated from the popular mobilization under way, in universities, large cities, and within unions clandestine radical groups formed and began to organize for

revolution. Groups that defined themselves as Marxist and dedicated themselves to the revolutionary struggle appeared in almost every Latin American country before 1965.

Coincidentally, within organizations associated with the Roman Catholic Church, a second revolutionary front took shape. Responding to calls from the Church hierarchy to make the Church more responsive to the needs of the poor and oppressed, lay organizers and clergy alike began reaching out to communities in new and important ways. The worker-priest movement in Argentina and the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs, Ecclesial Base Communities) in Brazil and elsewhere are notable examples of this trend. As this push for social and political engagement peaked in response to the instructions that Vatican Council II (1962–1965) provided, many of the clergy became radicalized by the experience. Discouraged by the Catholic Church's conservatism, individuals resigned their positions and became political activists.

The spread of revolutionary organizations did not result in many successful challenges to established regimes in the 1960s, however. Urban revolutionary cells in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela appeared and quickly collapsed. In Guatemala, efforts to organize a peasant revolt collapsed under pressure from military campaigns that the United States helped coordinate and support.

Sandinistas arriving in Managua following the overthrow of Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio Somoza, September 1978. (John Giannini/Sygma/Corbis)

The few successful organizations relied on a community or institutional base. Radical Marxist groups in Peru took shape in Andean universities. In Argentina, the Ejército Revolutionario del Pueblo (ERP, Revolutionary Army of the People) and the Montoneros emerged from groups that had splintered off from the Perónist political movement. Other groups, such as the Fuerza Armada Revolucionaria Colombiana (FARC, Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), the M-19 in Colombia, and the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front) in Nicaragua, survived and expanded by shifting from urban to rural bases.

The Catholic Church unintentionally contributed to the survival and spread of popular liberation movements in much of Latin America. While Church officials eventually backed away from the political engagement that Vatican II had dictated, local parishes provided space and protection for community groups that initially focused on community needs and concerns. The meeting places and community base allowed leaders to shift these groups into more radical directions. This trend, which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, came at times in reaction to attempts at repression or came as a result of links to other radical cells that effectively recruited locals to their broader causes.

In the 1970s, incompetent or incomplete efforts to destroy guerrilla groups and protest organizations helped galvanize liberation movements

in some cases. Most notably in Nicaragua, the clumsy and brutal actions of the Anastasio Somoza dictatorship helped win sympathy and support for the FSLN. By 1979, united with opposition political parties, reform groups, and other dissenters, the FSLN overthrew the dictatorship and moved to establish a new Marxist revolutionary regime.

By the end of the 1970s, applying the lessons learned from the Vietnam War and motivated by the challenge that the Sandinista government represented to its authority in the region, the United States became more directly involved in a military reaction to popular liberation movements. U.S. intervention in El Salvador helped transform the conflict there into a bloody stalemate. Aid and advice to the Guatemalan military sustained its struggle against peasant-based resistance groups.

Military governments in Argentina and Uruguay effectively neutralized urban guerrilla movements. But in other contexts, government actions helped maintain the strength of liberation movements into the 1980s and beyond. While organizationally distinct from early revolutionary cells that had operated in Chiapas, the Ejécito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, Zapatista National Liberation Army) launched a strong challenge to the authority of the Mexican state beginning in 1984.

Daniel Lewis

See also

Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Dirty War; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Sandinistas; Shining Path; Vatican Council II

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Lattimore, Owen
(1900–1989)

One of America's foremost experts on Central Asia and China, political advisor to Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi, and during the McCarthy era a victim of anticommunist hysteria. Born in Washington, D.C., on 29 July 1900, Owen Lattimore spent much of his youth in China, where his father was an educational advisor to the Chinese government.

Lattimore became enthralled with Asian culture and society. In 1920 he joined the staff of a newspaper in Shanghai and devoted himself to the study of Chinese history and culture. He also made the acquaintance of Nationalist Chinese leader Jiang. In 1928 Lattimore took up studies at Harvard University but in 1929 returned to China, traveling the famed Silk Road and other parts of the country.

In 1930 Lattimore, now acknowledged as one of the leading American experts on China, took an academic post at Johns Hopkins University, where he soon became the director of its Page School of International Relations, a position he held until 1953. As he wrote and lectured, he also became more engaged in public policy issues, especially as they related to U.S.-Chinese relations. During 1941–1942 he served as Jiang's political advisor and during 1943–1944 was deputy director of the Office of War Information's Pacific theater operations. In 1945 Lattimore returned to his post at Johns Hopkins University and published *Solution in Asia*. In it, he urged Jiang to purge his government of corrupt officials and undertake genuine democratic reforms. This book made Lattimore a special target of the so-called China Lobby, those Americans who opposed compromise with the Chinese communists and supported Jiang without reservation and question.

Owen Lattimore testifies before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Lattimore, an academic and expert on China, was accused of being a Soviet spy by Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1950. Although Lattimore was cleared of all charges in 1955, the damage had been done. (Library of Congress)

Following the October 1949 communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, Lattimore and other so-called China Hands (U.S. State Department China experts such as John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies) came under fire from reactionary Republicans and other conservatives for having helped America "lose China." Such rhetoric was politically driven and utterly without merit, for if anyone had "lost" China, it was Jiang and the inept Nationalists. This line of accusation nonetheless played into the hands of Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, who in 1950 accused Lattimore of being "Moscow's top spy." Lattimore came under intense scrutiny and was investigated by McCarthy's Senate subcommittee but was subsequently cleared of all charges. However, in 1952 Lattimore was indicted for perjury and again underwent agonizing scrutiny. Finally, in 1955, he was cleared of all charges. But the damage had been done, and his name would always remain suspect among those who believed that he was a spy. Lattimore continued to write, teach, and lecture. He died on 21 May 1989 in Providence, Rhode Island.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Jiang Jieshi; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; Service, John Stewart

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Latvia

Former Soviet republic and since August 1991 the independent Republic of Latvia. Latvia, with a 1945 population of approximately 1.3 million people, covers 24,938 square miles, roughly the size of the U.S. state of West Virginia. It borders on Lithuania and Belarus to the south, Russia to the east, Estonia to the northeast, and the Baltic Sea to the west-northwest. Latvia has a long history of changing governments and shifting populations. Its major industries include the manufacturing of buses, vans, railroad cars, synthetic fibers, agricultural machinery, fertilizers, electronics, pharmaceuticals, processed foods, and textiles.

From 1721 to 1918, Latvia was controlled by imperial Russia. Latvia gained its independence on 18 November 1918, although the republic was vexed by political turmoil and lasted only twenty-one years. The Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union contained secret provisions whereby the Soviet Union would take control of Latvia. Thus, in October 1939, Moscow forced the Latvians to sign a treaty of mutual assistance, which gave the Soviet Union ground, air, and naval basing rights there.

On 17 June 1940, Soviet forces invaded Latvia. Three days later, a new pro-Soviet government was installed, and Latvia formally became a Soviet territory. Some 35,000 Latvians were either killed or deported within the first year of the incorporation. Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, occupying Latvia until 1944. Many Latvians considered the Nazi occupiers as liberators. However, this did not stop Germany from slaughtering as many as 90,000 Latvian Jews. The Red Army reoccupied Latvia in 1944, and many Latvians fled west during 1944–1945 to escape the return of Soviet control.

After the war, Latvians suffered severe hardships under Soviet rule because of their resistance to mandated socioeconomic changes and the collectivization of agriculture. As a result, more than 175,000 Latvians were killed or deported to Siberia and northern Russia. At the same time, a large-scale influx of Russians into Latvia lowered the number of Latvians there by 25 percent.

During the second Russian occupation, Latvia remained one of most economically advantaged and industrialized territories in the Soviet Union. The Latvian Communist Party was composed mainly of non-Latvian immigrants, who maintained political control and shaped cultural influences in the area for the next forty years.

In the late 1980s, with the advent of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform agenda, Soviet control of Latvia began to loosen. Demands for self-rule soon began to surface, and members of the local Latvian government joined with activists pushing for democratic reform. In the spring 1990 elections, Latvian nationalists won a majority of seats in the parliament and moved quickly to draft and adopt a constitution. A 1991 popular referendum resulted in a majority vote for secession from the Soviet Union. Latvia's independence drive was hastened by unforeseen events in Moscow. Two days after the coup attempt against Gorbachev, Latvia declared its independence

on 21 August 1991, which was recognized by the crumbling Soviet government on 6 September 1991. Two weeks later Latvia joined the United Nations (UN), and in 1994 the last of the Russian troops left the country.

Latvia applied for European Union (EU) membership in 1995 and was accepted in 2004. It has become a preferred trading route between what is now Western Europe and Russia. Latvia's major trading partners are Russia, Germany, Britain, Sweden, and Finland. Latvia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999 and has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 2004.

Arthur M. Holst

See also

Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Soviet Union

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Launch on Warning

Strategic defensive concept that involves launching nuclear forces when incoming nuclear missiles are still in flight—that is, when radar warnings of an enemy attack are received. During the Cold War, it is believed that both the United States and the Soviet Union adhered to some type of Launch on Warning (LoW) strategy. With the advent of large nuclear missile forces in the late 1950s, both nations adopted a LoW posture, although neither side seemed willing to publicly admit to it.

LoW was theoretically designed to lessen the likelihood of a preemptive first strike. The logic went that if one side knew that its opponent's nuclear forces would be launched before any actual detonations occurred (during a sneak attack), then the fear of massive retaliation (and, later, mutual assured destruction, or MAD) would prevent a preemptive nuclear strike. LoW would also theoretically increase the odds of a retaliatory strike, because nuclear missiles would be launched before being destroyed by incoming missiles. In essence, military planners found unacceptable a scenario in which a retaliatory blow would be administered only after their country absorbed a crippling and catastrophic first strike. LoW went hand in hand with MAD. Both postures sought to discourage the use of a sneak attack by making the result of such an attack too nightmarish to contemplate.

After the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was erected in 1959, the ability to implement LoW became far easier. The task became easier still in the 1970s with the advent of satellite-based warning systems.

In most cases, these early warning devices gave commanders anywhere from fifteen to thirty minutes' warning of a nuclear attack. The Soviets, of course, developed their own early warning systems. It is interesting that neither the Soviets nor the Americans made LoW an explicit part of their nuclear strategies. Nevertheless, the capability to do so had existed since at least the early to mid-1960s. The extreme sensitivity and covert nature of the issue make it difficult to determine when and if LoW ever became standard operating procedure.

There are obviously very grave consequences associated with LoW, as its many critics have made clear. It most certainly raises the specter of an accidental nuclear exchange. If warning systems malfunction or are somehow misinterpreted, nuclear forces may be launched upon false alarm. Such scenarios are not just the bailiwick of fiction and Hollywood producers. Indeed, both the Americans and Soviets have documented false warnings of nuclear attack that might have unleashed Armageddon. Perhaps one of the most disturbing of such occurrences happened on 14 November 1979. In the wee hours of the morning, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor, was awakened by a phone call. What he heard was horrifying. An early warning system indicated that a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack involving some 2,220 missiles was under way. As he was about to inform the president, Brzezinski received another call indicating that the attack was indeed a false alarm. Had Carter been made aware of the attack, he would have had just three to seven minutes to decide on a response. As it turns out, someone had mistakenly inserted a war game exercise program into an early warning computer. The Soviets have reported similar incidents.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System; First-Strike Capability; Mutual Assured Destruction

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Leahy, William Daniel
(1875–1959)

U.S. naval officer, administrator, diplomat, and outspoken opponent of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Born on 6 May 1875 in Hampton, Iowa, William Leahy graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, in 1897. He saw action in the Spanish-American War (1898) as well as in

the Philippine Insurrection and Boxer Rebellion in China during 1899–1902.

Deciding to make a career in the navy, Leahy was stationed at a number of posts and became close friends with Franklin Roosevelt, then assistant secretary of the navy. In 1918 Leahy was promoted to captain, and in 1927 he became a rear admiral, at the same time taking on the post of chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. He rose to the rank of vice admiral in 1935.

In January 1937 Leahy was promoted to full admiral and became chief of naval operations. He retired in 1939, which prompted President Roosevelt to warn, "Bill, if we have a war, you're going to be right back here helping me run it." In September 1939, one month after Leahy's retirement, Roosevelt appointed him governor of Puerto Rico. In November 1940 he became ambassador to France, a position he held until May 1942. True to his words, Roosevelt called Leahy back to active duty in July 1942 to serve as chief of staff to the commander in chief, a special post created for the wartime situation. In effect, Leahy was the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although that title would not come into use until after the war. He performed brilliantly in the role.

Despite his lack of combat experience, Admiral of the Fleet William Daniel Leahy was in effect the first chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during World War II and a trusted presidential advisor. Leahy opposed dropping the atomic bomb on Japan. (Library of Congress)

In December 1944 Leahy became the U.S. Navy's first fleet admiral. He gained respect from some and scorn from others when he vigorously opposed the use of atomic weapons against Japan. He believed that Japan could be defeated without the use of the bombs and without a costly invasion. He cited the fact that America's insistence on an unconditional surrender was preventing the Japanese from capitulating.

In March 1949 Leahy again resigned his post and retired. The following year, just as McCarthyism was about to set in and the Korean War broke out, Leahy published his memoirs, *I Was There.* Its publication revived the debate about the use of the atomic bomb. Indeed, Leahy wrote, "in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages." Such a position from a high-ranking war hero raised many eyebrows and served only to fuel the fires of McCarthyism. Leahy died in Bethesda, Maryland, on 20 July 1959.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

He retired in 1939, which prompted President Roosevelt to warn: "Bill, if we have a war, you're going to be right back here helping me run it."

See also

Atomic Bomb; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism

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Lebanon

Middle Eastern nation located on the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, bordering on Israel to the south and Syria to the east and north. Covering 4,015 square miles (roughly twice the size of the U.S. state of Delaware), Lebanon's 1945 population was approximately 1.4 million people. This figure is only an estimate, as there are no official census figures. The only government census was in 1932, when France held Lebanon as a League of Nations mandate. It counted 861,399 people. France used this census as the basis for the religious composition of local government, giving a six to five advantage to Lebanese Christians. That ratio was maintained after independence following World War II, with subsequent population figures being estimates by experts on demographic trends. A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) population estimate in 1986 showed that Shia Muslims comprised 41 percent and Sunni Muslims 27 percent of the population. The Maronites (Christians) comprised 16 percent, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics 5 percent each, and the Druze 7 percent.

Lebanon declared its independence from France in November 1941, becoming a charter member of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and a member of the Arab League the same year. However, sectarian differences served as a basis for internal strife, as did regional and international conflicts. Although the Maronites continued to control Lebanon, the relative growth of other groups—mainly Islamic—brought that control into contest.

Sectarian tensions have plagued Lebanon since independence. The growing Muslim population led ultimately to dissatisfaction with Christian dominance. This strife has been exacerbated by regional and international conflicts. Lebanon's membership in the Arab League embroiled the country in the Arab-Israeli conflict from the very beginning of Israeli independence in 1948, with Lebanese forces joining other Arab nations to crush the Jewish state.

The Cold War also played a part in Lebanon's woes, as both the United States and the Soviet Union sought influence in the region by supporting various regimes at odds with each other. A turning point came in 1958. That year, the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq fell and was replaced by a government that seemed to tilt toward the Soviet bloc. Egypt had already rejected Western support in favor of Soviet aid in building the Aswan Dam and was pursuing union with Syria, which still had claims to Lebanon. Lebanon's Maronite-controlled government responded by requesting American aid, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent U.S. Marines to Beirut to stabilize the region. The intervention worked. Muslim and Christian Lebanese appeared to be working together in recognition of the growing power of the Muslim population.

This seeming accommodation was short-lived, for regional conflicts now took center stage. Since 1948 there had been more than 100,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, some of whom pursued guerrilla operations against Israel. Lebanese Muslims generally supported the Palestinians, while the Christian population opposed guerrilla operations, fearful that these would

lead to Israeli reprisals that would threaten Lebanese independence. The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 coupled with the expulsion of Palestinian guerrillas from Jordan in 1970–1971 increased the power of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Indeed, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) established its headquarters in Beirut.

The Lebanese Army tried to restrain the guerrillas, but this led to sectarian clashes between the Maronites and Muslims. Civil war broke out in 1975. The subsequent chaos involved years of conflict between Lebanese Christians and Lebanese Muslims. Lebanese of both faiths were often at odds with the Palestinians. In addition, occupation of various parts of Lebanon by chiefly Syrian but also Israeli and Palestinian forces as well as terrorist attacks on French and American military forces posted there in the early 1980s only added to the unrest. The human toll resulting from Lebanon's strife has been tremendous. Indeed, in some of the worst of the fighting during March 1975–November 1976, some 40,000 Lebanese were killed and 100,000 wounded.

The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of civil conflict in Lebanon. It continued, with Syria, a former Soviet client state, dominating the country with an active military presence. Although Syrian forces departed in 2005, Lebanon still suffers from the complex nature of its internal struggles and will likely remain a pawn in regional conflicts.

Daniel E. Spector

See also

Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Middle East; Palestine Liberation Organization

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Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in

The first U.S. intervention in Lebanon occurred in 1958 when President Dwight Eisenhower ordered U.S. Marines to the tiny nation to support a peaceful transition of power. This action was in direct response to Cold War concerns of instability that might benefit the Soviet Union in the Middle East as well as to the perceived threat from Arab nationalism, then being promoted by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. This intervention has generally been considered a success, and a peaceful transition of power was brokered by the United States. The second U.S. intervention in Lebanon took place during 1982–1984, when President Ronald Reagan similarly deployed U.S. Marines, first to act as a buffer between an invading Israeli military force

A U.S. Marine mans a machine gun near Beirut, Lebanon, July 1958. (Library of Congress)

and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headquartered in Beirut, and later to serve as peacekeepers.

In January 1957, President Eisenhower requested a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in the Middle East to prevent the spread of communism. This policy, which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was formed in response to waning British influence in the region following the Suez Crisis of 1956. Prior to this, the Eisenhower administration had been willing to allow the British to take the lead in protecting the Middle East, particularly its vital oil fields. By 1957, however, the president had lost faith in British capabilities and declared his intention to take the lead in keeping the region out of Soviet control. The doctrine was therefore used as a guarantee to the noncommunist governments in the region as well as a threat to those who would support alliances with the Soviets.

Events in the region during 1957 and 1958 were seen by the United States as warning signs that both communism and radical Arab nationalism were on the rise. In 1957, King Hussein of Jordan, considered a moderate, established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In February 1958, the most radical regimes in the region, Egypt and Syria (both supported by the USSR), merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). In July 1958, the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by a radical military junta.

In the face of these developments, along with relentless propaganda by Arab nationalists against his more pro-Western regime and internal threats to his rule, Lebanese President Camille Chamoun asked for direct American

intervention to defend his government. President Eisenhower, invoking his new doctrine, immediately ordered U.S. Marines to Lebanon.

The main issue at stake in Lebanon was Chamoun's effort to change the constitution to allow him to continue to rule the nation after his term of office expired. Eisenhower instructed his personal representative in Lebanon, noted diplomat Robert Murphy, to pressure Chamoun to give up power in order to circumvent an all-out civil war in Lebanon. Chamoun eventually conceded, and a popular favorite for the presidency replaced him, allowing American troops to withdraw peacefully.

The second American intervention in Lebanon, during 1982–1984, was similar in many ways to the first, at least in the beginning. On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in an effort to crush the PLO, which had been using Lebanon as a base of operations for attacks against Israel. Although a staunch supporter of Israel, by 1982 President Reagan had begun to fear that Israeli actions in Lebanon (and elsewhere) would inflame anti-Western sentiments in Arab nations and provide an opportunity for increased Soviet influence in the region. Therefore, his administration attempted to broker an arrangement whereby the PLO would be evacuated from Lebanon in exchange for an Israeli promise to withdraw to its own borders.

When worldwide pressure intensified against Israel after its relentless attacks in Lebanon, especially in the PLO's West Beirut stronghold, and after direct threats by the Reagan administration, the PLO was allowed to leave Beirut in late summer 1982. As part of the agreement, a multinational force (MNF) of American, French, and Italian troops was sent to Beirut to ensure the safety of those departing from its harbor. More than 15,000 Palestinians were successfully evacuated by the end of the operation on 1 September 1982.

Following the evacuation of the PLO, however, the ongoing civil war escalated among various Christian, Muslim, and Druze factions vying for control of Lebanon. Furthermore, Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon continued to clash, threatening an all-out war between the two nations. Reagan ordered the Marines back to Beirut (and convinced the other members of the MNF to do the same) to serve as peacekeepers. As time passed, the MNF was embroiled in the fighting and became viewed as supporting the Lebanese government.

When a bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, the justification for the MNF to stay in Lebanon changed. Secretary of State George Shultz argued that America would not give in to terrorists, and so the Marines stayed in place as the civil war raged on. Then, on 24 October 1983, an event occurred that forced the United States and the MNF from Lebanon for good. A suicide bomber, believed to be from a Shiite Muslim terrorist group, drove a vanload of explosives into the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport, killing 241 troops. Across town at the French headquarters, another bomb killed 58 soldiers. Public pressure in the United States and the collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984 finally forced Reagan to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon, and the other MNF nations soon followed. The Lebanese Civil War raged for years afterward.

Brent M. Geary

See also

Arab Nationalism; Eisenhower Doctrine; Lebanon; Middle East; Murphy, Robert Daniel; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization; Radical Islam; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Suez Crisis

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Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe
(1902–1947)

French Army general and commander of French Far Eastern forces (1945–1946). Born into an aristocratic family on 28 November 1902 near Amiens, Count Jacques-Philippe de Hauteclocque took the nom de guerre of Leclerc during World War II to avoid reprisals against his family in France. Upon his 1924 graduation from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, he distinguished himself the next year as a second lieutenant fighting Moroccan rebels. He returned to teach at Saint-Cyr and also contributed articles on social issues to the *Revue Catholique*.

Wounded in June 1940 during the Battle of France, Leclerc was taken prisoner. The Germans believed him too weak to move and placed him at a chateau belonging to some of his friends, from which he escaped to join Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle's Committee of National Liberation in London.

After his recuperation, Leclerc went to Nigeria and gathered scattered groups of French colonial soldiers. In a daring campaign begun with only about twenty men, he won over garrisons and with them control of the Cameroons. By 1941 Free French forces controlled all of French Equatorial Africa. Leclerc, by now a colonel, commanded the Desert Army of veteran colonial troops, Chad Sharpshooters, an Arab camel corps, a few British officers, and some young Free Frenchmen. With this force and a few obsolete aircraft, he conducted successful raids against Italian outposts in the Sahara.

In late spring 1942 Leclerc decided on a march from Lake Chad to the Mediterranean. De Gaulle sent both supplies and reinforcements. Begun on 22 December, the march covered 2,000 miles in thirty-nine days. On 25 January Leclerc's force entered Tripoli concurrent with the British Eighth Army. In June 1944 Leclerc, now commanding the French 2nd Free French Armored Division, landed at Normandy. His division captured Alençon, the first French city retaken by French troops. General Dwight Eisenhower allowed Leclerc's division to be the first to liberate Paris, and it also liberated Strasbourg and Bordeaux.

With the end of fighting in Europe, in June 1945 de Gaulle appointed Leclerc to command the French Expeditionary Corps to restore French sovereignty in Indochina. Leclerc was unenthusiastic. "Send me to Morocco," he said. De Gaulle claimed that he replied, "You will go to Indo-China because that is more difficult."

Leclerc signed for France the Japanese surrender document, and on 5 October 1945 he arrived in the city of Saigon. He soon secured an agreement with the British that preserved France's position in southern Vietnam, and on 25 October he began the reconquest of Indochina for France, predicting that it would take about a month for mopping-up operations to be concluded. Leclerc's highly mobile mechanized forces quickly established French authority over southern Vietnam and Cambodia but, numbering only 40,000 men, they controlled little beyond the cities and main routes of communication.

Leclerc became convinced that the Viet Minh was a nationalist movement that France could not subdue militarily, and he supported talks that resulted in the March 1946 Ho-Sainteny Agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Unlike most of his compatriots, he was aware of the great difficulties of jungle warfare and favored negotiations that would mean abandoning the attempt to create an independent Cochin China. In a secret report to Paris on 27 March 1946, he said that there would be no solution through force in Indochina.

The return of French high commissioner to Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu to assume political control relegated Leclerc to military functions. D'Argenlieu and other French colonial administrators opposed meaningful concessions to the nationalists, and Leclerc, at his own request, departed Indochina in frustration. On 14 July 1946 he was named inspector general of French forces in North Africa and was promoted to full general. Leclerc died in a military plane crash in Algeria on 28 November 1947.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; France; Indochina War

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Le Duc Tho
(1911–1990)

Vietnamese revolutionary, member of the Vietnamese Communist Party's Political Bureau, and chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks. Le Duc Tho was born Phan Dinh Khai in Nam Ha Province on 14 October 1911.

He became active in communist political circles at a young age and in 1930 helped found the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). During the 1930s he spent nearly a decade in prison for his anti-French political activities. In 1945 he helped form the nationalist Viet Minh organization with Ho Chi Minh and from the late 1950s largely directed the war in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). According to some sources, Le's views actually prevailed over those of Ho.

Le is primarily remembered for his role in the Paris Peace Talks with the United States, which began in May 1968. He demanded an immediate halt to U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the dismantlement of South Vietnam's government. American negotiators, especially National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, refused these demands. The negotiations and the bombings continued until 1972, when Le and Kissinger agreed to a cease-fire. Le again requested a halt to the bombings, but he softened his stance on Vietnam's political self-determination. He eventually accepted a cease-fire that would leave South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu in power but that also allowed North Vietnam's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops to remain in parts of South Vietnam. The final peace agreement was signed in early January 1973. The United States withdrew its troops in March of that year. Late in 1973 the Nobel Prize Committee awarded both Le and Kissinger its peace prize, which Le refused to accept because the war continued.

In 1975 Le traveled to South Vietnam to oversee the final offensive there, which resulted in the unification of the country in April 1975. Between 1975 and 1986 he continued as a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee. In 1978 he oversaw Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. His power diminished in the mid-1980s, and following the economic reforms of 1986 he resigned his posts. Le died in Hanoi on 13 October 1990.

Brian D. Behnken

See also

Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Kissinger, Henry; Nguyen Van Thieu; Pham Van Dong; Viet Minh; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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LeMay, Curtis Emerson
(1906–1990)

U.S. Air Force general. Born in Columbus, Ohio, on 15 November 1906, Curtis LeMay attended Ohio State University by day and worked in an iron foundry at night. Enrolling in ROTC, in June 1928 he secured a commission as a second lieutenant in the field artillery before switching to the Army Air

Corps, winning his wings in October 1929. In 1937 he transferred to the 49th Bombardment Group at Langley Field, Virginia, becoming one of the first pilot-navigators of the new Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and leading a fleet of the aircraft on a goodwill tour of Latin America.

Promoted to colonel in March 1942, LeMay took command of the 305th Bomb Group, leading it to Britain later that year as part of Eighth Air Force. He soon established himself as a daring commander and tactical innovator who improved bombing techniques. As commander of the 3rd Bombardment Division from June 1943, he led the first shuttle raid on Regensburg, Germany, landing in North Africa and winning promotion to brigadier general in September. In March 1944 he became the youngest U.S. major general since Ulysses S. Grant.

In August 1944 LeMay was transferred to the Pacific theater, where he headed the 20th Bomber Command of new Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers based in China. With these planes, he conducted the first raids on the Japanese mainland. In January 1945 he took charge of the 21st Bomber Command on Guam and developed the highly innovative low-level, nighttime fire-bombing techniques that were used to destroy major Japanese industrial cities, while at the same time reducing B-29 losses. In July 1945 he took command of the Twentieth Air Force in the Marianas, which included the B-29s that dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay. A hawkish hardliner when it came to the Soviet Union, LeMay directed the beginning of the Berlin Airlift in 1948 and then headed the Strategic Air Command. (Library of Congress)

During 1945–1947 LeMay served as deputy chief of staff for research and development, helping to deploy the first jet bombers in the new U.S. Air Force. In October 1947 he assumed command of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, thus overseeing the initial aerial resupply operations of the city of Berlin during the Soviet blockade of 1948–1949. In October 1948 he was recalled to the United States to head the Strategic Air Command (SAC). In his nine years as SAC commander, he greatly expanded its manpower and aircraft, adding B-47 and B-52 jet bombers and KC-135 jet tankers. He also integrated intercontinental missiles into the force.

In 1951 LeMay was promoted to full general, the youngest since Grant. Named Air Force vice chief of staff in 1957 and chief of staff in 1961, LeMay had numerous disagreements with President John F. Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and General Maxwell D. Taylor's flexible response strategy. LeMay took a hard-line approach in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when he advocated bombing Soviet missile installations in Cuba. He also disagreed with President Lyndon B. Johnson's policy of gradual escalation during the Vietnam War. LeMay retired to enter private business in February 1965. His book *America in Danger* (1968) was sharply critical of Johnson's Vietnam policies.

LeMay advocated massive bombing of North Vietnam, not ruling out the use of nuclear weapons, "to bomb them back into the Stone Age."

In 1968 LeMay ran unsuccessfully for the vice presidency of the United States on a ticket headed by George C. Wallace. LeMay advocated massive bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), not ruling out the use of nuclear weapons, "to bomb them back into the Stone Age." LeMay died at March Air Force Base, Riverside, California, on 1 October 1990.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Aircraft; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bombers, Strategic; Cuban Missile Crisis; Flexible Response; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Strategic Air Command; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Vietnam War

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Lend-Lease

Mutual-aid program among the various Allied powers during World War II, dominated mainly by U.S. material assistance to thirty-eight members of the wartime alliance. When World War II began in September 1939, the U.S. Neutrality Acts forbade the sale of American war matériel on anything other than a cash-and-carry basis. By autumn of 1940, with France out of the fight and the United Kingdom in dire straits and running short of supplies and assets, President Franklin Roosevelt realized the need to provide Britain with immediate assistance. Isolationist sentiment in the United States, however, dictated that Roosevelt not strike too munificent a deal. This led to Roosevelt's brilliant (and consciously misleading) analogy, first aired at a press conference on 17 December 1940, that America should temporarily loan Britain war goods in the same way that a person might loan a garden hose to a neighbor whose home was on fire.

The Lend-Lease bill became law on 11 March 1941. It remained in effect until August 1945, when President Harry Truman canceled the bulk of the program after the Japanese surrender, a decision that vexed the British government given its perilous economic condition and angered the Soviets, who had also relied heavily upon Lend-Lease aid.

Any firm dollar amount of the value of Lend-Lease aid is somewhat speculative, but during its lifetime the program is thought to have provided at

least $50 billion in aid. About half of this amount was in the form of munitions, 22 percent in industrial goods, 13 percent in agricultural products, 5 percent in oil, and the remainder in services rendered (for example, the rental, maintenance, and repair of shipping). Lend-Lease aid reached its peak in 1944, when the United States delivered $15.1 billion in goods and services, or about 17 percent of the nation's entire war expenditures for that year. More than $30 billion in Lend-Lease aid went to the United Kingdom, with the Soviet Union receiving $11 billion, France $2.3 billion, and China $1.3 billion. The supply pipeline was not all one-way, however. The United States received $7.3 billion from the British and French, mostly in the form of technology transfers and raw materials.



The terms of Lend-Lease repayment were left to the discretion of the president, and Roosevelt had spoken only of a vague "gentlemen's agreement," with no firm conditions laid down. In December 1945 the United Kingdom reached a settlement with the United States to pay off $532 million in Lend-Lease obligations. The British government paid off the remainder of its Lend-Lease debt on 29 December 2006. Several billion dollars were supposed to be repaid by the Soviets at the end of hostilities, but the onset of the Cold War halted negotiations, and it was only in June 1990, under much different circumstances, that the United States and the USSR finally negotiated a settlement.

Alan Allport

See also

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.

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Leopold III, King of Belgium (1901–1983)

King of Belgium (1934–1950). Born on 3 November 1901 in Brussels, the son of King Albert I, Leopold Philippe Charles Albert Meinrad Hubertus Marie Miguel fought in World War I, serving as a soldier in the 12th Belgian Regiment. After the war, he enrolled at the St. Anthony Seminary in Santa Barbara, California. In 1926 he married Princess Astrid of Sweden. She died in a car accident, in which Leopold was driving, in 1935.

Leopold became king on 23 February 1934 following the death of King Albert. After September 1939 and the start of World War II, Leopold rejected

appeals from France and Britain for military conversations, fearful that this would encourage the Germans to invade Belgium. When the German Army did invade neutral Belgium in May 1940, Leopold soon surrendered his forces in violation of pledges made to France and Britain. He also refused to leave the country as part of the government-in-exile in London. In 1941 he married his children's governess, Liliane Baels, a commoner. Removed from Belgium by the Germans in 1944, Leopold was liberated by Allied troops in Austria at the end of the war.

Feelings in Belgium ran high against Leopold at the end of the war, and he remained in Geneva while the Belgian government debated the fate of the monarchy. In a March 1950 referendum, he received 57.7 percent of the vote. He then returned to Belgium, but when mass demonstrations and riots erupted in Wallonia (which had voted heavily against the king), he relinquished control of affairs to his son Baudouin on 2 August 1950. When Baudouin reached his majority, Leopold abdicated in his favor, and Baudouin acceded to the throne on 16 July 1951. Leopold subsequently traveled extensively and pursued an interest in social anthropology. He died in Bruxelles (Brussels) on 25 September 1983.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Baudouin, King of Belgium; Belgium

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Le Pen, Jean-Marie
(1928–)

French extreme rightist politician and founder and leader of the right-wing political party Le Front National (National Front). Born on 20 June 1928 in Trinité-sur-Mer, France, Jean-Marie Le Pen fought in the Resistance during World War II. This experience provided the grist for his rabid anti-Gaullism and anticommunism. Le Pen became politically active in right-wing youth organizations as a student of law at the University of Paris in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

In 1953 Le Pen abandoned his studies, joined the Foreign Legion, and served in Indochina as a parachutist. Upon his return in 1955, he resumed his studies and political career by joining the right-wing Poujadist movement. Winning a seat in the January 1956 elections as a Poujadist, he became the youngest member of the National Assembly. In September, however, he left France to participate in the Algerian War. Accused of torture, he was forced to return to France in May 1957.

After having broken with another right-wing politician, Pierre Poujade, Le Pen successfully ran as an independent in the November 1958 elections but lost his seat in November 1962. This setback did not keep him from supporting the candidacy of the rightist candidate Jean-Louis Trixier-Vignancour in the presidential elections of 1965. In 1972, Le Pen founded his own party, the far-rightist Front National. His primary focus has been one of seeking to maintain the purity of the French nation and its culture, mainly through vicious anti-immigration rhetoric. This largely explains his fierce anticommunism blended with anti-Semitism, xenophobia, homophobia, and admiration of German national socialism.

Le Pen has rejected the European integration process and is an advocate of a tariff-protected economy. Initially a mere marginal political figure, he has enjoyed increasing popularity, particularly since the 1980s. While capturing only 0.75 percent of the vote in the 1974 presidential elections, his share rose to 15 percent in the 1995 elections and to more than 16 percent in 2002. Moreover, he managed to win a seat in the European Parliament in 1984 and again in 1999. His hitherto unchallenged position in the party was damaged when his deputy, Bruno Mégret, challenged him as party leader in 1998. Although Mégret's power play was unsuccessful, the subsequent split weakened Le Pen and Le Front National.

Matthias Trefs

See also

Anti-Semitism; Chirac, Jacques; De Gaulle, Charles; France; Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry; Mitterrand, François; Pompidou, Georges

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Li Guangyao
(1923–)

Prime minister (1959–1990) and senior minister of Singapore (1990–present). Born in Singapore on 16 September 1923 to a middle-class Chinese family, Li Guangyao beginning in 1935 attended the Raffles Institute and Raffles College where he excelled as a student. He went on to study law at Cambridge University, graduating in 1949, and returned to Singapore to practice law.

Li's political career began in November 1954 when he founded the moderate-leftist People's Action Party (PAP), which has dominated Singapore politics ever since. He became a champion of the poor and of labor unions

Senior minister of Singapore Li Guangyao shown arriving at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on 2 May 2002. (U.S. Department of Defense)

while managing to solidify PAP's political influence. In June 1959 he became the first prime minister of the city-state of Singapore. In 1963 he brought Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia but in 1965 withdrew from the federation because of political unrest. A republic was established that same year, and Singapore became a wholly autonomous entity, with Li continuing as prime minister.

As prime minister, Li engineered a miraculous transformation of Singapore from a poverty-ridden port city to a wealthy, modern state that became the model of East Asian economic prowess. He oversaw a tightly controlled welfare state with an emphasis on private enterprise and foreign investment. But his rule also had a rather dark side that included the suppression of political opposition and the implementation of strict laws governing public behavior and drug use, many of which were accompanied by draconian enforcement that included corporal punishment and long jail sentences.

Criticized for his government's repressive policies, Lee stepped down as prime minister on 28 November 1990, although he retained the position of senior minister, which he still holds.

Ha Thi Thu Huong

See also

Malaysia; Singapore; Southeast Asia

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Li Peng
(1928–)

Chinese communist politician, vice premier, and premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Chengdu, Sichuan, China, in October 1928, Li Peng was adopted by Zhou Enlai, the future Chinese premier, in 1939. In 1945 Li joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He enrolled at the Moscow Power Institute in 1948 and graduated in 1954.

Li returned to China in 1955 and became involved in a number of electrical power programs, serving at the Fengman Hydroelectric Power Plant, in

the dispatcher's Office in the Northeast Power Bureau, and in the Beijing Electric Power Administration.

During 1979–1983 Li served successively as vice minister and minister of power industry and vice minister of the newly created Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power. Meanwhile, his connection to the now-deceased Zhou facilitated his rise in the CCP's political hierarchy. In June 1983 Li became vice premier, playing an active role in the PRC's foreign affairs. He became premier in 1988, a post he held until 1998. As premier, he was responsible for China's economic modernization and the military crackdown against student demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square incident on 4 June 1989. His role in the incident seriously harmed his reputation in the international community. Li retreated from the political spotlight in 1998, becoming chairman of the National People's Congress and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Deng Xiaoping; Tiananmen Square; Zhou Enlai

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Li Xiannian
(1909–1992)

Vice premier during 1954–1983 and president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1983–1988. Born in Hongan, Hubei Province, on 23 June 1909, Li Xiannian was trained as a carpenter, having received little formal education. In 1927 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and began organizing the peasantry and armed guerrilla units.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Li fought with communist forces in central China, earning him command of the Central China Military Region in 1944. During the Chinese Civil War, he served first as deputy commander of the Central Plains People's Liberation Army and then in May 1949 as chairman of the provisional government of Hubei and political commissar of the Hubei Military District.

After the PRC's birth in October 1949, Li was assigned to serve in Hubei, becoming mayor of Wuhan in 1952. In mid-1954 he was transferred to Beijing when he became the vice premier. In mid-1957 he was also appointed minister of finance, in which capacity he reformed the Chinese economy along Soviet lines, resulting in the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward in late 1959. As vice premier, he led a number of delegations abroad to nurture PRC ties with other socialist and third world nations. Despite several

political purges, including the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), he retained his government positions. After the revolution ended, he took up more positions, first as vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee in 1977 and then vice chairman of the state financial and economic commission in 1979.

In 1983 Li succeeded Deng Xiaoping as president of the PRC, a post he held until 1988. During this time he devoted much attention to advancing his nation's international status. He retreated from public life in 1988 and retained only the chairmanship of the People's Political Consultative Conference, in which capacity he supported Deng's order to crack down on student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. Li died on 21 June 1991 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Tiananmen Square

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Liao Chengzhi
(1908–1983)

Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Tokyo in September 1908, Liao Chengzhi enrolled at the Waseda University in Japan in 1925. In 1928 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which resulted in his expulsion from the university and deportation from Japan. He then traveled to Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1932 he returned to China to continue underground party activities. During the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War he served in Hong Kong and Guangdong Province as the party's purchasing agent, liaison officer, and coordinator of revolutionary work in southern China.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Liao became deputy secretary of the New Democratic Youth League and president of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, both of which were founded by Liao himself and were devoted to promoting youth works and recruiting young party members. He was made vice chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, assuming the chairmanship in 1959. He was also responsible for establishing and leading a number of mass organizations, such as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and the China Peace Committee, all of which came into existence in late 1949 to cultivate the Chinese communist cause and image at home and abroad. One of his primary tasks was to promote the PRC's ties with Japan,

which resulted in the establishment of the China-Japan Friendship Association in 1963.

In 1967 Liao was purged from office during the Cultural Revolution. In 1972 he returned to the public scene as advisor to the Foreign Ministry, continuing his previous works of fostering PRC ties with Japan and the overseas Chinese. Liao died on 10 June 1983 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Zhou Enlai

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Liberia

Western African nation, approximately 38,000 square miles in size, bordering on Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Atlantic Ocean. In 1945, the population of Liberia was approximately 730,000 people. In 1820, former U.S. slaves began to colonize lands populated by many indigenous groups, and on 26 July 1847 they founded the state of Liberia. The new nation closely followed the political and constitutional model of the United States, from which its founders (known as Americo-Liberians) had come. The Americo-Liberian minority monopolized political power, denying citizenship to indigenous peoples until 1946.

With the outbreak of World War II, Liberian President Edwin Barclay sought to strengthen Liberia's historical ties to the United States by entering the war on the Allied side (although the tiny Liberian military never fought in the war) and granting the United States the right to build and maintain military bases in Liberia. In exchange, Liberia received American assistance in developing its infrastructure, which included the construction of Liberia's first deep-water port of Monrovia.

Barclay's successor, William Tubman, continued this pro-American policy throughout most of his nearly twenty-eight years as president (1944–1971), receiving significant U.S. aid and in return welcoming extensive foreign investment, especially from American companies. Under this policy, however, Liberia's economy remained weak, and sharp divisions between the prosperous Americo-Liberians and the impoverished masses led to increasing social unrest. Tubman also supported the United States politically, backing its stance on African decolonization as well as the war in Vietnam.

Over the course of his tenure, Tubman increased his personal power by effectively banning political opposition and setting up a vast internal security apparatus. He consolidated Liberia's modest military (including a national

guard, militia, and coast guard) under a joint command and rechristened it the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). He also expanded its forces from 3,000 men in 1962 to 4,000 at the time of his death in 1971. In 1980, the AFL counted 5,000 troops. Throughout this period, the Liberian military received significant training and equipment from the United States.

When Tubman died in office in 1971, he was succeeded by his vice president, William Tolbert Jr. The late 1960s and the 1970s witnessed the deterioration of Liberian-U.S. relations. Complaining that the United States was taking Liberia's support for granted, first Tubman and then Tolbert turned toward Pan-Africanism and Cold War neutrality, while economically Liberia sought to expand trade and political contacts with Europe. Under Tolbert, Liberian relations with the communist bloc improved dramatically. Liberia engaged in diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, formally recognized Cuba in 1976, and opened relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after Tolbert visited the PRC on a state visit in 1979.

Economic weakness and popular discontent mounted during the 1970s, reaching a peak in 1979. Liberia's so-called year of ferment began when the government proposed reducing subsidies on rice, effectively doubling the price of this Liberian staple food. The ensuing Rice Riots soon evolved into sustained, broad-based social protests against government corruption and ineptitude, which Tolbert met with harsh repression and the imprisonment of political opponents.

Amid this atmosphere of instability, a group of enlisted soldiers led by Samuel Doe staged a coup in April 1980, killing Tolbert and most of his cabinet while decimating the upper ranks of the military. The new regime promised a more equitable distribution of wealth and power, but the regime in fact enriched its members at the nation's expense and developed an extensive system of patronage, with political and military positions going disproportionately to Doe's own Krahn ethnic group.

Afraid that the new regime might turn to the Soviet Union and Libya for support, President Jimmy Carter's administration rushed an economic and military aid package to Liberia in 1980. President Ronald Reagan further expanded U.S. aid to Doe. In exchange, Liberia closed the Libyan embassy, reduced Soviet embassy staff, and cracked down on alleged leftist radicals. Despite Doe's brutality against his opponents and his fraudulent victory in the October 1985 presidential election, Reagan continued to back his regime. But under President George H. W. Bush, the United States slashed economic aid to the corrupt government.

Toward the end of the 1980s, discontent in Liberia manifested itself in the appearance of regional rebel groups. In December 1989, these groups allied with an Americo-Liberian former military officer, Charles Taylor, who led a guerrilla war against Doe from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire. The United States and the West declined to intervene in the conflict, although Doe received support from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which sent a peacekeeping force to Liberia in August 1990. In

September 1990, rebels captured and killed Doe, precipitating a seven-year civil war among the rebel factions.

Elun Gabriel

See also
Africa; Doe, Samuel Kanyon

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Liberman, Evgenii Grigorevich
(1897–1983)

Prominent Soviet economist. Born in Slavuta in the Ukraine on 2 October 1897, Evgenii (Evsei) Liberman moved to Kiev with his family while he was still an infant. He was initially refused university entrance because of the Russian government's quota on Jews in higher education. He later secured a waiver during World War I because his sister was a military doctor. His law studies were interrupted both for service in the Russian Army during the war and then during the Russian Civil War thereafter, when he fought on the side of the Reds.

Resuming his studies at the University of Kiev, upon graduation Liberman moved to Kharkov as an economist with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. He then enrolled in the Kharkov Labor Institute to study economics, remaining there as an instructor. Travel to Germany formed the basis for his theories of production planning. In 1933 he joined the faculty of the Kharkov Institute for Engineer Economics and became its dean. Evacuated following the German invasion of 1941, he worked in industrial planning in Kirghizia. In 1944 he joined the Research Institute for Finance in Moscow and three years later rejoined the Kharkov Institute. In 1950 he published *Cost Accounting at an Engineering Works and Economic Management of a Socialist Enterprise.* In 1956 he was awarded a doctorate and was appointed professor at the Kharkov Institute.

The basis of Liberman's economic theory was that profitability, rather than output, should be the central criterion for judging the economic success of socialist enterprises. This implied recognition of the principle of supply and demand previously unaccepted in Soviet economics, which had relied solely on output set by a central planning agency. His theories were a reflection of the debates going on in the Soviet Union during de-Stalinization. Leading Soviet economist Vasily Nemchinov brought Liberman's ideas to the attention of Premier Nikita Khrushchev and persuaded him to allow Liberman to publish an article in *Pravda.* This article, "Plans, Profits, and Bonuses," which appeared on 9 September 1962, became the basis for the economic

reform program, appropriately known as Libermanism. Liberman argued not only that demand-driven production would lead to an increase in quality but also that profitability should be rewarded in the form of bonuses and higher wages. Khrushchev agreed, and in August 1964, shortly before his fall from power, he allowed limited experiment in two textile plants, the Bolshevichka in Moscow and the Mayak in Gorky.

Under Khrushchev's successors General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Alexei Kosygin, the plan was confirmed by the Twenty-third Party Congress and supposedly implemented in a third of Soviet consumer products factories. The plan was doomed, however, because of widespread opposition among bureaucrats who had previously set production quotas and now did their best to sabotage its success by withholding necessary raw materials.

In 1963 Liberman joined the faculty at Kharkov State University. His reforms were curtailed in the early 1970s. The inability of the state to carry out meaningful economic reform was an important factor in the later collapse of the Soviet Union. Liberman died in the Soviet Union on 10 March 1983.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Khrushchev, Nikita; Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Libya

Predominantly Muslim North African nation covering 679,358 square miles. With a 1945 population of approximately 900,000 people, Libya borders Niger, Chad, and Sudan to the south; Tunisia and the Mediterranean Sea to the north; Algeria to the west; and Egypt to the east. The Ottoman Empire ruled Libya for much of the nineteenth century, but in 1907 Italy began to assert itself in the region, seeking colonies to bolster its status as a great European power. After a brief war with the Turks during 1911–1912, Italy gained control of Libya. A twenty-year Libyan insurgency resulted, and Italy did not pacify

Libya, 1981 – 1986



the colony until 1931. The rebellions against Italy gave Libya an important tradition of anti-imperialism.

Libya was the site of significant fighting in the North African campaigns of World War II until it was ultimately secured by the British and the Americans in 1943. At the end of the war, Libya's status was immersed in the larger question of the fate of European imperial possessions in the Middle East and Africa. Ultimately, in 1949 the United Nations (UN) passed a resolution in favor of a united, independent Libya. The UN appointed Dutch diplomat Adrian Pelt to act as commissioner and oversee the establishment of the new nation. Negotiations among the varied regions in Libya proved delicate. Those in and around Tripoli supported a large degree of national unity, while the more established government of Cyrenaica preferred a federal system and insisted on choosing the monarch. The process resulted in a constitutional monarchy, an elected bicameral parliament, and a federal system of government. Amir Idris of Cyrenaica was named hereditary king of Libya, and final independence was declared on 24 December 1951.

The new Kingdom of Libya had strong links to the West. Both Britain and the United States maintained military bases on its soil and supported the state financially in return. Libya also had a strong Arab identity and joined the Arab League in 1953. As Arab nationalist movements grew in response to the 1948 creation of the State of Israel, Libya experienced a conflict of identities. The emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabic nationalist regime in Egypt in 1954 encouraged the growth of similar political thought within

Libya, and the 1956 Suez Crisis only increased this trend. The discovery of oil in the late 1950s transformed the country, endowing it with wealth and increased geopolitical significance. Oil exports reached $1 billion by 1968.

Arab nationalism and Middle Eastern conflict continued to affect Libya and its pro-Western policies in the 1960s. In 1964 Nasser charged that American and British bases in Libya might be used to support Israel in a conflict, and he pressured the Libyan government to close them. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War proved a turning point for Libyan politics. On 5 June 1967, the day hostilities began, anti-Jewish and anti-Western riots broke out in Tripoli. When Nasser falsely claimed that the Arab defeat was because of American and British assistance to Israel, Libyan oil workers refused to load American, British, and German tankers. The Libyan prime minister was forced to resign, and the king appointed a new cabinet. In the months after the war, the government was under continued pressure from Arab nationalists internally and externally. It pledged financial aid to Egypt and Jordan and demanded the closing of all foreign bases on Libyan soil (although the demand was not pressed). On 31 July 1969, a group of junior army officers seized power while the king was out of the country. The Revolution Command Council (RCC), headed by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, took control with little opposition.

Qadhafi, an adherent of Nasser's version of Arab nationalism, stressed Arab unity, socialist economic policies, and opposition to Western imperialism. Unlike Nasser, however, Qadhafi maintained that this agenda could be reconciled with a strong emphasis on Islamic law. He rejected the Western presence in the Middle East, and he completed the removal of foreign bases in Libya and considered Israel an imperialist outpost. After Nasser's death, Qadhafi actively sought leadership in the Muslim world in the 1970s, promoting his Third International Theory, a middle way between the communism of the Soviet Union and the capitalism of the West. Although he succeeded in convincing more than thirty African countries to reject relations with Israel, he never gained the confidence of other Muslim nations.

Always an enemy of Zionism, Qadhafi supported Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and sponsored terrorist attacks against Israel and related Western targets. As the 1970s progressed, Qadhafi voiced his support for revolutionary movements around the world, and Libya played host to a number of insurgent groups. He also sought to build up the Libyan military and pursued significant arms purchases from France and the Soviet Union after 1970. However, his suspicion of the atheist dimension of Soviet communism kept Libya out of the Soviet orbit in the strict sense. Nevertheless, his anti-Western activities assured him of Russian support.

Internally, Qadhafi sought to remake Libyan society, insisting that a mixture of socialism and Islam would ensure social justice. He created a welfare state based on oil revenue and reformed the legal system to include elements of Koranic law (Sharia). His *Green Book* (1976) laid out his political philosophy. In it he rejected representative government in favor of direct democracy. In 1977, he set up Basic People's Congresses across the nation but still retained power in his own hands. Finally, he transformed Libya's oil industry by tak-

ing production away from international oil companies, setting a pattern that would be imitated by other oil-rich states.

Despite Qadhafi's radical politics, Libya and the United States avoided direct confrontation for much of the 1970s because of their economic relationship. This changed, however, when Libya vehemently opposed Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. Qadhafi viewed any Arab rapprochement with Israel as a betrayal, while the Americans viewed the talks and the resulting 1978 peace treaty as crucial for lasting peace in the Middle East. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter's administration listed Libya, Cuba, and the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) as states that supported terrorism. U.S.-Libyan relations continued to sour. On 2 December 1979, rioters targeted the U.S. embassy in Tripoli in imitation of the attack on the American embassy in Tehran earlier that year. As a result, in May 1980 the United States withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Libya.

With the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980, relations chilled further. On 6 May 1981 the Reagan administration officially labeled Libya as a state supporter of terrorism and expelled Libyan diplomats from the United States. The administration also pursued a freedom of navigation policy and challenged Libya's 1973 claims of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean. On 19 July 1981, the *Nimitz* carrier battle group was patrolling near the Gulf when two of the carrier's F-14 Tomcat fighters were approached and attacked by two Libyan Soviet-made Su-22 fighter jets. The American planes evaded the attack and shot down both Libyan planes.

Libyan naval officer holding up a portrait of Muammar Qadhafi while another raises his arms in victory, five days after the U.S. bombing of Tripoli, 20 April 1986. (Bernard Bisson/Corbis)

Tensions increased further, and in March 1982 the United States banned the import of Libyan oil. The sanctions had limited effect, however, as European nations did not adopt U.S. policies. Qadhafi continued to support revolutionary and terrorist activity. On 5 April 1986, an explosion in a Berlin nightclub killed 3 people and injured 200, including 63 U.S. servicemen. The United States claimed Libyan involvement and retaliated with great ferocity. On 15 April, U.S. Air Force and Navy planes bombed five targets in Libya.

The Reagan administration maintained that the raid resulted in significant disruptions to Libyan-supported terrorism, and such activity did decline for a number of years. On 21 December 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed over Lockerbie, Scotland, by a terrorist bomb. More than 270 people were killed, and subsequent investigations pointed totwo Libyan men as primary suspects. When the Qadhafi regime refused to extradite the men for arrest and trial, the UN imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992. American confrontations with Libya continued, and a second incident over the Gulf of Sidra resulted in the destruction of two Libyan MiG-23 fighter planes in January 1989. At the end of the Cold War, the Qadhafi regime remained steadfast in its support of revolutionary movements and terrorist actions against Israel and the West. The United States continued to view Libya as a sponsor of international terrorism. In recent years, Qadhafi has taken a more conciliatory tone with the West, including turning over the men responsible for the Pan Am bombing and paying restitution to victims' families. In February 2004 Libya declared that it would renounce its weapons of mass destruction program and comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus began a thaw in relations with the United States, which resumed diplomatic relations that June and lifted all remaining economic sanctions in September 2004.

Robert S. Kiely

See also

Anticolonialism; Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Decolonization; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Qadhafi, Muammar; Suez Crisis

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Lie, Trygve
(1896–1968)

Norwegian politician, diplomat, and first secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) during 1946–1952. Born on 16 July 1896 in Oslo, the son of a carpenter, Trygve Lie earned a law degree from the University of Oslo in 1919 and then worked as a legal advisor to the Norwegian Federation of

Norwegian Trygve Lie served from 1946 to 1952 as the first secretary general of the United Nations. (Library of Congress)

Trade Unions. Firmly established in the Labor Party, he was appointed minister of justice in 1935 and elected to parliament in 1936.

In 1939 Lie became minister of supply and shipping. He also served as foreign minister for Norway's government-in-exile in London, a post he held during 1941–1945. He continued on as foreign minister until February 1946, when he accepted the UN position as secretary-general.

Lie led the Norwegian delegation to the 1945 San Francisco UN organizational conference and played a key role in drafting the Security Council provisions of the UN Charter. When he assumed the UN secretariat in 1946, he sought to bridge the gap between East and West even as the Cold War began. The Soviets initially approved of his efforts, although the Western democracies were often frustrated by what they perceived as his equivocation and indecisiveness. Lie's attempts to establish a new cooperative world order were soon torn asunder by growing Cold War tensions.

Lie was certainly a proactive secretary-general who believed strongly in the role and purpose of the UN. He also set the tone of the organization by insisting that his office be accorded the dignity and respect that befitted a supranational body. But his tenure was not without its troubles. The Soviets were furious with him for supporting the American-led UN intervention in the Korean War (1950–1953). Ultimately, they refused to support him and attempted to block his reappointment in November 1950. Realizing that he

could not continue to be effective without the support of the communist bloc, he resigned in November 1952.

After leaving the UN, Lie continued his political and diplomatic career, serving as provincial governor of Oslo and Akershus during 1955–1963. In 1959 Norwegian King Olav appointed Lie to mediate a border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. He served as Norwegian minister of industry during 1963 and minister of industry and trade during 1963–1965. Lie died on 30 December 1968 in Geilo, Norway.

Norbert Götz

See also

Korean War; Norway; United Nations

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Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich

(1920–)

Soviet Communist Party politician, first a supporter but later an outspoken critic of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies. Born on 29 November 1920 in Dubinkino, Siberia, Yegor Ligachev pursued what was viewed as a model career in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He graduated from the prestigious Institute of Aviation in Moscow in 1939, joined the CPSU in 1944, and held a number of party posts in the Novosibirsk area before moving to Moscow. He became deputy chief of propaganda in 1961 and deputy chief of party personnel in 1964.

Four years later, Ligachev returned to Siberia, probably because he was unwilling to collaborate with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. In 1976, however, Ligachev was granted full membership in the CPSU's Central Committee. In 1983 Yuri Andropov, new general secretary of the party, recalled Ligachev to Moscow. In 1985 Andropov's successor, Konstantin Chernenko, nominated Ligachev to the Politburo. He became a full member only weeks after Chernenko's death.

In 1985 Gorbachev became CPSU general secretary and announced his reform program, perestroika. Ligachev initially endorsed Gorbachev's efforts by chairing Politburo meetings, thus serving as Gorbachev's de facto second-in-command. But Ligachev refused to back the reformers' quest for what he considered to be radical changes. He thus played a major role in the dismissal from the Politburo of Boris Yeltsin, who had pushed for an even faster

pace to perestroika. In September 1988, when Ligachev publicly condemned efforts to reform the party apparatus, Gorbachev forced the Politburo to expel him from office. Ligachev then became widely identified with the orthodox, communist critique of Gorbachev and perestroika, which relegated Ligachev to the far fringes of Russian politics.

Frank Beyersdorf

See also

Andropov, Yuri; Brezhnev, Leonid; Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Soviet Union; Yeltsin, Boris

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Lin Biao
(1907–1971)

Vice premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1955–1971. Born in Huanggang, Hubei Province, on 5 December 1907, Lin Biao enrolled at the Huangpu Military Academy in 1925. He graduated the following year, joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and enlisted in the armed forces. His military talents earned him the command of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, one of the three components of the Chinese communist forces during the Sino-Japanese War. Wounded in early 1938, he retired from active military duty and went to Yan'an, Shaanxi, where he was involved in troop training and liaison work. He was then assigned to northern China, where he helped establish a powerful base that ensured the CCP's 1949 victory in the Chinese Civil War.

After the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, Lin became secretary of the Central-South Bureau and commander of the Central-South Military Region. In 1955 he became vice premier, vice chairman of the National Defense Council, a member of the CCP Central Committee, and a marshal of the People's Liberation Army. In September 1959 he assumed the posts of defense minister and the senior vice chairmanship of the National Defense Council. His power and influence peaked during the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Presenting himself as the spokesman for Chinese leader Mao Zedong, Lin advocated world communist revolution and resistance to American imperialism.

In April 1969 Lin replaced Liu Shaoqi as Mao's successor and heir apparent. Lin did not, however, remain long in power. It was alleged that, emboldened by his military power, he had staged an abortive coup in 1971. Having failed to assassinate Mao (as officially reported), Lin attempted to

flee to the Soviet Union but died in an airplane crash on 13 September 1971 near the Mongolian border.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong

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Lippmann, Walter
(1889–1974)

Prominent American writer, journalist, columnist, and foreign policy pundit who helped popularize the term "Cold War." Born on 23 September 1889 in New York City, the son of a successful clothing manufacturer, Walter Lippmann graduated from Harvard University in 1909 and began a storied career in journalism and public policy, writing extensively for the *New Republic* (which he founded), the *New York World*, and the *New York Herald Tribune*. He achieved his greatest exposure and influence, however, as a columnist for the *Washington Post* and *Newsweek* magazine. His newspaper column "Today and Tomorrow" was syndicated in more than 250 papers around the world, and his sensible, lucid writing style earned him two Pulitzer Prizes, not to mention a devoted audience of readers.

American Walter Lippmann, a profound political thinker and an astute commentator on national and international events, influenced presidents for nearly sixty years. (Library of Congress)

In his 1947 book *The Cold War*, Lippmann instantly popularized the term used to describe the state of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. He proposed that rather than relying on military might alone to contain the Soviet Union, the Cold War should be fought by consolidating and unifying the Atlantic community through economic integration, including programs such as the 1947 Marshall Plan.

Although generally considered to be a foreign policy realist, Lippmann opposed George F. Kennan's doctrine of containment as unrealistic and unsustainable. Lippmann argued that the doctrine compelled the United States to adopt a reactive foreign policy, putting it at a strategic disadvantage. He also questioned the wisdom of extending security commitments to unreliable client states and putative anticommunist movements within states. He criticized the Truman Doctrine as overly militaristic.

By the mid-1960s, Lippmann's warnings proved quite prescient. He opposed American military intervention in support of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), which he saw as a manifestation of the inherent flaws of the containment policy. He lamented President Lyndon B. Johnson's decisions that had transposed Vietnam into an American war and predicted that U.S. intervention would ultimately divide America as the number of casualties rose.

Lippmann retired from journalism in 1967, at the height of a public standoff with Johnson, although he continued to contribute to *Newsweek* and grant interviews. Lippmann died in New York City on 14 December 1974.

Christopher A. Preble

See also

Containment Policy; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennan, George Frost; Marshall Plan; Soviet Union; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War

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Literature

The Cold War was fought on the literary as well as the diplomatic and political fronts. Although it did not provide so immediately absorbing subject matter for writers as did the two world wars of the twentieth century, it created a tense, competitive environment in which all thoughtful writers operated. Sometimes openly but often by parable or indirection, serious writers confronted the social, political, and philosophical issues raised by the conflict, which eventually split the world into two opposing ideological camps. During the McCarthy era of the early 1950s, a significant number of American writers found their careers threatened should they express sympathy for communism. Their often-coerced testimonies before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and Senator Joseph McCarthy's Senate subcommittee were invariable dramatic and sometimes life-altering. Always mindful of the feared blacklist, writers learned to proceed with caution. Those who did not conform resorted to the use of pen names. At the same time, the interest generated by Senate hearings and Cold War intrigues provided the more openly commercial writers, those who produced entertainment that titillated casual readers, a superabundance of plot possibilities.

Decades before the Cold War began, numerous men and women of letters had found socialist and Marxist ideas attractive. Some had flirted with communism and had looked toward the Soviet Union as a noble experiment. Naturalism, the literary movement that dominated serious European and

Playwright and screenwriter Lillian Hellman. Her Left-leaning politics led to her being called before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Her refusal to cooperate with the committee caused her to be blacklisted in Hollywood for more than a decade. (Library of Congress)

American fiction in the first half of the twentieth century, had actually encouraged many writers in this direction. Since the time of Émile Zola in late nineteenth-century France, practitioners of literary naturalism had prided themselves on their ability to rouse the public and mitigate miserable living conditions by highlighting social abuses in fiction. Because these writers knew the social problems of Western Europe and the United States best and juxtaposed this reality to the rosy propaganda that was emanating from the Soviet Union, it was not uncommon for them to respond positively to features of the communist message.

As the HUAC hearings got under way, writers who had worked in Hollywood were particularly vulnerable to the committee's scrutiny. Lillian Hellman (1905–1984) was perhaps the most highly publicized writer to confront HUAC directly. A major American dramatist and woman of letters, she had earned her reputation with such plays as *The Children's Hour* (1934), one of the first Broadway dramas to treat lesbianism, and *Watch on the Rhine* (1941), an antifascist play. Although born in New Orleans to an affluent family, she had become involved in radical politics under the influence of her companion, Dashiell Hammett (1894–1961).

Hellman became an eager student of Marxist texts and briefly joined the Communist Party for humanitarian and idealistic reasons. In the early years of World War II, she had carefully followed the party line, first urging the United States to stay out of the conflict, during the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and later advocating involvement when Germany violated its treaties by invading the Soviet Union in 1941. By the time she was called to testify before HUAC, her days with the party were over. By skillful management of public relations, she was able to avoid tattling on former associates without going to prison herself.

Hammett was not so fortunate. Although a dedicated Marxist who had supported radical movements in the United States, he claimed that he had never actually joined the Communist Party. Nevertheless, he refused to cooperate with HUAC, invoking the Fifth Amendment eighty times during his testimony. Refusing to identify communist sympathizers he had known, he was sentenced to six months in federal prison, was blacklisted in Hollywood, and was hounded by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the rest of his life. His writings, identified as subversive by Senator McCarthy and McCarthy's sidekick Roy Cohn, were removed from many libraries. This was a considerable disappointment to Hammett's many readers, who regarded him as a creator of the American hard-boiled school of detective fiction with his Sam Spade and Thin Man stories. His best-known works, such as *Red Harvest* (1927) and *The Maltese Falcon* (1930), are still regarded as classics of the genre.

Winners of the Nobel Prize in Literature

Year	*Author*	*Country*	*Year*	*Author*	*Country*
1945	Gabriela Mistral	Chile	1969	Samuel Beckett	Ireland/France
1946	Hermann Hesse	Switzerland	1970	Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn	USSR
1947	André Gide	France	1971	Pablo Neruda	Chile
1948	T. S. Eliot	United Kingdom	1972	Heinrich Böll	Germany
1949	William Faulkner	United States	1973	Patrick White	Australia
1950	Bertrand Russell	United Kingdom	1974	Eyvind Johnson	Sweden
1951	Pär Lagerkvist	Sweden		Harry Martinson	Sweden
1952	François Mauriac	France	1975	Eugenio Montale	Italy
1953	Winston Churchill	United Kingdom	1976	Saul Bellow	United States
1954	Ernest Hemingway	United States	1977	Vicente Aleixandre	Spain
1955	Halldòr Laxness	Iceland	1978	Isaac Bashevis Singer	United States
1956	Juan Ramón Jiménez	Spain	1979	Odysseus Elytis	Greece
1957	Albert Camus	France	1980	Czeslaw Milosz	Poland/United States
1958	Boris Pasternak (declined)	USSR	1981	Elias Canetti	Bulgaria/United Kingdom
1959	Salvatore Quasimodo	Italy	1982	Gabriel García Márquez	Colombia
1960	Saint-John Perse	France	1983	William Golding	United Kingdom
1961	Ivo Andric	Yugoslavia	1984	Jaroslav Seifert	Czechoslovakia
1962	John Steinbeck	United States	1985	Claude Simon	France
1963	Giorgios Seferis	Greece	1986	Wole Soyinka	Nigeria
1964	Jean-Paul Sartre (declined)	France	1987	Joseph Brodsky	USSR/United States
1965	Mikhail Sholokhov	USSR	1988	Naguib Mahfouz	Egypt
1966	Shmuel Yosef Agnon	Israel	1989	Camilo José Cela	Spain
	Nelly Sachs	Germany/Sweden	1990	Octavio Paz	Mexico
1967	Miguel Angel Asturias	Guatemala	1991	Nadine Gordimer	South Africa
1968	Yasunari Kawabata	Japan			

Other writers with strong Hollywood connections caught up in the HUAC net included Clifford Odets (1906–1963), Ring Lardner Jr. (1915–1983), and Arthur Miller (1915–2005). Odets emerged as one of the sadder figures of the McCarthy era. A leading playwright of the 1930s and 1940s and the author of *Waiting for Lefty* (1935) and *Golden Boy* (1937), Odets was a member of the Marxist League of American writers, which had included the great American novelist Theodore Dreiser (1871–1945). Odets joined the party itself around 1935. According to his later testimony, he resigned six or eight months later in disappointment. The communist publications *The Daily Worker* and *The New Masses* had unfavorably reviewed his plays, labeling him a "hack writer" who did not properly promote proletarian themes. When he later testified before HUAC, Odets attempted to downplay leftist influence in Hollywood, claiming that the collaborative system that produced Hollywood films made it next to impossible for a writer to inject Marxist ideas into scripts. Because of his conciliatory approach to the committee, many of his colleagues accused him of collusion with the enemy, and the experience left him disheartened.

Lardner was the son of a popular American humorist and had been an Academy Award-winning screenwriter in 1942. He was the youngest of the group of motion picture screenwriters and directors accused of communist sympathies, designated as the Hollywood Ten. In the 1930s he had visited the Soviet Union to judge, he believed, the Marxist experiment firsthand. At that time he had truly believed it his duty to try to communicate Marxist ideas through film. HUAC regarded him as an important witness, but his failure to answer the committee's questions resulted in a citation for con-

American playwright Arthur Miller, ca. 1950, whose *Death of a Salesman* won the Pulitzer Prize. Miller was married for a while to actress Marilyn Monroe. (Corbis)

tempt, a year's prison sentence, a $1,000 fine, and the Hollywood blacklist. For two years he was forced to make his living anonymously. His novel *The Ecstasy of Owen Muir* appeared in England in the 1960s but could not be published in the United States. He was finally able to return to Hollywood in the 1960s, where he earned a second Academy Award for his work on the screenplay of *M*A*S*H* (1970).

Miller (1915–2005), like Hellman, was a major twentieth-century American playwright whose drama *Death of a Salesman* (1949) redefined tragedy for the modern theater. A liberal activist from youth, Miller had still never been willing to put himself under the discipline of the Communist Party. He rejected its doctrine that all artists should employ their talents to further the party line. Yet he believed that the Communist Party should be able to function legally in the United States, and he condemned HUAC as a pack of witch-hunters. While Miller was willing to be forthright with HUAC about his own beliefs and actions, he firmly refused to testify against others. On several occasions in later years, Miller publicly expressed his conviction that the very existence of civilization depended on trust and loyalty. Although his career survived and he became a media celebrity upon his marriage to Hollywood actress Marilyn Monroe, Miller did not escape unscathed. He was even refused a passport by the State Department.

Two later Miller plays powerfully reflect his reactions to HUAC and the anticommunist hysteria that damaged the careers of people close to him. *The Crucible* (1953), ostensibly about the Salem witch trials of early American colonial history, was generally understood to be a parable of McCarthyism. *After the Fall* (1964) was a more direct depiction of Miller's personal experiences as a harassed artist and husband of a neurotic film star.

To those who were seized by the Red hysteria, it often seemed that all American letters had turned leftist. There were, however, significant counterbalances. During the early years of the Cold War, Ernest Hemingway (1899–1961) and William Faulkner (1897–1962) were among the most admired American writers. Hemingway believed that a writer betrayed his art if he used it to promulgate an ideology. The extreme subjectivity of Hemingway and the social conservatism of Faulkner made them unlikely heroes of the Left.

Nineteen Eighty-Four (1947), a horrific piece of political satiric fiction by the English writer George Orwell (1903–1950), circulated throughout the United States and was widely interpreted as a vision of what the West would become if dominated by the Soviet Union. In the society of Oceania, as described in the book, the omnipresent television set indoctrinates folk in the Big Lie, the government's interpretation of everything. All speech, action, and even thought are controlled by Big Brother.

Another book that profoundly influenced American thought appeared in 1949. *The God That Failed* was a collection of essays by important novelists, poets, and journalists whose earlier ideals had been betrayed by the reality of what the Soviet Union had become. They had all initially believed communism to be the best hope for the oppressed masses of the world. The participants in *The God That Failed* were Arthur Koestler, a Hungarian novelist; Louis Fischer, an American journalist; André Gide, a French essayist and novelist; Richard Wright, a major African American novelist; Ignazio Silone, an Italian journalist and novelist; and the British poet Stephen Spender.

Especially moving was Richard Wright's narrative of his emergence from Mississippi plantation life to a writing career in Chicago. The Communist Party had promised equality for all, with particular concern for the plight of the African American in the years before the successes of the civil rights movement. Wright's eventual discovery of the tyranny and duplicity of the party was a painful epiphany.

Equally powerful was Gide's account of his visit to the Soviet Union in June 1936 as a guest of the Soviet Society of Authors. He had approached his visit with the conviction that the Russian experiment was the wave of the future. Although he was shown every courtesy and provided the finest accommodations the country had to offer, his eyes and ears were open. He was unable to deny that the vast masses of Soviet citizens still lived in abject poverty. While the rest of the world was bombarded with rosy visions of an ideal state by the party's propaganda machine, Russian workers continued to suffer under deplorable tyranny that rivaled that of the czars.

Perhaps the most outspoken and abrasive literary opponent of communism in the United States during the Cold War was Ayn Rand (1905–1982), a native of Russia who had experienced communism firsthand and passionately hated it and all its works. Her novels, which sometimes became best-sellers and always attracted a cult following, were rarely more than fictional embodiments of her ideas and prejudices. *We, the Living* (1936), *The Fountainhead* (1943), and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957) extolled the virtues of self-interest, the fulfilment of individual potential, and the value of capitalism as the system best designed to favor self-fulfilment. As a friendly witness before HUAC in October 1947, Rand attacked early Hollywood portrayals of life in the Soviet Union as an idealized lie. She testified that the Soviet Union was in fact a prison from which many were risking their lives to escape. Her claim that Russians smiled only "privately and accidentally" was widely quoted and was ridiculed by Hellman and others.

In the English language, it was genre fiction that most directly exploited the Cold War. Spy thrillers became a staple, expertly penned by Graham Greene (1904–1991), Ian Fleming (1908–1964), John Le Carré (1931–), Tom Clancy (1947–), and others. Greene was a major British writer who rarely concealed his hostility toward American policies. He divided his literary output into two clear categories: his serious fiction, which explored religious and philosophical themes, and his entertainments, often set against worldwide political conflicts. *The Third Man* (1948) unfolded in postwar Vienna with a leading character who bore a remarkable resemblance to Soviet mole Kim

Philby, a man for whom Greene had once worked. *The Quiet American* (1955) used Vietnam as a backdrop, at the beginning of the American involvement in the turmoil generated by the French and by nationalist and communist factions. *Our Man in Havana* (1958) revealed a cloak-and-dagger world of espionage more ridiculous than awesome.

Fleming, another British writer, created the character of James Bond, perhaps the most popular of all fictional Cold War spies, certainly after the cinema discovered him. Bond's most notable Cold War adventures erupted in *From Russia with Love* (1957) in which Bond romped with buxom Soviet female agents as he battled SMERSH, the Soviet organ of vengeance, interrogation, torture, and death; in *For Your Eyes Only* (1960), in which SHAPE headquarters, a Russian hideout near Paris, is destroyed; and in *Octopussy* (1966), which found Bond snaring a top Soviet agent found bidding for a Fabergé egg in a Sotheby auction. The Bond stories were splendid camp, and their exaggerations made many feel that the Soviets were more buffoons than threats.

Le Carré, a third British spy novelist, made good use of his personal experiences in the British Foreign Service as background for his novels. Among his best-known thrillers are *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (1963) and *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (1974). These narratives suggest a grim, lonely espionage underworld in which values are often blurred and loyalties sometimes ambiguous.

Clancy, an American, wrote thrillers rivaling the appeal of the leading British spy novelists. Books with special Cold War relevance included *The Hunt for Red October* (1984), *Red Storm Rising* (1986), *Patriot Games* (1987), and *Cardinal of the Kremlin* (1988). He wrote a fast-paced adventure narrative, more real-world than were the James Bond adventures, yet he avoided the moral ambiguities that intrigued Greene and Le Carré.

Science fiction became the most popular literary category during the Cold War, particularly after paperbacks became widely distributed. This genre at its best provided an even more provocative attack on communism than had the spy stories. Hundreds of paperbacks were published each year, some predicting dystopian futures in which tyranny would prevail. Others painted a horrifying panorama of a planet devastated by a Cold War turned hot in a thermonuclear disaster. These narratives generally refrained from siding with either East or West in the conflict. The destructive potential, they seemed to say, is spread about equally throughout the human race. The bomb had become the new Frankenstein monster, the golem through which the suicidal impulses of humanity would find expression.

Two of these apocalyptic novels attracted special attention. Neville Shute (1899–1960) was a British writer living in Australia when he published *On the Beach* (1957). He envisioned a near future where nuclear war has wiped out all life in the Northern Hemisphere. Australians alone survive, but only for a few days, with full awareness that global winds will soon bring radioactive contamination to them.

Three years after the appearance of *On the Beach*, Walter M. Miller Jr. (1922–1996) published his hauntingly poetic *A Canticle for Leibowitz*, one of

the few science fiction books that has crossed over literary categories to become recognized as a significant work of twentieth-century American fiction. In this unusual science fiction story, after the nuclear holocaust the tiny Catholic Order of Leibowitz undertakes the task of preserving some memory of previous civilization.

Although writers in the English language have most notably confronted the Cold War in their fiction, European literature has also been strongly conditioned by the events of the period, often struggling with Cold War issues on a philosophical or religious plane. In Italy, France, and elsewhere on the European continent, atheistic views, strongly influenced by the dialectal materialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, have battled Christianity in the minds and hearts of serious writers.

In France, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), highly sympathetic to Marxism although frequently critical of the Soviet Union, best represented the atheistic position. In 1945 Sartre founded a political and literary magazine, *Les Temps Modernes*, which reflected his position as an independent socialist addressing Cold War issues. His novels, such as *The Age of Reason* (1945) and *Troubled Sleep* (1949), gave fictional embodiment to his social and philosophical ideas. A more mellow atheistic French voice was that of Albert Camus, a fellow existentialist who had actually once been a Communist Party member. His novel *The Plague* (1947) has been variously interpreted as a parable of Resistance fighters in Paris revolting against Nazi domination and as a protest against all revolutionary movements that justify the use of any methods to achieve their ends.

Espousing Christianity even in a France often labeled "post-Christian" were writers such as Georges Bernanos (1888–1948), François Mauriac (1885–1970), and Julian Green (1900–1998), an American citizen who spent most of his life in France and wrote almost exclusively in the French language. Much of the career of Bernanos was devoted to writings that promoted his liberal views, which included his denunciations of French bourgeois values and Spanish dictator Francisco Franco's exploits. As a frequent essayist, Bernanos took positions with which both communists and ultrarightists could occasionally agree.

Mauriac, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1952, affirmed Christian values with novels that were more concerned with personal and family relationships than social movements. His message in numerous novels was that beneath prosperous exteriors, regardless of the political system, human beings are torn by uneasy emotions in disordered lives of their own making.

Green likewise concentrated on the wars within the human personality in books that reflected his personal dilemmas, his conversion from Protestantism to Catholicism, and his acknowledgment of his homosexuality. These introspective works included *Moira* (1950) and *Each in His Own Darkness* (1960).

In Italy, Alberto Moravia (1907–1990), an influential intellect tormented by the plight of the poor, skeptical of Christian solutions, and alert to the appeal that the Communist Party made to postwar Italians, became the best

known of his country's novelists throughout Europe and the United States. From the beginning, the socially alienated were his choice subjects, while his style was sparse and realistic. *A Woman of Rome* (1947), about a Roman prostitute, and *Time of Desecration* (1978), a political allegory, were among his most penetrating works.

While the intellectuals were debating the social reality portrayed by Moravia and examining his implied solutions, masses of people were devouring the Don Camillo stories of Giovannino Guareschi (1908–1968). These were simple tales somewhat reminiscent of medieval legends of St. Francis, about a village priest in the Po Valley who converses with the crucifix above his altar and verbally spars with his old friend, Pepponi, the communist mayor of his village. The books made the simple plea for Christian virtues above the vapid promises of communism.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Russian writers faced very different problems than their Western counterparts, who often had a bewildering assortment of philosophical options from which to choose. Instead of castigating their opponents, Soviet writers had to concern themselves with pleasing their government and following the party line or else circulating their manuscripts through a flourishing Russian underground. Writing guilds in the Soviet Union operated under clearly defined precepts of socialist realism, which an individual author violated only with considerable courage. In Soviet Russia under Josef Stalin, there was to be no art for art's sake. All writings were to serve the proletarian revolution. Crude propaganda novels flooded the Russian market, celebrating women who chose to forgo singing in the Moscow opera in order to increase their egg production on collective farms or men allowed to marry their intended only after factory quotas had been surpassed.

In Soviet Russia under Stalin there was to be no art for art's sake; all writings were to serve the proletarian revolution.

Ilya Ehrenburg (1891–1967) was one of the best-known writers of genuine talent to faithfully follow the party line. He was, not surprisingly, awarded two Stalin Prizes for *The Fall of Paris* (1941), a fictional account of French societal decay from 1935 through 1940, and *The Storm* (1948), a war novel with Tolstoyan pretensions. Vera Panova (1905–1973) was another loyal Soviet novelist who, nevertheless, managed to convey in her writing the compassion and humanistic vision that had been the identifying feature of the great nineteenth-century Russian novelists. She received the Stalin Prize in 1947 for *The Train*. Although she did not fail to tackle social issues according to the cannons of socialist realism, she is best remembered for her loving portraits of children, such as *Evodokiia* (1959).

Mikhail Sholokhov (1905–1984), who became the Nobel laureate of 1965, was acclaimed by his government as an obedient communist as well as a powerful writer. His most loved work was *And Quiet Flows the Don,* written between 1928 and 1940. It presented a vast panorama of the revolutionary period in a way that did not displease the authorities.

Two serious Russian writers came into open conflict with their government when they were awarded Nobel Prizes. During the Cold War the prize itself, still the most prestigious in the world for literary achievement, be-

came politicized. In 1958, Boris Pasternak (1890–1960) was coerced by his government into refusing the prize, which was awarded to him not only for a distinguished body of poetry but also for his masterpiece *Doctor Zhivago*, completed in 1956 but not published in his native land until 1988. *Doctor Zhivago*'s theme was the aspirations of the individual pitted against the demands of doctrinaire systems.

In 1970 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918–) was awarded the Nobel Prize. His writings—fictionalizations of personal experiences—had exposed the underside of Soviet life, the ruthlessness of the prison camps, and the injustice of the courts. *First Circle* (1968) was based on the years that he spent in a prison research institute, while *Cancer Ward* (1968) resulted from his hospitalization and treatment for cancer during a forced exile in Kazakhstan in the 1950s. *The Gulag Archipelago*, which began publication in Paris in 1973, was considered his most thorough exposé of the notorious Soviet prison and labor camps. Living under almost constant harassment, Solzhenitsyn did not bend to the Soviet authorities but remained a thorn in their flesh until he finally was expelled from the country in 1974. Equally unhappy in the West, despite the acclaim he received for both his writing and his political courage, he returned to Russia in 1994.

Russian author Boris Pasternak, author of the acclaimed novel *Doctor Zhivago*, outside his home in Peredelkino, a writers' colony located southwest of Moscow, October 1958. (Jerry Cooke/Corbis)

On both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Cold War conditioned both serious and popular literature. The unsettled quality of life and the fears generated by the reality of mutual assured destruction (MAD) may be easily discerned in the novels of several decades, although the conflict failed to call forth the epic writing that has always resulted from the world's great armed conflicts.

Allene Phy-Olsen

See also

Atomic Bomb; Communist Fronts; Film; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthy Hearings; McCarthyism; Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr

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Lithuania

Former Soviet republic and now an independent Baltic state. The Republic of Lithuania, which declared its independence on 11 March 1991, had a 1945 population of some 2.25 million people. Covering 25,174 square miles, Lithuania is about the size of the U.S. state of West Virginia. It borders the Baltic Sea, Russia, and Poland to the west; Belarus to the south and east; and Latvia to the north. Lithuania is divided into ten counties. It is now a parliamentary democracy.

Throughout its history, Lithuania has fallen victim to its more powerful neighbors, namely the Soviet Union and Germany. On 23 August 1939, the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact contained secret clauses that divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of control. The Soviets controlled Lithuania only for a short time during the initial stages of World War II. After German forces invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Lithuania remained under German control until 1944. During this time, a puppet German regime ruled the state, and most of the Lithuanian Jewish population perished in the Holocaust.

In the summer of 1944 the Red Army forced the Germans to withdraw from Lithuania, and Soviet authorities again took control and subjected the country to strong rule in order to end any remaining resistance to their authority. This tactic did not work out as the Soviets had planned, since a well-organized armed resistance nonetheless emerged. The ensuing guerrilla war claimed approximately 50,000 lives on each side. In response, Soviet authorities deported some 10 percent of the Lithuanian population to Siberia. Resistance to Soviet rule ended in 1952.

The remainder of the 1950s through the 1960s was a period of relative political and social calm in Lithuania. During this time, the Soviet Union carried out forced agricultural collectivization and heavy industrialization. It also established its own political institutions in Lithuania, based on command-style socialism, and co-opted Lithuanian culture. This period was followed by a growing nationalist movement that began in the 1970s, which expressed clear opposition to the Soviet system.

The social and political climate began to change under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s. His policies of glasnost and perestroika had a tremendous impact on the Soviet Union and other states under its control. Soviet political oppression lessened dramatically, and prodemocracy movements emerged in Lithuania and other Baltic and East European countries. Soon enough, Gorbachev's reforms had set the stage for a centrifugal explosion of the Soviet system, a development far beyond his original intentions.

In Lithuania, the first mass prodemocracy demonstration, organized by the Sajūdis Lithuanian Reorganization Movement, took place on 24 June 1988 at Gediminas Square in Vilnius. The group demanded wholesale political and economic reforms. A second major demonstration occurred on 9 July and involved more than 100,000 protesters. On 23 August, a third mass

demonstration occurred in Vilnius during which more than 200,000 people gathered to mark the forty-ninth anniversary of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. The Lithuanian Supreme Council, an official parliamentary commission of Lithuanian legislature, declared that the pact was an international crime and that the Soviet annexation of Lithuania was therefore illegal. In late 1988 the Congress of the Soviet Union confirmed the decree of the Lithuanian Supreme Council by acknowledging that the pact had indeed been illegal.

On 23 August 1989, nearly 2 million people from Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia formed a living chain to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet pact. The chain stretched some 400 miles from Vilnius, through Riga, and ended in Tallinn. That same year, the Sajūdis movement formally demanded independence for Lithuania. In the 1990 parliamentary elections, the Sajudis movement won 101 of 141 seats. This impressive electoral mandate led to the reestablishment of the independent Republic of Lithuania on 11 March 1990.

The Soviets, who refused to acknowledge that they had lost control over their Baltic client states, responded with an economic blockade on Lithuania that lasted eighteen months. The Soviets also murdered numerous government employees, seized government buildings, and resorted to other terror tactics. On the evening of 12 January 1991, they killed thirteen unarmed civilians who were protecting Lithuania's radio and television transmission tower and the parliament building. That night came to be known as Bloody Sunday. Faced with overwhelming Lithuanian opposition, the Soviets officially recognized Lithuania's independence on 6 September 1991.

Today, Lithuania is a member of the United Nations (UN), the European Council (EC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ironically perhaps, Russia became Lithuania's largest trading partner.

Arthur M. Holst

See also

Europe, Eastern; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Soviet Union

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See Malcolm X

Little, Malcolm

Liu Shaoqi
(1898–1969)

General-secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during 1949–1968 and chairman of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1959–1968. Born in Ningxiang, Hunan Province, on 24 November 1898, Liu Shaoqi enrolled in Moscow's communist University of Toilers of the East and joined the CCP in 1921. He returned to China in 1922 and was assigned to organize the labor movement, becoming chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor in 1931.

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, Liu served successively as head of the North China, Central Plains, and Central China Bureaus, engaging in underground and organizational works and helping to ensure eventual victory in both wars. After the PRC's birth in October 1949, Liu became the second vice chairman of the state and concurrently the general secretary of the CCP. In April 1959 he succeeded Mao Zedong as the PRC's chairman. During Liu's chairmanship, the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly irreconcilable, taking on a heavy ideological tone. Liu viciously attacked the Soviets' revisionism and rapprochement with the West, insisting that permanent revolution should be the ultimate goal of the communist bloc.

Meanwhile, Liu became active in diplomacy as he tried to enhance the PRC's international status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In 1963 he toured non-communist nations in Asia, becoming the first PRC chairman to visit countries outside the communist bloc.

Liu's pro-Maoist position, however, did not save him from the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Indeed, his growing influence and power ultimately aroused Mao's suspicion. In October 1968 Liu was relieved of all his posts, and the chairmanship was passed on to the defense minister, Lin Biao, in 1969. Liu died in prison in Kaifeng, Henan, of medically neglected diabetes on 12 November 1969.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong

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Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.
(1902–1985)

Prominent Republican senator from Massachusetts and longtime U.S. diplomat. Born in Nahant, Massachusetts, on 5 July 1902, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.

was the grandson of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. The younger Lodge graduated from Harvard University in 1924 and worked as a journalist until 1931. After serving in the Massachusetts state legislature during 1933–1936, he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1936.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Lodge and Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan forged a bipartisan consensus behind President Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime policies. Lodge thoroughly rejected the traditional isolationist position of the Republican Party that had, ironically, been championed by his grandfather, who had led the fight against the League of Nations in 1920. Lodge won reelection in 1942, but he resigned his Senate seat in 1944 to serve in the U.S. Army as a lieutenant colonel.

In 1946 Lodge was again elected to the Senate. Paired again with Vandenberg, Lodge supported President Harry Truman's foreign policies by voting for both the Marshall Plan and U.S. entry into the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). During his second term, Lodge became convinced that the United States needed a president who could overcome latent Republican isolationism. He therefore backed General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1952 campaign, serving as Eisenhower's campaign manager. Ironically, while Eisenhower won in a landslide, Lodge lost his Senate seat to John F. Kennedy.

Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., originally an isolationist, in the years following World War II became a proponent of American internationalism and a determined opponent of Soviet expansion. Lodge served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN), the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), and to the Federal Republic of Germany (FGR, West Germany). (Yoichi R. Okamoto/ Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

Lodge served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN) during 1953–1960. He ran for vice president alongside Richard M. Nixon in 1960, an election they lost to Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. After that, Lodge became a consultant to *Time* magazine until President Kennedy named him U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in August 1963. Lodge, reacting to increasing American disaffection with the South Vietnamese government, was involved in supporting the South Vietnamese generals who toppled President Ngo Dinh Diem in a coup in November 1963. Lodge was recalled by President Johnson in January 1964 but returned as ambassador in 1965, serving until 1967. Lodge then was U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) during 1968–1969.

Republican President Richard M. Nixon appointed Lodge to head the U.S. delegation to the Vietnam peace negotiations in Paris in January 1969. In 1970 he was named Nixon's special representative to the Vatican, a position he held until 1977. Lodge died on 25 February 1985 in Beverly, Massachusetts.

Chris Tudda

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam War

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Lon Nol
(1913–1985)

Cambodian Army chief of staff (1955–1966), minister of defense (1955–1966), premier (1966–1967, 1969–1970), and president (1972–1975). Born on 13 November 1913 in Prey Veng Province, Lon Nol was educated at a lycée in Saigon during 1928–1934 and joined the French colonial civil service thereafter.

By 1951 Lon Nol had been a provincial governor, an army officer, and chief of police. In 1955 Cambodian ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk appointed him both army chief of staff and minister of defense. Initially, Lon Nol was a trusted advisor to the prince. However, Lon Nol and other conservatives opposed Sihanouk's policies.

As the Vietnam War escalated, Sihanouk sought accommodation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in order to assure Cambodia's neutrality. This involved allowing the North Vietnamese to expand their logistics net to their People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong (VC, Vietnamese Communist) forces in South Vietnam through eastern Cambodia (the Sihanouk Trail) as well as sending supplies through the port of Sihanoukville. Sihanouk's toleration of North Vietnamese violations of its sovereignty greatly antagonized the governments of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), and Sihanouk eventually broke off relations with both countries. As opposition to his policies grew, he appointed Lon Nol premier in September 1966, a post he held until April 1967.

Lon Nol was often accused of plotting to overthrow Sihanouk, but he was out of the country during October 1969–February 1970 undergoing medical treatment in France. He did meet with Sihanouk in France in January 1970 and reportedly persuaded the prince to adopt new, tough measures against communist forces operating in their Cambodian sanctuaries against South Vietnam.

In February 1970 the small Cambodian Army shelled some PAVN and VC camps in Cambodia. In March a series of anti-Vietnamese demonstrations began in Cambodia, and Lon Nol, now in Cambodia, sent Sihanouk, who was still abroad, a telegram demanding a sharp increase in the size of the Cambodian Army. Sihanouk was outraged by this, but on 18 March the Cambodian National Assembly voted to remove Sihanouk as head of state. All indications point to Lon Nol as a reluctant participant in the change of power.

The North Vietnamese were determined to retain their valuable Cambodian sanctuaries, and fighting soon began between the PAVN and the poorly equipped and abysmally trained Cambodian Army. Increasingly, the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer, Cambodian Communists), led by Pol Pot, took the lead in fighting the Cambodian Army.

Lon Nol reestablished relations with the United States, and Cambodia received significant U.S. military and financial aid. Cambodian nationalist resolve could not overcome poor training, however. In March 1972, Lon Nol suspended the constitution, imposed martial law, and took over full power as president of a Cambodian republic.

Despite direct American support in the form of air strikes against communist positions inside Cambodia (which had the ancillary effect of driving the communists deeper into the Cambodian interior), the Cambodian Army proved no match for the communist forces. Lon Nol also proved to be surprisingly inept as a leader. Although suffering from serious health problems, he rejected suggestions that he step down. He did not leave Cambodia until 2 April 1975, a few weeks before the Khmer Rouge entered the capital of Phnom Penh. After receiving medical treatment in Hawaii, he settled in California. Lon Nol died in Fullerton, California, on 17 November 1985.

Arne Kislenko and Spencer C. Tucker

Prime minister of Cambodia Lon Nol. The former minister of defense, Nol came to power at the height of the Vietnam War as the United States intensified its bombing campaign by attacking North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

See also

Cambodia; Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot; Sihanouk, Norodom; Vietnam War

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Lovett, Robert Abercrombie
(1895–1986)

U.S. secretary of defense (1951–1953). Born in Huntsville, Texas, on 14 September 1895, Robert Lovett moved in 1909 with his family to New York. He attended Yale University, temporarily dropping out to serve as a naval aviator after the United States entered World War I. In the early 1920s he joined and soon became a partner in the venerable investment bank Brown Brothers, later Brown Brothers Harriman.

Robert Lovett served in the U.S. Department of War (later the Department of Defense) and the State Department over several decades, spanning World War II and the Korean War. He played an important role as secretary of defense during 1951–1953. (Library of Congress)

In 1940 Lovett's continuing interest in aviation and his concern to build up U.S. aerial production capacities led Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to appoint him assistant secretary of war for air. For almost five years Lovett supervised the immense World War II buildup of American airpower and helped the Army Air Forces to retain some autonomy, a policy that later made it easier for the Army Air Forces to become an independent service arm.

After the war Lovett returned to private life until 1947, when his former superior George C. Marshall, to whom he was particularly close and whom President Harry S. Truman had just appointed secretary of state, persuaded Lovett to become undersecretary of state. He remained in office until late 1948, overseeing the development of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In September 1950, when Marshall became secretary of defense during the Korean War, Lovett once again served as his deputy, supervising a major military buildup and succeeding Marshall when the latter retired in late 1951.

Lovett left office when the Truman administration ended, but successive presidents repeatedly sought his views on assorted foreign policy issues, regarding him as a key member of the Wise Men, the establishment figures who presided over the mid-twentieth-century expansion of American international power. In the mid-1950s Lovett presciently warned that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had become overly enamored of covert operations. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis President John F. Kennedy consulted Lovett, who counseled moderation. He was one of the senior advisors who, by late 1967, was disillusioned with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, even though he did not attend the meeting of such Wise Men in March 1968 that ultimately counseled President Lyndon B. Johnson to withdraw American forces from Vietnam. Lovett died in Locust Valley, Long Island, New York, on 14 September 1986.

Lovett left office when the Truman administration ended, but successive presidents repeatedly sought his views on assorted foreign policy issues.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Korean War; Marshall, George Catlett; Marshall Plan; McCloy, John Jay; Military-Industrial Complex; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Truman, Harry S.; United States Air Force; Vietnam War

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Luce, Clare Boothe
(1903–1987)

Accomplished playwright, editor, journalist, U.S. congresswoman, diplomat, political activist, and wife of magazine magnate Henry R. Luce. Clare Boothe Luce was born Anne Clare Boothe on 10 April 1903 in New York City. She had a peripatetic childhood, living in New York, Chicago, Memphis, and France. Originally drawn to acting, she enrolled briefly in a New York City drama school but dropped out after less than a year. In 1923, at age twenty, she married a well-to-do clothing manufacturer she had met while working on women's rights issues. Her husband was twenty-four years her senior, and the marriage ended in 1929. Luce subsequently threw herself into writing and editing, working for *Vogue* and *Vanity Fair* magazines. In 1935 she wed Henry Luce, founder of *Time* and *Life* magazines, among others.

Luce then turned to her love of the theater. She had quit her editorial position in 1934 to devote her full energies to theatrical writing, which resulted in a number of well-received plays that appeared on Broadway. Beginning in 1940 she traveled extensively for *Life* magazine, and in 1941 she and her husband traveled to China as roving reporters. In 1942 Luce won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives from Connecticut. She was the state's first woman elected to Congress. A staunch Republican, she was highly critical of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democrats. During her two terms in office (1943–1947), Luce was often critical of Democratic foreign policy but nevertheless voted with it most of the time. She was also a key player in the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which brought nuclear energy under full civilian control in 1946. Before her term expired, she had already begun to sound the alarms about communist subversion, a precursor of McCarthyism that exploded onto the scene in 1950.

After exhaustively campaigning for Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1952 election, Luce was rewarded when the new president named her ambassador to Italy, a post she held during 1953–1956. As such, she helped mediate the

Successful journalist and playwright Clare Boothe Luce was a political conservative who served in the U.S. Congress and then was ambassador to Italy. (Library of Congress)

dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste. In 1959, Eisenhower appointed her to the ambassadorship of Brazil. However, after an acrimoniously partisan Senate confirmation process during which Luce quipped that a leading Democrat acted as if he had been "kicked in the head by a horse," she resigned the position just days after being confirmed.

Luce continued her writing, painting, and political activism, becoming increasingly identified with the far right wing of the Republican Party. In 1964 she considered a run for the U.S. Senate but was dissuaded from doing so by party leaders. She then largely retired from the public spotlight until 1981, when President Ronald Reagan appointed her to the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. She left the board in 1983. Luce died in Washington, D.C., on 9 October 1987.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Luce, Henry Robinson

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Luce, Henry Robinson
(1898–1967)

U.S. publishing magnate, influential opinion-maker, and prominent internationalist. Born on 3 April 1898 in Dengzhou, Shantung Province, China, the son of a Presbyterian missionary, Henry Luce enrolled at the elite Hotchkiss Preparatory School in Connecticut, graduated from Yale University in 1920, and studied at Oxford during 1920–1921. A brilliant student, he edited Yale's newspaper with fellow publishing enthusiast Briton Hadden. In 1923, Hadden and Luce launched *Time* magazine, which quickly became a major success. When Hadden died in 1928, Luce became head of the burgeoning publishing empire.

Luce married playwright and future Republican politician Clare Boothe in 1935. The next year he brought out *Life*, the first successful photojournalism magazine. Keenly attuned to popular trends, in 1954 he launched *Sports Illustrated*, appealing to Americans' love of entertainment sports.

Luce believed that Americans knew too little about the outside world, so he emphasized international news coverage in many of his magazines. His pro-American, procapitalist reading of global events strongly influenced the American public's perceptions of the larger world. In the 1920s and early 1930s he was attracted to fascism, and his magazines published admiring portrayals of Italy's Benito Mussolini and Spain's Francisco Franco. Later, however, Luce opposed the Axis powers. In an influential editorial titled "The American Century" in the February 1941 issue of *Life*, he called for U.S. entry into World War II and the need to accept global responsibilities.

Luce's strong anticommunism, devotion to the Republican Party, and youthful experiences in China shaped his support for Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) cause. Jiang appeared on more *Time* magazine covers than any other world leader. Like the so-called China Lobby, Luce refused to recognize the 1949 success of the Chinese Revolution, and his enormous influence helped preclude any alternative U.S. policy toward China for a generation. In the 1950s and early 1960s, he promoted the Republic of Vietnam's (ROV, South Vietnam) president Ngo Dinh Diem as America's new democratic champion in Asia. Luce and his publications backed both the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Luce died on 28 February 1967 in Phoenix, Arizona.

Michael E. Donoghue

See also

China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Containment Policy; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Ngo Dinh Diem

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Lumumba, Patrice Emery
(1925–1961)

Congolese independence leader and the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (June–September 1960). Born in Onalua, Belgian Congo, on 2 July 1925, Patrice Lumumba attended a Protestant mission school and worked for a number of years as a post office clerk. In October 1958 he formed the first nationalist political organization in the Congo, the Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement). In October 1959 he was jailed for instigating riots in Stanleyville but was released to attend the January 1960 Round Table Conference in Brussels, convened to discuss Congolese independence.

Upon the independence of the Congo in June 1960, Lumumba became the new nation's first prime minister. Only a few days later, however, Congolese soldiers mutinied, and the mineral-rich province of Katanga announced its secession. Belgium then dispatched troops to the Congo and supported the Katanga secessionist movement. Hoping to avoid a showdown and possible civil war, the United Nations (UN) dispatched a peacekeeping force to the Congo at the behest of Lumunba's government.

Lumumba's relationship with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld was tense, and UN forces were overly assertive and patronizing. Furthermore, the UN refused to intervene in the Katangan secessionist crisis and Belgian troops remained in the country. Thus, in August 1960 Lumumba broke relations with Hammarskjöld, threatened to demand the withdrawal

The first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1960, Patrice Lumumba is shown here speaking with supporters in Leopoldville on 15 October 1960 in an effort to regain his office. (Library of Congress)

of UN forces, and turned to the Soviet Union for assistance in the growing crisis. This action galvanized President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration to support the assassination of Lumumba, although Belgian plans to get rid of the radical upstart were already under way.

On 5 September 1960, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu summarily dismissed Lumumba as prime minister, a move of questionable legality that enraged Lumumba and his supporters. In early December, Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu ordered Lumumba arrested, an act carried out with the help of foreign intelligence sources that allegedly included the United States. In January 1961 Lumumba was transferred to Katanga, where he had many Belgian and Congolese enemies. On 17 January 1961 he was murdered in Katanga. While in 2001 the Belgian government acknowledged some responsibility for Lumumba's assassination, his killing has never been fully documented.

Lise Namikas

See also

Congo, Republic of the; Hammarskjöld, Dag

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Luxembourg

Small West European nation bordered by Belgium to the west and north, France to the south, and Germany to the east. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, with a 1945 population of some 290,000 people, covers just 998 square miles, making it slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Rhode Island. The people of Luxembourg speak German, French, and the national language, Letzeburgesch.

Luxembourg gained its independence after the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century. In the 1867 Treaty of London the country's autonomy was reaffirmed, and the European powers declared Luxembourg a neutral nation. Over time the nation developed a representative assembly serving under a constitutional monarchy.

During World War I and World War II, the Germans violated Luxembourg's neutrality. Following World War II, the nation shed its neutral stance and joined in several alliances. Together with the Netherlands and Belgium, Luxembourg formed the Benelux Accords. This agreement tied the three nations together in an economic union. In 1948 Luxembourg, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium signed the Brussels Pact, which pledged the five nations to collaborate economically, militarily, and socially over a fifty-year period. The signatories banded together out of a common fear of renewed German militarism. The treaty pledged that the five nations would take whatever steps necessary to combat a future attack by the Germans. One year later, in 1949, Luxembourg signed the charter establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Luxembourg also received financial aid via the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan during 1948–1952 to spur postwar economic recovery.

Although a change in the nation's constitution introduced compulsory military service during 1944–1967, throughout the Cold War Luxembourg contributed little in terms of military forces to NATO. Luxembourg's tradition of neutrality and antimilitarism and its small population virtually assured a small military force. In 1979, for example, Luxembourg had no air force and had an army of only 660 men. NATO forces were nonetheless stationed in Luxembourg throughout much of the Cold War.

Luxembourg's economy grew steadily in the post–World War II era. Much of this was centered in metallurgical industries. In 1957 Luxembourg

became one of the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC), which later became the European Union (EU). During the 1950s the country attracted foreign investors by offering enticing tax incentives. As a result, the people of Luxembourg enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in Europe. In 2002 Luxembourg adopted the euro as the nation's official currency.

Justin P. Coffey

See also

Belgium; Brussels Treaty; Europe, Western; European Economic Community; European Union; Netherlands

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Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich

(1898–1976)

Soviet biologist responsible for a theory of genetics that came to be known as Lysenkoism. Born on 29 September 1898 in Karlovka, Ukraine, to a peasant family, Trofim Lysenko attended the Kiev Agricultural Institute. In 1927 while he was working at an experimental agricultural station in Azerbaijan, the Communist Party newspaper *Pravda* trumpeted his success in developing a method of planting a winter crop of peas to sustain cattle. The achievement proved short-lived, for the crops failed in succeeding winters, but Lysenko was by then firmly established as a scientist in the Soviet style, and other triumphs soon followed.

Lysenko developed, for example, a number of theories to shorten the growing season and enhance production. One was cooling seed grains before they were planted. He claimed that this not only increased yield but that these improved qualities were then passed on. In effect, this notion of acquired characteristics was a revival of the discredited theories of seventeenth-century French scientist Jean Baptiste Lamarck, who had argued for evolution but also claimed that acquired characteristics might be inherited. According to such a theory, the giraffe, for instance, had evolved from antelopes that had stretched their necks to reach the leaves in higher branches of trees.

In 1935 the government made Lysenko a member of the All-Union Institute of Selection and Genetics and gave him his own journal, *Vernalization*, to publicize his theories and purported successes. During 1936–1938 Lysenko was the director of the institute, and from 1938 he was president of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences. In 1939 he was elected a full member and Presidium member of the USSR's Academy of Agricultural

Sciences. During 1939–1956 and 1961–1962 he was president of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and during 1940–1964 he was director of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences.

Lysenko became a centerpiece of Soviet science, in part because he represented a new kind of practical, peasant-based science divorced from the world of academics in their laboratories. This fit well with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's trumpeting of practice as more important than theory. Probably the chief reason for Lysenko's advancement, however, was his ability to motivate the peasantry, which was suffering under Stalin's policy of forced agricultural collectivization.

In a 1948 speech that Lysenko claimed had been approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he blasted genetic theories accepted in the West as "reactionary and decadent" and Western scientists as "enemies of the Soviet people." As president of Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Lysenko carried out his instructions to purge Soviet science of "harmful" ideas. Many scientists chose to admit their "errors" and fell into line. Others who refused lost their jobs. Many were also imprisoned and executed, the most prominent of the latter being biologist Nikolai Vavilov.

The science of genetics particularly suffered, for the notion of acquired characteristics fit nicely into communist theory and the project of creating a "new Soviet citizen" within a generation or two. Such ideas were ridiculed by scientists in the West, and indeed under Lysenkoism much of Soviet science, and especially agriculture, reverted back to the era of the Middle Ages.

Lysenko retained his position after Stalin's death in 1953. Under Nikita Khrushchev, however, mainstream Soviet scientists at last were given the opportunity, previously denied, to criticize Lysenko and his theories. Physicist Andrei Sakharov openly attacked Lysenko in the course of a 1964 speech before the General Assembly of the Academy of Science. Calls for the restoration of true scientific methods in biology and in agricultural science followed, and that same year Lysenko was removed from his post and assigned to an experimental farm. In 1965 a commission of scientists sent to Lysenko's farm produced a devastating critique of his methods. This report completed the ruin of his reputation when it was made public. Lysenko died in Moscow on 20 November 1976.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Khrushchev, Nikita; Sakharov, Andrei; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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M

MacArthur, Douglas
(1880–1964)

U.S. Army general and commander of the U.S. Occupation forces in Japan and of United Nations (UN) forces in the Korean War during 1950–1951. Born on 26 January 1880 at an army post near Little Rock, Arkansas, Douglas MacArthur was the son of General Arthur MacArthur, the U.S. Army's highest-ranking officer during 1906–1909. In 1903, the younger MacArthur graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and then served as an engineering officer in the United States, the Philippines, and Panama. In 1913 he began a four-year stint at the War Department General Staff.

After the United States declared war on Germany in World War I, MacArthur went to France to fight with the 42nd Division in the Champagne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne operations. From 1919 to 1922, Brigadier General MacArthur was superintendent at West Point before serving two command tours in the Philippines. Promoted to general, he became U.S. Army chief of staff in 1930. In 1935, he accepted a position as military advisor to the Philippine government, organizing Filipino defense forces over the next six years.

Recalled to service with the U.S. Army in July 1941, MacArthur became commander of U.S. Army Forces in East Asia. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, he commanded the defense of the Philippines before his departure for Australia in March 1942. He then supervised Allied military operations in the Southwest Pacific theater. Promoted late in 1944 to general of the army, he became commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific in April 1945. He then became Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in August to accept Japan's surrender and supervise the occupation. Although at times autocratic, he efficiently enacted a series of political, economic, and social reforms designed to eliminate Japanese militarist, ultranationalist, and feudal habits before implementing the reverse course that transformed Japan into a Cold War security partner of the United States.

In his capacity as SCAP, MacArthur presided nominally over the U.S. occupation of Korea. He rarely played a direct role in determining policy there, but he was a consistent advocate of early U.S. military withdrawal. Never enthusiastic about President Harry S. Truman's efforts to provide military

General Douglas MacArthur enjoyed a long and distinguished army career but was also one of the most controversial soldiers in U.S. history. MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II. President Harry S. Truman appointed MacArthur to head the United Nations Command during the Korean War but then dismissed him for insubordination, a decision that was correct but widely unpopular at the time. (National Archives and Records Administration)

and economic aid to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), MacArthur outlined a strategy in 1949 excluding it from guarantees of U.S. protection. That same year, the general lobbied for a U.S. defense commitment to Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi after the Chinese communists forced his flight to Taiwan. A dedicated anticommunist, MacArthur's efforts to boost Jiang's Nationalist government on Taiwan against the People's Republic of China (PRC) intensified the Cold War in postwar Asia.

When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) attacked South Korea in June 1950, President Truman immediately committed ground troops in response to MacArthur's recommendation. Named head of the United Nations Command (UNC), he pressed for the full use of U.S. military power in Korea. After his controversial Inchon landing succeeded in September 1950, he enthusiastically embraced the Truman administration's decision to eliminate North Korea's communist regime. But by then MacArthur's relations with Truman were strained because of the general's continued pressure for stronger action to help the Chinese Nationalists topple the PRC.

During October 1950 as UN forces pushed northward, MacArthur downplayed the danger of Chinese involvement. At the Wake Island Conference, he assured Truman that the PRC's threat was a bluff and even if carried out would not impede achievement of U.S. war aims. After China's massive intervention in late November, MacArthur blamed the retreat and other battlefield problems on restrictions against attacking China, while rejecting the wisdom of seeking an armistice. But in March 1951, the front stabilized near the prewar border along the 38th Parallel. Informed of Truman's impending cease-fire initiative, MacArthur torpedoed it by issuing a public demand that Chinese forces surrender or face attacks upon their homeland. Then came release of his letter to a congressman characterizing Truman's policy in Korea as appeasement. MacArthur's insubordination and attempts to undermine Truman's conduct of the war prompted the president to relieve him of his command on 11 April 1951.

Politically ambitious, MacArthur already had increased Cold War tensions when he sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1948. After Truman fired him, MacArthur looked for vindication and took his case directly to the American public. Despite broad popular affection for the general as a war hero and frustration regarding Korea, neither average citizens nor most civilian and military officials favored a wider Asian war. During the U.S. Senate's investigation of MacArthur's firing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) voiced opposition to his plan to escalate the war. In 1952, when the American people elected a general as president, it would not be MacArthur but rather Dwight D.

Eisenhower. MacArthur then dropped out of public life, making only occasional public appearances. He died at Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, D.C., on 5 April 1964.

James I. Matray

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; East Asia; Japan, Occupation after World War II; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Truman, Harry S.; United States Army

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Machine Guns

Machine guns are relatively heavy, rapid-firing small arms that can provide continuous or frequent bursts of automatic fire until their ammunition is expended. Firing rounds of 15mm or less in diameter, machine guns, unlike automatic cannon, do not shoot explosive shells, but their high rates of fire make them ideal for suppressing an enemy unit's movements or fire. That enables them to dominate infantry combat except in the presence of tanks or artillery fire, and they can be found in virtually every tactical military unit and on nearly all combat vehicles. It also made them a key component in the tactical doctrines of both the Western and Soviet blocs.

During the Cold War, both sides equipped their combat vehicles with machine guns. Their infantry doctrines differed slightly in machine gun employment, however. The West used machine guns as platoon- to company-level fire support weapons, while the Soviet bloc deployed them down to squads, the lowest tactical infantry component.

All modern machine guns are air-cooled, that is, their barrels are exposed to the air and designed to be swapped out with a cooler barrel if the installed barrel becomes overheated. Many older machine guns had a water jacket around the barrel so that the weapon could be fired continuously without interruption. Few water-cooled machine guns remain in service today, but they were found in most Soviet bloc militaries to the very end of the Cold War.

Machine guns are categorized by their caliber, method of employment, or construction. The three categories of machine gun are heavy, medium, and light. Heavy machine guns (HMGs) fire the .50-caliber (12.7mm) cartridge and, when not mounted on a vehicle, require at least two people to operate them. Those not mounted on a vehicle are mounted on a carriage or tripod. The world's most commonly employed HMG is the .50-caliber M-2

A U.S. Army soldier, wearing goggles and carrying an M-60, 7.62mm machine gun, runs with his comrades through blowing sand during a joint U.S.-Egyptian military training exercise in 1988. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Browning HMG, which entered service in 1933, although its basic design dates back to 1918. Built in the United States and under license in a dozen other countries, the M-2 is found in many infantry units as tripod-mounted battalion weapon but is more commonly seen mounted on military vehicles, tanks, and naval vessels. Its primary counterpart is the Soviet-designed Degtyarev DShK 1938/46 HMG. The DShK 1938/46 also uses a 12.7mm cartridge and can be mounted on a wheeled carriage but is more commonly mounted on military vehicles.

The Soviets introduced the heaviest machine gun to see service during the Cold War, the 14.5mm KPV HMG, which employed the same round as the Soviet Draganov antitank rifle of World War II. This heavy and very powerful weapon proved deadly against unarmored vehicles and most buildings and was fairly effective as an antiaircraft weapon when employed in quad mountings as the ZPU-4. It was the standard armament for the BTR-50 and BRMD armored vehicles and can now be seen mounted on trucks and other vehicles in such combat zones as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and Angola. Soviet satellite countries imported large numbers of DShK 1938s and KPVs and manufactured thousands under license. They remain in service with the Russian, Chinese, and many Middle Eastern militaries today.

Medium machine guns (MMGs) and light machine guns (LMGs) fire the much smaller, traditional rifle ammunition, that is, less than .50-caliber

(12.7mm). MMGs are crew-served, tripod or carriage mounted, air-cooled weapons intended to provide continuous suppression fire. They largely have been removed from service because their weight, which equals that of an HMG, inhibits their mobility in heavy terrain without providing the penetrating firepower of HMGs. The Chinese and Vietnamese armies are the only militaries that use these weapons today.

MMGs were replaced in most Western armies by LMGs that fire the same rifle-caliber round and can be mounted on a vehicle or tripod or equipped with a bipod. Those that could be easily adapted to so many uses and platforms were often called general-purpose machine guns to separate them from those employed only as squad-level weapons or coaxial machine guns on armored vehicles. Tripod-mounted LMGs employ a crew of three, while the same machine gun, equipped with a bipod, is worked by a crew of two to three men, varying in different armies.

The tripod provides a more stable firing platform, enabling the gunner to engage targets more accurately at longer range than can be achieved by firing from the prone position with a bipod. Squad automatic weapons (SAWs) essentially are LMGs that fire the same short rounds as modern assault rifles. Most modern armies center their smallest tactical units, the fire team (United States) or squads (most other countries), around SAWs.

Both sides entered the Cold War equipped with weapons developed or produced during World War II. However, by the mid-1950s, both sides introduced machine guns derived from the lessons learned in that war and the lesser conflicts that followed. By 1954, Western nations centered their various machine gun models on the standard 7.62 × 51mm cartridge ammunition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They derived their machine gun designs from the German MG-34 and MG-42 of World War II, however. The U.S. M-60, West German MG-3, Swiss SIG MG-710, and Belgian FN MAG are all descendants of those German weapons. The American M-60 saw the widest service during the Cold War, followed by the FN MAG. In Western nations, the bipod-equipped variants were used as platoon weapons, while company weapons platoons mounted the same machine guns on tripods for longer-range support.

In Soviet doctrine, machine guns were found at every level of military unit.

In Soviet doctrine, machine guns were found at every level of infantry unit, down to the squad level. Their equivalent to the NATO M-60/Belgian FN MAG was the PK, which used the same long 7.62mm cartridge as the Draganov sniper rifle. Like its Western counterparts, it came in both tripod (PKMB) and bipod (PK) versions. The Soviets also designed an LMG around the Soviet Union's shorter-range 7.62 × 39mm (M-43) cartridge, the same cartridge as the AK-47 assault rifle. The resulting Degtyarev RPD became the most produced LMG of the Cold War era. Found in every squad of every Soviet bloc ground and internal security unit as well as virtually all insurgent forces, it was widely imported and manufactured under license. Romania, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) copied and manufactured the gun. It was replaced in the early 1960s by the RPK, which uses the same round as the then-new AKM

assault rife. The RPD's and RPK's effectiveness as squad-level weapons triggered the Western development of SAWs.

One of the most notable developments in small arms during the Cold War was the 1963 introduction of the Stoner 63 system. An American, Eugene Stoner, assembled a weapons kit, or set of weapons parts that can be used to transform one basic weapon to perform six different tasks. By exchanging barrels, stocks, and magazines, the basic weapon can be changed into an assault rifle, an LMG, an MMG, and a vehicle-mounted machine gun. The U.S. Stoner 63A first utilized the 7.62mm NATO cartridge and later the 5.56mm NATO as well as the Belgian FN M-246 (M-1N1N1). His weapons system never saw widespread service, but it was highly prized by U.S. Navy Special Forces units during the Vietnam War.

Michio Asakawa and Carl Otis Schuster

See also
Small Arms

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Maclean, Donald
(1913–1983)

British spy and member of the Cambridge Five spy network. Born on 25 May 1913 in London, Donald Duart Maclean was to become legendary as a member of a group of five Cambridge University students who converted to Marxism in the 1930s and then spent all or a portion of their professional lives spying for the Soviet Union. Maclean excelled at the Greshams School, and in 1931 he enrolled at Trinity Hall, Cambridge University, and studied foreign languages. There he became associated with the fellow students who would come to be known as the Cambridge Five. In the midst of the Great Depression of the 1930s, he saw communism as the remedy for the plight of the British working class and was more than willing to spy for the Soviet Union. Taking first-class honors from Cambridge in 1934, that same year he immediately joined the British Foreign Office, where he remained for seventeen years. In 1951 he was appointed head of the American Department of the Foreign Office.

Maclean's Foreign Office career abruptly ended in 1951. British MI5 had recently concluded that the Venona decrypts indicated that the coded messages sent under the cryptogram "Homer" had come from Maclean. Kim

Philby, another of the Cambridge Five, was working in the United States as a liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and learned that Maclean was to be interrogated by MI5. Philby manipulated the recall to London of fellow British spy Guy Burgess, then at the British embassy, in order to warn Maclean that his cover had been blown. Maclean, accompanied by Burgess, fled to the Soviet Union in May 1951. In contrast to Burgess, Maclean accepted his new Soviet life and worked within it. In fact, he cooperated with Soviet officials, became a Soviet citizen, was made a colonel in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), and worked as a foreign policy analyst under the name of Mark Frazer until his death in Moscow on 6 March 1983.

Ernie Teagarden

See also

Cambridge Five; Espionage; MI5; MI6; United Kingdom

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Macmillan, Maurice Harold
(1894–1986)

British Conservative Party politician, minister of housing (1951–1954), minister of defense (1954–1955), foreign secretary (1955), chancellor of the exchequer (1955–1957), and prime minister (1957–1963). Harold Macmillan, half-American by parentage, was born on 10 February 1894 in London into the prosperous Macmillan publishing family. He was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford, but wartime service prevented him from finishing his degree. He saw combat in World War I as a captain and was wounded three times. He then worked for the family firm.

Elected to Parliament from Stockton-on-Tees in 1924, Macmillan held his seat until 1929 and again from 1931 to 1964. His reading of Britain during the 1930s led him to a progressive, mildly statist form of conservatism, the philosophy of which was expressed in his book *The Middle Way* (1937). In 1942, Prime Minister Winston Churchill appointed Macmillan resident minister at Allied Forces Headquarters in the Mediterranean, where he formed a friendship with U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Beginning in 1951, Macmillan served as a successful minister of housing before moving to defense in 1954 and then the foreign office in April 1955. He moved to the treasury in December 1955, a post he held until 1957. As

Harold Macmillan served as prime minister of Great Britain from 1957 to 1963. During that time, he helped to rehabilitate the reputations of both the British Conservative Party and Great Britain following the debacle of the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis. (Library of Congress)

chancellor of the exchequer during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Macmillan had to convey to Prime Minister Anthony Eden the severity of the economic pressure being applied to the United Kingdom by the United States, which had furiously condemned Britain's role in the crisis.

Despite having prevaricated during the crisis—initially he was very hawkish—Macmillan ascended to the premiership upon Eden's forced resignation in January 1957. Macmillan's most immediate task was to mend fences with the United States, and he traveled to meet his old friend Eisenhower, now president of the United States, in Bermuda later in 1957.

Decolonization, particularly in Africa, was a major theme during Macmillan's premiership, and in 1960 he toured that continent, delivering his famous "Wind of Change" speech in South Africa, a formal acknowledgment of the growth of African national consciousness. He also developed a generally cordial relationship with U.S. President John F. Kennedy. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis there were frequent phone calls between the White House and 10 Downing Street, with Kennedy ostensibly seeking advice although in reality seeking affirmation for his policies. Yet at the December 1962 Nassau meeting with Kennedy, the two principals engaged in robust diplomatic exchanges as Macmillan pressed the Americans to provide Polaris missiles to Britain. Perhaps his greatest foreign policy triumph came in the summer of 1963, when he signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Americans and Soviets.

In 1963 Macmillan was greatly embarrassed by the Profumo Affair, when his defense minister, John Profumo, confessed to lying to Parliament about having shared the same mistress as the Russian defense attaché in London, Evgeny Ivanov. That same year French President Charles de Gaulle rather capriciously vetoed Britain's belated application to join the Common Market (European Union).

During Macmillan's successful 1959 election campaign, he had declared that "most of our people have never had it so good," yet in the early 1960s there were indeed serious economic problems, which Macmillan addressed with improvised institutional initiatives including the dismissal of seven cabinet members in the so-called Night of the Long Knives in 1962. With his popularity waning and the economic scene not much improved, Macmillan became ill in the summer of 1963 and resigned as prime minister in October. Made Earl of Stockton in 1984 during the Margaret Thatcher government, he took great pleasure in criticizing her policies. Macmillan died on 29 December 1986 in Chelwood Gate, Sussex.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Cuban Missile Crisis; Decolonization; De Gaulle, Charles; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Missiles, Polaris; Profumo Affair; Suez Crisis; Thatcher, Margaret; United Kingdom

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Madman Strategy

President Richard M. Nixon's plan to bluff the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) into ending the Vietnam War. Nixon had been vice president under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and as president sought to utilize Eisenhower's 1953 tactic in Korea. Shortly after he had become president, Eisenhower had let it be known that if the Korean stalemate continued, he would seek to win the war militarily, even with nuclear weapons. An armistice was concluded three months later.

Nixon ignored other factors leading to the armistice, including the death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Nixon believed that Eisenhower's bluff, which he called the Madman Theory, had been instrumental in the armistice. As he told his aide Bob Haldeman, "I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do *anything* to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button'—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace."

Nixon's strategy did not work with Hanoi, and ultimately Nixon fell back on, and intensified, the same failed policies of President Lyndon Johnson's administration, especially the use of airpower. As Nixon's national security advisor, later secretary of state, Henry Kissinger noted in his book, *White House Years*, "unfortunately, alternatives to bombing the North were hard to come by."

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam War

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Magsaysay, Ramon
(1907–1957)

Filipino politician, secretary of national defense (1950–1953), and president of the Philippines (1953–1957). Born the son of a schoolteacher on 31 August 1907 in Iba, Zambales Province, Ramon Magsaysay in 1927 enrolled at the College of Liberal Arts at the University of the Philippines and went on to obtain a bachelor's degree in commerce from Jose Rizal College in 1932. After graduation, he joined a bus company in Manila as a mechanic and rose to be the company's manager.

Magsaysay fought against the Japanese following their invasion of the Philippines beginning in December 1941 and became a captain in the Philippine Army's 31st Division. In April 1942 he joined a group of U.S. Army officers who continued guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and became known as the Zambales Guerrillas. The Japanese military listed Magsaysay as Japan's "Enemy Number One." He led his followers in liberating Zambales ahead of the arrival of American forces on 29 January 1945, and he became the military governor of Zambales the next month.

Intelligent and a dynamic speaker and debater, Magsaysay was elected to the Philippine Congress from Zambales on the Liberal Party ticket in April 1946 and was reelected in 1949. In 1950, President Elpidio Quirino appointed him secretary of national defense. Magsaysay helped improve army morale and played a leading role in the defeat of the communist Hukbalahap (Huk) guerrilla insurgency and in the capture of its entire politburo within a month of assuming office. In combating the Huk insurgency, Magsaysay worked closely with U.S. Army Colonel Edward Lansdale. Magsaysay's land program is also credited with playing an important role in disarming a number of the guerrillas.

A man of great conviction, Magsaysay fought corruption in politics. He resigned his cabinet post after a falling out with Quirino in 1953 and switched to the Nacionalista Party. Magsaysay then won the 1953 presidential elections against Quirino.

In foreign policy, President Magsaysay's staunch anticommunism won him American support and led ultimately to the formation of the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), with Manila as its headquarters. On the home front, Magsaysay embarked on major land reform initiatives and began governmental restructuring. His career was abruptly ended when he was killed in a plane crash near Cebu in the Philippines on 17 March 1957.

Udai Bhanu Singh

See also

Hukbalahap; Lansdale, Edward Geary; Philippines; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

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Maizière, Lothar de
(1940–)

Last premier of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The career of Lothar de Maizière is perhaps the most unusual of any Soviet bloc politician. Born in Nordhausen, Germany, on 2 March 1940, he started off as a violinist, studying at the College of Music in Berlin and earning a position with the Berlin Symphony Orchestra. He then entered law school at Humboldt University. In 1957, he joined the Christian Democratic Union, one of the five bloc parties allowed to operate in the GDR, as well as the Synod of Protestant Churches. He became vice president of the latter organization in 1985.

When Erich Honecker's regime collapsed on 9 November 1989 and Hans Modrow formed a new communist reform cabinet, Maizière became minister for religious affairs and the deputy premier. He resigned both posts in January 1990, however, advocating the union of the two Germanies. Campaigning on a reunification platform, he won election to the East German parliament in the first and only free elections held in that state. He became premier of a coalition government, succeeding Modrow. Within months, he negotiated the end of the GDR.

Assigned to the post of minister without portfolio in the unification government of Helmut Kohl, Maizière once again resigned, this time over allegations that he had worked earlier in his career for the East German Ministry of State Security (Stasi). Maizière never faced any formal charges, however. He currently resides in Berlin.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

German Democratic Republic; Honecker, Erich; Kohl, Helmut; Modrow, Hans; Stasi

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Makarios III, Archbishop
(1913–1977)

Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and first president of Cyprus (1959–1977). Born the son of a shepherd in Pano Panayia, Cyprus, on 13 August 1913, Makarios III's birth name was Mikhail Khristodolou Mouskos. He became a novice monk in the Kykkos monastery, adopting the name of

Archbishop Makarios III headed the Cypriot Orthodox Church from 1950 to 1977. Although he sought to unite Cyprus with Greece, the proposed partitioning of the island between the Greek and Turkish communities prompted him to sign an agreement that made Cyprus an independent nation in 1959. Makarios was president of Cyprus from 1959 to 1977. (Library of Congress)

Makarios, and studied theology at the University of Athens and Boston University. Ordained in 1946, he was elected bishop of Kition in 1948. In 1950 he organized a plebiscite among Greek Cypriots, who represented 80 percent of the island's population, which indicated strong support for union with Greece (enosis). Makarios was elected archbishop of Cyprus on 18 October 1950 as Makarios III and became known as a champion of enosis.

In February 1954 Makarios III met with Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos, who tacitly supported enosis. In April 1955 Makarios lent his support to General Georgios Grivas, leader of the terrorist National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOAK), to begin an armed campaign against British forces, which still controlled the island. Makarios III's support of terrorism led British authorities to exile him in 1956 to the Seychelles. In 1957 he left the Seychelles and took up residence in Athens, where he kept up his enosis campaign.

In 1958, however, Makarios seemed to change his attitude toward enosis and suggested in an interview that he was prepared to accept Cypriot independence. After the Greeks and Turks decided to move forward with Cypriot independence in February 1959, he was elected president on 13 December 1959, with a Turkish Cypriot as vice president. Makarios initially tried to unite the Greek and Turkish communities, but his efforts were stymied by deep-seated ethnic hostilities and individuals who still wished to go forward with enosis. In November 1963 Makarios sought amendments to the constitution, a request that led to violent clashes between Greeks and Turks on the island. In December 1967 he was forced to accede to a Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration in charge of Turkish affairs.

In February 1968 Makarios won reelection to the presidency of Cyprus, but in 1973 the three other Cypriot bishops asked him to resign. Makarios refused, standing successfully for a third term in 1973. His time in office was marked by repeated assassination attempts by enosis supporters who claimed that he had betrayed the cause.

In July 1974 a Greek-sponsored coup deposed Makarios, and he was forced to flee the country, first to Malta and then to London. Turkey used this as a pretext to invade the northern third of Cyprus, proclaiming a separate state in the north. Makarios returned to Cyprus as president in December 1974 and died on 3 August 1977 in Nicosia.

Lucian N. Leustean

See also

Cyprus; Greece; Papagos, Alexander; Turkey

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Malan, Daniel François
(1874–1959)

Afrikaner nationalist politician and first prime minister of the apartheid government of South Africa (1948–1954). Born on 22 May 1874 in Riebeeck West, South Africa, Daniel Malan earned an undergraduate degree at Victoria College, Stellenbosch, and a doctorate in theology from the University of Utrecht, Holland, in 1905. Upon his return to South Africa a decade later, he was ordained a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church in 1905 and joined the new National Party in July 1915. Malan then went on to edit the party's newspaper, *De Burger*, and entered parliament in 1918.

When the National Party first came to power in 1924, Malan became minister of internal affairs, education, and public health. However, he refused to follow the leader of the National Party into a merger with the South African Party, and in 1934 he took the lead in creating a new "purified" National Party, which won the 1948 general election on a platform that included apartheid, a comprehensive system of rigid racial segregation.

Malan, a strong anticommunist, became prime minister in May 1948 and took advantage of the Cold War fears of South Africa's Western allies, none of whom came out strongly against the new apartheid policies that his government introduced. In 1950 Malan's government pushed through parliament the wide-ranging Suppression of Communism Act, which was to be used to suppress opposition to apartheid. Before the act became law, the Communist Party of South Africa had dissolved itself, to emerge some years later as the underground South African Communist Party.

Although the apartheid laws embarrassed many Western nations, Britain and the United States nevertheless saw South Africa under Malan as a relatively strong state friendly to the West. In addition, the West took advantage of South Africa's bountiful natural resources, most notably its supply of uranium, and realized that the country occupied a strategic position on the sea route around the African continent. In the Cold War context, therefore, the leading Western powers tolerated South Africa's apartheid regime because of its geopolitical importance.

Malan left office and retired from politics in November 1956. He died in Stellenbosch on 7 February 1959.

Christopher Saunders

See also

South Africa; Vorster, Balthazar Johannes

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Malayan Emergency
(1948–1960)

Twelve-year guerrilla war that began on 18 June 1948. The conflict was an indigenous attempt by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to overthrow British colonial rule. Expected to last no more than a few months, the insurgency continued until 31 July 1960, three years after Malaya had gained its independence. The Malayan Emergency was Britain's longest colonial conflict and turned out to be far more costly in human and material terms than anyone could have foreseen.

The war's immediate catalyst was the murder of three rubber plantation managers in Perak, Malaya, on 16 June 1948. Two days later the British high commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, declared a state of emergency. The MCP guerrillas in the mobile corps committed the murders three months after the party had called for an armed insurrection against British rule. The conflict was called an "emergency" for economic reasons, as London insurance companies would only cover property losses to Malayan rubber and tin estates during riot or commotion in an emergency but not in an armed insurrection or civil war.

The Malayan Emergency was rooted primarily in postwar economic and political dislocations in Malaya. Despite the importance of these local factors, however, the predominant explanation for both the origins of the insurgency and the British determination to defeat it was the Cold War paradigm of communist containment. The inaugural conference of the Cominform in September 1947 and the Calcutta conference of the Indian Communist Party in February 1948, which adopted Andrei Zhdanov's two-camps thesis, were presumed to be linked to the armed rebellions against colonial rule in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines.

Britain coveted its role in Southeast Asia, as it relied on the region for both economic and strategic reasons. Britain's massive military commitment to defeat the insurgency (by October 1950 nearly 50,000 British troops were deployed) at a time of severe postwar fiscal austerity had a significant economic dimension. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, the British were determined to return to Malaya, and Malaya's dollar-earning potential made British control over its colonial possession absolutely essential. In dollar terms, rubber sales exceeded in total value all other domestic exports from Great Britain to the United States. Interruption of that supply would inflict significant damage to the British economy. When the insurgency commenced, Britain was

A Malayan man showing a soldier his identity card, which all locals must carry, 1949. This was during the twelve-year Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), when the Malayan Communist Party attempted to end British colonial rule. (Bert Hardy/Getty Images)

struggling to maintain the value of its currency. This made earnings from the Sterling Area, of which Malaya was the linchpin, all the more vital. Crushing the insurgency would ensure the maintenance of British economic interests.

But the insurrection was not easy to quell. Initially, the British response was fitful, uncertain, and inept. Not until 1950, when Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs became director of operations, did the British initiate a more systematic and coordinated approach to the crisis. Britain's new program, in which the insurgents were detached from their supply sources and their support bases, provided a key breakthrough in the rebellion. Through a major relocation process, which prefigured the American policy of strategic hamlets in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam), more than half a million Chinese squatters living near guerrilla areas were moved into 450 so-called New Villages. The villages hampered MCP operations and increased their vulnerability to the military operations of British-controlled security forces.

This population control, initiated by Briggs, was harsh but effective. It was prosecuted even more vigorously by General Sir Gerald Templer, who was appointed high commissioner with full powers over the military, police, and civilian authorities in early 1952. Templer also fought the counterinsurgency on other fronts. He developed an efficient, synchronized, and expanded intelligence apparatus; invented and implemented the concept of hearts and

minds; enlarged the intelligence budget so that informers could be paid; and coordinated the use of sophisticated black propaganda and psyops by MI6 personnel.

Aerial warfare was refined as well. Safe conduct passes accompanied by promises of monetary rewards were air-dropped to encourage or accelerate defections. Aerial drops of millions of strategic leaflets, such as handwritten letters and photographs from surrendered guerrillas, were used in conjunction with voice aircraft to personalize propaganda. British aircraft also dropped 1,000-pound bombs, chemical defoliants, and napalm on MCP jungle camps.

By 1954, when Templer departed, these measures had transformed the conflict. The insurgents had been forced back into the jungle, where they struggled to sustain themselves. In 1955 the MCP offered, in vain, to negotiate a settlement. In 1957, upon Malaya's independence, the insurgency lost its motive as a war of colonial liberation. In 1958, after mass defections, the MCP demobilized, and by 1960 the movement was limited to a small nucleus hiding on the Malayan-Thai border, from which it conducted hit-and-run raids along the northern Malay Peninsula for the next twenty-five years. A final peace settlement was signed on 2 December 1989.

The Malayan Emergency cast a long shadow over the new nation. Its mythology has come to dominate the modern history of Malaya, and it became a benchmark of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. For Americans embarking on military involvement in Vietnam and wishing to apply successful British strategies, the Malayan Emergency became the quintessential counterinsurgency primer.

Phillip Deery

See also

Cominform; Containment Policy; Decolonization; Malaysia; United Kingdom; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

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Malaysia

Southeast Asian nation on the Malay Peninsula and also including Sarawak and Sabah in the northern portion of Borneo. Malaysia comprises 127,316 square miles, making it slightly larger than the U.S. state of New Mexico. Malaysia is bordered by Thailand to the north, the South China Sea to the east and south, and the Strait of Malacca to the west. In 1945, Malaysia had a population of some 6 million people. As with many other Southeast Asian states, Malaysia gained independence during the Cold War. Its multiethnic

and religiously diverse population complicated development of a truly Malaysian identity, and like other countries in the region it endured revolution and internal conflict. But unlike some Southeast Asian nations, Malaysia emerged from its troubled past as one of the most stable, economically advanced countries in Asia.

The Malay Peninsula was for centuries the crossroads of Eastern and Western civilizations. Independent sultanates interacted with Portuguese, Dutch, British, and Siamese (Thai) interests in the region for nearly 300 years. It was not until the late nineteenth century, however, that most sultanates were united under British rule as the Federated States of Malaya. Within the so-called residential system, the British controlled government administration, while Malay rulers retained sovereignty. In effect, this co-opted the sultans into the British Empire.

Although anticolonial movements existed before, it was not until World War II that nationalism swept Malaya. The Japanese conquest of Malaya in early 1942 signaled the decline of the British Empire in Asia, and radical Malay nationalists heralded the Japanese as liberators from colonial rule. The Japanese generally respected Islam, the predominant religion in Malaya, by allowing clerical councils considerable latitude. Sultans retained their authority and in many instances openly cooperated with the Japanese authorities.

However, many Chinese and Indians in Malaya were killed, forced into slave labor, or starved to death by the Japanese. The radically different treatment that these groups received only aggravated ethnic tensions in Malaya, and the Chinese and Indians considered the Malay population complicit with Japanese occupation policies. Some, mainly Chinese, joined the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and resisted the Japanese. The MCP was loosely allied with the Western powers but was also anticolonial and opposed to the restoration of British rule.

Even before the war had ended, Britain began reorganizing Malayan states to better suit ethnic and religious divisions in the territories. In April 1946 the Malayan Union was formed, joining the peninsular states with the Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca, while Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo became Crown colonies. All were under the authority of a governor-general. Malay leaders initially opposed this reconfiguration, but the British convinced them that Malay-dominated independence would be granted. Moreover, the British promised economic recovery premised on Malaya's rubber and mineral wealth.

In July 1946 the British government began constitutional talks with the newly formed United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Debate centered on the authority of sultans and on British proposals to extend citizenship to all ethnic groups in a multiracial union. The talks produced the Federation of Malaya, inaugurated in February 1948. Britain maintained its colonial administration, while Malay rulers kept control of individual states. Citizenship was restrictive and heavily favored the Malays, but through this collaboration the British hoped to avoid a more radical nationalist movement as witnessed in Indochina, Burma, and especially Indonesia.

Malayan Insurgency, 1948 – 1960

The restoration of Dutch rule in Indonesia after World War II had provoked violent revolution there, which the British feared would lead to Pan-Malay nationalism. After Indonesia won independence in 1949, the worry became communism, which gained support among its Chinese population. Both British and Malay rulers feared that with a large Chinese population of its own, the federation could face a communist insurgency such as Indonesia had experienced.

In fact, the MCP was composed mostly of Chinese and opposed both British rule and Malay domination. Few Malays joined the movement, but there were recruits from Indonesia. Beginning in June 1948 with the murder of three estate managers, the MCP launched a widespread insurgency through its armed wing, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). For the British, this began a twelve-year period of conflict known as the Malayan Emergency.

There is debate over whether the insurgency was part of an international campaign of revolutions orchestrated by the Soviet Union and China or was stimulated by the marginalization of Malaya's Chinese population and poor economic conditions. There are also questions about how and why the Malayan Emergency lasted so long, especially considering that MCP leadership was notoriously divided. Clearly, British officials failed to anticipate the insurgency and were slow to react, but international pressures were also a factor. Britain was hard-pressed economically after the war, and it abandoned large parts of its empire, including India and Burma. And defense spending rose sharply after the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War. In short, the problem in Malaya revealed the larger limitations of Britain's imperial power.

At first, British and Commonwealth forces struggled against the insurgency. The October 1951 assassination of Henry Gurney, Britain's high commissioner in Malaya, marked a particularly low point. But the approach that Gurney and his successor, Sir Gerald Templer, took in fighting the Malayan Emergency was ultimately successful. Economic and social progress was seen as the key to undermining communism's appeal, so Templer embarked on major socioeconomic reforms. The resettlement of Chinese squatters also disrupted the MRLA's network. Above all, reforms to citizenship law helped integrate non-Malays, easing Chinese alienation. Multiracial political parties, rather than those based strictly within communities, were encouraged. But doubtful that this would actually happen, British administrators supported the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), anticommunist groups that wrestled away from the MCP the hearts and minds of non-Malays.

By 1953 counterinsurgency operations were proving successful, and by mid-1954 the strategy of political cooperation also seemed to be working. In July 1954, the Alliance Party—uniting UMNO, the MCA, and the MIC—was born. It dominated national elections in July 1955, committed fully to fight the insurgency, and moved quickly with the British to plan Malaya's independence. The communist strategy had clearly backfired. Rather than dividing Malaya, the Malayan Emergency brought ethnic groups together in a staunchly anticommunist alliance linked to Britain. With the signing of

the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement in 1957, Britain continued counterinsurgency efforts while moving toward Malayan independence, which was finally achieved on 31 August 1957.

There was only slight support for the MCP from the Soviet Union and China, as Indonesia and Indochina received the most attention from Moscow and Beijing. Conversely, the United States supported Britain's counterinsurgency efforts, which furthered the Anglo-American special relationship. This was particularly the case with one of the leaders of the counterinsurgent strategy, Sir Robert Thompson, who held a variety of posts in Malaya, including secretary for defense (1959–1961), and later advised the United States in Vietnam. With the disintegration of the MRLA, the Malayan Emergency ended in 1960. Malaya had survived the communist threat.

In 1963 Britain yielded Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to the renamed Federation of Malaysia. It then backed Malaysia in its confrontation with Indonesia, which opposed the federation's acquisitions of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo. As part of his Crush Malaysia campaign, Indonesia's President Sukarno broke off diplomatic relations and withdrew from the United Nations (UN). War seemed a real possibility, but Britain stood fast behind Malaysia, clearly sobering Indonesia. In this Britain retained some of its imperial glory in Southeast Asia while allowing for a relatively peaceful process of decolonization.

The Chinatown area in Kuala Lumpur on 17 May 1969, following days of racial rioting between Chinese and Malay mobs that left one hundred persons dead. (Bettmann/Corbis)

There were, however, other problems facing Malaysia. Secessionist movements in Penang, Johor, and Kelantan complicated the federation. Singapore, largely Chinese in population, withdrew from the federation to become an independent country in 1965 because of disputes involving revenue sharing and political representation. As always, the balance of power between Malays and non-Malays remained a constant worry. Malaysia's first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957–1970), survived these challenges by maintaining the multiracial Alliance Party. Malaysia even managed considerable foreign policy successes, such as gaining an elected seat to the UN Security Council (1965) and helping to form the 1967 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Following the May 1969 elections, however, violent race riots broke out, and Rahman was accused of abandoning Malay constituencies in favor of the Chinese and Indians. UMNO was seriously divided, with some members defecting to the opposition Parti Islam se Tanah Malaya (PAS, Pan-Malayan Islamic Party). Many Chinese joined the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which became the main vehicle for political participation by non-Malays. The Alliance Party quickly fell apart. Rahman resigned as prime minister in September 1970 and as UMNO president in June 1971.

The 1969 riots did, however, force examination of government and legal structures in Malaysia. Parliament was temporarily disbanded and replaced by the National Operations Council, a sixty-seven-member body representing the major ethnic groups, trade unions, professions, and religious bodies. The council worked to secure the rights and representation of non-Malays while guaranteeing the special position of Malay language, culture, and the Islamic faith. Economic prosperity was considered the key to combating racial and ethnic tensions. Yet urban centers, where most Chinese and Indians lived, were better off than rural areas, where the Malay majority resided. The council therefore adopted policies to advance the *bumiputra* (sons of the soil), the predominantly Malay lower classes.

Under Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammad (1981–2003), economic development for Malays became the overriding concern. This focus, however, came at the expense of the non-Malay community, which was checked by the domination of UMNO. Thus, although ostensibly a democracy, in effect Malaysia emerged in the 1980s as a unitary state. Behind the veneer of a multiracial federation, Malaysia had become a predominantly Malay country. Through the draconian 1960 Internal Security Act (ISA), a vestige of British law from the Malayan Emergency, Mahatir undermined all opposition. Human rights violations against non-Malay activists, particularly during the late 1980s, went largely ignored by the world community. Instead, Malaysia's moderate Islam, economic prosperity, and leading role in ASEAN lent it credibility as one of Southeast Asia's most economically successful and developed countries.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Decolonization; Indonesia; Lee Kuan Yew; Malayan Emergency; Singapore; Southeast Asia; Sukarno; Thompson, Sir Robert; United Kingdom

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Malcolm X
(1925–1965)

African American nationalist leader who became a militant champion of civil rights in the 1960s and greatly influenced black militant and separatist groups, including the Black Panthers. Born on 19 May 1925 in Omaha, Nebraska, the son of a black itinerant minister, Malcolm Little moved with his family in 1929 to East Lansing, Michigan. In 1942 he dropped out of school and moved to Boston. In the years that followed, he became involved in criminal activities and in 1946 was sentenced to ten years in prison for burglary.



Malcolm X was a militant African American leader and chief spokesman for the Nation of Islam. He is shown here during a press conference in 1964. (Library of Congress)

While in prison, Little became an adherent of the religious teachings of the Nation of Islam, a black nationalist sect that preached black power and denounced whites as "devils." After his release from prison in 1952, Little dropped his surname and adopted "X," which signified the lost name of his African ancestry. Malcolm X soon became the Nation of Islam's most successful spokesman and organizer. As the civil rights movement gained momentum in the early 1960s, he repeatedly attacked the nonviolent, civil disobedience philosophy of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr.

In December 1963 Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad suspended Malcolm X from the organization after a period of growing antagonism between the two men. Muhammad believed that the outspoken and charismatic Malcolm X was attempting to push him aside. This suspension resolved Malcolm X to found his own organization, the Muslim Mosque, in March 1964. Unlike Muhammad, Malcolm X believed that the civil rights struggle should be transformed into an international Pan-African struggle for human rights, an idea that he further developed during a pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in April 1964. Upon his

return, he took a far more conciliatory stance toward whites and intended to bring the plight of African Americans to the United Nations (UN) in an attempt to coax African nations to indict the United States for human rights violations. This plan was ultimately unsuccessful. On 21 February 1965, Malcolm X was assassinated in New York City by three black gunmen whose identities remain unknown.

Simon Wendt

Malcolm X soon became the Nation of Islam's most successful spokesman and organizer.

See also

Black Panthers; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Race Relations, United States

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Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich

(1902–1988)

Soviet politician and premier. Born in Orenburg, Russia, on 13 January 1902, Georgy Malenkov served in the Red Army from 1918 to 1921 and joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1920. After graduation from technical school in 1925, he worked as an administrator for the CPSU Central Committee and in the Moscow party apparatus until 1941. During this period he handled personnel matters and the implementation of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s. Elected to the Central Committee and its secretariat in 1939, he became a candidate member of the Politburo by 1941.

During World War II, Malenkov served as a member of the Council of State Defense and as senior political officer. In 1943 he supervised economic recovery efforts in liberated Soviet territory, serving in this capacity until his election as a full Politburo member and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1946. He also helped engineer the purge of his rival and CPSU chief ideologist Andrei Zhdanov in 1948.

As Malenkov's political fortunes continued to rise during the next five years, he was named chairman of Council of Ministers (premier) and, briefly, first secretary of the Central Committee after Josef Stalin's death in March 1953. Malenkov was, however, soon compelled by his Politburo colleagues to surrender the post of first secretary to Nikita Khrushchev, although the two cooperated in opposing the attempted seizure of power by Deputy Chief of the Council of Ministers Lavrenty Beria in June 1953, which led to the execution of Beria. Nevertheless, rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev over economic and other policy issues became a struggle for power. Khrushchev gained the upper hand in the end, and Malenkov was forced to resign as premier in February 1955. Nikolai Bulganin replaced him as premier, although

Malenkov remained in the Presidium (Politburo) and became a deputy premier responsible for electric power.

Following Khrushchev's 1956 de-Stalinization speech, Malenkov joined with fellow Stalinist Presidium members Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and Dmitri Shepilov in an attempt to oust Khrushchev in June 1957. Successful in the Presidium, the so-called Anti-Party Group failed when the matter was taken to a plenum of the Central Committee, where Khrushchev received vital support from Marshal Georgi Zhukov, minister of defense. In July, Malenkov lost his seats in the Presidium and the Central Committee and was named manager of a hydroelectric power station in Kazakhstan. In 1961, the CPSU expelled him from its ranks and forced him into retirement. He lived in obscurity until his death in Moscow on 14 January 1988.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich; Khrushchev, Nikita; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich; Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich

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Malik, Jacob Aleksandrovich
(1906–1980)

Soviet diplomat. Born in Ostroverkhovka, Russia, on 6 December 1906, Jacob Malik graduated from the Kharkov Institute of Economics in 1931. He worked as a Komsomol (Communist Youth League) activist in the Ukraine before entering the Moscow Institute of Diplomatic and Consular Service. After graduation in 1937, he worked for two years in the press department of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs before being appointed counselor at the Soviet embassy in Japan. In 1942 he became ambassador to Japan, serving until 1945. From May to July 1945, he was involved in negotiations concerning a Japanese effort to prevent Soviet entry into the Pacific War and to secure Soviet mediation with the Allies.

After the war, Malik served as an advisor to the Allied Control Commission for Japan and was named a deputy foreign minister in August 1946. In May 1948 he assumed the ambassadorship to the United Nations (UN), which he held until 1952. From January to August 1950, the USSR boycotted UN Security Council meetings to protest the organization's refusal to seat the People's Republic of China (PRC). Malik was thus unable to exercise a veto when the United States gained approval for military assistance to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) following the South Korean invasion by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) in June 1950.

In 1951 Malik offered a cease-fire proposal that led to armistice talks, and he was involved in negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty. In 1952 he was named a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, a position he would hold until his death. He served in Moscow as first deputy foreign minister from October 1952 until his appointment as ambassador to Great Britain in March 1953. In 1960 he returned to Moscow as first deputy foreign minister until his reappointment as ambassador to the UN in 1968. Failing health and injuries sustained in an automobile accident led to his retirement at the end of 1976. Malik died in Moscow on 11 February 1980.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Korean War; United Nations

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Soviet diplomat Jacob Malik. (AFP/Getty Images)

Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich

(1898–1967)

Marshal of the Soviet Union. Born to a poor peasant family near Odessa on 23 November 1898, Rodion Malinovsky enlisted in the Russian Army at the outbreak of World War I. Badly wounded in 1915, he spent several months recuperating before reassignment as a machine gunner with the Russian Expeditionary Corps in France in April 1916. He was decorated for bravery and again wounded. His unit mutinied in the spring of 1917, however, and Malinovksy was transferred to North Africa.

Malinovsky returned to Russia via Vladivostok in August 1919. He made his way along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Omsk, where he joined the Red Army and fought against the White forces. He then served as chief of staff of III Cavalry Corps. In 1926 he joined the Communist Party and a year later entered the Frunze Military Academy for a three-year officers' training program. He next served as a military advisor to the Republican forces during 1937–1938 in the Spanish Civil War. Returning to the Soviet Union, he became a senior instructor on the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy.

In March 1941 Major General Malinovsky assumed command of the new XLVIII Rifle Corps on the Romanian border. In August, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he had charge of the Sixth Army in the Ukraine, where he had no choice but to withdraw before the advancing Germans. Promoted to lieutenant general that November, the next month he took command of the Southern Front. Following the ill-fated Kharkov Offensive in June 1942 for which he shared blame, he was reassigned to rear-echelon duty.

During July and August 1942, Malinovsky headed the Don Operational Forces Group before being named in August to command the Sixty-Sixth Army. He also developed a long association with Nikita Khrushchev, then a political officer reportedly assigned by Josef Stalin to watch Malinovsky. He next commanded the Voronezh Front in October and the Second Guards Army in November. In the latter capacity he played a key role in the Battle of Stalingrad, in December defeating Army Group Don, the German relief force under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.

Malinovsky was promoted to colonel general in February 1943, commanding the Southern Front that month and the Southwest Front in March. In April he was promoted to general of the army. He played a major role in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943 and then spearheaded the drive across the Ukraine, taking Odessa in April 1944. His command was redesignated the 3rd Ukrainian Front in October 1943 and the 2nd Ukrainian Front in May 1944. From the Ukraine, he led Soviet forces into Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. In September 1944 he was promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union.

When the war in Europe ended, Malinovsky took command of the Transbaikal Front in the Far East, pushing into Japanese-held Manchuria. A prominent member of the Soviet military hierarchy after the war, he headed the Far East Command during 1947–1953 and the Far East Military District during 1953–1956. He was deputy minister of defense during 1956–1957 and then succeeded Marshal Georgi Zhukov as minister of defense. In this post Malinovsky introduced strategic missiles into the Soviet arsenal and oversaw Soviet military modernization.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev, now premier of the Soviet Union, asked Malinovsky how long it would take U.S. forces to crush Cuba. Malinovsky replied with an estimate of "two or three days," a statement that Khrushchev passed along to a furious Fidel Castro. Malinovsky died in office of cancer in Moscow on 31 March 1967. Marshal Andrei Grechko succeeded him as minister of defense.

Michael Share and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cuban Missile Crisis; Khrushchev, Nikita; Stalin, Josef; Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich

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Malraux, Georges-André
(1901–1976)

French writer and cabinet minister, widely celebrated as a twentieth-century Renaissance man. Born in Paris on 3 November 1901, Georges-André Malraux from childhood suffered from Tourette's syndrome. He took courses at the Institute of Oriental Languages but did not graduate. At age twenty he married Clara Goldschmidt, a German Jewish heiress; they divorced in 1946. After their marriage they traveled in Europe and to Cambodia on an archaeological expedition. In Cambodia, Malraux was arrested and sentenced to prison for discovering and then stealing Khmer sculptures. Influential friends won his release.

Fascinated by Asian culture and civilization and already writing literary reviews, Malraux published his first book, *Le Temtation de l'Occident* (The Temptation of the West, 1926), in which he discussed the meeting and clash of civilizations. Further travel and study in Indochina and China led him to become active in leftist causes such as the Young Annam movement that was pledged to win Indochina dominion status.

A gifted and prolific writer of novels and books on art, Malraux earned lasting literary renown with his book *La Condition humaine* (Man's Fate, 1933). Much of his writing supported leftist politics, including the demand for an end to colonialism. With the outbreak of civil war in Spain in 1936, he organized an international air unit to aid the republican cause. Although he exaggerated his own role, he was twice wounded in the fighting. His novel about his experiences, *L'Espoir* (1937, published in English in 1938 as *Man's Hope*), was soon made into a movie.

Acclaimed French author, adventurer, and statesman Georges-André Malraux. (Library of Congress)

At the outbreak of World War II, Malraux became an officer in the French Army. Wounded and captured by the Germans in 1940, he escaped and joined the French Resistance. Taken prisoner again in 1944, he again escaped. He ended the war leading a volunteer brigade and fighting in Alsace and western Germany.

Following the war, Malraux, until this point sympathetic with the communists, denounced alliances with them. Greatly impressed by the role played by great men in history, he became an avid admirer of General Charles de Gaulle, who must have appeared to have been a character from one of his own novels. De Gaulle appointed Malraux his minister of information, but he left office when de Gaulle resigned in January 1946.

Now a committed Gaullist and French nationalist, Malraux was active in the establishment of the Rassemblement

du Peuple Français (RPF, Rally of the French People), which sought the general's return to power. Malraux continued to write. Turning to the history of art and aesthetics, during 1947–1949 he published the three-volume *Psychologie de l'art* (Psychology of Art). He also spoke out on international issues, and the beginning of the Algerian War in 1954 brought out his deep anticolonialism.

When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, Malraux joined his cabinet, first as minister of information and then as France's first minister of cultural affairs (1960–1969). He remained in the government until de Gaulle's final resignation in 1969. Malraux used his position to promote the role of the arts in French society and, despite tight budgets, was able to accomplish a great deal. Among his achievements were the cleaning and refurbishment of important Paris monuments.

Following his departure from government, Malraux continued to write. He published his *Anti-Mémoires* (Anti-Memoirs) in 1967. Malraux died in Paris on 23 November 1976.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Algerian War; De Gaulle, Charles; France

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Malta

Group of five small islands in the central Mediterranean, some 60 miles south of the southeastern tip of Sicily. Malta, with a 1945 population of some 287,000 people, covers an area of 122 square miles. Located astride major Mediterranean shipping lanes, throughout the centuries Malta has been strategically important.

Long a Christian outpost against the Muslim Turks, Malta came under British rule at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the Royal Navy subsequently established a major naval base there. Britain granted the islands a degree of self-government in 1887 and full responsible government in 1921, only to take the latter away in 1933 when London feared pro-Italian sentiment. During World War II, Malta came under heavy air attack from the Axis powers, but the locals and British forces persevered.

In 1947, London restored self-government to Malta. In 1959, following long and heated disagreements between Britain and the left-wing Labour

Party in Malta headed by Prime Minister Dom Mintoff, London again suspended the constitution.

Following the drafting of a new constitution in 1961, Britain granted Malta full independence on 21 September 1964. A mutual defense treaty gave Britain the right to retain military bases on the islands for another decade in return for modest economic loans and grants. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Mediterranean naval headquarters also remained in Malta, having been set up there in the late 1950s.

The Maltese economy struggled despite the large naval presence and tourism, and in 1971 Mintoff's Labour Party returned to power. Mintoff immediately insisted that Britain and/or NATO pay much more for facilities in Malta. The prime minister employed various intimidation tactics and asserted that the country's dependence on Western defense was irrelevant, or even detrimental, to its own security. In 1972, Britain and Malta managed to reach a temporary defense agreement. However, NATO's Mediterranean headquarters moved to Naples, and in 1979 British forces departed the island for good. Malta then became an active member in the Non-Aligned Movement and opted for neutrality to secure its independence, a policy that has been enshrined in the country's constitution since 1987. In May 1987, sixteen years of Labour Party rule came to an end with the election of Eddie Fenech Adami as prime minister. Adami also ended the close ties with Libya that had developed earlier in the decade. Malta applied to join the European Union (EU) in 1990 and became a member in 2004.

Gudni Jóhannesson

See also

Non-Aligned Movement

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Malta Meeting, Bush and Gorbachev
(2–3 December 1989)

Summit conference between U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev held on 2–3 December 1989 just outside Valletta Harbor, Malta. The summit was preceded by meetings earlier that year between U.S. Secretary of States James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze. In September 1989, Baker and Shevardnaze planned a summit between Bush and Gorbachev, although Bush and Gorbachev had also discussed a meeting earlier that year.

In their talks, Bush pressed Gorbachev on a number of military-related issues. In response, Gorbachev pledged to end military aid to Nicaragua, renounced any future Soviet interests in Central America, discussed the issue of renewed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and alluded to the possibility of a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty (which was signed in 1990). Gorbachev also reassured Bush that the Soviet Union would never initiate a war with the United States.

The issue of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was a particularly sensitive subject. Gorbachev wanted to assist Afghanistan's despotic Mohammad Najibullah and opposition forces to open a peace dialogue, but the Americans were apprehensive of further Soviet intervention. Earlier that year, Baker and Shevardnaze had concluded that United Nations (UN) assistance would be more helpful in Afghanistan. Despite their differences, both sides agreed that neither superpower should impose a decision upon the Afghan people.

Eastern Europe and economic concerns were also discussed at the meeting. While Gorbachev wanted to maintain socialism in Eastern Europe, he recognized that far too many people were disillusioned with it. In order to maintain links—both political and economic—with Eastern Europe, however, the Soviets needed the West's help in stabilizing the area. Consequently, Gorbachev told Bush that he welcomed American influence in Eastern Europe. German reunification, for example, was accompanied by American economic aid. Bush offered Gorbachev American economic assistance and supported Soviet applications to join institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Although no major breakthroughs occurred at the Malta meeting, it was nonetheless symbolic of the final thawing of the Cold War.

The late 1980s was a period of fragmentation for the Soviet Union. Communist rule was steadily eroding in many satellite states, which badly weakened Soviet geopolitical power. By 1989, communist parties had been irrevocably weakened in Poland, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Romania, communist leader Nicolae Ceauşescu was executed in December 1989 and the entire Politburo was arrested. Popular military fronts had emerged in Lithuania, Moldavia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The Soviets had also abandoned their revolutionary efforts in the developing world. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Gorbachev also faced severe difficulties. Many political leaders feared that perestroika would fail, and rumors were circulating about a possible coup against Gorbachev.

The Bush administration debated whether it should continue pressuring the Soviets to make further military concessions or adopt a more accommodating approach. Some, including Bush, wanted to ensure that Gorbachev remained in power because his reforms paralleled U.S. interests. Others, such as Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, believed that any policy deviation would be a mistake. They expected perestroika to fail and thought that Gorbachev's overtures

might have been a maneuver to split the Western alliance. This view may have had some merit. In December 1988 Gorbachev announced major troop reductions, which in turn led to West European demands for increased diplomatic concessions by the United States. Western Europe, Solidarity leaders in Poland, and reformers in Hungary wanted the Bush administration to negotiate in areas other than arms control and criticized American aid programs for being insufficient.

Jonathan A. Clapperton

See also

Afghanistan War; Baker, James Addison, III; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; Europe, Eastern; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hungary; Perestroika; Shevardnadze, Eduard; Soviet Union; United States

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See Falklands War

Malvinas War

Mandela, Nelson
(1918–)

South African antiapartheid nationalist leader and president of South Africa (1994–1999). Born in Transkei, South Africa, on 18 July 1918, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela attended the University College of Fort Hare and the University of Witwatersrand, qualifying in law in 1942. He subsequently set up the first black law practice in Johannesburg with his colleague and fellow activist Oliver Tambo. In 1942 Mandela joined the African National Congress (ANC) and in 1944 cofounded the ANC Youth League. He became ANC national secretary in 1948.

Initially opposed to working with other antiapartheid groups, during the 1952 Defiance Campaign Mandela changed his mind and thereafter advocated united action across South Africa's racial divides to challenge apartheid policies. In December 1952 he was convicted under the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act and received a nine-month suspended sentence. Despite government-imposed restrictions limiting his movement and banning

African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela in London, 1962. Mandela went on to become president of South Africa during 1994–1999. (Mary Benson/Corbis Sygma)

him from political meetings, he continued to work as an ANC leader and was responsible for the development of a contingency plan under which the ANC would continue to work clandestinely in the event of a state crackdown. In December 1956 he was among 156 activists charged with treason against the state. The subsequent Treason Trial, in which Mandela and the others were charged with plotting a revolution, lasted until 1961. Mandela was acquitted.

After the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre in which sixty-seven blacks were killed during an antiapartheid demonstration, the government banned the ANC and other dissident groups. A year later, to evade arrest, Mandela went underground. In June 1961 the ANC launched an armed struggle against the state, with Mandela now leading the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the ANC's armed wing. Mandela coordinated a sabotage campaign and planned for a guerrilla insurgency. In January 1962 he secretly left the country and traveled to Ethiopia, Algeria, and London to solicit support and receive guerrilla training. When he returned to South Africa that summer, he was captured on 5 August.

In the case that followed, Mandela was convicted on charges of incitement and illegally leaving the country and was sentenced to five years in prison. While he was in prison, police raided the ANC's underground headquarters, and many ANC leaders were arrested. This development brought Mandela back to court in the Rivonia Treason Trial, in which he was sentenced to life imprisonment on 12 June 1964. Mandela spent eighteen years at Robben Island Prison, off Cape Town, before being transferred to Pollsmoor Prison in 1982.

Amid growing external and internal pressures, South Africa's apartheid regime began to unravel in the late 1980s. Finally, on 18 February 1990, Mandela was released by President F. W. de Klerk, just days after de Klerk had lifted the ban on the ANC and other antiapartheid groups. Mandela succeeded the ailing Tambo as president of the ANC in 1991, the same year in which the government repealed the last of the apartheid laws. For their efforts to end apartheid, both Mandela and de Klerk shared the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize.

For their efforts to end apartheid, both Mandela and de Klerk shared the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize.

In May 1994, following the country's first national elections in which all races could vote, Mandela became the first black president of South Africa, a post he held until 1999.

Peter Vale

See also
Africa; Constructive Engagement; South Africa

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Mann, Thomas C.
(1912–1999)

U.S. State Department official, presidential advisor, and one of the U.S. government's most important post–World War II Latin American policymakers. Born on 11 November 1912 in Laredo, Texas, Thomas Mann graduated from Baylor University in 1934 with BA and LLB degrees and then practiced law. He began working for the Department of State in 1942 as a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador to Uruguay.

In 1952 as deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, Mann argued that the disparity of wealth between the United States and

Thomas Mann (*left*) meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 May 1965. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

Latin America would spur anti-Americanism and economic nationalism and that communists would exploit these circumstances. Willing to cast aside the U.S. nonintervention pledge, he concluded that Washington must intervene in Latin America if communism threatened to gain a foothold there.

Although he had been one of the creators of the multilateral Inter-American Development Bank, in 1959 Mann articulated his fears that plans for a large U.S. aid program for Latin America would raise unreasonably high expectations that could not be met, resulting in disillusionment and increased anti-Americanism in the region. Indeed, his misgivings were largely borne out in the Alliance for Progress, launched by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, that disproportionately benefited the wealthy.

From December 1963, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, Mann held two important posts. He was both assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs and head of the Agency for International Development, which ran the Alliance for Progress. At the same time, he was made a special assistant to the president. In March 1965 Mann became undersecretary of state for economic affairs. He essentially directed U.S. policy in Latin America.

Following President Johnson's cue, the so-called Mann Doctrine shifted the emphasis of the Alliance for Progress more in the direction of anticommunism and the protection of U.S. investments. In 1965 Johnson appointed Mann undersecretary of state for economic affairs.

That same year, however, key congressmen asserted that the administration's April 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, carried out with Mann's strong support, had greatly overstated the communist threat. With the 1966 appointment of Lincoln Gordon as assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, Mann's influence over Latin American policy effectively ended. He resigned from the Department of State in May 1966, yet many of his policies would be adopted by future administrations.

From 1967 to 1971 Mann served as president of the Automobile Manufacturers Association. He died on 23 January 1999 in Austin, Texas.

James F. Siekmeier

See also

Alliance for Progress; Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Latin America, Communist Parties in; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in

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Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil, Baron
(1867–1951)

Finnish military officer, regent (1918–1919), commander in chief of the Finnish Army (1917–1918, 1939–1944), and president of Finland (1944–1946). Born into a Swedish-speaking Finnish noble family on 4 June 1867 in Askainen, Finland, Carl Mannerheim was determined to become a military officer. He entered the Nicholas Cavalry School in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1887 and was commissioned in the Russian Army in 1889. He served until 1917, seeing action in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and World War I and rising to the rank of lieutenant general by 1917.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 estranged Mannerheim, who returned to newly independent Finland in December, at which time he became commander in chief of Finnish forces fighting the Red Army and led his forces to victory in 1918. Elected regent in December 1918, he toyed with the possibility of attempting to oust from power Russian leader Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik government, but his plans never materialized. Mannerheim withdrew from politics in 1919 after being defeated in the presidential elections.

During 1931–1939 Mannerheim served as chairman of the Finnish National Defense Council. He was commander in chief of the Finnish Army during both the Winter War (1939–1940) and the Continuation War (1941–1944) against the Soviet Union. He was advanced to the rank of field marshal in June 1942.

On 4 August 1944, as Finland was being defeated by Soviet Army forces, Mannerheim became president of Finland. The new president concluded an armistice with the Soviet Union in September 1944. He then turned his attention to German troops remaining on Finnish soil, waging the so-called Lappland War against them. Mannerheim worked diligently to redeem his nation's reputation with the Soviet Union and to preclude a communist takeover of his country. As such, he carried out Finland's armistice obligations to the letter, including the dismantlement of his beloved Defense Corps and the timely payment of war reparations. Reluctantly, Mannerheim appointed J. K. Paasikivi prime minister on 17 November 1944, marking the beginning of a decline in the president's influence.

The 1944 armistice had obligated the Finns to hold trials for those responsible for the Continuation War. In all, fourteen Finnish leaders were tried and convicted. Recognizing Mannerheim's popularity and his diligence in carrying out the terms of the armistice, the Kremlin did not demand that he be brought to trial. In poor health, Mannerheim resigned on 4 March 1946 and retired to Switzerland. He never returned to Finland and died on 28 January 1951 in Lausanne, Switzerland.

Silviu Miloiu

See also
Finland; Paasikivi, Juho; Soviet Union

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Mao Zedong
(1893–1976)

Chairman and cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and founder and chairman of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Shaoshan, Hunan Province, on 19 November 1893, Mao Zedong graduated from the Hunan First Normal School in 1918. He then went to Beijing to work in the Beijing University Library, where he learned Marxist ideology and developed his revolutionary plan to save China. Mao helped found the CCP in Shanghai in 1921. In 1924, following the Comintern's instructions, Mao joined the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party, forming the first United Front aimed at Chinese national unification. In so doing, he bought time for the infant CCP to grow under the GMD shield. However, the United Front broke down in mid-1927 when GMD leader Jiang Jieshi decided to purge the Chinese communists, thereby beginning the CCP-GMD power struggle that lasted for two decades.

Mao Zedong led the communists in the civil war against the Nationalists in China and was the leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1949 to 1976. Although remembered as one of the great Chinese leaders who made China a major player on the world stage, he was also responsible for the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. (Illustrated London News Picture Library)

Following the breakdown of the United Front, Mao and other frustrated Chinese communists worked on their own to develop a unique Chinese path to carry out the socialist revolution. In January 1935 Mao became the CCP chairman, a post he held until his death. His ascension to power is attributed to his ideological and tactical pragmatism, which rejected the rigid application of Soviet orthodox thinking and instead emphasized the uniqueness of Chinese history and culture. After expelling Jiang's GMD government from the mainland, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949, officially ending the Chinese Civil War. Mao's reign can be divided into three periods: 1949–1957, 1958–1965, and 1966–1976.

The first period was characterized by imitation of the Soviet model in reconstructing China and consolidating the CCP's power. On foreign policy matters, Mao coined the three principles of make another stove, clean the house and then invite the guests, and lean to one side. According to the first two principles, Mao was determined to start anew by pursuing an anticolonial and anti-imperialist policy to eliminate China's century-old semicolonial status, imposed by imperial powers since the mid-nineteenth century. Because the PRC's birth coincided with the Cold War, Mao's policy of lean to one side signaled a pro-Soviet and anti-American stance. His first foreign policy initiative was a visit to Moscow in December 1949, culminating in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950.

The PRC's anti-American stance was vividly showcased over the question of Taiwan, where Jiang's GMD government still retained power, as well as in the Korean War, the Geneva Conference, the first and second Taiwan

Strait crises, and the Bandung Conference, at which Mao attacked America for its "imperialist" designs in the Taiwan Strait.

Domestically, Mao selectively transplanted the Soviet model. Politically, he preferred a democratic dictatorship, along the principles of democratic centralism and coexistence with other revolutionary parties and noncommunist classes, to the Soviets' proletarian dictatorship. Mao wished to avoid the Soviet political purges of the 1930s. Yet he ensured that real power and leadership rested in the hands of the CCP, as the terms "dictatorship" and "centralism" suggested.

In economic matters, Mao strictly adhered to the Soviet model, with Soviet technical and material assistance. In early 1950, he ushered in land reform, which involved government confiscation and the redistribution of agrarian land to peasants. This stage was completed in late 1953 and was succeeded by collectivization aimed at boosting agricultural production. In 1953, Mao launched the First Five-Year Plan, which strove to develop heavy industries and was completed a year ahead of schedule.

To consolidate his control over the country, Mao adopted mass socialization by encouraging the formation of numerous mass organizations in the early 1950s to mobilize the population to participate in such movements as the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign, the Three-Anti Movement to combat corruption and wasteful bureaucracy, and the Five-Anti Movement against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government property, and leakage of state economic secrets.

The second period of Mao's rule demonstrated his determination to establish a unique brand of Chinese socialism, designed to wean China from Soviet aid. The year 1958 began with the Second Five-Year Plan, which was much more ambitious than the first. To accelerate China's industrialization, Mao launched the three-year Great Leap Forward program at year's end, a radical measure designed to catch up with and surpass British industrial output. To this end, he ordered the establishment of nationwide People's Communes, which was also an essential step in facilitating the socialist transformation of China.

The Great Leap Forward, however, was doomed to failure, as the PRC was not ready for such a radical transformation. The results were measured in massive manpower and property losses. Another adverse impact was the growing division within the PRC leadership. Realizing his miscalculation and hoping to avoid becoming the scapegoat for further losses, Mao gave up his PRC chairmanship to Liu Shaoqi in April 1959 while retaining the chairmanship of the CCP. In September 1959, Mao relieved Peng Dehuai of his post as defense minister because of his opposition to the Great Leap Forward. The failure of the Great Leap Forward convinced moderate leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai that socialization should be slowed down, a view that made both men targets of the Cultural Revolution in later years. To compensate for the economic dislocation and destruction of the Great Leap Forward, Mao reluctantly agreed to relax economic socialization by dismantling the communes and using material incentives to revive the

Chinese economy, cures proposed by Liu and Deng. By the mid-1960s, China's economy had been restored to its 1957 level.

Mao's drive for independence also resulted in the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance. His insistence on proceeding with the radical Great Leap Forward alarmed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who decided to stop assisting the PRC's national reconstruction in 1958. This forced Mao to pursue a lone course in implementing both the Second Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward.

Mao's unilateral initiation of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in September 1958 prompted Khrushchev to withhold nuclear information. The Sino-Soviet split became official after Mao passed the chairmanship to Liu, who intensified the ideological attack against Soviet revisionism and Khrushchev's advocacy of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West. By 1963, Sino-Soviet unity had all but disappeared. To compensate for the loss of Soviet aid, Mao promoted closer PRC ties with Asian and African countries. His success in this enabled the PRC to become an influential leader in the developing world, transforming the bipolar Cold War world into a tripolar one.

Mao incited the Red Guards to criticize old customs and practices by employing such means as violence, public trials, and mass rallies.

The decade-long Cultural Revolution constituted the third period of Mao's era, during which the PRC experienced violent chaos and disorder. Determined to reassert his personal authority and monolithic leadership over the country, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 through his wife Jiang Qing. By reviving the class struggle and Marxist-Leninist teachings, he purged all potential opponents, including old comrades, from both the government and the CCP. To ensure his personal control, Mao packed the party and the government with his supporters, such as his wife and Hua Guofeng, both of whom were made Politburo members. Outside the government, Mao incited the Red Guards, radical youths indoctrinated with Maoism, to criticize old customs and practices by employing such means as violence, public trials, and mass rallies. The Red Guards were also sent into the countryside to encourage the so-called cult of Mao. This ten-year period constituted the darkest days of the PRC's history, characterized by a reign of red terror that badly bruised Mao's revolutionary legacy.

The Cultural Revolution also had a direct bearing on the PRC's foreign policy. On the one hand, the revolution aroused grave hostility and suspicion from the PRC's allies, who either severed diplomatic relations with the PRC or recalled their foreign service delegations. Combined with the Sino-Soviet split, the Cultural Revolution almost completely isolated the PRC within the international community. On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution made possible the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations because of their mutual desire to enhance each other's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In February 1972, Mao received U.S. President Richard M. Nixon in Beijing, which culminated in American diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1979. This rapprochement marked the end of China's diplomatic isolation.

Mao died in Beijing on 9 September 1976. Shortly after his death, in October 1976, Hua, now the premier, seized power and ended the Maoist era by officially terminating the Cultural Revolution.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Hua Guofeng; Jiang Qing; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korean War; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Peng Dehuai; Sino-Soviet Treaty; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; Zhou Enlai

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Marcos, Ferdinand Edralin
(1917–1989)

Filipino politician and authoritarian president of the Philippines (1965–1986). Ferdinand Marcos was born on 11 September 1917 in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte Province. His father was a politician, his mother a teacher. In December 1938, while a student at the University of the Philippines College of Law, Marcos was arrested for the 1935 assassination of his father's political rival, Julio Nalundasan, and found guilty of murder. Marcos, considered a brilliant law student, composed an 830-page brief for the Supreme Court while in prison. Citing trial errors, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and Marcos left prison in October 1940. He fought against the Japanese occupation of the Philippines but was captured and imprisoned by the Japanese.

Following the war, Marcos began his political career as an aide to President Manuel Roxas during 1946–1947. In 1949 he won election to the Philippine House of Representatives as a Liberal Party candidate. In 1959 he was elected a senator. Abandoning the Liberal Party for the Nationalist Party, he was elected president of the Philippines in November 1965.

The Americans saw in Marcos a potential ally in the escalating Vietnam War. Marcos in fact agreed to send some Filipino forces to the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) as a show of support for anticommunism in Southeast Asia. Although as a senator he had opposed earlier requests to send troops to Vietnam, as president he agreed to send 2,000 noncombat soldiers, claiming that he could send no more because of Filipino opposition to the war. In return, the United States increased its financial aid to the Philippines.

In 1969 Marcos launched simultaneous campaigns to crush the ongoing communist Hukbalahap insurgency and the Muslim Moro uprising in Mindanao. In November that same year he became the first president of the Philippines to win reelection, although his second term was marked by increasing civil unrest. In September 1972 he imposed martial law following a

Filipino President Ferdinand E. Marcos waves to welcomers during a visit to Washington, D.C., 5 January 1983. (Department of Defense)

series of bombings in the capital city of Manila, the discovery of an assassination plot, and an alleged communist conspiracy to seize power.

Although Washington undoubtedly knew of the rampant government corruption and the president's exaggeration of the threat of a communist coup, it continued to support the regime in order to ensure Filipino support of its own Cold War aims, including endorsement of the continued lease of important U.S. military bases in the islands. U.S. officials hoped, vainly as it turned out, that Marcos would implement reforms to reduce the grinding poverty of millions of Filipinos, which the United States believed was fueling the resistance movements. Although Marcos ended martial law in 1981, he carried on his increasingly autocratic rule.

In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan's administration continued to back Marcos, despite his dictatorial ways and abuse of human rights. The 21 August 1983 assassination of Marcos's political rival Benigno Aquino, however, united the anti-Marcos opposition and marked the beginning of the end for his rule.

In the snap election of February 1986, Aquino's widow, Corazon Aquino, ran against Marcos. Marcos claimed a dubious victory amid widespread accusations of electoral fraud, which emboldened his opponents to drive him from power. In February 1986, as angry mobs converged on the presidential palace, Marcos and his wife Imelda fled to Hawaii. In October 1988, a U.S. federal court indicted the Marcoses on racketeering charges. Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu on 28 September 1989.

Donna Alvah

See also

Aquino, Benigno, Jr.; Aquino, Corazon; Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in; Hukbalahap; Philippines; Reagan Doctrine; Vietnam War

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Mariel Boatlift
(April–September 1980)

Mass exodus of Cuban refugees to the United States occurring between April and September 1980. The Mariel Boatlift, the product of more than

In 1980, some 125,000 Cuban refugees poured into the United States during the so-called Mariel Boatlift, Fidel Castro's invitation to Cuban Americans to travel to Mariel Harbor and take any of their friends and relatives to the United States. Although an apparent sign of relaxed restrictions, it later became evident that the event was orchestrated to purge Cuba of political dissidents. (U.S. Coast Guard)

two decades of hostility between the United States and Cuba, brought more than 125,000 Cubans from the Cuban port of Mariel to southern Florida.

After the United States severed diplomatic relations with the communist island-nation of Cuba in 1961, travel and migration between the two countries essentially stopped. When U.S. President Jimmy Carter assumed office in January 1977, he sought to improve relations with Latin America, and Cuban leader Fidel Castro responded to the overture.

In 1979, Castro permitted Cuban Americans to return to Cuba. After witnessing the abject poverty in which many Cubans lived, however, many of these visitors returned to the United States with a determination to do something about it. Meanwhile, Castro faced growing dissent sparked by housing and job shortages as well as a stagnant economy.

On 4 April 1980, presumably to get rid of troublemakers, Castro ordered guards removed from the Peruvian embassy in Havana, and within hours

throngs of Cubans requested political asylum. This move should have served as a warning to Washington, but the signal went largely unnoticed.

Soon afterward, the United States found itself in the midst of a major refugee crisis when Castro allowed any person wishing to leave Cuba free access to depart from the port of Mariel, located about 28 miles west of Havana. On 19 April 1980, the Cuban government announced that Cuban Americans could travel to Cuba to pick up refugees, going so far as to contact Cuban Americans directly to encourage them to make the journey. Cuban Americans immediately set sail for their relatives in virtually any vessel that appeared even marginally seaworthy. Thousands of fishing boats, yachts, and other small craft departed from Key West and Miami, Florida, for Mariel.

The vessels were typically loaded up with more refugees than they were designed to carry safely. The first refugees arrived on 21 April. By the time the boatlift came to an end, more than 125,000 Cubans had made the journey to the United States. Miraculously, only 27 people perished at sea, due chiefly to search and rescue efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard.

The vast majority of the Cuban immigrants entered the United States in violation of American law, as they were undocumented. But President Jimmy Carter's administration refused to return the refugees for humanitarian as well as legal and political reasons. The decision not to interdict boats meant that the United States had little choice but to accept the Mariel Cubans. Castro also required boats to accept additional passengers, some of whom had been recently released from prison or mental asylums. More than 23,000 of the arriving Marielitos admitted previous criminal convictions, although many of those convictions were for offenses that would not have warranted detention under U.S. law. Only 2 percent, or 2,746 Cubans, were classified as criminals under U.S. law and were not granted citizenship. Still, reports that criminals and the mentally ill were among those thousands arriving daily fueled a major public backlash. By the time Castro stopped the Mariel Boatlift, the Carter administration, already under great duress because of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, appeared to have botched the situation. It had failed to capitalize on the propaganda value of Cuba's internal problems and seemed entirely unable to control immigration. The Mariel Boatlift certainly added to the American public's frustration with Carter's administration and indirectly led to his November 1980 electoral defeat by Ronald Reagan.

Caryn E. Neumann

See also

Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Castro, Fidel; Cuba

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Market Socialism

Market socialism is a hybrid economic system combining elements of a socialist, command-style economy with a capitalist, free-market economy. Debates over the implementation of market socialism began as a theoretical construct, but it gained acceptance with the introduction of market elements in Yugoslavia after 1948. More recently, economic reform in one-party communist states, particularly in the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, and Laos, has been labeled market socialism.

When traditional Marxists proposed the nationalization or collectivization of the means of production, adherents of market-driven economies claimed that an economy without free markets would be unable to perform the foremost task of an economy, namely the optimal allocation of resources. In 1908 the Italian economist Enrico Barone introduced the so-called socialist calculation debate by describing a process in which a minister of production, by solving a set of equations, could achieve the same end as that of a market-driven economy. Other Marxist economists argued that socialism would surpass capitalism because it would not be subject to business cycles and economic downturns. However, Ludwig von Mises, one of the famed Austrian School economists, argued that socialist states' attempts to calculate correct prices for goods would be distorted, since there would effectively be no market for capital goods, that is, means of production.

Other socialist economists refuted the von Mises argument by describing a socialist pricing system in which prices for capital goods would be fixed by authorities as if they were market prices, based upon a reiterative process of tatonnement, or the synchronization of supply and demand. Centrally planned economies later used this reiterative process, matching plans at different levels of planning. But a more general critique of socialist economies emerged from the work of another Austrian economist, Friedrich August von Hayek, who became one of the greatest defenders of market economies throughout the Cold War. He argued that while in theory the socialist state could simulate the mathematical equations of a market-driven system, it would be virtually impossible for a state to collect information on millions of prices and consumer preferences, such as market economies provide automatically. Hayek's work on the economics of information was never satisfactorily refuted by proponents of socialism.

The debate over market socialism became politically relevant when Yugoslavia's leader Josip Broz Tito broke with the Soviet Union in 1948. After World War II Yugoslavia had introduced a centrally planned economy. But in 1950 the Basic Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises by Working Collectives was introduced to encourage workers' input. Thus, collectivization continued, but planning became decentralized via so-called labor-managed collectives. Tito also abandoned agricultural collectivization. Yugoslavia subsequently enjoyed a much higher living standard than other socialist states. Yugoslavian economic success also depended on greater openness, which allowed for economic aid from the United States and assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In July 1965 another major Yugoslavian reform reduced state influence over investment, taxes, and prices. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavian system of market socialism did not solve the more intractable problems of socialist economies, such as the soft budget constraint (soft taxes, soft subsidies, and soft credit) and the virtual absence of corporate bankruptcy or the dismantlement of unprofitable companies. In truth, labor-managed firms were more fiction than fact, as the persistent influence of state-mandated decision making rendered decentralization unattainable. Additionally, the influence of workers on decision making spawned problems of inequality, since it created a strong position for insiders interested in maximizing productivity per employee rather than overall profit.

The breakdown of socialist economies in the late 1980s led to the abandonment of market socialism by Yugoslavian successor states. Other states with nominal market socialism, such as Hungary, also abandoned the system in favor of free-market economies, although the former Soviet Union's early stage of transition to capitalism was termed market socialism.

The early 1980s witnessed the emergence of new economic variants in which economic transition under communist one-party systems was carried out, notably in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. These new systems were also labeled market socialism. In lieu of the dismantlement of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), these economies permitted the growth of a private sector alongside the SOEs, producing a dual economy. While these economies achieved quite spectacular successes as measured by their robust growth rates, special problems still persisted. These included low levels of new development and unresolved difficulties in functioning of the SOEs.

Bernhard Johannes Seliger

See also

China, People's Republic of; Hungary; Soviet Union; Tito, Josip Broz; Vietnam; Yugoslavia

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Markos, Vafiades
(1906–1992)

Political and military commander of the communist National Liberation Front during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). Born in Theodosia, now Tosia,

Anatolia (present-day Turkey), on 28 January 1906, Vafiades Markos did not receive a formal education. He worked at a succession of manual labor jobs and immigrated to Greece during the war between Greece and Turkey following World War I.

Markos joined the Greek Communist Party in 1927 and was arrested several times for organizational activities on behalf of the Federation of Greek Communist Youths (OKNE). Markos escaped internal exile following the German invasion and occupation of Greece in 1941 and quickly rose to a leadership position in the communist-led guerrilla resistance movement, becoming commander of the Greek Popular Liberation Army (ELAS).

General Markos played a minor but nonetheless crucial role in the early history of the Cold War. With the withdrawal of Axis forces from Greece at the end of World War II, civil war broke out between the Democratic Revolutionary Army (DSE), commanded by Markos, and the rightist Greek government that returned from exile, supported by the British.

The imminent threat of a successful communist takeover in Greece raised the specter of a domino effect in the region, with the potential to destabilize Turkey and the Middle East. When the British government informed Washington that it could no longer maintain economic and military support for the rightist Greek regime of Georgios Papandreou, the United States stepped in and, under the 1947 Truman Doctrine, extended $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey.

In December 1947 Markos became both president and minister of war in the Temporary Democratic Government (known as the government of the mountains). The DSE collapsed in 1949 after the withdrawal of Yugoslavian support and a disastrous shift in tactics away from guerrilla operations. Denounced by DSE leader Nikos Zachiariadis, Markos was relieved of his duties. In October 1950 he was expelled from the party and placed under house arrest in Albania and then in Moscow. After thirty-five years in exile, he returned to Greece in 1985. Markos died in Athens on 22 February 1992.

Michael Kilburn

See also

Containment Policy; Greece; Greek Civil War; Papandreou, Georgios; Truman Doctrine

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Marshall, George Catlett
(1880–1959)

U.S. Army general, chief of staff of the army (1939–1945), secretary of state (1947–1949), and secretary of defense (1950–1951). Born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on 31 December 1880, George Marshall graduated from the Virginia

Military Institute in 1901 and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry the following year. His assignment to the Philippines was followed by postings within the United States, including from 1906 to 1910 at Fort Leavenworth Infantry and Cavalry School, first as a student and then as an instructor. From 1913 to 1916 he served once more in the Philippines.

After American intervention in World War I, in June 1917 Marshall went to France as a training officer to the 1st Division. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1918, he became the First Army's chief of operations, winning general admiration for his logistical skills in arranging for the movement of hundreds of thousands of troops across the battlefront. After working on occupation plans for Germany, in spring 1919 he became aide to General John J. Pershing, then army chief of staff.

Between the wars Marshall spent three years in Tianjin, China, with the 15th Infantry Regiment and five years as assistant commandant in charge of instruction at the Infantry School in Fort Benning, Georgia. He won promotion to colonel in 1932, holding assorted commands in the continental United States.

Marshall's personal knowledge of American officers, many of whom he had trained, helped him select numerous commanders for both the European and Pacific theaters.

In 1938 Marshall became head of the War Plans Division in Washington, in quick succession rising to deputy chief of staff with promotion to major general and then, in spring 1939, chief of staff of the army. He was promoted to temporary general that September. With war raging in Europe, Marshall threw himself into rebuilding the American defense establishment. Increasingly assisted by pro-Allied civilians such as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Marshall instituted and lobbied for programs to recruit and train new troops; expedite munitions production; assist Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union to resist their enemies; and coordinate British and American strategy. He presided over an increase in the U.S. Army from a mere 190,000 men in September 1939 to more than 8.157 million men and women by April 1945. His personal knowledge of American officers, many of whom he had trained, helped him select numerous commanders for both the European and Pacific theaters.

Marshall was a strong supporter of opening a second front in Europe, a campaign ultimately deferred until June 1944. Between 1941 and 1945 he attended all the major wartime strategic conferences, including those at Placentia Bay, Washington, Quebec, Cairo, Tehran, Malta, Yalta, and Potsdam. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his successor President Harry S. Truman relied heavily on Marshall's advice. Marshall's greatest disappointment was perhaps that he never received field command of the European invasion forces. Roosevelt gave him that choice but also told him that he would prefer that Marshall remain chief of staff, a post he continued to hold throughout the war. He was not only highly effective in supervising the massive American war effort but also enjoyed excellent relationships with key senators and congressmen, who almost without exception admired and respected his professional abilities and personal integrity.

In 1945 Marshall participated in discussions as to whether to drop the newly developed atomic bomb. Eager to end the Pacific war expeditiously,

he supported its use. When the war ended, Marshall publicly advocated that in the interests of national security, his country needed to maintain a far larger, more professional, and better-equipped permanent defense establishment than in the past. He clearly anticipated that the United States would in the future play a far greater international role and might have to do so almost anywhere in the world.

Marshall retired in November 1945, whereupon President Truman promptly dispatched him to China, where he spent a year unsuccessfully attempting to mediate the civil war between the Nationalist government and communist rebels. In January 1947 Marshall became secretary of state. Soviet-American relations were then on a steep downward trajectory. Shortly afterward, in February 1947, Truman delivered his famous Truman Doctrine speech, calling for aid to help Greece and Turkey resist internal and external communist threats and placing this in the context of an all-embracing U.S. commitment to oppose communism throughout the world, the expression of what would soon become known as the strategy of containment.

Marshall and his aides, including Undersecretaries of State Dean G. Acheson, William L. Clayton, and Robert A. Lovett, developed and lobbied Congress for policies that would put this strategy into practice. Marshall's most visible accomplishments were the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), a coordinated $13 billion five-year strategy to rehabilitate the economies of Western Europe that he announced in June 1947, and American membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the first permanent security pact the United States had ever entered.

One of the most distinguished public servants in U.S. history, General George Catlett Marshall was chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II and was widely recognized as the "Organizer of Victory." During the Cold War he served as both secretary of state and secretary of defense. He is remembered for implementing the Marshall Plan for the recovery of postwar Western Europe, which won him the Nobel Prize for Peace. (Library of Congress)

Marshall left office in January 1949, shortly afterward heading the American Red Cross. At the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Truman persuaded him to accept the position of secretary of defense, in which capacity Marshall again built up American manpower and war production and pushed for selective service legislation. He also strongly supported Truman's dismissal for insubordination of General Douglas MacArthur, commander of United Nations (UN) forces in Korea, a decision that later exposed Marshall to vehement and politically motivated accusations of procommunist sympathies from Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and his followers, as did his failure to preserve China from a communist takeover in 1949.

Marshall again left office in September 1951, succeeded as secretary of defense by Robert A. Lovett, his protégé and disciple. In December 1953 Marshall's efforts for European recovery won him the Nobel Peace Prize. He died at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., on 16 October 1959. An architect of the American century of U.S. international dominance, Marshall

epitomized the intimate links between his country's diplomatic and military policies.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Atomic Bomb; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Chinese Civil War; Collins, Joseph Lawton; Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Korean War; Lovett, Robert Abercrombie; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall Mission to China; Marshall Plan; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; National Security Act; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United States Army; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Marshall Mission to China
(1945–1947)

During December 1945–January 1947 former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall traveled to China as a special U.S. emissary on the instructions of President Harry S. Truman. Marshall's mission was to mediate a truce between the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government of Jiang Jieshi and the insurgent communist forces of Mao Zedong, thereby establishing peace and forming a workable government comprised of both parties, which had been intermittently engaged in a civil war since 1927. Marshall's efforts were not motivated by humanitarian peacemaking alone. They aimed to avert further civil war that might culminate in a communist victory and thereby obviate the need for U.S. military intervention by establishing a stable government to prevent Soviet intervention in China. Yet neither the Nationalists nor the communists turned out to be sufficiently committed to the success of Marshall's efforts.

Their long-term goals simply did not embrace mutual accommodation, and in the short term they each used the cover of the Marshall mission to their advantage. Marshall arrived in China on 20 December 1945 and initially achieved impressive results, as a cease-fire was established on 10 January

1946. That same month, a Political Consultative Council, with representatives from all of China's warring parties, agreed to the outlines of a new, more democratic political system that would be discussed further via the National Assembly. Finally, in February, the communists agreed to merge their military with the Nationalist army on the condition that military and political reorganization proceeded simultaneously.

The fly in the ointment, however, turned out to be North China and Manchuria. U.S. policy was to transport Jiang's troops there to take over from the defeated Japanese and establish order. Understandably, Mao viewed this with considerable suspicion. Moreover, Soviet forces had entered Manchuria to fight the Japanese in August 1945 but had withdrawn in April 1946, leaving behind a vacuum into which the warring factions expanded. When the communists captured Changchun on 18 April 1946, Jiang expanded the conflict, and despite Marshall's efforts to secure a cease-fire, China was once again engaged in civil war. Early victories against the communists emboldened Jiang, and he laid down unacceptable political terms as the price for reestablishing the cease-fire. A brief lull in June offered some hope, but by July Marshall had concluded that Jiang was not interested in a long-term cease-fire; rather, he was set on wiping out the communists.

Marshall sought to rescue the mission from complete collapse with the assistance of U.S. Ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart, who was trusted by the communists, and by cutting off U.S. arms shipments to Jiang. Simultaneously, President Truman called for progress, without which U.S. policy toward China might change. On 30 September 1946, however, Jiang announced an attack on Kalgan, a town in Inner Mongolia held by the communists. Nationalist forces captured it in October, conceding to a cease-fire a month later. On his own terms, Jiang also summoned the National Assembly. The communists, understandably, stayed away.

By October, Marshall had concluded that a political solution was impossible. He had also concluded that U.S. military intervention was not a viable solution. American diplomacy in China had reached the end of the road. Marshall returned to the United States in January 1947 as the Chinese Civil War continued.

Paul Wingrove

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Marshall, George Catlett

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Bland, Larry I., with Roger B. Jeans and Mark F. Wilkinson, eds. *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947*. Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998.

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Marshall Plan

Massive U.S. economic aid program for Western Europe begun in 1947 and designed chiefly to rebuild war-torn economies and serve as a bulwark against communist encroachment. In the wake of World War II, Europe experienced a severe economic crisis because of the crippling effects of nearly six years of war. The United States had attempted to promote European recovery through limited reconstruction loans, relief assistance, German war reparation transfers, and new multilateral currency and trade arrangements. By the winter of 1947, however, it was apparent that these piecemeal stabilization efforts were not working. Millions of West Europeans were unemployed, inflation and shortages were rampant, and malnutrition had become a widespread concern.

The central problem facing Europe was low industrial productivity. Industrial and agricultural production lagged behind prewar levels, as the wartime destruction or disruption of factories and equipment had led to dramatically decreased industrial output. Adequate funds were not available for reconstruction and replacement, and none of the nations involved had the wherewithal to raise large amounts of capital. To make matters worse, basic building-block industrial materials such as steel and coal were scarce.

The growing economic troubles fed frustration, hopelessness, and despair. And many Europeans had begun to seek out political solutions to their troubles. Alienated from capitalism, some began turning to communism as an alternative. In France, Italy, and Germany, the crisis had eroded government support and lent credence to communist promises of economic stability. In Great Britain, serious financial woes forced policymakers to reduce international agreements that had helped resist the spread of communism. Only by eliminating the economic conditions that encouraged political extremism could European governments withstand the influence of communism, and nobody seemed to understand that better than the Americans.

A worker shovels rubble during the rebuilding of West Berlin in front of a building adorned with a sign supporting the Marshall Plan. This massive U.S. financial aid program greatly assisted in the rebuilding of Western Europe after World War II. (National Archives and Records Administration)

U.S. policymakers believed that rejuvenated West European economies would provide a strong demand for American goods and help maintain the United States as the world's leading economic power. They also envisioned Western Europe as an integral part of a multilateral economic system of free world trade crucial to the liberal-capitalist world order that Washington had in mind for itself and its allies. Clearly, unity and prosperity in Western Europe would create an economy able to generate high productivity, decent living standards, and political stability.

The European Recovery Program, which came to be known as the Marshall Plan in honor of Secretary of State George C. Marshall, would serve to strengthen shaky pro-American governments and ward off the inroads being made by domestic communist parties and other left-wing

Marshall Plan Aid



organizations sympathetic to the Soviet Union. U.S. Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson, who helped formulate the plan, argued that American foreign policy had to harness American economic and financial resources to preserve democratic institutions and to expand capitalism abroad. He also saw the Marshall Plan as necessary for long-term national security. Thus, the plan emerged as an all-embracing effort to revive the economies of Western Europe. The plan was unprecedented in terms of the massive commitment of American dollars, resources, and international involvement.

First formally proposed by Secretary of State Marshall on 5 June 1947 in a speech at Harvard University, the plan applied to all of Europe. Aid was not directed against communism specifically but was directed toward the elimination of dangerous economic conditions across all of Europe. Accordingly, the United States controversially planned to reconstruct Germany as an industrial power. Marshall had concluded that German resources, manpower, expertise, and production were absolutely essential to European recovery. For success, the plan had to allow full German participation but at the same time prevent German industrial power from becoming a future threat to peace.

Additionally complicating matters was Marshall's belief that the objective of the Soviet Union was to delay European economic recovery and therefore exploit the consequent misery and political instability. Yet Marshall did not want his nation to assume the responsibility for permanently dividing Europe. Thus, to avoid having the plan viewed as anti-Soviet, he invited the Soviet



Union and its East European satellite states to participate in implementation of the plan. Nations eligible to receive economic assistance would be defined by those countries that were willing to cooperate fully with the American proposal. All the while, U.S. policymakers fully counted on Moscow's rejection.

President Harry S. Truman believed that the United States should not unilaterally devise a plan for recovery and force it upon the Europeans. Instead, the particular aid initiatives came from the Europeans and represented not a series of individual requests but rather a joint undertaking by all of the countries in need of American assistance. In other words, the Americans wanted a lasting cure for Europe's problem and not a mere quick fix. America's role would be to assist in the drafting of a program and to support that program with American resources.

The Soviet Union together with Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, and twelve other European nations gathered at the first planning conference, convened in Paris on 27 June 1947. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov demanded that each country be allowed to fashion its own plan and present it to the United States. Georges Bidault and Ernest Bevin, the foreign ministers of France and Britain, respectively, opposed Molotov. Bidault and Bevin, in line with American wishes, stressed that the Marshall Plan had to be a continent-wide program in order to take advantage of the economies of the continent as a whole, or, seen in another light, to take advantage of the economies of scale rendered only through a jointly administered effort. As the United States had predicted, the Soviets quickly withdrew, denouncing the plan as an imperialist, anti-Soviet tool. Molotov warned that if Germany were to be revived, then the continent would be divided. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania still expressed interest in the Marshall Plan, but the Soviet Union pressured them into withdrawing.

The Soviets left Paris chiefly because participation in the plan would have required the disclosure of extensive statistical information about the Soviet Union's financial condition and also would have given the Americans some control over Russia's internal budget. Additionally, George Kennan, father of the U.S. containment policy and director of the State Department's policy planning staff, had earlier made it clear that aid would not be advanced to nations that refused to open their economies to U.S. exports. These requirements were unacceptable to the Soviets, as Kennan realized. The Soviets were not willing to abandon the exclusive orientation of their economy.

The Soviets kept their finances a well-guarded secret and set about weakening the Marshall Plan. In response, they formed the Cominform on 6 July 1947 to help coordinate international propaganda aimed at torpedoing the plan. On 12 July 1947, the Soviet Union negotiated trade agreements with its communist satellites that diverted to Eastern Europe a substantial amount of trade that had previously gone to Western Europe. Finally, later that year, the Soviets proposed the Molotov Plan for East European recovery as an alternative to the Marshall Plan.

Lengthy negotiations thus ensued without the Soviets or their client states. Participating nations laid the groundwork for the recovery plans and requested $28 billion to be spent over the course of four years. On 15 March 1948, the U.S. Senate endorsed the plan by a 69–17 vote after the House had approved it by a 329–74 margin but only allocated $17 billion in aid. The Marshall Plan passed despite growing conservative objections to international agreements. The communist-led overthrow of the Czechoslovakian government and the Soviet Union's badgering of Finland for military bases had apparently convinced U.S. legislators of the seriousness of the Soviet threat.

When the plans were finalized, the United States created the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and named Paul Hoffman as its head. The ECA made the ultimate determination of specific aid and projects to be undertaken. The fundamental way in which the Marshall Plan contributed to increased European productivity was by furnishing capital, food, raw materials, and machinery that would have been unavailable without American help. The ECA made U.S. funds available to foreign governments to buy goods that were primarily obtained from their own private agricultural and industrial producers. The ECA also authorized purchases in other countries, especially Canada and Latin America. These policies also helped to reduce excessive demand on raw materials in the United States, thereby protecting the U.S. economy from inflationary pressures. The plan additionally benefited non-European countries and contributed to the development of multilateral trade. Recipients of the largest amounts of aid were Britain, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), and the Netherlands.

Participating European governments sold American-financed goods to their own people. The payments received were placed in special funds that were employed where they could best serve economic recovery and ensure financial stability. Italy used its funds for public works projects, such as replacing bombed-out bridges. The British reduced government debt to check inflation.

A shipment of cornmeal arrives in Reykjavík. Bread and butter were the most urgent food needs in the Europe of 1948. By the end of 1951, $1.5 billion worth of bread grains had been sent to Western Europe, while fats and oils accounted for $345 million. (National Archives and Records Administration)

During 1948–1952, approximately $13.5 billion in Marshall Plan aid went to the revitalization of Western Europe and guided it onto the path of long-term economic growth and integration. By 1950, industrial production in Marshall Plan countries was 25 percent higher than 1938 levels, while agricultural output had risen 14 percent from the prewar level. The volume of intra-European trade among Marshall Plan beneficiaries increased dramatically, while the balance-of-payments gap dropped significantly. Britain had sufficiently recovered by January 1951 so that Marshall Plan aid was suspended at that time, a full year and a half before the scheduled termination of the program. It should be noted, however, that the onset of the Korean War in June 1950 and the autumn 1950 decision to deploy American troops to Western Europe to bolster North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defenses also contributed to increased European productivity.

The Marshall Plan also advanced European unification and integration. The Americans sought a single large market in which quantitative restrictions on the movement of goods, monetary barriers, and trade tariffs had been largely eliminated. The creation of an integrated free market modeled after the United States would encourage the growth of consumer demand and large-scale industry. It would also permit more efficient use of materials and labor while stimulating competition. The West Europeans removed a number of economic barriers and established subregional agreements such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The success of the Marshall Plan ultimately paved the way for the establishment of the Common Market in 1958.

The Marshall Plan did not cure all of Europe's problems. Productivity advanced considerably but leveled off by 1952, the last year of the plan. Europe's dollar gap had also begun to widen. The Korean War and concomitant rearmament program diverted resources and manpower to defense production, thereby creating scarcities of certain commodities. As a result, inflation became problematic.

The intensification of the Cold War and the onset of the Korean War hastened the end of the Marshall Plan. The Mutual Security Act of 1951, signed in the wake of the Korean War, provided a new strategy for European recovery that largely superseded the Marshall Plan. The act made military security rather than economic self-reliance the major objective of American policy in Western Europe. Aid recipients had to sign new agreements assuring the fulfillment of military obligations and promising to maintain European defensive strength. The ECA was abolished in favor of a Mutual Security Agency that was responsible for supervising and coordinating all foreign aid programs—military, technical, and economic.

Caryn E. Neumann

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Bevin, Ernest; Bidault, Georges; Cominform; Containment Policy; Europe, Western; European Coal and Steel Community; Hoffman, Paul Gray; Kennan, George Frost; Marshall, George Catlett; Molotov Plan; Stalin, Josef; Truman, Harry S.

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Masaryk, Jan
(1886–1948)

Czechoslovakian diplomat and foreign minister (1940–1948). Born in Prague on 14 September 1886, the son of Professor Tomáš G. Masaryk, founder and first president of Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk graduated from Charles University in Prague in 1907. He then studied at Boston University and worked in various jobs before returning to Prague in 1913. During World War I, he served in the Austro-Hungarian Army at the same time his father was working abroad to bring about the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Following the war and the creation of the new state of Czechoslovakia, Masaryk entered its diplomatic service, becoming chargé d'affaires in Washington, D.C., in 1919. Two years later he was appointed secretary to Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš. In 1925 Masaryk became ambassador to Great Britain, serving there until the 1938 Munich Agreement, after which he resigned in protest.

In July 1940, President Beneš appointed Masaryk foreign minister of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile. During the war, Masaryk delivered regular radio messages beamed to occupied Czechoslovakia to bolster civilian morale. He also carefully pursued Beneš's policy of cooperation with both the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

In May 1945 Masaryk accompanied Beneš on the latter's visit to Moscow to meet with Soviet leaders and assure them that Czechoslovakia intended to be a bridge between East and West. Masaryk continued as foreign minister even after the communists won a plurality of votes in the May 1946 elections and pursued his effort to retain strong ties with both the communist bloc and the West.

In July 1947 the Czechoslovak government, then led by communist Prime Minister Klement Gottwald, announced its intention to participate in the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan. Several days later, when Gottwald, Masaryk, and other Czechoslovak leaders visited Moscow, Josef Stalin forced them to rescind their decision, marking Czechoslovakia's official entrance into the Eastern bloc. Although disappointed and opposed to the communist-dominated government, Masaryk remained the foreign minister, respecting the wishes of President Beneš, even after the communist coup in February 1948.

Two weeks after the communist takeover, on 10 March 1948 Masaryk's body was found in the courtyard of the foreign ministry building in Prague. Communist authorities ruled the death a suicide, but many believed that he was murdered. During the 1968 Prague Spring, the case was reopened. Following the subsequent Warsaw Pact invasion, the case was again closed, but after the 1989 Velvet Revolution another investigation was launched, which in January 2004 concluded that Masaryk had indeed been murdered.

Gregory C. Ference

See also

Beneš, Edvard; Czechoslovakia; Gottwald, Klement; Marshall Plan; Prague Spring

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Massu, Jacques
(1908–2002)

French Army general who played an important role in the Algerian War. Born on 5 May 1908 in Châlons-sur-Marne, France, Jacques Massu graduated from the French military academy at Saint-Cyr in 1928 and embarked on a series of assignments in France's African colonies. During World War II, as a battalion commander in the Free French Forces, he fought in North Africa and in the 1944 campaign in France, when he participated in the liberation of Paris.

Following World War II, Colonel Massu fought in the Indochina War (1946–1954). He was then transferred to Algeria, where fighting had begun in November 1954. He was promoted to brigadier general in June 1955 and commanded the elite 10th Parachute Division in the 1956 Suez invasion.

In January 1957 French Governor-General in Algeria Robert Lacoste invested Massu with full power to break a general strike proclaimed in Algiers by the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN), part of the Battle of Algiers that had begun on 30 September 1956 with the detonation of explosive devices at three locations throughout the city. Massu and his men operated with ruthless efficiency, including the use of torture, to break the general strike and destroy the FLN terrorist cells and organization in Algiers. The Battle of Algiers, certainly the most dramatic episode of the Algerian War (1954–1962), ended in March 1957.

Fearful that the government in Paris was about to grant Algeria its independence, Massu took a leading role in the May 1958 coup in Algiers by rightist European settlers and army officers that resulted in the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle. Following Massu's remarks to a journalist in December 1959 that the army had perhaps erred in bringing de Gaulle back to power, de Gaulle recalled Massu to France. De Gaulle soon forgave Massu, however, assigning him command of the French army garrison at Metz. Massu continued as a staunch Gaullist and refused to lend his support to army uprisings against de Gaulle in Algeria in January 1960 and April 1961. Massu retired from the army in July 1969 as a full general.

As with many French veterans of the Algerian War, Massu spent the remainder of his life trying to come to terms with the tactics employed by the French Army in the conflict. In the 1970s, he was one of his own fiercest defenders, writing a book challenging events depicted in the influential 1966 film *The Battle of Algiers*. But in 2001 he struck a more conciliatory tone, raising doubts over the effectiveness of torture in military operations and encouraging increased openness on the consequences of France's Algerian occupation. Massu died in Loiret, France, on 26 October 2002.

John Spykerman and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Algerian War; De Gaulle, Charles; France; Indochina War

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Aussaresses, Paul. *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955–1957*. Translated by Robert L. Miller. New York: Enigma Books, 2002.

Massu, Jacques. *La Vrai Bataille d'Alger*. Paris: Presses pocket, 1974.

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Mau Mau

Militant indigenous social movement that sought to end British colonial rule in Kenya during the late 1940s and 1950s. The Mau Mau emerged in the second half of the 1940s as a response to the British colonial government's policy to restrict access by the African Kenyan population to fertile land. Members of the Kikuyu tribe particularly suffered under this arrangement, and many of them began to reject constitutional politics as a means to redress their grievances. The growing Mau Mau movement frequently punished or killed those Africans who remained loyal to the colonial government.

The roots of the Mau Mau lay in the early twentieth century, when British authorities decided to provide land for white settlers in Kenya's White Highlands region. In the aftermath of World War II, Kikuyu peasants and tenant farmers who had traditionally been denied access to land by white settlers grew increasingly bitter about this trend toward privatization. During the war years, moreover, unemployment had increased dramatically in the area around the colony's capital, Nairobi, adding to the growing frustration among members of ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru. In the minds of many Africans, the Kikuyu-dominated Kenya African Union (KAU), a political party that fought for an end to colonial rule, had not adequately dealt with these problems. As a result, militant members of the KAU in the Nairobi River Valley and Central Province began to advocate a more radical plan of action, which sought land for the dispossessed, Kikuyu unity and self-help, and an end to colonial rule by means of violence if necessary.

When British authorities first learned of this movement in 1948, they dubbed the militants "Mau Mau," but the origins of the term are not clear. In fact, "Mau Mau" has no meaning in any Kenyan language. Many militants referred to their movement as *ithaka na wiathi*, which means "land and moral responsibility" or "freedom through land." While the colonial government considered the Mau Mau a monolithic movement, it lacked a unified leadership and consisted of numerous separate groups. Nevertheless, the term "Mau Mau" stuck and came to signify savagery and cultism for colonial authorities and white settlers. In particular, the movement's central initiation ritual, the so-called oathing, worried the British, as it required members to pledge their

Kikuyu women, previously Mau Mau adherents, renouncing their Mau Mau oath during a cleansing ceremony in Nyeri, Kenya, in 1952. (Library of Congress)

lives to the putatively subversive cause of the Mau Mau. Although the Mau Mau was officially declared illegal in 1950, the secretive movement continued to grow and intimidated or killed white settlers and those Africans who refused to take the oath. By September 1952, several hundred blacks had been arrested for alleged membership in the Mau Mau.

The assassination of Kikuyu Chief Waruhiu on 7 October 1952 led the colony's governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, to declare a state of emergency and marked the beginning of a four-year armed struggle involving Mau Mau guerrillas, Kenyan loyalists, and British colonial troops. British efforts to suppress the movement also included the arrest of KAU President Jomo Kenyatta, other nationalist leaders, and thousands of Mau Mau supporters. By early 1953, almost 18,000 Africans had been sent to trial for alleged activities in the militant movement. Despite these repressive measures, the Mau Mau groups continued their activities. In March 1953, Mau Mau fighters launched their first military offensive, massacring the residents of the loyalist village of Lari. Nevertheless, the British offensive, code-named Operation ANVIL, which lasted from 24 April to 9 May 1954, demonstrated the superiority of British troops, who arrested 19,000 men during large-scale raids of private buildings in Nairobi. Sporadic fighting continued after ANVIL, but the number of Mau Mau fighters had been reduced to approximately 5,000.

The capture of guerrilla leader Dedan Kimathi in late October 1956 marked the end of major combat operations against the Mau Mau. Although Kenyan militants had been defeated militarily, fear of new uprisings compelled British authorities to initiate political reforms during 1957–1958. In January 1960, the state of emergency officially ended. By the end of the conflict, Mau Mau guerrillas had killed more than 1,800 Africans and 32 European settlers. Official estimates put the number of Mau Mau casualties at 10,500, while colonial and British troops lost approximately 600 soldiers. Kenya finally gained independence in 1963.

Simon Wendt

See also

Africa; Anticolonialism; Decolonization; Kenya; Kenyatta, Jomo

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May, Allan Nunn
(1911–2003)

British physicist and one of the first Cold War spies to work for the Soviet Union. Born in Birmingham, England, on 2 May 1911, Nunn May's academic prowess won him numerous school and university scholarships, including one to Cambridge. While attending that university, from which he graduated and gained his doctorate, he was drawn to leftist causes, joining both the Communist Party and the Association of Scientific Workers.

Upon the outbreak of World War II, May allowed his Communist Party membership to lapse and began working on the British atomic weapons program, known as the Tube Alloys Project. In 1943 he relocated to the Chalk River Laboratory near Montreal, Canada, that had become an annex of the U.S. Manhattan Project. That same year, Soviet military intelligence recruited him as a spy. Operating under the code name "Alek," May supplied his handler, Pavel Angelov, and controller, Colonel Nikolai Zabotin (Soviet military attaché in Ottawa), with a range of atomic secrets, including details about the Trinity and Hiroshima bombs, the output of plants, and microscopic samples of Uranium-235. Historical evidence now seems to suggest, however, that despite May's extensive and advanced knowledge of the atomic bomb, the information he passed on was of a general nature and therefore not particularly useful to the Soviets.

In May 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) intelligence officer, defected to the West. During debriefings, Gouzenko revealed the nature of the atomic spy ring, directly implicating May. But because British intelligence hoped that May might offer further

insight into Soviet penetration of the Allied atomic bomb program, he was permitted to return to King's College, London University. He was finally arrested in March 1946 and was charged under the British Official Secrets Act. He confessed and served six years of a ten-year prison sentence. Upon his release in December 1952, he was blacklisted. But in 1961 he was invited by President Kwame Nkrumah to work in Ghana. In 1978 May returned to Cambridge, where he died on 12 January 2003.

Phillip Deery

See also

Espionage; Fuchs, Klaus; Gouzenko, Igor

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Mazowiecki, Tadeusz

(1927–)

Polish journalist, dissident, politician, Solidarity leader, and prime minister of Poland (1989–1990). One of the leading members of the Catholic anti-communist opposition in Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was born on 18 April 1927 in Płock to a family of Polish intellectuals. He graduated from Warsaw University in 1947 with a law degree and served as head of a Warsaw publishing agency during 1947–1948 but was forced out of the position because of his Catholic views.

In 1949 Mazowiecki commenced political activity and work as a journalist in the PAX organization, which tried to reconcile Catholicism with communism. After a disagreement with PAX leadership, he was forced out of the organization in 1955. In 1956 he cofounded the Catholic Intelligentsia Club and in 1958 created the monthly magazine *Wiez*, one of the few independent Polish periodicals.

During 1961–1971 Mazowiecki was a deputy in the Polish parliament. As a member of the Catholic parliamentary club Znak ("the sign"), he became known for his fiery speeches demanding freedom of speech, religious tolerance, political pluralism, and autonomy for universities. Beginning in 1976 he became associated with the democratic opposition movement, which among other things criticized a change in the constitution that confirmed the centrality of the Communist Party in Polish affairs.

In August 1980 Mazowiecki became the head of a group of advisors to striking shipyard workers in Gdańsk. The following year he was appointed editor of the periodical *Solidarnosc* and was recognized as one of the most important members of the Solidarity labor union. After Polish Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law in 1981, Mazowiecki was jailed in December 1981 and released in December 1982.

During 1983–1989 Mazowiecki was among the most prominent advisors to Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa and actively participated in the Round Table debates during February–April 1989. In August 1989 Mazowiecki was elected prime minister, and in September 1989 he created a coalition cabinet dominated by Solidarity. His government initiated the final dismantling of the communist system, a transition to parliamentary democracy, a free market economy, and the reorientation of Polish foreign policy toward the West.

In November 1990 Mazowiecki ran for president of Poland but lost. He then founded his own party, the Democratic Union. He served as an envoy for the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commission in the former Yugoslavia in 1992. Mazowiecki retired from public life in 1995.

Andrzej Paczkowski

See also

Human Rights; Jaruzelski, Wojciech; Poland; Solidarity Movement; Wałęsa, Lech

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McCarthy, Eugene Joseph
(1916–2005)

U.S. political leader, U.S. senator, author, and critic of the Vietnam War. Born in Watkins, Minnesota, on 29 March 1916, Eugene McCarthy was a former seminarian who earned a BA in English from St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota, in 1935 and an MA in political science at the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis in 1939. He returned to St. John's to teach economics and other subjects during 1940–1943. During 1944 he worked as a civilian in the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department. During 1946–1949 he taught at the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Active in politics as a member of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, McCarthy first won election to Congress in 1948. He served ten years in the House of Representatives (1949–1959). He took a strong stand against the spread of communism and supported Harry S. Truman's response to the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) in 1950. Elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958, McCarthy served two terms.

McCarthy voted for the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that gave President Lyndon B. Johnson authority to pursue the Vietnam War. In April 1965, McCarthy joined the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he continued to support Johnson administration policies toward Vietnam. By 1966, however, McCarthy was openly doubting that the Vietnam War would contain communism. Instead, he argued that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) was intensely nationalist and

independent of the People's Republic of China (PRC). He also challenged the morality of the war, especially the bombing of North Vietnam.

On 30 November 1967, McCarthy announced his campaign for the Democratic Party nomination for president, although he tempered his criticisms with votes for war-related authorizations and appropriations in 1967 and 1968. He asserted that civil rights laws and social welfare legislation would strengthen the United States domestically and globally. His antiwar stance, multi-issue platform, and television persona led large numbers of idealistic antiwar students to volunteer for his campaign.

Six weeks after the 1968 Tet Offensive, McCarthy embarrassed President Johnson in the New Hampshire Democratic Primary by winning 80 percent of the delegates and 42 percent of the nonbinding presidential preference votes, although it is clear that many people who voted for McCarthy were not opposed to the war but did so simply to register their dissatisfaction with Johnson's prosecution of it. McCarthy's success confirmed perceptions of Johnson's vulnerability and led to both Robert Kennedy's decision to enter the race and the president's withdrawal. At the 1968 Democratic Convention, McCarthy received a fourth of the delegates.

McCarthy did not run for reelection to a third term in the Senate in 1970. In 1972, he sought but did not receive the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. In the 1976 U.S. presidential election, McCarthy received some 757,000 votes as a write-in candidate. He subsequently continued to write and speak out on major issues. McCarthy died in Washington, D.C., on 11 December 2005.

Eugene McCarthy's opposition to the Vietnam War electrified the nation's youth and brought thousands into active involvement in Democratic Party affairs in 1968. (Library of Congress)

Vincent Kelly Pollard

See also

Containment Policy; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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McCarthy, Joseph Raymond
(1908–1957)

U.S. Republican politician, junior senator from Wisconsin (1947–1957), and instigator of the anticommunist Red Scare phenomenon in the early 1950s known as McCarthyism. Born on 15 November 1908 in Grand Chute, Wisconsin, the son of a dairy farmer, Joseph McCarthy in 1935 earned a law degree from Marquette University and was admitted to the bar that same year. This legal training was, however, simply a gateway to a career in politics.

In 1939 McCarthy won election to a Wisconsin circuit judgeship in a campaign that introduced all the ugly characteristics of his later public battles. He falsely portrayed his opponent and incumbent officeholder Edgar Werner as senile and corrupt. With the outbreak of World War II, McCarthy enlisted in the Marine Corps. He performed competent but unexceptional work as an intelligence officer in the Pacific theater, a role that he later embellished to include fictionalized bombing raids against strongly defended Japanese islands. "Tail-Gunner Joe," as he liked to be called, spun his fantasies so well that he was awarded, with dubious entitlement, the Distin-

Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy delivers a televised speech in 1953. (Library of Congress)

guished Flying Cross. While still on active duty in 1944, he campaigned unsuccessfully in the Republican primary for one of Wisconsin's U.S. Senate seats, but two years later he made a successful challenge for the other seat in a barnstorming campaign across the state.

McCarthy's first few years in the Senate were underwhelming. In search of a cause that might win him power and celebrity, not to mention a second term, he latched onto the Red Scare investigations that were being popularized so theatrically by groups such as the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). On 7 February 1950 McCarthy made a speech to a Republican women's group in Wheeling, West Virginia, in which he claimed, quite dramatically, to have a list of 205 officials in the U.S. State Department who were either communists or communist sympathizers. As with so many of McCarthy's allegations, the list was bogus, and the number of those suspected changed almost daily. Nonetheless, the effect was sensational. The press gave it extensive coverage, and the ploy turned the previously obscure senator into a household name.

McCarthy followed up his feat with a series of other lurid and spurious charges, often changing the details without explanation or apology when their hollowness became clear. He had mastered the use of the multiple untruth, and before long the term "McCarthyism" had become a byword for the sort of crude finger-pointing and false accusations at which its originator excelled.

The peak of McCarthy's career came in late 1952 when, after winning a landslide reelection, he was named chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and its Subcommittee on Investigations. This gave him a broad mandate to probe suspected communist infiltration of public offices and invested him and his chief counsel, Roy Cohn, with sweeping and sinister authority. However, hubris and overreach led quickly to disaster. In late 1953 McCarthy launched a major inquiry into alleged subversive activity in the U.S. Army, some of the hearings being nationally televised. These led to the harassment and bullying of several high-ranking army officers. This proved too much for President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had long detested McCarthy personally but who had been up to that point too timid and wary of challenging him in public.

In April 1954, on Eisenhower's insistence, a thirty-six-day televised hearing was held to investigate McCarthy's allegations. His uncouth behavior, bullying of witnesses, and long-winded speeches came across poorly on television, and his popularity plummeted, especially after a celebrated dressing-down by army counsel Joseph Welch on 9 June. The furious attorney pointedly asked McCarthy, "Have you no sense of decency, sir?" By December 1954, McCarthy faced Senate censure for disreputable behavior, and his reputation speedily unraveled. He was also stripped of his committee assignments. His final unhappy years were spent in futile excoriation of the enemies and traitors whom he believed had undone him. McCarthy died of alcohol-related liver disease in Bethesda, Maryland, on 2 May 1957.

Alan Allport

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; McCarthy Hearings; McCarthyism

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McCarthy Hearings

Series of hearings held by the notorious red baiter Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, junior Republican senator from Wisconsin, during 1950–1954, ostensibly to expose communists in America. The most dramatic of McCarthy's myriad hearings were nationally televised during 22 April–17 June 1954. The so-called Army-McCarthy Hearings marked the end of the senator's demagogic reign during the post–World War II Red Scare that came to be known as McCarthyism.

In February 1950 McCarthy made a stunning and completely unsubstantiated public accusation that the U.S. State Department was riddled with 205 communists or communist sympathizers. By constantly changing his stories and the numbers of alleged communists in high places, he became a household name and made a career out of being the nation's top anticommunist whistle-blower for the next four years. As the nation fell under the spell of McCarthy, with the help of a transfigured national press, hundreds of loyal government employees lost their jobs and had their lives ruined during the period known as McCarthyism. Labor organizers, writers, artists, teachers, Hollywood actors, and even the U.S. military were all targets of McCarthy's anticommunist witch-hunt. Educators with liberal sympathies were labeled a threat and found their academic freedom severely restricted. McCarthy even went so far as to accuse World War II army hero and Secretary of Defense General George C. Marshall of harboring "a communist conspiracy so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man." McCarthy particularly targeted Foreign Service officers in the State Department, which greatly weakened the department's Asian desk.

McCarthy, although not universally loved by the Republican Party, was allowed to pursue his tenuous claims because such activity gave the Republicans a potent weapon against President Harry S. Truman and the Democrats, whom they believed had botched U.S. foreign policy particularly in China and Korea. When Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower won the pres-

U.S. television's first major sensation involving government operations was the series of Senate subcommittee hearings chaired by communist-hunter Senator Joseph McCarthy. The highlight came in a 1954 series of televised hearings about the supposed communist infiltration of the U.S. Army. Here, McCarthy responds to charges that a photo of army personnel, submitted as an exhibit at the hearings, has been altered. (AP/Wide World Photos)

idency in 1952, he chose not to confront McCarthy directly, although he despised him. Eisenhower instead hoped that McCarthy would eventually go too far and destroy himself. He did just that in 1954.

During 1953–1954, McCarthy chaired the Senate Committee on Government Operations and its Subcommittee on Investigations. During his tenure as chairman, the subcommittee held countless hearings around the nation and investigated myriad charges of communist subversion and espionage in the federal government and defense industries. In addition to McCarthy's favorite foil, the State Department, the Voice of America, the U.S. Information Libraries, the Government Printing Office, and the Army Signal Corps all fell victim to the subcommittee's inquiries. McCarthy routinely bullied his witnesses and often threatened them with prosecution for contempt of Congress. Unfortunately, many who fell within the senator's cross-hairs lost their jobs and careers or were blacklisted when they refused to cooperate with him.

In 1954, McCarthy accused the U.S. Army of harboring communist spies, a patently outrageous claim. In retaliation, army leaders produced a detailed chronology of the actions taken by McCarthy's chief counsel Roy M. Cohn to pressure army officials to ensure preferential treatment for one of his own staff members, G. David Schine, who had recently been drafted. Senator McCarthy responded that the army was holding Schine hostage to prevent him from fully investigating communist subversion within the military. McCarthy's clash with the army led Congress to vote on an investigation into each party's claims. The resulting Army-McCarthy Hearings were televised nationwide to a large and captivated audience and allowed many Americans to see firsthand the bullying and brutish behavior of the Wisconsin senator.

McCarthy did not come across well on television, and his appeal diminished quickly as it became apparent that he was little more than a bully and a liar. As novelist John Steinbeck observed at the time, McCarthy "had a stubble of a beard, he leered, he sneered, he had a nasty laugh. He bullied and shouted. He looked evil."

"[McCarthy] had a stubble of a beard, he leered, he sneered, he had a nasty laugh. He bullied and shouted. He looked evil." —John Steinbeck

The most famous dramatic showdown of the hearings came in June 1954, when McCarthy unleashed his wild accusations on a young lawyer assisting Joseph Welch, who was representing the army. "Until this moment, Senator," Welch seethed, "I think I really never gauged your cruelty or your recklessness. . . . Have you no sense of decency, sir?" At this, the gallery burst into applause, and McCarthy looked wounded and confused, asking what had just happened. Just as television had helped him gain notoriety, the medium also brought about his downfall. As Missouri Senator Stuart Symington said to McCarthy, "The American people have had a look at you for six weeks. You are not fooling anyone."

Meanwhile, Congress moved in for the kill. In a 67–22 vote in December 1954, the Senate formally censured McCarthy for contemptuous behavior and bringing disrepute to Congress. McCarthy was stripped of his committee assignments and faded into political obscurity. He died only three years later, at age forty-nine, from alcohol-related liver disease.

After the excesses of McCarthyism, the U.S. Supreme Court changed the law to give witnesses testifying before congressional committees more protection in order to prevent the abuses of McCarthyism from reoccurring. To this day McCarthy's name is synonymous with unsubstantiated accusations and innuendo, intolerance, fear-mongering, and browbeating.

Valerie L. Adams

See also

McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism

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McCarthyism

Era of intense anticommunist sentiment, sometimes referred to as the Second Red Scare, that dominated American politics and society, resulting in civil liberty encroachments and widespread paranoia. As the Cold War settled in during the late 1940s, Americans became increasingly concerned with the perceived communist threat at home. President Harry Truman initiated his Loyalty Program in 1947, aimed at rooting out communists from the federal government, and politicians in both major parties began vying with one another in an attempt to prove their patriotism and anticommunist mettle. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a Wisconsin Republican looking for a political opportunity and instant fame, seized the moment and turned the politics of anticommunism into a high art form, in the process becoming one of the nation's most notorious demagogues. McCarthy did not begin the Second Red Scare, but his name became synonymous with it, and his actions coarsened political discourse, cheapened basic constitutional freedoms, and ruined the careers of many innocent individuals. McCarthyism began in earnest in 1950 and ended in 1954, when McCarthy was finally censured for his reckless activities.

McCarthy, who won election to national office in 1946, had experienced a most uninspiring career in the Senate. Facing the potential prospect of losing his seat in the 1952 elections, he decided to take advantage of the anticommunist atmosphere. Thus, during a February 1950 speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, he claimed—quite dramatically—that he held in his hand a list of 205 communists working in the State Department. This captured the immediate attention of the American press, which gave McCarthy wide coverage, and he soon became a household name.

By employing what one historian has termed "multiple untruths," McCarthy's mostly bogus claims went largely unquestioned by the press and even by his own political colleagues. He gained the most notoriety through his myriad hearings, during which he accused hundreds of writers, actors, teachers, scholars, and others of having communist sympathies. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 added immense fuel to the fires of McCarthyism. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine McCarthy's enormous popularity had the war not occurred. His antics created a supercharged atmosphere of paranoia and hysteria seldom seen in American society.

For a time, McCarthy was so powerful and so feared that few people seriously scrutinized his allegations or the corrosive results of his hearings, some of which were conducted through the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), although the vast majority were conducted on his own via a Senate subcommittee. By bombarding witnesses with vast amounts of conflicting, unsubstantiated, and ever-changing information, McCarthy evaded serious challenges to his credibility. His clever use of "multiple untruths" combined with his courtship of the American press made it nearly impossible to pin him down on any particular allegation, although in retrospect it may be said that almost none of his charges resulted in the discovery of the "vast communist conspiracy" that he claimed resided in the top echelons of government. McCarthy's accusations resulted in the blacklisting of a host

of Hollywood actors and screenwriters, as most studios feared the repercussions of the senator's indictments. In 1952, McCarthyism had become so entrenched that when the senator implied that General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army in World War II and an icon of that conflict, had ties to communism, nobody, including General Dwight D. Eisenhower, publicly rebuked McCarthy for such a patently absurd accusation.

The age of McCarthyism had serious ramifications and enormous reach. For example, when a group of teachers in New York came under fire for their alleged "communist leanings," the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the McCarthyites' attacks in *Adler et al. v. Board of Education of the City of New York*. Reviewing the case in 1952, the Court ruled that schoolteachers did not have the right to work on their own terms and that past and present associations were relevant because of teachers' responsibility for shaping the minds of their students. McCarthyism also had a devastating impact on the State Department. McCarthy's accusations against the department's Asian experts left a void in the department's ability to correctly analyze developments in East and Southeast Asia.

In 1954, during the nationally televised Army-McCarthy Hearings in which the Wisconsin demagogue tried to claim communist subversion in the U.S. Army, the subterfuge of McCarthyism was finally laid bare. McCarthy's bizarre allegations, bullying of witnesses, and generally boorish behavior shocked many Americans. The national press finally undermined the senator's credibility, while the reputation and gravitas of the U.S. Senate was seriously undermined. After the hearings were suspended, McCarthy was formally censured by his Senate colleagues and stripped of his committee assignments. The fall of McCarthy in 1954 was as spectacular as his rise, but the long shadows of McCarthyism would not be soon forgotten. Many of McCarthy's victims never did revive their ruined careers, and the McCarthy era serves as a cautionary tale of how intolerance mixed with fear-mongering can chisel away at the most basic of constitutional rights.

Valerie Adams and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthy Hearings; Truman Loyalty Program

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McCloy, John Jay
(1895–1989)

U.S. assistant secretary of war (1941–1945), president of the World Bank (1946–1948), and U.S. high commissioner for Germany (1949–1952). Born in

Philadelphia on 31 March 1895, John J. McCloy lost his father at age seven. Propelled upward by his ambitious mother, McCloy attended the Peddie Institute, Amherst College, and Harvard Law School. During World War I he interrupted his studies to serve in the U.S. Army, becoming a captain of artillery and acquiring an internationalist outlook.

In 1924 McCloy joined the prestigious New York corporate law firm of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine, and Moore, rising to partner in 1929. He spent several years representing Bethlehem Steel in the Black Tom case, in which that firm sought and in 1939 eventually obtained $20 million in damages from the German government for sabotaging an American munitions plant during World War I.

In 1940 McCloy joined the War Department as a consultant to Secretary Henry Lewis Stimson, a lifelong hero and role model. Appointed assistant secretary the following year, McCloy was involved in virtually every major political and military wartime decision until he left that position in November 1945. He staunchly advocated the wartime internment of Japanese Americans and throughout his life would claim that national security reasons had amply justified the consequent infractions of civil liberties. He supported War Department proposals envisaging Germany's economic reintegration into Europe, helping to thwart Treasury Department plans to partition the country and destroy its industry. In 1945 he unsuccessfully opposed employing atomic weapons against Japanese cities, something he always contended had been unnecessary.



John J. McCloy, who served in several key U.S. posts including high commissioner for Germany (1949–1952). (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

McCloy left the War Department in 1945, briefly heading the World Bank from 1946 to 1948. From 1949 to 1952 he was American high commissioner in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and was responsible for implementing that country's return to independent statehood. Controversially, he decided to pardon various German industrialists including Alfred Krupp, whom the Nuremberg tribunals had convicted of war crimes, a decision that many ascribed to Cold War expediency. McCloy staunchly backed his longtime French friend Jean Monnet's efforts to bring about West European political and economic integration, considering this essential to heal long-standing Franco-German antagonisms and strengthen Europe economically.

McCloy was president of the Chase Manhattan Bank from 1953 to 1960, after which he returned to law. He remained one of the Wise Men, recognized foreign policy experts whom successive presidents consulted on a wide range of international issues. The journalist Richard H. Rovere even termed him the "chairman" of the American Establishment. From 1961 to 1974 McCloy was a presidential advisor on arms control. Although he did not attend the meeting of senior advisors that counseled President Lyndon B. Johnson

in March 1968 to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam, by that juncture McCloy was already known to be disillusioned with the American commitment to that country. He died in Stamford, Connecticut, on 11 March 1989.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; European Coal and Steel Community; Germany, Federal Republic of; Lovett, Robert Abercrombie; Monnet, Jean; Monnet Plan; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Vietnam War; World Bank

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McGovern, George Stanley

(1922–)

U.S. Democratic Party politician, congressman (1957–1961), senator (1963–1981), and presidential candidate (1972). Born on 19 July 1922 in Avon, South Dakota, George McGovern attended Dakota Wesleyan University during 1940–1942. He then enlisted in the U.S. Army and flew more than thirty combat missions in the European theater of operations as a lieutenant piloting B-24 bombers. He returned to Dakota Wesleyan after the war and graduated in 1946. He earned a PhD in history from Northwestern University in 1953 and returned to Dakota Wesleyan as a professor, remaining there until 1956.

McGovern entered Democratic Party politics in 1953, was first elected to Congress in 1956, and retained his seat until 1961. He lost a senatorial bid in 1960. President John F. Kennedy then appointed McGovern to head the Food for Peace program, an initiative to use U.S. food surpluses to fight world hunger. McGovern resigned this post in 1962 to seek South Dakota's other senatorial seat, winning a narrow election victory that November and taking office in January 1963.

McGovern emerged in the mid-1960s as a leading critic of American Cold War policies. He presciently warned against further American involvement in Southeast Asia, and after a 1965 trip to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) he publicly advocated a political rather than military solution to what he viewed as a civil war.

In 1970, along with Senator Mark Hatfield, McGovern introduced the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment that called for the removal of U.S. military forces from South Vietnam by the end of 1971 and for the end of all funding to South Vietnam. The amendment failed to win approval.

McGovern won the Democratic nomination for president in the 1972 election and campaigned as an antiwar candidate. He called for a blanket amnesty for draft resisters and for drastic cuts in military spending. Incumbent President Richard M. Nixon ridiculed McGovern's positions, labeling him a radical and out of touch. Nixon easily defeated McGovern in the November election. In 1980, McGovern was defeated for reelection to the Senate. He retired from active politics in January 1981.

A prolific author and acknowledged expert on world hunger and food problems, McGovern worked with the United Nations (UN) in many capacities. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2000.

Michael D. Richards



George S. McGovern, U.S. congressman and senator, shown here in 1961. (Library of Congress)

See also

Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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McNamara, Robert Strange
(1916–)

U.S. secretary of defense. Born in San Francisco, California, on 9 June 1916, Robert McNamara was an Army Air Corps officer in World War II, when he used statistical techniques acquired at the Harvard Business School to improve the logistics, planning, and analysis of strategic bombing raids over Europe and Japan. Joining the Ford Motor Company after the war, in November 1960 he was appointed president but left almost immediately when President John F. Kennedy recruited him as secretary of defense.

McNamara moved at once to enlarge his personal staff and centralize decision making in the secretary's office, developing and employing a planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) in efforts to enhance cost-effectiveness by eliminating duplication, waste, and overlapping programs

President of Ford Motor Company when he was named U.S. secretary of defense in 1961, Robert McNamara held that post for seven years under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. McNamara was one of the principal architects of U.S. policy in Vietnam. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

among the three services and subjecting proposed weapons systems to close cost-benefit analysis. These and other efficiency measures, including proposals to close unneeded military bases and consolidate the National Guard and Army Reserves into one system, provoked fierce opposition from many military men and from powerful congressional and civilian lobbies.

McNamara supported the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which he hoped would facilitate Soviet-American arms limitation talks, even as he supported developing a U.S. second-strike capability, the ability to retaliate ferociously even after absorbing a massive nuclear attack. He also broke with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's emphasis on threatening massive retaliation in all crises to support expanding the military by 300,000 men to develop flexible-response capabilities, a mobile striking force prepared for conventional or guerrilla warfare. Defense Department budgets rose from $45.9 billion in 1960 to $53.6 billion in 1964. Another reason for this surge was McNamara's early decision to increase land-based U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to 1,000, a move that may have triggered a similar Soviet buildup and arms race. He publicly defended the nuclear strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD), arguing that it served as a deterrent to nuclear war.

McNamara made an early mistake in endorsing the disastrous April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. During the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, however, he was generally credited with devising the relatively moderate naval quarantine response strategy that Kennedy decided to follow. During the Kennedy presidency McNamara's reputation soared, only to fall dramatically and permanently under Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson.

Growing American involvement in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), which McNamara endorsed, undercut his efforts at rationalization. Military intellectuals later criticized McNamara's decision to permit the demands of the Vietnam War to denude American North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Under Kennedy, McNamara backed moderate increases in American advisors and military aid programs to Vietnam. Despite his deepening pessimism and personal doubts, however, to Congress McNamara presented an unequivocal picture of unprovoked North Vietnamese aggression. In July 1965 McNamara endorsed requests by General William C. Westmoreland for an increase of 185,000 American troops in Vietnam, but President Johnson rejected as politically unacceptable his accompanying recommendations to call up reserve forces and increase taxes for the war.

McNamara always doubted both the effectiveness and the morality of the heavy U.S. bombing raids, but Johnson and the military chiefs frequently overruled him. By 1966 McNamara had become increasingly pessimistic over the war's outcome, especially when antiwar protests intensified and he became a prime target for ferocious criticism, although as late as mid-1967 he appeared on occasion to believe that the war could be won. Within the Johnson administration, McNamara's growing emphasis upon seeking a negotiated settlement in the war that he still publicly defended decreased his influence, and in late 1967 Johnson rejected his recommendations to freeze U.S. troop levels, cease bombing North Vietnam, and transfer ground combat duties largely to the South Vietnamese Army. McNamara announced his impending resignation in November 1967, leaving three months later to become president of the World Bank.

McNamara remained at the World Bank until 1982, dramatically expanding its lending and development programs. During Ronald Reagan's presidency, McNamara was one of several leading American diplomats who openly sought a pledge by the United States that it would never be the first state to use nuclear weapons. In 1986 he published proposals designed to reduce the risk of conflict. In 1995 he finally published his memoirs and concurrently became heavily involved in continuing efforts by Vietnamese and Western scholars and officials to attain greater understanding of each other's position in the Vietnam conflict. In 2003 he cooperated in producing a documentary, *The Fog of War*, on his experiences from World War II onward.

McNamara remains controversial. His persistent refusal to characterize the American decision to intervene in Vietnam as inherently immoral and unjustified, as opposed to mistaken and unwise, still generates passionate and often highly personal criticism from former American opponents of the war.

Priscilla Roberts

To Congress McNamara presented an unequivocal picture of unprovoked North Vietnamese aggression.

See also

Arms Control; Bay of Pigs; Bundy, McGeorge; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Missile Gap; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Mutual Assured Destruction; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Partial Test Ban Treaty; Peace Movements; Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; Vietnam; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests; World Bank

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Medvedev, Roy Aleksandrovich
(1925–)

Soviet revisionist historian. The twin brother of Soviet geneticist Zhores Medvedev, Roy Medvedev was born in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 14 November 1925. His father, a Red Army officer, was arrested in 1938 during Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's Great Purges and died working in the Kolyma mines.

Drafted into the Red Army in 1943, Medvedev fought on the Caucasus Front. He left the army at the end of the war. During 1946–1951 he studied history in the Philosophical Faculty of Leningrad University. During 1951–1957 he taught history and served as director of a village school. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1952. During 1957–1971 he worked for the Prosveshchenie publishing house. He then was employed by the Academy of Pedagogical Science, but during the early 1960s he became disillusioned and entered the world of antigovernment samizdat (underground publishing).

In 1967 Medvedev published a bombshell book critical of Stalin's rule, published in the West as *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*. For this he was stripped of his CPSU membership. Medvedev has written some thirty-five books, most of which have been translated into other languages. Among his published works are books written with his brother, including *Khrushchev: The Years in Power* (1978). In 1970 he also published, along with dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov, an open letter critical of the Soviet government.

Since 1971 Medvedev has been a freelance journalist and author. He rejoined the CPSU in 1989 and was elected as a member of the Congress of People's Deputies for the 1989–1991 term. He then served as a member of the Supreme Soviet and subsequently was cochairman of the Socialist Party of Russian Workers.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Khrushchev, Nikita; Medvedev, Zhores Aleksandrovich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Medvedev, Zhores Aleksandrovich
(1925–)

Soviet geneticist and dissident writer. The twin brother of Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, Zhores Medvedev was born in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 14 November 1925. His father, a Red Army officer, was arrested in 1938 during Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's Great Purges and died working in the Kolyma mines. Zhores Medvedev studied at the Timiriazev Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Moscow Institute of Plant Physiology, earning a degree from both in 1950.

Medvedev is perhaps best known for his attacks on Soviet geneticist Trofim Lysenko and the latter's theory that acquired characteristics might be inherited. Perhaps Medvedev's best-known work, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, was published in 1969. For this and other activities critical of the government, Soviet authorities confined him in a psychiatric hospital in 1970. He was released only after a campaign mounted by the world scientific community as well as some Soviet scientists. In 1973, while he was on a trip to Britain, Soviet authorities stripped him of his Soviet citizenship, forcing him into exile in London.

A prolific author, Medvedev has written some fifteen books related to agriculture, biochemistry, biology, the history of science, and history, many of them published in the West. He was the first to reveal to the West the Soviet nuclear accident at Chelyabinsk in the Ural Mountains in September 1957. He discussed this in detail in *Nuclear Disaster in the Urals* (1979), and in 1990 he chronicled the Chernobyl disaster as well. Medvedev has also written books with his brother, including *Khrushchev: The Years in Power* (1978). Now retired, Medvedev is a freelance scientist and journalist.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Chernobyl; Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich; Medvedev, Roy; Soviet Union

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Meir, Golda
(1898–1978)

Israeli diplomat, Labor Party politician, foreign minister (1956–1965), and prime minister (1969–1974). Born Goldie Mabovitch in Kiev, Russia (now Ukraine), on 3 May 1898, she immigrated with her family to the United States in 1906. Intent on becoming a teacher, she enrolled at the Wisconsin State Normal School in 1916 but stayed there just one year, never finishing her degree. That same year she became an active member in the Zionist labor movement. There she met Morris Meyerson, whom she married in 1917. Golda Meyerson and her husband immigrated to Palestine in 1921, where she became active in Hista'drut, the Jewish labor movement. During the 1930s and early 1940s Meyerson busied herself working in the Zionist movement. In 1940 she became head of the political department of Hista'drut.

Golda Meir was a prominent Israeli political leader and the first woman to hold the office of prime minister of Israel (1969–1974). She was forced to resign in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War, which had caught Israeli leaders by surprise. (Library of Congress)

After helping raise funds for Jewish settlement and before Israel's War of Independence (1948), Meyerson twice met secretly with Jordan's King Abdullah in an unsuccessful effort to prevent war. During the war, she traveled to the United States and there raised $50 million for Israel. Following the war, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, sent her to Moscow as Israel's ambassador, and at his urging she adopted the Hebrew surname Meir (which means to burn brightly).

Elected to parliament in 1949 on the Labor Party ticket, Ben-Gurion immediately appointed Meir minister of labor. She served in that position until 1956, gaining a reputation as a strong and decisive leader, particularly in resettling the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees who immigrated to Israel during these years. Meir went on to serve as foreign minister during 1956–1965, working to strengthen Israel's relationship with the United States and with the new nations of Africa, to which she dispatched a series of aid missions. In part because of her efforts, U.S.

arms sales to Israel increased steadily in the 1960s, particularly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

On 26 February 1969, the ruling Labor Party appointed Meir prime minister. She faced daunting challenges, including Israeli national security imperatives and Middle Eastern instability. Her efforts to trade recently conquered land for peace with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan failed, and terrorist attacks and cross-border raids into Israel increased. Skirmishing with Egypt escalated into the War of Attrition, which lasted through August 1970. The following month, Syria invaded Jordan to support a Palestinian rebellion but withdrew its forces after Meir threatened to attack Syria.

Tensions with Egypt and Syria increased steadily until the morning of 6 October 1973, when Israel's director of intelligence warned of an imminent attack. Concerned about Israel's international reputation, Meir rejected proposals to launch a preemptive attack as Israel had done in 1967. That afternoon Egyptian and Syrian forces invaded Israeli territory, driving back the surprised and outnumbered Israeli Army. Following a series of early defeats, Israeli counteroffensives finally subdued both Arab armies, and a U.S.-imposed cease-fire ended the war on 24 October.

Although the war was won, the early setbacks, heavy casualties, and surprise of the invasion tarnished Meir's administration. She resigned on 3 June 1974 and returned to private life. Meir died on 8 December 1978 in Jerusalem.

Stephen K. Stein

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Begin, Menachem; Israel; Israel, Armed Forces; Rabin, Yitzhak

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Menderes, Adnan
(1899–1961)

Turkish politician and prime minister. Adnan Menderes was born in 1899 into a wealthy family of landowners in Aydin, Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire). He attended Izmir American College and later the Faculty of Law at Ankara University, graduating in 1935. During Turkey's Independence War (1919–1922), he participated in the local resistance against the Occupation Forces and later received an honorary medal. In 1930 he founded the local chapter of the Free Party that advocated liberal economic principles. When the party closed down in the same year, he joined Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Republican People's Party (RPP) and was elected to the parliament on its ticket in 1931.

Although Menderes served in various parliamentary committees, he gained a nationwide reputation only in 1945 when he vehemently criticized the government's proposal to redistribute big landowners' property to the peasants. His ideas sparked interest among the elites who were unhappy with the RPP's single-handed rule. When his opposition found more popular currency, he was expelled from the party along with two other major political figures. In 1946 he cofounded the Democrat Party (DP) that defeated the RPP in the 1950 national election and brought him to the premiership.

Menderes continued to follow the RPP's pro-Western policies. He supported Turkey's participation in the Korean War and its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the other hand, he tried to establish closer relations with Muslim countries and relaxed the strict controls over the practice of religion. Unlike the RPP governments, his administration advocated economic liberalism and launched various modernization projects especially in agriculture. The projects were mostly financed with international loans that gradually overwhelmed the economy. Despite his decreasing popularity, Menderes remained in power until 27 May 1960, when his government was overthrown and his party was closed down by a military coup d'état.

The DP came to power with the support of peasants, petty merchants, and the middle class, but it soon alienated the secular groups as well as the military with its pro-Islamic and authoritarian policies. Menderes intensified the censorship over the press after the 1954 elections and jailed many journalists who criticized his administration. When the military intervened in 1960, he was arrested and tried for embezzling state funds and corruption, among other charges. At the end of an eleven-month trial, he and two other ministers were executed on the island of Imrali on 17 September 1961 and buried there. In 1990, their bodies were brought to a mausoleum in Istanbul with a state funeral led by Turkish President Turgut Özal.

Burcak Keskin-Kozat

See also

Marshall Plan; Turkey

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Mendès-France, Pierre
(1907–1982)

French premier (1954–1955). Born in Paris on 11 January 1907, Pierre Mendès-France was a brilliant student. He earned a diploma from the École Libre des Sciences Politiques and a doctor of laws degree from the Faculty of Law

and was admitted to practice law at age twenty-one, then the youngest lawyer in France.

Elected to the Chamber of Deputies as a Radical-Socialist in 1932, Mendès-France was its youngest member. He was next undersecretary for finance in Léon Blum's second government but joined the French Air Force as a lieutenant in September 1939 at the outbreak of World War II. He flew in Syria and in the campaign for France. Briefly imprisoned by the Vichy government following the French military defeat, he escaped abroad and joined the Free French in London. He was a captain in a bomber squadron when, in November 1943, General Charles de Gaulle named him minister of finance in the Free French government at Algiers.

As minister for national economy in the provisional government at the end of the war, Mendès-France wanted to issue new bank notes and freeze accounts as a means to halt inflation, end the black market, and uncover information on profiteering from collaboration with the Germans. He also proposed an austerity program. Many opposed this draconian economic plan, including Finance Minister René Pleven, and in a fateful decision de Gaulle rejected it, whereupon Mendès-France resigned.

Mendès-France later became executive director for France in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Washington, French administrator of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and representative to the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council. Over the next two decades he was often in opposition to government policies, warning against the dangers of drift (*immobilisme*). He was also critical of France's failure to grant independence to the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, and he opposed the Indochina War.

French Premier Pierre Mendès-France. A trained economist and leader of the Radical-Socialists, Mendès-France became premier of France in June 1954 following the French military defeat in Indochina. He sought to modernize the French economy but was forced to concentrate on foreign affairs and ended his nation's involvement in Indochina. (Library of Congress)

In May 1954 the French were defeated in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, forcing Premier Joseph Laniel from office. Mendès-France assumed the premiership on 18 June. He neither smoked nor drank, his preferred beverage being milk. Even rarer for a French politician was his candid approach to problem solving. His goal was to reinvigorate and modernize the French economy, but he was forced to spend most of his energies on foreign affairs.

On 20 June 1954 Mendès-France announced his intention to end the war in Indochina within thirty days or resign. He won his controversial gamble at the Geneva Conference on the last day of the deadline. With the war terminated, he set in motion events that led to independence for Morocco and Tunisia in 1956. Also controversial was his failure to support the European Defense Community (EDC), which was defeated in the Chamber while he was premier.

When he attempted to bring about domestic reform, attacking alcoholism and attempting to modernize the economy by opening it up to free competition, Mendès-France encountered stiff opposition. Hated by many as a Jew, as a reformer, for his opposition to the EDC, and as "the gravedigger of the French Empire," the Chamber ousted him from power on 5 February 1955. The Radical-Socialist Party then split, and Mendès-France lost his post as party leader.

Although brief, Mendès-France's premiership was one of the most notable in the history of the Fourth Republic. The failure of his experiment disillusioned many young French reformers and helped pave the way for de Gaulle's return to power in 1958. Mendès-France remained in the Chamber of Deputies until defeated for reelection in 1958. Reelected in 1967, he was defeated in the Gaullist landslide the following year. Mendès-France died in Paris on 18 October 1982.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; European Defense Community; France; Geneva Conference (1954); Indochina War; Morocco; Pleven, René Jean; Tunisia

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Mengistu, Haile Mariam
(1937?–)

Ethiopian Army officer and military ruler of Ethiopia (1974–1991). Born around 1937 at Jimma in southwestern Ethiopia to a family of the low-caste Amhara clan, Haile Mengistu was forced by poverty to enlist as a teenager at half-pay in the boys' unit of the Ethiopian Army. At age eighteen he transferred to the regular army and attended the Holeta Military Academy. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1962, Mengistu, as with many Ethiopian officers, was sent for further training to the United States, where he experienced racial discrimination.

Rising through the ranks of the army, Mengistu was a leading figure in the group of officers that overthrew Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. Mengistu considered himself a socialist and sought to establish a people's republic. Elected chairman of the new ruling committee, or Derg, which made him the de facto chief of state, he achieved sole control of the government in February 1977 when he had his political rivals killed.

Mengistu ended the special relationship between Ethiopia and the United States, turning to the Soviet Union for support and aid. This assistance enabled him to consolidate his hold on power, crush a rebellion in Eritrea, and repel the Somali invasion of the Ogaden in 1978. Soviet support also enabled Mengistu to retain power during the turbulent 1980s, when a devastating famine in 1984 drew attention to his failed agricultural policies, rebellion in Eritrea and Tigray flared, and increasing internal unrest prompted challenges to his regime.

After 1989 and the end of the Cold War and termination of Soviet aid, Mengistu's hold on power weakened. Unable to meet the combined challenge of the Eritrean and Tigray People's Liberation Fronts, Mengistu fled into exile to Zimbabwe in May 1991. In 1994 a trial began in Addis Ababa of Mengistu and seventy-two of his former aides concerning the deaths of nearly 2,000 people in the 1977–1978 terror campaign. In a December 2006 verdict, Mengistu, sometimes known as the "Butcher of Addis Ababa," was found guilty (in absentia), as were all but one of the defendants.

Donna R. Jackson

See also

Africa; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia; Ogaden War; Somalia

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Menon, Vengalil Krishnan Krishna

(1896–1974)

Indian nationalist, champion of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Indian foreign minister (1957–1962). Born on 3 May 1896 in Calicut, the son of a well-to-do lawyer, V. K. Krishna Menon would play a crucial role in the early formulation and implementation of India's foreign policy. He studied law at University College, London, and in 1934 obtained an MA degree from the London School of Economics. In Britain, beginning in 1924, he became an indefatigable lobbyist for Indian independence, working mainly through the India League. It was largely due to his ceaseless lobbying efforts that Britain's Labour Party became sympathetic to the cause of Indian independence.

Menon was a close confidant of India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The Non-Aligned Movement in which he, with Nehru, became an important player was an instrument for negotiated peace settlements in a number of Cold War conflicts. In 1947 Menon became the first high commissioner for India in London, in which post he remained until 1952. Effectively his country's ambassador, he devised a formula that enabled India to be a member of the Commonwealth while being a republic.

V. K. Krishna Menon, head of the Indian delegation to the United Nations (UN), addresses the UN General Assembly on 24 June 1955. Echoing the earlier demands of Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, Menon called for prohibition of nuclear weapons and the freeing of all colonies. (Bettmann/Corbis)

As the head of the Indian delegation to the United Nations (UN) from 1952 to 1956, Menon achieved notable success. During the Korean War (1950–1953), the Indochina War (1946–1954), and the Suez Crisis (1956), Menon, in a series of informal discussions with the belligerents' representatives, succeeded to a large extent in bringing about settlements between the opposing parties. He took passionate stances in favor of disarmament and decolonization, causes to which he was deeply committed. He also spoke in favor of admitting the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the UN.

Menon was appointed minister without portfolio with cabinet rank in 1956. In 1957 he won a seat in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, whereupon Nehru appointed him minister of defense, a position he held until 1962 when he resigned in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War, which was a defeat for India. Menon's career never recovered from this blow, and he occupied himself with academics and law until his death on 6 October 1974 in New Delhi.

Amrita Singh

See also

India; India, Armed Forces; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Non-Aligned Movement; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations

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Menzies, Robert Gordon
(1894–1978)

Australian Liberal Party politician and prime minister (1939–1941, 1949–1966). Born on 20 December 1894 in Jeparit, Victoria, Australia, Robert Menzies was educated at Wesley College and the University of Melbourne. He entered the Victorian parliament in 1929 and the federal parliament in 1934, becoming prime minister in 1939. Two years later he was forced to resign because of dissatisfaction with his leadership. In 1944 he founded the Liberal Party, which he led to victory in the 1949 federal elections. He was duly elected prime minister, and his second premiership was far more successful than the first. He won a record seven general elections and cast a long political shadow over postwar Australia.

During Menzies' second premiership, which coincided with the chilliest period of the Cold War, Australian troops were dispatched to participate in the Korean War (1950–1953) and then to Malaya, the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Pact and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) agreements were signed, and Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War began. Although Menzies' anticommunism was genuine and, at times, visceral, he skillfully exploited Cold War fears to advance his political agenda. In 1950 he introduced the controversial Communist Party Dissolution Bill. He disliked the illiberal idea of outlawing a political party but believed that the threat to liberalism posed by communism must be eliminated. The legislation was unparalleled in Australian political history, as it reversed the accepted judicial principle that an accused person was innocent until proven guilty. Despite the Australian High Court's subsequent ruling against the act's constitutionality, Menzies persisted in his efforts to stamp out indigenous communism.

In late 1950, with the Korean War raging, Menzies warned darkly of the likelihood of a third world war within three years. In this looming apocalyptic conflict, he prognosticated that the communists would become fifth columnists. In 1951, his government held a national referendum seeking constitutional power to ban the Communist Party and communist activities. The referendum was defeated by a narrow margin.

The issue of Cold War communism again exploded in 1954 when Soviet intelligence operative Vladimir Petrov defected and Menzies appointed a Royal Commission to investigate allegations of Soviet espionage. The Petrov Affair precipitated a split in the Labour Party and led to the formation of the staunchly anticommunist Democratic Labour Party in 1955, the electoral consequences of which kept Menzies' Liberal Party in power for the next seventeen years.

Menzies retired from politics in January 1966. He died on 15 May 1978 in Melbourne.

Phillip Deery

See also

ANZUS Pact; Australia; Petrov, Vladimir Mikhailovich; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

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Mexico

Latin American nation comprising 769,000 square miles, bordered by the United States to the north and Guatemala and Belize to the south. A culturally and geographically diverse nation, Mexico's climate zones range from high desert to tropical jungle, and its population is 90 percent Roman Catholic. During World War II, Mexico cooperated closely with the Allied powers to meet the Axis threat. In fact, Mexico was one of only two Latin American nations to provide combat forces during the war. Mexico even permitted the United States to draft Mexican citizens residing in the United States and to recruit in Mexico itself, resulting in some 250,000 Mexican citizens serving in the U.S. armed forces. After 1945, Mexico, with a population of 22 million, saw its ties to the United States weaken, especially in foreign affairs. Throughout the Cold War, in fact, Mexico often found itself at odds with U.S. foreign policy.

In the postwar world, Mexico wanted to maintain close economic ties with the United States but was not enthusiastic about maintaining close military ties in the name of hemispheric defense. While U.S. policy focused on containing communism, Mexico was more concerned with issues of economic development. Mexico did not view the Soviet Union as a particular threat, and furthermore, the Mexican government boasted a long and successful history of quashing indigenous communist movements. Traditional Mexican foreign policy principles often worked against U.S. Cold War policy. Mexican policy revolved around self-defense, belief in the equality of

all nations, peaceful resolutions to conflicts, participation in international organizations, nonintervention, and the search for counterbalances to U.S. domination.

Mexico's response to the Korean War showcased the divergent concerns of the United States and Mexico in the early Cold War. Mexico supported the U.S. position within the United Nations (UN). Nevertheless, the Mexican government steadfastly resisted U.S. pressure to commit troops to the conflict. The United States wanted Mexico to commit one military division to the war, hoping that Mexican participation would encourage troop commitments by other Latin American countries. The U.S. request was unrealistic, however, given Mexico's limited resources and combat experience. Furthermore, Mexico did not view the Korean War solely through the eyes of communist containment.

Mexico also disagreed with U.S. Cold War policy toward Latin America. Mexico's own history made it generally sympathetic to left-wing revolutions, even when communists played a prominent role. And Mexico's traditional foreign policy principles prevented it from supporting U.S. efforts to block such revolutions. The Mexicans refused to support America's covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation in Guatemala, which ousted that nation's leader in 1954. Fidel Castro's successful 1959 revolution in Cuba also put Mexico and the United States at loggerheads. Even when Castro proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist in 1960, the Mexicans continued to defend Cuba's right to self-determination.

Mexico's independent position in foreign affairs reflected its political stability and economic growth in the quarter-century following World War II. Political stability was the product of the dominant role played in Mexican politics by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the official party that controlled all branches and all levels of government. While other parties were permitted, the only real contests for political power took place within the PRI itself, not between the PRI and other parties.

The Mexican government had committed itself to an economic development policy that after World War II became known as import-substitution industrialization. This policy encouraged domestic industrialization through a variety of measures such as tariffs and import quotas. In the 1940s and 1950s, this approach produced spectacular economic growth known as the Mexican economic miracle.

Although the economic policy had nationalist elements, the role of U.S. investors in the economy increased. At the same time, U.S. influence in cultural affairs became so great that Mexicans began to complain about U.S. cultural imperialism even as they embraced fast-food franchises and other aspects of American popular culture. By the late 1960s, the end of the economic boom and growing demands for democratization forced a rethinking of Mexico's foreign and domestic policies.

In the 1970s, Mexico diverged even further from U.S. Cold War foreign policies. Mexican President Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) wanted Mexico to assume leadership among developing nations and was a major player in establishing the Latin American Economic System, aimed at promoting and



Mexican President Luis Echeverría, shown here at a press conference in Rome on 11 November 1979 after he spoke to the United Nations World Food Conference. (Bettmann/Corbis)

protecting Latin American regional economic interests. In 1973 the Echeverría administration refused to recognize the American-backed military regime in Chile that had overthrown the Marxist Salvador Allende. Mexico also prompted the Organization of American States (OAS) to soften its stance toward Cuba. In 1975 the OAS passed a resolution allowing each member to determine its own relationship with Cuba.

U.S.-Mexican disagreement continued under Echeverría's successor, José López Portillo (1976–1982). By then, Mexico's growing oil industry allowed it to pursue an even more independent foreign policy. Americans and Mexicans parted company once more, this time over U.S. policy in Central America. The 1979 Sandinista victory in the Nicaraguan Civil War had greatly alarmed the United States because of its communist leanings. By January 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration transformed Nicaragua into a Cold War litmus test, vowing to overturn the Sandinistas. Much to America's dismay, Mexico began providing the Sandinista government with food, oil, and credit. López Portillo further strained relations with the United States by recognizing the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador as a representative political force.

Mexico's assertive independence was, however, short-lived. As oil prices declined sharply in the early 1980s, Mexico found itself in the midst of a serious economic crisis by 1982. For the remainder of the 1980s, Mexico's finan-

cial problems dictated closer ties with the United States. As the Cold War came to a close, Mexico looked to the United States to help jump-start and modernize its economy. It thus moved briskly toward linking its economic future with the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other bilateral and hemispheric economic arrangements.

Don M. Coerver

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Americas; Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; El Salvador; Guatemalan Intervention; Korean War; Nicaragua; Organization of American States; Sandinistas; Somoza Debayle, Anastasio; Somoza García, Anastasio

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MI5

British counterintelligence agency, charged with preserving internal security. Created in 1909, MI5 played important roles in World War I and World War II against German intelligence networks in Britain. MI5 enjoyed particular success during World War II, when it apparently neutralized or turned all German agents in Britain and helped preserve the security of Operation OVERLORD, the Allies' June 1944 invasion of France.

MI5 was responsible for countering internal subversion and espionage and for directing counterintelligence operations against potential British enemies. As such, there was a long-standing rivalry between MI5 and MI6, the agency charged with gathering overseas intelligence. During the Cold War, MI5 targeted in particular the Communist Party in Britain. Although MI5 enjoyed numerous successes, the defection to the Soviet Union of MI6 agent Kim Philby in January 1963 was a blow to the prestige of British intelligence operations in general. MI5's reputation was itself damaged in the Profumo Affair of that same year, when it was revealed that MI5 had been slow to warn that Minister of War John Profumo and Captain Yevegeny Ivanov shared a common mistress in Christine Keeler. MI5 suffered an additional embarrassment in 1979 when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher revealed that an MI5 operative, Sir Anthony Blunt, had been a Soviet spy and had probably warned Philby, allowing him to elude arrest and escape to the Soviet Union. MI5 saw its reputation further tarnished by charges that it had worked to undermine

Harold Wilson's Labour government, believing it to be insufficiently anti-communist, and that its longtime director Sir Roger Hollis was a Soviet mole. Charges against Hollis have never been proven, however.

Arthur M. Holst and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Espionage; Profumo Affair; Thatcher, Margaret

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MI6

Operating under the British Foreign Office, MI6 is the government agency responsible for gathering overseas intelligence relating to British security. It thus corresponds to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Founded in 1909, MI6 began as the International Section of the Secret Service Bureau. From 1921 it was known as the Secret Intelligence Service. Since the British government refuses to acknowledge its existence, it has no formal public name. During World War II, MI6 had responsibility for the Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park outside of London that produced radio-derived ULTRA intelligence that was so vital in the Allied victory in the war.

MI6 played a substantial role in the Cold War. The organization was able to turn Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) agent Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who provided vital intelligence information on the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. Colonel Penkovsky smuggled photographs of some 5,000 secret Soviet documents before he was discovered and executed by Soviet authorities in 1963.

MI6 had its embarrassments as well. In 1963 one of its top agents, Kim Philby, fled to Moscow and was exposed as a Soviet spy and member of the Cambridge Five spy ring. Later it was revealed that Philby, who had been British intelligence liaison officer with the CIA, had been able in 1951 to warn another member of the Cambridge Five ring, Guy Burgess, that he was under investigation. Burgess and yet another member of the group, Donald Maclean, then fled to the Soviet Union. Another embarrassment for MI6 occurred when it sent navy diver Commander Lionel Crabb on a never-explained mission around the hull of the *Ordzhonikidze*, the Soviet ship that had brought Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev to Britain on a state visit. Crabb's disappearance led to a parliamentary inquiry and the dismissal of a number of MI6 employees.

Arthur M. Holst and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy; Espionage; Maclean, Donald; MI5; Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich

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Michael I, King of Romania

(1921–)

King of Romania (1927–1930, 1940–1947) and pretender to the throne since 1947. Born in the royal castle at Sinaia on 25 October 1921 to Romania's Crown Prince Carol and Princess Helen of Greece, Michael succeeded his grandfather Ferdinand I as king in 1927, bypassing his father, who had renounced his claim to the throne in 1925 in order to pursue a liaison with the socialite Magda Lupescu. This brief regency ended in 1930 with the return of his father, who engineered his own accession as Carol II, pursuing self-indulgent policies and political gestures and ultimately creating a royal dictatorship in 1938 meant to counter the growing influence of defense minister Ion Antonescu and the fascist Iron Guard. After the Soviet Union's occupation of Bessarabia and the ceding of Transylvania to Hungary, in September 1940 Carol was obliged to abdicate in favor of Michael, then nineteen years old. It was Antonescu, however, who held real power in Romania.

Michael I was the king of Romania from 1927 to 1930 and then from 1940 to 1947. Although he severed Romania's relationship with the Axis powers during World War II, he was unable to prevent the nation from coming under communist control after the war. Forced to abdicate the throne in 1947, he moved with his family to Switzerland. (Library of Congress)

Michael and Helen, now effectively wards of the state, spent most of the war years at Sinaia, visiting the capital only for command figurehead appearances with Antonescu. On 23 August 1944, with the Soviets poised for invasion of Romania, Michael and a sympathetic military element managed a coup that deposed Antonescu and a number of ministers, who soon were turned over to the Soviets. In September 1944 Michael traveled to Moscow to sign an armistice with the Allies, ending the war for Romania and paving the way for the Romanian communists to fully emerge and claim power. By force of will, Michael maintained a presence in Romania until he was pressured to abdicate and sent into exile in December 1947. He has since made his home in Switzerland, working with an American brokerage firm and acting as a goodwill

ambassador on behalf of Romania since the fall of the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu.

GORDON E. HOGG

See also
Antonescu, Ion; Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Romania

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Middle East

The Middle East was both an important focal point and a flash point of the Cold War, and it remains such today. During the Cold War, Israel and the Arab states fought three major wars. The two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union and the former colonial powers of Britain and France, both of which retained important interests in the region, all intervened there. The period also was characterized by rising Arab nationalism in the new, fully independent nation-states that emerged following World War II.

Although some scholars identify the Middle East in cultural terms to include those countries embracing Islam, the Middle East generally is delineated by geography to consist of those countries of southwestern Asia west of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Under this definition, the Middle East includes Turkey, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, and Egypt.

Most of the Middle East was dominated by the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. Turkey joined the Central Powers at the outbreak of that war and, as a result, in the Treaties of Sèvres (August 1920) and Lausanne (July 1923), it was shorn of its non-Ottoman possessions and was left with Anatolia in Asia Minor and a small portion of the Balkans in Europe, extending from Istanbul on the north side of the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmora.

Britain and France had both been intensely involved in the Middle East. The British were anxious to control the Suez Canal, safeguarding their imperial lifeline to India. From 1882 the British had controlled Egypt. At the beginning of the twentieth century, oil also became a major consideration in the Middle East. Petroleum was immensely important to the industrialized West, and the Middle East held the world's largest known crude oil reserves.

At the conclusion of World War I, both France and Britain secured Middle Eastern mandates, subject only to the oversight of the League of Nations. In accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement reached between the two powers during the war, Britain gained mandates over Iraq and Palestine, while France secured mandates over Syria and Lebanon. In these cir-

cumstances, modern Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel came into being.

One vexing problem had arisen during the war. While the British government had encouraged the Arabs to rebel against Ottoman control (the Arab Revolt), it had also sought to secure the support of world Jewry for the Allied war effort. Indeed, in 1917 the British government had issued the Balfour Declaration, promising a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Zionists, who sought to secure the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, now found themselves confronting rising Arab nationalism.

In the decades after World War I, increasing numbers of European Jews settled in Palestine. There they bought land but in the process also displaced Arabs. Caught in the middle and with rising Arab-Jewish communal violence, the British found the situation increasingly difficult to control.

The Middle East was immensely important to the Allies during World War II. In order to secure the Suez Canal, the British established in Egypt their largest overseas base. The importance of Egypt and the canal in British strategic thinking is seen in the fact that at the height of the 1940 Battle of Britain, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill diverted scarce military resources to the Middle East. Persian Gulf oil was also of immense strategic importance to the Allied war effort, and Iran became an important supply corridor for U.S. Lend-Lease aid shipped to the Soviet Union.

The Middle East was immensely important to the Allies during World War II. In order to secure the Suez Canal, the British established in Egypt their largest overseas base.

World War II had immense impacts on the Middle East. During the conflict, nationalist sentiment intensified among the Arab states of the region, leading to full independence for these states. Another new state also appeared in Jewish Israel. During World War II, Nazi policies resulted in the deaths of some 6 million Jews in Europe, and following the war the survivors determined that the Holocaust would never be repeated. Zionists demanded fulfillment of their long-standing call for establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

During and immediately after the war, the British government, which was keenly aware of the effects of these demands on intercommunal violence, tried to inhibit Jewish immigration to Palestine. Indeed, patrolling British destroyers turned back boats filled with Jewish refugees endeavoring to reach Palestine. Soon, armed Jewish groups were fighting the British.

The Holocaust had created an immense sense of moral obligation among the Western powers, especially as the United States and other nations, despite mounting evidence of Nazi persecution, had restricted Jewish immigration in the years immediately before the war. The British government, meanwhile, attempted to work out a partition of Palestine, and when this failed the exasperated British turned the matter over to the United Nations (UN). A UN Security Council agreement to partition the former mandate won the support of the Jews but failed to win acceptance from militant Palestinians and the Arab League. Already, considerable violence had begun as militant Palestinians, confident of eventual victory, attacked Jewish settlements. Hard-pressed financially and unable to maintain order, London took the precipitous decision to abandon its mandate on 14 May 1948. The Zionists immediately proclaimed the independence of the Jewish state of Israel.

Israel won immediate recognition from both the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S. decision was rather obvious. The United States contained the world's largest Jewish population, and many wealthy Jews were quite influential politically. Jews in general were an important voting bloc to be solicited by both Democrats and Republicans. President Harry S. Truman was also deeply moved by the suffering of the Jews during the war, and the Jews had proclaimed their intention to establish a Western-oriented, democratic state. At the same time, the United States maintained close ties with the oil-producing Persian Gulf states. Despite being strongly anti-Israel, these states were tied to the United States financially through their exports of oil. Influential Islamic clergy in these states also found Soviet policies toward religion distasteful.

The initial Soviet position of support for the Jewish state was more complex. Many of the Jews who had settled in Palestine were of Russian extraction, and the first agricultural settlers were committed socialists. The Soviets, who had suffered so much in the war at the hands of the Nazis, also identified with what the Jews had experienced. In addition, the Soviets hoped to supplant British influence in the region. The Soviets had actively been seeking a port on the Mediterranean and in the years immediately after World War II brought immense pressure on Turkey in an effort to control the straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. They also sought to secure the province of Azerbaijan in northern Iran that they had occupied during the war.

The United States sought to counter Soviet pressure in the region. When Britain announced in 1947 that it could no longer support the Greek government in its war with communist insurgents, the United States took up the gauntlet. In the 1947 Truman Doctrine, President Truman proclaimed U.S. aid for both Greece and Turkey and pledged U.S. support for those countries fighting communist insurgents and outside pressures. The United States also maintained a strong naval presence in its maintenance of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The Israeli declaration of independence was, in any case, immediately followed by the first Arab-Israeli War (1948–1949). Although vastly outnumbered, the Israelis were much better disciplined and organized. They ultimately prevailed over their divided opponents, who had conflicting war aims. At the end of the war, Israeli forces succeeded in driving back the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. In the process, many tens of thousands of Palestinians fled, and the Israelis forced others to leave.

The rise of President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt dramatically changed the Middle East. Nasser was a committed Arab nationalist with Pan-Arab aspirations. His goals greatly alarmed Israeli leaders, for the security of the Israeli state had rested in large part on Arab division. Among his accomplishments, Nasser secured a final British departure from Egypt. He also gained a pledge of U.S. financial support for construction of an immense dam on the Nile at Aswan. But when the West rejected his requests for modern weaponry, the Egyptian leader turned to the Soviet bloc for assistance. The United States feared that this would upset the arms balance in the Middle

East to the detriment of Israel. Nasser's subsequent conclusion of an arms deal with Czechoslovakia led to the withdrawal of U.S. assistance for the Aswan Dam project. The Soviets stepped in to provide technical assistance, but to pay for the dam project Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, which had been owned by a private company in which the British government was the largest stockholder.

Nasser's decision to nationalize the canal had immense repercussions, ultimately bringing the British government into a secret arrangement developed by the French and Israeli governments to topple him from power. The Israelis were convinced that as soon as Nasser had integrated modern Soviet weapons into its armed forces, Egyptian forces would invade Israel. Indeed, he had already sponsored terrorist raids across the border into Israel and had closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The secret plan developed by the Israelis, French, and then the British called for Israel to land paratroopers at the canal and also advance into the Sinai. The British and French would then demand that both sides pull back and allow their forces to occupy the canal zone. If, as expected, Egypt refused, British and French forces would invade.

The Suez Crisis was one of the major events of the Cold War. Although Egypt did indeed reject the Franco-British ultimatum and British and French troops attacked Egypt, the three invading powers were soon forced to withdraw under heavy U.S. pressure and Soviet threats. An angry President Dwight D. Eisenhower, caught by surprise by the allied move, insisted on a unilateral withdrawal. Far from toppling Nasser, the Suez Crisis strengthened his position both in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. Britain was the biggest loser. Soviet prestige soared, and the United States also gained credibility, although it continued to be hampered by its unqualified support of Israel, which emerged as a big winner. The UN established observers along the Israeli-Egyptian border, and the blockade of the Strait of Tiran came to an end.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, allied itself closely with Arab nationalism against the West and Israel. Thanks to expanded Soviet military assistance, by 1966 the Egyptian armed forces appeared to be sufficiently strong to threaten Israel. This fact, the signing of a defense pact between Egypt and Syria in 1966, and increasing Palestinian attacks on Israel from the neighboring Arab states all greatly alarmed Tel Aviv. Then in mid-May 1967, Nasser ordered Egyptian troops into the Sinai Peninsula and demanded the concentration of UN observers there, leading to their withdrawal. Convinced that the Egyptians would soon attack, Israel struck first.

After securing the approval of President Lyndon Johnson's administration in the United States, the Israelis launched a devastatingly effective air strike on 5 June 1967. It was carefully timed so as to destroy the bulk of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. The Israelis also moved against the Syrians and reluctantly against Jordan, for King Hussein decided to enter the war. The resulting Six-Day War changed the map of the Middle East. Israel took the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank of the Jordan River and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

The Soviets threatened intervention but in the end did nothing, which greatly diminished their prestige in the Arab world. French President Charles

Overturned vegetable truck on the road to Beer Sheva (Beersheba). The driver was slightly wounded when the truck was fired upon by fedayeen, 7 April 1956. (Israel Government Press Office)

de Gaulle, angered over the preemptive Israeli strike, did cut off French military assistance to Israel, however. The United States, which had done little to assist Israel in the war, nonetheless positioned the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean as a warning to the Soviets, and shortly after the war, the United States substantially increased its military and economic assistance to Israel. The Soviets, meanwhile, made good the military losses sustained by the Arab states.

In 1964, Palestinian nationalist Yasir Arafat had formed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as an umbrella organization for disparate Palestinian groups fighting Israel. It began launching terrorist raids of its own with the aim of eliminating the Jewish state. The bulk of the PLO attacks came from Jordan, and soon there was virtually a state within a state. In September 1970 King Hussein moved to expel the PLO, prompting military intervention on the part of Syria, a staunch PLO supporter. Jordan secured pledges of support from Britain and the United States but was able to both expel the PLO and hold off the Syrians without outside assistance.

Nasser died in September 1970 and was followed as president of Egypt by Anwar Sadat, who concluded that the United States was the only country capable of forcing Israel into a negotiated settlement. He therefore ordered Soviet military advisors to leave Egypt, and Soviet bases there closed. These moves failed to win any concessions from either the United States or Israel,

however. Sadat then concluded that only a renewal of the fighting could force a settlement. To enhance the possibility of success, he concluded a secret understanding with Syria for a joint surprise attack on Israel.

The Israeli government was indeed caught completely unawares by the Egyptian attack of 6 October 1973, which occurred at the start of Yom Kippur. Elaborate Egyptian deceptions masked their preparations. What became known as the Ramadan War, the Yom Kippur War, or the War of Atonement began with an Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal. The Egyptians then set up defensive positions. Their surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites on the other side of the canal devastated reacting Israeli aircraft, and their new handheld Soviet antitank missiles took a heavy toll from responding Israeli armor. In the north along the Golan Heights, Syrian forces almost overran severely outnumbered Israeli defenders. Israeli forces rallied on both fronts, and by the time a cease-fire was declared they had driven the Syrians back and penetrated Syria itself almost to Damascus. On the Southern Front against Egypt, Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and were threatening to sever the supply lines to the Egyptian Third Army. A complete victory by either side was not acceptable to the United States or the Soviet Union, and under their joint pressure a cease-fire came into effect, followed by a military withdrawal.

One important side effect of the Ramadan War was the Arab oil embargo of 1973–1974. The major Arab oil-producing states sided with Egypt and Syria and cut off oil shipments to any nation supporting Israel, including the United States. This action exposed the dependence of the Western nations, especially Western Europe and Japan, on Arab oil and greatly strengthened the influence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) over both the supply and pricing of petroleum. Huge increases in oil and energy prices, combined with shortages of each, badly crippled the West's already fragile economy. But increases in the price of oil gave the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf vastly increased wealth as well as expanded influence. These states contributed considerable sums to support the Palestinians and directly or indirectly supported Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israel. The oil embargo also increased the world influence of the Soviet Union, the world's largest oil-producing nation.

In November 1977, Sadat took a major step toward reaching a settlement with Tel Aviv by visiting Israel. His initiative ultimately resulted in the 1978 Camp David Accords, which were followed the next year by a comprehensive Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The administration of President Jimmy Carter in the United States hoped that the treaty would lead to a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, but the ensuing widespread condemnation of Sadat in the Arab world and his assassination in 1981 largely prevented this. Meanwhile, the hard-line Arab states opposing any accommodation with Israel moved closer to the Soviet Union.

At the same time, increasing Palestinian terrorist attacks from Lebanon led Israel to invade southern Lebanon and establish a defensive zone there. Syria, meanwhile, sent its forces into northern Lebanon. The Syrians subsequently took control of that country, which was sharply divided between Muslim and Christian populations.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returns to Tehran on 3 February 1979. He had returned to Iran from exile two days earlier to take control of the revolutionary government. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The oil-producing states, although they provided financial support to the Palestinians and states opposing Israel, took no military action of their own. This enabled them to maintain friendly relations with the West, especially the United States. This situation was particularly true with Iran, ruled by the pro-Western Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Soviet pressure on Iran following World War II and a close alliance between the Soviet Union and Iraq, Iran's regional rival, also served to cement a bond with the United States. Iran and Iraq were at loggerheads over the Shatt al-Arab waterway that separated the two nations. The shah, however, was increasingly unpopular and out of touch with the aspirations of his people. Opposition to the shah was centered in Islamic fundamentalists opposed to his Westernization and his close ties with the United States. In January 1979 the shah was forced to flee Iran, and the next month the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state, which was violently anti-American. In November 1979 Iranian militants overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran and seized 160 Americans as hostages, inaugurating a crisis that probably cost Carter reelection as president.

In 1979 Soviet forces invaded neighboring Afghanistan. The next year Iraq invaded Iran, beginning an eight-year-long (1980–1988) protracted and immensely costly conflict for regional dominance. The war ended in stalemate, but Iran remained committed to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

In December 1988, the PLO publicly accepted the existence of Israel, increasing pressure on both sides for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Cold War ended, however, without formal achievement of this goal.

In 1990, believing that the United States would not intervene, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sent his forces into Kuwait and took over that state. Iraq had long claimed Kuwait as a province, and Saddam was angered over slant-drilling into a large Iraqi field by Kuwait as well as by excessive Kuwaiti oil production that tended to drive down the price of oil. Iraq wanted the price of oil as high as possible in order to pay off its massive debts from the Iran-Iraq War. U.S. President George H. W. Bush was convinced that Iraq would soon pressure Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, so he put together a coalition of powers that ultimately drove Iraq from Kuwait. Bush ended the war early, however, with the result that Hussein remained in power. This ultimately led to a new war with Iraq a decade later.

The Cold War ended with the Middle East as one of the most important areas in the world, not only because of the still-simmering Arab-Israeli feud but also because of the increasing importance of oil in the world economy.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Middle East Regional Defense Organizations; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Suez Crisis

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Middle East Regional Defense Organizations

When the Clement Attlee government came to power in Britain in July 1945, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin moved to end British colonial rule in much of the Middle East. To that end, he hoped to replace older British protectorate agreements with Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt with bilateral treaties that would reduce British commitments without giving up influence in the region. Talks for new agreements were frustrating, however. The Iraqis backed out at the last minute and did not sign the 1947 Portsmouth Agreement. The Egyptians were also unready to accept Britain's new terms and demanded the removal of British troops. While the Iraqi rejection did not pose any immediate difficulties for the British, Egypt's demand jeopardized Britain's main stronghold in the Middle East.

Britain's inability to reach a bilateral defense agreement with Egypt led Britain and the United States to promulgate regional defense organizations instead. The latter included the Middle East Command (MEC) in October 1951 and the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in 1953. It was believed that the organizations would commit Egypt to regional defense without subjecting it to British dominance. Nevertheless, the Egyptian monarchy and successive revolutionary regimes rejected any formal military link with the West.

Efforts to create a regional defense structure with Egypt at its core ended in May 1953, following a visit by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the Middle East. Discussions with regional leaders—mainly with Egyptian officials—convinced Dulles that there was no chance of including Egypt in a regional defense organization. He suggested that a different country should be the linchpin of the organization, and Iraq seemed a viable alternative.

At the time, Turkey and Iraq were negotiating a mutual defense agreement. Cultural ties between Iraq and Turkey made such a pact a natural union. With tacit encouragement from Washington and with the understanding that the parties to a regional defense organization would be rewarded with military aid, the two governments agreed to expand the treaty and to use it as a platform from which to launch a regional defense organization that would include Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq. Turkey and Pakistan had signed a defense agreement earlier, so the proposed regional defense organization was a logical extension.

In February 1955 Iraq signed a defense agreement with Turkey, the initial step toward the establishment of what became known as the 1955 Baghdad Pact, which included Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain. Washington thereupon announced that it would strengthen the Iraqi Army, which stood on the front line against the Soviet Union.

Iraq took a leading role in the initiative, and not simply from fear of the Soviets. It agreed to take part in a Western-oriented regional defense agreement so as to claim regional dominance over Egypt. At the time, Iraq was the only rival to Egypt's leadership in the Arab world. Indeed, the Iraqis deeply resented the establishment of the Arab League under Cairo's auspices and saw an Iraqi-based defense organization, the headquarters of which was to be located in Baghdad, as an effective counterbalance to Egypt's push for regional hegemony.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser did perceive the pact as a challenge to Egypt's position in the Arab world and was still reeling from criticism over the "humiliating clause" in the October 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement that would allow British troops access to Egyptian bases in case of war. Thus, the Egyptian leader fought back by suppressing opponents and adopting a strong Pan-Arab line. He devoted considerable energy to preventing any expansion of the Baghdad Pact. Waving the banner of Pan-Arab nationalism and resorting to manipulation and even violence, Nasser spared no effort to ensure that other Arab states did not come under the Iraqi sphere of influence.

Nasser's struggle against the Baghdad Pact stirred trouble for the pro-Western Jordanian and Lebanese regimes. His agitation reached its zenith in July 1958 when the Iraqi regime was toppled by anti-Western elements, and the Jordanian and Lebanese regimes faced a similar danger. The United States and Britain were determined to prevent Jordan and Lebanon from falling under Nasser's influence, and American and British forces were sent to Beirut and Amman, respectively, in July 1958 to prop up the pro-Western governments. In March 1959 the new Iraqi republic withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which then became known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In the end, however, Nasser had his way, as the Baghdad Pact lost its main pillar, Iraq, and never expanded in the way that the United States and Great Britain had envisioned.

David Tal

See also

Arab Nationalism; Iraq; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel

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Miki Takeo
(1907–1988)

Japanese conservative politician and prime minister (1974–1976). Born the son of a wealthy landowning family in Donari, Japan, on 17 March 1907, Miki Takeo studied in the United States before graduating with a law degree from Meiji University in 1937. That same year, he was first elected to the Japanese Diet (parliament). Because of his strong opposition to the war with the United States, he was able to continue his political career once the war ended in August 1945.

Referred to as a "Balkan politician" because he headed a small Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faction, Miki adopted a dovish position within the ruling conservative party. He held many key posts, among them minister of communications (1947–1948) and minister of transportation (1954–1955).

Miki Takeo, prime minister of Japan, 1974–1976. (Bettmann/Corbis)

While serving as director general of the Economic Planning Agency (June–December 1958), he disagreed with the revision of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and resigned. He was minister of international trade and industry during 1965–1966 and minister of foreign affairs during 1966–1968. Because of Miki's reputation as a politician of great integrity, when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was forced to resign because of criticism of his fiscal policies, Miki was chosen to replace him in December 1974.

When Miki became prime minister, the U.S.-Soviet détente and improved U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) had greatly reduced the likelihood of a major war that might have involved Japan. Nonetheless, the Japanese sought to strengthen their defensive posture. Thus, in 1976 the Miki government announced the National Defense Program Outline, a policy designed to strengthen the Japanese armed forces to a level at which they could repel a limited attack without external aid. At the same time, the government mandated a limit on Japan's defense budget spending at 1 percent of gross national product (GNP).

In September 1976, a defecting Soviet fighter pilot landed his MiG-25 fighter aircraft in Hokkaido. Japan allowed U.S. military experts to inspect the plane before returning it to the Soviet Union, an action that greatly strained Japan's relations with Moscow. Also, during Miki's tenure, no substantial progress was made toward a peace treaty with the PRC. Miki was forced to resign in December 1976 after a power struggle within the LDP. He died in Tokyo on 14 November 1988.

Iikura Akira

See also

Japan; Japan, Armed Forces; United States–Japan Security Treaty

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Mikołajczyk, Stanisław
(1901–1966)

Polish politician, prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile (1943–1944), and head of the Polish Peasant Party (1945–1947). Born on 18 July 1901 in Holsterhausen, Germany, to peasants who had immigrated to Germany, Stanisław Mikołajczyk's family returned to Poland after his birth, where he attended primary school and completed several courses in agricultural science before dropping out of school. Drawn to politics early, he was an active

member of the Peasant Party from 1924, became a protégé of party leader Wincenty Witos, and was an organizer of the Peasant Youth Union. In 1930 Mikołajczyk became a deputy in the Sejm (Diet), and during 1933–1939 he served as deputy chairman of the Peasant Party's executive committee, all the while championing the cause of peasant farmers.

Following the defeat of Poland by Germany in September 1939, Mikołajczyk fled first to France and then to Great Britain, where he became one of the leading émigré politicians. In early 1941 Władysław Sikorski, Polish prime minister-in-exile, named Mikołajczyk deputy premier. When Sikorski died in July 1943, Mikołajczyk succeeded him. Although he attempted to follow Sikorski's lead in cultivating cordial relations with the Soviets, Mikołajczyk was ultimately unsuccessful in this endeavor. He did not support Soviet leader Josef Stalin's attempt to set postwar Polish borders along the Curzon Line and refused to join the Moscow-backed Lublin Polish government, which had been set up in July 1944. Mikołajczyk nonetheless continued to seek compromise with Stalin, which drew the ire of his opponents in his own government. In November 1944, Mikołajczyk resigned his position.

In the spring of 1945 in a bid to bring a democratic regime to Poland, Mikołajczyk agreed to participate in the communist-dominated Provisional Government of National Unity, serving as deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture. In August 1945, he founded the Polish Peasant Party, which soon emerged as the dominant party in Poland. But the Soviet-backed Provisional Government saw to it that this party never gained an electoral foothold, first by postponing parliamentary elections and then by engaging in massive electoral malfeasance in the rigged January 1947 elections. Realizing that he faced possible imprisonment after the elections, Mikołajczyk surreptitiously left Poland in October 1947 and settled in the United States, where he lived until his death in Washington, D.C., on 13 December 1966.

Andrzej Paczkowski and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Curzon Line; Poland; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich
(1895–1978)

Soviet politician, Politburo member (1926–1966), deputy prime minister (1937–1955), and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1964–1965). Born the son of a carpenter in Sanain, Armenia, on 25 November 1895,



Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union Anastas I. Mikoyan during a visit to the United States in 1959. (Ed Clark/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Anastas Mikoyan briefly attended a seminary in Tiflis (Tblisi) before aborting his clerical career to join the revolutionary Bolshevik Party in 1915. After participating in underground party work in Baku, where he narrowly escaped execution, he held party assignments that dispatched him to Nizhny Novgorod and the northern Caucasus, where he fought in the Russian Civil War.

In 1922 Mikoyan was elected to the party's Central Committee. A supporter of Josef Stalin, in 1926 Mikoyan became a candidate member of the Politburo and was appointed commissar for foreign trade. In this post, he raised hard currency for the fledgling Soviet economy in part by selling Russian art treasures to the West. In 1934 he headed the Commissariat of Food Production, introducing modern methods to the industry.

Mikoyan became a full member of the Politburo in 1935 and was deputy prime minister during 1937–1955. Although he played a role in Stalin's show trials in 1937, Mikoyan managed to escape the Stalinist purges himself. During World War II, Mikoyan supervised the procurement and transportation of supplies.

Following World War II, still in the Ministry of Trade, Mikoyan's political star waned, but he was sufficiently trusted to be sent to meet secretly in January 1948 with communist leader Mao Zedong, then on the verge of full power in China. There are indications that Stalin believed Mikoyan was plotting to unseat him and that Stalin was planning Mkikoyan's death when the Soviet leader died in 1953.

In the post-Stalin succession struggle in 1953, Mikoyan salvaged his political career by lending his support to Nikita Khrushchev. Even before Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956, Mikoyan often referred to the "evils" of Stalin's dictatorship. In 1957 Mikoyan supported Khrushchev against the challenge from the so-called antiparty group and soon became one of Khrushchev's closest advisors. In autumn 1962 Khrushchev dispatched Mikoyan to Cuba, where he had the unenviable task of persuading Cuban President Fidel Castro to accept the terms on which the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was ended.

In July 1964 Mikoyan was elected chair of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, making him titular head of state. As such, he timidly supported Khrushchev's ouster from power in October 1964. With new leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev, Mikoyan found himself increasingly isolated, and he relinquished his chairmanship in December 1965. He retired from the Politburo in April 1966, although he remained a member of the Communist Party Central Committee until 1976. Mikoyan died in Moscow on 21 October 1978.

Paul Wingrove

See also
Cuban Missile Crisis; Khrushchev, Nikita; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Military Balance
(1945–1990)

The Cold War military balance was as much a comparison of U.S. and Soviet military capabilities as it was a reflection of perceptions, ideas, and assumptions, fueled by the necessity of protecting not just the physical security of a nation but also its core values and way of life as well. This balance, moreover, was an evolutionary process driven by the manner in which leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain perceived and responded to events on the world stage. While much is known about the decision-making dynamics within the American national security establishment during the Cold War, the same cannot be said for the Soviet Union, even after Russian archives were opened after the end of the Cold War.

The Cold War military balance was defined by three phases. The first phase, marked by the U.S. nuclear monopoly, was ushered in by the use of atomic weapons against Japan in August 1945 that were employed to influence the Japanese decision to surrender. The fact that the beginning of the Cold War coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age ensured that the history of the two would become inextricably intertwined.

As the postwar period progressed, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated. From the Soviet perspective, American insistence upon free elections in what it saw as its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, the threat of capitalist encirclement by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and the American nuclear monopoly combined to portray a hostile picture of the West. In much the same way, Western democracies perceived a growing Soviet threat to liberal capitalist democracies around the globe. Communist threats to both Greece and Turkey in 1947, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, and the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949) all seemed to confirm that the Soviets were intent upon world domination.

Yet in spite of this growing hostility, U.S. officials were reasonably confident that as long as the United States held the nuclear monopoly, the threat of Soviet military aggression against core interests was minimal. In the immediate postwar period, this monopoly proved vital in counterbalancing the Soviet Union's massive conventional military advantage, itself a by-product of the war against Germany on the Eastern Front. This correlation of forces ensured that relations between the two Cold War powers remained relatively stable.

August 1949, however, marked a crucial shift in the Cold War military balance. On 29 August the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon,

years ahead of most predictions. U.S. national security planners came to believe, moreover, that by 1954 the Soviets would possess sufficient nuclear capacity to launch a devastating strike against the United States. With its possession of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union could initiate a conventional assault on Western Europe and could be relatively secure in the knowledge that a U.S. nuclear response would be thwarted by the threat of a nuclear counterresponse from the Kremlin. If the United States and NATO chose not to increase their conventional forces, Soviet aggression after 1954 would force either free world appeasement or nuclear devastation. This urgency, combined with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, underpinned President Harry Truman's response to the National Security Council's NSC-68 report, which called for a massive conventional and nuclear military buildup. This policy, driven by the shattering of the U.S. nuclear monopoly and the Korean War, ushered in the second phase of the Cold War military balance: American nuclear superiority.

The underlying fear of the consequences that accompanied Soviet nuclear capabilities in the absence of an adequate conventional deterrent defined the Truman administration's new post-1950 defense posture, which redressed the military balance through a vast conventional rearmament program both at home and in Western Europe. Because conventional forces were generally more expensive than nuclear weapons, the Korean War stalemate and the American preoccupation with rearmament led to budget deficits, inflation, rigid governmental controls on prices and wages, materials shortages, and what many considered to be the beginnings of an American garrison state. Capitalizing on these difficulties, Republican presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower based his 1952 election platform on a more cost-effective national security posture. The Korean War seemed to provide ample evidence that the Truman administration's approach was based too heavily on reaction rather than prevention, that it gave too much initiative to the Soviet Union, and that it was not economically sustainable in the long run. Eisenhower, therefore, adopted the so-called New Look defense strategy, predicated on massive retaliation.

Eisenhower administration officials believed that the only way the Soviets could be deterred was to create the perception that the United States would initiate a nuclear response to any level of Soviet aggression, ranging from a limited conventional incursion against a peripheral interest to a full-scale nuclear strike against the United States. To further heighten its perceived credibility, massive retaliation was deliberately cloaked in ambiguity. It was believed that Soviet leaders would refrain from aggression if it was unclear whether an American nuclear response would be automatic. All of this, moreover, could be accomplished at a lower cost than the programs prescribed by NSC-68, meaning, in the words of Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, "more bang for a buck." As a result, the Eisenhower administration invested deeply in building the U.S. nuclear stockpile, although it was not successful in bringing down defense spending in any major or enduring way.

Similar to the way in which the Korean War shaped the perceptions of NSC-68 was the way in which the Soviet launching of *Sputnik 1* (October

Military parade through Red Square in Moscow, 1963. (Library of Congress)

1957) impacted massive retaliation. Because *Sputnik 1* was propelled into space by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), it demonstrated that the American mainland was vulnerable to direct missile attack. This event, when coupled with the knowledge that the Soviet nuclear stockpile had increased significantly since 1949, forced many defense strategists to rethink the wisdom and prudence of massive retaliation. Although Eisenhower's policy was marginally more cost-effective, the ambiguity upon which much of the deterrent value was based also carried with it a heightened sense of brinkmanship and thus the possibility of nuclear war through miscalculation.

Eisenhower's political opponents, backed by several influential figures within his own military establishment, began calling for a more balanced military capability with a de-emphasis on nuclear weapons. By increasing NATO's conventional strength, the United States and its allies would, in response to Soviet aggression, be able to forgo the unpalatable choices of either nuclear annihilation or appeasement. In what was almost a direct throwback to NSC-68 and the Truman administration, John F. Kennedy's nomination as the Democratic presidential candidate saw him adopt the new doctrine of flexible response as the basis for national security policy.

Flexible response was put into action in 1961 following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's ultimatum to end Western access rights to West Berlin. Conscious of the correlation of forces that in conventional terms were decidedly in favor of the Soviet Union and acutely aware that NATO's response to Soviet aggression lay in either humiliation or all-out nuclear war, Kennedy employed the sword and shield concept by increasing the presence of tactical nuclear weapons and initiating a significant buildup of conventional forces in Europe. In turn, Khrushchev quietly dropped his ultimatum.

This shift toward flexible response played a significant role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. It meant that NATO's conventional deterrent and its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons gave time and pause to the escalatory process, maximized the possibility of a diplomatic settlement, and minimized the threat of war by miscalculation. Although the conflict was resolved peacefully, it made clear the dangers of brinkmanship and the threat of full-scale nuclear conflict. With these lessons fresh in their minds, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to seek a Cold War détente. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed in August 1963, imposed mutual restraint on large-scale atmospheric nuclear tests, and perhaps most significantly, a direct hotline was established between the White House and the Kremlin.

By the beginning of the 1970s, the Cold War military balance entered its third and final stage: rough nuclear parity. As the decade progressed and as both the United States and the Soviet Union increased their nuclear stockpiles, it became clear to both sides that a nuclear war was unwinnable. This underlay the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and, paradoxically, the belief that mutual vulnerability was the key to stability and deterrence. This balance of strategic nuclear parity coupled with the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and the sword and shield concept embraced by NATO gave rise to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that began in November 1969 and set the tone for much of the rest of the Cold War.

Yet for a short time it seemed that this balance would be upset yet again. Viewing détente as akin to appeasement, in the early 1980s President Ronald Reagan's administration believed that stability lay not in mutual vulnerability or assured destruction but rather in enhanced defense against a nuclear first strike. With this in mind, in 1983 Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a vast scientific and military program aimed at developing a new generation of space-based antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses. The objective of SDI was to create a multilayered defensive shield in space that could destroy hundreds of incoming ballistic missiles through electromagnetic guns and lasers mounted on satellites. It was a system that carried with it immense cost and invited harsh criticism that such a system could never be employed or perfected.

Fearing that it would be at a critical disadvantage in the event of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union responded with its own version of SDI and in doing so triggered a renewed arms race. Significantly enough, however, this occurred at the same time that the Soviet economy began to flounder. It quickly became apparent to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that the



An artist's rendering of the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), June 1984. Part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), it was to intercept and destroy incoming missiles aimed at the United States. A fifteen-foot radial net opens to destroy the incoming warhead by impact at more than 15,000 feet per second. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Soviet economy was unable to sustain high defense spending. Consequently, he moved to implement political and economic reforms that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and thus the end of the Cold War military balance.

The American victory in the Cold War, no matter how Pyrrhic, had a lingering effect on the post–Cold War world. For many years, the West faced a marked vulnerability in conventional strength, yet with the demise of the Soviet Union and the ensuing revolution in military affairs, the United States found itself in the position of having overwhelming conventional superiority. Coupled with its superior technological capabilities, the U.S. conventional capability has been central to dealing with asymmetrical threats from terrorists and rogue states in the post–Cold War world.

Josh Ushay

See also

Berlin Crises; Containment Policy; Cuban Missile Crisis; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korean War; North Atlantic Treaty; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Soviet Union, Army; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; Soviet Union, Navy; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Strategic Defense Initiative; Truman,

Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy

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Military-Industrial Complex

An interlocking alliance among the U.S. military establishment, defense industries, and research-oriented universities that during the Cold War created a separate, stand-alone economy dedicated to national security imperatives. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his farewell address of January 1961, was perhaps the first public official to warn of the dangers of the burgeoning military-industrial complex, thereby raising awareness of a process that had begun in earnest a decade before. Eisenhower, like others who worried about this phenomenon, feared that the military-industrial complex had the potential to wield great power by absorbing vast amounts of the nation's resources, granting undue influence to nonelected government officials and corporate executives, and perhaps subverting the democratic process as a result. Eisenhower's warning was in fact somewhat ironic, however, considering that his administration had been instrumental in the growth of the complex.

The military-industrial complex arose in the early 1950s in response to the needs of the Cold War. In America's fight against communism, resources had to be harnessed to develop new military and defense technologies. Much of the research for these endeavors was conducted at large research-intensive universities. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Stanford University were among the top research schools in these areas. Defense-oriented industries often provided much of the capital and additional resources to fund research and development. In turn, they were usually rewarded with sizable government contracts to produce military hardware and weapons systems that had originated in university laboratories. In almost every case, both

university and industrial research and development (R&D) was initiated by the U.S. Department of Defense. Thus, a tightly connected military-industrial-academic reciprocal relationship was created.

The Cold War military-industrial complex was born out of the decision by President Harry Truman administration's to engage the United States in a massive military rearmament program after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Between 1950 and 1953, the U.S. defense budget increased almost fourfold, from $13.5 billion in 1950 to more than $52 billion in 1953. The vast majority of those funds did not go to the war in Korea but instead were earmarked for long-term rearmament programs designed to keep the United States one step ahead of its Soviet Cold War rival.

Even after Eisenhower tried to rein in defense spending in the mid-1950s, the defense budget fell only slightly and certainly remained at least three times as high as the pre–Korean War level. The Korean rearmament program essentially gave teeth to the National Security Council's seminal NSC-68 report of early 1950 that envisioned a huge military buildup. Pivotal in fueling the military-industrial complex was the late 1950 decision to create a permanent industrial base that would provide the United States with excess industrial capacity that could swing into high gear at the first sign of war. Such a decision resulted in the government-sponsored construction of a military-oriented industrial sector that was of little use for civilian applications.

The U.S. Navy's GEOSAT mission radar altimeter spacecraft undergoes final testing at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 1 January 1985. (U.S. Department of Defense)

It is important to note that Eisenhower was against neither the military nor big industry or academia. In fact, he was a proponent of all. As a five-star army general, he appointed mostly businessmen and industrialists to his cabinet, and he briefly served as president of Columbia University. He was also supportive of the scientific community, establishing the new post of special assistant to the president for science and technology in 1957. It was also his administration that embarked on the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the U-*2* reconnaissance plane, and orbiting satellites, all of which utilized the military-industrial complex that he warned against.

But if Eisenhower encouraged the development of these relationships, why did he alert the nation to the dangers inherent in a scientific-technological-industrial elite? The answer to that may be that Eisenhower's address was directed at what science advisor Herbert York called the "hard-sell technologists and their sycophants" who invented the missile gap and tried to exploit *Sputnik 1* and the Gaither Report to instill fear that America was losing ground to the Soviets. Clearly, what Eisenhower was warning against was not so much his own science advisors but rather the scientific-technological elite, special interest groups that had sprung from the emphasis on military research and development in industry and universities.



The military-industrial complex, which still exists today, has provided many benefits to society. Superior weapons technology, satellites, nuclear reactors, silicon chips, chemotherapies, molecular genetics, and particle physics have all benefited from the military-industrial-academic alliance. In many ways, the military-industrial complex was simply a continuation of the evolving big science of the prewar years. Most Americans viewed this growth as a positive development for national security and economic growth.

On the down side, however, the military-industrial complex has resulted in the creation of a separate economy whose products, such as nuclear weaponry, are not likely to be used commercially and add little or nothing to long-term economic productivity. It also had made some industries too reliant on defense contracts, the results of which were glaringly apparent in the early 1990s when the end of the Cold War brought about sharp cuts in defense spending, fueling unemployment and an industrial downturn. Finally, many of the jobs in the defense-oriented sector are ones requiring advanced education and training, meaning that America's working class has largely been left out of the military-industrial complex's largesse. All in all, the phenomenon first brought to light in the early 1960s has been a mixed blessing.

Valerie Adams

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Gaither Report; Korean War; Military Balance; National Security Council Report NSC-68; *Sputnik;* United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy

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Milošević, Slobodan
(1941–2006)

Yugoslav political leader and Serbian nationalist. Born on 29 August 1941 in the commercial town of Požarevac to the east of Belgrade, Slobodan Milošević graduated with a degree in law from Belgrade University in 1964. He had joined the Communist League in 1959 and began his government career as economic advisor to Belgrade's mayor in 1966, thereafter achieving senior positions in Yugoslav state gas and banking industries from 1969 to 1983.

In 1984 Milošević committed to political life on a full-time basis, heading the local Communist Party organization in Belgrade. In 1986 he was elected president of the Serbian Politburo of the League of Communists, taking advantage of this post to militate for a Serbian agenda within the Yugoslav federation. In April 1987 he first caught the public eye by rallying support for the Serbian minority in Kosovo, and over the coming years he made the Serbian cause his political focus, overpowering opposition elements as Serbia annexed the autonomous regions of the Vojvodina and Kosovo in 1988 and cynically alienating the leadership of Croatia and Slovenia as the League of Communists disintegrated in January 1990.

Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, 1993. (Corbis Sygma)

After employing the Yugoslav Army to put down demonstrations in Belgrade that were prompted by his presidential victory in Serbia's first multiparty elections in December 1990, Milošević proclaimed on 9 March 1991 the Yugoslav federation to be in its "final agony." The secession of Slovenia and Croatia from the federation on 25 June 1991 prompted him to order armed intervention by the Serb-controlled Yugoslav Army. A European Community (EC) accord ended the fighting in Slovenia by 7 July 1991, but warfare persisted in Croatia until efforts by the EC and special United Nations (UN) envoy Cyrus Vance eventually halted hostilities there on 2 January 1992.

Following the Bosnian declaration of independence in March 1992, Serb forces soon began a campaign of ethnic cleansing along the Drina River, culminating with the eventual death or displacement of more than 50,000 non-Serbian

Bosnians. The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Serbia on 30 May 1992, and the following month, amid international outcry over his apparent sponsorship of war atrocities, Milošević declared that Serbia and Montenegro now constituted the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a mere vestige of the former Yugoslavia. At the August 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Milošević and FRY Prime Minister Milan Panic disagreed over the latter's willingness to accept international criticism of ethnic cleansing and FRY's territorial claims to Serbian areas in neighboring lands. Milošević successfully rebuffed Panic's challenge in the December 1992 Serbian presidential election.

After Bosnian Serbs demonstrated their noncompliance with the Vance-Owen and Contact Group peace plans espoused by Milošević, he instituted a blockade of the Bosnian Republika Srpska in August 1994. In July and August 1995, multiple Serbian and Croatian offensives precipitated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Bosnian Serbs. A U.S.-led effort secured a cease-fire in September, and the war was ended by the November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement in which Milošević was a visible and important player. Yet he had overestimated the degree to which trade and financial sanctions would be lifted. By the winter of 1996–1997, economic hardships endured by Serbia under selective continuing sanctions that blocked its entry into the UN and the World Bank provoked weeks of organized street protests against Milošević, and late 1997 Serbian-Albanian tensions in Kosovo flared into a renewed war of attrition by the summer of 1998. Reports of extensive ethnic cleansing campaigns again brought NATO bombing of Serbia in March 1999, and on 27 May Milošević was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In June 1999 Milošević acceded to the terms ending the latest war, which included a NATO presence in Kosovo.

In September 2000 Milošević lost the FRY presidential election to Vojislav Kostunica and on 6 October 2000 announced his departure from office. Milošević was arrested and detained by FRY authorities on 31 March 2001. Delivered to the ICTY in The Hague on 28 June 2001, he died of natural causes there on 11 March 2006 during his trial for war crimes committed in the killing fields of Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also

Nationalism; Vance, Cyrus Roberts; Yugoslavia

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Mindszenty, József
(1892–1975)

Hungarian Catholic prelate, writer, dissident, archbishop of Esztergom, and primate of Hungary (1945–1974). Born József Pehm on 29 March 1892 in Csehmindszent, Hungary, he was ordained a priest in 1915 and in 1919 was a vicar in Zalaegerszeg. During his twenty-seven years of service in that city, he founded a parish and a school, built a monastery and a church, renovated the cathedral, and authored several books. In 1942 he adopted the more Hungarian-sounding name of Mindszenty.

In March 1944 Mindszenty was named bishop of Veszprém. He opposed the German occupation of Hungary during World War II and was imprisoned in November 1944. Released in April 1945, he became the archbishop of Esztergom later that year and was elevated to cardinal in 1946.

Mindszenty openly opposed the policies, especially the seizure of church lands and properties, of Mátyás Rákosi, Hungary's deputy prime minister and general secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Mindszenty also publicly denounced the secularization campaign and rigged elections of 1947. Arrested on 26 December 1948 and accused of treason, he was subjected to five weeks of torture, whereupon he confessed to the charges against him and was tried and subsequently condemned to life imprisonment.

Mindszenty's 1949 trial and imprisonment caused international indignation. Pope Pius XII raised his own objections, and the United Nations (UN) General Assembly declared it an international crime. In spite of persecution, however, Mindszenty remained committed to the Church and to Christian values. In 1955, because of ill health, he was transported to Felsőpetény, where he was kept under house arrest.

Mindszenty's release was among the demands of the prodemocracy forces during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He was set free on 31 October 1956. On 3 November he gave a radio speech in which he criticized Soviet-style land reform and economic policies. On 4 November, warned about Soviet tanks advancing on Budapest, he sought and secured refuge at the U.S. legation in Budapest. He lived in its compound until 1971. In 1962 he was tried in absentia for his role in the 1956 revolution and found guilty of treason.

Following drawn-out negotiations among Washington, the Vatican, and Hungarian officials, on 28 September 1971 Mindszenty was allowed to leave Hungary and settled in Vienna. During his last years, he took on an international role and embarked on missions around the world, also visiting Hungarian enclaves around the globe. Because Mindszenty opposed relations between the Vatican and Hungary, Pope Paul VI requested his resignation as primate in 1973. But Mindszenty refused to resign, believing that such a step would only reward the communist regime for its deplorable behavior.

Cardinal Mindszenty died in Vienna on 6 May 1975. In 1994, Pope John Paul II began the canonization process for him.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also
Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Rákosi, Mátyás

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Mines and Mine Warfare, Land

Land mines are stationary explosive weapons planted in the path of an enemy to hinder his movement or to deny him access to certain territory. Mines may be considered both offensive and defensive weapons. They are generally concealed and rigged so that they will be initiated by the presence of either enemy troops or vehicles, except in instances where they are exploded by remote control. Land mines produce casualties by direct explosive force, fragmentation, shaped-charge effect, or the release of harassing agents or lethal gas. Land mines include improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

There are two main types of land mines: antitank (AT) and antipersonnel (AP). AT mines are large and heavy. They are triggered when vehicles such as tanks drive over or near them. These mines contain sufficient explosives to destroy or damage the vehicle that runs over them. They also frequently kill people in or near the vehicle. AT mines are laid in locations where enemy vehicles are expected to travel: on roads, bridges, and tracks.

AP mines are triggered much more easily and are designed to kill or wound people. They may be laid anywhere and can be triggered by various means: stepping on them, pulling on a wire, or simply shaking them. AP mines may also be rigged as booby traps to explode when an object placed over them is removed. Generally speaking, AP mines contain small amounts of explosives. They are therefore smaller and lighter than AT mines. AP mines may be as small as a packet of cigarettes. They come in all shapes and colors and are made from a variety of materials.

The demilitarized zone across Korea remains one of the most heavily mined areas in the world.

Mines are normally laid in groups to form minefields. There are several types of these fields. Defensively, the hasty protective minefield provides local, close-in security protection for small units. This minefield employs no standard pattern in laying the mines. An example of a hasty protective minefield would be placing mines to cover a likely avenue of approach by an enemy force. A second type is the point minefield. It is utilized primarily to reinforce other obstacles, such as road craters, abatis, or wire obstacles not associated with hasty protective minefields. A third type is the tactical minefield. Its primary use is to arrest, delay, and disrupt an enemy attack. The field may be employed to strengthen defensive positions and protect their flanks. A fourth type is the interdiction minefield. It is utilized to trap or harass an

enemy deep in his own territory, assembly areas, or defensive positions. Scatterable mines are ideal for this type of minefield.

Modern land mines date from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, but World War I witnessed continuous use of land mines to protect trench lines. Land mines continued to play an important role during World War II. Two important developments took place in land-mine warfare during that conflict in the appearance of AT mines and the introduction of AP mines employed against infantry and to protect AT mines from detection and removal.

Many current AT mines are derived from those of World War II. For example, the TMM1, produced in the former Yugoslavia, and the PT Mi-Ba, produced by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, are descendants of the German AT Tellermine 43 and 42. The American designs are the M-15 and M-21 series, while the Russians produce a similar mine, the TM-46, the Italians the M-80, and the Chinese the Type 72. These are canister-shaped mines that are buried using tilt-rod fusing and pressure fusing. They range from 10 to 30 inches in diameter and 3 to 7 inches in height. They contain between 7 and 15 pounds of high explosive. Another popular design is the square-shaped AT mine such as the American M-19, Italian VS-HCT2, and Belgian PRB-ATK M3. They are approximately 10 inches square and 4–5 inches high with 5–25 pounds of explosives. Many of these are magnetic-influence mines with pressure as a backup fusing system.

AP mine models introduced during World War II are still in service, with only minor modifications. Examples are the Russian AP mine POMZ (and the later model POMZ-2M, a stake mine consisting of a wooden stake with a cast iron fragmentation body). The Russian PDM-6 AP mine is basically the wooden-cased mine used during the Russo-Finnish War of 1939–1940. Its successors, the PDM-7, PDM-7ts, and PDM-57, are employed worldwide. There are also bounding mines similar to the U.S. M16 series and the Russian OMZ (fragmentation obstacle AP mine, or Bouncing Betty)—canister mines topped with a pressure fuse. Such mines stand 5–7 inches tall (including the fuse) and are 3–4 inches in diameter, with approximately 1 pound of explosives. The improvised version of these AP mines consists of an artillery shell or a mortar bomb buried nose down in the ground. It is similar to IEDs used in both the Vietnam and Iraq wars.

After World War II, the trend in land mines has been toward miniaturization and substitution of metallic parts with those of plastic. For example, the American M14 series first used in Vietnam and the Russian PFM-1 and PFM-1S AP mines first used during the Israeli-Syrian conflict of October 1973 and massively by Soviet troops in Afghanistan are small air-delivered plastic weapons with a low metallic signature. Other common AP mines with low metallic content are the Type-72 series (People's Republic of China, PRC), encountered throughout Southeast Asia, and the PMN (Russia) present in Asia (Afghanistan, China, Iraq, and Vietnam) and in southern Africa, where it is known as the Black Widow. These are all small canister-type mines 2.5–4 inches in diameter and 1.5–4.5 inches in height. They all use pressure fusing and carry 1–4 ounces of explosives.

During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong constructed antipersonnel mines from such materials as artillery and mortar shells, cartridge cases, and pipe. U.S. forces sustained significant casualties from these weapons. (U.S. Army Center of Military History)

The Korean War (1950–1953) saw widespread use of mines, particularly in the intense, largely static warfare of the second half of the war following the entry of the PRC in the fighting. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) across Korea remains one of the most heavily mined areas in the world. The Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s saw an increase in the use of AP mines, offensively as part of ambushes with the American M18 Claymore and with its twins, the Soviet MON 50 and Chinese Type 66. These mines are generally command-detonated. They are all of curved rectangular shape, about 1 inch thick, 3.5 inches tall, and 8–12 inches long, filled with 1.5 pounds of explosives with a layer of metal balls (similar to 00 shotgun shells) faced toward the target area. These mines are never buried but rather are positioned on bipod legs that allow aiming. They were employed in Vietnam offensively but were also defensively employed around firebases (for U.S. and Allied forces) and sanctuaries (for communist forces).

The United Nations (UN) estimates that 24,000 people are killed and at least 10,000 are maimed each year as a result of active and inactive minefields. A high percentage of these casualties are children. The present method

for clearing mines involves painstaking detection and careful destruction of the devices. In 2004 the UN listed thirty-five countries with minefields of more than 1,000 mines. Egypt leads the list with 23 million mines planted, followed by Iran with 16 million; Angola with 15 million; and Afghanistan, the PRC, and Iraq with an estimated 10 million each. It can take one person eighty days to clear 2.5 acres.

Those who clear the mines, known as deminers, are at great risk of becoming victims themselves. More than eighty deminers died in mine-clearing operations in Kuwait following the 1991 Gulf War. French deminers still clear mines and unexploded artillery shells from as far back as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and World War I. It is estimated that worldwide up to 85 million AP mines await clearance. In 2004 the UN estimated the cost of laying a single mine at less than $10 but its removal at $1,800.

In 1991, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals began discussions regarding a ban on AP land mines. In October 1992 the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was formed with the following groups as its founding organizations: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. The ICBL called for an international ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of AP land mines and for increased international resources for mine clearance and mine victim assistance programs.

Polish troops assigned to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) sweep for mines in the Golan Heights in 1974. The UNDOF patrolled the buffer zones between Israel and Syria and Israel and Egypt, established following the 1973 war. (Corel)

An international treaty, often referred to as the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty, was negotiated in 1997. It is formally named the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Among the first governments ratifying the treaty were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The treaty went into effect in March 1999. In recognition of its achievements, the campaign was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Signatories to the treaty include all Western Hemisphere nations except the United States and Cuba, all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states except the United States and Turkey, all of the European Union (EU) except Finland, forty-two African countries, and seventeen nations in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan. Important military powers not ratifying the treaty include the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North and South Korea.

The treaty binds states to destroy their stockpiled AP mines within four years, and those already in the ground must be removed within ten years. In addition to comprehensively banning AP mines, the treaty requires signatories to perform mine clearance and urges mine victim assistance programs.

Despite the treaty, mines continued to be laid in nations such as Angola, Cambodia, Senegal, and Sudan.

Herbert Merrick

See also

Artillery; Mines and Mine Warfare, Sea

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Mines and Mine Warfare, Sea

Naval mine warfare played a critical role in several Cold War conflicts between 1950 and 1990. During this time, especially early on, technological developments in sea mining drew heavily from the technologies and tactics used during World War II. German minefields had so constrained Soviet naval operations in that war that most Soviet mines and mine warfare tactics of the Cold War era were direct derivatives of German mines, mine warfare research, or tactics. Moreover, the Soviet Union maintained the world's largest mine warfare and mine countermeasure capabilities throughout the Cold War. The European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also focused considerably on mine warfare.

Mines come in two primary categories, moored and bottom mines, and in two types determined by their method of detonation, contact or influence mines. Contact mines detonate when the target makes contact with it, while influence mines are detonated by the target's influence on the surrounding maritime environment (e.g., its effect on the local magnetic field, sound, or pressure waves generated by the target's movement). Moored mines are tethered to a casing resting on the seafloor. Bottom mines lie directly on the seafloor. Moored mines can be either contact or influence detonated, while all bottom mines are by influence only.

Laying mines is a relatively simple process. Almost any kind of platform (surface ship, submarine, or aircraft) can lay mines. When Iran laid mines in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s, for example, it used a wide variety of innocuous surface craft, including small dhows (wooden cargo ships) that were indigenous to those waters. The Iranians' purpose was to conceal mining operations from both their enemies and the international community

that had condemned their use. It took the U.S. capture of an Iranian minelayer to prove Iran's clandestine activities. That incident constitutes the basis for one of the concerns of the late and post–Cold War era: terrorist employment of mines to attack shipping.

Unlike mine laying, mine countermeasures are complex and dangerous. Minesweeping is the oldest method, using ships that tow their countermeasure equipment through the area (field) where the mines are suspected or known to be. Minesweepers are constructed of nonferrous materials (wood, reinforced fiberglass, etc.) that use special propulsion systems and are heavily sound-dampened to reduce any influences that might detonate the mines they pass over. Since they precede their sweep gear, however, minesweeping can be a risky operation. The United States pioneered the use of minesweeping helicopters in the late 1970s. Besides being faster and safer than ships, helicopters and their equipment were air transportable, providing greater strategic mobility.

However, the Cold War era was marked by the development of increasingly complex bottom influence mines designed to defeat most minesweeping tactics. By the 1970s, they could be set for specific target types (e.g., cargo ships or aircraft carriers instead of destroyers). Some had counters that allowed a preset number of targets to pass before detonating. Others came with preset activation and deactivation dates, either to ensure safe passage during those periods, to establish a sanitation date, or to complicate mine countermeasures. The best mines combined all of these elements and usually required multiple influences to detonate. Defeating these mines necessitated extensive sweeping over several weeks to provide a reasonable probability, but not certainty, of safe passage.

Sailors on board the U.S. Navy minesweeper *Mockingbird* (AMS 27) deploy an acoustic hammer box prior to commencing minesweeping operations in Korean waters. The long-serving minesweeper helped pave the way for amphibious landings such as Inchon and Wonsan. (Naval Historical Center)

This technology forced a shift to mine hunting, using precision sonars and other sensors to hunt for mines. This is a particularly slow process, however. Although sensors can detect bottom mines, they also discover other objects of similar shape and dimensions. Moreover, tides, marine life, and bottom materials tend to obscure the mines over time. Hence, every suspected mine has to be investigated individually. Prior to the 1980s, most nations used divers to investigate suspected mines and disarmed those that they found. The inherent dangers involved with such operations inspired the West to investigate safer mine-hunting methods. The United States reportedly employed specially trained mine-hunting dolphins in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, a method that remains controversial to this day. As the Cold War drew to a close, however, most Western nations, including the United States, relied increasingly on remote underwater robotic systems to detect mines.

Mine warfare figured prominently in four of the Cold War era's hot wars: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the Iran-Iraq War. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) laid thousands of mines off its coast following the 1950 Inchon landing. With America's mine countermeasure units long decommissioned after World War II, the United States reactivated the Imperial Japanese Navy minesweeping units, including their crews, to sweep the mines protecting Wonsan and Hangnam. Egypt also laid thousands of mines during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War to close the Suez Canal and Sharm El-Sheik. American mines completely closed Haiphong Harbor in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and other ports to shipping in 1973. The agreement that ended the Vietnam War called for the United States to clear out the minefields, a process that took more than two months. Several months later, those same mine countermeasure units joined with Egyptian forces to conduct the mine clearing and salvage effort that reopened the Suez Canal after some eight years of closure. Mines were also a large concern during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups also resorted to the use of sea mines, laying moored contact mines off Lebanon's coast. Although not effective militarily, Iranian mines embarrassed the United States, nearly sinking the frigate USS *Samuel B. Roberts* on 14 April 1988. Lacking effective mine countermeasure units that could operate in the Persian Gulf, U.S. forces had to use the tankers they were escorting as ad hoc minesweepers. Two other U.S. Navy units were damaged by mines during the Persian Gulf War, driving the U.S. Navy to reinvest in new mine countermeasure technology.

Mines remain a major obstacle today. Their existence or suspected presence in a harbor or shipping lane can create an almost paralyzing effect on shipping. Defeating naval mines and, perhaps more importantly, identifying the perpetrators who laid them will be a critical naval mission well into the future.

Carl O. Schuster

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Iran, Armed Forces; Iran-Iraq War; Korean War; Persian Gulf War; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Navy; Vietnam War

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Missile Gap

Alleged shortfall of American intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as compared to those of the Soviet Union during the late 1950s. The alleged missile gap turned out to be illusory. The popular idea of a missile gap be-

tween the United States and the USSR began in earnest after the Soviets' October 1957 launching of the world's first orbiting satellite. While the debate on this matter reached a crescendo in 1960, it had begun as early as 1956, when Democratic Senator Stuart Symington charged that the United States was lagging behind the Soviets in the production of guided missiles. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration denied the allegations, but the Democrats refused to let the issue alone. In August 1957 the Soviet Union launched the world's first ICBM and two months later launched the first satellite, *Sputnik 1*, propelled into space by a rocket.

Thus, to many Americans the Soviets seemed to have taken the lead in rocket technology. This development presented not only a public relations problem for the Americans but had national security ramifications as well. Now the United States was faced with the potential of a Soviet ICBM attack. This sense of technological inferiority and vulnerability was further increased by the findings of the 1957 Gaither Committee. Among other things, the Gaither Report argued that the missile gap not only existed but that it was expected to widen, with the Soviets moving well ahead of the Americans in missile and rocket technology. Worse yet, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reports seemed to support this evaluation, concluding that the Soviet Union had the capability to manufacture 100 ICBMs in 1960 and some 500 more during 1961–1962. However, these figures were based on nothing more than pure speculation.

The second full-powered Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile to be tested leaves its launching pad at the Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, 2 August 1958. (Bettmann/Corbis)

President Eisenhower tried to downplay *Sputnik 1* and the Gaither Report's findings, but public reaction was one of fear and outrage. Furthermore, the matter became a partisan political issue, as the Democrats seized upon it as a way to attack the president and the Republican Party for "complacency." Hard-line Democratic Cold Warriors saw these developments as proof that the Eisenhower administration had not been spending enough money on national defense. In fact, the Eisenhower administration had spent a great deal of money on developing guided missiles, especially the Titan, Thor, Polaris, and Minuteman, but did so cautiously, seeking to find a middle ground among defense spending, domestic spending, and balanced budgets.

Even when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) presented to Eisenhower ominous estimations of the prospects of Soviet missile programs, the president remained unconvinced. The missile gap debate reignited in 1958, with the publication by Hanson W. Baldwin, military commentator for the *New York Times*, of the book *The Great Arms Race: A Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Power Today*, which criticized Eisenhower's reaction to *Sputnik 1*. This reinforced some voices coming from the Pentagon that were still warning of a missile gap and calling for increased defense spending. Another influential

voice that joined the fray was that of the prominent journalist Joseph Alsop, who charged that the Soviet Union "will have unchallengeable superiority in the nuclear striking power that was once our specialty." Alsop blamed Eisenhower.

The reaction to the column was striking, especially given the upcoming 1958 congressional elections. Eisenhower then launched a countercampaign in which he asserted that no missile gap existed and that the United States still led in the missile race. However, his efforts failed to convince the public. The missile gap furor helped the Democrats retake both houses of Congress in the November 1958 elections. Now the Democrats were poised to push through higher defense appropriations and by doing so to embarrass the president. Indeed, in 1959 Congress voted for a larger defense budget than that requested by Eisenhower.

The controversy did not end there. Among those convinced that the missile gap did exist was Massachusetts Democratic Senator John F. Kennedy. He partially conducted his 1959 senatorial reelection campaign using the missile gap as proof of Republican bungling. Kennedy easily won a second term, but he continued his crusade concerning the gap after reelection, although it appears that much of his evidence of a missile gap came from Alsop's columns on the matter and not from any hard intelligence sources.

Predictably, the missile gap proved to be a major issue in Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign, in which he attempted to portray his opponent, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, as being soft on defense spending and communism. While Kennedy agreed with Eisenhower that the United States was militarily stronger than the Soviet Union, he was also convinced that the U.S. missile program was lagging behind that of the Russians, which would pose grave consequences for the future. Reportedly, Eisenhower had fairly reliable intelligence evidence—much of it gathered by clandestine U-2 reconnaissance overflights of the Soviet Union—suggesting that the United States actually possessed superiority over the Soviets vis-à-vis ICBMs. But national security imperatives bound him to secrecy. Kennedy won a perilously thin victory over Nixon in the 1960 presidential election. Once Kennedy became president, he quickly learned the truth: the missile gap was nothing more than a myth.

Kennedy did not, however, immediately reveal his knowledge about the missile gap. The controversy was quietly resolved during a February 1961 press conference by Kennedy's secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, who casually mentioned that there was no missile gap. With that, the subject sank into relative obscurity. In fact, Kennedy's national security policy was conducted on the basis that the United States enjoyed considerable strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Some historians claim that this reality informed the outcome of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

David Tal

See also

Alsop, Joseph Wright; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Gaither Report; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Military Balance; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Polaris;

Nuclear Arms Race; *Sputnik;* U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union; United States Air Force

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Missiles, Antiballistic

Defensive missile system capable of intercepting and destroying incoming enemy ballistic missiles while in flight. Military planners began to envision antiballistic missile (ABM) systems during World War II when the Germans employed their V-2 rocket against London and other Allied targets. The importance of fielding a capability to defeat enemy missiles was significantly strengthened by the postwar development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with nuclear warheads.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union worked to develop ABM systems in the 1950s, generally using modified surface-to-air missile systems, such as the U.S. Army's Nike Zeus. ABM systems were viewed as a means of protecting valuable resources, including critical military forces and major cities, from destruction. As the technological challenges and cost of ABM operations became apparent and the size of strategic nuclear forces increased, the United States focused primarily on research and development and on improving early warning capabilities, relying on the deterrent effect of a strong nuclear retaliatory force to maintain security from nuclear attack. The Soviet Union deployed a limited system, the Galosh, around Moscow in the early 1960s and retained protection of the capital throughout the Cold War.

In the late 1960s, the United States announced that it would proceed with the Sentinel system to protect American cities from a limited attack by the Chinese. This system was eventually shifted to cover missile fields under the Safeguard program in an effort to gain greater stability for nuclear deterrence. Because of its high cost and technological glitches, Safeguard was only operational at one site in North Dakota for five months beginning in October 1975, although its Perimeter Acquisition Radar was integrated into the national early warning and attack assessment system. Concern over sustaining a stable deterrence posture was reflected in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that was negotiated along with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), which limited the United States and the Soviet Union to only two ABM sites (further limited to a single site each in a 1974 follow-up protocol).

President Ronald Reagan's administration sought to move away from the complete vulnerability to nuclear attack inherent in the mutual assured destruction (MAD) doctrine and to use new technological capabilities to build a national missile defensive system. This proposed system, called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), eventually became known as "Star Wars" due to components that relied on space-based platforms and new types of weapons such as x-ray lasers to destroy missiles. Reagan argued that an operational ABM system would make nuclear missiles obsolete. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the SDI concept was scaled back, although research and development efforts continued and options for protection against limited attacks, especially accidental launches or strikes by rogue states, became the justification for continuing to develop an ABM capability.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Antiaircraft Guns and Missiles; Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Arms Race; Outer Space Treaty; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; United States Air Force

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Missiles, Cruise

Unmanned, aircraft-like missile systems designed to carry a warhead to a surface target. Cruise missile designs emerged during World War I, but the first effective operational system was the German V-1 Buzz Bomb used during World War II. After World War II, jet-propelled cruise missiles were developed as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, allowing strikes at night and in all weather conditions and removing concerns over aircrew survivability. The U.S. military developed a series of surface-to-surface systems such as the U.S. Air Force's intercontinental-range Snark (briefly operational in 1961) and the shorter-range theater nuclear systems Matador and Mace. These systems and the navy's Regulus missile for ship- or submarine-to-shore strikes were replaced by ballistic missiles and aircraft-delivered weapons that offered advantages in survivability, accuracy, and flexibility over the early land-based cruise missiles. The Soviet Union also developed a number of cruise missile systems for surface-to-surface theater delivery of nuclear weapons but also

used cruise missiles in a broad range of ship-, submarine-, and aircraft-launched roles during the 1950s and 1960s.

The U.S. and Soviet militaries both developed cruise missiles for aircraft delivery against strategic targets. Examples of such systems included the Soviet AS-3 Kangaroo and the U.S. Air Force Hound Dog missile in the 1960s. As a strategic weapon, cruise missiles extended the range of manned bombers and could suppress enemy defenses and complicate the defensive plans of the adversary. In the 1980s, the U.S. military fielded a new generation of nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) that extended the useful life of the B-52 bomber. The U.S. Navy also fielded a nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile called the Tomahawk, which was eventually deployed in a conventional land-attack version that was also installed on surface ships.

Cruise missile systems initially involved primarily nuclear warheads, but conventional warheads were increasingly used as guidance capabilities improved. A key nonstrategic mission was antiship attack, fielded in land-, ship-, submarine-, and air-launched systems. These cruise missiles provided smaller naval forces and coastal defensive positions the ability to challenge larger navies. The Egyptian Navy, using Soviet-made Komar-class boats and Styx ship-to-ship missiles, demonstrated the antiship potential of cruise missiles by sinking the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* in 1967, history's first loss of a ship to a guided missile.

A BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile launched from the U.S. Navy destroyer *Merrill*, March 1983. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The final significant nuclear role for cruise missiles in the Cold War was the mid-1980s U.S. deployment of mobile ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), based on the Tomahawk submarine-launched missile, to bases in Britain and on the European continent in response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. Combined with the deployment of the Pershing II ballistic missile, the GLCM deployment contributed to arms control negotiations that resulted in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the removal of GLCM, Pershing II, and SS-20 systems from Europe. Conventional cruise missiles grew in capability and importance during the 1980s. Their increasingly important role was ably demonstrated during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

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See also

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Air Force; United States Navy

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Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic

Long-range, land-based, rocket-propelled ballistic missiles capable of carrying one or more conventional or nuclear warheads. The intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, along with the manned bomber and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), made up the strategic nuclear triad of these two superpowers. China later also developed ICBMs.

The land-based ICBMs offered survivability and quick delivery of nuclear weapons over long distances. Throughout the Cold War, the accuracy, reliability, and flexibility of ICBM systems continuously improved. At the peak of the Cold War in 1984, the United States maintained 1,054 ICBMs deployed in underground silos, while the Soviets possessed 1,398 ICBMs deployed in silos and in rail- and road-mobile systems.

Development of the ICBM began shortly after the end of World War II. ICBMs are normally defined as long-range missiles that can attack targets located great distances from their launch sites. In 1966, the Air University Aerospace Glossary defined ICBMs as those missiles with a range of 5,000 miles or more. Other sources have defined the ICBM as a missile with a range of 1,500–2,000 miles. The ICBMs deployed during the Cold War were configured with nuclear warheads.

Initial missile programs, especially in the United States, focused more on air-breathing, jet-powered cruise missiles than ballistic systems. By the late 1940s, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union had determined that ballistic missiles were better for long-range attack missions because flight times, survivability, and accuracy were much better than they were for slower, aerodynamic vehicles. By 1953, the development of smaller, lighter thermonuclear weapons made it possible to construct long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads. The earliest systems were complicated liquid-fueled missiles that employed liquid oxygen and kerosene or storable hypergolic chemicals (fuel and oxidizer that ignited and burned when mixed without a separate igniter) as propellants. The first versions were deployed on soft, above-ground launchers that required anywhere from fifteen minutes to several hours to prepare for launch. They were guided by ground-based radio guidance systems that limited the number of missiles that could be launched at a single time. The first U.S. operational ICBM system, the Atlas D, was a 75-foot-long missile weighing more than 250,000 pounds. It was housed in either above-ground gantries or ground-level concrete struc-

The first U.S. operational ICBM system, the Atlas D, was a 75-foot-long missile weighing more than 250,000 pounds.

tures, known as coffins, with three missiles and one guidance system at each complex. The first American ICBM attained nuclear alert (ready) status in October 1959.

Inertial guidance systems replaced the radio systems early in the life of ICBMs, with only the Atlas D and Titan I deployed with radio guidance. The inertial system was more accurate and reliable than radio guidance and allowed missiles to be based individually, providing a higher survivability scenario during a nuclear exchange. The early U.S. liquid-fueled cryogenic missiles were expensive to maintain, had low reliability, and were not exceptionally accurate. These systems, the Atlas and Titan I, carried single four-megaton nuclear warheads. The United States was quick to replace these missiles with the solid-fueled Minuteman missile, and by 1965 all Atlas and Titan I missiles were removed from service, to be replaced by the Minuteman and the hypergolic-fueled Titan II.

These new systems were easier to maintain and required far fewer missile combat crew members and maintenance personnel to keep them on alert. They were also much more survivable, with hardened silos scattered over wide areas, and were accurate to within a few hundred feet of the target. The United States maintained a force of fifty-four Titan II missiles, each with a nine-megaton warhead, on alert from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. The Minuteman, which was developed in three versions (I, II, and III), first came on alert in 1962.

Launch of an Atlas missile from the U.S. Air Force Missile Test Center, Cape Canaveral, Florida, on 20 February 1958. (U.S. Air Force)

By 1967, 1,000 Minuteman missiles were on alert at six U.S. bases. The Minuteman I and II had single warheads of about 1.1 megatons, while the Minuteman III featured a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) system equipped with up to three warheads of either 170 or 340 kilotons of yield. The entire force of Minuteman and Titan II missiles could be launched in a matter of minutes after the decision to execute was made. In the late 1980s, 50 Minuteman missiles at F. E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, were replaced by 50 Peacekeeper missiles, a larger system that could carry up to ten 300-kiloton warheads capable of hitting ten different targets.

The Soviets developed more varieties of missiles than did the Americans, early on relying on both cryogenic and hypergolic storable propellant systems. As with the United States, the Soviet Union quickly realized that the cryogenic systems were slow to launch and hard to maintain, but, unlike the United States, Russia concentrated on ICBM designs in the 1960s through the 1980s that featured storable liquid-fueled systems, with missiles deployed both in underground silos and in mobile launchers. The first Soviet ICBM, the SS-7 (known to the Soviets as R-16), employed storable propellants and was first put on alert on 1 November 1961.

The Soviets were slower to adopt solid-fueled ICBMs but replaced their second- and third-generation liquid-fueled missiles with systems similar to

the Minuteman and Peacekeeper systems. Soviet warheads were generally in the 1-megaton range, but two Soviet ICBMs (the SS-9 and SS-18) carried enormous 25-megaton warheads. In 1984, at the peak of the Cold War, the Soviets had 1,398 ICBMs deployed, including 520 SS-11s, 60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308 SS-18s, and 360 SS-19s.

China tested its first missile in 1960 but did not complete development and testing of an ICBM until 1980. China's first ICBM was liquid-fueled. China did not develop a solid-fueled ICBM until the early 1990s. Compared to the United States and the Soviet Union, the Chinese have maintained a very small ICBM force, with most of the emphasis on countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union rather than any threat by the United States.

Strategic arms limitation and reduction agreements between the United States and Russia resulted in a significant reduction in the number of ICBMs. The United States reduced its force to only 500 Minuteman III missiles, which will eventually have only one warhead apiece. All Minuteman II missiles were removed and the silos destroyed at three bases between 1994 and 1998, and Peacekeeper missiles were removed between 2002 and 2007. At the end of 2002, the Russians maintained a force of 709 ICBMs, a mix of SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, and SS-27 liquid- and solid-fueled missiles in silos or mobile launchers.

Charles G. Simpson

See also

Atomic Bomb; Bombers, Strategic; Hydrogen Bomb; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Missile Gap; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Pershing II; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Poseidon; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Arms Race; Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; Strategic Air Command; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; United States Air Force

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Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic

Longer-ranged missiles designed for use within a specific theater of war. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) are generally defined by their range, which is approximately 1,500–3,000 nautical miles (NM). This is compared to medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) systems of 600–1,500 NM and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of 3,000–8,000 NM. Early

IRBM systems were developed by the United States and the Soviet Union for all-weather and night-delivery nuclear capability, complementing aircraft and cruise-missile delivery systems for nuclear strikes. IRBM nuclear capability was an important component in theater planning, but these systems were also designed to be a backup for ICBM systems, which posed a greater technological development challenge in the 1950s and early 1960s.

The United States developed and deployed two IRBM systems in the 1950s, the U.S. Air Force's Thor and the U.S. Army's Jupiter. The Jupiter missiles were placed at bases in Italy and Turkey as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force structure, and the Thor missiles were operated by the Royal Air Force from sites in the United Kingdom. The U.S. systems were quickly made obsolete by advances in ICBM forces, but they were retained for deterrence effect and as symbols of American commitment to the defense of Europe. The Soviets also developed and fielded a series of IRBM systems during the 1950s. These systems, designated SS-4 (often classified as MRBMs) and SS-5, provided an early nuclear delivery capability and remained part of the Soviet force structure into the 1980s, when they were replaced by the SS-20. The Chinese and the French also developed and deployed IRBM systems as part of their nuclear force structures.

Launch of a Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile, 23 November 1981. (U.S. Department of Defense)

IRBM systems played a central role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Soviet IRBMs were placed in Cuba in 1962 in an effort to enhance the delivery capability against the United States, precipitating the most dangerous standoff of the entire Cold War. After the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, the Americans removed their Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey in a publicly unacknowledged trade-off and an expedient elimination of obsolete weapons. The Thor missiles were also removed from Britain in 1963.

The U.S. military moved away from land-based IRBMs in the 1960s, turning to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-range aircraft for deep theater nuclear delivery capabilities, complemented by shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet military retained its IRBM capabilities throughout the Cold War because of the proximity of targets and its strategy for nuclear employment in theater operations. Soviet modernization of its IRBM force with the much more accurate and multiwarhead-capable SS-20 missiles in the late 1970s resulted in a brief arms race in Europe, as the United States responded with the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles to counter the potential first-strike capability of the new Soviet missile force. The U.S. deployment of new nuclear delivery systems in Europe resulted in considerable political protest and resistance, but the move produced arms control discussions with the Soviets that led to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The

INF Treaty, signed in 1987, eliminated all theater nuclear delivery systems in Europe with ranges between 270 and 3,000 NM.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

China, Republic of, Armed Forces; Cuban Missile Crisis; Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in; Force de Frappe; France, Air Force; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Pershing II; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; Royal Air Force; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; United States Air Force

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Missiles, Pershing II

American intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) system. The Pershing II missile was the culmination of the Pershing missile program begun in 1956. The Pershing II system was a nuclear-capable tactical army support weapon deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) for use by both the U.S. Army and the German Air Force. Manufactured by the Martin Marietta Corporation, the Pershing II relied upon cutting-edge radar guidance technology, which rendered it the most accurate tactical missile of its time. Each missile was 34 feet long, weighed 16,500 pounds, had a range of 1,100 miles, and was armed with a single W-85 maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV) thermonuclear warhead of 5–50 kilotons variable yield.

The Pershing II served as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) frontline deterrent in the event of a Warsaw Pact conventional or nuclear attack against Western Europe. The missile was also designed to counterbalance new Soviet Russian SS missile systems that became operational in the late 1970s. The Pershing II was successfully tested in 1977, and NATO approved its deployment in February 1979.

NATO's deployment announcement drew immediate criticism from Germany's Green Party and other European antinuclear organizations. Large demonstrations were held throughout Western Europe to protest the placement of the Pershing II missiles. There were also smaller protests in the United States. Nonetheless, the first Pershing II missiles arrived in West Germany in December 1983 and were fully operational two years later. In 1985

The U.S. Army launches a Pershing II missile from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on a long-range flight down the Eastern Test Range on 2 June 1983. (U.S. Department of Defense)

a Pershing II exploded, killing three people and injuring fourteen more, and this spurred more angry European protests.

In 1987, President Ronald Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the Soviet Union. All IRBMs with a range of between 300 and 3,400 miles were thereby abolished, ending the Pershing II missile program.

J. A. Menzoff

See also

Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in; Germany, Federal Republic of, Armed Forces; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; United States Air Force; United States Army

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Missiles, Polaris

U.S. Navy submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carried in nuclear-powered submarines. The SLBM system constituted the initial seaborne leg of what became America's nuclear triad and was part of its nuclear deterrence strategy. This strategy called for the United States to have a survivable nuclear retaliation capability in order to deter a potential Soviet first strike. Bombers and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in hardened silos provided the other legs of the triad, each with its particular advantages and disadvantages. The submarine-based element offered stealth, denying the Soviets knowledge of the number and locations of the embarked missile systems. It was a sound enough strategy, but the Polaris leg was almost scrapped.



Lockheed Missile and Space Division engineers lower a Polaris missile into a fiberglass sleeve aboard the ballistic missile submarine *George Washington* at Port Canaveral, Florida, in 1960. Lockheed aided the U.S. Navy in its preparation for submerged launchings on the Atlantic Missile Range during the Cold War. (Naval Historical Center)

The U.S. Navy of the 1950s favored cruise missiles over ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles were cheaper and easier to install on ships and submarines, and the technology was already well understood. However, ballistic missiles offered more range, greater accuracy, and faster response times, and perhaps more importantly, there was no known defense against ballistic missiles at the time. By 1956, the U.S. Navy began to examine the challenges of installing a missile system aboard ships and submarines. The initial proposal to install Jupiter missiles was rejected because of the dangers of storing the missiles' liquid-oxygen oxidizer component in an enclosed hull for any significant period of time. Solid rocket fuel was the chosen option, and the primary contractor, Lockheed, concentrated on developing new and more powerful solid rocket fuels for the project. The first test flight took place in 1959, and the Polaris missile entered service aboard the U.S. Navy submarine *George Washington* in 1960. The first improved model, the A-2 Polaris, became operational in 1961. It had a range of 1,700 nautical miles and could deliver a single 800-kiloton nuclear warhead within 3,800 feet of the target.

To save money, the navy chose to modify an attack submarine design to carry the missiles. It recognized early that diesel-electric submarines lacked the range and operational capabilities to be effective ballistic-missile platforms. Research and development experience with early nuclear-powered submarines had demonstrated that they had the power to support the missile system and the under-

water endurance to prevent the Soviets from detecting the launch platform. Hull testing with the *Albacore* had also indicated the best hull form. Navy engineers took the design for the new class of attack submarines with an *Albacore* hull and simply inserted a missile compartment to hold sixteen Polaris missiles. Thus was born the George Washington–class of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines. Close coordination between the missile and submarine design teams precluded any major problems with construction. The lead submarine unit was completed in time to join the missile test program in late 1959.

The Polaris missile system was the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy's ballistic missile system throughout the 1960s, not leaving service until 1974. It was the first missile to be fired from a submerged submarine and the first to use a cold-launch system. That is, a missile's rocket engine did not ignite until after it left the launch tube. A compressed-air slug lifted the missile out of the tube and above the ocean's surface. The rocket engine ignited after the missile broke the ocean's surface. That system saved the navy the challenge, expense, and dangers of containing a rocket ignition within the submarine's hull. It proved reliable in service and has been the standard method for all submarine-launched missiles developed during and after the Cold War.

The Polaris was the first missile to be fired from a submerged submarine and the first to use a cold-launch system.

Carl O. Schuster

See also

Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Submarines; Triad; United States Navy

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Missiles, Poseidon

The UGM-73 Poseidon C-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) served as the primary sea-based nuclear weapon in the U.S. nuclear triad from its initial operational date in 1971 until its replacement by the Trident C-4 SLBM in the early 1980s. A direct successor to the Polaris A-3 missile, the Poseidon was a two-stage, solid-propellant missile weighing 65,000 pounds, with a firing range of approximately 2,500 nautical miles. Thirty-four feet long and 72 inches in diameter, the Poseidon was 10 percent longer and 40 percent wider than its forerunner. However, advancements in fire-control and shock-attenuation systems enabled it to be housed and fired from Polaris launch tubes.

A single Poseidon missile carried up to fourteen of the Mk-3 reentry vehicles, each with a 50-kiloton thermonuclear payload. This capability marked a substantial advantage over the three 200-kiloton warheads carried

A direct successor to the Polaris A-3 missile, the Poseidon was a two-stage, solid-propellant missile weighing 65,000 pounds, with a firing range of approximately 2,500 nautical miles.

on the Polaris. Although not a major leap in terms of overall kilotons, the Poseidon's greatest advantage over its predecessor was the ability to target its warheads against geographically distinct targets, using a system known as multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV). The advent of MIRV technology in the Poseidon and its land-based counterpart, Minuteman III, altered the national nuclear strategies of both the United States and the Soviet Union, most notably by convincing each country of the ultimate futility of developing costly antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. This realization was codified by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) of 1969–1972.

The first Poseidon missile was launched from a test pad at Cape Kennedy, Florida, on 16 August 1968, with the first submerged launch completed from the U.S. Navy submarine *James Madison* on 17 July 1970. The *James Madison* deployed with sixteen operational Poseidon missiles in March 1971, initiating a class of fleet ballistic-missile submarines distinguished from its precursor Lafayette-class by the ability to carry the Poseidon, although eventually all Lafayette-class submarines were retrofitted to accommodate Poseidon as well. Beginning in 1979, Ohio-class submarines carrying the Trident C-4 (later D-5) missile began to replace the James Madison and Lafayette classes, with the last Poseidon submarine decommissioned in September 1992. Over the course of its operational lifetime, the Lockheed Missile and Space Company produced approximately 620 Poseidon UGM-73 missiles.

Robert G. Berschinski

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Missiles, Antiballistic; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Nuclear Arms Race; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; United States Navy

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Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic

The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was the most secure leg of the American and Soviet Cold War nuclear triads, the other two components of which were land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and manned bombers. SLBMs were effectively the United Kingdom's sole strategic nuclear weapon system after 1968 and one of two French weapons systems. Initially armed with comparatively small single warheads having low accuracy when first deployed in the 1950s and 1960s, SLBMs became increasingly accurate and powerful throughout the Cold War period.

The primary advantage of the SLBM over other delivery nuclear systems was derived from the comparative invulnerability of its submarine launch platform. In theory, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was secured by its nearly silent operation and an endurance limited only by its crew's capacity to stay at sea.

The development of the SLBM overcame daunting technological challenges including concerns over proper guidance, warhead size, and underwater launches. Unlike land-based missiles, the dynamic launching point of the SLBM demanded the development of sophisticated inertial guidance systems that could mark the weapon's precise launch point. Furthermore, most SLBMs used stable, solid fuels, both for safety at sea and to guarantee the ability to launch without vulnerable missile-fueling time. Additionally, limited space and weight required the development of comparatively efficient warheads. Finally, underwater launching avoided the time and vulnerability entailed in surfacing.

The test-firing of a Trident intercontinental ballistic missile from a U.S. submarine, SSBN *Nevada*, on 30 September 1986. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The world's first fully effective SLBM to overcome all these obstacles, the U.S. Polaris A-1 missile, grew out of the U.S. Navy's early postwar ambivalence about nuclear weapons. The navy's initial position, which found full expression during the 1949 Revolt of the Admirals (when the U.S. Air Force had sole delivery capability) was that atomic weapons were ruthless and barbaric. This position abruptly changed in the early 1950s as atomic weapons were first deployed on carrier-borne aircraft and the navy's Regulus cruise missile. The February 1955 Killian Report's recommendation to push forward with both sea- and land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) gave the necessary impetus to the development of an SLBM. After an initial flirtation with a solid-fueled version of the U.S. Army's Jupiter missile, the navy's Special Projects Office pursued the Polaris program beginning in late 1956. After surmounting numerous technological obstacles and sixty-two test launches, including the first underwater launch on 20 July 1960, the Polaris became operational at the end of that year with sixteen missiles aboard the SSBN *George Washington*. The Polaris A-1 was capable of carrying a 600-kiloton (kt) warhead with a firing range of 1,200 miles.

The Polaris A-1 was supplemented in 1962 by the Polaris A-2, which had a slightly longer range, allowing for Mediterranean operation, and a larger warhead. The Polaris A-3, which became operational in 1964, was the first multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) system. The A3 had three 200 kt warheads, providing strike capability against projected Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) technology, and a range of 2,500 nautical miles. The Poseidon C-3 SLBM, deployed in 1971, used ten 40 kt warheads in a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) designed to overwhelm Soviet ABMs around Moscow and came equipped with increased accuracy providing very limited

capability against hardened targets. The final iterations of U.S. SLBMs, the Trident C-4 and Trident II D-5, deployed in 1979 and 1989, respectively, provided the hard-target kill capability that had been long sought-after.

Soviet SLBM development followed a similar track but lingered several years behind equivalent U.S. technology. The first Soviet SLBM, the liquid-fueled SS-1b, a modification of the land-based SS-1 Scud, could only be fired from a surfaced submarine and had a range of only 90 miles. Follow-on systems in the 1960s, including the SS-N-6 IRBM, could be fired while submerged and carried megaton-range warheads but were liquid-fueled and grossly imprecise, with accuracies measured in kilometers. The next decade saw intercontinental range (SS-N-8) and MIRV development (SS-N-18). Only in the 1980s did the Soviets deploy technologically equivalent solid-fueled missiles, the SS-N-17 and SS-N-20.

While France developed its own domestic solid-fueled SLBMs from the 1970s on, Britain adopted the U.S. Polaris in the late 1960s. After indigenously adapting the Polaris warhead in the Chevaline Program to defeat Soviet ABMs, Britain again turned to the United States in the 1980s with the purchase of the Trident SLBM. The only other SLBM-armed nation, the People's Republic of China (PRC), deployed a solid-fueled, single-warhead weapon in the late 1980s.

The principal effect of SLBMs on nuclear strategy was to provide the technological means for a credible last-ditch deterrent. In the United States, the low accuracy and small warheads of the earliest missiles pushed the navy in 1957 to advocate finite deterrence, which called for maintaining only a small and secure second-strike capability, a role for which the Polaris was perfectly suited. Although this idea did not become the basis of deterrent policy, SLBMs formed the most secure (if least accurate and slowest reacting) leg of the American and Soviet nuclear triads. Their relative economy, compared to manned bombers and ICBMs, provided France and Britain with a sufficient nuclear deterrent, in the latter's case as the only operational strategic system after 1969. However, in reality these advantages were offset by relatively low accuracy and yield. Furthermore, SSBN maintenance requirements would have found a substantial number of them in port, vulnerable to surprise attack.

Edward Kaplan

See also

China, People's Republic of, Navy; France, Navy; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Poseidon; Royal Navy; Soviet Union, Navy; Submarines; United States Navy

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Mitterrand, François
(1916–1996)

French political leader and president of France (1981–1995). Born in the town of Jarnac near Cognac (Charente), France, on 26 October 1916, François Mitterrand studied at the Sorbonne and the École Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris, earning degrees in law and political science.

Mitterrand began his military service in 1938 and was a sergeant when World War II began. Wounded in May 1940 during the Campaign for France, he was taken prisoner by the Germans but after several attempts escaped at the end of 1941. He then made his way to Vichy, where he found a position on the Commission for War Prisoners. In 1943 he joined the Resistance, claiming that Vichy's anti-Semitism left him no choice. Under the nom de guerre of Morland, Mitterrand became a Resistance leader.

After the war Mitterrand founded and headed an organization of former prisoners and deportees. He also took up journalism and politics, joining the small centrist Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (UDSR). Although he lost his first election attempt in 1946, shortly thereafter he won election to the Chamber of Deputies from Nièvre in Burgundy, holding that seat until 1958. In 1947 he became the youngest cabinet minister in a century as minister of veterans' affairs. He went on to serve in eleven different governments during the Fourth Republic as minister of overseas territories (1950–1951), of the interior (1954–1955), and of justice (1956–1957). After 1953 he also headed the UDSR.

Mitterrand's service in so many different cabinets earned him the reputation of a political opportunist, but he opposed the return to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958, charging that it was a coup d'état and a threat to democracy. Mitterrand failed to win election in 1958, but the next year he was elected both to the Senate and as mayor of Château-Chinon in Burgundy. He won election to the National Assembly in 1962 and thereafter until 1981.

Mitterrand ran unsuccessfully for the French presidency in 1965 as the candidate of the moderate Left and secured communist support in the second round of balloting. He then capitalized on his strong election showing to organize the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS) for the 1967 legislative elections. The FGDS

President of France from 1981 to 1995, François Mitterrand was the first socialist to win election as president during the Fifth Republic. (Embassy of France)

included his new party, the Convention of Republican Institutions (CIR), which won 192 seats, reducing the Gaullist majority to 6 seats. However, the FDGS disintegrated in the Gaullist June 1968 landslide that followed the Events of May, and Mitterrand did not run for the presidency in 1969.

Mitterrand then merged his own CRI with the Socialist Party (PS) and, despite his own lack of socialist credentials, assumed the leadership of the PS in 1971. He again ran for the presidency in 1974 but lost by a single percentage point to Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing. Meanwhile, in 1977 the socialists broke with the communists, enhancing Mitterrand's position as a moderate.

Mitterrand won the French presidential election of May 1981, ending twenty-three years of conservative control. He then called a general election in which the PS won an absolute majority in the new assembly. As president, Mitterrand carried out a sweeping legislative agenda. He nationalized major industries and financial institutions; raised worker benefits and reduced the workweek to thirty-six hours; increased the minimum wage and benefits for single mothers, retirees, and the handicapped; established a ministry of women's rights; liberalized abortion rights; and abolished the death penalty. He also increased defense spending with the creation of a rapid reaction force and the modernization of the nation's nuclear strike force. France also continued nuclear testing. Sharply increased government spending, however, created great budget deficits and an economic turndown, forcing Mitterrand into an austerity program in 1982 and decreased social spending.

In foreign affairs, Mitterrand supported European integration. He also backed Britain in the 1982 Falklands War, and he established a close working relationship with U.S. President Ronald Reagan. Mitterrand's state visit to Israel in 1981 was the first by a French president.

The 1986 legislative elections produced a Gaullist majority and forced Mitterrand to name rightist Jacques Chirac as premier. The resulting cohabitation, as it came to be known for a socialist president and a Gaullist premier, worked surprisingly well and pleased the French electorate. Mitterrand concentrated on international affairs, only occasionally intervening in domestic issues. He defeated Chirac in the 1988 presidential elections, winning 54 percent of the vote.

Mitterrand concentrated on foreign policy issues, including the Maastricht Treaty, construction of the cross-Channel tunnel with Britain, and support for both the 1991 Gulf War, in which French military forces participated, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Bosnia. Mitterrand was also much interested in building and transforming the Paris skyline with such pet projects as the new d'Orsay Museum, the renovation of the Louvre Museum, and the construction of the Bastille Opera and La Défense, much to the dismay of many traditionalists. His second presidential term also brought scandal, including fresh controversies over his wartime record and revelations of a daughter by a longtime mistress. Consumed by prostate cancer, Mitterrand resigned the presidency in May 1995 and died in Paris on 8 January 1996.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Chirac, Jacques; De Gaulle, Charles; European Integration Movement; Falklands War; France; Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Mobutu Sese Seko
(1930–1997)

Congolese politician and dictator (1965–1997). Born Joseph Désiré Mobutu on 14 October 1930 in Lisala in the former Belgian colony of the Congo (Zaire), Mobutu Sese Seko was educated in Belgian missionary schools. Expelled from school in 1950, he served in the colonial army during 1950–1956. After he left the service, he became a journalist for the *L'Avenir* news journal.

Mobutu was appointed army chief of staff by the Congo's first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, in 1960. On 14 September 1960, after a showdown between Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu, Mobutu announced that he was neutralizing both leaders by launching a coup. Not yet strong enough to form his own government, he grudgingly accepted Kasavubu as president. Relations between Mobutu and Lumumba steadily worsened, however, and Mobutu was among those who plotted the assassination of Lumumba in January 1961.

Following Lumumba's murder, Mobutu remained out of the political limelight for several years while consolidating his power base behind the scenes. On 25 November 1965, he staged a second coup, bringing him to sole power. He formed his own political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR, Popular Movement of the Revolution); outlawed all other political parties; and dealt harshly with opponents.

As part of his national authenticity movement, Mobutu changed the name of the Congo to Zaire in 1971 and changed his own name to Mobutu Sese Seko the following year. In a bid to rid Zaire of colonial influences, he mandated that all citizens drop their Christian names in favor of Africanized ones. As head of state Mobutu promised stability and order, and although there was little internal dissent during his repressive reign, rebellions in the Shaba



President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. During the Cold War, the United States feared communist expansion into Africa by the Soviet Union and therefore supported the junta led by Mobutu in 1965. Mobutu consolidated his power, created a single-party state, and ruled Zaire until he was overthrown in 1997. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Province during 1977–1978, which were brutally repressed, demonstrated that serious opposition to his rule existed.

Only those loyal to Mobutu served in the civil administration; most were susceptible to bribery, cronyism, and corruption. Nevertheless, Western aid, especially from the United States and Belgium, filled Mobutu's coffers, and he obliged with strong pro-Western, anti-Soviet policies. But he also had an independent streak; he shrewdly catered to the West by taking advantage of Cold War rivalries while maintaining his own cult of personality at home.

Mobutu ruled for thirty-two years as an iron-fisted autocrat, years that have become known as the kleptocracy based on evidence that he stole billions of dollars from his own people.

Mobutu ruled for thirty-two years as an iron-fisted autocrat, years that have become known as the kleptocracy based on evidence that he stole billions of dollars from his own people. Under the guise of Zairianization, Mobutu nationalized between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign-owned industries and channeled the profits from these to his own personal accounts. Not surprisingly, rural areas and the nation's vast peasantry remained wholly neglected.

After the Cold War wound down in the early 1990s, the United States tried to push Mobutu to accept political and economic reforms. He was reluctant to do so and found himself alone facing the rebel forces of Laurent Kabila. In the meantime, the country's economy was in shambles, and Mobutu was powerless to reverse the economic slide. In May 1997 he was forced to relinquish power and was expelled from the country by Kabila's forces. Mobutu died in Rabat, Morocco, on 7 September 1997.

Lise Namikas

See also

Congo, Democratic Republic of the

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Modrow, Hans

(1928–)

Premier of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Born on 27 January 1928 in what is now Jasenitz, Poland, Hans Modrow served in the German Army during World War II. He was interned as a prisoner of war in 1945.

Released in 1949, Modrow joined the new Socialist Unity Party (SED) that dominated the government of East Germany. Political work in Berlin led to his appointment in 1973 as first secretary of the Dresden Communist Party organization, where he gained a reputation for honesty. He migrated toward the reform wing of the party in the late 1980s and refused to suppress the public protests that emerged in Dresden in 1989. When Willie Stoph resigned as premier on 13 November 1989, Modrow took his place at the head of the government, hoping that he could sustain the East German government through reform.

Modrow's regime did not last long. Internally divided and under pressure to unify with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Modrow's government allowed the first—and last—free elections in East Germany. Modrow lost the election to Lothar de Maizière, who had been a member of Modrow's cabinet from November 1989 to January 1990. It was thus Maizière who oversaw the process of reunification.

Modrow, however, continued on in politics as a member of the reformed communist party, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). He was elected to the parliament in 1992 as a representative from Berlin, a PDS stronghold. Despite being found guilty in 1993 of election fraud committed during the Dresden municipal elections of May 1989, he went on to win election as a member of the European Parliament in 1998. Modrow still holds that post and, since 2003, serves as honorary chairman of the PDS.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

European Parliament; German Democratic Republic; Maizière, Lothar de

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Moldavia (Moldova)

Presently known as the Republic of Moldova, during the Cold War it was known as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) and was one of the fifteen constituent republics of the Soviet Union. Moldavia covers 13,100 square miles and is sandwiched between Ukraine to the east and Romania to the west. In 1945 the population of Moldavia was approximately 2.2 million people.

Moldavia became part of the Russian Empire during the Napoleonic Wars in May 1812 and was renamed Bessarabia. In 1918 Moldavia was reunited with Romania but was annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940, in accordance with terms of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939. Upon annexation, Moldavia's southern counties were ceded to Ukraine, thus cutting off its access to the Black Sea, while a part of the former Soviet Autonomous Republic of Moldavia (created by Moscow in October 1924) merged with Moldavia.

In order to integrate Moldavia into the Soviet system, the country was subjected to a process of deliberate denationalization. In 1941 an estimated

250,000 Moldavians were forcibly relocated to the Russian steppes. Other forced deportations occurred during 1944–1964. Moscow colonized Moldavia with ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, with some 250,000 of them immigrating to Moldavia during 1946–1953. Romanians always considered Moldavians as ethnically and culturally Romanian, but to justify the Moldavian annexation, the Soviets argued that Moldavian inhabitants were a distinct ethnic group. To emphasize this premise, Moscow insisted that the Moldavian language—which in its spoken form is indistinguishable from Romanian—be written in the Cyrillic alphabet. The Soviets also reinterpreted Moldavian history by falsely linking its culture with that of Russia. In the economic sphere, the main trends in Moldavia involved agricultural collectivization and the establishment of state farming cooperatives along with the accelerated development of state-owned industries.

Although local government did exist in Moldavia, most important decisions were made in Moscow. Even the Communist Party of Moldavia was merely a branch of the all-union government, and few Romanian Moldavians attained high positions within it. Among the key figures in the party were Russians, Ukrainians, and Russified Transdnestrian Romanians. Among officials were subsequent Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Konstantin Chernenko.

Following Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and driven by the newly formed Popular Front of Moldavia, the republic government passed a law on 31 August 1989 that made Moldavian the official language of the MSSR, mandated the use of the Latin alphabet, and asserted its ties to Romania. In the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev, the Republic of Moldavia declared its independence, which was then quickly recognized by the international community.

Silviu Miloiu

See also

Bessarabia; Romania; Soviet Union

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Mollet, Guy
(1905–1975)

French socialist politician, minister for European Relations (1950–1951), and premier (1956–1957). Born on 31 December 1905 in Flers (Orne), Guy Mollet, the son of a textile worker, graduated from the University of Lille and then taught English at a Lycée in Arras. In 1921 he joined the French Social-

ist Party (SFIO), becoming its regional secretary for the Strait of Dover (Pas de Calais) in 1928.

Mollet joined the French Army at the beginning of World War II and was wounded and captured by the Germans in 1940. Released in 1941, hereturned to Arras and joined the French Resistance. Immediately after the war, he was elected mayor of Arras, a position he held until his death. He represented the Strait of Dover in both the 1945 and 1946 constituent assemblies.

In March 1946 Mollet was elected secretary-general of the SFIO, a position he would hold until 1969. He served in Premier Léon Blum's government as minister of state during 1946–1947. Mollet was appointed minister for European Relations in René Pleven's cabinet during 1950–1951 and was vice premier in Henri Queuille's government in 1951. Mollet was also French representative to the Council of Europe and president of the Socialist Group. During 1951–1969, he served as vice president of the Socialist International.

In January 1956 Mollet became premier of France. His domestic program included improved old-age pensions and annual paid vacations for workers. Although he preferred to deal in domestic issues, foreign affairs dominated his tenure. In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. France joined Britain and Israel in a military campaign to seize control of the canal. The Suez Crisis turned out to be a fiasco for the participants, as Britain, France, and Israel were forced to withdraw under heavy pressure from U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration. British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden was forced to resign, but Mollet remained in power despite widespread opposition from within the SFIO regarding his decision to send troops to Egypt.

French Premier Guy Mollet, shown here during a 27 February 1956 radio address on the Algerian War. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Mollet also prosecuted the Algerian War to suppress nationalists there led by the National Liberation Front (FLN). Unable to convince the National Assembly to raise taxes in order to fund enhanced military operations in Algeria, he resigned as premier in May 1957.

Mollet was among those French politicians who supported the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle in the crisis of May 1958, and Mollet backed de Gaulle's subsequent constitutional reforms creating a more powerful executive. During 1958–1959 Mollet served in the interim de Gaulle government as minister of state but broke with de Gaulle in 1962 in order to work on building a viable left-wing opposition movement. Mollet never fully embraced the demarche with the Communist Party that this would entail, however.

Mollet retired from politics in 1969 when the SFIO was absorbed into the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left. He died in Paris on

3 October 1975. Mollet acquired a posthumous reputation as having been a rightist machine politician who betrayed socialism by fighting Algerian independence and supporting de Gaulle.

John H. Barnhill and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Algerian War; Decolonization; De Gaulle, Charles; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; France; Suez Crisis

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Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich

(1890–1986)

Soviet foreign minister (1939–1949, 1953–1956). Born Vyacheslav Skriabin in the village of Kukarka, in Viatsk Province, on 9 March 1890, he attended secondary school in Kazan and the polytechnic in St. Petersburg. In 1905 he joined the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party, changing his name to Molotov, which means "the hammer." He participated in the 1905 Revolution. In 1909 he was arrested and sent into internal exile for two years. Upon completion of his sentence, he moved to St. Petersburg, where he joined the staff of *Pravda* and became a close friend of Josef Stalin, one of the editors of the Bolshevik newspaper. Arrested several more times, Molotov managed to escape and was at large at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917.

Following the revolution, Molotov took charge of nationalization programs in various parts of Russia. In 1920 he became secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and in 1921 secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and a candidate member of the Politburo. In 1926 he became a full member of the Politburo and in 1930 premier. He slavishly assisted Stalin in carrying out the massive purges of the party and armed forces in the 1930s. Well known for his absolute loyalty to Stalin, Molotov's only sign of rebellion came in 1948 when he abstained from a Politburo vote to arrest and imprison his wife.

In May 1939 Molotov replaced the internationalist Maksim Litvinov as commissar for foreign affairs, an appointment that signaled Stalin's intention to seek accommodation with Nazi Germany. On 23 August 1939, Molotov and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop signed the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact in Moscow that allowed Germany to invade Poland and begin World War II. In November 1940 Molotov went to Berlin to confer with German leaders about redefining German and Soviet spheres

of influence, but the negotiations failed, and Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941.

During the war, Molotov helped develop the alliance among the Soviet Union, Britain, and France, and he attended the Allied conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam as well as the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drafted the United Nations (UN) Charter. Stalin determined Soviet foreign policy, but Molotov implemented it, usually taking an intransigent line in negotiations with his Western counterparts for which he earned the nicknames of "Stonebottom" amd "Old Iron Pants." Clashes between Molotov and U.S. President Harry S. Truman at Potsdam helped set the tone for the Cold War.

Molotov was the chief architect of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and he took a hard line toward the West. He also took a leading role in the Soviet effort to develop an atomic bomb. The Molotov Plan, the Soviet counterpart to the Marshall Plan, bore his name. Molotov also took a hard line toward Yugoslavia that led to the break between that nation and the Soviet Union in 1948. He continued as foreign minister until 1949, when he was demoted following the so-called Leningrad Affair in which doctors and party officials implicated in the plot to kill Andrei Zhdanov were purged. There is absolutely no indication that Molotov was ever involved in any effort to unseat Stalin.



Longtime Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov. (Library of Congress)

Following Stalin's death in March 1953, Molotov was reinstated as foreign minister. He supported early accommodations in the Cold War, such as the armistice in Korea and the 1954 Geneva Conference ending the Indochina War. There were sharp limits to his concessions to the West, however. He soon clashed with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and his policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, leading Khrushchev to dismiss him as foreign minister in June 1956. In June 1957 Molotov was expelled from the Politburo and the Central Committee and from his government posts. For the next five years, he held such unimportant posts as ambassador to Mongolia (1957–1960) and Soviet representative on the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (1960–1961). His implacable opposition to Khrushchev led the latter to expel Molotov from the Communist Party in 1962. Molotov then retired on a modest pension to a small Moscow apartment. He remained in disgrace until Konstantin Chernenko rehabilitated him in 1984. Molotov died in Moscow on 8 November 1986.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich; Khrushchev, Nikita; Marshall Plan; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; World War II, Allied Conferences; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

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Molotov Plan
(1947)

Soviet proposal to organize and fund the economic recovery and reconstruction of its East European satellite states through a series of bilateral agreements. Prompted by and a counterproposal to the 1947 Marshall Plan, the 1947 Molotov Plan was an attempt to prevent Central and East European states from accepting U.S. Marshall Plan aid. The Molotov Plan was also designed to bind the region more closely to the Soviets. Named for Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, the plan led to the 1949 establishment of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).

When U.S. leaders unveiled the Marshall Plan in June 1947, they made it clear that the program would be open to all European nations, not just those in Western Europe. At the same time, they predicated participation in the plan regarding full cooperation and full disclosure, which they knew the Eastern bloc was unlikely to do. Initially, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland as well as the Soviet Union had exhibited interest in participating in the Marshall Plan. After Molotov left the 1947 Paris Conference, however, the Soviets balked at the plan's guidelines and feared that participation in it would open Eastern Europe to Western influence. Thus, they withdrew from the negotiations and forbade their satellites from signing on to the program.

Molotov subsequently alleged that the Marshall Plan was a disguise for U.S. dominion over Europe and the reintegration of Germany into the capitalist camp. Because of the attractiveness of the Marshall Plan and the dire economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe, an alternative proposal from the Soviet Union became a political necessity. In early 1948 East European states, including Bulgaria and Romania, concluded bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. In January 1949 they became member states of Comecon, which was established to carry out the economic, ideological, and political integration of Soviet bloc nations.

Bernhard Seliger

See also

Comecon; Marshall Plan; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich

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Mongolia

Landlocked Central Asian nation of 604,207 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Alaska. Mongolia, with a 1945 population of approximately 7.74 million people, is bordered by Russia to the north and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the south. Mongolia was a strategic buffer as well as a potential battlefield between the PRC and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Mongolia and the PRC's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region were originally one unified state, which became part of imperial Qing China during the seventeenth century in two stages. Inner Mongolia referred to the southern half of this formerly unified Mongolian state, while the northern part became Outer Mongolia.

Following the anti-Qing revolution in October 1911, both Outer and Inner Mongolia declared their independence. Inner Mongolia's independence was short-lived, however; it was retaken by the new Chinese leaders, the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists), who proclaimed the Republic of China (ROC) on 1 January 1912. GMD troops also tried to reoccupy Outer Mongolia but were driven out in 1921, a result of the Russian Bolsheviks' assistance to the Outer Mongolian independence cause. On 11 July 1921 the Outer Mongolians regained their independence and in 1924 proclaimed the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), with power resting in the hands of the Soviet-sponsored Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The country was renamed Mongolia, as it is known today. Backed by the Soviet Union, Mongolia's independence was twice reaffirmed by the successors of Qing China: in January 1946 by the ROC and in October 1949 by the PRC, removing the Chinese threat of redeeming Mongolian sovereignty.

Owing to its geographical location, Mongolia's foreign policy direction was entirely shaped by the Sino-Soviet relationship. During the period of Sino-Soviet harmony throughout the 1950s, Mongolia was able to maximize its national interests. Through the 1946 Mongolian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the 1952 Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, Mongolia gained a vast labor supply as well as economic, material and technical assistance. With Soviet approval, Mongolia followed the PRC's lead in building up its international status. In 1955, Mongolia pledged to support the PRC's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, first publicized in the Bandung Conference, in developing diplomatic relationships with noncommunist developing-world nations. In 1961, Mongolia gained United Nations (UN) membership.

As the Sino-Soviet split crystallized in the early 1960s, Mongolia's buffering role was enhanced when the PRC and the Soviet Union competed

Parade in Mongolia, January 1962. Posters are of the leader of the Mongolian Revolution, Sukhe Bator (*left*), and Karl Marx (*right*). (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

over the country. In 1960 the PRC concluded with Mongolia the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, and in 1962 the China-Mongolia Border Treaty delimited formal boundaries and resolved territorial disputes. On the other hand, the Soviet Union renewed and replaced the 1946 treaty with a twenty-year treaty in 1966. This treaty contained a defense clause, entitling Mongolia to Soviet defense assistance in case of an external invasion, implicitly referring to the PRC. Mongolia chose to side with the Soviet Union, owing in part to the Soviets' record of assistance in its independence movement and in part to the renewed fear of a PRC push to reclaim the lost Outer Mongolia, a perception stemming from the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

In accordance with the 1966 treaty terms, in 1967 the Soviets began to deploy troops in Mongolia with the aim of shifting the Soviet defense line southward along the Mongolian-PRC border. When the Sino-Soviet split culminated in a serious border incident in March 1969 along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, the Soviet Union had already stationed a total of four divisions of ground troops (two tank and two motorized) and unspecified air force units in Mongolia. Some of them were equipped with intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear and chemical warheads, targeting the PRC's nuclear installations in the western province of Xinjiang.

Although the border conflict ended in September 1969, the likelihood that Mongolia would become a battlefield for a Sino-Soviet nuclear confrontation remained high. The Soviet Union continued its deployment in Mongolia. In 1970, a coordinated air system was created in Mongolia to control about 1,000 Soviet combat aircraft stationed there. This military presence ensured Mongolia's consistently pro-Soviet and anti-PRC foreign policy until the mid-1980s, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to restore Sino-Soviet relations and withdraw troops from Mongolia. Free of Soviet pressure, Mongolia normalized its relationship with the PRC at the end of 1986 and established normal ties with the United States in January 1987.

In terms of domestic politics, Gorbachev's political and economic liberalism unleashed the MPRP's political opponents, who championed more democracy. Inspired by the Tiananmen Square protests of spring 1989, the prodemocracy and anti-MPRP Mongolians staged a series of demonstrations, beginning in December 1989 and ending in the MPRP's fall from power in March 1990. In July 1990, a multiparty election was held that created a coalition government.

In January 1992 a new constitution came into force, replacing the People's Republic with a hybrid parliamentary-presidential state. The new constitution forbade the presence of foreign troops, ensuring the true independence and sovereignty of Mongolia.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Sino-Soviet Border Incident; Soviet Union; Tiananmen Square

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MONGOOSE, Operation

U.S. covert operation, begun in 1961, to overthrow the Cuban government and assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Following the failed April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, communications between Castro and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev increased dramatically. Castro requested additional Soviet military support, and the Kremlin acted on his appeal. Within a year, Moscow had approved a $148 million arms package, although Khrushchev stalled the support.

After a clandestine meeting between Richard Goodwin, President John F. Kennedy's representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council

in Uruguay, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara on 22 August 1961 in which Goodwin laid out ways that Cuba could improve relations with the United States, he reported that he saw Guevara's views as a sign of a deteriorating Cuban economy and impatience with Moscow. As a result, various U.S. agencies began discussing programs to sabotage the Cuban economy, and Kennedy began exploring options to eliminate Castro. Kennedy's brother and attorney general, Robert Kennedy, did not want to involve the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because of the Bay of Pigs debacle. In November 1961, he approached President Kennedy with a plan that would establish an interagency project against Cuba that would not rely on CIA experts. On 30 November, President Kennedy named Brigadier General Edward Lansdale chief of operations for the project.

The interagency committee, known as Special Group, included Robert Kennedy and Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon. The inclusion of Kennedy and Dillon changed the group's name to the Special Group Augmented (SGA). SGA members were CIA Director John McCone, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson from the State Department, Roswell Gilpatric from the Defense Department, General Lyman Lemnitzer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Maxwell D. Taylor. Also in attendance at meetings, although they were not members, were President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

Plans for sabotage and counter-intelligence included the injection of untraceable poison into Castro's favorite brand of cigars, the poisoning of Castro's food and drinks, and the retrofitting of Castro's fountain pen with a hidden needle capable of injecting a lethal toxin.

In February 1962, Khrushchev finally agreed to provide arms support to Cuba after receiving intelligence reports that the White House was planning to destroy Castro.

Lansdale devised a two-phase plan to implement Operation MONGOOSE. The plan included paramilitary, sabotage, and political propaganda programs. The SGA ordered an intensification of sabotage and intelligence activity, while President Kennedy continued to waver on the necessity of military action. Without the support of U.S. forces, the stability of Operation MONGOOSE began to weaken. Instead, the CIA turned to the Mafia for assistance in assassination plots, and Lansdale used his experience in psychological warfare to devise strategies for propaganda. Plans for sabotage and counter-intelligence included the injection of untraceable poison into Castro's favorite brand of cigars, the poisoning of Castro's food and drinks, the retrofitting of Castro's fountain pen with a hidden needle capable of injecting a lethal toxin, airdropping anti-Castro propaganda over Cuba, spraying a television studio where Castro was about to appear with a hallucinogenic drug to undermine his popularity, contaminating Cuban sugar, and counterfeiting Cuban money and ration books.

In the spring of 1962, Robert Kennedy asked the SGA to consider the role of the Soviet Union as a factor in determining the outcome of MONGOOSE. The group did not, however, act on this directive, as the idea of a Soviet military base on Cuba was too remote too consider. Yet only a few months earlier, Khrushchev had agreed to begin building up Cuban forces. Ultimately, SGA's nonchalance was a factor in the development of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Lansdale's project was shut down in October 1962 following the Cuban Missile Crisis, but similar CIA psychological warfare projects against Castro continued well into 1963. These operations failed to win over a skeptical Cuban population.

Lacie A. Ballinger

See also

Bay of Pigs; Castro, Fidel; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Khrushchev, Nikita; Lansdale, Edward Geary

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Monnet, Jean
(1888–1979)

French commissioner general for planning during 1945–1952, first president of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) during 1952–1955, and generally regarded as the father of European unity. Born on 9 November 1888 in Cognac, France, Jean-Omer-Marie-Gabriel Monnet was the son of a prosperous vintner. After joining the family business at age sixteen, he traveled extensively in Great Britain, Europe, North America, and the Middle East.

During World War I, Monnet held various positions in the Allied purchasing, shipping, and supply bureaucracy. From 1919 to 1922 he was deputy secretary-general to the new League of Nations and was instrumental in organizing an international loan that facilitated Austrian postwar economic reconstruction. From 1923 until the late 1930s, he was a partner in various American financial firms, raising further international European reconstruction loans in the 1920s and attempting to do the same in China for much of the 1930s.

An early opponent of Adolf Hitler, from the 1938 Munich Agreement until the defeat of France in June 1940 Monnet sought to facilitate major French armaments purchases in the United States. After the fall of France, he unobtrusively became a key member of the Washington-based British Supply Commission, relentlessly lobbying President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration for sharp increases in industrial war production and enormously expanded aid to Great Britain. Monnet spent most of 1943 in Algiers helping to organize a united front for France's liberation including both Vichy and Gaullist Free French forces, an organization that General Charles de Gaulle soon dominated. Monnet returned to the United States in October 1943 as France's commissioner-at-large to negotiate presidential

Jean Monnet, an economist and diplomat, planned and initiated much of the economic rebuilding and modernization of post–World War II France and Western Europe. He is widely regarded as the father of the European Union. (Library of Congress)

recognition of de Gaulle's position, a formal Lend-Lease agreement, and relief and reconstruction aid for liberated France.

Returning to France in November 1945, as commissioner general for planning Monnet speedily devised the Monnet Plan for French economic revival and modernization, a program driven by a mixture of democratic planning and foreign economic assistance. Convinced that only full-scale European cooperation would prevent future devastating wars, from 1945 onward he quietly but relentlessly crusaded for this, playing central roles in the establishment in 1951 of the ECSC, of which he became the first president, and its 1957 successor the European Economic Community (EEC), which ultimately evolved into the European Union (EU). Monnet's long-standing friendships with key American officials including John Foster Dulles, John J. McCloy, George W. Ball, and numerous others helped him to win American support for these endeavors. From 1955 Monnet, universally considered the preeminent founder of a unified Europe, headed the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, working constantly to strengthen existing institutions. Monnet died at Montfort-l'Amaury, Yuelines, Ile de France, on 16 March 1979.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Ball, George Wildman; Churchill, Winston; De Gaulle, Charles; Dulles, John Foster; European Coal and Steel Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; European Parliament; European Union; France; McCloy, John Jay; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Schuman, Robert

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Monnet Plan

Proposed in 1945 by French statesman Jean Monnet and implemented during 1947–1952, the Monnet Plan (Le Plan, or The Plan) was part of the post–

World War II reconstruction of France and Western Europe. The Monnet Plan anticipated American funding and from 1948 was financed by capital made available to France under the Marshall Plan. Basically an arrangement for industrial modernization, the Monnet Plan set goals for six basic economic sectors: coal, iron and steel, electricity, cement, agricultural machinery, and transport.

On 4 December 1945 Monnet, who as head of the French Supply Commission coordinated imports from the United States to France under the Lend-Lease program, submitted to General Charles de Gaulle, head of the provisional French government, a set of proposals to modernize and rebuild the French economy. The memorandum urged the linking of reconstruction to modernization, with the ultimate goal of raising the French standard of living and securing France a place in international affairs. Modernizing would entail raising productivity in both industry and agriculture through improved production methods and better equipment. The proposal also urged the coordination of previously existing plans that covered individual sectors of industry. Moreover, it demanded the collaboration of workers, citizens, and industrialists.

Following adoption of Monnet's proposals by the French Council of Ministers, an executive order of 3 January 1946 authorized the establishment of the Commissariat Général du Plan (Planning Commission) and the committees of modernization that were attached directly to the head of government. Vertical committees were set up by sectors (e.g., iron and steel), and horizontal committees were established to troubleshoot specific problems (e.g., labor). Upon its establishment, Monnet became the head of the Commissariat. The newly established commissions prepared the first plan in 1946, and it was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 14 January 1947.

Numerous past French projects had involved economic planning in the interwar period. Only in the 1940s, however, did plans take the form of documents outlining objectives and the means to achieve them. The Monnet Plan combined the economic traditions of liberalism with those of central planning. The reconstruction of a neoliberal economic order relied on the power of the state. Although political groups in postwar France agreed on the necessity for economic recovery, they disagreed on the strategies to achieve it. Acceptance of the Monnet Plan was dependent not so much on domestic economic necessities but rather on the French government's foreign economic objectives within Europe, especially vis-à-vis Germany. The French government considered Germany's economic weakness vital to the successful restoration of France's economic and political strength in Europe. Paris considered unrestricted access to the coal and coke resources of the Ruhr as critical to jump-starting French steel production. In this way, the Monnet Plan was a forerunner of the 1950 Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which were designed to carefully monitor the economic power of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).

From its inception, the Monnet Plan anticipated American funding. Hence, approval of the plan by U.S. policymakers was critical to its realization. Previous professional commitments, among them his collaboration with

the Lend-Lease administration, had helped Monnet create a network of contacts with U.S. politicians and administrators. Assuming a prime role in the bilateral French-American talks that resulted in the Blum-Byrnes Accords (May 1946), Monnet promoted his modernization plan in Washington. For President Harry Truman's administration, the restoration and modernization of France was part of the larger economic reconstruction of a democratic and capitalist Western Europe that they hoped to enlist in the fight against Soviet communism. The Truman administration, initially concerned with the plan's prioritization of heavy industry and its neglect of financial and monetary stability, endorsed the plan after timetable adjustments and the inclusion of financial considerations had been made.

The Monnet Plan met almost all its goals, thanks in large part to Marshall Plan assistance. The Monnet Plan restored French economic confidence and encouraged the private sector to invest in new, more modern enterprises. The lessons of the plan proved essential to Monnet and his advisors in conceiving the Schuman Plan declaration of 9 May 1950, which paved the way to the founding of the ECSC.

Brigitte Leucht

See also

European Coal and Steel Community; Lend-Lease; Marshall Plan; Monnet, Jean

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Monrovia Group

One of two main factions in the Pan-African movement of the early 1960s, created in May 1961 in response to the formation of the other leading faction, the so-called Casablanca Group. The Monrovia Group was made up of twenty African nations, including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In general terms, it favored a less formal confederation of newly independent African states and a more voluntary approach to participation in cultural and economic exchange (and less socialism) than did the Casablanca Group.

In January 1961, Moroccan King Muhammad V invited the leaders of Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Mali, Libya, and the Algerian government-in-exile to Casablanca to discuss African unity. This meeting was partly a response to an earlier gathering in Brazzaville, Congo, the previous month. The so-called Brazzaville Group promoted a loose confederation of independent African

states, but not the kind of political integration supported by certain radical forces on the continent, and supported United Nations (UN) intervention in the crisis then plaguing the Congo. Furthermore, the Brazzaville members had excluded those radical forces, specifically Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and rejected Morocco's claim to Mauritania, which had recently sought UN recognition.

In response to this, Morocco's ruler invited those same radical leaders to a conference in the hope of gaining their support for his claims on Mauritania. This meeting, which was dominated by the charismatic Nkrumah and Nasser, promoted a strong political union for Africa's newly independent states. Specifically, it accepted in principle Nkrumah's ideas of a United States of Africa, based on the American model. It also favored socialist, centralized economic planning; industrialization; and a continental defense structure. In addition, the group recognized Morocco's claim to Mauritania (to the delight of their host), rejected the promotion of regional groups over a continental confederation, supported Algerian independence and the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the Congo, and declared Israel as "a base for imperialism."

In keeping with the factionalism that marked the Pan-African movement at this time, still another bloc was created in response to the formation of the Casablanca Group. In May 1961, twenty African states (including the members of the Brazzaville Group) gathered in the Liberian capital of Monrovia to discuss African unity, but this group was considered more moderate in its approach and intentions. The Casablanca Group was excluded as being too radical and ambitious (particularly Nkrumah and Nasser), and with the exception of Tunisia, North Africa was not represented.

Following the first Monrovia meeting, a war of words broke out between the two factions, as the press and politicians from both sides accused the other of being tools of imperialism or harboring secret designs to dominate the continent. As a result, a general climate of mutual distrust ensued.

When a second meeting of the Monrovia Group was held in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1962, the rest of the Casablanca Group refused to attend when the Algerian government-in-exile was not invited. Over the course of 1962, however, two of the main problems dividing the groups were resolved. Algeria received its independence in July 1962, about the same time that the conflict for control in the Congo reached a resolution with the establishment of a central government. Furthermore, by this time it had become increasingly apparent that the two factions shared many goals, including the promotion of independence for the remaining European colonies in Africa, nonalignment in the Cold War, and some form of continental cooperation in trade and foreign policies.

After lobbying by such influential African leaders as Sekou Toure of Guinea and Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie, the two groups finally came together in a meeting of thirty-two African nations in May 1963 in Addis Ababa, where they agreed to a compromise plan for achieving greater African unity. The result was the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the demise of the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups.

Brent M. Geary

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Decolonization; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Organization of African Unity

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Moro, Aldo
(1916–1978)

Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) politician and prime minister (1963–1968, 1974–1976). Born on 23 September 1916 in Maglie, Italy, Aldo Moro attended the Archita High School in Taranto and in 1938 earned a degree in law from Bari University. The following year he was named president of the Catholic student organization Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana (FUCI), which he headed until 1942. In 1941 he began teaching law and politics at Bari University.

Italian political leader Aldo Moro. A former premier and Italy's most influential politician, Moro was kidnapped and his five bodyguards shot to death by six Red Brigade terrorists in March 1976. Held for fifty-four days, Moro was then executed. His body was found in the trunk of a car in Rome. The event touched off massive public demonstrations in Italy. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Moro was active from an early age in the DC and in 1946 was elected to the Constitutional Assembly, helping to draft Italy's new constitution. In the April 1948 elections he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies and served as undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry during 1948–1950. In 1955 he was named minister of justice, a post he held until 1957. During 1957–1958 he served as minister of education, and in 1959 he was elected secretary of the DC, the most powerful position in the party. At the same time, he continued his university career, receiving an appointment at the Rome University in 1964 to teach law and penal procedures.

In November 1963 Moro became prime minister, forming a coalition government with the Socialist Party. He led two other governments until 1968, a remarkably long tenure by Italian standards. During 1970–1972 and again during 1973–1974, he was foreign minister, returning to lead yet two more governments during 1974–1976 (his fourth and fifth).

As foreign minister, Moro was particularly active in promoting the settlement of pending disputes with Yugoslavia and Ethiopia and was also committed to European integration. While heading his fourth government, he was also rotating president of the European Community (EC)

and as such signed the Helsinki Final Act. He pursued a balanced policy between the Arab countries and the West, hoping that Italy might avoid becoming a battleground for terrorism from outside. In his domestic policies, he favored the inclusion of the growing Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the government.

As Italy was rocked by terrorism from both the extreme Right and Left, Moro lent his name to another short-lived government from February to April 1976. That July, he was elected president of the DC. On 16 March 1978, on his way to parliament, he was kidnapped by the terrorist organization Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades). After fifty-four days in the Red Brigades' so-called people's prison, during which time Moro wrote several letters and a long memorandum, members of the Red Brigades executed him on 9 May when negotiations between them and the Italian government collapsed. Moro's body was found in an automobile in Rome.

Alessandro Massignani

See also

Italy; Red Brigades

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Morocco

The Kingdom of Morocco is located in northwest Africa. It borders on the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Western Sahara to the south, and Algeria to the east. Morocco has an area of 172,414 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of California. Until the early twentieth century, Morocco was relatively isolated from spheres of European, Middle Eastern, or sub-Saharan African influence, resulting in a strong Berber and Arab Islamic national character. During 1912–1956 Morocco was a French and Spanish protectorate. Its 1945 population was approximately 8.5 million people.

Occupied by U.S. forces in November 1942, Morocco contributed approximately 350,000 troops to fight in the liberation of France and Western Europe. Despite deep ties to France and the French culture, the Moroccan people increasingly embraced nationalism. In January 1943, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt traveled to Casablanca, where he met with Winston Churchill for ten days to plan strategy. At that time Roosevelt also met with Moroccan Sultan Sidi Mohammed (1927–1961) and proclaimed American support for Morocco's eventual independence.

With growing nationalist sentiment in Morocco, the French government exiled the sultan and his family, first to Corsica and then to Madagascar

during 1953–1955. In the wake of the Indochina War and with the outbreak of rebellion in Algeria in 1954, France granted independence to both Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, although Spain continued to control the Western Sahara region until the mid-1970s and still retains the small enclaves of Cuenta and Melilla along the Mediterranean coast.

Returning from exile a national hero in November 1955, the sultan became King Mohammed V upon independence on 2 March 1956. The king was both the nation's spiritual leader, as a direct descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, and its political head of government. In this period, Morocco maintained close ties to the United States.

Upon Mohammed V's unexpected death in March 1961, his son, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, became king as Hassan II and ruled for the next four decades until his death in July 1999. Hassan, while lacking the charisma and unifying ability of his father, was nonetheless an effective leader, able to balance relations with the West, whose economic and political aid helped modernize his country, and the Middle East, whose Islamic heritage was his basis for power.

Although the Moroccan government was ostensibly a constitutional monarchy, in reality Hassan controlled nearly all sectors of government, including the military. Strongly opposed to communism, he oppressed the leftist Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Popular Forces) for much of the 1960s. Notwithstanding, Morocco enjoyed cordial relationships with communist countries such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

In 1970 a new constitution providing for a unicameral legislature came into being, but this failed to placate political and military opponents of Hassan's centralized authority. Army elements led by General Muhammad Oufkir staged two unsuccessful coups, one in July 1971 and another in August 1972, that the king barely survived. To strengthen his position, Hassan embarked on an effort to secure the Western Sahara. In November 1975 he called upon 200,000 of his countrymen to take part in the Green March, in which they peacefully crossed into Western Sahara to demonstrate Moroccan determination to regain that territory, which historically had been part of Morocco. Despite widespread international criticism, Morocco annexed the phosphate-rich region upon its abandonment by Spain a few months later. This action led to a protracted guerrilla war with the Saharawi resistance, known as the Polisario. In this struggle, the United States supported Morocco, the result of the long-standing alliance between the two countries. As part of this arrangement, U.S. forces enjoyed access to bases in the country, although they relinquished control of their last air base in Africa, at Kenitra, to Morocco in October 1978.

The early 1980s saw increasing domestic difficulties, including the cost of war in Western Sahara, a sluggish economy, rising inflation, and a severe drought. In 1981 these problems contributed to food riots in Casablanca in which some one hundred people died. A $1.2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), changes in the tax structure, improvements

The so-called Green March into the Spanish Sahara, 6 November 1975. (Nogues Alain/Corbis Sygma)

in agriculture, and increased revenue from trade and tourism ameliorated many of these problems in the second half of the decade.

Hassan pursued a conciliatory foreign policy. In the 1980s he worked to secure Arab recognition of Israel and an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In July 1986 he held two days of talks on Palestinian issues with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Hassan also sought to improve relationships among other Arab states as a result of the Cold War. In 1984 he organized the Islamic Congress of Casablanca and created the Arabic-African Union with Libya. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Morocco aligned itself squarely with the United States and sent troops to defend Saudi Arabia.

During Hassan's reign, literacy, women's equality, and economic well-being all increased substantially. The social and economic disparity between urban and rural populations decreased through improved education, health care, and communication. But rising Islamic fundamentalism posed difficult challenges for Morocco in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These problems continue to the present under the leadership of Hassan's son and successor, King Mohammed VI. Challenges include continued fighting in Western Sahara, reducing constraints on private activity and foreign trade, and achieving sustainable economic growth.

Mark Sanders

See also

Decolonization; Hassan II, King of Morocco; Middle East

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Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon
(22–30 May 1972)

Summit meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev during 22–30 May 1972, marking a historic turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations with the first presidential visit to the Soviet Union since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nixon's nine-day summit meeting with Brezhnev solidified the superpower détente, underway since the late 1960s. Among the numerous agreements signed during the summit, the most important were the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the accompanying Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, SALT I Interim Agreement). These agreements completed the first stages of the larger SALT discussions.

Crucial to understanding the nature of the Moscow summit is the international situation in which it occurred. In the early 1970s, relations between America and the Soviet Union improved dramatically because of the relaxation of tensions in Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet suppression of the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. In the spirit of détente, the Nixon administration embarked on a policy of multilateral disarmament agreements, such as the 1971 signing of the Seabed Treaty. Détente ultimately served not only U.S. interests but also Soviet security interests. Despite relaxed tensions in Europe, Asian events might have had a damaging effect on American-Soviet relations. The 1971 India-Pakistan War and the Vietnam War were additional irritants. To the Soviets, détente outweighed these concerns, and a secret trip to Moscow by Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, in April 1972 finalized the summit plans.

In addition to the fruitful Moscow discussions and daily signatures of agreements between the conferees, Nixon made trips to Leningrad and Kiev and gave a live radio-television address to the Soviet people. His address highlighted the shared historical struggles of the two nations and reiterated their mutual responsibilities as global superpowers. During the summit, Nixon and Brezhnev discussed the status of the international community and a plethora of bilateral issues in hopes of continuing and furthering

détente despite the differing ideologies of the two superpowers. The two leaders agreed that smaller third-party states should not interfere with maintaining détente. Bilateral negotiations included the limitation of strategic armaments; commercial and economic agreements; cooperation in health issues; environmental cooperation; scientific, educational, and cultural cooperation and exchanges; and cooperation in space exploration. The results of these negotiations provided the necessary framework for a joint space venture in 1975, large U.S. grain sales to the Soviets, and, most importantly, the SALT agreements.

The majority of the summit concentrated on the SALT agreements. The Nixon administration had inherited a legacy of outdated doctrines pertaining to U.S. nuclear strategy. The antiquated policy of maintaining nuclear superiority over the USSR was no longer practical. Thus, through détente it was now possible to conduct negotiations limiting the growth of the superpower nuclear arsenals. In a first step toward the realization of SALT, on 26 May Nixon and Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. The ABM Treaty limited the deployment of antiballistic missiles for each nation to two sites. The SALT Interim Agreement froze the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by each country.

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union (*left*) and President Richard Nixon (*right*) shake hands in Moscow during talks regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The treaty was the first significant arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. (National Archives and Records Administration)

In a move to reaffirm both American and Soviet commitments to détente, the two powers signed the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This document contained twelve principles and served to encapsulate the spirit of the Moscow summit and the evolving superpower détente. Some of the more important principles included the notion of peaceful coexistence and the promise of future summit meetings.

Jonathan H. L'Hommedieu

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Brezhnev, Leonid; Détente; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nuclear Arms Race; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

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Moscow Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan
(29 May–2 June 1988)

Summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held in Moscow during 29 May–2 June 1988. It was the fourth such meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev since 1985. For Reagan, the conference coincided with congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra Affair. Because of this, some critics speculated that the president was trying to divert attention from the scandal by creating a newsworthy achievement at the meeting. The major accomplishment of the summit was the signing of the already-ratified 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 1 June 1988. It did not represent a breakthrough in arms control.

From the Soviet perspective, the 1988 summit greatly enhanced Gorbachev's domestic and international prestige. This was because of the obvious close relationship between the two leaders and Reagan's international reputation as an anticommunist hard-liner. Gorbachev's heightened prestige gave him important political capital, which was needed as he continued to move forward with his perestroika and glasnost reforms.

The meeting was carefully crafted to focus on the INF Treaty. The treaty had been forged at the December 1987 Washington summit meeting between the two leaders and was approved by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders in March 1988 and by the U.S. Senate on 29 May 1988. The treaty called for the destruction of 2,611 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with flight ranges of 300–3,400 miles. Included in the treaty were U.S. Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles as well as Soviet SS-4, SS-12, SS-20, and SS-23 missiles. It also specified very detailed on-site inspection and verification procedures. In accordance with the treaty, by 1991 both countries would have eliminated all intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The summit also resulted in a wide variety of smaller agreements. These covered a spectrum of topics such as student exchanges, nuclear power research, maritime rescues, fisheries, transportation, and radio navigation. Typical of these agreements was the Bilateral Ballistic Missile Launch Agreement. It called for both nations to inform the other no less than twenty-four hours in advance of any ballistic missile launch.

During the summit, Gorbachev surprised the American delegation on the first evening by handing Reagan a proposed joint declaration regarding peaceful coexistence, which Reagan declined to endorse. The declaration would have bound both countries to a pact of nonaggression and prohibited the use of force to resolve disputes. Reagan's advisors believed that the statement was too ambiguous.

Analysts were surprised by the degree of progress made toward future nuclear weapons reductions, as indicated by points of agreement on land-based mobile missile systems and air-launched cruise missiles. However, the conference revealed that the two nations were still far apart on other important arms control subjects, such as sea-based cruise missiles and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

In general, the summit was a success but did not produce any dramatic or unexpected results. Gorbachev expressed his disappointment that opportunities for more dramatic progress had been missed. For his part, Reagan continued to send a clear message regarding the importance of human rights and political reform in the Soviet Union. Indeed, his meetings with Russian religious leaders and Soviet dissidents underscored this point. A modest but important accomplishment of the meeting was to provide an effective bridge to future summits between Gorbachev and President George H. W. Bush.

Louis A. DiMarco

See also

Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Iran-Contra Affair; Perestroika; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strategic Defense Initiative

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Moscow and Yalta Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon
(27 June–3 July 1974)

Summit meeting between U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev held during 27 June–3 July 1974 in Moscow and Yalta during the period of détente between the two Cold War superpowers. One of the major objectives and achievements of détente was to limit the ongoing nuclear arms race. This was embodied in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT) Treaty. The summer 1974 meeting was the first summit meeting between the two leaders since June 1973, when Nixon hosted Brezhnev in the United States. The meeting was a part of a continuing dialogue between the two countries designed to decrease tensions and foster greater East-West cooperation.

Ultimately, the United States sought to move beyond the achievements of SALT I and II to address the limitation of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) carrying nuclear warheads. The Americans were also interested in extending the five-year SALT I interim agreement that would expire in 1977. Unfortunately, the last meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev was overshadowed by U.S. domestic events, specifically ongoing congressional investigations of the Watergate scandal, which would soon implicate Nixon. In fact, Nixon's domestic problems had become a factor in his motivation to meet with the Soviet leader. The president hoped that a successful meeting might distract the public's attention from the growing Watergate crisis.

The 1974 meetings took place in Moscow, Minsk, and Yalta. U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger accompanied the president throughout the summit. Alexei Kosygin, head of the Council of Ministers, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko accompanied Brezhnev. Although Nixon and Brezhnev got along famously on a personal level, very little of substance was produced during the meeting beyond discussion of rather routine cultural, scientific, and economic exchanges.

The major achievement of the conference was the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which limited the two nations' nuclear weapons tests to a maximum of 150 kilotons. The agreement also required advance notification of nuclear tests and an exchange of data, making seismic test monitoring possible. Another significant accomplishment was agreement on a formal protocol to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which reduced the number of ABM sites allowed each country from two to one.

One of the reasons that the 1974 meeting did not produce major new arms control agreements as some had expected was division within the Nixon administration. This split concerned the effects that the SALT II Treaty would have on U.S. offensive nuclear capability. The American military had made great strides in MIRV technology in the two years since the SALT negotiations began. Some people in Congress and the Pentagon did not want that potential advantage negotiated away. Others, including Kissinger, did not see any inherent value in achieving a strategic advantage in nuclear weapons. This issue remained unresolved during the conference and thus precluded any bold U.S. proposals in the area of arms control.

Nixon, facing impeachment by Congress in light of damaging evidence that tied him directly to the Watergate scandal, resigned from office on 9 August 1974. If he had hoped that the summit with Brezhnev would convince the American people that his personal diplomatic skills were more important than his abuse of power and criminal activity, he was mistaken. Still, the June–July 1974 meetings were not a failure. The TTBT was finally ratified by the U.S. Senate (after many modifications) in 1990. And protocols were set for a miniconference on SALT II, to take place in November 1974. Most importantly, the policy of détente was sustained and continued through the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations.

Louis A. DiMarco

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Brezhnev, Leonid; Détente; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nuclear Arms Race; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Threshold Test Ban Treaty

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Mossadegh, Mohammed
(1882–1967)

Iranian nationalist and prime minister of Iran (1951–1953). Born on 19 May 1882 in Tehran to a prominent family, Mohammed Mossadegh studied at the Institute of Political Science in Paris during 1909–1911 and earned his law degree from the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1913. The following year he returned to Iran, and in 1917 he was named deputy finance minister. He became finance minister in 1921 and foreign minister for a brief time in 1923. Later that same year, he withdrew from politics in protest over Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's repressive and pro-British policies. For most of the next two decades Mossadegh worked mainly in the private sector, and his political forays were quite limited.

Mossadegh was elected to parliament in 1944 on the National Front Party ticket and went on to lead a nationalist movement that sought to remove British control over Iranian oil. He became prime minister in the spring of 1951. His first actions in office were directed at enforcing the Iranian parliament's Oil Nationalization Bill, which called for seizing control of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. His next battle was with the shah over control of the military. Although the shah reigned over the nation, his only constitutional power was direct control over the nation's armed forces. Mossadegh wanted control of the military to be vested in the cabinet, a request that the shah refused.

In 1952, Mossadegh resigned in protest but became prime minister again within weeks, following popular uproar over his apparently forced resignation. Besides raising the hackles of British oil interests, his socialist domestic reforms had begun to alarm the United States. An attempted coup in March 1953 failed, as did a similar attempt on 16 August. Three days later, however, another effort to unseat Mossadegh by force succeeded, with the backing and aid of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). On 20 August Mossadegh was placed under arrest, and the shah, who had fled several days earlier, returned to assume control of the government. The shah now exercised sweeping authority. Mossadegh was tried, convicted, and sentenced to three years in prison. Upon his release, he remained under house arrest until his death in Tehran on 4 March 1967.

Robert N. Stacy

Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, ca. 1951. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also

Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Central Intelligence Agency; Iran; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

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Mountbatten, Louis, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma
(1900–1979)

British admiral, last British Viceroy to India (1947), and governor-general of independent India (1947–1948). Born on 25 June 1900 into the British royal family at Windsor Castle, London, as Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas of Battenberg, his mother was a granddaughter of Queen Victoria. At age thirteen Mountbatten enrolled in the Royal Naval College, and during World War I he served on ships prior to receiving his commission as a sub-lieutenant in 1918. During 1918–1920 he attended Christ's College, Cambridge University. In 1920 he resumed his naval career, being promoted to lieutenant commander in 1928 and captain in 1937.

With the outbreak of World War II, Mountbatten saw combat at sea, was recognized for valor, and was promoted to commodore (1941) and acting vice-admiral (1942). He was named chief of combined operations in 1941, a position that brought with it membership on the British Chiefs of Staff and the joint Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff. In October 1943 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill appointed Mountbatten supreme allied commander in the Southeast Asia theater, a post he held until 1946.

Lord Louis Mountbatten, British admiral and statesman (1900–1979). (Illustrated London News Picture Library)

With the end of the war, the British Labour government moved to grant independence to India. Yet Indian society had become increasingly polarized between Hindu and Muslim nationalists. The Hindus wanted the new Indian state to be a single entity, while the Muslims wanted the country divided into two nations, a predominantly Hindu India and a predominantly Muslim Pakistan. In the end, independent Indian and Pakistani states emerged in 1947. Mountbatten entered into this volatile situation in 1947 as the last viceroy of India. His task was to preside over the absolute end of British rule in India and to bring about the transition to independence in the most orderly fashion possible. Scattered violence continued to mar the independence process, however, and Mountbatten served an additional year (1947–1948) as governor-general of India. After first being named a viscount, he was named an earl in 1948.

In 1948 Mountbatten returned to the Royal Navy, was promoted to admiral in 1953, and served as 4th sea lord and commander of the Mediterranean Fleet during 1952–1955. He became 1st sea lord in 1955, serving until 1959, and he was chief of the defense staff during 1959–1965. In 1956 Mountbatten was promoted to admiral of the fleet. He retired from the navy in 1965.

On 27 August 1979 Mountbatten was assassinated by Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists, who blew up his yacht in Donegal Bay, near his summer home in Sligo in the Irish Republic. His teenage grandson, another youth, and his daughter's mother-in-law were also killed, and several other Mountbatten family members were seriously injured.

William T. Walker

Mountbatten was assassinated by Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists, who blew up his yacht in Donegal Bay, near his summer home in Sligo in the Irish Republic.

See also
India; Pakistan; United Kingdom

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Mozambique

Southeast African nation covering 304,494 square miles, roughly twice the size of the U.S. state of California. The Republic of Mozambique, with a 1945 population of approximately 6 million, borders on Swaziland to the south; South Africa and Zimbabwe to the west; Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania to the north; and the Indian Ocean to the east. Portuguese navigator Vasco de Gama explored Mozambique in 1489, and Portugal colonized the land in 1505.

Mozambique fell into ruinous conditions during 1500–1640 as Portugal's power waned. With limited Portuguese influence, Mozambique experienced an extended period of sharecropping that kept most farmers in a state of serfdom. Also, from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, large numbers of Africans were shipped as slaves, mainly to the Macarena Islands and Brazil. By 1891, political policies of the Portuguese shifted the administration of much of Mozambique to a large, private trading organization known as the Mozambique Company, under a charter granting sovereign rights for fifty years. The Mozambique Company was one of two concession companies to which Lisbon entrusted the administration of Portuguese East Africa, although it was controlled and financed mostly by the British. Because policies in Mozambique were designed to benefit white settlers and the Portuguese homeland, little attention was paid to national integration, economic infrastructure, or education.

After World War II, Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar insisted on holding on to Mozambique and the other Portuguese colonies. A drive for Mozambican independence soon developed, and in 1962 several anticolonial political groups formed the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), a leftist, anti-Portuguese guerrilla movement under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane.

Mondlane helped initiate an armed campaign against Portuguese colonial rule in September 1964. After ten years of sporadic warfare and Portugal's return to democracy, Frelimo took control of the capital city of Maputo in a coup in April 1974. Within a year, almost all Portuguese colonists had departed. Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975.

Mondlane responded to Mozambique's lack of resources and abysmal economy by moving into alignment with Cuba and the Soviet Union. After he was assassinated in 1969, Frelimo established a one-party Marxist state under President Samora Machel. Racial violence soon ensued, and many Europeans fled the country. Meanwhile, Frelimo banned private land ownership, nationalized all industries, and put in place educational and health reforms. The new government, sporadically supported by the Soviet Union, was economically dependent on South Africa with its hostile apartheid government. It also had to fight the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), an anticommunist political organization of guerrillas sponsored by the white minority government of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and financed by South Africa. In 1979 Rhodesia invaded Mozambique, igniting even more violence that wrought havoc and killed scores of civilians.

In 1982, RENAMO launched a series of attacks on transport routes, schools, and health clinics, and Mozambique descended into civil war. In 1984, the South African regime agreed to stop sponsoring RENAMO under the Nkomati Accord if the Mozambican government expelled exiled members of the African National Congress (ANC) residing there. The ANC was a governing party in South Africa founded to defend the rights of the black majority. However, South Africa continued funneling financial and military resources to RENAMO until a permanent peace accord, the General Peace Agreement, was reached in 1992. In the meantime, years of violence, civil war, political instability, and gross government inefficiency all but ruined the Mozambican economy. Indeed, in 1990 Mozambique was estimated to be the world's poorest nation.

In 1994 Mozambique held national elections, which were accepted by most parties as free and fair. Frelimo won, under Joaquim Chissano, while RENAMO ran as the official opposition. By the mid-1990s Frelimo, which had cast aside its earlier Marxist leanings, had made progress on the economic front by introducing free-market mechanisms, cutting inflation, and stabilizing the currency.

Glen Anthony Harris

See also

Africa; African National Congress; Mozambique Civil War; South Africa; South African Destabilization Campaign; Zimbabwe

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Mozambique Civil War
(1977–1992)

Major armed conflict in southeastern Africa. After World War II, Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar continued to believe that Mozambique and other Portuguese overseas possessions should remain under Portuguese control. In Mozambique, however, Eduardo Mondlane led a revolt against Portugal. He also founded the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), an anti-Portuguese liberation movement.

On 25 September 1964, Frelimo solders, with logistical assistance from the surrounding population, attacked the Portuguese administrative post at Chai in Cabo Delgado Province. This raid marked the beginning of the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique. Although Mondlane was assassinated in 1969 and Salazar devoted considerable resources to suppress the insurrection, colonialism in Mozambique collapsed in 1974.

When Mozambique finally declared its independence from Portugal in 1975, the leaders of Frelimo soon established an autocratic one-party state allied with the Soviet bloc. Upon coming to power, they eliminated political pluralism, religiously affiliated educational institutions, and the role played by traditional societal authorities. In 1977, with a Marxist state firmly in place, an anti-Frelimo political group came into being, known as the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO). It received significant support and funding from the white minority government of neighboring Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) as well as from South Africa and the United States. When in 1977 RENAMO launched a series of attacks on transport routes, schools, and health clinics, the country fell into a full-fledged civil war.

RENAMO's fighters sought to disrupt Mozambique's communications and transportation infrastructure in order to overthrow the Marxist government. In this it had considerable success. Indeed, during most of the long civil war that followed, the government was unable to exercise effective control outside urban areas, and much of the countryside remained cut off from the capital. The conflict gradually shifted to a guerrilla war. After Zimbabwean nationalists took control of their country in 1980, RENAMO relied primarily on South African support to wage a campaign against the Frelimo government.

In 1983, Frelimo President Samora Machel (1983–1986), facing mounting internal economic troubles, sabotage from neighboring South Africa, and the side effects of the long Rhodesian Civil War, conceded that socialism had failed in Mozambique and acknowledged the need for major political and economic reforms. He then negotiated the Nkomati Accord with the South African government, signed on 16 March 1984. Essentially a nonaggression pact, the accord called for an end to Mozambique support for the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and for South Africa to

Young Frelimo soldier during the Mozambique Civil War, 1987. (Patrick Durand/Corbis Sygma)

cease supplying RENAMO. Mozambique generally complied with the agreement, but South Africa, engaged in fighting a growing Marxist threat in the region, did not abide by it and continued to supply the rebels. Thus, the war continued.

In 1986 Machel, returning from an international meeting in Zambia, died in a plane crash on South African territory. The accident was attributed to error on the part of the Soviet pilot, but there is still speculation that South African authorities had a hand in it. Following Machel's death, Joaquim Chissano became president of Mozambique. Chissano, who was one of the original founders of the Frelimo movement, sought to continue the economic and social reforms begun by Machel.

In 1990, with the apartheid regime crumbling in South Africa and support for RENAMO waning in South Africa as well as in the United States, the first direct talks began between the Frelimo government and RENAMO. The Italian government and Catholic Church officials served as mediators and facilitators. In November 1990 a new constitution was adopted in which Mozambique became a multiparty state with periodic elections and guaranteed democratic rights. On 4 October 1992 in Rome, President Chissano and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama signed a peace agreement negotiated by the United Nations (UN). It formally took effect on 15 October. A UN peacekeeping force (ONUMOZ) supervised implementation of the Rome General Peace Accords and a two-year transition to democracy.

In 1994 Mozambique held internationally supervised elections, which were accepted by most parties as being both free and fair. Chissano won the election, and his government began the arduous process of reviving the economy and developing the country's extensive resources. His policies included programs to promote rural marketing, provide greater access to credit, and raise the productivity of small-scale farmers.

Glen Anthony Harris

See also

Africa; African National Congress; Mozambique; South Africa; South African Destabilization Campaign; Zimbabwe

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Mugabe, Robert Gabriel
(1924–)

Black South African nationalist, prime minister (1980–1987) and executive president of Zimbabwe (1987–). Born on 21 February 1924 at Kutama Mission in the Zvimba District of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Robert Mugabe earned a BA degree from Fort Hare University in South Africa in 1951. He then pursued additional studies in education and worked as a teacher in Ghana during 1958–1960.

Mugabe returned to Southern Rhodesia in 1960 a Marxist and joined Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic Party (NDP). In December 1961 the NDP was banned, and Mugabe became secretary-general of its successor, the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU), located in Tanzania. Deepening personal and ideological differences with ZAPU led Mugabe to leave the party in 1963. He immediately joined, as secretary-general, the newly formed Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU). He returned to Rhodesia in 1964 and was imprisoned until 1974, when he was released by Ian Smith's white minority government.

Mozambique's independence in 1975 provided ZANU with a secure base in a neighboring country, and Mugabe quickly developed a close relationship with Mozambican President Samora Machel. From 1976 Mugabe was recognized as the head of the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and emerged as a leading contender for the top leadership position within an ever-fragmenting nationalist movement. Supported by the People's Republic of China (PRC), ZANU became the leading guerrilla force in Zimbabwe. The escalating war gave rise to sustained regional and international attempts to secure a negotiated settlement between the Smith regime and the two main nationalist groups, ZANU and the Zambia-based ZAPU.

During the September 1979 Lancaster House talks, which led to the end of white rule in Rhodesia, Mugabe was persuaded to accept the terms of a political settlement. Unable to resolve long-standing differences with Nkomo, ZANU ran as an independent party (ZANU-PF) in the February 1980 elections. On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe declared its independence, with Mugabe as prime minister.

In late 1987, the position of prime minister was substituted for that of executive president, which combined the posts of head of state and head of government. Mugabe thus gained more power. His attempts to introduce land reform brought disaster. Farm productivity plummeted, resulting in widespread food shortages. His regime has also grown more repressive and corrupt, drawing the ire of Zimbabweans and regional leaders alike.

Peter Vale

See also

Africa; Kaunda, Kenneth David; Mozambique; Mozambique Civil War; Namibia; Smith, Ian Douglas; Zimbabwe

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Mulroney, Martin Brian
(1939–)

Canadian politician and prime minister (1984–1993). Born into an immigrant Irish Catholic working-class family on 20 March 1939 in Baie-Comeau, Quebec, Brian Mulroney attended a private high school in New Brunswick and then St. Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia. He received a BA degree in political science in 1959. He also earned a law degree from Laval University in 1964. That same year he moved to Montreal and worked for that city's largest law firm. A successful labor lawyer and a skilled negotiator, he gained popularity and became a public figure when he was appointed to the Quebec Royal Commission of Inquiry into Union Freedom.

Brian Mulroney, prime minister of Canada during 1984–1993. His government pursued deregulation of key industries and reform of the tax structure as well as continuing efforts to unify Canada while recognizing Quebec as a distinct society. (Brian Mulroney, Ogilvy Renault S.E.N.C.)

Mulroney subsequently entered the business world as executive vice president and then president of the Iron Ore Company of Canada. In 1976, while still engaged in business, he campaigned for the leadership position of the Progressive Conservative Party but lost to Joe Clark. Mulroney became the party's leader on 11 June 1983, this time defeating Clark, and entered the Canadian House of Commons. After Mulroney's party won the greatest majority in Canadian history, he was sworn in as Canada's eighteenth prime minister on 17 September 1984.

Among the accomplishments of Mulroney's first term was the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States, thanks largely to his close relationship with President Ronald Reagan. Mulroney's bilingual past and fluent French aided his brokering of the Meech Lake Accord (1987), which recognized Quebec as a distinct society within Canada, although the accord failed to pass.

Mulroney's second term, which began in 1988, saw high unemployment and an economic downturn in Canada. Several scandals also plagued his administration. Mexico's inclusion with Canada and the United States in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 proved unpopular. That same year, a second attempt to unify the country's constitution, the Charlottetown Agreement, was ultimately defeated in a national referendum. In the midst

of economic recession and massive layoffs, Mulroney resigned as both prime minister and leader of the Progressive Conservative Party on 24 February 1993.

In 1995 the new government charged Mulroney with accepting millions of dollars in kickbacks from an airline deal but on 6 July 1997 it offered an apology and settled out of court. In May 2002 Mulroney was awarded the prestigious Order of Quebec.

Gary Kerley

After Mulroney's party won the greatest majority in Canadian history, he was sworn in as Canada's eighteenth prime minister on 17 September 1984.

See also
Canada

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Multilateral Force, NATO

A sea-based nuclear weapons–sharing arrangement promulgated by the United States during 1960–1965 among its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In a move to counter and contain nuclear weapons development by Great Britain and France as well as to improve cohesion among all the nations of NATO, the United States in December 1960 proposed the development of a multinational seaborne alternative to the land-basing of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Europe. Indeed, as France distanced itself from routine military participation in NATO during these years and as Cyprus became a crucible for Greek and Turkish disagreement, NATO badly needed a unifying force, which the Multilateral Force (MLF) attempted to provide.

Initially conceived as a force comprising five U.S. Navy ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) operated by crews drawn from various NATO states that would fire its weapons only upon reaching a unanimous committee vote, the MLF elicited a largely skeptical response from most NATO members. But it was bolstered by nuclear delivery system provisions set forth in the 1962 Nassau Agreement, alarming not only some NATO partners but the Soviet Union as well by placing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) closer to putative control over nuclear weaponry.

Concerns voiced in the U.S. Congress and by nuclear propulsion proponent Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover over the perceived operational and security risks that multinational manning might visit upon complex vessels such as Polaris submarines led President John F. Kennedy's administration in February 1963 to propose a much less costly and more easily developed

alternative. The proposal called for a purpose-built fleet of twenty-five apparent merchant ships, each armed with eight Polaris missiles, and formally established that October as the MLF template by a participant NATO Working Group comprising the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Greece, and Turkey. Military, security, and legal subgroups addressed such issues as basing for the fleet, crew training and discipline, and the all-important firing protocol. The anonymity of these ships, roving the Atlantic and Mediterranean shipping lanes with their international crews and concealed ballistic missiles, would have created an almost insurmountable barrier to their timely positive identification by the Soviets, who condemned the MLF as an exercise in piracy.

A crew drawn from seven NATO participants reported aboard the U.S. missile destroyer *Biddle* in mid-1964 for what would constitute the only deployment of the MLF: the Mixed Manning Demonstration, an eighteen-month trial of the multinational crew concept. This test was carried out against the backdrop of doubts and misgivings about the transfer of U.S. nuclear weapons and personnel to an international force, the British Labour Party's opposition to the MLF, and resentment by the smaller NATO contingents of the apparent control of MLF policy by the United States and Germany.

President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, tired of the political and military complexities of promoting the MLF as the Vietnam War deepened, gladly greeted Britain's late 1964 counter-MLF proposal for a European-derived Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) within NATO. The British proposal thereby dissolved the increasingly problematic MLF before it could be chartered, leaving its Mixed Manning Demonstration to carry through what became essentially a NATO friendship cruise.

Gordon E. Hogg

See also

Missiles, Polaris; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Multiple Reentry Vehicles

The section of a ballistic missile—either an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—that separates from the rocket upon reentry into Earth's atmosphere and unleashes several

reentry vehicles, each carrying a nuclear payload, over the same target. Usually, a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) drops several warheads in a specific pattern over the same area to increase the damage to a particular target.

This kind of weapons system has obvious advantages over a single-warhead device delivered to the same area. It greatly diminishes the likelihood of a failed mission, because if one or even two bombs fail to detonate, the remaining live warheads can accomplish the task. Finally, MRVs can address inaccuracy issues by offering payload redundancies. The United States first deployed MRVs in the mid-1960s on Polaris A-3 SLBMs. The Soviet Union first began using MRVs on their SS-9 Mod 4 ICBMs.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the MRVs were eclipsed by a new type of MRV, the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV). As nuclear delivery systems' reliability, payloads, and accuracy all markedly increased, the need for hitting one target with multiple warheads became far less important. Instead, scientists and defense experts now sought to get more bang for the buck by placing multiple warheads on a single missile capable of striking multiple targets. Most U.S.-built MIRVs carried anywhere from three to twelve independently targeted warheads. The Soviets more than matched the American MIRVs.

A time exposure of eight Peacekeeper (LGM-118A) intercontinental ballistic missile reentry vehicles passing through clouds while approaching an open-ocean impact zone during a flight test, 20 December 1983. (Department of Defense)

MIRVs accomplished two key goals: first, they rendered antiballistic missile (ABM) systems relatively useless, as an onslaught of incoming MIRVed missiles would likely overcome any ABM site; and second, MIRVs were more efficient and cost-effective in the long run because significantly fewer missiles were needed to carry out a nuclear attack. Although the precise details of the functioning of MIRVs are a well-kept secret, it is believed that MIRVs can release decoys designed to fool enemy radars and interceptors. Over the years, MIRVs became ever more accurate as scientists made use of Global Positioning Satellites (GPSs) and custom-integrated circuits that make constant in-flight adjustments to ensure that MIRVs hit their targets dead on.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Missiles, Antiballistic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic

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Munich Analogy

Historical analogy positing that appeasement only invites further aggression. In the belief that they were preventing a war with Germany, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Premier Édouard Daladier, during a September 1938 conference in Munich, Germany, ceded German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia to German dictator Adolf Hitler. Seemingly emboldened by the British and French concession at Munich, six months later Hitler sent in German troops to occupy the remainder of Czechoslovakia. The acquisition of Czechoslovak military hardware, especially artillery but also tanks and aircraft, in addition to war industries immensely benefited the German war machine. On 1 September 1939, German forces invaded Poland, starting World War II.

Cold War–era politicians often used the Munich example as a reason to stand firm in the face of foreign hostility. They applied the Munich Analogy especially in the face of perceived Soviet aggression. The Munich reference illustrates both the power and limitations of analogical reasoning. The 1947 Truman Doctrine and the U.S. intervention in the Korean War in June 1950 assumed that communist aggression had to be countered in order to forestall a third world war. President John F. Kennedy, whose Harvard undergraduate thesis "Why England Slept" (1940) dissected the causes of laggard British rearmament before World War II, invoked the lessons of the 1930s during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

But the Munich Analogy can be carried too far. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden conflated Egyptian nationalism with fascism, which set the stage for Britain's disastrous participation in the 1956 Suez Crisis. President Lyndon Johnson's misapplication of the analogy to Vietnam rationalized a strategically dubious conflict and ignored the profound dissimilarities between Nazi Germany and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the goals of their governments. The Vietnam War did not fully discredit this analogy, however, as President George H. W. Bush carelessly likened Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to Hitler prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Joseph Robert White

See also

Containment Policy; Cuban Missile Crisis; Korean War; Persian Gulf War; Suez Crisis; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War

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Murphy, Robert Daniel
(1894–1978)

U.S. diplomat and State Department official. Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on 28 October 1894, Robert Murphy attended Marquette University and George Washington University, where he earned a law degree in 1917 and that same year joined the foreign service. His first postings were as a consul in various European cities. Beginning in 1930, he served in various capacities in Paris, leaving there as chargé d'affaires in 1941.

Murphy's hitherto typical career took a dramatic turn when he was asked by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to be his representative to French North Africa, with the purpose of obtaining the defection of French forces from the collaborationist Vichy regime. Following this mission, Murphy was involved in the planning for the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942. Following the German defeat of May 1945, he became a political advisor in Germany and later director of the Office for German and Austrian Affairs.

During 1949–1952 Murphy served as U.S. ambassador to Belgium and then in 1953 to Japan. He completed his government service as deputy undersecretary of state during 1954–1959. President Dwight D. Eisenhower called him out of retirement in 1960 to assess the turbulent situation in the newly independent Congo, and during the Eisenhower era Murphy became a top diplomatic troubleshooter for the U.S. government. In 1953, Eisenhower sent Murphy to Seoul, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), to convince Syngman Rhee to sign the armistice ending the Korean War. The following year, Murphy traveled to Belgrade to encourage Marshal Josip Broz Tito to reach an agreement with Italy over Trieste. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, Murphy was dispatched to London to evaluate the position of the British government.

Perhaps most significantly, during the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958, Murphy acted as a personal representative of President Eisenhower. Murphy established communications with all of the opposing factions, helped to ensure the safety of the 14,000 U.S. Marines in Beirut, and promoted a peaceful handover of power and an end to the crisis. Before returning to the United States, he visited Baghdad and Cairo in an effort to calm the tensions that had erupted in the Middle East during the tumultuous summer of 1958.

Following his retirement from government, Murphy served as the director of several companies, including Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and Corning Glass Works. He died in New York City on 9 January 1978.

Brent M. Geary

Robert Murphy, U.S. undersecretary of state and diplomatic troubleshooter, here leaving a meeting with British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden during the 1956 Suez Crisis. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

See also
Arab-Israeli Wars; Belgium; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in

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Museum, Cold War

See National Cold War Museum and Memorial

Music

Significant cultural trends complemented the major political developments of the Cold War in the United States, and nowhere was this fact more evident than in popular music. During the Cold War, music evolved at a dizzying rate: blues begat rock and roll, big band swing gave way to bebop jazz quartets, folk music gained considerable popularity, and funk would turn to disco in the 1970s. By the time the Berlin Wall came down in autumn 1989, several new musical genres had emerged that would have been wholly unrecognizable to listeners in the immediate post–World War II era.

The 1940s witnessed the last hurrah of the big band era, when swing reigned with artists such as Glenn Miller, Woody Herman, Count Basie, and Duke Ellington. Toward the end of the decade, rhythm and blues (R&B) and blues gained in popularity with the raw sounds of T-Bone Walker, Memphis Slim, and John Lee Hooker. Hank Williams also boosted the popularity of country-western music with what he called the "moanin' blues," featuring his twangy country voice over blues chord progressions.

The 1950s were perhaps the most significant years in the history of modern popular music. Jazz artists such as Miles Davis and Charlie Parker took the big band sound and distilled it into smaller jazz quartets. The end result was bebop, a more dynamic articulation of jazz that focused on improvisation and the individual soloist. The popularity of R&B also increased during the 1950s. The Platters, Fats Domino, and Ray Charles each had numerous hits throughout the decade, indicating that African American music, thought to be an urban and Southern phenomenon, was gaining popularity with crossover audiences. The emergence of rock and roll in the middle of the decade elucidates the extent to which white musicians appropriated African American music such as the blues and R&B.

The term "rock and roll" was first coined in 1951 by Cleveland disc jockey Alan Freed. Soon after, the sounds of Elvis Presley—largely credited as the first rock-and-roll pioneer—could be heard on radio stations throughout the United States, although some radio stations in the South refused to play it because of the obvious African American influence. Presley's first hit, "That's Alright Mama," represented a fusion of R&B, soul, and country-

Music of the Cold War

Decade	*Most Popular Styles/Genres*	*Examples*
1940s	Big Band/swing	Glenn Miller, Woody Herman, Count Basie, Duke Ellington
	Blues/R&B	T-Bone Walker, Memphis Slim, John Lee Hooker
1950s	Jazz	Miles Davis, Charlie Parker
	R&B	The Platters, Fats Domino, Ray Charles
	Rock 'n roll	Elvis Presley, The Comets
	Country	Johnny Cash, Patsy Cline
	Latin	Perez Prado, Tito Puente
1960s	Jazz/fusion jazz	John Coltraine, Miles Davis
	Latin	Stan Getz, Joao Gilberto
	Rock 'n roll	The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, The Kinks
	Protest-oriented	Bob Dylan, Jefferson Airplane, Country Joe and the Fish, Buffalo Springfield
1970s	Rock 'n roll	Led Zeppelin, Black Sabbath, The Who
	Punk	The Ramones, The Clash, The Sex Pistols
	Disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Donna Summer
1980s	Pop	Madonna, U2, Huey Lewis, Whitney Houston
	Rap	Beastie Boys, Run-DMC, Easy-E
	Rock 'n roll	Van Halen, Def Leppard, Ozzy Osbourne

western. The almost instantaneous popularity of rock and roll was demonstrated by Bill Haley and his Comets' 1955 hit, "Rock Around the Clock," which remained number one on the Billboard charts for eight weeks and formally ushered in the rock era.

During the 1950s, country, classical, and Latin music also gained in popularity. Up-and-coming country stars Johnny Cash and Patsy Cline defined what came to be known as the Memphis Sound. Capitalizing on the novel power of television, Leonard Bernstein introduced classical music to millions with a series titled *Young People's Concerts*. The end of the decade witnessed a surge in the popularity of Latin music, with artists such as Perez Prado and Tito Puente introducing Afro Cuban rhythms such as the clave, son, and mambo to very receptive North American audiences.

If the 1950s are to be recognized for innovation, then the 1960s must be credited for giving the new genres shape and lasting substance. The popularity of Latin music continued into the 1960s, especially with the cool sounds of Brazil. Saxophonist Stan Getz is largely responsible for introducing Latin music to large audiences by blending Joao Gilberto's bossa nova with the West Coast sounds of cool jazz. Getz and Gilberto's collaboration would pay off quite handsomely with their 1964 megahit "The Girl from Ipanema."

After smaller bands became the standard in the 1950s, jazz evolved by leaps and bounds during the 1960s. John Coltrane, long a member of Miles Davis's bebop groups, broke away to form his own quartet in the late 1950s and, until his death in 1966, was credited with creating some of the most creative and experimental jazz. The quartet gained critical acclaim with its 1964 album, *A Love Supreme*. Toward the end of the decade, Davis also moved away from more conventional chordal and rhythmic structures and began experimenting with electric instruments, creating a genre of music that was

dubbed "fusion." His landmark 1969 album, *Bitch's Brew,* represented the first shot fired in the fusion movement and, along with *A Love Supreme,* remains to this day one of the best-selling jazz albums ever produced.

During this period, James Brown injected R&B with a hitherto unmatched energy, increasing the tempo and organizing ever-tighter arrangements, essentially creating funk. His pathbreaking 1962 live recording, *Live at the Apollo,* reached second place on the Billboard Top 100. Brown influenced myriad pop musicians including Sly and the Family Stone and later Parliament/Funkadelic.

Rock and roll also gained significant momentum throughout the 1960s. The Beatles' 1964 performance on the *Ed Sullivan Show* marked the beginning of the so-called British Invasion. The Beatles and other groups such as the Rolling Stones and the Kinks produced hit after hit in the United States, dominating the charts and setting new records for album sales. The new sound of the British Invasion, particularly the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, influenced an entire generation of musicians ranging from the Beach Boys to the Grateful Dead.

In 1965, emerging folk icon Bob Dylan rattled the acoustic world by "plugging in" at the Newport Folk Festival. His electric performance of "Maggie's Farm" was met with an equal mix of boos and cheers. Folk music's transition from acoustic to electric would influence rock music and, more importantly, the acid rock that would come to define the late 1960s. Moreover, Dylan's music (his lyrics in particular) is one of the more salient examples of a society expressing its political frustrations through music. Examples of this include "Gods of War" and "Its Alright Ma (I'm Only Bleeding)," which dealt with the evolving Vietnam War.

Many artists of the time perceived U.S. intervention in Vietnam as morally reprehensible.

It was the ongoing Cold War and the Vietnam War that caused pop music to take on a decidedly political bent in the middle to late 1960s. Many artists of the time perceived U.S. intervention in Vietnam as morally reprehensible. They saw music as a means to express not only their personal dissatisfaction with the behavior of the U.S. government but also, and perhaps more importantly, to spread their message of dissent to the listening public. The protest music of artists such as Jefferson Airplane, Country Joe and the Fish, and Buffalo Springfield resonated with a largely dissatisfied youth. Moreover, protest music contributed to the counterculture that emerged in the late 1960s. Acid rock groups such as the Grateful Dead and the Velvet Underground represented not just an alternative music scene but also an alternative way of being. While the 1969 Woodstock music extravaganza is often cited as the height of the 1960s counterculture, many argue that it also marked the end of an era. Regardless, the concert produced legendary performances by Joe Cocker, Jimi Hendrix, and Joan Baez that to this day define both a decade and a generation.

The beginning of the 1970s was marked by disillusionment and building dissatisfaction. Many African American musicians used music as a medium to express their frustration with the limited gains of the civil rights movement. Dissatisfaction with the persistence of racial discrimination was articulated by Sly and the Family Stone with "Don't Call Me Nigger, Whitey"

Bob Dylan and Joan Baez sing at the 1963 March on Washington. The pair were again featured in D. A. Pennebaker's 1967 documentary *Don't Look Back*. (National Archives and Records Administration)

and James Brown's "Damn Right, I Am Somebody." Similarly, anger at continued socioeconomic inequality was expressed by Gil Scott Heron with "Whitey's on the Moon" and "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" and, perhaps most famously, by Marvin Gaye's "What's Going On."

Perhaps reflecting the pessimism of the decade, rock and roll became heavier and darker with the likes of Led Zeppelin, Black Sabbath, and The Who. By 1977, these hard-rock groups would influence the emergence of such groups as The Ramones, The Clash, and the Sex Pistols, marking the beginning of what would come to be called punk music, an alternative to the emerging disco culture. By the end of the decade, disco spiked in popularity, much of which was credited to the film *Saturday Night Fever*.

Disco ushered in the 1980s. Before fading into obscurity, however, it left its indelible mark on the one record that perhaps defined the decade: Michael Jackson's *Thriller*. The album included seven top-ten singles and, with 26 million copies sold, is the second–best-selling album in history. Other pop superstars of the 1980s included Madonna, U2, Huey Lewis, and Whitney Houston.

By 1986, rap was gaining popularity beyond the urban crucible within which it had been created, becoming increasingly recognized among suburban

white teenagers. Rap originated in 1979 with groups such as the Sugar Hill Gang and Afrika Bambaataa, who influenced a new generation of hit rappers in the 1980s including the Beastie Boys, Run-DMC, and Easy-E.

When the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, Roxette's "Listen to Your Heart" topped the Billboard charts until a couple of weeks later, when Milli Vanilli's "Blame It on the Rain" took the position. What both songs lack are the social or political messages of the music of previous decades, but they did carry the formula for a hit established by producers in the 1950s: singing of love over a catchy rhythm.

R. Matthew Gildner

See also

Beatles; Vietnam War Protests

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Muskie, Edmund Sixtus

(1914–1996)

U.S. senator (1959–1980) and secretary of state (1980–1981). Born in Rumford, Maine, on 28 March 1914 to Polish immigrant parents, Edmund Muskie graduated from Bates College in 1936 and received a law degree from Cornell University in 1939. In 1940 he began practicing law in Maine.

Muskie enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1942, serving in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters until his discharge in 1945. He returned to Maine, where he became involved in local politics. In 1946 he was elected to the Maine legislature, winning reelection in 1948 and 1950. He then set his sights on the governorship, an office he won in 1954. He served in the governor's mansion until 1959, when he was sworn in as the junior U.S. senator from Maine. His political ascendancy was particularly noteworthy because he was a Democrat in an overwhelmingly Republican state.

Muskie was an effective senator and served on the Foreign Relations Committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Environmental Committee, which helped him hone his skills as an environmentalist. In the contentious 1968 presidential election, he was the Democratic nominee for vice president. Hubert Humphrey—the Democratic presidential nominee—and Muskie lost a close election to Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew.

On 7 May 1980, Muskie ended his long senatorial career to take on the position of secretary of state. Sworn into office on 8 May, he retained his post until January 1981, when a change in administrations necessitated his resignation. He assumed his new office under extremely trying circumstances. President Jimmy Carter had chosen Muskie to replace Secretary of State

Cyrus R. Vance, who had resigned in protest over a failed attempt to gain the freedom of fifty-three U.S. hostages being held by student radicals in Tehran, Iran. Muskie left no major impact on U.S. foreign policy, but he worked tirelessly to end the hostage crisis. Carter's inability to bring this affair to a satisfactory conclusion probably cost him the 1980 election.

After leaving office in January 1981, Muskie practiced law, wrote, and spoke on a variety of topics. He died in Washington, D.C., on 26 March 1996.

Paul Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Nixon, Richard Milhous

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Mutual Assured Destruction

Cold War strategic doctrine stressing nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, designed ostensibly to prevent a full-scale nuclear exchange. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was an important part of the Cold War beginning in the 1960s and is cited as one of the main reasons that there was no direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The doctrine was founded upon nuclear deterrence and was based on the premise that both superpowers had enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times over. Thus, if one superpower launched a nuclear first strike, the other would launch a massive counterstrike, resulting in the total devastation of both nations.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration in the mid-1950s warned that if the United States were attacked first it would unleash massive retaliation. Thus, the MAD doctrine was born in the 1950s but did not reach fruition until the 1960s, when the Soviets achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was then perhaps the first person to fully articulate MAD. Through the years, technological advances were constantly molding the doctrine. The U.S. deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the early 1960s, for example, ensured a second-strike capability, thus further deterring the likelihood of a first strike.

The doctrine propagated the notion that each side had equal nuclear firepower and that if an attack occurred, retaliation would be equal to or greater than the initial attack. It followed that neither nation would launch a first strike because its adversary could guarantee an immediate, automatic, and overwhelming response consisting of a launch on warning, also known as a fail deadly. The final result would be the destruction of both sides. The end reasoning of MAD was that it contributed to a relatively stable peace.

The Command Post of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Cheyenne Mountain Complex in April 1984. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The MAD doctrine survived into the 1970s and ironically contributed to the nuclear arms race. Each side tried to outwit and outproduce the other, as the example of the introduction of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) demonstrates. MIRVs came on-line in the early 1970s and upped the ante of nuclear deterrence by placing multiple warheads on a single missile. The justification for this and other technological enhancements was that the more missiles produced, the less chance there would be of an intentional nuclear attack.

The MAD doctrine became essentially obsolete on 25 July 1980 when President Jimmy Carter adopted the so-called countervailing strategy by reorienting U.S. policy to win a nuclear war. This was to be achieved by attacking and destroying the Soviet leadership and its military installations. It was assumed that such an attack would precipitate a Soviet surrender, thereby preventing the total destruction of the United States and the Soviet Union. This policy was taken even further by President Ronald Reagan, who proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. This was a system that would purportedly form a protective umbrella over the United States by destroying incoming nuclear missiles before they reached their targets. SDI has yet to be implemented, however, and many of its critics argue that there is no current technology available to make it a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent.

Dewi I. Ball

See also

Arms Control; McNamara, Robert Strange; Missile Gap; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests

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Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks
(1973–1989)

Negotiations aimed at conventional force reductions in Central Europe. In May 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed during the Moscow summit to begin negotiations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact on conventional force reductions

in Central Europe. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks began in Vienna on 30 October 1973, but disputes quickly emerged over a number of issues. There was disagreement as to each side's actual existing force levels (the so-called data problem), whether the goal should be parity or percentage reductions, and whether reductions should focus on troops or equipment. Other sticking points included timetables for reductions, whether there should be national subceilings, and the critical matter of verification. Although tentative agreement was reached on most of these points by the summer of 1979, differences remained over the data problem and verification. By the end of the year, hope of agreement had faded with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the end of détente, although the talks continued.

In April 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a phased reduction of all forces, nuclear and conventional, in a region stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU), not just conventional forces in Central Europe. He further agreed to parity in forces and consented to on-site verification. In June, the Warsaw Pact proposed that these points form the basis of new negotiations. Following the Reykjavík summit in October 1986, NATO accepted the proposal, but only if limited to conventional forces. The Warsaw Pact agreed, and over the next two years, discussions established the parameters of the new talks.

On 10 January 1989, an agreement to begin negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in Vienna. These talks would cover all ground and air conventional forces in the ATTU region but not nuclear weapons. The final session of the MBFR talks was held on 2 February, and the CFE negotiations began in Vienna on 9 March 1989.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Afghanistan War; Brezhnev, Leonid; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; Détente; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Reykjavík Meeting; Warsaw Pact

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Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.–Republic of China
(December 1954)

Mutual defense and security agreement between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) signed on 2 December 1954. Convinced that the defeat of Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government in the long-fought Chinese Civil War was inevitable, U.S. policymakers

decided to pursue a hands-off policy toward China and stopped aiding the GMD. After the GMD was defeated and forced to flee to Formosa (Taiwan) in October 1949, the Americans' China policy was made explicitly known by U.S. President Harry S. Truman on 5 January 1950. U.S. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson elaborated his nation's stance toward the Chinese situation on 12 January 1950, claiming that Taiwan did not fall within the U.S. defensive perimeter in Asia.

Still harboring thoughts of retaking China, Jiang continued to plead for U.S. assistance. The Korean War (1950–1953) provided the first such chance, when Truman deployed the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. Intervention by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Korea in late 1950 quite suddenly made Taiwan a valuable strategic interest. The Republicans' victory in the 1952 U.S. presidential election further signaled American readiness to assist Jiang. In December 1953, Washington incorporated Taiwan into its defensive perimeter.

The need for a U.S.-ROC defense pact became apparent during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955). Following the Geneva Conference in April 1954, the United States worked closely with Southeast Asian nations to negotiate what later became the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) for collective security. Excluded from SEATO, Jiang proposed a bilateral mutual security pact between the United States and the ROC. Meanwhile, he took steps to strengthen the defense of Taiwan and its offshore islands. This pre-

Nationalist Chinese troops on the Tachen Islands, which lie close to the Chinese mainland. (Bettmann/Corbis)

cipitated the PRC's shelling of two island groups in the Taiwan Strait on 3 September 1954, sparking the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The crisis hardened U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan. Thus, on 2 December 1954 the United States and the ROC signed the Mutual Security Treaty, formally acknowledging U.S.-ROC unity and pledging joint action against a common danger in Asia.

In return for U.S. support, the ROC granted America the right to station troops on Taiwanese soil. When the PRC seized the Dachens and Yijiangshan, another group of islands north of Taiwan in mid-January 1955, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan (Formosa) Resolution, authorizing the use of military force to defend Taiwan and its adjacent territory. The resolution committed American forces to Taiwan's defense, although it remained ambiguous whether the offshore islands were covered. The treaty and resolution were followed by considerable U.S. military, economic, and technical assistance to Taiwan, which helped in modernization efforts and maintained Jiang's GMD government. This solidarity, however, waned once the PRC and the United States began to normalize their relations in the early 1970s. On 1 January 1979 the United States severed its diplomatic relations with the ROC and terminated the treaty. The United States granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC in March 1979.

Still unwilling to abandon Taiwan completely, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979, which maintained an unofficial and nondiplomatic relationship with the Taiwanese regime.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First

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MX Missile System

The Mobile Experimental (MX) missile was a U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and centerpiece of the U.S. arms buildup of the late 1970s and 1980s. The MX, formally known as the LGM-118A Peacekeeper, was a four-stage rocket. The largest ICBM ever in the U.S. arsenal, the MX was 71N in length and 7N8O in diameter and weighed at launch some 198,000 pounds. The first three stages were of solid propellant, while the fourth was liquid propelled. The MX had a range of greater than 6,000 miles and a speed at burnout of up to 15,000 miles per hour. The MX carried ten Avco

Shock-absorbing pads fall away from the surface of an LGM-118A Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile as it emerges from its launch canister. This photograph is from the first test launch of the Peacekeeper, on 17 June 1983 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. (U.S. Department of Defense)

MJ 21 multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—its predecessor, the Minuteman III had only three, less powerful warheads—and was believed to be more accurate than any other ICBM. The MX missiles were ultimately placed in canisters in former Minuteman silos to protect them against damage and give them a cold-launch capability. At launch, the Peacekeeper was ejected by pressurized gas some 50 feet in the air before first-stage ignition occurred, the first ICBM to employ such technology.

Development of the Peacekeeper began in 1971 with the search for a successor to the Minuteman, sparked by a perceived growing threat from Moscow in the form of more accurate Soviet missiles. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) sought a missile with greater range, increased accuracy, and variable yield warheads that could take advantage of MIRV technology and counter the new monster Soviet SS-18 missile capable of launching ten warheads at separate targets. Many experts held that deployment of such a missile with a first-strike capability would be destabilizing, and this, along with funding issues and basing questions, impeded development.

Concerned about vulnerability to a Soviet first strike, in 1976 Congress passed legislation blocking funding for any ICBM situated in a fixed silo. The U.S. Air Force then presented a variety of different plans. Finally, in 1976 President Jimmy Carter's administration adopted the shell game plan in which 200 MX missiles would each be shuttled around among 23 different silos. The logic behind this plan was that the Soviets would have to employ 23 warheads to ensure that they had destroyed one MX, or 4,600 warheads to hit them all. When Ronald Reagan became president, he scrapped the Carter mobile plan in favor of placing the MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos.

In 1983 Congress and the Reagan administration reached a compromise. While the MX missiles would be placed in silos, the United States would also build 500 single-warhead ICBMs, dubbed the Midgetman. The Midgetman was never built, however.

The air force successfully carried out the first test of the Peacekeeper missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, on 17 June 1983. Additional tests were conducted from Minuteman test silos. Production of the Peacekeeper began in February 1984, with the first fifty missiles deployed in the Minuteman silos at F. E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. The fiftieth missile was delivered in December 1988.

Additional deployments were halted when in July 1985 Congress cut the total number of MX missiles to only fifty until the Reagan administration could produce a more survivable basing plan. The Reagan administration proposed a rail garrison concept with two missiles on each of twenty-five special trains to be deployed onto the national rail net in periods of international

tension. This plan was never implemented, and all fifty missiles were based at F. E. Warren Air Force Base.

As a part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), the United States agreed to eliminate its MIRV Peacekeeper ICBMs by the year 2003. The last of the MX missiles went off alert status on 19 September 2005.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Multiple Reentry Vehicles; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

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See Burma

Myanmar

My Lai Massacre
(16 March 1968)

U.S. military atrocity during the Vietnam War. On 16 March 1968, in My Lai 4, a cluster of hamlets in Son Tinh District in Quang Ngai Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, soldiers of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) of the 23rd (Americal) Division killed between 200 and 504 unarmed Vietnamese civilians. Charlie Company was at the time part of Task Force Barker, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker Jr. Major General Samuel H. Koster commanded the 23rd Division.

The events of My Lai must be set in the circumstances of the Vietnam War. Although in no way justifying the action taken, it was often impossible to tell friend from foe, and communist forces were waging a guerrilla war and committing atrocities of their own against U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces as well as Vietnamese civilians. In addition, members of Charlie Company were frustrated by recent casualties sustained in the area—which they knew as "Pinkville" for its pronounced communist sympathies—from snipers, mines, and booby traps. Attacking the hamlet seemed a chance for payback for casualties sustained. Poor leadership, and not only at the junior level, certainly contributed to the events that followed. It is unclear what precise orders Charlie Company commander Captain Ernest Medina gave to his platoon leaders, including 1st Platoon commander Lieutenant William Calley, but Calley's men were under the impression that anyone left in the village was presumed to be an enemy.

On 16 March the platoon proceeded into the hamlet and there executed all civilians they encountered. The killing stopped only when Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, whose helicopter was supporting the operation, landed his craft between Calley's men and fleeing Vietnamese survivors and threatened to open fire on the U.S. soldiers if they did not cease fire. The government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam claims that 504 Vietnamese perished that day.

Shamefully, the army engaged in a coverup of the affair at both the brigade and division levels. GI journalist Ronald Ridenhour, who had heard stories of a massacre, investigated and tried to get the army to conduct an inquiry. When the army failed to take action, Ridenhour brought the incident to the attention of the secretary of defense and other government officials. In March 1969, he sent written evidence to several dozen people, including President Richard M. Nixon and sixteen congressmen. Only two of these, House member Morris K. Udall and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee L. Mendel Rivers—took action, demanding a Pentagon investigation.

Lieutenant General William Peers headed the investigation into the My Lai events. By that time, Lieutenant Colonel Barker had died in Vietnam. Only the most junior officer involved, Lieutenant Calley, was ever charged and convicted. He received a sentence of life in prison, later reduced to ten years. Still, there was a great outcry on the part of many Americans who believed that Calley had been made a scapegoat and that the verdict rendered had been unjust. President Nixon later pardoned Calley. General Koster, however, was forced to retire from the army.

The My Lai Massacre and events flowing from it did much to turn public opinion in the United States against the war. In March 1998 the army recognized Thompson and his two crewmen (one of whom was killed in Vietnam in April 1968) with the Soldier's Medal for gallantry.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Vietnam War

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N

Nagorno-Karabakh

A mountainous region covering 1,700 square miles that was part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic but acquired de facto independence as the result of a war that began in 1991. In 1918 the enclave had a population of some 330,000 people. In 1921 the Soviet regime handed over Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, despite the fact that its population was predominantly Armenian and that it was separated from Armenia proper by only a few miles. Josef Stalin, who was in charge of nationality policies in the Soviet Union at the time, deliberately placed different ethnic groups in the same administrative unit in order to dilute national and ethnic cohesiveness and to pit people against people.

Azerbaijanis and the Muslim-dominated Azeri local government did not respect the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenians (who are Christian) in the enclave experienced discrimination and the suppression of their cultural traditions. As Armenians left the region, their majority gradually declined from 96 percent in 1926 to 76 percent in 1979, or by approximately 123,000 people. On 20 February 1988, a group of Armenian nationalists responded to growing uncertainty in the Soviet Union by publicly calling for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The Azeri government responded with an attack on Armenian residents in Sumgait, a town outside the Azerbaijani capital of Baku. When Armenians demonstrated their solidarity with the victims by organizing protests in Yerevan and in Stepanakert (now Xankändi), the principal town of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azeris responded with more anti-Armenian violence. On 12 July 1988, an assembly in Nagorno-Karabakh voted to secede and join Armenia. The Armenians feared that if the Soviet Union disintegrated, they would have no political or economic future in a nationalist Azerbaijan.

In January 1989, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to deal with the crisis by replacing Azeri control over the enclave with direct control from Moscow. When the Azeris responded with a rail and road blockade of the region and Armenia, however, he backed down. Gorbachev's vacillation served only to provoke the Armenians of the enclave. After Armenia declared its independence in September 1991, a referendum on independence was

Soviet peacekeeping troops with riot control gear patrol streets in the ethnic conflict-torn, disputed (Armenian) enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, 1 October 1989. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

held in Nagorno-Karabakh. On 10 December 1991, 82 percent of the enclave's eligible voters went to the polls, and of those 99 percent voted for independence. For the Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, the 2 January 1992 declaration of independence was meant to be a step toward eventual amalgamation with Armenia.

The response of Azeri President Ayaz Mutalibov was to proclaim direct control of the enclave and send in a military force, which surrounded and bombarded Stepanakert. Karabakh Armenians, claiming that they had no assistance from Armenia proper, formed self-defense forces and drove the Azeri army back. In the process the Armenians took control of the Lachin Strip, which gave them road contact with Armenia proper. When the Azeri Army recovered and again bombarded Stepanakert, the Karabakh Armenians established close contact with the Armenian government headed by Levon Ter-Petrossian. With aid from Armenia and the Armenian diaspora, the Armenians went on the offensive. During October 1992–September 1993, the Armenians drove the Azeri Army out of the enclave and went on to occupy an additional 3,400 square miles of Azeri territory. Hundreds of thousands of Azeris fled the advancing Armenians, and Azerbaijan was thrown into political turmoil.

In September 1993, Turkey and Iran sponsored a successful United Nations (UN) resolution demanding that the Armenians withdraw from Azeri

territory. The Armenians ignored the resolution and temporarily pushed almost to the Iranian frontier. An Azeri offensive in December 1993 succeeded in regaining some of the lost territory, but the Armenians remained in control of Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, in May 1994, through the mediation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a fragile cease-fire was signed by representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is estimated that during 1988–1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cost some 18,000 lives. Another 25,000 people were wounded, and approximately a million Azeris were displaced from their homes.

Despite efforts on the part of the OSCE to mediate, a tense standoff continued. When Ter-Petrossian, attempting to end the crisis, announced that Nagorno-Karabakh could expect neither to join Armenia nor to become independent, he was removed from office in February 1998 and was replaced by Robert Kocharian, the Armenian prime minister and a native of Nagorno-Karabakh. The president of Azerbaijan, Haydar Aliyev, and Kocharian met more than twenty times during 2000–2003, but a permanent settlement of the crisis proved elusive. Despite the protests of Russia, Azerbaijan, and the European Union (EU), Arkady Gukasyan, a staunch proponent of Nagorno-Karabakh independence, was reelected president of the enclave in August 2002 by 90 percent of the Karabakh voters.

Bernard Cook

See also

Armenia; Azerbaijan; Soviet Union

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Naguib, Mohammed
(1901–1984)

Egyptian military officer, prime minister (1952–1954), and president of Egypt (1953–1954). Born on 20 February 1901 in Khartoum, Sudan, Mohammed Naguib graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Cairo in 1925. He led a machine gun and infantry regiment in the Sinai in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and was wounded three times.

Naguib was one of the leaders of the Committee of Free Officers (El-Doubat El-Ahrar), a secret group established in 1947 by young nationalist army officers who were determined to end British rule in Egypt and the political excesses of King Farouk I and sought to introduce social reforms. In 1951 Naguib became commander of infantry forces in the Egyptian Army as a major general.

On 23 July 1952, the Committee of Free Officers, including Naguib and Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, led a popularly supported coup

Egyptian Premier Mohammed Naguib in 1953. (Bettmann/Corbis)

against Farouk's government. A Revolutionary Council of eleven officers, with Naguib as ostensible leader, then assumed control of Egypt. Naguib became commander of the Egyptian armed forces. On 26 July he presented Farouk with an ultimatum to abdicate and leave Egypt immediately. Farouk departed the same day. On 18 June 1953, following introduction of a new constitution, Naguib declared Egypt a republic and became president of Egypt.

The revolutionary leaders claimed to be animated by five basic principles: an end to colonialism, an end to economic inequality, the maintenance of a strong military, embrace of social justice and economic reform, and support for the democratic process. Naguib was much more cautious and conservative than many of the other younger officers. Nasser was the real leader of the movement from the beginning, and during February–May 1954 he and his supporters stripped Naguib of his posts. By May, Nasser had replaced Naguib as prime minister and president of the Revolutionary Council, leaving him only with the nominal position of president. Finally, in November 1954, the Revolutionary Council deprived Naguib of the presidency as well and, accusing him of treating with enemies of the revolution, placed him under house arrest. President Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, freed Naguib in 1971. Naguib died on 28 August 1984 in Cairo.

Nilly Kamal

See also

Egypt; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Sadat, Anwar

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Nagy, Ferenc
(1903–1979)

Hungarian politician and prime minister (1946–1947). Born on 8 October 1903 in Bisse, Hungary, to a peasant family, Ferenc Nagy completed elementary school and then worked on his parents' tiny farm. In 1930 he cofounded the Independent Smallholders Party and served as its first general secretary until August 1945. He was elected to parliament in 1939 and cofounded the Hun-

garian Peasant Union, serving as its first chairman during 1941–1943. At the end of World War II in 1945, he became the chairman of both parties.

Nagy reentered parliament in 1945, becoming minister of reconstruction in 1945 and chairman of the National Assembly (November 1945–February 1946). On 4 February 1946 he was appointed prime minister. During his short tenure in office, he faced three sizable challenges: inflation, nationalization, and growing pressure from the Communist Party. Inflation subsided when new currency was introduced, but the other two problems remained unresolved. Nagy had falsely expected that Soviet troops would depart Hungary after the signing of a peace treaty. Moscow had already decided on the Communist Party takeover of government, however, and the Smallholders Party was gradually eliminated from the political scene. Nagy resigned on 1 June 1947 while on holiday in Switzerland. Soon thereafter he was expelled from the Smallholders Party and deprived of his citizenship.

Nagy moved to the United States and settled in Virginia, where he ran a dairy farm. In 1947 he participated in the foundation of the International Peasant Union, and he became its deputy chairman and then chairman during 1964–1970. During 1963–1970 he also gave speeches and conducted seminars at American universities. After 1970 he withdrew from politics altogether. Nagy died in Fairfax, Virginia, on 12 June 1979.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Europe, Eastern; Hungary

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Nagy, Imre
(1896–1958)

Hungarian communist politician and premier (1953–1955, 1956), executed for his involvement in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Born on 7 June 1896 in Kaposvár, Imre Nagy joined the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1915. Taken prisoner by the Russians in July 1916, he was held in Siberia until 1918, during which time he converted to Bolshevism. From March to September 1918 he was a member of the Red Army. Captured by White forces, he managed to escape and in 1920 joined the Russian Communist Party.

In 1925 Nagy joined the illegal Hungarian Communist Party and in 1930 left for the Soviet Union. During the next fourteen years, he studied agriculture and became an expert on rural welfare. In December 1944 he participated in talks with Soviet leader Josef Stalin on future Hungarian governance.

Imre Nagy was premier of Hungary during that nation's abortive 1956 revolution. He defied the Soviets and, after the failure of the revolution, was tried and executed. Nagy was rehabilitated in 1989 following the collapse of communism in Hungary. (Library of Congress)

With the defeat of Germany, Nagy returned to Hungary and served as agriculture minister (1944–1945), interior minister (1945–1946), speaker of parliament (1947–1949), minister of food supply (1950–1952), minister of harvest (1952), and vice prime minister (1952–1953). In 1945 he implemented long-awaited land reforms.

Nagy's criticism of the Hungarian Communist Party's agricultural and economic policies resulted in his expulsion from the party leadership in 1949, although he was readmitted in 1950. On 4 July 1953 he became premier, replacing Mátyás Rákosi, who had fallen out of favor with the new Soviet leadership following Stalin's death. Nagy's 1953 reform program, called the New Course, was aimed at relaxing the pace of industrialization, allowing peasants to leave collective farms, and mitigating police terror. When the political climate in Moscow changed in favor of the hard-liner Rákosi in April 1955, however, Nagy was forced to resign and was expelled from the party in November.

Nagy again became premier during the anti-Soviet Hungarian Revolution of 24 October–4 November 1956. At first, he advocated only moderate reforms. But by proclaiming Hungary's neutrality and announcing its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact on 1 November, he clearly overreached and provoked a Soviet intervention. After the Soviets invaded Hungary on 4 November to crush the rebellion, Nagy secured political asylum at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. Promised safe conduct out of the country by Hungarian authorities, he was arrested on 22 November by Soviet authorities when he left the Yugoslav embassy and was sent to Romania, where he was held for seven months. In February 1958 he was secretly tried on charges of treason and found guilty. Nagy was executed on 16 June 1958 in Budapest. In 1989, during the Velvet Revolution, Nagy's courage and sacrifice were officially recognized, and his remains were reburied with honors in a state funeral.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Hungarian Revolution; Hungary

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Nakasone Yasuhiro
(1918–)

Japanese Liberal Democratic Party politician and prime minister (1982–1987). Born in Gunma Prefecture on 27 May 1918, Nakasone Yasuhiro graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1941. After serving in the navy during World War II, he won election to the House of Representatives in April 1947. In 1951 during the Korean War, he gained notoriety by petitioning American occupation authorities to revise the constitution and rearm Japan.

As director general of the Defense Agency during 1970–1971, Nakasone sought to develop a more autonomous defense posture. As trade minister during 1972–1974, he initiated a breakthrough trade agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in January 1974. He also defied U.S. leaders by supporting an accommodation with the Arab states to sustain oil supplies during the 1973–1974 oil embargo.

On 27 November 1982, Nakasone was elected prime minister. In this post he continued his efforts to transform Japan into a geopolitical and strategic power. Ironically, given his intensely nationalistic reputation, Japan's deeper integration with the Western alliance also characterized his administration. He quickly established a close relationship with President Ronald



Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro at the conclusion of a convention of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Tokyo, 22 January 1985. (Reuters/Corbis)

Reagan and spoke of Japan acting in a crisis like "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" to prevent Soviet forces from entering the Pacific.

At the May 1983 G7 summit, Nakasone's insistence that members' security was indivisible precluded agreement on an intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty that would have allowed Moscow to redeploy SS-20 missiles in Asia. Under pressure from the U.S. government, Nakasone agreed to participate in research on Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) missile defense system in September 1986, and in January 1987 Nakasone broke Japan's mandated ceiling on defense spending, which had been limited to 1 percent of gross national product (GNP). However, fierce domestic opposition blocked his efforts to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq War.

Nakasone cultivated a personal relationship with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev but failed to improve Japan-Soviet relations significantly. Similarly, despite making an unprecedented visit to the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) in 1983 and providing a large government loan to the PRC in 1984, Nakasone's official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine—dedicated to Japanese war dead—in September 1985 poisoned relations with both Beijing and Seoul. He resigned as prime minister on 19 June 1987.

Many of Nakasone's goals went largely unfulfilled during his tenure. However, he did help to set the course of post–Cold War Japanese foreign policy. Nakasone retired from politics altogether in 2003.

Christopher W. Braddick

See also
Japan

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Namibia

Southwestern African nation covering 318,261 square miles, approximately three times the size of the U.S. state of Colorado. With a 1945 population of some 4.8 million people, Namibia is a mineral-rich country that borders on Angola and Zambia to the north; Zimbabwe and Botswana to the east; South Africa to the south; and the Atlantic Ocean to the west.

The population of Namibia is composed of at least twelve different ethnic groups. The largest groups are the Ovambo, representing eight tribes and

slightly more than 45 percent of the population, followed by the Damara, approximately 9 percent of the population; the Herero, approximately 7 percent of the population; and the Kavango, approximately 7 percent of the population. The Ovambo live in northern Namibia, spilling across the Angolan border on either side of the Cuene River. As in much of postcolonial Africa, there was interethnic rivalry in Namibia, particularly between the Ovambo and the Herero.

The Conference of Berlin during 1884–1885 granted Germany the right to colonize what became known as South West Africa (Namibia). Following Germany's defeat in World War I, South Africa received South West Africa as a League of Nations mandate in 1920. In 1966, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly revoked the South Africa mandate, but South Africa refused to give up the territory. The International Court of Justice, in 1971, thus declared South Africa to be in illegal occupation of Namibia. Subsequently, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) began a war of independence, which directly or indirectly drew in the competing superpowers. In 1978, UN Resolution 435 called for the independence of Namibia.

After the Soviet Union's 1979 intervention in Afghanistan marking the end of détente, the global geopolitical chess game between the Soviets and the Americans shifted to Africa. U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration sought to roll back Soviet gains, particularly those made in the developing world, and in the words of Reagan's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, "Namibia served as the most active diplomatic interaction between Africans and Americans." Namibia was strategically squeezed between apartheid South Africa and Soviet-supported Marxist Angola, and its struggle for independence involved both Zaire and Zambia. Namibia's Cold War experience had two distinct eras: 1945–1966, when it was formally under South Africa's control, and 1966–1990, during which time it fought for independence.

The nations that held mandates under the League of Nations acceded to the same rights under the Trusteeship Council of the UN. This included, under Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, the principles of nonannexation and self-determination. But General Jan Christiaan Smuts, head of the Union Government in South Africa, petitioned the UN for formal annexation of Namibia. The UN rejected this. Rather than accept UN demands to place Namibia under a trusteeship in preparation for independence, in 1946 South Africa announced its intention to formally incorporate Namibia. With the coming to power of the National Party in 1948, South Africa continued to ignore its trusteeship obligations and the UN demands. Then, in 1951, it annexed Namibia.

The apartheid government set up a 1962 commission of inquiry concerning self-determination in Namibia. The commission predictably prescribed the same separation of races in Namibia that was apartheid policy in South Africa: it divided the country into distinct areas for natives, Europeans, and so-called coloreds. Besides the overt racism, the problem (as with South Africa) was the distribution of land: the population of natives, whites, and coloreds was proportioned 18:3:1, while the division of land was proportioned 0.74,

6.74, 0.62 per native, white, and colored persons, respectively. Nonwhites had no say in the division of land.

South Africa was not meeting its obligations. Thus, the UN took steps to restore the rights of the people involved in the impasse. During 1946–1965 it passed seventy-three resolutions on South West Africa, calling on South Africa to discontinue its policy of apartheid and adhere to the mandate agreement.

Until 1960, the superpowers had few interests in southern Africa (the Soviet Union maintained consular relations with South Africa only until 1956). The year 1960 was dubbed "the year of Africa," and many newly independent African states joined the UN. Throughout the early to mid-1960s, the UN provided the rhetorically anticolonial Soviet Union with a ready-made solidarity with much of the developing world.

Involvement during the Cold War by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Africa and in Namibia in particular should not be ignored. It was at least as much in competition with the USSR as with the United States. Because SWAPO received Soviet support, the PRC supported the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), SWAPO's main domestic rival.

SWAPO, the nationalist movement that led the fight against South African rule, was founded in 1957 by Ovambo intellectuals in Cape Town, South Africa. It was thus dominated by the northern Ovambo people with some Herero participation. However, the Herero broke away from the organization in 1959 and formed the SWANU in Windhoek. In 1962, SWAPO decided to employ terrorist tactics to gain independence and trained in camps located in the Soviet Union, China, Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania. Sam Nujoma became SWANU's first president in 1966 and based his operations in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and Luanda.

SWAPO was divided into SWAPO-external and SWAPO-internal. The latter was never declared illegal by South Africa. SWAPO-external maintained offices in New York, London, Cairo, Algiers, and Dakar and used its external ties to become the dominant party.

In 1973 the UN General Assembly declared SWAPO the authentic representative of the people of South West Africa. Four years later, it endorsed SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. The UN supplied financial assistance to SWAPO, reaching $230,500 per year in 1980. SWAPO received additional support from the UN World Food Program; the UN Trust Fund for Namibia; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the UN Development Program.

The Namibian independence struggle was in some ways typical of those that preceded it in sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, the revolutionary group adopted a Marxist-Leninist program. There were multiple reasons for this. They rejected democratic capitalism as the ideology of the colonial powers, the Soviet Union's rapid state-sponsored industrialization was seen as a model of success, and to some extent socialism appealed to the more communal nature of traditional (precolonial) African politics. SWAPO's 1976 Political Programme adopted at Lusaka was based on the principles of scientific socialism. This included the usual socialist litany of public-sector control over

finance, external finance, and the means of production. SWAPO would also support peasant cooperatives and state-owned ranching. In November 1988, as Namibian independence appeared imminent, SWAPO issued the so-called Economic Policy Document indicating that land, mineral and fishing rights, public utilities, and former South African companies would be part of the public sector.

SWAPO's independence struggle took on a regional dimension when Portugal suddenly withdrew from Angola in 1974. The Soviets and Cubans intervened in Angola in support of the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime there and subsequently developed close military ties with SWAPO as well as with Mozambique, Zambia, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Angola's independence created new strategic opportunities for SWAPO. Before then, SWAPO used the Angolan territory dominated by the MPLA's major rival, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), to support its insurgency. It now used MPLA-controlled territory. The MPLA also offered SWAPO a new headquarters and extensive basing facilities. Thus, the South Africans saw Angola as a forward defense area and allied with UNITA in the Namibian bush war that had begun in 1966.

The terrorist activity of the military wing of SWAPO, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), was limited to a few border areas. Approximately 85 percent of PLAN forces was comprised of Ovambo. PLAN cooperated with the military wing of the MPLA in Angola and thus was able to use Angolan territory from which to launch attacks. But the counterinsurgency operations of the South African Defense Force were able to contain the SWAPO insurgency, largely by pushing its bases deeper into Angola.

Namibians celebrating independence in Windhoek, 21 March 1990. (Alexander Joe/AFP/Getty Images)

The most important effort at internal reform of South West Africa during South Africa's control was the Turnhalle Conference. It actually consisted of six sessions (September 1975–October 1976). In 1975, Pretoria announced that a formal constitutional conference would begin on 1 September. SWAPO and SWANU would not be allowed to participate. In May 1977, there was a referendum by white voters on the Turnhalle Constitution, which 95 percent of the voters approved. This did not, however, meet the demands of SWAPO or the international community. Because the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) failed to end discriminatory legislation and practices or even effectively to start economic and social development programs, the prevalent attitude among Namibian blacks was that only SWAPO, the guerrilla fighters, merited their political endorsement.

As early as July 1979, President António Agostinho Neto of Angola held secret talks with American negotiators. Among the issues discussed was the establishment of a demilitarized zone of 50 kilometers on each side of the

Namibian-Angolan border and restrictions of SWAPO bases in Angola. Agreement was never reached, however, and the conflict escalated. The United States and its British, French, West German, and Canadian allies formed the Contact Group to negotiate Namibia's independence with South Africa and the so-called Frontline States (FLS), comprised of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The FLS acted as patrons and advisors to SWAPO. The negotiations between the Contact Group and the FLS resulted in UN Security Resolution 435 in September 1978.

During Ronald Reagan's presidency (1981–1989) and eight years of negotiations led by Chester Crocker, the United States eventually brokered the 1988 peace accords that linked South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia and independence for that country to Cuba's exit from Angola. This occurred despite the fact that for many years Angola and its FLS partners (with the support of the Soviet Union and radical nonaligned states) had rejected linking Namibian independence to Cuba's withdrawal from Angola. The decline of Cold War tensions was symbolized by the Soviet Union's willingness to pressure its clients, Cuba and Angola, to accept a negotiated settlement.

James J. Hentz

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Constructive Engagement; Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro; South Africa

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Nasser, Gamal Abdel
(1918–1970)

Egyptian nationalist politician, vice president (1953–1954), premier (1954–1956), and president (1956–1970). Born in Beni Mor, Egypt, on 16 January 1918, the son of a civil servant, Gamal Abdel Nasser at an early age developed great antipathy toward Britain's rule over Egypt, setting the stage for his later championing of Egyptian nationalism and Pan-Arabism. Settling on a military career, he graduated from the Egyptian Royal Military Academy in 1936 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant. While stationed at a post in the Sudan, he met and became friends with future Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. Based on their mutual dislike of the British, they eventually laid the groundwork for a secret anti-British organization that came to be called the Free Officers.

The Free Officers recruited Egyptian military officers who wished to bring about an end to British colonial rule and to oust King Farouk I. After

months of painstaking planning, the organization fomented a revolt against Farouk's government on 23 July 1952. Three days later, the king abdicated and fled Egypt. Upon Farouk's abdication, a Revolutionary Command Council was established under the leadership of Major General Mohammad Naguib, with Nasser working behind the scenes. When the council declared Egypt a republic in June 1953, Naguib became its first president, with Nasser as vice president. Beginning in the winter of 1954, a political power struggle ensued between Nasser and Naguib. Within months, Nasser took de facto control as president of the Revolutionary Command Council. Naguib was allowed to continue as president of Egypt, although this was in reality little more than a figurehead position.

Nasser and his faction consolidated their hold on power, and after the October 1954 attempt on his life, which he blamed on Naguib, Nasser ordered Naguib arrested. Using the assassination attempt to solidify his power base, Nasser became premier of Egypt on 25 February 1955. Seven months later he also took the title of provisional president.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser addressing a crowd during a visit to Algiers, 7 May 1963. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Nasser quickly moved to centralize his authority, creating a tightly controlled police state in which political opponents were imprisoned, intellectuals and elites disenfranchised, and industries nationalized. In June 1956 a national election occurred in which Nasser was the sole candidate for the presidency, and thus he officially became Egypt's second president.

In addition to seeking land reform and following quasi-socialist economic policies, Nasser sought to modernize Egyptian infrastructure. His public works projects included the building of a massive dam at Aswan, for which he received promises of financial support from the United States and Great Britain. He also approached the United States about purchasing arms. When the United States refused this request, fearful that the arms would be used against Israel, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets saw a chance to increase their influence in the region and began negotiating an arms deal with Nasser, whereupon the United States and Britain withdrew their support for the Aswan Dam project in early July 1956. Seeing an additional opportunity to gain more influence with the Egyptians and to establish a foothold in the Middle East, the Soviet Union quickly offered to help Nasser with the dam.

Nasser used the loss of Western financial support as a pretext to nationalize the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956. This action provoked joint French, British, and Israeli military action against Egypt, beginning the Suez Crisis. On 29 October 1956 Israeli forces attacked Egypt, and two days later French and British forces attacked by air. On 5 November, French and British forces landed at Port Said, further escalating the conflict. The United States, not privy to the attack, applied great pressure on the Israelis as well as on the French and British to withdraw, which they did on 7 November. Far from

The United States applied great pressure on the Israelis as well as on the French and British to withdraw, which they did on 7 November.

being defeated, Nasser was vindicated by the Suez Crisis, and he shrewdly used this victory to further consolidate his rule at home and to promote Pan-Arabism throughout the Middle East. The Suez Crisis turned him into a hero of Middle East nationalism.

In pursuit of his Pan-Arab vision, Nasser established the United Arab Republic (UAR) on 22 February 1958. Consisting of only Egypt and Syria, however, the UAR fell apart when Syria withdrew on 28 September 1961. Nevertheless, Nasser continued to promote Arab nationalism and his vision of a Pan-Arab union.

Nasser's strong-arm rule began to work against him as the years progressed. Losing some of his popular appeal at home, he attempted to reform the government, which was corrupt and riddled with cronyism. Instead, he was forced to crack down on his opponents who tried to expand their power during the attempted reorganization. In foreign affairs, in an effort to play up Arab resentment toward Israel, he signed a defense pact with Syria in November 1966. In early 1967, he began provoking the Israelis through a number of different actions, including insisting on the departure of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers from the Egyptian-Israeli border, blockading the Gulf of Aqaba, and moving troops into the Sinai.

In retaliation, on 5 June 1967 the Israelis attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The war lasted only until 9 June and proved to be a humiliating defeat for Nasser. His miscalculation further eroded his support in Egypt and blemished his reputation throughout the Middle East. In March 1969 he launched the War of Attrition against Israel, which resulted in many more Egyptian than Israeli casualties. In July 1970, he agreed to a cease-fire arrangement put forward by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, ending the war. By then in deteriorating health, Nasser died on 28 September 1970 in Cairo.

Dallace W. Unger Jr.

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Egypt; Farouk II, King of Egypt; Rogers, William Pierce; Sadat, Anwar

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National Cold War Museum and Memorial

A depository for Cold War memorabilia and an educational opportunity for the general public. The National Cold War Museum and Memorial is currently a portable exhibit of historical artifacts that travels around the world in hopes of promoting interest in a permanent Cold War museum facility. The museum's current holdings include reference material from a variety of Cold War personalities and events as well as unique artifacts such as U-2 pilot

Francis Gary Powers's flight helmet and the suitcase carried across Berlin's Glienecke Bridge on 10 February 1962 when the Soviets turned Powers over to the United States in exchange for Soviet spy Colonel Rudolf Abel.

Francis Gary Powers Jr. and John Welch formally established the museum in 1996. Powers's father unwittingly became a major figure in the Cold War when the Soviets shot down the U-2 reconnaissance plane he was piloting on 1 May 1960. His capture and imprisonment in the Soviet Union led to a full-blown diplomatic crisis that deepened Cold War hostilities and embarrassed President Dwight Eisenhower's administration on the eve of a U.S.-Soviet summit, which was promptly canceled by an angry Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Resolved to honor Cold War figures such as his father, who died in 1977, the younger Powers dedicated the museum to preserving and relating the many stories and incidents indelibly marked by the Cold War.

Plans are under way to locate a permanent home for the museum. One potential location is a twenty-acre former Nike Missile site outside Washington, D.C.

William Craig

See also

Abel, Rudolf; Espionage; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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National Intelligence Estimate

U.S. intelligence report intended only for the highest-ranking government officials. Information for National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) is gathered from all the intelligence agencies of government and assembled under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Most NIEs deal with the threat posed by other countries to the security of the United States. NIEs on a specific country include analysis of all aspects of that nation, including its foreign policy objectives, leadership, military capabilities, and economic strengths. The most important country NIEs during the Cold War were those dealing with the Soviet Union. Special NIEs treat specific problem areas or probable reactions to a U.S. initiative.

CIA Director General Walter Bedell Smith initiated the NIEs in 1950. At first they were produced by a Board of National Estimates, with its membership from the different federal intelligence agencies. In 1973, however, the board was replaced by intelligence officers with specialized knowledge in the specific areas under study.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Collection; Smith, Walter Bedell

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National Security Act
(26 July 1947)

Legislation effecting sweeping organizational changes in U.S. military and foreign policy establishments signed into law by President Harry S. Truman on 26 July 1947. The National Security Act was a critical step in preparing America to wage the deepening Cold War. Specifically, the act created the National Security Council (NSC), National Security Resources Board (NSRB), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and U.S. Air Force (the third branch of the U.S. armed forces). Congress amended the act in 1949, providing the secretary of defense with more power over the individual armed services and their secretaries.

Soon after World War II ended, the uneasy alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union began to degenerate, and a long-standing ideological and military confrontation between the two superpowers quickly set in. By late 1946, the Truman administration had adopted a defense policy that became known as containment. This policy sought to contain Soviet influence and the spread of communism throughout the world. It was this mind-set that prompted passage of the National Security Act.

By the end of 1947, the containment policy had elicited both the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The National Security Act was an effort to add a domestic component to containment and to help coordinate U.S. diplomatic and military commitments to meet the challenges of the Cold War. The act was designed to centralize the military services under the single banner of the DOD—which was directed by the secretary of defense, a new cabinet-level position—to provide one main intelligence apparatus in the new CIA and to provide foreign policy advice directly to the president via the NSC, which resided within the Executive Office of the president. The JCS, composed of a representative from each of the armed services, was to act as a military advisory group to the president and his civilian advisors.

The CIA emerged from the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and smaller postwar intelligence operations. Its first director was Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter. The existing War and Navy Departments were folded into the DOD, whose first secretary was James V. Forrestal. The new U.S. Air Force, which became a free-standing entity, was built from the existing U.S. Army Air Corps. The NSC's chief role was to coordinate and prioritize information it received from other agencies and to advise the president on national security issues based on analysis of that information. At the time, there was no provision made for a national security advisor, a post that

came into being under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953. Taken in its totality, the National Security Act provided for a powerful, well-coordinated system that linked national security with foreign policy and military decision making.

Bevan Sewell

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; Forrestal, James Vincent; Marshall Plan; Truman, Harry S.; United States Air Force; United States Army; United States Navy

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National Security Agency

U.S. intelligence-gathering agency. Headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, the National Security Agency (NSA) is the highly secretive component of the U.S. intelligence community and specializes in activities related to cryptography and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Established on 4 November 1952 by President Harry S. Truman in the wake of a series of intelligence lapses regarding the Korean War, the NSA served as the U.S. government's primary technical intelligence-collection organization throughout the Cold War.

The United States was renowned for its success in the realm of SIGINT (the gathering and analysis of intercepted voice communications intelligence, or COMINT) and electromagnetic radiation (electronic intelligence, or ELINT) during World War II. Yet the Americans entered the early years of the Cold War with a disorganized SIGINT apparatus loosely coordinated among the independent and oftentimes redundant cryptologic agencies of the army, navy, and air force. In line with the centralizing theme of the 1947 National Security Act, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson established the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949 to streamline SIGINT collection. Plagued by the weaknesses of limited jurisdiction and ill-defined authority, however, deficiencies in AFSA's relationship with the service agencies were made readily apparent prior to and during the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

At the urging of President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson appointed New York attorney George Abbott Brownell to head a probe investigating AFSA's failings. The resultant "Brownell Committee Report" advocated replacing AFSA with a centralized national agency capable of



Headquarters of the National Security Agency (NSA), located at Fort George G. Meade in Maryland, 4 August 1960. (Bettmann/Corbis)

unifying all U.S. SIGINT efforts. Fully agreeing with this recommendation, within months President Truman dissolved the AFSA and quietly signed into law the NSA.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the NSA established itself as a key intelligence player in virtually all major Cold War political and military conflicts. In 1953 the NSA began overflights of Soviet airspace using converted B-47 Stratojets equipped with various receivers capable of intercepting Soviet air defense radar signals. By intentionally triggering the activation of the Soviet air defense radar system, the B-47s could pinpoint and map the locations of Soviet systems on the ground, providing crucial information for U.S. pilots. By the late 1950s, the Stratojets had been replaced by the high-flying U-2 reconnaissance jet, and overflights to collect Soviet SIGINT data continued, focusing on radar emissions and telemetry information related to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches. The overflight program ended suddenly amid an international crisis when, on 1 May 1960, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the central Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. Initially disavowing any knowledge of the overflight program, the

Eisenhower administration was forced to concede that it had ordered the flights when faced with irrefutable evidence presented by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

Although direct flights over Soviet airspace were terminated in the wake of the Powers controversy, the NSA maintained a robust collection effort utilizing ground, air, sea, and space-based antennas and sensors to monitor the transmissions of the Eastern bloc as well as nonaligned and allied nations. In an often contentious relationship with the U.S. Navy, NSA listening posts were established on both adapted warships such as the *Liberty* and on smaller dedicated collection platforms such as the *Pueblo* to loiter in international waters collecting transmissions, while NSA-directed submarines tapped into undersea communication cables. Ground stations concentrating on intercepting shortwave and very high frequency (VHF) emissions were established in strategically important locations around the globe ranging from Ellesmere Island in the upper reaches of the Arctic Circle to Ayios Nikolaos in Cyprus, to Field Station Berlin in West Berlin, to Misawa Air Force Base in Japan. After the undisclosed launch of the first SIGINT satellite in June 1960, the NSA also began to establish an array of ground-based relay centers in remote locations on the periphery of the Soviet Union.

By the late 1970s the NSA was enjoying great success in decoding the encrypted Soviet messages that had previously eluded the U.S. intelligence community. As the NSA's mission grew, its budget increased exponentially. Exact budgetary figures from the Cold War period continue to be withheld as classified information, but during that time the NSA established itself as the largest U.S. intelligence agency in terms of both manpower and financial resources.

Robert G. Berschinski

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Collection; Korean War; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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National Security Council Report NSC-68

NSC-68 was a response by President Harry S. Truman's administration to the Soviets' first atomic explosion in late August 1949 as well as the October

1949 communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. The top secret report was released to the president on 14 April 1950. Its principal architect was Paul H. Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

The basic premise of NSC-68 was that since the Soviets had developed a workable atomic bomb, a hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb would not be far behind. The drafters of NSC-68 estimated that by 1954, "the year of maximum danger," the Soviets would be capable of launching a crippling preemptive strike against the United States. According to NSC-68, the United States could not prevent such a blow without a massive increase in its military and economic capacities. Should the report not be heeded, in case of Soviet aggression the United States would be forced into appeasement or nuclear war. Nitze and other policymakers believed, therefore, that the key to avoiding this dilemma and preserving free-world security lay in a vast conventional rearmament. NSC-68 also demanded greater foreign aid, however, along with expanded military assistance to the Western Allies, additional funding for information and propaganda campaigns, better intelligence gathering, and an expansion of nuclear weapons programs.

Alarmed by the report's recommendations and likely costs, President Truman initially shelved the plan. Only after the sudden outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 did he agree to implement the NSC-68 rearmament program. Thanks in part, at least, to the Korean War, U.S. defense expenditures quadrupled, going from $13.5 billion before the war to more than $54 billion by the time Truman left office in January 1953. The lion's share of this massive rearmament program in fact was not directed to the Korean War but instead went toward fulfilling America's long-term mobilization base as envisioned in NSC-68. Indeed, NSC-68 put muscle into Truman's containment policy.

Although subsequent administrations would tinker with the recommendations in NSC-68, the report nonetheless guided U.S. national security and military mobilization planning for almost a generation after its drafting. Fundamentally, NSC-68 was underpinned by the traditional Cold War mentality. Many of its critics have argued that the report overstated the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. Some, however, have maintained that NSC-68 was a wise and prudent response to a real and present Soviet danger. Still others have pointed out that although NSC-68 may have painted a somewhat distorted picture of the Soviet Union, this distortion results more from what is now known from newly opened Eastern bloc archives as opposed to what was known to officials at the time. Whatever the case, it is a truism that NSC-68 was a seminal and paradigmatic Cold War document.

Josh Ushay

See also

Atomic Bomb; Containment Policy; Hydrogen Bomb; Korean War; Military Balance; Nitze, Paul Henry; Truman, Harry S.

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National Security Study Memorandum 39
(10 April 1969)

Review of American foreign policy in southern Africa, commissioned during President Richard Nixon's first administration. On 10 April 1969, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger authorized National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39), a detailed critique of American foreign relations in southern Africa that included proposals for future policy options. Both the memorandum and the study itself were imbued with Kissinger's notions of realpolitik. Avoiding a military confrontation in Africa was a high priority given the nature of U.S. military commitments elsewhere, particularly in Vietnam. Thus, to ensure the region's political stability, NSSM 39 analysts suggested that U.S. doctrine shy away from dictating reform policies to colonial governments. Public denunciations of South Africa's racist politics were therefore deemed unwise for fear of risking American intervention and strategic destabilization in the region.

Rather than advocating social justice, the study's key recommendations revolved around safeguarding American strategic and economic interests. Maintaining South Africa's gold production was the chief financial concern, while the prime strategic goal was limiting Soviet and Chinese influence in the area. Conceivably, these policies were intended not only to enhance the U.S. government's regional influence but also to reduce the likelihood of American military intervention in an African civil conflict. The report stated explicitly that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."

Scot D. Bruce

See also

Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Anticolonialism; Constructive Engagement; Decolonization; Kissinger, Henry; Mozambique; Namibia; South Africa

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Nationalism

Political and social movement seeking to promote the interests of an individual nation at the expense of the wider international community but also to rid nations or regions of colonialism and to actualize self-determination based upon ethnic, racial, or religious cohesiveness. During the Cold War, nationalism was often used as an instrument of leverage by the Western and communist blocs to attract new allies and to gain or maintain hegemony in certain states or regions. Eventually, nationalism led to the collapse of the communist bloc, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the fragmentation of artificially incorporated national entities such as the former Yugoslavia.

Following World War II, nationalist movements blossomed throughout the world. The main contributors to this development were the principles of self-determination and decolonization. These in turn were driven by economic and political forces and were pushed forward by several labor parties, most notably those in Britain and France. This ultimately brought about the independence of most African and Asian nations.

In addition, the role of native intellectuals educated in Western Europe or the United States, and there exposed to Western political and economic thought, strongly impacted the domestic and foreign policies of the newly independent states. The geopolitical climate of the Cold War brought strong pressures on every new nation to align with either the United States or the Soviet Union. In their desperate search for new allies, both nations sponsored national liberation movements that often bred corruption and human rights abuses.

The Soviet Union played the role of the anti-imperialist power, opposing Western colonialism in favor of nationalist causes and striving to associate national liberation with socialism. The Americans were similarly driven by ideology. Often in favor of native peoples struggling for independence, they liberated the former Commonwealth of the Philippines in July 1946 and transformed Puerto Rico into a self-governing commonwealth in 1952. The United States intervened in almost every nationalist dispute in the world, ostensibly to defend democracy and champion the national cause.

In January 1961, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev pledged Soviet support to wars of national liberation, as in Vietnam. This point was amplified by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev when he reasserted in the Brezhnev Doctrine of November 1968 the rationale already used to justify the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution—that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a socialist state in order to preserve socialism there.

The American policy toward nationalism, launched in 1947, was predicated on the Truman Doctrine, which pledged support to any nation under siege by internal or external communist forces. In Europe, U.S. policy relied on the Balkanization of the communist bloc based on nationalism. Exploitation of nationalist movements was a common modus operandi of U.S. foreign policy in Yugoslavia, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe as a means of weakening Soviet control and influence. In Greece, just after the 1945 liberation, a leftist nationalist uprising led by the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) and helped by communist Yugoslavia tried to overthrow the authoritarian British-backed government. Fearing a communist victory, President Harry S. Truman asked for and obtained from Congress $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey to support democratic movements.

Despite ideological similarities with the Soviets, Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito's interpretation of communism and nationalism alarmed the Soviets after 1945. Pan-Slavism was invoked by both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. While the USSR used this to contain centrifugal forces, particularly in Ukraine, Tito's attempt to form a southern Slavic union with Bulgaria alarmed Soviet leader Josef Stalin and contributed to the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav split.

Nationalism was a dangerous force inside the USSR itself. Apart from nationalist movements in the Baltic region, the Soviet Union was at risk from internal ethnic strife. Indeed, the risk of Pan-Turkish nationalism had informed Stalin's decision to separate the Turkish peoples of Central Asia into five distinct republics. From the Khrushchev era on, while stressing the importance of policies of nativism, the creation of the Homo Sovieticus was enhanced. Mixed marriages, forced migration, and the mandatory use of Russian were used to de-emphasize the separate nationalities and form a Soviet citizen who, regardless of his place of birth, was faithful to Moscow. For this reason, in the Soviet empire the word "patriotism" was always preferred to "nationalism."

Despite the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, which pledged support for all national movements against colonial rule, both the Americans and the Soviets continued to justify their intrusions in domestic politics under the guise of national liberation support. The two superpowers chose as one ground for confrontation the divided Korean Peninsula, each backing a different regime claiming to be the legitimate government for all Korea. The Korean War, a result of this policy, lasted for three years (1950–1953).

In Vietnam, nationalists led by veteran communist leader Ho Chi Minh succeeded in driving France out of the northern part of the country in 1954. The 1954 Geneva Conference temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, pending national elections to reunify the country in

A Soviet poster titled "Love Your Motherland" showing a schoolteacher with her students in Moscow, 1949. (Library of Congress)

1956. Because Ho was a communist and was supported by the communist bloc and because the communists had never voluntarily relinquished power once they had secured it, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration chose to support South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem when he refused to hold the elections in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) as scheduled. The United States supported Diem in his stand. This failure to hold the elections called for by the Geneva Accords in effect led to the renewal of warfare and the start of what became known as the Vietnam War. This struggle, which began in earnest in 1957, would not end until the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

In Latin America, economic interests were not easily subordinated to the natives' cause. In Guatemala in 1954, a coup led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) overthrew the nationalist and reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz, which had tried to expropriate the lands of a U.S.-based company. The Arbenz regime was replaced by a pro-American government. After Fidel Castro's 1959 coup in Cuba, his nationalization of land and companies resulted in a full-blown crisis in U.S.-Cuban relations. This precipitated an ongoing U.S. effort to dislodge Castro from power, including the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and drove the Cuban government closer to the Soviet Union.

Arab nationalism emerged as a driving force during the Cold War, although not necessarily aligned with the two superpowers. In 1945 seven nations—Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Transjordan (Jordan since 1948)—created the Arab League, which was destined to expand to more than twenty countries by the end of the century. Its aim was mutual aid and the improvement of economic conditions in Arab states. Beginning in the 1970s, the Arab League helped financially strapped African nations reduce their economic dependence on the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United States feared Arab nationalism in the Middle East. In April 1955, Britain and the United States pushed Turkey and Iraq into forming the Baghdad Pact, a mutual defense pact also known as the Middle East Treaty Organization. Iran and Pakistan joined later that same year. In 1959, on the departure of Iraq from the organization, it became known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). CENTO was dissolved in 1979 with the withdrawal of first Iran, following the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and then Pakistan.

During the Eisenhower presidency, containing Arab nationalism by offering help to individual Arab states was a chief priority. Thus, policy was aimed at keeping the Middle East under Western control. It was also a way to contain the nationalist forces unleashed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In 1958 Egypt and Syria joined to create a new nation, the United Arab Republic (UAR). Attempts to include neighboring Yemen failed. After the 1961 military coup in Syria, Egypt remained the only country in the new republic, which ceased to exist in 1971.

Nationalist motivations were behind the March 1951 murder of Iranian Prime Minister Haji-Ali Razmara, who had opposed nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. Mohammed Mossadegh took control of

Carrying a huge portrait of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptians protest the Syrian decision to end the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, 30 September 1961. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Iran and subsequently nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, run by the British and paying royalties only to the shah of Iran. These events caused a rupture in Iranian relations with the Western powers. Consequently, the CIA sponsored a coup to topple Mossadegh, who was arrested in August 1953 and was replaced by General Fazlollah Zahedi.

The desire for independence pushed the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria to begin a guerrilla war there against France in November 1954. After prolonged warfare and much bloodshed, France gave Algeria its independence in 1962. Continuing the nationalist tradition that engaged him in the 1948 Israeli-Palestinian War, Nasser assisted the FLN in Algeria, gradually shifting both Algeria and Egypt toward a socialist orientation, although both nations were technically part of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1956, meanwhile, the United States and Britain reneged on an agreement to help finance the building of Egypt's Aswan Dam, provoking Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal to make up for the lost funding. This in turn led to the October 1956 Suez Crisis in which British, French, and

Israeli forces attacked Egypt. Due to strong U.S. pressure, the three powers soon withdrew, but the attack nonetheless served to strengthen Nasser's nationalist and Pan-Arab agenda.

Libyan President Muammar Qadhafi has also been a staunch promoter of Arab unity based on ethnoreligious similarities. In December 1969 he signed the Tripoli Charter, calling for a flexible federation with Sudan and Egypt. On 1 January 1972, the Federation of Arab Republics, consisting of Egypt, Syria, and Libya, came into existence. Unity with Syria (in September 1980) and Morocco (in August 1984) was attempted but never came to fruition.

Nationalism, of course, contributed to the collapse of the communist bloc and the Soviet Union beginning in 1991. After failed attempts at liberalization during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring of 1968, the Solidarity movement in Poland finally arranged for free elections in that nation in 1989. Hungary followed suit, and by the fall of 1989 the Velvet Revolution, made possible because of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's refusal to employ force, had swept through Eastern Europe, completing the process of democratization and the reassertion of national sovereignty. Demands for independence in the Soviet Baltic Republics and the nationalist Rukh movement in Soviet-controlled Ukraine played a main role in the December 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, formally ending the Cold War. That same year, the dismantlement of Yugoslavia unleashed nationalist forces that engulfed the region in civil war for more than a decade.

The Cold War was over, but nationalism continued to exact a frightful toll in terms of human suffering in the Horn of Africa, Sudan, the Yugoslav successor states, Sri Lanka, and many other places around the globe.

Abel Polese

See also

Algerian War; Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Anticolonialism; Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Bay of Pigs; Brezhnev Doctrine; Castro, Fidel; Decolonization; Domino Theory; Greek Civil War; Ho Chi Minh; Human Rights; Hungarian Revolution; Khrushchev, Nikita; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Prague Spring; Qadhafi, Muammar; Suez Crisis; Tito, Josip Broz; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War

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Navarre, Henri
(1898–1983)

French Army general and commander in chief of French forces in Indochina (1953–1954). Born on 31 July 1898 at Villefranche de Rouergue in Aveyron, Henri Navarre enlisted in the French Army in 1916 to gain admission to the French military academy at Saint-Cyr in 1917, receiving a commission in the cavalry (Hussars) the following year. As a career army officer, he served with distinction in Syria, Morocco, and Germany during the 1920s and 1930s. He became an intelligence officer in 1939 for the French command in North Africa and in metropolitan France for the French resistance during World War II. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1945 and became inspector general of French Army troops in Germany. Advanced to major general in 1950, he commanded the French 5th Armored Division in Germany. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1953.

In May 1953, Navarre was selected to replace General Raoul Salan as commander in chief of French forces in Indochina. Navarre soon changed French tactics from defensive to offensive operations. In July 1953 he flew to Paris to present his plan to win the war. The Navarre Plan called for deployment to Indochina of 20,000 additional French troops, the expansion of the National Vietnamese Army to at least 200,000 men, and the granting of greater independence to the Indochinese states in order to secure their support for a wider war.

In undertaking offensive operations, Navarre set up a major blocking position in northeastern Vietnam that he hoped would prevent a renewed Viet Minh invasion of Laos. He also hoped to draw limited Viet Minh forces into a set-piece battle in which they might be destroyed by French artillery and airpower. Navarre's plan, Operation CASTOR, positioned sizable French military assets in the remote valley town of Dien Bien Phu. Viet Minh commander General Vo Nguyen Giap took the bait, and the result was the March–May 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Minh decision to commit much greater assets than Navarre had anticipated coupled with their success in bringing artillery to the mountains around Dien Bien Phu and Navarre's overestimation of French air capabilities spelled defeat for the besieged and allowed French politicians to shift the blame to the military and extract the nation from the war.

An embittered Navarre retired from the army in 1956 to run a brick factory and to write his memors, *Agonie de l'Indochine* (1956). He died in Paris on 21 June 1983.

BRADFORD WINEMAN

See also

Algerian War; France; France, Army; Indochina War

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Ne Win
(1911–2002)

Burmese general, interim prime minister during 1958–1960, and despotic leader of Burma (Myanmar) during 1960–1988. Ne Win, born Shu Maung to a Chinese family on 24 May 1911 in Paungdale, Burma, was a lackluster student who failed his entrance exams to the University of Rangoon. After that he held a series of odd jobs until joining the nationalist group Dobama Asiayone (Our Burma Association) in 1938, where he met fellow nationalist and future Burmese leaders U Nu and Aung San.

In 1941 Shu Maung was among the so-called Thirty Comrades chosen by Japanese forces occupying Burma to lead the Burmese Independent Army (BIA) against British rule. By 1943 he commanded the BIA and formally adopted the name Ne Win, meaning "radiant sun." In 1945 the BIA switched allegiance, fighting alongside British forces against the Japanese and, later, against communist insurgents.

Aung San, widely considered the "father" of Burma, was assassinated by rivals in July 1947. His heir apparent, U Nu, thus presided over Burma's independence in January 1948. U Nu appointed Ne Win chief of staff of the army, which, like the new country itself, was sharply divided along ethnic lines. He rebuilt and unified the armed forces but was not content in a subservient position. With his sights set on becoming uncontested leader of Burma, in September 1958 he and two other military commanders seized power after they forced U Nu's resignation. In February 1960 the military junta allowed elections that returned U Nu to power. A deteriorating economy and internal strife prompted yet another military coup in March 1962, however, with Ne Win assuming the role as president.

Burmese General Ne Win, who became prime minister and then president of Burma. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Ne Win's Revolutionary Council implemented the "Burmese Way to Socialism." The regime was brutal and corrupt, based on a bizarre mix of extreme nationalism, Stalinism, and indigenous religious practices. Many Burmese dissidents were executed, jailed, or forced to flee the country as the regime savagely repressed ethnic rebellions. Equating capitalism with foreign domination, non-Burmese citizens were stripped of their assets and deported. Banks and industries were nationalized, and private land was expropriated. Profoundly xenophobic, Ne Win virtually sealed Burma off from the outside world. He was himself an odd recluse, pursuing his bizarre fascinations with numerology, Buddhism, and animism. It is rumored that he routinely bathed in dolphins' blood to stay young.

By the 1980s, Burma was desperately poor and hopelessly isolated, despite expectations in 1948 that it would become Asia's success story. Ne Win avoided the revolutions that swept Southeast Asia during the Cold War but nevertheless destroyed Burma's economy and exacerbated internal divisions. On 8 August 1988 he suddenly resigned,

claiming that the date (8-8-88) was propitious. Despite a fleeting hope that democracy might flower after his resignation, generals loyal to him took over and continued his troubling legacy. They continue to rule today amid international condemnation for human rights abuses. Ne Win remained influential until his death, in seclusion, on 5 December 2002 in Yangôn, Myanmar.

Arne Kislenko

See also
Aung San Suu Kyi; Burma; U Nu

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He was himself an odd recluse, pursuing his bizarre fascinations with numerology, Buddhism, and animism. It is rumored that Ne Win routinely bathed in dolphins' blood to stay young.

See Brunei

Negara Brunei Darussalam

Nehru, Jawaharlal
(1889–1964)

Indian nationalist leader and first prime minister of India (1947–1964). Born in Allahabad, India, to a wealthy and influential family on 14 November 1889, Jawaharlal Nehru was tutored in Indian culture and language from an early age. His formal education took place in Britain, where he graduated from Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1910 and the Inner Temple, London's venerable law school, from which he earned a law degree, in 1912. He returned to India in 1912 and joined his father's legal practice but soon entered politics and in 1919 joined Mohandas Gandhi's campaign of civil disobedience to gain Indian autonomy.

However, Nehru wanted more than self-rule and sought complete independence from Britain. In spite of this difference, both Gandhi and Nehru supported and encouraged one another. Nehru's influence on the Indian Congress (INC) was significant, and almost single-handedly he extended the independence movement's agenda to include myriad issues, both domestic and international, that affected the interests of the Indian people.

Nehru also prompted members of the INC to consider the full future of India, that is, what form of government it should have, what rights should be incorporated into its constitution, what India's place in the world should be, and what planning would be necessary to bring about full and unfettered independence. Nehru's involvement in the independence



Indian nationalist leader Jawaharlal Nehru was the first prime minister of independent India during 1947–1964 and a leader of the nonaligned nations during the Cold War. (Library of Congress)

movement resulted in his imprisonment by British authorities on several occasions during the 1930s and 1940s.

During the 1930s, the British government moved tentatively toward granting India self-rule. World War II postponed that plan, however, as the Japanese threat and increased violence between Muslims and Hindus created a turbulent environment during the early 1940s. Following the war, the British Labour government under Prime Minister Clement Attlee moved ahead with plans for an independent India. The major impediment to independence resided in the controversy over whether India would be a single unified state or two separate states: a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan. Nehru envisioned a single state but was persuaded by Lord Louis Mountbatten, viceroy of India, to accept a partitioned India. In August 1947 India and Pakistan gained full independence, and Nehru became India's first prime minister.

By the time India's independence had been established, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was already well under way. While following a general theme of nonalignment, India's foreign policy tended to reflect Nehru's personal preferences. In the 1920s Nehru had visited the Soviet Union and was sympathetic to the goals of communism. In 1949 he made a state visit to the United States and found the experience unnerving, as he found the postwar materialism of American society and the politics of anticommunism very unappealing. Many historians have argued that Nehru's sympathy for the Soviet Union and antipathy toward the West was evident in 1956 when he openly condemned Britain, France, and Israel for their involvement in the Suez Crisis but remained almost silent during the Soviets' brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution that same year. Over time, however, he moved toward a more centrist position as Anglo-American policies became more tolerant of nonaligned nations.

In the late 1950s Nehru was confronted by People's Republic of China (PRC) incursions into Tibet and regions along the border between India and China. At the same time, Indian-Pakistani tensions were repeatedly exacerbated over the contested region of Kashmir. Indian and Pakistani forces clashed frequently in the mostly Muslim Kashmir. In 1962 a border conflict escalated into the Sino-Indian War. The United States supported India in its conflict with China but not in India's struggle with Pakistan, then an American ally. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, expressed support for India in its clash with Pakistan but remained noncommittal regarding the India-China conflict.

Nehru continued his nonaligned stance in spite of these crises, while India's independent foreign policy was viewed admiringly by many of the newly independent states of the developing world. He died in office on

27 May 1964 in New Delhi. Nehru left an indelible mark not only on modern Indian history but also on the history of independence and nationalist movements all around the globe.

William T. Walker

See also

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; India; India-Pakistan Wars; Kashmir Dispute; Mountbatten, Louis, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma; Non-Aligned Movement; Pakistan; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations

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See Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi

Nehru, Swarup Rani

Németh, Miklós
(1948–)

Hungarian reform communist politician and prime minister (1988–1990) who played a key role helping to end the Cold War. Born on 24 January 1948 in Monok, Hungary, Miklós Németh graduated from the University of Economics in Budapest in 1971. During 1971–1977 he taught at the same university, interrupting his professorship in 1974 to study at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

In 1977 Németh became deputy head of a division in the National Planning Institute. During 1981–1987 he served as deputy head and then head of the Department of Economic Policy of the Hungarian Communist Party, and in 1987 he became a member of the party's Political Committee and secretary in charge of economic policy for the party's Central Committee.

On 24 November 1988 Németh was appointed prime minister of Hungary. In this position, he pushed for comprehensive economic and political reforms, which set the stage for Hungary's eventual transition to democracy. On 10 March 1990 he signed an agreement with Moscow that brought about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Following Hungary's first democratic elections in March 1990, József Antall succeeded Németh as prime minister on 23 May 1990. Later in 1990, Németh was elected to parliament

as an independent representative, but he resigned in 1991 when he was appointed vice president of the European Bank for Research and Development in London. He returned to Hungary in 2000 but chose not to reenter the political arena.

Without doubt, Németh was the single most important player in ending communist rule in Hungary and in ushering in the Velvet Revolution. When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev acquiesced to greater independence for Eastern Europe, Németh immediately began to implement fundamental reforms, realizing that such sweeping changes would be next to impossible to reverse once in place. His objective was to reintegrate Hungary and the whole of Eastern Europe into the world economy and the free market system. During his tenure, Németh agreed to the state reburial of Imre Nagy, the executed premier and hero of the 1956 anti-Soviet Hungarian Revolution. Németh opened the border to East German refugees, which triggered a sequence of sweeping international political changes. He ordered the barbed-wire fence along Hungary's western border with Austria removed, and he and other party reformists founded the Hungarian Socialist Party. During his period as premier, the constitution was modified, Hungary was declared a republic, and laws were passed to bring about a new election system and political pluralism.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Europe, Eastern; Hungary

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Nenni, Pietro
(1891–1980)

Italian Socialist Party (PSI) leader, foreign minister (1946, 1968), and vice premier (1963–1968). Born in Faenza, Italy, on 9 February 1891 to a peasant family, Pietro Nenni was influenced in his youth by the local tradition of radical republicanism. He migrated into journalism and in 1911 was jailed for protesting the Italian war in Libya. In 1914 he participated in the demonstrations and strikes known as the Red Week.

Nenni served in the Italian Army in World War I and joined the PSI in 1921. An opponent of Benito Mussolini's fascist regime, he was forced to take up residence in France in 1926 and became one of the leaders of the party. Nenni also edited that party's newspaper, *Avanti,* and fought on the republican side in the Spanish Civil War.

Incarcerated by the Nazis in 1940 and transferred to confinement in Italy, Nenni was liberated in 1943. He became a key player in the Resistance and

played a major role in the birth of the postwar Italian Republic, serving as foreign minister in 1946. He then led the PSI into a close alliance with the Communist Party to help preserve the unity of the Left, forcing a schism with Giuseppe Saragat's moderate faction. This move ultimately paved the way for a major defeat of the Left in the April 1948 elections. Nenni's decision shaped the future of the Italian Left, and it was not until after 1956 that he distanced the PSI from the Communist Party and opened a dialogue with the Christian Democrats.

Nenni's drawn-out negotiations with Amintore Fanfani's Christian Democratic Party—the so-called opening to the Left—finally succeeded in December 1963, when the PSI was readmitted to Aldo Moro's government. Nenni served as vice premier during 1963–1968 and briefly as foreign minister in 1968. His passionate approach to politics made him a widely popular figure in Italy and helped to solidify coalition politics. Nenni died in Rome on 1 January 1980.

Leopoldo Nuti

See also
Italy

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Nepal

South Asian nation covering 54,363 square miles, a little larger than the U.S. state of Arkansas. The Kingdom of Nepal, with a 1945 population of some 6 million people, is located south of the Himalayas and is bordered by Tibet, now part of the People's Republic of China (PRC), to the north and by India to the east, south, and west. A predominantly Hindu nation, the Nepalese constitutional monarchy is the only official Hindu state in the world.

Modern Nepal dates back to the late eighteenth century, when the expansionist Shah dynasty of the Kingdom of Gorkha established control in the foothills of the Himalayas. The establishment of Nepal coincided with establishment of the British East India Company's control in India. An 1816 treaty marking the conclusion of the 1814–1816 Anglo-Gorkha War established a British Resident ruling in Kathmandu. In general, the British refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal while also guaranteeing protection for the kingdom. While Shah rulers remained on the throne, the hereditary prime ministers of the Rana family exercised real political power during 1846–1951. In 1951, disaffected elements of Nepalese society joined with King Tribhuvan (ruled 1906–1955) to overthrow the Rana autocracy.

Gurkha troops of the British Army present their Khukuri knives during a review at Aldershot, England, on 12 October 1971. (Getty Images)

In the two world wars, Nepal supported the British by sending recruits for the Gurkha (distortion of Gorkha) Brigade. Since the nineteenth century, the British had employed Gorkhali fighters for their military needs. A 1947 agreement divided the existing Gurkha battalions between India and the United Kingdom, and a small number of Gurkha soldiers remain in the British Army today.

Nepalese cooperation in World War I partly prompted the 1923 treaty by which Britain recognized Nepal's independence. Hence, when the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent after World War II, Nepal remained an independent kingdom.

Nepalese foreign policy after 1945 continued a long historical trend of nonalignment and the practice of balancing itself among the great powers. Nepal maintained a formally equidistant relationship with both the PRC and India but made overtures toward one or the other when its interests so warranted. Thus, while Nepal espoused neutrality in the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War and the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the government nonetheless bought

arms only from India. Although wary of Chinese expansion, Nepal nonetheless established relations with the PRC in 1955, recognized its sovereignty in neighboring Tibet, and concluded an aid agreement the following year that provided Nepal with Chinese economic and technical assistance.

Nepal dealt with the two Cold War superpowers in a similar fashion. Cordial diplomatic relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union ensured the flow of U.S. and Soviet aid to Nepal. In 1973 at the summit of nonaligned nations in Algiers, King Birendra (ruled 1972–2001) proposed the concept of Nepal as a zone of peace. Some 110 nations have since endorsed this proposal.

Since World War II, Nepal's shift away from its traditional isolationist posture is also reflected in its membership in a variety of international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

From 1951 until the launching of the 1990 prodemocracy movement, Nepal adopted three different constitutions (1951, 1959, and 1962). Although the 1959 constitution created a bicameral legislature, with a popularly elected lower house, disproportionate political power still rested with the reigning monarch. The 1962 constitution, also known as the Panchayat (Council of Elders) Constitution, introduced a form of guided democracy that abolished political parties, created a legislature indirectly elected by members of the local panchayat and other functional groups, and further concentrated royal power.

In 1990 a prodemocracy movement ended the Panchayat system, and a new constitution not only created a multiparty parliamentary system and an independent judiciary but also codified basic individual rights. As subsequent events have shown, this did not stop King Gyanendra (ruled 2001–present) from stepping in and dissolving the government as he saw fit.

From 1996 onward, a guerrilla-style People's War led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), a faction that broke off from the United People's Front, has been a major threat to internal stability. In 2001 Crown Prince Dipendra murdered his father King Birendra, mother, and seven other family members before killing himself. Gyanendra, the new king and Birendra's brother, chose to deal with the Maoist insurgency by dismissing his government in February 2005 and assuming absolute power to rule, a suspension of democracy that he justified in the name of national security.

Soo Chun Lu

See also

India-Pakistan Wars; Non-Aligned Movement; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations; South Asia

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Netherlands

A small and densely populated country of 16,033 square miles, or roughly twice the size of the U.S. state of New Jersey, with a 1945 population of just over 9 million people. The Netherlands is bordered to the north by the North Sea, to the southwest by Belgium, and to the east by Germany. During the Cold War, the Netherlands was a solid and dependable member of the Western community of nations. It was also an economically prosperous and politically stable state that made a significant contribution to the economic unification of Europe, while it played a substantial part in Allied defense efforts with its relatively sizable armed forces.

Few nations suffered the extent of physical damage during World War II that the Netherlands experienced. Its cities, especially Rotterdam, had been subjected to extensive air attack, and at the end of the war defensive flooding inundated large areas. Half of the large Dutch merchant marine was lost in the war. However, economic recovery was surprisingly rapid, and both Amsterdam and Rotterdam soon flourished. Rotterdam became the major entrepôt for oil into Europe from the Middle East and the highest-volume seaport in the world.

Not even the loss of the Netherlands East Indies, formerly a major source of income for the country, prevented the Dutch resurgence. During

A typical scene in the Waalhaven basin, Rotterdam, Netherlands. During the Cold War, Rotterdam was the world's highest-volume port. (Corel)

the war the Japanese had occupied the colony, and they encouraged Ahmed Sukarno to set up an independent state. Weakened by the war, the Dutch had no choice but to acquiesce when Sukarno proclaimed Indonesia a republic in August 1945. The Dutch subsequently tried to reverse events, but heavy pressure from the United States and Britain led the Netherlands to agree in December 1949 to the establishment of the United States of Indonesia within a larger Netherlands-Indonesia Union. Sukarno was unhappy with this solution and continuing ties with the Netherlands, and in 1950 he set up the unitary Republic of Indonesia.

Again under U.S. pressure, the Dutch gave up Dutch New Guinea (Irian) in 1962 to Indonesia. Of its former vast overseas empire, the Netherlands retained only Suriname and Curaçao with a few nearby islands, including Aruba. Surinam, part of the northeastern Latin American mainland, is now independent. In 1954 the Netherlands Antilles, including Curaçao and Aruba, received internal autonomy and equal status, sharing foreign affairs and defense arrangements with the motherland. Although they lost an empire, the Dutch have added to their continuous territory thanks to an ongoing program of draining the Zuider Zee.

Queen Wilhelmina abdicated in 1948 after fifty years on the throne and was replaced by her daughter, Queen Juliana. She, in turn, abdicated in 1980, to be followed on the throne by her daughter Beatrix. Beatrix's marriage to Claus von Amsberg, a German diplomat who had been in the Hitler Youth and in the Reichswehr, was at the time quite controversial.

Although they lost an empire, the Dutch have added to their continuous territory thanks to an ongoing program of draining the Zuider Zee.

The Netherlands has enjoyed one of the longest periods of representative government in all of Europe, although the large number of political parties made parliamentary government at times difficult. In the 1963 elections, for example, twenty-four parties contested, and ten of them won seats in the States General, which is allocated on proportional representation. Two parties dominated: the Catholic People's Party, later part of the Christian Democrats; and the Labor Party. A coalition made up of these two parties ruled the country until 1958, when Labor lost support by its unorthodox policy of wage fixing. After 1958 the Catholic People's Party formed a ruling coalition. In the 1960s and 1970s there was a transition from a center-rightist to a center-leftist government and then, after 1977, a shift back to a center-rightist government. Traditionally, the Christian Democrats or Labor formed cabinets with Labor and/or lesser parties (such as the Liberals).

The Netherlands remains among the world's most liberal states. Dutch theologians clashed with Rome, and Dutch welfare benefits were among the most advanced in Europe. Among controversial issues during the Cold War were the 1976 revelations of payoffs by the Lockheed Corporation to Queen Beatrix's husband, Prince Bernhard, and the decision to approve the stationing of cruise missiles on Dutch territory.

Following World War II, the Dutch abandoned their policy of neutrality, which dated back more than a century, by becoming a signatory to the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This decision was motivated not only by fear of the Soviet Union. Equally important in the short term was the need to ensure American

economic aid. For the longer term, the Netherlands regarded U.S. involvement as the best way of opening up international trade, extremely important for a country dependent on foreign trade, and curbing potential power plays by larger European powers.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 prompted the Netherlands to increase its defense efforts, within the framework of NATO. The Dutch sent a battalion to Korea and nearly doubled their defense budget. The latter was the outcome of intense and prolonged political debate, concluded in early 1951, concerning the direction of the Dutch armed forces. A strong maritime-naval lobby managed to prevail on the initially reluctant government to build a relatively large naval force that included an aircraft carrier, cruisers, frigates, submarines, minesweepers, and aircraft. The Dutch undertook this program against the wishes of the United States and Britain, both of which envisaged modest tasks for the Dutch Navy involving the North Sea and Dutch territorial waters.

The need for the buildup of the army and air force, on the other hand, was not in dispute. In close consultation with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) constructed an army corps with one combat-ready division and just under four mobilizable divisions. The fact that the Netherlands, against the wishes of SHAPE, maintained a large number of mobilizable territorial units showed the limits of NATO influence. The Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) developed into a sizable power with squadrons of fighter jets and squadrons of tactical fighter bombers.

Under Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs J. M. A. H. Luns (1952–1971), the Netherlands showed itself to be a loyal ally. Following the relinquishing of Dutch New Guinea in 1962, the Dutch armed forces concentrated almost exclusively on conventional and nuclear NATO tasks. Thus, the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN), together with Great Britain, focused on the forward combat of the fast-growing Soviet submarine fleet near the Norway-Iceland gap. A second combat-ready division gave added mobility to the army corps. On top of that, a reinforced brigade was garrisoned in close proximity to the deployment area on the North German plain. The RNLAF, with surface-to-air guided weapons, among others, contributed to the Allied air defensive perimeter that extended over Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) territory from the North Sea to the Swiss and Austrian borders.

From the second half of the 1960s, the image of the staid Netherlands was restyled by a number of developments. Young people no longer imbibed traditional concepts and beliefs, instead adopting a more critical stance. Many Dutch began contemplating probing questions. Could the United States, which intervened with large-scale air strikes and napalm in the war in Vietnam, remain the leader of the West? How could continued membership in NATO, which allegedly defended freedom and democracy, be rationalized when these same values were being trampled by dictatorial regimes in various South European states? Was it not time, in a period of détente between East and West, to move the North-South issue to the forefront of the international agenda? For the first time, the Dutch NATO policy and the military

contribution to NATO became the subjects of frenzied public debate in the Netherlands.

The Netherlands also manifested itself strongly in new domains, such as human rights within the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Until the end of the Cold War, however, the Netherlands embraced the policies of maintaining Atlantic unity, the movement toward the economic integration in Western Europe, and a supranational European Economic Community (EEC). The Netherlands made a contribution to the peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) during 1979–1985.

The UNIFIL episode coincided with the dramatic national and international debate on the stationing of new intermediate-range nuclear weapons on the territories of Belgium, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands. After three times deferring a decision, the Dutch government finally agreed at the end of 1985 to the United States flying in forty-eight cruise missiles. The Dutch behavior was a source of constant irritation to its allies, who characterized it as "Hollanditis" or the "Dutch disease." The ratification by Moscow and Washington of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Convention in 1987, which provided for the removal from Europe of all American and Soviet nuclear arms of intermediate range, precluded the actual stationing of the cruise missiles. This agreement formed part of a period of relaxation that ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Jan Hoffenaar and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Brussels Treaty; Indonesia; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Sukarno

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Neutron Bomb

A nuclear device, also called an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW), designed to minimize the usual catastrophic blast effects of a conventional nuclear

detonation while releasing large and concentrated amounts of deadly radiation. Invented by the American scientist Sam Cohen at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, neutron bombs are thought to have been first added to the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the mid-1970s. The bomb is a nuclear device similar in construction to other small thermonuclear devices. However, the neutron bomb differs in that its explosive yield is purposefully capped. Thus, damage to structures is limited in scope.

The bomb's true effectiveness as a weapon comes in the amount of radiation that is unleashed in a fairly concentrated area. Indeed, the radioactive yield of a neutron bomb can be many times more potent than that of other nuclear warheads. Upon detonation, a neutron bomb unleashes massive amounts of ionizing radiation (neutrons, hence its name), which in turn delivers an immobilizing electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and a lethal dose of radiation.

Because of its unique characteristics, the neutron bomb had several tactical uses. First, it could be deployed around U.S. nuclear missile silos and detonated during a Soviet missile attack. The damaging EMP would disrupt the electronics of incoming missiles and render them inoperable. Second, the neutron bomb was built to be deployed as a tactical (or battlefield) nuclear bomb. In this case, it would be used to kill soldiers protected by armor and to stop advancing armored vehicles such as tanks, which tended to be somewhat more impervious to the effects of nuclear-induced blast and heat. The lethal doses of radiation would kill humans almost instantly, while the EMP would render mechanized vehicles useless. Finally, the bomb could be used as a tactical weapon in densely populated areas (such as Central and Western Europe) without causing wholesale destruction to surrounding towns or cities. Of course, many of the alleged benefits of the neutron bomb were theoretical and oversold. Damage to surrounding structures, not to mention to people, would have been astronomical anywhere near ground zero. Cohen also made the argument that the bomb could be a highly effective antiship weapon if detonated high above enemy vessels.

In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter's administration announced its intention to deploy tactical neutron bombs in Europe, ostensibly to stop a Soviet armored attack against the West. The decision brought immediate consternation in Western Europe as well as in the United States. Mass protests quickly ensued across Western Europe, and Belgium, Holland, and Norway publicly refused to allow neutron bomb deployments on their soil. Carter had intended to deploy neutron warheads on Lance missiles and as artillery shells in Europe. In the spring of 1978, he announced that he was delaying production of the bomb but was reserving the right to go forward with it at a later date for the purposes of negotiating future arms control deals.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan pledged to reverse the Carter administration's neutron bomb moratorium. When Reagan became president in 1981, he gave the green light to resume neutron bomb production. It is believed that approximately 1,000 neutron bombs were built during the early and mid-1980s, but strong antinuclear campaigns in Western Europe prevented the deployment of the

weapons. At the same time, the Soviets, French, Chinese, and Israelis all embarked on neutron bomb programs or built their own stockpile of ERWs.

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See also

Atomic Bomb; Hydrogen Bomb; Nuclear-Free Zones; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; Tank Warfare

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New Look Defense Policy

Embraced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration on 30 October 1953, through the National Security Council (NSC) policy document NSC 162/2, the New Look defense policy was designed to implement U.S. military policy in a more cost-effective way without losing any ground in the Cold War. During the 1952 presidential election, Eisenhower had criticized President Harry S. Truman's administration both for being soft on communism and for risking the economic health of the nation due to high defense costs and budget deficits. Once in office, the Eisenhower administration sought a new policy that would fulfill its election pledges and address the events that unfolded during 1953.

Following the start of the Korean War in June 1950, the defense budget had nearly quadrupled by 1953, a fact that greatly troubled President Eisenhower. Working with his treasury secretary, George Humphrey, and his director of the Bureau of the Budget, Joseph Dodge, the president proposed a policy of fiscal conservatism that would help balance the budget and allow the nation to wage the Cold War without risking its economic well-being.

The need for a new defense posture was highlighted further when the policymaking apparatus of the Eisenhower administration ground to a halt as its leading protagonists were racked by indecision in the wake of Soviet leader Josef Stalin's death in March 1953 and the East German uprising in June of the same year. Leading members of the NSC argued over how best to exploit these situations and whether or not the United States should seize the initiative and attempt to roll back communism. In May 1953, Eisenhower launched Operation SOLARIUM, which established three task forces to study and debate the future of American military policy. Task Force A was headed by George Kennan and advocated a scenario loosely based on the containment policy already in place; Task Force B, led by Major General James McCormack, proposed a more muscular type of containment that would emphasize nuclear deterrence; and Task Force C, headed by Admiral Richard L. Conolly, examined the potential of a policy that would liberate

Eastern Europe by rolling back communism. By July 1953 all three task forces had reported their findings to the NSC, although they were unable to reach consensus on the preferred course of action. Ultimately, the approach chosen would borrow from all three recommendations.

Discounting the 1950 NSC-68 policy document that presumed 1954 would be the "year of maximum danger," NSC 162/2 instead outlined a plan that would see the United States prepare for a long-haul struggle. The document called for greater use of covert operations and psychological warfare, an increase in aid to European and Asian allies, and a readiness to use nuclear weapons as a first response to any Soviet aggressive action, be it conventional or nuclear. At the same time, the New Look would decrease reliance on conventional forces, which, it was hoped, would bring down defense expenditures. The document was eventually initialed by Eisenhower on 30 October 1953. The policy was soon put into place, although U.S. defense budgets fell only marginally during 1954–1958 before rising once more.

Bevan Sewell

See also

Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennan, George Frost; Military Balance; National Security Council Report NSC-68

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New Thinking Policy

An important component of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's far-reaching perestroika reform agenda begun in 1985 and designed to bring about a new approach to Soviet foreign policy. New thinking (novoe myshlenie) acknowledged that a superpower nuclear exchange would bring about mutual assured destruction (MAD). Thus, a major goal of new thinking was to greatly ease tensions between East and West.

In July 1985, for example, Gorbachev unilaterally announced a moratorium on nuclear tests to demonstrate his commitment to nuclear arms reductions. President Ronald Reagan dismissed the initiative as propaganda, and when Gorbachev came under fire from Soviet military leaders, he was forced to back away from the moratorium. Even so, he never allowed nuclear tests to resume at the same scale as before the moratorium. In 1987, he negotiated reductions in both nations' nuclear arsenals via the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite Gorbachev's agreement to a highly disproportionate reduction of Soviet missiles, Reagan insisted on moving forward

President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev addressing the United Nations, December 1988. (Robert Maass/Corbis)

with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which in turn threatened Gorbachev's ability to further justify Soviet disarmament on a large scale. The most important example of the new thinking in Soviet foreign policy was Gorbachev's December 1988 speech to the United Nations (UN) in which he announced a dramatic reduction in Soviet conventional forces and committed the USSR to grant freedom of choice to East European nations.

The explanation for this radical shift in Soviet foreign policy is twofold. First, Gorbachev recognized that his nation could no longer afford to engage in a never-ending arms race because of the severe strains under which the Soviet economy was laboring. Second, the new thinking was based on a fundamental shift in ideology. The influx and acceptance of new ideas, particularly from Western Europe, prompted greater awareness of the advantages of a free-market economy and an open society.

These new ideas were aimed toward incrementally transforming the Soviet economy to a mixed system of free market and central planning. This synthesis of socialism and capitalism sought to create a new hybridized form of socialism. In foreign policy, the new thinking turned present economic weakness into a moral strength. By reducing military spending, perestroika reforms were meant to unburden the Soviet economy while at the same time demonstrating the moral superiority of the new Soviet socialism. Instead of promoting the age-old class struggle and the East-West antagonism that went with it, new thinking based Soviet foreign policy on universal human values

and the creation of a new and mutually beneficial system of security in Europe and around the world. Ultimately, of course, the new thinking wrought historical changes that neither Gorbachev nor his fellow reformers could have envisioned. The new thinking not only hastened the end of the Cold War but also led to the dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1991.

Frank Beyersdorf

See also

Arms Control; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Market Socialism; Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Perestroika; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strategic Defense Initiative; Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev

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New Zealand

English-speaking island nation in the South Pacific Ocean located approximately 1,000 miles to the southeast of Australia. With an area of 104,454 square miles and a population of approximately 1.7 million in 1945, New Zealand experienced the Cold War as a product of both its geographic isolation and its own foreign policy priorities.

Domestically, the Cold War influenced New Zealand politics. In 1949 the New Zealand National Party came to power under a platform aimed at safeguarding the country against communism and socialism. The National Party retained power in New Zealand for much of the remainder of the Cold War.

New Zealand formalized its relationship with the United States via the September 1951 Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Pact. The ANZUS Pact provided New Zealand with some assurances that the United States would come to its assistance if attacked, while New Zealand's interpretation of the pact served as its guide for Cold War foreign policy. The treaty is significant in that it was the first one signed by New Zealand without the United Kingdom and ultimately led to New Zealand's participation in various Cold War conflicts around the world.

New Zealand was one of the first countries to respond to the call by the United Nations (UN) for troops in support of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) after that country was invaded by the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea (DPRK, North Korea) on 25 June 1950. On 26 July, the New Zealand government voted to raise a volunteer force, known as Kayforce, to serve with UN forces in Korea. Kayforce remained in Korea until 1957, almost four years after the July 1953 armistice. Nearly 6,000 New Zealanders served in Korea during this period, with 33 killed in action.

Concurrent with the Korean War, New Zealand responded to British appeals for support during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960). New Zealand contributed a number of different types of forces to the Commonwealth cause against the communist insurgents, and in the process fifteen New Zealanders died. New Zealand also contributed to the Commonwealth force that operated in Borneo during Indonesia's *konfrontasi* policy during 1963–1965 and remained involved in the region until October 1966, after which time its Cold War focus turned to the conflict in Vietnam.

New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War began in 1962, when it sent a small number of military advisors to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in support of that country's war against communist insurgents. In May 1965, New Zealand agreed to add an artillery battery to its Vietnam contingent. Prime Minister Keith Holyoake (1957, 1960–1972) helped push through parliament a resolution to introduce additional forces in June 1966 that fell under the operational control of the Australian Task Force positioned in Phouc Tuy Province. Approximately 3,900 New Zealanders served in Vietnam during 1962–1972, with a peak strength of 543 in January 1969. Thirty-eight soldiers were killed in the war.

In 1972, New Zealand elected the Labour Party to power, altering the country's foreign policy objectives and Cold War experiences. The Labour Party had opposed New Zealand's Vietnam War participation and believed that an adjustment in that country's alliance system was required in order to avoid future foreign entanglements. Prime Minister Norman Kirk (1972–1974), who oversaw New Zealand's withdrawal from Vietnam, pushed for a more independent foreign policy that limited American and British influences in favor of action better suited toward New Zealand's regional goals. The first test of this new policy emerged in the Middle East. When the United States called for a trade embargo against Iran after Iranian students had taken hostages from the American embassy in Tehran in 1979, New Zealand refused to go along. The first significant movement away from New Zealand's traditional Cold War policy would culminate six years later with a break between the two Cold War allies.

While New Zealand's Cold War experience often occurred beyond its borders, the perceived threat of communist agent provocateurs was always present during the period. One prominent example was the case of William Ball Sutch who, in September 1974, was charged under the 1951 Official Secrets Act with passing information to Soviet embassy officials. Sutch, New Zealand representative to various UN offices and secretary for the Department of Industries and Commerce, was accused of being a communist. He was acquitted in February 1975 after an investigation yielded no evidence that he had passed information or had been a member of the Communist

Party. The episode, however, was a reminder that the Cold War mentality that pitted the Western world against communism could permeate even a remote island-nation such as New Zealand.

Toward the end of the Cold War, the New Zealand government reassessed its international position. In January 1985, when the U.S. Navy destroyer *Buchanan* was scheduled to make a visit to Auckland, Labour Party Prime Minister David Lange (1984–1989) asked for assurances that the ship carried no nuclear weapons. Because it was American policy not to identify whether one of its ships possessed nuclear weapons, the visit was denied. This event precipitated a rift between the two countries during which the United States canceled nearly thirty combined military exercises and stopped sharing intelligence information. In August 1986, the rift widened when the United States officially proclaimed that it no longer considered New Zealand a participating member of the ANZUS Pact, and New Zealand was thus no longer eligible for U.S. security guarantees.

This rupture in relations occurred near the end of the Cold War. It was probably no coincidence that the two events were contemporaneous. The end of the Cold War called for a reevaluation of foreign policy objectives for all involved. For New Zealand, whose reliance upon the United States resulted in its participation in a number of Cold War battles, the end of the Cold War meant an opportunity to realign itself toward regional matters. The rift did not last long, as the two countries, which shared similar histories and traditions of democracy, searched for accommodation and consensus following the Cold War.

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See also

ANZUS Pact; Australia; Korean War; Malayan Emergency; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Vietnam War

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Ngo Dinh Diem
(1901–1963)

Vietnamese politician, prime minister of the State of Vietnam during 1954–1955, and president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1955–1963. Born on 3 January 1901 in Hue to an aristocratic Roman Catholic family with close ties to Vietnamese Emperor Thanh Thai, Ngo

Ngo Dinh Diem, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), shown during a visit to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on 11 May 1957. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Dinh Diem for a time considered entering the priesthood. His elder brother, Ngo Dinh Thue, became a priest and eventually archbishop of Saigon. Diem graduated from the School of Law and Administration of the University of Hanoi in 1921 and embarked on a promising career as a public administrator. He became a provincial governor at age twenty-five, and at age thirty-two he joined the cabinet of the youthful emperor Bao Dai. During and after World War II, Diem opposed both French colonial rule and the communist-led national independence movement.

In 1945, Diem rejected an offer from Ho Chi Minh to join the communist-dominated Viet Minh as premier of the short-lived Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) government because he viewed the communists as a threat to his Catholic values and to his vision of an independent Vietnam and because the North Vietnamese government had executed one of his brothers. Diem left Vietnam in 1950 in self-imposed exile. During the next four years, he traveled extensively in Europe and the United States. He lived in a Catholic seminary in New Jersey for two years, and there he met

several prominent American Catholics, including Cardinal Francis Spellman and then-Senator John F. Kennedy. Through his youngest brother, Ngo Dinh Luyen, Diem also kept in contact with Dai. As the French negotiated their exit from Indochina at the 1954 Geneva Conference, Dai named Diem prime minister in June 1954.

In October 1955, with the help of his large family, especially his younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem staged a referendum that deposed Dai and made Diem president of the newly created South Vietnamese government. Most of the key positions in the new government went to Diem's family and friends or to fellow Catholics, although the latter comprised only 10 percent of the population. Diem's government was characterized by corruption, nepotism, and favoritism. His secret police, directed by brother Nhu, sought to repress all political opposition. With American support, Diem canceled the 1956 elections that had been called for in the Geneva Accords. Discontent in South Vietnam grew into an armed insurgency, which North Vietnam clandestinely helped organize as the National Liberation Front (NLF).

American officials had harbored doubts about Diem's leadership since 1954 but overlooked his liabilities because of his staunch anticommunist stance, trumpeting him as a leader who had triumphed over great obstacles to create an independent South Vietnam. Diem refused to accept American advice to institute domestic reforms to win the support of the South Vietnamese people, and he would not accept American advice on the choice of his army commanders and tactics to win the guerrilla war then raging. As his regime became more oppressive, even forbidding Buddhist religious observances in a country that was 80 percent Buddhist, Diem faced growing challenges not only from Buddhist monks but also from students, peasants, NLF guerrillas, and even members of his own armed forces. As the situation grew more untenable, a group of South Vietnamese generals, tacitly supported by the U.S. government and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), plotted against Diem. The coup began on 1 November 1963, and the next day Diem and his brother Nhu were assassinated. Although President Kennedy voiced shock at Diem's murder, his administration was certainly complicit in the coup. After Diem's death, South Vietnam was ruled by a rapid succession of unstable military governments.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Geneva Conference (1954); Ho Chi Minh; Southeast Asia; Vietnam

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Nguyen Cao Ky
(1930–)

Vietnamese military officer and politician, premier of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1965–1967, and vice president during 1967–1971. Born on 8 September 1930 in Son Tay, Nguyen Cao Ky graduated from high school and in 1951 was drafted into the Vietnamese National Army, formed to fight the communist-led Viet Minh. Following six months of officer training, he was commissioned an infantry lieutenant. Volunteering for pilot training, he spent two years in France and Morocco and returned to Vietnam in 1954 a fully qualified pilot.

Ky rose rapidly in rank in the new Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF, South Vietnamese) and participated in the November 1963 coup against Ngo Dinh Diem that brought General Duong Van Minh to power. That same month, Ky was promoted to brigadier general and assumed command of the RVNAF, a post he held until June 1965. In January 1964 he supported Major General Nguyen Khanh in a coup against Minh. The new regime promoted Ky to major general. In 1965, after several more coups and changes of government, a group of military officers known as the Armed Forces Council formed a new government, and Ky was subsequently elected premier while Nguyen Van Thieu, an army general, became the head of state.

As premier, Ky directed the daily operations of the government and played the principal role in meetings with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Hawaii in February 1966. As the 1967 presidential election approached, he and Thieu vied for control of the government. The Armed Forces Council put Thieu at the head of its ticket and gave Ky the vice presidential slot, based solely on military seniority. They won the election, with 34.8 percent of the vote against ten other tickets.

Alienated from Thieu, Ky intended to challenge him in the 1971 elections but instead decided to retire from politics when he found that the Thieu faction would never permit a free and unfettered election. Ky was well known for his personal integrity and honesty, and he never trusted Thieu or his supporters. Although the Republic of Vietnam Supreme Court agreed to permit Ky's name on the ballot, he nevertheless chose to withdraw from the race.

Ky publicly criticized Thieu's leadership in the last days of South Vietnam, proclaiming defiantly that he would never leave Vietnam. On 29 April 1975, however, as North Vietnamese forces closed in on Saigon, Ky flew a helicopter to a U.S. aircraft carrier off the coast and later settled in California. In 2004, he became the first former South Vietnamese leader to visit Vietnam.

James H. Willbanks

South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson during their discussions regarding the Vietnam War in Honolulu, Hawaii, 7 February 1966. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

See also
Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Van Thieu; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Nguyen Van Thieu
(1923–2001)

Military officer and president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1967–1973. Born on 5 April 1923 in Try Thu, Ninh Thuan Province, the son of a small land owner, Nguyen Van Thieu was educated in Roman Catholic secondary schools in Hue. He joined the Viet Minh nationalist organization in 1945 but became disillusioned with it because of its hard-line communist leanings. He abandoned his flirtation with the Viet Minh and attended the National Military Academy in Hue, graduating in 1949. He also attended infantry school in France and the staff college in Hanoi in 1952. As a battalion commander in 1954, he drove the Viet Minh from his native village.

Following the 1954 division of Vietnam, in 1955 Thieu assumed command of the South Vietnamese Military Academy in Da Lat and then rose rapidly through the ranks of the South Vietnamese army. During the military coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, Colonel Thieu led a regiment of his troops against the presidential palace. Promoted to brigadier general, shortly thereafter he became a member of General Duong Van Minh's ruling Military Revolutionary Council. Thieu and a group of other officers led a coup against Duong in January 1964, which brought Major General Nguyen Khanh to power. Thieu cooperated with a subsequent coup against Khanh and was appointed deputy prime minister in the short-lived government of Dr. Phan Huy Quat. In June 1965, Thieu was promoted to lieutenant general and became chief of state and chairman of the military junta, the National Leadership Committee, while General Nguyen Cao Ky was installed as prime minister.

In the 1967 presidential elections held under the auspices of a new constitution, the junta selected Thieu as the presidential candidate and Ky as the vice presidential nominee. They won the election with 34.8 percent of the vote against ten other tickets. Staunchly anticommunist, Thieu presided over a regime that opposed any settlement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and its National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam. Taking advantage of the January 1968 Tet Offensive, he launched a general mobilization that doubled the size of the South Vietnamese armed forces. In 1971, he finessed an election law that effectively

disqualified his major opponents, Ky and Minh. Thieu was thus reelected president in 1971.

Agreement was reached in the Paris Peace Talks in late 1972 on a framework to end the war, and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger traveled to Saigon to present it to Thieu. He rejected the agreement, however, believing that it provided few guarantees and that the U.S. government had betrayed South Vietnam in the negotiations, chiefly because People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces did not have to withdraw from South Vietnam but merely had to promise not to reinforce. When the North Vietnamese refused to renegotiate, President Richard M. Nixon ordered extensive bombing of North Vietnam in December 1972. This brought Hanoi back to the negotiating table, and a new peace agreement was reached in January 1973 with a few cosmetic changes. Kissinger insisted that Thieu sign or face the end of U.S. aid.

As the last of the American troops departed, fighting resumed in South Vietnam between the two sides, and Thieu ordered attacks on areas controlled by the communists in defiance of the peace agreement. By mid-1974, the so-called Third Indochina War was well under way. The situation steadily deteriorated for the South Vietnamese government forces, especially after the U.S. Congress reduced military aid to Saigon and Nixon resigned because of the Watergate scandal in August 1974.



Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during 1967–1973. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

When the North Vietnamese government launched the Ho Chi Minh Campaign in the spring of 1975, Thieu made the disastrous decision to abandon northern South Vietnam, which precipitated collapse elsewhere. On 21 April 1975, with PAVN forces closing in on Saigon, he appeared on television and addressed his people. He accepted no blame himself and denounced the United States. Five days later, he fled to Taiwan in a U.S. transport plane. Thieu later settled in the United States and died in Boston, Massachusetts, on 29 September 2001.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Kissinger, Henry; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nguyen Cao Ky; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam

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Nicaragua

Central American nation encompassing 49,998 square miles, slightly bigger than the U.S. state of New York. With a 1945 population of just 1 million people, Nicaragua borders Honduras to the north, Costa Rica to the south, the Pacific Ocean to the west, and the Caribbean Sea to the east.

Nicaragua gained its independence from Spain in 1821. In 1823, Agustin Iturbide, the Mexican emperor in charge of the region, was overthrown. The United Provinces of Central America, led by Guatemala, rebelled and created a federation. Soon, each Central American entity became a republic, and the federation dissolved in 1838.

Considerable political turmoil characterized Nicaragua during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. The strategic position of the country attracted the attention of the larger powers, first Great Britain and then the United States. In 1850, the United States and Britain signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, thereby agreeing to joint control of a canal across Nicaragua. The treaty is emblematic of American will to dominate the area, as Nicaragua's government was not even consulted before the treaty was signed.

In addition to U.S. governmental involvement in Nicaragua, there were also American adventurers, known as filibusters, always eager to be part of the Nicaraguan predicament, sometimes even in opposition to U.S. official policy. The most prominent of these filibusters was William Walker, who invaded Nicaragua in 1851. Walker's invasion was defeated by a coalition of Nicaraguan political parties in 1858, with the support of Great Britain and the economic aid of Cornelius Vanderbilt, the American financier and railroad magnate.

U.S. troops intervened repeatedly to protect the economic interests of the United States. A major intervention occurred in 1927 to stop a civil war. Some Nicaraguans resented such frequent intrusions in their national affairs and organized a guerrilla campaign led by Liberal Party General Augusto César Sandino. Although Washington considered Sandino an outlaw, many Latin Americans supported him as a resistance hero.

In 1932 Liberal leader Juan Sacasa won the presidential elections, and the United States withdrew its troops. President Sacasa appointed Anastasio Somoza as director general of the Nicaraguan Army (National Guard). In June 1936, the ambitious Somoza overthrew Sacasa and took control of the presidency and the Liberal Party. From 1936 to 1979, a Somoza dynasty ruled Nicaragua through its control of the National Guard. Before his death in 1956, Somoza had transformed the country into a family estate. His two sons, Luis and Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle, subsequently controlled Nicaragua's politics and economy.

The Somoza brothers continued their father's personal dictatorship. Congress chose Luis Somoza to complete his father's term. In 1966, Tachito became president and commander of the National Guard. Ruthless dictators who played on Cold War sensibilities, the Somozas presented themselves as the last anticommunist bulwark in Latin America. They ruled Nicaragua with fierce anticommunist rhetoric and by torturing and killing their political opponents. The Somozas controlled not only Nicaragua's politics and the army

Nicaragua, 1979

but also the entire economy. In 1979, the Somoza family's personal wealth was estimated at $900 million.

By the mid-1970s, Somoza's control began to erode. An earthquake destroyed Managua in 1972, killing more than 10,000 people and leaving many more homeless. With complete disregard of the tragedy, Somoza profited from the international aid and the control of government contracts for reconstruction. Such corruption strengthened the armed opposition known as the Sandinista Front, a radical leftist organization inspired by the 1959 Cuban Revolution. In 1974, Somoza ran for president in fraudulent elections in which the leader of the legal opposition refused to participate and which Archbishop Miguel Obando refused to recognize. Needless to say, Nicaragua remained desperately poor as the Somoza dynasty siphoned off any money earmarked for poverty mitigation and economic development. While the Somozas weaned the country from its reliance on banana imports, they did nothing to build or modernize the economy.

When Jimmy Carter became president of the United States, human rights became a central focus of U.S. policy toward Latin America. Somoza felt betrayed by an American president who placed human rights above anti-communist loyalties. The Carter administration viewed Somoza as a liability rather than an asset to the United States and began to pressure him to implement reforms.

On 10 January 1978, a plot organized by Pedro Ramos, a right-wing Cuban American exile, killed the leader of Nicaragua's moderate opposition, Pedro

Young Sandinista guerrillas man a position in Masaya, Nicaragua, on 25 July 1979. The boy at left is armed with a slingshot. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Joaquín Chamorro. Somoza was blamed for the murder, catalyzing a united front against the dictatorship. Afraid that a reformist solution might neutralize their insurrection, the radical Sandinistas had accelerated their armed struggle in 1977 and created a national front. The Sandinista opposition found receptive friends not only in Cuba but also in Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Panama, which recognized a state of belligerency in Nicaragua. Indeed, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a resolution declaring Somoza "the fundamental cause" of the Nicaraguan crisis.

On 28 May 1979 the opposition proclaimed a provisional government in San José, centered on a democratic program of political pluralism and a mixed economy. During the first half of 1979, the Sandinista leftists undertook a formidable guerrilla offensive with massive military aid from Cuba, Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica. The different Sandinista factions also reconciled among themselves, focusing on the overthrow of Somoza and suspending ideological differences. Some were social democrats, others were Marxists, and a significant group was Fidel Castro's sympathizers. On 19 July 1979, the insurrection triumphed. A Nicaraguan provisional government was inaugurated with massive popular support and international approval. According to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, more than 45,000

Nicaraguans had died during the war against Somoza, and the country had suffered more than $2 billion in economic losses.

Carter's policy toward the Sandinistas tried to avoid a confrontation of the kind that pushed Castro into the Soviet bloc. In September 1979, Carter met with Daniel Ortega, Sergio Ramírez, and Alfonso Robelo, leaders of the new government. In the meeting, Carter and Ortega agreed not to let the past interfere with relations between the two governments. The Carter administration then announced that it would not support the ex-Somoza guardsmen who were organizing subversive activities. At the same time, Carter pointed out that human rights were a major concern of the United States. The Nicaraguan officials expressed support for the policy and committed to not aiding civil conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador.

The end of détente by 1980 influenced the mood in both Washington and Managua. In Nicaragua, the moderate members of the junta—Robelo and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro—resigned when the Sandinistas packed the Council of State with their own supporters. In the United States, new U.S. President Ronald Reagan defined Nicaragua as a test case to stop Marxist subversion. His presidential campaign platform had called for terminating all economic aid to Nicaragua and for supporting anti-Sandinista forces.

Whereas Carter had tried to keep Nicaragua out of the East-West conflict, the Reagan administration transformed Central America into a Cold War battleground. On 9 March 1981, Reagan instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to organize covert antigovernment actions and to support the group of Somoza loyalists led by Colonel Enrique Bermúdez who were already battling against the Sandinista government. Yet the Reagan administration faced two main obstacles in its unilateralist policy toward Nicaragua. Domestically, the U.S. Congress was reluctant to engage in a war, and it reduced and then banned aid to the anti-Sandinista forces (Contras). In Nicaragua, a significant sector of the opposition did not support the radicalization of the revolution but instead sought a third negotiated option to the Contra program. Indeed, this internal moderate opposition was critical of Reagan's support of the Contras and finally articulated an alternative to both the Sandinistas and Contras.

The civil war in Nicaragua cost more than 30,000 lives and close to $2.5 billion, without increasing the likelihood of a stable democracy or dislodging the Sandinistas from power. The ideologues behind the war in Washington and Managua provided each other with enough provocation and cannon fodder to last for more than a decade of war in Nicaragua, with important ramifications for El Salvador and Guatemala. In addition, between 1986 and 1988, congressional reports confirmed that Reagan administration officials diverted profits from arm sales to Iran to provide illegal support to the Contras in what became the Iran-Contra Affair.

Alarmed by Reagan's interventionist policy and the deterioration of Nicaraguan democracy under the Sandinistas, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama created the Contadora Group in January to search for a Latin American solution to the Nicaraguan problem. After democratization processes

More than 45,000 Nicaraguans had died during the war against Somoza, and the country had suffered more than $2 billion in economic losses.

in South America, the Contadora Group included a support group (consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru) that provided a unified appeal for regional agreements of peace and reconciliation among and within Central American countries and that received significant support from the democratic majority in the U.S. Congress.

In February 1989 another summit of Central American presidents held in El Salvador led the Sandinista government to agree to hold elections in early 1990. The internationally supervised elections of 25 February 1990 brought an opposition victory and a democratic transition process under the moderate leadership of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.

Arturo Lopez-Levy

See also

Americas; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Castro, Fidel; Contadora Group; Contras; Cuba; Détente; Human Rights; Iran-Contra Affair; Sandinistas; Somoza Debayle, Anastasio; Somoza García, Anastasio

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Niebuhr, Reinhold
(1892–1971)

Influential Protestant U.S. theologian and political activist, perhaps most well known for his ideas that link Christian principles with statecraft and diplomacy, and also a key contributor to modern-day just war theories. Karl Paul Reinhold Niebuhr was born on 21 June 1892 in Wright City, Missouri, the son of German immigrants. His father was a Protestant minister. From an early age, Niebuhr exhibited interest in pursuing a clerical career. He graduated from Elmhurst College in Elmhust, Illinois, in 1910, majoring in religion and theology. From there he went to the Eden Theological Seminary in St. Louis, from which he graduated in 1913. He entered Yale University in 1914 and received a master's degree in theology in 1915. That same year, he was ordained to the Evangelical Synod, an offshoot of the German Lutheran Church.

Niebuhr's first assignment was the pastorate of the Detroit Evangelical Church, which mainly served automobile workers. There he came to identify with the harsh effects of industrialization on American workers. He soon became an archenemy of industrialist Henry Ford and a staunch proponent of unionization. The effects of World War I infused Niebuhr with a powerful strain of pacifism, which he extolled both in print and from the pulpit.

In 1928 Niebuhr took a faculty position at New York's famed Union Theological Seminary. In the 1930s he strongly advocated on behalf of the more militant faction of the Socialist Party of America, and he believed that a united front that included the Communist Party of the United States was the only prescription for the ills of the Great Depression. World War II moved Niebuhr away from his earlier pacifist stances. Indeed, he became a supporter of war to arrest the march of the Axis powers.

During and after World War II, Niebuhr continued to modify his beliefs and political sympathies. He became the key adherent of what would be called Christian Realism, which advocated a tough approach to politics and diplomacy, especially those that dealt with communist powers such as the Soviet Union. Soon, he became an influential anticommunist crusader and a supporter of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. Indeed, he had come full circle from his early years in the ministry.

Niebuhr had a profound influence on policymakers and political thinkers such as George F. Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau, who are credited with the rise of political realism, a direct offshoot of Christian Realism. From the early 1950s through the mid-1970s, Niebuhr's prolific writings and lectures on theology, politics, and social issues made him the most important theologian of the time and one of the top political philosophers of the mid–Cold War period. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. read widely in Niebuhr's many works.

In the end, Niebuhr expressed optimism in the U.S. journey toward social justice, despite the prickly issues that were emerging from the Vietnam War. He was perhaps unique for his era in the sense that he was able to straddle the political and the theological so ably. His influence on social, political, and religious thinking cast a long shadow over the Cold War and continues to influence modern-day thinking. Niebuhr retired from the ministry in 1960 and died in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, on 1 June 1971.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Just War Theory; Kennan, George Frost; King, Martin Luther, Jr.

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Nigeria

Western African nation and Africa's most populous country. Nigeria covers 356,667 square miles, about one-third larger than the U.S. state of Texas. Nigeria is bordered by Benin to the west, Cameroon to the east, the Gulf of

Guinea to the south, and Niger and Chad to the north. In 1945 Nigeria's population numbered 22 million and by 1990 had grown to at least 90 million. During the Cold War, the country gained independence from Britain (1960), underwent a civil war (1967–1970), and alternated between short periods of democratic government and long spells of military rule.

Since its days as a British colony, Nigeria has been divided along ethnic and geographic lines. Among hundreds of ethnic groupings, three are especially prominent, as reflected in the regional division of the country at the time of independence. Muslims of the linked Hausa and Fulani groups dominate the northern half, or Northern Region, of Nigeria. The Western Region, which takes up the quadrant of the country to the south and west of the Niger River, is populated heavily by the Yoruba people. The southeastern quadrant of Nigeria, known as the Eastern Region, is home to a large population of Igbo (or Ibo) people.

Britain made the kingdom of Lagos into a Crown colony in 1861 and then expanded its imperial influence along the Niger Delta in the 1870s and 1880s. By the turn of the twentieth century, virtually all of modern Nigeria was under British control. In 1914, British officials united the Muslim Northern Region and the mostly Christian Southern Region under a single administration. Following World War II, Britain slowly granted more autonomy to Nigeria's native population. British policy favored continued federation for the rival ethnic regions and also institutionalized the preeminence of the Muslim Northern Region.

Nigeria gained its independence on 1 October 1960 under civilian leadership and formalized a federation style of government in 1963. While this structure was meant to provide the various regions with a high degree of autonomy, in practice the central federal government has typically dominated affairs. At independence, Nigeria was divided into just three regions, but over time it continued to subdivide and reapportion provinces in response to the political demands of smaller ethnic groups. There are now dozens of states.

The country elected rulers democratically until January 1966, when a coup overthrew the First Republic and Major General Aguiyi Ironsi came to power. Ironsi himself fell to another coup just six months later, when senior military officer Yakubu Gowon seized power. Gowon ruled during 1966–1975. Subsequent military rulers of the country included Ramat Mohammed (1975–1976), Olusegun Obasanjo (1976–1979), Muhammad Buhari (1983–1985), Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993), and Sani Abacha (1993–1998). A civilian, Shehu Shagari, served as president during the years of the Second Republic (1979–1983).

Regional tensions in Nigeria came to a head in 1967, when the Eastern Region attempted to secede from the Nigerian federation as an independent nation called Biafra. Despite some international support for the Biafran cause, Nigeria's federal government had defeated the separatist movement by 1970. More than a million people died during the conflict. Most of the deaths occurred among the Eastern Region separatists, and many of those deaths were caused by starvation, as federal military forces used blockades of food and food shipments as a key strategic weapon to crush the rebellion.



An Ibo tribesman inspects a rifle at a training camp in Owerri in July 1968. Following their training, the soldiers joined the fighting in Biafra's war against Nigerian federal forces. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The 1970s witnessed an economic resurgence as the country recovered from the civil war and reaped great profits from its considerable oil reserves. Since independence, the nation's economy has been increasingly dominated by oil, which accounts for more than half of Nigeria's gross domestic product (GDP) and the vast majority of its exports. Much of the wealth derived from oil has ended up in the hands of Nigeria's military rulers and civilian bureaucracy, and there has been little technological transfer from foreign-owned oil concerns to native-owned industries.

During the Cold War, Nigeria remained formally nonaligned but generally maintained warm relations with the United States and Great Britain. English remained Nigeria's official language, as it had since colonial days. Nigeria also carried on steady trade with France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), and other Western commercial nations. At various times, Nigeria attempted to assert itself as a regional diplomatic and economic leader, such as in its opposition to South Africa's apartheid during the Second Republic in the early 1980s. While economic mismanagement and corruption hampered Nigeria's development, the country produced many

famous intellectuals during the Cold War era, including international literary figures and Nobel Prize winners such as Chinua Achebe and Wole Soyinka.

T. E. Walker Jr.

See also

Africa; Biafra War; Non-Aligned Movement

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Nitze, Paul Henry

(1907–2004)

Prominent U.S. Cold War strategist and arms control negotiator. Born on 16 January 1907 in Amherst, Massachusetts, the son of a college professor, Paul Nitze graduated from Harvard University in 1928. He then became an investment banker with Dillon, Read & Company on Wall Street. In 1940 he joined the firm's former vice president and future secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal, in government service in Washington. Nitze's first assignment was to help draft the Selective Service Act. In 1942, he became head of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare, and at war's end he was vice chairman of the Strategic Bombing Survey.

Nitze's greatest contribution to the Cold War occurred during his directorship of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff (PPS). He was one of the first to suggest a massive U.S. aid program as essential to European recovery. Beginning in August 1949, he was deputy director of the PPS under George F. Kennan, assuming the top spot in January 1950 after Kennan's resignation. In this post, Nitze played a central role in the drafting of the National Security Council report NSC-68.

NSC-68 was a comprehensive, top secret review of American national security policy and was triggered in part by the Soviet's first atomic bomb explosion in September 1949. The report was given to President Harry S. Truman in April 1950 but was not officially approved until September 1950, several months after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korean) invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Convinced that the Cold War was entering a dangerous new phase, NSC-68's authors called for a vast conventional and nuclear rearmament program to counteract perceived Soviet aggression. The report provided the blueprint for U.S. defense planning during the next twenty-five years.

Nitze left the State Department at the end of the Truman administration but nonetheless continued to play an active role in the development of U.S. Cold War policy, contributing to the 1957 Gaither Report that was critical of Eisenhower's New Look defense posture. The report was most notable for warning of a missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union, an erroneous conclusion.

After advising President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nitze became secretary of the navy in 1963. He served as deputy secretary of defense during 1967–1969 and assistant secretary of defense for international affairs during 1973–1976.

Skeptical of détente, Nitze was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and was the principal U.S. negotiator in arms-control talks in Geneva (1981–1984). In an effort to break a deadlock over intermediate-range missiles in Europe, Nitze took a walk in the woods with Soviet Ambassador Yuli Kvitsinsky in 1982, resulting in a sweeping and unauthorized compromise that was, however, rejected by President Ronald Reagan. Nitze was the principal negotiator of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, serving until his retirement from government service in 1989 as special advisor on arms control to Reagan.

A quintessential Cold Warrior, Nitze died in Washington, D.C., on 19 October 2004.

Josh Ushay

Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze (*left*) is shown here being escorted around a base in Vietnam by Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Wood of the U.S. 1st Marine Division. (National Archives and Records Administration)

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Fallout Shelters; Forrestal, James Vincent; Gaither Report; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Kennan, George Frost; Korean War; Munich Analogy; National Security Council Report NSC-68; Truman, Harry S.

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Nixon, Richard Milhous
(1913–1994)

U.S. politician, vice president, and president of the United States. Born in Yorba Linda, California, on 9 January 1913, Richard Nixon graduated from Duke Law School and then practiced law in Whittier, California, until 1942. During World War II he spent four years in the U.S. Navy, serving in the South Pacific and becoming a lieutenant commander. After demobilization in 1946 he ran successfully for Congress as a Republican and in 1950 for a California Senate seat, races notable for his use of anticommunist smear tactics

against his Democratic opponents. In 1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower selected Nixon as his running mate for the presidency, and Nixon spent eight years as vice president, demonstrating particular interest in foreign affairs and traveling extensively. In 1960 he narrowly lost the presidential race to John F. Kennedy. Eight years later Nixon was elected president on the Republican ticket.

As president, Nixon belied his earlier reputation as an uncompromising anticommunist, restructuring the international pattern of U.S. alliances by playing the China card and moving toward recognition of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) while using the new Sino-American rapprochement to extract concessions on détente and arms control from the Soviet Union. In doing so, Nixon worked closely with his energetic national security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, restricting Secretary of State William P. Rogers largely to routine diplomatic business. Kissinger finally replaced Rogers in August 1973.

In 1968 the inability of the United States to achieve victory in the controversial Vietnam War, despite increasingly high deployments of troops, dominated the political agenda. Nixon, promising that he had a plan to end the war expeditiously, won the presidency. He accelerated the program of Vietnamization begun under President Lyndon B. Johnson, gradually withdrawing American troops while providing Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) forces with massive amounts of war supplies intended to enable them to defend themselves. In August 1969 Kissinger embarked on protracted negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). To win time for Vietnamization, Nixon ordered the secret bombing of Cambodia as well as a ground invasion of that country that helped bring the communist Khmer Rouge to power there later. At Christmas 1972 Nixon ordered a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam to pressure its leaders to accept a settlement. Some assailed him for winning a peace settlement that effectively assured South Vietnam only a decent interval before a North Vietnam takeover two years later.

American withdrawal from Vietnam was only part of the broader strategic realignment that Nixon and Kissinger termed their "Grand Design."

American withdrawal from Vietnam was only part of the broader strategic realignment that Nixon and Kissinger termed their Grand Design. The Nixon Doctrine, announced in July 1969, called upon American allies to bear the primary burden of their own defense, looking to the United States only for supplementary conventional and, when necessary, nuclear assistance.

Conscious that their country no longer enjoyed the undisputed supremacy of the immediate post–World War II period and that growing economic difficulties mandated cuts in defense budgets, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to negotiate arms limitations agreements with the Soviet Union. To pressure the Soviets, whose relations with communist China had become deeply antagonistic by the early 1960s, Nixon began the process of reopening American relations with China, visiting Beijing in 1972, where he had extended talks with Chinese communist Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, and preparing to de-emphasize the long-standing U.S. commitment to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and recognize the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in its stead.

These tactics alarmed Soviet leaders and facilitated a relaxation of Soviet-American tensions, broadly termed détente. At a May 1972 Moscow summit meeting, Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed two arms limitations treaties, jointly known as SALT I, that took effect the following October. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited antiballistic missile defense sites in each country to two, with neither hosting more than a hundred ABMs. The Interim Agreement froze for five years the number of nuclear warheads possessed by each side. Détente did not mean the end of Soviet-American rivalry, however.

After winning a second presidential victory in 1972, Nixon hoped to move toward full recognition of the PRC and further arms control agreements. The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, however, diverted his administration's attention from these plans. The war precipitated an Arab oil embargo on Western states that followed pro-Israeli policies, contributing to an international spiral of skyrocketing inflation and high unemployment that afflicted the United States and Western Europe throughout the 1970s.

Presidential summit meetings with Brezhnev at Moscow and Yalta in June–July 1974 brought no immediate results, in large part due to Nixon's own calamitous domestic problems, even though they set the stage for the Helsinki Accords and additional arms control agreements under Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford. The Watergate political scandal, which led to Nixon's resignation in August 1974, aborted all his ambitions for further progress in overseas affairs.

Richard M. Nixon realized his dream of becoming president in 1969. A strong proponent of opening relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and of détente with the Soviet Union, Nixon was forced to resign the office in August 1974 as a result of the Watergate scandal. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Nixon devoted his final two decades to writing his memoirs and numerous other books and essays on international affairs, part of a broader and reasonably successful campaign to engineer his political rehabilitation and to win respect from contemporaries and a place in history for his presidential achievements and foreign policy expertise. In Nixon's final years, several presidents, including Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and William Jefferson Clinton, sought his insights on various international subjects, especially relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union. Nixon died in New York City on 22 April 1994.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Arab-Israeli Wars; Arms Control; Brezhnev, Leonid; Bush, George Herbert Walker; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Détente; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khmer Rouge; Kissinger, Henry; Mao Zedong; McCarthyism; Military Balance; Missiles, Antiballistic; Missiles, Intercontinental

Ballistic; Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Moscow and Yalta Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nixon Doctrine; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Rogers, William Pierce; Soviet Union; Space Race; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Vietnam; Vietnam War; Zhou Enlai

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Nixon Doctrine
(3 November 1969)

Cold War foreign policy doctrine of President Richard M. Nixon, formally enunciated in an address to the nation on 3 November 1969. The Nixon Doctrine called for the United States to continue to meet all its current treaty commitments and to provide a nuclear shield for vital allies. However, the doctrine backed away from the open-ended commitment that the United States had made to contain communism via the 1947 Truman Doctrine. As such, the United States promised only economic aid and military weaponry to developing-world allies threatened by communist aggression, with the stipulation that such nations must enlist their own manpower to confront armed challenges to their security. In the wake of the politically unpopular deployment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops to Korea and then Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine warned that the United States would no longer bear the burden of directly confronting communist threats in the developing world.

Criticized as a foreign policy retrenchment, the Nixon Doctrine grew out of a changing international strategic and economic environment. The doctrine signaled an end to the postwar bipolar era in which a nearly omnipotent United States rose to counter every perceived Soviet challenge. Nixon saw the world of the late 1960s as multipolar, a pentagonal world in which the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet bloc, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) all exerted powerful military and/or geopolitical influence. The Sino-Soviet rift, France's 1967 withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military command, Britain's retreat from

the Persian Gulf, and the rise of the developing world all marked this sea change. The Nixon Doctrine also took into account the relative U.S. economic decline as Western Europe and Japan forged competitive economies. The costs of the Vietnam War, in conjunction with other U.S. commitments, clearly influenced Nixon's posture.

Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, realized that domestic resistance precluded direct U.S. intervention in another bloody brushfire war such as Vietnam. Indeed, Nixon alluded to his new strategic initiative on 25 July 1969, the very day that he announced the first U.S. troop withdrawals from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). South Vietnam served as the first model for the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon's implementation of Vietnamization, the gradual replacement of U.S. troops with South Vietnamese forces, shaped U.S. policy in the later years of the war, although greater economic assistance and military equipment transfers to South Vietnam accompanied Vietnamization.

The United States employed the Nixon Doctrine in other key areas of the globe in the early to mid-1970s. Increasingly, the doctrine relied upon strong men, or so-called deputy sheriffs, assigned by Washington to guard U.S. interests. These U.S.-backed deputy sheriffs included Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Egypt's Anwar Sadat, Filipino strongman Ferdinand Marcos, Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza, Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, among others. All were to safeguard U.S. interests in their respective regions, while the United States provided them with aid and arms.

Relying on the despotic rule of many of these deputy sheriffs elicited sharp criticism, however. Opponents viewed the Nixon Doctrine as a stratagem for U.S. hegemony on the cheap. Indeed, when many of the rulers fell in the late 1970s and 1980s, there were costly negative consequences to U.S. strategic interests. The 1979 collapse of the shah's regime in Iran offered a prime example of the Nixon Doctrine's distinct limitations.

The Nixon Doctrine was born of the recognition that U.S. power had limits following the Vietnam debacle. No longer could the nation afford to "pay any price" or "bear any burden," as President John F. Kennedy had promised in his 1961 inaugural address. The world had changed drastically since then. Nixon and Kissinger attempted to manage the U.S. retreat as cost-effectively as possible, without undue loss of U.S. power and influence. In the economically stagnant 1970s, the use of U.S. proxies and arms transfers, together with rapprochement with the PRC and détente with the Soviet Union, seemed the best solution to maintaining U.S. hegemony in a multipolar world. President Ronald Reagan's use in 1983 of U.S. troops in Lebanon and Grenada effectively ended the Nixon Doctrine, signaling the return of U.S. unilateralism and direct U.S. military interventions overseas.

Michael E. Donoghue

See also

Containment Policy; Détente; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kissinger, Henry; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War

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Nkrumah, Kwame
(1909–1972)

African nationalist, prime minister (1957–1960), and president (1960–1966) of Ghana. Born in Nkroful on 21 September 1909, a date debated by scholars but accepted by him as accurate, Kwame Nkrumah was educated in mission schools, where he later taught. He pursued higher education at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, and in 1943 he earned a master's degree in philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania.

Nkrumah then traveled to London in 1945 and studied at the London School of Economics. Influenced by his earlier experiences with racism in the United States and his studies of American independence and revolution, Nkrumah's politicization and nationalist views were furthered in London, where he founded the West African National Secretariat and served as joint secretary for the Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945.

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana led the drive for independence and became his nation's first premier in 1957 and president in 1960. (Library of Congress)

In 1947 Nkrumah returned to the African Gold Coast to lead the movement for independence. His position as general secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and founder of the Convention People's Party (CPP) led to his 1950 imprisonment by British colonial authorities. In 1951 Nkrumah, still incarcerated, won the Gold Coast colony's first general election with a huge majority. Released in January 1951 as leader of the colonial parliament, he became prime minister of the Gold Coast in March 1952. He won reelection in 1954 and 1956 and became prime minister of an independent Ghana on 6 March 1957. When Ghana declared itself a republic on 1 July 1960, he became president.

Only months after independence, however, Nkrumah's regime moved toward dictatorship. As president, he championed a nonaligned foreign policy and pursued relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. An advocate of economic growth through industrialization, he negotiated the U.S. financing of a hydroelectric dam on the Volta River, despite his vocal commitment to socialism.

Nkrumah's popularity declined steadily, along with the Ghanaian economy. On 24 February 1966, while he traveled abroad, political opponents staged a coup in Accra. Six

days later Nkrumah flew to Guinea, where he spent the next six years in exile. Suffering from cancer, he arranged for secret transport to Bucharest in August 1971. Nkrumah died there on 27 April 1972.

MARY E. MONTGOMERY

See also

Africa; Anticolonialism; Decolonization; Ghana; Nationalism; Non-Aligned Movement

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Nobel Peace Prize

Prize established by the estate of Alfred Nobel on 27 November 1895, whereby funds are to be disbursed on a yearly basis among five prizes in the areas of physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature, and peace. Nobel also stipulated that prizes were to be given to those who, during the preceding year, "shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind" or "shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace." With this objective in mind, a nongovernmental organization known as the Nobel Foundation was established in 1900 to make such determinations.

Photograph of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to United Nations peacekeeping forces in 1988. (Corel)

The Nobel Peace Prize is judged by a special committee of five members known as the Nobel Committee, appointed by the Norwegian parliament rather than by the Nobel Foundation. The committee evaluates nominations with the assistance of numerous experts. The nomination must be received by the committee before 1 February of the year that the nominee is to be considered for the prize, while the final decision is made in October. The Peace Prize award ceremony is held on 10 December in Oslo, Norway. The Peace Prize itself is presented by the chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee in the presence of the King of Norway. Each laureate receives a medal, a diploma, and a monetary award and is expected to present a Nobel lecture to be published in *Les Prix Nobel* yearbook.

The first Nobel Peace Prize was awarded on 10 December 1901 to Jean Henry Dunant (1828–1910), the Swiss founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Nobel Peace Prize Winners, 1945–1990

Year	*Awarded to*	*Country*
1945	Cordell Hull	United States
1946	Emily Greene Balch; John R. Mott	United States
1947	The Friends Service Council; The American Friends Service Committee	United Kingdom; United States
1948	Not Awarded	
1949	Sir John Boyd Orr	United Kingdom
1950	Ralph Bunche	United States
1951	Léon Jouhaux	France
1952	Albert Schweitzer	West Germany
1953	George C. Marshall	United States
1954	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	International
1955	Not Awarded	
1956	Not Awarded	
1957	Lester Bowles Pearson	Canada
1958	Georges Pire	Belgium
1959	Philip Noel-Baker	United Kingdom
1960	Albert Lutuli	South Africa
1961	Dag Hammarskjöld	Sweden
1962	Linus Carl Pauling	United States
1963	International Committee of the Red Cross; League of Red Cross Societies	International
1964	Martin Luther King Jr	United States
1965	United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF)	International
1966	Not Awarded	
1967	Not Awarded	
1968	René Cassin	France
1969	International Labour Organization (I.L.O.)	International
1970	Norman Borlaug	United States
1971	Willy Brandt	West Germany
1972	Not Awarded	
1973	Henry Kissinger; Le Duc Tho (declined)	United States; North Vietnam
1974	Seán MacBride; Eisaku Sato	Ireland; Japan
1975	Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov	USSR
1976	Betty Williams; Mairead Corrigan	Ireland
1977	Amnesty International	International
1978	Mohamed Anwar Al-Sadat; Menachem Begin	Egypt; Israel
1979	Mother Teresa	India
1980	Adolfo Pérez Esquivel	Argentina
1981	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	International
1982	Alva Myrdal; Alfonso García Robles	Sweden; Mexico
1983	Lech Wałęsa	Poland
1984	Desmond Mpilo Tutu	South Africa
1985	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War	International
1986	Elie Wiesel	United States
1987	Óscar Arias Sánchez	Costa Rica
1988	United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces	International
1989	Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso	Tibet
1990	Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev	USSR

Of awards during the Cold War, a number have been given to individuals whose efforts had been directly related to the work of the United Nations (UN). For example, the 1950 Peace Prize went to Ralph Bunche (1904–1971), the principal secretary of the UN Palestine Commission, for his brokering of the 1949 armistice agreements following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. In 1957, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Bowles Pearson (1897–1972) was awarded the prize primarily for his role in trying to end the 1956 Suez Crisis through the UN. One of the more interesting awards occurred in 1953, when

the Nobel Peace Prize was presented to General George C. Marshall of the United States for his efforts as secretary of state in promoting the European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshall Plan. Marshall is the only professional soldier to be so honored. The 1990 Peace Prize went to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev for his effort to liberalize the Soviet regime and its East European satellite states. Notwithstanding that a principal Nobel requirement is that recipients have to work "for the abolition or reduction of standing armies," the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the UN Peacekeeping Forces.

Jaroslav Dvorak

See also

Bunche, Ralph Johnson; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Marshall, George Catlett

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Stenersen, Øivind, Ivar Libæk, and Asle Sveen. *The Nobel Peace Prize: One Hundred Years for Peace; Laureates, 1901–2000*. Oslo: Cappelen, 2001.

Nomenklatura

The Russian term *nomenklatura* was derived from the Latin word *nomenclatura*, meaning a list of names. The Soviet Nomenklatura alluded to a list of persons who held senior positions in the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union, such as those in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), state institutions, trade unions, and the like. The appointees to such positions were nominated by and subject to approval at various levels of the CPSU's committees, including the Central Committee (CC) of the party or local provincial and district-appropriate governmental authorities.

The term *nomenklatura* was first mentioned in a 12 November 1923 decree issued by the Russian Communist Party's (RCP) CC Organization Bureau, although it has never been used in government-issued legislative appointments. Officially, the Nomenklatura system was first created to act exclusively inside the party hierarchy. In fact, however, it was a nationwide system, since the party Nomenklatura spread its influence over all Soviet government communities, at various levels. The lists included not only those persons to be considered for party appointments and official state institutions but also to those in various social institutions. Even public offices that were considered to be nominally elective, such as those in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Executive Council of Trade Unions, were eventually included in the lists of Nomenklatura appointments.

As a rule, Nomenklatura personnel could perform general administrative and political leadership functions, as their success in climbing upward in the bureaucratic hierarchy depended almost exclusively upon political factors rather than on their competence and skill per se. In fact, party leaders rarely took into account the fact that many Nomenklatura members holding

government office often had below-average education or lacked formal education altogether. They were only required to meet the primary requirement for advancement, demonstrating unfailing loyalty to the party.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika reforms, begun in the mid-1980s to revitalize and streamline government institutions, began with a campaign to weaken positions of high-ranking Nomenklatura members, and he drastically reduced the importance of the Politburo. The CPSU CC Secretariat lost its function as a body of joint leadership, while new personnel gradually replaced high-ranking old members of the Nomenklatura. Quite naturally, such reforms proved unnerving to many members of the old guard.

As the Soviet system collapsed in the late 1980s and very early 1990s, a paradoxical situation developed and was exploited by parts of the party elite and governmental personnel, including members of the Nomenklatura. These individuals declared themselves "defenders of the democratic course of developments" but at the same time tried to use their former clout to push their way into the postcommunist governing elite. Thus, despite Gorbachev's attempts to de-emphasize the influence of the Nomenklatura, its clout continued in the post-Soviet, post-Gorbachev era.

Jaroslav Dvorak

See also

Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Soviet Union

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Non-Aligned Movement

A loose association of nations opposed to Cold War entanglements that sought to create a third force between the communist bloc and the Western Bloc. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was originally comprised of twenty-four Afro-Asian countries plus Yugoslavia. It held its first summit in Belgrade in September 1961. From the outset, NAM embraced issues theoretically unrelated to the Cold War, including anticolonialism, antiracism, economic development, and, under the Arab states' influence, anti-Zionism. To date there have been thirteen summits at approximately three-year intervals. After Belgrade, NAM met in Cairo (1964); Lusaka, Zambia (1970); Algiers (1973); Colombo, Sri Lanka (1976); Havana (1979); New Delhi (1983); Harare, Zimbabwe (1986); Belgrade (1989); Jakarta, Indonesia (1992); Cartagena de Indios, Colombia (1995); Durban, South Africa (1998); and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2003). In 2003, the movement had 116 members. Mutual interests in protecting state sovereignty and promoting development account for its expanding membership and durability.

Cuban President Fidel Castro and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat raise their hands together during a session at the Seventh Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi in March 1983. (Alain Nogues/Corbis Sygma)

Before NAM's foundation, Indonesian leader Sukarno's Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April 1955 demonstrated the value of small-state collaboration. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vaguely worded *Panch Sheel* (five principles of peace), which formed the basis for Sino-Indian relations and was popularized at Bandung, anticipated NAM principles by stressing mutual respect, preservation of state sovereignty, and peaceful coexistence. In the five years before the Belgrade conference, the founding countries—India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt—took exception to Great Power interference in weaker countries' affairs and to the superpowers' unwillingness to reduce nuclear tensions.

The simultaneous Suez Crisis and Hungarian Revolution of 1956 drew together Nehru, Yugoslavian Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although their politics were dissimilar, they shared concerns about the Cold War, decolonization, and national independence. The emergence of sixteen African states in 1960, the intensification of South African apartheid, the worsening U.S.-Soviet relations, the Congo Intervention, the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs incursion (1961), and the Second Berlin Crisis furnished the first summit's historical context.

The Belgrade meeting established enduring precedents for NAM. First, the organizational meeting, which took place in Cairo in June 1961, confined

membership to countries that rejected participation in what were termed "Great Power conflicts" or signaled their intention of eventually departing from them. Countries that did not fully meet these criteria could nevertheless be invited as observers. Second, the Algerian provisional government's invitation as a full member, one year before that country's independence, underscored NAM's commitment to anticolonialism. Subsequent summits conferred diplomatic recognition upon the Angolan provisional government, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Zimbabwe African National Union/Zimbabwe African People's Union, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the Southwest African People's Organization (SAPO) in Namibia. Third, the members reached agreement by consensus rather than by ballot, a procedure that led to criticism from the United States at later summits. Finally, Belgrade concluded with a communiqué outlining joint concerns. Although Nehru wished to make the first meeting a forum on global peace, the foremost issues were decolonization, noninterference in sovereign countries' internal affairs, and combating racism. While the People's Republic of China (PRC) was not invited to Belgrade, NAM—as China's exclusive representative—called for its admission to the United Nations (UN).

In 2003, the movement had 116 members. Mutual interests in protecting state sovereignty and promoting development account for its expanding membership and durability.

Cairo illustrated the host country's influence over the NAM agenda. Forty-seven countries attended the 1964 summit. NAM invited all members of the new Organization of African Unity (OAU) because its 1963 charter adopted nonalignment. Under Nasser, NAM called for a Palestinian homeland three years before the PLO's foundation. Cairo was also significant for what was ignored: in October and November 1962, the PRC invaded India. At Cairo, the Chinese invasion was not mentioned because many members wished to cultivate good relations with the PRC. The selective treatment of security issues where members' national interests were at stake typified this and subsequent meetings. The departure of many NAM founders partially accounted for the six-year hiatus between Cairo and Lusaka. Nehru died just before the Cairo summit. In the intervening years, Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, and Burma's U Nu were deposed.

The conference at Lusaka established the movement's minimal institutional base. The host country's leader served as NAM spokesperson between triennial meetings, and its foreign ministry and permanent UN delegation dedicated offices to NAM affairs. At Lusaka, members agreed to hold annual foreign ministers' conferences and to work as a caucus in the UN. Occasionally, NAM has established emergency funds to support anticolonialist causes such as the Africa Fund, which assisted the antiapartheid frontline states of Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe in the 1980s.

Unlike the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), NAM was not an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy. Certain members, such as Saudi Arabia, had close U.S. ties, while others, such as Yugoslavia, feared Soviet interference. The movement nevertheless supported certain Soviet initiatives, such as the call for two special UN disarmament sessions and the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Quick to condemn by name Western countries deemed responsible for violating developing-world countries' sov-

ereignty, such as the continuing U.S. naval presence at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, NAM did not apply this standard to Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

Although U.S. policymakers in the 1950s decried neutralism as aiding the Soviets, successive U.S. administrations, even President Dwight Eisenhower's, retained strong relations with many uncommitted countries. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan issued reminders to the Cairo and New Delhi summits that Soviet expansion constituted another form of imperialism. The Soviets anticipated that NAM would facilitate their goal of frustrating Western–developing world alliances and of becoming eventual adherents to the Soviet bloc. A split over North-South issues in the 1970s demonstrated that Soviet and NAM interests were not identical, however.

The Non-Aligned Movement has repeatedly lobbied for economic aid to the developing world. A special NAM meeting in Cairo in 1962 called upon the UN to facilitate development, which led in early 1964 to the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, at which the Group of 77, then the world's poorest countries and including many NAM members, was formed. At the Algiers conference and afterward, NAM called for a special UN General Assembly session on development. In 1974, the UN passed the New International Economic Order (NIEO), an agenda that sought increased technical, financial, and agricultural aid for nations in the developing world, to which the Soviets, partly for ideological reasons, showed little sympathy.

Joseph Robert White

See also

Africa; Anticolonialism; Bandung Conference; Decolonization; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Palestine Liberation Organization; South Asia; Southeast Asia; Tito, Josip Broz

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See North American Aerospace Defense Command

NORAD

Noriega, Manuel
(1938–)

Panamanian military leader and de facto leader of Panama (1983–1989). Born in Panama City on 11 February 1938, Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno became a career soldier. He attended the elite Military School de Chorrillos in Peru and the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia. Noriega rose quickly through the ranks of Panama's National Guard. Following a 1968 coup that placed Omar Torrijos Herrera in control of Panama, Noriega became chief of military intelligence. After Torrijos died in a plane crash in 1981, Noriega was appointed chief of staff to General Rubén Dario Paredes, head of the National Guard.

Allied with a group of officers who moved against Darío in August 1983, Noriega proclaimed himself general and effectively took control of the Panamanian government. He increased the size and scope of the National Guard, with which he controlled the government and economy mainly through cronyism and corruption. He courted popular support among the urban and rural poor and used the National Guard to eliminate or intimidate his political enemies and challengers.

Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, shown here at a ceremony in Panama City in 1987 commemorating the national hero Omar Torrijos. (Bill Gentile/Corbis)

Panama's first presidential elections since 1972 were held in October 1984, with Nicolas Ardito Barletta emerging as the winner. Nonetheless, it was Noriega and not Barletta who controlled Panama. In 1985, Noriega was accused of ordering the assassination of Hugo Spadafora, an outspoken critic of Noriega and the National Guard. When President Barletta ordered an investigation into the murder, Noriega ousted Barletta from office.

In 1986, allegations surfaced that Noriega was involved in drug trafficking and money laundering and was working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When Panamanians staged mass protests demanding that Noriega relinquish power, he brutally suppressed the demonstrations and cracked down on civil liberties in 1987. At the same time, President Ronald Reagan's administration, embarrassed by Noriega's illegal activities and his ties to the CIA, began to plan for his removal from office. On 5 February 1988, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) indicted Noriega for racketeering and drug trafficking.

The United States resorted to diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions to force Noriega from office, although these proved largely futile because of Noriega's absolute hold on power. In the presidential elections of May 1989, the U.S.-supported candidate Guillermo Endara Galimany beat Noriega's handpicked candidate by a large margin. To avoid losing power and being extradited to the United States, Noriega nullified the results of the election, ordered his thugs to severely beat Endara, and crushed anti-Noriega demonstrations. In December 1989, President

George H. W. Bush sent 27,000 troops to invade Panama and remove Noriega from power.

Noriega fled to the Vatican embassy in Panama City, but after a week and a half of psychological warfare tactics designed to flush Noriega out of the embassy and negotiations with the Vatican, U.S. forces secured his surrender. Noriega was immediately taken to Florida, where he was tried and convicted in September 1992 of drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering. He was sentenced to forty years imprisonment, reduced to thirty years in 1999.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Bush, George Herbert Walker; Panama

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Norstad, Lauris

(1907–1988)

U.S. Army and Air Force general and supreme Allied commander for Europe during 1956–1963. Born on 24 March 1907 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Lauris Norstad graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1930. The following year he transferred from the cavalry to the U.S. Air Corps, commanding the 18th Pursuit Group at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Early in World War II General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold appointed Norstad to his advisory council, a group of bright young air force officers entrusted with long-range planning. Shortly thereafter Arnold assigned Norstad to London, where he helped to organize Operation TORCH, the Anglo-American North African invasion campaign, in the process attracting favorable notice from Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Promoted to brigadier general in March 1943, as director of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Norstad helped devise the bombing campaign against Axis forces in the Balkans and Italy. Returning to Washington in 1944 as Arnold's chief of staff, Norstad worked on planning the B-29 strategic bombing campaign against Japan that preceded the detonation of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He subsequently served on the Spaatz Board, which revised American airpower doctrine and policy in light of nuclear weapons and established the Strategic Air Command (SAC). He was promoted to major general in June 1945. From 1945 to 1950, he held several air force staff positions and was closely involved in postwar air force planning.

In October 1950 Eisenhower, returning from retirement to become the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), which headed the new

U.S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) during 1956–1963. (NATO Photos)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), appointed Norstad commanding general of United States Air Forces in Europe, soon expanded to include control of all Allied air forces in Central Europe. In July 1952 Norstad became, at age forty-five, the youngest American four-star general. In July 1953 he became air deputy to General Alfred Gruenther, the new SACEUR, whom he succeeded in 1956, the only air force officer ever to hold this position. In 1958 Norstad was concurrently appointed Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCEUR).

From the late 1950s Norstad lobbied fiercely for an independent NATO nuclear-armed force, including both long-range strategic and short-range tactical missiles, which he believed were essential to demonstrating NATO's resolve to utilize such weapons if necessary in its own defense, and increased threefold the number of such missiles under his command. In 1961 Norstad's pressure persuaded President John F. Kennedy to commit Polaris submarines to such a force, with each NATO member retaining a veto over nuclear decisions. Norstad wished to enhance West German defense capabilities, initially proposing a West German nuclear-armed force, and was instrumental in equipping Germany with nuclear-capable missiles, although these remained under his control. During the 1961 crisis over Berlin, Norstad unsuccessfully urged Kennedy to state publicly that the United States would, if necessary, employ nuclear weapons to defend Berlin. In January 1963 Norstad's belief that the Kennedy administration's defense posture overemphasized conventional forces at the expense of nuclear weaponry brought his early resignation.

In retirement, Norstad held various top positions with Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation. In the mid-1960s he urged the Republican Party to endorse an independent NATO nuclear force. In 1972 he was one of several senior statesmen who, at the request of President Richard Nixon, successfully opposed the congressional Mansfield Amendment, which would have cut American troops in Europe. Able and energetic, he was instrumental in setting the direction of post-1945 U.S. aviation and strategic doctrine. Norstad died in Tucson, Arizona, on 12 September 1988.

Priscilla Roberts

In July 1952 Norstad became, at age 45, the youngest American four-star general.

See also

Berlin Crises; Bombers, Strategic; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany, Federal Republic of, Rearmament and NATO; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Missiles, Polaris; Multilateral Force, NATO; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; United States Air Force

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North American Aerospace Defense Command

Binational military organization established in 1957 between the United States and Canada to provide collaborative defense for the two countries, especially against nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) had its origins in the cooperation of the two countries during World War II and a formal agreement on defense collaboration signed in 1947. In 1954, the United States and Canada began developing the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line across northern Canada

An orbital analyst in the Space Defense Operations Computation Center at NORAD tracks the Cosmos 1402 satellite in orbit, 18 February 1983. (U.S. Department of Defense)

and Alaska to provide advanced warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the polar region.

As the DEW Line became operational in August 1957, the United States and Canada reached agreement to create an integrated operational control system for the air defense forces of the two countries. NORAD was thus established in September. Its headquarters was located at Ent Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, while an operations center was constructed in a deep, hardened bunker inside nearby Cheyenne Mountain. Initial operations began in April 1966. The NORAD commander was a U.S. general who also commanded the U.S. Continental Air Defense (CONAD) Command and the U.S. Air Force component, the Air Defense Command (ADC). The deputy commander was a Canadian flag officer.

The NORAD command and control system integrated the full range of air defense capabilities. The early warning system included the northern DEW Line, the Mid-Canada Line, the Pinetree Line, coastal radar sites, Texas Tower radar sites at sea, U.S. Navy picket ships, and U.S. Air Force airborne radar platforms. NORAD directed its active defenses through a series of computerized operations centers that controlled air defense assets for designated regions of the two countries. The system controlled American and Canadian interceptor aircraft and U.S. Army and Air Force surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) dedicated to strategic defense as well as other available resources such as fighter aircraft that could be assigned to air defense in an emergency. As the missile threat evolved, NORAD also became responsible for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and a range of space-tracking systems. Although CONAD was responsible for operational antiballistic missile (ABM) capabilities (the Safeguard system was briefly operational in 1975–1976), the Canadian government declined to become involved in ABM activities.

During the 1970s, the air defense forces assigned to NORAD were significantly reduced, and subordinate command structures were revised, reflecting the increased threat from ballistic missiles and changing national strategies. The strategic SAM sites were phased out, dedicated interceptor units were substantially reduced, and the multiservice CONAD was disbanded, replaced by the Aerospace Defense Command. The Canadian component changed from the Canadian Forces Air Defence Command to the Air Defence Group. The role of NORAD shifted to emphasize warning and attack assessment as well as space surveillance and supporting nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a surprise attack would not destroy U.S. retaliatory forces. In 1979, a major U.S. Air Force reorganization resulted in most ADC operational capabilities being dispersed to the Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command (SAC), with the ADC being inactivated in 1981.

The increased role of space in NORAD operations was recognized when the name was changed to the North American Aerospace Defense Command in 1981. As the Cold War ended, NORAD's functions continued to provide the warning and space surveillance missions.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Antiaircraft Guns and Missiles; Missiles, Antiballistic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Mutual Assured Destruction; Strategic Air Command; United States Air Force

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North Atlantic Treaty
(4 April 1949)

Collective security treaty that served as the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., on 4 April 1949 by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty was a seminal event in the Cold War because it provided for the eventual militarization of the containment policy and the Cold War and was soon followed by the Soviet bloc's creation of the rival Warsaw Pact. The treaty was also the first permanent peacetime alliance that the United States had ever concluded, a major break with the long-established isolationist U.S. foreign policy tradition. Still, the treaty adhered to the United Nations (UN) Charter and upheld the principles of democracy, liberty, and the rule of law. The self-defense and collective security agreement provided that all signatories desired to live in peace and security within the North Atlantic area. If one nation were attacked, all signatory nations would endeavor to maintain the peace and security of the other nations. The treaty came into force on 24 August 1949 and consisted of fourteen articles.

Article 1 simply stated that the treaty was in accord with the UN Charter and that international disputes were to be settled peacefully. Article 2 asserted that "free institutions" were to develop cooperative economic arrangements and prevent economic conflict among the twelve signatory nations. Article 3 held that to pursue the objectives of the treaty it was necessary to adopt and maintain measures to repel "armed attack." Article 4 stipulated that signatories would consult with one another if the "territorial integrity, political independence or internal security" of any were threatened. Article 5 stated that if one or more of the signatory nations came under "armed attack," such attack would be deemed an attack upon all nations of the treaty, recognized pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 6 qualified Article 5 by stating

that an attack on one or several nations or on the military and their equipment wherever stationed constituted an attack on the territory of the signatory nations.

Article 7 held that the role of the UN Security Council to maintain international security was not to be undermined and that the rights of UN members were not to be affected. Article 8 declared that the treaty did not conflict with previous international agreements. Article 9 established a NATO Council to meet upon request and to establish a defense committee to ensure the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. Article 10 stated that other European nations could accede to the treaty with the unanimous agreement of the signatory nations. Article 11 declared that ratification would be undertaken within each member nation and that the treaty would be in force when the majority of signatories ratified it. Article 12 stipulated that a treaty review could take place after ten years. Article 13 maintained that once the treaty had been in force for twenty years, nations could leave the organization providing they gave one year's notice to the U.S. government. Article 14 declared that the treaty was to be written in English and French and was to be deposited with the U.S. government.

Dewi I. Ball

See also

Containment Policy; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, History of

(1948–1990)

Preliminary discussions surrounding an Atlantic treaty among the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty Powers (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Britain) began on 6 July 1948 in Washington, D.C. By the end of October, the framework for a mutual defense pact for the North Atlantic region was agreed upon. Drafting commenced in December 1948, and the final text was made public in March 1949. On 15 March 1949 the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty Powers formally invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to join the alliance. These nations all endorsed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, providing the legal basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On 24 August 1949 the treaty entered into force, and the first North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting took place in Washington on 17 September.

The first and primary task for the new organization was to put in place an effective and credible apparatus for collective defense. During NATO's first

few years, efforts focused primarily on defense-related problems and their economic implications. The political process of cooperation, which was also a component of the alliance, remained largely undefined. In October 1949 President Harry S. Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, setting the stage for U.S. involvement in NATO collective security arrangements. In January 1950 he approved plans for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic region and authorized the expenditure of a significant sum of money for military aid.

Other important tasks after NATO's founding were establishing its main organizations and bodies and making them operational. To this end, the NAC appointed U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on 19 December 1950. In April 1951, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) became operational at Roquencourt, near Paris. Later that year, the NATO Defense College (NDC) was unveiled in Paris. In March 1952, British General Hastings Lionel Ismay was appointed NATO's first secretary-general. A month later, NATO opened its provisional headquarters in Paris and convened the first NAC meeting in permanent session. The first enlargement of the organization also took place in 1952, when Greece and Turkey were invited to join NATO.

On 31 March 1954 the Soviet Union requested membership in NATO but Britain, France, and the United States vetoed it. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), on the other hand, was invited to join and became a member in 1955. By the mid-1950s, broad lines of intra-alliance cooperation on defense issues had been defined, and the main institutional bodies had been established. Thus strengthening the political consultation process and cooperation in nonmilitary areas was identified as the new priority for NATO. In 1956 the NAC approved the recommendations on nonmilitary cooperation within NATO. In 1957, Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak succeeded Ismay as NATO secretary-general. At an NAC meeting later that year, member nations reaffirmed the principles and purposes of the alliance. In 1958 NATO defensive strategy was likewise reaffirmed, and in 1959 a new NATO headquarters was opened in Paris.

In 1961, Dirk U. Stikker of the Netherlands succeeded Spaak as secretary-general. In an NAC meeting that year, NATO members reaffirmed their support of West Berlin, strongly condemning the building of the Berlin Wall, and approved the renewal of diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union. In the 1962 Athens Guidelines, the circumstances involving the use of nuclear weapons were reviewed. Toward this end, the United States and Britain agreed to contribute and integrate part of their strategic nuclear forces to NATO. In a NATO military exercise (dubbed Operation BIG LIFT) in 1963, the United States ably demonstrated how quickly it could reinforce NATO forces in Europe in the event of a crisis. The following year, Italy's Manlio Brosio became the new secretary-general.

In a move deeply troubling to other NATO states, French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew his nation from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966. As a consequence, NATO offices were relocated. In 1967 the NDC moved to Rome, SHAPE relocated to Mons, and NATO's

Secretaries General of NATO during the Cold War

Name	*Country*	*Term*
Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay	United Kingdom	April 4, 1952–May 16, 1957
Paul-Henri Spaak	Belgium	May 16, 1957–April 21, 1961
Dirk Stikker	Netherlands	April 21, 1961–August 1, 1964
Manlio Brosio	Italy	August 1, 1964–October 1, 1971
Joseph Luns	Netherlands	October 1, 1971–June 25, 1984
Lord Peter Alexander Rupert Carington	United Kingdom	June 25, 1984–July 1, 1988
Manfred Wörner	(West) Germany	July 1, 1988–August 13, 1994

headquarters was established in Brussels. In 1967 the NAC also approved the Harmel Report, aimed at reducing East-West tensions by proposing a new military strategy for NATO. The new strategic concept of flexible response provided the alliance with myriad options to respond to many types of enemy aggression. NATO's old strategy had required a massive military response to any form of aggression. Improving East-West relations thus became a new priority for NATO. In 1968, NATO issued the Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), an initiative to work for disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation.

In 1970 NATO's first communications satellite was launched, and at the ministerial meeting later in the year the United States announced that it would not reduce its forces in Europe unilaterally. In 1971, Joseph Luns of the Netherlands succeeded Brosio as NATO secretary-general, while Brosio was tasked with conducting exploratory talks with the Soviets and other governments vis-à-vis MBFR. In 1974, member countries signed the Declaration on Atlantic Relationships, reaffirming the partnership between Europe and North America and also ensuring the continued development of transatlantic cooperation. Also in 1974, Greece withdrew its military forces from the integrated military structure of NATO to protest Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus.

In 1976 the prospects for MBFR were discussed. Because of the relentless growth in Warsaw Pact forces, the NAC agreed to further strengthen NATO conventional defenses. Unfortunately, this decision interrupted the promising developments in the MBFR process. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also endangered the improvement in East-West relations. The controversial double-track decision made at a special ministerial meeting in 1979 announced the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Europe, to be paralleled by an arms control effort to obviate the need for such deployments. In 1980 Greek forces were reintegrated into the NATO military structure. In 1982 Spain joined the alliance.

The first deliveries of IRBM components to Britain in 1983 were the ultimate result of the double-track decision. Deployment of the missiles proved highly controversial and sparked a considerable nuclear freeze movement throughout Western Europe. In response, the Soviet Union suspended negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces reductions. In 1984, Britain's Peter Alexander Rupert Carrington, 6th Baron Carrington, became the new secretary-general.

In the mid-1980s, East-West relations began to thaw. In 1986 NATO called upon the Soviet Union to help promote peace, security, and a productive East-West dialogue. A high-level task force on conventional arms control was established in 1986, and at the end of the year NATO foreign ministers issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, calling for further negotiations on confidence-building measures and conventional stability. In 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed, which eliminated American and Soviet land-based IRBMs. The forward progress in East-West relations continued throughout 1988. NATO issued a statement on conventional arms control, calling for progress in eliminating conventional force disparities. In July 1988, West Germany's Manfred Wörner succeeded Carrington as secretary-general. In December, NATO foreign ministers welcomed Soviet reductions in conventional forces and outlined NATO proposals for negotiations on confidence-building measures and conventional stability.

In 1989 two new sets of negotiations were launched at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) follow-up meeting in Vienna: talks on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and negotiations on confidence-building and security measures among all thirty-five CSCE members. In December 1989 NATO celebrated its fortieth anniversary at a special summit meeting in Brussels. NATO set forth new goals and policies in recognition of the recent and sweeping changes in the waning Cold War and to further extend East-West cooperation. In July 1990 NATO issued the London Declaration, which provided a road map to guide the transition of the alliance from the era of Cold War confrontation to the age of post–Cold War cooperation and partnership. A joint declaration and commitment to nonaggression was signed in Paris in November 1990. The transformation of the alliance in the new security environment was clearly reflected in its new strategic concept unveiled in November 1991. Cooperation and partnership with Central and East European nations thus became a central and integral part of NATO policies.

The roots of change in NATO's history can be traced as far back as the Harmel Report of the late 1960s. Throughout the decades, NATO continued to play an important role in providing the framework for consultation and coordination of policies among its member countries to diminish the risk of crisis and war.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Containment Policy; Double-Track Decision, NATO; Germany, Federal Republic of, Rearmament and NATO; Harmel Report; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Multilateral Force, NATO; Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; Truman Doctrine

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

Multinational politico-military organization, the mission of which is to safeguard freedom and security in the transatlantic region. In 1945, the United Nations (UN) was founded on the assumption that the big powers would be able to reach agreement on major issues and that none of them would seek any territorial aggrandizement. Neither of these premises came to pass once the Cold War began.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed his concerns over this as early as 1945, as he witnessed Soviet policy in action and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. In 1947, numerous conciliation efforts between the Western powers and the Soviet Union concerning the future of Germany failed, and that same year President Harry S. Truman announced in what became known as the Truman Doctrine that the United States would support free people in resisting subjugation by outside forces. As such, Greece and Turkey soon received American aid to wage the fight against communism.

In general, in the immediate postwar era, West European economies and military establishments were weak and almost wholly uncoordinated. Thus, the idea of European economic and military cooperation and integration began to emerge. Churchill mentioned the idea of a defensive alliance between like-minded nations as early as 1946.

In a bid to encourage Western cooperation, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall initiated the European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshall Plan, in June 1947. The 1947 Dunkirk Treaty was a sign of collaboration between Britain and France, serving as a basis for Britain's proposal for a Western union, which would consist of a network of bilateral agreements. This concept was fine-tuned at a March 1948 meeting in Brussels among Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. A few days later, leaders of these states signed the Treaty of Brussels, which set up a joint defense system and strengthened economic and cultural ties to resist ideological, political, and military threats.

U.S. involvement and commitment in such arrangements was still open to question, however. The Vandenberg Resolution passed by the U.S. Congress in June 1948 bridged the legal gap and made it possible for the United

Representatives from twelve nations convened in Washington, D.C., to sign the treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 4 April 1949. (NATO Photos)

States to enter into an Atlantic alliance in time of peace. Preliminary talks on the Atlantic Treaty began on 6 July 1948 in Washington, D.C., and by the end of October the principles of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic area had been agreed upon.

The drafting of the treaty began in December 1948, and the final text was made public in March 1949. On 15 March 1949 the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty Powers invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to join the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, D.C.

The treaty is a classic diplomatic document, offering wide areas of cooperation among its members. Its purpose was to establish a just and lasting peaceful order based on the commonly shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It committed each signatory to share the risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of collective security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) currently has twenty-six member nations.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bevin, Ernest; Brussels Treaty; Churchill, Winston; Cominform; Containment Policy; Europe, Western; Marshall, George Catlett; Marshall Plan; North Atlantic Treaty; Schuman, Robert; "Sinews of Peace" Speech; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; Vandenberg Resolution

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North Korea

See Korea, Democratic People's Republic of

North Vietnam

See Vietnam

Northern Ireland

See Ireland, Northern

Norway

Scandinavian nation located in the western portion of the Scandinavian Peninsula. The Kingdom of Norway borders the Norwegian Sea to the west, the North Sea to the south, Sweden to the east, and Finland and Russia to the north. Norway covers 125,181 square miles, making it just slightly larger than the U.S. state of New Mexico. Norway had a 1945 population of nearly 3.1 million people.

During 1397–1814 Norway was part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and during 1814–1905 it was part of Sweden. Norway has also had significant ties with Britain as a trading partner and guarantor of its access to the high seas. During World War II, in spite of its effort to remain neutral, Norway was invaded and occupied by Germany (1940–1945). The outcome of the war gave Norway a shared border with the Soviet Union.

At the end of the war, King Haakon (ruled 1905–1957) returned to Norway from exile in Britain and called on Social Democrat Einar Gerhardsen to form a government. One immediate task was to investigate wartime collaboration with the Germans. Some 93,000 Norwegians were investigated. Twenty-five were executed, the most prominent being Vidkun Quisling, the Nazi puppet ruler of Norway during the war. Seventeen thousand others received lesser sentences.

The ruling Social Democratic Labor Party (DNA), which held power during 1945–1961, initially hoped for the restoration of Norwegian neutrality through great power cooperation within the context of the United Nations (UN), but the advent of the Cold War shattered this. Norwegian leaders attempted a balancing act between East and West but soon gave that up in the face of a growing Soviet threat.

Many Norwegians had admired Soviet economic progress in the years before World War II. Norwegians were also grateful for the Red Army's liberation of northern Norway toward the end of the war, and they were pleased that the Soviet Union supported the candidacy of Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie as UN secretary-general. Nonetheless, Norwegians harbored a general distrust of the Soviet Union.

Skepticism of the capitalist West and the fear of provoking the Soviets made a firm alignment with the West difficult, but strong wartime ties with Britain, the failure of efforts at creating a defensive alliance among Norway, Sweden, and Denmark in early 1949, and fears that the Western powers might not come to its defense without a firm security arrangement all led to a decision by the DNA leadership to opt for a defensive arrangement with the West. Thus, Norway formally abandoned its traditional neutrality in signing the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. Finland had been forced to sign a treaty aligning it to some degree with the Soviet Union in 1948, while Sweden remained neutral. The constellation of Norwegian and Danish NATO membership, Swedish nonalignment, and Finnish ties to the Soviet Union has frequently been termed "the Nordic balance."

In order to minimize tensions with the Soviets, Norway imposed limitations on its NATO membership and objected to specific NATO policies. Thus, the allies were not allowed to establish permanent bases in Norway during peacetime and were not permitted to hold military exercises in close proximity to the Soviet border. Oslo also opposed U.S. attempts to bring Francisco Franco's fascist Spain into NATO and resisted Turkey's and Greece's accession as members because of their undemocratic governments. Norway also had reservations over the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) joining NATO in 1955.

Norwegian territory played a key role in the polar strategy of the Cold War. The Arctic provided the shortest flight path for long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) between North America and the Soviet Union. The Soviets' naval buildup in the Kola region following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-Norwegian operations to track Soviet submarines also demonstrated the growing strategic importance of the region.

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Leopard I main battle tanks taking part in the NATO military exercise ALLOY EXPRESS in Norway in March 1982. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Domestically, Norway reached considerable national prosperity in the Cold War period. Wartime damage had been relatively modest. The main priorities of 1945 were economic reconstruction and the creation of a modern welfare state. Economic planning was heavily influenced by Keynesian economics. Norway participated in the Marshall Plan, which proved a major boost to the nation's postwar economic rehabilitation. After 1949, a consensus over foreign policy existed between the DNA and center-rightist political parties. However, the DNA itself was divided. Its left-wing faction opposed NATO membership and broke away from the DNA in 1961 to form the Socialist People's Party (SF), later renamed the Socialist Left Party (SV). It had close ties to the international peace movement. The Norwegian Communist Party remained small.

The DNA and the largest right-wing party, the Conservative Party, wanted Norway to join the European Community (EC). However, an alliance of the SF, the left-wing of the DNA, and center-rightist parties based in rural Norway mobilized the electorate to defeat membership in a 1972 referendum (repeated in 1994). These same political forces have, since World War II, sought to prevent the depopulation of rural Norway by securing heavy government subsidies and the regulation of major industries.

Shipping, fisheries, and industrial raw materials such as aluminum had been traditional Norwegian sources of income. After 1970, however, oil rev-

enues from newly developed North Sea fields contributed substantially to the expansion of the public sector and governmental welfare programs. The developing welfare state helped to preserve Norway as an egalitarian society with few socioeconomic divisions. Since the mid-1970s, the Samí ethnic minority, living mostly in the far northern region of Norway, has received growing recognition and cultural autonomy. By 1991, Norway ranked among the world's five wealthiest countries, and the public sector remains dominant despite reforms during the 1980s and 1990s.

Norway imposed compulsory military service throughout the Cold War period, with the armed forces divided into a navy, an army, and an air force. Based on the experience of the 1940 German surprise attack, a ready reserve force, the Home Guard, also came into being to secure the vital infrastructure. Through the reorganization of Free Norwegian Forces in Britain during World War II, unit structures, equipment, and training had closely mirrored British models. From the 1950s, however, Norway adopted U.S. equipment, routines, and unit structures as a consequence of its participation in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and bilateral programs. From the 1950s, the Norwegian Air Force has been equipped with American-built fighters, while small arms used by the armed forces have mostly been German models. Norway's principal contribution to NATO weaponry was in the Penguin antishipping missile and small arms ammunition.

The main role for Norway's armed forces in the event of a shooting war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was to delay Soviet advances sufficiently to allow allied assistance to arrive. Supplies for units earmarked for this task were stored in facilities deep in the Norwegian mountains. With the strengthening of NATO's Central European defenses by West Germany's membership in 1955 and the Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula, the Norwegian Army was increasingly concentrated in the northern part of the country.

Despite the end of the Cold War, Soviet-Norwegian territorial disputes in the Barents Sea remain unsolved. Neither economic aid nor political encouragement from Norway and other Western nations has succeeded in removing the environmental hazards resulting from the decaying bases of the former Soviet Northern Fleet. These continue to pose great risks to Norway's shoreline and important fishing grounds, which are perilously close to potential radioactive and chemical leaks.

Frode Lindgjerdet

After 1970, however, oil revenues from newly developed North Sea fields contributed substantially to the expansion of the public sector and governmental welfare programs.

See also

Scandinavia

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Nosek, Václav
(1892–1955)

Czechoslovak communist official, minister of the interior (1945–1953), and minister of labor (1953–1955). Born on 26 September 1892 in Velká Dobrá (in the Kladno Region), Gustav Nosek was by training a miner. Active early in Social Democratic Party politics, he joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) at its inception in 1921. During 1924–1938, he served as secretary of the communist unions and was a member of the CPCz Central Committee during 1929–1936. During World War II, he was one of the party's leaders in exile, serving in London as vice chairman of the government-in-exile during 1942–1945.

Upon his return to Czechoslovakia, Nosek became a member of both parliament and the CPCz Central Committee, posts he held until his death. He is perhaps best known for his activities as interior minister during 1945–1953 and especially during the struggle for power in early 1948. As interior minister, he controlled the Czechoslovak police forces. In February 1948, he used his authority to remove eight noncommunists from leading positions in the Prague police force and replaced them with CPCz members.

When a government decree demanding the reinstatement of the dismissed officers went unheeded, noncommunist government officials submitted their resignations in protest. This signaled the beginning of the government crisis that ended on 25 February 1948, when the CPCz essentially took control of the state. In the following years Nosek's influence waned, particularly after 1950, when the new ministry of national security assumed responsibility for the police forces. Nosek left his post in 1953. He died on 22 July 1955 in Prague.

Bradley F. Abrams

See also
Czechoslovakia

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Novoe Muslenie

See New Thinking Policy

Novotný, Antonín
(1904–1975)

Czech communist politician, deputy prime minister (1953–1957), and president of Czechoslovakia (1957–1968). Born in Letňany, now part of Prague, Bohemia, on 10 December 1904 to a working-class family, Antonín Novotný

had little formal education and became a locksmith. He joined the Social Democratic Party and became a founding member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) in 1921. Rising through the party ranks, in 1928 he became the leader of the communist sports organization and the next year leader of the CPCz in the Karlín district of Prague. Following the German occupation, he became a leader of the underground CPCz. Arrested in September 1941, he was sent to the Mauthausen concentration camp for the duration of the war.

Novotný became regional CPCz secretary of Prague and joined the CPCz Central Committee in 1946, playing an important role in the 1948 February communist coup. In May 1948 he was elected to the National Assembly. As a Stalinist, Novotný profited handsomely from the CPCz purges during 1951–1954, becoming a Politburo member in 1951 and deputy prime minister in 1953. Also in 1953, he replaced Rudolf Slánský as first secretary of the CPCz. In November 1957, upon the death of Antonín Zápotocký, Novotný, while maintaining control of the CPCz, was elected president of Czechoslovakia. He was reelected to a second five-year term in 1964.

Antonín Novotný, Czechoslovakia's president during 1964–1968 and Communist Party leader during 1953–1968. The Stalinist Novotný was forced from office as a consequence of the reform period known as the Prague Spring. (Miroslav Zajíc/Corbis)

Novotný steadfastly resisted calls for de-Stalinization following Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's speech of February 1956 in which he denounced Stalin. Novotný also opposed political and cultural liberalization while at the same time increasing party control over the country by purging CPCz members who advocated reform. Nonetheless, he allowed some economic reforms in an attempt to raise living standards. In spite of this, by the 1960s the Czechoslovak economy began to falter, and criticism of Novotný increased. He responded by firing many of his supporters and permitting investigation into and condemnation of the 1950s Stalinist show trials. In the process, many of its victims were rehabilitated. Despite these token gestures, Novotný's lack of education and political savvy limited his ability to move forward with additional reforms.

At the end of 1967 during a Central Committee meeting, Alexander Dubček, leader of the Slovak Communist Party, denounced the economic stagnation and repressive nature of the Novotný regime. When Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev refused to intercede, Novotný was forced to resign as first secretary of the CPCz on 5 January 1968. He was replaced by Dubček, who began the 1968 Prague Spring reforms.

During the liberalization process, Novotný resigned the presidency to General Ludvík Svoboda in March 1968, lost his remaining party positions, was purged from the CPCz, and retired from public life. Novotný's CPCz membership was restored in 1971, and he died in Prague on 28 January 1975.

Gregory C. Ference

See also
Czechoslovakia; Dubček, Alexander; Khrushchev, Nikita; Prague Spring

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NSC-68

See National Security Council Report NSC-68

Nuclear Arms Race

General term for the undeclared Cold War contest in which the United States and the Soviet Union developed, tested, and deployed increasingly advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The strategic motivation behind the arms race was each nation's drive to ensure that its adversary not gain any measurable advantage in nuclear-strike capability. Also at play was the evolving concept of nuclear deterrence, which held that a nation must retain adequate nuclear capabilities to deter the enemy from launching a preemptive nuclear attack. This concept became known as mutual assured destruction (MAD) and held that any preemptive attack would result in an overwhelming and catastrophic retaliatory strike.

The nuclear arms race traces its origins to World War II, when the United States learned that Germany had the capacity and the desire to build an atomic bomb. Spurred by this threat, the Americans raced the Germans to build the first nuclear weapon, although it was hardly a competitive endeavor. The Germans paid less attention to atomic weapons development than the Americans, and as America poured considerable sums into its Manhattan Project, Germany focused on what seemed to be more pragmatic weapons systems.

The race continued beyond World War II. With its first test explosion in July 1945, the United States possessed an atomic monopoly, and the Soviet Union, with which the Americans found themselves increasingly at odds, understandably feared the American nuclear threat, especially given the demonstrated ability of the United States to conduct long-range strategic bombing. Thus, the Soviets pursued their own atomic bomb with great vigor. Soviet spies who had infiltrated the Manhattan Project and a skilled scientific community allowed the Soviet Union to detonate its first nuclear weapon in September 1949.

The United States sought to retain its nuclear lead and, in an action-reaction cycle that would typify the arms race, pursued the next nuclear

development—in this case, a thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb. America's success in developing the hydrogen bomb in 1952 was followed by Soviet success in 1955. The nuclear arms race now entered its most recognizable form wherein the superpowers pursued weapons that were smaller in size, more powerful, and increasingly accurate. In the same vein, delivery systems became faster, more accurate, and more difficult to locate.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the primary delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons was strategic bombers. More advanced aircraft were needed to carry more than one nuclear weapon, and indeed, nuclear weapons needed to be smaller so that they could be carried by a variety of aircraft. The American B-29 was matched by the Soviet TU-4, but neither proved sufficient. Developments led ultimately to the B-52 and the TU-20, both intercontinental bombers capable of delivering large payloads to multiple targets.

The next step in the nuclear arms race was missile development. Advances in rocketry led to the development of ballistic missiles in both the United States and the Soviet Union. The first U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Atlas D, was deployed on 31 October 1959. The Soviets followed suit with their own ICBM, the SS-6 Sapwood of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation, on 20 January 1960. ICBMs were a step up from their cousins, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and became the most popular delivery system because of their range and relative invulnerability to enemy air defenses. ICBMs had a maximum range of 10,000 miles and could be stationed on the other side of the world from their targets.

Inspection of an LGM-30G Minuteman III missile inside a silo about 60 miles from Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, 1989. (U.S. Department of Defense)

In the 1950s, both superpowers came to rely on nuclear weapons as the primary weapon for any major Cold War engagement. The nuclear arms race created ever-larger arsenals and increasingly effective delivery systems. As a result, both sides became vulnerable to an enemy attack. It was this vulnerability that perpetuated the arms race during the decade and beyond. Neither side was willing to give up its weapons, and the newer weapons now meant that the nation that launched a first strike might be able to avoid a retaliatory strike if its nuclear advantage were enough to allow it to destroy most of the enemy's nuclear forces in the first blow. Any large gap in nuclear arms made one nation vulnerable, and nuclear stability could only be ensured by nuclear parity. As a result, scientific advances by one nation had to be matched by the other, or else a gap would result and one side would gain advantage.

This situation was aggravated in the 1960s with the evolution of the counterforce (or no cities) doctrine. Advocates of the doctrine suggested a

Nuclear Arms Race, 1945 – 1985





general agreement between the superpowers to use nuclear weapons only against military installations, sparing population centers. Adopting this policy meant accepting the reality that in order to sustain the ability to launch an effective counterstrike, a nation must deploy enough weapons to ensure that the enemy could not destroy them all in a preemptive strike. Thus, more and better weapons were needed.

The alleged existence first of a bomber gap, then a missile gap, later an antiballistic missile gap, and later still a missile throw-weight gap kept arms manufacturers in perpetual development. In the United States, the military-industrial complex also contributed to the arms race as defense industries fought for lucrative military contracts by driving forward to the next level of weaponry and delivery systems. In November 1960, the United States deployed the world's first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the *George Washington*, capable of launching sixteen Polaris missiles. The Soviets followed in 1968 with their own SSBN. These weapons increased the danger of the arms race and were potentially even more deadly than ICBMs, as they were capable of avoiding retaliatory strikes because of their ability to hide deep beneath the ocean.

Changes in computer technology also advanced the nuclear arms race. Advances were made on both sides in ICBMs, bombers, and submarines, but the United States maintained strategic superiority. In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, however, the Soviet Union took the lead in ICBM production and in the development of antiballistic missile (ABM) technology. Soviet ABMs were designed primarily to protect major cities, such as Moscow, and were less effective against a full attack against Soviet military installations. Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) complicated matters. MIRVs meant that each ICBM could deploy a dozen or more warheads, each

programmed for a separate target. MIRVs promised to overcome any ABM system.

Arms control talks and treaties during the 1970s and arms reduction agreements during the 1980s slowed but did not stop the nuclear arms race. When the Cold War ended, so did the nuclear arms race in its original form. Because nuclear weapons remain a strategic force for some nations, a new and different nuclear arms race seems likely to develop.

Brian Madison Jones

See also

Atomic Bomb; Atoms for Peace Proposal; Hydrogen Bomb; Missile Gap; Missiles, Antiballistic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Tests

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Nuclear-Free Zones

Nuclear-free zones are areas of the world where nuclear weapons are prohibited. The most prominent example of these is in Latin America and the Caribbean basin. In February 1967 the Tlatelolco Treaty (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) was signed in Mexico City. Subsequently endorsed by the United Nations (UN), it obligates signatory states not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons or to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory. Amended to include the Caribbean basin states, it then became formally known as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and was ultimately signed by all thirty-three eligible states.

Other examples of self-proclaimed nuclear-free zones are the states of Finland and Sweden. When New Zealand proclaimed itself a nuclear-free zone and refused to allow U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons into its ports, it led to the breakup of the Australian–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Pact.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(1 July 1968)

Treaty signed by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union on 1 July 1968, entered into force on 1 March 1970, to prevent the sale or proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) divided the signatories in two categories: the nuclear nations (the United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, and the People's Republic of China) and the nonnuclear nations. The nuclear states pledged not to provide nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states (Article I) and to pursue nuclear disarmament (Article IV). The nonnuclear states pledged not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons of their own (Article II).

The treaty marked a watershed in the history of arms control and paved the road to détente between the superpowers. Although the idea of the NPT had been discussed as early as 1961, it was only in 1965, after the first Chinese nuclear test caught the attention of President Lyndon Johnson's administration, that it was seriously debated in Geneva by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (EDC), a committee created in 1962 by the United Nations (UN) to promote general disarmament.

The main stumbling block to the conclusion of the treaty had been the U.S. pledge to share its nuclear arsenal with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, particularly those that had no nuclear weapons of their own, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and Italy. This commitment had been established via the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). The Soviets regarded the MLF as a step toward proliferation and blocked the Geneva negotiations as long as the Americans refused to abandon the MLF. Eventually the Johnson administration gave up the idea behind the MLF and decided to share with its allies only the plans about the use of its atomic arsenal, in particular the targeting of ballistic missiles.

By late 1966, the U.S.-Soviet rapprochement had gone so far that the two superpowers tabled a joint NPT draft to write a new one. Some NATO allies, however, were not particularly pleased by this turn of events and criticized the new draft, which clearly prohibited the MLF. Draft modifications concerning inspections and the duration of the treaty partly deflected this criticism, however, and the treaty was concluded by early summer of 1968. The August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia delayed its ratification, but the necessary number of signatures was gathered by March 1970, when the treaty came into effect.

With 188 signatories, the NPT has the widest scope of any arms control agreement. Yet India, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), and Pakistan—all now either confirmed or suspected nuclear powers—remain outside the treaty, so doubts about the NPT's efficacy have increased since the 1990s.

Leopoldo Nuti and David Tal

See also
Détente; Multilateral Force, NATO; Nuclear Arms Race; Partial Test Ban Treaty

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Nuclear Tests

Beginning with the first successful test of a nuclear weapon by the United States in July 1945, nuclear-armed nations have built and tested nuclear devices in a continuing effort to improve the design and increase the yield of fission (atomic bomb) and fusion (hydrogen bomb) weapons. Nuclear tests have been conducted in the atmosphere, underground, and underwater and have contributed to remarkable progress in nuclear weapons research. Nuclear tests serve both military and scientific purposes as well as diplomatic goals. Often, nations have used nuclear tests to convey a variety of diplomatic messages.

The first test of a fission weapon took place near Alamogordo, New Mexico, on 16 July 1945 under the auspices of the Manhattan Project, the top secret U.S. program aimed at building an atomic bomb. Named Trinity, the test successfully detonated at 5:29 A.M. and yielded the equivalent of 20,000 tons, or 20 kilotons (kt), of TNT.

Crater at the Nevada Test Site in Mercury, Nevada. It was formed when a 100 kiloton explosive buried under 635 feet of desert alluvium was fired at the site on 6 July 1962. The crater is 320 feet deep and 1,280 feet in diameter. (U.S. Department of Energy)

In the years that followed the Trinity test, other nations pursued first fission weapons and later fusion, or thermonuclear, weapons. Successful tests were key markers of progress for these nations as they sought to be included in the elite "nuclear club." Indeed, until the advent of supercomputers in the late 1980s, nuclear tests were the only way of determining readiness of a nation's nuclear forces.

The United States conducted two additional nuclear tests after Trinity before the Soviet Union became the second nuclear nation, testing a fission bomb yielding 22 kt on 29 August 1949. The successful Soviet test convinced American policymakers to pursue the next level in nuclear weapons, the fusion bomb, which was first tested by the United States on 3 October 1952. That weapon yielded the equivalent of 10 million tons, or 10 megatons (mt), of TNT. The Soviets followed with their own thermonuclear test on 22 November 1955, a device that yielded 1.6 mt. The Soviets claimed that a 12 August 1953 explosion was a thermonuclear test, but it was in fact a fission weapon boosted in yield by the use of tritium in the nuclear reaction. The United States had tested a similar device in 1951.

Three more nations—Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China (PRC)—all tested fission weapons during 1953–1964. Great Britain tested its first nuclear weapon on 3 October 1953, France on 13 February 1960, and China on 16 October 1964. These nations later successfully tested fusion weapons. Great Britain was first among the three with a thermonuclear test on 11 November 1957, followed by China on 17 June 1967 and France on 24 August 1968. These five nations constituted the five declared nuclear nations. However, two other nations—India and Pakistan—have also tested nuclear weapons. India did so first on 18 May 1974 and then tested three more times in 1998 before Pakistan tested its first weapon on 28 May 1998 and its second on 30 May 1998. On 9 October 2006, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) announced its first nuclear detonation. Western intelligence confirmed that a large underground explosion had occurred and emitted radioactivity, but it is believed that the detonation was a misfire because of its small yield (under one kiloton). North Korea admitted that the yield was less than expected but insisted that it was a full-fledged detonation. Scientists and scholars continue to debate the specifics of these tests.

During 1945–1998, the five officially declared nuclear nations plus India and Pakistan conducted 2,051 nuclear weapons tests, 528 (26 percent) of which have been atmospheric. The Soviet Union and the United States have accounted for 1,745 (85 percent) of the total number of tests. The British have tested 45 weapons and the French 210. The biggest year for nuclear tests was 1962, when 178 tests were conducted.

In the largest nuclear test ever recorded, the Soviet Union conducted an atmospheric test on 30 October 1961 that yielded 50 mt. The weapon was not suitable for deployment, however, as no delivery system has been constructed to carry such a large device. The largest underground test yielded 5 mt and was conducted by the United States on 6 November 1971. Of the 2,051 nuclear tests, 935 have been conducted in Nevada and 496 in Kazakhstan. In the United States, Alaska, Mississippi, and Colorado have also been hosts to nuclear tests. Tests have been conducted in North America, Asia, Africa, and Australia.

The goals of such tests vary but generally include a desire to improve the design, increase the yield, or shrink the size of nuclear weapons. Nations also utilized such tests to prepare for possible battlefield uses. After a test, troops would march into the area, simulating an actual engagement and testing their ability to operate in such an environment. Nuclear blasts were also detonated to test the survivability of various infrastructures, civilian homes, and even ships at sea.

During the Cold War, nuclear tests served as a means of communication between superpowers and regional powers, as in the case of India and Pakistan. The Soviet nuclear test of 1949 announced to the world that the American atomic monopoly had ended, a development that dramatically affected the course of the Cold War. Now possessing atomic weapons, the Soviets quickly regained a military advantage because the United States could never match man-for-man the Soviet Red Army.

In 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which halted nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space.

An even better example might be the Soviet test in November 1961. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev took every opportunity to test the new American president, John F. Kennedy. In Cuba, Laos, and Berlin, Khrushchev attempted to bully Kennedy. As part of this strategy, Khrushchev broke the three-year-long nuclear testing moratorium with a series of tests that concluded with the world's largest nuclear test, of 50 mt. This weapon was 3,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and it forced Kennedy to resume nuclear testing in the United States. The Cold War grew increasingly tense in the months that followed.

In the United States, in particular, nuclear tests became a controversial political issue. Dangerous radioactive fallout resulted from every atmospheric test conducted, and those conducted in Nevada and New Mexico impacted those Americans living downwind of the nuclear fallout. Radioactive dust settled back to the earth, where it entered the food chain. Americans who lived close to the test sites suffered lasting and debilitating health effects. Increased cancer rates and genetic birth defects were just some of the deadly results of America's nuclear testing program.

In 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which halted nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space. With negotiations beginning in 1993, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a more inclusive treaty that would all but eliminate nuclear tests. Failure on the part of major nations to sign or ratify the treaty has hindered its utility. Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the treaty, and neither the United States nor China has ratified it. Israel is widely believed to have nuclear weapons, even though it has conducted no nuclear tests.

Brian Madison Jones

See also

Atomic Bomb; Bikini Island Atomic Tests; Fallout Shelters; Hydrogen Bomb; Nuclear Arms Race; Partial Test Ban Treaty

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Nuclear Weapons, Tactical

Small, low-yield nuclear warheads designed to be used against targets within a theater of war and in support of military operations by field forces, in contrast to strategic nuclear weapons designed for planned use against targets in

the adversary's homeland. Tactical nuclear weapons provided additional options for military commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions. The size, destructiveness, and limited numbers of early atomic weapons led to their assignment primarily to strategic targets, initially enemy economic centers (generally city targets), as well as key military facilities, such as command and control centers; strategic offensive capabilities, such as bomber bases; and major logistical facilities. However, the power of nuclear weapons caused military planners to prize their potential impact on the battlefield. Even in the last stages of World War II, U.S. military planners considered the option of employing atomic bombs in the tactical role of supporting an invasion of the Japanese mainland rather than against the urban targets of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The U.S. Army's Davy Crockett, a hand or jeep portable tactical nuclear recoilless rifle system deployed by the United States during the Cold War in support of the army's frontline pentomic battle groups, 1960. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In the early 1950s, as America's nuclear weapons inventory increased and technology improvements created smaller weapons, military planners began to incorporate nuclear weapons into theater of war plans and the development of doctrine, tactics, and force structures. The technological advances were especially important in creating weapons that could be delivered by smaller tactical aircraft—fighters and light bombers—as well as artillery pieces and short- and medium-range missile systems. The smaller warheads were also refined for specialized functions such as surface-to-air missiles, antiship missiles, antisubmarine depth charges, and air-to-air missiles and rockets. Small nuclear weapons even led to the development of backpack weapons that could be emplaced as atomic demolition munitions for blocking lines of advance, channeling enemy movements, or destroying high-value targets. The Soviet Union and eventually other nuclear-capable states also developed smaller nuclear weapons that were optimized for tactical employment.

The U.S. military's development of tactical nuclear weapons was stimulated by the practical challenge of countering the large Soviet military that was retained after World War II. Concern over fighting against numerically superior forces was amplified by the experience of engaging Chinese "volunteer" forces during the Korean War (1950–1953). The technological advance of firepower provided by nuclear weapons offered a solution to the threat that would also be more cost-effective than building large conventional forces. President Dwight Eisenhower's administration quickly formalized a commitment to nuclear weapons as the foundation of national security planning in the New Look defense posture, which emphasized both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The strategic and theater components of the U.S. Air Force were optimized for nuclear delivery, and even the U.S. Army developed a new organizational structure (known as the Pentomic Division) designed for the more fluid environment of theater nuclear operations.

The U.S. Navy also developed extensive nuclear capabilities for battles at sea and for strikes against shore targets. In 1957, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the U.S. style of doctrine and force structure, making nuclear firepower the key element of its ability to deter and potentially defeat aggression by the numerically superior Soviet Army. The Soviet military responded to the NATO move by expanding its own theater nuclear forces.

In the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy's administration moved away from Eisenhower's New Look by developing a stronger conventional capability and a broader range of options for military scenarios in a security policy known as flexible response. American and NATO military forces developed conventional operational concepts and supporting force structures and doctrines. NATO's conventional capability provided flexibility and was also a response to concerns over the extensive damage that nuclear operations would inflict on European territory and the challenges that this would present to postwar recovery. This expanded range of options also continued to include tactical nuclear forces, which played an important role in NATO plans and force structure throughout the rest of the Cold War, enhancing deterrence and providing an option for escalation if conventional defensive efforts failed.

Some options were developed to minimize the impact of nuclear conflict on friendly territory, such as revised delivery procedures, smaller-yield warheads, and proposals for specialized warheads that would minimize radioactive fallout and maximize immediate radiation that would kill soldiers and damage equipment with limited harm to civilian infrastructure and restricted residual radiation—the so-called neutron bomb. The United States maintained an extensive inventory of aircraft, artillery, and missile-delivered nuclear weapons in Europe throughout the Cold War. Additionally, allied forces were trained and prepared to deliver nuclear weapons that were controlled and released by U.S. military personnel. The British and French military also developed nuclear weapons that they controlled for tactical roles.

The Soviet military also developed an extensive tactical nuclear capability, with an apparent emphasis on preempting NATO nuclear forces in any initial use, with follow-on use as necessary to gain success in rapid, offensive armored operations. Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces also developed conventional options in the 1970s and 1980s that could be used at the start of any theater conflict in an effort to gain a rapid, decisive advantage before nuclear weapons were used.

By the end of the Cold War, both Soviet and Western forces were developing concepts for using advanced, highly accurate conventional weapons—combined with enhanced reconnaissance and communications capabilities—in combat roles that had once been only possible with nuclear warheads. But even with improved conventional systems, sizable tactical nuclear forces remained available to both sides of the Cold War deterrence structure as tensions drew down.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

AirLand Battle; Atomic Bomb; Flexible Response; Hydrogen Bomb; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Multilateral Force, NATO; New Look Defense Policy; Soviet Union, Army; Soviet Union, Army Air Force; United States Air Force; United States Army

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Nyerere, Julius Kambarage
(1922–1999)

African nationalist, chief minister (1961–1962), and president (1962–1985) of Tanganyika (later the United Republic of Tanzania). Born in Butiama in the British colony of Tanganyika on 13 April 1922, Julius Nyerere was educated in Great Britain and graduated from Edinburgh University with an MA degree in history and economics in 1952. He returned to Tanganyika and in 1954 formed the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), an organization seeking to win independence from Britain.

On 1 September 1960, Nyerere won the national elections and became Tanganyika's first chief minister. In March 1961, Tanganyika gained its independence from Britain. Nyerere was elected prime minister, but he resigned on 22 January 1962. In December 1962 Tanganyika became a republic, and Nyerere was elected president on 9 December 1962.

Nyerere was one of the founders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. In April 1964, Tanganyika formed a union with the Republic of Zanzibar, establishing the United Republic of Tanzania. Because Zanzibar had been receiving military aid from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union, this created Cold War tensions in the region. By 1965, as Tanzania's relations with Britain and the United States deteriorated, both countries curtailed their foreign aid to Tanzania.

Even before Tanzania's relations with the West had begun to decline, Nyerere had begun to cultivate a closer relationship with the Soviet bloc and the PRC. Since the communist bloc had been providing weapons and training for liberation movements supported by Tanzania in southern Africa, it



Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, helped form the Organization of African Unity. (National Archives and Records Administration)

was natural for Tanzania to establish closer contacts with these nations. In August 1964, Nyerere signed an agreement inviting PRC military advisors to Tanzania. In February 1965 Nyerere visited China, and four months later PRC leader Zhou Enlai visited Tanzania. Despite his close relations with the communist bloc, Nyerere had no intention of relying on any single country for support, and he pursued a pragmatic foreign policy benefiting Tanzania.

On 5 February 1967, Nyerere announced in the Arusha Declaration that Tanzania was a socialist nation, and a day later he proclaimed the nationalization of all banks. On 6 January 1968, he admitted that Tanzania had allied with the communist powers in supporting liberation movements in southern Africa, but he argued that this did not affect Tanzania's other foreign policies.

Although Nyerere instituted a number of socialist programs, he was first and foremost an African nationalist. He based his program of collectivization of the nation's agricultural system, Ujamaa ("familyhood"), on the extended family of traditional Africa before the coming of the Europeans. The system of collectivization failed, however. By 1976 Tanzania had gone from Africa's largest exporter of agricultural products to its greatest importer.

Nyerere resigned the presidency on 31 July 1985. In a candor unusual in a politician, he admitted frankly, "I failed." He remained chairman of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania until 1990, however. Nyerere died in London on 14 October 1999.

Edy Parsons

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Tanzania

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O

Obote, Apollo Milton
(1924–2005)

Ugandan prime minister (1962–1966) and president (1966–1971, 1980–1985). Born on 28 December 1924 in Akokoro, northern Uganda, Milton Obote studied at Busoga College during 1945–1947 and at Makerere University College beginning in 1948. Makerere officials expelled him in 1950 for political activity, and he went to Kenya to work a number of menial jobs.

On his return to Uganda in 1957, Obote organized the Lango branch of the Uganda National Congress (UNC). He was elected to membership in the Uganda Legislative Council and in 1958 was elected to represent the Lango district in the country's first popular election. When the UNC split in 1959, he formed the Uganda People's Congress (UPC). He formed a coalition with the Bagunda and three other kingdoms, and when the national elections were held on 27 April 1962, the UPC majority made him prime minister.

On 9 October 1962 Uganda ended sixty-eight years as a British protectorate and gained its independence. Obote sought national unity, economic reform, and better relations with Western nations. But in 1966 he was implicated in a gold-smuggling plot along with his protégé Idi Amin, the deputy commander of the Ugandan armed forces. In retaliation, Obote suspended the constitution, staged a coup, and declared Uganda a republic, naming himself as president on 2 March 1966.

Although not despotic in his economic or political outlook, Obote's lack of charisma, his authoritarian manner, and his widespread unpopularity doomed his first presidency. His attempts to move his country to the Left, coupled with several economic crises and scandals, further hamstrung his rule. On 25 January 1971, while on a state trip to Singapore, Amin deposed Obote and immediately set up a military regime.

Obote spent nine years in exile in the Sudan and Tanzania. With the help of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, Obote defeated Amin in April 1979 and regained the presidency. Amin fled to Libya.

The election that followed in 1980 was not accepted by a large portion of the electorate because Obote, who was not chosen on the first ballot, used his loyal troops to recount the votes and suppress any opposition. Several factions rose up against him, and the army, which he had always used to his benefit, now

turned against him. He was deposed in 1985 by General Bazilio Okello. Obote fled to Zambia, and died in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 10 October 2005.

Gary Kerley

See also
Africa; Amin, Idi; Uganda

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Office of Strategic Services

World War II U.S. foreign intelligence agency and forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Created by order of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 13 June 1942 at the suggestion of Colonel William J. Donovan, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the principal U.S. foreign intelligence agency during World War II. This civilian-run intelligence agency reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Roosevelt appointed Donovan to head the OSS. A prominent lawyer and former U.S. assistant attorney general, Donovan had fought in World War I and won the Medal of Honor.

The OSS was the equivalent of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Special Operations Executive (SOE), with which it developed a close relationship during the war. Employing several thousand people, the OSS undertook a variety of covert activities, including intelligence gathering and counterintelligence work in both the European and Pacific theaters of war. Despite some successes, the OSS attracted fierce criticism from the U.S. military and the Department of State. Donovan's brash leadership style did little to reduce tensions with other intelligence agencies, and there were growing concerns about maintaining a covert intelligence agency in peacetime. OSS support for resistance movements such as Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh in Indochina also tainted the agency with a leftist aura.

On 20 September 1945 President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9620, which disbanded the OSS ten days later, despite Donovan's appeal for establishing a centralized U.S. intelligence agency. Within a few months, however, the growing Cold War caused Truman to reverse course. The OSS was the direct precursor of the CIA, established in 1946 and formally confirmed by act of Congress in the National Security Act of 1947. Many key figures in the CIA, including directors Allen W. Dulles, Richard Helms, and William S. Colby, began their intelligence careers as OSS agents.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Central Intelligence Agency; Colby, William Egan; Dulles, Allen Welsh; Helms, Richard McGarrah; Ho Chi Minh; National Security Act; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.

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Ogaden War
(1977–1978)

Territorial conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia fought during 1977–1978.

The Ogaden War was a localized dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, but the dynamics of Cold War geopolitics endowed this conflict with global implications. With communist bloc nations providing support to the Ethiopians and with the Somalis seeking accommodation with the Americans, the possibility existed that the Cold War would be fought out in the Horn of Africa through proxies. The United States, however, remained neutral, and in March 1978 Ethiopia triumphed in the war, a victory directly resulting from Soviet and Cuban aid. For many in the West, this provided yet another example of communist expansion, and American neutrality was seen as weakness that would only spur further Soviet aggression. Such a perception led U.S.

Young Somali recruits training at a Mogadishu army barracks following General Mohammed Siyad Barre's mobilization announcement of imminent combat with Ethiopia, February 1978. (Henri Bureau/Sygma/Corbis)

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to later claim that "SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden."

The Ogaden region, although inhabited mainly by ethnic Somalis, was territorially part of Ethiopia and had long been a source of contention between the two nations. In August 1977, border skirmishes erupted into full-scale war, with some 30,000 troops fighting on each side. Initially, the Somali incursion into Ethiopia met with success, and by October the Somali insurgents controlled all of the Ogaden except for the strategic towns of Harar and Diredawa. As the year progressed, however, the situation began to improve for the Ethiopians, mostly because of increasing aid from the communist bloc.

During the first few months of the war, the Soviet Union had also provided military aid to Somalia. However, Ethiopia was considered the greater prize in the African Horn region, and Somali leader Mohammed Siyad Barre feared Soviet abandonment. In October 1977 his fears were realized when the Soviet Union halted all military support to Somalia while greatly increasing supplies and troops to Ethiopia. In the Cold War context, Barre took the logical step. He officially broke ties with the Soviets and Cubans in November and expelled all their military personnel. He then approached the United States for help.

Although the American president, Jimmy Carter, was anxious to improve relations with Somalia, his reorientation of American foreign policy in January 1977 had led to a de-emphasis of traditional Cold War concerns in favor of such issues as regionalism and human rights. Instead of responding to the perceived Soviet threat, Carter insisted that the United States remain neutral and applied a policy that was based on these new principles rather than on traditional Cold War considerations.

Carter cited Barre's violations of human rights and pointed out that by invading Ethiopia he had violated both international law and the Cairo Resolution of 1964, which stated that the borders of African nations would be honored and maintained. Carter therefore refused to provide Barre with military aid, called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and, following his policy that "African problems should have African solutions," suggested that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) should host peace talks.

Although the OAU attempted to negotiate a peace agreement, it met with little success. Indeed, all the warring parties seemed dedicated to a military solution to the Ogaden conflict, but the extent of communist bloc support for Ethiopia combined with the lack of support for Somalia meant that Barre's territorial ambitions were doomed to failure. On 9 March 1978 he announced that all Somali forces were being withdrawn from Ethiopia.

Even though the war ended with Ethiopia maintaining its territory, the implications of the conflict for the Cold War were far-reaching. Brzezinski would later claim that American reluctance to actively oppose communist bloc involvement in the war demonstrated American weakness and encouraged Soviet aggression. Such a perception, he believed, led to the collapse of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and ultimately the failure of détente.

Donna R. Jackson

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Barre, Mohammed Siyad; Cuba and Africa; Détente; Ethiopia; Organization of African Unity; Somalia

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Olympic Games and Politics

During the Cold War, the Olympic Games became a prominent tool in the propaganda war between East and West. Each side believed that Olympic victories would demonstrate the superiority of its social and political system, and each side used diplomacy, boycotts, and other political measures to seek prestige and influence at the Olympics, especially as the event grew into an enormously popular global festival.

In the United States, Olympic participation was largely funded by private sources, and athletes adhered to the amateur ideal (at least in principle) until that went by the wayside in the 1980s. In contrast, the Soviet Union's highly successful "big red sports machine" was entirely state-sponsored, and the Soviet government poured substantial resources into training and nurturing athletes who were amateur in name only.

The Soviet Union entered the Olympics for the first time at the 1952 Helsinki Games as part of a drive to bolster its new superpower status through demonstrations of athletic prowess. Winning was a high priority indeed for the Soviet regime, and the first Soviet victory in the unofficial medal count came at the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games. With the two superpowers and their allies competing directly against one another, international sports events inevitably became highly politicized. The extraordinary growth of

Olympic Games during the Cold War

Year	*Summer Olympics Location*	*Winter Olympics Location*
1948	London, United Kingdom	St Moritz, Switzerland
1952	Helsinki, Finland	Oslo, Norway
1956	Melbourne, Austrailia	Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy
1960	Rome, Italy	Squaw Valley, United States
1964	Tokyo, Japan	Innsbruck, Austria
1968	Mexico City, Mexico	Grenoble, France
1972	Munich, West Germany	Sapporo, Japan
1976	Montreal, Canada	Innsbruck, Austria
1980	Moscow, Soviet Union	Lake Placid, United States
1984	Los Angeles, United States	Sarajevo, Yugoslavia
1988	Seoul, South Korea	Calgary, Canada

television coverage after 1956 and increasing levels of public interest in the Olympics meant that the Games became a highly visible element of the struggle for the hearts and minds of the rest of the world. For many Americans, Soviet bloc athletic successes fed fears that communism was gaining ground in the Cold War, while American victories provided reassurance that freedom would ultimately triumph over tyranny.

The International Olympic Committee (IOC), the international body that oversees the Games, claimed to eschew politics but could not avoid confronting many thorny political issues during the Cold War. Although the IOC tried to steer a middle course, it often deferred to the wishes of the West, and its president during 1952–1972 was an American, Avery Brundage.

One of the most contentious of these issues was the German question. According to IOC rules, only one committee could be recognized from a country. In 1950, when the division of Germany was still uncertain, the IOC provisionally recognized the Olympic committee of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) as representing all of Germany. The German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) also pressed for recognition, hoping that participation in the Olympics would bring international recognition. Both West Germany and the United States blocked the East German bid, however. In 1955 the IOC provisionally recognized East Germany but insisted that East Germans compete jointly with the West German team. At the 1968 Games, with the division of Germany firmly established, the IOC finally permitted a separate East German team. The East German sports system, which was highly regimented and relied heavily on the use of illegal drugs, achieved impressive successes that undoubtedly aided the country's campaign for worldwide political recognition.

The East German sports system achieved impressive successes that undoubtedly aided the country's campaign for worldwide political recognition.

The IOC faced a similarly protracted political debate over China. After the communists established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland in 1949, the IOC debated whether to recognize the PRC, the Nationalists in Taiwan, or both. At the 1952 Games, the Nationalists refused to come and the PRC athletes arrived too late to participate. In 1958 the PRC withdrew from the Olympic movement in protest against Taiwan's continuing participation. In 1971, when the United Nations (UN) expelled Taiwan and recognized communist China, the IOC haltingly began to make overtures to the PRC. In 1976 the Canadian government, which had adopted a one-China policy, set off a political firestorm when it refused to allow the Taiwan team to enter the Montreal Olympics under the name Republic of China (ROC). Many Americans were outraged and called for a boycott. Taiwan's athletes ultimately withdrew, and a few years later a compromise was reached whereby the IOC admitted the PRC as China's representative, while Taiwan remained a member under the name Taipei. The PRC's first Olympic appearance came at the 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid. The PRC boycotted the 1980 Moscow Summer Games.

Despite security precautions, there was a bloody terrorist incident during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich. On 5 September 1972, eight members of Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) gained entrance to the Olympic Village, five of them

by scaling a fence. They then killed two Israeli athletes and took nine others hostage.

The terrorists called themselves Black September in order to mask their al-Fatah identify, but Arafat had ordered the operation. The terrorists demanded that Israel free 234 Arab prisoners and that West Germany release two German terrorist leaders imprisoned in Frankfurt. Following several hours of negotiations, the German government and the terrorists reached a deal providing for a plane to Cairo. Meanwhile, German sharpshooters took up position with orders to open fire simultaneously and kill all the terrorists without harming the hostages.

The Germans then transported the terrorists, hostages, and several German officials by three helicopters to a nearby military airfield where a Lufthansa jet was waiting. The German rescue attempt there went awry, and in the bloody shootout that followed at 3:00 A.M. on 6 September, the Palestinians set off a grenade in one of two helicopters, killing all aboard, while the terrorists in the remaining helicopter killed all the remaining blindfolded Israeli hostages. The firefight claimed eleven Israelis, five terrorists, and one German policeman. Three of the terrorists were captured alive.

The next month other terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet, and in order to secure the release of the passengers, the German government agreed to free the three imprisoned terrorists, who were flown to freedom in Libya.

The most far-reaching episode of East-West conflict involving the Olympic Games erupted after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. To protest the Soviets' action, President Jimmy Carter pressured the U.S. Olympic Committee to withdraw the American team from the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. Under American pressure, a number of U.S. allies, including West Germany and Japan, also withdrew. Others, such as France, participated as a way of asserting independence from U.S. policy.

Only a few weeks before Los Angeles opened the next Olympic Games in 1984, the Soviet Union announced that it would not participate. The Soviet government cited concerns over a hostile environment in the United States, but most commentators saw the move as retaliation for the 1980 boycott. Despite the withdrawal of seventeen other nations, including East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Cuba, and Hungary, the Games proved popular and—thanks to unprecedented commercialization—were financially successful. As a result of the Soviet boycott, the Olympics attracted intense nationalistic fervor in the United States.

Cold War rivalries also spawned some of the best-known Olympic sporting moments. In 1956, in the aftermath of the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, a Hungarian-Soviet water polo match turned into a bloody fistfight. In 1972 the unbeaten American basketball team

In a scene of wild jubilation, U.S. Olympic hockey players celebrate their upset 4–3 victory over the Soviet Union in the semifinal game of the Lake Placid Winter Olympics, New York, 22 February 1980. (Bettmann/Corbis)

lost to the Soviets after a controversial decision in the last seconds of the gold-medal match. The American ice hockey team's improbable victory over the heavily favored Soviet team at the 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid, New York, was credited with helping to revive American patriotism after a decade of economic and political gloom.

The lead in the unofficial medal count at the Games was held more often by the Soviet Union than the United States. In 1988 in Seoul, the Soviets and East Germans won a decisive victory in this. These Olympics also saw the last appearance of athletes from the USSR, although they continued to represent their new nations.

Barbara Keys

See also

Afghanistan War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hungarian Revolution

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Open Skies Proposal
(21 July 1955)

Plan proposed by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 21 July 1955 at the Geneva Conference that called for mutual inspection of Western and Eastern bloc military establishments through aerial reconnaissance, thereby diminishing the likelihood of surprise attacks by either side. The Open Skies Proposal was the American response to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 10 May 1955 proposal calling for deep and mutual cuts in nuclear weapons.

While Khrushchev accepted planned U.S. reconnaissance flights over Eastern Europe, he refused to allow such flights over the Soviet Union because they would expose Soviet weaknesses and provide the United States with verification of Soviet targets. Khrushchev's refusal to accept the proposal gave Eisenhower an advantage in the propaganda war, as it belied his contention that the Soviet Union wanted peace.

Historians are divided over the sincerity of the Open Skies Proposal. Some, citing various administration studies such as Operation CANDOR, the Killian Report, and the report of the Nelson Rockefeller working group (which called for, respectively, explaining the danger of nuclear weapons, a nuclear test ban, and the exchange of atomic information between the two blocs as a means to prevent accidental nuclear war), consider the proposal

sincere. Others argue that because the United States enjoyed a clear technological advantage, Eisenhower knew that his proposal would never be accepted. They argue that the proposal represented an easy way for Eisenhower to claim moral superiority over the Soviet Union without committing to any concrete measures.

Chris Tudda

See also

Arms Control; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Geneva Conference (1955); Khrushchev, Nikita; Nuclear Arms Race

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Oppenheimer, Julius Robert
(1904–1967)

U.S. scientist. Born in New York City on 22 April 1904, Julius Robert Oppenheimer attended the Ethical Culture School of New York and Harvard University, graduating from the latter after three years in 1925 with honors and a degree in chemistry. Turning to physics, he spent a year pursuing graduate work at the Cavendish Laboratory and then switched to the University of Göttingen, Germany, and the new field of theoretical quantum physics, receiving his doctorate in March 1927. He pursued postdoctoral studies for two years in the United States, Holland, and Switzerland before accepting a joint appointment at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and the University of California, Berkeley. An inspiring teacher, he quickly attracted a generation of enthusiastic graduate students to Caltech and Berkeley, which became leading international centers of quantum physics. Although Oppenheimer published extensively on spectra, particles, neutron stars, and black holes, his personal scientific contribution was less outstanding, and he was never a serious contender for a Nobel Prize.

In October 1941 Oppenheimer began fast-neutron research for the U.S. government in connection with atomic bomb development. One year later he became director of the central laboratory for bomb design and development at Los Alamos, New Mexico, supervising the Manhattan Project. In this enormously demanding position he displayed new self-discipline, and his skillful intellectual leadership, capacity to absorb and process information, concern for the team of 1,500 working under him, and ability to negotiate the often-difficult relationship between individualistic scientists and governmental demands for conformity became legendary. After the 1945 atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the exhausted Oppenheimer, who told President

Most famous for his involvement with the development of the atomic bomb, J. Robert Oppenheimer also had a major influence on the study of quantum physics. For two decades he directed the prestigious Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Oppenheimer's brilliant career was marred by allegations regarding his patriotic loyalty, and he was stripped of his security clearance. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Harry S. Truman that "I feel we have blood on our hands," hoped that the bomb's destructiveness might eventually force nations to abandon war.

Leaving Los Alamos in late 1945, Oppenheimer became director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton two years later and quickly transformed it into the world's leading center for theoretical physics while simultaneously enhancing its existing reputation in humanist studies. As the most prestigious American advisor to the 1945–1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Committee on Nuclear Power and the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), he advocated international control of atomic energy and lectured extensively, seeking to enhance popular scientific understanding.

In 1953 growing domestic McCarthyist, anticommunist sentiment and resentment by some colleagues—notably Edward Teller—of Oppenheimer's earlier reluctance to develop a thermonuclear bomb led the American government to withdraw his security clearance. This was done on the grounds that his wartime evasiveness over potential security problems and prewar left-wing and communist associates, including his brother, a former fiancée, and his wife, had permanently compromised his status. A full-scale inquiry held in 1954 at Oppenheimer's insistence confirmed this verdict. Later evidence revealed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) blatantly infringed Oppenheimer's civil rights by tapping his telephone and providing transcripts of his legal consultations to the inquiry's members. In 1994 retired Soviet spy General Pavel A. Sudoplatov claimed in his memoirs that Oppenheimer had passed atomic secrets to Soviet agents, but major errors in his account led most in the scientific community to doubt this. Although excluded from governmental counsels, Oppenheimer retained his academic position at Princeton until June 1966, publishing several books on science for the educated general reader. He died in Princeton, New Jersey, on 18 February 1967.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Atomic Bomb; Atomic Energy Commission, United States; Hydrogen Bomb; McCarthyism; Teller, Edward

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Organization for European Economic Cooperation

Multinational West European economic recovery and integration program. In order to continue the work of the European Recovery Program (also known as the Marshall Plan) on a more permanent basis, the Conference for European Economic Cooperation (also known as the Conference of Sixteen) established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on 16 April 1948. Headquartered in Paris, the OEEC had eighteen founding members: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the western zones of occupation in Germany. The Free Territory of Trieste participated until it again became a part of Italy in 1954. Many leading European figures played a role in the OEEC, including Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak and Britain's Sir Anthony Eden.

The OEEC played a central role in the allocation of Marshall Plan funds until 1952, when that program ended. The early efforts of the OEEC, however, were plagued by crises of currency valuation, distribution, and convertibility. These problems were particularly difficult to resolve, as decisions in the OEEC Council could be made only with unanimity. Under a plan devised by the OEEC's so-called Committee of Wise Men in August 1949, nearly $12 billion in American and Canadian aid to Europe eventually was meted out through the Marshall Plan. The United Kingdom received nearly one-quarter of the aid, with France getting one-fifth. Italy and the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) received just over 11 percent each.

As the Marshall Plan shifted its emphasis from issuing credits to promoting economic integration in August 1949, the OEEC once again played a critical role. The OEEC negotiated limited freedom of trade in foodstuffs, manufactured products, and raw materials that accounted for nearly 60 percent of intra-European trade by the end of 1950. To prevent further problems and ease the movement of currencies, the OEEC created the European Payments Union (EPU) in September 1950. The EPU was dissolved in 1958 when all member currencies became convertible.

Although the OEEC was also involved in early discussions aimed at creating a single European market, the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952 and British pressure gave the leading role in these developments to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The OEEC continued to work in the background, however, establishing the European Productivity Agency (1952) and the European Nuclear Energy Agency (1957). The OEEC also provided the institutional framework for negotiations leading to the European Free Trade Area and eventually to the 1957 Treaty of Rome.

In September 1961, the OEEC was subsumed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a global body that seeks to facilitate trade. Today, the OECD comprises member thirty nations and is active in more than one hundred countries.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

European Integration Movement; Marshall Plan

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Organization of African Unity

Pan-African organization formed in October 1963. Early in the twentieth century, American scholar-activist W. E. B. Du Bois began to organize a Pan-African movement. When decolonization was under way in earnest in the early 1960s, Du Bois' vision was realized when newly independent African nations gathered in Ethiopia in 1963 to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The history of the organization has been a stormy one, as it was often drawn into the midst of Cold War conflicts and geopolitics.

Preliminary discussions involving the organization of the OAU precipitated a rift between the Monrovia Group, consisting of medium and small African states, and the rival Casablanca Group, headed by Ghana's leader, Kwame Nkrumah. Generally speaking, the Monrovia Group sought a loose confederation of African states, while the Casablanca Group proposed a tighter union. On the surface, Nkrumah seemed the natural choice to lead a Pan-African movement, given his long dedication to nationalism and the hopes that Ghana would become a role model for economic development in Africa. But Nkrumah was also a man with vast personal ambition and dictatorial tendencies. Many people feared that his vision for the OAU was of an instrument to project his political influence far beyond the borders of Ghana.

The tension between the two factions might have left the OAU stillborn, but during the spring and summer of 1963, Ethiopian officials unsuccessfully mediated between the two groups. By October 1963, the delegates

Heads of state from thirty independent African nations meet in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963 with the intent to form what would become the Organization of African Unity (OAU). (Bettmann/Corbis)

had finished the OAU charter and officially registered it with the United Nations (UN).

Still, its member nations were reluctant to delegate authority to the OAU to resolve African conflicts. As the shameful record of superpower meddling and proxy wars in Africa became public in the 1960s and 1970s, the OAU states resolved not to take sides in the internal affairs of other nations.

On the other hand, from its inception the OAU pledged assistance to the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa, and a Liberation Committee was established to offer support to other African liberation movements that might arise. Comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda, the Liberation Committee announced that it would adopt a variety of tactics, including economic boycotts and diplomatic campaigns, to assist liberation movements throughout Africa. The most controversial actions in this regard were direct monetary payments to liberation movements and the construction of military training camps. The available monetary funds were not substantial, standing at less than $2 million in 1964. And despite public pledges to make aid to liberation movements a top priority, the committee's budget was still less than $4 million in 1972.

Even though the OAU's monetary assistance was meager and had a negligible effect on the outcome of liberation movements, many Western nations

The OAU record on refugee assistance has also been consistently dismal. In 1969, there were 500,000 refugees in Africa. By 1994, that number had skyrocketed to 6 million.

disapproved of such support. They viewed many of the liberation efforts as anticapitalist and procommunist. The role of the OAU in leading many developing-world nations to sever ties with Israel in 1973 also created consternation throughout the West. Within the OAU, debates ensued about how to deal with the emergence of rival liberation movements in Angola, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The OAU offered to mediate between the rival groups, but its assistance was ineffective. The OAU also came under fire for failing to object to the arrival of Cuban forces in Angola during the 1970s. The OAU's silence on this controversial issue indeed suggested a double standard.

The human rights record of the OAU has been a topic of worldwide concern. During 1963–1982, the OAU received 6,800 complaints of human rights violations but only acted on 127 of those. In response to international criticism and pressure, the OAU approved a human rights charter in 1986, but enforcement remained sporadic at best.

The OAU record on refugee assistance has also been consistently dismal. In 1969, there were 500,000 refugees in Africa. By 1994, that number had skyrocketed to 6 million. Yet the OAU did little to intervene or mitigate the effects of what was clearly a humanitarian crisis, stating that refugee assistance would be akin to interfering in the internal affairs of its member states.

In 2003 the OAU, with great fanfare, announced a name change. It is now known as the African Union. Whether the organization can bring about positive change in Africa still remains to be seen.

Michael J. Polley

See also

Africa; Decolonization; Monrovia Group; Nationalism; Nkrumah, Kwame

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Organization of American States

Multinational institution established in 1948 by the U.S. and Latin American governments to promote international cooperation within the Western Hemisphere. The concept of an organization to encourage cooperation among Western Hemispheric nations originated in the early nineteenth century, when the South American revolutionary war hero Simón Bolivar unsuccessfully proposed a league of Latin American republics. Decades later, the United States revived the idea with more success and with a different agenda: the promotion of trade. At a conference in Washington, D.C., during 1889–1890, eighteen Western Hemispheric nations founded the Commercial

Bureau of the American Republics (later transformed into the Pan-American Union), with headquarters in Washington, D.C.

After 1945 various pressures, many related to the Cold War, led the U.S. and Latin American governments to seek closer cooperation through new institutions. Latin American leaders worried about declining U.S. economic engagement following World War II and sought to open new channels for encouraging U.S. aid and investment. President Harry Truman's administration, anxious about worsening Cold War tensions, hoped to consolidate U.S. authority in the hemisphere.

In 1947, the United States and nineteen Latin American governments signed the Rio Pact, a mutual defense treaty that advanced the long-standing U.S. effort to make enforcement of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine a multilateral responsibility. A year later, twenty-one Western Hemispheric nations gathered in Bogotá, Colombia, to discuss economic and political relations. On 30 April 1948, the attending nations signed the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS).

The OAS called for efforts to promote peace, prosperity, and democracy in the hemisphere and established mechanisms for resolving disputes among member states. At the insistence of Latin American governments keenly aware of the long record of U.S. intervention in their nations, the OAS also declared the principle of nonintervention. Adopted over U.S. objections, Article 15 of the OAS Charter asserted that "no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State."

In the decades that followed, Washington repeatedly overcame this limitation by using the OAS as a means to attain U.S. geopolitical objectives behind a façade of regional solidarity. President Dwight Eisenhower's administration established this pattern in 1954 when it used the OAS to help oust the left-leaning government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. The administration had calculated that an OAS resolution condemning Arbenz would give a veneer of legitimacy to U.S. action against the regime. Washington told Latin American governments that the episode was a "test case" of the OAS's ability to defend the hemisphere and threatened to act alone if the organization failed to take a stand. With only Guatemala in opposition, sixteen Latin American governments grudgingly supported the United States. In June 1954, as a military operation sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) overthrew Arbenz, U.S. leaders claimed to be acting in the interests of the OAS.

The OAS performed a similar function when the United States sought to apply pressure on Cuba during the early 1960s. When Cuban leaders complained to the United Nations (UN) about U.S. hostility, Washington convinced the UN Security Council that the OAS, not the UN, was the appropriate body to consider the issue. Under the guise of regional cooperation, the United States then maneuvered to exclude Cuba from the OAS. At a ministerial meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962, President John Kennedy's administration won OAS approval—by a one-vote margin—of a statement declaring "Marxism-Leninism incompatible with the American system."

When the United States was on the losing end of OAS votes, U.S. officials sometimes ignored the organization and simply acted unilaterally. Before the 1982 Falklands War, for example, the OAS voted 17–0, with the United States abstaining, to back Argentina's claim to the disputed islands. Washington then imposed economic sanctions against Argentina and sent military aid to Britain. In 1989, the United States ignored a 20–1 vote in the OAS condemning its December 1989 invasion of Panama.

Mark Atwood Lawrence

See also

Americas; Falklands War; Guatemalan Intervention; Panama, U.S. Invasion of; Rio Pact

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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Oil cartel founded on 14 September 1960 at the Baghdad Conference to give oil-exporting countries leverage in negotiations with foreign oil companies that, at the time, controlled production and dictated prices and the share of profits going to producing nations. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Arab member nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) enacted embargoes against supporters of Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars in an effort to influence Middle East policy. Since the 1980s, OPEC has acted largely apolitically, seeking to stabilize oil production and prices to maximize members' profits while guaranteeing a reliable oil supply to the world economy.

As early as 1945, oil-producing nations recognized that a unified stance on pricing and output would improve their effectiveness in bargaining with the major oil companies. The oil companies' enactment of a series of unilateral price cuts in 1959 and 1960 finally provided the impetus for the world's five largest oil exporters—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Venezuela—to band together with the express purpose of reversing these price cuts. Over its first two decades of operations, OPEC expanded its membership to include Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon. It negotiated with oil companies but with little success in eroding the oil companies' power. In the early 1970s, however, OPEC finally succeeded in wresting pricing power from the oil companies, which were increasingly vulnerable to political decisions made in the oil-producing states that housed their operations. On 16 October 1973, in reaction to the Yom Kippur War, OPEC quadrupled the price of oil, beginning a series of

OPEC headquarters in Vienna, Austria. (Barbara Gindl/EPA/Corbis)

unilateral price hikes that effectively ended the companies' control over all but the technical side of oil production.

As Arab nations' production made up an increasing share of the world oil market, they began to use their power politically, applying oil embargoes against Britain and France during the 1956 Suez Crisis and against the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) during the 1967 Six-Day War. However, these embargoes failed, in large part because of U.S. willingness to make up the oil shortfalls to its allies.

Arab oil producers' attempts to use the oil weapon to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict reached a peak in October 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, precipitated by Egypt and Syria's surprise attack on Israel. On 17 October, one day after OPEC initiated its sharp price increase, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decreased oil production and initiated a five-month oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands to protest their support for Israel. The oil price shock combined with the embargo caused severe economic disruptions in much of the world, producing a worldwide recession.

The Soviet Union, itself an oil exporter, had little to risk from the Arab states' use of the oil weapon and encouraged the oil embargo because it

weakened the West economically. At the same time, the Soviet Union took advantage of decreased Arab production and higher prices, significantly increasing its oil exports to the United States during the embargo—a fact that neither nation publicized.

The oil embargo caught Americans largely unprepared. As a result, the U.S. government instituted gasoline rationing that resulted in long lines at gasoline stations and national anxiety over energy supplies. In response to the price increases and the embargo, the United States sought to establish a cartel of oil-consuming nations to confront OPEC directly, but major importers' diverse oil needs and political positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict stymied this plan. In 1975, the U.S. Congress did pass legislation to establish a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to protect against future supply disruptions.

Although the Arab states ended the oil embargo soon after hostilities ceased and without securing the desired Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, this unprecedented assertion of Arab power transformed the position of oil-producing states and fueled Arab nationalism. Both the United States and the Soviet Union devoted increasing attention to the Middle East as a strategic battleground, while the Arab world endeavored to exercise political influence independent of the superpowers.

OPEC's achievement of higher oil prices in 1973 ultimately damaged the oil producers' economies by the late 1970s, when the resulting worldwide recession produced inflation and falling demand for oil. Oil prices spiked again during 1979–1980, the result not of OPEC strategy but of two political crises: the Iranian Revolution and the start of the Iran-Iraq War. Since the 1980s, OPEC has pursued a policy of price control, ensuring substantial profits without adversely affecting the world economy. Today, OPEC has eleven member states. Ecuador and Gabon left OPEC prior to the 1990s.

Elun Gabriel

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Iran; Iraq; Middle East; Saudi Arabia

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Orwell, George
(1903–1950)

Influential novelist, journalist, and social critic. Born Eric Arthur Blair in Motihari, India, on 25 June 1903, he adopted the pen name George Orwell in

1933. He attended the elite Eton College on scholarship but failed to earn entrance to a university. He instead joined the Indian Imperial Police in Burma, working there during 1922–1927 before resigning, having witnessed firsthand the sordidness of imperialism.

On returning to England, Orwell attempted to become a writer but initially earned little for his effort. His first substantial published work, *Down and Out in Paris and London* (1933), was a documentary account of life at the bottom of the social order. This was followed by his 1934 novel *Burmese Days*, a sharp condemnation of imperialism. More novels followed, mainly chronicling the frustrations of lower–middle-class life in interwar England. In 1936 he traveled to the north of England to live with the industrial working class, subsequently describing their downtrodden, wretched lives in *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937).

At about the same time, Orwell formally became a socialist, although he remained for only a few years in the Independent Labour Party. His socialism was of a vaguely egalitarian, fraternalistic cast, in part a simple reaction to the snobbery of the British class system and in part fired by a belief in social justice. He fought in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) in support of the Republicans on the political Left and barely survived a bullet wound to the neck. He wrote of his time there in *Homage to Catalonia* (1938). He was left with an enduring hatred of Soviet leader Josef Stalin and the Stalinist political modus operandi that, Orwell felt, had undermined the Left's struggle against the Nationalists led by General Francisco Franco. During World War II, Orwell broadcast war reports for the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) and wrote for the left-wing newspaper *Tribune*.

In 1945 Orwell published *Animal Farm*, a knowing parody-novella of the Russian Revolution and its subsequent betrayals of Marxism.

In 1945 Orwell published *Animal Farm*, a knowing parody-novella of the Russian Revolution and its subsequent betrayals of Marxism. In 1949 he produced his last book, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, a dystopian, nightmarish analysis of life in a bureaucratic, totalitarian society. Directed at neither Stalinism nor fascism but drawing lessons from both systems, this famous work was a warning with a touch of prophecy. In this final work, which gave us "Big Brother," the "Ministry of Truth," "Newspeak," and the oxymorons "War Is Peace, Freedom Is Slavery, Ignorance Is Strength," Orwell expresses most vividly his hatred of political oppression in all its forms.

Orwell's legacy has been clouded in recent years by the revelation, rather heavily overinterpreted, that toward the end of his life he provided a list of crypto-communists, or fellow travelers, to a semisecret department of the British Foreign Office. Orwell died in London on 21 January 1950.

Paul Wingrove

See also
Literature

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Ostpolitik

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) foreign policy initiative that sought rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact beginning in 1969, generally coinciding with the beginning of U.S.-Soviet détente. During 1949–1963, West Germany, under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, pursued Westpolitik (Western Policy). Westpolitik involved, among other things, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), the rearmament of West Germany, and participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Common Market. Westpolitik also dictated a relatively uncompromising attitude toward the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in particular. Epitomizing this attitude were Bonn's refusal to open relations with the Soviets until forced to do so by Moscow's threat not to release thousands of German prisoners of war still held in captivity and the Hallstein Doctrine, which held that West Germany would not enter into relations with any country, the Soviet Union excepted, that recognized East Germany.

Beginning with Ludwig Erhard's chancellorship (1963–1966) and continuing with that of Kurt Kiesinger (1966–1969), West Germany's leadership began to modify its approach toward the Soviet bloc, sending trade missions to Poland, Hungary, and Romania in hopes that economic agreements would lead to political dialogue. This transformation served as a prelude to the more radical Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) implemented by Chancellor Willy Brandt's government during 1969–1974.

Mayor of West Berlin during 1957–1966 and foreign minister in the Kiesinger government, Brandt became West Germany's first Social Democratic chancellor in October 1969, heading a coalition cabinet that included Walter Scheel, leader of the Free Democratic Party, as foreign minister. Seeking to reduce tensions in Central Europe, hoping to ameliorate conditions for Germans living in East Germany, and recognizing that a hard-line approach had brought German reunification no closer, Brandt as foreign minister had already set out to improve relations, via negotiations and diplomatic agreements, between West Germany and the Warsaw Pact. As chancellor, he and Scheel worked aggressively to expand this process.

Brandt's Ostpolitik encountered substantial obstacles, both internationally and domestically. President Richard M. Nixon's administration, itself seeking détente, proved reluctant to surrender the initiative in East-West relations to Bonn. At the same time, East Germany, led by Walter Ulbricht, made negotiations with West Germany dependent upon Bonn's willingness to recognize East Germany diplomatically, a condition unacceptable to the Brandt cabinet. In addition, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) opposition in the Bundestag made repeated attempts to stymie Brandt's initiatives.

Fortunately for Brandt, the Soviet Union had ample reason to embrace Ostpolitik. Concerned over growing hostilities with communist China, desirous of increasing economic ties with the West, and sensing an opportunity

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt paying tribute to the Jewish insurgents killed by the Germans during the uprising in the Jewish ghetto in Warsaw in 1943, the Ghetto Heroes' Memorial, Warsaw, 7 December 1970. (Bettmann/Corbis)

to possibly split NATO, the Kremlin welcomed Ostpolitik, agreeing to discuss relations with West Germany in early 1970. Talks between the Soviet Union and West Germany culminated in the Treaty of Moscow on 12 August 1970, whereby both sides renounced the use of force against each other and acknowledged as inviolable existing European frontiers. Moscow even added a supplemental declaration affirming Germany's right to reunify by peaceful means, thereby undercutting one of the CDU/CSU's chief criticisms of Ostpolitik. The Soviets also agreed to discuss Berlin with the United States, Great Britain, and France, with the objective of redressing the divided city's status.

West Germany's willingness to recognize existing European frontiers paved the way for an agreement with Poland via the Treaty of Warsaw, signed on 7 December 1970. In so doing, Bonn acknowledged the disputed Oder-Neisse Line (although stipulating that it remained subject to change in a final peace settlement), while Warsaw agreed to allow Germans residing in Poland to relocate to either East or West Germany provided they conformed with Polish emigration laws. Moscow's decision to discuss Berlin's status led to

the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, which saw Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union acknowledge that West Berlin was not part of West Germany, recognize West Germany's right to represent West Berlin internationally, and offer diplomatic protection to its citizens. Additionally, the agreement promised Soviet facilitation in the movement of traffic from West Germany to West Berlin and pledged the signatories to resolve by negotiation any future problems concerning Berlin.

Eight months later, in May 1972, East Germany, now headed by Erich Honecker, and West Germany signed a transit agreement guaranteeing West Berliners access rights to East Germany—all but forbidden since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961—and granting East Germans the right to visit West Germany in cases of family emergency. This agreement set the stage for the West German–East German Basic Treaty, signed on 21 December 1972, in which the two Germanies renounced the use of force in their relations, agreed to recognize and respect each other's authority and independence, renounced any claim to represent the other internationally, agreed to respect human rights principles as enumerated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, and consented to an exchange of permanent missions but not of ambassadors.

Brandt followed up the Basic Treaty by entering discussions with Czechoslovakia that led to a concrete agreement similar to the 1970 Treaty of Moscow in December 1973. That same month, West Germany exchanged ambassadors with both Hungary and Bulgaria, meaning that by the time Brandt left office in May 1974, West Germany enjoyed relations with every East European communist regime except Albania.

Ostpolitik greatly reduced Cold War tensions in Central Europe and thereby contributed to the success of détente in the 1970s. It essentially eliminated Berlin as a Cold War issue, opened the door for the entry of both Germanies into the UN in September 1973, and improved conditions for Berliners. It also marked West Germany's emergence as a state willing to act independently on the international stage. Finally, Ostpolitik earned Brandt acclaim both in Germany and abroad, symbolized by his selection as the winner of the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also

Brandt, Willy; Détente; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hallstein Doctrine; Honecker, Erich; Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg; Scheel, Walter; Territorial Changes after World War II; Ulbricht, Walter

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Outer Space Treaty
(10 October 1967)

International treaty establishing legal rules for the exploration of space and creating select limits on military activities in outer space. The formal title of the Outer Space Treaty is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The treaty developed from discussions in the United Nations (UN) that began in the late 1950s concerning the peaceful use of outer space and two 1963 UN resolutions on the peaceful use of space and open access to space for all states. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) also provided a foundation for the Outer Space Treaty by forbidding nuclear testing in space. The Outer Space Treaty was approved by the UN General Assembly on 19 December 1966, was quickly signed by the key states, and formally went into force in 10 October 1967.

The Outer Space Treaty establishes space and all celestial bodies as open to exploration by all states, with no legal basis for claiming national sovereignty and in accordance with established international law. The treaty holds that although countries are free to operate in space, they also bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Further, they have an obligation to act responsibly, to not interfere with the space activities of others, and to cooperate and provide assistance to others if needed. The treaty forbids the placement of nuclear weapons or other forms of weapons of mass destruction in orbit as well as stationing these weapons on the moon or anywhere else in outer space. Additionally, the treaty language specifically prohibits the building of bases, the testing of weapons, or military exercises on the moon or other celestial bodies.

Although the treaty emphasizes the peaceful use of space, its specific limitation on weapons of mass destruction has been interpreted by military planners as allowing the development of other types of weapons for use in space unless precluded by other treaties or arms control measures, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. However, some analysts interpret the Outer Space Treaty more broadly and argue that all weapons are banned from space under the peaceful use concept. In spite of these opposing views, both the United States and the Soviet Union studied and tested various types of weapons systems that could be used in space, especially for antiballistic missile and antisatellite purposes.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Arms Control; Missiles, Antiballistic; Space Race; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

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Owen, David
(1938–)

British Labour Party politician, cofounder of the Social Democratic Party, and secretary of foreign and Commonwealth affairs (1977–1979). Born in Plympton, Devon, England, on 2 July 1938, David Owen studied medicine at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University, from which he received his undergraduate degree in 1959. He began his clinical medical studies at St. Thomas' Hospital, London, in October 1959 and qualified as a medical doctor in 1962.

Joining the Labour Party in 1960, Owen was elected to Parliament in 1966 and rose rapidly through the ranks. He served as navy minister during 1968–1970 and as shadow junior defense spokesman during 1970–1972. He resigned from the shadow cabinet in 1972 when his party rejected British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC).

When Labour returned to power in February 1974, Owen became minister of health and served until September 1976, when he was appointed deputy to the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. In February 1977, he was named secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, a post he held until May 1979. A consistent champion of European integration and a dedicated Atlanticist, he worked closely with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance in 1977 over the independence of Rhodesia. In October 1978 Owen helped persuade South Africa to accept a United Nations (UN) resolution to oversee elections in Namibia. He supported British troop deployments to the Falkland Islands to forestall Argentinean claims and was criticized by members of his own party for his pro-American position during the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

After May 1979, and now in opposition, the Labour Party became increasingly anti-European and hostile to nuclear weapons. Having already resigned from the shadow cabinet in November 1980, Owen and three other parliamentarians left Labour and formed the Social Democratic Party in March 1981. During 1983–1987 Owen headed that party. He left Parliament in 1992, later working with Vance again in an attempt to establish peace in the former Yugoslavia.

Paul Wingrove

See also
Callaghan, James; Smith, Ian Douglas; Vance, Cyrus Roberts

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Owen, David. *Time to Declare*. London: Penguin, 1991.

Özal, Turgut
(1927–1993)

Turkish politician, premier, and the eighth president of the Turkish Republic. Born in Malatya, Turkey, on 13 October 1927, Turgut Özal received his bachelor's and master's degrees in electrical engineering from Istanbul Technical University and went on to study economics in the United States from 1952 to 1953. Upon his return to Turkey, he served as an advisor to the Defense Ministry, the State Planning Organization, the World Bank, and Premier Süleyman Demirel. Özal proved to be a solid, pro-Western Cold War ally.

After Turkey's 1980 military coup d'état, Özal was appointed deputy prime minister. He was forced to resign after a banking scandal in 1982. In 1983, his center-rightist Motherland Party gathered a majority of the votes in national elections, making him Turkey's forty-fifth prime minister. Although the party lost popular support as a result of its economic austerity program, it maintained its parliamentary majority in the 1987 elections, and Özal secured a second full term as prime minister. Two years later, the Turkish parliament elected him the first civilian president of the republic since 1960.

As premier, Özal implemented extensive economic liberalization reforms, including the lifting of exchange controls and privatization of state economic enterprises. His liberalism did not, however, extend equally to the political sphere. He campaigned for the ban on the pre-1980 politicians' political rights, favored strict controls over the press, and turned a blind eye toward widespread human rights violations. He was at best a pragmatic democrat. He proposed greater rights for the Kurdish minorities mainly to curtail the military conflict in southeastern Anatolia. In foreign affairs, he pursued pro-Western Turkish policies, including integration with the European Union (EU), active involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and political partnership with the United States. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, he began to establish cultural and economic ties with the new Central Asian republics. Özal died unexpectedly on 17 April 1993 in Ankara, Turkey.

Burcak Keskin-Kozat

Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal, February 1989. (David Rubinger/Corbis)

See also

Demirel, Süleyman; European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Turkey

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Paasikivi, Juho
(1870–1956)

Finnish politician, prime minister (1918, 1944–1946), and president (1946–1956). Born to a merchant family in Tampere, Finland (then Russia), on 27 November 1870, Juho Paasikivi earned degrees in Russian language, history, and law from the University of Helsinki and a doctorate in law there in 1901. He held positions in academia (1899–1903), served as director of the State Financial Office (1903–1914), and worked in a private banking institution (1914–1934).

Paasikivi joined the conservative Old Finnish Party, later renamed the National Coalition Party, and was elected to parliament in 1907. He served briefly as prime minister of the newly independent Finland in 1918, at which point he supported a monarchy and left government service.

As World War II loomed, Paasikivi returned to government work, serving as ambassador to Sweden during 1936–1940 and then ambassador to the Soviet Union during 1940–1941. He adopted a more compliant attitude toward the Soviets than his government in general demonstrated. After the end of the Continuation War (1941–1944) with the Soviet Union, Paasikivi was one of the few Finnish politicians who continued to enjoy his country's confidence. He was appointed prime minister in November 1944, serving under President Carl Mannerheim, and in March 1946 was elected president of Finland upon Mannerheim's resignation. Paasikiivi was elected to office in his own right in February 1950. In the February 1956 election, in spite of his advanced age, he reluctantly offered himself as a candidate in the second ballot and was ultimately elected because of a split vote among competing parties.

As president, Paasikivi stood generally aloof from party politics and became a true champion of his country. Guided by what he viewed as "small state realism," he deserves credit for protecting Finnish democracy during the Cold War in spite of its recognized geopolitical position in the Soviet sphere of influence. He was successful in maintaining Finnish independence by means of an accommodating policy toward the Soviet Union, insisting that Finland was a "capitalist friend."

In his capacity as the leading Finnish politician in the immediate post–World War II years, Paasikivi developed the so-called Paasikivi Line, aimed at inspiring trust in Moscow on the assumption that Soviet interest in Finland was of a strategic nature and not ideologically driven. Thanks to his pragmatic realism and tactical skills, he carefully balanced the need to be obliging in questions of vital concern to the Soviet Union while remaining uncompromising on Finnish essentials, most importantly its autonomy and democracy. Paasikivi died in Helsinki on 14 December 1956, only months after his reelection.

Norbert Götz

See also

Finland; Kekkonen, Urho; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil, Baron; Scandinavia

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Paisley, Ian
(1926–)

Northern Irish church leader, politician, founder of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and representative of radical political unionism in the Northern Ireland conflict. Born on 6 April 1926 in Ballymena, Northern Ireland, Ian Richard Kyle Paisley received theological training at the Theological Hall of the Reformed Presbyterian Church in Belfast and was ordained to the ministry in 1946. As a Presbyterian minister, he helped to establish the first free Presbyterian Church of Ulster in 1951, which he has led since its inception.

Paisley's political career began during the Irish civil rights movement in the 1960s. During 1964–1971 he headed the Protestant Unionist Party, and in 1971 he founded and has since led the DUP. He has consistently fought any attempt to politically reconcile the Republic of Ireland and Northern Irish Republicans. He has pursued his irredentist goals as a member of the British Parliament (since 1970), a member of the Northern Ireland assembly (1973–1974 and again since 1998), and as a member of the European Parliament (1979–2004). Paisley and his supporters helped to bring down the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement and, together with the other major Unionist leaders, opposed the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. His party took a similar stance toward the 1993 Downing Street Declaration. Although initially supportive of the talks that preceded the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the DUP soon ended its cooperation when Sinn Féin was allowed to join in the arrangement. Paisley is a controversial figure and doubtless one of the most radical and aggressive Unionist politicians, but he is also described as a committed

representative of his constituency members, regardless of their religious affiliations.

Matthias Trefs

See also

Adams, Gerard, Jr.; Ireland, Northern; Ireland, Republic of; Irish Republican Army; Sinn Féin

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Pakistan

South Asian nation with an area of 310,401 square miles, slightly less than twice the size of the U.S. state of California. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with a 1947 population of approximately 60 million, is bordered to the east by India, to the west by Iran and Afghanistan, to the north by the People's Republic of China (PRC), and to the south by the Arabian Sea.

European explorers first arrived in the area late in the fifteenth century. By the 1800s, the British had become the dominant European presence on the subcontinent. In 1857 the British took over the administration of India, ruling it through a mixed system of direct control and indirect rule.

Muslim nationalists in India established the All-India Muslim League in 1906. As agitation for independence grew, Muslim leaders became increasingly concerned about ensuring the political rights of the Muslims in a Hindu-dominated state. Arguing that India was both a Hindu and a Muslim state, Mohamed Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League political party, believed that Muslim rights would be endangered in a Hindu-majority nation. The solution, therefore, was a separate state for the Muslim population.

Consequently, Pakistan was carved out of British India and became a state on 14 August 1947. It originally consisted of two sections—West Pakistan, which is the current state of Pakistan, and East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh—separated by roughly 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Leaders of the fledgling nation confronted many internal challenges. The partition had left Pakistan with a shortage of trained personnel and resources to engage in the nation-building process. This dilemma was compounded by the dislocation and communal violence that accompanied partition, which had left between 500,000 and 1 million dead. Soon after independence, Pakistan fought its first war with India over the disputed Jammu-Kashmir territory

This dilemma was compounded by the dislocation and communal violence that accompanied partition, which had left between 500,000 and 1 million dead.

The last British viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten (in uniform), officially hands over power to Mohamed Ali Jinnah (to left of Mountbatten), leader of the new nation of Pakistan, on 14 August 1947. (Library of Congress)

(commonly known as Kashmir). Hostilities came to an end in 1948 with a cease-fire supervised by the United Nations (UN).

The transfer of power established Pakistan as a parliamentary democracy, with Jinnah as the first governor-general. The Constituent Assembly (a vestige of the prepartition Indian Constituent Assembly) was charged with drafting a new constitution. Political instability was common in this first phase of Pakistani political history, which lasted from 1947 to 1958. Seven prime ministers served during this period. Pakistan also lost its two preeminent leaders: Jinnah, who died in August 1948, and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who was assassinated in 1951. In 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly and placed the government in the hands of a Cabinet of Talent comprised of powerful civil and military officials.

In 1956 Pakistan finally promulgated its first constitution, which established the country as an Islamic Republic, created the office of the president, and subordinated the office of the prime minister to the presidency. Those who had hoped for a more thorough Islamization of the republic were disappointed. The struggle over the role of Islam in the nation would continue to be an issue, however.

From independence onward, ethnic unrest and provincial challenges to central authority complicated the nation-building process. For example, in 1956 Pakhtun leaders in the Northwest Frontier Province threatened to agitate for a separate Pakhtun homeland. Military force had to be used against the khan of Kalat in Balochistan, who declared his independence from Pakistani control.

The period of parliamentary democracy ended with the imposition of martial law in 1958 by President Iskandar Mizra (1955–1958). Just weeks later, Muhammad Ayub Khan overthrew Mizra. This second phase of Pakistani political history, from 1958 to 1971, witnessed military rule under Presidents Ayub Khan (1958–1969) and Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan (1969–1971).

Ayub Khan, who considered himself a reformer, changed family and marriage laws and brought marriage and divorce under government control. To encourage industrial development, the government introduced tax incentives and made credit more available. Rapid population growth and crop failures, however, caused recurrent food shortages. Ayub Khan introduced land reform to further limit the size of single holdings and instituted price controls. The government also began a Green Revolution by introducing high-yield seeds and selling public land to individual farmers. By the late 1960s, the Green Revolution had yielded positive results in the Punjab. Ayub Khan also introduced Basic Democracy, a five-tier system of representative institutions ranging from union councils at the village level to a provincial development council for each province. Elected members of the village councils were charged with drafting a new constitution, which was promulgated in 1962.

Ayub Khan continued Pakistan's close relationship with the United States and benefited from U.S. economic and military assistance. At the same time, he astutely pursued cordial relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which resulted in cultural and trade exchanges as well as Chinese aid to Pakistan.

In 1965, hostilities again broke out between Pakistan and India over the issues of Kashmir and water distribution from the Indus River. In 1969, as opposition to his rule grew, an ailing Ayub Khan resigned in favor of General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. The opposition had been fueled in part by the failure to liberate Kashmir. But there was also a growing desire to restore democratic rule.

Yahya Khan scrapped the Basic Democracy introduced by his predecessor, abolished indirect elections for president, introduced a representation system based on population, and promised a return to constitutional government. In December 1970 the Awami League posted a stunning electoral victory in East Pakistan and won a majority in the National Assembly. In the West, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won a majority. Neither Yahya Khan nor Bhutto wished to have Mujib ur-Rahman of the Awami League as prime minister, and both acted to prevent the National Assembly from convening. This obstructionism enraged Bengalis in East Pakistan, who were already unhappy with what they perceived as West Pakistani governmental callousness toward the suffering caused by recent floods in the East. Bengalis also objected to the imposition of Urdu as the official

language. Yahya Khan responded to the street agitation by ordering a military crackdown in the East. Developments careened toward civil war as Easterners demanded secession.

Unrest in the East soon brought Pakistan into another war with India. Refugees from East Pakistan, both Hindus and Muslims, fled to the neighboring Indian state of Bengal. In early December 1971, Indira Gandhi ordered an invasion of East Pakistan, and Pakistani forces quickly surrendered. What had been East Pakistan now became the independent state of Bangladesh.

Military defeat and national humiliation triggered Yahya Khan's resignation, ushering in the next period of Pakistani history that promised a respite from military rule. Bhutto became president (1971–1977) and restored civilian rule for the first time since 1958. In 1973 Bhutto introduced a new constitution, which established a parliamentary government that divided responsibilities between a largely ceremonial president and a powerful prime minister. Bhutto himself now assumed the role of prime minister. The constitution established Islam as a state religion and aligned all civil laws accordingly.

In the 1970s Bhutto pursued a far more socialist developmental strategy than what had persisted since independence. The government nationalized entities in the agricultural, industrial, and financial sectors. Sluggish growth and Bhutto's failure—and perhaps reluctance—to break the grip of the powerful landowning community meant that his economic and social promises remained unrealized, however.

Popular agitation and suspicion of voter fraud after the 1977 elections sparked widespread unrest. This opened the door to yet another period of martial law. General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and his fellow military officers ousted Bhutto and dissolved the government. Bhutto was executed in 1979.

Zia, who held power during 1977–1988, furthered the transformation of Pakistan into an Islamic state. He created an Islamic judicial system and banned political parties, having found no reference to them in Islamic teachings. He also passed ordinances discriminating against women. In part, he hoped to unify the nation by having people rally behind the protection of their Islamic heritage. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 helped strengthen Zia's message of endangered Islam, so Pakistan began to provide aid to resistance fighters in Afghanistan. Other countries, principally the United States and China, also used Pakistan as a conduit for funneling weapons and aid to the mujahideen (freedom fighters) in Afghanistan.

Martial law was ended in 1985, with Zia becoming president. But he amended the constitution to shift the balance of power to that office. He could now dismiss the prime minister, the provincial governors, and the national and provincial legislatures. Zia died in 1988 in an airplane crash. During the 1980s, he and his military advisors began to reverse some of the nationalization policies of the 1970s. Government deregulation and economic liberalization policies encouraged greater private investments. This process continued through the 1990s to the present. In December 1988, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became prime minister, the first woman leader of a Muslim nation.

The current Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf, came to power through a military coup in 1999 and returned the country to military rule. In the post–Cold War period, Pakistan has garnered attention as a close U.S. ally in the war on terror. This has made the country a beneficiary of generous U.S. economic and military aid.

Soo Chun Lu

See also

Ayub Khan, Muhammad; Bangladesh; Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; India-Pakistan Wars; Jinnah, Mohamed Ali; Kashmir Dispute; Pakistan, Armed Forces; South Asia; Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad; Zia ul Haq, Muhammad

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Pakistan, Armed Forces

The partition of India in August 1947 into an independent Pakistan and India split the military as well as other institutions. The partition agreement awarded two-thirds of the former Indian assets to India, although the bulk of preindependence Indian Navy sailors were Muslims, and Pakistan secured a majority of the naval vessels, including three frigates.

A domestic security crisis coupled with a lack of qualified personnel and supplies burdened the fledgling Pakistani military from the onset of independence. Pakistan's geographical position also presented a security nightmare. The new nation was split into East and West Pakistan, with a hostile India between the two. The navy had perhaps the most impossible task, as it would have to operate while divided by 3,500 miles of Indian coastline.

Pakistan fought three wars with India, chiefly over Kashmir, during 1947–1949 and in 1965 and 1971. The secession in 1971 of East Pakistan, which became independent as Bangladesh, at least rendered Pakistan's defense against India easier. Problems remained with a long, common, ill-defined border and the fact that Pakistan's major population centers were close to the Indian frontier.

Most of Pakistani defense spending was centered on the army and air force. The navy came in a poor third, although it did receive some warships from the Royal Navy. In 1964, the Pakistani Navy acquired the first submarine of the subcontinent's navies in an ex-U.S. Tench-class boat.

A regiment of soldiers during a military parade celebrating the anniversary of Pakistani independence, 1964. (Paul Almasy/Corbis)

For most of the Cold War period, Pakistan allied itself with the United States, although this relationship was not a constant one. Pakistan also received some military assistance from the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and other nations. The Pakistani military continually intervened in politics, and although nominally a democracy, Pakistan was under martial law for much of the Cold War period.

Following the 1971 defeat by India, Pakistani leader Zulfikar Bhutto (president during 1971–1973 and prime minister during 1973–1977) devoted considerable resources to rebuilding the military, attempting to move it toward a more professional, capable force but under strict civilian control. Bhutto also created the 18,000-member Federal Security Force, in essence his own private army. His reforms included development of new military production facilities and the addition of a naval air wing. The PRC provided a number of naval patrol craft. The United States furnished destroyers, and Pakistan secured submarines from France and midget submarines from Italy.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, one of Pakistan's closest allies, was a serious blow, as was the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan that December. The latter event, however, led to closer ties with the United States. Pakistan secured U.S. F-16 aircraft, Harpoon antiship missiles, helicopters, and upgraded M-48 tanks. The military also increased in size, with a large portion of the costs borne by the United States and Muslim Persian Gulf nations. In 1994 the active army numbered 520,000 men, with 300,000 in the reserves. The navy had 22,000 personnel and the air force had 45,000, with 8,000 in the reserves. In that year Pakistan also possessed some 2,000 tanks, 430 combat aircraft, 3 destroyers, 10 frigates (4 of them guided missile types), and 6 submarines.

Sparked by continued security threats, including a nuclear test by India in 1974, Pakistan developed its own nuclear capability and conducted its own nuclear test in 1998. After 1989, with the breakup of the Soviet bloc and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States declined. This was rekindled with the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the onset of the U.S.-led war on terror.

Melissa Hebert and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

India; India, Armed Forces; Kashmir Dispute; Pakistan

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Palestine Liberation Organization

Political organization dedicated ostensibly to the creation of an independent state for Palestinian Arabs in Palestine. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by the Arab League and Egypt. The PLO has had many component parts and affiliated groups since its inception. Its leading bodies have been the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Central Council, and the Executive Committee (which holds the PLO's real political and executive power). The Palestine Revolutionary Forces served as the armed branch of the PLO.

In its early years the PLO was dominated by Egyptians. By the late 1960s, however, other groups dedicated to Israel's demise became ancillary organizations to the PLO. They included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). These groups used guerrilla warfare to resist Israeli efforts to crack down on Palestinian extremists.

The PLO entered a new phase in 1968 when Yasir Arafat and his guerrilla group, al-Fatah, took control of the movement. By 1972 Arafat had consolidated his power and moved the PLO's base of operations to Jordan. By 1970, however, increasing tension and skirmishes between PLO forces and Jordan's police and military forces led King Hussein to evict Arafat and his movement from Jordan. After several months of violence—including an assassination attempt against Hussein—the PLO left Jordan in autumn 1970.

The PLO relocated to Beirut, Lebanon, as hundreds of Palestinian refugees settled in Palestinian camps there. The Lebanese government put few restraints on the PLO's activities, which now included periodic raids across the Israeli border. During the 1970s, Arafat believed that diplomacy was more helpful than violence alone (although he did not disavow violence) in achieving Palestinian statehood. Other PLO groups did not agree. The PFLP engaged in a spate of airliner hijackings and terrorist-style attacks even outside of the Middle East, including the terrorist attack during the 1972 Munich Olympics. Arafat condemned attacks overseas because these brought international condemnation of the PLO. After 1974, he ordered PLO groups to limit their attacks to Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.

In 1974 Arafat spoke for the first time to the United Nations (UN), passionately calling for an end to Zionism. He also stated that he intended to continue the fight to achieve a Palestinian state. His speech apparently struck a sympathetic cord, and the PLO became an official UN observer in November 1974.



Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat gives directions to his followers during fighting with Israeli forces in Beirut in 1982. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In 1975 civil war erupted in Lebanon between the Maronite Christians and Muslims. In the ensuing chaos that killed several thousand people, Arafat seized southern Lebanon and western Beirut. By 1976 the PLO had increased its clout enough that it was allowed to participate in UN Security Council debates. The PLO also used its position in Lebanon to escalate the frequency and ferocity of attacks against Israel. Israel retaliated in kind. In June 1982 Israel began bombing Beirut to root out the PLO. In August 1982, Arafat agreed to vacate Lebanon. The PLO then relocated to Tunisia, where it spent much of the 1980s rebuilding its organization, which had been severely damaged by the Beirut fighting.

In November 1988 the PLO formally declared the State of Palestine, which it claimed covered the entire old British mandate of Palestine. That same year Arafat vowed to end terrorism and recognize Israel. This was a new tack, as the PLO had never before been willing to recognize Israeli sovereignty. In return, the PLO asked the Israelis to abandon the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1991 the PLO and Israel began negotiations in order to reach a settlement, which resulted in the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords promised the Palestinians self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while Arafat formally recognized Israel. By 1996, however, the peace process began to unravel as militant Islamic groups began

launching terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. Neither Arafat nor the PLO claimed responsibility for the attacks, but Israeli leaders were quick to place the blame on the Palestinians.

While many of the attacks were the work of radical groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the perception was that Arafat was tacitly encouraging the bloodshed and that he had not, in fact, disavowed violence as a political weapon. Whether this was true or not, Israel had little choice but to respond to the violence and protect its citizens. At the time of Arafat's death in 2004, the Oslo peace process was in tatters, and the future prospects of the PLO and Palestinian statehood remained as murky as ever.

Amy Blackwell

See also

Arafat, Yasir; Israel; Lebanon; Middle East; Radical Islam

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Palme, Olof
(1927–1986)

Swedish politician, chairman of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SAP) during 1969–1986, and prime minister during 1969–1976 and 1982–1986. Born on 30 January 1927 to an upper-class family in Stockholm, Sven Olof Joachim Palme earned a bachelor's degree in political science from Kenyon College, Ohio, in 1948 and a law degree from the University of Stockholm in 1951. He joined SAP in 1949. In 1953 he was employed by Prime Minister Tage Erlander as his personal secretary and in 1958 was elected to parliament. In 1963 Palme entered government as minister without portfolio. Two years later he became minister of communication and in 1967 became minister of education, a post he held until 1969.

In October 1969 Palme succeeded his patron Erlander as prime minister and chairman of SAP. Palme was a charismatic and often controversial politician, with a keen interest in foreign affairs. He became internationally renowned for his provocations of the United States and sympathies for the developing world, although in spite of his sometimes-polarizing foreign policy he acted in a generally pragmatic vein.

As the leader of a neutral country in the Cold War, Palme was a leading propagandist against the Vietnam War, which he opposed as a colonial legacy and imprudent effort to contain communism. His appearance in a demonstration alongside the North Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow in February 1968, his comparison of the Christmas 1972 U.S. bombing of Hanoi with fascism, and his welcoming of U.S. military deserters to Sweden precipitated a

Olof Palme, answering questions in his capacity as United Nations (UN) special envoy during a press conference at UN headquarters in New York, 26 November 1980. Palme, a staunch critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, served as premier of Sweden during 1969–1976 and 1982–1986. He was assassinated in 1986. (Bettmann/Corbis)

significant diplomatic falling out with Washington. Palme's positions regarding South Africa's apartheid regime, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Cuba, Nicaragua, and nuclear disarmament only caused further irritation. Many U.S. officials were sharply critical of Palme, but others saw him as the apotheosis of a statesman wedded to his principles who did not submit to the bipolar logic of the Cold War. In spite of his dovish image, he nevertheless maintained a strong defense as well as military contacts with the West.

Palme initiated and chaired the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, active during September 1980–April 1982, that advocated the concept of global common security. Palme was assassinated on a downtown Stockholm street on 28 February 1986 after he and his wife left a theater. His murder stunned the Swedes, who are known for their civility and nonviolence. The man accused and convicted of assassinating Palme was later acquitted for lack of evidence, and ever since, conspiracy theories have proliferated concerning Palme's untimely death.

Norbert Götz

See also

Erlander, Tage; Scandinavia; Sweden

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Panama

Central American Spanish-speaking nation bordered by Colombia to the southeast, Costa Rica to the northwest, the Caribbean Sea to the north, and the Pacific Ocean to the south. Roughly the size of the U.S. state of South Carolina, Panama is 30,193 square miles in area and had a 1945 population of 703,000 people. During the Cold War, Panama's economics and politics were shaped overwhelmingly by its relationship to the United States. Washington propped up reliable, mainly authoritarian governments in Panama City, while American firms, through direct investment as well as the sheer weight of their activities in the Panama Canal Zone, controlled much of the Panamanian economy.

The United States sought a high degree of influence over Panama largely because of the crucial importance of the Panama Canal, a major economic, military, and geostrategic asset. Despite much tension and controversy, Washington succeeded in protecting its interests through a mix of force, pressure, and concession that shaped Panama's history during the Cold War.

Panama assumed geostrategic importance in the late nineteenth century, when a waterway across the Central American isthmus became technically feasible. In 1903, in a ploy to construct and control a canal, President Theodore Roosevelt's administration facilitated a secessionist rebellion in the Colombian province of Panama and then signed a treaty with the new Panamanian government. Besides assuring the new government's dependence on Washington, the deal awarded the United States the right to operate the canal in perpetuity while also ceding total control over a 10-mile band of territory surrounding the waterway to the United States.

The asymmetry of the treaty and the colonial mentality of Americans who settled in the Canal Zone proved to be major irritants during the decades that followed. Panamanians demanded that the United States end discrimination against local workers, share its revenues more evenly, and respect Panamanian sovereignty.

U.S.-Panamanian tensions became more significant during the Cold War. Americans feared that the Soviet Union or its allies might be able to exploit widespread anti-Americanism and glaring economic inequalities exacerbated by a post–World War II depression. In 1947, mounting resentment against the United States clearly manifested itself when Panama's National Assembly unanimously rejected American plans to build new military bases around the canal. Riding a wave of nationalism that united Panama's highly stratified society, the Panamanian government insisted in 1953 that Washington agree to revise the canal treaties.

The United States responded to Panamanian discontent in various ways during the 1950s and 1960s. Washington sought to blunt unrest by increasing economic aid to Panama. In the early 1960s, for example, the country became a major recipient of U.S. assistance under President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress.

In addition, Washington sought to head off further radicalization of Panamanian opinion by offering concessions to the relatively reliable conservatives who still dominated Panamanian politics. In 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower's administration agreed to increase and equalize pay for Panamanian canal workers and to increase the canal annuity paid to Panama. New explosions of anti-American agitation occurred in 1958–1959 and early 1964, the latter prompting President Lyndon B. Johnson to agree to write new treaties recognizing Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone.

Johnson's pledge resulted in neither quick agreements nor political stability. Panama remained wracked by poverty and political turbulence despite an impressive 6.4 percent average annual gross national product (GNP) growth rate during 1950–1970. In 1968, a group of National Guard officers overthrew the oligarchy that had controlled Panamanian politics for decades, and

Gas-masked national guardsmen, some on horseback, move to restrain opposition demonstrators following the impeachment of President Marco A. Robles by the National Assembly, 25 March 1968. (Bettmann/Corbis)

charismatic National Guard Colonel Omar Torrijos took power the following year. Stressing nationalist and populist themes, Torrijos made stiff new demands of the United States when canal talks reopened in the early 1970s. After fitful progress, on 7 September 1977 the two sides signed new treaties, which provided for the gradual return of the canal to Panamanian control by the end of the century.

The 1977 treaties created new U.S. anxieties about the security of the canal and pushed Panama toward yet another political crisis. With violence and leftist movements sweeping across Central America in the early 1980s, the Pentagon poured money into the Panamanian military, known as the Panama Defense Force, and facilitated the rise to power of Manuel Noriega, the Defense Force's corrupt and brutally repressive leader. In 1986, however, the United States reversed course and began pressing for his removal. As the need for a reliable strongman declined, Noriega's critics pointed to evidence of drug trafficking, gun running, and other illegal activities. Meanwhile, opposition groups within Panama demanded the restoration of democracy and civil liberties.

When Noriega repeatedly refused to step down, and with increasing violence against Americans in the Panama Canal Zone, President George H. W. Bush ordered an invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989. U.S. forces put down resistance in four days of fighting and took Noriega into custody in Jan-

uary 1990. As the Cold War came to an end, democratic rule returned to Panama, but the United States once again dictated Panama's destiny.

MARK ATWOOD LAWRENCE

See also

Alliance for Progress; Americas; Noriega, Manuel; Panama, U.S. Invasion of; Panama Canal Treaties

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Panama, U.S. Invasion of
(20 December 1989)

In an action known as Operation JUST CAUSE, U.S. armed forces invaded Panama on 20 December 1989 to overthrow Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, disrupt Panamanian involvement in drug trafficking, and reduce potential threats to American interests in the region. Operation JUST CAUSE was the culmination of tensions that had been building between the United States and the Noriega regime since 1981. Although Noriega had established ties to the U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), he was also connected to Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Noriega's increasing involvement in international drug trafficking, including links to major drug cartel figures, and his use of anti-American rhetoric elevated concerns in Washington.





During 1987 the United States increased pressure to remove Noriega, but this produced a backlash in Panama and other Latin American states. In 1988, two American federal grand juries indicted Noriega on drug charges, and the U.S. government further pressured the Panamanians to force him out. Based on the deteriorating situation, the U.S. military began to develop plans that would provide a range of options to deal with Panama.

The situation deteriorated further when Noriega overturned the results of a national election on 7 May 1989 and strengthened his personal hold on power in Panama. Although the Organization of American States (OAS) criticized Noriega, the regional body took no significant action to stop him. A Panamanian coup attempt on 3 October 1989 led Noriega to purge the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), further solidifying his control. Subsequently, Panamanian police and security forces increased their harassment of U.S. military personnel and other foreign citizens. This harassment and Noriega's increasing hostility toward the United States caused American leaders to refine the established plan to deal with the Panamanian strongman. The plan, code-named BLUE SPOON, envisioned a joint invasion task force of 22,000 soldiers, complemented by another 5,000 personnel from the U.S. Marines, Navy, and Air Force. Approximately 12,000 personnel would begin the operation from the Panama Canal Zone. Significant special operations forces would also be involved in the invasion. The invasion force would face a PDF of 4,000 combat troops and another 8,000 personnel of Noriega supporters, known as the Dignity Battalions, who were basically armed thugs.

Violence against U.S. citizens escalated after the Panamanian National Assembly proclaimed on 15 December 1989 the existence of a state of war with the United States. Most troubling were the Panamanian security forces' murder of a U.S. Marine and the abuse of a navy officer and his wife. President George H. W. Bush and his advisors decided that the time to act had arrived. Bush ordered the military to proceed with a full-scale operation that had the highest probability of success through the application of overwhelming force. The overarching objectives of the operation were to protect U.S. citizens living in Panama, secure the Panama Canal and U.S. military installations, help the Panamanian people restore democracy, and arrest Noriega and bring him to the United States for trial.

Operation JUST CAUSE began on 19 December 1989 with an airlift of Army Rangers and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. A portion of the aircraft carrying the 82nd Airborne troops was delayed by a winter storm. This slowed the buildup of combat forces in Panama but had little effect on the operation's outcome. Combat operations commenced shortly before 1:00 A.M. local time on 20 December, when it had become clear that the PDF knew an attack was imminent. The first moves were by special operations units assigned to capture key facilities, block escape routes, and capture Noriega.

U.S. Marines stand guard with their LAV-25 light armored vehicles outside a destroyed Panamanian Defense Force building on 20 December 1989, the first day of the U.S. invasion of Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Noriega avoided initial capture and went into hiding, a major concern of military planners who feared that he would establish a guerrilla resistance against U.S. forces. Meanwhile, Army Rangers conducted successful drops on a series of targets around Panama City, with rapid reinforcement from the 82nd Airborne. Although some of the initial fighting was intense, the U.S. assault forces overcame the resistance and quickly established control. Airdrops were complemented by ground forces moving out of the Panama Canal Zone. These forces also encountered initially strong resistance but were able to rapidly overcome the Panamanian forces and gain their objectives. The key objective, capturing Noriega, was delayed until he sought refuge in the Vatican's embassy on 24 December. After his location was known, Panamanian resistance faded rapidly.

Diplomatic negotiations and a variety of pressure tactics eventually forced Noriega to surrender to U.S. authorities on 3 January 1990. He was then flown to the United States, where he would stand trial and be convicted on drug trafficking charges. After he had been isolated and then captured, U.S. efforts shifted to civil affairs—establishing stability and security—along with returning to power those government officials who had been elected in May 1989.

The use of overwhelming force allowed rapid victory and resulted in low casualties on both sides: 23 U.S. killed and 332 wounded in action; 297 Panamanian deaths, 123 wounded, and 468 captured. The rapid return by the Bush administration of control of the country to the Panamanians minimized Latin American opposition to the U.S. invasion.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Americas; Baker, James Addison, III; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Drug Trafficking; Noriega, Manuel; Panama

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Panama Canal Treaties
(1977)

Controversial 1977 agreements between the United States and Panama that transferred the Panama Canal to full Panamanian control effective in 1999. While many Americans hailed the treaties as a bold act of statesmanship to remedy historical injustices, others condemned them as a shameful giveaway of American prerogatives.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos sign the Panama Canal Treaties. The 1977 treaties ceded control of the canal to Panama in December 1999. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Tension over ownership and management of the Panama Canal dated from early in the twentieth century. In 1903, American eagerness to construct a waterway through the Central American isthmus led President Theodore Roosevelt's administration to sponsor a secessionist rebellion in the Colombian province of Panama. Once the rebellion had succeeded, Washington then signed the highly advantageous Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty with the new Panamanian government. The deal gave the United States not only the right to operate the canal in perpetuity but also a protectorate over Panama and control over a 10-mile ribbon of territory (569 square miles) surrounding the canal. In return, the United States paid the Panamanian government $10 million and promised annual payments of $250,000.

Panamanians protested that this deal conceded too much to the United States and soon began demanding revisions. Above all, they objected to discriminatory labor practices in the Panama Canal Zone, the paltry sum paid to Panama, and American infringements on local sovereignty. In the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took note of these complaints and, invoking his Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America, agreed to revise the treaty. Under accords signed in 1936, the United States ended its protectorate over Panama, increased its annual payments, and promised more evenhanded treatment of Panamanian employees in the Canal Zone. The arrangement

did not alter basic inequities in the U.S.-Panamanian relationship, however, and serious tensions erupted again during the early Cold War.

Renewed Panamanian agitation presented U.S. leaders with conflicting priorities. On the one hand, the canal remained a potent symbol of U.S. power and ingenuity. No president could bargain away U.S. control without serious political risks. On the other hand, continued Panamanian resentment against the United States seemed to invite political instability that might benefit the Soviet Union or, after 1959, Fidel Castro's Cuba. In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration sought to split the difference by agreeing to minor treaty revisions connected mainly to financial and labor aspects of canal operations.

Such tinkering proved to be too little, too late. Anti-American demonstrations and riots, provoked partly by confrontational U.S. residents of the Canal Zone, exploded in 1958 and 1959. When another round of deadly rioting broke out in early 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration feared serious damage to the U.S. image across the Western Hemisphere and worried that Panamanian leftists might capitalize on the chaos to take charge of the country. Convinced of the need to deprive the radicals of such a potent grievance, Johnson delivered a landmark speech in December 1964 promising to negotiate an entirely new relationship with Panama.

In June 1967, the two sides appeared poised to reach a deal calling for joint administration of the canal and the abolition of the Canal Zone. The agreement unraveled, however, when the Panamanian government, under attack for achieving too little, withheld the accord from the Panamanian legislature. Political turbulence in Panama, including a military coup in 1968, prevented any new progress until the early 1970s. By then, charismatic Panamanian dictator and colonel of the National Guard Omar Torrijos had consolidated sufficient power to make another attempt at gaining control over the canal.

In 1973, the Panamanian government took its case to the United Nations (UN) and won a moral victory when the UN Security Council voted overwhelmingly to demand major U.S. concessions. Washington vetoed the measure but, recognizing its worsening position in international opinion, agreed in 1974 on a series of principles that met key Panamanian desires. U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack declared that their countries would work toward a treaty providing for the gradual turnover of both the canal and the Canal Zone to Panamanian control. Most importantly, they agreed to set a termination date after which Panama would exercise full sovereignty.

Solutions slowly fell into place to numerous remaining disagreements. Above all, Torrijos grudgingly accepted President Jimmy Carter's insistence in early 1977 that the United States must retain the right to intervene unilaterally if it judged that the canal was under threat, a key demand of the Pentagon and conservatives in Congress. Finally, on 11 August 1977, thirteen years after the process had begun, the two sides met in Panama City and signed new treaties with a termination date of 31 December 1999.

The deal won overwhelming Panamanian and international approval but encountered fierce American resistance during the ratification process. Oppo-

nents in the United States had already begun organizing for a fight in previous years, especially during the 1976 presidential campaign when Ronald Reagan denounced the emerging deal as a humiliating surrender of American rights. Public opinion polls in 1977 showed that many Americans shared Reagan's skepticism, but careful maneuvering by the treaties' supporters kept the agreements alive. Most importantly, backers in the Senate eased some of the criticism by adding a proviso strengthening the U.S. right to intervene in Panama to protect the canal. The Senate ratified the last of the treaties on 18 April 1978.

U.S.-Panamanian relations suffered a major setback in the 1980s when the United States first encouraged the rise of military strongman Manuel Noriega and then pressured him to step down, a process that culminated in a U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989. Despite this disruption, however, both sides have adhered to the treaties, with Panamanians gradually taking responsibilities for maintaining, operating, and defending the canal during the 1980s and 1990s. On 31 December 1999, Panama took full control of the waterway. President Bill Clinton, apparently anxious about the lingering political explosiveness of the canal issue, avoided the handover ceremonies.

Mark Atwood Lawrence

See also

Americas; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Castro, Fidel; Kissinger, Henry; Panama; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi
(1900–1990)

Indian nationalist and diplomat, sister of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and one of the world's leading women in public life. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was born Swraup Rani Nehru in Allahabad, India, on 18 August 1900. Her father, Motilal Nehru, was a wealthy lawyer and well-known political figure. Educated at home by English tutors, she became active in India's freedom movement at a young age and was imprisoned on three separate occasions by the colonial British government. In 1921 she married Ranjit Sitaram Pandit and changed her name after her marriage to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit. Her husband died in 1944.

During 1937–1939 and again in 1946–1947, Pandit became a member of the Legislative Assembly and minister for local self-government and public

health in the United Provinces, the first Indian woman to hold a cabinet post. She was also a member of the Indian parliament from 1964 to 1968.

Pandit's career as a diplomat began when she canvassed international support for India's independence at the 1945 San Francisco organizing conference for the United Nations (UN). She led the Indian delegation during the 1946–1948 and 1952 UN General Assembly sessions and in 1953 was elected president of the General Assembly's eighth session, the first woman to hold that position. Pandit's successful effort during the 1946 UN session to pass a resolution condemning apartheid in South Africa led the United States to suspect India of pro-Soviet leanings, coloring U.S. perceptions of India during the Cold War. Pandit served as India's ambassador to the Soviet Union (1947–1949) and concurrently to the United States and Mexico (1949–1951). She was also Indian high commissioner to the United Kingdom and to Ireland (1954–1961).

Returning to domestic politics in India, Pandit served as governor of the state of Maharashtra during 1962–1964 and later as a member of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament. She retired from active public life in 1968 but returned in 1977 to campaign against the undemocratic rule of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, her niece. Pandit died in Dehra Dun on 1 December 1990.

Appu K. Soman

See also

Gandhi, Indira; India; Nehru, Jawaharlal

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Papadopoulos, Georgios
(1919–1999)

Greek military leader and prime minister (1967–1973), regent (1972–1973), and president (1973–1974) of the Greek military junta, otherwise known as the Greek Revolutionary Junta. Born in Eleochorion, Greece, on 5 May 1919, the eldest son of a village teacher, Georgios Papadopoulos graduated from the Greek Military Academy in 1940, saw combat duty in World War II during 1940–1941 and in the final stages of the Greek Civil War in 1949, and was promoted to the rank of colonel in 1960. During 1959–1964 he served in the clandestine Service of Information (KYP), an arm of the Ministry of Defense. He went on to become a key advisor to Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou.

A rabid anticommunist and right-wing extremist, Papadopoulos joined a group of officers who, fearing another victory of Papandreou's Center Union Party in the May 1967 elections, overthrew the government in a bloodless coup on 21 April 1967. The junta rationalized the ouster as an effort to stamp out communist subversion in the government. Papadopoulos became one of three officers of the military junta. It is alleged that the junta was supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for whom he had long worked. He was the preponderant force of the junta, holding the positions of prime minister (1967–1973), regent (1972–1973), and president (1973–1974). The military regime relentlessly cracked down on dissidents and suspended basic civil liberties. After the failed 1974 attempt to formally annex Cyprus, after which the Turks counterattacked and partitioned the island, the junta collapsed in July 1974. Papadopoulos was sentenced to death for high treason and insurrection in 1975. However, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He died on 27 June 1999 in Athens.

Lucian N. Leustean



Georgios Papadopoulos, Greek general, politician, and leader of the military dictatorship of 1967–1974. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

See also

Constantine II, King of Greece; Cyprus; Greece; Papandreou, Georgios

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Papagos, Alexander
(1883–1955)

Greek soldier and prime minister of Greece (1952–1955). Born in Athens on 9 December 1883, Alexander Papagos completed his military studies in Belgium at the Military Academy in Brussels and the Cavalry School in Ypres, Belgium. He was commissioned in the Greek Army in 1906 and saw his first combat duty in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). In 1917 he was dismissed for opposing Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos but was rehabilitated upon the restoration of King Constantine in 1920. Papagos participated in the Greek invasion of Turkey during 1919–1922 but was purged from the army in 1923 for aiding the Leonardopoulos-Gargalidis group. In 1926 Papagos was reinstated in the army and in 1927 was promoted to major general. In October 1935 he was one of the officers who forced the resignation of Prime Minister Panagis Tsaldaris. Papagos later held the positions of corps

commander and minister of war. In 1936, during the dictatorial regime of General Ioannis Metaxas, Papagos became chief of the army General Staff and from 1937 chaired the National Defense Council.

During the Italian attack on Greece on 28 October 1940, Papagos's troops managed to repulse the invasion and drive the Italian forces back to Albania. Papagos was appointed commander in chief of the army during the German offensive. However, he was taken prisoner in April 1941. From 1943 he was held in German POW camps until he was liberated in 1945. In January 1949, during the final stages of the Greek Civil War, he was appointed commander in chief of the government army, fighting against the communist guerrillas. After the defeat of the communists in the summer of 1949, he was promoted to marshal, the first Greek officer to hold that rank.

In May 1951 Papagos retired from the army and promptly formed a new political party, the Greek Rally, that became a powerful force in Greek politics. After electoral changes that dispensed with proportional voting in favor of majority voting, his party won the November 1952 elections with 49 percent of the vote, and he became prime minister. He immediately set about the process of reconstructing Greece after years of war and civil strife. After Greece joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, he agreed in 1953 to a treaty permitting U.S. military bases in Greece. Papagos died in office on 4 October 1955 in Athens.

Lucian N. Leustean

See also

Greece; Greek Civil War

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Papandreou, Andreas Georgios

(1919–1996)

Greek statesman and prime minister (1981–1989, 1993–1996). Born in Chios, Greece, on 5 February 1919, the son of Georgios Papandreou, Andreas Papandreou attended the American College in Athens and obtained a law degree from the University of Athens in 1940. After being arrested twice as a Trotskyist activist during the regime of dictator Ioannis Metaxas, Papandreou fled to the United States, where he earned a PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1943 and became an American citizen in 1944. He

then served as a U.S. Navy officer for two years. During 1955–1959 he taught at Harvard and several other American universities.

Papandreou returned to Greece in 1959, and Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis appointed him head of the Center of Economic Research and Planning. After his father Georgios was appointed prime minister in 1963, Papandreou gave up his U.S. citizenship, won a seat in parliament in February 1964, and became deputy minister for economic policy in his father's cabinet. In November 1965 he was forced to resign from office over allegations of favoritism, but a mere six months later he again took up his old post. After the military coup in April 1967, he was jailed for eight months and was released under a general amnesty order. In exile he taught in Stockholm and then Toronto, becoming the leader of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK).

Following the downfall of the military dictatorship in 1974, Papandreou returned to Greece and founded the left-wing Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). PASOK's popularity steadily increased, and in 1981 it captured a convincing parliamentary victory. Papandreou became prime minister.

Papandreou's party won the 1985 elections with 46 percent of the vote. During his second term, his government was plagued by a financial scandal that ultimately led to the resignation of three ministers. In addition, the crisis extended to Papandreou's personal life, when the Greek media publicized his affair with a young former airline stewardess before he had divorced his second wife. PASOK lost the elections of June 1989, and Papandreou resigned. In 1992 he was charged with bribery and corruption but was later acquitted. In October 1993 PASOK again captured an electoral plurality, with Papandreou becoming prime minister until he retired in January 1996 because of health problems. He died on 23 June 1996 in Ekali, near Athens.

Greek politician Andreas Papandreou survived an early self-imposed exile to the United States and later imprisonment, torture, and forced exile by a military government to become the first socialist prime minister of Greece in 1981. (Embassy of Greece)

Lucian N. Leustean

See also

Greece; Papandreou, Georgios

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Papandreou, Georgios
(1888–1968)

Greek politician and prime minister (1944, 1963, 1964–1967). Born in Kalentzi, Achaia, Greece, on 13 February 1888, Georgios Papandreou graduated from the Law Faculty of the University of Athens in 1911 and briefly pursued postgraduate studies in Germany. He became one of the closest supporters of Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, who appointed him governor of the Aegean Islands during 1917–1920. Papandreou was elected to parliament in 1923 and held various ministerial positions during 1924–1935. After abandoning the Liberal Party, he founded his own small Republican Socialist Party in 1935. He was exiled in 1936 during the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas and was imprisoned by the Germans during 1942–1944.

After his escape, Papandreou joined the royalist government and was appointed prime minister in exile in April 1944. He returned to Athens on 18 October 1944 after the German departure. In December 1944, at the beginning of the Greek Civil War, he resigned and was replaced by General Nikolaos Plastiras. During 1946–1952 Papandreou held ministerial positions in several governments. In 1950 he founded the Georgios Papandreou Party, and after joint leadership of the Liberal Party in the late 1950s, he organized a new center-leftist coalition, the Center Union, in 1961.

Securing a narrow victory in the elections of November 1963 over Konstantinos Karamanlis's National Radical Union, Papandreou was appointed prime minister but immediately resigned in an attempt to achieve an absolute majority in the elections of February 1964. He won these elections with an unprecedented 53 percent of the vote and was appointed prime minister. In 1965 he managed to survive an internal crisis that saw his son Andreas Papandreou, a member of his cabinet, accused of belonging to the left-wing organization Aspida. In July 1965, King Constantine II dismissed Papandreou as prime minister over clashes regarding control of the Ministry of Defense.

In 1967 a group of young officers, in a coup that came to be known as the Revolution of 21 April 1967, overthrew the government. Papandreou was held under house arrest until his death on 1 November 1968 in Athens.

Lucian N. Leustean

See also

Constantine II, King of Greece; Greece; Papandreou, Andreas Georgios

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PAPERCLIP, Operation (1946–1954)

Secret U.S. plan to spirit German scientists out of Nazi Germany after World War II. Based on an earlier operation code-named OVERCAST, Operation PAPERCLIP was signed into policy by President Harry S. Truman on 6 September 1946. PAPERCLIP was so-named for the individual dossiers and immigration papers joined together by paperclips. OVERCAST was originally designed to exploit the knowledge of German scientists, technicians, and engineers in the war against Japan and to prevent the use of their expertise in any future attempt to remilitarize Germany. PAPERCLIP kept the German scientists out of Soviet hands. The United States was thus able to use them to advance American military and scientific capabilities.

Truman's directive specifically forbade the entry of prominent Nazi Party members or active supporters of the party into the United States, as the State Department was particularly sensitive to the immigration of high-level Nazis into the country. The War Department, however, was unhappy that the State Department had rejected entry visas for certain leading scientists with active ties to the Nazi Party. The Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA), in charge of PAPERCLIP for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had used the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), to summarize the war crimes investigations of the desired scientists. Discovering that the State Department would not approve immigration of those with negative OMGUS reports, JIOA began to cleanse certain dossiers. The War Department considered this necessary because the growing threat of communism had become a greater perceived danger than the morality of individual scientists. Expunging Nazi Party connections seemed a fair price to pay for keeping critical scientific information from the Soviets, as scientists involved in PAPERCLIP had participated in the wartime development of the deadly V-1 and V-2 rockets.

The top secret operation remained classified until 1973. Declassified information has proven that the scope of the project far exceeded what was previously known. Once thought to have involved as many as 750 scientists, PAPERCLIP actually brought more than 1,600 former Nazis with valuable scientific skills to the United States. Many had extensive Nazi Party backgrounds, and others had direct connections to Nazi war crimes, including bizarre pseudoscientific testing on humans. PAPERCLIP officially ended in 1957 at the request of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), which protested the loss of so many valuable scientists and engineers.

PAPERCLIP was an essential Cold War program in that it greatly enhanced American knowledge of rocketry and missile technology. Perhaps the best known of all PAPERCLIP scientists who transferred their allegiance to the United States was famed rocket scientist Werner von Braun, credited with developing the Saturn 5 moon rocket that landed Americans on the surface of the moon.

Thomas D. Veve

See also

Braun, Wernher von; Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Space Race

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Paraguay

Landlocked South American nation bordered by Brazil to the north and east, Bolivia to the northwest, and Argentina to the south. Paraguay, roughly the size of the U.S. state of California, comprises 157,046 square miles and had a 1945 population of 1.247 million people. Its population is made up of people of European background, people of mixed Native American and European descent, and a significant indigenous population, mainly Guaraní Indians.

The first half of the twentieth century proved to be a time of great upheaval in Paraguay. During 1900–1954 the country had thirty-four different presidents. Although there were fleeting experiments in democracy in the late 1930s, during 1940–1947 General Higino Morínigo's one-man rule prevailed. Challenging his autocratic rule, the Colorado Party drove him from power in 1947. The Colorados then split into three factions, with the populist Federico Chaves finally prevailing in September 1949. Faced with a plethora of economic and political problems, he tried to strengthen his position by building up the police force to counterbalance a restive army. This controversial move alienated many, and in May 1954 General Alfredo Stroessner, with the backing of the military and Paraguayan elites, toppled the Chaves government.

Although there was virtually no threat of internal subversion, between 1947 and the mid-1970s, U.S. military assistance averaged about $750,000 annually.

Stroessner had long been preparing for his coup. He proved his loyalty, temporarily at least, by thwarting a coup attempt in September 1949. By October 1951 he commanded the armed forces. The Stroessner dictatorship lasted until February 1989, the longest-lasting government in Paraguayan history and one of the longest-running regimes of the Cold War. By restructuring the Colorado Party to make it an instrument of his rule, Stroessner effectively controlled all aspects of civil society. He also maintained good relations with his powerful neighbors, Argentina and Brazil.

Stroessner enjoyed warm relations with the United States. A year before taking power, he toured the U.S. Pentagon and major military installations in the United States and the Panama Canal Zone. Not surprisingly, Washington quickly granted recognition to his regime in 1954. As a reward for his staunch anticommunism, a few months after his rise to power the United

States granted his government a 50 percent increase in development assistance. During 1961–1963, at the beginning of President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, Stroessner received $27.9 million in aid. He used foreign assistance to co-opt segments of the population with colonization programs and government jobs. Although there was virtually no threat of internal subversion, between 1947 and the mid-1970s U.S. military assistance averaged about $750,000 annually.

American assistance helped ensure that Stroessner remained a loyal U.S. Cold War ally, and Paraguay under his regime consistently supported Washington's position in international institutions. During the latter part of the 1970s Paraguay also participated in Operation CONDOR, an alliance of South American intelligence agencies developed to fight communist subversion in the region.

Until the late 1970s, Stroessner's popularity had risen along with Paraguay's economy, but his support waned as economic problems began to plague the small nation in the 1980s. The military became disenchanted with his rule, and the Colorado Party broke into squabbling factions. As democratization swept Latin America in the 1980s, Paraguay also got caught up in the wave. General Andres Rodríguez ousted the aging Stroessner in a coup on 3 February 1989, becoming the standard-bearer of the Colorado Party and handily winning the 1 May 1989 elections. Since then, Paraguay has moved toward full democracy, and a multiparty system has replaced Stroessner's one-man rule. After the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Paraguay focused on democracy and stemming the flow of illicit drugs and pirated (counterfeited) items to the United States.

President Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay ruled for twenty-five years before being overthrown by that country's military in 1989. No other Latin American leader in the twentieth century, democratic or dictatorial, had remained in office for so long. (Horacio Villalobos/Corbis)

JAMES F. SIEKMEIER

See also

Alliance for Progress; Americas

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Paris Conference
(May 1960)

Aborted East-West summit meeting. After U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev met at Camp David in September 1959, a thaw in East-West relations began to take form. Eisenhower and Khrushchev appeared ready to discuss outstanding East-West issues at a four-power (United States, Soviet Union, France, Great Britain) summit, the first such meeting since the Geneva Conference of July 1955.

Within the Western camp, opposition arose against the personalized bilateralism of Camp David. Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Chancellor Konrad Adenauer feared that German reunification might be sacrificed on the altar of a U.S.-Soviet détente. French President Charles de Gaulle postponed the date of the Paris Conference until mid-May 1960, after the explosion of the first French atomic bomb and after Khrushchev's state visit to France.

In early 1960, Eisenhower hoped to negotiate a nuclear test–ban treaty by offering concessions on Berlin. He was inclined to recognize the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), to accept the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's western border, and to offer West German nuclear abstention to stabilize the status quo in Berlin. In March 1960, when Khrushchev for the first time agreed to allow international inspections to verify a nuclear test–ban treaty, Eisenhower, against the advice of the U.S. defense establishment, decided to accept a partially unverified test ban. Several Soviet moves after Camp David convinced Eisenhower that Khrushchev genuinely wished to solve East-West problems. First, Khrushchev publicly withdrew his Berlin ultimatum in October 1959. Second, in December 1959 the Soviet Union signed the Antarctica Treaty, providing for, among other things, a demilitarized zone in the Arctic. Third, Khrushchev announced a unilateral cut in the Soviet Army by 1.2 million men in January 1960. With British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan also calling for a test-ban treaty, the chances appeared bright for an international agreement on the eve of the Paris Conference.

Following the Soviet downing of an American U-2 reconnaissance plane on 1 May 1960, however, Khrushchev publicly attacked the U.S. action. Washington at first refused to acknowledge overflights of the Soviet Union and produced a press release stating that a weather plane over southeastern Turkey had inadvertently strayed into Soviet airspace. But on 7 May 1960, when Khrushchev disclosed that the U.S. pilot was still alive and that the plane's wreckage was clearly identifiable, the United States had no choice but to own up to the incident. In an attempt to save the summit, Eisenhower decided to deny personal responsibility, which proved disastrous. On 7 May, the U.S. government announced that Eisenhower had not authorized the U-2 flight of 1 May. Soon, however, news stories reported that Eisenhower was either lying or was no longer in control of his own government. To counter this public relations imbroglio, on 9 May 1960 he reversed course and accepted full responsibility for the incident, hoping to defuse the situation once and for all.

Eisenhower realized that Khrushchev would use the U-2 affair as a bargaining chip but hoped that he would still be interested in serious negotiations with the West. On 15 May 1960, Khrushchev delivered to de Gaulle and Macmillan several conditions for his participation in the summit. Eisenhower had to apologize for the U-2 flights, promise to discontinue the U-2 program, and punish the persons responsible for the overflights. Despite such unpalatable conditions, Eisenhower continued to believe that he could come to terms with Khrushchev once they met in person. On 16 May, however, at the first official session of the four-power meeting, Khrushchev delivered a forty-five-minute tirade against U.S. policies and publicly repeated his conditions for continuing the summit talks. Eisenhower replied with restraint but refused to apologize, although he did hint that he might discontinue the U-2 flights. This was a vague and empty commitment, however, as the U-2 was soon to be eclipsed by the first orbiting U.S. spy satellites. Khrushchev left the preliminary conference meetings, and the Paris Conference was officially declared over on 17 May 1960.

The failure of the conference provided Berlin with a respite of about a year. But when Khrushchev met with Eisenhower's successor John F. Kennedy in Vienna in early June 1961, the Soviet leader reenergized the Berlin Crisis and ultimately erected the Berlin Wall in August 1961. On 1 September 1961, the Soviets resumed atmospheric nuclear tests, breaking a three-year mutual moratorium. The United States and Britain also resumed nuclear testing before finally concluding a Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union on 25 July 1963, only months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Paris Conference's failure resulted not only in a significant blemish on Eisenhower's reputation and legacy but also represented a lost opportunity to downgrade—or perhaps even end—the titanic Cold War struggle of the preceding fifteen years.

Christian Nuenlist

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Geneva Conference (1955); Khrushchev, Nikita; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; U-2 Incident; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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Paris Peace Conference and Treaties
(29 July–15 October 1946)

At the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, the Allied leaders established a Council of Foreign Ministers. Representing Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, its task was to plan the preparation of peace

U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes addresses delegations at the Paris Peace Conference in the Luxembourg Palace in Paris, 1946. (Library of Congress)

treaties with the Axis powers. Their discussions produced increasingly bitter exchanges that reflected the arrival of the Cold War.

On 29 July 1946 representatives of twenty-two states met at Paris in the faded magnificence of the Luxembourg Palace to discuss and draft peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. This Plenary Conference continued preliminary work completed the previous spring by experts. Strong disagreements resulted in deadlock and the end of the conference on 15 October. Informal discussions continued, however, culminating in a gathering of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York from 4 November to 6 December 1947 that ratified the agreements. The treaties were formally signed on 10 February 1947 at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, in the same room where the plenary sessions of the Paris Peace Conference following World War I had taken place.

Each of the treaties with the five states contained provisions recognizing the inviolability of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The treaties ratified the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Roma-

nia, which, however, regained all of Transylvania from Hungary. Romania was required to pay the Soviet Union $300 million in reparations and to limit its armed forces to 138,000 men. Hungary returned to its 1938 borders, with the exception of a small territorial loss in favor of Czechoslovakia. Hungary was forced to pay an indemnity of $200 million and restrict its armed forces to 70,000 men. Bulgaria retained southern Dobrudja and was forced to pay an indemnity of $70 million. Its military was restricted to 65,500 men. Finland ceded to the Soviet Union the Karelian Isthmus and the Arctic seaport of Petsamo (now Pechenga), which provided the Soviet Union a frontier with Norway. The USSR also secured a fifty-year lease on a naval base at Porkkala. Finland's armed forces were restricted to 41,500 men, and it was forced to pay $300 million in reparations to the Soviet Union.

In other developments, Italy's frontiers were slightly redrawn to reflect more closely lines of nationality. Yugoslavia was determined to secure not only Venezia Giulia, which was largely Slavic in population, but also the port of Trieste, which was heavily Italian. Initially declared a free territory, Trieste was incorporated into Italy in 1954. Italy also lost the Tenda and Briga border areas to France, its Adriatic islands to Yugoslavia, and the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. In addition, Italy lost sovereignty over its African colonies of Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland. The Italian military was reduced to 300,000 men, and Italy was forced to pay $360 million in reparations.

In the meantime, without a formal treaty, the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. By 1947 Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria were all Soviet satellites.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Bulgaria; Decolonization; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Greece; Hungary; Italy; Libya; Romania; Soviet Union; Yugoslavia

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Park Chung Hee
(1917–1979)

South Korean Army general and president of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) during 1961–1979. Born at Kumi, near Taegu, on 14 November 1917, Park Chung Hee graduated from the Taegu Teacher's College and entered the Military Officer Training Academy of the Manchurian Imperial Army in Changchun, China, in April 1940. He attended the Japanese Military Academy during 1942–1944, was commissioned a lieutenant, and then served in Japan's Kwantung Army until the end of World War II.

Park returned to southern Korea in May 1946 and became an officer in the Constabulary Army during the U.S. occupation of Korea. The newly established South Korean government, under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, arrested Park in November 1948 on charges that he led a communist cell in the Constabulary Army. Park was subsequently sentenced to death by a military court, but his sentence was commuted by Rhee at the urging of several high-ranking Korean military officers.

On 30 June 1950, immediately after the Korean War began, Park returned to active service as a major. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel that September and to colonel in April 1951. As a colonel, he became the artillery commander of II Corps in February 1953 and of III Corps in May 1953. Advanced to brigadier general in November 1953, he became commander of the 5th Division in July 1955 and of the 7th Division in September 1957. Promoted to major general in March 1958, that June he became chief of staff of the First Army. In July 1959 he headed the 6th District Command, which had responsibility for the defense of Seoul. He then commanded in succession the Quartermaster Base and the 1st District Command. In September 1960 he became chief of the Operations Staff of the South Korean Army and, that September, deputy commander of the Second Army.

In April 1960, mass antigovernment demonstrations forced the aging Rhee from power. That July, national elections brought a coalition government to power with Yun Po Sun as president and Chang Myon (John W. Chang) as premier. Despite their attempts to initiate needed reforms, their efforts largely failed, and antigovernment violence increased. Taking advantage of the situation, a group of young officers helped Park seize power in a military coup on 16 May 1961.

Park was promoted to lieutenant general in August 1961 and to general in November 1961. Following the coup, he was consecutively elected president in 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1978. Initially, he embarked on a generally successful economic modernization program that brought stability and increased prosperity to his country. During 1965–1973, he dispatched more than 47,000 South Korean troops to Vietnam at the request of the United States. From the early 1970s, however, public resistance against his authoritarian regime increased. The once-flourishing South Korean economy was on the skids by the mid-1970s. Park's iron-fisted rule ended abruptly when he was assassinated in Seoul by his director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Chae Gyu, on 26 October 1979.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Korea, Republic of

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Partial Test Ban Treaty
(5 August 1963)

Treaty banning all nuclear tests, except underground trials. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 by representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union and was entered into force on 10 October 1963 with unlimited duration. The PTBT was the result of five years of intense negotiations concerning the limiting of nuclear weapons tests. Some 125 nations have since signed the document, although France and the People's Republic of China (PRC) refused to sign, arguing that the test ban was a means of preserving the superiority of the three initial nuclear powers.

The PTBT was clearly an attempt to make nuclear weapons programs more difficult to sustain, thus limiting nuclear proliferation. The signatories to the treaty agreed that they would no longer carry out any nuclear test explosion in the atmosphere, underwater, in outer space, or in any other environment that would allow the spread of radioactive fallout beyond the territorial borders of the state conducting the test. There was a precedent for an agreement of this kind, namely, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the first major international arms control treaty following World War II. Its goal was to prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes in the belief that it was in humankind's interest to keep the continent pristine and open to scientific research.

World public opinion was already attuned to the dangers of atmospheric nuclear testing as a result of the 1954 *Castle Bravo* incident, when a thermonuclear weapons test at Bikini Island in the Pacific unwittingly exposed to nuclear fallout 28 Americans, 236 Marshall Islanders, and 23 crew members of the Japanese fishing boat *Castle Bravo*. Public opinion was further inflamed by France's decision to conduct atmospheric tests in Polynesia in 1962.

Furthermore, in the United States there was increasing support for a test ban throughout the summer of 1963. In early July of that year, 52 percent of Americans signaled unqualified support for a test ban. After the treaty had been signed, 81 percent of those polled approved the ban. During the early 1960s, two developments were influential in pushing forward a test ban. Considerable radioactive materials were being poured into the atmosphere as a result of atmospheric nuclear testing, and the world's nuclear states had advanced their nuclear technology to the point where a combination of underground tests and physical calculations gave them sufficient information to design and test their strategic weapons without the risk of radioactive fallout.

In 1962, the newly established Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) within the United Nations (UN) became the principal forum for discussions concerning a test ban. After protracted negotiations, an agreement emerged on the use of seismic stations and on-site inspections for

U.S. President John F. Kennedy signs the Partial Test Ban Treaty on 5 August 1963. The treaty prohibited several types of nuclear tests. (Robert Knudsen, White House/John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)

verification purposes, but disagreement on the acceptable number of inspections continued. In July 1963 the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union initiated tripartite talks on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. The agreement on a partial test-ban treaty came out of those discussions after about three weeks of talks.

The PTBT seemed to offer hope for future disarmament agreements. Following the PTBT negotiations, worldwide concern over nuclear testing and the nuclear arms race in general declined dramatically. In 1968 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed, restricting the flow of weapons, technical knowledge, and fissile materials to states that did not already have nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union went a step further in 1974 when they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). It limited underground testing, which was allowed by the PTBT, to a maximum weapons yield of 150 kilotons, and only at declared testing

sites. It also allowed on-site inspection by the other state for any test expected to exceed 35 kilotons. The TTBT did not enter into force until 1990. It had a duration of five years, with five-year extensions, and remains in force today. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was called for in the preamble of the PTBT but was not signed until 1996. As of 2007, the United States had refused to ratify the CTBT, despite being one of the original signatories. Nonetheless, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia have observed unilateral nuclear testing moratoriums since 1992, and the last French test took place in 1995.

Jérôme Dorvidal and Jeffrey Larsen

See also

Atomic Bomb; Hydrogen Bomb; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Tests

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Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich

(1890–1960)

Russian poet and novelist whose work earned him the 1958 Nobel Prize in Literature, which the author declined because of political pressures in the Soviet Union. Boris Pasternak was born into an upper-class Jewish family in Moscow on 10 February 1890. His father was a painter and art professor, his mother a celebrated concert pianist. In his early years, Pasternak was keenly interested in music, showing considerable talent in music composition. By 1910, however, he had abandoned his musical aspirations and instead went to Germany's University of Marburg in 1912 to study philosophy. His stay in Germany lasted just a few months. He traveled to Italy and returned to Russia in 1914 to embark on a career as a writer.

Pasternak's first attempts at poetry were not commercial successes, although he did publish a number of books of poetry. During World War I he worked and taught in a chemical plant in the Ural Mountains, a grim locale that may have provided grist for his later work, including his famous novel *Dr. Zhivago* (1957). By the mid-1920s, the writer had earned a considerable reputation in Russia for his rather bleak but compelling poems, many of which dealt with the Russian Revolution of 1905. He also wrote of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and, in the early 1930s, began to tailor his writings to fit the standards of the Soviet regime. Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's infamous

purges of the 1930s horrified Pasternak and soured him on communism. Thereafter, he turned to translating into Russian the works of other writers (such as William Shakespeare and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe), perhaps as a way to avoid controversy in his own writing and to pander to Stalin's personal tastes.

Pasternak and his wife relocated to Peredelkino, a haven for Soviet writers just outside Moscow, several years prior to the outbreak of World War II. There Pasternak enjoyed a comfortable life where he was permitted to work, relatively uninterrupted, on his many poetic and prose compositions. Because many of the themes and passages in *Dr. Zhivago* were considered anti-Soviet, Pasternak was unable to get his first (and only) novel published behind the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless, the manuscript was smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published in Italy in 1957. It was an immediate hit, both with critics and general readers.

The publication of *Dr. Zhivago* had serious consequences for Pasternak, however. He was hounded and persecuted by Soviet authorities. In 1958 he was named the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Literature due in large part to *Dr. Zhivago*, which was officially banned by the Soviet government. Old and in poor health, Pasternak turned down the honor after initially seeming to accept it. It is quite clear that the writer changed his mind because he feared that a trip to Stockholm to receive the award would have resulted in his banishment from the USSR.

The Swedish Academy, which had bestowed the honor on Pasternak, respectfully stated that the award was still valid, whether Pasternak personally received it or not. *Dr. Zhivago* was not published in the Soviet Union until 1987, thirty years after it debuted in the West. Pasternak spent the last few years of his life under a pall of government suspicion. He died in Peredelkino on 30 May 1960.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Literature; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Pauker, Ana Rabinsohn
(1893–1960)

Romanian communist leader and foreign minister (1947–1952). Born into an orthodox Jewish family in the village of Codăeşti, Vaslui County, in central Moldova on 13 February 1893, Ana Rabinsohn received a Hebrew education and became a teacher. In 1915 she joined the Social Democrat Party and later its pro-Bolshevik faction. Married in 1921 to Marcel Pauker, a prominent communist leader (and victim of Soviet leader Josef Stalin's purges in

the late 1930s), she became a member of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), created in May 1921 and banned in 1924.

As secretary of the Women's Central Commission, Pauker was a leader in the trade union movement. As a member of the RCP's General Council, she traveled to Moscow in 1922 for the Communist International (Comintern) congress. Arrested for her political activities in 1923, she was soon released and went into exile in Switzerland and the Soviet Union before being involved with Comintern activities in France and the Balkans (1931–1935).

Returning to Romania in 1935, Pauker was again arrested and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, but in May 1941 she was exchanged for a Romanian Bessarabian leader held by the Soviet Union. In Moscow she served on the Executive Bureau of the Comintern and headed the External Bureau of the RCP. During World War II, she was the undisputed leader of Romanian communist exiles. In 1943 she helped organize Romanian Army prisoners held by the Soviets into a division to fight against the Germans, becoming its political commissar with the rank of colonel.

Returning to Romania in September 1944 after the Soviet armies had entered the country, Pauker became secretary of the RCP Central Committee. Known as the "Red Iron Lady," she played a major role in the establishment of communist rule. Associated with party excesses of the 1948–1951 period and slavish devotion to Stalin's policies, she did oppose a number of policies, including the widespread party purges (1948–1952).

Romanian communist leader Ana Rabinsohn Pauker was foreign minister of her country during 1947–1952. (Corbis)

As vice premier from April 1949 to September 1952 and minister of foreign affairs during November 1947–June 1952, Pauker was the first woman to hold such powerful positions within the Soviet bloc. *Time* magazine in February 1948 called her "the most powerful woman alive." During 1948–1949, she arranged treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union and other people's democracies as well as Romanian diplomatic recognition of Israel (June 1948) and the immigration to Israel of 118,000 Romanian Jews.

Beginning in 1952, Premier Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a strong Stalinist, angry at Pauker's opposition to his purge directives as well as her handling of Romania's economic crisis, purged the Jewish leader from her posts, with Stalin's blessing. Arrested in February 1953, Pauker was freed following Stalin's death the next month, although she remained under house arrest and never regained a position of leadership. Later she was permitted to work as a translator of French and German for the party publishing house. Retiring on a pension, Pauker died from breast cancer in Bucharest on 14 June 1960.

Dumitru Preda and Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe; Romania

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Paul VI, Pope
(1897–1978)

Roman Catholic prelate and pope (1963–1978). Pope Paul VI was born Giovanni Battista Enrico Antonio Maria Montini on 26 September 1897 in Concesio, Italy, to a wealthy family of local nobility. He entered the seminary in 1916, was ordained in 1920, and subsequently studied at the Gregorian University and the University of Rome. He was first assigned to Poland in 1922. However, poor health forced his return to Rome. He then entered the Vatican Secretariat of State in 1923, where he remained for thirty-two years.

Pope Paul VI, 1970. (National Archives and Records Administration)

After 1944, with Pope Pius XII acting as both pope and secretary of state, Montini became especially influential. As archbishop of Milan (1954–1963) he involved himself deeply in social problems, often mediating between workers and employers. He became a cardinal in 1958.

Elected pope in June 1963, he took the name of Paul VI and continued the reforms of his predecessor, John XXIII, including Vatican Council II. In 1964, Paul VI was the first pope in more than 150 years to leave Italy, making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. That journey was followed by pastoral visits to five continents.

Paul also improved relations with communist countries, often receiving their leaders in the Vatican. In 1971 he succeeded in peacefully ending Cardinal József Mindszenty's fifteen-year exile in the U.S. embassy in Budapest, bringing him to Rome.

The pope frequently met with the leaders of other churches and in 1969 addressed the World Council of Churches. He was also committed to implementing Vatican Council II reforms and ecumenism. However, he clung to tradition on such Church dogma as papal infallibility and artificial contraception, which he reaffirmed in his 1968 encyclical *Humanae Vitae*. In 1971, the synod of bishops supported Paul's stand on retaining priestly celibacy, although a sizable minority was said to have had qualms

over the issue. Pope Paul VI died in Rome on 6 August 1978. His successor was John Paul I.

Luc Stenger

See also

John XXIII, Pope; Mindszenty, József; Roman Catholic Church; Vatican City; Vatican Council II

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In 1964, Paul VI was the first pope in over 150 years to leave Italy, making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

Peace Corps
(1961–)

U.S. organization established by executive order in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy. The Peace Corps was inspired by fears current in the 1950s that U.S. officials were overly remote from the day-to-day concerns and lives of ordinary people in developing countries, anxieties well expressed in the influential best-selling novel by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer, *The Ugly American* (1958). Alarmed that emphasis on military rather than economic aid and American support for elites risked losing for the United States third world support for the Cold War, in the 1960 presidential campaign Kennedy called on Americans, particularly though not exclusively the young, to spend two years working in education, community development, or technological assistance programs in such countries. They would receive relatively low salaries and share their hosts' living and working conditions. Such efforts were intended to restore the original goals of President Harry S. Truman's Point Four Program of assistance to underdeveloped areas.

Headed for its first five years by Sargent Shriver, Kennedy's brother-in-law, the Peace Corps rapidly sent thousands of volunteers each year to what would eventually be more than 138 countries throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America and, with the ending of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Numbers of volunteers peaked at 15,000 in 1966, fell rapidly during the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s were somewhere below 5,000 annually. By 2005, 178,000 Americans had served as Peace Corps volunteers. The majority of volunteers provided educational services, but agriculture, food production, health, environmental, conservation, and community development services were also well represented. Initially an independent agency created by the Peace Corps Act of 1961, in 1971 the organization was placed under the umbrella federal agency ACTION, established to coordinate both domestic and overseas volunteer programs, before regaining its independence in 1981. Winning over initially skeptical congressmen, the Peace Corps quickly succeeded in attracting strong bipartisan support for its relatively modest and unassuming programs and appropriations, which has continued to the present.

U.S. Peace Corps volunteers and villagers constructing a drinking water well in Bihar, India, in 1967. (Library of Congress)

Although the Peace Corps' inception owed much to Cold War preoccupations and although both American radicals and host countries on occasion characterized it as an agent of U.S. cultural imperialism, the agency made strenuous efforts to remain apolitical. Volunteers, the majority recent college graduates, were sent only to countries that specifically requested their services and were strictly forbidden to become involved in local politics or to have any contact with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The emphasis was on people-to-people contact. Volunteers did not bring expensive equipment with them but brought only their own skills and abilities. Even so, potential host countries sometimes viewed the Peace Corps as an agent of cultural imperialism.

Complicated political conditions significantly limited Peace Corps activities in certain areas of the world. In 1965 President Sukarno of Indonesia ended all Peace Corps programs as a nationalist gesture of protest against American neoimperialism, a move imitated in 1983 by Malaysia. A deliberate policy of refusing to send volunteers to any country where U.S. troops were engaged in combat precluded their service in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia during the Vietnam War, despite pressure from officials in President Lyndon Johnson's administration, and even after the resumption of relations with the United States in later years those countries did not welcome the Peace Corps. In 1981 fears for volunteers' safety brought the closing of the Peace Corps program in Colombia. Japan declined to use Peace Corps vol-

Peace Corps in Africa, Caribbean and Latin America

In Africa

Region	*Country*	*Dates*	*Total Volunteers*
Africa	Benin	1968–present	1,449
Africa	Botswana	1966–1997; 2003–present	1,889
Africa	Burkina Faso	1966–1987, 1995–present	1,352
Africa	Cameroon	1962–present	2,801
Africa	Cape Verde	1988–present	355
Africa	Chad	1966–1979; 1987–1990; 1990–1998; 2003–present	726
Africa	Gabon	1963–1967, 1973–present	1,460
Africa	Ghana	1961–present	3,670
Africa	Guinea	1962–1966, 1969–1971, 1985–present	1,061
Africa	Kenya	1964–present	4,623
Africa	Lesotho	1967–present	1,888
Africa	Madagascar	1993–present	592
Africa	Malawi	1963–1969, 1973–1976, 1978–present	2,131
Africa	Mali	1971–present	2,127
Africa	Mauritania	1967; 1971–1991; 1991–present	1,052
Africa	Mozambique	1998–present	310
Africa	Namibia	1990–present	878
Africa	Niger	1962–present	2,769
Africa	Senegal	1963–present	2,639
Africa	South Africa	1997–present	530
Africa	Swaziland	1969–1996, 2003–present	1,283
Africa	Tanzania	1962–1969; 1979–1991; 1991–present	1,899
Africa	The Gambia	1967–present	1,284
Africa	Togo	1962–present	2,338
Africa	Uganda	1964–1973; 1991–1999; 2000–present	720
Africa	Zambia	1993–present	683

In Caribbean and Latin America

Region	*Country*	*Dates*	*Total Volunteers*
Caribbean	Dominican Republic	1962–Present	3,609
Caribbean	Eastern Caribbean	1961–Present	3,334
Caribbean	Jamaica	1962–Present	3,348
Latin America	Belize	1962–Present	1,640
Latin America	Bolivia	1962–1971; 1990–Present	2,452
Latin America	Costa Rica	1963–Present	2,993
Latin America	Ecuador	1962–Present	5,375
Latin America	El Salvador	1962–1980; 1993–present	1,695
Latin America	Guatemala	1963–present	4,097
Latin America	Guyana	1967–1971; 1995–present	382
Latin America	Honduras	1963–present	5,073
Latin America	Mexico	2004–present	25
Latin America	Nicaragua	1968–1979, 1991–present	1,461
Latin America	Panama	1963–1971, 1990–present	1,437
Latin America	Paraguay	1967–present	2,911
Latin America	Peru	1962–1975; 2002–present	2,417
Latin America	Suriname	1995–present	242

unteers in English literacy programs, while China did not accept volunteers until 1995, when they began to train Chinese English-language teachers under the label "U.S.-China Friendship Volunteers." As a matter of national pride, India, Brazil, Russia, and Nigeria, each of which at times accepted Peace Corps volunteers, subsequently chose to withdraw from the program.

By the early twenty-first century, Peace Corps volunteers were on average older and more experienced than in the past and were serving in seventy-two countries in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America, while the agency's 2004 budget amounted to $325 million. In 2003 President George W. Bush's administration, anxious to burnish the American image in the developing world, especially the Middle East, proposed doubling the number of Peace Corps volunteers from the existing 7,000 to 14,000 by 2007.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Truman, Harry S.

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Peace Movements

The Cold War was perhaps unique with regard to the amount of dissent it created in both the East and West. During 1945–1990, three significant peace movements stand out. The first was sparked by the 1954 U.S. testing of the hydrogen bomb on the South Pacific island of Bikini that led to the rise of a large-scale international nuclear disarmament movement. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a global rebellion against the Vietnam War. In 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) double-track decision to station intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Western Europe led to large-scale antiwar and antinuclear protest demonstrations that culminated during 1982–1983.

Defined as autonomous, nongovernmental, generally nonpartisan, and nonviolent organizations, peace movements range from strict opposition to all wars (pacifism), to opposition against a specific type of weapon (such as

nuclear bombs), to opposition against a particular conflict. The late nineteenth century saw the growth of worldwide peace activities leading to the 1907 Hague Convention. World War I also generated a rising peace sentiment. During the interwar years, pacifist activism was most prominent in Britain yet proved difficult to uphold as Germany, Italy, and Japan pursued increasingly more aggressive policies. After World War II, peace movements were overwhelmingly concerned with the banning of the production, testing, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons.

In the United States, uneasiness over the use of nuclear weapons was voiced only days after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Church groups were joined by scientists and politicians in promoting international controls over nuclear energy. As the Cold War intensified during the late 1940s, antinuclear activists—including prominent scientists Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard—were clearly fighting an uphill battle. At the time, the antinuclear movement found little support among an American public focused on combating the communist threat. During the early 1950s, McCarthyism further pushed peace activists onto the defensive.

On 1 March 1954, the U.S. testing of the most powerful hydrogen bomb to date on the Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific led to rising public concern over the long-term health effects of nuclear fallout. When 28 Americans, 236 Marshall Islanders, and 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing boat were contaminated by nuclear fallout from the blast, the Bikini tests made international headlines. This led to renewed demands for nuclear disarmament by international peace organizations such as the War Resisters' International (WRI), the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFR), and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Mainstream publications as well as period novels and films greatly alarmed the American public, while scientific studies on radioactivity further stirred pacifist sentiment.

When 28 Americans, 236 Marshall Islanders, and 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing boat were contaminated by nuclear fall-out from the blast, the Bikini tests made international headlines.

By no means were these concerns limited to the United States, however. Japanese reaction to the Bikini tests had been furious, whereas in Britain scientists had already urged their government not to develop the hydrogen bomb as early as 1950. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) the stationing of the first U.S. nuclear weapons in 1953 as well as the news of NATO military exercises that simulated the dropping of 335 atomic bombs gave overwhelming appeal to banning the bomb. There was rising concern in Scandinavia, Italy, and France as well. In the mid-1950s, polls all over Western Europe showed that between 80 and 90 percent of the population supported a test-ban treaty as well as a ban on nuclear weapons altogether.

Early on, scientists themselves played a prominent role in the struggle against the bomb. A key figure was British mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell, whose 23 December 1953 BBC radio address attracted considerable international attention and led to the creation of the Pugwash Movement, supported by a number of leading physicists on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Influenced by their Western colleagues, some Soviet physicists, most notably Andrei Sakharov, warned their government of the dangers of nuclear weapons.

Dressed as H-bombs, demonstrators in London march to Hyde Park in a "Ban the Bomb" protest staged by Britain's Communist Party, 6 May 1957. (Bettmann/Corbis)

When nuclear testing programs accelerated during the late 1950s, a first wave of mass protests to ban the bomb erupted. Britain took the lead with the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). The first march from London to Aldermaston on Easter 1958 adopted the symbol that has become the emblem of peace movements ever since: a circle encompassing a broken cross. In West Germany, the CND was copied by the Easter March Movement that originally grew out of opposition to NATO's decision to equip West German forces with nuclear weapons. Other countries such as Sweden and Switzerland followed suit, although French leftists were more concerned with the Algerian War than antinuclear issues.

In the United States, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) came into existence in 1957. Like the CND, it began by demanding a halt to nuclear testing but evolved into a broader nuclear disarmament movement. Unlike its European counterparts, however, SANE was unable to achieve the same kind of mass mobilization. At about the same time, European peace activists began to coordinate their efforts. In 1959, for example, British, Dutch, Swedish, Swiss, and West German nuclear disarmament organizations set up the European Federation Against Nuclear Arms.

Although the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) fell short of peace activists' demands, protesters could claim that they had helped pressure the Americans and Soviets to achieve a breakthrough at the negotiating table. Reaching its zenith in 1964 with the tally of Easter Marchers numbering 500,000 in twenty nations, the antinuclear campaign waned during the late 1960s as Cold War tensions eased. By politicizing a generation of young people, cooperating across national borders, and developing new forms of political action, however, it had set the stage for the coming protests against the Vietnam War.

By the mid-1960s, the Vietnam War had already replaced the antinuclear movement as the main focus of peace-related activities. In the United States, worries over the Vietnam War mounted even before President Lyndon Johnson began to dispatch large numbers of combat troops in 1965. In Britain, the CND staged large demonstrations against the war in 1966 and 1967. At its antiwar rally in February 1966, groups from West Germany, Austria, France, Sweden, Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands declared their solidarity with American student protesters. In October 1967, the march on the Pentagon was echoed by closely coordinated solidarity demonstrations against American military installations in West Berlin and by antiwar rallies in Amsterdam, London, Oslo, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo.

Throughout the world, Vietnam War protests stimulated the growth and expansion of student movements, which saw their culmination in 1968. In

Britain and West Germany, student protests that had originally organized over issues of college discipline and curriculum were transformed into mass demonstrations with more than 100,000 participants in 1968. In France, student protests snowballed into mass demonstrations involving organized labor and other groups, nearly toppling the government of Charles de Gaulle. The greatest mobilization was in Japan, where Vietnam War protests rallied almost 800,000 people in 1970. There is much evidence from many other Western as well as developing countries that opposition to the American engagement in Vietnam led to the radicalization of students worldwide.

As with the antinuclear protests that preceded it, the Vietnam War protests witnessed the emergence of global networks of rebellion. The close ties among American and West German and other European protesters formed a striking parallel with their governments' Cold War cooperation. Important figures of the German New Left had become acquainted with their American counterparts as exchange students during the early 1960s. After their return to Germany, they helped organize protests against the American war in Vietnam using methods that they copied from the U.S. civil rights movements, such as mass sit-ins.

Whereas the nuclear disarmament activists of the 1950s had by and large accepted the established institutional framework, Vietnam War protests developed into a more systematic anti-imperialist and anticapitalist ideological critique of Western democracy. European and American activists identified with developing-world revolutionaries such as Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong. However, their revolutionary rhetoric and violent methods often alienated even those middle-class voters who had been broadly sympathetic to the antinuclear cause.

Vietnam War protesters march on the Pentagon on 21 October 1967. In one of the first and most significant anti–Vietnam War demonstrations, more than 100,000 people rallied at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., and then marched across the Arlington Memorial Bridge to the Pentagon. (Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

Because of significant steps made toward nuclear arms control and superpower détente during the late 1960s and early 1970s and the focus on Vietnam, the antinuclear campaign had largely disintegrated. It returned, however, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when NATO's 1979 double-track decision to deploy land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe led to new fears of nuclear Armageddon. This second-wave antinuclear movement achieved an even larger protest mobilization than the first. Like its predecessor, it was transnational and was often built on the experiences of earlier protest efforts.

The antinuclear campaign of the early 1980s took place within the framework of renewed Cold War tensions and hostilities. Soviet efforts to achieve military superiority in Europe and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as well as Ronald Reagan's election as president in 1980 ended the long phase of détente between the superpowers. Yet despite the Soviet military buildup, a

majority of West Europeans did not fear an impending invasion. Because of growing public dissent to nuclear armaments in Eastern Europe as well, West European activists perceived themselves as part of a Pan-European movement battling against the dangers of the nuclear arms race.

President Jimmy Carter's Neutron Bomb Campaign had already raised antinuclear fears in Western Europe during 1977–1978. It was not until December 1979, however, when a NATO summit decided to deploy IRBMs if the Soviet Union did not withdraw its forward-basing of SS-20 missiles, that large-scale protests in several countries emerged. Campaigns achieved the most domestic support in Belgium and the Netherlands, where the peace movement was successful in coaxing the governments to delay the NATO deployment schedule. In Britain, where the CND was rejuvenated, nuclear weapons became an important political issue as well. In October 1980, 80,000 people marched to Trafalgar Square. In West Germany, protest demonstrations involved upwards of 100,000 people in the same year. The high point occurred in December 1983, just before the deployment of the IRBMs began. As many as a million demonstrators protested throughout West Germany, in addition to 600,000 in Rome and 400,000 in London.

The transnational protest networks of the 1980s had their roots in the ecological and feminist movements that had sprung up during the 1970s. They also enjoyed the backing of a substantial number of churches and labor unions. Despite considerable support in Western Europe and among the media, the peace movement of the early 1980s was unable to build upon the same kind of nuclear anxiety that lent the 1950s' movement such resonance. Because of its association with leftist and liberal causes, the 1980s' antinuclear campaign came to enjoy only limited support among mainstream political parties. This led to the founding of new political groups such as the West German Green Party.

The 1980s' peace movement did not originate in the United States. Despite considerable support from American peace groups (such as the National Freeze Campaign), the European peace movement developed independently from American influences. The stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles affected the balance of power in Europe. In addition, it had been European governments, above all West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government, that had taken the lead in pushing NATO toward the double-track decision. Finally, there was a strong sense of a European solidarity vis-à-vis the superpowers because East European antinuclear activists shared many concerns with their West European counterparts.

The Cold War–era peace movements did not produce immediate results in terms of disarmament or the lessening of tensions between East and West. Yet they had palpable effects on Western public opinion and to a lesser degree on East European governments. Beginning in the 1950s, they forced governments to address widespread fears of the destructive force of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Cold War, with its strong elite cooperation across national borders, provided a unique international framework for the unprecedented growth of transnational peace activity. Thus, antiwar activism during

the 1945–1990 period paved the way for more recent peace, environmental, and antiglobalization movements.

Philipp Gassert

See also

Double-Track Decision, NATO; Germany, Federal Republic of, Rearmament and NATO; McCarthyism; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; New Look Defense Policy; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Tests; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Students for a Democratic Society; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests; World Council of Churches

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Peaceful Coexistence

Soviet foreign policy doctrine of the immediate post-Stalin era that contributed to a brief thaw in Cold War tensions during the late 1950s and early 1960s. On 14 February 1956, at the opening session of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, in his report to the attending delegates, rejected the fatal inevitability of war between the communist and capitalist worlds and declared that the two competing socioeconomic systems could coexist peacefully. His assertion, made eleven days before his famous "secret speech" of 25 February in which he condemned Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's cult of personality and the crimes committed under his rule, marked the official adoption of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. This stance would guide Soviet foreign policy toward the West, the United States in particular, until Khrushchev's fall from power in October 1964.

Although Khrushchev characterized peaceful coexistence as a Leninist principle that had always been the general line of Soviet foreign policy, he was referring to the period from 1922 to 1929, when the Soviet regime, for practical reasons, practiced a policy of accommodation toward the capitalist world. In fact, peaceful coexistence represented a sharp break with the

Stalinist era (1929–1953), during which the dictator consistently portrayed the Soviet Union as a socialist island surrounded by a capitalist sea and preached the inevitability of conflict between communism and capitalism.

The road to peaceful coexistence actually began more than a year before the Twentieth Party Congress. On 1 January 1955, Khrushchev's colleague Prime Minister Georgy Malenkov stated that the Soviet Union's recent development of the hydrogen bomb made coexistence with the West both necessary and possible. Over the next nine months, the Kremlin followed up the Malenkov statement with a series of concrete steps clearly indicative of a new foreign policy paradigm. In May 1955, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France signed the Austrian State Treaty, which provided for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria. The treaty ended a decade of four-power occupation and restored Austria's political independence. In July, Khrushchev traveled to Geneva and met with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and French Prime Minister Edgar-Jean Faure in the first summit meeting of the Cold War. Although this Geneva Summit failed to resolve the most pressing Cold War issues, it did allow for the establishment of a personal rapport between the leaders of the two superpowers. Finally, in September 1955, Moscow established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).

Multiple motives lay behind the Soviet's quest for peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev certainly believed it essential for the cause of world peace, arguing in his 14 February 1956 report to the Twentieth Party Congress that only two choices existed: either peaceful coexistence or the most devastating war in history. Furthermore, he recognized that better relations with the West would allow for cuts in defense spending and the reallocation of funds to domestic programs to improve the living conditions of Soviet citizens who had known little else but hardship since the early 1930s.

Peaceful coexistence did not represent the end of the Soviet commitment to international communism or the loss of faith in the ultimate victory of communism over capitalism. Khrushchev remained convinced that the future belonged to communism. Yet unlike Stalin, who saw communism's preordained triumph as the by-product of an inevitable clash with capitalism, Khrushchev believed that the noncommunist world would voluntarily convert to communism once the Soviets had demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet socialist system.

Peaceful coexistence neither ended the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race nor produced a settlement of outstanding Cold War issues. Moscow and Washington continued to add to their nuclear arsenals, both quantitatively and qualitatively, while the status of Berlin produced a series of crises during 1958–1961. Furthermore, peaceful coexistence could not prevent new crises. For example, the U-2 Crisis of May 1960 short-circuited the heralded Paris Conference that same month, and the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis arguably brought the Soviet Union and the United States closer to a nuclear showdown than any other event during the Cold War.

The Soviet Union's new foreign policy paradigm also played a part in exacerbating the Sino-Soviet split, as the leadership of the People's Repub-

lic of China (PRC) lambasted the policy as revisionist and a betrayal of true Leninist ideology. Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence did change the tenor of Soviet-American relations for the better during the 1950s and early 1960s, producing a welcome relaxation of tensions that ultimately paved the way toward the era of détente during the 1970s.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also

Détente; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Geneva Conference (1955); Khrushchev, Nikita; Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; Open Skies Proposal; Paris Conference; Soviet Union; U-2 Incident

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Pearson, Lester Bowles
(1897–1972)

Canadian diplomat, Liberal Party politician, and prime minister (1963–1968). Born on 23 April 1897 in Toronto, Ontario, Lester "Mike" Pearson graduated from the University of Toronto in 1919. In 1928 he was invited to join the staff of the new Department of External Affairs. He served as first secretary of the Canadian High Commission in Britain during 1935–1941. In 1942 he moved to the Canadian embassy in Washington, D.C., and was promoted to ambassador to the United States in 1945.

In 1946, Pearson became deputy minister of external affairs. In this position, he played a leading role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He entered the political arena in 1948, was elected to the Canadian Parliament, and became secretary of state for external affairs in September 1948, serving in that post until June 1957 when the Liberal Party lost its majority.

Pearson served as president of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1952. In this position, he tried unsuccessfully to resolve the Korean War. In 1957 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in mediating an end to the 1956 Suez Crisis by sending UN peacekeeping forces to the region.

In January 1958, Pearson was elected leader of the Liberal Party following the retirement of Louis Stephen St. Laurent. From 1958, Pearson clashed with Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. Pearson became prime minister in April 1963 following the Canadian national elections and held that post until his retirement in April 1968, when he was

Lester B. Pearson was a Liberal Party politician and prime minister of Canada during 1963–1968, when he strongly resisted U.S. efforts to get Canada involved in the Vietnam War. (Corel)

replaced by Pierre Trudeau. The Liberal Party never enjoyed a majority during Pearson's tenure as prime minister.

Pearson resisted U.S. efforts to involve Canada in the Vietnam War. In a 1965 speech at Temple University, he suggested that a break in the American bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) might lead to negotiations. Meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson following the speech, aides were shocked to observe Pearson being grabbed by the lapels by a frustrated Johnson.

Upon retirement, Pearson taught at Carleton University in Ottawa and worked on his memoirs. He died in Ottawa on 27 December 1972.

John David Rausch Jr.

See also

Canada; Suez Crisis; United Nations; Vietnam War

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Pehm, József

See Mindszenty, József

Peng Dehuai

(1898–1974)

Defense minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1954–1959. Born in Xiangtan, Hunan Province, on 24 October 1898, Peng Dehuai graduated from the Hunan Military Academy in 1923. In 1928 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and served in the Red Army, later the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He ranked second in military importance only to the Chinese military leader Zhu De.

During both the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Chinese Civil War (1947–1949), Peng served in northwestern China commanding communist military forces. In 1948 he became commander of the First Field Army, a post he held until 1954. After the PRC's birth in October 1949,

Peng was also appointed chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Committee, responsible for reorganizing the Northwest. In October 1950 he became both commander and political commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers, who participated in the Korean War (1950–1953). On 27 July 1953 he signed the armistice agreement at Panmunjom. He returned to China in August 1953 and resumed his former posts until September 1954, when he was appointed vice premier, vice chairman of the National Defense Council, and defense minister.

Given Zhu's increased passivity because of old age, Peng became more influential in military matters. He was responsible for national defense, army training and reorganization, and the construction of defense infrastructure. He was also largely responsible for preparing for the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of August 1958. As both vice premier and defense minister, he frequently traveled abroad. His last official assignment was to lead a military delegation to Eastern Europe during April–June 1959.

Shortly after returning, in September 1959, Peng was relieved of his two posts on charges that his military policy contained anti-CCP and bourgeois elements. Thereafter, he disappeared from public life until December 1966, when he was sentenced to imprisonment by the leaders of the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Peng died on 29 November 1974 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

Peng Dehuai, commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army that fought United Nations Command forces in the Korean War. Peng signed the armistice agreement at Panmunjom in 1953. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

See also

China, People's Republic of, Army; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; Zhu De

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Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich

(1919–1967)

Soviet spy and double agent. Born in Ordzhonikidze in the Caucasus on 23 April 1919, the only son of a military officer, Oleg Penkovsky attended Soviet artillery school and was commissioned in 1939. His World War II record was exemplary, and in 1945 he was sent to the Frunze Military Academy and after that to the Military-Diplomatic Academy. In 1955 he was assigned as a military attaché to the Soviet embassy in Ankara, Turkey. In

1956 he returned to Moscow to study the science surrounding rockets and missiles. In 1960 he was appointed to the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research. By this time he had become disillusioned with communism and fearful that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would precipitate a nuclear disaster. Penkovsky was also informed that because of his father's past as a loyal soldier, he would never be promoted to the rank of general.

Penkovsky first offered his services as a double agent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in August 1960 but received a less-than-enthusiastic response. He then turned to Britain. An initial contact with Greville Wynne, a British businessman with a tangential relationship with MI6, led to Penkovsky's delivery of a packet of secret Soviet material in April 1961, the contents of which were shared with the CIA. The CIA and MI6 then agreed to jointly approach Penkovsky when he arrived in London on 20 April 1961 as head of a Soviet trade delegation. From that point on, he provided secret material either via Wynne, when visiting the West as a member of a Soviet trade group, or on park benches in Moscow to Janet Chisholm, wife of undercover MI6 officer Rodrick Chisholm. Soon Penkovsky was passing on a large amount of highly classified information.

Data on Soviet missile production provided by Penkovsky gave the West a realistic evaluation of the true strength of Soviet missile forces and revealed as illusory the so-called missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. The information was unambiguous; the United States was far ahead. Information provided by Penkovsky assisted greatly in verification in September 1962 when U-2 reconnaissance aircraft detected missile site construction in Cuba. Penkovsky's material helped President John F. Kennedy in dealing with Khrushchev and bringing about the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

On 22 October 1962 Penkovsky was arrested by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) and confessed to his spying activities. He was tried, found guilty, and executed in Moscow on 16 May 1963. Wynne was seized a few weeks later. Imprisoned, he was exchanged in April 1964 for Gordon Lonsdale, a Soviet double agent then being held in a British prison. How Penkovsky was detected remains a mystery. He may have been discovered with Janet Chisholm during routine surveillance. He may have been betrayed by a double agent. Some have also suggested that Penkovsky was simply too careless. Nevertheless, most espionage experts consider him the most important Soviet spy for the West in the Cold War era.

Ernie Teagarden

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Cuban Missile Crisis; Espionage; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; MI6; Missile Gap

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See Cultural Revolution

People's Republic of China, Cultural Revolution in

Perestroika

Perestroika, meaning "restructuring" in Russian, was an important aspect of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform agenda, designed in conjunction with glasnost ("openness") and demokratizatsiia ("democratization") to renew socialism and end the political and economic stagnation that had plagued the Soviet state for nearly two decades. At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev first promoted his ideas of perestroika, which included reduced centralization and bureaucratization, a de-emphasis on state economic planning, and modest moves toward private ownership of commercial enterprises. In 1987, in an attempt to further promote his reform ideas, Gorbachev published *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*. In doing so, he propounded new economic concepts, novel ideas on foreign policy, and his thoughts on socialist ethics.

Gorbachev's lack of detailed expertise on economic matters combined with great resistance among staunch defenders of the ancien régime made significant changes in the Soviet Union exceedingly difficult to enact. In the end, his commitment to reforming communism rather than abolishing it meant that his reforms were too limited to satisfy those individuals and groups calling for more dramatic change. Although some parts of his reform agenda were successfully implemented, continued sociopolitical problems and a failed coup attempt in August 1991 led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the simultaneous resignation of Gorbachev in December 1991. Perestroika may not have been successful domestically, but it was definitely influential on the international scene, allowing the Soviets and Americans to engage in revolutionary nuclear and conventional arms reduction agreements.

Melissa Jordine

See also
Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Soviet Union

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Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier
(1920–)

United Nations (UN) secretary-general (1982–1991). Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was born in Lima, Peru, on 19 January 1920 into a Roman Catholic family of aristocratic Spanish descent. He studied law at Catholic University, Lima, and entered his country's diplomatic service in 1940, serving in France, the United Kingdom, Bolivia, and Brazil and attending the first UN General Assembly session in New York in 1946.

From 1964 to 1966 Pérez de Cuéllar was Peruvian ambassador to Switzerland, and in 1969 he became his country's first ambassador to the Soviet Union. From 1971 to 1977 he was Peru's permanent representative to the UN. He chaired the UN Security Council in 1974, where he helped to mediate the protracted dispute over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. After two years as ambassador to Venezuela, in 1979 he became UN undersecretary-general for special political affairs. As Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's special representative, from April 1981 Pérez de Cuéllar attempted to defuse tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.



Peruvian diplomat Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was the fifth secretary-general of the United Nations. He played a significant role during the Persian Gulf crisis. (Corel)

Elected secretary-general in December 1981 as a candidate acceptable to both the Western and Soviet blocs, Pérez de Cuéllar served two five-year terms, which coincided neatly with the ending of the Cold War. He encouraged the relaxation of Soviet-American tensions that began once Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet general secretary in 1985. Pérez de Cuéllar believed that the new international climate gave new scope for the expansion of UN activities, ambitions largely stymied by the determination of the United States, under conservative Republican President Ronald Reagan, to cut rather than expand American contributions and dues to the UN on the grounds that the organization was plagued by waste, inefficiency, and a bloated bureaucracy.

Early in his tenure, Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts to mediate disputes between Argentina and Great Britain failed to prevent the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) War. A staunch and widely respected advocate of negotiation, conciliation, and peacekeeping, he launched personal and ultimately successful initiatives, which Cold War de-escalation facilitated, to alleviate and end hostilities in Afghanistan, Namibia,

and Lebanon and to relieve famine in Ethiopia. He also consistently emphasized refugee resettlement and human rights.

During 1987–1988, Pérez de Cuéllar took the lead in obtaining and implementing UN Resolution 598, which called for the cessation of hostilities in the lengthy and brutal Iran-Iraq War. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 brought new challenges. UN Security Council Resolution 678 provided the legal basis for the coalition that ultimately drove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. Under Pérez de Cuéllar's leadership, the UN condemned Iraq's subsequent spring 1991 attacks on Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, established a protective no-fly zone in that area, and ultimately took over control of Kurdish refugee camps there. Throughout his tenure as secretary-general, Pérez de Cuéllar displayed deft diplomatic skills and exhibited well-honed leadership in international crises.

Leaving office at the end of 1991, Pérez de Cuéllar accepted a visiting appointment at Yale University, where he wrote his memoirs. Looking ahead to the post–Cold War era, he urged the UN to move beyond international mediation and peacekeeping and focus on addressing social and economic problems and human rights abuses. In 1995 he ran unsuccessfully for president of Peru, losing to Alberto Fujimori. After Fujimori resigned on corruption charges, Pérez de Cuéllar served from November 2000 to July 2001 as foreign minister and president of Peru's Council of Ministers. He then became Peru's ambassador to France, where he remained after his final retirement in September 2004.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Afghanistan War; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Cyprus; Falklands War; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Human Rights; Iran-Iraq War; Iraq; Kuwait; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Namibia; Persian Gulf War; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; United Nations; Waldheim, Kurt

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Perón, Eva
(1919–1952)

Charismatic wife of Argentine dictator Juan Perón. Born on 7 May 1919 in the small town of Los Toldos, Argentina, to a desperately poor family, María Eva Duarte at age fifteen went to Buenos Aires and soon became a popular radio personality, well known for her romantic involvement with a number of influential men.

Eva Perón was arguably one of the most powerful women in the Americas during the mid-twentieth century. The wife of Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón, she exercised an unofficial yet powerful influence in that country. (Library of Congress)

On 18 October 1945, Duarte married Colonel Juan Perón, a member of the fascist-leaning General Officers Union (GOU) that two years before had overthrown the Argentine government. Historians are still in disagreement over the amount of political influence that Eva Perón wielded upon her husband. Some depict her as the power behind the throne, while others view her in a more traditionally supportive role.

Following Juan Perón's 1946 election as president of Argentina, Eva Perón became an increasingly important public symbol of the regime, most notably during her 1947 Rainbow Tour of Europe. She was an ardent champion of the poor, and through her Social Aid Foundation she worked tirelessly to build hundreds of schools and hospitals throughout Argentina. Her charitable work and championing of women's rights earned her notoriety throughout Latin America and the world. The Social Aid Foundation provided her with a lavish lifestyle and great political power but also cemented her reputation for generosity among Argentina's poor, who referred to her as "Santa Evita." Her untimely death from cancer on 26 July 1952 in Buenos Aires triggered a tremendous outpouring of grief, and to this day Eva Perón remains a mythical figure in Argentine history.

Vernon L. Pedersen

See also

Argentina; Perón, Juan Domingo

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Perón, Juan Domingo

(1895–1974)

Argentine Army general, politician, and president of Argentina (1946–1955, 1973–1974). Born in Lobos, Buenos Aires Province, on 8 October 1895, Juan Perón was educated at the Colégio Militar (Military College) during 1911–1913 and the Escuela Superior de Guerra during 1926–1929.

During the late 1930s, Perón served as a military observer in Italy, where he became enamored with Italian fascism. Having risen to the rank of colonel by 1943, he was a key participant in the military coup that ousted Ramón Castillo's government in May 1943. In November of that year Perón

became secretary of labor and welfare, and in February 1944 he was named vice president and secretary of war. Forced to resign his posts by political opponents in October 1945, he was briefly jailed but was released a few days later after labor unionists staged mass demonstrations and demanded his release.

Challenged by a coalition of established political parties, Perón was overwhelmingly elected president in February 1946. As president, Perón, who has been accused of having fascist tendencies, courted organized labor and the urban poor and promoted industrialism through populist policies that transformed the state into a sponsor of economic modernization and social welfare, an ideology dubbed Perónism. He also became a champion of an independent Argentina that would forge a middle way between capitalism and communism. Perón's so-called third position advanced central economic planning, higher living standards, and an autonomous foreign policy that would help Argentina stand apart in the bipolar Cold War world. Perón was reelected in 1951, but corruption, inefficiency, a deteriorating economy, and disagreements with the Roman Catholic Church resulted in his removal from power via a military coup in September 1955. He went into exile and eventually settled in Madrid.

Juan Domingo Perón, president of Argentina during 1946–1955. Though deposed and exiled to Madrid in 1955, he returned to become president again in 1973–1974. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Perón remained active in Argentine politics even during his exile and prevented rivals from gaining authority over his still-viable political movement. During the late 1950s and 1960s, Argentina was plagued by a stagnant economy, civil unrest, and revolving-door governments. As Argentina became more polarized and as politically motivated terrorism increased in the early 1970s, Perón began to engineer his comeback. In the March 1973 elections, Argentineans elected Perón's handpicked stand-in, who promptly resigned, triggering another election. Perón was elected president for a second time in October 1973.

Perón's second term was doomed by an abominable economy and an acrimonious split between his leftist and rightist supporters. He instinctively turned to the Right and began governing by decree. Perón died on 1 July 1974 in Buenos Aires, leaving the government in the inept hands of his third wife, Isabel, who was overthrown in March 1976 by a military junta.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Argentina; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in; Perón, Eva

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Pershing II Missiles

See Missiles, Pershing II

Persian Gulf War
(17 January–
28 February 1991)

The Persian Gulf War resulted from the Iraqi invasion of neighboring Kuwait. In July 1990 U.S. intelligence detected an Iraqi military buildup along the Kuwaiti border. On 17 July Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein threatened military action against Kuwait for its violation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil caps. Overproduction had driven down the price of oil. Because of Iraq's recently completed eight-year war with Iran (1980–1988), it had accumulated a war debt of some $80 billion, and Baghdad was anxious to keep oil prices high. There was also an ongoing Iraqi border dispute with Kuwait over charges of Kuwaiti slant-drilling into Iraqi-controlled oil fields. Finally, Iraq had long claimed Kuwait as a province.

Washington had been increasingly concerned over Iraq's expanding nuclear industry and its chemical and biological weapons, some of which Hussein had used in the war against Iran and even against his own people, the Kurds. But U.S. policy was ambiguous, and Iraqis knew that Washington had tacitly supported them in the war with Iran, providing satellite intelligence information on Iran. U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie delivered mixed messages on behalf of the George H. W. Bush administration that seemed to allow Hussein free rein in the Persian Gulf. Hussein thus believed that Washington would probably not challenge a move against Kuwait. On its part, the State Department did not believe that Hussein would actually mount a full-scale invasion. If military action occurred, Washington expected only a limited offensive to force the Kuwaitis to accede to Iraqi oil production demands. Clearly, Washington underestimated Hussein's ambitions.



Burning Kuwaiti oil wells and a destroyed Iraqi tank in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. (Corel)

On 2 August 1990 Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and speedily overran the country. The United States demanded that Hussein recall his troops from Kuwait. When he refused, the Bush administration took action. Washington feared that an unchecked Iraq would threaten Saudi Arabia, which possessed the world's largest oil reserves, and thus would be able to control both the price and flow of oil to the West. Bush also saw Hussein as a new Adolf Hitler and was determined that there would be no Munich-like appeasement of aggression.

On paper Iraq appeared formidable. Its army numbered more than 950,000 men, and it had some 5,500 main

Disposition of Forces in the Gulf War, 1991



battle tanks (MBTs), of which 1,000 were modern T-72s; 6,000 armored personnel carriers (APCs); and about 3,500 artillery weapons. Hussein ultimately deployed forty-three divisions to Kuwait, positioning most of them along the border with Saudi Arabia.

In Operation DESERT SHIELD, designed to protect Saudi Arabia and prepare for the liberation of Kuwait, the United States put together an impressive coalition that included Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as well as Britain, France, and many other states. Altogether, coalition assets grew to 665,000 men, 3,600 tanks, and substantial air and naval assets.

Hussein remained intransigent but also quiescent, allowing the buildup of coalition forces in Saudi Arabia to proceed unimpeded. When the deadline for Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait passed on 15 January 1991, coalition commander U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf unleashed Operation DESERT STORM on 16 January. It began with a massive air offensive, striking targets in Kuwait and throughout Iraq, including Baghdad. In only a few days the coalition had established absolute air supremacy over the battlefield. Iraq possessed nearly 800 combat aircraft and an integrated air defense system controlling 3,000 antiaircraft missiles, but it was unable to win a single air-to-air engagement, and coalition aircraft soon destroyed the bulk of the Iraqi Air Force. Air superiority assured success on the ground.

The air campaign destroyed important Iraqi targets along the Saudi border. Night after night B-52s dropped massive bomb loads in classic attrition warfare, and many Iraqi defenders were simply buried alive. Schwarzkopf also

mounted an elaborate deception to convince the Iraqis that the coalition was planning an amphibious assault against Kuwait. This feint pinned down a number of Iraqi divisions. In reality, Schwarzkopf had planned a return to large-scale maneuver warfare, which tested the U.S. Army's new AirLand Battle concept.

Schwarzkopf's campaign involved three thrusts. On the far left, 200 miles from the coast, XVIII Airborne Corps of the 82rd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), supplemented by the French 6th Light Armored Division and the U.S. 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, were to swing wide and cut off the Iraqis on the Euphrates River, preventing resupply or retreat. The center assault, the mailed fist of VII Corps, was to be mounted some 100 miles inland from the coast. It consisted of the heavily armored coalition divisions: the U.S. 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry (Mechanized) Division, and the British 1st Armored Division. VII Corps's mission was to thrust deep, engage, and then destroy the elite Iraqi Republican Guard divisions. The third and final thrust was to occur on the coast. It consisted of the U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary force of two divisions, a brigade from the U.S. 2nd Armored Division, and allied Arab units and was to drive on Kuwait City.

On 24 February Allied forces executed simultaneous drives along the coast, while the 101st Airborne Division established a position 50 miles behind the border. As the Marines moved up the coast toward Kuwait City, they were hit in the flank by Iraqi armor. In the largest tank battle in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Marines, supported by coalition airpower, easily defeated the Iraqis. The battle was fought in a surrealist day-into-night atmosphere caused by the smoke of oil wells set afire by the retreating Iraqis.

As the Marines, preceded by a light Arab force, prepared to enter Kuwait City, Iraqi forces fled north with whatever they could steal. Thousands of vehicles and personnel were caught in the open on the highway from Kuwait City and were pummeled by air and artillery along what became known as the "highway of death." The Allies now came up against an Iraqi rear guard of 300 tanks covering the withdrawal north toward Basra of four Republican Guard divisions. In perhaps the most lopsided tank battle in history, the Iraqi force was defeated at a cost of only one American death.

Thousands of vehicles and personnel were caught in the open on the highway from Kuwait City and were pummeled by air and artillery along what became known as the "highway of death."

Lieutenant General Frederick Franks Jr., commander of VII Corps to the west, angered Schwarzkopf by insisting on halting on the night of 24 February and concentrating his forces rather than risk an advance through a battlefield littered with debris and unexploded ordnance and subject to the possibility of casualties from friendly fire. When VII Corps resumed the advance early on 25 February, its problem was not the Iraqis but the supply of fuel; because of the speed of the advance, the M1s needed to be refueled every eight to nine hours.

The afternoon of 27 February saw VII Corps engaged in some of its most intense combat. Hoping to delay the coalition, an armored brigade of the Medina Republican Guard Division established a 6-mile-long skirmish line

Estimated Human and Equipment Losses in the Gulf War

	Human Casualties	*Tanks*	*Other Vehicles*	*Artillery*
Coalition	500	4	9	1
Iraq	220,000	3,700	1,000	3,000

on the reverse slope of a low hill, digging in their T-55 and T-72 tanks. The advancing 2nd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division came over a ridge, spotted the Iraqis, and took them under fire from 2,500 yards. The American tankers used sabot rounds to blow the turrets off the dug-in Iraqi tanks. The battle was the largest single armor engagement of the war. In only forty-five minutes, U.S. tanks and aircraft destroyed sixty T-72, nine T-55 tanks, and thirty-eight Iraqi armored personnel carriers.

Allied tanks, especially the M1A1 Abrams and the British Challenger, had proved their great superiority over their Soviet counterparts, especially in night fighting. Of 600 M1A1 Abrams that saw combat, not one was penetrated by an enemy round. Conversely, the M1A1's 120mm gun proved lethal to Iraqi MBTs. It could engage the Iraqi armor at 3,000 meters (1.86 miles), twice the Iraqis' effective range, and its superior fire control system could deliver a first-round hit while on the move. Overall, the coalition maneuver strategy bound up in the AirLand Battle worked to perfection. As VII Corps closed to the sea, XVIII Corps to its left, with a much larger distance to travel, raced to reach the fleeing Republican Guards' divisions before they could escape to Baghdad.

In only one hundred hours of ground combat, Allied forces had liberated Kuwait. On 28 February President Bush stopped the war. He feared the cost of an assault on Baghdad and was also concerned that Iraq might then break up into a Kurdish north, a Sunni Muslim center, and a Shiite Muslim south. Bush wanted to keep Iraq intact to counter a resurgent Iran.

The war was among the most lopsided in history. Iraq lost 3,700 tanks, more than 1,000 other armored vehicles, and 3,000 artillery pieces. In contrast, the coalition lost 4 tanks, 9 other combat vehicles, and 1 artillery piece. In human terms, the Allies sustained 500 casualties (150 dead), many of these from accidents and friendly fire. Iraqi casualties totaled between 25,000 and 100,000 dead, with the best estimates being around 60,000. The coalition also took 80,000 Iraqis prisoner. Perhaps an equal number simply deserted.

Following the cease-fire, Hussein reestablished his authority. He put down, at great cost to the civilian population, revolts by the Shiites and Kurds. He also defied United Nations (UN) inspection teams by failing to account for all of his biological and chemical weapons, the so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Ultimately, President George W. Bush would use the alleged presence of WMD as an excuse to send U.S. and allied forces to invade and occupy Iraq in another war in 2003.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

AirLand Battle; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Hussein, Saddam; Iran-Iraq War; Iraq

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Peru

South American nation covering 496,233 square miles. Peru, with a 1945 population of approximately 7.5 million, borders Brazil and Bolivia to the east, Ecuador and Colombia to the north, Chile to the south, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. Peru contains a number of ethnic groups, with indigenous and mestizo people its greatest majority. Located in the Andean region of South America, Peru's varied geography includes coastal plains, Andean highlands, and tropical jungles. Ninety percent of its population is Roman Catholic.

During World War II, Peru broke relations with the Axis powers once the United States entered the war and deported Japanese living in Peru to the United States. Mineral exports greatly benefited the Peruvian economy during the war. Peru's foreign policy after World War II shifted from a traditional anti-imperialist mind-set to a pro-Western outlook in which free market policies became a priority.

By 1950 foreign investments in mining, sugar refineries, and fishing further revitalized the Peruvian economy. The nation became the first world exporter of fish meal, and a mining law passed in 1950 granted tax exemptions to foreign investors. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Peru solidified its ties to the United States by signing a Mutual Defense Assistance Pact. Peru did not, however, send troops to the conflict.

While the Peruvian government distanced itself from the new government of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959, the ideology of the Castro revolution soon extended into Latin America, and Peru was no exception. Indeed, the 1960s witnessed the emergence of revolutionary groups with pro-Castro sympathies. This revolutionary fervor was particularly prevalent among the *campesino* movement, students, and intellectuals. However, these groups were unable to gain power or significant influence in Peru's decision-making processes. Nevertheless, they tilled the ground for future guerrilla movements that became notorious in the 1980s: Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The latter was the precursor of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MLR, Left Revolutionary

Juan Velasco Alvarado, president of Peru (1968–1975), shown here in 1968. (Getty Images)

Movement). Not until the early 1980s, however, did the Shining Path become publicly known for its terrorist attacks.

U.S.-Peruvian relations changed in 1968 when General Juan Velasco Alvarado took power via a coup that overthrew President Fernando Belaúnde Terry. Alvarado's regime sought a more independent foreign policy aimed at strengthening the country internationally and inviting more economic development. Alvarado initiated relations with communist nations, restored relations with Cuba, and joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1974. Peru signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union in 1969 and with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971.

Alvarado's strong advocacy of developing-world nations was combined with economic nationalism at home. His regime nationalized the American International Petroleum Company (IPC), industrial plants, and sugar refineries. It also undertook long-delayed agrarian reform and nationalized the press as well. This so-called revolution from above brought modest benefits to Peruvian population, but by 1975, with mounting foreign debts and a paucity of foreign credit, Velasco's reforms all but ended.

During the 1980s, popularly elected President Belaúnde continued a nonaligned foreign policy, although his sympathy for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua put him at odds with U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration. Belaúnde became an important mediator in the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) War, offering not only military support to Argentina but also a peace proposal for Argentina and Great Britain, which the British rejected. This diplomatic approach was also supported by the Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who was secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) at the time.

Domestically, Belaúnde's neoliberal market-oriented economic policies did not gain the support of the population but instead contributed to significant social discontent. The growing presence of Shining Path and Túpac Amaru presented another obstacle for Belaúnde's regime, which was accused of committing human rights abuses against civilians during 1983–1985.

Peru's diplomacy was nonetheless vital in Central American conflicts. In 1985 Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay created the Contadora Support Group in an effort to negotiate a peace agreement for Central America. Despite its active diplomacy toward Central America, Alan García's government during 1985–1990 was unsuccessful in bringing economic improvement to the country. Toward the end of the Cold War, Peru's economy was in chaos, the drug business had grown rapidly, and guerrilla movements continued to challenge the government. With the presidency of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), Peru's relations with the United States improved, especially in the area of drug enforcement and the implementation of new economic programs.

Carina Solmirano

See also

Americas; Castro, Fidel; Contadora Group; Contras; Falklands War; Non-Aligned Movement; Sandinistas; Shining Path

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Petrov, Vladimir Mikhailovich
(1907–1991)

Soviet spy and defector. Born of peasant origins in the Siberian village of Larikha on 15 February 1907, Vladimir Petrov established a local Komsomol (Communist Youth) cell in 1923 and became a full-time Komsomol organizer and Communist Party member in 1927. He was recruited by Soviet intelligence (NKVD) in 1933. He survived Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's purges of the 1930s, was posted to Stockholm during World War II, and was dispatched to Australia in February 1951. Ostensibly third secretary to the Soviet embassy in Canberra, Petrov was in fact a colonel in the Ministry of State Security (MGB).

On 3 April 1954, Petrov defected in Sydney. He was the most senior-ranking Soviet spy to defect to the West since the 1930s. Two weeks later his wife, Evdokia, an embassy cipher clerk and MGB officer, also defected after dramatically being freed from armed Soviet couriers by Australian security police at the Darwin airport. Not surprisingly, the Petrov defections caught the interest of the Western counterintelligence community, resulting in the closing of the Soviet embassy in Canberra and the withdrawal of the Australian embassy staff from Moscow.

Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies promptly established the Royal Commission on Espionage, which convened for 126 days, examined 119 witnesses, received more than 500 exhibits, and published almost 3,000 pages of transcripts. The exhibits included the controversial Petrov Papers handed over at the time of Petrov's defection. Although many on the Left alleged these to be forgeries and that the defection itself was a political conspiracy, the declassified Venona decrypts confirmed the authenticity of the documents in 1996. The royal commission uncovered evidence of successful Soviet espionage in Australia during 1945–1948 but could not initiate prosecutions without compromising the Venona operation. Petrov's revelations caused an uproar not only in Australia but also in Great Britain, as he provided new material, leaked to the British press by MI5 officers, concerning the flight, defection, and whereabouts of the missing British spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean.

Petrov received a new identity, Sven Allyson, and lived in a safe house in the Melbourne suburb of East Bentleigh, where he died in a nursing home on 14 June 1991.

Phillip Deery

See also

Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy; Cambridge Five; Espionage; Maclean, Donald; Menzies, Robert Gordon

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Pflimlin, Pierre
(1907–2000)

French politician and last president of the French Fourth Republic (1958). Born in Roubaix, France, on 5 February 1907, Pierre Pflimlin studied law at Strasbourg University and the Catholic Institute in Paris. A member of the Popular Republican Movement (MRP), he was elected to the Municipal Council of Strasbourg in 1945. He also served in the post–World War II constituent assemblies and was first elected to the National Assembly, as a deputy from Bas-Rhin, in 1946. He was reelected in 1951 and 1956. A close friend of Robert Schuman, Pflimlin actively promoted Franco-German reconciliation and European integration.

During the government crisis precipitated by the Algerian War, on 9 May 1958 Pflimlin was asked to form a new government. Violence flared in Algiers over concerns that Pflimlin was about to grant Algerian independence. On 26 May General Charles de Gaulle met with Pflimlin to discuss the latter's resignation, but talks broke down. Nonetheless, Pflimlin resigned the next day. This paved the way for de Gaulle to return to power as the last premier of the Fourth Republic on 1 June and later to establish the Fifth Republic.

During 1958–1959, Pflimlin was one of four ministers of state in de Gaulle's first cabinet. During 1959–1983 Pflimlin served as mayor of Strasbourg, and during 1962–1965 he was also the president of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe. Dedicated to European integration, in 1979 he won election to the European Parliament and served as its president during 1984–1987. Pflimlin retired in 1987 and died in Strasbourg on 27 June 2000.

Cezar Stanciu and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Algerian War; De Gaulle, Charles; European Integration Movement; European Parliament; France

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Pham Van Dong
(1906–2000)

Vietnamese nationalist revolutionary, founder of the Viet Minh, premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during 1950–1975, and prime minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) during 1975–1987. Born in Quang Ngai Province on 1 March 1906, Pham Van Dong became active in nationalist and communist politics as a teenager. Like many other Vietnamese revolutionaries, he spent eight years in prison for his anti-French stance. In 1930 he helped found the Indochinese Communist Party.

Pham Dong was one of the primary leaders of the nationalist Viet Minh in its long struggle against French colonialism and during the Indochina War (1946–1954). Following the decisive Vietnamese victory over the French in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French agreed to negotiate a peace settlement. Pham Dong served as the Viet Minh's chief negotiator in Geneva, insisting upon immediate Vietnamese independence and elections to reunify the country. He failed to win the support of the Soviet and Chinese delegates to achieve these goals. The resultant Geneva Accords recognized the independence of North Vietnam but temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel and postponed elections to reunify the country until 1956. For Pham Dong, the peace talks were a Pyrrhic victory, and he believed with some justification that the Viet Minh had gained less at the peace table than they had won on the battlefield.



Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Pham Van Dong, shown here during a state visit to France on 25 April 1977. (Richard Melloul/Sygma/Corbis)

Pham Dong served as premier of North Vietnam during 1950–1975. Despite the fact that he was one of the staunchest Cold War opponents of the United States, many within the U.S. government and in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) admired his consistent attitude and dealings with the United States. He never wavered in his desire for complete Vietnamese autonomy and a united Vietnam. He also refused to negotiate with Washington until the bombings of North Vietnam ended.

After the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, Pham Dong became the most visible public figure in Vietnam. Beginning in 1970 he played a key role, along with Le Duc Tho, at the Paris peace talks. Employing tactics that went back to previous negotiations with France and the United States, Pham Dong demanded an immediate cease-fire and the removal of South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu.

When Le Duc softened North Vietnam's stance in 1972 to allow Thieu to remain in office, many believed that it was Pham Dong who had pushed for such an accommodation. Pham Dong eventually advocated a coalition government that would represent officials from both North Vietnam and the SRV. But the SRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government resisted such an arrangement, ultimately delaying the signing of the peace accords. The final agreement, which ended the war and led to the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops, was signed in January 1973.

Pham Dong continued to play a central role in Vietnam after the U.S. withdrawal. He became prime minister of a united Vietnam (the SRV) after communist forces conquered South Vietnam in April 1975. He was replaced as prime minister in 1987 after Vietnam suffered a series of severe economic dislocations. Nevertheless, he remained an important advisor and revolutionary figure. He wrote several histories of the Vietnam War as well as a biography of Ho Chi Minh. Pham Dong died in Hanoi on 29 April 2000, one day before the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of Saigon.

Brian D. Behnken

See also

Geneva Conference (1954); Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Le Duc Tho; Nguyen Van Thieu; Viet Minh; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Philby, Harold Adrian Russell
(1912–1988)

British spy and member of the Cambridge Five espionage ring. Born on 1 January 1912 in Ambala, India, the son of John Philby, famed British explorer, author, and diplomat, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim" Philby attended Westminster School and in 1928 went on to Trinity College, Cambridge University, where he met Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Anthony Blunt, all of whom were influenced by the communist economist Maurice Dobb.

In 1932, Philby left Cambridge as a dedicated Marxist with an economics degree. Having been approached by Soviet intelligence while still a student, he became a Soviet agent in 1933. He joined the staff of the London *Times* and covered the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) for the newspaper. In 1940 he joined the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), where he remained until 1951. His work for both MI6 and the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) was excellent.

In 1949, Philby was sent to Washington as an MI6 liaison with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There he became involved with the Burgess-Maclean defection in 1951. In fact, it was suspected that through Burgess, Philby had warned fel-

low spy Maclean of his impending interrogation. Philby was recalled to London and came under Security Service (MI5) suspicion as a double agent. In 1956 he went to Beirut as a journalist but continued in partial MI6 employment. Additional damaging information about him came to MI5, some from Soviet defectors. Finally, Philby was offered a guarantee of immunity in return for a detailed confession. He chose to flee to Moscow on 23 January 1963.

Philby was received as a hero in the Soviet Union and became a consultant to the KGB. In 1968 he published his memoirs, *My Silent War*. Philby died in Moscow on 11 May 1988.

Ernie Teagarden

See also
Cambridge Five

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British spy Kim Philby. A member of the Cambridge Five espionage ring, Philby spied for the Soviet Union and fled to Moscow in 1963. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Philippines

Southeast Asian nation. The Republic of the Philippines covers 186,000 square miles, somewhat larger than the U.S. state of California. An archipelago of 7,108 islands (with 90 percent of the population on just ten of them), it is located between the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea. South of Taiwan and north of Indonesia and eastern Malaysia, the Philippines lies 750 miles east of Vietnam. In 1945, the Philippines' population was approximately 18 million people.

The Philippine Revolution of 1896 was interrupted by the Spanish-American War (1898) and terminated by the Philippine-American War (1899–1902). Attaining domestic self-government, the Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935–1946) was interrupted by World War II in 1941 and the Japan-sponsored Second Republic (1943–1944). On 4 July 1946, the Philippines gained independence.

Prior to constitutional independence in 1946, nationwide elections were held. Socialists and communists generally supported candidates who favored expropriation of landed estates and redistribution of land to rural laborers.

Leftist candidates with these views did not favor continuing military links with the United States. After the election, leftist candidates were illegally denied seats in Congress and, in response, the pro-Moscow Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP, Communist Party of the Philippines) drew on the traditions of rural resistance to lead a rebellion against the central government. Indeed, land reform and relations with the United States remained contentious political issues in the Philippines throughout the Cold War.

The landed Filipino elite sought to suppress labor union organization by radicalized farmers. Well represented in the Senate of the Philippines by 1947, this elite accommodated the United States by providing military bases, including ground storage and communications facilities, airfields, and harbors, in exchange for financial aid. The American bases were seen as a means to discourage radicals and leftists from seizing power. The 1947 Military Bases Agreement facilitated U.S. aerial surveillance of other parts of Asia as well as bombing missions and troop deployments during the Vietnam War. Also in 1947, a Military Assistance Agreement established the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), which facilitated contacts and dialogue between Filipino military officers and their American counterparts.

At the United Nations (UN), Carlos P. Romulo was the first Asian to preside over the UN General Assembly (1949–1950). Romulo and other Filipino representatives championed decolonization during the Cold War, although they later supported the United States in the Vietnam War, which they viewed in Cold War terms.

After the Philippines sent forces to assist in the Korean War (1950–1953), a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States was signed and ratified in 1951. However, the Philippines resisted American pressure and delayed cosigning the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan. This reluctance stemmed from the brutal Japanese occupation during World War II.

In the meantime, the PKP-led rebellion continued. Utilizing U.S. military and economic assistance and his own popularity, President Ramon Magsaysay (1953–1957) defeated the PKP by capturing its entire top leadership and offering amnesty and relocation to rank-and-file rebels. The PKP never recovered from this blow.

In 1958, Senator Claro M. Recto criticized the Philippines' position as a Cold War "magnet for nuclear attack." Thereafter, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, that phrase galvanized successive generations of Filipino activists opposed to nuclear weapons.

Inspired by the Vatican Council II (1962–1965), Filipino Catholics began applying Liberation Theology's "preferential option for the poor" in the late 1960s. They formed Christian base communities whose purpose was to alleviate extreme poverty. This religious-political movement aggravated divisions within the Catholic Church, and some ecclesiastical leaders dismissively labeled calls for fundamental social change as communist. Meanwhile, student protests against shootings of Filipinos near military bases and against the Vietnam War became increasingly militant. On the birthday of People's Republic of China (PRC) leader Mao Zedong in 1968, leaders of the Kaba-

taang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) and former PKP members formed the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Initially, the CPP was impressed with Mao's Cultural Revolution and its verbal anti-imperialism.

Facing sustained challenges from broad sectors of society as his second term drew to a close, President Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986) imposed martial law on 21 September 1972. In the process, three major daily newspapers critical of Marcos were closed. Although the CPP was unable to undertake effective action against the regime, political opponents were labeled as Communists and were arrested and imprisoned without trial. Many were tortured and even executed extrajudicially, and Congress was shut down. U.S. President Richard M. Nixon approved the imposition of martial law. Without voting scrutinized at public meetings, Marcos then imposed an authoritarian constitution.

Marcos's law-and-order theme was initially popular in urban areas. However, opposition to the regime and its policies grew. Founded in 1973, the best-known anti-martial law coalition was the National Democratic Front (NDF). Along with the CPP and its New People's Army, the NDF also included Christians for National Liberation, with priests, nuns, and laity as members. Complicating Marcos's hold on power was a civil war with Moros (Filipino Muslims) in Mindanao. Until the mid-1970s, in fact, the Moro National Liberation Front was a much greater military threat than the CPP to the regime.

Following the example of Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China as part of a broader strategy to offset the global influence of the Soviet Union, Marcos himself met with Mao in June 1975. Marcos also extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC, three and a half years before the United States. In return, Mao agreed not to support the CPP.

No elections were held until 1978. The Filipino economy began a downward spiral in the late 1970s, especially after the 1979–1980 oil price shocks. By this time, widespread government corruption, political persecution, and the opulent lifestyle of Marcos and his political cronies outraged growing sections of the population. Also, by the late 1970s, the CPP and its New People's Army were becoming a major threat to the Marcos regime. For a short period, communist and Muslim rebellions coordinated military tactics at the field commander level. Although martial law was formally lifted in 1981, rule by presidential decree continued.

The unsolved 1983 assassination of former senator and opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino at Manila International Airport was widely believed to have been planned by Imelda Marcos, the president's spouse, and General Fabian Ver. This did little to weaken the personal loyalty of President Ronald Reagan to Marcos, but fearing that reaction to the assassination was swelling the NDF's ranks, key Republicans and Democrats in the United States made overtures to the noncommunist wing of the anti-martial law coalition. Among them was Aquino's widow, Corazon Cojuangco Aquino.

Under pressure from the U.S. media, members of the U.S. Congress, and the international community, President Marcos announced a snap election in 1985. Corazon Aquino ran against Marcos. Her campaign temporarily unified

Jubilant Filipinos hold aloft a large poster of Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel in front of the main building of the Presidential Palace. Thousands swarmed through the gates to celebrate the overthrow of President Ferdinand Marcos on 25 February 1986. (Reuters/Corbis)

much of the anti-Marcos opposition. Despite her pro-American inclinations, her vague open-options policy on the future of the Military Bases Agreement attracted left-wing activists. Nonetheless, the 2 February 1986 election failed, as 25 percent of the vote was never counted. Indifferent to widespread documented voting fraud, the Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature) declared Marcos the winner. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration feared that continued rule by Marcos would increase the CPP's popularity, estimated at 20 percent.

As street demonstrations and boycotts erupted to protest the compromised election, former Marcos loyalists led a small army revolt in the National Capital Region. Hundreds of thousands of Filipinos (including nuns and priests in their religious garb) protectively surrounded the rebels, blocking Marcos's tanks in a four-day televised event. Military defections continued.

On 25 February 1986 Marcos fled the Philippines for the United States, and Aquino became president. Astonishing all observers, the CPP had failed to participate in the protests that terminated the Marcos regime. This self-inflicted political faux pas led to multiple splits within the CPP, weakening it for the remainder of the Cold War. Aquino survived a full term (1986–

1992) in spite of military coup attempts led by officers eager for a more vigorous fight against the CPP.

As the Philippines returned to democracy, U.S. embassy staff underestimated how intensely opposed crucial constituencies were to renewing the Military Bases Agreement. Women's groups and the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition urged President Aquino's appointed Constitutional Commissioners to limit her power to renew the Military Bases Agreement. Ratified by the voters in 1987, the new constitution advocated "an independent foreign policy," opposed nuclear weapons, and required Senate ratification of future military base agreements.

Three months before the Soviet Union collapsed, the Philippines Senate voted against renewing the treaty on 16 September 1991. The Senate majority thereby also rebuffed the private preferences of Indonesian and Malaysian leaders, who wanted U.S. bases to remain. Although the decision ended U.S. military bases, the JUSMAG survived the Cold War. So too did the CPP. In 1992 legislation provided that communist organizations would no longer be classified as "subversive." Before President Joseph "Erap" Estrada (1998–2001) was forced from office for corruption, the basis for closer U.S.-Philippines military cooperation was laid in the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1999.

Vincent Kelly Pollard

See also

Aquino, Benigno, Jr.; Aquino, Corazon; Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in; Magsaysay, Ramon; Marcos, Ferdinand Edralin; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Roman Catholic Church; Southeast Asia

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Picasso, Pablo
(1881–1973)

Spanish-born painter and sculptor, credited (with Georges Braque) for having cocreated Cubism, and one of the most influential artists of the twentieth century. Pablo Picasso was born Pablo Ruiz in Málaga, Spain, on 25 October 1881. He showed artistic genius at a very young age and began signing his works "Pablo Picasso" in his late teens (Picasso was his mother's maiden name). From his father, José Ruiz Blasco, who was an artist himself, Picasso learned the essential elements of his trade. He attended several prominent art schools in his youth but never earned a degree. When he was barely twenty years old, he ventured to France and fell in love with Paris, which was arguably the artistic center of the world. He would become a virtual permanent resident of France, although he never became a French citizen. Art historians have categorized Picasso's works by placing them into several different categories. The Blue Period (1901–1904) featured dark and gloomy blue-tinted works that often depicted various street people such as acrobats, prostitutes, beggars, and harlequins. The Rose Period (1905–1908) was more uplifting than the previous one and utilized soft reds, pinks, and orange-colored paintings. Picasso's brief African Period (1909–1910) was so named because he used African objets d'art as his focus. The most famous painting in this genre is *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* (The Young Ladies from Avignon). From 1909 to 1912 Picasso, along with his close collaborator Braque, pioneered Cubism, which essentially deconstructed objects, broke them down into their component shapes, and then reconstructed them. The results were often unforgettable if not controversial. Picasso evolved Cubism over the years to include a more synthetic Cubism that employed collage, lending it legitimacy among serious artists for the first time. As he moved into sculpture, he utilized Cubism to endow his works with an almost other-worldly dimension. He has often been said to have flirted with surrealism, although the artist flatly denied any connection to the movement made famous by Salvador Dalí.

Picasso's personal life was punctuated by torrid love affairs, marriage, separation, extramarital affairs, and at least one illegitimate child. He was a self-avowed pacifist and rather apolitical, except for his joining the Communist Party in the early 1940s. This he did mainly to show his displeasure with the quasi-fascist government in power in his native Spain. He refused to fight in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). However, perhaps his most famous painting, *Guernica*, was a visual protest of the barbaric bombing of a Basque village (Guernica) by fascist allies of Generalissimo Francisco Franco in 1938. During World War II, Picasso stayed on the political sidelines and again did not take up arms. He made France his home, spending much of his time in the south of France, and continued to produce both sculpture and paintings, although his work now tended to be less politicized than it had been in the 1930s and 1940s.

Picasso did become involved in the postwar peace movement and took strong exception to U.S. involvement in Korea and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. For the remainder of his life, he continued to confound and astound his critics. Although some attempted to categorize him as a mod-

ernist, Picasso's work usually defied such categorization. And Picasso himself dismissed such labeling. Without doubt, he was one of the most famous and celebrated artists of the twentieth century and influenced countless other artists. Picasso died in Mougins, France, on 8 April 1973.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Hungarian Revolution; Korean War; Peace Movements

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Pieck, Wilhelm
(1876–1960)

First president of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) during 1949–1960. Born in Güben on 3 January 1876, Wilhelm Pieck was

German Communist leader Wilhelm Pieck, shown here on his election as the first president of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in 1949. (AP/Wide World Photos)

initially affiliated with the German social democratic movement. He joined the woodworkers' union in 1894 and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1895. Like many socialists, Pieck became disillusioned when the SPD failed to oppose World War I. He became a member of the radical Spartacus League and eventually helped found the German Communist Party (KPD). When Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Pieck fled to Moscow, where he joined Walter Ulbricht and other German communist leaders being groomed for a government-in-exile.

Pieck returned to Germany with the Soviet Red Army in 1945. While Ulbricht worked to entrench Soviet policies, Pieck became a figure of conciliation. It was Pieck and Otto Grotewohl, the leader of the SPD in the Soviet zone of Germany, who symbolically shook hands and founded the Socialist Unity Party (SED). In October 1949, Pieck was elected as the first president of the newly founded East Germany. His role was largely ceremonial, particularly as the East German government failed to gain widespread diplomatic recognition. Ulbricht exercised the real power.

Pieck died in Berlin on 7 September 1960. His legacy as a true communist who brought German socialism to its logical conclusion was commemorated in the names of streets and factories across East Germany. His hometown of Güben was renamed Wilhelm-Pieck-Stadt in 1961.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

German Democratic Republic; Grotewohl, Otto; Stalin, Josef; Ulbricht, Walter

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Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto
(1915–2006)

Chilean general and dictator (1973 to 1990). Born in Valparaiso on 15 November 1915, Augusto Pinochet graduated in 1937 from the Chilean Escuela Militar (Military School) and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry. He spent his entire adult life in military service, during which time he served as a military attaché in Washington and as a faculty member at the Military School and the Chilean War College. In 1968 he attained the rank of brigadier general and in 1971 assumed the rank of division general. In 1972

he became chief of staff of the army. Then in August 1973, amid growing civil unrest, President Salvador Allende Gossens named Pinochet army commander in chief.

Along with most of Chile's high command, Pinochet was known for his conservative, anticommunist views. On 11 September 1973, he led the coup that brought down Allende's socialist government. Allende was killed during the struggle. In the wake of the coup, Pinochet directed a merciless military-style campaign against enemies of the new regime. Security and military officials arrested, detained, tortured, and executed thousands of Chileans.

Security and military officials arrested, detained, tortured, and executed thousands of Chileans.

The coup represented the final step in a carefully planned campaign that had received significant support from the U.S. government against the Allende government. Intelligence and monetary support funneled through the U.S. embassy, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), military contacts, and cooperative private organizations had helped Chilean opposition groups challenge the Allende government during 1970–1973.

Under Pinochet's authoritarian rule, the Chilean government promptly reversed its social and economic policies and promoted neoliberal, export-oriented reforms aimed at modernizing the country. Mixed results and mounting social problems generated a strong but cautious opposition movement in Chile during the 1980s. Despite public revelations of gross human rights violations during the 1970s that culminated in international trials against various officers who had served the dictatorship, Pinochet clung to power.

Augusto Pinochet came to power in Chile in a 1973 coup and remained the nation's military dictator until his defeat in a free election in 1990. He would spend much of his remaining years evading prosecution for human rights crimes. (Embassy of Chile)

Confident that he would prevail, Pinochet held a plebiscite in 1988 in which Chileans were given a choice between a return to civilian rule or the continuation of the Pinochet presidency until 1997. Chileans voted against the dictator, and he was ultimately forced to relinquish the presidency on 11 March 1990, although he retained his position as army commander in chief until 1998.

Pinochet was arrested in London in October 1998 via an international warrant issued by a Spanish judge. International courts hounded Pinochet, intent on bringing him to trial for his various and sundry crimes as Chile's dictator. He avoided trial in Spain because of alleged ill health, was forced to return to Chile in March 2000, and was tried and convicted there. His convictions were overturned in late 2000 because his mental state was in question during the trial. In 2004, investigators discovered efforts by Pinochet to transfer financial assets out of the country illegally. This move undermined his credibility, and the government stripped him of legal immunity. In November 2005, he was charged with tax evasion for having concealed some $27 million in secret bank accounts and was ordered placed under house arrest. Never forced to stand trial and unrepentant to the end, Pinochet died in Santiago on 10 December

2006. He was accorded a military but not a state funeral. Many Chileans chose to remember him not for the abuses and atrocities of his regime but as a staunch anticommunist whose free-market policies made rapid Chilean economic growth possible.

Daniel Lewis

See also

Allende Gossens, Salvador; Chile; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous

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Pistols

See Small Arms

Pius XII, Pope
(1876–1958)

Roman Catholic prelate and pope (1939–1958). Pius XII was born Maria Giuseppe Giovanni Eugenio Pacelli in Rome on 2 March 1876 to an influential Italian noble family. In 1894 he entered the seminary and enrolled at the Gregorian University, completing higher studies at the Sapienza School and the Papal Atheneum of St. Apollinaris. He was ordained in 1899. In 1904 he was named a monsignor, and a year later he became a domestic prelate. Soon thereafter, he began a nearly forty-year career as a Vatican diplomat. In 1917, he was first consecrated bishop, then archbishop, and was named nuncio to German Bavaria. He became apostolic nuncio to Germany in 1920. During his time in Germany, he negotiated concordats with Bavaria (1924) and Prussia (1929) before returning to Rome, where he was named a cardinal in 1929 and Vatican secretary of state in 1930. Disgusted and disheartened by Nazi ideology, he sought to protect German Catholics from Nazi persecution by negotiating a 1933 concordat with Adolf Hitler's Germany.

Pacelli was elected pope on 2 March 1939, taking the name Pius XII. His actions during the Jewish Holocaust are controversial and still subject to debate today. There is irrefutable evidence that Pius XII was a vocal critic of anti-Semitism, however, even if he did not act sufficiently forcefully early on to stanch Nazi atrocities. The pope did much to protect Rome and many other ancient cities from damage during the war, and his founding of the Papal

Welfare Organization after the conflict helped thousands of refugees, repatriates, and former servicemen.

Pius became a vociferous opponent of communism during the Cold War, having publicly and bitterly denounced it as early as 1942. Yet the pope was also cognizant of the shortcomings of capitalism, and he openly called on all nations to commit to the eradication of poverty and inequality. In terms of doctrine and church governance, he established the dogma of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary in 1950, and he significantly expanded the number of archbishops and bishops, particularly in the developing world. His papal legacy is still subject to fierce debate by scholars over his conduct during the Nazi era and the Holocaust. Pope Pius XII died on 9 October 1958 at Castel Gandolfo, Italy. He was succeeded by John XXIII.

Luc Stenger and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Roman Catholic Church; Vatican City

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

Pius XII was pope from 1939 to 1958. A staunch anticommunist, Pius came under severe criticism for not speaking out against Adolf Hitler and the Holocaust. (Library of Congress)

Pleven, René Jean
(1901–1993)

French politician, minister of finance (1944–1946), minister of national defense (1949, 1952–1954), minister of justice (1969–1973), and premier (1950–1951, 1951–1952). Born in Rennes on 15 April 1901, René Pleven studied law and political science in Paris, receiving a doctorate in law from the University of Paris. During 1929–1939 he served as the Automatic Telephone Company's director general for Europe.

During the German occupation of France (1940–1944), Pleven served in the Resistance and as a diplomat for General Charles de Gaulle. Pleven also played a central role in the general's London Committee, which advocated an approach to postwar economic growth combining free enterprise with central planning by elite civil servants trained in France's finest schools. During 1944–1946 Pleven served as finance minister in de Gaulle's postwar provisional government. During 1945–1973 Pleven represented a district in his native Brittany in the Chamber of Deputies.

Pleven led the Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (USDR) from 1946 to 1953, when François Mitterrand succeeded him. During the

French politician René Pleven held numerous cabinet posts in the 1940s and 1950s. He was French premier during 1950–1952. Photograph taken in 1971. (Alain Nogues/ Corbis Sygma)

politically volatile Fourth Republic (1944–1958), Pleven served as premier twice, first during July 1950–March 1951 and then during August 1951–January 1952. He also served in several other ministerial posts, most notably as minister of national defense, first in 1949 and then during 1952–1954. Just as the 1950 Schuman Plan sought to restrain a resurgent Germany through the integration of Western Europe's coal and steel industries, Pleven, to achieve a similar aim in the military sphere, gave his name to an October 1950 plan to develop a European army made up of supranational military units under the command of a European defense minister accountable to a European parliament. The so-called Pleven Plan evolved into discussions of the European Defense Community (EDC), but by excluding the United States, it chiefly complicated the organization of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

While European efforts at economic integration enjoyed the blessing of the United States, the stakes in the realm of security were too high in the dark days of the Cold War. Although the question of rearming Germany was extremely important for Pleven and France, more immediately pressing was the war against nationalist forces in Indochina, which failed decisively in 1954 with the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Although Pleven would remain politically active for decades to come, his most influential period was over, and his plan never came to fruition, instead eventually being subsumed by NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG, West Germany) entrance into the alliance. During 1969–1973 Pleven served as justice minister but lost his Chamber of Deputies seat in 1973. He retired from national politics and died in Paris on 13 January 1993.

Maarten L. Pereboom

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; European Defense Community; Indochina War; North Atlantic Treaty; Pleven Plan

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Pleven Plan
(1950)

Plan proposed by French Prime Minister René Pleven in October 1950 to build an integrated, supranational West European defense force to repel potential Soviet threats. The plan was a natural successor to the Schuman Plan, which sought to integrate the economy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) into the larger European economy, ultimately resulting in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Pleven Plan was also a response to the deteriorating international situation, exacerbated by the September 1949 Soviet atomic bomb testing, the October 1949 victory of communist forces in the Chinese Civil War, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the large-scale commitment of U.S. forces to that theater. The French plan sought to integrate West Germany into a European defense structure without allowing Bonn to rearm unilaterally. French leaders also did not relish the idea of West German admittance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, the Pleven Plan would effectively bypass such a scenario.

In 1949 the United States, Great Britain, and France agreed that to defend Germany properly would mean the restoration of its autonomy. Most American and European policymakers were convinced that only a fully integrated Germany could stanch the threat of internal communist subversion or, worse still, a military invasion from the East. They did not agree, however, on the means by which to achieve this.

The defense of Germany and the restoration of its role as an equal partner caused the Western governments to realize that rearming Germany would require a German military contribution, but not one in which Germany did so unilaterally. The Americans, British, and French thought that the best way to achieve such a goal would be in establishing an integrated European force.

In September 1950, at the New York conference of foreign ministers, the Americans proposed an integrated European army under the aegis of NATO in which German military units would have no capacity for independent action. This would be led by a NATO commander—Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)—with a sizable American military contribution. French concerns about a rehabilitated Germany caused Paris initially to balk at this plan.

On 24 October 1950, Pleven announced a plan of his own for a European army. Worked out by Jean Monnet, the French architect of West European integration, this project aimed at avoiding any autonomous German control over its troops. According to the Pleven Plan, German troops were to be recruited and trained not by the German government but rather by a supranational European army integrated within the existing NATO military structures, alongside NATO troops. The plan would include a European defense minister responsible to the control and supervision of a European assembly. German armed forces would exist only within an integrated European military arrangement.

Both the British and the Germans opposed the Pleven Plan. The British believed that instead of leading to the creation of an Atlantic community, such an arrangement would dilute Atlanticism by excluding direct American involvement. It would also, they pointed out, complicate—or even duplicate—the organizational structures of NATO. Bonn rejected the plan because German troops would clearly be in a subservient role. Moreover, it was a project that would have required member nations to relinquish a certain degree of national sovereignty, which did not sit well.

Soon the plan evolved into the abortive European Defense Community (EDC), debated at length by the Western alliance and finally defeated, rather ironically, by the French themselves in 1954. By then, with American reassurances of protection and with British troops to be stationed in Germany, many of France's fears concerning a resurgent belligerent Germany were allayed, and the Pleven Plan and the EDC were subsumed by the admission of West Germany into NATO.

Simone Selva and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; France; German Democratic Republic, Armed Forces; Germany, Federal Republic of, Armed Forces; Pleven, René Jean

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Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich
(1903–1983)

Soviet political leader and head of state. Born in Karlovka, Ukraine, on 18 February 1903, Nikolai Podgorny worked in a factory beginning at age fifteen. A Komsomol (Young Communist League) activist in the early 1920s, he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1927 and graduated from the Kiev Technological Institute for the Food Industry in 1931. He was an administrator in sugar plants during the 1930s. During the 1940s, he held a succession of senior posts in the administration of the food industry in the Ukraine and at the national level.

Beginning in 1950, Podgorny's career shifted to the party apparatus in the Ukraine, where he rose rapidly during the next several years. In 1956 he was elected to the CPSU Central Committee and served as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party during 1957–1963. He became a candidate member of the CPSU Presidium in 1958 and a full member in 1960. In 1963, he was appointed a secretary of the Central Committee. Accounts differ as to his role in the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964, but Podgorny

quickly lent his support to new First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, becoming part of the collective leadership along with Premier Alexei Kosygin.

On 9 December 1965, Podgorny became chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, thus becoming the ceremonial head of state, but his influence in the government soon declined as Brezhnev sought to consolidate his power. In April 1966, Podgorny was removed from the Central Committee secretariat. Although he was still politically prominent, his influence was nonetheless waning. In 1977 Brezhnev engineered Podgorny's removal from the Politburo and then from the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet. Brezhnev assumed the chairmanship himself while remaining first secretary, thus gaining diplomatic status as head of state while also maintaining the real power that came as leader of the CPSU. Podgorny lived in quiet retirement until his death in Moscow on 11 January 1983.

Steven W. Guerrier

Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and thus ceremonial head of state of the Soviet Union during 1965–1977. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Khrushchev, Nikita; Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich; Soviet Union

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Point Four Program
(1949)

Foreign aid program of President Harry S. Truman, announced in January 1949 and first funded beginning in 1950. As the Cold War deepened in 1947–1948, the Truman administration sought ways to keep communist influences out of the developing world. A major part of this effort would become direct and indirect assistance to nations of the developing world in the form of technical assistance, loans, investments, and the like. The Point Four Program marked an attempt to fulfill those goals and acted as a sort of Marshall Plan to poorer nations. Point Four, however, was on a scale far less grand than that of the Marshall Plan. The program received its name because it was the fourth point of Truman's foreign policy initiatives enunciated in his 20 January 1949 inaugural address.

The Point Four Program began in earnest in early 1950. As policymakers weighed their options as to what types of aid should be emphasized,

a consensus soon emerged that saw technical assistance to the developing world as the single best way to effect change there. The focal point of such aid would be in the areas of education, agriculture, public health, and medical care. The U.S. government relied principally on the private sector to plan and build necessary infrastructure, which it would reimburse in cash, tax credits, or other types of incentives. All but a small amount of the aid that went to the Point Four Program was administered bilaterally—between the United States and recipient nations—through the U.S. Department of State's Technical Cooperation Administration.

The Point Four Program was, in the end, rather limited in scope. It had no sooner gotten off the ground when the Korean War began in June 1950. The war shifted the focus from international aid programs such as Point Four to rearmament and military readiness. What's more, a good deal of Point Four assistance tended to be funneled into military and military support programs in recipient nations rather than to education, health care, or agriculture.

The advent of Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency in 1953 marked the practical end of the Point Four Program as a stand-alone entity. Eisenhower, who eschewed handing out large amounts of foreign aid (at least in his first term), ordered the Point Four Program absorbed into general foreign assistance programs. Although Point Four's immediate legacy was quite modest, it did set the stage for future programs such as the International Finance Corporation (1956), the Inter-American Development Bank (1961), and the Alliance for Progress (1961).

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also
Marshall Plan

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Pol Pot
(1928–1998)

Head of the Cambodian communist Khmer Rouge and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea (Cambodia) from 1976 to 1978. Born Saloth Sar in the village of Prek Sbau near the provincial capital of Kompong Thom Saloth Sar, Cambodia, on 19 May 1928, Pol Pot adopted his revolutionary name only in 1976. His parents were landowners with royal connections. He was sent to Phnom Penh at the age of six to join his brother Loth Suong, who worked in the palace as an administrator. Saloth Sar was briefly a novice in a monastery and studied radio engineering in France during 1949–1953. While there, he joined the French Communist Party.

Saloth Sar returned to Cambodia in January 1953 and began to rise within the Cambodian communist movement, becoming party leader in 1963. Rejecting an offer from Prince Sihanouk to form a coalition government, Saloth Sar fled into the jungle and organized the Khmer Rouge, a communist guerrilla army. On 13 May 1976, after defeating Lon Nol, the U.S.-backed general who had overthrown Sihanouk in a 1970 coup, Pol Pot became Cambodian prime minister and declared "Year Zero." He and the Khmer Rouge leadership renamed the country Kampuchea and immediately set out to transform Cambodia into a rural collectivist society. He emptied the city of Phnom Penh, ordered millions of Cambodians into forced labor, and imposed other brutal policies that resulted in a holocaust against his own countrymen. It is estimated that some 1.5 million Cambodians died during Pol Pot's bloodthirsty reign.

Deposed Cambodian Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, shown here during a clandestine meeting with Japanese journalists in his guerrilla base near the Thai-Cambodia border, 12 December 1979. (Bettmann/Corbis)

To return Kampuchea to its "rightful" position in Indochina, Pol Pot saw the need to regain "lost" territories, launching raids on Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam beginning in 1977. In retaliation, in late 1978 forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and ousted Pol Pot from power, although he continued to wage guerrilla warfare from bases in Thailand and western Cambodia, launching raids against the Vietnamese-installed Phnom Penh government and later sabotaging the peace plan and elections sponsored by the United Nations (UN). In 1985, it was announced that Pol Pot was relinquishing command of the Khmer Rouge. He then disappeared from public view but resurfaced in 1997 when Khmer Rouge leaders in western Cambodia conducted a trial and convicted him of murdering other Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot was sentenced to house arrest but died on 15 April 1998 in Anlong Ven while being held prisoner, supposedly from a heart attack, although there is some speculation that he may have been murdered by one of his former subordinates.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Cambodia; Geneva Conference (1954); Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Sihanouk, Norodom; Vietnam

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Poland

Central European state. Strategically located between Germany and Russia, Poland saw its flat, open country serve for many centuries as an invasion route for both East and West. Bordered on the north by the Baltic Sea, to the northeast by Russia and Lithuania, to the east by Belarus and Ukraine, to the south by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and to the west by Germany, today's Poland has an area of 121,196 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of New Mexico. Its 1945 population was approximately 24 million people.

Moscow regarded Poland as vital for the security of the Soviet Union. In both world wars, armies had invaded Russia from this direction. For that reason alone, Moscow sought to control Poland. This would not be easy, for Poles had a long-standing hatred of the Russians, an entrenched Roman Catholicism, and a strong Peasant Party.

For a time in the Middle Ages, Poland had been the largest nation in Europe, but a fractious nobility unwilling to yield power to the central government led to its dismemberment in the late eighteenth century by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Modern Poland reappeared as a consequence of World War I, created by the victorious Allies to serve as a buffer against a resurgent Germany but also to contain Bolshevik Russia, both of which sought to bring about its demise.

The new Polish state pursued an expansionist foreign policy to recover former Polish territory, alienating powers that might have helped defend it. Domestically, Poland suffered from too many small and unproductive farms, widespread illiteracy, a political system that led to numerous small parties and cabinet instability, divisions between the urban and rural segments of the population, and endemic anti-Semitism. In 1926, with Poland teetering on the edge of chaos, General Józef Piłsudski seized power with the intention of reforming the state. He held power as dictator until his death in 1935. Piłsudski at least had Polish interests at heart; his successors were simply inept.

On 1 September 1939, German forces invaded Poland, touching off World War II. Two weeks later, in accordance with secret provisions of the August 1939 German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, Soviet forces attacked from the east. Poland was absorbed within a month and was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union. More fighting occurred when the Germans struck east in June 1941. Then in 1944 the Soviet armies drove the Germans west. Poland suffered terribly in the war, with more than 6 million dead.

Poles were not grateful to the Soviets for their liberation. Indeed, Poles held the Soviets responsible for the massacre of up to 15,000 Polish officers in the Katyń Forest near Smolensk in 1941 (which the Kremlin blamed on the Germans and for which it did not formally acknowledge responsibility until 1989). In London, the legally constituted Polish government-in-exile represented the nation, and under its direction, an underground state survived within Poland that included the secret Home Army. The exiled government also commanded a 200,000-man army-in-being. Led by Lieutenant

General Władysław Anders, it fought gallantly on the Allied side in Italy and in other campaigns, ending the war as the fourth-largest Allied force in Europe. Geography prohibited these men from liberating their homeland, and ultimately most chose to live in the West rather than return to a communist Poland.

At the end of July 1944 the Soviet Army approached the Vistula, encouraging the Home Army to rise up. It did so on 1 August, driving the Germans from the city. For the next sixty-three days the embattled forces of General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski fought the Germans, while Soviet Army forces did nothing to help. Some 260,000 Poles died in the abortive revolt, during which the Germans razed large areas of Warsaw. The Soviets maintained that the pause in their offensive was necessary, but foreign observers noted that the Germans smashed the core of national resistance, which greatly assisted in the imposition of a communist regime later.

The Soviets finally resumed their advance and took Warsaw in January 1945. By early February, most of Poland had been cleared of the Germans. The Soviets installed a provisional liberation government, the Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (PKWN, Polish Committee of National Liberation)—also known as the Lublin Committee—in Lublin in eastern Poland on 22 July 1944. This was the date subsequently observed by communist Poland for the establishment of the Polish state. After they took Warsaw, the Soviets moved the PKWN to Warsaw and recognized it as the provisional government of Poland.

In the fall of 1944, Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk of the London government traveled to Moscow with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in what proved to be a final opportunity for reconciliation. But Churchill's obstinate colleagues in London rejected the concessions he made there, whereupon Mikołajczyk resigned and Moscow broke off relations with the London-based Polish government. Probably no genuinely representative government would have met Soviet requirements.

Postwar Poland was about four-fifths its prewar size. There was, however, no problem concerning minorities. Virtually all of Poland's prewar population of 3.5 million Jews had died during the war, a number of these with Polish complicity. Some 4 million Germans had also fled the Soviet Army advance at the end of the war. Agreement at Potsdam over the expulsion of Germans from former East Prussia led to the departure of an additional 2.5 million Germans during 1945–1947.

Allied agreements at the July 1945 Potsdam Conference assigned to Polish administration the former German territories east of the Elbe and Vistula Rivers, along with Gdańsk (former German Danzig) and southern East Prussia. The Soviet Union took the major city of Königsberg, which became Kaliningrad, as well as eastern Poland to approximately the Curzon Line (set by the Allied powers in 1920 after World War I as Poland's eastern border). In effect, Poland had been moved westward by about 150 miles. In its acquisition of Silesia from Germany, Poland secured a strong industrial base and a more balanced economy. Instead of the former narrow corridor to the Baltic, Poland now possessed about 250 miles of seashore. Although the Western

powers at Potsdam accepted Polish administration of these regained territories, no peace treaty legalized the annexation. Domestically, the PKWN carried out a program of repression, especially in the new territories, eliminating centers of resistance and either killing, arresting, or sending to Soviet labor camps thousands of people.

On 21 June 1945, Bolesław Bierut established in Warsaw the Provisional Government of National Unity. Strong British and American pressure induced the communists to admit Mikołajczyk as deputy premier, along with three other representatives, and the West then reluctantly recognized it as the legal government of Poland. The Yalta agreement had called for "free and democratic" elections, but not until January 1947 did the regime feel confident enough to call elections, which hardly met the Yalta criteria. The old Peasant Party had been so completely infiltrated by the communists that Mikołajczyk formed a new opposition peasant organization known as the Polish People's Party, which became an immediate target of the government. No one was surprised when the government bloc, which included nominal participation of several captive parties, won 394 out of 444 seats in the first parliament. Later that year Mikołajczyk fled abroad. Poland was now completely dominated by the communists. At the end of 1948, the Polish Workers' Party absorbed the Polish Socialist Party to form the Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR, Polish United Workers' Party).

Socialist Józef Cyrankiewicz was premier after 1947, but Bierut was the leading figure in the state. Elected by the parliament as president, he served in that post from 1945 to 1952, when a new constitution abolished that office. He then became premier. After Bierut's death in Moscow of a cerebral hemorrhage early in 1956, Edward Ochab became the new strongman. Nevertheless, ultimate power rested in the minister of defense, Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. Born in Poland, on the Kremlin's orders he became a Polish citizen and de facto Soviet viceroy.

The PZPR dominated Polish life. Opposition politicians were either eliminated or jailed. Control was assured by the secret police and Soviet occupation forces. The government also proceeded against the Catholic Church, leading to the trials of priests and bishops and even the arrest of the primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, in 1953.

The de-Stalinization campaign that followed the death of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in March 1953 and especially Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of him at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 produced shockwaves throughout the Soviet bloc. The initial impetus for events in 1956 in both Poland and Hungary came from intellectuals and youth pointing out the failures of the regimes to follow the communist ideal.

Restiveness in Poland became direct action on 28–29 June 1956 in Poznań (Posen) with a large demonstration in which industrial workers demanded redress of grievances. A mob attacked the headquarters of the security police. Army troops, rushed to the scene, refused to fire upon the crowds. Order was restored only by the dispatch of large numbers of security police.

A tank surrounded by civilians in front of a bank during antigovernment rioting in Poznań, Poland, in 1956. (Library of Congress)

The government sought to blame the rioting on foreign agents and provocateurs but was soon forced to admit the justice of the complaints. It dared bring to trial in September only a dozen young men, ages eighteen to twenty-two, none of whom were charged with political crimes. Their testimony evoked considerable public sympathy.

The Poznań riots led to Berman's resignation and brought Władysław Gomułka to power in October. He had served as party secretary after the postwar government had come to power, but he had placed Polish national interests ahead of those of the Soviet Union and had been dismissed from his posts and imprisoned until late 1954. The Kremlin was sufficiently worried about this transfer of power that Khrushchev invited himself to Warsaw, arriving there with a number of key Soviet leaders and generals, including commander of Warsaw Pact armies Marshal Ivan Konev. With talk of Soviet military intervention, factory workers and students mobilized.

Khrushchev eventually agreed that Gomułka might assume power. The agreement that was worked out allowed the Poles control of their own internal affairs in return for the maintenance of communism and adherence to the Warsaw Pact. One immediate sign of the new relationship was the departure for the Soviet Union of Marshal Rokossovsky.

Gomułka, now PZPR secretary, ended forced agricultural collectivization, and the number of collective farms soon fell from more than 10,000 to fewer than 2,000. Indeed, by 1985, 80 percent of Poland's farms were privately owned. Gomułka also moved to change the relationship of the state with the

Catholic Church. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński was released from detention and allowed to assume his post. The Catholic Church was permitted freedom of worship, the right to build churches and maintain its own publications, and the opportunity to advance religious education in the schools. In return, Wyszyński and the Church supported the new regime and provided it with a popular base.

In May 1956, Gomułka worked out an agreement with the Soviet Union for the repatriation to eastern Poland of some 250,000 Poles living in the Soviet Union. He proved a loyal supporter of Soviet foreign policy, and Polish troops participated in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Gomułka was not a liberal, and the PZPR retained strict control.

Economic problems led to severe rioting in 1970 and 1976. In December 1970, Gomułka was replaced as the regime's strongman following food riots after the government announced sharp increases in the price of basic foodstuffs. Troops fired on workers at Gdynia. Edward Gierek, the PZPR secretary, was from Silesia, where he had been hardened by work in the mines from age thirteen. In an effort to build support, he immediately reversed the price increases. He also opened Poland to foreigners and allowed more Poles to travel abroad. In addition, he devoted attention to more consumer goods, made possible by massive foreign loans, chiefly from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) as part of German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. Poland's foreign aid debt swelled to more than $20 billion by the 1980s, which was badly handled and was used largely to industrialize. There was also rampant corruption. Sharp increases in prices in 1976 led to strikes, and once more riot police had to be called in.

In October 1978 Archbishop Karol Wojtyła was elected pope as John Paul II. The news of his elevation electrified Poland. He was the first Polish pope and, for that matter, the first from behind the Iron Curtain. In June 1979, John Paul II paid a tumultuous nine-day visit to his homeland.

In the summer of 1980 a spate of chaotic strikes occurred, triggered by a sharp rise in meat prices announced by the Gierek government in July. The strikes were centered in two areas that were vital for the Polish economy: the Baltic ports, especially Gdańsk, and the coal fields of Silesia. Coal was the country's chief commodity export and was vital for the economy. The unrest began in August at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. There, 16,000 workers went on strike, demanding free trade unions and the right to strike. Gierek was forced to resign in September, ostensibly for health reasons. In a surprise move, Stanisław Kania replaced him.

The unrest at Gdańsk led to strikes in Silesia, where 200,000 miners demanded safety improvements and the same rights won by the Baltic workers. The government made the same concessions in Silesia. Kania took a conciliatory stance toward the strikers and tried to placate both the Soviets and the Poles. The strike leader turned union chief was electrician Lech Wałęsa. This was the beginning of Solidarność (Solidarity), the first noncommunist trade union of the Eastern bloc.

With workers threatening a general strike throughout the country, the government gave in, granting free unions and the right to strike but also

Workers pray during the Lenin Shipyard strike in Gdańsk, Poland, in August 1980. (Alain Keler/Sygma/Corbis)

agreeing to loosen press censorship and grant freedom to jailed dissidents and access to the state press and broadcast services by the Catholic Church. In return, the workers recognized the supremacy of the Communist Party in the country (although not over the unions), paid homage to the Soviet alliance, and promised not to form a political party. Ultimately, Solidarity claimed 10 million members, more than half the Polish workforce.

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev hoped to contain these problems peacefully, approving a loan of about $100 million to Poland—a small sum compared to the massive foreign debt. The other side of the coin, however, was the largest Warsaw Pact military maneuvers in a decade, dubbed "Brotherhood in Arms, 1980," held in September along the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) border with Poland. These seemed to many highly reminiscent of the 1968 Warsaw Pact maneuvers along the Czech border, just before tanks rolled into Prague.

The Kremlin could not allow the Gdańsk settlement to stand. Free trade unions in Poland raised the unacceptable risk of labor unrest throughout the Soviet Empire, where the economies of all of the satellites faced similar difficulties. There was even a danger of such worker unrest permeating the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet leadership hoped to avoid armed intervention. Poland had an army of 210,000 troops in 15 divisions, with 650 first-line aircraft. The Polish Navy was the largest non-Soviet fleet in the Warsaw Pact. No one was certain what the Polish armed forces might do. Western analysts

were calculating that the Soviets might need an invasion force of a million men. But Soviet leaders were prepared to intervene if necessary, even at this risk and the end to détente with the United States.

Soviet leaders hoped that Kania could roll back the reforms. His failure to accomplish this led to the February 1981 appointment of General Wojciech Jaruzelski as premier, replacing Jozef Pinkowski. With Brezhnev issuing thinly veiled warnings that "the pillars of the socialist state" were in jeopardy, Jaruzelski called for a moratorium on strikes. Solidarity ignored this and, in March and April 1981, staged a warning strike to dramatize their newest demands of the right for Polish farmers to form their own union and a call for punishment of officials who had harassed Solidarity members. Jaruzelski accused Solidarity of abusing its right to strike and again appealed for a moratorium on strikes. Meanwhile, there were new Warsaw Pact maneuvers in and around Poland.

In July and August the Communist Party, voting for the first time via secret ballot, reelected Kania as first secretary, but Silesian coal miners went out on strike in protest against dwindling food supplies and government meat rationing. In September, Solidarity held its first national congress and passed resolutions calling for free elections in Poland and the right of workers to manage the factories.

The Soviets bluntly condemned these Solidarity actions, leading Jaruzelski to order a sweeping law-and-order crackdown. In October, Kania was abruptly ousted as PZPR chief by the Polish Central Committee, and Jaruzelski took charge as the first military man to rule Poland since World War II. He called for an immediate end to strikes. In November, Wałęsa, Jaruzelski, and Cardinal Josef Glemp, the head of the Catholic Church in Poland, met in a domestic summit, but talks between Solidarity and the government broke down. In December 1981, Solidarity called for mass demonstrations and urged the formation of workers' guards to protect unionists. It also called for a national referendum on establishing a noncommunist government.

Jaruzelski's response came on 13 December with a declaration of a state of national emergency and martial law and the arrest of some 6,000 people, including Solidarity leaders. Massive military presence in the streets prevented unrest. Key factories came under military control. These moves, along with the knowledge that the Soviets would have intervened had Jaruzelski not taken such drastic steps, prevented violence. To many outside observers, it seemed obvious that Solidarity had gone too far.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan retaliated by imposing economic sanctions on Poland. Gradually, the Jaruzelski regime eased up considerably. In 1987 it released Solidarity leaders from prison. Martial law restrictions were also ultimately ended. In an unprecedented move, the government also put on public trial four officers of the security police who murdered the popular Solidarity supporter Father Jerzy Popiełuszko. The fundamental problems continued, however, and Poland remained an economic basket case.

Jaruzelksi spent the next few years trying to hold off pro-Moscow hardliners and Westernizing liberals in his own party, bring to an end the eco-

Polish Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa gives the peace sign during a visit to Washington, D.C., on 15 November 1989. (Reuters/Corbis)

nomic boycott by the West, and preserve some role for the Communist Party. With the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader, Jaruzelski moved toward reform and accommodation with Solidarity. Roundtable talks in 1988 led to the legalization of Solidarity. Under Jaruzelksi's leadership, the party accepted democratization and entered into discussions that it assumed might lead to power-sharing but would stop short of a surrender of power. This proved impossible, and in the June 1989 national parliamentary elections, Solidarity candidates swept into power. Jaruzelski resigned as premier but won election the next month as president by a narrow margin. Tadeusz Mazowiecki became the first noncommunist premier in the Soviet bloc since 1945.

Poland made the transition to democratic government and, in January 1990, opted for the more difficult—in the short term—economic policy of complete free enterprise. The next month, the Polish United Workers' Party dissolved itself. At the end of 1990, the first fully free elections in postwar Poland took place, and Wałęsa was elected president.

Poland remained the major beneficiary of Western investment from among the former Eastern bloc countries. Prewar problems continued for

some time, however. A staggering foreign debt crippled economic growth, although in 1994 finance ministers of the leading Western powers agreed to a plan whereby Western banks slashed half of the $13 billion commercial debt, a great boost to what was by then Europe's fastest-growing economy.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Berman, Jakub; Bierut, Bolesław; Gierek, Edward; Gomułka, Władysław; Jaruzelski, Wojciech; Kania, Stanisław; Mazowiecki, Tadeusz; Mikołajczyk, Stanisław; Ostpolitik; Poland, Armed Forces; Rapacki, Adam; Solidarity Movement; Światło, Józef; Wałęsa, Lech; Wyszyński, Stefan, Cardinal

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Poland, Armed Forces

During World War II, Soviet leader Josef Stalin sought to create a Polish army under his control as an alternative to the Polish armed forces that had been fighting alongside the Allies since September 1939. In May 1943, near Moscow, the Tadeusz Kościuszko 1st Infantry Division was founded and later grew into the I Polish Corps and then, in 1944, the Polish Army. Recruits came principally from among Polish deportees in the Soviet Union, and the officers were primarily drawn from the Red Army. Political oversight came in the form of commissars drawn from the Polish Communist Party.

The Polish Army participated in the liberation of Warsaw as well as the subsequent Pomeranian and Berlin campaigns. When World War II ended, the army numbered 335,000 men in two field armies, an armored corps, and air units.

After the war, the size of the Polish military was gradually reduced. In 1949, it reached its lowest postwar level of only 130,000 men. As the Cold War intensified, the army was significantly increased beginning in 1950, reaching 382,000 men at its peak in 1954. This expansion was accompanied by an enormous increase in military equipment. Thus, during 1949–1956 the number of tanks increased from 225 to 2,188, while military aircraft grew from 272 to 1,110. In order to provide this equipment, the armaments industry also expanded significantly. This imposed a major burden on the already-

strained Polish economy and was one of the reasons for the failure of the Six-Year Plan of 1950–1955.

During the Stalinist period, numerous purges were carried out in the Polish military, with the counterintelligence service arresting hundreds of officers who were falsely accused of espionage. Twenty were executed. After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the growth of the military slowed, and beginning in 1955 its size was gradually reduced.

The Warsaw Pact, created in 1955, did not represent a major change, since the Polish Army had already been made fully subordinate to the General Staff of the Soviet Army in the early 1950s. All key command positions in the Polish Army were held by Soviet officers.

In October 1956, Marshal Marian Spychalski, who had been repressed during the Stalinist period, was appointed minister of defense. Soviet officers were then recalled, and their functions were assumed by Polish officers. According to Warsaw Pact planning of the early 1960s, in the event of war Poland was to commence military action in northern Europe toward Denmark and Belgium. Poland would commit to the attack three field armies, an air army, and its navy. In all, 380,000 men would be engaged of a total of 712,000 available, with the recall of reserves, in time of war. In the early 1970s, the army underwent expansion and modernization, including the introduction of rocket forces. In the early 1970s it numbered 418,000 men, a level that remained largely unchanged until the end of the Cold War. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, purges in the officer corps resulted in the dismissal of 1,500 officers of Jewish descent. General Wojciech Jaruzelski also replaced Spychalski as minister of national defense.

Approximately 30,000 soldiers from Poland's Second Army participated in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that crushed the Prague Spring. The army was also used to quash social unrest at home. During 1945–1948, it had fought against the anticommunist underground and Ukrainian separatists. It was also the main tool in crushing worker unrest in Poznań in 1956 as well as in Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin in 1970. The Polish Army's largest military operation after World War II came with the imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981 and involved some 70,000 soldiers. Army detachments ended strikes and broke up demonstrations, and those arrested were tried in military courts. Military commissars also appeared in factories and state institutions.

In the 1980s, the military underwent additional modernization, which was halted only in 1988 by a growing economic crisis. At the end of the Cold War, the lessening of tensions led to a significant reduction in the size of the military and a shift to defensive capabilities. By early 1992, the Polish Army had decreased from some 295,000 men in 1986 to just over 199,000 men. Tanks had been reduced from 3,400 to 2,800. Combat aircraft had fallen from a 1986 total of 675 to 500 in 1992. The navy also operated fewer ships.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Poland moved closer to the West, which was reflected in increasing arms transfers from the West and more operational contacts with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. Poland joined with NATO in

July 1994 in the first Partnership for Peace (PFP) participating state from the former Soviet bloc. Poland became a full member of NATO in March 1999.

Paweł Piotrowski

See also

Poland; Prague Spring; Solidarity Movement; Warsaw Pact

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Polaris Missiles

See Missiles, Polaris

Pompidou, Georges
(1911–1974)

Leading French politician, Fifth Republic premier (1962–1968), and president (1969–1974). Born in Montboudif in the Auvergne region of south-central France on 1 July 1911, Georges Pompidou attended several lycées before enrolling in the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he graduated first in his class in 1934. He then pursued advanced studies at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques, earning a degree in political science (administration).

Upon fulfilling his required military service, in 1935 Pompidou taught at lycées, first in Marseille and then in Paris. With the advent of war, in 1939 Pompidou was mobilized as an infantry lieutenant. Following the armistice the next year, he returned to teach in Paris. He did not join the Resistance.

General Charles de Gaulle returned to Paris following the liberation of the city in August 1944 and set up his provisional government. A friend helped Pompidou secure a modest post on de Gaulle's staff. In January 1946 when de Gaulle abruptly resigned as provisional president, Pompidou remained in his service. He arranged for publication of the general's wartime memoirs and headed a charity established by the general and his wife for the mentally retarded. Pompidou also became an executive in the Gaullist

Georges Pompidou, president of the Fifth Republic of France during 1969–1974. (Henri Bureau/Sygma/Corbis)

Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF, Rally of the French People), but in 1953 he advised de Gaulle to disown the movement and remain aloof from politics.

In 1954 Pompidou assumed a post with the Rothschild Bank, becoming a general director two years later. He continued to make himself indispensable to de Gaulle, however. When the political upheaval of May 1958 returned the general to power, Pompidou became his chief of cabinet. Once the transition to the Fifth Republic was completed, Pompidou returned to the Rothschild Bank, but in 1961 de Gaulle charged Pompidou with establishing ties with representatives of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in Switzerland. Secret talks there led in 1962 to a settlement of the Algerian War.

In April 1962 de Gaulle named Pompidou premier of France with jurisdiction over domestic affairs. There was much criticism of this appointment, for Pompidou had never held elective office. Readily accepting the primacy of the president in the new constitutional system, he proved to be an effective administrator and speaker.

The student unrest of May 1968 followed by widespread worker strikes gave Pompidou the chance to demonstrate his political skills. De Gaulle appeared stunned by events, and it was Pompidou who came up with the plan of a wage increase for workers and who managed the new election campaign (dissuading de Gaulle from a referendum) that led to a Gaullist triumph in the subsequent elections.

De Gaulle never forgave Pompidou for his success, and a few days later, in July 1968, asked Pompidou to resign. When he left office, Pompidou had been premier longer than any other Frenchman since François Guizot in the mid-nineteenth century.

At the beginning of 1969, de Gaulle announced a national referendum on a proposal to reorganize France administratively and said that he would regard the referendum as a personal vote of confidence. In April, French voters defeated the proposal by a narrow margin, and de Gaulle promptly resigned. Pompidou ran for the presidency on the Gaullist ticket in the June elections, stressing continuity and openness. Divisions on the Left contributed to his victory.

President Pompidou's leadership style differed greatly from that of de Gaulle. Pompidou proceeded cautiously and deliberately, and he was much more approachable and friendly than his predecessor. There was also great freedom of discussion, and he did not lecture his ministers.

Although he had a solid majority in the National Assembly, Pompidou broadened the government by bringing in non-Gaullists and surrounding himself with competent technocrats. His government devalued the franc and launched an austerity program. It also implemented university reform. The French economy did well until the energy crisis brought on by the Arab oil embargo. This brought high inflation and forced Pompidou to float the franc.

In international affairs, Pompidou believed, like his predecessor, that the president had sole responsibility for foreign policy. He continued de Gaulle's efforts to build relations with China and the Soviet Union and sought to advance French influence in the Middle East. French policy under Pompidou more accurately reflected actual power, and this frequently forced him to compromise. In several areas, he reversed the policies of his predecessor, such as allowing Britain to enter the Common Market and improving relations with the United States.

Pompidou also helped transform the city of Paris. His building projects included an underground shopping center at Les Halles, a new office and shopping complex at La Défense, and the Pompidou Center for contemporary art. (Pompidou was himself a published poet and frequently offered his opinions on art and architecture.) His most controversial building project was the Montparnasse Tower.

Pompidou's last year and a half was marked by economic problems and personal illness. He died of cancer in Paris on 2 April 1974 and was followed in office by his minister of finance, Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing. Pompidou had demonstrated that both Gaullism and the Fifth Republic could continue without the general.

Spencer C. Tucker and Elizabeth Pugliese

See also

De Gaulle, Charles; France; Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry

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Porkkala

Peninsula projecting into the Gulf of Finland, located some 12 miles from Helsinki. Throughout history the Porkkala Peninsula has been a strategic outpost controlling navigation in the Gulf of Finland and approaches to Helsinki and St. Petersburg (Petrograd, later Leningrad). During World War I, Russia constructed permanent fortifications on Porkkala as protection for Petrograd. During the Finnish-Soviet negotiations of October 1939, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov demanded a base at Porkkala as necessary to close off the Gulf of Finland. The Finns rejected the Soviet demand on the grounds that Porkkala was too close to their capital.

During the Finnish-Soviet negotiations ending the Continuation War (1941–1944) between Finland and the Soviet Union, the Soviets renounced their claim to Hanko and instead demanded the right to construct a naval base at Porkkala. The Finns were forced to agree to a fifty-year lease on Porkkala as part of the Moscow Armistice concluded on 19 September 1944. Finnish President Carl Mannerheim regarded this concession as the most troublesome provision of the armistice agreement because Soviet forces could easily occupy Helsinki via Porkkala.

The Finnish handover of Porkkala took place ten days after the armistice was signed, and its 10,000 inhabitants were given eight days to evacuate the peninsula. On 28 September 1944, Soviet troops occupied the area. The lease was confirmed in the Paris Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947. On 24 May 1947, the Soviet Union and Finland signed the Porkkala-Udd Transit Agreement that permitted Soviet forces to transit southeastern Finland in order to supply their recently acquired base.

In the years that followed, the value of the Porkkala Peninsula to the Soviet Union diminished. There was no threat to Soviet control over the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and military advances also meant that the Soviet Union could close off the Gulf of Finland from its southern coast. Also, conclusion of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in April 1948 and the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union pursued by President Juho Paasikivi (1946–1956) all worked to lessen tensions between the two states.

On 17 February 1955, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin informed President Paasikivi and Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen that Moscow was willing to renounce its fifty-year lease on Porkkala in return for a twenty-year extension of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with Finland, and a communiqué was subsequently issued to that effect. Porkkala was officially returned to Finland on 26 January 1956.

Silviu Miloiu

See also

Finland; Kekkonen, Urho; Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil, Baron; Paasikivi, Juho; Soviet Union

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Portugal

Southwestern European state. The Republic of Portugal lies on the western coast of the Iberian Peninsula, which it shares with Spain. Portugal occupies 35,516 square miles of territory, about the size of the U.S. state of Maine, and had a 1945 population of approximately 8 million. The economy was based largely on tourism, textiles, the cork industry (the world's largest), seafood, wine, and timber and forest products. The country occupies an important geostrategic position, facing west to the New World and south along the great sea routes to Africa. Beginning in the fifteenth century, Portuguese seafarers laid the basis for a widespread empire. As a result, 100 million people currently speak Portuguese as their mother tongue.

The Portuguese Republic began in 1910, but parliamentary chaos caused the military to seize power in 1926. University economics professor António Salazar was briefly minister of finance, charged with restoring financial order. Salazar returned to that same post in 1928 with the full powers he demanded and, for the next forty years, completely dominated Portugal. In 1932 he became premier of an authoritarian regime in which the Catholic Church had considerable influence. Salazar's National Union party was the political voice of the so-called Estado Novo (New State). Salazar's system, which combined eighteenth-century despotism with both fascist and democratic trappings, came to be known as clerical fascism and served as a model for the Nationalists in Spain. Portugal was a police state, although Salazar, an austere bachelor who remained largely unknown to his people, endeavored to preserve a democratic façade. Elections occurred on a regular basis, but the opposition was tightly controlled.

Portugal remained officially neutral during World War II. In 1943, however, it leased bases in the Azores to Britain and the United States. After the war, Portugal was readily admitted to the United Nations (UN) and was invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) upon its founding in 1949.

Although some families enjoyed great wealth, Portugal as a whole had the lowest standard of living in Western Europe. It also had the highest illiteracy and infant mortality rates. As a result, many Portuguese emigrated, chiefly to Brazil. The government never could deal with pressing financial problems because it routinely spent half of the annual budget trying to retain

Residents of Lisbon demonstrating on 1 May 1974, celebrating the 25 April coup d'état organized by the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), which overthrew the Salazar dictatorship. (Henri Bureau/Sygma/Corbis)

Portugal's overseas colonies. Fighting began in Angola in 1961, in Guinea in 1963, and in Mozambique in 1964. Ultimately, the Portuguese committed 140,000 troops to the struggle.

In 1968 a disabling stroke forced Salazar to yield power. His successor, Marcelo Caetano, relaxed press censorship, gave women the vote, and liberalized other aspects of Portuguese life. The colonial wars continued, however, and on the morning of 25 April 1974 in Lisbon, a group of young army officers with no clear political program overthrew the conservative-authoritarian regime. It was called the Revolução dos Cravos (Carnation Revolution) because of the prevalence of red carnations worn by the populace, who convinced the forces of order not to resist. The revolution marked the end of the longest-lived authoritarian regime in Western Europe.

Those responsible for the revolution had fought in the colonies. Poorly compensated, they had also been forced to fight with inferior equipment against guerrillas often armed with modern Soviet weapons. Such factors led the disgruntled officers to form the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA, Armed Forces Movement).

The MFA's political views were shaped by contact with disgruntled Portuguese university students forced to serve in the army and by captured African guerrilla leaders. The MFA came to believe in the need for a thorough

change in Portuguese society and leadership. Surprisingly, this was a revolution against the colonial wars, for the MFA was convinced that the army could not win and indeed would be blamed for the defeats.

The Carnation Revolution brought to power General António de Spinola, the recently dismissed deputy chief of staff who had openly proposed a political democratization of Portugal and an end to the costly colonial wars. His book, *Portugal and the Future* (1974)—published without military authorization—provided the theoretical justification for the revolution, although he did not participate in it. The revolution was also unusual in that only five people died in it, two of them accidentally. Certainly, the revolutionaries enjoyed overwhelming national support.

The new Portuguese leaders immediately moved to divest the nation of its overseas empire. By the end of 1975, Portugal had granted independence to its two giant African colonies of Angola and Mozambique as well as to Portuguese Timor in the Indonesian Archipelago. Timor declared its independence on 28 November 1975 but was occupied by Indonesian troops nine days later. Brutal Indonesian repression and human rights violations followed. Of its former colonies, Portugal retained only the Azores in the Atlantic, Madeira southwest of Portugal, and the tiny outpost of Macau (Macao) near Hong Kong. (India had seized Goa and some other smaller enclaves in 1961.)

On 13 April 1987, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Portugal concluded an agreement under which Macau became the Macau Special Administrative Region of China on 20 December 1999. The PRC guaranteed Macau a free enterprise system and a high degree of autonomy for fifty years. Portugal, the first European power to establish a presence on the Asian mainland, was thus the last to leave it.

Decolonization had reduced the total land area administered by Portugal by 95 percent and its global population by 65 percent. The country was also deluged by a half million *retornados*, refugees of Portuguese or colonial origin who fled the former possessions. With the economy under severe strain, this was a difficult time for Portugal. U.S. aid and loans totaling $1 billion helped considerably, and in the end the enterprising *retornados* added much to the Portuguese economy.

Postrevolution Portuguese politics were marked by uncertainty and confusion. The Spinola administration of conservative, older officers was to the political Right of those who had carried out the coup. Spinola opposed any communist role in the government, which the MFA favored. When the MFA and the communists forced Spinola to cancel a rally by his supporters in September 1974, believing it to be a possible coup attempt, Spinola resigned. He apparently hoped to return to power when the Right gained strength. At the end of 1975, after communist-leaning General Vasco Gonçalves was removed from power under Western pressure, military units sympathetic to the communists attempted a coup, and the now-moderate Council of the Revolution, the executive authority of the state led by General Francisco Costa de Gomes, retaliated by removing leftist officers from the armed forces.

Military authority declined, the result of ideological differences among its leaders and parliamentary election victories of the Socialist Party, led by

Mario Soares, and the bourgeois parties. The political situation was chaotic. In the first six years, the country had a dozen different governments. Going into the 1975 elections, the first since the revolution, there was real concern that the Portuguese would vote the communists into power. Economic assistance from the United States and Britain helped prevent this. As in Italy, communist strength could be largely explained in economic terms, with high Portuguese inflation, unemployment, and illiteracy rates.

Premier Mario Soares, a moderate socialist, became the dominant figure and was twice premier in the period to 1979. His Socialist Party was supported by the communists and some Social Democrats. With centrist parties demanding new elections, in late 1979 President António Eanes dissolved parliament. The elections brought a shift to the Right, and Maria Pintasilgo, a social activist and devout Catholic, became the first woman premier in Portuguese history. Her government soon fell, and new elections were held in 1980. A center-rightist coalition gained a majority (132 of 250 seats) in the National Assembly, a sign of how far Portugal had moved to the Right since the revolution.

In 1983, Soares and the socialists returned to power in a coalition government, which made it difficult for him to implement his programs. By the mid-1980s there were two major political parties in Portugal: the Social Democrats, led by the charismatic economist Aníbal Cavaco Silva, and the Socialist Party, now led by Vitor Constâncio. In November 1985, Cavaco Silva became premier in a minority government, and in the July 1987 national elections he was reelected with the first single-party parliamentary majority government since the 1974 revolution. A great boost to the establishment of democracy in Portugal was the nation's admission, along with Spain, to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. Improving economic conditions helped build a solid basis for democracy in both Iberian states.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Caetano, Marcelo Jose das Neves; Cavaco Silva, Aníbal António; Eanes, António; Salazar, António de Oliveira; Soares, Mario; Spinola, António de

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See Missiles, Poseidon

Poseidon Missiles

Powers, Francis Gary
(1929–1977)

American U-2 reconnaissance pilot shot down and taken captive on 1 May 1960 while on a mission to photograph military installations in the Soviet Union. Born on 17 August 1929 in Burdine, Kentucky, Gary Powers, known as Frank to nearly everyone, was the son of a coal miner. He graduated from Tennessee's Milligan College in 1950, joined the U.S. Air Force, and ultimately became an F-84 fighter pilot.

In 1956, Powers accepted an offer to fly a new type of aircraft on secret missions as a civilian contractor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The U-2, specially designed by Lockheed to carry cameras and other monitoring devices over the Soviet Union to obtain information not otherwise available, was difficult to fly. Nevertheless, Powers became a proficient pilot, garnering the most flying time in his unit.

U.S. pilot Francis Gary Powers is sentenced to ten years imprisonment on charges of espionage after his U-2 spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory on 1 May 1960. The incident damaged U.S.-Soviet relations, but Powers was returned to the United States in a swap for a Soviet spy after serving twenty-one months. (Bettmann/Corbis)

On 1 May 1960, during the twenty-fourth U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union, Powers was downed by a Soviet antiaircraft missile, previously believed incapable of reaching the plane's 70,000-foot flying altitude. Unable to activate the destruct mechanism that would destroy the evidence of his espionage activity—the camera and film in the aircraft—Powers bailed out of the U-2 and parachuted to the ground, where he was captured and turned over to the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB). The Soviet Union publicly announced his captivity and the existence of the plane's wreckage after the United States denied any knowledge of the flight, greatly embarrassing President Dwight D. Eisenhower and using this as an excuse to cancel a major East-West summit scheduled to be held in Paris. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev left the preliminary meetings after Eisenhower refused to apologize for the incident.

After a Soviet show trial that garnered international attention, Powers was sentenced to ten years in prison. He served twenty-one months, and in February 1962 he was exchanged for Soviet master spy Colonel Rudolf Abel. Inquiries by the CIA and the U.S. Senate determined that Powers had behaved properly during the ordeal, despite varying opinions to the contrary. He went on to serve as a Lockheed test pilot for seven years, and in 1970 he published memoirs criticizing the CIA for inadequately preparing for a shoot-down. He then became a helicopter pilot for a California television station. Powers was killed on 1 August 1977 in a Los Angeles helicopter crash. Having previously received the Intelligence Star, in 2000 he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Prisoner of War Medal, and the Director's Medal from then-CIA Director George Tenet.

Christopher John Bright

See also

Abel, Rudolf; Paris Conference; U-2 Incident; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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Prague Spring
(1968)

Brief period of unprecedented liberalization in communist-ruled Czechoslovakia, short-circuited by a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of the country. On 5 January 1968, the Communist Party leadership of Czechoslovakia ousted Stalinist First Secretary Antonín Novotný. Having been elevated to first secretary in March 1953 and thus enjoying one of the longest tenures among communist leaders in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, he fell victim to growing economic, political, and national discontents. Since the early 1960s, he had rejected reform while exhibiting a willingness to use repression against workers, intellectuals, and students who questioned the existing system.

Novotný's replacement as first secretary was forty-six-year-old Alexander Dubček, who as leader of the Slovak Communist Party since 1963 had championed reform in general and the cause of equality for Slovakia in particular. While committed to maintaining Czechoslovakia's relationship with Moscow, he advocated socialism with a human face, sponsoring reforms designed to transform the Czechoslovak system into one in which socialism coexisted with democracy, individual rights, and moderate economic freedoms. The result was a brief era of political, cultural, and economic liberalization known as the Prague Spring.

While Dubček's accession to power brought an immediate change in the political climate in Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring commenced in earnest on 9 April 1968, when the Czech Communist Party announced the so-called Action Program. This promised, among other things, reduced state economic planning and greater freedom for both industry and agriculture, a commitment to economic quality between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, protection of civil liberties, and autonomy for Dubček's native Slovakia. The party would retain its leadership position, but the program stipulated that henceforth it would be more responsive to the desires of the people.

Over the course of the next several months, with the support of Ludvik Svoboda, who had replaced Novotný as Czechoslovak president in early April, Dubček fulfilled many of the program's promises. He abolished censorship, sanctioned the creation of workers' councils in factories, moved to increase trade with the West, allowed greater freedom to travel abroad, and supported the writing of a new party constitution designed to democratize the party. The Dubček regime even went so far as to enact a Rehabilitation Law in

June that provided retrials for individuals previously convicted of political crimes by the communist regime.

The Czechoslovak population responded enthusiastically to the reforms, basking in a freedom it had not enjoyed since before the communist coup of February 1948. The press, radio, and television especially flourished, raising openly for the first time questions about political purges, show trials, and concentration camps. By early summer, the public was pushing for further reforms to include the creation of independent political parties, the establishment of genuine political democracy, and more radical economic reforms.

As the Prague Spring unfolded, anxieties arose in Moscow. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev viewed the Czechoslovak reforms as a rejection of the Soviet political and economic model and worried that Prague might unilaterally withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Similar anxieties took hold among German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and Polish conservative communist leaders who feared that the Czechoslovak reforms might destabilize their own countries. On 16 July, Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian leaders sent a joint letter to Prague demanding a halt to the reform movement. Blaming recent developments in Czechoslovakia on "reactionaries" supported by imperialism, the letter explained that the Czechoslovaks appeared headed off the socialist path and that the reforms threatened the entire socialist system. Dubček responded that his reforms should not be construed as anti-Soviet and that Czechoslovakia had no intention of leaving the Warsaw Pact. He also met twice with Brezhnev, in Prague on 22 July and in Cierna on 29 July, apparently to prevent a Soviet military intervention.

Annoyed with Dubček's refusal to end the reforms and unconvinced of his intentions, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners, Romania excepted, decided to act. On the night of 20–21 August 1968, an estimated 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops (primarily Soviet Red Army but including units from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) invaded Czechoslovakia, meeting minimal resistance from a stunned population. Arrested and transported to Moscow on 21 August 1968, Dubček surrendered to Soviet demands to end the reforms. On 27 August, he returned to Prague, tearfully informing the Czechoslovak population that the era of liberalization was over. Subsequently, the Prague Spring's most significant reforms were annulled as the old political and economic system was restored. Ultimately, in April 1969, Dubček was removed as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's first secretary. His replacement, Gustáv Husák, supported by Red Army troops, thereafter presided over one of the most repressive communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Moscow justified its intervention by formulating what soon became known in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which declared that no individual communist party had the right to make unilateral decisions that might be potentially damaging to socialism. It further stated that because a threat to the socialist system in any given country represented a threat to the socialist system as a whole, it was the duty of other socialist countries to intervene militarily to suppress any potential deviation from prescribed communist policies.

Demonstrators surround Soviet tanks in protesting the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion that crushed the so-called Prague Spring, 21 August 1968. (Libor Hajsky/EPA/Corbis)

While military intervention in Czechoslovakia headed off what Moscow perceived as a dangerous development, it exacerbated the Soviet Union's already precarious relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), whose leaders publicly compared it to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler's aggression against Czechoslovakia in the 1930s. Equally significant, the intervention elicited public condemnation by the United States and led to the postponement of already-scheduled Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between President Lyndon Johnson and Brezhnev in Moscow.

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See also

Brezhnev Doctrine; Czechoslovakia; Dubček, Alexander; Husák, Gustáv; Novotný, Antonín; Sino-Soviet Split; Warsaw Pact

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Present Danger, Committee on the

Bipartisan group of senior U.S. government officials, academics, and opinion leaders organized in 1950, subsequently revived in 1976, to convince the American public and U.S. policymakers of the dangers posed by the Soviet Union's military and foreign policies. Twenty-five years later, the success of this organization spurred the creation of a similar body that bore the same name and had similar goals.

The first Committee on the Present Danger was founded in 1950, shortly after the Korean War began, to campaign for the permanent expansion of U.S. military forces, capabilities, and commitments, especially the deployment of far more substantial U.S. troop contingents in Western Europe to strengthen the infant North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Similar prescriptions had been made earlier that year in the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), a paper prepared by the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and largely authored by the second PPS director, Paul H. Nitze. President Harry S. Truman initially rejected its recommendations, which effectively called for a major militarization of the existing policies of containment of the Soviet Union, but accepted most of them once the Korean War erupted in June 1950. Even before the war began, several State and Defense Department officials and consultants who supported NSC-68 hoped to establish a citizens committee to press for major increases in American defense budgets and commitments.

Headed by James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, and largely run by former army undersecretary Tracy S. Voorhees, the committee, although formally a private organization, received strong backing and assistance from leading Truman administration officials, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Undersecretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett as well as Nitze. Established in December 1950 after extensive preliminary discussions with administration officials, the committee compared the Soviet menace to the Nazi threat a decade earlier and pressed for the restoration of the military draft, doubling the size of the existing U.S. military, and the deployment of several additional divisions to Western Europe. The committee quickly attracted an array of prominent members, including several college presidents, lawyers, media figures—among them Edward R. Murrow of CBS, Julius Ochs Adler of *The New York Times*, and Screen Actors Guild President Ronald Reagan—and William J. Donovan, former director of the Office of Strategic Services.

The committee worked closely with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials and with the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) established by Tru-

man in the spring of 1951 to coordinate efforts to win the loyalties of peoples in Soviet-controlled states, especially in Eastern Europe. Committee members campaigned energetically for the policies they favored, speaking and writing extensively, sponsoring films, disseminating cartoons and other publicity, briefing journalists, lobbying congressmen, and writing detailed policy recommendations and briefs for sympathetic administration officials.

The committee's efforts contributed significantly to the Great Debate of 1951 on U.S. foreign policy, the outcome of which decisively oriented the country away from isolationism and toward a militarily assertive position of high defense expenditures, large armed forces, and major overseas alliance commitments. Leading committee officials, including Voorhees, successfully urged the sympathetic General Dwight D. Eisenhower to seek the Republican Party nomination for president in 1952, in the hope that this would check the influence of Republican isolationists and wed that party, like the Democrats, to the militarized internationalism that the committee favored. After Eisenhower's election victory in November 1952 and the Korean War armistice the following summer, the committee members felt that its mission had been accomplished, and by late 1953 it had effectively faded away.

The first committee subsequently served as a model for the second Committee on the Present Danger, founded in the mid-1970s by foreign policy experts—including academics, former officials, and opinion makers—who argued that an expansionist Soviet Union was increasing the size, composition, and capabilities of its military arsenal in spite of arms control agreements and a general warming of superpower relations, known as détente. Committee members feared that the Soviets were preparing to wage—and prevail in—a nuclear exchange with the United States, thus giving the Soviet Union enormous leverage in any future confrontation with America or its allies. The committee favored the development of new American weapons and opposed arms control agreements, which it believed bolstered Soviet military dominance. In 1981, when Reagan (an early member of the committee) became president, many of the committee's positions became official government policy.

The committee ultimately concluded that the United States was systematically underestimating Soviet military capabilities.

Veteran U.S. foreign policy advisor and NSC-68 drafter Nitze and Yale Law School Dean Eugene V. Rostow, formerly an undersecretary of state for President Lyndon B. Johnson, conceptualized the organization in late 1975. While they were finalizing plans the following year, Nitze and several other like-minded foreign policy experts were asked to scrutinize the government's recent assessment of the Soviet Union. They ultimately concluded that the United States was systematically underestimating Soviet military capabilities. These findings further spurred the committee's organizational efforts. Eventually, political scientist and future United Nations (UN) ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, congressional aide Max Kampelman, labor leader Lane Kirkland, and novelist Saul Bellow joined Rostow, Nitze, and 142 others as founding members of the Committee on the Present Danger.

Although the foreign and defense policies of Republican President Gerald R. Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger were the committee's main focus during its formative stages, organizers believed that their efforts

were necessary regardless of who won the 1976 national election. Thus, two days after Ford was defeated by Democrat Jimmy Carter, the committee formally announced its establishment. Over the next several years, the group undertook a high-profile campaign, including disseminating analytical studies, conducting public opinion polling, and offering congressional testimony in support of new nuclear weapons and greater skepticism of détente. The committee vigorously opposed Carter's effort to conclude a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union.

Critics of the committee believed that it was misreading Soviet military developments and foreign policy goals. To these observers, changes in the Soviets' arsenal could be explained benignly as defensive in nature or dismissed as a logical reaction to American actions. They believed that the committee's antagonism toward the Soviet Union and advocacy of new weapons reflected discredited past approaches and only increased the likelihood of a dangerous superpower confrontation. The committee's critique of American policy did not waver, however, and many of its suggestions were implemented by the Reagan administration, particularly during 1981–1985.

Christopher John Bright and Priscilla Roberts

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Bombers, Strategic; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; Détente; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Kirkpatrick, Jeane Jordan; Kissinger, Henry; Korean War; Military Balance; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; National Security Council Report NSC-68; Nitze, Paul Henry; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nuclear Arms Race; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Truman, Harry S.

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Profumo Affair
(1963)

Sex and spy scandal that rocked British politics in 1963 and ultimately brought down the government of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. John Profumo, who had been educated at Harrow and Oxford, was a Conservative Party politician, a member of high society, and the husband of actress Valerie Hobson. At the time the scandal broke, he was secretary of state for war. Showgirl Christine Keeler came from a rough-and-tumble, unhappy back-

ground and eventually had a brief affair with Profumo after the two had met at a party in 1961, organized by fashionable London physician Stephen Ward.

Profumo soon broke off the affair, but rumors nevertheless surfaced in 1962, as did rumors that Keeler had also had an affair with Yevgeny "Eugene" Ivanov, a military attaché at the Soviet embassy on whom the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had a dossier. Ivanov was thought to be part of the Soviet spy network. The serious implications of Profumo's affair were obvious, as he had shared a mistress with a known Soviet intelligence operative.

When the story became the talk of Britain, Profumo appeared before the House of Commons in March 1963 and stated emphatically that there had been "no impropriety whatever" in his relationship with Keeler. But the clamor did not subside, and Profumo's protestation of innocence convinced few. In June 1963 he again appeared before Parliament and admitted that he had lied in his March testimony and that he had had an affair with Keeler. On 5 June, he resigned from the government. Lord Denning investigated the scandal and issued a damaging report in September 1963, further undermining the Macmillan government by criticizing its slow reaction to the crisis, although the report noted that no breach of national security had occurred. The report also eschewed the titillating details that the public seemed to crave. The government attempted to divert attention by prosecuting both Ward and Keeler. Keeler later spent nine months in jail on a perjury conviction, and Ward committed suicide after being charged with living on immoral earnings.

Ultimately, the scandal brought down the government. In October 1963 Macmillan, already troubled by ill health, resigned as the scandal stories continued to swirl. Alec Douglas-Home took over as prime minister, and the Conservatives lost to the Labour Party in the elections of 1964.

Keeler wrote an autobiography in 2001 in which she detailed her part in the Profumo Affair. Profumo kept a public silence for more than forty years, devoting his time to charity work, although a bipartisan attempt by former colleagues to rehabilitate his reputation began in 2003.

The scandal was also another example of the Cold War treachery that began when spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, of the Cambridge Five, fled to Moscow in the early 1950s. George Blake, another British ex-diplomat, had been convicted of spying in 1961, and in 1963 an Admiralty clerk was caught spying. That same year, Kim Philby was revealed as the third man in the Maclean-Burgess spy ring.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy; Cambridge Five; Espionage; Maclean, Donald; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Philby, Harold Adrian Russell

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Protest Movements

The late 1960s witnessed a brief but dramatic eruption of radical protest movements. This occurred on a global scale, but particularly in the United States, Eastern and Western Europe, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and Latin America. The protests were directed not only against the domestic political, socioeconomic, and cultural order but also against the conditioning of domestic society and politics by the international constellation, shaped by the Cold War and decolonization. Common to the protest movements of San Francisco, New York, Chicago, Paris, Mexico City, Prague, and Beijing was the fundamental questioning of domestic as well as international allegiances. As the conditions of the domestic Cold War varied greatly among these diverse societies, however, so too did the protesters' demands.

Cold War themes were evident in the slogans and debates of the late 1960s' protest movements. As far as the Western world was concerned, criticism of U.S. dominance in political, military, economic, and cultural issues was a driving force for many of the leftist protest movements. Opposition to the war in Vietnam and American involvement in it was one of the dominant themes in the protest movements in America, Western Europe, Canada, and Latin America. In the United States, the evolution of the civil rights movement grew out of the understanding of a striking contradiction between the official rhetoric on justice and freedom as justifications of Cold War foreign policy and the domestic system of racial discrimination and segregation.

The protest wave was preconditioned by major changes in the East-West conflict from the late 1950s onward, particularly the strategic changes undertaken by the Soviet Union and the impasse created by strategic parity. These changes impacted domestic society and politics and shaped the conditions in which new, more radical forms of political and cultural critique could express themselves. First, after the 1953 death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin and upon the introduction of dramatic political and strategic changes by his successor Nikita Khrushchev beginning in 1956, the fear of Soviet communism decreased among large portions of the public in the West. Khrushchev's strategy of peaceful coexistence eventually facilitated the development of East-West détente, the first signs of which appeared on the European continent in the early 1960s.

Second, on the European continent the situation of quasi parity in strategic terms between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) brought about the promise of mutual destruction in any future war. Adding to this realization was the fact that young people in the 1960s were of a generation that did not know firsthand the devastation and destruction of war. Despite its other-worldly omnipresence, they were less strongly alarmed by the nuclear threat than were their parents.

As fears of both nuclear war and communist takeover diminished, governments and ruling elites in the West needed new sources of legitimization. Leftist movements and allied student groups protested against the conditions of American hegemony in political, military, economic, and cultural terms. This was most visible in France. The eruption of student radicalism in May 1968 carried with it a fierce denouncement of American imperialism.

In the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and Asia —although in very different ways—domestic and international developments led to a situation in which political protest emerged. Communist governments such as the PRC under Mao Zedong, the Romanian regime under Nicolae Ceauşescu, and the Czechoslovak system under Alexander Dubček all at some point during the 1960s objected to Soviet dominance over the communist world and its strategy vis-à-vis the West. This, in turn, created conditions in which these nations' populations more or less openly came to criticize their own leaders and the communist ideology that underpinned their grasp on power. The interaction between a heterodox domestic communist leadership and the radicalization of criticism of society was most visible in Czechoslovakia, where the Prague Spring (1968) was eventually crushed by a military invasion led by the Soviet Union.

Student leaders D. Cohn-Bendit and J. Sauvageot demonstrate after the evacuation of the University of Paris, the Sorbonne, during rioting in Paris on 13 May 1968. (Burlot Jacques/Corbis Sygma)

The repression of the Czech reform movement, the normalization (or forceful realignment) of the Soviet-aligned communist world after 1968, the dissolution of the most radical student movements in Western Europe and the United States, and the mediating of their protests through partial domestic reform marked the end of this brief era of global protest. This coincided with the rise of East-West détente on the international level beginning in the early 1970s, as evidenced by the Sino-American rapprochement and the warming of U.S.-Soviet relations. As a result of the pressure that their societies had put on them, governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain began to consider détente an absolute necessity, as it helped to create a new political consensus on the national and international levels.

Maud Bracke

See also

Anti-Americanism; Decolonization; Détente; Peace Movements; Prague Spring; Race Relations, United States; Vietnam War

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Protests, Vietnam War

See Vietnam War Protests

Pueblo Incident
(23 January 1968)

Diplomatic and military confrontation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the United States. On 23 January 1968, four North Korean naval vessels seized USS *Pueblo*, touching off a major confrontation with the United States.

North Korea's hostility toward the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and the United States resulted in what can only be labeled as reckless behavior in 1968. On 21 January 1968, a squad of thirty-one North Korean commandos penetrated the demilitarized zone along the 38th Parallel and reached the northern edge of Seoul with the acknowledged mission of assassinating South Korean President Park Chung Hee. When they were within a mile of the Blue House (the South Korean presidential mansion), they were detected by South Korean police. A gun battle ensued, with all but three commandos killed. One was taken prisoner. Amid this atmosphere, the North Koreans seized the *Pueblo* on 23 January, just two days after the attempted assassination of Park.

The *Pueblo* was equipped with the most sophisticated modern intelligence devices, and twenty-seven members of its eighty-two-man crew were cryptographic and intelligence personnel.

Captained by Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, the *Pueblo* (SGRT-21) was an American intelligence-gathering ship operating off the eastern coast of North Korea. Built by the U.S. Army in 1944 as a general-purpose supply vessel, it had been transferred to the navy in 1966. Converted and commissioned in 1967 as an auxiliary general environmental research (AGER) ship, the *Pueblo* was actually designed for intelligence gathering. Essentially a small cargo vessel (850 tons and 177 feet in length), the ship was slow (12.5 knots) and only lightly armed, with .50-caliber machine guns. It was also equipped with the most sophisticated modern intelligence devices, and twenty-seven members of its eighty-two-man crew were cryptographic and intelligence personnel. The vessel was in international waters essentially unprotected, supposedly conducting oceanographic research but actually involved in gathering electronic intelligence on North Korea. When the ship was taken, Pyongyang claimed that it had entered North Korean territorial

USS *Pueblo* (SGRT-21) was an American intelligence-gathering ship that was seized by the North Koreans in international waters off the coast of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) on 23 January 1968. (U.S. Navy)

waters in Wonsan Bay. Washington insisted that the *Pueblo* had been at least 13 miles beyond the 12-mile limit imposed by North Korea.

During the actual seizure of the ship—the first U.S. warship to be surrendered to a foreign power since the War of 1812—one crewman was killed and several others, including Bucher, were wounded. The ship was then taken into Wonsan harbor under its own power. The North Koreans treated the ship's crew brutally, and on 26 January Japanese television aired a film made by the North Koreans in which Bucher and his crew signed a joint appeal to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to apologize to the North Korean government for the intrusion of the *Pueblo*. Meanwhile, North Korean radio broadcast Bucher's alleged confession, which stated that his ship had deliberately intruded into North Korea's territorial waters.

The seizure of the *Pueblo*, without a shot being fired in its defense, caused great controversy in the United States. Bucher was both condemned and praised, but certainly the responsibility for the ship's capture extended far up the chain of command. The vessel was inadequately protected, and it received no support from any other source when attacked. Capture of the

ship's sophisticated listening devices and cryptographic equipment was a great windfall for the communist intelligence services.

On 24 January, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk described the seizure as "an act of war." The next day, President Johnson called up a number of U.S. Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Navy Reserve units, a total of 14,787 personnel, and declared that American forces in and around South Korea would be strengthened. He also ordered the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* to take up a position off the North Korean coast. In the days and weeks to come, the task force would include three cruisers, five carriers in addition to the *Enterprise,* eighteen destroyers, and the *Pueblo*'s sister ship the *Banner* (AGER-1). But the United States undertook no hostile action against North Korea, and Johnson announced that the U.S. government would seek "a prompt and a peaceful solution to the problem." Already facing an untenable situation in Vietnam, Washington did not wish to settle the *Pueblo* case by military force. Perhaps aware of this, Pyongyang defiantly declared that it was prepared to meet any eventuality and would deal any American attacks an "exterminating blow."

Taking a hint from a statement over Radio Pyongyang that the *Pueblo* case could be solved by direct negotiation, Washington initiated secret talks with the North Korean government at the truce village of Panmunjom in February 1968. By 4 March, the United States and North Korea had met ten times at Panmunjom. The North Koreans insisted that the United States must admit to and apologize for the supposed intrusion. Meanwhile, Radio Pyongyang reported on 12 February that Captain Bucher made a "second confession," and on 4 March Johnson received a letter purported to be from *Pueblo* crewmen asking Washington to admit that the vessel had violated North Korean waters. From 22 March to 2 April, the North Korean government circulated a series of letters allegedly written by the prisoners and warned that a refusal to apologize could cost lives. Then, on 13 September, Japanese newspapers reported a news conference in Pyongyang at which the *Pueblo* crewmen allegedly said that they had been ordered to intrude into the 3-mile limit of North Korea's territorial waters.

Ten months of negotiations finally led to the 22 December 1968 release of Commander Bucher and eighty-one *Pueblo* crew members after the United States issued a statement of apology on 21 December acknowledging that the *Pueblo* "had illegally intruded into [North Korean] territorial waters." Washington also pledged that no U.S. ships would intrude into the territorial waters of North Korea in the future. Although U.S. chief negotiator Major General Gilbert H. Woodward read a statement inserted into the record disavowing the confession before signing the statement prepared by North Koreans, the North Korean government claimed a great moral as well as diplomatic victory. The North Koreans did not return the *Pueblo*.

During 1966–1969, emboldened by America's preoccupation with Vietnam, the North Korean government tested U.S. resolve to defend South Korea by waging what many historians consider a second Korean conflict. During that period in Korea, U.S. casualties numbered 82 killed and 114 wounded. Also, 85 Americans were taken prisoner, including the 82 from the *Pueblo*.

After 1969, when it became clear to the North Koreans that the United States was determined to remain firm in South Korea, the hostile actions diminished.

JINWUNG KIM

See also

Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kim Il Sung; Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Korean War; Park Chung Hee; Vietnam War

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Q

Qadhafi, Muammar
(1942–)

Libyan military officer and head of state (1970–present). Born the youngest child of a nomadic Bedouin family in the An Nanja community in Fezzan in June 1942, Muammar Qadhafi attended the Sebha preparatory school from 1956 to 1961. He subsequently graduated from the University of Libya in 1963, the same year he entered the Military Academy at Benghazi, where he became part of a cabal of young military officers whose plans included the overthrow of Libya's pro-Western monarchy.

Qadhafi and the secret corps of militant, Pan-Arabist officers seized power in Libya on 1 September 1969, following a bloodless coup that overthrew King Idris. After a brief internal power struggle that consolidated his rule, Qadhafi renamed the country the Libyan Arab Republic and officially ruled as president of the Revolutionary Command Council from 1 January 1970 to 1977. He then switched his title to president of the People's General Congress during 1977–1979. In 1979 he renounced all official titles but remained the unrivaled head of Libya.

Domestically, Qadhafi's reign was based upon Islamic socialism. Loosely following the model of his hero, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qadhafi promoted the privatization of major corporations, the creation of a social welfare system, and the establishment of state-sponsored education and health care systems. He also outlawed alcohol and gambling. His regime encompassed a dark side, however, including the sometimes violent suppression of dissidents and the sanctioning of state-sponsored assassinations.

In foreign policy, Qadhafi promoted the ideals of both Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism. He was a major proponent of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and supported various anticolonial liberation struggles in

Muammar Qadhafi has been the leader of Libya since January 1970 and prime minister since January 1970. For much of that time he was labeled a terrorist by both Western media and governments. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)

The bombing raid, designed to kill Qadhafi, instead killed his infant daughter and scores of civilians.

sub-Saharan Africa, including those in Mozambique and Angola. He also supported Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and was a staunch ally of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, stances that annoyed the United States, which had maintained a certain loyalty to European interests in Africa and viewed the South African apartheid regime as a bulwark against communism.

Qadhafi's Middle East policies further alienated him from the West. In many respects, he viewed himself as heir to Nasser's notion of Pan-Arabism, which sought to unify all Arab states into one Arab nation. In 1972 Qadhafi attempted to broker a merger of Libya, Egypt, and Syria into a unified nation, and in 1974 he signed a tentative alliance agreement with Tunisia, although neither scheme worked out. At the same time, he became a strong supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and is rumored to have been a chief financier of the radical Islamic Black September movement, which most notoriously engineered the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. He was also linked to other terrorist attacks, including the December 1988 bombing of a Pan Am 747 airline jet over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Qaddhafi's ties to Islamic terrorism drove a deep wedge into Libyan-U.S. relations. By the early 1980s, Qadhafi had marginally allied himself with the Soviet Union and had received significant weapons supplies from it. Meanwhile, tensions between Libya and the United States reached fever pitch during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. In 1986 Reagan authorized the U.S. bombing of Tripoli in retaliation for the bombing of a West Berlin discothèque that had been tied directly to Qadhafi. The bombing raid, designed to kill Qadhafi, instead killed his infant daughter and scores of civilians.

The end of the Cold War witnessed an easing of tensions in U.S.-Libyan relations as Qadhafi took a more conciliatory stance toward the West. He publicly apologized for the Lockerbie bombing and offered compensation to victims' families. He also openly condemned the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and has taken a more moderate line in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In February 2004, Libya renounced its weapons of mass destruction program, and that June the United States and Libya resumed formal diplomatic relations, after which most economic sanctions against Libya were lifted.

Jeremy Kuzmarov

See also

Africa; African National Congress; Arab Nationalism; Camp David Accords; Libya; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization

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Qian Qichen
(1928–)

Diplomat, vice premier, and foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, on 5 January 1928, Qian Qichen joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the age of fourteen, engaging in the student movement and various underground activities. From 1945 until the CCP's victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Qian worked for the leftist newspaper *Dagong Bao* developing his writing and liaison skills.

During 1949–1954, Qian remained in Shanghai as secretary and researcher of the Communist Youth League Committee. In 1954 he went to Moscow, where he studied in the Central Communist Youth League School. Graduating in 1955, he became second secretary in the Chinese ambassadorial delegation to the Soviet Union. In 1962 he became counselor of the Chinese embassy in Moscow. In autumn 1974 he was appointed ambassador to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

Qian returned to China in 1977 and assumed the directorship of the Information Department in the Foreign Ministry, a post he held until 1982. During his tenure he led a number of governmental delegations abroad, fostering closer ties with the West after the Sino-American rapprochement and the normalization of relations between the two countries. In 1982 he assumed the post of vice foreign minister and was responsible for restoring Sino-Soviet relations, having led a number of Sino-Soviet summit meetings. In April 1988 he became foreign minister, representing the PRC in the United Nations (UN) while continuing to promote closer Sino-Soviet ties.

In 1991 and 1993, Qian was appointed state councillor and vice premier, respectively, posts he held until 1998. During his tenure in these offices, he helped establish the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, which ensured the successful implementation of Deng Xiaoping's one country, two systems policy. In March 1998 Qian retired from his high-profile positions, taking up membership in the CCP's Central Committee and the Politburo.

Law Yuk-fun

Qian Qichen, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China in the cabinet of Prime Minister Li Peng from April 1988 to March 1998. (U.S. Department of Defense)

See also

China, People's Republic of; Deng Xiaoping; Hong Kong

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Qiao Guanhua
(1913–1983)

Foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1974–1976. Born in Yancheng, Jiangsu Province, on 28 March 1913, Qiao Guanhua graduated from Germany's University of Tübingen in 1936. After the Sino-Japanese War began in mid-1937, he returned to China and worked in Wuhan, Hubei, as a war correspondent. In 1939 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), serving in the Propaganda Department. In summer 1949 he left China to head the Hong Kong branch of the New China News Agency.

After the creation of the PRC in October 1949, Qiao became vice chairman of both the Foreign Ministry's Foreign Policy Committee and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, in which capacities he attended the United Nations (UN) Security Council's October 1950 meeting condemning America's Taiwan policy, the 1951–1953 Panmunjom negotiations over the Korean War, and the April 1954 Geneva Conference. These wide-ranging experiences earned him the post of assistant foreign minister in October 1954, then the vice minister position in April 1964, which he held until 1974. Upon the restoration of the PRC's seat in the UN in 1971, he led the Chinese delegation at the annual UN General Assembly meeting until 1976. Another of his major achievements was the drafting of the February 1972 Sino-American Joint Communiqué, which symbolized the Sino-American rapprochement during President Richard M. Nixon's visit to China. In 1974 Qiao became foreign minister but was relieved two years later, branded as a revisionist by the leaders of the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). He was barred from public life until 1980. In 1982 he was given an advisory post in the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Qiao died on 22 September 1983 in Beijing.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Geneva Conference (1954); Korean War

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R

Raab, Julius
(1891–1964)

Austrian political leader and chancellor (1953–1961). Born on 29 November 1891 in St. Pölten, Lower Austria, Julius Raab studied civil engineering at the Technical University in Vienna. He served in World War I as an engineering officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army. In 1927 he was elected to the National Assembly of the first Austrian Republic, and in 1938 he founded Austria's first trade union congress. At the time of the German annexation of Austria in 1938, he was serving as minister for commerce and transportation. During World War II, he worked in construction.

Raab returned to the National Assembly in 1945 and became a cofounder of the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP). During 1945–1960 he was the party chairman. Elected Austrian chancellor on 12 April 1953, he was able to capitalize on the new leadership in Moscow that followed the death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin a month earlier. Raab readily embraced Moscow's initiative and was the first noncommunist leader to meet officially with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, negotiating the 1955 Austrian State Treaty that ended the ten-year Allied occupation of Austria and restored its full sovereignty. While very much pro-West, in foreign affairs Raab steered a careful course so as not to alienate the Soviet bloc. His domestic program, based on free enterprise and governmental noninterference, revitalized the economy and kept wage and price increases in check. He resigned because of ill health on 11 April 1961. Raab died in Vienna on 8 January 1964.

Warren W. Williams

See also

Austria; Austrian State Treaty; Khrushchev, Nikita

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Rabin, Yitzhak
(1922–1995)

Israeli military hero, minister of labor (1974), minister of defense (1984–1990), and prime minister (1974–1977, 1992–1995). Born on 1 March 1922 in Jerusalem, Yitzhak Rabin graduated from high school in 1940, his last formal education. In 1941 he joined the elite Palmach military force. As a colonel, he commanded a brigade in battles around Jerusalem during the 1948 Israeli War for Independence. Remaining with the army, he was promoted to major general in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in December 1954. In December 1964 he was named IDF chief of staff and was promoted to lieutenant general. In June 1967, Arab saber rattling instigated by Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser led Rabin to urge the Israeli government to launch a preemptive military strike against Egypt. Striking first in the Six-Day War, Rabin's IDF achieved a stunning victory, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights before a cease-fire was negotiated.



Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, shown here in February 1976. (Alain Dejean/Sygma/Corbis)

Retiring from the IDF as a lieutenant general in January 1968, Rabin served as ambassador to the United States during 1968–1973. In December 1973 he was elected to the Knesset representing the Labor Party and became Prime Minister Golda Meir's minister of labor for a brief time in early 1974. When Meir resigned, Rabin was elected to head of the Labor Party. He became Israeli prime minister on 2 June 1974.

As prime minister, Rabin supported U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, which led to military disengagement and reduced tensions between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai. Rabin's government ordered the daring Entebbe Raid in June 1976 to free Jewish hostages in Uganda. A violation of banking laws by his wife led Rabin to resign the prime ministership on 7 April 1977. When Labor lost the national elections that same year, he returned to the Knesset.

In September 1984 a National Unity government was formed with Rabin as defense minister. Rabin oversaw the Israeli military withdrawal from most of Lebanon southward into a security zone and suppressed the 1987 Palestinian Intifada uprising. When that government fell in 1990, Rabin rejoined the Knesset opposition.

Labor's electoral victory in June 1992 made Rabin prime minister once again. In spite of personal reservations,

he agreed to secret peace negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993 that led to the signing of the Oslo Accords, beginning a process that would presumably lead to Palestinian self-rule. For his efforts, Rabin won the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize. His willingness to compromise and offer territorial concessions amid continued Palestinian terrorist actions brought him under increasing political attack from hard-line Israelis. On 4 November 1995, Jewish right-wing extremist Yigai Amir assassinated Rabin while he was attending a peace rally in Tel Aviv.

Thomas D. Veve

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arafat, Yasir; Entebbe Raid; Israel, Armed Forces; Kissinger, Henry; Meir, Golda; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Palestine Liberation Organization

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Rabin, Yitzhak. *The Rabin Memoirs*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.

Race Relations, United States

In many ways, the Cold War helped accelerate the civil rights movement in the United States. In the midst of World War II, Gunner Myrdal noted in his seminal 1944 work *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* the paradox of fighting for democracy abroad while failing to achieve full democracy at home. In the early Cold War years, President Harry S. Truman did attempt to improve the race issue through the desegregation of the armed forces in 1948 and other civil rights initiatives. Looking abroad, Truman and his advisors hoped to ally with as many countries as possible against the communist bloc. This often meant being friendly to colonial powers, white supremacists in South Africa, and despots in the developing world.

A most striking example of race as a Cold War issue occurred in 1957 in Little Rock, Arkansas. In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned its 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* "separate but equal" ruling that had legalized racial segregation. The 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision ruled that public schools could no longer prohibit black and white children from attending the same school. President Dwight Eisenhower was at best ambivalent about the ruling, advising the nation that change required patience. However, the president was forced to act in 1957 when the Central High School in Little Rock attempted to fulfill the *Brown* ruling by integrating nine black students into the all-white institution. Pandering to the segregationist voters, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus took actions to prohibit the African American students

One embarrassing situation occurred during the administration of President John F. Kennedy in 1961, when Chad's new ambassador was refused service in a Maryland restaurant.

from entering the school. The nation—and the world—witnessed on television a white mob blocking the students' access to Central High. Faubus and Eisenhower engaged in a showdown that eventually led to the president calling up the National Guard to enforce the court ruling. Eisenhower, in a nationally televised speech on 24 September 1957, justified his action in Cold War terms: "At a time when we face grave situations abroad because of the hatred that communism bears toward a system of government based on human rights, it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world." National Guard troops remained in Little Rock for the entire academic year, and the incident served to propel the civil rights movement forward.

At the same time, the anticolonial movement raged on throughout Asia and Africa. The Soviet Union exploited poor race relations in the United States to win support in the developing world. The United States was also trying to win over the newly independent nations while not alienating its Western allies. This led to desegregation in Washington, D.C. One embarrassing situation occurred during the administration of President John F. Kennedy in 1961, when Chad's new ambassador was refused service in a Maryland restaurant. Desegregation was vital for the United States during the Cold War if it wished to solve the American dilemma.

Interestingly, however, some historians have argued that the Cold War was not a war against communism but rather one for the preservation of white supremacy. Labeling anticolonial opponents as communists gave U.S. policymakers a free hand to slow the course against colonialism and, in the words of Gerald Horne, "gave white supremacy a new lease on life." The Council on African Affairs accused the United States of trying to replace European imperialism in Africa, and following the overthrow of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1961, African Americans organized protests in Chicago; Washington, D.C.; and New York. In Africa, as the decades progressed and the civil rights movement achieved great success, it became increasingly difficult for American policymakers to justify their support for colonial Portugal or apartheid-ruled South Africa. In the end, minority white rule in South Africa came to an end, as did Jim Crow in the United States.

Valerie L. Adams

See also

Africa; Anticolonialism; Decolonization

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Radical Islam

Radical Islam may be defined as a militant form of Islamic thought that claims religious validation for a variety of political, military, and paramilitary activities, frequently directed against Israel and the West. A common view in the West, supported to some extent by the popular media, suggests that contemporary terrorism and insurgency proceed from the Islamic notion of jihad, or holy war, articulated in the Koran.

It is certainly true that contemporary Muslim extremists tie their attacks explicitly to jihad and its basis in Islamic tradition. However, such ideas do not represent a continuous, dominant strain in Islamic or Arab thought over the past 1,400 years. While the idea of holy war clearly played a role in the initial Arab conquests of the early Middle Ages, in later medieval conflicts, and in some anticolonial movements of the late nineteenth century, it does not act as the dominant ideological justification for modern Arab unity or for political and military conflict in the period after World War II.

On the contrary, in the twentieth century Arab nationalism in the guise of Baathism or Nasserist Arab socialism served as the primary ideological basis for conflict in the Middle East. Arab political leaders of the mid-twentieth century did not employ the idea of jihad to a great extent, even in their opposition to Israel. The notion of holy war, as it is currently embraced by extremist groups, grew largely in response to a number of late twentieth-century factors: the failure of secular Arab political and military initiatives, the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the end of Soviet support for Arab regimes in the Middle East, the Palestinian Intifada, and the Persian Gulf War.

Radical Islam is sometimes referred to as Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic extremism. Some Muslim writers refer to it as a variant of Islamic revivalism. Radical Islamic beliefs combine an anti-Western political agenda with a set of theological principles. In the mid-twentieth century, radical Islam grew in the Middle East in response to Western imperialism and the spread of Western values in the region. In 1929, Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian opposed to the growing secularism in the Muslim world, founded the Ikhwan Islamiyya (Muslim Brotherhood). His goal was to transform Egypt into an Islamic state modeled after the ideal days of the Prophet Muhammad and the Companions. The organization began as an Islamic charity but evolved into a more radical group, and in the 1940s it assassinated several prominent Egyptian officials. However, in 1949 al-Banna was killed by one of the Egyptian intelligence services.

At the time of al-Banna's death another Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb, was working toward an education degree at the University of Northern Colorado. He had been sent to the United States in 1948 by the Egyptian government to study the U.S. educational system. However, the more he saw of Western society, the more alienated he became. He returned to Egypt in 1950 and joined the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb wrote several influential works, including *Social Justice in Islam*, a lengthy commentary on the Koran, and a shorter book, *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq* (Milestones, or Signposts on the Road). In these he

argued that before the coming of the Prophet Muhammad, the world was in *jahiliyah* (spiritual darkness), a condition dominated by opposition to Allah. For a brief time the Prophet Muhammad and the Companions lived in a pure Islamic society ruled by submission (Islam) to the will of Allah.

According to Qutb, modernity was a time of great danger, as Islam faced a new kind of *jahiliyah*. The new *jahili* societies included the atheistic communists, the corrupted Christian and Jewish societies, Arab nationalist states, and Muslim states that cooperated with the West. All these opponents had to be defeated through jihad for Islam to prevail. Qutb was hanged by Gamal Abdel Nasser's government in 1966, and his fate illustrates the opposition of secular Arab authorities toward Islamic radicalism for much of the twentieth century.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the views of Qutb influenced many radical organizations: the Egyptian Islamic Liberation Movement, the Islamic Group Movement, and, ultimately, the Palestinian group Hamas. It is important to point out that Arab governments largely opposed the growth of Islamic radicalism during the period from World War II to the 1980s. Arab regimes in the mid-twentieth century based their identity and their warfare with Israel primarily in terms of Arab nationalism rather than Islamic unity. Indeed, such regimes, supported by the Soviet Union, often viewed activist Islam

A group of women, members of the Pasdaran-e Inqilab or Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, standing in the back of a truck, 18 May 1979. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established the Pasdaran in May 1979 to help uphold the government's Islamic laws. (Christine Spengler/Sygma/Corbis)

as a threat. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) framed its foundational documents in terms of nationalism, Arab socialism, and anti-Zionism. However, this pattern changed in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

In 1979, a theocratic Shiite regime headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took power in Iran and confronted the United States by seizing the U.S. embassy in Tehran and holding its staff hostage. That same year, the Soviet Union invaded the nation of Afghanistan and installed a puppet regime there. Both events would fuel the growth of radical Islamic political activity. The Iranian regime sponsored Islamic fundamentalist political and paramilitary activity against Israel and the West, most particularly the Shiite group Hezbollah, active in Lebanon and Israel.

In Afghanistan, Soviet occupation produced native opposition, creating a generation of mujahideen motivated primarily by radical Islamic ideas and encouraged and supplied by the United States as a counter to Soviet influence. While the Afghani resistance resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviets from the country after nine years of warfare, it also resulted in the establishment of Afghanistan as a haven for radical Islamic activity. Indeed, during the 1980s, thousands of recruits from Arab nations went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Already immersed in Wahhabism, the strict version of Islam prominent in Saudi Arabia, they developed an anti-Western agenda based on the writings of Qutb, among others. One of the Saudi Arabian citizens fighting in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, who ultimately went on to found the al-Qaeda organization in 1989.

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, as conventional warfare against Israel fueled by Arab nationalism failed, as receding Soviet power freed former Middle Eastern client states of communist influence and deprived them of military and financial aid, and as the Iranian and Afghani crises produced a generation of anti-Western fighters motivated largely by radical Islam, anti-Israeli and anti-Western activity in the Muslim world adopted a religious character. Such feeling inspired the first Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Intifada, in 1987. Groups such as Hamas played a leading role in the Intifada, as radical Islam came to rival Arab nationalism as the defining ideology behind the struggle against Israel. Such ideas appealed particularly to the powerless and the disenfranchised in Palestinian society. The rhetoric of the PLO is indicative of this change. Whereas once its agenda centered on secular Arab socialism and nationalism, the PLO adopted language of martyrdom and holy war and gave rise to its own radical group, the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. Fundamentalist Islam has remained a potent force in Middle Eastern politics to the present day.

Andrew Jackson Waskey and Robert S. Kiely

See also

Afghanistan War; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Terrorism

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Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

U.S. government-sponsored international radio broadcasts transmitted to communist nations and other authoritarian regimes. During the Cold War, Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) broadcast uncensored news and information to audiences in the Soviet bloc in an attempt to weaken communist control over information and to foster internal opposition. RFE broadcast to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania and, in the 1980s, to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. RL transmitted in Russian and some fifteen other national languages of the Soviet Union.

Unlike other Western broadcasters, RFE and RL concentrated on developments within and about their target countries not covered by state-controlled domestic media. They acted as surrogate home services, reporting on actions of the authorities and relaying views of dissidents and opposition movements. Notwithstanding repeated technical interference (jamming, for example), broadcasts generally reached their intended audiences. Evidence of the impact of the broadcasts on the eventual collapse of the communist regimes has been corroborated in the testimony of leaders such as Czech President Václav Havel after 1989.

Thubten J. Norbu, the brother of the Dalai Lama, speaks over Radio Free Europe in 1959. (Library of Congress)

RFE and RL were conceived in 1949 by George F. Kennan of the U.S. Department of State and Frank G. Wisner, head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Policy Coordination, as instruments to utilize Soviet and East European émigrés in support of American foreign policy objectives. Founded as nonprofit corporations ostensibly supported with private funds, RFE and RL were in fact funded by the U.S. government through the CIA until 1972. The first official broadcast took place on 4 July 1950. RFE and RL initially adopted more confrontational editorial policies and used more aggressive language than other Western broadcasters. By the mid-1950s, however, as U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc became more conciliatory, the networks emphasized the need for liberalization and evolutionary system changes. In so doing, they broadcast news and information about domestic politics and economic issues as well as cultural and historical traditions normally suppressed by commu-

nist authorities. Over time, the networks evolved into saturation home services, seeking large audiences by broadcasting almost around the clock and by incorporating programs on Western music, religion, science, sports, youth, and labor issues.

The networks faced the considerable challenge of operating as surrogate home services in information-poor environments. They carefully monitored state-controlled print and electronic media and frequently interviewed travelers and defectors in field bureaus around the world. The networks cultivated ties with Western journalists and other visitors to communist countries and received information from regime opponents, often at great personal risk to the informants, within their target countries. This information was gathered to support broadcasts, but RFE and RL research reports also served many Western observers as their major source of information about the communist bloc.

RFE and RL programs were produced in Munich in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and were broadcast via shortwave transmitters operating on multiple frequencies and high power to overcome jamming and other frequency-disruption tactics. The networks enjoyed substantial operational autonomy and were highly decentralized in function. Émigré broadcast service directors with intimate knowledge of their audiences were responsible for most broadcast content, within broad policy guidelines and under American management oversight.

The communist authorities devoted major resources to countering RFE and RL broadcasts. In 1951, Soviet leader Josef Stalin personally ordered the establishment of local and long-distance jamming facilities to block Western broadcasts. Eastern bloc authorities also launched propaganda, diplomatic, and espionage campaigns intended to discredit the broadcasts. In addition, they jailed individuals providing information to either network. Ironically, the same authorities relied on secret transcripts of the broadcasts for information they could not obtain from local media that they themselves controlled.

After 1971, direct CIA involvement in the networks ended, and they were then openly funded by congressional appropriation through the Board for International Broadcasting. The network corporations were merged into a single entity, RFE/RL, Incorporated, in 1976.

The networks established intimate contact with their audiences during the 1970s and 1980s, when new waves of émigrés strengthened broadcast staffs and as dissidents and other regime opponents, emboldened by the Helsinki Final Act (1975), began to challenge the communist system. RFE and RL provided a "megaphone" through which independent figures, denied normal access to local media, could reach millions of their countrymen via uncensored writings. RFE and RL were able to document large audiences and acted as the leading international broadcaster in many target countries. After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, many East European and Russian leaders testified to the importance of RFE and RL broadcasts in ending the Cold War. Operating today from Prague in the Czech Republic, RFE/RL broadcasts to the southern Balkans, most of the former Soviet Union,

Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq in support of democratic institutions and a transition to democracy.

A. Ross Johnson

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Helsinki Final Act; Kennan, George Frost; Voice of America

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Rahman, Mujibur
(1922–1975)

Founding member and leader of the Awami League, first prime minister (1972–1975), and president (1975) of Bangladesh. Born on 22 March 1922 in Faridpur, India (now Bangladesh), to a middle-class Bengali family, Mujibur Rahman graduated with a degree in political science from Islamia College, Calcutta, in 1947. He then studied at Dhaka University's School of Law but was expelled in 1948 for his support of a university workers' strike. He was an ardent supporter of Bengali nationalism and sought to preserve his people's language and culture, particularly after Indian and Pakistani independence in 1948.

In March 1948 Rahman was arrested for leading a demonstration against Pakistani Governor-General Mohamed Ali Jinnah's attempt to impose Urdu on the Bengali-speaking people of East Pakistan. In June 1949, while still imprisoned, Rahman helped organize the Awami League, a political party dedicated to Bengali nationalism. He was elected several times to the Pakistani national parliament and twice (1954 and 1955) served as a minister in the East Pakistani government. He served as president of the Awami League during 1963–1975.

Arrested and imprisoned many times by the Pakistani government of Muhammad Ayub Khan, Rahman nevertheless fully supported Pakistan in its wars with India. In 1966 he presented his Six-Point Program for building strong relations between East and West Pakistan while establishing greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which would have its own tax system and currency and would also raise its own militia. Ayub Khan had Rahman arrested for destabilizing activity, and tensions between East and West Pakistan increased.

In the December 1970 Pakistani elections, Rahman's Awami League won 160 of the 165 seats allocated to East Pakistan. However, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party, and Rahman were unable to compromise to form a coalition government. Pakistani President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan then attempted to crush political opposition in East Pakistan

with military force. The conflict and resulting refugees produced a new war between Pakistan and India in late 1971.

In January 1972, Rahman became the prime minister of the new state of Bangladesh. In early 1975 he became president of Bangladesh under a new constitution and worked successfully toward reconciliation with Pakistan. On 15 August 1975, however, the Bangladeshi military staged a coup that overthrew the government and resulted in the assassination in Dhaka of Rahman and most of his family.

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See also

Bangladesh; Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; India; India-Pakistan Wars; Pakistan; Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad

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Rahman, Tunku Abdul
(1903–1990)

Prime minister of the Federation of Malaya (1957–1963) and Malaysia (1963–1970). Abdul Rahman was born Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Prince of Kedah, on 8 February 1903 in Alor Setar, Kedah (then the Malay States). Better known by the honorific title Tunku (Lord), he was considered Malaysia's Bapa Kemerdekaan (Father of Independence). He received his university degree from St. Catherine's College, Cambridge University, in 1925. He claimed that his intense nationalism was motivated by racial discrimination he endured while studying in Britain.

Rahman welcomed World War II as the end of European dominance in Southeast Asia. However, Japanese brutality there shocked him. Rather than push for immediate autonomy, he accepted gradual independence under British rule in the ethnically diverse Federation of Malaya.

In 1949 Rahman became chair of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and in 1951 its president. Malaya confronted several secessionist movements, but the greater threat was a communist insurgency. Led predominantly by ethnic Chinese, the insurrection endured from 1948 to 1960. It was better known as the Malayan Emergency. Rahman helped the British fight the insurgency and also forged the anticommunist Alliance Party with Chinese and Indian leaders. In exchange for minority rights, they

Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Alhaj, the first prime minister of independent Malaya and then Malaysia, shown here in March 1963. (Bettmann/Corbis)

supported his campaign for Malay-led independence. This was achieved in August 1957, with Rahman as the first prime minister. He decisively won reelections in 1959, 1964, and 1969.

In 1963 Rahman narrowly averted war with Indonesia over the incorporation of British Sarawak and Singapore into Malaysia. He then handled Singapore's peaceful departure from Malaysia in 1965. He also steered Malaysia to an elected seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 1965 and into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.

Despite these successes, however, many lost faith in Rahman following the 1969 election. Violent race riots quickly shattered political alliances and split parties. Some Malays accused Rahman of favoring minority interests over theirs, and he resigned in 1970. He then ran *The Star* newspaper and headed the Organization of Islamic Conference. Rahman died on 6 December 1990 in Kuala Lampur.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Malayan Emergency; Malaysia

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Rajk, László

(1909–1949)

Hungarian Communist Party politician, minister of the interior (1946–1948), and foreign minister (1948–1949). Born on 8 March 1909 in Székelyudvarhely, László Rajk studied language at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Budapest but was expelled in 1931 for his political activities after he joined the then illegal Hungarian Communist Party. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), he served as party secretary to the Hungarian battalion of the International Brigades. He returned to Hungary in 1941 and became secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee in September 1944. In December 1944, Hungarian Nazi authorities arrested him.

Rajk was released in the spring of 1945 and quickly became involved in politics, acquiring leading positions in the Communist Party. In November 1945 he became deputy general secretary. During March 1946–August 1948 he served as minister of the interior in a coalition government, and in August

1948 he was appointed foreign secretary in the communist government.

Unlike many other Hungarian Communist Party leaders, Rajk was not Moscow-trained and had no special connections there. Politically ambitious and a masterful communicator, he was also an intellectual and was generally popular with the Hungarian people. These attributes were ample cause for Mátyás Rákosi, general secretary of the Communist Party, to view Rajk as his principal rival. On 30 May 1949 the Communist Party leadership ordered Rajk's arrest. With the full support of Moscow, which regarded Rajk as too much the Hungarian nationalist and too independent of the Kremlin's control, he was charged with treason by the People's Tribunal, given an elaborate show trial, and found guilty. Rajk was sentenced to death on 24 September 1949 and was executed on 15 October in Budapest. In 1955 he was rehabilitated, and his remains were solemnly reburied with state honors on 6 October 1956.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also
Hungary; Rákosi, Mátyás

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László Rajk, minister of foreign affairs of Hungary, was denounced as a Titoist spy in 1949, tried, and executed. His "crime" was actually being a nationalist who was popular with the people. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Rákosi, Mátyás
(1892–1971)

General secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (1945–1956), minister of state and vice prime minister (1945–1952), and Hungarian prime minister (1952–1953). Born on 9 March 1892 in Ada, Hungary (now Serbia), Mátyás Rákosi joined the Communist Party in 1918. During 1918–1925 he undertook various political assignments in Hungary and the Soviet Union, including the secretariat of the Comintern. In 1925 he was imprisoned in Hungary for political activities determined to be unlawful. Upon his release in 1940, he moved to the Soviet Union and then headed the communist émigrés in Moscow during 1941–1944.

In 1945 Rákosi returned to Hungary and was appointed general secretary of the Communist Party. During his service as vice prime minister, beginning in 1949 he introduced a Stalinist-style government in Hungary. After the communist takeover in 1948, Rákosi did everything possible to stay in power, knowing that this depended on maintaining Moscow's support. He was responsible for many illegal trials, executions, and imprisonment of dissidents,

while his forced collectivization policies damaged the economy and led to misery among his own people. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution was a response, in part, to his authoritarian rule.

In 1952 Rákosi became prime minister, exercising de facto dictatorial rule and cultivating his own personality cult. Following Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's death in March 1953, Rákosi was summoned to Moscow, where he was found guilty of many illegalities. In June 1953, the new Soviet leadership forced Rákosi to relinquish the premiership to Imre Nagy, although Rákosi retained his position as general secretary of the party. By March 1955, he had regained the support of Moscow and tried to restore a communist dictatorship based on a Stalinist model. After Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin's leadership, the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party relieved Rákosi as general secretary in July 1956. He was then forced to leave Hungary for the Soviet Union, where he remained until his death on 5 February 1971 in Gorkij.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Khrushchev, Nikita; Nagy, Imre; Rajk, László; Stalin, Josef

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RAND Corporation

Independent, nonprofit think tank founded jointly by the U.S. Army Air Forces and the Douglas Aircraft Company in 1945 to ensure the continuation of technological advancements begun during World War II. Since its foundation, the RAND Corporation (RAND is short for "Research and Development") has served both the public and private sectors. Although it mostly addressed the defense concerns of the U.S. Air Force during its initial years, it was later expanded to tackle social problems as well. RAND played a significant role in the advancement of technology during the Cold War.

Project RAND, precursor to the RAND Corporation, began in October 1945 as the brainchild of Henry "Hap" Arnold, commanding general of the U.S. Army. He worked in collaboration with a number of influential individuals from both the public and private sectors—including Edward Bowles, Donald Douglas, and Major Generals Lauris Norstad and Curtis LeMay—to establish an institution that could successfully coordinate efforts among the military, government, industry, and academe to promote the development of science and technology.

In March 1946, Project RAND was inaugurated as a division of the Douglas Aircraft Company. RAND reported to the U.S. Army Air Forces' deputy chief of air staff for research and development, which was established in December 1945 and headed by LeMay. The RAND staff grew to include several fields including mathematics, engineering, aerodynamics, physics, chemistry, economics, and psychology. RAND produced its first study in May 1946 and has since produced many volumes of original research.

Project RAND split from Douglas Aircraft in May 1948 and thereafter became the RAND Corporation, a nonpartisan research and design enterprise. Both its goals and purpose are explicitly set forth in its articles of incorporation, which seek "to further and promote scientific, educational and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States."

The exigencies of the Cold War, more than anything else, dictated RAND's research agenda during its first years. Its directors' insistence on cross-fertilization and free inquiry culminated in innovative approaches to defense problems that included systems analysis and game theory. Essential to RAND's innovation was its interdisciplinary approach to problem solving. RAND is also responsible for having created a number of precursors to modern-day technologies that were essential to both the space age and the computer age. These innovations ranged from infrared detection, missile targeting, and reentry technology to video recording, computers, and the Internet.

In the 1960s, RAND began to move beyond defense matters, addressing domestic policy issues as well. This was in part because of a decrease in U.S. Air Force contracts as other research and design organizations emerged. Moreover, the armed forces had learned much about how to conduct their own research from years of collaboration with RAND. Aside from science and technology, RAND began to specialize in education, civil and criminal justice, the environment, population studies, terrorism, and transportation. Despite this shift, however, in the 1990s two-thirds of RAND's research focused on national security issues.

R. Matthew Gildner

See also

LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Military-Industrial Complex

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Rapacki, Adam
(1909–1970)

Minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Poland (1956–1968). Born in Lviv on 24 December 1909 into a family of Polish intelligentsia, Adam Rapacki graduated in 1932 from the Main Trade School in Warsaw and

then studied at the Polytechnic Institute in Milan. He was then employed as a scientific worker at the Cooperative Scientific Institute and the Institute of Market Conditions and Prices in Warsaw.

Mobilized for the Polish Army at the beginning of World War II, Rapacki served as an infantry lieutenant until captured by the Germans. He spent the remainder of the war in a German prisoner of war camp. Freed in March 1945, he soon joined the Polish Socialist Party. Upon the establishment of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) in December 1948, he became a member of that party's Political Bureau, a post he held until 1970. During 1947–1969 he was also a deputy in the Sejm (Diet). During 1947–1950 he held the post of minister of navigation, and during 1950–1956 he served as minister of higher education.

In April 1956 Rapecki was appointed minister of foreign affairs. As such, he was regarded as the main architect of Polish foreign policy and enjoyed the trust of Polish First Secretary Władysław Gomułka. Aware of the limitations stemming from Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact, Rapacki sought to exploit existing opportunities to conduct a more independent foreign policy from that of the Soviet Union while securing Polish interests. Particularly important to him was the so-called German question. Under Rapacki, Polish diplomacy was directed at winning international recognition of the inviolability of Poland's Oder (Odra) and Niesse (Nysa Luzycka) River frontier in the west. He also endeavored to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). At the same time, he hoped to forestall West German rearmament.

Rapacki intended to construct a new European security system by creating a nuclear-free zone of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia via his 1957 Rapacki Plan, which also sought to create a permanently divided Germany. The plan was endorsed by Moscow mainly for propaganda purposes, but it met stiff opposition from East Germany, West Germany, and the United States and was never enacted.

Moscow saw Poland's refusal to support the Soviet Union in its post-1956 controversy with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a sign of too much foreign policy independence on the part of the Poles. In fact, during 1956–1970 secret PRC-U.S. talks were held in Warsaw. In 1966 Rapacki mediated talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the United States. He also tried to cultivate economic relations with capitalist countries, an effort that bore little fruit. In 1968 his policies were vituperatively attacked by the orthodox faction of Polish national-communists. Gomułka defended him, but Rapacki resigned his post in April 1968 (the resignation was formally announced that December). Rapacki died in Warsaw on 10 October 1970.

Wanda Jarzabek

See also
Gomułka, Władysław; Poland; Rapacki Plan

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Rapacki Plan
(1957)

Proposal announced by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki at the United Nations (UN) on 2 October 1957 calling for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union endorsed the plan on 10 December 1957, believing that it would prevent nuclear weapons from being based in West Germany. If implemented, the plan would also allow the Soviet leadership to reduce the costs of stationing troops in Eastern Europe. Finally, eliminating nuclear weapons in Central Europe ostensibly demonstrated Moscow's commitment to reducing international tensions through nuclear nonproliferation.

Ironically, the United States rejected the Rapacki Plan for the same reason, for it would have eliminated the nuclear shield concept from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) defense strategy. Politically, the Rapacki Plan would permanently divide Europe, a concept that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration secretly desired but publicly condemned. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also denounced the plan, calling it a "Russian trap" designed to destroy the NATO alliance.

Polish national security interests also influenced Rapacki's initiative. As with the Soviet Union, Polish leaders feared a revival of German military might and refused to believe that NATO could permanently rein in traditional German militarism. Thus, he believed that the division of Germany should be perpetuated and that nuclear weapons should be banned from both Germanies. Nonetheless, Rapacki also believed that the elimination of the German security threat could promote Poland's own commercial and cultural exchanges with Western Europe, especially with West Germany. In addition, the Rapacki Plan might chart a semiautonomous Polish foreign policy, decreasing Polish dependence on Moscow. Lastly, the ongoing Polish–East German rivalry also caused Rapacki to announce his plan. Fearful that East Germany would eclipse Poland within the Warsaw Pact, he recognized that forcing East Germany into a confederation with West Germany would lead to the disintegration of East Germany.

East Germany vehemently opposed the Rapacki Plan, and over the next year the proposal died out as the Western alliance continued to dismiss it out of hand. The failure of the Rapacki Plan was used by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in his Berlin ultimatum of 27 November 1958 in which he

promised unilateral Soviet recognition of East Germany as a sovereign state, thus setting off a major crisis between East and West.

Chris Tudda

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Berlin Crises; Khrushchev, Nikita; Rapacki, Adam

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Reagan, Ronald Wilson

(1911–2004)

U.S. politician and president of the United States (1981–1989). Born on 11 February 1911 in Tampico, Illinois, Ronald Reagan graduated from Eureka College, worked as a sports announcer, and in 1937 won a Hollywood contract with Warner Brothers, eventually appearing in fifty-three movies. As president of the Screen Actors Guild during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the once-liberal Reagan purged alleged communists and veered strongly to the Right. His politics grew increasingly conservative in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In 1966 the genial Reagan won the first of two terms as the Republican governor of California. During his campaign he supported U.S. intervention in Vietnam and condemned student antiwar protesters. He soon became one of the leading figures of the increasingly powerful Republican Right, supporting deep cuts in taxes and domestic expenditures, high defense budgets, and a strong anticommunist international posture, positions he affirmed while seeking the Republican presidential nomination in 1976 and 1980.

In 1980, when Reagan defeated Democratic incumbent President Jimmy Carter, the United States was suffering from spiraling inflation and high unemployment. In Iran, radical Muslims had overthrown Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, sending oil prices soaring, and for more than a year held U.S. diplomatic personnel hostage in Tehran. An almost simultaneous Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan intensified a sense of American impotence, as did communist insurgencies in Central America and Africa. Reagan opposed compromise with communism. Believing firmly in the American way of life and convinced that an American victory in the Cold War was attainable, the ever-optimistic Reagan used blatantly triumphalist, anti-Soviet rhetoric, famously terming the Soviet Union an "evil empire."

Reagan purposefully engaged the Soviets in an arms race whereby he and his advisors hoped that American technological and economic superiority would strain the Soviet economy. In 1982 and 1983 the president issued directives intended to deny the Soviets Western credits, currency, trade, and technology and to embargo Soviet exports of oil and natural gas to the West. The Reagan administration hiked the defense budget from $171 billion to $376 billion between 1981 and 1986, hoping to force the Soviets into bankruptcy and to position the United States better to combat communism around the world. In 1983 Reagan announced that the United States would begin research on an expensive new ballistic missile defense system, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star Wars, to intercept and destroy incoming nuclear missiles. If successful, this program, which contravened several existing arms control treaties, would have provided the United States with substantial protection against a Soviet nuclear attack, thereby destabilizing the nuclear balance and quite possibly triggering a new arms race.

Ronald Reagan was president of the United States during 1981–1989. A staunch anticommunist, he carried out the largest peacetime defense buildup in U.S. history and worked to reverse the liberal tradition that had dominated U.S. politics since the Great Depression. (Library of Congress)

Breaking with Carter's policies, Reagan also deliberately de-emphasized human rights, consciously supporting dictatorships provided they were pro-American while assailing human rights abuses within the Soviet sphere. Covert operations intensified as the United States offered support to anticommunist forces around the world, providing economic aid to the dissident Polish Solidarity trade union movement and military and economic assistance to antigovernment rebels in Angola, mujahideen guerrillas in Afghanistan, and the anti-Sandinista Contras in Nicaragua. Efforts to overthrow the existing Nicaraguan government included Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mining of ports and harbors. When Congress responded by passing the Boland Amendment of 1984, forbidding funding for Nicaraguan covert actions, the Reagan administration embroiled itself in an ill-fated secret enterprise to sell arms to Iran—thereby evading its own embargo but, officials suggested, enhancing the political standing of Iranian moderate elements—and using the proceeds to aid the Nicaraguan Contras. Revelations of these illegal activities and his probable complicity in them embarrassed Reagan during his second term.

They did not, however, compromise Reagan's ability to reach unprecedented new understandings with the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding his bellicose rhetoric and a near infatuation with prospective nuclear war according to some Reagan administration officials, in practice Reagan was surprisingly pragmatic and cautious. In potentially difficult guerrilla settings, his administration favored covert operations, preferably undertaken by surrogates such as the Afghan mujahideen or the Nicaraguan Contras, over outright military

intervention. Wars were kept short and easily winnable, as in the small Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983 when American troops liberated the island from Marxist rule. When, almost simultaneously, radical pro-Syrian Druze Muslims bombed the Beirut barracks of an American peacekeeping force in Lebanon, killing 241 American soldiers, the United States quickly withdrew. In 1986, suspected Libyan involvement in terrorist incidents provoked only retaliatory American surgical air strikes on Tripoli.

Despite campaign pledges to the contrary, Reagan did not shun the People's Republic of China (PRC) or restore American relations with the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). In 1982 the Reagan administration reached an understanding with China on Taiwan, after which the Chinese gave some support to the Afghan rebels. Sino-American trade increased, and Reagan made a 1984 state visit to Beijing. By 1984, domestic politics suggested that the president moderate his anti-Soviet line. He faced a reelection campaign against a liberal opponent, Walter Mondale, just as his nuclear buildup and the stalemating of inconclusive arms control talks had generated substantial public support in both America and Europe for a nuclear freeze. In September 1984, Reagan proposed combining all major ongoing nuclear weapons talks into one package, and Soviet leaders soon agreed.

Reagan's mellowing coincided with the culmination of long-standing Soviet economic problems. Empire imposed added burdens on the Soviets as military spending rose, diverting funds from domestic programs. Most countries in Eastern Europe still resented Soviet domination. In Poland, the Solidarity movement proved remarkably persistent, undercutting Soviet control. Assertive Soviet policies in Africa and Latin America carried a high price tag too, while the decade-long Afghan intervention embroiled Soviet troops in a costly and unwinnable guerrilla war.

In 1985 the young and energetic Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He immediately sought to address Russia's problems and reform the communist economic and social system, an uphill battle given the immense burdens of the Soviet military. In addition, the costly SDI program that Reagan had recently proposed was likely to demand massive further investment.

American and European leaders were initially wary of Gorbachev's overtures, but even so, he quickly won great popularity. After meeting Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, the hard-line British Conservative prime minister whom Reagan had long found to be a political soul mate, urged her colleague to work with the Soviet leader, and Reagan was more willing than many of his advisors to trust Gorbachev. Domestic economic factors may also have impelled Reagan toward rapprochement. Deep tax cuts meant that heavy government budget deficits financed the defense buildup in the 1980s, and in November 1987 an unexpected Wall Street stock market crash suggested that American economic fundamentals might be undesirably weak. Reagan had several summit meetings with Gorbachev, and in 1987 the superpowers signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe and imposing strong verification procedures. This marked the beginning of a series of arms reduction agree-

President Ronald Reagan delivers a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin on 12 June 1987. During the course of his remarks, Reagan called upon Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. (Ronald Reagan Library)

ments, continued under Reagan's successor George H. W. Bush, and of measures whereby the Soviet Union withdrew from its East European empire and, by 1991, allowed it to collapse. Although Bush's presidency saw the culmination of these developments, it was Reagan who first perceived their potential.

Reagan, the oldest U.S. president in history, left office in 1989. After a decade-long battle with Alzheimer's, he died of pneumonia at his home in Los Angeles, California, on 5 June 2004. Reagan's impressive state funeral in Washington, D.C., paid tribute to him as the American president whose policies effectively helped to end the Cold War on U.S. terms.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Afghanistan War; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Central Intelligence Agency; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Governor's Island Meeting, Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush; Grenada Invasion; Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Iran; Iran-Contra Affair; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Libya; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Namibia; Nicaragua; Perestroika; Poland; Religious Right, United States;

Reykjavík Meeting; Sandinistas; Shultz, George Pratt; Solidarity Movement; Soviet Union; Strategic Defense Initiative; Thatcher, Margaret; Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev; Weinberger, Caspar

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Reagan Doctrine

Cornerstone of President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy and a major contributory factor to the administration's greatest scandal, the Iran-Contra Affair. Although best articulated in 1985 by Reagan, the Reagan Doctrine was evident during earlier stages of his presidency. The doctrine proposed U.S. assistance for anticommunist forces who challenged the Soviet Union or its clients. Reagan lauded these freedom fighters and linked their plight to the traditional U.S. mission of promoting self-determination. Policymakers hoped to minimize U.S. casualties and expenses through the use of proxies and small paramilitary units. Soviet leaders perceived the Reagan Doctrine as a signal of a more aggressive prosecution of the Cold War. At best an economic strategy, it carried with it, however, the potential to embroil the United States in civil wars of little relevance to the national interest.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed the Reagan Doctrine in such hot spots as Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Ethiopia. This policy worked well in Afghanistan, where U.S.-backed mujahideen guerrilla fighters inflicted heavy losses on Soviet forces and the Kremlin experienced a Vietnam-style quagmire of its own. In Angola, the anticommunist rebels became a liability for the Reagan administration as they destroyed U.S. oil facilities and accepted support from South Africa's apartheid regime. Meanwhile, the Angolan government increasingly cooperated with U.S. oil companies and investors.

The Reagan Doctrine received the greatest attention in Central America. The United States helped train and equip a 17,000-man Salvadoran army

to wage a counterinsurgency against a guerrilla force roughly a quarter its size. The slaughtering of political opponents and a rigged election compelled U.S. officials to install a moderate government that ultimately failed to bring peace or democracy to El Salvador.

In Nicaragua, the Reagan White House championed the Contras, who were fighting against the revolutionary socialist Sandinista regime. Reagan likened the Contras to America's "founding fathers" despite reports of atrocities committed in their name. Washington authorized CIA training for Contras and the construction of military bases in neighboring Honduras to facilitate rebel operations. In 1983 the CIA mined Nicaraguan ports and launched clandestine attacks on oil facilities and airports. Congress suspended military aid to the Contras in 1984, which prompted Reagan officials to explore covert avenues of assistance and to solicit private donations.

A preoccupation with applying the Reagan Doctrine to Nicaragua dovetailed with U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In 1985, White House officials used Israelis as intermediaries to secretly supply military hardware to the Iranian government in the hope of securing the release of fifteen Americans held hostage in the region. This pipeline operated for fourteen months, during which time a few captives were released and other people were kidnapped. In November 1986 the story of the arms-for-hostages deal broke in the American press. President Reagan was compelled to admit to attempts made to influence those whom he called "moderates" in the Iranian government. The Central American connection emerged three weeks later when U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese disclosed that the proceeds from the Iranian arms sales had been clandestinely diverted to the Contras in violation of the 1982 Boland Amendment, which had banned any spending for the overthrow of the Sandinista government.

In 1987 Congress held hearings into what the media dubbed the Iran-Contra Affair, with Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a National Security Council aide, emerging as the star witness. North vigorously defended the Reagan Doctrine despite having admitted to illegally shredding government documents and misleading Congress. Eleven members of the Reagan administration pled guilty or were convicted of charges stemming from the Iran-Contra Affair. Reagan claimed ignorance of the financial conduit to the Contras. The Reagan Doctrine aimed to avoid another Vietnam but ultimately became associated with the sort of executive branch deception and hubris that had made that war so controversial.

Eleven members of the Reagan administration pled guilty or were convicted of charges stemming from the Iran-Contra affair.

Jeffrey D. Bass

See also

Afghanistan; El Salvador; Iran-Contra Affair; Nicaragua; Somoza Debayle, Anastasio

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Red Army Faction

The most prominent and persistent of the leftist German terror organizations of the 1970s and 1980s. The Red Army Faction (RAF) was anticapitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-American (influenced in particular by events in Vietnam). Many of its targets were American or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military installations and personnel. It received logistical support from the German Democratic Republic's (GDR, East Germany) secret police (Stasi) and from several Palestinian terrorist groups. The RAF was generally more sophisticated and violent than comparable groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Weathermen in the United States.

The roots of the RAF lay in the student protest movement, factions of which became more radical after the shooting of student Benno Ohnesorg by a Berlin police officer on 2 June 1967. Among those who opted for violence were Andreas Baader, an anarchist drifter, and Gudrun Ensslin, a PhD student. After the 2 April 1968 firebombing of a Frankfurt department store, Baader was arrested and imprisoned. His spectacular liberation on 14 May 1970, during an alleged working session for a social science research project with Ulrike Meinhof, marked the beginning of the RAF as a terrorist organization. One guard was shot and severely wounded, and Meinhof, who had earlier gained some prominence as a journalist, now joined the RAF as an active member. The newly formed group traveled to Jordan in the summer of 1970 to receive military training from the Palestinian al-Fatah terrorist organization.

In April 1971, the RAF published a statement elaborating its concept of an urban guerrilla, which was inspired by Latin American and Italian guerrilla groups. It justified violence as a necessary defense against the alleged brutality of Western, and in particular American, imperialism. Most of the organization's early pamphlets referred to atrocities committed in Vietnam by U.S. troops. In May 1972, the RAF launched its May Offensive, a series of six bomb attacks that included attacks on U.S. military headquarters in Frankfurt and Heidelberg. By June, however, the authorities had rounded up and arrested many of the RAF's leading members, including Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof, and Jan-Carl Raspe. They were later imprisoned in the newly built high-security complex of Stuttgart-Stammheim.

Following legal procedures and a lengthy trial, the leaders were sentenced to life imprisonment in April 1977. Their defense lawyers focused on the conditions of their imprisonment, which included long periods of isolation. While unsuccessful in court, these protests generated considerable sympathy for the RAF among the German radical Left, which also regarded Meinhof's May 1976 suicide as a state-sponsored murder.

The so-called second generation of the RAF aimed at liberating the Baader-Meinhof group and was responsible for the hostage drama at the German embassy in Stockholm in April 1975. Six terrorists stormed the building and demanded the immediate release of the RAF leadership. When the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) declined, the attackers killed two German diplomats and—unintentionally—detonated explosives

that ignited the building. A German-Palestinian plane hijacking that had as one of its demands the release of RAF terrorists ended with even more bloodshed in July 1976 in Entebbe, Uganda. On 5 September 1977 the RAF took hostage Hanns Martin Schleyer, president of the German Employers' Association.

For increased pressure, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a German civilian plane in Palma de Mallorca, Spain, on 13 October 1977, also demanding immediate release of the RAF prisoners. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stalled for time but was determined not to negotiate. After four days, the recently created West German antiterror squad GSG-9 stormed the plane at the airport of Mogadishu, Somalia, and rescued the hostages. Upon hearing the news, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe committed suicide in their prison cells. Schleyer was shot dead by his captors and left in a car trunk near Mulhouse, France.

Most members of the second-generation RAF were arrested, but the terrorism continued. The third-generation RAF again focused on American installations and soldiers, including the attempted murder of NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Alexander Haig (25 June 1979) and the car-bomb explosion at the U.S. Air Force headquarters in Ramstein (31 August 1981). However, it also hit German politicians and industrialists. During the 1980s, ten RAF members fled to East Germany, where they received new identities. Following their subsequent identification by West German police, the former terrorists were apprehended by the new East German government in June 1990. The last attacks ascribed to the RAF were the murders of bank manager Alfred Herrhausen in November 1989 and industrialist and politician Detlev Rohwedder in April 1991 and the bombing of a new high-security prison (Weiterstadt) in March 1993.

Hans-Martin Schleyer (1915–1977), German president of the Employer's Association and of the Federal Association of German Industry. Schleyer was kidnapped and held by the Red Army Faction, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, in Cologne in September 1977. (Getty Images)

In April 1992, the RAF issued a declaration that it was de-escalating its armed struggle. The group disbanded on 20 April 1998. With the end of the Cold War, political support from the radical Left and financial support from East Germany ceased, and the remaining RAF terrorists finally accepted the fact that they had outlived their political relevance.

Jan Martin Lemnitzer

See also

Entebbe Raid; Germany, Federal Republic of; Red Brigades; Schmidt, Helmut; Stasi; Terrorism; Weathermen

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Red Brigades

Italian leftist terrorist organization begun in 1970. During 1970–1990 the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) in Italy mobilized thousands of activists and sympathizers on the Left for what it saw as a struggle against imperialism and capitalist excesses.

The origins of the Red Brigades lay in part in disappointment that the student movements in 1968 and 1969 had failed to produce a revolution. There was also dissatisfaction with the moderation of the Communist Party. Right-wing extremism, which went on the offensive in the summer of 1969, helped produce a terrorist response from the Left. The neofascist groups set out to create an atmosphere of violence that would lead to a military takeover. During 1969–1970, right-wing extremists in Italy were responsible for a hundred or more bombings. In 1970, Renato Curcio and Margherita Cagol, student activists from Trento, founded the Red Brigades to meet what they considered an imminent threat from the Right.

The Red Brigades combined the Italian tradition of resistance to fascism, which its members believed had been left unfinished, with ideas drawn from People's Republic of China's (PRC) leader Mao Zedong and the Viet Cong. In the beginning, the Red Brigades concentrated mainly on sabotage. Soon, however, they turned to violent campaigns against representatives of what they considered to be imperialism, targeting businessmen, right-wing political figures, government officials, and judges. In 1974 the Red Brigades kidnapped Judge Mario Sossi, known for his rightist views. Unable to locate the hideout of the terrorists, the Italian government reluctantly negotiated Sossi's release in exchange for eight prisoners. As soon as Sossi was released, however, the government reneged on its agreement to release the prisoners.

During 1975–1977 the Red Brigades went through a radical phase that included attacks on Fiat automobile plants and the murder of Francesco Coco, the attorney general of Genoa. On 16 March 1978, members of the Red Brigades caused a sensation by kidnapping Aldo Moro, at the time leader of the Christian Democratic Party and a former premier. Periodically, the Red Brigades issued statements declaring that Italy was an integral player in an imperialist coalition led by the United States. They viewed Italy as a good starting point for the revolution to destroy imperialism. Moro wrote letters demanding that the government negotiate his release. The Christian Democratic government of Premier Giulio Andreotti refused to negotiate,

despite intense popular and political pressure. Finally, the Red Brigades murdered Moro on 9 May 1978 and placed his body in the back of a car, which was left on a busy street in Rome.

The government responded to Moro's murder by giving General Carlo Alberto Dall Chiesa unlimited power to wage a relentless campaign against terrorism. The Red Brigades, now into a second generation of activists, responded with thousands of attacks (2,379 in 1978 and 2,513 in 1979). A turning point in the terror campaign came with the 1980 arrest of Patrizio Peci, a Red Brigades leader who gave police information that led to raids on Red Brigades hideouts throughout Italy.

The Red Brigades, now into a second generation of activists, responded with thousands of attacks—2,379 in 1978 and 2,513 in 1979.

The Red Brigades mounted one more spectacular action, kidnapping U.S. Army Brigadier General James Lee Dozier in December 1981. In this case, Dozier was rescued and his kidnappers arrested. The Red Brigades continued to operate for the balance of the decade. (An offshoot of the Red Brigades claimed responsibility for two murders in 1999 and 2002, and two activists on the run for two decades were arrested in 2004.) Internally, however, the organization split into opposing factions, some of which rejected armed struggle. The Red Brigades, like its counterparts in other countries, tested the commitment of the Italian government to democracy and civil liberties. The government successfully balanced this commitment against the need for severe measures to deal with terrorism.

Seen in the context of the Cold War, the Red Brigades appeared to some observers to be part of an international terrorist movement backed by the Soviet Union. There were connections between the Red Brigades and other terrorist groups, such as the Red Army Faction in Germany. Nevertheless, there was no powerful Euro-terrorist movement capable of mounting a challenge to Western regimes. Each terrorist group pursued its own set of aims, and cooperation was limited and fleeting.

Michael D. Richards

See also

Andreotti, Giulio; Italy; Moro, Aldo; Red Army Faction

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Refugees

Persons displaced from their home countries because of war or other calamities and forced to reside temporarily, and sometimes permanently, in another country usually contiguous to their own. Refugees are common throughout

history, but the scale of refugee movement in the twentieth century was unparalleled. The first international effort to deal with refugees occurred in 1921 when the League of Nations created a High Commissioner for Russian refugees in Europe. As the old order crumbled after World War I, the High Commissioner took on responsibility for Armenian and other refugees. In 1933, refugees from Nazi Germany became a concern.

The victorious powers in World War II defined a refugee as a person fleeing his native country out of fear of persecution. The close of the conflict saw the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which dealt with both displaced persons (DPs) and refugees. The United Nations International Refugee Organization (UNIRO), created in 1946, gave way to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the major legal document of the postwar refugee protection system, was formally enacted in 1951. Fifty years later, the UNHCR had an operating budget of more than $1 billion to spend on the millions of refugees it serviced.

Refugees usually live in impermanent, makeshift camps, for months if not years. At the end of 1945 there were some 50 million DPs, of whom 1.5 million were refugees. In the year 2000, refugees totaled more than 20 million.

Frightened and alone, a little girl sits on a battered suitcase as she watches for her lost mother, November 1956. The child became separated from her parents in the escape across the Austro-Hungarian border following the Soviet intervention in Hungary. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Ninety to 95 percent of DPs remain in their country of origin, usually in a protected sanctuary, while foreign countries accommodate the remainder. Refugee populations can be quite large. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution created more than 200,000 refugees out of a population of 10 million. Although ill-equipped to handle the influx, Austria bore the brunt of the burden until other European nations and the United Nations (UN) could mobilize resources. France took in 13,000, and Britain 20,000, but most Hungarian refugees wanted to live in the United States. The U.S. government accepted 80,000 Hungarians. Canada set no limit and soon became the second-choice destination. Toronto soon possessed the third-largest Hungarian population of any city in the world.

World War II generated millions of DPs, some of whom refused to return to now-communist countries. The UNIRO was responsible for repatriation, resettlement, and operating refugee camps. The organization resettled 1.3 million refugees during 1947–1950. Nations receiving these refugees included the United States, Australia, Canada, and Israel. In 1950, the UNHCR was created. With a small budget and a restricted mandate, the UNHCR was largely stymied by the U.S. decision to set its own policy on refugees.

The United States initially sought to ease the burden on European nations due to refugee influxes. As part of the reconstruction of war-battered Europe, the United States

provided humanitarian assistance and absorbed a share of the refugees. The U.S. Displaced Persons Act of 1948 authorized the immigration of 205,000 DPs and 17,000 orphans, but the entrants were charged against the immigration quotas of the affected, mostly East European, nations. Various refugee laws enacted during 1945–1965 allowed more than 700,000 refugees into the United States, and American foreign aid helped European states with the costs of further refugee settlements. These actions were undoubtedly powerful propaganda tools for the West against communist regimes.

Meanwhile, in 1951, the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees further defined a refugee as one who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality."

Cold War–era refugees fled from problems other than simply communism, however. Because different regions created disparate conditions for refugees, regional conventions were generated. The 1969 Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa, established by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration in Central America were two such examples. Both incorporated human rights violations as causes for refugee situations. Most Western nations held to the narrower UN definition, however.

By 1960, all West European nations except Spain had ratified the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The United States declined to participate, however, as its policies for wartime refugees covered all aspects of the convention. The United States continued to deal with refugee crises on an ad hoc basis through legislation such as the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, the 1957 Refugee-Escapee Act, and the 1958 Hungarian Refugee Act. It is estimated that a quarter of a million refugees took advantage of these laws.

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution generated a refugee crisis in Austria and Germany, and the UNHCR received additional funding for camps and resettlement. Because UNHCR management of the crisis was evenhanded and efficient, both the Western and communist blocs approved of its actions, enhancing the future viability of the organization. The UNHCR expanded from its initial mission of handling postwar refugees when it became the UN's general refugee agency. After the Hungarian Revolution, refugee-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Friends Committee, also began supplementing the UN effort.

The U.S. government, however, persisted in defining a refugee as an anticommunist. For example, the 1957 Refugee-Escapee Act defined a refugee as a person in flight from communism or Middle Eastern countries. The 1959 Cuban Revolution sent large numbers of refugees directly to America. Initially, the United States defined Cubans as temporary refugees until the 1961 Bay of Pigs failure indicated that the communist government might last for a long time. The U.S. government also came to see the propaganda advantage of sheltering refugees from Cuban leader Fidel Castro's communism. The United States assumed that domestic costs to local governments, such as those in Florida, were secondary and temporary because these refugees were considered to be Cuba's best and brightest.

The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 continued the traditional American practice of assisting refugees but on its own terms rather than those of the UN. Although the United States remained mostly outside of the international refugee system, it incorporated refugees into its regular immigration process. Refugees were the seventh preference and received 17,000 annual immigration slots, or 7 percent of the total. The definition remained restrictive and reflective of America's anticommunist foreign policy. Refugees were persons escaping communism or specified countries in the Middle East. By 1965, forty-six nations adhered to the UN Refugee Convention, including all Western countries except Canada and the United States.

In the 1960s, NGOs such as the Lutheran Immigration Service, the American Friends Service Committee, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference became increasingly vocal on behalf of immigration reform and refugee protection. In 1967 a protocol to the UN Refugee Convention applied the 1951 agreement to a broader geographical area and eliminated the time restriction. This change was necessary because before that time, most Western nations used quotas and accepted refugees from communist nations exclusively. Yet decolonization and civil wars generated increasing refugee flows in Africa, South America, and Asia. Because the UNHCR had been dealing with these crises, the change simply reflected reality. In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson, under pressure for his Vietnam policy, signed the Refugee Convention, which the Senate quickly ratified. There was no enabling legislation, however, so the 1965 act and definition remained in effect for another decade.

A Vietnamese refugee, with his belongings secured between his teeth, climbs a cargo net to the deck of the U.S. combat store ship *White Plains* on 30 July 1979 in the South China Sea. Following the fall of Saigon in 1975, thousands of Vietnamese fled political persecution and economic hardship. Many of the small wooden craft used by the refugees either capsized or were sunk by pirates. (National Archives and Records Administration)

After the communist victory in Vietnam in April 1975, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians fled to Australia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The UNHCR and NGOs helped, but the burden was too great for the host nations. A majority of Americans opposed Indochinese immigration. The Citizens' Commission on Indochinese Refugees, a collection of NGOs, worked with the U.S. State Department to assist in the camps and in relocation efforts. Congressional acts of 1977 and 1978 authorized 300,000 refugees, above the Category Seven (refugees) limit. Australia, Canada, and Japan also assisted in accepting refugees and financing refugee camps, but the United States assumed the major burden.

By 1980, the U.S. Congress was dissatisfied with the refugee resettlement process, especially extensive executive branch control, so it enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which raised the ceiling, eliminated the charging of refugees against the annual quotas, and defined refugees in accordance with the UN definition. The act also set up streamlined administrative procedures for would-be

refugees, established social service agencies for them, and gave the president authority to set and adjust annual refugee limits.

With the ending of the Cold War, the refugee process became less discriminatory. Asylum seekers came from the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa. The primary beneficiaries of the legislation were Iraqis, Somalis, Bosnians, and East Europeans. Despite the change, the United States continued to violate international norms by granting asylum to refugees from communist Nicaragua and Cuba while, at the same time, making asylum more difficult for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala, whose governments President Ronald Reagan's administration had supported. Haitians were denied entry to the United States and sometimes due process because they were not fleeing from political repression but were merely seeking to escape economic hardship. Local municipalities did not want them, so the U.S. Coast Guard began interdicting Haitian vessels at sea and returning them without inquiry or due process. The American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International, the Haitian Refugee Center, and others protested and filed lawsuits. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton continued the interdiction policy, and a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court ruling affirmed the contention by the executive branch that refugees in international waters had no legal rights.

After the Cold War, in the waning years of the twentieth century, formerly hospitable governments facing internal immigrant and economic problems began tightening their borders to control refugees. The conflicting needs to protect refugees and to control immigrants became more evident, leading some to call the 1951 Refugee Convention outdated if not obsolete. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) dealt with asylum seekers because of congressional belief that political asylum allowed otherwise inadmissible immigrants to sneak through the U.S. system. The act established a rigid administrative process and allowed detention pending adjudication by immigration officers rather than immigration judges. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Amnesty International, and the Cato Institute all decried the violation of international agreements.

In 2000, the UNHCR began Global Consultations on the Refugee Convention. The UNHCR sought an international recommitment to the 1951 convention and a reworking of its coverage to include those refugees outside the old convention. Nations and international organizations began working to determine and deal with the internal conditions that consistently caused refugee movements rather than simply reacting to each refugee crisis. The European Union established a High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG), which attempted to move refugee policy beyond border controls to ameliorating economic and political conditions in the country of origin. By 2001, one in thirty-five people in the world was a migrant, and yet most talks on migration were either bilateral or among a handful of states. In 2001, the Swiss government implemented the Berne Initiative as a forum for all states to meet annually and discuss migration issues. Its goal was to establish communications and discussions between sending and receiving nations

to better manage refugee flows. Also in 2001, the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration established an Action Group on Asylum and Migration, and in 2003 the Geneva Migration Group came into being. Nonetheless, refugee crises persisted despite all the conferences and reports.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Decolonization; Displaced Persons; Refugees

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Refuseniks

Unofficial term for Soviet citizens to whom the Soviet Union denied permission to emigrate. The most famous refuseniks included Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Anatoly Sharansky. Refuseniks were often harassed after applying for an emigration visa. Although many Volga Germans, Armenians, Evangelical Christians, Roman Catholics, and other ethnic and religious minorities tried to escape persecution or sought a better life abroad, a great many of the refuseniks were Jewish.

Except for a brief time in the mid-1950s, Soviet Jews were not allowed to practice their religion and faced pervasive anti-Semitism. During the Cold War, especially after Israel emerged as a Western ally and the specter of Zionism raised fears of internal destabilization, Soviet Jews were presumed to be traitors or security risks, and they were treated accordingly. In the 1960s, especially in the period following the 1967 Six-Day War, thousands of Jews, secular as well as religious, requested visas to leave the country.

By so doing, however, Soviet Jews thereby maneuvered themselves even more firmly into the position of outcasts. Some were allowed to leave, but most were refused permission and had to wait for years for exit visas. Entire families had to quit their jobs and were subsequently prosecuted for being "parasites" (a Soviet classification for unemployed persons), and their children were not allowed access to education. Many were arrested, sent to

labor camps, or detained for being "insane." Frequently, the reason given for the denial of emigration visas was "state security."

Jews worldwide and sympathetic nations such as the United States and the Netherlands (which had taken over consular matters for Israel during 1967–1991) protested against these violations of basic human rights. Sharansky, especially, became a worldwide symbol of Soviet repression. Despite world pressure and strong support for the refuseniks, during 1960–1989 only 320,000 Jews managed to leave the Soviet Union. Roughly 125,000 of them went to Israel. The number of Soviet émigrés to Israel dwindled in the 1980s, however.

The refuseniks distinguished themselves from dissidents and human rights activists, who rose to prominence after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Refuseniks did not advocate changes in the Soviet system but instead pleaded for their right to leave the country. Sometimes refuseniks and dissident groups overlapped. Anatoly and Avital Sharansky belonged both to the refuseniks and to the Moscow Helsinki human rights group.

In 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev permitted mass Jewish emigration. This, however, also caused problems. The United States limited the number of immigrants it would accept. Consequently, Israel had to accept an estimated 1 million Soviet Jews. Because Jewish identity in Russia was not determined according to Jewish tradition, anyone who claimed that he or she was a Jew received an identity card indicating Jewish nationality. Some emigrating Soviet Jews thus were actually impostors or criminals who sought to exploit their newfound freedoms. After 1990, Soviet Jewish immigrants continued to pour into Israel at a rate of 1,400 per week. Integrating them into Israeli society and assisting Jews who wanted to remain in Russia therefore became a main focus of the Israeli government.

After 1990, emigrating Soviet Jews continued to pour into Israel at a rate of 1,400 per week.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Anti-Semitism; Bonner, Yelena Georgievna; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Helsinki Final Act; Israel; Sakharov, Andrei; Soviet Union

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Religious Right, United States

For the duration of the Cold War, few Americans were more staunchly anticommunist than members of the so-called Religious Right. Grounded in atheism, communism was anathema to conservative Christians, and they vigorously supported policies aimed at curbing the influence of the Soviet

The evangelical Reverend Billy Graham served as a religious advisor to many American presidents. (Library of Congress)

Union and other communist regimes. At the height of the Cold War, numerous individuals and organizations associated with the Religious Right went even further, urging American policymakers to strike a death blow to so-called godless communism by mounting a preemptory military strike against the Soviet Union. Although this advice went unheeded, the Religious Right steadily gained influence in the United States throughout the Cold War, its arguments moving from the fringes of foreign policy debates into the forefront during Ronald Reagan's presidency.

Even in the early years of the Cold War, conservative Christians such as Billy James Hargis took a harder line than most mainstream American anticommunists. Hargis, a fiery fundamentalist preacher, campaigned tirelessly against communism in the 1950s and 1960s, using his Christian Crusade as a platform to argue that the United States had to serve as a bulwark for Christianity against the godless doctrines emanating from Moscow. In one memorable effort to combat communism, Hargis masterminded the Bible Balloon Project, in which tens of thousands of balloons bearing Bibles and religious tracts were released from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and directed toward Eastern Europe.

Reverend Billy Graham, perhaps the most prominent and well-recognized conservative Christian of his era, loathed communism as well, denouncing it in a 1950 speech as both anti-God and anti-American. As with many members of the Religious Right, Graham viewed the struggle between Christianity and communism in apocalyptic terms, and he repeatedly used his pulpit to urge American leaders to be firm in their resolve against Moscow.

Although the Religious Right tends to be associated with Protestant churches, the Roman Catholic Church also played a role in the politics of anticommunism. Pope Pius XII was rabidly anticommunist, and the Catholic Church openly supported the anticommunist antics of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, himself a conservative Roman Catholic.

Believing that communism had to be obliterated and not simply contained, members of the Religious Right and other ultraconservatives rallied around Republican Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election. Goldwater spectacularly failed to convince the American electorate that the country needed to adopt a more heavy-handed approach toward the Soviets, but his campaign energized conservative Christians and introduced them to Reagan, perhaps their most important political patron. Throughout his political career, Reagan addressed domestic and foreign policy issues with often simplistic and moralistic approaches that resonated with conservative Christians. After he gained the presidency in 1980, members of the Religious Right generally applauded his willingness to confront communism. Like Reagan,

they believed that the Soviet Union was not simply a rival state but rather an evil empire bent on world domination and the eradication of Christianity.

Conservative Christians saw one of their own—the Pentecostal minister and broadcaster Pat Robertson—make a bid for the presidency in 1988. Articulating the views of many evangelicals, Robertson interpreted world events through the prism of biblical prophecy (particularly the passages in the Book of Revelation that foretell Armageddon). Even as the power of the Soviet Union waned, Robertson and like-minded members of the Religious Right issued apocalyptic warnings that Christendom was under siege by communism, the very same arguments made by their ideological forebears at the dawn of the Cold War.

Shawn Francis Peters

See also

Goldwater, Barry Morris; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Roman Catholic Church

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Renner, Karl
(1870–1950)

Austrian socialist theoretician, politician, author of the First Austrian Republic's constitution, and president of the Second Austrian Republic (1945–1950). Born in Unter-Tannowitz in Moravia (present-day Doini Dunajovice in the Czech Republic), Karl Renner earned a law degree at the University of Vienna in 1898 and, along with Otto Bauer, formulated the Austro-Marxist school of thought in his many writings. In 1907, Renner was elected to parliament as a representative of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party (SPÖ). He quickly rose to prominence as a theorist and practitioner of Austrian socialism.

When the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in 1918, Renner emerged as the leader of the interim state chancellery and led the Austrian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. As head of the Austrian government until June 1920, he was largely responsible for the basic outline of the constitution of the Austrian Republic. He served in parliament until it was dissolved in 1934, which included a term as president of parliament from 1931 to 1933. He was one of the most prominent advocates of Anschluss (union with Germany) in 1938.

In April 1945, Red Army forces entering Austria found Renner and brought him to Vienna to form a provisional government. Fearing that he was a Soviet puppet, the Western Allies refused to recognize the regime. Renner, however, constructed a cleverly balanced cabinet that won Western support.

The three major political parties—the SPÖ, the Austrian Communists (KPÖ), and the conservative People's Party (ÖVP)—were represented, but each minister worked with two undersecretaries from the other parties. This along with Renner's habit of not allowing food or drink in meetings until a consensus was reached helped ensure political balance in postwar Austria.

Renner was chosen as the first president of the Second Republic of Austria following the elections of October 1945. He continued in office until his death in Vienna on 31 December 1950.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also
Austria

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Republic of Ireland

See Ireland, Republic of

Republic of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty
(1953)

Defense treaty between the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and the United States, signed in Washington, D.C., on 1 October 1953 and entered into force on 17 November 1954. Current security arrangements between the two nations continue to be based upon the Republic of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty, which was created in response to the strong demands of South Korean President Syngman Rhee for an American commitment to his nation's defense after the Korean War (1950–1953).

Consisting of six articles, the treaty affirmed that each signatory would regard an armed attack on the other in the Pacific area as "dangerous to its own peace and safety and declare that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." With this defense treaty, the United States assumed responsibility for defending the political and territorial integrity of South Korea. Backed by the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and the stark reality of life along the demilitarized zone on the Korean Peninsula's 38th Parallel, the wisdom of the treaty was initially unquestioned in South Korea and the United States.

Since the late 1990s, however, South Koreans have increasingly criticized the treaty because it provides the legal foundation for U.S. bases and the sta-

tioning of U.S. forces in South Korea. As South Koreans' fear of military attack from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) declined, many South Koreans questioned the structure of the South Korean–U.S. military alliance.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Korea, Republic of; Korean War; Rhee, Syngman

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Reuter, Ernst
(1889–1953)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) politician and mayor of Berlin. Born in Apenrade, Germany, on 29 July 1889, Ernst Reuter studied philology, geography, and history at the universities of Marburg, Munich, and Münster during 1907–1912. He joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1912 but turned to communism in 1918, joining the new German Communist Party (KPD). Because he criticized the dependence of the KPD on the Soviet Union, he was expelled from the KPD in 1922 and returned to the SPD.

During the 1920s Reuter was a member of the Berlin municipal council, becoming councilor for traffic in 1926. He became mayor of Magdeburg in 1931 and entered the Reichstag in July 1932. The Nazi regime stripped him of his office and imprisoned him during 1933–1934. After his release, he fled first to Great Britain and then to Turkey.

In November 1946, Reuter returned to Berlin and was elected councilor for traffic one month later. He soon proved to be a staunch opponent of the merging of the SPD with the KPD. Therefore, when a clear majority elected him mayor of Berlin in June 1947, the Soviet military administration refused to recognize the vote. Only in December 1948, after the municipal administration had been divided into western and eastern zones, did Reuter become the first mayor of West Berlin. During the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949), Reuter, a charismatic speaker, became a symbol of the city's will to resist Soviet and GDR, East German pressure.

Reuter's famous appeal, "People of the world, look on this city," made him well known in all of Germany and abroad. A member of the Parliamentary Council and of the Bundestag during 1949–1953, he tried to promote

closer ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). His last years in office were marked by a growing reputation for honesty and political courage but were somewhat overshadowed by internal struggles in the Berlin SPD, which resulted in its electoral defeat in December 1950. Thanks to his high popularity, however, he remained in office. Reuter died in West Berlin on 29 September 1953.

Bert Becker

See also

Berlin Blockade and Airlift; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of

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Revolt of the Admirals
(1949)

Episode in the late 1940s involving an acrimonious debate over U.S. defense priorities in which navy leaders sharply disagreed with President Harry S. Truman's allocation of financial resources. The determination of U.S. Navy leaders to fight for their service came to be known as the Revolt of the Admirals. Its leaders were Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis E. Denfield.

The revolt had been simmering for some time, as navy leaders believed that their service was being subordinated to both the U.S. Army and the fledgling U.S. Air Force, which was created in 1947. Part of the debate centered on President Truman's plan for unification of the armed forces that would place all the armed services under the new Department of Defense. It also concerned the continuing post–World War II defense drawdown and resulting shortage of funds for new weapons programs.

In the reorganization of the armed forces, army and air force leaders would have preferred to do away with the navy altogether. At the least the army sought to absorb the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), while the air force wanted to take over naval aviation. The navy did keep its aviation, and the USMC's independence was preserved. However, navy suspicions were nevertheless heightened.

Of great concern to navy leaders was the priority assigned by the Truman administration to the army and air force in terms of funding. Truman questioned spending considerable sums on new ships that might easily be destroyed by atomic weapons. The air force insisted that priority go to strategic bombing and especially the Convair B-36 Peacemaker bomber. The B-36,

The keel for the U.S. aircraft carrier *United States*, 18 April 1949. (U.S. Navy)

the world's first intercontinental bomber and the U.S. Air Force's largest aircraft (popularly called the Aluminum Overcast) entered service in 1948.

Navy leaders sharply disagreed with the air force preoccupation with nuclear war. They believed that limited war was the most likely scenario in the nuclear age. The admirals also insisted that World War II in the Pacific had amply demonstrated the ability of carrier task forces to project force over great distances. The navy called for a new generation of supercarriers with supporting battle groups. These carriers were specifically designed to take the aircraft necessary to carry the multiton nuclear bombs of the period.

Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal agreed with navy leaders and approved construction of the first supercarrier, the 65,000-ton flush-deck *United States* (CVA-58). Forrestal retired for health reasons at the end of March 1949, however. His replacement, Louis A. Johnson, wanted the air force to have a monopoly on strategic nuclear weapons and toward that end would order additional B-36 bombers. Johnson was also determined to cap defense expenditures, and he believed that the place to make large cuts was in naval programs.

Less than a month after taking office, on 23 April Johnson canceled construction of the *United States,* the keel of which had already been laid. Sullivan resigned in protest. Another Johnson decision, that USMC air assets would be transferred to the air force, was rescinded, but only following sharp congressional opposition.

Johnson promptly replaced Sullivan as secretary of the navy with a personal friend, Francis Matthews, known derisively in the navy as the "rowboat secretary" because of his complete lack of naval experience. Leading officers were outraged, and a research group, Op-23, headed by Captain Arleigh A. Burke, began assembling data critical of the B-36. An anonymous document (later shown to have been written by a civilian assistant, later fired, in the office of the secretary of the navy) then circulated, denigrating the B-36 and characterizing it as a "billion dollar blunder." The document also charged that Johnson had a personal financial interest in B-36 construction.

Subsequent hearings by the House Armed Services Committee found no evidence that Johnson had any financial interest in B-36 procurement. The committee also held that one service should not question the weapons of another and thus called into question testimony by the army and air force chiefs supporting Johnson's decision to cancel the *United States*. The committee also criticized the "summary manner" in which Johnson had made his decision, without proper consultation. In addition, the committee condemned the firing of Denfield, whom Johnson had sacked following his congressional testimony.

Gradually the matter died down, especially with the beginning of the Korean War. The onset of that conflict in June 1950 reinforced the important role played by aircraft carriers in the projection of U.S. military power. Under fire from all sides, especially given the lack of preparedness of the U.S. military to fight in Korea, Johnson resigned in September 1950. The Revolt of the Admirals did serve one positive function. It opened national debate on the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. military establishment. Only after considerable wrangling was a consensus reached that multiple nuclear options would be the best response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Forrestal, James Vincent; United States Navy

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Reykjavík Meeting
(11–12 October 1986)

Summit meeting held between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavík, Iceland, on 11–12 October 1986. The summit marked a failed U.S.-Soviet effort to produce a comprehensive agreement on strategic arms limitations.

Gorbachev, responding to the Reagan administration's intention to abandon Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, offered a series of proposals in early 1986 to jump-start the stalled Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and space defense negotiations. Gorbachev called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, in three stages, over the ensuing fifteen years. He also urged the withdrawal of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe, thus supporting Reagan's earlier zero-option proposal. Gorbachev further proposed major cuts in conventional forces and pushed for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing. Moscow had thus seized the initiative in U.S.-Soviet arms talks.

Gorbachev's proposals compelled the Reagan administration to push for another summit meeting. Gorbachev, despite an agreement at Geneva to visit the United States, now refused to go unless there was some progress in arms talks. Eventually he dropped his demand and agreed to meet with Reagan in Reykjavík for preliminary talks.

Although American officials saw Reykjavík as a preparatory meeting for a Washington summit, Gorbachev arrived at the summit with specific proposals, calling for a 50 percent reduction in all strategic arms, the elimination of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe, a total test ban, and a mutual agreement to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty for another decade. The Americans replied with an offer to abolish all strategic missiles over the next decade. Not to be outdone, Gorbachev pushed a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons, not just missiles, by 1996. Negotiations collapsed when Reagan refused to confine his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to laboratory testing. The two sides blamed each other for the failure to reach an agreement.

Nevertheless, Reykjavík produced several immediate breakthroughs in U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. Both Gorbachev and Reagan returned home convinced of a mutually sincere interest in peacefully ending the nuclear standoff. Recognizing that the Soviet Union could not afford to continue the arms race, Gorbachev ordered a major review of U.S.-Soviet relations, causing the Soviets to disconnect INF negotiations from SDI although not SDI from START negotiations. Greater emphasis would now be placed on political accords rather than military power to ensure Soviet security. This change paved the way for the negotiation of the 1987 INF Treaty, which eliminated medium- and short-range missiles. This marked the first time that the two powers had agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. At the same time, both sides worked out a provisional agreement on strategic defense in which they pledged not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Dean Fafoutis

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Arms Control; Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Strategic Defense Initiative

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Reza Pahlavi, Mohammad
(1919–1980)

Authoritarian ruler of Iran (1941–1979). Born in Tehran on 26 October 1919, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was the son of Reza Pahlavi, shah of Iran during 1926–1941. The younger Reza Pahlavi attended L'Institute Le Rosey (an elite Swiss boarding school) and then Iran's Military College at Tehran. During World War II, the British and Soviets forced the elder shah to abdicate because of his pro-German sympathies, making his son shah.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, shah of Iran, shown here on 16 November 1977 preparing to depart after a visit to the United States. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Following the war, Iran was politically unstable, and the shah proved to be highly unpopular. His pro-Western orientation, lavish lifestyle, and efforts to Westernize Iran did not sit well with conservatives and Muslim clergy. In addition, his authoritarian tendencies soon came into conflict with Iran's nationalist factions, the most powerful of which was headed by Mohammed Mossadegh, who became prime minister in 1951. In early 1953, after a power struggle with Mossadegh, the shah was compelled to leave Iran, but he soon returned to power with the support of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain's MI6 intelligence agency. The shah ousted Mossadegh in a countercoup and ordered his arrest in August 1953.

The shah subsequently embarked upon the main project of his reign, the creation of a large, technologically advanced military. While his domestic policies did create economic growth—albeit unevenly distributed—he also created a ruthless secret police force (SAVAK) that quashed all opposition. The shah aggressively lobbied the Americans for military assistance and matériel, often citing the importance of Iran as a Cold War ally, specifically as a member of the Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The United States was reluctant, however, to grant his request for large weapons purchases because of his heavy-handed rule. Successive American administra-

tions tried to convince the shah to implement internal reforms, and to that end in the early 1960s the shah instituted the so-called White Revolution, which emphasized land reform and expanded suffrage.

Beginning in 1970, President Richard Nixon's administration, in a major policy change, permitted huge weapons sales to Iran. These sales continued until Jimmy Carter became president and scaled back arms sales because of the shah's human rights record. Under increasing internal and external pressure to relax his police state, the shah was forced to flee Iran on 16 January 1979. Following his departure the monarchy was abolished, and Iran became an Islamic theocracy led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The shah died of cancer on 27 July 1980 in Cairo, Egypt.

Robert N. Stacy

See also

Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Iran; Iran, Armed Forces; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Mossadegh, Mohammed

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Rhee, Syngman
(1875–1965)

Ardent anticommunist Korean nationalist and first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) during 1948–1960. Syngman Rhee was born in Pyongsan, Hwanghae Province, now in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), on 26 March 1875. After studying Chinese classics at home, he enrolled in an American Methodist school in Seoul in 1894. When Seo Jai Pil, a reformer and independence fighter, established the Independence Association in 1896, Rhee joined it. In 1898 he was arrested on charges of subversion and imprisoned until 1904, during which time he converted to Christianity.

Upon his release Rhee went to study in the United States, and after attending both George Washington University and Harvard University, he received a PhD from Princeton University in 1910. His return home that year coincided with Japan's annexation of Korea. In 1912, he returned to the United States and remained in exile there until 1945. He established the Korean Commission in Washington, D.C., to lobby on behalf of Korean independence. By the time of Korea's liberation in August 1945, he had become Korea's best-known political figure overseas.

Because of his reputation among Koreans, the Korean People's Republic, a self-proclaimed leftist government, elected Rhee its president in the fall of 1945. Korean conservatives also wanted him to lead the country. But he refused these offers and began organizing his own party. In December

Syngman Rhee, president of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) during 1948–1960, was a staunch nationalist committed to the reunification of Korea. Rhee assumed near dictatorial powers while presiding over a society facing communist challenges. (Library of Congress)

1945, he mobilized opposition to the Moscow Agreement on Korea that stipulated a Korean trusteeship. Beginning in 1946, he called for the creation of a separate government in southern Korea. Washington, for its own reasons, finally agreed and in the fall of 1947 persuaded the United Nations (UN) to arrange and observe a general election in May 1948.

The South Korean government was established on 15 August 1948, and Rhee was elected president by a wide margin. Soon thereafter, he adopted the March North policy to reunify Korea, then divided at the 38th Parallel, and asked the United States for military aid. Washington demurred for fear of igniting a civil war.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea. Throughout the war, Rhee demanded the unification of all Korea under his leadership and attempted to sabotage any measure that might have undercut this goal. His aim of a unified Korea was increasingly at odds with U.S. policy, which by 1951 was ready to negotiate a settlement that would effectively restore the status quo antebellum. In particular, Rhee's release of some 27,000 North Korean POWs in June 1953 nearly derailed the armistice talks.

After the Korean War, Rhee became increasingly dictatorial and corrupt. He was finally forced out of office in April 1960 by a student-led revolt. The following month, he left Korea for exile in Hawaii, where he died in Honolulu on 19 July 1965.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Korean War

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See Zimbabwe

Rhodesia

Ridgway, Matthew Bunker
(1895–1993)

U.S. Army general and army chief of staff (1953–1955). Born at Fort Monroe, Virginia, on 3 March 1895, Matthew Ridgway graduated in 1917 from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. During World War II he was promoted to brigadier general in January 1942 and to major general that August. During 1942–1944 he commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in Europe and fought in Italy, France, and Germany. In August 1944 he took command of the new XVIII Airborne Corps and directed it in the Netherlands, in the Battle of the Bulge, and in Germany.

Promoted to lieutenant general in June 1945, Ridgway held a succession of different commands. In December 1950 he took charge of the Eighth Army in Korea following the sudden death of Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker. Restoring the Eighth Army's shattered morale, he drove communist forces back above the 38th Parallel. In April 1951 President Harry S. Truman relieved the insubordinate General Douglas MacArthur as commander of United Nations (UN) forces and replaced him with Ridgway. In July 1951 Ridgway opened truce talks with North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Promoted to full general, in May 1952 Ridgway followed General Dwight D. Eisenhower as supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe (SACEUR), where he worked to build up cooperation and military effectiveness within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Soon after becoming president in 1953, Eisenhower appointed Ridgway chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Ridgway mistrusted the president's New Look defense doctrine of relying primarily upon atomic weapons rather than conventional military forces and clashed repeatedly with both Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. In 1954, when French forces were besieged at Dien Bien Phu and the French government sought American military assistance and intervention through air strikes, Ridgway successfully urged restraint and moderation, warning that any such action risked embroiling the United States in a disastrous war.

Retiring in June 1955, Ridgway joined a military contracting firm and wrote extensively on defense and foreign policy matters. President John F. Kennedy's administration proved receptive to Ridgway's ideas that the U.S.

One of the nation's most distinguished military leaders, General Matthew B. Ridgway commanded U.S. airborne forces in World War II and United Nations forces in the Korean War. (Library of Congress)

Restoring Eighth Army's shattered morale, he drove communist forces back above the 38th Parallel.

military maintain sufficient manpower to permit a flexible response to a wide range of situations. As a private citizen, Ridgway deplored growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, thinking the war unwinnable and ill-considered. He was among the senior advisors, or Wise Men, who in March 1968 urged President Lyndon B. Johnson to suspend bombings, seek a negotiated peace, and begin withdrawing American forces from Vietnam. Ridgway died in Fox Chapel, Pennsylvania, on 26 July 1993.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; New Look Defense Policy; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam; Vietnam War; Wilson, Charles Erwin

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Rifles

See Small Arms

Rio Pact
(September 1947)

Agreement drawn up in September 1947 and formally known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance that created a mutual defense system for the Western Hemisphere. World War II motivated multilateral cooperation in the Americas. After the United States entered the war in December 1941, most American nations supported the United States by declaring war on the Axis nations or by severing relations with them. Encouraged by wartime solidarity, American leaders fashioned an inter-American system of collective security at a series of international conferences. In 1945 foreign secretaries signed the provisional Act of Chapultepec in Mexico City, stating that an attack against any nation in the hemisphere would be considered an act of aggression against all the signatories of the declaration.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security that produced the Rio Pact met in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, during 15 August–2 September 1947. Signed by the United States and twenty other American countries including former Axis sympathizer Argentina, the pact made the Act of Chapultepec a permanent treaty. The inter-American system was based on the preexisting principle that an attack against one American nation was to be considered an attack against them all.

The prototype for the formation of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Pact went into effect on 3 December 1948 after ratification by two-thirds of the signatory nations. It became the principal document regulating mutual security and conflict resolution within the inter-American system. Signatories decided by a two-thirds majority what kind of collective action would be taken, ranging from breaking diplomatic relations to imposing economic sanctions and using armed force, but no state was required to use such force. In addition to being an anticommunist Cold War agreement, the pact was also invoked to resolve many interhemispheric controversies. Signatories pledged to submit all hemispheric disputes for settlement according to the procedures of the inter-American system before bringing cases to the United Nations (UN).

The terms of the Rio Pact became the foundation for the 1948 Act of Bogotá, which established the Organization of American States (OAS), and implementing the Rio Pact became a primary responsibility of that body during the Cold War. U.S. President John F. Kennedy described the 1962 Soviet-Cuban maneuver to introduce nuclear missiles into Cuba as a violation of the Rio Pact. He invoked the authorization for the use of force under the pact (for the first time) against Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

When U.S. leaders believed that communism threatened their nation's hemispheric interests, they often circumvented the Rio Pact and acted unilaterally, either covertly, as in the 1954 Guatemala intervention by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or overtly, as in the U.S. military's 1983 invasion of Grenada. The pact was invoked numerous times during the Cold War but fell into disuse as Latin Americans became dissatisfied with U.S. domination of the inter-American system and as Cold War threats ceased.

David M. Carletta

See also

Americas; Chapultepec Conference; Cuban Missile Crisis; Grenada Invasion; Guatemalan Intervention; North Atlantic Treaty; Organization of American States

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Rochet, Waldeck
(1905–1983)

French political leader and general secretary of the French Communist Party (PCF) during 1964–1972. Born in Sainte-Croix (Saône-et-Loire) on 5 April 1905, Waldeck Rochet joined the PCF in 1924. In 1930 party officials sent him to attend the Comintern school in the Soviet Union. Returning to France, in 1932 he became party secretary for the Lyons region. Two years later he moved to Paris to head the farmers' section of the party's Central Committee. In May 1936, he won election to the Chamber of Deputies from Colombes-Nanterre. The next year he became a voting member of the Central Committee and director of the PCF's farmers' newspaper, *La Terre*.

Arrested when the PCF was outlawed at the beginning of World War II, Rochet was imprisoned first in France and then in Algiers. Freed following the Allied North African landings, he represented the PCF in the London headquarters of the Free French. Resuming his previous party posts in late 1944, in 1950 he became a full member of the PCF Politburo. He also represented the Saône-et-Loire in the two constituent assemblies and the National Assembly during 1946–1956 and in the Department of the Seine from 1956.

French Communist Party leader Waldeck Rochet. (Corbis Sygma)

In 1961 Rochet became deputy general secretary of the PCF and in 1964 its general secretary. Attempting a new course for the party, he led the PCF into the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left). The high point of this alliance was his decision to support Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS) candidate François Mitterrand in the second round of the 1965 presidential elections.

Rochet also experienced tense relations with Moscow, culminating in 1968 when the PCF publicly expressed its disapproval of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. He then came under heavy pressure from both his more rigid colleagues and Moscow. His health deteriorated, and he was diagnosed as suffering from Parkinson's disease. By 1969 he could no longer function as leader of the PCF but won reelection the next year with Georges Marchais as his deputy and heir apparent. In 1972 Marchais succeeded Rochet, who was elevated to the post of honorary president. Rochet died in Paris on 15 February 1983.

Maud Bracke and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

France; Mitterrand, François; Thorez, Maurice

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Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich
(1908–1979)

U.S. political leader, governor of New York, and vice president of the United States. Born in Bar Harbor, Maine, on 8 July 1908, Nelson Rockefeller was one of the heirs to the vast Standard Oil fortune of John D. Rockefeller. Nelson Rockefeller was determined to win distinction in the political arena, where his ultimate ambition, never attained, was to become president of the United States. A liberal Republican, he was coordinator of the Office of Inter-American Affairs during 1940–1944; assistant secretary of state for American Republics' Affairs during 1944–1945; chairman of the International Development Advisory Board (Point Four Program) during 1950–1951; undersecretary of Health, Education and Welfare during 1953–1954; and special assistant to the president during 1954–1955. Rockefeller demonstrated particular interest in Latin America, where he and his family possessed enormous property and business holdings. Throughout the 1960s he was a leading but perennially disappointed candidate for the Republican presidential nomination.

A firm anticommunist and leader of the internationalist wing of the Republican Party who believed implicitly in the prevailing Cold War orthodoxy, Rockefeller originally supported the U.S. commitment to Vietnam and the 1965–1967 military escalation. During the 1968 presidential campaign, he announced that he would attack neither Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson's prosecution of the war nor his turn toward peace negotiations. During that year's Republican convention, both Rockefeller and his rival, Richard M. Nixon, supported and won a platform plank favoring peace negotiations over the opposition of conservative California Governor Ronald Reagan's followers, who urged a more aggressive prosecution of the war.

After Nixon's election, Rockefeller loyally supported the president's Vietnam policies. When the Watergate scandal forced Nixon's resignation in August 1974, his successor, Gerald R. Ford, made Rockefeller his vice president. Conservative opposition to Rockefeller's liberal Republicanism denied him the second place on the presidential ticket in 1976. Rockefeller died in New York City on 27 January 1979.

Priscilla Roberts

See also
Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Rogers, William Pierce
(1913–2001)

U.S. secretary of state (1969–1973). Born in Norfolk, New York, on 23 June 1913, William Rogers was a New York lawyer with impeccable establishment credentials. He graduated from Colgate University in 1934 and from Cornell Law School in 1937. He had a long record of public service beginning with assistant district attorney in New York County (1938–1942, 1946–1947), where he served under Thomas E. Dewey. Rogers was then counsel to the U.S. Senate War Investigating Committee (1947) and chief counsel to the U.S. Senate Investigations Sub-Committee of the Executive Expenditures Committee (1947–1948). At this time he first met the young Congressman Richard M. Nixon, with whom he worked on the Alger Hiss case. During Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency, Rogers was appointed assistant attorney general (1953–1958) and then attorney general (1958–1961).



William Pierce Rogers, U.S. secretary of state during 1969–1973. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Rogers was a personal friend of Nixon, whom he assisted when the latter set up a legal practice in New York after his defeat in the California gubernatorial election of 1962. Although Rogers served briefly as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations (UN) in the early 1960s, he had little foreign policy background. His appointment as secretary of state reflected Nixon's desire to retain control of foreign policy. Rogers soon proved no match for the dominating, driven, and intellectually brilliant National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, under whose direction the National Security Council within a few weeks wrested from the Department of State the crucial power to set the agenda for U.S. foreign policy discussions. Throughout his term as secretary of state, Rogers remained a marginal figure, entirely overshadowed by the publicity-hungry Kissinger. Nixon said of his two subordinates: "Henry thinks Bill isn't very deep, and Bill thinks Henry is power-crazy."

Nixon and Kissinger often left Rogers ignorant of major foreign policy initiatives, including arms control, secret negotiations to end the Vietnam War, and the opening of trade with China, of which he first learned through newspaper accounts of Kissinger's 1971 trip to Beijing. Rogers did, however, deal successfully with major issues involv-

ing Middle Eastern policy, Korea, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and supervised routine State Department business adequately.

On Vietnam and Indochina, Rogers favored caution, conciliation, and negotiation over the generally more militant instincts of Nixon and Kissinger, who more often than not ignored his counsel against, for example, the resumption of bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in 1969, the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April 1970, and further bombings and the mining of Haiphong Harbor in spring 1972. Unusually, Kissinger briefed the secretary in full on the final version of the Paris Peace Accords, which were signed in January 1973 and of which Rogers became a strong supporter. Equally unusual, Kissinger stayed at home while Rogers went to Paris to initial the accords.

In September 1973 Nixon asked for Rogers's resignation, replacing him with Kissinger. Rogers returned to the practice of law in Washington, D.C., leading the committee that investigated the explosion of the *Challenger* space shuttle in 1986 but playing little role in foreign affairs. He died of heart failure at Bethesda, Maryland, on 2 January 2001.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

China, People's Republic of; Détente; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Paris Peace Conference and Treaties; Vietnam War

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Roh Tae Woo
(1932–)

South Korean general, politician, and president of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) during 1988–1993. Born in Taegu on 4 December 1932, Roh Tae Woo graduated in 1955 from the Korea Military Academy with his close friend Chun Doo Hwan, future South Korean president. Woo became a lieutenant colonel in June 1968 and went to Vietnam as a battalion commander in September of that year. He was promoted to colonel in November 1971 and brigadier general in October 1974. After advancing to major general in 1978, he took command of the 9th Infantry Division in January 1979.

When Hwan seized control of the South Korean armed forces in a bloody coup on 12 December 1979, Woo played an essential supporting role in bringing his 9th Infantry Division to Seoul. Advanced to lieutenant general in August 1980, he headed the Defense Security Command, the South Korean military intelligence agency. In July 1981 he retired from active service with the rank of full general.

Woo then plunged into politics and was elected president of South Korea in December 1987, defeating longtime opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who split the opposition vote. Woo took office in early 1988. In foreign affairs, he vigorously pursued a Nordpolitik that called for rapprochement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This policy led to the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union in 1990, and by 1992 South Korea had established diplomatic ties with all of the East European nations and the PRC.

Meanwhile, in September 1990 South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young Hun met in Seoul with his North Korean counterpart Yon Hyong Muk in the first such meeting of leaders of the two Koreas. It resulted in the December 1991 Basic Agreement on North-South Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange, and Cooperation and the Agreement on the Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Earlier that same year, North and South Korea were admitted simultaneously to the United Nations (UN). Woo retired from the presidency in February 1993.

In 1995 Woo was tried, convicted, and sentenced to seventeen years' imprisonment for his part in the 1979 military mutiny and coup and for corruption while in office. He was released under a special amnesty in December 1997.

Jinwung Kim

See also

Korea, Republic of

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Roman Catholic Church

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the original nineteenth-century communist theorists, took a dim view of religion. Marx was born into a liberal Jewish family that converted to Christianity for political and social expediency. Engels, on the other hand, came from a family that practiced a pietistic

Cuzco, once a center of Inca civilization, was conquered in the sixteenth century by the Spanish, who replaced the Incan ruins with their own baroque architecture. (Corel)

Protestant faith against which he revolted as a young man. Both philosophers rejected the supernatural claims of religion and its political and sociological implications. Indeed, Marx famously referred to organized religion as "the opiate of the masses." Thus, it is not surprising that from the beginning the Roman Catholic Church, with its vast worldwide influence, has been identified as one of the most formidable foes of communism. Indeed, popes were quick to spot the challenge to established faith. During the 1950s, as the Cold War raged, Catholics the world over were instructed to conclude their liturgies with the prayer "Save Russia." When communism eventually collapsed in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, a Polish patriot, Pope John Paul II, held the papal office and was widely perceived to have played a central role in its demise.

During the decades in which the Soviet Union ruled its vast empire, all religions were decried. Stately cathedrals were transformed into museums of the history of religion and atheism, where vivid tableaux depicted the atrocities committed throughout history in the name of religion. Severe restrictions were placed on religious instruction, and evangelism was halted. Popular plays and musical dramas were built around scenarios of local comrades who overcame the duplicity of clerics, whether Christian in European Russia or Islamic in the Asiatic republics of the Soviet Union. But special venom was always reserved for Roman Catholicism, which was regarded as both Christian

and alien. While the Eastern Orthodox Church had deep roots in Russia's history and its prelates could be more easily coerced, Catholics were ruled by a foreign bishop and were regarded as reactionary and hostile.

Achille Ratti, who became Pope Pius XI in 1922, was the first pope forced to confront communism directly. Two years before his elevation to the papacy, he had been threatened by Bolshevik troops while on a diplomatic mission to Poland. As he observed atheistic communism in action, with the persecution and murder of priests in Russia and the closing of churches, he became convinced that communism posed the gravest threat that European Christianity had ever faced. Communist influences in Catholic nations such as Mexico and Spain only confirmed his view that Bolsheviks were "missionaries of the Antichrist" intent on conquering the world. Never a proponent of democratic government, his distaste for communism was so great that he initially regarded Italian fascism as a bulwark against this threat from the East. For the same reasons, despite strong suspicions of German racial and religious policies, the Catholic Church negotiated a Concordat with German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler in 1933.

Eugenio Pacelli, a protégé of Ratti, succeeded his mentor in 1939 as Pope Pius XII. Pacelli had served as a Vatican diplomat in Munich in 1919, where he had suffered his own encounter with communist thugs. A lover of German culture, the new pope, like his predecessor, feared communism more than he came to detest the policies of Hitler or Mussolini. Although Pius XII's critics have, with full hindsight, subsequently charged him with indifference to Hitler's genocidal policies, Pius believed that Stalinist atrocities, equally enormous, also required denunciation.

After World War II, communism mounted a serious challenge to Christian Democrats in Italy. Believing his church to be in deadly peril, Pius XII became a Cold War leader, and the Vatican actively supported noncommunist political parties, both spiritually and financially. As the Cold War settled in, Catholics in Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania came under increasing hardships. In Hungary, Cardinal József Mindszenty was arrested for his resistance to communist rule, becoming a martyr-hero to Protestants as well as Catholics. In the United States, the Catholic Church became a strong supporter of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and his ill-conceived anticommunist witch-hunt. Catholic relief agencies aided refugees from Eastern Europe. In France, even the innovative and popular Worker Priest Movement, in which priests lived among the people and shared their hardships, was deemed too socialist and was disbanded by the Vatican. In 1949, Pope Pius XII brandished his most potent weapon when he excommunicated Catholics who joined the Communist Party. The communists were equally intolerant, forbidding church membership among party members.

Pius XII, who died in 1958, was replaced by a more populist pope, the much-loved Angelo Roncalli, who became John XXIII. More sympathetic to the stated economic aims of socialism than had been the aristocratic Pius XII, John XXIII softened the Church's anticommunist rhetoric. Indeed, he even made friends of some Cold War antagonists. The Italian Marxist Pier

Paolo Pasolini dedicated his film *The Gospel According to St. Matthew* to the new pope. John held an audience with the daughter and son-in-law of Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev, even though Khrushchev had renewed some restrictions on religion that had lapsed after Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's death. Pope John even sent presents of stamps and coins to the Khrushchev grandchildren. He also initiated Vatican Council II, which counted among its many missions the opening of the Church to friendlier relations with people of other religious and political persuasions.

John XXIII's successor, Giovanni Battista Montini, who took the name Paul VI, was a pensive, cautious man who hoped to ease the lot of Catholics behind the Iron Curtain with the accommodations of his Ostpolitik. Less confrontational than some of his predecessors, Paul ordered Cardinal Minszenty, who had been living in publicized sanctuary in the American embassy in Budapest, to leave Hungary, where he had become a diplomatic embarrassment. The pope believed that open Catholic hostility to communist governments only confirmed their view that Christians were unreliable and hostile citizens. However, his actions pleased neither side for very long, and as his papacy neared its end, his critics dubbed him a Hamlet for his indecisiveness.

In 1978, the cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church surprised the world by electing the first non-Italian pope in more than 400 years. He was Karol Wojtyła, archbishop of Kraków, who had lived and conducted much of his ministry under the yoke of Polish communism. Not long into his reign as John Paul II, some Vatican insiders began accusing him of giving more attention to East European politics than to his spiritual duties. It was clear that as a Pole himself, he was able to converse easily with East European leaders. Whatever their political persuasion, they could not help but feel national pride in his election. John Paul's support for the Solidarity movement in his homeland and his papal visits to Poland gave all East Europeans new hope. By the time he established diplomatic ties with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989, the end of godless communism in East Europe was near. The pope later met with Vladimir Putin, president of the new Russia, and traveled to Cuba to be welcomed by Fidel Castro.

In 1978, the cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church surprised the world by electing the first non-Italian pope in over 400 years.

Although John Paul II was no great admirer of capitalism, he rejected outright the compromises between Catholicism and Marxism advocated by certain Latin American liberation theologians, most notably the Peruvian Jesuit Gustavo Gutiérrez. Obsessed with the poverty and exploitation of the Indian masses, Gutiérrez had stressed a social gospel, with relatively little attention paid to the New Testament Gospel. His ideas and writings had appealed to intellectuals throughout the Americas but exerted little influence on the masses of the Latin American faithful.

At the beginning of the third millennium, the full story of Pope John Paul II's contribution to the collapse of European communism was still not fully known, although both General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the strongman of Poland, and Gorbachev had publicly acknowledged the primacy of his role. Particularly puzzling remains the May 1981 assassination attempt on John Paul II that had taken place in St. Peter's Square. Mehmet Ali Agca, who

fired the shots, was a Turk variously described as a communist under the control of Bulgaria and, later, as a possible Islamic militant.

Although in fragile health, John Paul II realized his dream of ushering in the third Christian millennium. The Church's old foe, communism, had been largely vanquished, but the Church nonetheless found itself in disarray. Vatican Council II reforms had not only brought a freshness into the staid institution but were also responsible for a loss of unity and discipline among the faithful. Some cardinals were challenging the absolute authority of the pope, while others were accusing him of dereliction or heresy. Presidential candidates in the United States were ignoring Vatican moral directives on abortion, and in some dioceses marriage annulments were handed out as freely as secular courts granted divorce. Catholics everywhere were picking and choosing which doctrines and moral directives they chose to follow. But the West's oldest intact institution had faced challenges before and entered the new millennium still a potent force in world religion and politics.

Allene Phy-Olsen

See also

John XXIII, Pope; John Paul II, Pope; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; Mindszenty, József; Paul VI, Pope; Pius XII, Pope; Solidarity Movement; Vatican Council II

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Romania

Southeast European nation with an area of 91,699 square miles, slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Oregon. With a 1945 population of approximately 15.5 million people, Romania borders on Ukraine and Moldavia to the north, the Black Sea to the east, Bulgaria and Serbia to the south, and Hungary to the west. After the 1881 Congress of Berlin, Romania became a kingdom, independent of the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of World War I, Romania proclaimed its neutrality. However, in 1916 it joined the Allied powers in hopes of securing additional territory. Forced to sign the punitive Treaty of Bucharest with Germany in May 1918, Romania reentered the war on the Allied side at its end. As a consequence of having sided with the Allies, Romania nearly doubled in size, securing possession of both Russian and Hungarian lands, including Bessarabia and Transylvania.

In 1938, King Carol II turned the monarchy into a dictatorship by abolishing the 1923 constitution. In the turbulent year of 1940 the nation was reorganized along fascist lines. That May, under heavy German pressure,

The House of the People in Bucharest, originally meant to house the state government of Romania, was nearing completion upon Nicolae Ceauşescu's overthrow in 1989. The immense building was renamed the Palace of the Parliament in the post–Cold War era. (Corel)

Romania joined the Axis de facto. In June, acting in accordance with secret provisions of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of August 1939, the Soviet Union forced Romania to cede Bessarabia and also northern Bukovina, which had not been Russian before. Germany then forced Romania to return part of Transylvania to Hungary and the southern Dobruja to Bulgaria.

King Carol II had alienated his people by his open affair with a mistress and widespread corruption. National outrage over the loss of half of the nation's population and territory allowed the profascist, anti-Semitic Iron Guard to bring about Carol's abdication in September 1940.

Carol's nineteen-year-old son Michael (Mihai) replaced him but was a figurehead. The prime minister, World War I military hero General Ion Antonescu, exercised real power. In November, Romania officially joined the Axis. Antonescu sent troops to participate in the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 in order to reclaim Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. He continued offensive operations in the Soviet Union on promises from Hitler of additional territory, including the Black Sea port of Odessa. Romania ultimately supplied more troops to the war against the Soviet Union than all the other German satellites combined.

Antonescu rejected appeals after the disastrous Battle of Stalingrad from other Romanian political leaders to withdraw the nation's troops from the

Soviet Union, claiming, no doubt correctly, that Axis victory was no longer possible. Romania had mounted the tiger and was now obliged to finish the ride. Finally, in late August 1944, with Soviet forces having crossed the eastern border, King Michael ordered the arrest of Antonescu and announced Romania's withdrawal from the Axis alliance.

Romania now fell under Soviet occupation. The armistice signed in Moscow on 12 September 1944 required Romania to join the Allies; relinquish Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and Dobruja; and pay to the Soviet Union war reparations equivalent to $300 million. The Soviets in return promised to restore to Romania northern Transylvania from Hungary. The Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947 ratified these agreements.

During the war, Romania suffered some 600,000 casualties. Antonescu was tried by the communists in May 1946 and executed. Soviet pressure, meanwhile, impeded King Michael's attempts to form coalition governments. During March 1945–June 1952, the communist takeover proceeded under the Soviet-installed regime led by Petru Groza. Never a major force in Romanian politics, the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) had fewer than 1,000 members in 1945.

Nonetheless, the Groza government systematically squelched rival parties and appointed communists to key ministerial and army posts. Prominent figures included Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, who returned from Soviet exile, and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Teohari Georgescu, Nicolae Ceauşescu, and Alexandru Drăghici, who had been imprisoned during the war. A new secret police force, the Securitate, formed in 1945 under Soviet direction, enforced communist control and directed a network of concentration camps. As a result, in the rigged election of November 1946, the PCR gained almost 90 percent of the vote. King Michael was forced to abdicate in December 1947.

In 1948, the PCR merged with a wing of the Social Democrats into the Romanian Workers' Party (PMR). Now known as a people's republic, Romania adopted a Stalinist constitution with Gheorghiu-Dej, Luca, and Pauker heading the PMR Central Committee. Banks, industries, mines, and transportation were nationalized, and a state planning commission was set up. Already a member of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), in January 1949 Romania joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), formed to promote economic development and cooperation among communist states.

Industrialization and the forced collectivization of agriculture proceeded rapidly. These moves led to food shortages and reduced exports, causing the government to slow down collectivization. Concurrently, churches were placed under government control, and much of their property was seized. Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's purges after the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav split prompted Gheorghiu-Dej to remove prominent rivals. He became PMR general secretary and Romanian premier in 1952 when Groza was named president, an honorary post that Groza held until his death in 1958.

Gheorghiu-Dej's premiership initially led to somewhat better living conditions. The largest concentration camps closed, and wages rose. After

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin in February 1956, Gheorghiu-Dej feared criticism as a Stalinist. He therefore responded by consolidating control of the Securitate, now headed by Interior Minister Drăghici, and purging anti-Stalinists.

During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Romania allowed Soviet troops to reinforce the Hungarian border, although it refused to send troops to Hungary. Uneasy about the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, the government reduced Hungarian language education there, merged the Hungarian Bolyai University of Cluj with the Romanian Babeş University in 1959, and in 1960 modified the borders of the Hungarian Autonomous Province, an area that Ceauşescu would eliminate in 1968.

Gheorghiu-Dej's final years marked a gradual shift from Soviet domination. The last of 35,000 Soviet ground forces left Romania in July 1958, even though air and naval bases remained. Soviet-Romanian trade dropped off in 1958 when Gheorghiu-Dej refused Khrushchev's request that Romania delay industrialization and specialize in supplying agricultural products and raw materials to Comecon members. In defiance, Gheorghiu-Dej began to seek Western financial and trade support. Critical of the Soviet Union's role in the Sino-Soviet split and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Romania strengthened its relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Yugoslavia, and Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 prompted negotiations to remove Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) advisors.

Emerging as first secretary of the renamed PCR after Gheorghiu-Dej's 1965 death, Ceauşescu continued rapid industrialization and an autonomous foreign policy, whereby Romania began its role as mediator between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Ceauşescu's popularity rose when he denounced the Warsaw Pact's August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, which ended the Prague Spring. This anti-Soviet stance precipitated U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's August 1969 visit and Ceauşescu's return visits in the 1970s.

The Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 also convinced the Ceauşescu regime to promulgate a new military doctrine, the "War of the Entire People," to resist any incursion, whether from NATO or Warsaw Pact nations. The subsequent Law on National Defense (1972) stated that Romania's armed forces would take orders only from the country's national command. Forces of Patriotic Guards were set up to supplement the regular armed forces, and defense strategy focused on prolonged resistance, small-unit attacks, and a scorched-earth policy in case of invasion.

Romania enjoyed a brief period of relative prosperity thanks to Western trade concessions, large foreign credits, and a plentiful supply of energy and raw materials. New construction reduced the housing shortage. Denouncing his predecessor's hard line, Ceauşescu freed political prisoners and deposed Interior Minister Drăghici. This all soon changed as Ceauşescu reimposed rigid central planning. Inspired by a visit to the PRC and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) in 1971, he encouraged a cult of personality. Upon Premier Ion Maurer's 1974 retirement, Ceauşescu filled the newly created office of president.

Romanian soldier on a tank in Bucharest, December 1989. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu was overthrown in a popular uprising that found wide national support. (David Turnley/Corbis)

Thereafter, natural disasters, export deficits, and energy depletion led to near economic collapse. Romania's foreign debt rose from $3.6 billion in 1977 to $10.2 billion in 1981. To pay the debt, Ceauşescu imposed strict food and electrical rationing and, to boost the country's workforce, forbade abortion and contraception. The so-called systematization campaign to resettle villagers in agroindustrial centers destroyed historical landmarks and evoked international criticism. Continuing suppression of minorities, especially of the Hungarians in Transylvania, prompted a string of protests. Increasingly removed from reality, Ceauşescu surrounded himself with sycophants, appointed family members to leading positions, and further weakened the country with his lavish lifestyle and grandiose schemes. Western support dwindled, especially when the 1978 defection of Ion Pacepa, deputy director of the Department of External Information (DIE), the foreign secret service, revealed Ceauşescu's disinformation campaign to gain Western aid and trading benefits.

In March 1989, a publicly released letter signed by six senior PCR members in the name of the National Salvation Front (NSF) signaled the government's imminent demise. In December 1989, antigovernment demonstrations in Timişoara soon spread to Bucharest, where Ceauşescu had called a progovernment rally. The populace and much of the army turned against Ceauşescu and his wife, who fled in a helicopter but were captured, tried, and summarily executed on 25 December 1989.

Political tensions did not end with Ceauşescu's fall. Initially a caretaker government, the NSF, led by Ion Iliescu, was elected in 1990. Soon after, student protests demanding the trial of Securitate agents and Ceauşescu associates erupted in Bucharest. Miners brought in from the Jiu Valley brutally intervened. Allegations persist that former Securitate agents have retained powerful positions. Violent ethnic clashes flared in Tîrgu-Mures in 1990, followed by protests against the 1995 Education Law. Nevertheless, Hungary and Romania signed a Treaty of Cooperation in September 1996 whereby Hungary renounced all claims to Transylvania and Romania agreed to guarantee minority rights. Romania became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and joined the European Union (EU) on 1 January 2007.

Anna M. Wittmann

See also

Antonescu, Ion; Bodnăraş, Emil; Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Comecon; Cominform; Drăghici, Alexandru; Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe; Groza, Petru; Hungarian Revolution; Iliescu, Ion; Michael I, King of Romania; Pauker, Ana Rabinsohn; Prague Spring; Securitate; Soviet-Yugoslav Split

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Rome, Treaty of
(25 March 1957)

The Treaty of Rome was actually two treaties signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 by the leaders of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), France, Holland, Italy, and Luxembourg that established the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The two treaties were the result of long negotiations, the roots of which lay in the French rejection of the treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) in August 1954. That dramatic episode halted the process of European integration and left the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as its only tangible result.

In the aftermath of the EDC's collapse, many ideas were put forward to resume the process of integration. The president of the ECSC High Authority, Frenchman Jean Monnet, favored expanding the ECSC to encompass other sources of energy as well as public transportation, and he suggested creating a new community for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Other policymakers proposed the establishment of a common market or even an economic union. All of these ideas eventually were included in a memo that the foreign ministers of the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) circulated among the ECSC members on 18 May 1955. On 1–2 June 1955, in Messina, Italy, the ECSC foreign ministers decided to set up an intergovernmental committee under Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak to explore the options presented in the Benelux memo.

Spaak's committee met in Brussels during July 1955–April 1956 and focused on the creation of a common market and an atomic community. On 29–30 May 1956, the committee's final report, which had suggested the creation of two new communities, was discussed and approved in Venice by the six ECSC foreign ministers, who decided to use it as the basis for a new round of negotiations. These talks, chaired by Spaak, began in June 1956 but soon ran into a number of difficulties. The West Germans were skeptical about turning their newly created nuclear industry over to a supranational authority, preferring instead to concentrate on the creation of a common market that would benefit their expanding industrial exports. The French, on the other hand, were reluctant to abandon their old protectionist habits

and insisted on the creation of an atomic energy community, particularly if this could be endowed with a joint European isotope separation plant for the production of enriched uranium.

The stalemate was broken by the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the disastrous Anglo-French military expedition in the Suez Canal in October 1956. The crises revealed Western Europe's powerlessness and dependence on the United States and acted as a catalyst for the conclusion of the negotiations. The last obstacles were overcome in early 1957, and both treaties were signed in Rome on 25 March 1957. All countries ratified the treaties before the end of the year, and on 1 January 1958 the two new communities were formally established. While EURATOM never acquired the important role that Monnet and others had envisioned for it, the EEC contributed to the continuous economic growth of Western Europe and quickly became the central pillar of European integration.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration showed much support for the negotiations but expressed its favor mostly in private talks, as it feared a repetition of the EDC debacle when the public display of American enthusiasm for the project backfired, making the EDC appear an American rather than a European design. Great Britain, on the other hand, displayed only a limited interest in the early phase of the negotiations, and as they picked up speed, Britain declined to participate any further. Subsequent attempts to merge the EEC into a larger free trade area, including Britain, failed. Thus, the Treaty of Rome deepened what hitherto had been only a limited chasm between Great Britain and continental Western Europe, potentially introducing a source of friction between London and the six EURATOM/EEC members.

Leopoldo Nuti

See also

European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; Mollet, Guy; Monnet, Jean; Spaak, Paul-Henri; Western European Union

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Roncalli, Angelo Giuseppe

See John XXIII, Pope

Roosevelt, Eleanor

(1884–1962)

Democratic activist, first lady, and United Nations (UN) delegate. Born in New York City, the niece of President Theodore Roosevelt, and educated

at Allenswood, a girl's school near London, England, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt married the politically ambitious Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a distant cousin who in 1913 became assistant secretary of the navy in Woodrow Wilson's administration. After having six children, during the 1920s Eleanor Roosevelt, whose husband was left permanently crippled by polio in 1921, became extremely active in Democratic Party politics and women's, labor, and peace organizations.

In 1929 Franklin Roosevelt became governor of New York State and in 1932 ran successfully for the presidency, an office he held from March 1933 until his death in April 1945. Eleanor Roosevelt was a liberal voice in his administration, although as World War II approached, loyalty and perhaps conviction compelled her to break with many friends and support her husband's increasingly interventionist policies. During the war she advocated liberal plans for the postwar world, including the creation of an international organization to maintain peace.

Eleanor Roosevelt was the first wife of a president to use her unique position to fight for the rights of minorities, women, and the destitute. After the death of her husband, Roosevelt played an important role in the fledgling United Nations. (Library of Congress)

Franklin Roosevelt's sudden death in April 1945 blocked his widow's original plans to attend the first meeting of the UN, to which Harry S. Truman, his successor, soon appointed her a delegate. She chaired the commission that drafted the UN Declaration on Human Rights adopted in 1948. Alarmed by intensifying Cold War tensions, she urged continuing East-West dialogue. She backed the Marshall Plan for economic aid to Europe but opposed the Truman Doctrine's call for U.S. military aid to Greece and Turkey and a global American anticommunist crusade. Gradually won over to anti-Soviet containment policies, in January 1948 she was one of the founders of Americans for Democratic Action, a liberal organization that endorsed Truman in that year's presidential campaign rather than his more pro-Soviet Democratic rival Henry A. Wallace, her husband's former vice president.

Dwight D. Eisenhower dropped Roosevelt from the UN, but his Democratic successor John F. Kennedy again named her a delegate, in which capacity she worked closely with Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy's ambassador to the UN and an old friend. Roosevelt, sponsored by the American Association for the United Nations, traveled extensively, advocating peace, human rights, and dignity for all and urging greater economic aid to developing countries. She died in New York City on 7 November 1962.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Americans for Democratic Action; Containment Policy; Human Rights; Marshall Plan; Peace Movements; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; United Nations; Wallace, Henry Agard

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Roosevelt, Franklin Delano

(1882–1945)

U.S. politician and president of the United States (1933–1945). Born at his family's Hyde Park estate in Dutchess Country, New York, on 30 January 1882, Franklin Roosevelt studied at the Groton School, Harvard College, and Columbia Law School. He then entered Democratic politics, consciously modeling his career upon his distant cousin President Theodore Roosevelt (whose niece Eleanor he married in 1905). After serving two terms as a state senator, in 1913 Roosevelt became assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. In World War I, Roosevelt was vehemently pro-Allied and interventionist, lobbying strenuously for major increases in defense spending. In 1920 he ran unsuccessfully as the Democratic vice presidential candidate on a pro–League of Nations ticket.

Shortly afterward Roosevelt contracted polio, which left him permanently disabled but did not prevent his return to politics. Elected governor of New York in 1928, four years later he ran successfully for the presidency. In his first term as president, Roosevelt concentrated primarily on domestic affairs, launching a major reform program, the New Deal, to tackle the Great Depression and its effects. Even so, by the mid-1930s he displayed far greater determination than most Americans to check the growing influence and territorial designs of expansionist fascist dictatorships in both Europe and Asia, which he and his close advisors believed ultimately menaced American strategic, economic, and ideological interests.

Appreciable popular resistance to American intervention notwithstanding, when the general European war began in September 1939, Roosevelt unequivocally and immediately placed the United States in the broad Allied and antifascist camp. Two years of fierce debate over U.S. foreign policy ensued, during which Roosevelt moved his country ever closer to outright war with Germany while providing massive quantities of aid to Great Britain, France, and, from summer 1940, Free French forces, the Soviet Union (after June 1941), and China.

The United States entered the war as a result of the concurrent crisis in the Pacific, where Roosevelt sought to use economic policies to force the Japanese to withdraw from China and Indochina. The Japanese refused and on 7 December 1941 mounted a preemptive strike on Pearl Harbor. There is absolutely no evidence that Roosevelt knew about the attack in advance and deliberately left the Pacific Fleet exposed.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, the only person to be elected president of the United States four times, was the father of the New Deal and directed the nation to victory in World War II. He is shown here delivering one of his popular Fireside Chats, a series of evening radio talks in which he explained his policies to the American people. (Library of Congress)

From then until 1945 the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were the senior coalition partners in the Grand Alliance against the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan). Since Roosevelt sought to build up China as a key postwar U.S. ally in Asia, at times he accorded that country similar formal status, although its military and economic weakness and semioccupation meant that it never carried the same weight as the other three. As president, Roosevelt set the parameters of American and Allied strategy. He consciously chose to place winning the war in Europe ahead of the Pacific theater and authorized the development of atomic weapons. He also presided over the forging of close permanent ties among the U.S. military establishment, science, and industry, links that later hardened into a postwar military-industrial complex.

During the war, Roosevelt met repeatedly with his Soviet and British counterparts, Soviet President Josef Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston

Churchill, to reach agreement on Allied strategy and to plan for the postwar world. At Roosevelt's urging, in August 1941 Britain and the United States signed the Atlantic Charter, committing the two powers to a postwar international organization to maintain peace and to base the postwar order on principles of liberal free trade, international law, national self-determination, and human rights. Other members of the Grand Alliance later endorsed this statement, although both Britain and the Soviet Union expressed significant reservations on economic and colonial matters.

Roosevelt himself frequently expressed strong opposition to the continuation of Western imperialism after the war, sentiments that greatly irritated Churchill, who believed profoundly in the British Empire. Roosevelt was even more dedicated to ending French colonial rule, although there are indications that by early 1945 this was no longer so high a priority for him.

The British and U.S. decision to defer the cross-Channel invasion of Europe until the spring of 1944 effectively ensured that after the war Soviet military forces would control most of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Early indications of what this would imply occurred from August to October 1944, when Soviet troops stood by while German forces suppressed an uprising in Warsaw that eliminated many potential opponents of Soviet as well as German rule. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the three leaders signed the Declaration on Liberated Europe supposedly promising free elections on democratic principles to all areas taken over by the Allies, but only the goodwill of the occupying powers, who could interpret them as they pleased, guaranteed these pledges. At Yalta, the Big Three also agreed to divide Germany into three temporary, separate occupation zones to be administered by their occupying military forces. Roosevelt's acquiescence in the Yalta provisions exposed him to fierce posthumous attacks from conservatives, but given the military situation on the ground, the United States and Britain had few effective means of preventing Soviet domination of the area. By the time of Roosevelt's death in April 1945, U.S.-Soviet relations were deteriorating as the brutality with which Stalin intended to impose effective Soviet domination on much of Central and Eastern Europe became increasingly apparent to often shocked Allied observers.

Roosevelt himself erroneously assumed that the postwar understanding among Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States would endure beyond victory, envisaging a peace settlement effectively based on the delegation to each great power of a regional sphere of influence. During the war, he endorsed postwar American membership in the United Nations (UN) and newly created international economic institutions, effectively setting the United States on the path of continued involvement in international affairs, moves for which he cannily obtained bipartisan political support. He expected that the wartime Allies, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, would effectively dominate the new UN.

Under Roosevelt, the United States became the world's greatest economic and military power, a position it retained throughout the twentieth century, and moved decisively away from its limited pre-1940 internationalism. In

poor health in his final year, Roosevelt did not survive to view the results of his labors. He died of a stroke at Warm Springs, Georgia, on 12 April 1945.

Roosevelt had not informed his vice president and successor, Harry S. Truman, in any detail of his future intentions in the international sphere, but Truman nonetheless promptly expressed himself as intending, with due guidance from Roosevelt's advisors, to fulfil his predecessor's postwar ambitions. Some historians, notably Daniel Yergin, have suggested that Truman was far more uncompromising in dealing with the Soviet Union than Roosevelt would have been. However, given the weakness of the ties binding the Grand Alliance once Japan had been defeated, it may well be that Roosevelt too would have faced equally great difficulties in maintaining continued harmonious relations with Stalin.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Anticolonialism; Atomic Bomb; China, People's Republic of; Churchill, Winston; Declaration on Liberated Europe; Eisenhower, Dwight David; France; Jiang Jieshi; Marshall, George Catlett; Roosevelt, Eleanor; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Stimson, Henry Lewis; Territorial Changes after World War II; United Kingdom; Vietnam; World War II, Allied Conferences

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Rosenberg, Julius
(1918–1953)

American engineer and Cold War spy. Born on 12 May 1918 in New York City, Julius Rosenberg was educated at Jewish schools and in his late teens became involved in radical politics. He studied electrical engineering at the College of the City of New York, and there he became a central figure in a close-knit group of engineering students who were members of the Young

Ethel and Julius Rosenberg ride to separate jails on 29 March 1951 after being convicted of espionage against the United States. The trial of the Rosenbergs was held in New York City in March 1951, at the height of the Red Scare. (Library of Congress)

Communist League, some of whom he later recruited into Soviet espionage. He met fellow activist Ethel Greenglass at a union meeting, and the two married in 1939.

During World War II, Rosenberg worked as a civilian inspector for the Army Signal Corps but was dismissed in early 1945 when his past Communist Party membership surfaced. In 1943 he had the first of some fifty meetings with Alexander Feklisov, a Soviet intelligence officer, and began providing classified military information to him, including secrets related to the manufacture of the atomic bomb. Beginning in 1946 Rosenberg started a small and ultimately unsuccessful engineering workshop with his brother-in-law, David Greenglass, who had previously worked as a machinist on the Manhattan Project.

On 17 June 1950 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Rosenberg after a series of confessions by Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, and David Greenglass, who turned witness for the prosecution. On 11 August Ethel Rosenberg was also arrested. The Rosenbergs' controversial trial began on 6 March 1951, deeply dividing a nation already polarized by McCarthyism and the Korean War. To some, the Rosenbergs personified the threat of atomic espionage; to others, they were unjust victims of McCarthyism and anti-Semitism. The Rosenbergs were convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage in wartime on 29 March 1951 and were sentenced to death six days later. Although it now appears that Julius—but not Ethel—was in some respects guilty of espionage, the verdict appeared shaky in 1951.

The Rosenbergs remained on death row for twenty-six months while their lawyers filed appeals and as international outrage with the verdict intensified. Both denied being communists and maintained their innocence. After President Dwight Eisenhower refused clemency, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were put to death by electrocution on 19 June 1953, the only two civilians executed for espionage during the Cold War.

Phillip Deery

See also

Chambers, Whittaker; Espionage; Fuchs, Klaus; Hiss, Alger; McCarthyism

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See Picasso, Pablo

Ruiz, Pablo

Rumsfeld, Donald
(1932–)

U.S. secretary of defense (1975–1977, 2001–2006). Born in Chicago, Illinois, on 9 July 1932, Donald Henry Rumsfeld graduated from Princeton University in 1954. After serving three years as a naval aviator, he went to Washington in 1957 and became an administrative assistant to an Ohio congressman.

In 1962, Rumsfeld won election as a congressman from Illinois. He won reelection three times but resigned in 1969 to assume the post of director of the Office of Economic Opportunity in President Richard Nixon's administration. In 1971 Rumsfeld became director of the Economic Stabilization Program. Early in 1973 he was appointed U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In August 1974, following President Nixon's resignation, Rumsfeld headed the transition team for President Gerald R. Ford. Rumsfeld then served the Ford administration as White House chief of staff from 1974 to 1975 and then became secretary of defense on 20 November 1975. Rumsfeld was the youngest secretary of defense to that time and held the post until the end of Ford's term in January 1977. During his tenure at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld oversaw the initial production runs of the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, the Mark 12A nuclear warhead, and the MX ballistic missile system.

In 1977, Rumsfeld left government for the private sector, serving as chief executive officer (CEO), president, and later chairman of G. D. Searle & Co., where he engineered a financial turnaround during 1977–1985. During 1990–1993 he was CEO of General Instrument Corporation, again taking a troubled company back into profitability.

In 2001, Rumsfeld returned to the public sector as secretary of defense in President George W. Bush's administration. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Rumsfeld became one of the most visible members of the Bush team and lobbied successfully for a significant boost in the defense budget. He occupied center stage in planning the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. His comments condemning what he called "Old Europe" (namely, France and Germany) sparked controversy. He also came under fire for his handling of the war in Iraq, especially his belief that the conflict could be won by a small number of troops and that only a small number of forces would be required for occupation and stabilization purposes. He shrugged off any responsibly for the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Nonetheless, he enjoyed the full support of President Bush and continued as secretary of defense into the administration's second term. However, Rumsfeld resigned on 8 November 2006. This came a week after President Bush had expressed confidence in his defense secretary and said that Rumsfeld would remain until the end of his term, but it was also one day after the

midterm elections in which the Republican Party lost its majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The election was widely seen as a referendum on the Iraq War and, by extension, Rumsfeld's leadership in it. President Bush named former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Robert Gates to succeed Rumsfeld.

ARTHUR HOLST

See also

Bush, George Herbert Walker; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Nixon, Richard Milhous

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Rusk, Dean

(1909–1994)

U.S. secretary of state (1961–1969). Born in Cherokee County, Georgia, on 9 February 1909, David Dean Rusk graduated from Davidson College, then won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, completing a master's degree in politics, economics, and philosophy in 1934. Returning to the United States, he became professor of government and dean at Mills College, California. An Army Reserve officer, he was called to active duty in 1940, working on military intelligence in the War Department, transferring to Joseph W. Stilwell's staff in the China-Burma-India theater in 1943, and ending the war as a colonel on the War Department General Staff.

Rusk became special assistant to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, but in 1947 new Secretary of State George C. Marshall invited Rusk to head the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs. In spring 1949 Rusk became deputy undersecretary of state. Major policy initiatives during his tenure included the Marshall Plan, the establishment of a separate West German state, and the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In March 1950 Rusk became assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, formulating policy on the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), and the Koreas. When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) in June 1950, Rusk recommended firm action and military intervention under international United Nations (UN) auspices. A firm supporter of Chinese Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi, whom Chinese communist forces drove from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, Rusk strongly opposed U.S. recognition of the new PRC. His varied experiences reinforced his conviction that aggressive totalitarian powers of both Left and Right must be uncompromisingly opposed.

During 1951–1961 Rusk headed the Rockefeller Foundation, greatly expanding aid programs to the developing world. In 1961 President John F.

Kennedy appointed Rusk secretary of state. Rusk placed special emphasis on improving relations with the Soviet Union, pushing arms control agreements, including the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and increasing aid to developing countries. Generally speaking, he counseled moderation during the ongoing Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Initially skeptical of Kennedy's growing U.S. troop commitments in Vietnam, Rusk, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, who relied far more heavily on his advice, became increasingly dedicated to the proposition that the United States must resist communist aggression there. He reluctantly acquiesced in the 1963 coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, who had failed to institute domestic reforms that Rusk considered essential. Erroneously holding communist China primarily responsible for expanding North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military efforts, Rusk uneasily supported Johnson's escalation of the war in 1965. At that time Rusk opposed peace negotiations, fearing that his country would enter them from a position of weakness.

Dean Rusk, U.S. secretary of state during 1961–1969, was a staunch supporter of the Johnson administration Vietnam policies. Rusk is shown here on 16 September 1968. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

Although concerned that excessive American escalation might trigger outright war with China, Rusk supported subsequent troop increases and Johnson's bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and rarely favored bombing halts to facilitate potential peace talks. He became the war's most ardent official defender, clashing repeatedly with J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After the communist 1968 Tet Offensive, Rusk staunchly backed U.S. commander General William C. Westmoreland's request for 200,000 additional American troops. When Johnson rejected his advice in March 1968, Rusk's influence began to wane. He played only a minor role in the Paris peace talks that opened in May 1968.

His reputation tarnished by his exhausting years in office, a deeply scarred Rusk left the State Department in 1969, teaching international law at the University of Georgia until 1984 and eventually writing his memoirs. He died in Athens, Georgia, on 20 December 1994.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Arms Control; Ball, George Wildman; Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Fulbright, James William; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Munich Analogy; Ngo Dinh Diem; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Partial Test Ban Treaty; Tet Offensive; United Nations; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests; Westmoreland, William Childs

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Russell, Bertrand
(1872–1970)

British philosopher, writer, social commentator, and antiwar activist. Born on 18 May 1872 in Ravenscroft, Wales, to an aristocratic family, Bertrand Russell was first educated by private tutors. He then studied mathematics, logic, and philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge University, where he excelled so rapidly that after earning his BA in three years (1893), he was named a Trinity fellow in 1895. He first achieved international renown as the coauthor of the *Principia Mathematica* (1910) and wrote prolifically in the fields of logic and philosophy.

Englishman Bertrand Russell. During his long and prolific career, Russell wrote many philosophical works for both academics and laypeople. He is also widely remembered for his writings on social reform and his campaigns for peace. Russell won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. (Library of Congress)

Russell worked from the ivory tower during much of his life, pursuing causes that brought him in turn fame and infamy. He was an atheist, a pacifist, an advocate of sexual permissiveness, a socialist, a radical educator, and a peace activist. During World War I he opposed conscription, lost his lectureship at Cambridge because of it, and spent five months in jail in 1918 for participating in antiwar protests.

Russell succeeded to his seat in the House of Lords in 1931 as the third Earl Russell of Kingston. In the interwar period he wrote extensively, lectured, and taught. A frequent visitor to the United States, he was not always well received there. In 1940 he was fired from a teaching post at the City College of New York for his liberal views on adultery. During World War II he abandoned his pacifist stance in the face of fascist aggression.

After the war, he campaigned constantly against the perils of the atomic bomb. In 1955 the Einstein-Russell Manifesto against nuclear weapons laid the foundations for the annual Pugwash conferences that brought together scientists from East and West to debate and discuss international security and the perils of nuclear war. Russell founded the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1958, and in 1960 he formed the Committee of 100, which advocated civil disobedience against the bomb. In 1961 he was briefly jailed in Britain for inciting the public to civil disobedience during an antinuclear demonstration.

Although he was a socialist, Russell was by no means a supporter of Soviet-style communism. Nevertheless, he could sometimes be politically naive. He once claimed that President John F. Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan were "worse than Hitler" because, he argued, Hitler only wanted to kill Jews, whereas the British and American leaders might kill everybody in a nuclear war. Russell intervened in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis via personal letters to Washington and Moscow but in the end seemed to blame Kennedy more than Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for the showdown. In 1966, when Russell established the self-styled International War Crimes Tribunal, some criticized it as being more concerned with American war crimes in Vietnam than with criminal acts perpetrated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). Russell received the 1950 Nobel Prize for Literature, whose inscription aptly reads: "In recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought." Russell died in Penrhyndeudraeth, Wales, on 2 February 1970.

Russell worked from the ivory tower during much of his life, pursuing causes which brought him in turn fame and infamy.

PAUL WINGROVE

See also

Nuclear Arms Race; Peace Movements

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Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr.

(1897–1971)

U.S. senator and longtime chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Born in Winder, Georgia, on 2 November 1897, the son of a former justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, Richard Russell Jr. earned a bachelor of law degree from the University of Georgia in 1918. He was elected to the Georgia state legislature at age twenty-three and in 1931 became the youngest governor in that state's history.

Russell reached the U.S. Senate in 1933 as its youngest member and preached a small-town conservatism that was rapidly vanishing from the American political landscape. He mentored freshman Senator Lyndon Johnson and developed a powerful reputation as a behind-the-scenes orchestrator of Senate business. In 1951 Russell chaired the high-profile hearings on the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur from command of United Nations (UN) forces in Korea. The senator handled this potential political firestorm so adeptly that the controversy quickly subsided.

A master at shepherding defense appropriations through Congress, Russell chaired the Armed Services Committee during 1951–1952 and 1955–1968 while often serving as de facto head of the powerful Appropriations Committee at the height of the Cold War. As such, he provided strong support for what Dwight Eisenhower termed the military-industrial complex and helped ensure minimal congressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Although privately uneasy with the U.S. military commitment in Vietnam, Russell never put the full weight of his stature and influence behind a reevaluation of the U.S. engagement there. He criticized U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's gradual escalation policies and frequently called for greater U.S. resources and more decisive tactics in Vietnam during the late 1960s, despite doubts that victory was likely. Russell would not offer the White House political cover for extrication from the conflict. The normally outspoken legislator couched his timidity in claims of helplessness over providing solutions to the growing Vietnam quagmire. His equivocation ultimately proved most tragic in light of his special relationship with President Johnson.

Russell died in Washington, D.C., on 21 January 1971.

Jeffrey D. Bass

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; McNamara, Robert Strange; Military-Industrial Complex; Vietnam War

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Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich

(1929–)

Soviet premier. Born in the Donetsk Oblast on 28 September 1929, Nikolai Ryzhkov worked as a miner before his employment at the Orzhonikidze Heavy Machine–Building Plant in 1950. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956 and studied engineering at the Kirov Urals Polytechnical Institute in Sverdlovsk. After graduation in 1959, he returned to the Ordzhonikidze plant as a foreman. Appointed chief engineer in 1965, he became deputy director in 1970 and general director the following year.

In 1975 Ryzhkov became first deputy minister in the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine–Building, a post he held until 1979 when he was named first deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission, where he served until 1982. Elected to full membership in the CPSU Central Committee in 1981, he became a secretary the following year and headed the Economic Department.

In April 1985, Ryzhkov was elected a full member of the Politburo. Five months later, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev named him chairman of the Council of Ministers, making Ryzhkov the Soviet premier. In this post, he oversaw the implementation of Gorbachev's perestroika program of economic reforms but would take much of the blame for the poor economic performance of the late 1980s. Ryzhkov resigned on 25 December 1990 following a heart attack.

In June 1991, Ryzhkov ran against Boris Yeltsin for the presidency of the Russian Republic but lost by a large margin. Working in the private sector after the presidential election, Ryzhkov was chairman of the board of the Tveruniversalbank from 1993 to 1995. He was elected to the Russian State Duma in 1995 and was reelected four years later.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Soviet Union; Yeltsin, Boris

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S

Saar

A coal-rich state in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) bordering France and Luxembourg, historically a region of contested sovereignty between France and Germany. In the eighteenth century, the Saar region was partially in France and partially within two German principalities. The 1797 Treaty of Campo Formio transferred the entire area to France, but the 1815 Treaty of Paris following the Napoleonic Wars transferred the area to Bavaria and Prussia.

The Saar's extensive coal deposits led to industrial development following German unification in 1871. After World War I, the Saar was placed under the administration of the League of Nations for a period of fifteen years, with France to receive its coal production during that period to compensate France for the deliberate destruction of its coal mines by retreating German troops. At the end of the fifteen-year period, Saarlanders were to vote on their future. In a plebiscite held in January 1935, 90 percent of voters in the Saar opted to return to Germany.

After World War II the Saar passed under French military administration, and in 1947 the French set up an autonomous government for the region. In a plebiscite that year, the voters of the Saar approved economic unification with France, and a customs union went into effect in 1948. The other Western powers recognized this arrangement, much to the chagrin of West German leaders. France was obliged to give ground, however, for the 1954 Paris Pacts that provided for West German rearmament and its integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also provided for a compromise settlement of the Saar question. To the relief of the Germans, the Saar was declared to be autonomous rather than politically integrated into France. However, it was to remain economically integrated with France for fifty years. But Saar voters threw a monkey wrench into this arrangement by rejecting it in October 1955.

The 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which marked the movement toward the European Economic Community (EEC), and West Germany's integration into the Western alliance eased French concerns over the future of the Saar. As a result of the 1956 Franco-German Agreement, the

Saar became a West German territory on 1 January 1957. Although the customs union with France was dissolved in July 1959, France was granted the right to exploit the Saar's Warndt coalfields until 1981.

Bernard Cook

See also

European Coal and Steel Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; France; Germany, Federal Republic of

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Sadat, Anwar

(1918–1981)

Egyptian nationalist leader, vice president (1966–1970), and president (1970–1981) of Egypt. Born on 25 December 1918 in Mit Abu al-Kum, Egypt, one of thirteen children, Anwar Sadat attended the Royal Egyptian Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1938 as a second lieutenant. His first posting was in the Sudan, where he met Gamal Abdel Nasser, fellow nationalist and future Egyptian president. Stemming from their mutual disdain of British colonial rule, Sadat and Nasser helped form the secret organization that would eventually be called the Free Officers Group, comprised of young Egyptian military officers dedicated to ending British rule and ousting King Farouk II. During World War II, Sadat was jailed for conspiring with the Axis powers to expel British forces from Egypt.

Sadat was an active participant in the 23 July 1952 coup against King Farouk engineered by the Free Officers Group. Farouk abdicated and left Egypt on 26 July 1952. When Egypt was declared a republic in June 1953, Major General Mohammad Naguib became its president, and Nasser became vice president. In October 1954, after an attempt on Nasser's life, Naguib was removed from office, while Nasser consolidated his power. In February 1955 Nasser became prime minister and seven months later became president. Sadat, meanwhile, served loyally under Nasser, acting as his chief spokesman and one of his closest personal confidants and advisors.

Sadat became the first Arab leader to officially visit Israel in November 1977.

In 1964 Sadat became vice president of Egypt and then president upon Nasser's death in September 1970. When Sadat became president, Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union, once robust, was showing signs of serious strain. At the time of his death, in fact, Nasser had been moving away from the Soviet Union. Part of the reason for this had been the reduction in equipment that the Soviets were willing to sell to Egypt. On 18 July 1972, Sadat ordered all Soviet advisors to leave the country, to be followed by pilots and other army technicians.

On 6 October 1973, Sadat led Egypt, along with Syria, into a war with Israel with the goal of reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula lost in the 1967 Six-Day War. Although Egypt was defeated in the war, initial military successes and Sadat's determination earned him great respect among his people and lifted the morale of the nation, which had been badly shaken by Nasser's heavy-handed rule and economic difficulties. At war's end, the United States and the Soviet Union both were concerned about the balance of power in the Middle East and thus negotiated a cease-fire agreement that was generally favorable to Egypt, allowing Sadat to claim a victory of sorts.

Realizing that only the United States could elicit any substantive concessions from Israel, Sadat completely severed relations with the Soviet Union in March 1976 and began working with the Americans toward a peace settlement with the Israelis. In a courageous move, Sadat became the first Arab leader to officially visit Israel in November 1977, meeting with Prime Minister Menachem Begin and even addressing the Israeli Knesset. In September 1978, Sadat signed the Camp David Accords, ushering in a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel. The accords were highly unpopular in the Arab world, however, especially among fundamentalist Muslims.

Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt from 1970 until his assassination in 1981. Sadat is remembered for his part in concluding the 1979 Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. (Jimmy Carter Library)

Although the Camp David Accords were, in the long run, beneficial for Egypt, many in the Arab world saw them as a great betrayal and viewed Sadat as a traitor. In September 1981, Sadat's government cracked down on extremist Muslim organizations and radical student groups, in the process arresting more than 1,600 people. Sadat's strong-arm tactics angered many in the Arab community and only exacerbated his problems, which included economic stagnation and charges that he had quashed dissident voices through force.

On 6 October 1981, Sadat was assassinated in Cairo while reviewing a military parade commemorating the Yom Kippur War. His assassins were radical fundamentalist army officers who belonged to the Islamic Jihad organization, which had bitterly denounced Sadat's peace overtures with Israel and his suppression of dissidents the month before. Sadat was succeeded in office by Hosni Mubarak.

Dallace W. Unger Jr.

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Begin, Menachem; Camp David Accords; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Egypt; Farouk II, King of Egypt; Nasser, Gamal Abdel

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Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich
(1921–1989)

Soviet nuclear scientist, dissident, and human rights activist. Born on 21 May 1921 in Moscow, the son of a physics professor, Andrei Sakharov studied physics at Moscow University during 1939–1942 and at the Lebedev Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during 1945–1947 under the eminent theoretical physicist Igor Tamm. Sakharov earned his doctorate in 1947 and joined the Soviet nuclear weapons program in 1948, working in a special group then headed by his mentor.

Spearheaded by Sakharov, Tamm's group produced the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, successfully tested in August 1953, a development that greatly intensified the nuclear arms race with the United States. For his contributions to the development of the hydrogen bomb, Sakharov received both the Lenin and Stalin Prizes and earned election as a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1953.

Sakharov's participation in the Soviet nuclear weapons program lasted nearly twenty years. Initially, he believed that his work was of vital importance to the global balance of power. However, over time he grew uneasy with what he characterized as moral problems inherent in his work, and he became disillusioned with the Soviet system, specifically the absence of civil liberties and the secrecy surrounding science, culture, and technology.

Dissident Soviet physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, upon learning that he was awarded the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Beginning in the late 1950s, Sakharov called on the Soviet regime to ban atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In the early to mid-1960s, he moved on to criticize the continuing influence of the erroneous theories of T. S. Lysenko on Soviet genetics and to protest Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's tentative first steps toward rehabilitating the legacy of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Sakharov ultimately crossed the Rubicon to full dissident in 1968, when his essay "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom" appeared in the Western press. This extended essay, also known as the Sakharov Memorandum, warned of the dangers, including thermonuclear annihilation, that threatened humanity. He also pushed for reconciliation between socialist and capitalist nations, advocated democratic freedoms in the Soviet Union, denounced collectivized agriculture, and called for a careful reexamination of the Stalin era. In response, the Brezhnev regime removed Sakharov from the Soviet

nuclear weapons program and stripped him of all privileges to which he had been entitled as a member of the Soviet Nomenklatura.

In the summer of 1969, Sakharov became a senior researcher at the Lebedev Institute, but his primary concerns for the remainder of his life were human rights and the democratization of the Soviet Union. In 1970, he and fellow physicist Valeri Chalidze established the Moscow Human Rights Committee, which advocated freedom of speech, the full implementation of the Soviet constitution, and monitored violations of the law and the constitution including the arrests of dissidents by the Soviet regime. Sakharov's efforts in the name of human rights earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, making him the first Soviet citizen to garner the award, although he was not permitted to leave the Soviet Union to claim it.

Although the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) harassed Sakharov and threatened him with prosecution, he remained a free man until 1980 when, in the wake of his criticisms of the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and with the 1980 Moscow Olympics approaching, the Brezhnev regime exiled him to Gorky, a military-industrial city closed to foreigners. There Sakharov remained until December 1986, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, as part of his policy of glasnost, freed him, allowing him and his wife Yelena Bonner to return to Moscow and resume his scientific endeavors.

In 1989, the Soviet Academy of Sciences selected Sakharov to serve as a deputy in the newly established Congress of People's Deputies, the first democratically elected national legislative body to sit in Russia since the Bolshevik Revolution. There Sakharov proved to be an outspoken critic of Gorbachev, constantly pushing him to carry his political and economic reforms further. Sakharov died of a heart attack in Moscow on 14 December 1989.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also

Bonner, Yelena Georgievna; Brezhnev, Leonid; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hydrogen Bomb; Human Rights; Nomenklatura; Nuclear Arms Race; Peace Movements; Soviet Union

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Salan, Raoul Albin-Louis
(1899–1984)

French Army officer and bitter opponent of the dismantlement of France's colonial empire. Born in Roquecourbe (Tarn) near Toulouse on 10 June 1899, Raoul Salan was admitted to the French military academy at Saint-Cyr in

August 1917 during World War I but was immediately sent to the front in France. He returned to Saint-Cyr after the war and graduated in August 1919. He then served in Algeria, Morocco, the Middle East, and Indochina.

At first loyal to Vichy following the defeat of French forces by the Germans in June 1940, Salan later rallied to the Free French Resistance in 1943 and, as a colonel in command of a regiment, took part in the liberation of metropolitan France. In 1945 he was posted to French Indochina, where he commanded French forces in northern Indochina, accompanying Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh to France and the July 1946 Fontainebleau Conference. In April 1952, Salan assumed command of all French forces in Indochina, holding that post until January 1953 when he became inspector general of land forces in France. He accompanied French Army commander General Paul Ely on a fact-finding tour to Indochina in June 1954 and then returned there with Ely when the latter was named high commissioner and commander in chief of French forces (July–October 1954). The French military defeat in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 was a clarion call for Salan, who believed that there could be no defeats for the French colonial empire, a conviction shared by many of his fellow officers.

During January–May 1955, Salan commanded the reserve army in France and was a member of the Supreme War Council. In November 1956 he was dispatched to Algeria as commander in chief of French forces there with the rank of general of the army. At the time, France was heavily engaged in fighting anticolonial forces in Algeria. Salan initially supported General Charles de Gaulle's ascension to power in May 1958 and the establishment of the French Fifth Republic. That December, de Gaulle, who mistrusted Salan, removed him from command.

In 1959 Salan retired to Algeria. When he realized that de Gaulle was prepared to grant Algeria independence, he allied himself with the anti–Algerian independence movement Algérie française (French Algeria). On 22 April 1961, Salan was one of four French generals to foment a military coup attempt in Algeria. Known as the Generals' Putsch, it failed after three days, and Salan went underground to lead the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in a brutal campaign of terror against the French government in both Algeria and France. That July he was sentenced in absentia to death for treason.

Arrested in Spain in April 1962, Salan was returned to France and tried a month later. Found guilty, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released in May 1968 under a governmental amnesty. In 1982, President François Mitterrand restored Salan's military rank along with his pension. Salan died in Paris on 3 July 1984.

Cezar Stanciu

See also

Algerian War; Decolonization; De Gaulle, Charles; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Indochina War

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Salazar, António de Oliveira
(1889–1970)

Portuguese political leader and dictator. Born on 28 April 1889 in the village of Vimeiro, near the town of Santa Comba Dão, Portugal, António Salazar grew up a conservative Catholic. Educated at the University of Coimbra, he became a professor of political economy there. He was elected to the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies but soon withdrew because he considered it to be a futile exercise. In 1926, in order to end chronic political instability in Portugal (there had been forty cabinets since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1910), the Portuguese military seized power. Salazar was then briefly minister of finance. Recalled to the same post in 1928, he received the full authority that he demanded and in short order had placed Portuguese finances on a firm foundation. Over the next few years he gradually increased his power until in 1932 he became premier of an authoritarian government. From that point, he dominated Portuguese affairs until 1968.

Under a new constitution ratified in a 1933 referendum, Salazar reorganized Portugal as a corporative unitary republic rather than a pluralist state. A national assembly, elected by heads of families, served as the legislative body. A corporative chamber advised the assembly on social and economic matters and represented syndicates of various corporations. The Catholic Church also had widespread influence. Salazar's National Union party was the political voice of the so-called Estado Novo (New State), which combined eighteenth-century enlightened despotism with Christian morality, but also had both fascist and democratic trappings. This system came to be known as clerical fascism and subsequently became a model for the Nationalists in Spain and for Austria.

Portuguese Premier Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar addressing the National Assembly in 1954. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Profoundly religious, Salazar was also an ascetic and a bachelor. Unlike most dictators, he lived frugally on a modest salary and was utterly uninterested in the accumulation of personal wealth. He also remained virtually unknown to his people. While he admired fascism and supported the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War, he also intensely disliked Adolf Hitler and the Nazis and maintained diplomatic relations with Portugal's long-standing ally, Great Britain. As with Francisco Franco in Spain, Salazar appreciated the German war against communism but, unlike Franco, kept his country strictly neutral during World War II until, under British and U.S. pressure, he

Unlike most dictators, Salazar lived frugally on a modest salary and was utterly uninterested in the accumulation of personal wealth.

agreed in October 1943 to lease bases in the Azores. These proved vital to the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. Nonetheless, Salazar maintained that the nation was neutral, and Portugal profited from selling goods to both sides.

Portugal emerged from the war in a much better position than Spain, was readily admitted to the United Nations (UN), and was invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Portugal was a police state, Salazar always tried to preserve some of the elements of a democratic façade. Unfortunately for his country, however, he refused to allow economic modernization, believing that it would place traditional Portuguese values at risk, and the resultant economic stagnation led many Portuguese to emigrate. In his last years in power, Salazar was increasingly forced to devote substantial financial and military resources to maintaining Portuguese control over its overseas empire, especially in Africa. An injury in 1968 led to a disabling stroke, forcing him to yield power to Marcelo Caetano, who began reforms. Salazar died in Lisbon on 27 July 1970.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Caetano, Marcelo Jose das Neves; Franco, Francisco; Portugal; Spain

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San Francisco Peace Treaty
(8 September 1951)

Treaty signed by Japan and forty-eight other nations in San Francisco, California, on 8 September 1951 formally terminating the state of war between Japan and the other signatories and restoring full sovereignty to Japan. The treaty went into force on 28 April 1952.

On 17 March 1947, General Douglas MacArthur publicly proposed an early peace treaty with Japan. However, differing attitudes among the European powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China over how best to approach such a treaty ultimately led to the postponement of any international conference on the subject.

Meanwhile, growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States enhanced Japan's political and strategic importance, leading the Americans to embark on a mission to reconstruct Japan both economically and politically. In light of growing tensions with the Soviet Union, together with the October 1949 communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, U.S. policymakers, particularly those in the Pentagon, argued for the need to maintain U.S. military bases in Japan. Consequently, the United States became increasingly inclined to end its occupation of Japan.

The Americans made substantial moves toward securing a peace settlement after John Foster Dulles was appointed consultant to the State Depart-

ment in April 1950. Dulles, with nonpartisan domestic support, initiated negotiations with other Allied countries beginning in September 1950. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 added urgency to these peace negotiations.

The terms for the peace treaty drafted by the United States in late 1950 were seen as lenient and were consequently opposed by the Soviet Union, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. While no compromise could be reached with the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers persuaded the other states to accept the treaty's nonpunitive principles. The final draft of the treaty was jointly prepared by the United States and Great Britain.

The peace conference opened on 4 September 1951 in San Francisco and was attended by fifty-two nations. The treaty itself was signed by representatives of forty-nine nations, including Japan, on 8 September. Although their representatives were in attendance, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia refused to sign the treaty.

The treaty stipulated Japan's abandonment of all territories acquired since 1895, including Korea, Taiwan, the Kurile Islands, and southern Sakhalin and its adjacent islands. American provisional control of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands was permitted, with an agreement to obtain ultimate authorization of the U.S. administration under a United Nations (UN) trusteeship. The document also established Japan's liability for payment of war reparations and drew attention to Japan's fragile economic situation. Later that same day, the United States and Japan also signed a security treaty.

Kuniyoshi Tomoki

See also

Dulles, John Foster; East Asia; Japan; Kurile Islands; United States–Japan Security Treaty; Yoshida Shigeru

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Sandinistas

Nicaraguan revolutionary movement and political party that toppled the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in 1979 and ruled Nicaragua during the 1980s.

After 1960, Somoza's restrictions on political opposition combined with the success of revolutionary movements in Cuba and elsewhere emboldened a group of activists to challenge his hold on power. Led by Carlos Fonseca, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front) began its operations in Nicaragua's largest cities. The Sandinistas took their name from Augusto César Sandino (1895–1934), who led a nationalist rebellion against the U.S.



Sandinistas patrol outside Managua, Nicaragua, on 22 July 1979. The Sandinistas seized power three days earlier. (Patrick Chauvel/Sygma/Corbis)

military occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and early 1930s until his assassination by the U.S.-created Guardia Nacional (National Guard) enabled Somoza to seize control.

Designed as an urban guerrilla force, the FSLN had little impact. The corruption of the Somoza regime, however, helped sustain its organizational efforts. Shifting from urban to rural districts, the organization survived military defeats and factionalism well into the 1970s. In 1975, the group split into three organizational lines. The Prolonged Popular War faction (GPP), under the direction of Fonseca, Borge, and Henry Ruíz, led the effort to mobilize the population for war against the dictatorship. A second faction, led by Luis Carrión, Jaime Wheelock, and Carlos Núñez, focused on organizing workers and the urban underclass. A third group that would form the core of the Sandinistas' political force after 1979 built connections with business groups and other political opposition forces.

Somoza steadily lost popular support during the 1970s, and his reactionary policies helped the Sandinistas build their base and expand military operations. In 1974 the FSLN sponsored the formation of the United People's Movement (MPU), which linked unions, university students, and church-affiliated groups with their struggle. After 1977, the Sandinistas coordinated their campaigns with allied groups. Attacks against symbols of the Somoza regime, highlighted by the occupation of the National Palace and an ensuing

prisoner exchange in 1978, demonstrated the FSLN's capabilities while it continued to build popular support.

International pressure and dwindling support from President Jimmy Carter's administration led Somoza to choose exile before defeat, and on 19 July 1979 the Sandinistas occupied Managua and took command of the government. The splits in the movement did not initially affect the Sandinistas' efforts. After declaring the unification of the movement's factions in 1979, the FSLN outlined its plans for the political, social, and economic transformation of Nicaragua. Nationalism, agrarian reform, progressive social reforms, universal medical care, and popular education clearly showcased the government's socialist orientation.

The Carter administration briefly offered humanitarian assistance to the Sandinistas, but domestic political pressure from conservatives forced the administration to end aid in 1980. The staunchly anticommunist President Ronald Reagan treated the Sandinistas much more harshly. In 1981 the Reagan administration engineered the end of financial support from international lending agencies and authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate a counterrevolutionary movement in Nicaragua.

In 1982, with nearly $20 million from the United States, the Contra rebels began military operations against the Sandinista government. Launching small-scale raids from Honduras and Costa Rica, the Contras created an ongoing military challenge that sapped Sandinista resources. Nevertheless, the Sandinistas organized a government structure that allowed them to dominate the political process. A national directorate controlled the political process, the FSLN created youth groups and neighborhood committees to expand its base, and corporate bodies coordinated the political life of students, workers, and professionals.

Internationally, the Sandinistas counted on immediate support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Sandinista leadership chose to affiliate with the Socialist International rather than the Moscow-dominated Comintern. Harassed by Contra incursions and placed under a U.S. trade embargo that affected economic relations with its neighbors, the Sandinistas came to rely more and more upon economic and military aid from their communist allies.

Increasingly isolated, the Nicaraguan economy performed poorly under the Sandinistas. Inflation, shortages, and meager productivity hindered the government's efforts to diversify and expand the economy. Ultimately, the flagging economy undermined the Sandinistas' many ambitious social projects. Defense programs interfered with the agrarian reform program and exacerbated prickly government relations with the Miskito Indians in eastern Nicaragua.

In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the Boland Amendment, which forbade further Contra funding. The Reagan administration skirted the restriction by illegally selling weapons to Iran as a way of generating funds for Contra operations. While revelations of these extralegal maneuvers rocked the Reagan administration, the Contra war continued.

To bring legitimacy to their regime, the Sandinistas organized national elections in 1984. Splits in the opposition forces allowed the Sandinistas to use

their organizational strength to great effect. Daniel Ortega won election as president, and the Sandinistas worked to preserve their revolution's achievements, seeking international assistance in their ongoing conflict with the United States. In 1984, the International Court of Justice ruled that American actions in Nicaragua violated international laws but had no effect on U.S. policy. Latin American efforts to negotiate a peace settlement bore no fruit until 1989. Led by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez, the 1989 Central American Peace Initiative brought about a final settlement. Under the plan, the Contras would disarm and the Sandinistas would authorize a national election, scheduled for February 1990.

Opposition forces united behind candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of a leading opponent of the Somoza dictatorship who had been assassinated in 1978. Poor economic conditions and factionalism among the Sandinistas allowed the United Nicaraguan Opposition movement to capture the presidency and a majority of the seats in the National Congress. The Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat left the movement weakened and divided. Out of power, Sandinista leaders have recast their movement as a political party that competes effectively in local and national elections.

Daniel Lewis

See also

Contras; Iran-Contra Affair; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Somoza Debayle, Anastasio

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Sartre, Jean-Paul
(1905–1980)

French philosopher, novelist, playwright, and social and literary critic. Born in Paris on 21 June 1905, Jean-Paul Sartre studied philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure, from which he graduated in 1929, the same year he met his lifelong companion Simone de Beauvoir, who became well known as a feminist writer and philosopher. During 1929–1930 Sartre served as an officer with a French military meteorological unit, and during most of the 1930s he taught at lycées in Paris and Le Havre.

Sartre's first novel, *La Nausée* (Nausea), published in 1938, caused an immediate sensation. Influenced by German phenomenological philosophy, the novel laid bare the human condition by embracing the idea that human life has no inherent purpose. At the beginning of World War II, Sartre served in the army and fought in the 1940 campaign for France. Captured by the Germans, he was sent to several prisoner-of-war camps, including Stalag XIID, where he produced his play *Bariona*. Released in 1941, he wrote for the French Resistance during 1941–1944.

In 1945 Sartre founded with Beauvoir the journal *Les Temps Modernes*. A year later he published "Existentialism and Humanism," perhaps his most influential and widely read essay on existentialist philosophy. From 1945, he traveled extensively to lecture and write, becoming more politically active beginning in the 1950s. He refused to accept the 1964 Nobel Prize for Literature, arguing that to do so would compromise his political autonomy.

From the mid-1950s, Sartre was continually involved with leftist political causes. His efforts dealt with issues ranging from the lack of affordable housing in France to torture in Algeria and to the American war in Vietnam. While never a member of the Communist Party (he eschewed formal political allegiances), he evolved into a neo-Marxist who saw promise particularly in Maoism. His slide toward communism ultimately led to the painful end of his friendship with fellow existentialist Albert Camus. In 1960 Sartre reconciled the tenets of existentialism with those of classical Marxism in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. In 1960 he also signed the "Declaration on the Right to Insubordination in the War in Algeria" (also known as the "Manifesto of the 121") supporting Algerian independence and in 1966 was a member of fellow philosopher Bertrand Russell's International War Crimes Tribunal.

Sartre continued to write voluminously and, increasingly, about politics. He was the editor of *La Cause du Peuple* (1970), *Tout* (1970–1974), *Révolution* (1971–1974), and *Libération* (1973–1974) and was the founder, along with Maurice Clavel, of the Liberation news service in 1971. In failing health, Sartre began to lose his eyesight in 1975 and by the end of his life was completely blind. He died in Paris on 15 April 1980.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also

Camus, Albert; France; Prague Spring; Russell, Bertrand

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Satō Eisaku
(1901–1975)

Japanese politician and prime minister (1964–1972). Born on 27 March 1901 in Tabuse-chō in the Yamaguchi Prefecture, Satō Eisaku graduated from the law school of Tokyo Imperial University in 1924. He then entered the Ministry of Railways, serving there until 1948. In 1947 he was appointed permanent undersecretary of the Ministry of Railways but served in this post for just thirteen months. In 1948 he became chief cabinet secretary in the second

Satō was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his antinuclear diplomacy, an award that caused considerable controversy.

Yoshida Shigeru government. Satō was chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the Liberal Party in 1949 when he was elected to the Lower House of the Diet.

Satō held ministerial posts in the third and fourth Yoshida governments, including minister of the post office (1951–1952) and minister of construction (1952–1953). In 1953 he became director general of the Liberty Party (which merged with the Democratic Party in 1955 to become the Liberal Democratic Party), but he was forced to resign the position because of a ship-building company scandal during the fifth Yoshida cabinet in 1954. Satō subsequently became minister of finance during 1958–1960 under Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Satō's elder brother by adoption.

In October 1964 Satō succeeded Ikeda Hayato as prime minister. During his seven years in office, Satō signed the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty restoring normal diplomatic relations between the two countries and regaining control for Japan of the Ogasawara Islands in 1968. Although U.S. troops and bases remained on Japanese soil, Satō managed to negotiate a reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972.

Satō was less successful in establishing closer ties to either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China (PRC). Public outrage over his agreement to allow U.S. troops to remain on Okinawa ultimately forced his resignation in November 1972. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his antinuclear diplomacy, an award that caused considerable controversy. Satō died in Chiyodaku, Tokyo, on 3 June 1975.

Kiichi Nenashi

See also
Fukuda Takeo; Japan

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Saudi Arabia

Middle Eastern nation located on the Arabian Peninsula. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, founded in 1932, covers 756,981 square miles, nearly three times the area of the U.S. state of Texas, and had a 1945 population of some 3.5 million people. Saudi Arabia borders Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait to the north; the Persian Gulf, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to the east; Oman and Yemen to the south; and the Red Sea to the west. It has been dominated by its ruling family, the House of Saud, for all of its modern history. King Ibn Saud, the founding monarch, ruled until his death in 1953. All succeeding kings have been his sons (he had more than fifty). The House of

Saud has historical ties to the leadership of the Wahhabi sect of Islam, and as a result Saudi Arabian law and society are based on strict Muslim customs.

The role of Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia cannot be overstated. The state grew inexorably as a result of his domination of the Arabian Peninsula in the early twentieth century as the Ottoman Empire declined. After the end of World War I, he consolidated his position and became king in 1925. The realm was renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seven years later. The fortunes of the kingdom were transformed with the discovery of petroleum in the 1930s.

American oil companies (Chevron in particular) played the leading role in oil exploration and formed a partnership with the Saudi monarchy, paying royalties for the right to extract and ship Saudi oil. The importance of oil during World War II enhanced the Saudi-U.S. relationship, and in 1944, the Arab-American Oil Corporation (ARAMCO) was formed. President Franklin D. Roosevelt helped to cement the growing relationship when he met with Ibn Saud on an American destroyer in 1945. The Saudi monarchy thus maintained close economic and strategic ties to the United States throughout the remainder of the century.

Because of the growing strategic importance of the Middle East and its oil reserves to Cold War geopolitics, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought increased influence in the region. The Soviets endorsed the rise of secular, socialist, Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and Soviet military assistance was crucial to these nations in their ongoing struggle with Israel after its founding in 1948. The United States countered these Soviet moves by tightening its ties to the royal regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In 1962 civil war broke out in Yemen as a nationalist faction supported by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to overthrow the royal government there. Despite previous rivalries with the ruling house of Yemen, the Saudis gave financial support and military assistance to the Yemeni monarchy. Egypt and Saudi Arabia thus confronted each other directly in the conflict. The devoutly Muslim House of Saud opposed the rise of secular, socialist Arab nationalism and refused to tolerate the spread of Nasser's Pan-Arabism in the region. In addition, the respective affiliations of Egypt and Saudi Arabia with the Soviet Union and the United States made the Yemeni Civil War a regional theater of Cold War confrontation.

The Israeli issue greatly complicated U.S.-Saudi relations. The Saudis objected to the 1948 formation of Israel, opposed the displacement of Palestinian Arabs, and played a minor military role in the first Arab-Israeli War (1948). The Saudis would contribute significant funds to Palestinian causes until the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Despite its vehement opposition to Israel, the Saudi government nonetheless maintained tepid relations with Arab nationalist regimes in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan, Israel's principal enemies. Thus, Saudi Arabia did not participate in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973. However, as American support for Israel increased after the 1967 Six-Day War, the Saudis sought to influence American policy. This conflict laid the foundation for the 1973 oil embargo.

Massive increases in oil revenues (from $5 billion in 1972 to $119 billion in 1981) transformed Saudi Arabia into an affluent, urbanized society.

Saudi oil was largely controlled by American oil companies until the early 1970s. At that point, the House of Saud negotiated the gradual takeover of ARAMCO by Saudi interests. By 1973, the transfer of control had begun. When Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in October 1973, prompting the Yom Kippur War, Saudi Arabia's King Faisal obtained U.S. President Richard Nixon's assurances of American nonintervention. The Israelis suffered severe reversals in the opening stages of the conflict, however, which prompted Nixon to send U.S. military aid to Israel on 19 October. The next day, working through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Saudi government implemented an oil embargo directed at the United States. The embargo made the United States vulnerable to an economic recession, and American fuel prices rose 40 percent during the five months of the crisis. Even after the embargo ended, oil prices remained high for the rest of the decade.

Saudi Arabia emerged from the crisis as the clear leader of OPEC and with renewed respect in the Arab world. Massive increases in oil revenues (from $5 billion in 1972 to $119 billion in 1981) transformed Saudi Arabia into an affluent, urbanized society with generous government subsidies and programs for its citizens and no taxation. The U.S.-Saudi relationship eventually recovered and remained close. Indeed, Saudi Arabia often used its influence in OPEC to keep oil prices artificially low from the mid-1980s to late 1990s.

Supertankers loading oil in Saudi Arabia for shipment abroad. (Corel)

Such policies, however, had a downside. When oil prices dipped dramatically during 1981–1985, the Saudi economy plunged into recession, presenting the government with significant domestic unrest. A similar scenario was played out in the late 1990s. This time the Saudis acted aggressively, hiking oil prices in 2000 and 2001 to right their foundering economy. Continuing close ties between Washington and Riyadh also played a major role in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as Saudi Arabia was used as a staging area for U.S. troops during Operation DESERT STORM.

Despite the considerable power that the Saudis wielded in international relations beginning in the 1970s and the tremendous increase in wealth as a result of oil revenues, the House of Saud maintained strict control over Saudi society, culture, and law. Saudi Arabia remained an absolute monarchy until 1992, when the royal family promulgated the nation's first constitution.

ROBERT S. KIELY

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia; Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

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Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro
(1934–2002)

Angolan rebel nationalist leader, founder of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement, and guerrilla tactician. Born in Munhango, Bie Province, on 3 August 1934, Jonas Savimbi was purposely vague and evasive about his early life, claiming a PhD from the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. He may have spent two years in Portugal as a medical student. In 1966 he founded UNITA, a political movement dedicated to securing independence for that Portuguese colony. He fought a guerrilla war first against the Portuguese and then against the pro-Soviet, Marxist Angolan government, in the process surviving more than a dozen assassination attempts.

The Angolan nationalists fighting Portugal's colonial rule were the left-wing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, and Savimbi's UNITA. After Angola won independence in 1975, Neto came to power with the explicit support of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Savimbi immediately turned his sights on the MPLA government, plunging the new nation into a horrific civil war. Both South Africa and the United States supplied UNITA with arms and weapons.

Among the African leaders who openly supported Savimbi were Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Others were more discrete in their aid but nevertheless maintained diplomatic and commercial ties with UNITA. Savimbi began to score victories against the MPLA in the late 1980s. By 1990, in fact, his forces controlled almost half of Angola. The Angolan government negotiated a cease-fire with UNITA in 1991. The following year, Savimbi lost a questionable presidential election, and the civil war was reinvigorated, with periodic breaks, for another decade. Despite United Nation (UN) condemnatory sanctions and embargoes and international recognition of the popularly elected government in Luanda, Savimbi persisted, financing UNITA mainly through illicit sales of diamonds.

The United States and the Soviet Union used Angola as a proxy during the Cold War, while Savimbi used the Cold War to portray himself as a warrior against communism. With the Cold War ended along with the apartheid regime in South Africa, he continued the civil war, becoming a virtual international pariah with no major patrons. Savimbi died in battle in Lucusse on 22 February 2002. Just six weeks after his death, UNITA rebels signed a cease-fire, which ended the long civil war. Savimbi's struggle resulted in the deaths of more than a million people and the displacement of 2 million others.

John H. Barnhill

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Mobutu Sese Seko; Namibia

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Scandinavia

A region in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea area strategically divided between East and West during the Cold War and that displayed a low degree of Cold War tensions and a high degree of internal cohesion. Scandinavia comprised the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states of Iceland, Norway, and Denmark (with Greenland and the Faeroe Islands) as well as neutral Sweden and Finland.

Finland was able to maintain a democratic and capitalist system despite its special ties to the Soviet sphere. Finland in particular and Scandinavia in general can thus be considered anomalies in the predominantly bipolar world of the Cold War. In spite of partial submission to the logic of the Cold War, the Scandinavians never really abandoned the bridge-building approach to international relations that they had pursued in the immediate postwar years. The superpowers in their turn were willing to relax their confrontation in this region and to grant some rather extraordinary exceptions.

Scandinavian nations shared many mutual historical and cultural ties, although Finnish is not a Scandinavian language. Finland was a grand duchy under the Russian tsars during 1809–1917 but is nonetheless an integral part of the Scandinavian community. In the Scandinavian languages, and similarly in Finnish, this community is designated with the term "Norden" ("the North"), whereas the term "Scandinavia" in these languages is ambiguous and might exclude Finland, Iceland, and Denmark. Therefore, the terms "Norden" and "Nordic" are often used instead of "Scandinavia" and "Scandinavian" in the comprehensive sense described above.

Despite their attempts to establish a common policy of neutrality at the end of the 1930s, the Scandinavian countries were unable to escape the harsh realities of World War II. Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union and ended up as an ally of Nazi Germany, while Denmark and Norway were attacked and occupied by Germany. Denmark's North Atlantic territories (which at that time also included Iceland) were controlled by Great Britain and the United States during the war. Only Sweden was able to retain its neutrality. These different historical experiences were fundamental to understanding the future orientation of these countries.

In the case of Finland, which in its turn had attacked the Soviet Union and had been forced to conclude an armistice in 1944, additional compulsion came into operation. In regard to Denmark and Norway, small parts of these countries were liberated by Soviet forces in 1945, and citizens of both countries felt uneasy about their presence until they departed in 1945–1946. Norway also came under Soviet pressure to participate in a common defense of the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) Archipelago in these years.

Denmark and Norway were in a position to pursue a policy of bridge building after World War II and adhered to this policy until the spring of 1948. The election of Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie as the first secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) in early 1946 was an acknowledgment of this effort. In the meantime, Sweden actively tried to improve its strained relations with the Soviet Union while maintaining nonalignment. This effort paid dividends in April 1953 when Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld was elected as the second secretary-general of the UN. Except for Finland, Scandinavian governments decided to participate in the 1947 Marshall Plan, but they also displayed some discomfort with having to take a stand in the Cold War.

The discomfort of nonalignment, however, became ever more pressing as the Cold War deepened. In particular, the February 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia was viewed as a signal to seek some sort of security arrangement beyond the framework of the UN. Furthermore, the fact that Finland was forced to conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in April 1948 raised fears of the possible Sovietization of Scandinavia. In Norway, which shared a border with the Soviet Union, but also in Denmark, there were signs of near hysteria in the spring of 1948.

Against this background, and in order to prevent diverging security paths among the three Scandinavian core countries, Swedish Foreign Minister

Östen Undén suggested an outwardly neutral defense pact to Norway and Denmark in May 1948. Such an arrangement was seriously considered in the latter part of 1948 but collapsed in January 1949 because of irreconcilable differences between Norway and Sweden. While the Swedes insisted on independence from other military alignments, the Norwegians sought security guarantees from the West. The Danish government would have joined either configuration and, with a low-profile approach to foreign policy deeply rooted in its political culture, would even have preferred a bilateral defense union with Sweden over a more comprehensive Western arrangement. For strategic reasons, however, this solution did not appeal to the Swedes.

Thus, Denmark and Norway as well as Iceland were among the founding members of NATO in April 1949, while Sweden continued its policy of armed neutrality. The Swedish stance was also meant as a deliberate disincentive aimed at the Soviets so that the latter would not toy with the status of Finland. Even in the security policy of the Scandinavian NATO members, elements of neutrality or disengagement in the superpower conflict were preserved. Iceland placed the Keflavik Military Base at the disposal of the United States but did not establish any military forces of its own. Denmark and Norway built up their own defense rather slowly, and they accepted neither nuclear weapons nor foreign bases on their territory. The only exception was Greenland, where the Thule Military Base set up during World War II remained an American asset. On the other hand, the Danish government excluded from NATO military activity the island of Bornholm, the easternmost outpost of Denmark in the Baltic Sea, except as a listening post.

During the Korean War, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway contributed a hospital ship, field hospitals, and medical personnel. Since the UN's first peacekeeping operation in Suez in November 1956, all the Scandinavian countries except Iceland have been among major contributors to UN peacekeeping missions.

In recent years, new archival evidence has made it evident that Scandinavian involvement in the Cold War was deeper than contemporary actors admitted at the time. Contrary to its declared nonnuclear policy, for example, the Danish government gave the United States free rein to deploy nuclear weapons in Greenland. Even more remarkable is that allegedly neutral Sweden throughout the Cold War maintained rather elaborate security arrangements with the Western alliance that were kept secret. It is characteristic of the peculiar position of Scandinavia that while such conduct did occur, all parties involved, including the Soviet Union, contributed to the silence. Moreover, political relations with the Western powers, especially relations between Sweden and the United States, were characterized by a certain degree of aloofness. The support of the Scandinavian states for international law and the belief in the superiority of the Scandinavian welfare state contributed to the image of Scandinavia as representing a third (and perhaps better) way to deal with the political, economic, and military exigencies of the Cold War.

Inter-Scandinavian cooperation consolidated the image of communality in the region and helped to establish a picture of unique security arrange-

Female member of a Swedish infantry battalion with United Nations forces in Cyprus. Scandinavian forces often participated in peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. (Corel)

ments. In part to compensate for their different security policy orientation, the Scandinavian countries created the Nordic Council as a common parliamentary institution in 1952. They also closely cooperated in the framework of the UN, thereby frequently acting as mediators between East and West and increasingly between North and South. In 1955, the Soviet Union permitted Finland to become a member of the Nordic Council and of the UN. From then on, Scandinavian mutual cooperation helped Finland to retain a Western profile in spite of its foreign policy dependency on Moscow. The self-declared Finnish policy of neutrality was only at times acknowledged by the Soviet Union and has to be seen as a move in a game about sovereignty, not as corresponding to neutrality in the conventional sense of the word.

Tensions increased in Scandinavia in the 1970s and 1980s over external developments, one sign of which was the widely publicized incidents of Soviet submarines in Swedish waters. In this period, the considerable East-West military buildup began to threaten the status of Scandinavia as a quiet corner. There was some discussion of reviving proposals for a Nordic nuclear weapons–free zone, which had been considered in the 1960s, but nothing came of it.

Domestic developments in Scandinavia in the Cold War period were characterized by various peculiarities. Scandinavian countries were long

Swedish citizens protesting the international policies of the Soviet Union during the visit of a Soviet warship to Göteborg, Sweden, 8 June 1974. (Bettmann/Corbis)

regarded as representing a type of universal welfare state with a large public sector. They have all also been characterized as dominated by strong reformist social democratic parties as well as by a fragmented bourgeois camp and strong agrarian parties. Moreover, they have had a uniquely high degree of trade unionization, with up to 80 percent of the workforce, even white-collar workers, being organized in unions. Nonetheless, the capitalist and socialist sectors worked together with a high degree of consensus during the entire period of the Cold War.

Economically, in the Cold War the Scandinavian countries ranked among the most prosperous nations of the world, but there were characteristic time lags and substantial differences in economic structure. Sweden entered the postwar period with its industrial plan intact, with accelerated growth and an ever more pronounced tendency toward big business, unique for a country of its size. Denmark, for many years closest to Sweden among the Scandinavian states in terms of wealth, had a completely different economic structure based on agriculture and small-scale food industries. Finland was handicapped

because of its lack of participation in the Marshall Plan and the reparations that it had to pay to the Soviet Union. A substantial portion of the Finnish workforce relocated to Sweden during the first decades of the Cold War. Not until the 1980s did Finland approach its Scandinavian neighbors economically or in regard to its welfare programs.

Norway has been characterized by its small industries. It owes its present status as one of the richest countries in the world per capita to the oil production in the North Sea begun in the 1970s. Finally, despite some attempts of diversification, Iceland has been largely dependent on fishery, which left that country economically vulnerable and placed it at the forefront of the fight for the extension of exclusive economic maritime zones.

Given these differences in economic structure, attempts in the 1950s and 1960s to establish closer economic collaboration and a customs union among the Scandinavian countries were doomed to failure. In part because of welfare state nationalism and in part because of nonalignment in the Cold War, the Scandinavian countries were hesitant to participate in the European Integration Movement. Only Denmark, which was heavily dependent on the export of agricultural products to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and Great Britain, became a member of the European Community following a referendum in 1972. While the Norwegian elites were also in favor of accession, 53.5 percent of the population rejected such a move in the same year. Thus, while Denmark left the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in favor of the European Community (EC), Norway remained in the EFTA, with Sweden and Iceland among the other members. Finland was an associated member of the EFTA, but not until 1986 did the Soviet Union allow Finland to join the organization as a regular member.

Norbert Götz

See also

Denmark; Faeroe Islands; Finland; Greenland; Hammarskjöld, Dag; Iceland; Karelia; Lie, Trygve; Norway; Porkkala; Sweden

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Scheel, Walter
(1919–)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) minister for development aid (1961–1966), foreign minister and vice chancellor (1969–1974), and president (1974–1979). Born in Solingen on 8 July 1919, Walter Scheel began his career as a bank trainee. He served in the German military during World War II and became a solicitor in Düsseldorf in 1948.

A member of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Scheel entered the Diet of his native state of North Rhine–Westphalia in 1950 and served in the Bundestag during 1953–1974. He was also a member of the European Parliament during 1958–1969. In November 1961, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer appointed Scheel minister for economic cooperation, later retitled minister for development aid. Together with fellow FDP ministers, he resigned his post in October 1966 to protest tax increases proposed by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.

Scheel was elected FDP chairman in January 1968 and became foreign minister and vice chancellor in the Willy Brandt government on 21 October 1969. A strong supporter of Ostpolitik, Scheel helped normalize relations with the Soviet Union and Poland and recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) with the 1972 Basic Treaty on mutual relations, which marked the end of the Hallstein Doctrine. He was elected president on 15 May 1974. During his tenure, he proved to be an indefatigable promoter of closer European cooperation. Scheel retired from politics in June 1979.

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Brandt, Willy; Erhard, Ludwig; Genscher, Hans-Dietrich; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hallstein Doctrine; Ostpolitik

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Schlesinger, James Rodney
(1929–)

U.S. director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during February–July 1973, secretary of defense during 1973–1975, and secretary of energy during 1977–1979. Born in New York City on 15 February 1929, James Schlesinger

attended public schools before enrolling at Harvard, where he earned a doctorate in economics in 1956. He taught at the University of Virginia during 1956–1963, and during 1963–1969 he worked for the RAND Corporation, a think tank.

Following Richard M. Nixon's 1968 election as president, Schlesinger took a position with the Bureau of the Budget, and in 1971 Nixon named him chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In February 1973 Nixon appointed Schlesinger director of the CIA, but he stayed only five months before being confirmed as defense secretary that July.

Schlesinger's tenure at the Department of Defense coincided with a tense and troubled time in modern American history. The Vietnam War was winding down, and the Watergate scandal had already begun to engulf the Nixon administration. Schlesinger tried to maintain high defense budgets at a time of economic stagnation, when Congress was intent on trimming military spending. His efforts to increase defense spending were largely unsuccessful. He also sought to keep pace with the Soviets in terms of strategic nuclear weapons. Generally known as a hawkish hard-liner, he had doubts about the efficacy of détente, the warming of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The most controversial part of Schlesinger's time in office came during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. When several Arab countries launched a surprise attack against Israel, the Jewish state requested American military assistance. According to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Schlesinger delayed sending war matériel to Israel in U.S. aircraft for fear of offending Arab nations, a charge that Schlesinger has strenuously denied. This led to a permanent rift between the two men, and Kissinger thereafter worked assiduously to push Schlesinger out of the administration.

Following Nixon's resignation in August 1974, Schlesinger stayed on in President Gerald Ford's cabinet. However, Schlesinger's insistence on more defense appropriations and his disagreements with Kissinger led Ford to relieve Schlesinger of his post in November 1975. Schlesinger returned to public life in October 1977 when President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, named him to be the first secretary of energy. At the time, the United States was still reeling from the 1973–1974 energy crisis, and Carter was determined to implement a cohesive energy policy to wean America off oil imports. By 1979, however, Carter was unhappy with Schlesinger's efforts to handle the second energy crisis, precipitated by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis. Carter replaced Schlesinger in July 1979.

Schlesinger has remained active in politics, writing books and lecturing mostly on military and defense issues.

Justin P. Coffey

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Central Intelligence Agency; Détente; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon, Richard Milhous; RAND Corporation

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Schmidt, Helmut
(1918–)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) minister of the interior (1961–1965), minister of defense (1969–1972), minister of economic affairs (1972–1974), and chancellor (1974–1982). Born on 23 December 1918 in Hamburg, Helmut Schmidt saw combat in the German Army during World War II before being taken prisoner by British forces late in the conflict. During 1945–1949, he studied economics at the University of Hamburg, earning a doctorate.

Helmut Schmidt, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), speaking to the press at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston, 27 May 1983. Schmidt was at MIT to give the commencement address. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Schmidt joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1946 and was a civil servant in the state government of Hamburg beginning in 1949. He served in the Bundestag during 1953–1962 and in 1961 was appointed minister of the interior, a position he held until 1965. As such, Schmidt earned the reputation of a man of action after successfully coordinating relief efforts during the disastrous 1962 floods.

In 1965, however, Schmidt reentered the Bundestag and served the SDP in a number of leadership positions. Chancellor Willy Brandt appointed him defense minister in October 1969. When Brandt's minister for economic affairs and finance resigned under duress in July 1972, Schmidt took on that position. He soon gained critical acclaim for his economic policies. Upon the fall of the Brandt government, Schmidt became chancellor on 16 May 1974. He continued the Brandt coalition government and was reelected in 1976 and again in 1980.

During his tenure in office, Schmidt was confronted with the increasing threat of terrorism. Violent attacks of by the Red Army Faction, a far-leftist extremist group, against officials and politicians during 1974–1977 put the chancellor under enormous pressure to find solutions to combat this extremism without compromising constitutional liberties. Schmidt's popularity reached its zenith in October 1977 when West German forces freed all ninety-one hostages aboard a German jetliner hijacked by Palestinian terrorists in Somalia.

In foreign affairs, Schmidt managed to combine support for West European integration with further rapprochement with the East. He and French President Valéry Giscard

d'Éstaing are generally regarded as the political architects of the 1979 European Monetary System, the precursor of the European Currency Unit (ECU) and of the euro currency.

Regarding the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Schmidt continued the Ostpolitik of his predecessors. The chancellor's state visit to East Germany in December 1981 raised expectations of a closer rapprochement but resulted in little progress on contentious issues. The downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations had already begun to affect Schmidt's policy options by the late 1970s, however. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided in 1979 to deploy new nuclear missiles, mainly in West Germany, by late 1983 and to pursue Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) reduction negotiations in the interim, Schmidt's support of these proposals not only adversely affected his negotiations with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in June 1980 but also caused a domestic backlash in Germany. Nationwide antinuclear protests ultimately sparked the creation of the Green Party as a new political force.

When Schmidt demonstrated little understanding of or tolerance for the peace activists and environmentalists, many Germans saw him as being out of touch. His political decline accelerated when a dispute with Free Democratic Party (FDP) Chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher ensued over a program to reduce unemployment, which led to the resignation of the four FDP ministers in September 1982. After the Bundestag passed a vote of no-confidence against the chancellor in favor of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Helmut Kohl on 1 October 1982, Schmidt resigned. In 1983 he became co-editor of the weekly magazine *Die Zeit* and in 1985 a member of its managing board, actively committing himself to writing on political topics.

Bert Becker

See also

Brandt, Willy; Brezhnev, Leonid; Genscher, Hans-Dietrich; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry; Honecker, Erich; Kohl, Helmut; Scheel, Walter

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School of the Americas

U.S. military facility that trained Latin American militaries and police forces in counterinsurgency techniques during the Cold War. The School of the Americas opened in 1946 as the U.S. Army Caribbean School at Fort Amador in the Panama Canal Zone. The school was part of the larger U.S. Cold War containment strategy for Latin America that included the 1947 Rio Pact, the Organization of American States (OAS), and President Harry S. Truman's Point Four Program.

After World War II, Latin American militaries looked to the United States to supply the training for their national armed forces, replacing former French, Italian, and German military advisory groups. Particularly in the Caribbean region that included Central America, the Caribbean islands, and northern South America, the U.S. military sought to centralize its instruction of Latin American officers at a single location in the Panama Canal Zone. Initially, most of the training at the Caribbean Army School was in conventional warfare, unit exercises, and equipment maintenance. The school also taught police surveillance and antiriot techniques. Fear of Soviet subversion of Latin American labor movements and indigenous socialist parties became a prime concern for U.S. policymakers in the 1950s. Thus, American instructors trained Latin American armies more for internal repression, the crushing of possible procommunist coups, and the monitoring and suppression of leftist dissenters.

Following the successful 1959 Cuban Revolution, American concerns over communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere heightened, as did worries over the efficacy of leftist guerrilla movements championed by Ernesto "Che" Guevara and other Fidelistas. Guevara's activities unnerved U.S. military officials, who had watched a ragtag group of Cuban radicals defeat a 50,000-man Cuban Army that had been trained and equipped by the United States. Under the aegis of President John F. Kennedy's administration, counterinsurgency doctrine received greater emphasis in U.S. military strategy. In 1963 Kennedy vastly expanded the U.S. Army Caribbean School, renaming it the U.S. Army School of the Americas, and deployed the 8th Special Forces Group to the Canal Zone to serve as instructors. The institution greatly increased the variety of its training programs that now concentrated on counterinsurgency, civic action, crowd control, psychological warfare, and anticommunist ideology.

The institution greatly increased the variety of its training programs that now concentrated on counterinsurgency, civic action, crowd control, psychological warfare, and anticommunist ideology.

Critics of the School of the Americas assert that during this period the school began its policy of training officers in the techniques of interrogation, torture, kidnapping, assassination, and paramilitary terror tactics to be used in thwarting communist insurgencies. From 1946 through the 1990s, the school graduated nearly 60,000 officers. The school became a target of attack from

Panamanian nationalists who saw the facility as a violation of U.S.-Panamanian treaties that approved American military bases within the Canal Zone for canal defense only, not for the continent-wide repression of dissent. In 1967, Bolivian units trained at the School of the Americas helped track down and kill Guevara. During the 1960s, trainees from the school participated in six different counterinsurgency campaigns against leftist guerrillas in Latin America.

In the 1980s, the School of the Americas came under even sharper scrutiny from human rights groups for its contribution to the U.S.-backed counterinsurgency wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Human rights advocates such as Father Roy Bourgeois traced numerous atrocities committed against Central American civilians back to commanders and units trained by U.S. Green Berets at the School of the Americas. Links between graduates of the school and right-wing death squads also abounded. Critics increasingly referred to the institution as a "School for Assassins" or the "School for Dictators." Indeed, the school's alumni included Panamanian drug trafficker and dictator Manuael Noriega, Salvadoran death squad leader Roberto D'Aubuisson, Argentine military junta leader Leopoldo Galtieri, and Bolivian dictator Hugo Bánzer Suárez. Opposition to the school grew so vociferous that in 1984 the Pentagon agreed to withdraw the School of the Americas from the Canal Zone and transfer it to Fort Benning, Georgia, where it continues operating to this day under the new name of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.

Michael E. Donoghue

See also

Americas; Communist Revolutionary Warfare; Latin America, Communist Parties in

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Schriever, Bernard Adolf

(1910–2005)

U.S. Air Force (USAF) general, commander of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC)/Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) during 1959–1966, and key leader in the development of USAF missile and space capabilities. Born in Bremen, Germany, on 14 September 1910, Bernard Schriever immigrated to the United States with his parents in 1917. He graduated from Texas A&M University in 1931 and secured a U.S. Army commission. He earned an MA degree in aeronautical engineering from Stanford University in 1942.

Schriever was initially commissioned in the field artillery but then entered the U.S. Air Corps, earning his wings in June 1933. Prior to World War II, he served as a pilot and engineering maintenance officer. During the war, he flew B-17s in the Pacific theater and served in a number of staff positions, which led to duty at the U.S. Army Air Forces headquarters after the war. He continued to serve in staff positions related to science and research and development. He was promoted to brigadier general in June 1953.

In June 1954, Schriever became assistant to the commander of ARDC and commander of the Western Development Division with responsibility for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. He was promoted to major general in December 1955. He supervised the production of the first three classes of ICBMs: Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman. His responsibilities expanded into the USAF space program, which he also guided to success with the DISCOVERY/CORONA system. He moved up to command the ARDC in 1959 as a lieutenant general and remained in charge when the ARDC became the AFSC in April 1961. He was promoted to full general on 1 July 1961.

Schriever retired in April 1966 and was active as a consultant. He also founded the Urban Systems Associates. Often called the father of the air force missile and space programs, he was honored when Falcon Air Force Base outside Colorado Springs, Colorado, was renamed for him in 1998. Schriever died in Washington, D.C., on 20 June 2005.

JEROME V. MARTIN

See also
United States Air Force

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Schröder, Gerhard
(1910–1989)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) minister of the interior (1953–1961), foreign minister (1961–1966), and minister of defense (1966–1969). Born in Saarbrücken on 11 September 1910, Gerhard Schröder earned his doctorate in law from the University of Bonn in 1934. He began his career as an assistant at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, was a law clerk in 1936, and became a self-employed lawyer in Berlin in 1939.

Immediately after World War II, Schröder worked for the provisional government in the North Rhine Province of the British military occupation government, but in 1947 he established himself as a lawyer in Düsseldorf. A member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), he entered the Bundestag in September 1949. In his second cabinet, Chancellor Konrad Ade-

nauer appointed Schröder minister of the interior in October 1953. He served in that post until November 1961. During his tenure, he pushed for a national emergency law, which was enacted only after acrimonious debates in 1968.

In Adenauer's fourth cabinet, Schröder became foreign minister in November 1961, a position he held until October 1966. An unabashed Atlanticist, he promoted closer ties with the United States, which was the major reason for his long-running quarrel with Adenauer. Schröder agreed, however, with both Adenauer and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard on the goals of enlarging the European Economic Community (EEC) and strengthening collaboration within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Regarding the Soviet bloc, Schröder showed some willingness to modify the Hallstein Doctrine and to allow a gradual thaw in relations with Eastern Europe in economic matters, which he described as the "policy of movement." West German industrial interests strongly supported Schröder's attempt to open relations with Soviet satellites, resulting in the opening of trade missions in four Eastern capitals during 1963–1964.

During December 1966–October 1969, Schröder served as minister of defense. During 1969–1980, he was chairman of the foreign committee of the Bundestag. Schröder died on 31 December 1989 in Kampen, Germany.



Dr. Gerhard Schröder, minister of the interior of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), 1959. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Erhard, Ludwig; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hallstein Doctrine

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Schumacher, Kurt
(1895–1952)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Social Democratic Party (SPD) politician and proponent of German unification. Born on 13 October 1895 in Kulm, Germany, Kurt Schumacher enlisted in the German Army at

the outbreak of World War I and was severely wounded in December 1914. Beginning in 1915, he studied law and economics, receiving his doctorate from Münster University in 1920.

Schumacher joined the SPD in 1918 and served as editor of its newsletter during 1920–1924. He was elected to the Württemberg Diet in 1924, serving until 1931, and to the Reichstag in 1930, serving until 1933. He was imprisoned much of the time during 1933–1944 because of his opposition to Nazi rule.

In 1945, Schumacher became a driving force in the re-creation of the SPD, proving to be a staunch opponent of the merging of the party with the German Communist Party (KPD). The October 1946 merger agreement reached with Otto Grotewohl, chairman of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East German) SPD, confirmed Schumacher's status as the leading SPD politician in Germany's western occupation zones. After the fusion of the SPD and KPD in the Soviet occupation zone, which brought the Socialist Unity Party (SED) into being, Schumacher was elected chairman of the SPD for West Germany and West Berlin. A member of the Parliamentary Council since 1948, he supported the founding of West Germany but repeatedly stressed its provisional character.

Schumacher's campaign to become the first West German president ended unsuccessfully in the September 1949 elections. As a member of the Bundestag (lower house of parliament) since 1949 and especially as opposition leader of the SPD group, he became one of the strongest critics of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose policy of integrating West Germany into the Western bloc was regarded by Schumacher as the main obstacle to Germany's reunification. Schumacher called Adenauer "the chancellor of the Allies" during a parliamentary debate in November 1949 and was excluded from a subsequent session. Schumacher not only opposed the dismantling of Ruhr industry and the agreements on the Saar region but also fought against the entry of West Germany into the European Council and against the founding of the European Steel and Coal Community. In spring 1952, he regarded the so-called Stalin Note, a Soviet propaganda proposal to reunite Germany, as an important step forward, but Adenauer rejected Schumacher's demand to consider it seriously. Schumacher died in Bonn on 20 August 1952.

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Germany, Federal Republic of; Grotewohl, Otto

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Schuman, Robert
(1886–1963)

French finance minister (1945–1947), premier (1947–1948), foreign minister (1948–1952), justice minister (1955–1958), and founder of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Born on 26 June 1986 in Luxembourg, the son of a French Lorrainer and his Luxembourg wife, Robert Jean-Baptiste Nicolas Schuman grew up in Luxembourg, speaking Luxembourgeois, French, and German fluently. A brilliant student, he also learned Greek, Latin, and English at the academically rigorous Atheneum. He then studied law at the universities of Bonn, Berlin, and Munich, where he again excelled, and in 1910 he began to practice law in Metz. During World War I he fought in the German Army, and when Germany's defeat returned Alsace-Lorraine to France, he remained in Metz, specializing in German legal problems, especially those arising from the region's repeated transfers.

An austere bachelor and a devout Roman Catholic, in 1904 Schuman joined the ultra-Catholic student organization Unitas and became a leading Catholic layman. He was well versed in religious literature, and his pronounced social conscience and commitment to democracy made him a prominent founder of France's Christian Democrat political movement. In 1919 he joined the Catholic Popular Democratic Party and won election to the French Chamber of Deputies, remaining there for forty years. When Germany invaded France in 1940, he refused to join Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain's collaborationist Vichy government but instead returned to Alsace-Lorraine, where his public condemnation of German expulsions of French residents brought his arrest. Escaping the Gestapo, Schuman participated in wartime resistance propaganda efforts, helping to found the Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP, Popular Republican Movement), France's Christian Democratic party.

French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, shown here in 1950. (Leo Rosenthal/Pix Inc./Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

As French governments rapidly succeeded each other after liberation in 1944, Schuman spent two years as finance minister and seven months as premier before serving as foreign minister from 1948 to 1952. His heritage, liberal Catholicism, and democratic outlook all guided his dedicated efforts to encourage West European reconciliation. Working closely with Jean Monnet, on 9 May 1950 Schuman issued the Schuman Declaration, a public appeal to other European nations to create the ECSC, which evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and subsequently the European Union (EU). By

In the early twenty-first century, Schuman was under serious consideration for beatification as a Roman Catholic saint.

integrating key sectors of the French, German, Italian, and Benelux economies, the ECSC greatly reduced the possibility of future European hostilities.

From 1955 to 1958 Schuman was French justice minister and from 1955 to 1961 president of the European Movement. In 1958 he became the first president of the European Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, France, retiring in 1961. Schuman died at Scy-Chazelles, Lorraine, France, on 4 September 1963. In the early twenty-first century, he was under serious consideration for beatification as a Roman Catholic saint.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

European Coal and Steel Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; European Parliament; European Union; France; Monnet, Jean; Monnet Plan; Schuman Plan

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Schuman Plan

Proposal announced on 9 May 1950 by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman whereby France and Germany would pool their coal and steel industries. The plan was designed to eliminate eighty years of Franco-German rivalry, which had contributed to two world wars. It also marked the first step toward West European political and economic integration.

Schuman and Jean Monnet, France's leading proponent of European integration, argued that the Schuman Plan would transform intra-European relations in numerous ways. First, Franco-German production of heavy industry would necessitate joint control of the mineral-rich Ruhr and Saar regions, the geographical bone of contention between France and Germany. A basis of trust would thus be created between the French, who still feared another attack by Germany, and the Germans, who were concerned about permanent dismemberment by a vengeful former enemy.

Second, the successful implementation of the Schuman Plan would essentially solve the German problem by forcing the Federal Republic of Ger-

many (FRG, West Germany) to surrender much of its sovereignty in favor of integration into a larger European community. It was hoped that such an arrangement would stanch German militarism in the future. Yet Schuman and Monnet assured Germany that should the plan go forward, it would serve as the first step toward a mutual defense pact that would assuage its fears of permanent disarmament. This would later be proposed as the European Defense Community (EDC).

Third, the plan symbolized European integrationists' vision of a supranational organization that would transcend the nationalism they believed had stoked two world wars. Politically, therefore, Western Europe would become unified. Finally, the Schuman Plan could ultimately establish an economic bloc rivaling the United States and the Soviet Union.

Informed of the proposal on 8 May 1950, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer agreed that the Schuman Plan was based on equal rights for both nations and removed the Saar question from traditional Franco-German rivalry. He quickly wrote the French foreign minister and pledged that he would strongly urge West Germany's Bundestag (lower house of parliament) to approve the plan. Within days, the United States and Italy declared their approval, with the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) not far behind. After nearly a month of negotiations, the British signed off on it, and on 3 June 1950 a joint communiqué was issued announcing mutual acceptance of the plan. On 18 April 1951, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries signed the Schuman Treaty, thereby creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

Chris Tudda

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; Monnet, Jean; Saar; Schuman, Robert

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Schweitzer, Albert
(1875–1965)

Medical missionary, musician, theologian, and philosopher. Born in Kaysersberg, Upper Alsace (French territory then occupied by Germany), on 14

Albert Schweitzer was a German theologian and philosopher who is known for his missionary medical work in Africa. He wrote many books on his studies of music and philosophy and was awarded the 1952 Nobel Prize for Peace. (Arthur William Heintzelman/Library of Congress)

January 1875, the eldest son of a Lutheran pastor, Albert Schweitzer studied music and became an accomplished organist. In 1899 he was awarded a doctorate in philosophy by the University of Strasbourg. He remained at the university as a professor and administrator until 1913. In 1906 he published *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, which dealt with the major scholarly writings on Jesus Christ, and *The Art of German and French Organ Builders and Players*. He also produced the widely used performance edition of Bach's organ works (1912–1914).

In 1905 Schweitzer began medical studies at the University of Strasbourg with the aim of becoming a mission doctor. In 1913 he received his medical degree and set out for Lambarene, Gabon, in French Equatorial Africa. There he founded the Albert Schweitzer Hospital to treat the inhabitants of that area. Although the hospital and his treatment methods were often criticized by outsiders as being colonial, Schweitzer continued to operate the hospital and treat thousands of African patients. He also continued to study philosophy and took a keen interest in world problems.

In 1923 Schweitzer wrote *Kulturphilosophie* (Philosophy of Civilization), setting forth his personal philosophy of the reverence for life, an ethical system based on the mutual respect of all living things. He used this philosophy to guide not only his hospital work but also his everyday life. He would later expound on it via several philosophical and theological publications.

In 1952, Schweitzer was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. From the 1950s on, he spoke out against nuclear weapons and urged world leaders to stop nuclear weapons testing. Schweitzer died at Lambarene on 4 September 1965.

Carrie A. Lewis

See also

Africa; Nobel Peace Prize

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Securitate

Established in 1945, Romania's secret police service, popularly known as the Securitate, went under the official title of Departamentul Securităţii Statului (DSS, Department of State Security) during 1978–1989 and was allied with

the Departamentul de Informaţii Externe (DIE, Department of External Information), the main foreign intelligence service. Upon the fall of the Romanian communist regime in December 1989, the Securitate was proportionately the largest secret police force in Eastern Europe.

In April 1945, Petru Groza, Romania's Moscow-appointed prime minister, signed an order establishing the Serviciul Special de Informaţii (SSI, Special Information Service) to replace the World War II Siguranţa. Initially directed by agents from the Soviet People's Commissariat for Interior Affairs (NKVD), the SSI dealt with both foreign and domestic intelligence, while military intelligence fell to the Army General Staff under Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). Under Interior Minister Teohari Georgescu and Securitate head Lieutenant General Gheorghe Pintilie, the SSI was renamed the Direcţia Generală a Securităţii Poporului (DGSP, General Directorate for People's Security) in 1948. Expansions in 1949 included setting up special security troops and a militia to replace the police and gendarmerie, and, in 1950, a Directorate for Labor Units to oversee some 180,000 inmates of concentration camps throughout Romania. In 1951, a body for foreign intelligence was set up in the renamed Direcţia Generală a Securităţii Statuliu (DGSS, General Directorate of State Security). Throughout these changes, Alexandru Drăghici, who controlled both the Ministry of the Interior (1953–1965) and the short-lived Ministry of State Security, maintained a firm grip on the Securitate. The 1964 withdrawal of Soviet counselors marked the agency's increasing independence from Moscow. Following the 1965 death of party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Nicolae Ceauşescu continued a nationalist line, purging NKVD agents and deposing Pintilie and Draghici. The DIE became a separate body in 1972, and in 1978, the DGSS, now known as the DSS, was reorganized in nine directorates. As Romania's primary foreign intelligence organization, the DIE worked closely with the Ministry of the Interior, the Securitate, and the Directorate for Military Intelligence (DIA). The 1978 defection of DIE deputy director Lieutenant General Ion Pacepa led to a major purge of personnel and, upon his debriefing by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents, the cooling of Romanian-U.S. relations.

Moreover, the December 1989 overthrow of Ceauşescu highlighted the Securitate's weakness. Although it is uncertain to what extent Securitate forces were primarily responsible for violence before and immediately after Ceauşescu's overthrow, allegations persist that former Securitate agents have retained powerful positions, particularly in the Ministry for Foreign Trade and in private import-export businesses.

Anna M. Wittmann

See also

Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Drăghici, Alexandru; Espionage; Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe; Groza, Petru; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti; Romania

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Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on (1973–1990)

Multinational and multiphase discussions dealing primarily with the diminishment of East-West tensions in Europe and human rights issues. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) first convened on 3 July 1973 and was attended by thirty-five European and North American states. The CSCE provided critical momentum for sweeping political and social changes in the Soviet bloc that would significantly influence the end of the Cold War.

The Soviets, seeking formal recognition of their post–World War II borders, had sought a European security conference since 1954. West European countries had resisted such a conference, concerned that it might strengthen the Soviets' international position and potentially divide the Western alliance. By the late 1960s, however, widespread public interest in reducing East-West antagonism led West European governments to reconsider their position. Moreover, the Soviet Union removed a significant obstacle to the conference by indicating that it would not oppose American or Canadian participation.

The outcome was a complex, drawn-out period of diplomacy divided into four phases: the Helsinki Consultations to determine the timing and agenda of the conference from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973, the six-day meeting of foreign ministers formally launching the CSCE from 3 July to 8 July 1973, the principal negotiations of the Geneva stage from 29 August 1973 to 21 July 1975, and the final summit from 30 July 1975 to 1 August 1975 during which representatives from the thirty-five states convened in Helsinki and signed the Helsinki Final Act.

The CSCE negotiations centered around four so-called baskets of issues. The first dealt with ten principles guiding relations in Europe, including the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The first basket also incorporated confidence-building measures such as advanced notification of military troop maneuvers. The second basket addressed economic, scientific, and technological cooperation among CSCE states, while the third concentrated on humanitarian issues such as the reunification of families, improved working conditions for journalists, and increased cultural exchanges. The fourth basket focused on follow-up procedures.

The fourth basket extended the CSCE by stipulating that a follow-up meeting be held in 1977 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to assess the progress made toward fulfilling the terms of the Helsinki Final Act. The principal accomplishment of the Belgrade meeting (4 October 1977–9 March 1978) was the initiation of a process of review whereby countries that did not meet the terms of the Helsinki agreement, particularly its human rights provisions, could be held publicly accountable. Such reviews were held in a number of subsequent meetings that became known as the Helsinki Process. Despite the value of the follow-up meetings, however, some policymakers were concerned that the often acrimonious nature of the review process threatened the central goal of the CSCE, namely the reduction of tensions in Europe.

The Madrid review meeting (11 November 1980–9 September 1983) made little further progress in decreasing East-West tension or improving human rights, largely because of external events such as the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the Soviet downing of KAL Flight 007 on 1 September 1983. The Vienna meeting from 11 November 1986 to 19 January 1989 produced significant accomplishments related to human rights issues, especially the right of people to emigrate, religious tolerance, the upholding of the rights of national minorities, and the removal of restrictions on foreign broadcasting. The Vienna meeting exemplified how the CSCE successfully linked human rights with other elements of East-West relations, and the agreement there to hold a conference on human rights in Moscow signaled the extent to which the Helsinki Process had encouraged and facilitated progress on these issues in states such as the Soviet Union.

The emphasis on the protection of human rights, as pursued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the neutral and nonaligned countries through the Helsinki Process, ultimately paved the way for the political and social transformations in Eastern Europe that marked the end of the Cold War. The CSCE summit meeting in Paris (19–21 November 1990) recognized, for the first time, the fundamental political and social changes that had occurred in Europe in the fifteen years since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. In Paris, the leaders of the CSCE nations, including a now-reunified Germany, signed the Charter for a New Europe, recognizing the end of confrontation in Europe and, as the charter proclaimed, a new era of "democracy, peace, and unity."

Beyond the influential review meetings, the CSCE encouraged regular East-West engagement, forging connections that bridged some of the deep divisions in Europe with targeted discussions on issues such as scientific cooperation, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and security in the Mediterranean. These talks, known as experts' meetings, maintained connections between Western and Eastern countries. In addition, neutral and nonaligned CSCE signatories often played an important role in brokering compromises between the two sides.

Sarah B. Snyder

See also

Détente; Europe, Eastern; Europe, Western; Helsinki Final Act; Human Rights; KAL Flight 007

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See Shining Path

Sendero Luminoso

Service, John Stewart
(1909–1999)

U.S. Foreign Service officer and one of the so-called Old China Hands. Born in China to American missionary parents on 8 August 1909, John Service grew up in Sichuan Province, attended high school in Shanghai, and studied art history at Oberlin College in Ohio. He returned to China in 1922 and, following a brief time in banking, joined the American Foreign Service. When the Japanese entered Beijing, he helped escort Americans to safety. Assigned to the new Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) capital at Congqing as a political officer in 1941, his task was to gather information on all Chinese political parties and factions, including the communists. Service knew China well and had great insight regarding events there.

In the communist witch-hunt hysteria of the early Cold War period, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy attacked Service and other China Hands, including John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies, and Oliver Edmund Clubb. Accused of being soft on communism, Service had in fact reported truthfully on corruption in Jiang Jieshi's Nationalist government. Service had also pre-

U.S. Foreign Service officer John Stewart Service, whose career was ruined as a result of false accusations against him. (Bettmann/Corbis)

dicted a civil war that would lead to a communist victory if things were not changed.

Contrary to the charges made by the far Right, the China Hands did not welcome communism. They simply urged that U.S. pressure be brought to bear on Jiang and, failing that, advocated a policy of American neutrality in what was an inevitable civil conflict. Had their advice been heeded, the United States would probably have been able to maintain diplomatic relations with China. Certainly the charge that Service and other Foreign Service officials "lost" China was patently ridiculous. The Chinese themselves accomplished that.

In February 1950, Senator McCarthy specifically charged Service with being "a known associate and collaborator with communists." Although Service was subsequently cleared by a Senate committee, a Loyalty Review Board named by President Harry S. Truman said that there was "reasonable doubt as to his loyalty," and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson dismissed Service the same day. In 1956 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 8–0 (one justice took no part in the case) that the board had no right to review the State Department's findings and that Acheson had no right to dismiss him. Service then rejoined the State Department, retiring from an obscure post in the Liverpool, England, consulate in 1962.

Service then earned a master's degree at the University of California, Berkeley, and became library curator of its Center for Chinese Studies. With the 1970s thaw in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), Service visited China, even meeting with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1971. Service also published several books on China. He died in Oakland, California, on 3 February 1999.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Jiang Jieshi; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; Truman, Harry S.; Zhou Enlai

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Sétif Uprising
(8 May 1945)

An anticolonial uprising in Algeria that signaled the start of a liberation movement culminating in Algerian independence in 1962. On 8 May 1945, as much of the world celebrated the end of World War II in Europe, riots broke out among the Berber population of the city of Sétif in the Department of Constantine in Algeria. It began as just another victory parade, which had been approved by the French authorities.

Because 8 May was a market day, it attracted many Berbers from around the city who nursed long-standing grievances with the European settlers over the seizure of their ancestral lands. While marchers did carry posters proclaiming the Allied victory, there were also placards calling on Muslims to unite against the French for the release of nationalist leader Ahmed Messali Hadj and death to Frenchmen and Jews. Early in the parade a French plainclothes policeman pulled a revolver and shot to death a young marcher carrying an Algerian flag. This touched off a bloody rampage, often referred to as the Sétif Massacre.

Muslims attacked Europeans and their property, and violence quickly spread to outlying areas. The French authorities then unleashed a violent crackdown that included Foreign Legionnaires and Senegalese troops, tanks, air force planes, and even naval gunfire from a cruiser in the Mediterranean Sea. Settler militias and local vigilantes supported the authorities and took a number of prisoners from jails and executed them. Major French military operations lasted two weeks, while smaller actions continued for a month. An estimated 4,500 Algerians were arrested, of whom 99 were sentenced to death and another 64 were given life imprisonment. Casualty figures remain in dispute. At least 100 Europeans died. The official French figure of Muslim dead was 1,165, but this is certainly too low, and figures as high as 10,000 have been cited.

In March 1946 the French government announced a general amnesty and released many of the Sétif detainees, including moderate nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas, although his Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty political party was dissolved. The fierce nature of the French repression of the uprising was based on a perception that any leniency would be interpreted as weakness and only encourage further unrest.

The Sétif Uprising, which was not followed by any meaningful French reform, drove a wedge between the two communities in Algeria. Europeans now distrusted Muslims, and the Muslims never forgave the violence of the repression. French authorities did not understand the implications of this and were thus caught by surprise when a rebellion began in Algeria in November 1954.

Thomas D. Veve and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Algeria; Algerian War; Anticolonialism

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Shehu, Mehmet
(1913–1981)

Albanian military leader and premier of Albania (1954–1981). Born in Corush in southern Albania on 10 January 1913, Mehmet Shehu graduated from the American Vocational School in Tirana in 1932 with a degree in agriculture. He also briefly attended the Naples Military Academy in Italy before being expelled for his communist sympathies. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), he served in the International Brigades on the Republican side. Like many soldiers who fought for the Republican cause, he spent time in French internment camps, remaining there until 1942.

Shehu returned to Albania in 1942 and joined Enver Hoxha's military operations against the Italians, Germans, and noncommunist partisans. Shehu became a brigade commander in 1941 and was promoted to division command that same year. In 1943 he was elected a member of the Albanian Communist Party's Central Committee. The following year he became a member of the Albanian provisional government.

After the end of World War II, Shehu received advanced military training in Moscow and was named Albanian Army chief of staff in July 1946. Together with Hoxha, Shehu vociferously opposed Albania's incorporation into Yugoslavia. Hoxha removed him from office in December 1947, apparently under pressure by Coci Xoxe, leader of the pro-Yugoslav faction. Shehu was politically rehabilitated in 1948 and led the infamous purges of the Albanian Communist Party during 1948–1951.

A member of the Central Committee and Politburo beginning in 1948, during 1949–1954 Shehu served as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, minister of internal affairs, and head of the Albanian police. He became prime minister in 1954 and was then subordinate in Albania only to Hoxha.

Shehu significantly shaped both Albanian foreign and domestic policy, including helping to create the Albanian-Chinese alliance in 1961 that lasted until the mid-1970s. Domestically, he helped collectivize agriculture, nationalize industry, and institute universal health care and education. From the mid-1970s on, however, he came to oppose Hoxha's policy of increasing Albania's isolationism and self-sufficiency. In 1981 the power struggle between Hoxha and Shehu was resolved with Shehu's death, allegedly a suicide, in Tirana on 17 December 1981. Many believe that it was in fact a political assassination ordered by Hoxha, who claimed that Shehu was an agent of the U.S., Soviet, and Yugoslav governments.

Robert N. Stacy

See also
Albania; Europe, Eastern; Hoxha, Enver

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Sherman, Forrest Percival
(1896–1951)

American admiral and chief of naval operations. Born in Merrimack, New Hampshire, on 30 October 1896, Forrest Sherman graduated second in his United States Naval Academy class of 1917 and saw convoy escort service in World War I. He soon switched to naval aviation and thereafter remained a strong advocate for naval airpower. In May 1942 during World War II, he earned command of the aircraft carrier *Wasp*. While in support of the Guadalcanal campaign, he lost the *Wasp* to a Japanese submarine in September 1942. He survived the career blemish and was named chief of staff to Admiral John H. Towers, commander of the Pacific Fleet's air arm. Sherman then joined Admiral Chester Nimitz's staff as head of the War Plans Division.

Sherman made a substantial contribution to the navy's Cold War role. Promoted to vice admiral in December 1945, he served as deputy chief of naval operations under Nimitz during 1945–1947 and urged the navy to adopt a balanced force capable of global reach. Sherman served as the navy's representative during negotiations that helped unify the military services under the Defense Department in 1947. He advocated a permanent American naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea to counter Soviet moves in the Balkans. In December 1947, he assumed command of the U.S. Sixth Task Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Sherman was named chief of naval operations on 2 November 1949 in the wake of the disaster of the Revolt of the Admirals and began the task of restoring naval morale. He proved himself a powerful chief and began to carve out a strong role for the navy in the Cold War. He backed the carrier task force as central to the navy's Cold War mission and saw the need for future supercarriers. He also supported the expansion of the navy to meet other traditional missions, such as antisubmarine warfare, and saw a place for nuclear-powered vessels in the navy's future.

U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman, November 1949. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Sherman became the dominant member among the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). With the outbreak of the Korean War, he was a reluctant supporter of Douglas MacArthur's Inchon operation but convinced the JCS to endorse the plan. He supported President Harry S. Truman's decision to remove MacArthur from Korean command. Still serving as chief of naval operations, Sherman died in Naples, Italy, on 22 July 1951 while on a diplomatic mission concerning U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) basing rights.

Thomas D. Veve

See also

Clifford, Clark McAdams; Johnson, Louis Arthur; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; National Security Act; Norstad, Lauris; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Shevardnadze, Eduard

(1928–)

Soviet foreign minister (1985–1990, 1991), chairman of the Georgian State Council (1992–1995), and president of Georgia (1995–2003). Born on 25 January 1928 in the Georgian village of Mamati, Eduard Shevardnadze graduated from the Party School of the Communist Party Central Committee in 1951 and from the Kutaisi Pedagogical Institute in 1959. He then became an instructor for the Komsomol (Communist Union of Youth). Joining the Communist Party in 1948, he rose quickly through its ranks. He became a member of the Georgian Supreme Soviet in 1959.

During 1961–1964 Shevardnadze served as a party regional secretary, and during 1964–1965 he was deputy minister of internal affairs for Georgia. He became minister of internal affairs of Georgia in 1965, a post he held until 1972. During this period, Shevardnadze reformed Georgian agriculture, creating new incentives for farmers and boosting production. He was also responsible for firing and imprisoning hundreds of officials in his fight against bureaucratic corruption, earning him the reputation of a merciless opponent of corruption and inefficiency. He also forced government officials to give up properties that they had attained through bribery and other illegal means. He firmly believed that the Soviet economy would never move forward if corruption continued to plague the system.

In 1972, Shevardnadze was appointed first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, a post he occupied until 1985. There too he continued his fight against corruption. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1976. In 1977 Soviet authorities conducted a series of crackdowns against human rights activists, jailing many of the movement's top figures. Shevardnadze's Georgian government participated in the crackdowns, and among those jailed was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who in May 1991 would become the first democratically elected president of the independent Republic of Georgia. In 1978, Shevardnadze was promoted to candidate member status of the Soviet Politburo, which functioned as the central policymaking and governing body of the CPSU. That same year he was awarded the Order of Lenin for his honesty, integrity, and political courage.

Shevardnadze was awarded the Order of Lenin for his honesty, integrity, and political courage.

In 1985, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Shevardnadze minister of foreign affairs after the resignation of Andrey Gromyko. Shevardnadze also became a full member of the CPSU Politburo. As foreign minister,

President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia, photographed during his meeting with Secretary of Defense William Cohen at the Pentagon, 17 July 1997. (U.S. Department of Defense)

he played an important role in ending the Cold War. He reformed Soviet foreign policymaking, implementing Gorbachev's policies. These included withdrawing from Afghanistan, developing new arms control strategies, establishing ties with Israel, negotiating German reunification, and allowing for the democratization of Eastern Europe. Shevardnadze rejected all aid requests by communist leaders in Eastern Europe when revolutions and democratization swept their countries, allowing for a smooth and relatively bloodless transition to democracy in the region.

These actions, however, made Shevardnadze many enemies in Moscow. Nonetheless, he adhered to a strict policy of liberalization, which gradually separated him from Gorbachev's incrementalist policy of preserving a socialist system. Because of these differences and growing criticism from Communist Party hard-liners, Shevardnadze resigned his post in December 1990 and warned that the nation was headed toward dictatorship. Following his resignation, an unsuccessful coup by communist hard-liners in August 1991 seemed to prove that Shevardnadze's prediction was correct. He returned to the post of foreign minister in November 1991 but resigned together with Gorbachev in December when the Soviet Union was officially dissolved.

In March 1992, Shevardnadze became head of an interim Georgian government following the ouster of President Gamsakhurdia. In 1995, Shevardnadze survived an assassination attempt and that same year was elected president of the Republic of Georgia by a comfortable margin. He survived a second assassination attempt in 1998. In 2000 he won a controversial presidential election that was immediately followed by accusations of vote rigging. In November 2003, Shevardnadze was forced to resign the presidency after huge demonstrations showed that he had lost much of his political clout.

Arthur M. Holst

See also

Georgia; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gromyko, Andrey; Perestroika; Soviet Union

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Shigemitsu Mamoru
(1887–1957)

Japanese diplomat and foreign minister (1943–1946, 1954–1957). Born in Ōita Prefecture on 29 July 1887, Shigemitsu Mamoru graduated from Tokyo

University in 1911. He then joined the Foreign Ministry and served as an advisor to the Japanese delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and as consul general in Shanghai. He joined other Japanese diplomats after the conference in arguing for a more forceful Japanese foreign policy.

Shigemitsu was counselor to the Foreign Ministry during 1920–1924, chief secretary to the embassy in China during 1925–1927, and consul general in Shanghai during 1927–1930. In 1931 he became Japanese minister to China. Following the Manchurian Incident that same year, he sought direct talks with China rather than see the matter referred to the League of Nations. In April 1932 he was badly wounded (losing a foot) in an assassination attempt by a Korean nationalist.

As deputy foreign minister during 1933–1936, Shigemitsu devoted himself to Japan's relations with China. Resigning over the failure of his hardline approach, he was subsequently Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union (1936–1938), Great Britain (1938–1941), and the Wang Jingwei government in China during 1942. Shigemitsu opposed the Tripartite Military Pact that bound Japan to Germany and Italy.

Shigemitsu became foreign minister in the cabinet headed by Tōjō Hideki in 1943 and remained in that post in the subsequent Koiso Kuniaki and Higashikuni Naruhiko cabinets. As such, Shigemitsu signed the World War II capitulation agreement aboard the U.S. battleship *Missouri* on 2 September 1945. The next year, he was arrested and detained as a Class A war criminal. Sentenced to seven years in Sugamo Prison, he was released in 1950.

Shigemitsu was elected to the Japanese Diet in 1952. In 1954 he assumed the posts of both deputy prime minister and foreign minister in the Hatoyama Ichirō cabinet. In this post, Shigemitsu worked to restore diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and to gain Japanese entry into the United Nations (UN), both of which occurred in 1956. Shigemitsu died in Yugawara in Kanagawa Prefecture on 26 January 1957.

Tomoyuki Takemoto and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Hatoyama Ichirō; Japan

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Shining Path

Rural-based guerrilla organization founded in Peru and operational since 1980. Conceptually, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) developed in Peru during

the 1960s. First established at a Peruvian regional university, the group was the result of frustration with a corrupt and unresponsive political system and the ambition of intellectuals to put theory into practice. Shining Path's key leader was Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, who headed the School of Education at the University of San Cristobal de Huamanga. During the 1960s, Guzmán, also known as "Chairman Gonzalo," recruited a core group of like-minded activists. They distinguished themselves from other Marxist groups by promoting a Maoist line of thought and action that reflected the split in the Cominform between the Soviet Union and China.

The adoption of a Maoist line, which Guzmán labeled "Marxist-Leninist–Maoist-Gonzalo Thought," fit Peru well, for its peasant population remained sizable and isolated from political affairs. As Shining Path developed, its leaders developed a strategy of action that involved the mobilization of the peasantry in a revolutionary struggle against international and domestic "oppressors of the people."

The organization used its strength among the student population to dominate university administrations into the 1970s. Graduates of the School of Education sought positions in rural schools, where they used their classrooms to develop community connections for Shining Path. Guzmán and other leaders deepened their connections with China and soon expanded their field operations beyond the university. The failure of government reforms, in particular land redistribution and rural economic development programs, convinced the Shining Path hierarchy that the revolutionary potential of the peasantry was as yet underdeveloped.

Believing that they could serve as a catalyst for a rural revolution that would expand and strangle the urban centers of capitalist exploitation, Shining Path's leaders launched its first military operation in 1980, working to create centers of revolutionary activity throughout the Andean highland region. Shining Path reorganized peasant communities and extracted cash and material goods from "liberated" and other communities by force.

Peru's civilian governments initially proved incapable of meeting Shining Path's challenge. The election of President Alberto Fujimori in 1990, however, changed that. Fujimori suspended constitutional government and launched an ambitious campaign against Shining Path and other guerrilla organizations then in operation in other parts of Peru. His government also requested help and received aid from the United States to train the military and police forces in antiguerrilla tactics. The United States provided additional support for campaigns against cocoa production, which increased the presence of security forces in rural areas. In addition, the Peruvian government trained and equipped peasant forces to separate Shining Path from its popular peasant base.

The Fujimori administration's war against Shining Path achieved success rather quickly. Peruvian forces captured Guzmán in 1992, and a series of subsequent antiguerrilla campaigns destroyed Shining Path's military capabilities. While still nominally active, Shining Path no longer represents a significant challenge to the Peruvian government.

Daniel Lewis

See also

Cominform; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in; Peru; Sino-Soviet Split

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Shultz, George Pratt

(1920–)

U.S. secretary of labor (1969–1970), secretary of the treasury (1972–1974), and secretary of state (1982–1989). Born in Englewood, New Jersey, on 13 December 1920, George Shultz was the son of a New York businessman. He majored in economics at Princeton University and graduated in 1942. He then joined the U.S. Marine Corps, serving in the Pacific theater as an artillery officer and ending World War II as a captain. After demobilization, in 1949 Shultz obtained a doctorate in industrial economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he subsequently taught industrial relations, and then in 1957 began teaching at the University of Chicago.

Under Republican President Richard Nixon, Shultz served successively as secretary of labor (1969–1970), the first director of the Office of Management and Budget (1970–1972), and secretary of the treasury (1972–1974). He resigned in March 1974 to become vice president of the Bechtel Corporation, an international construction company, where he remained until 1982.

George Shultz held three cabinet-level posts under five U.S. presidents. A trained economist and specialist in labor relations, Shultz put his negotiating skills to use in service to Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, and Ronald W. Reagan. (U.S. Department of State)

In June 1982 Shultz became Republican President Ronald Reagan's second and last secretary of state, replacing the forceful but divisive Alexander M. Haig and adopting a low-key, nonconfrontational style. Even so, Shultz's cautious readiness to negotiate arms control agreements with the Soviet Union brought repeated clashes with the more hawkish secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, who favored major increases in weapons systems.

Shultz's tenure in office saw the emergence in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet general secretary. Gorbachev was a conciliatory leader who became increasingly committed to reducing his country's international military commitments and improving U.S.-Soviet relations. Shultz, initially somewhat skeptical and inclined to discountenance the more optimistic Reagan's readiness in his 1986 Reykjavík meeting with Gorbachev to consider abolishing all nuclear weapons, nonetheless negotiated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, designed to remove all such weapons from Europe. In 1988 the Soviets also concluded an agreement to withdraw all their

forces from Afghanistan, where they had been at war since 1979 with U.S.-backed mujahideen guerrillas.

From the time Shultz took office, initiatives to resolve or at least ease the entrenched disputes dividing between Israel and its Arab opponents after Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon were one of his major preoccupations. Except in Afghanistan, the warming in U.S.-Soviet relations had relatively little impact on the nearly intractable Middle Eastern situation. Shultz drafted the September 1982 Reagan Plan envisaging partial Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in return for Arab acceptance and respect for Israeli security interests, proposals that the Israeli government strongly rejected. Throughout his years in office, Shultz repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to broker similar schemes. In December 1988 he prevailed upon Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat to renounce the use of terrorism, a stance enabling the United States to open direct talks with the PLO, but Arafat failed to force his more radical followers to respect this stance, and within a year the U.S.-PLO talks broke down.

Shultz was a determined opponent of international terrorism and of governments, including those of Libya and Iran, that sponsored such tactics. After a suicide bomber from the Iranian-sponsored radical Islamic Hezbollah group attacked the barracks of the U.S. Marine Corps peacekeeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, in October 1983, killing 241 American servicemen, Shultz began to press Reagan to respond forcefully to such attacks on Americans. Shultz supported the use of force as well as military and economic sanctions, not just against individual terrorists but also against states that sponsored terrorism. He applauded Reagan's readiness in 1985 to employ military personnel to capture Palestinian hijackers of the American cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and to mount bombing raids on Libya in April 1986.

Shultz opposed and was therefore deliberately left in ignorance of efforts by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and others based in the Reagan White House to sell arms to the fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran and surreptitiously use the proceeds to fund the activities of anticommunist Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua. The ensuing scandal, which broke in 1986, damaged but did not destroy Reagan's presidency, and his final years in office saw further incremental warming in U.S.-Soviet relations, which came to full fruition under his successor, George H. W. Bush.

Shultz retired at the end of Reagan's presidency and became a senior fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, California. In retirement he has written lengthy memoirs.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Afghanistan; Afghanistan War; Arafat, Yasir; Arms Control; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.; Iran; Iran-Contra Affair; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Libya; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Palestine Liberation Organization; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Reagan Doctrine; Terrorism; Weinberger, Caspar

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Sihanouk, Norodom

(1922–)

King (1941–1954), prime minister (1955–1960), and head of state (1960–1970, 1975–1978, 1991–2004) of Cambodia. Born on 31 October 1922 in Phnom Penh to Cambodian King Norodom Suramarit and Queen Sisowath Kosawak, Norodom Sihanouk was educated in French primary schools in Indochina and spent two years studying at the French Cavalry and Armored School at Saumur, France, during 1946–1948. In November 1941 he became King of Cambodia. In 1945 while Cambodia was still under Japanese occupation, he proclaimed his country independent from French colonial rule. When the French returned after the Japanese surrender, however, they attempted to reassert control by minimizing Sihanouk's influence. He soon realized that only by championing independence from France could he maintain his popularity and power.

When the 1954 Geneva Conference formally granted Cambodian independence and called for free elections, Sihanouk abdicated the throne the next year in favor of his father. Sihanouk subsequently won a referendum and became prime minister in March 1955. Immensely popular among the peasantry, he strongly championed neutrality as the war in Vietnam escalated. Following his father's death in 1960, Sihanouk was again named head of state but was not granted the title of king. Alternately taking sides with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, he tried to prevent the war in the neighboring Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) from spilling over into his country, but he was largely unsuccessful as Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) forces transited through Cambodia into South Vietnam, and they and the Viet Cong used eastern Cambodia as a sanctuary.

Norodom Sihanouk was king of Cambodia from 1941 to 1955 and again from 1993 to 2004, and was also prime minister, head of state, and president. He tried, with only mixed results, to keep Cambodia neutral throughout the regional and civil conflicts that raged in Southeast Asia during his lifetime. (Library of Congress)

Frustrated in his efforts to keep Cambodia neutral, in 1968 Sihanouk restored relations with the United States and in 1970 secretly agreed to permit the Americans to bomb communist sanctuaries. At the same time, he attempted to block the growing influence of the communist Khmer Rouge.

While out of the country in March 1970, Sihanouk was ousted by a coup led by General Lon Nol. Sihanouk fled to Beijing, where he lived in exile. Following the 1975 Khmer Rouge takeover, he returned to Cambodia and became the symbolic head of state, while dictator Pol Pot remained the power behind the throne. In 1976 Sihanouk was placed under house arrest, but he escaped to China in 1978 when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. He unsuccessfully attempted to forge an alliance with the Khmer Rouge and others to oppose the new Vietnamese-imposed Cambodian regime. When Vietnam withdrew in 1989 and a peace treaty sponsored by the United Nations (UN) went into effect in 1991, he returned to Cambodia, where he was reinstated as king and Cambodian president, although his political power was limited. Sihanouk abdicated in October 2004 in favor of his son, Norodom Sihamoni.

Arne Kislenko and James H. Willbanks

See also

Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of; Khmer Rouge; Lon Nol; Pol Pot; Vietnam

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Sinai War

See Suez Crisis

"Sinews of Peace" Speech

(March 1946)

Speech given by Sir Winston Churchill, viewed by many historians as the opening rhetorical salvo of the Cold War, in which the term "iron curtain" was coined. On 5 March 1946 Churchill, who had been Britain's wartime

prime minister, presented his "Sinews of Peace" address—also referred to as the "Iron Curtain" speech—at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Churchill's comments strongly denounced Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe and warned that the Western powers must once again gird themselves for a potential conflict.

In October 1945 President Harry S. Truman forwarded an invitation from the president of Westminster College to Churchill, who had been defeated in the British elections of July 1945, to speak at that institution. Churchill accepted in November. He arrived in Washington, D.C., on 2 March and joined Truman on a three-day train trip to Missouri; the excursion had been Churchill's idea.

Churchill and Truman were cheered by some 30,000 people en route between Jefferson City and Fulton. More than 2,000 faculty, students, and invited guests filled the gymnasium at Westminster College on 5 March, a friendly audience for both Churchill and Truman.

In his speech, Churchill reviewed the history of the twentieth century with special emphasis on the period since the 1930s. He also painted a rather bleak and disappointing picture of Soviet behavior since the Allied victory over Germany a year earlier. Churchill argued that Soviet expansionist policies had drawn an "iron curtain" between Eastern and Western Europe. To counter the Soviets' threat to world peace, Churchill called for a mutual defense agreement among noncommunist states. He also called attention to the long-standing "special relationship" between the United States and Britain.

The speech had considerable impact. Americans and West Europeans were alerted to the new Soviet threat, and their governments appeared ready to respond to the challenge. Because of Churchill's Cassandra-like role in warning against appeasement in the 1930s and his defiance of Adolf Hitler in World War II, his remarks struck a responsive chord, although Truman was at the time noncommittal.

Churchill gave other speeches in Zurich, Strasbourg, Boston, and The Hague. These hugely successful speeches revitalized a political career that seemed to have ended in July 1945. His rhetorical success as leader of the opposition sustained his leadership of the Conservative Party and prepared the way for his political comeback in 1951. It also confirmed his constancy as an opponent of communism.

William T. Walker

See also

Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl; Churchill, Winston; Truman, Harry S.; United Kingdom

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Singapore

Southeast Asian nation. The Republic of Singapore, covering just 267 square miles, is one the smallest nations in the world. Strategically located off the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, it is composed of the main island of Singapore along with fifty-eight nearby islands between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Singapore's 1945 population was roughly 1 million people. Its deep-water anchorage makes it a valuable harbor, and records dating from the third century BC suggest that even then it was the main port between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. A number of Asian and European empires controlled Singapore for 1,500 years, ending with British rule that began in 1819. By 1832 Singapore was the capital of the Straits Settlement. In 1867 it became a Crown colony. By World War I it was a thriving, multicultural city and a powerful fortress, heralded as "the Gibraltar of Asia."

World War II changed that. Japanese forces overran British defenses on Singapore in February 1942, and the loss of Singapore signaled the beginning of the end of Britain's empire. The British recaptured the city-state in 1945 and established a military government, but the war had unleashed nationalist sentiments. Many Singaporeans favored autonomy, especially after 1946 when the British prepared a federation of Malay states for independence while Singapore remained a colony. British and Malay leaders worried that equal representation for all ethnic groups in Malaya would favor the well-organized and entrepreneurial Chinese, especially in Singapore, where they made up 60 percent of the population.

The Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) exacerbated these concerns and delayed Singapore's independence. In 1959 Singapore was finally granted self-government, but Britain retained control of foreign affairs and defense. In Singapore's first general election that same year, the People's Action Party (PAP) won a landslide victory. It has remained in power ever since. PAP leader Li Guangyao completely dominated Singapore's politics, governing as prime minister until 1990. Consequently, much about Cold War Singapore revolves around Li.

Li's first major challenge came in 1963, when Britain ceded Singapore to the reconstituted Federation of Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia nearly went to war. Malaysia's prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, skillfully averted war, but many Malay leaders wanted to break the Chinese hold on Singapore and were unwilling to extend equal representation to the Chinese in Malaysia. In 1964, race riots made for even more tension. However, the main source of contention between Singapore and Malaysia was money. Li's laissez-faire economic policies were antithetical to Malaysia's managed

The Singapore business district and harbor. (Corel)

economy, designed to favor Malays. Moreover, within the union Singapore collected and retained taxes but sent 40 percent annually to Malaysia. After much negotiation and artful diplomacy, Singapore separated peaceably from Malaysia and became a wholly independent country in August 1965.

Li quickly set the agenda for Singapore's independence. He was deeply committed to free enterprise and took full advantage of Singapore's diverse, well-educated, and industrious residents. He encouraged foreign investment and built modern transportation systems and urban housing developments. Singapore became the second most active port in the world. It also grew into a major international airline hub. By the 1980s, Singapore diversified into a major financial center and high-technology manufacturer, making it one of Asia's economic "four dragons," alongside Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Annual growth rates ranged between 8 and 11 percent for three decades, while per capita yearly income reached $12,000 by 1990, the fourth highest in Asia. With fewer than 4 million people, its gross domestic product (GDP) hit $75 billion by 1994. High life expectancies and literacy rates also distinguished Singapore. This success was all the more remarkable given the republic's lack of natural resources and its almost complete dependency on food, and even water, importation.

In foreign relations, Singapore was firmly in the Western camp until the mid-1970s, when it pursued a more neutral course. In 1967 it became a founding member of the pro-Western Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). It also hosted British military bases until 1971 and then entered into the Five Power Defense Agreement with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia until 1975. Li was also a close friend to the United States and a vigorous supporter of the American war in Vietnam.

At the same time, Li worried about alienating the communist powers, particularly the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although deeply anticommunist, Li realized that the PRC was becoming a major regional, if not global, power. He believed that Singapore's Chinese population could potentially assist in integrating the PRC into the world community. Still, he avoided aggravating delicate relationships with nearby Malaysia and Indonesia. Both endured serious communist insurgencies connected to their Chinese communities, and consequently both viewed the PRC with suspicion. Accordingly, Singapore did not recognize the PRC until 1976, and only after both its neighbors had done so.

Ostensibly a democracy, Singapore was and still is criticized for its somewhat authoritarian character. Li and the PAP ruled with a firm hand. There was little toleration of opposition parties, and the media was heavily controlled. Li justified this by portraying Singapore as a Chinese state surrounded by distrustful Malays. He also claimed that Britain's declining posture in Asia left Singapore vulnerable. In addition, he argued that a stable society was needed to build the economy. The most controversial manifestation of Li's paternalism was the Internal Security Act, which gave the government extraordinary authority to quash dissent. Whereas some point to Singapore's harsh laws and see a very low crime rate, others point to laws against chewing gum or not flushing toilets and see a dictatorship. Opposition to Li did surface, but popular support for the PAP remained above 60 percent.

Li resigned in 1990 and left the PAP in 1992, replaced by his deputy, Goh Chok Tong. In 2005 Li remained a senior minister and was regarded as the senior statesman of Southeast Asia. Similarly, despite what some condemn as its ruthless efficiency, Singapore is widely considered to be a great Cold War success story.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Indonesia; Li Guangyao; Malayan Emergency; Malaysia; Rahman, Tunku Abdul; Southeast Asia

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See Gerő, Ernő

Singer, Ernō

Sinn Féin

Irish political party advocating republicanism and opposition to British control. Newspaper editor and ardent Irish nationalist Arthur Griffith is usually credited with establishing Sinn Féin (roughly translated as "Ourselves" or "We Ourselves") in 1905. Griffith believed that by boycotting the British House of Commons, the Irish Parliamentary Party could reestablish Irish independence. He also championed Irish cultural and economic independence.

Griffith's message attracted many Irishmen and Irishwomen, most of them radicals, who were frustrated by the failure of Westminster-based politics to advance Irish nationalism. The Sinn Féin League (its title until 1908) grew rapidly, often by absorbing other radical groups. It did not impress Irish Parliamentary Party leader John Redmond, however. After his party's candidate defeated Sinn Féin's first parliamentary candidate in 1908, he dismissed the group as "a temporary adhesion of isolated cranks."

Sinn Féin opposed Irish enlistments into the British Army during World War I but had nothing to do with the 1916 Easter Rebellion. The British government believed otherwise because of the group's radical reputation and undeniable influence on Irish politics, and London referred to the revolt as the "Sinn Féin Rebellion."

In late 1917, Sinn Féin became what the British thought it was a year earlier: the political arm of Irish republicanism. With Eamon De Valera, one of the surviving leaders of the Easter Rebellion, as its president, Sinn Féin quickly became a well-organized and effective national political party but did not became more popular than the long-established Irish Parliamentary Party until the 1918 Conscription Crisis, sparked by the British government's threat to impose a military draft on Ireland. In December 1918, Sinn Féin won 73 of Ireland's 105 Westminster seats and, as Griffith had exhorted, refused to go to London. Instead, the elected members of Parliament established the Dáil Éireann as the legitimate government of the Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916.

Irish republicanism—and its political and military institutions, Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), respectively—split over the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. Led by De Valera, the antitreaty forces walked out of the Dáil and into civil war. These republicans, however, did not accept their 1923 defeat at the hands of the protreaty republicans, who adopted the name Cumann na Gaedheal (Legion of the Gaels) for their faction, which controlled the Irish Free State's government. Convinced that both the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland were illegitimate, Sinn Féin declared a policy of abstentionism. Its candidates would stand for election but would refrain from entering the illegitimate parliaments if elected. This strategy ultimately

The Sinn Féin League (its title until 1908) grew rapidly, often by absorbing other radical groups.

failed, and votes for Sinn Féin dwindled because most Irishmen accepted the Free State and rejected as nonsensical the idea of voting for a political party that refused to participate in a legitimate government.

Sinn Féin split again in 1926 when De Valera decided to participate in parliamentary politics and left in order to found Fianna Fail. Dedicated to advancing republicanism in Ireland through constitutional means, Fianna Fail formed a government by 1932 and used its power to reconcile many republicans to normal politics. By the end of World War II, De Valera's constitutional republicanism and wartime security measures had all but destroyed the IRA and Sinn Féin.

The IRA enjoyed a brief revival after 1945, training and arming for a campaign against British interests in Northern Ireland. The offensive, known as the Border Campaign, began in 1956, and in the next year's elections, Sinn

Sinn Féin supporters carry banners during a march in Birmingham to protest against internment in Ulster and the British police's alleged harassment of the Irish community, 7 October 1973. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Féin won its first seats in the Dáil since 1927. The Border Campaign faltered soon thereafter and ended with a whimper in 1962.

After 1962, new leftist leaders moved the IRA and Sinn Féin toward revolutionary Marxism and away from abstentionism and military action. In December 1969, however, the IRA divided over the proper response to the outbreak of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland during the previous summer. The Provisional IRA supported armed struggle. The Official IRA, on the other hand, decided on a long-term political strategy based on Marxist theories. In January 1970, Sinn Féin split along the same lines.

The Official IRA soon repudiated military action in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, dumping its arms in 1972 and essentially dissolving as a military organization. Official Sinn Féin devoted itself to left-wing politics. In 1977 it became Sinn Féin: The Workers Party, and in 1982 it dropped "Sinn Féin" from its title.

During the 1970s, Provisional Sinn Féin (as with the IRA, the modifier soon disappeared) maintained its refusal to engage in normal politics and mainly acted as a mouthpiece for the IRA. The widespread revulsion at the deaths of republican hunger strikers in 1981 prompted republican leaders to reconsider their traditional rejection of politics. In the early 1980s, the republicans adopted a bullet and ballot box strategy. Sinn Féin became a somewhat conventional leftist political organization, while the IRA continued its military operations. In 1986, Sinn Féin's president, Gerry Adams, declared that abstentionism no longer applied to Ireland's Dáil, prompting another republican split and the consequent creation of Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Féin.

By the early 1990s, the IRA–Sinn Féin leadership acknowledged that a military victory was unattainable. Encouraged by Sinn Féin's successes as a democratic socialist party on both sides of the border, it announced the cessation of military operations by the IRA in 1994 and, except for five months in 1997, has held to this cease-fire. The terms of the 1998 Belfast Agreement ensured Sinn Féin a place in Northern Ireland's new Assembly, effectively ending its more than seven decades in Ireland's political wilderness.

Scott Belliveau

See also

Adams, Gerard, Jr.; De Valera, Eamon; Irish Republican Army; Ireland, Northern; Ireland, Republic of; Paisley, Ian; United Kingdom

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Sino-Indian Border Confrontations
(1959–1988)

Protracted border dispute, culminating in a war in 1962 between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India that compromised India's standing among nonaligned nations and has not yet been settled. While the dispute between the PRC and India, a nonaligned nation, became an issue in the context of the Cold War, the origins of the Sino-Indian conflict date back to the nineteenth century. Both the British, who ruled India until 1947, and the imperial Chinese government had made claims to regions on India's northeastern frontier. Neither side, however, committed troops or exerted significant political pressure to settle claims over the contested area.

By the 1950s, this situation changed dramatically because of a variety of factors. Greater mobility and instant communications made it easier for the now-independent Indians and Chinese to attempt to exert control over the border areas. In addition, the incorporation of Tibet into China in 1950 substantially lengthened the Sino-Indian border, thereby increasing the likelihood of a conflict. The possibilities for a border clash increased dramatically in 1956 when the Chinese began to construct a military highway in the disputed territory. This led to a series of diplomatic protests and exchanges, followed in 1959 by an Indian military buildup along the border. Although there were no major military operations in the area, frequent military patrol missions and occasional small-scale skirmishes did occur.

In the summer of 1962, however, the border conflict escalated, with heavier than usual clashes. Heavy fighting then occurred in October and November, ending with a cease-fire on 21 November 1962. At the conclusion of this brief war, the PRC had taken all the contested area over which it had made claims, although it stopped short of advancing into Indian territory proper.

With the cease-fire, the Chinese withdrew to the positions they had held before the beginning of the war. The following month, a conference opened in Colombo, Sri Lanka, with representatives of Egypt, Burma, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Ghana, and Indonesia. These representatives, negotiating with the Indian and PRC governments, formulated what became known as the Colombo Proposals. The proposals called for PRC forces to withdraw 20 kilometers (12 miles) from their positions before the war and India not to advance its own troops. Although never formally ratified, the proposals were accepted by both sides.

Thus ended the actual conflict between India and the PRC, although for the next twenty-six years relations between the two major powers remained frigid. The movement of Chinese troops near the border in 1963, alleged Indian movements across the border, and the incorporation of northern areas as part of India all produced hostile rhetoric. PRC support of Pakistan during the latter's conflicts with India and Chinese opposition to the creation of Bangladesh, championed by India, were other manifestations of the poor relations between the two nations.

There were sporadic attempts on both sides to improve relations. Informal talks between Indian and Chinese diplomats occurred in the early 1970s, and in 1976, fourteen years after the conclusion of the war, full diplomatic

relations were restored. In 1988, the two nations agreed to the establishment of a bipartite commission to resolve the border question. Not until 2005 did the leaders of both India and the PRC announce a settlement of the dispute, although details remained to be arranged.

The conflict had especially pronounced effects in India. Jawaharlal Nehru's final months as prime minister were clouded by both his miscalculations that had led to the war and the loss of standing that the war had brought India within the Non-Aligned Movement.

Robert N. Stacy

See also

China, People's Republic of; India; India-Pakistan Wars; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Non-Aligned Movement; Tibet

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Sino-Soviet Border Incident
(2 March–11 September 1969)

A series of armed clashes during 2 March–11 September 1969 between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union over the demarcation of the Sino-Soviet boundary. This clash marked the height of the Sino-Soviet split and pushed the two nations to the brink of a nuclear confrontation.

By a number of unequal nineteenth-century treaties, Russia and the Chinese government agreed on a 4,500 mile-long border, running from the east through the northern border of modern Mongolia to the west of the PRC's Xinjiang Province. In the east, the demarcation line was drawn along the Amur River, known to the Chinese as Heilongjiang (literally meaning "the Black Dragon River"), along Heilongjiang Province's northern border, and along the Ussuri River, an Amur tributary between the eastern border of Heilongjiang and Russian Siberia. This border remained as it was after the fall of the Chinese Qing Dynasty and the Russian regime in the late 1910s and was twice reiterated, first with the Republic of China (ROC) in 1945 and then with the PRC in 1951.

Owing to its heavy reliance on the Soviet Union and the need to maintain Sino-Soviet solidarity, the PRC had consistently refrained from raising the border issue despite its nationalistic effort to eliminate the unequal treaties and restore territorial integrity. As the PRC sought to establish its independence from Soviet influence and the Sino-Soviet split loomed, the border

A Chinese soldier poses next to a portrait of Mao Zedong in April 1969 on the border between China's Xinjiang Province and the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, one of several sites where the two nations clashed in 1969 over border disputes. (AFP/Getty Images)

issue surfaced in 1960 when the PRC revoked the unequal treaties. Border negotiations began in February 1964 in Beijing but broke off in October 1964 when the Soviets insisted on maintaining the status quo. Tensions subsequently mounted along the Sino-Soviet border, with increased armed incidents. By 1969, there were 658,000 Soviet troops confronting 814,000 Chinese troops along the Amur River. The Soviet Union had also secured the permission of the Mongolian government to base Soviet ground and air forces in that nation.

On 2 March 1969, a Soviet border patrol was ambushed by Chinese troops on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, resulting in 31 Soviet deaths. On 15 March 1969, the Soviet Union retaliated by firing on Chinese troops on Damansky Island, causing nearly 800 deaths. Cascades of diplomatic protests and counterprotests and more border clashes followed. The most serious border incident occurred on 13 August 1969 on the border between China's Xinjiang Province and the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, pushing the PRC and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear confrontation. In response to the PRC's successful explosion of its first atomic bomb in October 1964, the Soviet Union had increased its nuclear forces in Asia, including those in the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and Mongolia. By 1969, the Soviet Union had installed an antiballistic missile system directed against the PRC. The Soviet action on the Xinjiang border seemed to confirm the PRC's suspicion that the Soviets were planning a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear installations in Xinjiang.

A war was averted when, on 11 September 1969, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Beijing, meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai to settle the border conflict. Both sides agreed on three principles: keeping the status quo of the Sino-Soviet border, not employing military forces, and preventing future military clashes. On 20 October 1969, the border talks suspended in 1964 resumed in Beijing, with concentration on the Amur-Ussuri demarcation line.

These negotiations made little progress, however. The Soviet Union continued its military buildup along the border throughout the 1970s. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union had tied down 25 percent of its conventional forces along the border. Perceiving this massive deployment as a threat, the PRC decided to normalize its relationship with the United States, culminating in the formal establishment of the Sino-U.S. diplomatic relationship in 1979.

Tensions along the Sino-Soviet border began to ease in July 1986, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his desire to restore Sino-Soviet harmony and settle the border disputes. In 1990, Soviet border forces were drastically reduced. Significant progress in the border talks was only achieved after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union was dissolved. As a first step, Russia returned Zhenbao Island to the PRC on 19 May 1991. Finally, on 14 October 2004, both sides proclaimed the demarcation of the 4,500-mile Sino-Soviet boundary as complete and uncontested.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Sino-Soviet Split; Soviet Union

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Sino-Soviet Split
(1956–1966)

The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance marked the transformation of the Cold War world from bipolarity to multipolarity. Superficially an ideological partnership between the world's two largest communist countries, the Sino-Soviet alliance began on 14 February 1950 with the conclusion of the

Sino-Soviet Treaty. From its inception, the seemingly monolithic union was fraught with constantly shifting expectations about its precise place in the socialist world, subjected to American attempts to split it, and afflicted by the progressively ideological radicalism of People's Republic of China (PRC) Chairman Mao Zedong. Although Sino-Soviet disagreements over Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 de-Stalinization campaign remained hidden for a time, the advanced state of the alliance's disintegration became known to the outside world by the early 1960s. Because Mao exploited ideological conflict for domestic purposes, the final breakdown of the Sino-Soviet partnership in mid-1966 coincided with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), launched both to purge the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of alleged ideological revisionists and to create a communist utopia.

Viewing any alliance with a great power solely as a temporary means to help restore past Chinese glory and power, the Chinese Communists by the late 1940s had decided to lean toward the Soviet Union. Surprised by Mao's request in late 1949 for an economic and military alliance, Soviet leader Josef Stalin first hesitated but then agreed for utilitarian reasons to conclude a Friendship and Alliance Treaty that provided the Soviet Union access to railroads, warm-water ports, and important raw materials deposits in Manchuria and Xinjiang in exchange for Soviet military and economic aid. Stalin's limited support of the PRC during the Korean War (1950–1953), however, revealed the limits of the military aspects of the alliance. After the dictator's 1953 death, the end of the Korean War, and Khrushchev's ascendancy to power, the focus of the Sino-Soviet relationship gradually shifted toward assistance in economic development and improved party relations.

Khrushchev's "secret speech" of 25 February 1956, charging Stalin with arbitrary and criminal rule, undermined Mao's growing personality cult in China but strengthened his hand in his relations with the Soviet leaders. After increasing his influence in the socialist world through diplomatic mediation during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Mao concluded that although he considered Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin unfair and imbalanced, it had nevertheless revealed the need to preempt internal dissent in China in order to prevent a crisis similar to the Hungarian Revolution. The PRC's Hundred Flowers campaign in the spring of 1957 was designed to allow party members and intellectuals to vent their pent-up frustrations in a highly controlled framework but threatened within only a few weeks to undermine the Chinese communist regime. While Beijing launched the Anti-Rightist campaign in the summer of 1957 to stamp out internal dissent, Khrushchev survived the so-called Anti-Party Incident, which the remaining Stalinists in the party leadership staged with the goal of reversing de-Stalinization. Both events proved to be crucial for the further development of the Sino-Soviet relationship, since they put the PRC and the Soviet Union on two conflicting political, ideological, and economic paths.

As modest liberalization continued in the Soviet Union in 1958, Mao, following the Anti-Rightist campaign, radicalized the domestic political discourse in the run-up to the Great Leap Forward, which was supposed to propel the PRC into full-fledged communism. These internal changes led

People's Republic of China (PRC) leader Mao Zedong confers with leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev during the latter's 1958 visit to Beijing. (Library of Congress)

to a more aggressive and anti-American foreign policy before and during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (August–September 1958). Mao's willingness, stated to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in early September, to trigger a nuclear war over a series of small, disputed islands in the Taiwan Strait placed the first significant strains on the Sino-Soviet relationship.

Faced with widespread famine as a result of the misguided economic policies of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP leadership undertook internal discussions in mid-1959 about economic reforms aimed at averting further disaster. Fearing challenges to his leadership, Mao was able both to purge his opponents within the party and to relaunch an unreformed Great Leap Forward in late 1959 in order to save his vision of a communist utopia. The economic catastrophes resulting from the Great Leap Forward, however, shocked the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Mao's radical anti-American stance also clashed with Khrushchev's rapprochement policies.

The unexpected April 1960 Chinese publication of the so-called Lenin Polemics—three articles released on the occasion of Vladimir I. Lenin's ninetieth birthday that promoted ideologically radical positions diametrically opposed to Soviet viewpoints—revealed the brewing Sino-Soviet tensions to the world. After ideological clashes between the Soviet and CCP delegations during the Third Romanian Party Congress in late June 1960, the Soviet

Union decided to punish the PRC by withdrawing all of its advisors from the PRC in July 1960.

Although the Great Leap Forward had caused the complete collapse of China's economy and had brought Sino-Soviet trade to a virtual standstill, Beijing used the withdrawal to blame Moscow for its economic problems. Until the mid-1960s, the PRC shifted much of its foreign trade away from the Soviet Union toward Japan and Western Europe. Because of China's pressing economic problems and the failure of Khrushchev's rapprochement with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower after the May 1960 U-2 Crisis, however, both sides realized the necessity of an ideological truce, which they formally reached at the Moscow Conference of the world's communist parties in late 1960.

Shunted aside from domestic decision making because of his close association with the failed Great Leap Forward, Mao used the 1961 Soviet-Albanian conflict as a tool to rebuild his political fortunes at home. Subsequent anti-Soviet propaganda in the PRC triggered conflicts between Soviet citizens and ethnic Central Asians living in Xinjiang on the one side and the local Chinese administration on the other. The mass flight of 67,000 people to Soviet Kyrgyzstan in the late spring of 1962 caused Beijing to abrogate its consular treaty with Moscow on the basis of alleged Soviet subversive activities in western China. Mao used these developments to restore his standing in the CCP leadership and to push for more anti-Soviet policies in the second half of 1962. Khrushchev's nuclear provocation and sudden retreat under U.S. pressure during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis provided Mao with an unexpected opportunity to attack the Soviet leadership publicly for ideological inconsistency and political unreliability.

The United States had been intent on splitting the Sino-Soviet alliance since 1950, but only in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis was it able to use the Soviet-British-American negotiations on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) to deepen the Sino-Soviet rift. Aware of the problems between Beijing and Moscow, Washington played on Soviet fears about China's nuclear weapons program and Khrushchev's dissatisfaction with Mao's ideological warfare. Despite the fact that the PTBT (initialed on 25 July 1963) did not infringe on China's nuclear program, the signing of the treaty by almost all countries of the world within five months isolated the PRC internationally.

The period from mid-1963 to mid-1966 witnessed the final collapse of Sino-Soviet party and military relations. Convinced that the Sino-Soviet pact had fulfilled its usefulness, Mao fanned and exploited ideological conflict and territorial disputes with his Soviet comrades for domestic purposes. Because the launching of the Cultural Revolution required a prior break with what Mao termed Soviet "revisionists, traitors of Marxism-Leninism, and fascists," he eventually broke party relations in early 1966 by his refusal to send a delegation to the Twenty-Third Soviet Party Congress. Simultaneously, his radical ideological stances precluded the invocation of Sino-Soviet Treaty obligations in support of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during the Vietnam War (1964–1973). By the mid-1960s, the military alliance between Beijing and Moscow factually ceased to exist,

although the treaty did not officially expire until 14 February 1980. Until the rapprochement initiated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, for nearly twenty-five years Sino-Soviet relations consisted only of low-level cultural relations and limited trade links.

Lorenz M. Lüthi

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Hungarian Revolution; Khrushchev, Nikita; Mao Zedong; Sino-Soviet Treaty; Stalin, Josef; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second

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Sino-Soviet Treaty
(14 February 1950)

Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 14 February 1950. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance marked the culmination of PRC Chairman Mao Zedong's two-month state visit to the Soviet Union (16 December 1949–14 February 1950). Negotiating a treaty was not the sole purpose of Mao's visit to Soviet leader Josef Stalin, for he was also in desperate need of economic aid and diplomatic support. Yet for Mao, the treaty had a substantial symbolic value, as it would replace an existing Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed in August 1945 between Stalin and Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) leader Jiang Jieshi, Mao's enemy in the civil war that had consumed China on and off during 1927–1949.

To Mao's perplexity, Stalin initially proved reluctant to sign a treaty. Stalin prevaricated, vaguely insinuating that a new treaty would upset agreements reached with the West at the February 1945 Yalta Conference. Only in January, when Mao had begun to complain about the lack of progress, did the Soviet leader change his mind. On 22 January 1950, Stalin told Mao that he was no longer concerned with how the Western powers might react to a new treaty, declaring "to hell with Yalta."

Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai was then summoned to Moscow to undertake the detailed negotiations. The treaty, to be in force for thirty years, committed each party to aid the other in the event of an attack by Japan "or states allied with it." Additional agreements modified rights that

the Soviet Union had obtained under the 1945 treaty. The Chinese Changchun Railway was to be returned to the PRC no later than 1952, the Soviets would have no rights to Port Arthur after 1952, and the administration of Dalny was to be immediately returned to the PRC.

But Stalin made additional demands, encapsulated in secret protocols. Mao had to acknowledge the formal independence of Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia, the Chinese were to grant rights of passage across their territory in time of war, and under another protocol, no third party would be granted economic rights in the Chinese regions of Manchuria or Xinjiang. Stalin further sought to set up joint companies with the Chinese to explore and exploit mineral deposits as well as to pressure the Chinese to deliver scarce raw metals to Russia. Mao later complained of these clauses as being semicolonial, but at the time he had little option other than to accept them. The Soviets did, however, grant $300 million in credits to the PRC and agreed to send technical experts to China to assist in economic development. Although Mao made many concessions, the treaty was undoubtedly an achievement for him, and the Soviet aid was most welcome.

Paul Wingrove

See also

China, People's Republic of; Mao Zedong; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Zhou Enlai

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Sino-Vietnamese War
(17 February–5 March 1979)

Short war between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Known to the Chinese as the Punitive War, its principal cause was the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Kampuchea). Although the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government of Heng Samrin soon controlled the cities and received official recognition from the SRV, the Soviet Union, Laos, and most other communist states, Pol Pot's ousted Khmer Rouge conducted guerrilla warfare. The Khmer Rouge received assistance from China, which saw Cambodia as being in its sphere of influence. The United States also aided the Khmer Rouge, despite the latter's genocidal activities.

When Vietnam refused to withdraw its forces from Cambodia, the PRC threatened military force. In early January 1979, Deng Xiaoping, Chinese



deputy premier and chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), announced that China might be forced to take measures contrary to its desire for peace. The PRC leadership considered the Vietnamese invasion as part of a greater Soviet expansionist design aimed at China.

There had also been numerous border disputes between the PRC and the SRV over their common 797-mile-long border, which had been delineated by the French. Although the territory under dispute was small, border incidents had multiplied. The two states also had conflicting claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, spurred by the possibility of oil deposits there.

Another major catalyst of the war was Vietnam's treatment of its Chinese Hoa minority. Some 1.5 million Hoa lived in Vietnam, most of them in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon). They were an important economic force, but many refused to become Vietnamese citizens. In March 1978 the SRV abolished private trading, confiscating at least 50,000 Chinese firms and forcing some 320,000 Chinese into the countryside for agricultural work as part of a plan to reduce the population of Ho Chi Minh City.

In March 1978 the SRV abolished private trading, confiscating at least 50,000 Chinese firms and forcing some 320,000 Chinese into the countryside for agricultural work.

Many Chinese fled overland into China, and by early July more than 150,000 had crossed the border. Many more attempted to escape by sea. This exodus of boat people was prompted by provocateurs working for the government and by gangsters motivated by greed. Many refugees perished at sea or were preyed upon by pirates. China expressed outrage over what it considered a deliberate SRV policy, recalling its ambassador and suspending aid to the SRV. The Chinese exodus slackened off after July 1979, but it remained a serious cause of friction.

Some historians have also suggested that the war may have been in part motivated by Deng's desire to highlight the technological deficiencies of the Chinese Army in order to make a case for its modernization or that Deng sought to keep the army occupied while he consolidated power.

Militarily, the PRC appeared to enjoy tremendous advantages. Its PLA numbered 3.6 million men in 175 divisions, but it was basically an inadequately equipped infantry force. With the exception of a brief clash with

Sino-Vietnamese War, 1979



India in 1962, the PLA had not fought a major war since the Korean conflict. The navy numbered 280,000–300,000 men and 1,050 vessels, and the air force had about 400,000 men and 5,000 mostly obsolete combat aircraft. In preparation for war, Beijing evacuated its side of the border. The government also placed on maximum alert its forces on the Soviet border. Deng assumed overall command, assembling thirty-one divisions and 1,200 tanks in the Vietnam border area.

The SRV's entire military establishment numbered only about 615,000 men, centered on twenty-five infantry divisions. Its military, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), was a modern, relatively well-equipped, well-disciplined force hardened by war. But six of the divisions were in Laos, and fourteen were in Cambodia. That left only five in Vietnam, four of which protected Hanoi. Some 70,000 Border Security Forces guarded the border with China, with another 50,000 lightly armed militia also available. Vietnam possessed up to 485 combat aircraft. The Vietnamese prepared for war by placing obstacles and laying minefields along the border and covering possible invasion approaches with artillery.

On 17 February 1979, 100,000 Chinese troops commanded by General Xu Shiyou attacked simultaneously at forty-three different points along the border, seeking to spread the defenders and probe for weak spots. The main Chinese attacks came along the half dozen traditional invasion routes to Hanoi, with the PLA intent on securing the key mountain passes. Everywhere the Chinese encountered tenacious Vietnamese resistance.

Chinese tank crewman taken prisoner by the Vietnamese during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Advancing into the SRV an average of 10 miles, the Chinese then halted for two days to regroup. Soon there were some 200,000 Chinese troops engaged. On 22 February the Chinese captured the important border cities of Lao Cai and Cao Bang. SRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap worked closely with army commander Senior General Van Tien Dung. The two men chose to wait to see where the major Chinese thrust would develop. Finally, on 3 March, Hanoi committed one division to the battle for Lang Son, which soon fell to the PLA. A second PAVN division was sent north along the coast, and Hanoi also withdrew a division from Cambodia, although it did not arrive in time to take part in the fighting. Had the war lasted longer, Hanoi would certainly have been forced to recall additional forces. Neither side employed its air force in the war.

The Chinese advanced up to 40 miles into Vietnam, but on 5 March Beijing abruptly announced that it had accomplished its goals and was withdrawing. As it departed, the PLA carried out a scorched-earth policy. The Vietnamese simply watched the Chinese depart, the withdrawal completed by 16 March.

Likely casualty totals in the war were 26,000 Chinese killed and 37,000 wounded, with Vietnamese casualties of 30,000 killed and 32,000 wounded. After the war, the Chinese exchanged 1,636 Vietnamese prisoners for 260 Chinese.

China obtained only a portion of its objectives. It had not destroyed any SRV regular divisions, had not forced Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, and had not altered Hanoi's policies toward its Chinese minority. The war also exposed glaring Chinese weaknesses, in communications especially but also in transport and weaponry.

During the war, the Soviet Union had airlifted supplies to Vietnam. Over the next year, the Soviet Union doubled its military advisors in Vietnam and its naval units in Vietnamese waters. Despite these moves, the war had exposed shortcomings in Soviet-Vietnam ties, which may have been another Chinese goal of the war.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of; China, People's Republic of; Deng Xiaoping; Pol Pot; Vietnam; Vo Nguyen Giap

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Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference

Defense procurement issue that shook relations between Great Britain and the United States. Toward the end of 1962, Great Britain faced the prospect of having no means of delivering its atomic weapons apart from its aging V-bombers. A British missile project, Blue Streak, had been recently abandoned because of technical problems. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan thus turned to the American Skybolt missile, which President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration had promised to sell to Britain in March 1960. But in 1962, hearing rumors that the Americans might scrap Skybolt, Macmillan asserted that the United States was not fully supportive of other Western states possessing independent nuclear capability, preferring instead to rely on a vaguely multilateral arrangement defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Skybolt Affair caused a great rift in Anglo-American relations, possibly the worst one in several generations.

In his memoirs published in 1973, Macmillan wrote that "it was difficult to suppress the suspicion that the failure of Skybolt might be welcomed

in some American quarters as a means of forcing Britain out of the nuclear club." For the prime minister, this was a fundamental issue, as the United Kingdom's independent deterrent showed that "we were not just satellites or clients of America." More to the point, a British bomb was a hedge against the possibility that the United States might not always be relied upon to use its weapons in defense of Europe.

Against this background, Macmillan and President John F. Kennedy agreed to meet in Nassau, Bahamas, in December 1962, but in deference to French President Charles de Gaulle's sensitivities about Anglo-American collusion, Macmillan met with de Gaulle first in Rambouillet, France. In generally even-tempered talks, de Gaulle hinted that he might veto Britain's application to join the Common Market, at that time still in negotiation. He also stated that the French, like the British, sought an independent nuclear deterrent and that he too was unclear about the implications of a multilateral nuclear force.

When Kennedy and Macmillan met on 19 December 1962, the prime minister immediately established Britain's credentials by enlarging on the crucial British scientific contribution in developing nuclear weapons and subsequent Anglo-American cooperation. President Eisenhower, he claimed, had promised him Skybolt as well as the submarine-launched Polaris missile "if necessary." Thus, Macmillan made it clear that if the Skybolt missile were now unavailable, he wanted the Polaris. Kennedy confirmed that Skybolt was indeed to be abandoned but suggested the sharing of development costs of a new missile, a quixotic offer that Macmillan declined. But Kennedy resisted offering Polaris to the British, unconvincingly arguing that to do so would alienate de Gaulle.

Macmillan was distressed by Kennedy's seeming disingenuousness and the importance that the Americans attached to their plan for the NATO-led multilateral control of nuclear weapons. He fought fiercely for Polaris but, in the process, had to concede something to the American demand for multilateralism, offering to make British nuclear forces available to NATO except where supreme national interests were involved. With that concession, Kennedy agreed at the Nassau Conference to provide the Polaris missile.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Missiles, Polaris; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Slánský Trial
(1952)

Infamous 1952 Czech show trial. On 6 September 1951, Rudolf Slánský was dismissed from his post as general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz). At the time of his dismissal, he was second only to President Klement Gottwald and had introduced Stalinist policies to postwar Czechoslovakia. On 24 November, agents of the Státni Tajna Bezpecnostni (STB), Czechoslovak secret police, arrested Slánský. Despite the fact that he had been a lifelong communist and an ardent follower of the orthodox party line, he was charged with high treason, espionage, conspiring to kill Gottwald, and Zionism.

Slánský was apparently targeted because of an intercepted communication from OKAPI, the code name for an intelligence organization of Czechoslovak émigrés established in 1948 by the United States in Bensheim, Germany. One of its analysts noticed that Moscow had failed to mark Slánský's fiftieth birthday with the obligatory congratulatory telegram. This led operatives at OKAPI to conclude that Slánský could be persuaded to defect. On 8 November 1951, an OKAPI letter to Slánský offering him political asylum in the United States was intercepted by the STB and sent to Moscow.



Rudolf Slánský, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), shown here in 1951. (Library of Congress)

Soviet leader Josef Stalin had expressed doubts about Slánský since July 1951. Now Stalin had "evidence" that the former general secretary was in communication with U.S. intelligence. With the OKAPI letter in hand, Stalin demanded Slánský's arrest.

By January 1952, physical torture and psychological duress led Slánský to admit his guilt to all the trumped-up charges against him. In his November 1952 show trial, the prosecutor depicted him as the head of an antistate conspiracy. Slánský and his thirteen codefendants followed the script prepared by the STB and its Soviet advisors and confessed to crimes they had never committed. All were found guilty. Slánský and ten others were summarily sentenced to death on 27 November 1953 and were executed in Prague on 3 December 1952. When the noose was placed around his neck, Slánský is reported to have said, "Thank you. I'm getting what I deserved."

The show trial in Prague helped to advance Stalin's geopolitical aims in two ways. First, all but three of the defendants were Jewish and were ostentatiously identified by the prosecution as Zionists. Their trial enabled Stalin to signal a reorientation of Soviet Middle Eastern policy in favor of Israel's Arab rivals. Second, the trial took place in the midst of the Soviet-Yugoslav split. The message to Central and East European governments was that if Slánský, a loyal Stalinist, was not safe, then no one was. Stalin would accept only strict obedience. The practice of modify-

ing Soviet policies to take into account specific conditions in each satellite country would not be tolerated.

The Slánský trial seriously damaged the cause of communist ideology. Before it, many European intellectuals associated communism with optimism and hope. Slánský's bizarre confession, delivered in the monotonous and tired voice of a tortured man, showed communism's real face.

Igor Lukes

See also

Czechoslovakia; Gottwald, Klement; Soviet-Yugoslav Split

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Small Arms

The term "small arms" generally refers to those types of handheld firearms that an individual can carry and operate by oneself. The introduction of assault rifles—independently developed in both the Eastern and the Western blocs—came to symbolize the history of military firearms in the Cold War era. Assault rifles, pioneered by the German Kurz MP 44 (Sturmgewehr 44) during World War II, are lightweight, short-barreled military rifles that fire smaller-sized rifle cartridges at either a fully automatic or semiautomatic setting.

The Soviets were the first to successfully develop assault rifles for practical use. Emphasizing mass production and durability, Mikhail Kalashnikov designed what would become the most common rifle in military history, the AK-47 (Avtomat Kalashnikova of 1947.) Through the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union and its satellite countries mass-produced the AK-47 and its derivatives. As the legacy of their military cooperation during the Cold War and as the result of the tremendous trade of Soviet weapons after the collapse of European communism in the late 1980s, today the AK-47 type assault rifle remains in common use throughout Africa and the Middle East.

Pressured by Moscow during the Cold War, most Eastern bloc armed forces had to adopt the standard weapons of the Soviet Union. This allowed the Warsaw Pact countries to enjoy among themselves the benefits of standardized and interchangeable weapons, military equipment, and training. The Warsaw Pact forces uniformly used the 7.62mm × 39 intermediate-powered round (M 43) developed by the Soviet Union along with the AK-47. The Eastern bloc countries also manufactured variations of the AK-47 rifle.

Unlike the Eastern bloc countries, however, each Western bloc country designed its own assault rifles using the 7.62mm NATO cartridge.

A Vietnamese communist soldier holding an AK-47 assault rifle. He was participating in the exchange of prisoners of war on 12 February 1973. (U.S. Department of Defense)

To produce a lighter rifle and to increase productivity, the Soviets developed the AKM rifle in 1957, an improved version of the AK-47. Warsaw Pact nations such as the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Hungary, and Romania soon adopted the new version. However, the People's Republic of China (PRC), a large-scale manufacturer of the AK-47 rifle, did not switch to the new Soviet weapon, perhaps an early sign of the coming Sino-Soviet split.

Meanwhile, the Western bloc countries under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also standardized their assault rifles to use the 7.62mm × 51 NATO cartridge in 1954. Later, some fifty noncommunist countries outside NATO adopted the 7.62mm NATO cartridge as well. Unlike the Eastern bloc countries, however, each Western bloc country designed its own assault rifles using the 7.62mm NATO cartridge. Among them, the U.S. M-14 rifle, the Belgian Fusil Automatique Léger (FAL), the Spanish CETME, and the West German Gewehr 3 A3 are well known.

Wishing to increase accuracy at full-automatic mode, in 1955 the United States began designing an improved version of the M-14. This new assault rifle, the AR-15 (Armalite) fired the .223 Remington 5.56mm × 45 cartridge, a smaller caliber than the 7.62mm NATO round. The AR-15 became a standard weapon for U.S. armed forces as the M-16 rifle.

During the Vietnam War the M-16 did not function well, especially in jungle environments. In response, the Americans introduced the revised M-16A1 rifle. A newer version, the M-16A2 rifle, debuted in the 1980s and remains the standard U.S. weapon. With the successive conversions to newer versions, the United States periodically sold its old M-16 rifles to other countries in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Consequently, the M-16 rifle, as with the AK-47, became ubiquitous in various armed conflicts around the world. Indeed, the AK-47 and the M-16 epitomized the split between East and West that divided the world during the Cold War.

During the 1960s and 1970s, many Western bloc countries adhered to the 7.62mm NATO cartridge and produced high-quality military rifles for the cartridge. It took time for them to recognize the superiority of smaller-caliber assault rifles such as the M-16A1, which can be loaded with more ammunition. In 1980, NATO adopted the .223 Remington cartridge as the 5.56mm NATO. Some Western bloc countries began experimenting on designs of smaller-caliber military rifles in the mid-1970s. Among those, the bull-pup type rifles such as the British Lee Enfield L-70 automatic rifle, the Austrian Steyr AUG, and the French MAS 5.56 automatic rifle featured a

A U.S. Air Force master sergeant fires his M-16 rifle during a training exercise at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, in October 1980. (U.S. Department of Defense)

shorter body without shortening the barrel by fitting the magazine behind the trigger.

The Eastern bloc also studied smaller-caliber assault rifles. The Soviet Union developed the AK-74 rifle that can fire the 5.54mm × 39 cartridge. After officially adopting the AK-74 in the 1970s, the Soviet Union displayed the power of the new assault rifles in its invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

As for the development of military pistols during the Cold War, both the Eastern and Western blocs adopted automatic pistols. The Western bloc possessed the .45 ACP (Automatic Colt Pistol) represented by the U.S. M1911A1 (Colt Government Model Automatic Pistol) and various types of the 9mm Parabellum among West European countries. Among Eastern bloc countries, the Soviet TT33 (Tokarev) with the 7.62mm caliber cartridge and the PM (Makarov) with the 9mm caliber cartridge became the principal military pistols. Most communist nations imported these pistols from the Soviet Union or manufactured them under a Soviet licensing system.

Asakaw Michio

See also

Machine Guns

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Smith, Ian Douglas
(1919–)

Premier of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia during April 1964–November 1965 and prime minister of Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) during 1965–1979. Born on 8 April 1919 in Selukwe (now Shurugwi), Ian Smith was educated in Gwelo before study at South Africa's Rhodes University.

Smith interrupted his studies to serve with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in World War II. He returned home to complete his degree in 1947 and farm in Selukwe. He became active in politics, first in the Liberal Party, then in the United Federal Party. In 1962, he cofounded the prosettler Rhodesian Front (RF) that won a slim parliamentary majority that same year. Two years later, in April 1964, Smith was appointed leader of the RF, replacing Winston Field as premier of Southern Rhodesia. When the white settler colony declared independence from Britain on 11 November 1965, Smith became prime minister of Rhodesia.

Smith adamantly opposed the transfer of political control to Rhodesia's black majority. Opponents of minority rule were labeled as communists and, after the outbreak of civil war in 1966, were considered terrorists. Rhodesia was subjected to international condemnation and sanctions, although neighboring South Africa did not support such actions.

In 1974, after spirited discussions with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and under pressure from South African Prime Minister John Vorster, Smith reluctantly accepted that the end of minority rule was inevitable. In 1979, under an internal agreement, multiracial elections were held, which brought Bishop Abel Muzorewa to power as the state's first black prime minister. Smith remained in the new multiracial cabinet.

Nevertheless, the civil war in the country continued, during which Rhodesian forces, with the assistance of dissident Mozambicans, breached the country's border. This precipitated great internal destabilization. Intervention by the British government, under the leadership of Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington, led to the Lancaster House Conference, which finally ended the Rhodesian impasse in December 1979.

New elections in 1980 brought Rhodesia full independence, ending its long international isolation. Robert Mugabe was elected the country's first president, and Smith became leader of the opposition, although his political

base had been badly eroded. In 1982, Smith retired to his farm in Shurugwi, ending a political career of almost thirty years. In his retirement, he remained an outspoken critic of Zimbabwe's government.

Peter Vale

See also

Africa; Kaunda, Kenneth David; Mozambique; Mozambique Civil War; Mugabe, Robert Gabriel; Namibia; South Africa; United Kingdom; Vorster, Balthazar Johannes; Zimbabwe

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Smith, Walter Bedell

(1895–1961)

U.S. Army general, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during 1950–1953, and undersecretary of state during 1953–1954. Born in Indianapolis, Indiana, on 5 October 1895, Walter Bedell Smith was educated at Manual Training High School in Indianapolis and briefly attended Butler University. He decided on a military career and in 1910 enlisted as a private in the Indiana National Guard. In the interwar years Smith, who had risen to the rank of major in 1939, acquired the organizational, administrative, and planning skills essential to managing modern warfare. He served with the Bureau of Military Intelligence, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Federal Liquidation Board and had several assignments either studying or instructing at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Army War College.

General George C. Marshall, appointed U.S. Army chief of staff in 1939, noted Smith's abilities and in October 1939 summoned him to Washington to assist in swiftly building up the military from its existing weakness to full wartime strength and capability. In September 1942 Smith was assigned to Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the European theater of war, as chief of staff, where he remained until the end of 1945, winning a stellar reputation as one of the finest army chiefs of staff.

Smith returned to Washington in January 1946 as chief of the Operations and Planning Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but two months later President Harry S. Truman appointed him ambassador to the Soviet Union, where he remained until 1949. Smith's experiences in this post, as

U.S. Army General Walter B. Smith performed important service as a staff officer during World War II. During the postwar period, he served capably as ambassador to the Soviet Union, the second director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and undersecretary of state. (Library of Congress)

the Cold War steadily and rapidly intensified, convinced him that the United States must take a firm line to contain Soviet expansion but also that the Soviets did not deliberately seek war and would back down when confronted by American strength.

In late June 1950 Truman named Smith, then commanding the First Army, director of the CIA. He was advanced to full general in July 1951. The president hoped that Smith would improve leadership and organization within the agency, then attracting heavy criticism for its failure to predict the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Smith's reputation as an outstanding bureaucrat and a staunch anticommunist helped to deflect further criticism from the CIA, which he centralized and coordinated, persuading Douglas MacArthur not only to allow the agency to operate in Korea but to utilize its intelligence. Under Smith, the CIA nonetheless wrongly predicted that China would not intervene in the Korean conflict and also failed to anticipate assorted coups in Latin America. Smith tightened the flow of intelligence, restricting the overall picture to a few high-ranking officers, and instituted a training program to develop a group of career intelligence officers.

As undersecretary of state during 1953–1954 in the Eisenhower administration, Smith provided a degree of continuity. After his retirement in 1954 an embittered Smith, who never received either the fifth star or appointment as chief of staff of the army that he believed he deserved, turned to business, amassing an estate valued at almost $2.5 million. In 1958 John Foster Dulles appointed Smith, a staunch and vocal supporter of nuclear expansion, as his special advisor on disarmament. Smith died in Washington, D.C., on 9 August 1961.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; Dulles, John Foster; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; Truman, Harry S.; United States Army

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Smuts, Jan Christian
(1870–1950)

South African military leader, international statesman, and prime minister (1919–1924, 1939–1948). Born in Bovenplaats, Cape Colony (now South Africa), on 24 May 1870, Jan Smuts was educated at Christ's College, Cambridge University, where he read law. He earned his degree in 1895 and then built a successful law practice in Johannesburg. Although born a British subject, he was extremely proud of his Boer ancestry and was an effective guerrilla leader in the Boer War (1899–1902). In 1910, he and his close friend Louis Botha worked together to create the Union of South Africa. Smuts then entered politics in Botha's cabinet, serving in several ministerial positions.

At the beginning of World War I, Smuts was serving as defense minister under Prime Minister Botha. Smuts commanded the offensive that took control of German Southwest Africa (the future Namibia) from the Germans. Made a British Army general, Smuts then took charge of British operations in East Africa. Before the end of the war, he joined the British Imperial War Cabinet as minister of air and helped to organize the Royal Air Force, the world's first independent air force. Smuts represented South Africa during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where he supported the League of Nations and helped develop the mandate system.

During 1919–1924 and again in 1939–1948, Smuts served as South Africa's prime minister. He returned to power in September 1939 as an advocate of war with Germany. He was also minister of defense, and from June 1940 he commanded South African armed forces in the war. Made an honorary field marshal in the British Army in 1941, he was throughout the war one of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's closest advisors.

Smuts believed that cooperation was the key to international stability and peace. After World War II, he took a leading role in the creation of the United Nations (UN) and was a strong supporter of South African cooperation with the British. Unfortunately, Smuts's visions of cooperation were never fully realized. At the time of his death in 1950, the Cold War was well established, and the world was no closer to genuine peace. Smuts died in Irene (near Pretoria), South Africa, on 11 September 1950.

Maurice Williams and Takaia Larsen

See also
Paris Peace Conference and Treaties; South Africa; United Nations

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Soares, Mário
(1924–)

Portuguese socialist politician, prime minister (1976–1978, 1983–1985), and president (1986–1996). Born on 12 July 1924 in Lisbon, Mário Alberto Nobre Lópes Soares graduated with a degree in history, philosophy, and law from the University of Lisbon in 1957. While there, he joined the Portuguese Communist Party. He was arrested multiple times during the era of the Estado Novo (New State), the conservative, clerical fascist regime under António de Oliveira Salazar, who ruled Portugal during 1932–1968. In 1951 Soares quit the Communist Party and went back to college to study law. By the 1960s he had aligned himself with the socialists and in April 1964, together with Francisco Ramos da Costa and Manuel Tito de Morais, created the Acção Socialista Portuguesa (Portuguese Socialist Action).

In March 1968, Soares was again arrested and banished for eight months to the island of São Tomé. He returned to Portugal but by 1970 had been banished again, this time to Italy, although he eventually settled in France. He returned to Portugal after the 25 April 1974 Carnation Revolution that ousted Marcelo Caetano.

Prime minister of Portugal Mário Soares, 14 March 1984. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In the aftermath of the coup, Soares was appointed minister for overseas negotiations and helped arrange the independence of Mozambique. However, the coalition government of the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA), coupled with the growing strength of the Portuguese Communist Party, caused Soares to question the direction of the revolution. He was instrumental in the resignation of Premier Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves. Elections were held in April 1976, and the socialists won sufficient seats for Soares to become premier. In July 1976, Soares was sworn in as the first premier under the new Portuguese constitution.

Soares and the socialists were unable to form a strong majority on the Left because of a rift with the communists. In 1997 he applied for Portugal to join the European Economic Community (EEC). He resigned in late 1978. Reelected in 1983, he served until 1985, when he lost to the Social Democrats and Aníbal Cavaco Silva.

Soares subsequently ran for president in 1986, winning by a narrow margin, but he won reelection in 1991 with a clear majority. He did not seek reelection in 1996,

but in 1999 he headed the socialist ticket in elections to the European Parliament, where he served until the 2004 elections.

David H. Richards

See also
Portugal

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Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich
(1897–1968)

Soviet general and defense official. Born the son of peasants in the village of Kozliki, near Grodna (then Poland, now Belarus), on 9 July 1897, Vasily Sokolovsky in 1918 joined the Red Army. As a participant in the Russian Civil War, he commanded a company, a regiment, a brigade, and finally the 32nd Rifle Division. He graduated from the Red Army Staff Academy in 1921 and then served in Central Asia in the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. He was then chief of staff first of a division and then a corps. Later he was chief of staff of first the Urals and then the Volga Military Districts.

Promoted to major general in May 1938 and to lieutenant general in June 1940, Sokolovsky became deputy chief of the General Staff in February 1941. In midsummer he was chief of staff of the Western Front, with responsibility for the defense of Moscow. Promoted to colonel general in June 1942, he took command of the Western Front in early 1943. In August 1943 he was promoted to general of the army. From April 1944 he was chief of staff of the First Ukrainian Front. In the last months of the war he was deputy commander of the First Belorussian Front.

After the war, Sokolovsky became deputy commander of Soviet occupation forces in Germany and governor of the Soviet zone of Berlin. During 1946–1949 he commanded Soviet occupation forces in Germany, a period that coincided with the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949. Indeed, it was Sokolovsky who suggested that American, British, and French soldiers in the western sectors of Berlin were guests of the Soviets rather than fellow occupiers.

Returning to the Soviet Union in 1949, Sokolovsky continued to play a major role in the Soviet military. During 1949–1960 he was first deputy minister of defense and then chief of the General Staff (1952–1960). At the end of his military career, he served as inspector general for the Ministry of Defense and oversaw the writing of *Voennaia strategiia* (Military Strategy), a 1962 planning manual that shaped Soviet thinking for most of the remainder of the Cold War. Sokolovsky died in Moscow on 10 May 1968.

Roger Chapman and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Soviet Union, Army; Soviet Union, Navy

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Solidarity Movement

Polish independent labor union established in September 1980, credited with bringing democracy to Poland and helping to end the Cold War. On 1 July 1980, the Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Edward Babiuch and communist First Secretary Edward Gierek, announced across-the-board price increases. Immediately, factory workers throughout Poland staged protest strikes. These proliferated and soon reached the Baltic coast, affecting Poland's largest port cities of Gdańsk and Gdynia.

Workers at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdańsk went on strike at the beginning ol August. The local strike committee, led by electrician Lech Wałęsa, was soon transformed into the Inter-Factory Strike Committee. It was unprecedented in both size and form, as it claimed to represent not just the shipyard workers but all Polish workers. The Strike Committee put forth a list of twenty-one demands to be met by the Polish Communist Party. These demands included the right to form independent labor unions, the right to strike, freedom of speech and press, the release of political prisoners, and other social and economic demands. On 31 August 1980, Wałęsa's committee signed an agreement in Gdańsk with Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Jagielski by which the government agreed to the workers' demands, including the formation of independent trade unions. Similar agreements were signed in Szczecin and Jastrz"bie. Several days later, Gierek resigned his post.

These demands included the right to form independent labor unions, the right to strike, freedom of speech and press, the release of political prisoners, and other social and economic demands.

As soon as the agreements were signed, workers began to organize themselves into union groups. Inter-Factory Strike Committees became Inter-Factory Founding Committees. Until this point, Polish labor unions had been an extension of the Communist Party and had no true independence.

On 17 September 1980, the Founding Committees decided to organize one umbrella labor union known as Solidarność (Solidarity). By this time, union membership was close to 4 million people, and the decision to form one central union was deeply troubling to Polish authorities. On 10 November 1980, following a series of difficult negotiations, Solidarity was officially registered as a union.

Moscow and Warsaw eyed Solidarity with great trepidation. The movement was large, and Soviet leaders especially viewed its antisocialist ele-

During a 1987 visit to Poland by Pope John Paul II, demonstrators march down a street carrying banners reading "Solidarność" (Solidarity), the name of the first Polish trade union, formed despite communist government opposition. (Peter Turnley/Corbis)

ments as particularly troubling. They also feared that it would set a precedent that might be followed in other communist bloc nations. Over the next thirteen months, an uneasy relationship existed between the Communist Party and Solidarity. Solidarity was gradually realizing its demands through strikes or the threat of strikes. These demands were in most cases limited to working conditions, wages, and workers' rights. By the end of 1981, nearly 10 million members, some 80 percent of the national workforce, had joined the movement.

Polish authorities never fully accepted the legitimacy of Solidarity. In fact, they had resorted to stalling tactics and harassment of union activists in the hope of weakening the movement. Meanwhile, the authorities were preparing plans to crush Solidarity, by military means if necessary. Tensions between Solidarity and the government peaked during the Solidarity Congress in September–October 1981. Solidarity's 8 September 1981 "Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe," which urged workers in other communist bloc nations to unite, brought applause among union members and near panic on the part of Polish and Soviet authorities. By then, it was clear that Solidarity had become a grave threat to communist rule. Moscow threatened Polish leaders with armed intervention unless Solidarity was shut down. For a time, the real threat of a Soviet military invasion loomed.

Then, on 13 December 1981, the Polish government, now headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, imposed martial law and declared Solidarity illegal. Almost 10,000 Solidarity members were detained. Wałęsa was among those arrested.

Pope John Paul II and the Catholic Church publicly supported the struggles of Solidarity and its imprisoned principals while clandestinely sending messages of encouragement to Wałęsa and others. Wałęsa credited the eventual triumph of Solidarity to the pope's intercession.

In April 1982, Solidarity activists who had avoided arrest formed the Solidarity Temporary Coordinating Committee to stage underground union activity. Four years later, in September 1986, Wałęsa initiated an open, albeit illegal, Solidarity Committee. The government refused to recognize this committee, and its members were closely watched by the secret police. Nevertheless, Wałęsa, who had won the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize, was now a prominent international figure. Silencing him was therefore exceedingly difficult for Polish authorities.

In August 1988, Polish authorities, together with the Catholic Church and the still-illegal Solidarity movement, commenced negotiations concerning the future of Poland. During February–April 1989, a roundtable brought together communists, opposition leaders, Solidarity members, and Catholic Church representatives. The talks brought an end to the government prohibition of Solidarity. In the elections that followed in June 1989, in which 35 percent of the seats were to be decided by election, Solidarity candidates won 161 of 161 seats in the Sejm and 99 of 100 in the Senate. In August 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, one of Solidarity's founders, formed the first noncommunist post–World War II Polish government. After 1989, Solidarity became a traditional political labor party.

Jakub Basista

See also

Gierek, Edward; Jaruzelski, Wojciech; John Paul II, Pope; Poland; Wałęsa, Lech

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Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr
(1918–)

Soviet-Russian dissident and writer. Born in Kislovodsk on 11 December 1918, the son of an artillery officer, Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn studied mathematics and physics at the University of Rostov-on-Don. Graduating in

1941, he briefly worked as a physics teacher. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, he was drafted and served as an artillery captain.

In February 1945, Solzhenitsyn was arrested in East Prussia for his criticism (in a private letter) of the policies of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and sentenced to eight years of hard labor in a gulag. In 1953 Solzhenitsyn was exiled to a village in Kazakhstan. Following his release in 1956, he settled in Riazan in 1957, working as a high school math teacher, all the while writing furiously.

In 1962, the leading Soviet literary journal *New World* published Solzhenitsyn's novella *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. A sensational success, it made the author famous. Never before had the conditions in a Soviet labor camp been described in such gritty detail and laconic poignancy. The support of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev then allowed Solzhenitsyn to pursue a career as a freelance writer and essayist.

Solzhenitsyn proved a brilliant strategist, preparing a profound assault on the moral legitimacy of the Soviet system by analyzing its labor camp system in his three-volume *The Gulag Archipelago* (1973–1975). In his cat-and-mouse games with the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) and its literary minions that he later described in *The Oak and the Calf* (1975), he was always mindful of the international position in which the Soviet Union found itself during the Cold War. After the confiscation of manuscripts in 1965 and subsequent harassment by Soviet officials, Solzhenitsyn employed dissident tactics such as writing an open letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers in 1967, having manuscripts smuggled to the West, and publishing them illegally through samizdat (chain mail–style self-publishing).

In the late 1960s, Solzhenitsyn's life became increasingly dramatic and regularly made international headlines. In 1969 he was excluded from the Soviet Writers' Union, but the following year he won the Nobel Prize in Literature. Soviet officials viewed the latter as a provocation, despite the backing that Solzhenitsyn received from leftist intellectuals such as Heinrich Böll, who had nominated him for the prize.

The publication of the first volume of Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago* in 1973 caused a cultural and political uproar and left no doubt that the author was beyond reconciliation with the Soviet system. In 1974, Solzhenitsyn was charged with treason and forced to leave the Soviet Union. After living briefly in Zürich, in 1976 he settled in Cavendish, Vermont. During his years in the United States, he led a secluded existence, rarely granting interviews and concentrating on his multivolume chronicle *The Red Wheel*, which focused on World War I and the factors that led to revolution in Russia in 1917. His 1978 Harvard University commencement speech made it clear that he was not a liberal reformer but rather an archconservative who rejected communism because of his ethical, spiritual, and national outlooks.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost reforms permitted a gradual acceptance of Solzhenitsyn in the Soviet Union. In 1989 he was reinstated to the Soviet Writers' Union, and his citizenship was restored in 1990. Solzhenitsyn's book-length essay *How We Can Rebuild Russia* (1990)

advocated grassroots democracy modeled after Switzerland and rejected a "consumerist civilization." Solzhenitsyn returned to Russia in 1994, visiting numerous cities on his triumphant sojourn to Moscow. Yet after several years, the writer's openly antimodern worldview turned him into an anachronism seemingly out of touch with postcommunist realities. He therefore rapidly lost his authority as a social visionary. Solzhenitsyn's nonfictional historical exploration *Two Hundred Years Together* (2001–2002) generated much controversy and led to accusations of anti-Semitism.

Peter Rollberg

See also

Glasnost; Gulags; Perestroika; Soviet Union

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Somalia

East African nation covering 246,199 square miles with a 1945 population of approximately 1.7 million people. Somalia is slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Texas and is bordered by the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the west, and Kenya to the southwest. Part of the strategically important Horn of Africa, Somalia served as a counterbalance to first the Soviet Union and then the United States for the other's presence in neighboring Ethiopia.

When Somalia achieved independence in 1960, the Soviet Union established relations with the new state, which became stronger when Major General Mohammed Siyad Barre seized power in 1969 and established a socialist state. During his failed attempt to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia during 1977–1978, he broke ties with the communist bloc and turned instead to the United States. As Somalia's internal problems worsened during the 1980s and clan rivalries intensified into civil war, however, the United States withdrew its support. Barre fled Somalia in 1991, but no new leader emerged, and civil war continues to plague the impoverished nation.

On 1 July 1960, the former colony of British Somaliland and the United Nations (UN) trusteeship of Italian Somaliland merged to form Somalia. Although the inhabitants shared a common ethnicity, clan loyalties divided the population and formed the basis of the political parties that continually vied for power. During 1960–1967, Aden Abdulla Osman served as president and was succeeded by Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (1967–1969).

In 1960, recognizing Somalia's potential as a counterbalance to the American presence in neighboring Ethiopia, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev established relations with Somalia and offered economic aid and expanded

Somalia and Eritrea

the port facilities at Berbera. In October 1969, following President Shermarke's assassination, Barre, commander in chief of the armed forces, seized power. He dismissed the elected government and proclaimed Somali socialism. Barre's attempts to improve conditions within Somalia included the adoption of an official script for the Somali language, improved education and health care facilities, and large-scale agricultural projects. He also granted the Soviets access to military facilities and received military aid sufficient to make Somalia one of the most heavily armed states in Africa. The Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in July 1974, the same year that Somalia joined the Arab League. In 1976, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party was founded.

Nationalism and irredentism—not communism—motivated Barre. He believed that the European scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century had destroyed his nation by dividing among the colonial powers the land inhabited by the Somali people. Barre wanted to reunite ethnic Somalis in neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti with the rest of the Somali nation but was constrained by the 1964 Cairo Resolution that pledged African states to maintain existing borders. With diplomatic backing unlikely, Barre resorted to military conquest to implement his plans, whereby chances of victory would be improved by external support. Hence, he tightened relations with the Soviet Union.

Barre began his campaign in July 1977 when, supported by Soviet arms and advisors, he attempted to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. However,

his fears that the Soviets had developed relations with Somalia only because they could not control Ethiopia were soon realized. Although Ethiopia and Somalia had both received military aid from the Soviet Union since 1974, the onset of the Ogaden War forced the Soviet Union to choose sides. In October 1977, Moscow halted military aid to Somalia.

In November 1977, Barre broke ties with the communist bloc and turned instead to the United States, hoping that the Americans would appreciate Somalia's value as a Cold War counterbalance. However, newly elected President Jimmy Carter was attempting to focus foreign policy on such principles as human rights rather than the Cold War. Citing Barre's deplorable human rights record and violation of international law by invading Ethiopia, Carter refused to help. With no external support and with the might of the communist bloc aiding Ethiopia, the war reached an inevitable conclusion. On 9 March 1978, Barre announced the withdrawal of all Somali forces from Ethiopia.

By 1980, however, the changing international environment, particularly the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, compelled Carter to steer U.S. foreign policy toward a more traditional Cold War orientation. In August 1980, an agreement was reached that granted the Americans access to military facilities in Somalia in return for military aid, thus countering the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and facilitating American military operations in the Indian Ocean. Barre's reputation prevented a closer relationship, and in 1989 his continued human rights violations prompted the U.S. Congress to halt military assistance.

A member of the rebel Somali National Movement militia points his gun at a broken portrait of President Mohammed Siyad Barre in northern Somalia, 1989. Barre's regime was overthrown in January 1991. (AFP/Getty Images)

As conditions in Somalia deteriorated, the misgivings felt by the Americans were progressively shared by the Somali people. During the 1980s the economy declined steadily, and periodic droughts aggravated food shortages caused by poor agricultural policies and government price controls. Barre's persistence in awarding key positions to members of his own Marehan clan and subclans of the Darod clan exacerbated clan rivalries and government corruption. Increasingly, dissent manifested itself through violence. The country entered a state of virtual civil war following an uprising that began in northern Somalia in May 1988 and then consolidated under the leadership of the Issaq-led Somali National Movement (SNM). Barre provided the Darod clan with arms with which to oppose the SNM, but Darod loyalty to Barre was diminishing. In April 1988 he lost support of the Ogadeeni subclan when Somalia and Ethiopia signed a peace treaty in which Barre renounced all claims to the Ogaden.

Opposition from the Hawiye clan led to the formation of the United Somali Congress (USC), which concentrated on efforts to take control of Mogadishu, prompting Barre to withdraw those troops still loyal to him to defend the

capital. By December 1990, much of Mogadishu had been destroyed and thousands had been killed in the fighting. On 27 January 1991, Barre fled Mogadishu, and the USC took control of the city. With the common enemy gone, however, clan rivalries exploded once more and civil war resumed, which, despite attempts by the international community—including the UN—to quell, continues.

DONNA R. JACKSON

See also

Africa; Africa, Soviet Interventions in; Africa, U.S. Interventions in; Barre, Mohammed Siyad; Decolonization; Ethiopia; Human Rights; Ogaden War

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Somoza Debayle, Anastasio
(1925–1980)

Nicaraguan dictator and president (1967–1972, 1974–1979). Born in León on 5 December 1925, Anastasio Somoza Debayle was the second son of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza García (1936–1956). Often referred to as "Tachito," Somoza Debayle graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1946 before heading Nicaragua's National Guard beginning in 1947. As commander of the National Guard, he helped his family maintain its hold on political power after his father's 1956 assassination. During his brother Luis Somoza Debayle's presidency (1956–1967), Anastasio Somoza brutally suppressed protests, crushed potential rivals, and developed important political and business contacts.

The death of his brother in 1967 allowed Somoza to seize power. In contrast to his brother's reliance on political parties and rigged elections, Anastasio Somoza established a thoroughly authoritarian rule. Throughout the years, violent repression of opposition groups, rigid press censorship, and challenges to businesses that rivaled the growing interests of the Somoza dynasty mounted. At the same time, Somoza maintained close relations with the United States and was viewed as a bulwark against communist subversion in Central America.

In 1972, Somoza was constitutionally forbidden from serving another presidential term, although he continued to be the de facto head of state. In December 1972 a massive earthquake virtually leveled Managua, and Somoza used the ensuing chaos to declare martial law, making him—as head of the National Guard—the ruler of the state. The earthquake resulted in

considerable international aid to Nicaragua, but revelations that Somoza had embezzled much of the aid led to his political isolation. Nevertheless, he was reelected president in 1974. Soon thereafter, the leftist National Liberation Front (FSLN, Sandinistas) launched a guerrilla war against the Somoza dictatorship. When the government lashed out at its enemies, popular support for the FSLN grew.

In response to the situation in Nicaragua, U.S. President Jimmy Carter sharply reduced financial and military aid to the Somoza regime. By 1978, the military situation in Nicaragua had turned against the dictatorship. In July 1979, facing condemnation at home and abroad, Somoza fled the country for Miami, Florida. He was assassinated in Asunción, Paraguay, on 17 September 1980.

Daniel Lewis

See also

Contras; Nicaragua; Sandinistas; Somoza García, Anastasio

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Somoza García, Anastasio
(1896–1956)

Nicaraguan military leader and president (1937–1947, 1950–1956). Born in San Marcos on 1 February 1896, Anastasio Somoza García was the founder of the Somoza political dynasty (1939–1979). Somoza's close ties to the United States began when he attended but did not graduate from the Pierce School of Business Administration in Philadelphia. He returned to Nicaragua in 1919 and pursued a military career. In 1933 he was named the first commander of the Nicaraguan National Guard, which the United States had helped create in 1927. Although the National Guard was designed as an apolitical force, Somoza nevertheless used it to seize political power. He ordered the assassination of political rivals, including Augusto César Sandino in 1934, and increased the National Guard's size and authority after seizing power in 1936 and installing himself as president in 1937.

Through World War II, Somoza maintained strong relations with the United States. He also launched a campaign against Nazi subversion in Nicaragua, an effort that allowed him to take control of German-owned assets throughout the country. These seized properties bolstered the family's sizable fortune and helped sustain the dynasty's political and economic ambitions for decades.

When the Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman administrations encouraged democratic trends in the Western Hemisphere after 1944, Nicaraguan opposition groups organized to push Somoza from power. Acting quickly, he

promised reforms and scheduled elections to ensure a change of administrations in the near future, which stalled the opposition movement. He then reinforced his grip on power by invading Costa Rica in 1946. Declaring the invasion a necessary intervention against communist subversion, he transformed himself into a staunch Cold Warrior and secured strong support from the United States.

Having faced down one challenge, Somoza used a combination of rewards and repression to manage Nicaraguan politics. He orchestrated social and economic reforms that improved working conditions and fostered economic growth in urban centers. He also allowed for the formation and operation of token opposition parties and loosened press restrictions. In January 1947 he symbolically stepped down as president but one month later ousted his successor and installed a puppet president while he held de facto power until 1950, when he arranged for his reelection.

Somoza continued to cultivate support from the United States. When Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán embarked on a series of significant economic reforms, most notably land reform, beginning in 1952, Somoza helped the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) train mercenaries in Nicaragua, from which they launched an invasion that toppled the Arbenz regime in 1954.

Having survived two decades in power, Somoza was shot by an assassin in León on 21 September 1956 and died of his wounds on 29 September. His eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, inherited the presidency. A second son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, already commander of the National Guard, maintained the family's control over the military and later gained the presidency.

President of Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza García, ca. 1940s. (Corbis)

Daniel Lewis

See also

Americas; Nicaragua; Somoza Debayle, Anastasio

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Song Meiling
(1897–2003)

Wife of Jiang Jieshi, Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) leader and president of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). Born in Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, on 5 March 1897, Song Meiling, daughter of a Methodist minister, was educated in the United States and graduated from Wellesley College in 1917.

When she returned to Shanghai at year's end, she engaged in church affairs and social welfare outreach until 1927, when she married Jiang, the leader of the GMD and future president of the ROC.

Song served as Jiang's closest aide, personal secretary, and English interpreter. From 1930 to 1932, she also held a membership in the Legislative Yuan. In 1934, she headed the women's department of Jiang's New Life Movement, a reform program aimed at halting the spread of communism by stressing traditional Chinese values.

During the Xi'an Incident of December 1936, Song played a critical role in securing Jiang's release from the rebellious GMD military generals and facilitated the GMD's cooperation with the Chinese communists to fight the Japanese during 1937–1945. Besides continuing the New Life Movement and leading Chinese women to fight against China's enemies, Song's other contribution during both the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War was to capture international attention and seek foreign assistance, especially from the United States. Throughout the 1940s she visited Washington frequently, lobbying for economic and military assistance to save the GMD government from collapse. This made her something of a celebrity in America, especially with the China Lobby.

In January 1950 Song went to Taiwan, joining Jiang, who had been defeated in the Chinese Civil War and forced to relocate the GMD headquarters on Taiwan. There Song continued her works in organizing women and seeking, largely in vain, U.S. assistance to defend the ROC. After Jiang's death in 1975, she moved to New York City and lived in semiseclusion. Song died on 23 October 2003 in New York City.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Jiang Jieshi

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Song Qingling
(1892–1981)

Vice chairwoman of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, on 27 January 1892, Song Qingling was educated in the United States and graduated from Wesleyan College in 1913. In 1914, on her way back to China, she stopped in Tokyo, where she met and immediately married Sun Yixian, founder of both the Republic of China (ROC) and the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists). During her marriage to Sun, which ended with his death in 1925, she developed her own career in revolutionary politics.

As Sun's widow, Song assumed a greater role in politics. She was elected to serve on the GMD's Central Executive Committee until 1945. In 1927,

she was also appointed a member of the State Council in the GMD government led by Jiang Jieshi, her brother-in-law as well as Sun's successor. Despite these familial connections, Song grew increasingly resentful of Jiang's hostility toward the Chinese communists, which she perceived as a betrayal of Sun's ideals of national unification. Embittered and frustrated, she left China and traveled to the Soviet Union and Europe in late 1927. She returned to China in 1931 and resisted taking part in politics, focusing instead on social welfare issues.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Song founded the China Defense League to promote the anti-Japanese war drive, an effort that included cooperation with the Chinese communists. Song's anti-Jiang and procommunist stance became even more obvious after the war, when she transformed the league into the China Welfare Fund, which supported communist-oriented organizations during the Chinese Civil War.

Upon the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese communists paid Song special treatment and great respect, primarily due to her symbolic value as a link between the PRC and Sun's revolutionary movement. Because of her past GMD connections, however, her PRC appointments were largely ceremonial in nature, carrying with them no real power or responsibility. She was, for a time, one of three noncommunist vice chairpersons in the new PRC government, a post she held until 1954, when Mao Zedong reorganized the government. She was also made the vice chairperson of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, owing to her earlier contacts with the Soviet Union. In 1959 she became one of the two vice chairpersons of the PRC, a post she retained until 1980. In early 1981, she was named honorary president of the PRC. Song died on 29 May 1981 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Jiang Jieshi; Song Meiling

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South Africa

Located on the southern tip of Africa, South Africa covers 471,008 square miles, making it roughly three times as large as the U.S. state of California. South Africa, which had a 1945 population of approximately 15 million people, is bordered by the Indian Ocean to the south and east, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Namibia to the northwest, Zimbabwe and Botswana to the north, and Swaziland and Mozambique to the northeast.

South Africa's Cold War history is essentially the history of apartheid, or racial separation. The National Party (NP), which came to power in 1948 and

would dominate South Africa until 1990, fully codified apartheid. The NP built a strong state, and consequently South Africa became the preponderant power in southern Africa. But its racial policies also rendered it a pariah in the international community. Still, South Africa, through its involvement in civil wars in Angola and to a lesser extent Mozambique and Zimbabwe, played an important role in Cold War geopolitics.

The apartheid era, which neatly coincides with the Cold War, can be divided into four periods: 1948–1958, including the administrations of D. F. Malan (1948–1954) and Johannes Strijdom (1954–1958); the premiership of Hendrik Verwoerd (1958–1966); the reign of Prime Minister John Vorster (1966–1978); and P. W. Botha's premiership beginning in 1978 and resignation as state president in 1989. The subsequent rise of F. W. de Klerk marked apartheid's denouement, hastened by the end of the Cold War.

During the late 1940s and 1950s, the NP's consolidation of state power was most clearly reflected by its policy of job reservation for whites. In the late 1950s, many businesses, most of which were run by English speakers, preferred to hire cheap black labor. The government responded by reserving fifteen different occupations for whites. This period also witnessed the inchoate institutionalization of apartheid by, for instance, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), the Population Registration Act (1951), and the Bantu Education Act (1955). Domestic resistance to apartheid was barely active during this period and came mainly from black political groups through civil protests.



Segregated stands in a sports arena in Bloemfontein, South Africa. (Corel)

Malan, and then Strijdom, advanced Afrikaner dominance while the colonial (white) dominance of the rest of Africa was in full retreat. Shielding South Africa from what they saw as the contagion of decolonization and the advancement of majority rule was their chief foreign policy priority. Malan outlined his Africa policy in a document titled *The African Charter* (1949), which was imbued with the notion of an African continent safe for "Western European Christian Civilization." Strijdom took a somewhat more pragmatic and prudent path. For instance, the growing importance of Africa to South Africa's foreign policy was reflected by the 1959 creation of South Africa's Africa Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs, its first geographic division. Throughout the 1950s, South Africa maintained a favored position in the West.

Civil unrest and the brutality at Sharpeville defined Verwoerd's premiership. In March 1960, the South African police fired on a group of demonstrators whom the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) had called upon to protest the South African Pass Laws, enacted by the government to restrict the movement of nonwhites. (Except when required for domestic help or other certified jobs, blacks had to remain in their own designated areas.) In the con-

adopted the Lusaka Manifesto, calling for an end to colonialism in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South West Africa (Namibia). It also included South Africa within its anticolonialism mandate.

The matrix of threat and opportunity facing South Africa inalterably changed on 24 April 1974, when Portugal's President António Salazar was overthrown. The cordon sanitaire was broken. Northern Namibia was now open to attacks by the anti–South African guerrilla force, SWAPO, from southern Angola. Mozambique became a base for forces fighting the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia, and South Africa was now directly vulnerable to ANC and PAC penetration from Mozambique. South Africa was pulled into the Angolan Civil War, with at least tacit support from the United States. In 1975, the U.S. Congress passed the Clark Amendment, however, ending covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assistance to UNITA, the rebel group fighting the Soviet Union/Cuban–backed Angolan government.

Growing global hostility toward South Africa led to the promotion of secret ventures initiated by Dr. C. P. Mulder, minister of information, and Eschel Rhodie, secretary of the South African Department of Information, to shore up South Africa's international image. The exposure of these activities, which became known as Infogate, led ultimately to the fall of Vorster.

Botha came to power on 28 September 1978 promising to accelerate the reform process begun by Vorster. Instead, Botha instituted a near-totalitarian state. The 1980s were a period of stagnation and decline for the South African economy. South Africa's real economic growth rate since World War II had averaged more than 5 percent annually. By 1979, however, it declined in every five-year period thereafter. During 1975–1980, the real growth rate was 2.8 percent, whereas during 1980–1985 it was a mere 1.1 percent.

Botha did allow for the abrasion of the petty aspects of apartheid, but his most radical and important reform was the 1983 constitution. It was meant to placate international public opinion by replacing the white-only franchise with a multiracial franchise. However, the new franchise and its two new chambers included only Indians and coloreds (people of mixed race or Malaysians). The first election in 1984 under the new constitution witnessed only a 29.6 percent turnout by coloreds and a 20.2 percent turnout for Indians. But most importantly, the new constitution triggered new instability and political changes.

The 1984 disturbances were to the Botha administration what Soweto had been to Vorster and what Sharpeville had been to Verwoerd. And, just as Soweto was a greater threat to apartheid than was Sharpeville, the 1984–1986 disturbances were a qualitatively different phenomenon than their precursors. The trade unions, the United Democratic Front (UDF), and the ANC were better organized and had deeper support both within and outside the country. In addition, portions of the white population were becoming increasingly critical of the government. Rising emigration and a growing reluctance to serve in the armed forces reflected the weakening confidence in the state.

The new constitutional dispensation triggered the August 1983 formation of the UDF, which was not a political party but rather an umbrella organiza-

tion encompassing many local groups that had accepted the ANC's 1955 Freedom Charter, which had advocated ideals of justice, equality, and economic development through state intervention in the best interest of the entire population. By March 1984, the UDF had more than 600 affiliated organizations with a combined membership of more than 2 million. Also, the new constitution led to a split in the NP. In 1982, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, NP leader for the Transvaal, and twenty-one other NP members refused to support Botha's reforms and were expelled from the party. Treurnicht subsequently formed the Conservative Party.

South Africa's foreign policy under Botha, which was run out of the State Security Council (SSC), was part of South Africa's total national strategy, a reaction to what was labeled as the total onslaught of communism. It held that the Soviet Union would cling to any territory over which it acquired control in Africa and would only surrender it if the center collapsed or if overall strategy favored such a move and that in black Africa, the Soviets had already selected and effectively controlled at least three states and were preparing the ground for three more: Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. To combat this perceived threat, Pretoria undertook a massive destabilization program, which included military forays as far north as Zambia and cost the region an estimated 1.5 million lives during 1980–1988 with a cumulative cost to the region of approximately $60.5 billion.

On 15 August 1985, Botha gave his much-anticipated "Rubicon Speech" at the Annual National Party's Province Congress in Durban. South Africa's foreign minister, Roelof Frederik Botha, had briefed Western leaders in advance, and the speech was in fact broadcast to the United States, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). However, what P. W. Botha delivered was not a radical departure from apartheid but rather a continuation of incremental reforms and the maintenance of apartheid. The international community was shocked. The South African rand, which had been falling since 1983, fell to a low of 0.35 to the American dollar in August 1985; the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was closed for the first time since Sharpeville; and Chase Manhattan Bank in New York decided not to roll over maturing short-term loans to South Africa. Other banks soon followed suit. South Africa had sunk to the depths of its pariah status.

In 1984, Pretoria reached an agreement with Mozambique, via the Nkomati Accord, which was to end South African support for the Resistencia Nacional Moçambicano (RENAMO), the rebel force fighting the Mozambique government, in return for an end to Mozambique's support for the ANC. The Nkomati Accord was as much a signal to the West as a sincere effort to improve regional relations. Botha followed this success with an eight-nation tour of Europe. In 1988, military stalemate in the southern Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale precipitated the end of South Africa's Angola war, which had become Pretoria's Vietnam.

Ill health ended Botha's reign in 1989, and an internecine struggle within the NP ensued. The next president, de Klerk, would ease South Africa into its transition away from apartheid, if not actually direct it, although the transition was certainly hastened by the end of the Cold War.

De Klerk released Mandela from Robben Island Prison on 11 February 1990. Mandela had been incarcerated for twenty-seven years. Nine days prior to his release, all opposition groups, including the ANC, were unbanned. Apartheid was in full retreat, and South Africa then entered a transition period that led, four years later, to full democratic freedoms.

James Hentz

See also

Africa; Botha, Pieter Willem; Botha, Roelof Frederik; Constructive Engagement; Decolonization; Malan, Daniel François; Mandela, Nelson; Mozambique; Mozambique Civil War; Namibia; Race Relations, United States; Smuts, Jan Christian; South African Destabilization Campaign; Vorster, Balthazar Johannes

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South African Destabilization Campaign

South African government program of forward defense in southern Africa designed to quash nationalist movements in the region, thereby preventing them from spreading to South Africa. Beginning in the late 1970s, South Africa began a concerted effort to cripple independent African states in the region. There were two components: one military, the other economic.

First, South Africa routinely violated the sovereignty of the neighboring states of Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and (less frequently) Zimbabwe. Rationalized as hot pursuit, the purpose was to flush out members of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC), especially its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK, Spear of the Nation). While methods differed in each military foray, four basic tactics were employed: commando raids, assassination of key leaders, aerial bombardment, and, in 1981, a coup attempt against the government of the Seychelles. These were complemented by a series of dirty wars similar to those used by the U.S.-backed Contras in Nicaragua, which the South Africans waged against Mozambique, Lesotho, and Angola.

The decision to destabilize Marxist-oriented Mozambique was taken by the Rhodesian regime that, in the mid-1970s, had founded and supported a

dissident group known as National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). After Zimbabwean independence in 1980, RENAMO was clandestinely adopted by the South African state and used by the South African Defence Force (SADF). Now backed with more firepower, RENAMO was active in all parts of the country. This campaign, along with increased economic pressure by South Africa on Mozambique, was highly effective and enabled the signing of the 1984 Nkomati Accord.

The SADF provided covert support to the Lesotho Liberation Army, which conducted a low-intensity war against the Lesotho government. This support, together with SADF raids on Lesotho and economic pressure, was also successful, culminating in the formal denial of refuge to the ANC by the Lesotho government. South Africa also occupied large parts of southern Angola, a tactic that began in 1974 when South Africa invaded that country ostensibly to fight communism. The occupation enabled the SADF to fight in the civil war in Angola on the side of the Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), a West-leaning liberation movement.

The economic component of the destabilization campaign was more subtle. South Africa's economy dwarfed those of its neighbors. Moreover, most regional transport routes passed through South Africa. In addition, many states in the region were dependent on employment offered in South Africa, especially in the mining sector. By manipulating one or more of these factors, South Africa created extensive economic dislocation in neighboring countries.

In response, the region sought support from the international community. The West offered sporadic aid, while the Soviet bloc provided some military assistance, including weapons and training. Solidarity for the affected states was strong among African states in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), especially its Liberation Committee. In this forum, the idea of developing Frontline States took root, and, in these same councils, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was conceived. The SADCC sought to mitigate South Africa's economic preponderance. The nonaligned states were also vociferous in their condemnation of South Africa's destabilization effort. The U.S. policy of constructive engagement was interpreted as being sympathetic to destabilization, and the Americans were initially reluctant to condemn South Africa. As circumstances deteriorated, however, individual acts of destabilization were condemned by President Ronald Reagan's administration.

A United Nations (UN) study estimated the costs of South Africa's destabilization campaign to be more than $60 billion during 1980–1988, while as many as 1.5 million people were thought to have perished due to war, terrorism, malnutrition, and epidemics.

Peter Vale

See also

Africa; Constructive Engagement; Dirty War; Mozambique; Mozambique Civil War; Namibia; Non-Aligned Movement; South Africa; Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference; Tanzania; Zimbabwe

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South Asia

World War II ended with the certain prospect for South Asia that British imperial power in the region, which had stood uncontested for more than a century, was about to come to an end. What was not clear was whether a single postimperial polity would emerge or whether South Asia would be divided into a number of successor states with competing interests and values. Also in question was whether one of the global superpowers would follow the British precedent and enforce its hegemonic suzerainty across the Indian Ocean. A half century later, it is still too soon to address these questions.

The Cold War history of South Asia is a story of incompleteness. Bitter grievances have been fought over with no decisive result, and enormous human and natural resources remain largely untapped. The Indian subcontinent did not prove to be as volcanic a juncture between the Eastern and Western blocs as, say, neighboring Southeast Asia, but the vacuum of power left by the retreating British attracted at various times the attentions of the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union, all of which vied unsuccessfully to secure a monopoly of influence.

The partition of the British Raj remains the starting point for any discussion of modern South Asia. Contrary to popular assumption, the British were never enthusiastic about the breakup of their Indian empire—divide and conquer played no part in British calculations in 1947. On the contrary, Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Labour government wanted a strong and united postcolonial India that (so it believed at the time) could still serve British interests through informal Commonwealth ties. But this preference for unity was less important than a bloodless exit from the theater. After it became clear that India's Islamic minority, led by Mohamed Ali Jinnah's Muslim League, would not accept a single-state solution without violence, British Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten resigned himself to partition.

In fact, Attlee's secretary of state for India, Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, had come close to brokering a one-India solution in 1946. His proposal for a three-tier federal state received tentative consent from Jinnah (whose cautious pragmatism is mostly forgotten today) and the Hindu-dominated Con-



Oxen and camels drafted to carry the belongings of Muslims fleeing to Pakistan following the separation of India, 5 September 1947. (Bettmann/Corbis)

gress Party, but the plan was scotched when Congress's President Jawaharlal Nehru made a public statement appearing to renounce Pethick-Lawrence's constitutional assumptions. The result was a wave of sectarian bloodshed that left cross-party cooperation impossible. It must be said that even the most conciliatory behavior by Jinnah and Nehru would have still left unsolved the problem of India's large and restless Sikh population, which had separatist ambitions unaddressed by the Pethick-Lawrence plan. Partition may have been a historical inevitability, at least by the end of World War II.

The ethnic cleansing of the India-Pakistan frontier following independence in August 1947 was the legacy of this political failure, a South Asian trauma that had vast psychological as well as material consequences for the future of the region. At least 1 million Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims died in what can only be described as spontaneous cross-border genocide. Between 10 million and 15 million more found themselves unwelcome foreigners in a state now hostile to their faith and were forced into permanent exile.

The inhumane exchange of population did not resolve the problem of religious minorities for either of the new nations, for 40 million Muslims still remained in India, and 10 million Hindus remained in Pakistan. Nor did it

provide for a stable or mutually acknowledged border. The new Pakistani state was strung awkwardly across India's northern perimeter, with roughly equal numbers to east and west. This arrangement would ultimately prove untenable. And a number of the historic princely states with populations of mixed confession were hard to incorporate into the partition. Among these, Kashmir proved so intractable a problem that it set off a series of informal Wars of the British Succession among India, Pakistan, and, to a lesser degree, China.

The postcolonial order proved unsatisfactory to a number of South Asian constituencies who believed that they were inadequately represented by the terms of 1947. India's untidy internal borders, a legacy of the ad hoc development of British imperial rule, were reorganized several times from the 1950s onward to try to appease the particularistic claims of language groups. Thus, the old province of Madras was broken up into Tamil and Telugu districts, and Bombay was partitioned between Marathi and Gujarati speakers. These reforms were, however, straightforward compared to the problem of postindependence Punjab and its Sikh minority. The traditional province of Punjab was carved up in the partition, and its namesake successor within post-1947 India went through a number of contortions before an agreeable all-Punjabi speaking unit was demarcated in 1966. But this concession failed to assuage the passions of secessionist Sikh radicals of the Shiromani Akali Dal Party, who sought the establishment of a free Khalistan state and, from the early 1980s onward, demonstrated an increasing willingness to use terrorist methods of political persuasion. The violent occupation of the Golden Temple of Amritsar by Sikh zealots in 1984 and the equally ferocious counterresponse by the Indian Army not only led to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that same year but also brought a round of depressingly familiar retaliatory pogroms against Sikhs in Delhi.

At least 1 million Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims died in what can only be described as spontaneous cross-border genocide.

Independent Ceylon (Sri Lanka after 1972) was dogged by internecine conflict on a similar model, making stable postcolonial rule just as difficult. The genteel paternalism of the country's first Westernized elite was rejected after 1956, when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party achieved parliamentary power, and its strident peasant-based Sinhalese nationalism became the characteristic motif of Ceylon's politics. Educational and religious laws brazenly favoring the Sinhalese language, culture, and Buddhist faith alienated the Tamil minority, leading to the vicious response of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the 1970s. The Tamil Tigers seized de facto control of much of the island's forested northern and eastern regions, but their success eventually triggered intervention by the Indian government, which with a large and politically turbulent Tamil community of its own had no desire to see Sri Lanka's civil war spill across the Laccadive Sea.

India's three-year military expedition to the war-torn LTTE homeland, beginning in 1987, was an attempt to enforce a shaky peace deal that ultimately failed. The price that India paid for its interference was the murder of Indira Gandhi's son Rajiv (prime minister during 1984–1989) by Tamil extremists, continuing the subcontinent's wretched tradition of political assassination.

Perhaps the best illustration of the irreducible nature of the problem is Bangladesh. The former East Pakistan emerged as a breakaway region seeking autonomy from its distant and imperious central government, but after independence in 1971, its own army engaged in sporadic campaigns across the southeastern Chittagong Hill Tracts, trying to suppress Buddhist tribes who themselves objected to Dhaka's overbearing style.

The subcontinent's internal disputes did not, of course, go unnoticed by the Cold War powers. The Soviet Union inherited from tsarist Russia a desire to break out of its landlocked Central Asian hinterland and expand its influence southward, a continuation of the Victorian era's Great Game. For its part, the United States had no desire to allow for a Soviet presence on the shores of the Indian Ocean, which would threaten Western lines of communication to the oil-rich Middle East. India, by far the largest and most populous state, was the key to regional hegemony, but neither side was able to secure its patronage for long, partly because successive Indian governments were able to play one side against another and partly because of the vague but cyclical appeal in New Delhi of the so-called Asian Resurgence, by which India, perhaps in partnership with the PRC, would reject the bipolarity of the Cold War and forge a third way.

Nehru, who acted as his own foreign minister during his premiership (1947–1964), brought the moral glamour of his long anticolonial career to the conference table and was something of a diplomatic celebrity during the first decade of India's independence. His commitment to self-determination and nonalignment policies had a fashionable cachet in the 1950s, encapsulated in the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" drawn up with the PRC in 1954 and later the foundation of the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. However, Nehru's high-mindedness was called into question when his government publicly supported the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary in 1956, a decision that cynics not unreasonably connected to the contemporaneous expansion of Soviet development aid to India.

Pakistan, meanwhile, smarting from the disappointing result of the First Kashmir War, sought and received military and economic support from Great Britain and the United States. It confirmed this Western tilt with founding memberships in the Manila Pact (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO) in 1954 and the Anglo-Iranian Middle East Treaty Organization (later the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO) the following year.

The dream of Sino-Indian fraternal leadership in Asia was abruptly brought to an end in 1962 when Chinese leader Chairman Mao Zedong's People's Liberation Army (PLA) hammered Indian border positions in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin at the Himalayan extremes of their long and imperfectly mapped frontier. Tensions with China had been more or less inevitable since 1950, when the traditional buffer region of Tibet was swallowed up by the PRC, but India's military drubbing that year and its reliance on hastily deployed American and British armaments was a stark reminder that rhetorical disengagement from the Cold War and pious appeals to nonviolence could not guarantee national security. The Sino-Indian War brought about a regional shift in allegiances. The PRC made successful approaches



Crowds watching the transport of Indian troops during the border war between India and China in 1962. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

to Pakistan (which still enjoyed Western support), while India took advantage of the split within the international communist movement to forge closer ties with the Soviet Union. The second round of major Indo-Pakistani fighting in 1965 underwrote this diplomatic realignment but bogged down in stalemate, with both sides having to rely on the bittersweet consolation that their opposition's war effort had been as badly managed as their own.

Until 1971 the balance of power in South Asia was still roughly divided between India and Pakistan, despite the large differences in size and population between the two. But the successful Bengali revolt that year and Pakistan's clear defeat by Indian forces in the field demonstrated the latter's resurgence under the virtuoso leadership of Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. India's victory in 1971 was far more than military, for Pakistan's genocidal atrocities in Bangladesh had been so embarrassing to the West that Britain and France had broken ranks with President Richard Nixon's administration in supporting their habitual ally in the region. Gandhi meanwhile secured a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's regime that provided conventional Warsaw Pact hardware as well as the technical support to launch an independent nuclear weapons

program. The underground detonation of India's first atomic bomb in 1974 was the confirmation, if anyone still needed it, that India was now the preeminent power in the subcontinent. As the rapport between New Delhi and Moscow continued to improve throughout the 1970s and as Pakistan languished in despotic chaos, it looked as though the West had backed the wrong horse in South Asia.

The Soviet Union's temporary advantage was squandered, however, by its ill-advised invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which uselessly soaked up prestige and resources. The war placed South Asia in the front line of the Cold War for the first time and proved particularly important for Pakistan, which the United States viewed as a vital logistical support base for anti-Soviet Afghani insurgents. The Afghan conflict proved at best a mixed blessing for the Islamabad regime, which was also under pressure from neighboring Iranian fundamentalists after the 1979 revolution. The United States poured arms and money into the country, but the influx of Afghan refugees and mujahideen guerrilla fighters in its northern provinces placed social and economic strains on an already fragile state. At the same time, Indira Gandhi's 1984 assassination and the political emergence of her much less Russophile son Rajiv opened the possibility of a rapprochement between the United States and India. The younger Gandhi was unenthused by India's traditional socialist practices and sought American ideas and capital to reinvigorate his country's economy in the computer age.

The weakening of India's entente with the Soviet Union also led to some improvement in its relationship with the PRC. While little concrete progress was made on the serious disputes over the Line of Actual Control along the Himalayan border or the ongoing occupation of Tibet (the Dalai Lama had operated a government-in-exile in Dharamsala since 1959), there was at least some symbolic economic and technological assistance, and the Chinese took a less emphatically pro-Pakistani line at the conference table. The creation of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 was a welcome cross-border initiative that proposed cooperative efforts to tackle the region's social and environmental problems—overpopulation, poverty, rural and urban squalor, and illiteracy—but a dialogue could only begin by avoiding any mention of ongoing political differences. Indeed, the Cold War ended without any major breakthroughs in key South Asian diplomatic problems. Kashmir, for instance, remained as much an Indo-Pakistani flash point as it had been in 1947.

Britain's withdrawal after World War II left the Indian subcontinent's smaller states without their traditional patron. Nepal, one of the most isolated polities in the world, still lingered in a premodern atmosphere of court intrigue, its domestic affairs dominated by the rivalry between the Shah dynasty and a number of feuding noble houses. After the dominant Rana clan was deposed in 1950, the Crown reasserted its authority, and the country thereafter went through cycles of royal authoritarianism interspersed with failed experiments in constitutional government. The smaller Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Sikkim were left in an even more exposed position after the British retreat, particularly once the invasion of Tibet raised the

specter of frontier conflict with the PRC. Both accepted Indian client status as they emerged unsteadily into the modern world, with Sikkim ultimately proving untenable as an independent nation and choosing complete absorption into its giant southern neighbor in 1975. Aside from feudal microstates of this type, the end of the Raj also left South Asia with a scattering of colonial anachronisms. Most significant were the so-called princely states that had never been formally administered by British India, Kashmir being the most notorious of these. Most of the others voluntarily became Indian provinces at independence, but the large landlocked kingdom of Hyderabad refused to cooperate despite the hopelessness of its position, and a year-long standoff ensued that ended only when India sent in troops in 1948.

There were also lingering remnants of European colonization, notably the French Indian territories on the Coromandel Coast and Portugal's old factory concession at Goa. The former were painlessly integrated into India proper in 1954. The latter resisted decolonization until 1961, when Indian forces again moved in and unilaterally annexed the territory—another move difficult to reconcile with Nehru's much-touted renunciation of political force.

Alan Allport

See also

Bangladesh; Bhutto, Benazir; Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; Gandhi, Rajiv; India; India-Pakistan Wars; Jinnah, Mohamed Ali; Kashmir Dispute; Mountbatten, Louis, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Nepal; Pakistan; Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi; Sino-Indian Border Confrontations; Sri Lanka

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South Korea

See Korea, Republic of

South Vietnam

See Vietnam

Southeast Asia

World War II and the Cold War both had a dramatic impact on Southeast Asia. This region includes Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. While it was the scene of other conflicts, Southeast Asia also experienced two of the Cold War's most serious and prolonged armed conflicts: the Indochina War (1946–1954) and the Vietnam War (1959–1975).

The Cold War affected Southeast Asia in a strikingly different manner than it did Europe. For one thing, the effort by the colonial powers to reestablish their authority at the end of World War II gave stimulus to nationalist movements throughout a region that already contained significant communist elements. Also, unlike Europe, where the bipolar system remained static and rival alliances for the most part maintained their internal cohesion, Southeast Asia witnessed frequent shifts in alliances as national interests often trumped ideology. In its later stages, Machiavellian rather than ideological considerations marked the Cold War in Asia.

Vietnam saw the most intense and prolonged turmoil in the region during the Cold War. There in 1941, veteran communist Ho Chi Minh established an umbrella nationalist organization known as the Viet Minh to fight for Vietnamese independence from the French and Japanese. By the end of World War II, the Viet Minh had gained widespread popular support and had liberated much of Tonkin. Indeed, Ho formally declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in Hanoi in September 1945. When both the United States and the Soviet Union refused to assist North Vietnam, however, Ho was obliged to negotiate with the French authorities.

The determination of the French to reestablish their control over their richest colony in addition to mutual mistrust and the breakdown of talks in France led to open warfare between the French and Vietnamese nationalists in November 1946 and the beginning of what would be, in its French and U.S. phases, the longest shooting conflict of the Cold War. At the beginning of the Indochina War, the French easily established control over the population centers, but the Viet Minh controlled much of the countryside and increasing amounts of it as the war went on.

The establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 spelled defeat in the war for the French, for it opened up the long Vietnam-China border for resupply to the forces fighting the French. The PRC also provided training camps on its territory for the Viet Minh. The United States was increasingly drawn into the conflict in support of the French, not only because of communist Chinese support for the Viet Minh but also because of the

A French patrol questioning a suspected communist. The French Foreign Legion played a major combat role in the war against the Viet Minh. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Chinese military intervention in Korea. The French claimed that the two fronts of Korea and Indochina were interrelated. By the end of the Indochina War in 1954, the United States was paying some 80 percent of the cost of the war. The French also refused to grant true independence to Vietnam. They continued to control, down to the end of the war, the institutions of the State of Vietnam, which they created in 1949.

The war had become immensely unpopular in France, and the French defeat in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu allowed politicians in Paris to shift the blame to the generals and extricate the nation from the conflict. Under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam were all to be independent. Vietnam was temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel, with elections to reunify the country scheduled to occur in 1956.

President Dwight Eisenhower's administration firmly believed in the domino theory: if one Southeast Asian country became communist, the remainder would fall to communism. Determined to prevent further losses in Southeast Asia, U.S. policymakers decided to form a regional security alliance. On 8 September 1954, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Manila Pact, establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The signatories extended the alliance's collective security guarantees to Cambodia, Laos, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam).

The government of South Vietnam, headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem, refused to hold the elections called for by the Geneva Accords. The United States supported Diem in his stand. Viewing Vietnam through the history of communist regimes elsewhere, President Eisenhower was convinced that the communists would not abide by the democratic process. The decision not to hold the elections in South Vietnam led to a renewal of fighting, begun by Viet Minh political cadres who had remained in South Vietnam to prepare for the elections. The North Vietnamese government undertook to support the insurgency and then took over the entire direction of the war.

With the communists gaining ground in South Vietnam, President John F. Kennedy had to make difficult choices. He sent significant economic and military aid, along with several thousand U.S. advisors, helicopter pilots, and support personnel, to the Diem regime. Diem proved inept at running the war, and South Vietnamese forces failed to make any headway against the communists. With the tacit approval of Washington, South Vietnamese generals overthrew Diem in November 1963. In the short term, this brought more chaos and a revolving-door political leadership in South Vietnam.

Kennedy also had to deal with developments in Laos. A 1957 agreement had led to the creation of a coalition government there under neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma that included the communist Pathet Lao. The coalition collapsed in 1959, leading to a power struggle among the American-supported rightists, the neutralists, and the Pathet Lao supported by North Vietnam. Kennedy favored diplomacy rather than intervention by SEATO to resolve the problem.

A cease-fire in 1961, followed by another Geneva Conference in 1962, led to the establishment of a unified government and the neutralization of

A Soviet BTR-40 armored personnel carrier shown on Route 7 in northern Laos, October 1961. (U.S. Department of Defense)

the country. This arrangement soon broke down, however, with Pathet Lao forces supported by North Vietnam battling the neutralist regime. Thailand became critical of tentative U.S. policies that failed to check the Pathet Lao. Washington mollified Bangkok through increased military and economic aid, a secret agreement to defend Thailand, and the stationing of American forces in Thailand.

Meanwhile, the Vietnam War steadily escalated. With South Vietnamese communist Viet Cong (VC) attacks on U.S. bases, in 1965 President Lyndon Johnson dispatched first the Marines and then substantial numbers of army ground forces. At the height of the war in early 1968, the United States had more than half a million troops in Vietnam. In an effort to halt infiltration into South Vietnam, the United States extensively bombed both North Vietnam and Laos.

Laos, in fact, became the most heavily bombed country in the history of air warfare as the United States sought, without success, to halt infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail through eastern Laos into South Vietnam.

Haunted by fears of a repeat of the Korean War, when the PRC had entered the war with the UN invasion of North Korea, the administrations of Johnson and Richard Nixon never did contemplate an invasion of North Vietnam, which meant handing the strategic initiative to the North Vietnamese.

With public pressure in the United States mounting for an end to U.S. participation, especially after the communist Tet Offensive of January 1968 (ironically, a U.S.–South Vietnamese victory over the communists), President Nixon accelerated American troop withdrawals. To purchase more time for the program of turning over more of the war to the South Vietnamese (Vietnamization), Nixon expanded the war into Cambodia. The United States supported General Lon Nol's overthrow of the neutralist Norodom Sihanouk regime in Cambodia in March 1970 and conducted first secret bombing and then troop incursions by South Vietnamese and U.S. soldiers. These decisions helped to bring the communist Khmer Rouge to power in that country.

After finally reaching accord with Hanoi, in January 1973 the United States withdrew its forces from South Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese government largely to fend for itself. In April 1975, South Vietnam fell to a North Vietnamese military offensive. Vietnam was reunited under the communist government in Hanoi, and the long war was over.

During the remainder of the Cold War, the Vietnamese government picked up the pieces of the war and worked to integrate the capitalist South into the North's communist system, with varying success. Vietnam also invaded and occupied Cambodia (1978–1992), fought a brief war with the PRC in 1979, and worked to secure international recognition and trade with the noncommunist states of Asia. Relations with the United States remained difficult, and there were no formal diplomatic ties. Vietnam battled major problems, and economic success was obtained only with the decision by the leadership to allow limited private enterprise. Ironically, the South became the economic engine driving the remainder of the country. Vietnam did establish close ties with the Soviet Union, which took over former U.S. bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. In 1975, the Pathet Lao took over full control of Laos, making it a satellite of Hanoi, and the communist Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, decolonization proceeded relatively more peacefully. Indonesian rebels led by Sukarno proclaimed independence in the Dutch East Indies on 17 August 1945. When the Netherlands sent out military reinforcements and resorted to force to regain control over their colony, the Soviet Union sided with the Indonesians. American attitudes toward the struggle were at first ambivalent. Later fearful that Indonesia might move into the Soviet camp, Washington applied economic pressure on the Netherlands, and the Dutch finally capitulated. Indonesia became formally independent on 27 December 1949.

Indonesia's leaders embraced nonalignment, rejecting a 1950 proposal by the Philippines for an anticommunist Pacific Pact. A high point of Jakarta's diplomacy was the April 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states. The PRC and Indonesia used the occasion to solidify Chinese-Indonesian relations. Despite the resumption of American economic aid to Indonesia in

1956 and a visit by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, U.S.-Indonesian relations sharply deteriorated when the United States supported the Dutch in the dispute over West Irian in 1957 and, rejecting Indonesian requests for American arms, supported secessionist Sumatran rebels. Although Washington soon abandoned its support of the rebels and agreed to sell small arms to Indonesia, Sukarno turned to the Soviet bloc for aircraft, destroyers, and submarines. Following a visit by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to Indonesia in 1960, Jakarta became a leading recipient of Soviet-bloc economic and military aid.

Even before World War II, Washington had promised to grant the Philippines independence. Buoyed by this pledge, most Filipinos had remained loyal to the United States during the war, and the United States granted the archipelago its independence on 4 July 1946. The United States retained key military bases there, however, and the Philippines remained under the U.S. defense umbrella throughout the Cold War as a key component in Washington's offshore defensive line to contain the PRC. Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base on the islands, the largest U.S. military facilities outside U.S. territory, proved indispensable during the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, however, U.S. policy toward the Philippines encouraged political repression and economic stagnation. The Ferdinand Marcos regime was a prime example. In power continuously during 1965–1986, Marcos savagely repressed his political opponents, subverted the democratic process, and bilked the government of billions of dollars. Meanwhile, most Filipinos lived in abject poverty. The United States tolerated and supported Marcos because of Cold War imperatives. When his rule became truly intolerable by late 1985, Filipinos rose up and forced Marcos and his spend-thrift wife Imelda to flee to the United States in February 1986.

Racked by civil war and under military rule throughout much of the Cold War, Burma's only direct involvement in the Cold War came soon after its independence in 1948. In late 1949, following the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) defeat in the Chinese Civil War, remnant GMD forces entered Burma. Using arms and supplies air-dropped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), they sustained their futile and clandestine activities until 1961.

In 1948, an insurgency by members of the pre–World War II Communist Party, mainly of Chinese ethnicity, who had served as the only real active guerrilla opposition to the Japanese, began in the Federation of Malaya. The guerrillas sought to carry out a war of liberation along Maoist lines against the British. Calling themselves the Malaysian Races' Liberation Army (MRLA), the communists enlisted the support of other Chinese in the colony. The insurgency reached a high point in 1952 with the assassination of High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney. Tough new British measures brought the insurgency under control by 1960.

In 1963 the Malay Federation, which had become independent in 1957, became the Federation of Malaysia with the addition of Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. Indonesia opposed its formation and initiated a low-intensity, undeclared war, known as the Konfrontasi, against Malaysia. The Western

powers supported Malaysia. In 1968, Britain announced the impending closure of its bases in Malaysia and Singapore as part of its decision to withdraw its forces from east of the Suez.

U.S.-Indonesian relations improved temporarily after the Kennedy administration mediated a final settlement of the West Irian issue in 1962. In the Sino-Soviet schism, Indonesia sided with Beijing. After an abortive coup by some pro-Chinese military officers with ties to the Indonesian Communist Party, the Indonesian Army ousted Sukarno from power in 1966. A massacre of suspected communists followed. With the strongly anticommunist army dominating, Indonesia moved away from the PRC, suspending diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1967. Indonesia also ended its confrontation with Malaysia and moved closer to the U.S. camp while remaining technically nonaligned.

In Thailand, the sole Southeast Asian state not under prior colonial rule but nonetheless dominated by Japan during World War II, the army overthrew the elected government in November 1947, alleging antiroyalist plotting by procommunist elements. In April 1948, the army restored Thailand's wartime prime minister, Phibunsongkhram (Phibun). His anti-Chinese and anticommunist policies endeared him to the United States, despite his record of collaboration with Japan in World War II. Thailand became a staunch American ally in the Cold War and received extensive U.S. financial and military assistance. Thailand was in fact the first Asian nation to send troops to the Korean War.

Led by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge regime unleashed a savage policy to return Cambodia, renamed Kampuchea, back to the Middle Ages.

Meanwhile, disillusioned with SEATO and unwilling to see themselves used as pawns in the superpower game, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand began in the early 1960s to explore the formation of a regional organization of their own. As such, they established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967. At its Kuala Lumpur summit in 1971, ASEAN proposed establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the region.

The East-West stage of the Cold War in Southeast Asia ended with the domino theory only partly fulfilled. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became communist, but no state outside of the former French Indochina fell to communism. Having defeated the United States, the victors began fighting among themselves. In Vietnam, the remainder of the Cold War saw the leadership of that state endeavoring to extricate the country from the consequences of its success against the United States.

In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge entered the capital of Phnom Penh in April 1975 on the departure of Lon Nol and the Americans. Led by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge regime unleashed a savage policy to return Cambodia, renamed Kampuchea, back to the Middle Ages. The Khmer Rouge in effect waged genocide against its population. The massacre of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and clashes with Vietnamese forces along the border between the two states brought the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea beginning in December 1978. Vietnam set up a puppet government and sought to wipe out the remnants of the Khmer Rouge, now actively supported by Thailand and the PRC and indirectly by the United States.

In 1982, a coalition of Cambodian resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, headed by Prince Sihanouk and supported by the PRC and Thailand, assumed Cambodia's UN seat with the backing of ASEAN and the West. The Vietnam-backed regime in Phnom Penh never gained international legitimacy, despite the fact that it had ended one of the most brutal regimes in modern times. In 1992, under heavy international pressure and with Hanoi having settled on other priorities, Vietnamese forces were withdrawn. Negotiations among the warring Cambodian factions proved long and difficult, however.

As the Cold War came to an end, ASEAN emerged as a vibrant community. The new realities of the post–Cold War era became further evident as countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia fretted that the complete Soviet withdrawal from the region would invite interference by the PRC. By the time the Cold War ended, forty-five years of interstate and intrastate wars in Southeast Asia had combined to create one of history's great human tragedies. The wars and immense loss of life had continuing effects, especially on the Indochinese states. Democracy became one of the casualties of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. While the Soviets and Chinese supported communist factions favoring their line wherever they existed, the West often sided with authoritarian regimes, overlooking their oppressive and corrupt domestic policies as long as they opposed communism. Communist treatment of political opponents was matched by anticommunist witch-hunts in Thailand and Indonesia.

With a skull on the muzzle of his M-16 rifle, a Khmer Rouge soldier waits with his comrades for the word to move out from Dei Kraham, some 12 miles south of Phnom Penh, during an operation along Highway 2 on 5 September 1973. (Bettmann/Corbis)

While the Cold War progressed, some of the Southeast Asian states made rapid economic strides. By the end of the Cold War, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and above all Singapore were leaders of the Asian economic miracle. Vietnam was actively seeking to join them. Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and the Philippines, however, were still plagued by stagnant economies and political instability. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia appeared set on emulating Europe, the Cold War's original theater, in progressing toward regional cooperation and prosperity rather than interstate rivalry and economic hardship.

Appu K. Soman and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Burma; Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Domino Theory; Geneva Conference (1954); Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Indonesia; Khmer Rouge; Laos; Malaysia; Ngo Dinh Diem; Philippines; Singapore; Sino-Vietnamese War; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Sukarno; Tet Offensive; Thailand; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Multilateral, regional political and mutual security alliance among eight nations: the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed in Manila on 8 September 1954. A supplementary Pacific Charter, declaring the self-determination of Asian peoples, accompanied SEATO's formation. While the charter established principles of economic, social, and cultural cooperation among signatory nations, SEATO's main goal was collective security. Member states agreed to defend one another and other designated nations against aggression from external or internal threats.

Established only weeks after the end of the 1954 Geneva Conference, SEATO was created in the wake of the French withdrawal from Indochina. The organization was the brainchild of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who hoped that the alliance would fill the void left by France's retreat and prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. SEATO also represented the first binding commitment by the United States to the defense of the region. Moreover, it came alongside expanded efforts by President Dwight Eisenhower's administration to build a viable regime in the southern half of Vietnam.

SEATO's structure and focus were problematic from the start. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), SEATO had no standing military force, and its membership included only two Southeast Asian nations. Thus, the organization was not truly representative of the region as a whole. The exclusion of Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya—all facing significant communist insurgencies—was a glaring weakness. In addition, the inclusion of Pakistan stirred the anger of India, driving it farther away from the Western

The national delegations of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) meet at the Social Hall of Malacanang Park in Manila, the Philippines, on 8 September 1954. (Bettmann/Corbis)

bloc. British and French participation was viewed as anachronistic by Asian members, an unwelcome remnant of European imperialism.

London and Paris viewed SEATO and its role quite differently than did Washington. The British did not fully share American convictions about the threat posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Southeast Asia. Nor did the British see the French defeat in Indochina as an absolute failure, as did U.S. officials. The British also hoped that SEATO would serve as the basis for a broader, regional nonaggression pact, perhaps eventually initiating détente with China. For their part, the French were never very interested in SEATO, especially given their humiliation in Indochina.

Equally troubling was Thailand's viewpoint. The Thais initially hoped that SEATO signaled a genuine commitment to fight communism on their doorstep, but they soon lost faith in it. Bangkok was chosen as SEATO headquarters, and in many ways Thailand, on the front lines of the communist advance, was the centerpiece of the organization. But against the backdrop of the worsening crisis in Laos, by the early 1960s Thai leaders saw SEATO as little more than a paper tiger.

CENTO AND SEATO



The crux of the problem for Thailand, and often the United States, was the rule of unanimity incorporated into the SEATO voting structure. The Thais frequently proposed forceful SEATO action against communism in the region, including resolutions approving the deployment of military forces to Laos and Vietnam by member states. The French and British refused to endorse such actions, however. Despite their anticommunist rhetoric, Pakistan and the Philippines also eschewed such commitments. SEATO planning sessions, training exercises, and joint military maneuvers were held annually, but behind this façade of unity the organization was paralyzed by dissension.

Few American officials saw SEATO as anything more than a military alliance. Dulles and others hoped that SEATO provisions in the Geneva Agreements would circumvent the barring of aid to Indochina. With this in mind, the Americans insisted that SEATO declare the intention to maintain a "protective area" over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), Laos, and Cambodia. Problems soon arose with other members over how this should be fulfilled. For the United States, SEATO was the principal mechanism through which military support for South Vietnam could be justified.

By the early 1960s, U.S. policymakers had less ambitious plans for SEATO. Presidents Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy both hoped that SEATO would resolve its difficulties and represent a viable alternative to unilateral commitments in the region, but as its ineffectiveness became ever more apparent, the emphasis in Washington shifted to maintaining the alliance for symbolic purposes. It was believed that the organization would at least help combat defeatism among governments in the region.

SEATO was not, however, entirely ineffective. Under the auspices of its military planning and training exercises, the Americans developed a considerable array of covert and overt operations in Thailand for use in Indochina. Washington also later used the organization to solicit commitments from Australia and Thailand to send troops to Vietnam. Moreover, although member states knew SEATO to be generally ineffective, the specter of unified military intervention by SEATO signatories may have in fact prevented more significant PRC and Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) support for communist insurgencies in the region.

In Indochina, however, by the mid-1960s SEATO was obviously toothless. As U.S. troops began pouring into Vietnam after 1965, France and Pakistan refused to sanction American policy, openly signaling SEATO's grave limitations. As the war intensified and expanded, even the pretensions of SEATO cohesion evaporated. American commitments to Asian member states, and those in the so-called protective area, were governed almost exclusively by bilateral agreements rather than by SEATO itself.

As U.S. forces began their withdrawal from Southeast Asia in the early 1970s, SEATO fell apart. Embroiled in its continuing conflict with India, Pakistan formally withdrew in November 1973. France followed in June 1974. Following the communist victories in Indochina in early 1975, the remaining members decided to disband the organization in September 1975. SEATO was finally dissolved in February 1977.

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See also

Domino Theory; Dulles, John Foster; Geneva Conference (1954); Indochina War; Vietnam War

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Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

Southern African regional organization designed initially to foster political stability and security, later expanded to encourage economic development. In 1980 nine states in southern Africa sought to lessen their dependency on the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Lusaka Declaration of 7 August 1979 brought the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) into being to enhance political stability and national security. In 1992 it changed its name to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and under the Treaty of Windhoek of 17 August 1992 shifted from political ends to economic ones. After 1996, SADC was based on free trade principles.

South Africa abandoned apartheid in 1991 and joined SADC in 1994. Mauritius joined in 1995, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Seychelles in September 1997. The fourteen SADC countries as of 2006 were Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Economic growth created disunity as each new member sought its own direction, and the SADC was unable to forge unanimity. SADC economies depend largely on raw materials production and as such have little to trade with each other. Indigenous industries are highly vulnerable to outside competition, which the organization has been powerless to control. Each SADC member has its own needs, commitment, and capacity, although all members share a general economic weakness. Many member nations have ties to larger groups such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a customs union, and the European Union (EU). The SADC remains a weak organization unable to overcome the legacies of historical conflict, colonialism, and chronic underdevelopment.

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See also
Africa; Decolonization

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Souvanna Phouma, Prince
(1901–1984)

Lao prince and premier of Laos (1951–1954, 1956–1958, 1960, 1962–1975). Born in Luang Prabang on 7 October 1901, the son of Prince Bounkhong, viceroy of the Kingdom of Luang Prabang, and Princess Thongsi, Souvanna Phouma received his secondary education in Hanoi. He then studied in France, earning degrees in architectural engineering from the University of Paris and in electrical engineering from the University of Grenoble.

Returning to Laos, Souvanna Phouma entered the Public Works Service in 1931 at Vientiane and by 1945 headed that body. In 1945, following the Japanese surrender, when his half brother, Prince Phetsarath, formed an independent government, Souvanna Phouma joined it as a minister, along with another half brother, Prince Souvannaphong. Upon the return of the French, the three men and other nationalist ministers fled to Thailand.

When the French granted greater liberties to Laos, Souvanna Phouma returned. He favored gradual Lao independence, unlike Princes Souvannaphong and Phetsarath who advocated radical change. Souvannaphong subsequently joined the Pathet Lao (Country of Lao), which supported a communist revolution. In November 1951, Souvanna Phouma became premier, his party having won sixteen of thirty-five seats in the Lao national election. He remained in power through the end of the Indochina War, until October 1954. He became premier again in March 1956, pledging to integrate the Pathet Lao into the government, a policy strongly opposed by the United States.

Negotiations with the Pathet Lao yielded an agreement at the end of 1957, but following victory by the Pathet Lao's political party, the Neo Lao Hak Set, in the national elections of 1958, Souvanna Phouma resigned in July and became ambassador to France.

Souvanna Phouma returned to Laos in 1960 and was briefly premier that August following a coup by Royal Lao Army Captain Kong Le. The government then fell into the hands of rightists backed by the United States. That

December, Souvanna Phouma fled to Phnom Penh, claiming to be the legitimate premier. He subsequently set up headquarters at Khang Khay on the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.

Following sporadic fighting between the Lao factions, a cease-fire was negotiated in May 1961, followed by a fourteen-nation conference in Geneva in June. Agreement there led to Souvanna Phouma being named premier of the coalition government.

But both sides violated the spirit of the Geneva Accords. Rightists and their American backers considered Souvanna Phouma a communist sympathizer, or at best terribly naive. They eventually accepted his leadership but, fearing communist influence, successive U.S. administrations pursued covert operations against the Pathet Lao alongside diplomacy. This secret war in Laos paralleled the Vietnam War. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) also fought a secret war by supporting the Pathet Lao and using Lao territory to supply insurgents in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The coalition eventually collapsed, but Souvanna Phouma remained as premier and eventually received U.S. support. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and the Pathet Lao, meanwhile, fought U.S.-supported Hmong irregulars under General Vang Pao.

The Lao government collapsed altogether in December 1975. Souvanna Phouma, who was in poor health (he had suffered a heart attack in July 1974), resigned and was named to the honorific post of advisor to the government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. He died in Vientiane on 11 January 1984.

Arne Kislenko and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Indochina War; Laos; Southeast Asia; Souvannaphong, Prince; Viet Minh; Vietnam War

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Souvannaphong, Prince
(1909–1995)

Minister of planning (1956–1958), deputy prime minister and economic minister (1962–1963), first president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (1975–1986), and one of the three princes who, along with Souvanna Phouma and Bounoum, dominated politics in Laos during the Cold War. Born in

Luang Prabang on 13 July 1909, Prince Souvannaphong (Souphanouvong) was highly intelligent. He spoke eight languages, studied engineering in Hanoi and in Paris, and was a certified civil engineer. Unlike those of his half brothers Souvanna Phouma and Phetsarath, Souvannaphong's mother was a commoner. Some believe that this turned him against royalty, although a more likely explanation was the influence of communist revolutions in China and Vietnam.

At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Souvannaphong was at Vinh in Vietnam. He then traveled to Hanoi, where he met Ho Chi Minh. Ho sent Souvannaphong to Savannakhet in Laos to rally anti-French forces there. Serving with the nationalist Lao Issara (Free Lao) movement, Souvannaphong was wounded fighting the French in 1946. In 1949 he presided over the formation of the communist-dominated Lao resistance movement, the Pathet Lao (Country of Lao), fighting the French. He also secretly joined the Indochinese Communist Party in 1954, although he was always careful to declare himself a neutralist.

For more than twenty years, Souvannaphong was the public face of the Pathet Lao, supporting its claim as a nationalist movement. During 1956–1958 he served as minister of planning in a coalition government led by Souvanna Phouma. When rightists seized power in 1960, Souvannaphong was imprisoned, although his dramatic escape that May helped win popular support for the Pathet Lao.

Prince Souvannaphong, first president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, shown here in December 1975. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The 1962 Geneva Accords provided for another coalition government under Souvanna Phouma, and Souvannaphong served as deputy prime minister and minister of the economy. However, continuing power struggles forced his resignation in April 1963.

Souvannaphong remained politically important as the crucial link between communists and the royal family, with whom the Pathet Lao never openly broke. In September 1973 he joined the new Consultative Council in a coalition government under Souvanna Phouma but dominated by communists. When the Pathet Lao finally seized power in 1975, Souvannaphong secured the abdication of the Lao King Savang Vatthana. That December, Souvannaphong was named president of the new Lao republic, although real power rested with the Communist Party. He held the ceremonial post until his resignation in 1986. Souvannaphong died at Vientiane, Laos, on 9 January 1995.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Ho Chi Minh; Laos; Southeast Asia; Souvanna Phouma, Prince; Viet Minh

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Soviet Union

A large, ethnically diverse Eurasian nation slightly less than 2.5 times the size of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviet Union) was formed in 1922 and dissolved in 1991. Since 1940, it was divided into fifteen constituent or union republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia, Tadzhikstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). The Soviet Union abutted twelve nations, six in Asia and six in Europe. To the south, its Asian neighbors were the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. To the west, Soviet European neighbors included Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, and Finland. To the north the Soviet Union bordered on the Arctic Ocean, and to the east it bordered on the North Pacific Ocean. Its population in 1945 was 145–150 million people.

As the world's leading communist power during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the principal antagonist and opponent of the United States. Tensions between the two powers dated back to the revolution and civil war that led to the creation of the Soviet Union. It was not until 1933 that the U.S. government extended diplomatic recognition, and relations remained chilly until 1941, when the two powers found themselves on the same side of the war against Germany. As World War II drew to a close, however, lingering mistrust between the two reappeared and, combined with fundamental ideological differences, led to the Cold War.

The principal postwar goal of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Josef Stalin was national security. Stalin sought to acquire territorial buffer zones that would provide physical defense against first Germany and then any possible Western attack. Soviet leaders believed that this, along with reparations to restore the shattered economy and society of the Soviet Union, was the least they deserved for their role in defeating Germany. At the same time, they hoped to secure and expand the future of communist ideology by surrounding the Soviet Union with like-minded regimes. Although his policies appear to have been fundamentally motivated by practical concerns of national security, Stalin was also a convinced socialist who saw the future in Marxian terms as a struggle between capitalism and communism.

In domestic politics, immediately after the war Stalin attempted to restore the party line. Prisoners of war returning from the West who might have

Columns of Moscow workers entering Red Square in 1948 during a mass demonstration in honor of the thirty-first anniversary of the Communist Revolution of November 1917. (Library of Congress)

been infected with dangerous ideologies were sent to the gulags. The leniency shown in Soviet culture during the war, when nationalism and orthodoxy were allowed to flourish in order to rally the populace, quickly disappeared. In 1946, Soviet authorities launched the Zhdanovschina, a campaign named for Leningrad party boss Andrei Zhdanov intended to force artists, writers, and other cultural figures to follow strict Stalinist ideals in their works. Three years later, Stalin used the excuse of Zhdanov's death to launch a purge of the Leningrad party apparatus. Yet another major purge was being prepared in 1953, indicating that Stalin remained intent on bending the nation and the party to his will.

In the international arena though, it is clear now that the Soviets knew they were not dealing from strength at the outset of the Cold War. In addition to vast property destruction, the Soviet Union had lost 25–27 million people dead in World War II, and it faced a United States that possessed nuclear weapons. As a counter, the Red Army was in physical possession of much of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Allies had allowed the Soviet Union to annex eastern Poland. To secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan, the British and U.S. governments also agreed to allow the Soviet Union to annex the Kurile Islands (which had never been Russian territory) and southern Sakhalin Island and to receive concessions in the Liaodong Peninsula of China (which included Darien and Port Arthur).

Stalin's initial pragmatic approach led him to withdraw Soviet forces from northern Iran in 1946, to disassociate himself from the communist rebellion in Greece, and to try to rein in the Chinese communists. The Soviets' inability to reach an acceptable agreement regarding the future of Germany, however, gradually drove Stalin to take a harder ideological line. Recent archival revelations indicate that Stalin desired a unified Germany that would be friendly toward, if not completely within, the Soviet sphere of influence.

Already in control of Poland and the remainder of Eastern Europe, after 1945 the Soviets exerted their influence within their zone of occupation in Germany. Harsh actions by the occupying Red Army had alienated most Germans. Soviet occupation authorities also shipped off to the Soviet Union anything of value, including entire factories. German prisoners of war also remained in the Soviet Union as slave laborers, some of them until 1955, while thousands of other Germans were also sent to the Soviet Union to serve in the same capacity.

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Stalin avoided any blatant displays of disagreement over Germany until the spring of 1947, when the announcement of the Marshall Plan apparently convinced him that the United States was trying to build an industrial base in Western Europe for future attacks against communism. The Soviet response was to blockade Berlin, which lay deep within the Soviet zone. The Soviets hoped to win support by providing food and energy to the population and to force the Allies from the city, which they could then use as a bargaining chip. British and American resolve, manifested in the Berlin Airlift and a counterblockade of the Soviet zone, forced Stalin to admit defeat in May 1949.

Even before that, however, the Soviets had subtly abandoned their policy of accommodation. In September 1947, Stalin orchestrated the creation of the Communist Informational Bureau (Cominform), a renewal of the Communist International that had been abandoned during World War II as a gesture of goodwill. During 1948–1949, the carefully balanced and "democratic" governments of states within the Soviet sphere were purged of any potential opposition to Soviet control, even by native communists. The new loyal regimes assented to the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the Soviet substitute for the Marshall Plan, in January 1949.

The Soviet zone of occupation in Germany quickly evolved into a separate state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), which the Soviet Union recognized in October 1949. Meanwhile, bloody purges occurred in the governments of Eastern Europe as Stalin tightened Soviet control of the region.

Even as the Iron Curtain rang down in Europe, the Soviet Union faced a new challenge in Asia. In 1949 the Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong emerged triumphant in the long struggle for power in China, establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. Although the Soviet Union publicly welcomed the arrival of a second communist power and championed Mao's regime in the United Nations (UN), Stalin was less than delighted. Not only had he failed in his attempt to subjugate the Chinese communist movement, but Mao's ideology challenged the hegemony of

Successor States to the Soviet Union

Soviet communism in the international arena. When Mao visited Moscow in the winter of 1949–1950, Stalin initially refused to treat with him. The fear that China might emerge as the leader of Asian communism not only led Stalin to relent in January 1950 but also influenced his decision to support the national ambitions of Kim Il Sung, the communist leader of North Korea. Meanwhile, in August 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb.

With substantial Soviet military assistance and the support of the PRC, in June 1950 North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). The Soviets' absence from the UN General Assembly (in protest over the refusal to allow Mao's regime to assume the Chinese seat) allowed the United States to marshal international support in what was the UN's first war. In October, the PRC entered the war. The Soviet Union provided air defense for China proper, but Mao was angry that this did not include air support for Chinese forces within Korea, which he believed he had been promised.

While Stalin's maneuvers preserved at least the appearance of Soviet ideological leadership and communist solidarity, the costs were significant. Fearing monolithic communist power bent on world domination, the Western Allies rallied together. They opened negotiations to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and bring it into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to defend against any communist aggression in Europe. The United States also signed a separate peace treaty with Japan, pairing it with a defense treaty that not only denied the Soviet Union de jure recognition of its territorial acquisitions in Asia but also provided military

bases to support the American strategy of containment. Although Stalin attempted to regain the initiative by proposing a united, neutral Germany in March 1952, there was little hope of this being accepted. When the Soviet dictator died in March 1953 the Cold War was at its peak, with a proxy war going on in Korea and both sides racing to build up their armaments in case a hot war should break out.

In the uncertainty that followed, Stalin's successors moved quickly to lessen tensions both domestically and internationally. Although both Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin's notoriously hard-line foreign minister, and Lavrenty Beria, the infamous head of the Soviet secret police, were in the initial group that succeeded the dictator, it was Georgy Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev who really directed policy. Both men favored pragmatic politics and better relations with the West. They lowered food prices and shifted somewhat the focus of the Soviet economy from industrial goods to consumer products. The purge already in progress, the so-called Doctors' Plot, was curtailed, and the accused were released. Thousands of other inmates from Stalin's camps also received their freedom. Beria himself, however, was arrested, tried in secret, and executed.

The thaw in the ideological battle also extended to foreign affairs. In July 1953 an armistice was concluded in Korea, and a year later, Soviet concessions led to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, breaking a decade-long deadlock over the future of that state. Khrushchev, who had emerged as the dominant figure in the new Soviet leadership, reconciled with Josip Broz Tito and visited Belgrade. In 1955 the nations of Eastern Europe signed the Warsaw Pact, pledging mutual defense. That July, Khrushchev met with Western leaders in Geneva in an attempt to mitigate tensions. Then, in February 1956 Khrushchev denounced Stalin's policies and methods in his famed "secret speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Similar criticisms of Stalinist policy immediately after the dictator's death had led to an uprising in East Germany on 16–17 June 1953. The new accusations caused rebellions first in Poland and then in Hungary. Popular protests against the Soviet occupation forced the Red Army to withdraw from Budapest. When protracted negotiations failed to produce a solution and Imre Nagy announced that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, however, in November 1956 Khrushchev ordered in the Soviet Army, which suppressed the rebellion in bloody street fighting. This Soviet action and the inaction of the Western powers, who were distracted by the concurrent Suez Crisis, made it clear that the spheres of influence delineated after the war would not be challenged.

The rest of the world, however, was under contention. Khrushchev's adopted philosophy of peaceful coexistence held that war between the superpowers was neither inevitable nor desirable but that competition was allowed. He and other members of the Soviet leadership accordingly traveled extensively, offering friendship and Soviet aid. In 1955, Khrushchev and President Nikolai Bulganin had visited India, Burma, and Afghanistan. When Fidel Castro's revolutionary movement gained power in Cuba in 1959, Khrushchev

was quick to recognize the regime as an ally and proffer assistance. A new Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact extended large-scale technical and financial aid to China in 1959 as well. Khrushchev's largest and best-known venture in this regard, however, was to subsidize construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, extending Soviet influence into the Middle East.

Khrushchev sincerely believed that the Soviet economy could overtake the United States, prove the superiority of communist doctrine, and provide an attractive model for third world nations to emulate. He initiated a series of reforms with this aim in mind, beginning in 1957 with the reorganization of the central economic ministries of the Soviet Union. The following year saw an adjustment in state investment priorities, and in 1959 the Soviet Union adopted a new, aggressive Seven-Year Plan designed to increase agricultural output and production of consumer goods. The Soviet leader was so confident of success that he allowed an exhibit of the American way of life in Moscow in 1959, where he engaged U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon in the famed Kitchen Debate on the merits of the two economic systems. In September of that year, Khrushchev became the first Soviet leader to visit the United States.



Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev watching the May Day parade in Red Square in Moscow on 1 May 1963. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Although Khrushchev had his successes, most notably in space (which he had aggressively promoted) with the launch of *Sputnik I* in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin's orbiting of Earth in 1960, the Soviet Union made little progress economically. Khrushchev's highly touted Virgin Lands program to vastly expand the cultivated areas of Soviet Central Asia was a failure. His rapprochement with the United States angered the Chinese, who accused the Soviets of revisionism. Mao argued in 1960 that even nuclear war would be preferable to peaceful dealings with the United States.

U.S.-Soviet relations remained tense throughout the period, though, thanks largely to Khrushchev's habit of fomenting crisis as a matter of policy. The Soviets produced their own hydrogen bomb in August 1953, and four years later they successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering such weapons to the U.S. mainland. Khrushchev used the missile threat liberally, convincing many Western analysts that the Soviet Union had in fact surpassed the United States in that area. He also revisited the issue of Berlin in November 1958, threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the Allies did not sign a treaty recognizing the existence of two Germanies and "the free city of West Berlin." The Soviet leader intended to use the city as a lever to open talks with the United States that he believed would lead to a European settlement and perhaps even the end of the Cold War. Although no progress was made even on smaller issues, a 1959 meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower was cordial enough and seemed to bode well for the future.

Corn-growing brigade leader A. G. Nee at Sverdlov Collective Farm in Tashkent Oblast, Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, July 1960. (Library of Congress)

It did not help Khrushchev's cause, however, when the Soviets shot down a U.S. U-2 spy plane on 1 May 1960. The event scuttled a second summit with Eisenhower, and when Khrushchev did meet with President John F. Kennedy in June 1961, progress was limited by the Soviet leader's condescending attitude. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, in combination with renewed Soviet nuclear testing, also helped curtail any realistic chance for an understanding with the United States.

The final blow to Khrushchev's aspirations, however, came with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Hoping to steal a march on the Americans and force them to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal in the game of global power politics, Khrushchev had arranged for the placement of Soviet missiles on Cuba, only 120 miles from the coast of Florida. American intelligence discovered the installations before the missiles could be deployed, and in early October 1962 Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent the arrival of additional weaponry. After a period where the world held its breath while Soviet cargo ships approached the Caribbean and nuclear war seemed imminent, Khrushchev backed down. The Soviet ships bearing the weapons and their support systems returned to the Soviet Union. This humiliation, combined with the failure of several domestic economic reforms in the early 1960s, finally convinced the other members of the Soviet Presidium that Khrushchev had to go, and he was duly removed in October 1964.

As in 1953–1954, the change in leadership brought uncertainty and change to Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, in particular, loosened once again as pressure for reform mounted in Moscow. In Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, new economic systems emphasizing market mechanisms instead of centralized control came into effect by 1968. Alexander Dubček, who became leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) in January 1968, boldly permitted political reforms as well.

By allowing independent pressure groups and relative freedom of the press, Dubček hoped to create "socialism with a human face," an aim not far off Khrushchev's desire for communism led by economic success. Like Khrushchev, Dubček miscalculated the effect of his policy. The new Soviet leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev was not prepared to tolerate such developments. Soviet tanks rolled into Prague on the night of 20–21 August 1968, bringing an end to the so-called Prague Spring and to most hopes of reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet Union allowed Poland to raise loans in the West to facilitate economic expansion in 1970, the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 emphatically restated the principle of 1956 that Soviet influence remained supreme in that sphere.

Although that statement of policy went unchallenged by the West, it stirred dissent among other communist states. Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia all condemned the Soviet action. Only sixty-one of seventy-five nations attending a June 1969 meeting in Moscow agreed to sign the main protocol. China denounced the Soviet Union in strident terms, and skirmishes along the Siberian border between the two powers raised the possibility of open warfare between the two communist giants.

On all other fronts, however, Brezhnev and his cronies were more successful in pursuing Khrushchev's foreign policy than Khrushchev himself had been. Soviet friendship with Cuba remained warm, and the Soviet Union pursued close ties with India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. Relations with West Germany also improved, and a treaty recognizing both German states was signed in 1970. While Soviet-supported Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) forces wore down U.S. and Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) forces in South Vietnam, Brezhnev repeatedly trumpeted the Soviet Union's support for national liberation movements everywhere. The Soviet Union joined Cuba in sending aid to liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique.

Despite these Soviet adventures, relations with the United States were cordial enough to merit an upgrade from peaceful coexistence to détente. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and began the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) in 1969. The resulting Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed in 1972. Visits between American and Soviet leaders became a fairly regular occurrence, with President Nixon visiting Moscow in 1972 and 1974, while Brezhnev came to New York in 1973. In 1975, both states signed the Helsinki Final Act, culminating several years of negotiations on questions of European boundaries and human rights.

Tensions did not, of course, disappear completely. In 1977 the Soviet Union stationed new SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. The United States retaliated by introducing cruise missiles to bases in West Germany and the United Kingdom and sent new Pershing missiles to West Germany as well. A second round of SALT prevented crisis and also reaffirmed the policy of détente by reaching a tentative agreement on missile placement in Europe in 1979.

Whatever goodwill existed between the two states in the 1970s, however, dissipated in the wake of the Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. U.S. President Jimmy Carter ordered an immediate increase in defense spending, and détente collapsed. The ideological divide between the two superpowers deepened when Ronald Reagan won the presidency in November 1980 and again when the Soviet Union approved the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. Even Brezhnev's death in November 1982 and another transition period failed to halt the Cold War.

As it had in 1953 and in 1964, Soviet policy moved toward reform and compromise during the period of transitional leadership. Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, strove to revitalize the Soviet system by introducing new discipline. He implemented anticorruption and antidrinking programs,

introduced new measures to ensure punctuality in the workplace, and commissioned studies for sweeping economic restructuring. To gain the requisite fiscal breathing space, he also attempted to resuscitate détente. He called for a summit with Reagan, proposed further reductions in nuclear arms, suggested a nuclear test ban, and, most startlingly, in January 1983 offered the possibility of a treaty forswearing attack.

Reagan responded by announcing the funding of research on a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the so-called Star Wars system for space defenses against any missile attack, in March 1983. Andropov refused to believe that any such system would be purely defensive, and suspicions mounted on both sides. It appeared that relations might reach crisis proportions when the Soviets shot down a South Korean airliner, flight KAL Flight 007, that strayed into Soviet airspace on 1 September 1983. Diplomats on both sides acted quickly to defuse the situation but were unable to renew the thaw of the 1970s. Any chances of further progress were forestalled by Andropov's declining health and death in February 1984 and then by the illness and incompetence of his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, an octogenarian who suffered from emphysema and lived only until March 1985.

The man who succeeded Chernenko, however, moved with speed great enough to make up for both his predecessors. A protégé of Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachev was known as a reformer, a practical intellectual, and an ambitious man of action. He had traveled in Western Europe, and both he and his wife Raisa appeared at ease in Western society, a marked difference from all Soviet leaders since Lenin. Gorbachev was, however, a committed socialist. He believed that vigorous reforms would prove the viability of the system and that Soviet communism and capitalism could coexist peacefully even as they competed economically.

Gorbachev's initial moves thus came in domestic policy with attempts to revitalize Soviet agriculture and manufacturing through a program of acceleration (uskorenie) and openness (glasnost). These soon gave way to a general restructuring (perestroika) that included foreign affairs and especially Eastern Europe. As Andropov had, Gorbachev sought on the one hand a respite from the arms race and from international distractions. On the other hand, he also believed that a reformed and reenergized Soviet socialist economy could deal with the challenges of the United States and world capitalism. If the United States would not negotiate, he would act unilaterally.

Gorbachev stated his intention to reverse the long-standing Soviet policy of controlling internal developments in the states of Central and Eastern Europe at a meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in March 1985 and initiated plans to extricate the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in October. He had cordial meetings with President Reagan in Geneva in November 1985 and in Reykjavík, Iceland, in October 1986. At the second meeting, he briefly won Reagan's agreement that all nuclear weapons on both sides should be destroyed within a decade before U.S. advisors effectively vetoed the accord. Negotiations continued, however, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty stipulating the destruction of all ground-based nuclear weapons of a particular range was signed in December 1987. In April 1988,

the Soviet Union pledged to withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year, and Gorbachev later announced a 10 percent reduction in the size of the Soviet Army that would coincide with the recall of six Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe.

These measures led to the end of the Cold War, but not in the way that Gorbachev imagined. The leaders of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe felt betrayed by Gorbachev's initiatives, while nationalists and dissidents within the Soviet Union used their new freedom to explore various means of escaping Russian domination. The Baltic states, citing the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 that Gorbachev had made public, clamored for independence. Large public demonstrations for independence also occurred in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

By the middle of 1989, the movement for independence and democracy had spread to Eastern Europe. Poland held free, if limited, elections in June 1989 that the opposition won handily. In September, the Hungarian government dismantled its fortified frontier with Austria and permitted free movement across the border. Thousands of East Germans exploited this loophole to escape to the West, while thousands of others demonstrated in the streets of Leipzig and other East German cities. Erich Honecker resigned as chairman of the East German Council of State in October 1989. The Berlin Wall, long a symbol of the divided world of the Cold War, came down the next month. The communist leaders of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia stepped down, and Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu was overthrown and executed.

A woman holding a sign above the crowd at a Ukrainian proindependence rally in 1991. (Peter Turnley/Corbis)

The Soviet Union did nothing. Within eighteen months, it too would cease to exist, unable to either reform or sustain the communist system that had existed since 1918. And with that, the Cold War, the ideological divide that had held the world in thrall for nearly fifty years, came to a close.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Afghanistan; Andropov, Yuri; Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Austrian State Treaty; Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Brezhnev, Leonid; Castro, Fidel; Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich; China, People's Republic of; Comecon; Cominform; Containment Policy; Cuban Missile Crisis; Détente; East Berlin Uprising; Gagarin, Yuri; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hungarian Revolution; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; KAL Flight 007; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Kim Il Sung; Korea, Democratic People's Republic of;

Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; Mao Zedong; Marshall Plan; Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Nixon, Richard Milhous; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich; Peaceful Coexistence; Perestroika; Prague Spring; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr; *Sputnik;* Stalin, Josef; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Suez Crisis; Tito, Josip Broz; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; Ulbricht, Walter; United Nations; United States; Warsaw Pact; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

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Soviet Union, Army

The Cold War Soviet Army was both the Soviet Union's most important military tool and the Communist Party's main guarantor of power. The Red Army emerged from World War II as the most powerful land force in the world. The Soviets' navy and air force, however, paled in comparison to those of their Western counterparts. The Soviet Red Army occupied the majority of Eastern Europe in 1945, making Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria unwilling satellites of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, the Red Army was the key factor in guaranteeing control of local communist governments there. From 1948 to 1949,

Soviet motorized infantry troops on a tactical exercise in May 1984. (U.S. Department of Defense)

the Red Army subsequently cut off Berlin from the West, precipitating the Berlin Airlift. After Soviet leader Josef Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev, his successor, shifted Soviet military emphasis from land forces to nuclear weaponry. Khrushchev also began training and supporting proxy forces against the West. Meanwhile, the Soviet Army ensured continued communist rule over Hungary in 1956, helped build the Berlin Wall in 1961, crushed the infant Czechoslovakian revolution in 1968, and clashed with the People's Republic of China (PRC) along the Soviet-PRC border in 1969. By the early 1970s, the Soviet nuclear arsenal also reached rough parity with the West. The Soviet Army, however, faced its greatest challenge in fighting the Afghanistan War (1979–1989).

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Red Army, immense and battle-hardened, was the most powerful land military force in the world. The force that took Berlin alone consisted of 110 infantry divisions, 11 tank and mechanized corps, and 11 artillery divisions, making it larger than all the World War II American land forces in Europe and Asia combined. The Red Army had also learned valuable lessons in fighting the German Army from 1941 to 1945. This experience paid off in the form of great operational skill, experienced leaders, and a cadre of elite, battle-tested units.

In 1946 Stalin renamed the Red Army the Soviet Army and supervised its continued mechanization. He envisioned an army capable of conducting deep penetrations with ground support aircraft, mimicking the Germans' strategy during the early part of World War II. Stalin planned to use his army as a counterbalance to the Americans' atomic monopoly. He believed that the

threat of this massive force invading Western Europe would prevent American atomic blackmail. This approach remained in place until Stalin's death in 1953.

The Soviet Army played a more active role in Soviet politics after Stalin's death. For example, Khrushchev enlisted the help of World War II Red Army hero Marshal Georgi Zhukov, whom Stalin had pushed out of the spotlight, to ensure his ascension as premier. Khrushchev made Zhukov minister of defense as a reward for his help. Khrushchev, like Stalin, grew to fear Zhukov's power, popularity, and ambition and in 1957 removed the old marshal from power.

When Khrushchev became premier, he set out to make the Soviet Army more effective by curbing the worst excesses of the Stalinist system. He reduced the army from 5.3 million men to 3.6 million men as a way to cut expenses and invested more resources in nuclear weapons. These changes, however, unwittingly led to independence and autonomy movements in Soviet satellite states. Soviet leaders subsequently called upon the army to force Eastern bloc governments to toe the line. For example, the Soviet Army brutally suppressed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 by using 30,000 men supported by armor to fight for ten days, mostly in Budapest.

Efforts to bolster the Soviet Army came to fruition in the late 1950s as it developed into a fully armored and motorized force. New tanks replaced World War II–era tanks, and Soviet industry supplied the army with huge numbers of armored personnel carriers (APCs). While its equipment and numbers were impressive, however, the Soviet Army still relied on the same basic structure and strategy of Stalin's Blitzkrieg-style vision of warfare. This doctrine may have served the Soviet Army well in a general—and conventional—war, but it would prove to be woefully inadequate in future conflicts, such as the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the officer corps retained older leaders wedded to old doctrine. This problem was so endemic that many Soviet generals in the 1980s and 1990s had been serving since before the German invasion, calcifying Soviet military strategy and doctrine.

The Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) grew to be an integral part of the defense of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The SRF became an independent military branch in 1959, charged with command and control over the Soviet Union's burgeoning fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The SRF, as it turned out, proved to be too small and inaccurate to deter the Americans during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

After the humiliating Cuban Missile Crisis, Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev in 1964. Brezhnev decided to build up both nuclear and conventional military forces. The consequent buildup of the SRF led to the introduction of the SS-11 missile system in 1966, followed by the SS-9 in 1967 and the SS-13 in 1969. By 1970, the Soviet Union outnumbered the United States in ICBMs 1,299 to 1,054. Subsequently, the Soviets developed a more powerful family of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMS, now armed with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Thus, the Soviets had reached nuclear parity, if not superiority, with the United States.

While the SRF increased in size and capability, the Soviet Army remained active. It invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 to quell an uprising, which lasted less than one full day. The Soviet Army also supported other communist regimes and proxy insurgencies, including those in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and Cuba.

Despite the West's view of monolithic communism, the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s led to a border clash in 1969. This schism was ostensibly due to ideological differences, but other issues were also involved. PRC leader Mao Zedong believed that he should have become the international leader of communism after Stalin's death. Khrushchev, however, had no intention of according Mao such status.

The Soviet war in Afghanistan, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, had many correlations to the American experience in Vietnam. After a Marxist party overthrew the Afghan government in 1978, the Soviet Army moved in to support the failing communist regime in December 1979 with one airborne and four motorized rifle divisions. Thus, Soviet mechanized forces secured the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The Soviet-backed Afghan government controlled only the country's urban areas, however. The Afghan guerrillas, or mujahideen, put up a fierce fight that Soviet politicians and military planners had failed to foresee. Opposition increased during the first four years of the war as the Soviet Army attacked the mujahideen in remote and rugged mountainous areas. Analogous to the Viet Cong's use of Cambodia and Laos, the mujahideen used sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran as safe havens, while the Soviet Army tried valiantly to combat this unconventional style of warfare.

Soviet forces began to use massive airborne operations for rapid movement and attack as well as scorched-earth tactics to starve and terrorize guerrillas. These tactics, however, only served to strengthen the resolve of the mujahideen. When Konstantin Chernenko became Soviet premier in 1984, he decided to change tactics in Afghanistan by attacking the support network and infrastructure of the Afghan resistance, including supply lines and safe havens. Although for a time these tactics appeared to be somewhat effective, the mujahideen's will to resist remained intact.

In 1986, the United States decided to send the Afghan guerrillas Stinger antiaircraft missiles and other high-tech weapons. With their new American weapons, the mujahideen began to shoot down roughly one Soviet aircraft per day. The Soviet Army could not sustain such losses, nor could it continue to effectively attack the guerrillas without helicopters. This led to the Soviet Army's use of mechanized ground forces to attack the guerrillas, but the army lacked the mobility to combat the elusive mujahideen. As with Vietnamization, the Soviets began to turn the battle over to the Afghan communists. The last Soviet troops left the country on 15 February 1989.

When Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko in 1985, he ushered in a completely new era. In 1987 Gorbachev agreed with President Ronald Reagan to destroy all intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In July 1991, Gorbachev and President George H. W. Bush signed the Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty (START I), drastically reducing the superpowers' strategic nuclear warheads.

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See also

Afghanistan War; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Brezhnev, Leonid; Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich; Cuban Missile Crisis; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hungarian Revolution; Khrushchev, Nikita; Prague Spring; Sino-Soviet Border Incident; Sino-Soviet Split; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Soviet Union, Army Air Force

The Red Army Air Force played an important role in World War II. During the war, Soviet pilots reportedly flew 3.125 million sorties. By 1943, Soviet aircraft production surpassed that of Germany. With more than 36,000 built, the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 ground support aircraft was the most-produced plane of the war by any nation. The effectiveness of Soviet aviation was enhanced by the country's receipt of some 20,000 U.S. and British aircraft. Nonetheless, the Soviet air arm operated primarily in a ground support role. The Soviets had nothing that approached U.S. or British strategic bombing capability.

The Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily (VVS, Soviet Air Force) became an entirely independent military service in 1946. Soviet concerns over U.S. strategic bombing and nuclear weapons also led to the establishment of a separate Soviet Air Defense Service as an independent branch with its own interceptor air arm in 1954. In addition, the navy retained its own air arm, and the rise of nuclear weapons led to the creation of a separate strategic striking force to control long-range strategic nuclear missiles. Nonetheless, their World War II experience caused the VVS to place primary emphasis on support of ground forces.

The VVS was composed of three major operational branches, the most important being the theater support arm, Frontovaya Aviatsiya (FA, Frontal Aviation). The other two components were Voenno-Transportnaya Aviatsiya (VTA, Military Transport Aviation) and Dal'naya Aviatsiya (DA, Long Range Aviation), both of which supported theater operations but also served as strategic national resources under the Soviet General Staff.

FA units provided tactical air support for Soviet theater operations, with responsibility for defensive and offensive counter-air operations, deep attacks on critical theater targets, fire support for ground units, reconnaissance, and electronic combat operations. During the 1950s, the FA component numbered as many as 12,000 aircraft.

Compared to Western systems, Soviet aircraft designs tended to be less technologically advanced. Building on German jet engine design, in 1946 the Soviets placed into production their first jet fighters, the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-9 and Yakovlev Yak-15. For their strategic bomber, on Soviet leader Josef Stalin's order the Soviets produced a carbon copy of the U.S. Boeing B-29, some of which had been forced to land on Soviet territory during the war. The result, produced by reverse engineering, was the Tupolev Tu-4. The first Soviet jet bomber, the handsome and versatile twin-engine Il-28, entered service in 1950.

During the Korean War (1950–1953), the Soviets sent substantial air units to southern Manchuria to fight on the side of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Soviet pilots dueled with United Nations Command (UNC) aircraft in far North Korea. They also trained units of the Chinese air arm and then turned over their aircraft to them, creating the Chinese Air Force.

Soviet fighter attacks did force the UNC to end daytime raids by B-29 bombers, but the Soviets refused to supply air support to communist ground units in Korea. Reportedly, the Soviets lost 120 pilots and 335 aircraft in the war. Their MiG-15 aircraft was one of the most successful of Soviet jet fighters and a close match for the North American F-86, which was hastily rushed to the Korean theater to meet the Soviet MiG-15. In dogfights with the MiG-15, the F-86 generally prevailed, thanks largely to superior American pilot training.

In aircraft design, the Soviets continued to emphasize maneuverability and interception capability in their fighter aircraft.

In aircraft design, the Soviets continued to emphasize maneuverability and interception capability in their fighter aircraft. Their MiG-19, entering service in 1955, was the first Soviet supersonic fighter aircraft. That same year, the turboprop Tu-95 entered service. It was the world's fastest propeller-driven aircraft and the first true Soviet intercontinental bomber. Already in 1950 the Soviets had in service their first military helicopters.

The progress of the Cold War and the threat posed by nuclear and thermonuclear war as well as the development of missile technology led to major changes in the VVS. Beginning in the 1960s, the Soviets modernized their fleet of strategic bombers. In 1961, the Tu-22 entered service as the Soviets' first supersonic strategic bomber. This process reached its culmination with the 1987 appearance of the Tu-160. With a gross weight of some 590,000 pounds, the Tu-160 is the heaviest warplane ever built. Capable of carrying a payload of 36,000 pounds, the Tu-160 carries a bigger payload and is faster than its rival North American/Rockwell B-1B. Although only fourteen Tu-160s were delivered by 1991, when combined with the extensive development of cruise missiles it gave the Soviets the capability to carry out deep strikes around the world.

A Soviet naval air force Tu-95 Bear D aircraft, July 1991. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Strategic bombers nonetheless played a less-significant role than land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), especially compared to the American triad structure. The Soviet bomber program was relatively small compared to that of the U.S. Air Force, reaching a high point of more than 800 aircraft and an average inventory in the 600s, with fewer than 200 truly intercontinental-ranged bombers.

At the same time, the Soviets continued to develop their fighter and interceptor capability, bringing on-line a wide range of fighter aircraft with the MiG-21, MiG-23/27, MiG-25, MiG-29, and MiG-31 as well as the Sukhoi Su-9, Su-11, Su-15, and Su-27. Ground attack aircraft appeared in the form of the MiG-27, Su-7, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-25. With the increasing importance of helicopters, in 1973 the Soviets introduced the superb Mikhail Mil–designed Mi-24 attack helicopter, prompted by U.S. development of the Bell AH-1 Cobra. The heavily armored Mi-24 saw wide service in Afghanistan.

The VTA component of the VVS performed long-range air transportation functions. The VTA controlled tactical—parachute and airfield assault landing and resupply—and international or strategic airlift. With a peak strength of 1,500 aircraft, the VTA was also charged with the delivery of Soviet airborne forces, which were also controlled as a strategic national asset. Transport aircraft extended their range and capabilities in the Antonov An-22, An-24, and An-26 and the Il-76. Entering service in 1987, the An-124 Ruslan, with a gross weight of nearly 893,000 pounds, surpassed the U.S. Lockheed C-5A as the world's largest aircraft to achieve production status.

Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopter. (U.S. Department of Defense)

In 1988 it was edged out by a stretched version, the An-225. Although only two of the latter have been built, they are the largest aircraft in world history.

Unlike the U.S. structure of assigning intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) along with the bombers to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the U.S. Air Force, the Soviets' land-based missile forces were not assigned to the VVS but rather to the separate service of the Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya (RVSN, Strategic Rocket Forces). The RVSN was created in 1959 to control the newly developed ICBM capability as well as intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). The Soviet military considered the RVSN to be the elite service of their force structure, with responsibility for ensuring Soviet security through the capability to conduct effective nuclear strikes at the beginning of any conflict, setting the stage for victory.

The nuclear capabilities of the DA and RVSN were further supported by the SLBM component of the Soviet Navy. The navy maintained a sizable long-range aircraft capability that provided maritime reconnaissance, antiship, and antisubmarine capabilities as well as air-to-surface missile strikes against land targets. Aircraft included the VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) Yak-36, which entered service in 1976 on the first Soviet aircraft carriers. The Soviets also introduced the Kamov Ka-25 helicopter with an antisubmarine warfare capability.

The final component of the Soviet airpower force structure was the Voyska Protivovozdushnoy Oborony Strany (PVO Strany, Troops of National Air Defense). The Soviet leadership created the independent PVO Strany in 1948, giving it responsibility for the integrated air defense system of the homeland. The PVO Strany organization controlled the substantial air defense system through early warning radars, weapons control systems, and a communications network. The technical systems were operated by the Radiotekhnicheskiye Voyska (RTV, Radio-Technical Troops). The extensive interceptor force assigned to PVO Strany was organized as the Istrebitel'naya Aviatsyiya PVO (IA PVO, Fighter Aviation of Air Defense). The interceptors were tightly controlled by the overarching command and control structure, which also integrated fighters that could be assigned to the national air defense role in an emergency. The Soviet interceptor inventory peaked at more than 5,000 aircraft in the late 1950s. PVO Strany also integrated the interceptor activities with the thousands of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that it controlled through the Zenitnyye Raketnye Voyska (ZRV, Zenith Rocket Troops) organization. These strategic SAMs could also be supported by the numerous tactical SAM systems that were deployed in the military districts across the Soviet Union as part of the Voyska Protinvovozdushnoy Oborony Sukhoputnykh Voysk (PVO SV, Troops of Air Defense of the Ground Forces). When ICBMs became a significant component of the U.S. force structure in the early 1960s, the Soviets reacted by expanding the PVO Strany organization to include an antimissile defense component (designated PRO). Active antimissile sites were deployed around Moscow. Likewise, as space systems were developed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, the Soviet military added an antisatellite component (designated PKO) to PVO Strany.

During the 1980s, the Soviet military developed the air operation concept, an aggressive offensive use of airpower at the start of a theater campaign, designed to seize the initiative and create conditions for a rapid ground victory. The air offensive was intended to reduce an enemy's offensive striking power—especially nuclear delivery systems and air, missile, and heavy artillery firepower—and establish at least localized air superiority over the main axes of attack. Additionally, the air attacks would help soften enemy defenses at and behind the points of attack and would limit enemy maneuvering capability in response to Soviet advances. Soviet theater operations would also include parachute and helicopter assaults to seize key enemy targets and support the rapid advance of the main ground assault. Reflecting their support role, FA units were assigned to the theater or front commander (in peacetime to the Military District commander in the USSR or to the Soviet Group of Forces outside the USSR).

By the mid-1980s, the VVS deployed some 6,000 tactical fighters, ground support, and reconnaissance aircraft as well as 670 strategic bombers. The Soviets also fielded 1,300 fighter interceptors. The VVS possessed some 3,500 helicopters and 650 transport aircraft. Soviet naval aviation added another 1,100 airplanes and helicopters.

Soviet air forces were an important component of Soviet theater war capabilities and operational concepts during the Cold War era. VVS units served during the Cold War not only in the Soviet Union but also in Central and Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. Noteworthy Cold War service came during the Korean War, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and especially the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). Soviet instructors and pilots saw air combat in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. They also served with the Egyptian Air Force during the War of Attrition (1969–1970), in Angola (1975–1990), and in Ethiopia (1977–1979). Such service demonstrated the wide reach of the VVS and provided much useful training, but it also revealed serious shortcomings in equipment, logistics, and organization and could not conceal that the Soviets placed reliance on numbers and tight control rather than on more flexible training and innovation.

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See also

Aircraft; Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Nuclear Arms Race; Soviet Union, Navy; Strategic Air Command; Triad; United States Air Force

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Soviet Union, Navy

During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy evolved from little more than a coastal protection force to a robust rival to the West's powerful maritime forces. The Red Navy at the end of World War II was small and technologically obsolete. Consequently, the Soviet government built a stronger naval arm to challenge the West's dominance of the seas. When Nikita Khrushchev became the Soviet premier and Admiral Sergey Gorshkov became admiral of the fleet, the Soviet Union laid plans for a powerful Red Navy. The Soviets' inability to challenge the U.S. Navy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis marked a crucial turning point for the Soviet Navy. Because it lacked the capability to challenge the U.S. Navy around Cuba, the Soviets set upon building a navy

to vie for control of the seas. By the 1980s, the Soviet Navy was numerically larger than the U.S. Navy but still lagged behind in terms of technology. However, the Soviet Navy—a victim of Gorshkov's 1985 retirement and of economic strain—was one of the first Soviet institutions to foreshadow the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Navy was primarily a coastal defense force at the end of World War II. But Soviet leader Josef Stalin feared a large-scale amphibious invasion by the West and wanted the Soviet Red Navy to deter such a threat. Stalin also wanted a large blue-water navy as yet another tool in the Soviet military and diplomatic arsenals. Economic constraints, however, prevented him from building such a fleet. The Soviet naval program was put on hold until the economy recovered sufficiently from World War II.

Shortly after Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet government created a separate Naval Ministry. When Khrushchev assumed control, he reviewed all Soviet military capabilities with respect to the West. In the process, he emphasized nuclear weapons above other military capabilities and, in January 1956, appointed Admiral Gorshkov as head of the navy. Gorshkov's goal was to create an oceangoing nuclear fleet. Thus, the navy introduced both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons into its forces, representing a marked change in the Soviet Navy's mission. Gorshkov not only had to pioneer a new Soviet maritime strategy but also had to deal with ice, choke points, and long distances. To these ends, he oversaw the building of a huge icebreaker fleet, the resupply of ships, and the establishment of overseas ports.

A key to the Soviet Navy's future was the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Its operational history began in 1955 when the Soviets launched their first ballistic missile from a submarine. Then, in 1957, the Soviets constructed their first nuclear-powered submarine. This combination of SLBMs and nuclear-powered submarines provided a linchpin of Soviet defense.

In October 1962 one of the seminal events of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, showcased the Soviet Navy's vulnerabilities, as it was unable to challenge the U.S. Navy's quarantine of Cuba. Moscow deployed several attack submarines to the area but was unable to seriously confront the American naval quarantine. The showdown embarrassed the Soviet Union in many ways, but the impotence of the Soviet Navy proved especially humiliating. Khrushchev vowed to make improvements to remedy Soviet naval deficiencies and to transform the Soviet Navy into the world's most powerful oceangoing force. Gorshkov received the support he needed in the form of a massive Soviet naval-building program.

Soviet SLBMs, like those of the Americans, came to the fore during the 1960s. Soviet SLBM submarines could survive an enemy first strike and thus posed a credible and effective deterrent. This force grew considerably and was a key component of Soviet defenses until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet submarine fleet grew from two submarines in 1967 to sixty-one in 1986, compared to the U.S. Navy's thirty-eight. However, the United States retained superiority in the overall number of SLBM warheads because its missiles carried more warheads than those of the Soviets. The



A Soviet Victor III–class nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSN) underway, 26 October 1983. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Soviets also employed nuclear-powered submarines armed with antiship cruise missiles. These cruise missile subs, coupled with the Soviet Navy's surface vessels and numerous fixed-wing aircraft, provided a deadly threat to the navies of the West, especially near the Soviet mainland.

The expansion of the Soviet Navy extended beyond submarines. Numerically, the navy grew to be the largest in the world, although its vessels were smaller and less advanced than those of its major foes. At its peak, the Soviet Navy had the capability to operate on and under every ocean during a modern war. The navy also expanded its land-based aircraft fleet's size and capabilities. As the Soviet buildup continued, the two superpowers' navies played a stressful and dangerous game of cat-and-mouse on the high seas. These confrontations included the ubiquitous presence of Soviet fishing trawlers, which were conducting electronic intelligence operations against the technologically superior U.S. Navy.

In 1972 the Soviets began a long-term program to build large nuclear-powered cruisers. These included hybrid aviation cruisers of various types as

Sailors man the rails of the destroyer *Admiral Vinogradov,* 31 July 1990. (U.S. Department of Defense)

well as battle cruisers. The aviation cruisers consisted of the two-ship Moskva class that had a cruiser bow and carrier stern and the four-ship Kiev class with a cruiserlike bow and a full angled flight deck. Both classes were capably armed with their own array of surface weapons systems as well as supporting helicopters and VTOL jet aircraft. The battle cruisers, three of which were commissioned before 1991, consisted of the more modern nuclear-powered Kirov class, which had great staying power and long range. The Soviet Union's first true aircraft carrier, the *Admiral Kuznetsov* (ex-*Tbilisi*) joined the fleet in January 1991.

After Gorshkov's retirement in 1985, the Soviet Navy began to steadily decline. Its vessels spent more and more time in port between patrols, and they also required more unscheduled maintenance because of lax general maintenance due to poor operational funding. These problems grew increasingly worse until the collapse of the Soviet Union, by which time the Soviet Navy had become a mere shadow of its former self.

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See also

Aircraft Carriers; Cuban Missile Crisis; Gorshkov, Sergey Georgyevich; Khrushchev, Nikita; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Submarines; United States Navy; Warships, Surface

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Soviet-Yugoslav Split
(1948)

The conflict between the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) that erupted in 1948 and led to the first public schism in the international communist movement. The reasons for the Soviet-Yugoslav split were the unwillingness of the Soviet leadership to tolerate insubordination, the ultraleftist orientations of Yugoslav leaders, and the Yugoslavs' aspirations to regional hegemony. The split ultimately paved the way for an independent form of socialism in Yugoslavia as well as for a neutral and later nonaligned foreign policy, strengthened movements of national communism in Eastern Europe, and broke up the seemingly fixed bipolar structure in Southeastern Europe.

In the immediate postwar period, the CPY was generally considered the most Stalinist communist party in Central and Eastern Europe and the closest ally of the Soviet Union. This was confirmed by the prominent role played by Yugoslav representatives at the founding session of the Cominform in September 1947. At the beginning of 1948, however, serious differences emerged, the immediate reasons being Yugoslavia's ambitions toward Albania and its continuing aid to the communist side in the Greek Civil War. Soviet leader Josef Stalin accused Yugoslav leaders of pursuing expansionist policies in the Balkans. Yet the Soviets' complaints, albeit containing some truth, were primarily motivated by the hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet leadership itself. It did not want to loosen its grip on Albania, to endanger the October 1944 Stalin-Churchill percentage agreements regarding influence in the states of Southeastern Europe that had placed Greece in the Anglo-American sphere, or to tolerate independent moves by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The essential aim was thus to strengthen Soviet supremacy over Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe.

Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, however, the overwhelming majority of the CPY leadership dismissed the Soviet criticism. In fact, it resisted Soviet tutelage and Moscow's attempts to interfere in internal affairs. In order to increase the pressure on the Yugoslav leadership, the Soviets recalled their military advisors, instructors, and civil experts from Yugoslavia in March 1948. They also initiated, with the first of three letters signed by Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, a public attack on top Yugoslav leaders. The letters accused the Yugoslavs of opposing prescribed socialist principles.

The Yugoslav leadership repudiated the accusations and refused to take part in the hastily convoked June 1948 Cominform session, which turned out to be a tribunal, of sorts, against the rogue CPY. The Cominform's resolution,

published on 28 June 1948, called upon the "healthy elements" of the CPY to force a policy change or, if necessary, to overthrow its leadership and replace it with a "new internationalist" one.

Belgrade tried to convince Moscow of its lasting loyalty to socialism, the Soviet Union, and Stalin, claiming that the accusations were simply not justified. At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership did not hesitate to fight Soviet Stalinism with Stalinist methods, purging the CPY of pro-Soviet members, called "Cominformists," of whom more than 55,000 were prosecuted and more than 15,000 were sent to the notorious labor camp at Goli Otok (Naked Island). In the years that followed, Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorated further, with Moscow engaging in strident propaganda, labeling the CPY leadership a "gang of spies and murderers," and accusing it of having turned the CPY into a "fascist party." During the most spectacular show trials of former East European leaders—Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria in 1948, László Rajk in Hungary in 1949, and Rudolf Slánský in Czechoslovakia in 1952—one of the most serious charges leveled was that all were "Titoist agents."

The Yugoslavs steadfastly resisted Soviet pressure tactics and gradually changed their policies in the early 1950s. Although Yugoslavia remained a dictatorship, it liberalized its economic policy, developing a new system of self-management socialism. In its foreign policy, Yugoslavia improved its relations with the West but remained independent and later became one of the leading members of the Non-Aligned Movement. After Stalin's death in 1953, the new Soviet leadership began to reassess its position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. Finally, Nikita Khrushchev, who emerged as Stalin's successor, sought to normalize relations with the Yugoslavs, visiting Belgrade in June 1955. Nevertheless, until the dissolution of both states in 1991, Yugoslavia always kept some distance from the Soviets, and its relationship with the superpower to the east remained an ambiguous one.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

See also

Cominform; Khrushchev, Nikita; Non-Aligned Movement; Rajk, László; Slánský Trial; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Tito, Josip Broz; Yugoslavia

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Spaak, Paul-Henri
(1899–1972)

Belgian socialist politician, international statesman, foreign minister (1936–1939, 1947–1949, 1954–1957, 1961–1966), and premier (1938–1939, 1946,

1947–1949). Born in Schaerbeek, Belgium, on 25 January 1899, Paul-Henri Spaak earned a degree in jurisprudence from Brussels University in 1921. He began his political career as a socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies in 1932. His efforts to keep Belgium out of World War II were in vain, and after the Belgian capitulation to Germany in May 1940, he went into exile first in Paris and then in London.

After the war, Spaak became a staunch supporter of international cooperation and collective security. He helped draft the United Nations (UN) Charter and served as the UN General Assembly's first chairman in 1946. On 28 September 1948 he delivered his famous "Speech of Fear" to the UN, denouncing Moscow's early Cold War policies and enunciating the reasons that Western countries feared the Soviet Union.

A brilliant speaker and an advocate of European integration, Spaak promoted the creation of the Benelux Customs Union (among Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) in 1948. In August 1949 he became president of the Council of Europe, an office from which he resigned in protest in 1951 over the lack of support from member governments. He played a leading role in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and presided over its General Assembly during 1952–1954. He was also committed to the formation of the European Defense Community (EDC), which was eventually defeated by the French National Assembly in August 1954. In 1955, the Messina Conference of European leaders appointed him to chair a committee charged with the preparation of a report on the creation of a common European market. The "Spaak Report" led to the March 1957 Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

Paul-Henri Spaak was Belgium's most important statesman in the two decades after World War II and undoubtedly one of the most important figures in the European unification movement. (Library of Congress)

In December 1956, when Spaak was chosen as second secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the organization was deeply split because of the autumn 1956 Suez Crisis. Spaak was a resolute advocate of the transformation of NATO from a military defense organization into an effective political instrument. As such, in 1957 NATO began to play an important role as a Western clearinghouse on East-West relations. When General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in France in June 1958, however, French nationalist policies reduced NATO's effectiveness and increasingly frustrated Spaak. De Gaulle's obstructionism within NATO contributed to Spaak's decision to relinquish his post in January 1961.

During 1961–1965 Spaak served as Belgium's deputy prime minister, minister for African Affairs, and foreign minister. The Congo crisis demanded most of his attention. He also launched several new plans for a European political community. During July 1965–February 1966 he was foreign minister in

the cabinet of Pierre Harmel. After a quarrel with his Socialist Party members over the relocation of NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels following de Gaulle's withdrawal from the alliance's military command in February 1966, Spaak resigned from politics in March 1966.

Spaak remained closely associated with NATO, however, serving as chair of a NATO special group tasked with establishing closer relations among NATO members during 1967–1972. In 1969, he published his memoirs, *Combats inachevés* (Unfinished Battles). Spaak died on 31 July 1972 in Brussels.

Christian Nuenlist

See also

Belgium; European Coal and Steel Community; European Defense Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; Europe, Western; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Space Race

The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to explore outer space, most often defined by the race to place a human on the moon. The space race was an integral part of the Cold War. Each side used the competition to demonstrate its technological prowess in the areas of science, education, engineering, and management. Both nations also used rocket and missile development gleaned from the space race to strengthen their military establishments. The two superpowers had been working on missile development for some time in hopes of developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to deliver nuclear warheads. Both sides thus hoped that these programs would help develop a rocket capable of placing a satellite into orbit.

Each side used the competition to demonstrate its technological prowess in the areas of science, education, engineering, and management.

The space race officially began on 4 October 1957 with the successful Soviet launch of the *Sputnik I* satellite. The orbiting *Sputnik I* not only established an early Soviet lead in the space race but was a major blow to American prestige, since U.S. leaders believed that the Soviets were incapable of such a breakthrough. The Soviet program, led by chief designer Sergei Korolev, who was largely unknown in the West, continued to reveal the American rocket program as unequal to the task. The Soviets' advantage was confirmed in their launching of the much-heavier payload *Sputnik II* on 3 November 1957.

Americans were surprised to learn that the United States lagged badly behind Soviet rocket and missile technology. Politicians were outraged and



Laika, the first creature to orbit the earth, in her capsule before the launch of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik II*, 1957. (Bettmann/Corbis)

proclaimed the existence of an alleged missile gap, which Senator John F. Kennedy exploited during his 1960 presidential campaign. Other Americans used the Soviet space lead to suggest a lack of rigor in American secondary schools in the fields of science and mathematics. While President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected the notion of American weakness, the public was shocked when on 6 December 1957 Project Vanguard was unable to place an American satellite in orbit.

Another American program, the Explorer project under the direction of the U.S. Army and headed by former German rocket scientist Wernher von Braun, served notice that the Americans had not yet yielded the space field to the Soviets. On 31 January 1958 the United States successfully launched *Explorer I*, a light satellite that proved more scientific than symbolic when it discovered the Van Allen Radiation Belts. Also, to provide overall direction to the American civilian space effort and to match Soviet successes, Congress created a new government agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). It began operations on 1 October 1958.

The Soviets continued to produce other impressive space firsts that the United States seemed unable to duplicate. The Soviet *Luna 1* was the first satellite to escape Earth's gravity when it entered solar orbit on 2 January 1959, although it missed its target of the moon. *Luna 2*, launched on 12 September 1959, sent back clear images of the moon's surface, while *Luna 3* on 7 October 1959 photographed the far side of the moon.

As successful satellite launches became routine, both sides sought to be the first to place a man in orbit. The Soviets won this competition with the launch of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin into a one-orbit voyage around Earth on 12 April 1961. The United States successfully put astronaut Alan Shepard into a suborbital low-level space flight on 5 May 1961. On 25 May 1961 President Kennedy classified the space race as an integral part of the battle between freedom and tyranny and raised the stakes when he announced the American goal of placing a man on the surface of the moon by the end of the decade. On 20 February 1962 the Americans finally matched the Gagarin flight by putting a man into Earth's orbit with the three-orbit trip of astronaut John Glenn.

Following Gagarin's mission, the Soviet Union's other firsts in manned flight included the first day-long space flight of Gherman Titov on 6 August 1961; the first female in space, Valentina Tereshkova, on 16 June 1963; and the first space walk, by Alexei Leonov, on 18 March 1965. Unmanned Soviet moon flight firsts included the *Luna 9* soft landing on the moon with the first photos from the lunar surface on 3 February 1966 and *Luna 10*, the first to be in moon orbit, on 3 April 1966. The Soviets made an impressive unpiloted flight to the moon with a return to Earth with *Zond 5* on 14 September 1968, which seemed to suggest that they were on the verge of sending the first man to the moon.

Although it appeared to many that the Soviets remained ahead in the space race, the United States worked feverishly to meet Kennedy's challenge and budgeted funds for it that the Soviet Union could not match. The Americans gradually eliminated the early Soviet race lead by securing qualitative advances, which translated into successes such as the rendezvous and docking of two manned spacecraft and the development and flight testing of the *Lunar Module*, both of which were essential to placing a man on the moon's surface. The United States also matched other Soviet achievements when it conducted several space walks and long-duration flights, and it achieved a soft landing on the moon with *Surveyor I* (2 June 1966). The United States achieved a major breakthrough with the year-long *Lunar Orbiter* low-level photo-mapping of the moon's surface beginning in August 1966, undertaken in preparation for a manned landing.

Both sides suffered human losses and engineering failures during the race. The most notable American loss occurred during the *Apollo 1* fire, which began during a routine launch pad test on 27 January 1967 and killed American astronauts Gus Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee. The results of the subsequent investigation appeared to doom the effort to meet President Kennedy's deadline. The Soviets suffered the first loss of a man during actual space flight when they announced the death of cosmonaut Vladimir

Komarov on 24 April 1967 during the crash landing of *Soyuz 1*. Other Soviet failures were masked by the secrecy and closed society of the Soviet Union, which also concealed its inability to keep pace with American successes.

While the Soviets were secretive, the United States won the publicity war. It announced its space mission schedule and proudly showed off its astronauts as men with "the right stuff." This effort earned positive media coverage and the support of the viewing public. The Soviet Union's propaganda machine also played up the country's own progress, but most Soviet space missions were announced only after success was certain. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did the world learn of the major flight limitations of the Soviet successes, their space failures, and the many near disasters that the cosmonauts endured.

The United States recovered relatively quickly from the *Apollo 1* disaster of January 1967. On 21 December 1968, American astronauts Frank Borman, James Lovell, and William Anders were launched into space in *Apollo 8*



Astronaut Buzz Aldrin stands beside a U.S. flag on the moon on 20 July 1969 during the *Apollo 11* space mission. (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)

and three days later orbited the moon. By then, the United States had a clear lead in the space race that the Soviets seemed incapable of closing.

When *Apollo 11* (Neil Armstrong, Edward "Buzz" Aldrin, and Michael Collins) landed on the moon on 20 July 1969, the Americans stood victorious in the space race. Five more successful landings on the moon went unchallenged by the Soviets. In September 1970 the Soviet Union succeeded in landing on the moon the *Luna 16* probe, which returned lunar samples to Earth. The Soviets were the first to establish a space station in orbit with *Salyut 1* on 19 April 1971. But in reality, once *Apollo 11* landed in the Sea of Tranquillity and returned safely home, the space race had ended.

Although the sense of a race was largely abandoned by both sides, further space exploration by both countries continued but without the Cold War fervor over which society was the most technologically advanced. In light of budget pressures and many unsolved domestic problems, leaders in both countries began to question the costs of space exploration. The spirit of political détente between the two superpowers began to reach into the field of space exploration. On 15 July 1975 both nations took a giant first step in long-term outer space cooperation with the launch and rendezvous of the *Apollo-Soyuz* mission. Cooperation between the two former adversaries continued in 1993 when the Soviets were invited to participate in the International Space Station.

The space race proved an energetic stimulus to both nations. The United States committed the funding necessary to win the race and, amid the unhappiness of the Vietnam War era, gave the nation a badly needed lift. While the Soviets could never match the United States in funding, they still achieved a stunning number of space firsts. These, however, came at the expense of those mission essentials required to send a man to the moon.

Thomas D. Veve

See also

Explorer I; Gagarin, Yuri; Missile Gap; Outer Space Treaty; *Sputnik*

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Spain

Southwestern European state. The Kingdom of Spain occupies some 85 percent of the Iberian Peninsula, which it shares with Portugal. Spain covers 194,968 square miles and had a 1945 population of some 27.5 million people. It is bordered by the Bay of Biscay and France to the north, Portugal to the west, the Mediterranean Sea to the south, and the Atlantic Ocean to the southwest.

Spain was united into a kingdom in 1492 and during the sixteenth century was among the most powerful states in Europe. Sapped by wars and not unrelated economic reverses, the country began a period of decline at the end of the sixteenth century and lost most of its vast overseas empire in the course of the nineteenth century. Spain lagged behind the rest of Western Europe in social and political reforms, leading to the expression "Europe stops at the Pyrenees."

Considerable political turmoil developed in Spain as the nation industrialized, leading to the terrible bloodletting of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). The fighting pitted forces seeking modernization (the Republicans) against those favoring traditional Spanish values (the Nationalists). Perhaps half a million people died in the fighting and reprisals following the Nationalist victory. General Francisco Franco held power. One party alone, the Falange Española Tradicionalista, was permitted. The Falange's doctrines were a blend of nationalism, traditionalism, and belief in a hierarchical order.

Spain was not officially a belligerent in World War II, although Franco was sympathetic to the fascist side and sent a division of troops (ostensibly volunteers) to the Eastern Front. Franco also opened Spanish ports to German submarines, and he annexed the international zone of Tangier, only to evacuate it in 1945. He made no move, however, against the principal British base at Gibraltar. Following the November 1942 American and British landings in North Africa, the Franco regime reverted to a more strict neutrality.

After the war, Spain was very much a pariah, especially as leftist parties controlled or influenced so many European governments. The United Nations (UN) voted overwhelmingly to deny Spain membership and, in December 1946, called for diplomatic sanctions against Madrid. Spain was also excluded from Marshall Plan aid.

This quarantine changed with the Cold War. In 1953 the United States and Spain signed a mutual aid agreement that provided U.S. military and economic assistance in return for air and naval bases. In 1955, the United States and Latin American states secured Spain's admission to the UN.

The United States played a leading role in keeping the Spanish economy afloat. Between 1953 and 1975, Washington extended some $3 billion in economic and military assistance. As Spanish liberals were quick to point out, this aid helped maintain Franco in power.

The Spanish Cortes (parliament) had begun to function again in 1942, but it was not representative of the people. The 1947 Law of Succession declared Franco chief of state for life and established a Council of the Kingdom to deal with the question of succession. Franco distrusted Don Juan, the son of King Alfonso XIII and heir to the throne, and in 1969 officially designated Don Juan's son, Juan Carlos, as his successor. Franco also arranged a concordat with the Catholic Church in 1953. Roman Catholicism was declared the official religion of Spain, and the Church received guarantees of special privileges and financial assistance.

Most of Spain's small overseas colonies vanished after the war. Spanish Morocco became part of the Kingdom of Morocco, but the almost purely Spanish cities of Cueta and Melilla across the Straits of Gibraltar in North

Africa remained Spanish. Moroccan nationalists continued to demand the return of these as well as Ifni and the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara, and the latter was indeed given up in 1975. Spanish Equatorial Africa also received independence in 1968. Spain retained the Balearic (Minorca and Mallorca) and Canary Islands.

The Spanish attempted to turn nationalism to their own advantage by mounting an intense and unsuccessful campaign against the British to return Gibraltar, which had been lost in 1704. This included banning British flights over Spain and closing the border with Gibraltar from the land side (1969–1985).

Franco died in November 1975 and was succeeded as head of state by thirty-seven-year-old King Juan Carlos I. To this energetic and charismatic ruler goes considerable credit for both the restoration and survival of democracy in Spain. The new king inherited serious problems. Inflation was running at 20 percent, and there was high unemployment and a growing trade deficit. Politically, there were threats from the Right, especially from among the military. Terrorism by Basque separatists had also increased. The king was, however, committed to democracy and change.

A Civil Guardsman who was inside the Spanish Congress of Deputies leaves through a window and surrenders, 24 February 1981. The failed coup d'état saw 200 armed Guardia Civil hold members of the Congress hostage for eighteen hours. King Juan Carlos I played a key role in quelling the coup attempt. (EFE/Corbis)

Juan Carlos initially continued Franco's premier, Carlos Navarro, in office. Six months later, however, Juan Carols named Adolfo Suárez to the post. Suárez organized his own party, the Union de Centre Democratico (UCD, Union of the Democratic Center). He also legalized forty-eight political parties, including the Communist Party, and in 1977 he led the nation into its first free elections—which he won—since 1936. Suárez also began loosening the censorship laws of the Franco era.

A new constitution declared Spain a parliamentary monarchy with seats in the Cortes allotted on the basis of the parties' total votes. The constitution separated church and state, guaranteed human rights, abolished the death penalty, legalized divorce, recognized separate nationalities within Spain, and extended the vote to eighteen-year-olds.

Suárez also moved to give the Basques and Catalonia their own autonomous parliaments under overall Spanish administration. These two were the only regional groups that had been autonomous before Franco revoked such rights after the Civil War, and they were the first two to receive home rule. The Right protested these moves, fearful that they would lead to the breakup of Spain. Terrorism continued in the Basque country, but over time support for the terrorists diminished.

In February 1981, the militant Right attempted to seize power. Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Molina led some 200 armed Civil Guards in bursting into the Cortes when it was in session. They ordered deputies to the floor and fired

shots into the ceiling. The whole episode was carried live on Spanish radio and television. Molina demanded military rule, and ultimately four of Spain's nine top generals declared for the putschists. Juan Carlos, clad in military uniform, made a dramatic television appearance and told Spaniards that he would never agree to an attempt by force "to interrupt the democratic process." This step probably saved democracy in Spain. The rebellion quickly collapsed, and the siege of parliament lasted only eighteen hours. Millions of Spaniards marched through the streets throughout the country to demonstrate their support for democracy. In both 1982 and 1985 the government discovered and foiled other plots.

Although the ruling UCD continued in power, Leopoldo Sotelo replaced Suárez as premier. Meanwhile, Suárez formed a new party, the Democratic and Social Center, looking to cooperate with the socialists. In 1982 Spain joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its modernizing military had 370,000 troops, more than 190 aircraft, 29 warships, and 8 submarines. More important was Spain's strategic geographical position controlling the western mouth of the Mediterranean.

Juan Carlos, clad in military uniform made a dramatic television appearance and told Spaniards that he would never agree to an attempt by force "to interrupt the democratic process."

In October 1982, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) won a solid majority in the parliamentary elections, which turned on economic issues. Márquez Felipe González became the first socialist premier in Spain since the Spanish Civil War. This also marked the first time in Spanish history that the socialists held an absolute majority in the parliament. The charismatic González turned the party away from Marxism. The socialists promised the creation of new jobs as well as continuation of the democratizing process.

A high point of González's first term was Spain's entry into the European Common Market in January 1986 (full membership came in 1992). The PSOE had come to power insisting on a referendum on membership in NATO. Once in power, the PSOE supported continued membership but had to proceed with the referendum, which passed. The PSOE did insist on a continued ban of nuclear weapons in Spain (a U.S. bomber had accidentally released an atomic bomb off the coast of Spain), maintenance of the Spanish military outside the NATO command structure, and a cutback in U.S. troops in Spain.

In the January 1986 parliamentary elections, the PSOE again won a majority, and González returned to the premiership. After a year of sometimes acrimonious talks, a base agreement was worked out with the United States. Some 12,500 U.S. military personnel were stationed at three air bases (Zaragoza, Torrejon, and Moron) and a naval base (Rota) that provided support for the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. There was considerable resentment on the part of the Left over U.S. support for Franco and what was seen as U.S. heavy-handedness in foreign policy, particularly toward the Middle East. Many Spaniards also opposed U.S. Latin American policies, and there was no sense of a threat to Spain from the Soviet Union.

In October 1989, González and his governing PSOE won a narrow national election victory and a margin of one seat in the Cortes. The New Right in Spain actively supported the socialists, who were completely committed to a

market-driven economy. By the end of the Cold War, Spain had come far indeed. Democracy appeared solidly rooted, and Spain was the world's twelfth-largest industrial power.

Melissa Jordine and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Franco, Francisco; González Márquez, Felipe; Juan Carlos I, King of Spain

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Spiegel Affair
(1962)

Political scandal involving top-level political leaders in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). The 1962 *Spiegel* Affair initially involved West German Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss. Ultimately, however, it led to the forced retirement of Konrad Adenauer, West Germany's first chancellor, in 1963.

In the 8 October 1962 issue of *Der Spiegel*, West Germany's leading weekly news magazine, an article appeared that was highly critical of the German Army (Bundeswehr) during joint North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military maneuvers (FALLEX 62). The article, one in a series of articles aimed at discrediting Strauss by accusing him of misconduct and corruption, revealed the inadequacy of the West German military. In retaliation, Strauss ordered a raid on the offices of *Spiegel*. Eleven staff members were arrested and subsequently charged with leaking state secrets.

The article itself quickly became less important than the issue of freedom of the press in a democratic society. Strauss, an influential politician because of his high-profile role in the Christian Social Union (CSU), the sister party in Bavaria of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), compounded the damage by lying about his role in the arrest of a *Spiegel* staffer in Spain. It soon became apparent that both Strauss and Adenauer had misled members of the Bundestag (parliament) when they had been questioned by the legislative body concerning their roles in the affair. Some of the tactics used in the affair, moreover, reminded Germans of Nazi measures in the 1930s. Adenauer eventually agreed to accept Strauss's resignation and confirmed that he would retire as chancellor in 1963.

When the *Spiegel* Affair broke, Adenauer failed to recognize the gravity of the situation and tried to use his considerable influence to preserve Strauss's position. For more than a decade, Adenauer had practiced what some observers termed "chancellor democracy," an approach to representative government that emphasized the importance of a powerful chancellor, and he had become accustomed to getting his way. The *Spiegel* Affair was a great test of West Germany's democratic institutions. In the end, democracy and the rule of law prevailed. Adenauer's exit also opened the way toward more representative democracy.

Michael D. Richards

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Germany, Federal Republic of; Germany, Federal Republic of, Armed Forces; Strauss, Franz Josef

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Spinola, António de
(1910–1996)

Portuguese military officer and first president of Portugal's Provisional Government (April–September 1974) following the April 1974 revolution. António de Spinola was born in Estremoz, Portugal, on 11 April 1910. He entered the army after graduating from the Colégio Militar (Military College) in 1928. He served in the Portuguese intervention forces in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and accompanied the German Army as an observer on the Eastern Front during World War II.

During 1961–1963 Spinola served in the beginning stages of the Angolan nationalist insurgency. By 1968 he was named commanding general and high commissioner of Guinea-Bissau, where the Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde was gaining strength, thanks in part to Soviet support. Despite the innovative counterinsurgency tactics that he employed in Guinea with moderate success, he became convinced of the ultimate futility of Portugal's African wars, which were consuming the lion's share of Portugal's resources. Furthermore, he was disillusioned by dictator Marcelo Caetano's refusal to allow any negotiations with the insurgents. It was during his time in Guinea that Spinola's charisma and outspokenness made an impression on the younger generation of officers who later would topple Caetano.

Upon his return from Africa in 1973, Spinola was named chief of staff of the armed forces. In February 1974, without government approval, he published his influential book *Portugal and the Future.* It called for liberalization



General António de Spinola, who served briefly as the president of the provisional government of Portugal following the April 1974 revolution. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)

and democratization at home and an immediate political solution to end the anticolonial wars in Africa. The book became a best-seller and heralded the end of Caetano's Estado Novo (New State). In April 1974 a group of young officers known as the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), many of whom had served under Spinola, toppled Caetano in a nearly bloodless coup and established the Second Republic. They first named Spinola head of the Junta of National Salvation and then provisional president of Portugal.

Spinola and the officers of the MFA disagreed, however, about the extent to which the coup should entail substantial social change and especially about how quickly and thoroughly Portugal should divest itself of its colonies. Spinola envisioned a gradual withdrawal and possibly a Portuguese federation to replace the empire. The more radical leaders of the MFA wanted unequivocal and immediate withdrawal of all troops. Spinola resigned in September 1974, and the next year he conspired with conservatives to overthrow the government but was forced into temporary exile. Following his departure, the establishment of the republic, and decolonization, some of Portugal's former colonies—especially Angola—attracted increased Soviet, Cuban, and American involvement. Spinola died in Lisbon on 13 August 1996.

Eric W. Frith

See also

Decolonization; Eanes, António; Mozambique Civil War; Namibia; Portugal

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Sputnik
(4 October 1957)

First man-made, Earth-orbiting satellite, launched by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957. Although commonly used to describe the first satellite, *Sputnik*, meaning "fellow traveler," actually designates a series of satellites that were numbered sequentially. *Sputnik I* weighed 184 pounds, excluding the propulsion vehicle, and was placed into space as part of the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), which included the objective of launching artificial satellites for scientific research. *Sputnik I* was followed by the 3 November 1957 launch of *Sputnik II*, a 1,118-pound capsule with a dog named Laika as a passenger. These two stunning Soviet successes occurred before the failed launch attempt of *Vanguard*, the American contribution to the IGY scientific effort, on 6 December 1957.

The *Sputnik* launches, especially when contrasted with the American failure, were important symbols of Soviet technological prowess, which marked the beginning of the intense space competition with the United States that became known as the space race. The launch provided the Soviet Union with an important propaganda tool that was used to publicize the alleged advanced nature of Soviet society and the progress that was possible in a modern communist society.

The American public was shocked by the *Sputnik* success, and American domestic politics were soon dominated by discussions of the Soviets' technological superiority and of the implied threat to the United States. American political leaders quickly pushed for changes that would restore public confidence and retain technological superiority over the Soviets. The U.S. government responded to the challenge by passing the 1958 National Defense Education Act, which provided incentives to promote the study of science, mathematics, engineering, technical education, and other fields deemed necessary to national security. Additionally, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to help centrally organize and coordinate American space efforts. However, military-oriented space programs, such as reconnaissance satellites, remained outside NASA and were cloaked in secrecy.

Militarily speaking, the launch of a Soviet R-7 rocket, which propelled *Sputnik* into orbit, confirmed the Soviets' capability to field nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This created an impression of



Sputnik 1, the first manmade satellite to orbit Earth, was launched by the Soviets on 4 October 1957. Weighing 184 pounds, it circled Earth every ninety minutes. (Bettmann/Corbis)

vulnerability in the United States and led to intensified American efforts to enhance early warning and defensive systems, expand the national civil defense program, and strengthen strategic nuclear forces. *Sputnik* directly contributed to the erroneous idea that a missile gap had developed between the Americans and Soviets, placing the United States at a comparative disadvantage. President Dwight D. Eisenhower knew that no such gap existed but was bound to maintain silence on the issue, as the information was highly classified. Ultimately, the missile gap became a hot-button issue in the 1960 presidential campaign.

For the Eisenhower administration, there was a beneficial side to *Sputnik*, however, as it removed concerns that the Soviet Union would raise national sovereignty issues in response to an orbital overflight by an American satellite. *Sputnik* established a precedent for satellites operating over sovereign territories and opened the legal window for reconnaissance satellite operations that were already being planned by the U.S. government. *Sputnik I* was an important scientific first, a clear public relations victory in the Cold War, and an important event that shaped the continuing international struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; *Explorer I;* Gaither Report; Missile Gap; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Open Skies Proposal; Space Race

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Sri Lanka

Island nation in southern Asia. Known as Ceylon until 1972, Sri Lanka lies just 20 miles off the southern tip of India, in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka encompasses 25,332 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of West Virginia, and had a 1945 population of approximately 7.2 million people. Largely shaped by India, Sri Lanka's political and cultural development was nonetheless unique. Moreover, unlike India, Sri Lanka never commanded the full attention of the superpowers during the Cold War. Rather, its modern history has been dominated by internal conflict between two principal cultures—the Buddhist Sinhalese and the Hindu Tamils—that still exists today.

As an important source of tea, coffee, spices, and rubber, Ceylon witnessed nearly 450 years of colonialism under Indian kingdoms as well as the Portuguese, Dutch, and British. In the nineteenth century, the British imported Tamil laborers from southern India to work Ceylonese plantations. This changed the balance between ethnicities but still left the Sinhalese comprising 75 percent of the population compared to a Tamil minority in northern and eastern Ceylon at just 20 percent.

Despite this divide, the process of decolonization came relatively peacefully for Ceylon. Strategically located, it was headquarters for the Anglo-American Southeast Asia Command during World War II. Nonetheless, in 1946 the British pulled out. Whereas in India the British faced tremendous pressure from nationalists, in Ceylon there was little activity by either Sinhalese or Tamils. Independence was more the result of British disengagement than any internal impulse. Indeed, many Ceylonese wished to remain part of the British Empire.

With British encouragement, however, Sinhalese leaders passed a constitution in 1946 and a bill of independence in 1947. On 4 February 1948, Ceylon became a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth but remained highly dependent on Britain for trade and aid during the first decade of independence. In 1950, Ceylon's capital hosted Commonwealth and Western nations in the so-called Colombo Plan for economic development in Asia. Anxious about possible Indian designs, Ceylon also relied on the British for defense, allowing them to maintain their Indian Ocean naval

base at Trincomalee. Accordingly, Ceylon pursued a predominantly pro-Western foreign policy. At the same time, however, relations with the communist world were amicable. Ceylon recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1950 and concluded trade pacts with Beijing in 1952. In 1955, Ceylon gained admission to the United Nations (UN) after the Soviet Union dropped its opposition. Two years later, the two nations exchanged diplomatic representation and signed trade accords.

Ceylon's foreign policy during the Cold War was shaped most by Solomon Bandaranaike, prime minister during 1956–1959. He nationalized major industries, abrogated the defense agreement with Britain in 1959, and pursued a self-professed neutral foreign policy by joining the Non-Aligned Movement. In reality, Bandaranaike's foreign policy was more opportunistic, playing the great powers against each other. He strengthened ties with communist countries, concluding agreements with the PRC that brought Ceylon $41 million in aid during 1957–1967. At the same time, he maintained relatively good relations with the United States. Washington cut aid to Ceylon in 1963 following the nationalization of petroleum industries but resumed the flow in 1966 after American companies were compensated. By 1991, the United States had granted more than $1 billion in aid. Throughout the Cold War, the Voice of America operated in Ceylon, and U.S. naval vessels made regular calls there. This balancing act remained the consistent focus of Ceylon's foreign policy until the 1990s.

Bandaranaike's domestic policies were equally important. He ignited conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils by making Sinhalese the only official language and by implementing other policies that exacerbated communal politics. The Tamils began a civil disobedience movement, and occasional violence erupted. In 1959 Bandaranaike was assassinated, not by Tamils but by a Buddhist radical who wanted the prime minister to do even more to establish Sinhalese dominance.

The April 1960 elections were won by Bandaranaike's widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the world's first female prime minister. She expanded her husband's foreign and domestic policies during two terms in office (1960–1965, 1970–1977). In 1962 she hosted a conference of neutrals to mediate the Sino-Indian War. In 1972 she changed the country's name to Sri Lanka (Sinhalese for "resplendent land") and declared it a republic. She then promulgated a new constitution and made Buddhism a state religion, further alienating the Tamils. Bandaranaike also faced insurrection from the Maoist People's Liberation Front (MPLF) that prompted a state of emergency lasting six years (1971–1977).

In 1977 Bandaranaike was ousted by J. R. Jayawardene, who served as prime minister and president during 1977–1988. Later that year the National Assembly adopted a presidential system of government, appointing Jayawardene to the office. Criticized by some as corrupt and authoritarian, he liberalized the economy and tilted to the West. He was elected president again in 1982 but had to contend with an increasingly divided nation. In May 1983, thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers were killed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers), militants who demanded an independent

homeland. Ethnic violence then rocked the country, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency. Attempts to crush the insurgents failed. Aided secretly by supporters in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the guerrillas were effectively organized and well armed.

Agreements in 1987 brought Indian troops, ostensibly as peacekeepers, to diffuse the situation. They remained until 1990 but failed to stop the violence. In fact, the unrest grew worse. Supporting the Tamils, the MPLF renewed attacks on the government in 1989. In 1990 Tamil guerrillas turned against Muslims who supported the Sinhalese. In 1991 the Indian government took over direct rule of Tamil Nadu, provoking the LTTE suicide bomb attack that killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that May. By 1992 nearly 20,000 people had been killed in the insurgency, including many senior military and government officials. Then, in May 1993, the LTTE assassinated President Ranasinghe Premadasa, causing even more bloodshed.

In August 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga became prime minister of a coalition government that bridged both Buddhist extremists and Marxist revolutionaries. In November 1994 she became the first woman elected president in Sri Lanka. Her government thereafter veered between military campaigns and peace negotiations, the most recent of which started through Norwegian intermediaries in 2001.

Arne Kislenko

Tamil guerrilla on patrol in Sri Lanka, February 1986. (Michel Philippot/Sygma/Corbis)

See also

Bandaranaike, Sirimavo; Colombo Plan; Non-Aligned Movement; South Asia

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See Stasi

Staatssicherheitsdienst der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik

Stalin, Josef
(1879–1953)

Russian revolutionary and dictator of the Soviet Union (1929–1953). More absolute a ruler than any Russian tsar, Josef Stalin (born Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili) was one of the most powerful and influential figures in history and certainly one of its most horrific. As many as 20 million people may have died as a direct result of his policies.

Much of Stalin's early life remains obscure, in part because he took pains to rewrite it. Born in the town of Gori, Georgia, in the Caucasus on 21 December 1879, he was the only child of his parents to survive infancy. His father was a cobbler and his mother a washerwoman and domestic. His father (who died in a barroom brawl) was an alcoholic and beat young Josef regularly.

Stalin's mother wanted Dzhugashvili to become a priest, and he graduated from the four-year elementary ecclesiastical school in Gori in 1894 and then entered a theological seminary in Tiflis (Tblisi) on a scholarship. He grew up to be a small man, barely five feet in height, with a pockmarked face and a withered arm (or at least one of sufficient infirmity to keep him out of the Russian Army). He either quit the seminary or was expelled. In any case, he said it was there that he was introduced to Russian Marxism.

In 1901 Dzhugashvili joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. His activities to secure funds included robberies and counterfeiting operations. He was subsequently arrested, tried, and convicted. Exiled to Siberia in 1903, he escaped a year later. His enemies would later charge that he was also in the pay of the tsarist secret police.

As many as 20 million people may have died as a direct result of Stalin's policies.

One of Dzhugashvili's aliases, the one by which he became best known, was that of Stalin (Man of Steel), given to him by his fellow revolutionaries for his strength and ruthlessness. Coarse and ill-mannered, Stalin was six times arrested and exiled and escaped five times. Freed during the March 1917 Revolution, he returned to Petrograd and became editor of the party newspaper, *Pravda* (Truth). His role in the Bolshevik seizure of power that November is unclear, but he clearly did not take a leading part. Leon Trotsky, a rival for power later, remembered Stalin's role as "a gray blur."

Stalin was active in the Russian Civil War (1918–1921) and the Russo-Polish War (1920–1921), and from 1920 to 1923 he was commissar of nationalities. In 1923 he assumed the post of secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), a position he used as a springboard to power. His political rise has been ascribed to his skill at infighting and playing one faction against another as well as his absolute ruthlessness, but he also put in long hours at his job and deserves considerable credit for his achievement.

By the late 1920s, Stalin had triumphed over his rivals, chief among them Trotsky, to wield absolute power in the Soviet Union. Stalin created the bureaucratic system and refined both the secret police and slave labor camps begun under his predecessor, Vladimir Lenin. Stalin abandoned Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) that permitted a degree of capitalism in Russia and initiated a series of five-year plans to modernize the economy,

concentrating on heavy industry. Stalin's economic policies included the forced collectivization of agriculture that claimed an estimated 10–15 million lives.

Stalin was personally responsible for the Great Purge trials of the 1930s that consumed virtually all of the top party leadership. Also falling victim to the Great Purge were military leaders, including 60 percent of Red Army officers above the rank of major. In the so-called Deep Comb-Out that accompanied the show trials, hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens simply vanished without benefit of judicial procedure.

Much of the blame for the dismal showing of the Red Army in the 1939–1940 war with Finland and at the outset of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 must be attributed to Stalin's policies. He had also labeled repeated warnings of an impending German attack as "Western disinformation." He grew in stature as a military commander and strategist during the war, however. Learning the art of war and absorbing specialist military information, he made all important strategic decisions for the Red Army as well as taking many decisions on the tactical level.

Josef Stalin, dictator of the Soviet Union during 1929–1953. (Library of Congress)

In foreign affairs, Stalin seized opportunities that presented themselves in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Knowing exactly what he wanted, he met with Western leaders in Moscow and at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences. In 1919, following World War I, the West had quarantined the new communist Russia with a series of new successor states, endeavoring to contain communism with a cordon sanitaire. Now, following World War II, Stalin sought the reverse, insisting at the very least on governments friendly to the Soviet Union in order to provide security for a badly wounded Soviet empire. Throughout his long reign, Stalin was intensely suspicious of foreigners and foreign, above all Western, influences. Thus, Soviets who had been in the West, including Red Army personnel captured during the war, were immediately suspect and treated as enemies. A great many people who had been in the West, voluntarily or involuntarily, were shipped off to the gulags. Many Soviet citizens had openly cooperated with the Germans during the war. Although Ukrainians were far too numerous to be uprooted, Stalin did make an example of the Crimean Tartars. He ordered some 300,000 of them sent to Uzbekistan in Central Asia.

Although there were fears in the West that Stalin's plans included the communization of Western Europe, the dictator's immediate motivation was simply that of securing the Soviet empire. Because of the Red Army presence on the ground, there was little that Western leaders could do to prevent this short of war with the Soviet Union, which despite the U.S. nuclear monopoly was unimaginable to Washington in 1945. Stalin's regime emerged from the war with all of Eastern Europe and much of Central Europe under its control.

The Soviet Union had suffered grievously during the war, with perhaps 27 million people dead and widespread physical destruction. Stalin put the population to work rebuilding, although his people paid for this in retention of the forty-eight-hour workweek and living standards well below those of 1940. In a new five-year plan, he continued his emphasis on building heavy industry, although some attention was paid to pressing housing needs.

To unite the Soviet people under his leadership, Stalin proclaimed the belief of a communist world threatened by encircling enemies. Everything was done to maintain the intense nationalist sentiments aroused by the ordeal of the long struggle against the Germans in World War II. Andrei Zhdanov, political boss of Leningrad, became the guiding spirit of this ideology, known as Zhdanovshchina. It championed Russian nationalism and attacked Western influence (now known as bourgeois cosmopolitanism), glorified communism, and above all trumpeted the accomplishments and inspiration of the Great Leader, Stalin, attributing to him all Soviet successes.

Once Stalin rejected a closer relationship with the West, the Cold War was launched in earnest. Stalin refused to allow the East European Soviet satellites to participate in the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), and following an impasse over German reunification on Soviet terms and impending Western currency reform in the Allies' zones of Germany, in the summer of 1948 Soviet troops cut off Western land access to the city of Berlin. This sparked a major East-West confrontation and led to the Berlin Airlift. Stalin's tactics and saber rattling resulted in the 1949 formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and prompted the movement toward West European unity.

Stalin pushed hard to develop an atomic bomb, a process greatly accelerated by Soviet espionage. Following the explosion of the Soviet Union's first nuclear device in late 1949, he adopted a less militant foreign policy, jettisoning the militant expansionism of the immediate postwar years in favor of one that was comparatively defensive in nature. While maintaining the traditionally truculent Soviet tone, he abandoned the further extension of his European empire. This move was accompanied by a massive propaganda effort, the great Stalinist Peace Campaign. Agitation against colonialism was increasingly used to weaken the Western hold on global military bases, while Soviet foreign policy also sought to sow discord between the United States and its allies.

Early in 1950, Stalin gave his blessing to plans by Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) leader Kim Il Sung to invade the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and reunify the peninsula under communist rule. Stalin evidently believed Kim's contention that the United States would either do nothing or would not react in time to save South Korea. Later, when the war went badly for Kim and North Korea, Stalin sanctioned military intervention by the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The last act in the Stalinist drama was the so-called Doctors' Plot. Fed by Stalin's continuing paranoia, nine doctors, six of them Jewish, were accused of employing their medical skills to assassinate prominent individuals, among

them Zhdanov, Stalin's heir apparent. Many in the Soviet Union believed that this heralded a return to the purges of the 1930s. But it may only have been a maneuver to strike out against the growing ascendancy of a leadership group headed by Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenty Beria or perhaps an effort to imbue the bureaucracy with renewed revolutionary zeal, much the way that Mao Zedong would do in the Cultural Revolution in China. Whatever the reasons, Stalin's death in Moscow on 5 March 1953, following a paralytic stroke, came as a relief to many in highly vulnerable Soviet leadership positions. His eventual successor, Nikita Khrushchev, began the slow process of de-Stalinization and denounced the many excesses of the Red Tsar.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; European Integration Movement; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korean War; Lend-Lease; Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich; Mao Zedong; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Soviet Union; World War II, Allied Conferences; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

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Star Wars

See Strategic Defense Initiative

Stasi

Secret police of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The Staatssicherheitsdienst der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, known simply as the Stasi, was one of the central pillars of the highly repressive East German regime. The Stasi functioned as a secret intelligence service, a

political secret police force, and a judicial inquiry organization. In Bautzen, the Stasi even maintained a prison for political dissidents. Allegedly, the Stasi was supervised by the Council of Ministers, but its real purpose was securing the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) hold on power.

The Stasi identified itself as a revolutionary organ, with a tradition that dated back to the 1917 foundation of the Bolshevik security service, the Cheka. Many Stasi officers were members of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), and some had even worked for the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB). In correspondence with these and other secret police ministries, the Stasi saw itself as the shield and sword of the single Communist Party. This was clear from the beginning. The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD), after having defeated Adolf Hitler's forces, took full control in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ). Together with German communists, they began to build a secret police organization as early as the spring of 1945. This department (K-5) of the Kriminalpolizei was headed by Erich Mielke, a confirmed party soldier. But not until the founding of East Germany in October 1949 was a ministry of secret service instituted. On 8 February 1950 a proclamation was made creating the Ministry of State Security, headed by Wilhelm Zaisser (and later Ernst Wollweber). Nevertheless, throughout the 1950s, KGB officers and instructors dominated the Stasi.

Because the Stasi employed its personnel based on their political beliefs and socialist zeal rather than their education and skills, its performance was seriously flawed during its first two decades. The East Berlin Uprising of 17 June 1953 caught the Stasi by surprise. It reacted with singular brutality, kidnapping Germans from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and West Berlin, torturing detainees, and worse. Only in the 1960s did the Stasi develop more sophisticated and subtle methods. When Erich Mielke took over the organization in 1957, the Ministry of State Security employed 14,000 official workers. Ten years later their number had grown to 33,000. By 1977 Stasi personnel reached 66,000, and at its peak in 1987, some 90,000 people worked for the Stasi.

The number of unofficial employees (agents, or *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*) was even higher, at 173,000 during the late 1980s. These unofficial collaborators were counted as the Stasi's most effective weapon in the battle against the enemy, that is, anyone who endangered the socialist order. These elements included foreign enemies, reactionaries in West Germany, or domestic oppositionists. To combat these divisive elements, the foreign intelligence service (HVA), headed by the charismatic Markus Wolf during 1952–1986, and the secret police department (the Hauptabteilung XX) cooperated closely.

Beginning in the 1970s, the ministry developed into a central institute for security, repression, and party power. The Stasi, under the reign of Mielke, was wholly dedicated to the single Communist Party and deeply intertwined with it. It was not subject to parliamentary control and took orders directly from party officials. However, during the autumn of 1989, when the East German regime collapsed, the Stasi quickly disintegrated. Dissidents occu-

pied Stasi headquarters in Berlin. The ministry was dissolved in early 1990, and its files can now only be accessed by the public under certain conditions.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

East Berlin Uprising; German Democratic Republic; Honecker, Erich; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti; Wolf, Markus

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Stepinac, Aloysius, Archbishop
(1898–1960)

Roman Catholic archbishop, cardinal, and Croatian patriot. Born in Brezarić on 8 May 1898, the eighth of twelve children of a peasant family, Aloysius Stepinac joined the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1916 as a second lieutenant and was taken prisoner in the war against Italy. Upon his release in 1919, he began undergraduate studies in agriculture at Zagreb University.

Stepinac decided to become a priest and went to Rome in 1924. During 1924–1929 he obtained two doctorates (one in theology, the other in philosophy) and returned home in October 1930. He was then appointed secretary to the archbishop of Zagreb and in June 1934 was nominated to be coadjutor of the archbishop. When the archbishop died in December 1937, Stepinac became archbishop of Zagreb.

Stepinac's behavior during World War II is controversial. Some sources accuse him of direct involvement with the fascist Ustashi regime, while others maintain that he acted with diffidence toward the government. In any case, with the end of the war, Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito proposed that Stepinac establish an autonomous Catholic Church independent of the Vatican. He refused and on 18 September 1946 was arrested and charged with cooperating with the Ustashi regime. In October 1946 Stepinac was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment. He remained in prison until 1951, when Tito's government commuted his sentence to house arrest in Krašić.

In an investiture ceremony in Rome on 12 January 1953, Pope Pius XII made Stepinac a cardinal, a gesture that led to the breaking of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See. Stepinac died on 10 February 1960 at Krašić and was buried behind the main altar in the cathedral in Zagreb. He was subsequently rehabilitated and beatified by Pope John Paul II on 3 October 1998.

Lucian N. Leustean

See also

Roman Catholic Church; Tito, Josip Broz; Yugoslavia

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Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr.

(1900–1949)

U.S. Lend-Lease administrator during 1942–1943, undersecretary of state during 1943–1944, secretary of state during 1944–1945, and ambassador to the United Nations (UN) during 1945–1946. Born on 22 October 1900 in Chicago, Illinois, Edward Stettinius was the son of a prominent industrialist who moved to New York in 1914 to direct Allied purchasing for the private banking house J. P. Morgan and Company during World War I. After attending the University of Virginia, where he spent much time on extracurricular social work, he joined General Motors and implemented innovative employee benefit programs. Moving to United States Steel in 1934, four years later he became chairman of the board.



U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr. (Library of Congress)

In 1940 Stettinius's earlier business-government liaison work on New Deal industrial recovery programs brought him the position of chairman of the War Resources Board. The following year he became director of priorities in the Office of Production Management, where he encouraged the development of synthetic rubber. In 1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Stettinius administrator of the Lend-Lease Administration, whose organization he streamlined and rationalized while successfully winning congressional support for its sometimes controversial aid programs to the Allies.

In September 1943 Stettinius became undersecretary of state, working under Secretary Cordell Hull with a commission to improve and coordinate the State Department's notoriously inefficient structural organization and improve its lackluster public image. Stettinius's other major responsibility was the creation of an international security organization, the UN. After laying the groundwork for this in discussions with British Foreign Office counterparts in the spring of 1944, Stettinius attended the August 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference, where he played a major role in drafting the UN Charter.

When poor health caused Hull's resignation in November 1944, Stettinius succeeded him. The new secretary

instituted public relations policies that greatly enhanced his department's popularity. He attended the controversial February 1945 Yalta Conference of Allied leaders, helping to draft American proposals for a Declaration on Liberated Europe and further clarifications of the UN Charter. Stettinius's greatest diplomatic contributions occurred from April to June 1945 at the San Francisco Conference of Allied Nations, which drafted the final UN Charter. His diplomatic skills were instrumental in persuading the numerous delegates to reach consensus on a charter that all could support.

Many officials considered Stettinius a lightweight. During the San Francisco Conference, President Harry S. Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt in April 1945, decided to replace Stettinius with South Carolina Democrat James F. Byrnes. On 27 June 1945, one day after the conference ended, Stettinius resigned to become the first U.S. representative to the new UN.

Disillusioned with the Truman administration's failure to use UN mechanisms to resolve the developing Cold War, in June 1946 Stettinius left the organization and became rector of the University of Virginia. In 1949 he published a carefully documented account of the Yalta Conference, defending Roosevelt's decisions there. Stettinius died of a heart attack in Greenwich, Connecticut, on 31 October 1949.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Hull, Cordell; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; United Nations

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Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II
(1900–1965)

U.S. politician, Democratic Party presidential candidate, and ambassador to the United Nations (UN). Born in Los Angeles, California, on 5 February 1900, Adlai Stevenson attended the elite Choate School and Princeton University and then earned a law degree from Northwestern University Law School. Joining the leading Chicago law firm of Cutting, Moore and Sidley, he rapidly won social prominence and a wide circle of intellectual friends, serving on many public service organizations, most notably the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Elected its president in 1935, he worked energetically

A prominent figure in the Democratic Party, Adlai Stevenson is perhaps best known for his unsuccessful bids for the U.S. presidency in 1952 and 1956. Stevenson held several high positions in government, including assistant to the secretary of state, governor of Illinois, and U.S. representative to the United Nations. (Library of Congress)

on its behalf, winning a reputation as a stellar public speaker.

A firm supporter of American intervention in World War II, in 1940 Stevenson headed the Chicago chapter of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. In 1941 he joined the Navy Department, remaining there until 1944. Shortly afterward, he joined the State Department as a special assistant to the secretary of state, where he stayed until 1947, serving on the American team at the 1945 San Francisco conference that created the UN and attending several UN General Assemblies.

Returning to Illinois, in 1948 Stevenson was elected governor on the Democratic ticket. As governor, he launched an activist and progressive social reform program and attempted to eradicate corruption. An outspoken opponent of McCarthyism, Stevenson quickly won national recognition as a remarkably eloquent rising political star. He was drafted on the third ballot at the Democratic National Convention in 1952, an open contest since the incumbent president, Harry S. Truman, damaged by McCarthyism and the Korean War, had chosen not to run again. Despite unstinting liberal enthusiasm for Stevenson, he faced an uphill battle against Dwight D. Eisenhower, the popular Republican candidate. Little divided them on foreign policy. Both were staunch Cold Warriors who implicitly endorsed the Truman administration's containment policy. In practice, Stevenson's position on Korea closely resembled that of Eisenhower, yet Stevenson offered no new initiatives but rather an indefinite continuation of the existing Korean stalemate. In 1952 and again in 1956, Eisenhower defeated Stevenson by wide margins.

In 1961, Stevenson hoped that the new Democratic president, John F. Kennedy, would name him secretary of state, but he instead became ambassador to the UN, a position he held for the rest of his life. Both John and Robert Kennedy regarded Stevenson as overly liberal, weak, and indecisive, so they treated him rather contemptuously. For fear of provoking congressional conservatives and the China Lobby, Stevenson was forbidden to express his personal preference for U.S. recognition of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC). Left ignorant of planning for the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, Stevenson at first erroneously informed the UN that his country had played no part in it.

Stevenson's finest hour came during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when he aggressively demanded that the Soviet UN representative confirm whether or not his country had deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba and advised the president to take a relatively moderate line during the crisis. Stevenson died in London on 14 July 1965.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Bay of Pigs; China, People's Republic of; Containment Policy; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Korean War; McCarthyism; Truman, Harry S.; United Nations

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Stimson, Henry Lewis
(1867–1950)

U.S. secretary of war (1911–1913, 1940–1945) and secretary of state (1929–1933). Born in New York City on 21 September 1867, Henry Stimson was educated at Phillips Andover Academy, Yale University, and Harvard Law School. In 1891 he entered the law firm of Root and Clark. Its leading partner, Elihu Root, a future secretary of war and secretary of state, became one of two role models, the other being future president Theodore Roosevelt, whom Stimson would try to emulate throughout his career.

Like Roosevelt, Stimson found public service more satisfying than a career in law and soon became active in New York Republican politics. Appointed secretary of war in 1911, he followed in Root's footsteps in attempting to modernize the U.S. Army, improving troop training and the efficiency of the General Staff, although congressional opposition blocked his contemplated consolidation and rationalization of army posts around the country.

When World War I began in Europe in 1914, the staunchly interventionist and pro-Allied Stimson campaigned ardently for preparedness, massive increases in American military budgets in anticipation of war with Germany, and universal military training. After American intervention, he volunteered and served in France as a lieutenant colonel of artillery. Returning from the war, he was convinced that the United States must assume a far greater international role.

Appointed by President Herbert Hoover as secretary of state in 1929, Stimson protested firmly against Japan's 1931 establishment of the puppet state of Manzhuguo, instituting the policy of American nonrecognition of its government. In the later 1930s, he was among the strongest advocates of firm American opposition to fascist states' demands. When World War II began in Europe in 1939, Stimson, a firm believer in an Anglo-American alliance, outspokenly demanded massive American assistance to the Allies.

In the course of his distinguished public service career, Henry L. Stimson served in the cabinets of four presidents. As secretary of state in 1932, he established a policy, later called the Stimson Doctrine, following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria not to recognize changes in violation of existing international nonaggression pacts. As secretary of war from 1940 to 1945, he recommended employing the atomic bomb against Japan. (Library of Congress)

Although or perhaps because he was a prominent Republican, in summer 1940 Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt made him secretary of war, a position Stimson held until the war ended. He attracted an able group of younger lawyers and businessmen such a Robert A. Lovett, Robert P. Patterson, and John J. McCloy who not only oversaw the massive recruitment and industrial mobilization programs that the war effort demanded but also accepted and wished to carry forward the forceful internationalist tradition that their revered chief embodied.

In the spring of 1945, Stimson was the first official to inform President Harry S. Truman that his country and Britain had developed an atomic weapon. Stimson approved its use against Japan but was largely responsible for the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration, whereby the Allies first invited Japan to surrender or face attack by unspecified but highly destructive new weapons. He later published an article justifying his own and other American officials' decision to use atomic weapons against Japan on the grounds that ultimately this saved more lives than it cost. He also initially suggested that in order to disarm Soviet suspicions, the Allies should share the secrets of nuclear power with the Soviet Union, plans that ultimately proved fruitless.

After retiring in 1945, Stimson endorsed a greatly enhanced American international role, publicly supporting the Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He published an influential volume of memoirs, setting forth his views on his country's international position. Stimson died on 20 October 1950 at Huntington, New York.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Atomic Bomb; Lovett, Robert Abercrombie; Marshall Plan; McCloy, John Jay; Military-Industrial Complex; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.

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Stockholm Document
(1986)

Final document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in Europe. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) included a modest set of measures to improve cooperation in a range of areas. The key component dealt with security issues and proposed a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) designed to lessen tensions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The Helsinki CBMs focused on advanced notice and exchanges of information concerning military maneuvers.

The Helsinki Final Act also called for follow-up meetings to assess progress and develop further CBMs. Little was accomplished at the first of these in Belgrade (1977–1978) and Madrid (1980–1983), largely because of the deterioration in East-West relations at the time. However, the Madrid meeting did agree to a call for a new conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures, to be held in Stockholm, with a mandate to develop a more comprehensive and verifiable set of CBMs, now termed CSBMs. All CSCE members would participate. The Stockholm Conference, as it was better known, began on 17 January 1984 and concluded on 21 September 1986 with the adoption of the Document of the Stockholm Conference, which became effective on 1 January 1987.

The Stockholm Document included agreed provisions for CSBMs in several areas related to the activities of ground and air forces and covered a geographic region from the Atlantic to the Urals. All parties to the agreement pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force and also agreed to give all other parties forty-two days' advanced notice of any military activity involving the movement of more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks. Notice was also required if more than 200 aircraft sorties would be associated with a notifiable troop movement, if any parachute or amphibious exercise involved more than 3,000 troops, and for the movement of any division-strength force into the covered area. All parties were permitted two observers at any exercise or transfer involving more than 17,000 troops or any parachute or amphibious exercise of more than 5,000 troops. All parties would also submit to all other parties an annual calendar listing notifiable activities at least one year in advance and for any involving more than 40,000 troops two years in advance. Movements of more than 75,000 troops were banned without a two-year notification, while those between 40,000 and 75,000 were banned without a one-year notification. Finally, all parties were granted the right to conduct on-site inspections by air and ground with four inspectors within thirty-six hours of a request, although no state had to accept more than three such inspections per year. This marked the first time that the Soviet Union accepted guaranteed on-site inspections.

The Stockholm Document marked considerable success in the process of developing meaningful CSBMs, which helped provide stability during the turmoil associated with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, but it

was not the end of the process. A new round of negotiations beginning in 1989 would produce enhanced CSBMs in the Vienna Document (1990).

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Helsinki Final Act; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on; Warsaw Pact

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Strategic Air Command

Primary U.S. air command for nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. The Strategic Air Command (SAC), a combat command of the U.S. Air Force, was responsible for long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), two-thirds of the nation's strategic nuclear triad. SAC's main goal was to maintain a strong, credible strategic nuclear force that could swing into action within minutes, either to prevent a nuclear strike or to inflict one on an enemy nation.

SAC was formed in 1946, a year before the U.S. Air Force became a separate military service. Originally, SAC consisted of World War II B-17 and B-29 bombers. Its first commander was General George Kenney. On 19 October 1948, Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay took command and oversaw the move of SAC headquarters from Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland to Offutt Air Force Base outside Omaha, Nebraska. He quickly established stringent standards of performance, strict evaluation procedures, and incentive and retention programs. He also changed the way that personnel viewed the command.

During LeMay's tenure, SAC added B-50 and B-36 bombers. In its early years, the command had its own jet fighters for bomber protection and its own airlift. B-29 bombers were modified to be used as aerial tankers, with aerial refueling becoming an integral part of SAC and the nuclear war plan. In 1951, SAC began taking delivery of the all-jet B-47 bomber and the KC-97 tanker. These two aircraft were the mainstays of SAC forces into the early 1960s. In 1955, SAC received its first B-52 Stratofortress eight-engine bomber. SAC entered the missile age with the Snark subsonic intercontinental cruise missile and the Rascal, designed to be launched against ground targets from the B-47. The following year, the KC-135 Stratotanker, a four-engine jet air refueling aircraft, entered service.

At least one-third of all aircraft and almost all missiles were on alert at SAC bases twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. During the 1960s, B-52 bombers armed with nuclear weapons were on airborne alert, ready to strike targets from orbits outside the Soviet Union. The airborne alerts were terminated in late 1968.

In 1959, SAC employed 262,600 personnel, 3,207 aircraft, and 25 missiles, including the Snark, the first Atlas ICBMs, Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and the Hound Dog, an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) carried by the B-52. By 1959, SAC's bomber force was an all-jet force. In 1960, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was formed with SAC's commander as director and a vice admiral as deputy director. The JSTPS was established to provide centralized planning for the entire U.S. nuclear triad, SAC bombers and missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), nuclear-armed tactical aircraft, and IRBMs. In the early 1960s, the Snark and Thor missiles were deactivated to make room for the new Atlas and Titan I ICBMs. B-47s and KC-97s were phased out, and the supersonic B-58 bomber was put into service. By 1962, the new Titan II

B-52D Stratofortress bombers at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, on 15 December 1972. The Strategic Air Command fleet was used extensively for bombing missions during the Vietnam War. (U.S. Department of Defense)

and Minuteman I ICBMs came on-line. SAC reconnaissance aircraft included the U-2 and the SR-71, which was commissioned in the late 1960s. At its peak strength peak in 1962, SAC employed more than 282,000 personnel.

During the next thirty years, SAC's mission remained unchanged. Missile forces stabilized with a mix of 1,000 Minuteman II and III ICBMs (with 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs replacing 50 Minuteman IIIs in the late 1980s) and 54 Titan II ICBMs (phased out in the mid-1980s). SAC aircraft included, at various times, a mix of B-1, B-52, and FB-111 bombers armed with gravity weapons, short-range attack missiles, and ALCMs; a tanker force of KC-135s and KC-10s; and U-2 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft.

SAC B-52 bombers played a major role in the Vietnam War. The SAC airborne command post, dubbed "Looking Glass," with an airborne battle staff commanded by a general officer, was on alert with at least one EC-135 aircraft airborne at all times during 1961–1992. The number of people in the command remained near 200,000 until reductions in the bomber force caused a slow exodus. SAC had about 110,000 personnel when it was deactivated on 1 June 1992.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. Air Force underwent a fundamental reorientation in structure and doctrine. Air force leadership acknowledged that SAC had accomplished its mission. It had maintained nuclear superiority—and peace—for forty-six years. After it was deactivated, SAC's aircraft became part of new U.S. Air Force operational commands.

Charles G. Simpson

See also

Aircraft; Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Pershing II; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Poseidon; Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Arms Race; United States Air Force

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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

Series of negotiations and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union that attempted to control the nuclear arms race. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union began to move away from the abyss of nuclear war and toward the reduction of nuclear armaments. The two superpowers also sought cooperation on this issue because of the immense cost of the nuclear arms race. Continued production

of nuclear weapons was becoming superfluous, as each side had more than enough capability to cripple the other even if only a small percentage of the weapons, should they be launched, actually struck their targets. The leadership of both nations was sufficiently motivated to seek an agreement on nuclear arms reduction. Adding to American motives were concerns that the Soviets might soon undermine U.S. superiority in nuclear arms and that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had acquired nuclear weapons beginning in 1964. Although the United States first approached the Soviet Union concerning strategic arms reduction talks in 1964, efforts to begin a dialogue failed repeatedly until the end of the decade.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Arms reduction talks between the two nations began in November 1969 and, after two and a half years of detailed negotiations, a two-part agreement was reached. The first major agreement to come out of the talks was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972. This treaty reflected a belief on the part of both nations that they should seek to limit the deployment of antiballistic missile systems.

ABMs were designed to destroy enemy missiles before they could strike their targets. The United States had sought an agreement with the Soviets since the late 1960s on ABMs, which the Soviets had begun to deploy, arguing that their continued deployment would lead the United States to develop larger nuclear weapons to defeat these defenses. Therefore, rather than slowing the arms race, the development and deployment of ABMs would only intensify the arms race. The Soviets finally accepted this line of reasoning. The preamble to the treaty reflected this understanding: "Effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."

The treaty had unlimited duration, with five-year reviews. The two sides created the Standing Consultative Commission to serve as the forum for discussing compliance issues or other problems with the treaty. The commission met in Geneva, Switzerland.

The ABM Treaty prohibited deployment of an ABM system for "the defense of the territory" or the provision of "a base for such defense." This effectively restricted the creation of a nationwide defensive system while permitting the Soviets and Americans to maintain two ABM sites, comprising no more than one hundred interceptor missiles at each location. Each country could position one ABM site to defend its capital, and the other could shield one group of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The agreement also prohibited transferring ABM sites to other nations.

Each side would verify compliance with the treaty through the use of national technical means. A 1974 Protocol to the treaty further limited each side to one ABM deployment site. The United States chose to place its system near the ICBM missile fields of Grand Forks, North Dakota, and the Soviet Union chose to defend Moscow.

The United States and Russia signed a series of agreements on 27 September 1997 that allowed Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to succeed

the Soviet Union as state parties to the treaty. These agreements also attempted to establish the demarcation between theater and national ballistic missile defense systems.

Ultimately, both sides realized that ABM systems lacked any real military value and were prohibitively expensive. The United States closed its sole ABM site in 1975. Russia's Galosh system surrounding Moscow is still operational. Citing national security concerns and a need to deploy a limited national missile defense system, the United States withdrew from the treaty on 13 June 2002.

Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms: SALT I. Of greater importance was the wider-ranging arms control agreement that emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which came to be known as SALT I, was signed in Moscow by President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev on 26 May 1972, along with the ABM treaty. The SALT I accord, which was scheduled to last for five years, required the two superpowers to maintain nuclear arsenals that were roughly equivalent to one another in terms of offensive land- and sea-launching platforms. The agreement froze the number of Soviet offensive ICBMs to 1,618 land-based missiles and 950 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The American arsenal was restricted to 1,054 land-based missiles and 710 SLBMs. Mobile missile systems were not addressed. While the Soviets seemed to have a numerical advantage in missile-launching capabilities, the United States continued to enjoy a substantial advantage in bombers (about 450 to the 260 for the Soviets) and could also rely on the nuclear deterrents belonging to their European allies. The Americans also took advantage of their technological superiority to develop multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The Nixon administration refused to negotiate any limits in regard to this technological advance, and the Soviets would later take advantage of this.

The agreement froze the number of Soviet offensive ICBMs to 1,618 land-based missiles and 950 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

In order to verify compliance with the terms of the treaty, both countries agreed to satellite photo reconnaissance of each other's territory. Even so, there were flaws in the agreement. The biggest problems were that the agreement failed to sufficiently regulate the upgrading of current missile systems. And it said nothing about the replacement of existing systems with new ones.

Each side took advantage of the loopholes in the treaty. The Soviets began to deploy a new missile system, the SS-19, that carried a warhead with six MIRVed warheads. This missile carried twice as many nuclear warheads as the mainstay of the U.S. intercontinental missile arsenal, the Minuteman. Eventually, the Soviet Union would develop the ability to launch missiles carrying ten MIRVs. On the other hand, the United States began to work on the development of the cruise missile, arguing that such a system was not covered under the SALT I agreement. Further compromising the spirit of the treaty were the new Soviet Backfire bomber, capable of reaching targets in the United States, and American plans to build the North American/Rockwell B-1

bomber and the Trident submarine. Another flaw in the treaty was that it permitted the replacement of so-called light missiles with heavy missiles, without adequately defining the term "heavy."

SALT I was designed to be an interim agreement, and the treaty contained a provision calling for continued talks aimed at creating a more detailed and comprehensive plan to regulate nuclear arms. Reaching agreement on what would become SALT II proved difficult, however. Progress was stalled by numerous factors, including President Nixon's resignation over the Watergate scandal in August 1974, American concerns with human rights violations in the Soviet Union, and a general deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations during the 1970s. The broad numerical outlines of the eventual SALT II agreement were laid out in a summit meeting between Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974, but this did not lead to forward progress for many years.

SALT II. Arms control talks continued between the two superpowers despite these obstacles. By 1979, both sides desired a new SALT agreement. Anxious to overcome numerous foreign policy setbacks, President Jimmy Carter's administration sought an arms deal to improve his chances for reelection in 1980. The Soviets sought an agreement chiefly for economic reasons, as the nation's rate of economic growth was quickly stagnating.

Concerned that the Soviets had an advantage in throw weight, or the size of the warhead that a missile could carry into space, Carter offered to cancel development of an experimental mobile ICBM that could carry ten warheads (the MX missile) if the Soviets would cut their heavy ICBM force in half. The Soviets refused to consider an offer to prevent deployment of what was still an experimental system. Carter then backed away from this position, and the negotiations began to move toward an eventual agreement. As a result, Carter and Brezhnev affixed their signatures to the SALT II Treaty at the Vienna summit meeting on 18 June 1979.

By the terms of the treaty, both sides agreed to a limitation on the number of warheads that would be allowed on an ICBM and the total number of allowable strategic launchers. Strategic nuclear launch vehicles were limited to 2,250 on each side, and no more than 1,320 of these missiles could be outfitted with MIRVs. Within that total, a further subcategory limited MIRVed ballistic missiles to 1,200, of which only 820 could be ICBMs. New ICBMs were limited to carry no more than ten warheads, and new SLBMs were limited to fourteen warheads each. The treaty also prohibited space-based nuclear weapons, fractional orbital missiles, and rapid-reload missile launchers.

A protocol to the treaty was signed at the same time and remained in effect until 31 December 1981. The Soviets agreed not to utilize their Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire bomber, which had the ability to reach targets throughout most of the United States, as an intercontinental weapon, while the Americans consented to delay deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles for three years. In addition, MIRVed ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with a range of more than 600 kilometers could not be tested.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signing the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) on 18 June 1979 in Vienna. The treaty was the culmination of a second round of talks seeking to curtail further development of nuclear arms. (Jimmy Carter Library)

The SALT II treaty ran into considerable opposition in the United States, as some liberals expressed disappointment that the treaty had failed to halt the arms race, and conservatives complained that the Soviets had retained a significant edge in throw weight.

Soviet actions in 1979 added immeasurably to the problem of ratifying the treaty. Their support of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Sandinista uprising in Nicaragua, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 all but torpedoed any prospects that SALT II would be ratified by the U.S. Senate. Knowing that the Senate would not ratify the SALT II treaty under such circumstances, Carter withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration on 3 January 1980. Although the treaty was never ratified by the United States, both sides nonetheless honored the agreement until May 1986, when President Ronald Reagan, citing Soviet violations, declared that the United States would no longer be bound by the limits of the SALT agreements.

Jeffrey A. Larsen and A. Gregory Moore

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Moscow Meeting,

Gorbachev and Reagan; Moscow and Yalta Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Nitze, Paul Henry; Nuclear Arms Race; Present Danger, Committee on the; Reykjavík Meeting

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Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Treaties

A series of bilateral arms control negotiations and treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) during the late 1980s and early 1990s that led to two treaties. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) resulted in the START I and START II treaties, which, unlike earlier arms control agreements that slowed or froze the rate of growth of strategic systems, were the first treaties to actually reduce the number of warheads and delivery systems on both sides.

Under President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), in the early 1980s the United States launched an arms buildup that was part of an overall strategy to confront the Soviet Union. Reagan hoped to improve the American bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviets by increasing the nation's military strength. He also hoped to force the Soviets to allocate more of their resources to the military in order to keep up. The most notable aspect of this renewed arms race was Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was an attempt to create a space-based missile shield that would render offensive nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. Critics viewed the SDI proposal as an expensive, unworkable, and possibly offensive weapons system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began installing Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in 1983 in response to the Soviets' refusal to downsize their arsenal of forward-deployed SS-20 theater-range missiles. This move caused the Soviets to walk out of arms control talks that had been ongoing in Geneva since 1982. Negotiations did not resume until March 1985.

In October 1986, Reagan abruptly reversed himself. During his first summit meeting with new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavík, Iceland, the American president expressed his willingness to remove intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) weapons from Europe and to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons. The initiative failed because Reagan was unwilling to include SDI in the proposal, and Gorbachev was unwilling to proceed unless SDI was part of the package.

Some two months later, the Soviets declared that they would negotiate according to the agenda laid out by the Americans, although initially focusing on the INF issue. The Soviets accepted the American proposal in February 1987, which called for the complete elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe. At the Washington Summit in December 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the INF Treaty. This treaty established a double-zero solution, calling for the removal of two classes of intermediate-range missiles—those with a range of roughly 600–3,500 miles and those with a range of 300–600 miles. An extensive on-site verification process was established as well. By the end of 1988, the removal of the missiles was complete.

START I. The START negotiations that had resumed in Geneva in 1985 bore fruit in 1991 with the signing of the Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the START I treaty. Under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev, the two nations concluded the treaty on 31 July 1991, just months before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The complex document served to reduce strategic nuclear delivery systems to 1,600 on each side, with attributed nuclear warheads (a somewhat arbitrary but agreed-upon number associated with certain delivery systems) restricted to 6,000 each.

There were additional sublimits for attributed warheads: 4,900 on deployed ballistic missiles, of which no more than 1,100 could be on mobile launchers. The Soviet Union was also limited to 154 heavy ICBMs, each carrying ten warheads. The treaty placed a limit on total nuclear throw weight, provided for verification processes, and also placed limitations on the types of vehicles that could carry nuclear warheads (including limits on the numbers of U.S. nuclear armed cruise missiles and Russian Backfire bombers).

On 23 May 1992 the Lisbon Protocol was signed, making START I a multilateral agreement among the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The treaty entered into force on 5 December 1994. The three new member states returned their residual Soviet-era nuclear arsenals to Russia prior to the implementation of the treaty and also joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nonnuclear weapons states.

The START I treaty had a duration of fifteen years, with the option to extend it at five-year intervals. All parties officially reached their treaty limits on 5 December 2001. The parties created a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission tasked with monitoring compliance with the treaty. The commission began meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1991. The treaty is scheduled to expire in 2009.



U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sign the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in Moscow in July 1991. Aimed at reducing the nuclear arsenal of the United States and the Soviet Union, the START negotiations succeeded the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s. (George Bush Library)

START II. START I was followed by the signing of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as START II, by Bush and Boris Yeltsin at the Moscow summit on 3 January 1993. START II relied heavily on START I for its definitions, procedures, and verification. The U.S. Senate ratified START II on 26 January 1996, and the Russian Duma ratified in on 14 April 2000.

This agreement called for a two-phase series of reductions. Phase one called for each side to reduce its deployed strategic forces to 3,800–4,250 attributed warheads within seven years of entry into force. There were sublimits for several categories within that total. Phase two, which was originally supposed to be completed by the year 2003, required each side to further reduce their deployed strategic forces to 3,000–3,500 attributed warheads. The following sublimits applied to phase two: 1,700–1,750 warheads on nuclear submarines, the elimination of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles, and the elimination of heavy ICBMs. America's B-2 bomber was left out of the START I treaty process since it was not scheduled to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). In START II, however, the two parties agreed to include the B-2 as a strategic weapons delivery vehicle with a U.S. commitment not to hang ALCMs on its wings.

This meant that it was accountable under the warhead limits and inspectable under the treaty's verification and compliance rules. The B-1 bomber was declared to have only a conventional mission. START II also significantly increased the level of on-site inspections necessary for implementation and compliance verification.

In March 1997, Yeltsin and President Bill Clinton met in Helsinki and agreed to extend the time period for START II implementation to 31 December 2007, as long as warheads were removed from the applicable systems by December 2003. Because of the delayed entry into force, phases one and two were to be completed simultaneously. The treaty parties created the Bilateral Implementation Commission, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, to monitor the compliance regime

Although eventually ratified by both sides, START II lost its relevance over the years, as the United States became more concerned with obtaining a modification to the ABM Treaty in order to deploy a ballistic missile defense system, to which the Russians remained opposed. START II was supplanted by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty), signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in May 2002. That agreement further reduces the number of nuclear warheads that can be deployed by each nation to 1,700–2,200 by the year 2012. Neither country any longer feels obliged to abide by the provisions of the START II treaty, but both are complying with START I.

Jeffrey A. Larsen and A. Gregory Moore

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Moscow Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Moscow and Yalta Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Nitze, Paul Henry; Nuclear Arms Race; Present Danger, Committee on the; Reykjavík Meeting

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Strategic Defense Initiative

Space-based, antiballistic missile (ABM) system endorsed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1983 as a way to neutralize the Soviet nuclear threat. Nicknamed "Star Wars" by its critics and the media, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) foresaw the use of satellites, mirrors, and lasers that would detect, track, and destroy incoming nuclear missiles. Reagan believed that the SDI might force the Soviets to engage in nuclear arms reduction talks and serve as a partial solution to the threat posed by the nuclear arms race.

To counter the Soviet threat in the 1950s, the United States began work on an ABM system. Various incarnations emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s, until the United States and the Soviet Union signed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This treaty limited the deployment of ABM systems to only two operational areas and stipulated that such a system could not protect the entire nation. Nevertheless, work continued in both nations to develop an effective means of nullifying an enemy nuclear attack.



Artist's rendering of one of the Strategic Defense Initiative designs from Los Alamos National Laboratory. It shows a space-based particle beam weapon attacking enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles. (U.S. Department of Energy)

Reagan had many motivations for pursuing the SDI. In principle, he disagreed with the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). MAD held that because of the catastrophic nature of thermonuclear war, any nation that initiated a nuclear exchange was guaranteed to suffer complete destruction in a counterstrike. Reagan believed that MAD was immoral and unacceptable. He was further motivated by the upcoming 1984 election and his desire not to be seen as a warmonger. Deploying a defensive system would demonstrate his desire to end the arms race.

Among those who supported the SDI were military contractors who stood to make money developing and deploying such a system. Other supporters included Robert McFarlane, Reagan's national security advisor during 1983–1985, who believed that the SDI could be used as a bargaining chip to motivate the Soviets to scale back their missile production. Opponents of the SDI, including some Reagan administration officials, mockingly nicknamed the plan "Star Wars" after the popular science fiction film series.

In a televised address on 23 March 1983, Reagan publicly announced his desire to pursue the SDI. The scientific task was difficult, he admitted, but the rewards would be worth it: a United States whose citizens did not have to live in fear of nuclear destruction. The SDI would be costly, perhaps in the trillions of dollars. Reagan lobbied his friend and ally British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who initially opposed the SDI but eventually came to see it as a good idea.

Unlike previous ABM systems, the SDI would provide missile defense from space. In fact, to intercept missiles in flight, space-based weapons were the best option, because land-based weapons could not overcome the problems presented by the curvature of Earth. Because Soviet long-range missiles took only thirty minutes to reach their targets, there was just enough time to detect, track, and intercept the warheads before they reentered the atmosphere. As Reagan described it and as scientists conceived it, the SDI would employ a number of satellites and space-based radars to detect and track incoming missiles and land- or satellite-based lasers reflected off orbital mirrors to destroy a warhead in flight. Scientists planned lasers that would employ X-ray, infrared, ultraviolet, or microwave radiation. They also conceived of particle-beam weapons in which streams of charged atomic matter would be directed at incoming warheads.

From the perspective of some, particularly new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the SDI was a great threat. When Reagan and Gorbachev first met in Geneva in 1985, the SDI proved the sticking point on any arms control agreements. Gorbachev fiercely objected to the SDI, arguing that such a system only made sense if the United States planned to launch a nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union. Gorbachev also well understood that the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States in computer technology, an area crucial to such an advanced weapons system. For the Soviet Union to allow the SDI to move forward would be to admit defeat. Gorbachev therefore insisted that Reagan give up the SDI before agreements on limiting offensive weapons could be reached. Reagan refused, but he also told Gorbachev that the SDI was necessary and that when it was finally completed,

he would share the technology with the Soviets. Gorbachev did not believe Reagan, and Reagan could see no logical argument against the SDI. Because of the SDI, the two men departed Geneva without a deal on arms control.

The Reagan administration ultimately failed to develop and deploy the SDI. The technology proved too daunting, and the costs were too high. Still, the mere threat of the SDI put tremendous pressure on the Soviets. Some scholars attribute the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse to Reagan's vigorous pursuit of the SDI. Others, however, regard the SDI as a costly boondoggle that only escalated Cold War tensions and contributed to swollen defense allocations and mammoth budget deficits.

Brian Madison Jones

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Missiles, Antiballistic; Mutual Assured Destruction; Nuclear Arms Race; Reagan, Ronald Wilson

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Stratemeyer, George Edward
(1890–1969)

U.S. Air Force general and commander of the Far East Air Force (FEAF) during the Korean War. Born in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 24 November 1890, George Stratemeyer graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1915 and served briefly in the infantry before beginning flight training. During and after World War I, he held various instructional and training positions, gaining a reputation as an effective administrator. During World War II, he served in the China-Burma-India theater as air advisor to Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell and then commanded the Eastern Air Command. He became a major general in 1942. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1945, Stratemeyer took command of the U.S. Army Air Forces in China before returning to the United States in February 1946 to head the new Air Defense Command, later the Continental Air Command.

In April 1949 Stratemeyer assumed command of the FEAF, comprising the Fifth Air Force in Japan, the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines, and the Twentieth Air Force on Okinawa. By 1950, 75 percent of the men under his command were products of the Air Force Reserve training program he had organized. Known for his ability to get the most from his subordinates, Stratemeyer displayed effective leadership following the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) by the Democratic People's Republic

of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) on 25 June 1950. When President Harry S. Truman ordered U.S. forces into action, Stratemeyer directed FEAF aircraft in the critical early days of the war, ordering attacks on the North Korean forces and providing air cover for the evacuation of Seoul. He then directed strategic bombing of North Korea to include the destruction of lines of communications, installations, and factories.

Following the Chinese military intervention in Korea, Stratemeyer opposed General Douglas MacArthur's flouting of directives. In late November 1950, after MacArthur unilaterally ordered the bombing of the Yalu River bridges, Stratemeyer informed his superiors in Washington, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) then restricted air raids to the southern side of the river. Stratemeyer believed, however, that his air forces should be permitted to conduct operations against Mainland China.

In May 1951 Stratemeyer suffered a heart attack, and he retired from active duty in January 1952. Thereafter, he became a public advocate for unlimited military operations against the People's Republic of China (PRC), complaining in an interview that Washington had "handcuffed" MacArthur. "We were required to lose the war," Stratemeyer told a Senate subcommittee. He also lobbied for expanding U.S. airpower as the most economical way to win wars and maintain a strong defense, and in 1954 he tried to dissuade the U.S. Senate from censuring Senator Joseph McCarthy for his reckless anticommunist witch-hunt. Stratemeyer died in Orlando, Florida, on 9 August 1969.

James I. Matray

See also

Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; United States Air Force; Vandenberg, Hoyt Sanford

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Strauss, Franz Josef

(1915–1988)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) minister for nuclear power (1955–1956), minister of defense (1956–1962), minister of finance (1966–1969), and minister-president of Bavaria (1978–1988). Born on 6 September 1915 in Munich, Franz Strauss studied to become a high school teacher at the University of Munich during 1935–1939 and then served in the German Army during World War II.

Following Strauss's brief internment in spring 1945, the American military occupation government appointed him deputy district president at Schöngau. In 1946 he cofounded the Christian Democratic Union (CSU), the sister party of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Bavaria. In June 1947, he became the youngest member of the Economic Council of the U.S.-British Bizonia. He also served in the Bundestag during 1949–1978 and again in 1987. During 1950–1953 and again during 1963–1966, he was deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU and during 1971–1978 served as economic speaker for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group.

Franz Josef Strauss, minister of defense of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), shown here in March 1958. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Strauss was appointed minister without portfolio in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's cabinet in October 1953 and was subsequently appointed minister for nuclear power in October 1955. Strauss served as minister of defense beginning in October 1956, a post he held until 1962. In this post, he pushed forward a number of structural reforms within the German armed forces, including universal conscription, introduced in April 1957. Forced to resign from office in November 1962 following the *Spiegel* Affair, during 1966–1969 he served Kurt-Georg Kiesinger's government as finance minister. When the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) formed a coalition in 1969 and launched Ostpolitik, Strauss became a hawkish opponent of Chancellor Willy Brandt's foreign policies.

Strauss's conservative position brought him into bitter conflict with Rainer Barzel, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, who showed more willingness to accept the new approach in foreign policy. Because of this controversy, Strauss demanded more independence for the CSU and was eager to establish his party nationwide, especially after Helmut Kohl, who was regarded as a moderate, became CDU chairman in 1973. When Strauss's plans failed in 1976, he committed himself to regional politics and became minister-president of Bavaria in 1978, an office he held until his death.

In his last years, to the surprise of many, Strauss developed a personal relationship with German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) leader Erich Honecker, whom he met twice in 1983 and again in 1987. After their first meeting, Strauss negotiated a major bank credit for the East Berlin government. Strauss died on 3 October 1988 in Regensburg, Germany.

Bert Becker

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Brandt, Willy; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Honecker, Erich; Kohl, Helmut; Ostpolitik; Scheel, Walter; Schmidt, Helmut; *Spiegel* Affair

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Students for a Democratic Society

Radical American political organization founded in 1959, considered the vanguard movement of the wave of Cold War progressive radicalism known as the New Left. The origins of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) can be traced to the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), the youth branch of the venerable Old Left society that campaigned on time-honored socialist issues of trade unionism and industrial rights during the 1930s.

The SDS's first official meeting was at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 1960, but the movement's intellectual ideological platform did not come until the publication of the Port Huron (Michigan) Statement, written and adopted as the group's manifesto in 1962. Its author, Tom Hayden, who also became SDS president that year, spoke of the need for a "participatory democracy" to replace the bellicose and corrupt complacency that, according to him, characterized American political life at the time. In particular, Hayden implored America's college-age youth—the affluent products of the long postwar boom—to openly challenge the unjust conventions of their parents' generation through grassroots educational initiatives, nonviolent protest, and civil disobedience. Hayden's call to arms struck a ringing chord within a young left-wing community, the "red-diaper babies," that was dissatisfied with the narrowly defined interests of traditional American socialism and was becoming increasingly interested in the social critiques of the European existentialists and the Frankfurt School. This marriage of concrete political grievances with more diffuse complaints about the nature of Western industrial civilization became a distinctive feature of the 1960s' Counterculture Movement.

The early years of SDS were occupied in support of the civil rights protests against Jim Crow racial segregation in the South as well as initiatives in poor urban districts to encourage small-scale civic dissent. SDS members took a natural interest in campus politics, particularly the attempts by conservative regents to continue some of the more straight-laced curriculum of earlier college days. The turning point in the history of SDS, however, came with the escalation of America's military involvement in the Vietnam conflict beginning in 1965. From its founding, the group was harshly critical of what it saw as unnecessary international belligerence by the United States and the deleterious effect that the "warfare state" had on economic and social priorities at home.

The August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution gave these concerns a particular intensity, and President Lyndon Johnson's decision in 1966 to limit draft

deferments for college students gave the core SDS constituency a personal stake in the politics of Vietnam. The national group organized mass protest marches in Washington, D.C., and New York City, while local campus chapters sponsored draft card burnings, sit-ins, and disruption of military recruitment visits and ROTC events. The SDS slogan "Make Love Not War" became one of the signature phrases of the era and the motto of antiwar activists around the globe.

By 1968, the SDS boasted more than 100,000 members on 400 college campuses. But while the passions of the Vietnam protests had given a powerful boost to enrollment, they also created tensions within the movement between those who believed in the original nonviolent principles of the Port Huron Statement and others who believed that state violence had to be met with counterviolence. Confrontations between student agitators and the authorities became uglier as the Vietnam struggle took on the character of a generational culture conflict. In 1968, a series of raucous building occupations at New York's Columbia University was met by a brutal police response that triggered a campuswide strike and the effective collapse of the college's academic program that year. In Chicago, student protestors outside the Democratic National Convention were among the thousands engaged in street battles against Mayor Richard Daley's notorious city troopers. The escalation of

Demonstrators protest the trial of the Chicago Seven (also known as the Chicago Eight). The Chicago Seven, antiwar activists arrested for protests during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, drew attention to their cause during lengthy and often bizarre legal proceedings. (Library of Congress)

violence reached its peak in 1970 when six students were killed in separate incidents at Kent State University in Ohio and Jackson State College in Mississippi. The internal politics of the SDS themselves spun into turmoil as hard-line followers of PRC leader Chairman Mao Zedong began taking over chapters and a number of extremist splinter organizations emerged, most famously the terrorist Weather Underground, or Weathermen, that in turn gave J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the excuse to harass the mainstream organization.

Student protests ebbed with the American disengagement from Vietnam in the early 1970s, but by that point the SDS was already finished as a significant force for change. Some of its prominent members, such as Hayden, continued in mainstream politics and enjoyed successful independent careers. Aside from its achievements in specific policy areas, perhaps the organization's most important legacy was the model it provided for later grassroots activism, much of which was ironically conservative in character, such as the pro-life, antiabortion lobby.

Alan Allport

See also

Peace Movements; Vietnam War Protests; Weathermen

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Study Centers, Cold War

See Cold War Study Centers, Non-U.S.; Cold War Study Centers, U.S.

Suárez González, Adolfo
(1932–)

Spanish interim president (1976–1977) and prime minister (1977–1981). Born on 25 September 1932 in Cebreros, Spain, Adolfo Suárez studied law at the Complutense University in Madrid and graduated in 1967. He then held several government posts during the Francisco Franco regime, including head of the radio and television ministries. Suárez eventually was appointed secretary-general of the Movimiento Nacional (National Movement) party.

For most of the Franco regime, the National Movement was the only political party allowed to operate legally. Suárez was appointed interim pres-

ident by King Juan Carlos I following Franco's 1975 death. Leftist and centrist politicians opposed Suárez's appointment, based on his close ties to the Franco regime. Nevertheless, Suárez proved to be a true reformer, spearheading political changes in 1976. He was also able to reform the military and return it to civilian control. These actions helped him form a more centrist party for the upcoming 1977 elections.

In 1977, during the first elections held after Franco's death, Suárez led the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD, Democratic Center Union) to a majority in the parliament and was appointed premier. His government continued to institute democratic reforms, relying on a coalition of centrist politicians. One of the biggest reforms was the implementation of a new constitution in 1979. In the 1979 elections, Suárez and the UCD were again victorious. Government became increasingly problematic, however, with an economic downturn and an increase in regionalist agitation. Suárez resigned in 1981 and subsequently dropped out of the UCD. In 1982 he formed the Centro Democrático y Social (CDS, Democratic and Social Center), which enjoyed only moderate success. In 1991 Suárez announced his retirement from public life. In May 2005 his son announced that his father was suffering from advanced Alzheimer's disease and that he recalled little of his time in government.

David H. Richards

See also
Spain

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See Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Submarines

Submarines operate both submerged and on the surface. They were developed to scout for the main battle fleet and destroy enemy warships. In World War I, they were also employed effectively as commerce destroyers, and in

World War II that and hunting enemy surface warships were their principal roles. The Cold War added the missions of hunting enemy submarines and serving as a launch platform for ballistic missiles.

At the beginning of the Cold War, all operational submarines used the diesel-electric drive. This required submarines to either surface frequently to recharge their batteries or be equipped with a snorkel breathing device for submerged diesel operation. Serious research into nuclear power for submarines, which promised essentially unlimited high-speed submerged operation, began immediately after World War II. The *Nautilus,* the first submarine with a nuclear power plant, was commissioned on 30 September 1954, although it was first under way under nuclear power on 17 January 1955. The *Nautilus*, 98.7 meters long with a beam of 8.43 meters, displaced 3,180 tons on the surface and 3,500 submerged. It could attain 22 knots on the surface and 23.3 knots submerged and was armed with six bow torpedo tubes with twenty-two torpedoes.

It was three years before the Soviets launched *K-3,* the first of a class of thirteen nuclear-powered submarines, on 9 August 1957. The *K-3* was commissioned on 7 January 1958. This Project 627–class (NATO-designated November-class) submarine was 107.4 meters long with a beam of 8.0 meters. It displaced 3,087 tons on the surface and 3,986 submerged. Its two-reactor power plant gave it a speed of 15.5 knots on the surface and 30.5 knots submerged. It had eight bow torpedo tubes and carried twenty torpedoes.

Nuclear power provided great cruising range. In 1960 the *Triton* sailed around the world while completely submerged, a trip of 41,519 miles. The *Triton* displaced 5,662 tons on the surface and 7,781 submerged, was 136.4 meters long and 11.26 meters in beam, had a speed of 27 knots both surfaced and submerged, and was armed with four bow and two stern torpedo tubes with fifteen torpedoes. Because submarines could now remain submerged for their entire duration at sea, they became much more difficult to track. However, nuclear power did not completely eclipse diesel submarines. Indeed, diesel submarines continue to be quieter and are considerably less expensive than those with nuclear power.

With the advent of nuclear weapons, including ballistic missiles, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to protect their missiles from a first strike by the other power. One of the solutions seized upon was to launch ballistic missiles from submarines. The Soviet diesel-electric Project 611 A (NATO-designated Zulu-IV) submarine *B-62,* with a single launch tube, was the first to fire a ballistic missile, on 16 September 1955. The succeeding Project 611 AB-class (NATO-designated Zulu-V) submarines were the first operational ballistic missile boat, the first (*B-67*) being commissioned on 30 June 1956. With a length of 90.5 meters and a beam of 7.5 meters, these submarines displaced 1,890 tons on the surface and 2,450 submerged. They attained 16.5 knots on the surface and 12.5 knots submerged. They could launch 2 R-11FM missiles (NATO-designated Scud) from vertical tubes in the sail, and they mounted six bow and four stern torpedo tubes with twenty-two torpedoes. Initially, Soviet ballistic missile submarines were very vulnerable during launch because they had to surface to fire their missiles.

United States Navy ballistic submarine *George Washington,* the first nuclear-powered submarine designed to launch Polaris ballistic missiles while submerged, on its launching at Groton, Connecticut, 9 June 1959. The *George Washington* was built quickly by cutting an attack submarine in half and adding a missile compartment. (United States Naval Institute)

In 1955, the United States also began work on a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which would ultimately become the Polaris. The first U.S. ballistic missile submarines used a design derived from that of the Skipjack-class attack boats, and their construction was expedited by redirecting materials, machinery, and equipment originally ordered for attack submarines. The first, the *George Washington,* was commissioned on 30 December 1959. These nuclear-powered boats displaced 5,900 tons on the surface and 6,700 submerged, were 116.36 meters long and 10.06 meters in beam, attained 16.5 knots on the surface and 22 knots submerged, carried sixteen Polaris missiles in vertical launchers, and had six bow torpedo tubes with twelve torpedoes. The *George Washington* test-fired two Polaris missiles while submerged on 20 July 1960 in the Atlantic and departed on its first patrol on 15 November 1960.

On 10 September 1960, the Soviet submarine *B-62* also successfully fired a ballistic missile while submerged. The new D-4 launch system replaced the earlier D-2 system originally fitted in the first nuclear-powered Soviet

Project 658–class (NATO-designated Hotel-I) ballistic missile submarines, first commissioned in December 1960. The upgraded Project 658M (NATO-designated Hotel-II) boats displaced 4,080 tons surfaced and 5,240 submerged and were 114.1 meters long and 9.2 meters in beam. Their two-reactor power plants provided a maximum speed of 18 knots surfaced and 26 knots submerged. They carried three R-21 (NATO-designated Sark) missiles in vertical tubes plus four bow and four stern torpedo tubes. Recommissioning began in June 1964. On 24 February 1972 while on patrol some 800 miles northeast of Newfoundland, the *K-19,* the first of the class, suffered a catastrophic failure in its cooling system, resulting in the deaths of twenty-eight of its crew.

The Polaris missile was upgraded over time, its range increasing with each iteration. The fourth upgrade produced a new missile, the Poseidon, that featured multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Each missile could carry ten to fourteen independently targeted nuclear warheads. The Poseidon first departed aboard a submarine on patrol on 30 March 1971.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to work toward the construction of larger ballistic missile submarines to accommodate bigger missiles. For the United States, this led to the Ohio-class submarines, the largest in the world at that time, embarking the Trident missile. The first of these, the *Ohio,* was commissioned on 11 November 1981. Ohio-class submarines displace 16,764 tons surfaced and 18,750 submerged, are 170.7 meters long with a beam of 12.8 meters, attain 18 knots surfaced and approximately 25 knots submerged, and carry 24 Trident ballistic missiles in vertical tubes and 24 torpedoes fired from 4 bow tubes. The eighteen Ohio-class Trident submarines remain in service, although four are being converted to launch up to 154 cruise missiles via twenty-two vertical tubes rather than ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union countered with its Project 941–class ballistic missile submarines (NATO-designated Typhoon), the first, *TK-208,* commissioning on 12 December 1981. They are even larger than the Ohio-class boats and thus are the world's largest submarines, although they carried only twenty ballistic missiles apiece. They displace 23,200 tons surfaced and 33,800 submerged, are 172.0 meters long with a beam of 23.3 meters, attain 16 knots on the surface and 27 knots submerged, and have six bow torpedo tubes with twenty-two torpedoes, along with 20 R-39 ballistic missiles (NATO-designated Sturgeon) in vertical tubes.

Besides ballistic missile submarines, the other major categories of submarines are attack and cruise missile submarines. Such submarines are used to hunt other submarines, especially ballistic submarines, as well as enemy surface vessels. Along with the first generation of attack and cruise missile submarines, the Soviets developed submarines equipped with cruise missiles as a means of attacking U.S. aircraft carriers. As with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles initially had to be launched from the surface. It was not until the Project 670–class (NATO-designated Charlie-I) nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines that the Soviets developed the capability to launch cruise missiles while submerged. These submarines displaced 3,580 tons on the surface and 4,550 submerged, were 94.0 meters long with a beam of 10.0

meters, attained 16 knots surfaced and 23 knots submerged, and were armed with eight cruise missiles on individual launchers and twelve torpedoes or antisubmarine missiles fired through six bow tubes. The United States first tested a cruise missile, the Regulus, from the USS *Tunny* on 15 July 1953. It saw limited service aboard five submarines (one nuclear-powered) but was retired in July 1964. Generally speaking, the U.S. Navy chose to rely on aircraft flown from aircraft carriers for antiship warfare purposes.

With the introduction of the second generation of attack and cruise missile submarines, missions included hunting other submarines. This mission was especially important for the Soviets, who built the Project 671–class (NATO-designated Victor) attack submarines specifically to hunt U.S. ballistic missile submarines. The most capable U.S. design in this category were the Thresher-class submarines. They displaced 3,750 tons surfaced and 4,310 submerged, were 84.9 meters long and 9.65 meters in beam, reached 15 knots surfaced and 28 knots submerged, and carried four torpedo tubes and twenty-three torpedoes or submarine rocket (SUBROC) antisubmarine missiles. This generation of submarines represented the bulk of American and Soviet submarine forces from 1961 until the end of the Cold War but is no longer in service.

The third generation of attack and cruise missile submarines are the American Los Angeles–class and the Soviet Project 971 boats (NATO-designated Akula). Production of this third generation of attack submarines was cut short by the end of the Cold War, but they remain in service today. The Los Angeles–class boats displace 6,080 tons surfaced and 6,927 submerged, are 110.3 meters long with a beam of 9.75 meters, and attain more than 30 knots submerged and possibly 20 knots on the surface. They have four torpedo tubes and carry twenty-six torpedoes (and also Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from vertical tubes in later boats). Their Soviet counterparts displace 6,300 tons surfaced and 8,300 submerged, are 108 meters long with a beam of 13.5 meters, travel at up to 20 knots on the surface and 35 knots submerged, and carry forty missiles (a mixture of torpedoes, antiship missiles, and up to twelve cruise missiles) fired through eight torpedo tubes (ten in later boats).

Two characteristics dominate the designs of the third-generation attack submarine classes: high underwater speed and greatly reduced noise emission. The much greater cost of nuclear submarines undoubtedly deterred many navies from adding them to their fleets, but the quest for low noise emission also encouraged development of advanced diesel-electric submarines.

From 1967, the German Type 209 epitomized these advanced conventionally powered boats. Early boats, of Type 209/1100, displaced 1,106 tons surfaced and 1,207 submerged, were 54.4 meters long with a beam of 6.2 meters, and could attain 11 knots surfaced or 21.5 knots submerged. The latest Type 209/1500 boats displace 1,660 tons surfaced and 1,850 submerged, are 62 meters long, and can reach 15 knots surfaced or 22 knots submerged. They are armed with fourteen torpedoes fired through eight tubes. More than forty boats have served with more than a dozen navies, and most are still operational. The new Type 212 that was developed from the Type 209 can be expected to achieve similar success.

The Soviets also continued to build diesel-electric attack submarines. The Project 877 boats (NATO-designated Kilo) displaced 2,350 tons surfaced and 3,126 submerged, were 72.6 meters long and 9.9 meters in beam, reached 12 knots surfaced and 25 knots submerged, and were armed with eighteen torpedoes fired through eight tubes. Although largely withdrawn from service in 2000, an export version of this exceptionally quiet design has proven very successful, with at least twenty sold to six navies since 1986.

Many other nations operated submarines. Among the principal Cold War navies with submarines were Great Britain and France. Britain launched its first nuclear-powered submarine, the attack-type *Dreadnought*, on 21 October 1960. The *Dreadnought* displaced 3,500 tons on the surface and 4,000 submerged, was 81 meters long and 9.8 meters in beam, attained 25 knots surfaced and 30 knots submerged, and was armed with twenty-four torpedoes fired through six tubes. The *Dreadnought* had an American nuclear power plant, enabling the British to save both considerable time and money. The British took a similar path when building their first ballistic missile submarines, the four-boat Resolution-class, by purchasing Polaris missiles. These submarines displaced 7,500 tons on the surface and 8,500 submerged, were 129.54 meters long and 10.06 meters in beam, reached 20 knots on the surface and 25 knots submerged, and could launch sixteen Polaris missiles via vertical tubes and also carried twelve torpedoes fired through six tubes. These submarines provided the British with their own nuclear underwater deterrent force.

Under President Charles de Gaulle, the French also developed an independent submarine nuclear deterrent force. They took a different path than

The *Dreadnought* (1960), the United Kingdom's first nuclear-powered submarine. (Art-Tech)

the Americans, British, and Soviets in that they built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines before their first nuclear-powered attack submarines. Altogether, the French built six Redoutable-class ballistic submarines, the first commissioning in 1971. They displaced 8,050 tons surfaced and 8,940 submerged, were 128.7 meters long and 10.6 meters in beam, attained 20 knots on the surface and 25 knots submerged, and carried sixteen ballistic missiles launched from vertical tubes plus eighteen torpedoes fired via four tubes. Five boats were decommissioned by 2003, but the four later Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines remain operational. France built a series of sophisticated conventionally powered attack submarines between 1961 and 1978 that also were successful export types. The first of France's six nuclear attack submarines, *Le Rubis*, was launched in 1976 and entered service in 1983. It displaces 2,410 tons surfaced and 2,680 submerged, is 75 meters long with a beam of 7.6 meters, attains 18 knots on the surface and 25 knots submerged, and is fitted with four torpedo tubes that can discharge a mix of fourteen torpedoes or Exocet missiles.

Dallace W. Unger Jr. and Paul Fontenoy

See also

Aircraft Carriers; France, Navy; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Poseidon; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Royal Navy; Soviet Union, Navy; United States Navy; Warships, Surface

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Sudan

Northeast African nation. The largest country on the continent, Sudan covers 967,493 square miles, about one-fourth the size of the United States. It is bordered by Chad and the Central African Republic to the west, Libya and Egypt to the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east, and Kenya, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south. It also has a 500-mile

coast on the Red Sea and is divided from north to south by the Nile River. Sudan's 1945 population was just under 9 million people.

Sudan was under Anglo-Egyptian rule during 1898–1956. It declared its independence in 1956, but a succession of coups from 1958 on, together with a wide economic and cultural gap dividing northern and southern Sudan, fomented instability in the country, which led to an ongoing civil war. Throughout much of the Cold War, Sudan's foreign policy vacillated between alliance with the West and East, depending on which faction was in control at any given time. Beginning with the so-called Condominium Agreements of 1899, Sudan was jointly administrated by Britain and Egypt. But a 1924 mutiny in the Egyptian Army compelled the British to evacuate Egyptian personnel from Sudan.

The Sudanese nationalist movement was somewhat fragmented and was associated with two rival religious sects: the Ashigga Party, later the National Unionist Party (NUP), allied with the Khatmiyya sect; and the Umma Party, or Independence Front (IF), connected with the Mahdiyya sect. The former called for unity with Egypt, whereas the latter called for complete independence. Two other independence movements, secular in nature, were the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and Sudan's Labor Union.

In 1953, Great Britain and Egypt granted Sudan self-rule, phased in over a three-year period. Parliamentary elections resulted in a victory for the NUP, and its leader, Ismail al-Azhari, became the first Sudanese prime minister in January 1954. The NUP soon reversed its policy, however, and strove for independence, which was decided on 19 December 1955 by a unanimous parliamentary vote. Independence went into effect on 1 January 1956.

The issue of north-south relations in Sudan, with the Muslim north more developed and the non-Muslim south ruled as a separate entity, soon became a sticking point after independence. Anxieties about the prospects of Muslim domination and demands for a federal system resulted in riots in southern Sudan. In August 1955, the Equatorial Corps composed of southerners mutinied in Torit, killing several hundred northern traders and government officials.

Although the southern revolt was repressed, civil war soon erupted, lasting from 1955 to 1972. The deteriorating internal situation urged Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil to invite General Ibrahim Abboud, the commander of the army, to take control of the government in November 1958. The resultant military junta ended parliamentary rule and granted power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Political parties were dissolved, the constitution was suspended, trade unions were abolished, and strikes were outlawed. But in October 1964, following a series of popular uprisings, a transitional government comprised of representatives from all parties including the SCP and the Muslim Brotherhood replaced the Abboud regime.

The spring 1965 elections brought to power a coalition of the UP and NUP with Muhammed Ahmed Mahgoub as prime minister and Ismail al-Azhari as president of the Supreme Council of State. After Mahgoub's resignation in 1966, Sadiq al-Mahdi was elected prime minister.

The al-Mahdi government was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Colonel Gaafar Muhammad Nimeri in May 1969, leading to the adoption of socialist policies, one-party rule by the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), closer relations with the Eastern bloc, and support for the Palestinian cause.

The Tripoli Charter of 27 December 1969, concluded by Nimeri, Muammar Qadhafi, and Anwar Sadat, established a union among Sudan, Libya, and Egypt. Announcement of this in the Sudan led to a coup against Nimeri that ousted him from power. Three days later, with widespread popular support, he returned to power and won the 1971 elections.

In 1972, Nimeri signed the Addis Ababa Agreement with southern rebels that granted regional autonomy for southern Sudan. The Addis Ababa peace agreement also signaled a rapprochement between Sudan and Ethiopia that would not survive Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie's fall in 1974, as Sudan was soon pressured by various Arab states to renew its support for the Eritreans in the ongoing Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict.

Leaders of the traditional Sudanese parties, excluded from involvement in politics, in 1974 organized a National Front (NF) to oppose the regime. On several occasions the NF staged abortive efforts to overthrow Nimeri. He continued to receive support from Libya, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, as early as 1971, those opposed to Nimeri had also organized the Southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), later the Sudan

Sudanese antigovernment soldiers in training, 8 March 1971. (John Downing/Express/Getty Images)

People's Liberation Movement. In October 1982, Egypt and Sudan signed a charter of political and economic integration. However, Sudan's deep and seemingly intractable economic problems did not improve.

Nimeri's failure to respect the Addis Ababa Agreement and the introduction of traditional Islamic law, the Sharia, and martial law in 1983 led to the resumption of the civil war led by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the military arm of the SPLM. The disastrous economic situation increased dependence on the West, especially the United States, and brought the bloodless coup in April 1985 in which Lieutenant General Abd al-Rahman Mohammed Swar al-Dahab took control of Sudan through a Transnational Military Council (TMC). He also sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, and Libya. In response to the coup, the SPLA declared a cease-fire while at the same time demanding aid for the southern regions and the abolition of the Sharia.

In accordance with General Swar's promise, general elections occurred in April 1986, and parliamentary democracy was restored. A coalition government, headed by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma party, ruled the country for the next three years. Although a 1988 agreement ending the civil war was supposed to stabilize Sudan, on 30 June 1989 General 'Umar Hasan Ahmed al-Bashir, supported by the National Islamic Front (NIF), led a bloodless coup and formed a fifteen-member Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC). His primary aim was to end the southern rebellion by force. However, the ongoing civil war that claimed nearly 1.5 million people during 1983–1997 showed just how difficult this task would be.

Abel Polese

See also

Africa; Decolonization; Egypt; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia

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Suez Crisis
(1956)

The Suez Crisis was one of the major events of the Cold War. It ended Britain's pretensions to be a world superpower, fatally weakened its hold on what remained of its empire, placed a dangerous strain on U.S.-Soviet relations, strengthened the position of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and distracted world attention from the concurrent Soviet military intervention in Hungary.

Suez Crisis, 1956



The Suez Crisis had its origins in the development plans of Nasser. The Egyptian president hoped to enhance his prestige and improve the quality of life for his nation's growing population by carrying out long-discussed plans to construct a high dam on the upper Nile River at Aswan to provide electric power. To finance the project, he sought assistance from the Western powers. But he had also been endeavoring to build up and modernize the Egyptian military. Toward that end, he had sought to acquire modern weapons from the United States and other Western nations. When the U.S. government refused to supply the advanced arms, which it believed might be used against Israel, in 1955 Nasser turned to the communist bloc. This step incurred the displeasure of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, as did Nasser's recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and his frequent denunciations of the U.S.-supported Baghdad Pact.

Resentment over Nasser's efforts to play East against West and especially his decision to turn to the communist bloc for arms led the Eisenhower administration to block financing of the Aswan Dam project through the World Bank. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had earlier assured Nasser of U.S. support, but on 19 June 1956, Dulles announced that U.S. assistance for the Aswan Dam project would not be forthcoming. The British government immediately followed suit.

Nasser's response to this humiliating rebuff came a week later, on 26 July, when he nationalized the Suez Canal. He had contemplated such a move for some time, but the U.S. decision prompted its timing. Seizure of

the canal would not only provide additional funding for the Aswan project but would also make Nasser a hero in the eyes of many Arab nationalists.

The British government regarded the sea-level Suez Canal, which connected the eastern Mediterranean with the Red Sea across Egyptian territory, as its lifeline to Middle Eastern oil and the Far East. The canal, built by a private company headed by Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps, had opened to much fanfare in 1869. It quickly altered the trade routes of the world, and two-thirds of the tonnage passing through the canal was British. Khedive Ismail Pasha, who owned 44 percent of the company shares, found himself in dire financial straits, and in 1875 the British government stepped in and purchased his shares. In 1878 Britain acquired the island of Cyprus north of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, further strengthening its position in the eastern Mediterranean north of Egypt. The British also increased their role in Egyptian financial affairs, and in 1882 they intervened militarily in Egypt, promising to depart once order had been restored. Britain remained in Egypt and in effect controlled its affairs through World War II.

When the U.S. government refused to supply the advanced arms, which it believed might be used against Israel, in 1955 Nasser turned to the communist bloc.

In 1952, a nationalist coup d'état took place in Egypt that ultimately brought Nasser to power. He was a staunch Arab nationalist, determined to end British influence in Egypt. In 1954 he succeeded in renegotiating the 1936 treaty with the British to force the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. The last British forces departed the Canal Zone only a month before Nasser nationalized the canal.

The British government now took the lead in opposing Nasser. London believed that Nasser's growing popularity in the Arab world was encouraging Arab nationalism and threatening to undermine British influence throughout the Middle East. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden (1955–1956) developed a deep and abiding hatred of the Egyptian leader. For Eden, ousting Nasser from power became nothing short of an obsession. In the immediate aftermath of Nasser's nationalization of the canal, the British government called up 200,000 military reservists and dispatched military resources to the eastern Mediterranean.

The French government also had good reason to seek Nasser's removal. Paris sought to protect its own long-standing interests in the Middle East, but more to the point, the French were now engaged in fighting the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria. The Algerian War, which began in November 1954, had greatly expanded and had become an imbroglio for the government, now led by socialist Premier Guy Mollet (1956–1957). Nasser was a strong and vocal supporter of the NLF, and there were many in the French government and military who believed that overthrowing him would greatly enhance French chances of winning the Algerian War.

Israel formed the third leg in the triad of powers arrayed against Nasser. Egypt had instituted a blockade of Israeli ships at the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's outlet to the Indian Ocean. Also, Egypt had never recognized the Jewish state and indeed remained at war with it following the Israeli War of Independence during 1948–1949. In 1955, Israel mounted a half dozen cross-border raids, while Egypt carried out its own raids into Israeli territory by fedayeen, or guerrilla fighters.

During the months that followed Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, the community of interest among British, French, and Israeli leaders developed into secret planning for a joint military operation to topple Nasser. The U.S. government was not consulted and indeed opposed the use of force. The British and French governments either did not understand the American attitude or, if they did, believed that Washington would give approval after the fact to policies undertaken by its major allies, which the latter believed to be absolutely necessary.

The British government first tried diplomacy. Two conferences in London attended by the representatives of twenty-four nations using the canal failed to produce agreement on a course of action, and Egypt refused to participate. A proposal by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for a canal "users' club" of nations failed, as did an appeal to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. On 1 October, Dulles announced that the United States was disassociating itself from British and French actions in the Middle East and asserted that the United States intended to play a more independent role.

Meanwhile, secret talks were going forward, first between the British and French for joint military action against Egypt. Military representatives of the two governments met in London on 10 August and hammered out the details of a joint military plan known as MUSKETEER that would involve occupation of both Alexandria and Port Said. The French then brought the Israeli government in on the plan, and General Maurice Challe, deputy chief of staff of the French Air Force, undertook a secret trip to the Middle East to meet with Israeli government and military leaders. The Israelis were at first skeptical about British and French support. They also had no intention of moving as far as the canal itself. The Israelis stated that their plan was merely to send light detachments to link up with British and French forces. They also insisted that British and French military intervention occur simultaneously with their own attack.

General André Beaufre, the designated French military commander for the operation, then came up with a new plan. Under it, the Israelis would initiate hostilities against Egypt in order to provide the pretext for military intervention by French and British forces to protect the canal. This action would technically be in accord with the terms of the 1954 treaty between Egypt and Britain that had given Britain the right to send forces to occupy the Suez Canal Zone in the event of an attack against Egypt by a third power.

All parties agreed to this new plan. Meanwhile, unrest began in Hungary on 23 October, and the next day Soviet tanks entered Budapest to put down what had become the Hungarian Revolution. French and British planners were delighted at the news of an international distraction that seemed to provide them a degree of freedom of action.

On 29 October, Israeli forces began an invasion of the Sinai Peninsula with the announced aim of eradicating the fedayeen bases. A day later, on 30 October, the British and French governments issued an ultimatum, nominally to both the Egyptian and Israeli governments but in reality only to Egypt, expressing the need to separate the combatants and demanding the right to provide for the security of the Suez Canal. The ultimatum called on

Israeli soldiers shown with a British-made Archer self-propelled gun captured from the Egyptians, 3 November 1956. (Israel Government Press Office)

both sides to withdraw their forces 10 miles from the canal and gave them twelve hours to reply. The Israelis, of course, immediately accepted the ultimatum, while the Egyptians just as promptly rejected it.

On 31 October, the British began bombing Egyptian airfields and military installations from bases on Cyprus. British aircraft attacked four Egyptian bases that day and nine the next. When Eden reported to the House of Commons on events, he encountered a surprisingly strong negative reaction from the opposition Labour Party.

Following the British military action, the Egyptians immediately sank a number of ships in the canal to make it unusable. The Israelis, meanwhile, broke into the Sinai and swept across it in only four days against ineffective Egyptian forces. Finally, on 5 November, British and French paratroopers began an invasion of Port Said, Egypt, at the Mediterranean terminus of the canal.

The Eisenhower administration had already entered the picture. On 31 October, President Eisenhower described the British attack as "taken in error." He was personally furious at Eden over events and is supposed to have asked when he first telephoned the British leader, "Anthony, have you gone out of your mind?" The United States applied immediate and heavy financial threats, both on a bilateral basis and through the International Mon-

etary Fund (IMF), to bring the British government to heel. Eisenhower also refused any further dealings with Eden personally.

A threat by the Soviet government against Britain on 5 November to send "volunteers" to Egypt proved a further embarrassment for the British government, but it was U.S. pressure that was decisive. Nonetheless, the world beheld the strange spectacle of the United States cooperating with the Soviet Union to condemn Britain and France in the UN Security Council and call for an end to the use of force. Although Britain and France vetoed the Security Council resolution, the matter was referred to the UN General Assembly, which demanded a cease-fire and withdrawal.

Israel and Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire on 4 November. At midnight on 6 November, the day of the U.S. presidential election, the British and French governments were also obliged to accept a cease-fire, the French only with the greatest reluctance. A 4,000-man UN Emergency Force (UNEF)—authorized on 4 November and made up of contingents from Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, and the Scandinavian countries—arrived in Egypt to take up positions to keep Israeli and Egyptian forces separated. At the end of November, the British and French governments both agreed to withdraw their forces from Egypt by 22 December, and on 1 December Eisenhower announced that he had instructed U.S. oil companies to begin shipping supplies to both Britain and France.

Yugoslav troops with the United Nations Emergency Forces on patrol, El Arish, Egypt, 1957. (Corel)

Nasser and Arab self-confidence were the chief beneficiaries of the crisis. The abysmal performance of Egyptian military forces in the crisis was forgotten in Nasser's ultimate triumph. He found his prestige dramatically increased throughout the Arab world. Israel also benefited. The presence of the UN force guaranteed an end to the fedayeen raids, and Israel had also broken the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, although its ships could still not transit the Suez Canal. The crisis also enhanced Soviet prestige in the Middle East, and the UN emerged from the crisis with enhanced prestige, helping to boost world confidence in that organization.

The Suez Crisis ended Eden's political career. Ill and under tremendous criticism in Parliament from the Labour Party, he resigned from office in January 1957. Events also placed a serious, albeit temporary, strain on U.S.-British relations. More importantly, they revealed the serious limitations in British military strength. Indeed, observers are unanimous in declaring 1956 a seminal date in British imperial history that marked the effective end of Britain's tenure as a great power. The events had less impact in France. Mollet left office in May 1957 but not as a result of the Suez intervention. The crisis was costly to both Britain and France in economic terms, for Saudi Arabia had halted oil shipments to both countries.

Finally, the Suez Crisis could not have come at a worst time for the West, because the crisis diverted world attention from the concurrent brutal Soviet military intervention in Hungary. Eisenhower believed, rightly or wrongly, that without the Suez diversion there would have been far stronger Western reaction to the Soviet invasion of its satellite.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Anticolonialism; Arab-Israeli Wars; Ben-Gurion, David; Dulles, John Foster; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; Egypt; Eisenhower, Dwight David; France; Israel; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Middle East; Mollet, Guy; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; United Kingdom

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Suharto
(1921–)

Indonesian Army officer and second president of Indonesia (1967–1998). Born Mohammed Suharto in the hamlet of Kemusuk in Central Java on 8 June 1921, Suharto in the Javanese tradition used only his one name. He completed secondary school and then worked briefly as a bank clerk before joining the Royal Netherland's Indies Army (KNIL) in 1940. In 1943 during the Japanese occupation in World War II, he joined the Japanese-trained self-defense force Peta. He then joined the Army of the Republic of Indonesia in October 1945 and participated in the independence war against the Dutch. He was a lieutenant colonel at the time of Indonesian independence in 1949.

During 1957–1959, Suharto commanded the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. In 1962 he went on to command the Mandala Campaign during the liberation of West Irian from the Dutch. By 1965, the army was split into two factions, the leftists, who were loyal to President Sukarno, and the rightists, who included Suharto. On 1 October 1965, Sukarno's guards murdered six right-wing generals during an alleged coup attempt by communist civilians. This galvanized the rightists, who purged the Sukarno faction from the army and began to take steps to oust the president. In the meantime, Suharto had begun to set his sights on seizing control of the government himself.

In keeping with Javanese propriety, Suharto moved cautiously in deposing Sukarno, first obtaining the Supersemar (Letter of Authority) transferring power to him on 11 March 1966 and then installing himself as provisional president one year later. On 21 March 1967, he arranged for his election as president by the People's Consultative Assembly. As Suharto consolidated his power, some half million suspected communists were killed, and Indonesia's Chinese minority was subjected to severe repression. Once his rule had been "legitimized" by the obviously rigged election, Suharto consolidated his power by manipulating the political system. He was reelected five consecutive times (1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993). Although he would provide unparalleled political stability and economic growth, the costs were steep.

Under Suharto's so-called New Order, parliament was purged of communists, labor organizations were liquidated,

Suharto ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, from 1967 to 1998. During this era, Indonesia shifted its alliances toward the West and rejoined the United Nations. Critics condemned Suharto for suppressing dissent, ignoring human rights, and enriching his family and friends. (Embassy of Indonesia)

and freedom of the press was all but curtailed. Suharto strictly limited the number of political parties, and his Golkar Party established de facto one-party rule.

Suharto revamped Sukarno's state-oriented economic policies with the help of American-trained economists at the University of Indonesia. Suharto encouraged exports and foreign investments, received economic aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stabilized the currency, and kept a tight lid on inflation. By the end of the 1960s, the economy was flourishing, and generally high growth rates were maintained until the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which decimated the Indonesian economic landscape.

Suharto's anticommunism was reflected in Indonesia's initially troubled relations with the Soviet Union and his severing of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). At the same time, he restored relations with Malaysia and encouraged regional cooperation that manifested itself in the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967. During the 1970s, he turned increasingly to the West—especially the United States—for military and economic aid.

In 1975 Suharto ordered the invasion of East Timor, and in July 1976 Indonesia formally annexed that former Portuguese colony. In establishing control, Indonesian forces killed perhaps one-third of East Timor's population. As time went on, Suharto's human rights abuses became ever more appalling, and in 1997, during the Asian financial crisis, the World Bank accused Suharto of having embezzled as much as 30 percent of Indonesia's development funds over the years. The financial crisis ultimately brought Suharto down, as the economy spiraled downward and antigovernment protests increased. On 21 March 1998, he was forced from office. A year later, when his economic malfeasance became widely known, he was placed under house arrest. Some estimate that when he left office, he had enriched his family to the tune of $15 billion through embezzlement and a variety of state-run monopolies over which he exercised de facto control.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Indonesia; Non-Aligned Movement; Sukarno

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Sukarno
(1901–1970)

Indonesian nationalist leader and first president of the Republic of Indonesia (1945–1967). Born Ahmed Sukarno in Surabaya, East Java, on 6 June 1901, like many Javanese Sukarno used only his last name. He studied in modern

In the hopes of securing independence for his nation, Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno actively collaborated with the Japanese during World War II. After the conflict, he was the first president of Indonesia during 1945–1967. (Library of Congress)

Dutch colonial schools and received a college degree in architecture from the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1926. Pursuing his passion for politics, he cofounded the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) in 1927 and became a leader of the independence movement.

Arrested by Dutch colonial officials for subversive activities, Sukarno utilized his trial to highlight the nature of imperialism and the importance of the PNI. Found guilty, he was imprisoned during 1929–1931. In July 1932, he was elected chairman of the Partai Indonesia, successor to the PNI. Arrested again on 1 August 1933 and exiled to Flores and then Bengkulu (in southern Sumatra), Sukarno's exile ended with the Japanese of invasion of Indonesia in 1942.

Sukarno embarked on active collaboration with the Japanese as a means to win Indonesian independence and used his considerable oratory skills to unify the people through radio broadcasts and personal appearances. He also secured significant concessions from the Japanese, such as administrative positions for Indonesians and permission to organize Indonesian political parties and military forces.

On 17 August 1945, only days after the Japanese surrender, Sukarno and fellow nationalist Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesian independence. A day later, the provisional parliament adopted a constitution that had already

been drafted. It also elected Sukarno president. The 1945 constitution, based heavily upon Sukarno's political philosophy, encompassed the Pancasilla (Five Pillars): national unity, internationalism, representative democracy, Marxist-style social justice, and belief in God. Sukarno's sterling negotiating skills and reputation ultimately steered Indonesia through the Battle of Surabaya, the Madiun Rebellion, and Dutch attempts to regain control over their colony.

Taken prisoner by Dutch forces in December 1948, Sukarno was released on 26 December 1949. The formal transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands occurred on 27 December 1949. Indonesia's anticolonial battle was over.

Sukarno's powers as president were somewhat circumscribed by the 1950 provisional constitution that provided for a parliamentary system. However, the new constitution proved just as ineffectual as the first. The parliament gridlocked, while social, political, religious, and ethnic tensions grew in scope and severity. Political instability ultimately prompted Sukarno in 1959 to introduce what he termed "guided democracy" by dissolving parliament, exiling political rivals, and reinstating the 1945 constitution that conferred upon him vast executive powers. As he became more autocratic, his reliance on the army and the Communist Party of Indonesia increased dramatically.

Sukarno also moved boldly in foreign policy. He hosted the Pan-Asian-African Bandung Conference in April 1955, established formal ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and requested financial and military aid from the Soviet Union. His pursuit of the West Irian claim against the Dutch ended successfully in 1963, although his confrontation with Malaysia culminated in Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations (UN) in 1964.

After several attempts on his life in the late 1950s, Sukarno tightened control by establishing strict publishing laws, bringing more communists into the government, and increasing state-sponsored discrimination toward the Chinese minority. In July 1961, he was made president for life. On 30 September 1965, when an abortive coup led by communists and junior army officers resulted in the brutal killing of six senior right-wing generals, Sukarno reacted hesitantly. General Suharto, commander of the Kostrad (Strategic Reserve), took the initiative and gradually pushed Sukarno from power. On 21 March 1967, Sukarno was forced to cede control to Suharto, who then ordered Sukarno held under house arrest. Sukarno died on 21 June 1970 in Jakarta.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Anticolonialism; Bandung Conference; Decolonization; Indonesia; Malaysia; Southeast Asia; Suharto

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Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

Administrative military headquarters for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO established the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on 2 April 1951, just four months after U.S. President Harry S. Truman named General Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). SHAPE became the nerve center of NATO's integrated military forces. Originally located in Rocquencourt, France, SHAPE moved to Casteau, Belgium, in 1967 when French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the NATO military command. Thus, the French military was autonomous from NATO, but France remained a member of NATO. Because Eisenhower wanted NATO to transcend individual nationalities, he fashioned SHAPE into a fully integrated command with officers from NATO nations acting as its staff officers. SHAPE served NATO well throughout the Cold War and continues to function to this day.

The origins of SHAPE date back to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which was organized by Eisenhower and began as a combined staff between the United States and Britain during the Allied liberation of Europe (1944–1945). Two keys issues, however, pointed toward a smaller, integrated headquarters that would be the genesis of SHAPE. SHAEF's American and British planners had often worked on divergent paths and were not always efficient. Second, Americans lacked understanding of the British conference system. Consequently, American officers often did not fully comprehend the ramifications of these meetings and wasted time and effort attempting to rectify misperceptions. Those studying these problems concluded that a supreme allied headquarters should employ one integrated staff cognizant of the need to avoid affronts to national pride.

The March 1948 Brussels Pact was crucial to the formation of SHAPE. This pact included a common defense arrangement among Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. The Western European Union was the mechanism for planning its military operations. Following the creation of NATO on 4 April 1949, the Western European Union headquarters, or the military headquarters of those European nations that would become part of NATO and were already allied, became the basis for SHAPE.

The integrated, multinational nature of SHAPE is evident in its first senior leaders: Eisenhower as SACEUR, British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery as deputy SACEUR, and British Air Chief Marshal Hugh Saunders as the air deputy to SACEUR.

SHAPE presided over NATO's Cold War collective defense against the Warsaw Pact and had to be ready to produce the strategies that would act as

a deterrent and defend NATO's constituent nations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, SHAPE continued its service by controlling such NATO operations as those in Bosnia (1995–present) and in Kosovo (1999–present). Thus, SHAPE's mission has changed from collective defense to cooperative security.

Jonathan P. Klug

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich
(1902–1982)

Soviet political leader. Born on 8 November 1902 in Shakhovskoye in western Russia, Mikhail Suslov served in local Komsomol (Young Communist League) posts from 1918 to 1921 and then joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He graduated from the Prechistenskaia Workers' Faculty in Moscow in 1924 and from the Plekhanov Institute of the National Economy in 1928. He did graduate work at the Institute of Economics of the Communist Academy during 1929–1931 while teaching at Moscow University. During 1931–1935 he served in administrative posts in the party apparatus before attending the Moscow Economic Institute. Graduating in 1937, he was elected to the CPSU Central Committee in 1941 and worked in party administrative posts in Rostov and Stavropol until 1944. During World War II, he was also a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front and served as chief of staff for regional partisan forces.

Beginning in 1944, Suslov held a succession of Central Committee posts. Named a Central Committee secretary in 1947, he had responsibility for enforcing party ideology. Following the purge of Andrei Zhdanov in 1948, Suslov also assumed responsibility for relations with foreign communist parties and served briefly as editor of *Pravda*. In 1952 he was elected to the expanded Presidium (Politburo), although he lost his seat when the body was reduced from twenty-five to ten members in 1953. Shortly afterward, he became second secretary of the Central Committee. He returned to the Presidium in 1955 and served until his death, wielding considerable influence in matters of ideology and foreign affairs.

A party conservative, Suslov opposed Nikita Khrushchev's extensive attempts to implement a de-Stalinization campaign beginning in 1956. Suslov became the principal advocate of intervention in Hungary during the 1956 uprising and was in Budapest to help oversee its implementation. He was also responsible for the banning of the Boris Pasternak's novel *Dr. Zhivago*. While Suslov supported Khrushchev in the Politburo power struggles of 1956–1957, differences between the two men grew over a number of issues, including economic reform, foreign policy, and the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, which Khrushchev permitted.

In October 1964, Suslov was a key figure in the ouster of Khrushchev. Suslov's conservative influence grew under Khrushchev's successor Leonid Brezhnev, especially in cultural affairs, in part because Suslov did not seek higher office himself. In foreign policy, he generally opposed détente, advocated intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, and urged similar action in Poland the following year. Suslov died in Moscow on 25 January 1982.

Steven W. Guerrier

Mikhail A. Suslov, member of the Presidium of the Soviet Union and hard-liner in matters of communist ideology and foreign policy, shown here in March 1956. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also

Afghanistan War; Brezhnev, Leonid; Cominform; Détente; Hungarian Revolution; Khrushchev, Nikita; Literature; Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr; Soviet Union; Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

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Svoboda, Ludvík

(1895–1979)

Czechoslovak general and president (1968–1975). Born on 25 November 1895 in Hroznatín, Moravia, to a peasant family, Ludvík Svoboda was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army during World War I. He deserted and joined the Czech Legion in Russia, attaining the rank of captain. At war's end, he returned to the new state of Czechoslovakia and joined its army. Following the German occupation of all Czechoslovakia in March 1939, he fled to Poland, where he organized a Czechoslovak military unit.

Following the German conquest of Poland in September 1939, Svoboda and his men went to the Soviet Union, where he led a Czechoslovak army corps against the Axis powers, becoming a brigadier general in 1943. Sympathetic to the communists, he secretly joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) during the war. In April 1945, President Edvard Beneš appointed Svoboda minister of defense, and Svoboda was promoted to full general in August 1945.

Svoboda officially and publicly joined the CPCz in October 1948, but the party hierarchy did not trust him and made certain that he had little power. During the Stalinist purges, he lost his positions in 1950 and was briefly imprisoned in 1951, after which he returned to his home village.

During his 1954 visit to Prague, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev personally interceded and demanded that Svoboda be politically rehabilitated. Svoboda then became the director of the Klement Gottwald Military Academy, retiring in 1959. A popular war hero, Svoboda was elected president of Czechoslovakia on 30 March 1968 during the Prague Spring.

After the August Warsaw Pact invasion, Svoboda refused to accept a Soviet puppet government or negotiate with the Soviets until he was assured that the leaders of the Prague Spring would not be harmed. So assured, he then agreed to Soviet demands that the Prague Spring reforms be reversed and accepted the normalization of Czechoslovakia, thereby losing much of his credibility. Illness forced his removal from office on 29 May 1975. Svoboda died in Prague on 20 September 1979.

Gregory C. Ference

See also

Czechoslovakia; Prague Spring

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Sweden

Scandinavian nation. Sweden covers 173,731 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of California, and had a 1945 population of approximately 6.8 million people. Sweden is bordered by Norway to the west, Finland to the north, the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea to the east, and the North Sea to the south-southwest. Once a great power, Sweden was reduced to a regional power following the Napoleonic Wars. During both world wars, Sweden managed to maintain its neutrality. Thus, its wartime experiences were quite the opposite of many other Western democracies. Not having had

to regret appeasement at Munich in 1938 or experience a Pearl Harbor, Swedish postwar foreign policy therefore became a continuation of its prior neutrality. Swedes adopted nonalignment in peace and neutrality in case of war. However, unlike Switzerland—another perennial neutral—Sweden did join the United Nations (UN) in 1946.

Following World War II, Sweden attempted to mollify the Soviets by forcing Baltic refugees to repatriate and granting Moscow substantial financial credits. The Soviets, however, did not show much gratitude. After Swedish diplomat Count Raoul Wallenberg negotiated the release of Hungarian Jews, he was apprehended by Soviet agents and disappeared. This aroused great anti-Soviet sentiments in Sweden. Other early Cold War Soviet provocations included the presumed Soviet downing of a Swedish surveillance aircraft in 1951 and Soviet efforts to disrupt the subsequent search and rescue mission.

In the immediate postwar years, Sweden failed in its attempt to create a nonaligned Nordic bloc to keep all of Scandinavia out of the Cold War. Finland signed a mutual aid, cooperation, and friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948, while Denmark and Norway joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This constellation of Norwegian and Danish NATO membership, Swedish nonalignment, and Finland's ties to the Soviet Union has frequently been termed "the Nordic balance." During the early Cold War, Sweden's Social Democrats and center-rightist political parties differed little on the practical aspects of nonalignment. Nevertheless, Sweden conducted security-related consultations with the United States and NATO in both the political and military spheres. On occasion, the center-rightists did advocate a tougher line with the Soviets in regard to Eastern Europe.

This constellation of Norwegian and Danish NATO membership, Swedish nonalignment, and Finland's ties to the Soviet Union has frequently been termed "the Nordic balance."

Although Swedes experienced some economic dislocation in the immediate post–World War II years, having escaped wartime destruction meant that their economic, political, and social institutions were still intact in 1945. In the elections of that year, the Social Democrats formed a majority government under Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson. When he died the following year, Tage Erlander replaced him and held the premiership until 1969. During 1951–1957, the Social Democrats had to share power with the Peasant Party, as it had done during the interwar years.

Swedish society was thoroughly democratic and civic-minded in its social and political structures. Swedes enjoyed a well-functioning social welfare state, a high level of social and corporate organization, and a strong public sector. Much of this was made possible by a thriving industrial base, funded by domestic financing. Swedish exports included high-value industrial products such as automobiles, machine tools, and ball bearings. But the postwar era also witnessed the rapid depopulation of rural Sweden, as industry and commercial concerns in the cities lured workers from the hinterlands.

Despite fears of provoking Soviet suspicions, Sweden accepted Marshall Plan aid and in 1951 also adopted the U.S. Cold War initiative that called for an embargo of strategic commodities and products to the Eastern bloc. Sweden also put recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) on hold until 1972 in accordance with the general Western view

that recognition could be seen as a hostile act against the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), a major trading partner.

In the areas of trade and other transnational interactions, Sweden did align itself with the West. Swedish policymakers thus created a tension between nonalignment and economic necessity. The European Council provided one arena for interacting with other democracies without being tied to a bloc. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) allowed for free trade outside the more politicized European Economic Community (EEC), which Swedish officials refused to join because it would contradict nonalignment.

As East-West tensions eased beginning in the mid-1960s, many nonaligned states had more freedom of action of foreign affairs. Accordingly, the Social Democratic government moved from pure realpolitik to a more idealistic foreign policy. At the core of this reorientation were expectations of a new economic world order, decolonization, nuclear disarmament, and the curbing of great power influence. The move away from realpolitik became most evident at the UN by Swedish participation in peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and the Congo and by Dag Hammarskjöld's posting as UN secretary-general. Indeed, rapid decolonization swelled the number of nonaligned states and broadened the appeal of Swedish foreign policy.

Swedish leaders did not shy away from confronting the United States. Prime Minister Olof Palme spoke out fiercely against the Vietnam War. Indeed, after the U.S. Christmas Bombings of Hanoi in December 1972, Palme compared the incident to the Holocaust. President Richard M. Nixon's administration was outraged and withheld its ambassador from Stockholm until 1974. Sweden also provided asylum to U.S. draft dodgers seeking to escape service in Vietnam, a policy that particularly rankled Washington.

In 1976, U.S.-Swedish relations improved markedly when the political Right gained power under Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin. The Peasant Party, to which Fälldin belonged, had changed its name to the Center Party and simultaneously aligned itself with the political Right. Still, no major policy changes occurred, although the idealism of the Social Democrats was drastically toned down.

With Cold War tensions already on the rise again in the late 1970s, the Swedish government condemned the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. At the same time, dramatic events were also unfolding closer to home. In October 1982, a Soviet submarine ran aground outside the Karlskrona naval base in southern Sweden. Moscow acknowledged the undeniable fact of the grounded sub (which the Soviets blamed on a damaged navigation system) but denied that there had been any systematic Soviet violation of Swedish territorial waters. Nonetheless, Soviet intrusions by submarines into Swedish waters continued.

When the Social Democrats and Palme regained power in 1986, Swedish officials withdrew their protests of Soviet submarine violations and announced an upcoming state visit to Moscow. However, Palme was assassinated in February 1986, and the trip was made by his successor, Ingvar Karlsson, in 1987. The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Sweden was facilitated by new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms.

The end of the Cold War transformed the Baltic Sea from a part of the Iron Curtain to an increasingly important line of communication between Sweden and the former Eastern bloc countries. As such, Sweden's influence in the region grew. However, friction was also apparent. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania harbored a grudge toward Sweden for its 1940 recognition of the Soviet takeover of these republics and had not forgotten Sweden's forced repatriation of Baltic refugees back to the Soviet Union in 1945. There was also some Baltic discontent over Stockholm's tepid support during the 1989–1991 struggles for independence. Baltic skepticism toward Sweden also had deep historical roots, as it was here that Sweden had vied with Russia for Baltic supremacy in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

With the end of the Cold War, Sweden no longer regarded the European Union (EU), the successor of the EEC, as part of a political bloc to which membership on their part would be a breech of their nonalignment policy. Thus, Sweden joined the EU after a referendum in 1994.

At the end of the twentieth century, government interventionism and large-scale industrial structures marked a troubled Swedish economy. It faced the challenge of globalization and demands for harmonizing with EU standards. Unemployment has been comparatively high by Scandinavian standards, placing additional burdens on social services. Foreign interests have purchased Swedish trademarks such as Volvo and Saab, and production has moved to countries in which labor costs are lower. Fearing unemployment and diminished benefits, Swedish trade unions have not always been cooperative in making necessary sacrifices in order to make Sweden's industry more competitive.

Frode Lindgjerdet

See also

Erlander, Tage; Hammarskjöld, Dag; Palme, Olof; Scandinavia; Sweden, Armed Forces; Vietnam War Protests

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Sweden, Armed Forces

In 1945, the Swedish Army lacked the capability of fighting a mechanized opponent in open terrain. The Swedish Navy and the Swedish Air Force had been expanded and were relatively modern in 1945, but the army was widely

dispersed in a large number of units defending different parts of Swedish territory rather than maintaining fewer, more modernized, and well-equipped units. This problem worsened during the 1970s and 1980s.

Sweden's war planning prepared for a combined Soviet coastal and airborne attack directed toward eastern Sweden around Stockholm, eventually followed by landings in southern Skåne as well as on the island of Gotland and in Gothenburg in western Sweden. In some scenarios, a land invasion across the Finnish border was also regarded as a potential threat. From the early 1960s, relatively more emphasis was placed on preparations to defend the most northern parts of Sweden. Here the fortress of Boden was supported by lines of fortifications along the rivers in northern Sweden. Other large systems of modern fortifications were built, especially in the Stockholm archipelago, while along the shores of Skåne in southern Sweden no fewer than 600 fortifications built during 1939–1945 were utilized during most of the Cold War.

Sweden's policy of neutrality prevented any formal ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but Sweden secretly established multilateral military cooperation with Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Swedish air bases were prepared to receive U.S. strategic bombers, plans were made for receiving oil and other strategic goods via Trondheim in Norway, and the communication system of the Swedish Air Force was connected with the U.S. air base in Wiesbaden in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). It is believed that Sweden also maintained intelligence cooperation with other Western nations and, beginning in 1960, was tacitly protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

In the late 1940s, Swedish armed forces consisted of 850,000 conscripts, approximately 60,000 professionals, and more than 100,000 volunteers. The total military structure comprised 36 army brigades, 33 large surface warships, 24 submarines, and 50 air force divisions with 1,000 airplanes. A large armaments industry included artillery systems from Bofors, aircraft from Saab, and surface ships from the Karlskrona shipyard. From 1960 on, the navy developed the concept of a lighter navy, in which the 2 cruisers and 15 destroyers were sequentially replaced by smaller but more powerful units. With the parliamentary defense budget decisions of 1968 and 1972, the military establishment was expected to do more with less. This resulted in severe organizational cutbacks and canceled training exercises, especially for the air force and navy, and the postponement of equipment replacement for the army. Instead, the need to defend a large area of territory took priority over further modernization and training. During 1956–1994, 70,000 Swedish soldiers participated in peacekeeping missions for the United Nations (UN) in the Middle East (1956–1994), the Congo (1960–1964), and Cyprus (1964–1987).

As late as 1982, Sweden could mobilize 850,000 men in twenty-eight army brigades, forty-eight naval ships (including twelve submarines), and twenty-three to twenty-four air force divisions. But of the twenty infantry brigades, only eight were regarded as modern, meaning that they could be employed for offensive operations. The remainder could only be used for

defensive tasks. In 1992, the infantry brigades were reduced to seventeen, and the total personnel in the armed forces amounted to 750,000.

As early as 1954, instructions had been issued as to how Swedish troops should deploy in case of a nuclear attack by the Soviets. During the 1950s, the Swedish military establishment began demanding the development of a Swedish nuclear deterrent. After serious and protracted debate, however, all such plans were scrapped in 1968.

For most of the Cold War period, the Swedish Air Force was among the world's most modern and powerful. In the 1950s, it numbered some 1,000 aircraft, produced by domestic manufacture. Many of these planes were in hardened sites, and the Swedes developed a widespread system of airstrips that would make use of the Swedish highway system in order to make it difficult for an attacker to wipe out the majority of aircraft in a first strike. The chief task of the air force and navy was to meet and defeat in the Baltic Sea any invasion force before it could reach Sweden itself. Training in close air support for ground forces was thus not a priority.

Lars Ericson

See also

Finland; Scandinavia; Sweden; Whisky on the Rocks Crisis

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Światło, Józef

(1915–1985?)

Officer in the Polish security apparatus and one of the most celebrated of communist defectors. Józef Światło was born Izak Fleischfarb on 1 January 1915 in Medyna (Eastern Galicia), the son of a Jewish low-ranking civil servant. He completed only primary school. During 1932–1938, he was an active member of a communist youth organization in Kraków and was twice arrested for his political activities.

In 1938 Fleischfarb was drafted into the Polish Army. Captured by the German Army in their invasion of Poland in September 1939, he escaped and made his way to eastern Poland, which had been incorporated into the Soviet Union. In 1943 he joined the communist-organized Polish Army, and

Józef Światło, who was deputy chief of Poland's secret police before he fled to the West, is shown at a press conference at the Voice of America headquarters in New York City on 1 October 1954. Światło was one of the most important defectors from the communist bloc to the West during the Cold War. (Bettmann/Corbis)

in November 1944 he was transferred to the Ministry of Public Security, where he worked with the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB).

In postwar Poland, the Soviets coerced Jews to change their Yiddish names to Polish names, and Izak Fleischfarb became Józef Światło. During 1945–1948 he held key posts in the regional structure of the security apparatus, and in October 1948 he was transferred to the central offices to work in a unit specially created for dealing with the Polish Communist Party. Dependable and distinguished for his abilities, he was entrusted with such tasks as the arrests of Władysław Gomułka and Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński.

On 5 December 1953, while on an official trip to Berlin, Światło found his way to U.S. authorities, defected, and was transported to the United States, where the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used him for propaganda purposes. In September 1954 he was granted political asylum, which was trumpeted by the U.S. government. Radio Free Europe broadcast more than 100 of Światło's programs titled *Behind the Scenes of the Security and the Party,* and in

1955 more than 800,000 copies of a brochure based on the broadcasts were scattered on Polish territory as part of the CIA's largest balloon campaign, Operation SPOTLIGHT. Światło's revelations forced Polish authorities to reorganize the security apparatus and to discharge or arrest several high-ranking Polish security officials.

Światło continued to reside in the United States under an assumed name and with CIA protection, essentially a nonperson. He died possibly in New York City in May 1985.

ANDRZEJ PACZKOWSKI

See also

Gomułka, Władysław; Poland; Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; Wyszyński, Stefan, Cardinal

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Switzerland

West European nation encompassing 15,942 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of New Jersey. Switzerland is bordered by Italy to the south, France to the west, and Germany and Austria to the north and east. The Swiss population in 1945 was 4.428 million people. By the end of World War II, Switzerland's neutrality during the conflict and its role as a financial and commercial center for Nazi Germany assured strained relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Swiss were internationally isolated and viewed integration and multilateralism warily. Their longstanding tradition of neutrality was at odds with the multilateral collectivism of the United Nations (UN). In 1946, Switzerland determined that it could not join the UN without having its neutrality explicitly recognized.

In 1954, the Swiss promulgated the so-called Bindschedler Doctrine, specifically outlining the nation's neutral position in peacetime. This doctrine strictly differentiated between the political and technical aspects of international affairs. Thus, while Switzerland would keep aloof from political and military alliances, it would play an active role in international economic, humanitarian, and technical organizations, displaying its commitment to international solidarity. During the Cold War, Swiss foreign policy hence pursued economic integration without political encumbrances.

Sir Anthony Eden (*right*) and Swiss President Max Petitpierre review a Swiss Honor Guard in Geneva in 1955. (Library of Congress)

Swiss Cold War security policy, with its emphasis on autonomous national defense by a militia army, was derived from the principle of armed neutrality. The concept of the citizen-in-arms was an important part of Swiss life and provided for a large army despite the nation's small population. At peak strength, the Swiss Army could field 600,000 soldiers.

During the early Cold War, Switzerland sided with the West and indirectly profited from the nuclear umbrella of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Under Federal Councilor Max Petitpierre (1945–1961), the Swiss government emphasized that the nation was ideologically aligned with the West, although it remained militarily neutral.

As a small landlocked country, Switzerland relied heavily on international trade. Therefore, with the exception of the subsidized agricultural sector, it supported the reduction of trade tariffs. Switzerland remained prosperous throughout the Cold War, depending on industrial exports such as textiles, chemicals, and engineering-related products. Switzerland also kept its place as an international financial center. Because the Swiss eschewed a large welfare state, their economy weathered the economic storms of the 1970s and 1980s rather well. The nation boasted comparatively low inflation, low unemployment, and positive growth and productivity. In addition, labor-

management relations remained positive and nonconfrontational, which added to Swiss economic stability.

Swiss politics are unique in that parties are highly decentralized and are focused on local rather than national issues. Although all the major parties are represented at the national level, they tend to be fixated on local constituencies and their particular interests, which dilutes the political system at the federal level. There is also a plethora of political parties in Switzerland that are decidedly balkanized by the large number of religious and linguistic cleavages throughout the country. Large French, German, and Italian-speaking populations help account for the great diversity in the political process. The four largest political parties in Switzerland are the Social Democratic Party (SPS), the Swiss People's Party (SVP), the Radical Party (FDP), and the Christian Democratic Party (CVP).

The Cold War accorded Switzerland an intermediary role in the East-West conflict. Switzerland provided its mediation services offices to both East and West, including offers to mediate a settlement to both the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts. In 1953, Switzerland engaged in the Korean War cease-fire agreement through two international commissions. Swiss neutrality was further recognized when the Soviet Union suggested in 1955 that Austria should develop a neutrality of the kind practiced by the Swiss.

Switzerland also took on international mandates to act as a protecting power, such as in representing U.S. interests in Cuba after 1961. In addition, Geneva served many times as a center for international negotiations. In 1985, for example, Geneva was the site of the historic summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Switzerland also hosted the humanitarian offices of the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross, which aims at assisting civilian victims of war.

In the 1970s, under Foreign Minister Pierre Graber (1970–1978), Swiss foreign policy became more active and multilateral. The Swiss Federal Council's landmark 1973 Security Report envisioned political participation in international security organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Switzerland played an important role in the CSCE together with other neutral and nonaligned nations.

During the Cold War and beyond, Switzerland's relationship with an increasingly united Western Europe was often troubled. Switzerland joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 and, with great delay, the Council of Europe in 1963. Yet Swiss relations with Europe became more difficult after the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), founded in 1960 with Switzerland as an active member, lost its importance in the 1970s with British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC).

After a late, even if most-narrow, referendum in favor of joining the United Nations (UN) in March 2002 (in 1986, a vast majority of Swiss voters had still voted against such an entry), Switzerland's major challenge in the twenty-first century remains the shaping of its relationship with a dynamically proceeding European Union (EU).

Christian Nuenlist

See also

Europe, Western; European Union; Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on

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Swords to Ploughshares Movement

Independent peace movement begun in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in 1980. "Swords to ploughshares" is a biblical quotation from the Book of Micah 4:3 and the Book of Isaiah 2:4. The movement's symbolic motto is depicted by sculptor Evgeniy Vuchetich's statue "Let Us Beat Swords into Ploughshares," donated by the Soviet Union to the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York in 1959.

During the preparations for the first Peace Decade in 1980, a ten-day period of peace activities conducted by the East German Union of Evangelical Churches, youth vicar Harald Bretschneider first used the symbol to summon all Christians to attend nationwide prayers. He also connected the symbol to the pacifist campaign "Make Peace Without Weapons" and to various peace movements in the West.

The symbol was made into cloth badges and was eagerly worn by many East German youths, who used it as a silent protest against the militarization of East German society. From 1980 on, peace groups formed within many churches in East Germany. They demonstrated against the presence of Soviet missiles on East German soil as well as against the degradation of the environment caused by industrial waste. Consequently, in November 1981 East German officials banned the wearing of the badges. The government considered it subversive to its so-called communist peace politics.

Peace activists both in and outside East German churches were labeled as subversive elements. Many youths who persisted in wearing the badges were harassed by the secret police (Stasi), banned from their final exams, and even prosecuted. The East German regime managed to prevent these groups from maturing into political movements, at least for a time. Pacifist and ecological groups remained at the grassroots level and were closely observed by the Stasi. Nevertheless, in the summer and fall of 1989, the opposition peace groups formed the nucleus of the mass protests against the government, which in turn brought an end to communism and the division of Germany.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

German Democratic Republic; Human Rights; Peace Movements; Stasi

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Syria

Arab nation in the Middle East covering 71,498 square miles, just slightly larger than the U.S. state of North Dakota. The Syrian Arab Republic, with a 1945 population of approximately 3.2 million people, borders on Jordan and Israel to the south, Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea to the west, Turkey to the north, and Iraq to the east. For much of its history, Syria was dominated by larger powers. It was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1920, and its economy and educational system had left its populace in relative destitution. In 1920, France received a League of Nations mandate over both Syria and neighboring Lebanon. However, French rule there resulted in repeated uprisings—particularly among the Druze. After a tortuous series of negotiations that began in the late 1920s, Syria was granted considerable autonomy in 1936. To fulfill previous agreements, France announced the formation of an independent Syrian republic in September 1941 with Shukri al-Kuwatl as its president. Syria became fully independent on 1 January 1944.

Syria took part in the failed Arab war against Israel during 1948–1949. A member of the Arab League, Syria was a vociferous opponent of Israeli statehood. The defeat in the war and disagreement over Syria's potential union with Iraq torpedoed al-Kuwatl's government. There were three coups in 1949, the last one headed by Lieutenant Colonel Adib al-Shishakli, who governed with a heavy hand until 1954. Al-Shishakli was ousted in 1954, and late that year elections were held to determine the makeup of the new government. In the end, a three-party coalition (People's, National, and Baath Parties) emerged with National Party chief Sabri al-Asali as head of the government. In the succeeding years, the Baathists, who combined Arab nationalism with socialist policies, became the most powerful political force in Syria. As such, Syria entered into economic and military agreements with the Soviet Union.

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In February 1958, Syria and Egypt joined to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). Within a year Egypt's intention to dominate the UAR became obvious, which forced yet another coup against the Syrian government in September 1961. Carried out by a group of military officers, the coup plotters pulled Syria out of the UAR and established the Syrian Arab Republic. In December 1961 elections for a national assembly occurred, and the body chose two conservative People's Party members to lead the new regime. Another coup in late 1962 again toppled the government.

In 1963, a joint Baath-military government came to power. The new government nationalized most industrial and large commercial concerns and engaged in land reforms that redistributed land to the peasants. Meanwhile, Syria continued to cultivate relations with the Soviet bloc. A schism in the Baath Party resulted in more instability, and in 1966 the radical wing of the party staged a coup and installed Yusseff Zayen as prime minister. Nureddin al-Attassi became president. This new regime tightened Syria's ties with the Soviets and Egyptians.

A member of a Syrian honor guard stands at attention during Operation DESERT SHIELD. Despite Syrian animosity toward U.S. ally Israel, Syria joined the United States in the coalition against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Syria fought yet another war with Israel in June 1967. This time, its defeat included the loss of the Golan Heights to the Israelis. The outcome of the war ultimately brought General Hafez al-Assad to power in 1970. An ardent Baath nationalist, Assad sought to increase ties to other Arab states, de-emphasize Syrian reliance on the Soviet Union, and defeat Israel.

In early 1971, Assad was elected president. He would rule the country until his death in 2000. Over the next several years following his election, he modernized the Syrian Army and engaged in modest economic reforms, while the Baath Party gained even more strength. Befitting his Baathist philosophy, the state played a central role in economic planning and implementation. It must be noted, however, that Assad's tactics could be brutal and that there was little room for dissent or democracy in Syria. Syria was involved in a fourth Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. After initial successes, and although Syrian forces this time fought well, they were nonetheless driven back beyond their original positions.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, Sunni Muslim fundamentalists began challenging the Baath Party's secular outlook. During 1976–1982, urban areas all across Syria became hotbeds of political unrest. Assad brutally crushed a February 1982 uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama, and troops killed several thousand people.

Assad also sent his army into Lebanon in 1976, ostensibly as a peacekeeping force during the civil war there. The troops stayed on, however, Assad siding with the Muslims who were fighting Christian militias. By the mid-1980s, Assad's forces had become the preponderant political and

military force in Lebanon. Syrian troops were not withdrawn from Lebanon until 2005.

At the same time, the 1980s saw the Assad regime taking harder-line Arab positions and moving closer to the Soviets. Assad's get-tough approach in regional politics included his funding and encouragement of terrorism. Assad, who was always in the end a pragmatist, sought to ameliorate relations with the West as the Soviet Union began to implode in 1990. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Assad was the first Arab leader to denounce the attack. His government also provided 20,000 troops to the international coalition that defeated Iraqi forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

In 1991, Assad's government entered into peace negotiations with Israel, although the process broke down with no firm agreement in January 2000. In June 2000, Assad died unexpectedly after thirty years in office. He was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad, who was carefully groomed as the heir apparent. Allegedly a free-market proponent, the younger Assad attempted some economic and political reforms, but the process has been fraught with setbacks and obstacles. In 1998, 65 percent of all Syrian revenues came from petroleum products.

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See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Arab Nationalism; Assad, Hafez; Lebanon; Middle East; Persian Gulf War; Radical Islam

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T

Taft, Robert Alphonso
(1889–1953)

U.S. senator (1939–1953) and unsuccessful candidate for the Republican presidential nomination (1940, 1948, 1952). Born in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 8 September 1889, the eldest son of the future Republican President William Howard Taft and his wife Helen Herron Taft, Robert Taft attended the Taft School for Boys in Watertown, Connecticut, and graduated from Yale University (1910) and Harvard Law School (1913). From 1914 onward Taft practiced law in Cincinnati, where he soon became active in Republican politics. Hostile to most New Deal domestic measures of the 1930s, by the time he won election to the Senate for Ohio in 1938 he was firmly identified with his party's conservative wing.

Taft was equally critical of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policies. When World War II began, Taft opposed American aid to the Allies, supporting the America First policies enunciated by ex-President Herbert Hoover and others and insisting that war would destroy American civil liberties and that Germany posed no danger to the Western Hemisphere. Following the U.S. entry into the war, Taft constantly assailed what he viewed as the excesses of domestic controls and propaganda while opposing the creation of a world bank or any other international organization apart from the United Nations (UN).

By 1946 Taft, nicknamed "Mr. Republican," had become a major figure within the cross-party conservative coalition that effectively dominated Congress. Immune to appeals for bipartisanship, as the Cold War developed he opposed high defense expenditures, voted in 1946 against the large American loan to Britain; complained that American military and economic support for Greece, Turkey, and the Marshall Plan were all too expensive; and opposed the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He believed that America's atomic weapons safeguarded it from any foreign attack and that his country should not commit troops outside the Western Hemisphere.

When the Korean War began, Taft, de facto though not official leader of a Republican Senate majority, exploited the war to shore up both his party's and his own political fortunes in the impending 1952 presidential campaign,

Ohioan Robert Taft, son of President William Howard Taft, was known as "Mr. Republican," a title that reflected his prominence as a powerful leader in the Senate but also characterized the values of the middle America he represented and held dear. His isolationist position prevented him from gaining the Republican nomination for president in either 1948 or 1952, but he remained influential. (Library of Congress)

which the Republicans were determined not to lose as they had unexpectedly done to Truman in 1948. Taft reluctantly supported Truman's initial decision to commit forces to Korea, but after communist China's intervention in late 1950, Taft accused the president of mishandling the war. Taft also deplored the administration's failure to seek either a formal declaration of war or a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in Korea. He laid much of the responsibility for the war on the administration's "bungling and inconsistent foreign policy." Taft even suggested that the United States might be well advised to withdraw from Korea and base its defenses upon a line running through the island positions of Taiwan and Japan. When Truman recalled General Douglas MacArthur in the spring of 1951, Taft defended the general, abandoning his customary restraint and publicly advocating MacArthur's preferred and highly provocative measures of bombing Chinese supply lines in Manchuria and including Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) troops from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan in UN forces.

Even though Taft found the extremist tactics of Senator Joseph R. MacCarthy personally distasteful, he tolerated them, believing that they would enhance the Republican Party's chances of victory. Campaigning for the 1952 Republican nomination, which he lost to the internationalist war hero Dwight D. Eisenhower, Taft harped constantly on the refrain that the Democratic administration had blundered unnecessarily into an expensive war that it could neither win nor end with honor, a theme that Eisenhower and other Republican candidates continually repeated. Named Republican majority leader after the election, a mellower Taft unsuccessfully attempted to rein in the excesses of McCarthyism. Taft died of cancer in New York City on 31 July 1953.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Greek Civil War; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall Plan; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; United Nations

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Taiwan Strait Crisis, First
(1954–1955)

Shelling of offshore Chinese islands in the Taiwan Strait from 3 September 1954 to 1 May 1955, initiated by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC's birth in October 1949 did not signify complete victory in the Chinese Civil War, at least not in the mind of PRC Chairman Mao Zedong. Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government still retained control of Taiwan and a number of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait, and Jiang continued to harbor quixotic ideas of retaking Mainland China. Mao in turn wished to complete his victory by capturing Taiwan and crushing the GMD. In fact, both Mao and Jiang had devised military plans to carry on the civil war so as to liberate the territories held by the other. The Korean War, however, had temporarily put these plans aside.

The first sign of a resumption in the civil war occurred in summer 1954. In August, Jiang deployed troops to the Jinmen and Mazu islands, known to Westerners as Quemoy and Mazu, two clusters of small islands located 8 miles off Mainland China's southeastern coast. At the same time, ongoing negotiations in Manila for a Southeast Asian mutual defense treaty, initiated by the United States during the Geneva Conference in April 1954, were about to conclude. Rumors flew that Jiang's GMD and the United States were working on a mutual defense pact aimed at the PRC. Seeing these moves as unwarranted provocation by the West, Mao was determined to stage a military showdown. On 3 September 1954, he ordered an artillery bombardment of Jinmen from Fujian Province, beginning the initial phase of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, which endured until late October. In the process, both Jinmen and Mazu suffered heavy bombardment.

The second phase began on 1 November and ended four days later, when PRC forces shelled and raided the Dachen and Yijiangshan islands off Mainland China's Zhejiang Province, north of Taiwan. Afterward, China's bombardment subsided and resumed periodically on a limited scale while the PRC's government awaited U.S. and Taiwanese reactions. In the midst of the crisis, the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Defense Treaty on 2 December 1954, which promised defensive aid to Taiwan. The PRC strongly protested the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, a stance that later secured the PRC's success at the Bandung Conference in April 1955.

The crisis reached a new zenith when PRC forces resumed heavy bombardment of the Dachens on 10 January 1955 and seized Yijiangshan on 18

January 1955. To halt further PRC advances, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwanese (Formosan) Resolution on 24 January 1955, which authorized the use of U.S. military force to fight further hostile Chinese communist movements. Determined to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States, Mao ordered the shelling scaled back. At the same time, Washington also wished to prevent a full military confrontation, as it was not prepared to defend all of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait.

The stalemated crisis finally drew to a close in late April 1955, upon an initiative from the PRC. On 23 April 1955, Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai declared at the Bandung Conference that the PRC had no desire to engage the United States in a war and was ready to negotiate an end to the standoff. To show its good faith, the PRC stopped all bombing of the offshore islands on 1 May 1955, which effectively ended the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Shortly thereafter, the PRC and the United States agreed to hold ambassadorial talks to resolve the Taiwan question. The talks began on 1 August 1955 in Geneva between the Chinese ambassador to Poland, Wang Bingnan, and the U.S. ambassador to Poland, Alexis U. Johnson. The Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks deadlocked, however, and were suspended in December 1957. In September 1958, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out, which resulted in another Sino-American confrontation.

LAW YUK-FUN

See also

Bandung Conference; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Jiang Jieshi; Jinmen and Mazu; Mao Zedong; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; Wang Bingnan; Zhou Enlai

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Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second
(1958)

Artillery bombardment of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait from 23 August to 25 October 1958, initiated by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Unlike the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955), the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis may be attributed to PRC Chairman Mao Zedong's desire to enhance his country's international standing in view of its growing diplomatic

A house on Jinmen destroyed by People's Republic of China (PRC) shelling, 1 October 1958. (John Dominis/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

isolation. This isolation was chiefly a result of poor relations with the United States and a deteriorating rapport with its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. Sino-American ambassadorial talks following the Bandung Conference and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis had been suspended in late 1957 because of irreconcilable positions over Taiwan. By mid-1958, after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's Beijing visit and his advocacy of peaceful coexistence with the West, Mao realized that the Soviet Union could not be counted on to lead the communist bloc. Mao was thus emboldened to pursue his own independent course in hopes of establishing himself as the true leader of the socialist world.

International events during July 1958 provided Mao with the perfect opportunity to test his mettle. The United States sent troops to intervene in Lebanon's civil disorder, and Britain deployed troops to quell uprisings in Jordan. Meanwhile, Taiwanese President Jiang Jieshi ordered his military on alert, which the PRC perceived as provocation. In response, on 23 August 1958 Mao ordered the shelling of Jinmen and Mazu, known to Westerners as Quemoy and Mazu, two island groupings 8 miles off Mainland China's southeastern coast. Mao rationalized his actions as providing moral support to the Middle East's "anti-imperialist struggles." Several days after the bombing began, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from the Middle East.

Unlike in the first Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States was fully prepared to defend Taiwan and the off-shore islands.

Mao played this up by publicly denouncing "continuing U.S. imperialism" in the Taiwan Strait. He also restated the PRC's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and its offshore islands. At the same time, he momentarily drew closer to the Soviet Union when Khrushchev gave his full support to the PRC's claims over the offshore islands.

Soviet support, as it turned out, was halfhearted. Disturbed by Mao's seemingly irrational and independent conduct, Khrushchev decided to rescind his earlier promise of sharing nuclear secrets with the PRC. Unlike in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States was fully prepared to defend Taiwan and the offshore islands. In a show of force, the United States deployed additional air and naval forces to protect the Taiwan Strait, and as a result, American and Chinese forces exchanged fire. The United States and the PRC appeared to be headed for a full-fledged conflict, which was not what Mao had intended. He had only wanted to keep the Taiwan question in play by applying what he called his noose strategy. He viewed the Jinmen as nooses constraining the United States, with Taiwan as another more distant noose. He reasoned that America, by committing itself to the defense of these three areas, had put a rope around its neck by trapping itself in the Taiwan Strait. This, he thought, would not only stretch U.S. resources but would also provide the PRC with the upper hand in the region.

Having successfully hooked the U.S. on the nooses, Mao decided to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait. On 6 September 1958, the PRC proposed the resumption of the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, which finally

reconvened at year's end. On 5 October 1958, the PRC issued the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan," restating the PRC's claim to sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait and its willingness to settle the crisis by peaceful means. On 25 October 1958, the PRC issued the "Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan," announcing that the shelling of the Jinmen would be restricted to odd-numbered days and would be limited by certain conditions, which helped defuse the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Periodic bombardment continued until 9 January 1959, when Mao lifted the shelling orders.

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See also

Bandung Conference; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Jiang Jieshi; Jinmen and Mazu; Khrushchev, Nikita; Mao Zedong; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First

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Tanaka Kakuei
(1918–1993)

Japanese politician and prime minister (1972–1974). Born in Niigata Prefecture on 4 May 1918 to a poor family that raised cattle, Tanaka Kakuei moved to Tokyo at age fifteen and established his own construction company, which became very successful during World War II. He was elected to the lower house of the Diet in 1947 and served as secretary-general of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) during 1965–1966 and 1968–1971.

Tanaka held several cabinet positions, including minister of finance (1962–1965) and minister of trade and industry (1971–1972). He succeeded Satō Eisaku as prime minister in July 1972.

The advent of Soviet-American détente and America's opening of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) beginning in the early 1970s gave Tanaka a chance to improve Japanese relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. After President Richard M. Nixon's historic February 1972 visit to the PRC, Tanaka visited Beijing in September 1972, meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. Tanaka also visited Moscow in October 1973, although a joint Japanese-

Soviet communiqué issued at the end of the meeting indicated minor progress in improving relations between the two nations.

The 1973–1974 oil crisis presented diplomatic difficulties for Tanaka. Although U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger visited Japan in November 1973 to unite the Western powers behind a single policy to deal with the crisis, Japan moved its Middle East policy toward a more pro-Arab stance to ensure a continued flow of oil.

Tanaka was forced to resign as prime minister in December 1974 over alleged financial mismanagement. He was arrested in 1976 and charged with accepting 500 million yen in bribes from the Lockheed Corporation. Even after his conviction in 1983, he continued to lead the LDP's largest faction and thus influenced Japanese politics until his health declined in 1985. Tanaka died in Tokyo on 16 December 1993.

Iikura Akira

See also

Détente; Japan; Satō Eisaku

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Tank Warfare

Despite those who believed that the atomic bomb had rendered conventional weapons obsolete, tanks—also known as armored fighting vehicles (AFVs)—saw wide service after World War II. The Soviet Union in particular saw AFVs as an essential element in forces that would engage the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the plains of Central and Eastern Europe.

One lesson learned in World War II was the need for all military components in a military force to be as mobile as the tanks. This led to the introduction of armored personnel carriers (APCs) to transport infantry but also to mount antiaircraft weapons, rockets, and mortars. The Soviets led in this development. Their Boevaia Mashina Pekhoti (BMP, Combat Infantry Vehicle) series was the first infantry fighting vehicle in the world. Infantry could now fight from within the vehicle, and some BMPs mounted a powerful gun and carried antitank missiles, enabling them to provide effective close infantry support. Self-propelled guns also continued in wide use.

In modern wars, armor, infantry, and artillery work together as a team in battle. Infantry and armor provide mutual support and protection. Tanks without accompanying infantry are vulnerable to enemy tank-killer weapons, while infantrymen in turn fall prey to small arms, machine guns, and other direct-fire weapons. Infantrymen and artillery help to protect the tanks from the tank killers, and the tanks engage enemy direct-fire weapons and armor. Offensive tactics envision armor employed en masse, in large formations to overwhelm an enemy and make deep penetrations.

The Soviet Union planned to utilize its far larger numbers of AFVs offensively. The Soviets thus opted for fast, maneuverable tanks with excellent firepower. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection was a low priority. The Western powers, assuming that they would be standing on the defensive against far larger Soviet formations, adopted defensive tactics. The British gave top priority to firepower, followed closely by protection for the tank crews as the second priority and then mobility as the third priority. As a result, the British fielded some of the heaviest tanks of the Cold War era. The Americans adopted a middle position. Speed and maneuverability held top priority, followed by firepower second and protection third.

In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union gradually moved away from nuclear warfare doctrine back to maneuver warfare. By the 1970s, the doctrine of the deep battle held sway in Soviet military thinking. Soviet armor doctrine evolved into something akin to that of World War II. Other forces would open gaps in an enemy front, which would then be exploited by massed armor formations, up to that point held in reserve. Armor columns would then drive deep into the enemy rear areas.

American and NATO strategy relied on firepower and slow withdrawal to inflict maximum punishment on Warsaw Pact attacking forces. This doctrine shifted in the 1980s in the AirLand Battle concept combining airpower, air mobility, and armor in a united offensive strategy in which NATO forces planned to outmaneuver and outfight the Warsaw Pact armies.

Although the dreaded confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces did not occur, Soviet tanks saw action in the restive satellite states, helping to quell an uprising in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in 1953 and to crush the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The almost completely bloodless 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia that ended the Prague Spring involved some 2,000 Warsaw Pact tanks, the largest deployment of armor in Europe during the Cold War. Tanks also took part in fighting in the former Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War.

In Asia, tanks participated in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and in the Korean War (1950–1953), notable as the first clash between U.S. and Soviet armor. At the beginning of the conflict, the Korean People's Army (KPA, North Korean Army) had a tremendous advantage in military hardware, including some 150 T34/85 medium tanks. The Army of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) had no tanks at all. The United States first deployed M24 Chaffee light tanks, hastily dispatched from Japan. The arrival in Korea of more powerful M4 Shermans and M26 Pershings, along with the 3.5-inch bazooka antitank rocket, helped turn the tide against the KPA armor.

A flamethrower tank during training in Korea. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Korea's terrain precluded large tank battles, although each side employed tanks as mobile pillboxes in dug-in positions for long-range pinpoint sniping fire against enemy positions.

Tanks also took part in the long Indochina War (1946–1954). They were, however, largely useless in the interior jungles. The French flew ten M24 Chaffees into Dien Bien Phu and assembled them there to take part in the most important battle of the war, but they could not prevent the French defeat.

Tanks participated in the Vietnam War (1957–1975). Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese) Army forces utilized the M24 Chaffee. After American forces entered the fighting in 1965, the United States deployed some 600 tanks to Vietnam. Although some lighter tanks—such as the M551 Sheridan and M50A1 Ontos—proved ill-suited for the Vietnam combat environment, the M48A3 Patton MBT (main battle tank) was widely employed in search and destroy missions, where it came to be known for its jungle-busting ability in clearing paths through dense vegetation. Its 90mm main gun proved an effective bunker buster, and its tracks and great weight

could survive mines and grind down bunkers. Tanks helped protect convoys, secure lines of communication (LOCs), and protect bases and also served as a rapid-reaction force.

Communist AFVs, chiefly the Soviet PT-76 light amphibian tank, were deployed mostly during the conflict's last few years and primarily in an offensive role. People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) forces deployed some 100 T-34 and T-54 Soviet-supplied tanks in their unsuccessful invasion of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in the spring of 1972 and lost 80 percent of them. In the final 1975 communist offensive, PAVN armor units with Soviet T-54s and T-55s, now better trained and integrated with infantry and artillery, proved an important element in the swift conquest of South Vietnam.

Tanks fought in the three wars between India and Pakistan, especially in 1965 and 1971. In the 1965 war, principally around Chamb and Shakargarth, India and Pakistan each deployed more than 1,000 tanks. In the ensuing heavy fighting, Pakistan lost some 300 tanks, India perhaps half that number.

Many governments used tanks to keep their own population in check. No more powerful image of the tank in the Cold War exists than that of Wang Weilin, the so-called "Tank Man," placing himself in front of and temporarily halting a line of Chinese NORINCO Type 69/59 MBTs on their way to crush the June 1989 student protest movement in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.

In the Middle East, tanks saw widespread service in Arab-Israeli wars, in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), and in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). Perhaps no other conflicts of the period captured the world's imagination as did the numerous wars in the Middle East, which saw some of the largest tank battles in history and proved useful laboratories concerning the design and employment of armored fighting vehicles. For the most part, the Soviet Union acted as chief supporter and arms supplier to the Arab states, and the Western powers, particularly the United States and France (at least until after the 1967 War) supported Israel. The fighting in the Middle East also saw the beginning of a new age in warfare with the first employment of antitank and antiship missiles.

Wang Weilin, known as the "Tank Man," slowing the progress of tanks on the Avenue of Eternal Peace in Beijing during the crushing of the Tiananmen Square uprising, 5 June 1989. (Reuters/Corbis)

In its war for independence, Israel initially had only a small armored force of pre–World War II French Hotchkiss light tanks, World War II British Cromwells, and U.S. Shermans, the latter purchased from Italy and the Philippines. These faced the far more numerous tanks of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. After 1949, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invested heavily in tanks, and the Jewish state became one of the most skillful practitioners of armored warfare in history. In collusion with France and Britain against Egypt in 1956, Israeli Super Shermans and French tanks rolled across the Sinai Peninsula in only four days, defeating a far larger Egyptian force of Shermans,

British Centurions, and some Soviet JS-3s but also 230 Soviet T-34/85s and a number of armored personnel carriers and self-propelled guns.

In June 1967, Israel again used its highly mechanized forces to launch a devastating preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria. Israeli tactics were similar to those employed by the Germans in their Blitzkrieg of World War II. Tanks would break through the enemy front and then push forward, closely followed by mechanized infantry that would engage enemy forces. This armored thrust was followed by motorized infantry to mop up what remained of enemy resistance in order to allow the vital supply column to proceed forward. Rapid Israeli envelopments allowed the numerically inferior Israeli armored forces to take the heavier Arab tanks from the rear and make short work of the Arab armies. Israel had some 800 tanks, while Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq had a combined strength of perhaps 2,500 tanks. Of 1,200 Egyptian tanks before the war, 820 were lost. Israeli armor losses amounted to 122 tanks, many of which were repaired and returned to battle.

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the tables were almost turned, thanks to Israeli complacency and new Egyptian tactics. Israel had invested heavily in the Bar Lev Line, a static defensive front along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, in effect rejecting maneuver tank warfare in which the bulk of armored forces are held back in mobile reserve. Egyptian troops struck in force across the Suez Canal, while Syrian troops simultaneously invaded the Golan Heights. These offensives caught the Israeli defenders completely off guard. On the Golan Heights, Syria deployed 1,400 tanks including Soviet T-34s, T-54s, and the latest T-64 model. To break through the thick Israeli minefields and defenses, the Syrians also utilized specialized armor vehicles such as flail tanks, bridge-layers, and engineer tanks. At the end of four days of savage fighting, however, Israeli forces (which included only 177 tanks) centered on British Centurions defeated the attacking Syrians.

With 1,700 tanks and another 2,500 armored vehicles, the Egyptian force on the Suez front was even larger. The Egyptians pushed across the canal with two armies and more than 1,000 tanks. The Egyptians promptly inflicted heavy losses on the counterattacking Israelis, releasing barrages of shoulder-fire missiles and in two days destroying 260 Israeli tanks. This success emboldened Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who decided on a deeper penetration of the Sinai. But this took Egyptian forces beyond the range of their surface-to-air (SAM) missile cover. The Egyptian offensive on 14 October involved more than 2,000 tanks on both sides, making it second in history only to the World War II Battle of Kursk in numbers of tanks engaged. The Israelis brought up reinforcements but were still outnumbered two to one in tanks, a disadvantage offset by superior hardware and training and the involvement of the Israeli Air Force. The Israelis not only stopped the Egyptian advance but also destroyed some 500 of their tanks.

Israeli forces then crossed over the canal and were in a position to inflict a resounding defeat on the Egyptians when a cease-fire went into effect. Israel won the Yom Kippur War but at a high cost, including the loss of 830

tanks. Many analysts concluded that the Yom Kippur War spelled the end of the tank era, as small, wire-guided missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) had caused about a third of Israeli armor losses. The conclusion proved premature.

Israeli tanks, most notably their superb new Merkava MBT, took part in the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and destroyed the Syrian 1st Armored Division. Although there were no interstate wars involving Israel thereafter, tanks and other AFVs continued to play a key role in intrastate operations as perhaps the most visible component of Israeli security operations against the Palestinian uprising.

Despite the proliferation of new antitank weapons and predictions that the day of the tank was over, when the Cold War came to a close with the collapse of the Soviet Union, AFVs were still very much a part of the world's military establishments.

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See also

AirLand Battle; Arab-Israeli Wars; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; India-Pakistan Wars; Iran-Iraq War; Korean War; Persian Gulf War; Vietnam War

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Tanks

Tanks, often referred to loosely as armor, armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), or tracks, are tracked and armored fighting vehicles armed with a high-velocity, flat-trajectory main gun for direct-fire engagement. This distinguishes them from artillery, which primarily employs indirect fire. Conceived in World War I as a means of ending the bloody stalemate of trench warfare, tanks were first employed by the British in September 1916 during the Battle of the Somme. They came into their own during World War II.

Among tank developments in the Cold War period was the end of the heavy tank in the 1950s. Technological advances allowed their functions to be performed by lighter, more maneuverable, and less expensive MBTs (main battle tanks), combining the old World War II medium and heavy tanks. Guns increased in caliber from 76mm, 88mm, and 90mm at the end of World War II to 105mm and even 120mm. Tanks appeared in a bewildering array of models. Their many variants included bridge-layers, flamethrowers,

and engineer and tank recovery vehicles. In addition to their main guns, tanks mounted one or more machine guns for antiaircraft protection and for engaging personnel and thin-skinned vehicles.

During the Cold War, tanks received improved engines and were capable of higher speeds. Systems also developed to provide protection for crews against the new threats posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack. New sights, night vision equipment, improved laser rangefinders and thermal imaging systems, and more powerful guns and projectiles also came into widespread use. In the ongoing race between projectiles and armor, more effective armor emerged in the form of layers of steel interspersed with ceramic-based light alloys providing excellent protection against both kinetic and chemical energy rounds.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom possessed a number of tanks from World War II that saw extended postwar service. Among these was the Comet (A34), with a 77mm main gun. It fought in the Korean War and remained in service until the early 1960s. The Centurion (A47) remained the principal British main battle tank of the first decades of the Cold War. The Centurion Mk VII mounted a 105mm main gun. It was widely exported and saw combat service in Korea, the Middle East, southern Africa, Pakistan, and Vietnam. It remained in service until 1969. The heavy A22 Churchill Infantry tank, first mounting a 75mm and later a 95mm main gun, fought in Korea.

The threat posed by Soviet heavy tanks in Europe led the British to develop the Conqueror heavy tank. Entering service in 1956, it mounted a 120mm gun. A new tank also mounting a 120mm main gun, the Chieftain Mark V MBT, came on line in 1963. Chieftains were exported to Iran, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman. The chief British MBT of the 1980s was the Challenger, introduced in 1983. It mounted a 120mm rifled gun and performed well in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Among tanks built specifically for export were the Vickers Mk I MBT (1964) with a 105mm main gun, sold to Kuwait and to India; an improved model Vickers Mk III MBT (1973), sold to Kenya and Nigeria; and the Khalid MBT (1981) with a 120mm gun, sold to Jordan.

France. In the immediate post–World War II period, France relied extensively on World War II equipment, on U.S. tanks supplied to the French Army at the end of the war but also on stocks of captured German tanks, most notably the Panther. The most successful of French-designed tanks was the excellent lightweight, air-transportable AMX-13. Introduced in 1952 with production continuing into the 1980s, it had an automatic loader for its long-barreled 75mm main gun, later upgraded to 90mm and then 105mm. The French sold the AMX-13 widely abroad, including to Israel.

Until the mid-1950s, both France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) relied chiefly on the U.S. M47 Patton as their MBT. These nations and Italy then decided to develop a lighter and more powerful MBT for their common use. The Germans produced the Leopard, while the French developed the AMX-30. It entered production in 1966 and mounted a powerful 105mm main gun along with a coaxial 20mm cannon. A large number of AMX-30s were sold abroad, including to Spain.

A British Challenger main battle tank moves into a base camp with other Allied armor during Operation DESERT STORM, 28 February 1991. (U.S. Department of Defense)

West Germany. When the West German government was permitted to rearm in 1955, it initially employed the U.S. M47 Patton as its MBT. With the failure of the joint French-German tank project, however, West Germany developed the Leopard. Produced during 1965–1984, it was also built under license in Italy. Mounting a 105mm gun, the Leopard 1 sacrificed armor protection for speed and maneuverability. This reliable, effective MBT attracted a number of foreign purchasers and was exported to a number of Western nations.

United States. Initially, the United States continued a number of its World War II tanks in service. The 75mm-gun M24 Chaffee was the main U.S. light tank until 1953. It was the first U.S. tank to enter the Korean War and saw wide service abroad in other armies during the entire duration of the Cold War. France employed it in Indochina, and Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) modified its M24s with a 90mm main gun.

The M41 Walker Bulldog replaced the Chaffee. One of the first U.S. tanks to be designed around a suitable engine, rather than designing the tank first and then trying to find an engine to suit, it mounted a 76mm main gun. Widely exported, it saw extensive and long service in many armies.

In the 1960s the U.S. Army tried to counter the growing weight of tanks with the M551 Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle (AR/AAV) Sheridan, a lightweight, air-transportable armored vehicle with a heavy gun

capable of knocking out any known tank. It mounted a 152mm gun, designed to fire the Shillelagh HEAT missile or combustible cartridge case conventional projectiles. The M551, although strictly speaking not a tank, was nonetheless used as one but had only limited armor protection. The Sheridan experienced numerous problems and did not enter service until 1968. It served in Vietnam but was poorly protected against enemy mines. The Sheridan remained in service with the 82nd Airborne Division into the 1990s and saw service both in Panama in 1989 and in the Persian Gulf War.

Sherman M4A3 and M4A3E8 medium tanks, the mainstay of U.S. armored forces at the end of World War II, fought with the United Nations Command (UNC) forces in Korea. There were many models and variants of the basic design, including dozers, 105mm howitzers, rocket launchers, tank retrievers, and flamethrowers. A great many Shermans were exported to other countries after World War II. Israeli Shermans, which were kept in operation for decades from a wide variety of sources, were also armed with an equally wide panoply of weapons, including antiradiation missiles. The French upgraded a number of Israeli Shermans with 75mm and 105mm main guns. Known as M50 and M51 Super Shermans, these fought modified M4 Egyptian Army Shermans in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The M26 Pershing tank, which entered service only in the last few months of the war in Europe, fought in Korea. Pending introduction of a new medium tank, World War II M26 Pershings were converted into the M46 medium with a new V-12 engine and cross-drive transmission. The M46 was unofficially known as the Patton, the name later officially bestowed on the M47. The M46 and the M26 bore the brunt of armor combat in Korea. The M46 had many of the same basic characteristics of the M26 and mounted a 90mm main gun.

The Korean War caught the U.S. Army in the midst of developing a new medium tank. The T42 design was not ready, but its turret and new gun were. As a stopgap measure, these were then adapted to the M46 hull, in effect the old World War II M26 with a new engine and other upgrades. This marriage of convenience became the M47 Patton. Mounting a 90mm gun, it entered service in 1952 and proved a successful design. Although it did not serve in the Korean War, it saw extensive service life in other armies, including in West Germany, France, Iran, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), and Yugoslavia.

The M48 Patton II MBT was rushed into service as a consequence of the Korean War and Soviet pressure on Berlin. Entering service in 1952, it was a brand-new design with new hull, turret, tracks, suspension, and transmission. The M48 was one of the most important of post–World War II tanks. Although it saw considerable service during the Vietnam War, this was rarely against communist armor. In Middle Eastern fighting with the Israeli Army, the M48 achieved an enviable record against its Soviet counterparts. It too was widely exported.

The M60 was essentially a refinement of the M48 begun in the late 1950s. Later, a number of M48s were rebuilt as M48A5s, essentially M60s, making the two virtually indistinguishable. The first M60 prototypes appeared in

An M-46 Patton tows another tank during the Korean War. The United Nations Command (UNC) often employed its tanks in long-range, pinpoint fire against communist positions. (National Archives and Records Administration)

1958. The M60 entered production in 1959 and service in 1960. It mounted the new British L7A1 105mm (4.1-inch) gun (known in the U.S. as the M68). The M60 also had a new fire-control system. The new tank weighed nearly 116,000 pounds and had a four-man crew. Its 750hp engine produced a maximum tank speed of 30 miles per hour. Armament consisted of the 105mm gun and two machine guns. Variants included the M60A1, with a new turret; the M60A2, which had a new turret with the 152mm gun/launcher developed for the M551 Sheridan; and the M60A3, which returned to the 105mm gun but with a thermal barrel jacket, a new fire-control computer with laser rangefinder, infrared searchlight, and night vision equipment. Most M60A1s were later modified to M60A3s.

The M60 was first supplied to U.S. Army units in Germany. Although no longer in U.S. active military service, the M60 was the principal U.S. main battle tank for twenty years, until the introduction of the M1 Abrams. The M60 saw combat in the Arab-Israeli wars and in the Persian Gulf War, when it served with the U.S. Marine Corps and the Saudi Arabian Army. A number of M60s remain in reserve and in the armed forces of many nations.

A U.S. M-1 Abrams tank assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division, participating in a training exercise, 1 September 1982. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The M60's replacement, the M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams, is today probably the top main battle tank in the world. It began during a search by West Germany and the United States for a new MBT that could defeat the vast number of tanks that the Soviets might field in an invasion of Central Europe. The first production model M1 came off the assembly line in 1980. The M1 was a revolutionary design and also a sharp departure from previous U.S. tanks. The M1 was more angular, with flat-plate composite Chobham-type armor and with armor boxes that could be opened so that the armor could be changed according to the threat.

After initial M1 production had begun, the army decided to arm the M1 not with a 105mm but with a German-designed 120mm smoothbore gun. It was first available in 1984, and the first M1A1 with this new armament was delivered in 1985. The M1A1HA introduced new steel-encased, virtually impenetrable, depleted-uranium armor. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia bought the Abrams. Egypt produced more than 500 under a coproduction arrangement.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union ended World War II with a large inventory of AFVs. Their excellent T-34/85 remained in production until the late 1940s. In 1947 the Soviets introduced an upgraded model, the T-34/85 II, that remained the principal Soviet MBT into the 1950s. Produced under license in both Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s, it was widely exported, and production did not cease until 1964.

The T-34/85 II saw extensive service in the Korean War with the Korean People's Army (KPA, North Korean Army). It also fought in the successive

Middle East wars and in Africa, and it saw combat as recently as the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

As noted, the Soviets led in the post–World War II development of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and modified them to carry a variety of weapons. These were gradually replaced by the Bronirovanniy Transportnaya Rozposnania (BTR, armored wheeled transporter) series of eight-wheeled APCs through missile-armed Boevaya Razvedyvatnaya Descent Mashina (BRDM, airborne combat reconnaissance vehicle) scout cars and the BMP series of personnel carriers. The BMPs mounted a large gun capable of providing effective support to dismounted infantry. They also carried antitank missiles and were constructed so as to allow infantry to fight from inside the vehicle, which distinguished this infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) from the less-capable APCs.

Along these lines the Soviets developed the PT-76 light tank, which had no equivalent in the West. As large as an MBT, the PT-76 was, however, thinly armored and was developed chiefly to lead amphibious assaults and conduct reconnaissance. Easily identifiable by its pointed nose and low, round turret with sloped sides and flat roof, the PT-76 was an amphibian without any preparation. Movement through water was accomplished by means of water jets from the rear of the hull. Mounting a 76.2mm main gun, the PT-76 entered service in 1955 and continued in Soviet service until 1967. It saw wide service in the armies of Soviet bloc countries but also was widely exported to Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. It fought in the Vietnam War, in the 1965 India-Pakistan War, and in conflicts in Africa. It continued in wide service well past the Cold War.

The IS-3 (Josef Stalin-3) remained the principal Soviet heavy tank immediately after World War II. The first postwar Soviet MBT, introduced in 1948, was the formidable T-54, itself a refinement of the T-44, the short-lived redesign of the T-34/85 at the end of World War II. It mounted a 100mm main gun.

The T-55, a follow-on T-54, appeared in 1958. Among many improvements was a more powerful engine. The T-54/T-55 had a long service life. Production continued until 1981, with a phenomenal 95,000 tanks manufactured, more than any other tank in history. Both the Chinese and Romanians produced copies. Even at the end of the Cold War, T-54/T-55s constituted some 38 percent of Soviet tank strength and as much as 86 percent of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armor. Reliable and relatively inexpensive, the T-54/T-55 was exported to more than thirty-five other nations. The T-54/T-55s had a mixed combat record. While sufficient to crush the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, they were not successful against Western-supplied Israeli armor in the 1967 Six-Day War or Coalition tanks in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

In 1953 the Soviets introduced their last heavy tank, the T-10 Lenin. It was basically an enlarged IS with a 122mm main gun. Expensive to build, heavy, and difficult to maintain, the T-10 was phased out in the mid-1960s in favor of the T-62, but it nonetheless equipped a number of Warsaw Pact armies and was exported to both Egypt and Syria.

A Soviet T-55 main battle tank, 29 September 1989. (U.S. Department of Defense)

The successor tank to the T-54/T-55 was the follow-on T-62 of 1961, which remained in first-line Soviet service for two decades. Similar in layout and appearance to the T-55, the T-62 introduced a number of improvements. It also mounted the new, larger 115mm smoothbore main gun, the first smoothbore tank gun in the world. Its gun enabled the T-62 to fire armor-piercing, fin-stabilized discarding sabot rounds that could destroy any tank at ranges of under 1,500 meters. Nonetheless, the gun could only fire four rounds a minute, and its automatic spent-case ejection system was a danger to the crew.

The Soviets built some 20,000 T-62s, and it was the principal Soviet MBT of the 1960s and much of the 1970s. It constituted 24 percent of Soviet tank strength at the end of the Cold War. T-62s were also built in large numbers by the People's Republic of China (PRC), Czechoslovakia, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). The T-62 had a checkered combat record. Many were exported to the Middle East, where they proved vulnerable to hostile fire.

While the T-62 was simply an improvement of the T-55, the next Soviet MBT, the T-64, was a new design and a significant advance in firepower, armor protection, and speed. It entered production in 1966 and was designed to replace both the T-54/T-55 series and the T-62. Initially it was armed with a 115mm gun, but Soviet designers decided that the tank was undergunned against the U.S. M60A1, so they upgraded the definitive version T-62A to a

more powerful 125mm smoothbore. The T-62B version could fire the 4,000-meter-range Songster antitank guided missile. The new tank experienced numerous reliability problems and was never exported.

The T-72 of 1971 proved to be both more reliable and far cheaper to produce. Similar in appearance to the T-64, it utilized the same gun, suspension, and track. Although its enormous 125mm smoothbore main gun allows the T-72 to fire projectiles with great destructive capability, ammunition flaws mean that the gun has a reputation for inaccuracy beyond about 1,500 meters. The gun is stabilized, allowing it to fire on the move, but is only truly effective at short ranges, and most crews halt the tank before firing. This put the T-72 at an enormous disadvantage against Western tanks with far superior gun-stabilization systems.

A large number of T-72 variants have appeared, offering an improved diesel engine, improved armor, and better sights. The T-72 currently equips not only the Russian Army and the armies of the former Warsaw Pact states but is also widely employed in the Middle East and Africa. It has been produced under license in Czechoslovakia, India, Iran, Iraq, Poland, and the former Yugoslavia. It is in fact the world's most widely deployed tank. Despite its many sales, the T-72 has not fared well in battle.

Both Iran and Iraq employed T-72s during their eight-year war in the 1980s, but there is little information about their effectiveness. Iraq counted some 1,000 T-72s in its inventory during the Persian Gulf War, but they were easily defeated by the U.S. M1A1 Abrams, which was able to take on the T-72 and destroy it at twice the effective range of the T-72's main gun. No M1A1s were destroyed by Iraqi tank fire. Despite these failings, it should be remembered that the T-72 was not designed to defeat Western armor—that was to be left to the T-64 and T-80. Rather, it was intended as a relatively inexpensive MBT that would be reliable and easy to maintain and could be widely exported. It met these criteria well.

The T-80 was the MBT designed to take on and destroy U.S. and other Western tanks. The last Soviet Union MBT, it appeared in prototype in 1976 but did not enter production until 1980. It was basically the follow-on to the T-64 with the flaws corrected, including a new engine and suspension system. It is armed with the 125mm smoothbore gun and two machine guns and is protected by composite explosive-reactive armor. The T-80 continues in production in both Russia and Ukraine. It has gone through upgrades and has been sold to China, Pakistan, and South Korea.

Israel. Tanks were essential weapons on the relatively flat and open terrain of the Middle East. The first Israeli armored vehicles were a hodgepodge of converted trucks and buses. In the 1948–1949 War for Independence, Israel had few tanks available. The United States provided a number of World War II-vintage M4 Shermans, and the Israelis also secured surplus Shermans from other armies. These saw long service, undergoing a bewildering succession of upgrades, including heavier guns, improved engines, and modified turrets. Once they had reached the limit of possible improvements, a number were turned into self-propelled guns. Indeed, improvisation became a hallmark of the Israeli military. The British Centurion, one of

Tanks were essential weapons on the relatively flat and open terrain of the Middle East. The first Israeli armored vehicles were a hodgepodge of converted trucks and buses.

the world's most successful tank designs, underwent upgrades in Israel beginning in 1967 to improve its range but also to improve crew protection, in which Israel probably led the world.

France also supplied AMX-13 light tanks (until France cut off arms shipments to Israel in 1967). Other tanks in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) included the British Centurion and the U.S. M47 and M60 MBTs.

Remodeled M60s are designated the Magach 6, 7, and 8. The Magach 7s and 8s fitted with a 120mm smoothbore gun are known as the Sabra. Israel offered this tank to Turkey and also converted a number of Turkish M60s to Sabras.

In their wars, the Israelis captured large numbers of Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks from the Arab armies. These were modified and added to the Israelis' inventory. Improvements included a new 105mm rifled gun, improved armor, and new fire-control systems.

In the 1970s, Israel began development of its own tank. Known as the Merkava, it entered service in 1978. Built on lessons learned in previous wars, the primary concerns in its design were firepower and armor protection. The Merkava underwent continued upgrades, with the Mk 2 appearing in 1983 and Mk 3 in 1990. One of the world's most powerful tanks, it also affords perhaps the best crew protection. The Mk 1 mounts a 105mm gun and also has a 60mm mortar in the turret roof. The Mk 2 has the same armament but improved armor and a new fire-control system. These two models were superseded by the Mk 3, introduced in 1990.

Tanks are expensive and difficult to design and manufacture, and the Arab states lacked such capability. Egypt manufactured tanks under license and produced an excellent APC. Saudi Arabia has also produced light armored vehicles. But for the most part, the Arab states have chosen to rely on foreign-manufactured AFVs.

Iran. Iran was forced, both because of its isolation from much of the world as a result of its Islamic fundamentalist government and a long war with neighboring Iraq, to manufacture its own tanks. One of its projects was to upgrade Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks captured during the long Iran-Iraq War. Known as the T-72Z Safir-74, this tank incorporates a 105mm rifled gun. The Zulfiqar MBT, however, combines components of the U.S. M48 and M60 and Russian T-72 tanks. The Iranians also produce their own APCs.

India and Pakistan. Aside from the Middle East, the largest Cold War–era tank battles occurred on the Indian subcontinent. Originally, both armies were equipped with World War II-vintage U.S. M4 Shermans. India secured from France the AMX-13 light tank and from Britain the Centurion MBT. Pakistan acquired the U.S. M24 Chaffee light tanks and the M48 MBT. These AFVs were the principal tanks of the first war fought between India and Pakistan in 1965. In their 1971 war, Pakistan also deployed Type 59 tanks from China, and India used T-55 tanks from the Soviet Union.

Following the 1971 war, India took steps to develop its own MBT. Beginning in 1974, India began design work on the Arjun. While the Arjun was undergoing development, India proceeded with local production of a Vickers MBT design, the Vijayanta (Victory) and the Soviet T-72. As the arms race

on the Indian subcontinent intensified, Pakistan developed the MBT-2000 Al Khalid beginning in 1988.

China. China produced no tanks of its own during World War II or the civil war that followed. After the communist victory in 1949, China acquired a number of T-54s, and China simply copied these for its first tank, the T-59. Developed by NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation) in 1959, the T-59, a virtual copy of the Soviet T-54 with modifications, mounted a 100mm smoothbore gun. In the early 1980s a Type II appeared with the substitution of a 105mm rifled main gun. China exported the Type 59 widely. It remains in service in China and in many countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Western companies have since upgraded a number of these tanks.

The first Chinese indigenous AFV was the Type 62 light tank of 1962. In essence a reduced version of the T-59, it mounted an 85mm main gun. Most remain in service. The T-62 was exported to Albania as well as to Africa and other Asian states, with Vietnam the principal recipient.

Chinese armor doctrine copied that of the Soviet Union in placing reliance on large numbers of light amphibious tanks. The Chinese Type 63 light tank improved on the Soviet PT-76 but mounted the same 85mm main gun armament.

The next Chinese MBT design was the NORINCO Type 69. Believed to have appeared first in 1969, it was first seen in public in a parade in 1982. The Type 69 MBT employed the same basic design of the Type 59 but soon received the more accurate 100mm rifled gun. The subsequent Type 79 was virtually a Type 69 but with the 105mm gun. A number of Type 69 tanks were exported to Iran and Iraq. Completely outclassed by the U.S. M1A1 Abrams and British Challenger MBTs, a large number of Iraqi Type 69s were destroyed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The NORINCO Type 80 introduced many improvements. Much of the world first saw the Type 69, believed to have entered production in 1985, in scenes of Chinese tanks crushing the prodemocracy student movement in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 1989. It incorporated a 105mm gun that could fire both Chinese and Western ammunition and an improved fire-control system.

Japan. As with West Germany, Japan rearmed only as a consequence of the Cold War. Japan did not produce a post–World War II tank until 1962. Its Type 61 MBT for the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (GDF) closely followed the U.S. M48 Patton, mounting a 90mm main gun. Its successor, the Type 74 MBT with 105mm gun, entered service in 1975.

Melissa Hebert and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

AirLand Battle; Tank Warfare

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Tanner, Väinö Alfred
(1881–1966)

Finnish politician, Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader, and prime minister (1926–1927). Born in Helsinki on 12 March 1881, Väinö Tanner was the son of a railway worker. After his secondary education in Helsinki in 1900, he completed a year of business school in 1901, then worked for corporations in Hamburg, Turku, and Viborg before entering law school at the University of Helsinki. Graduating in 1911, he then practiced law until 1915 while playing a leading role in the cooperative movement. In 1918, he became chairman of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party. He struggled to defend Finnish freedom and democracy first against the threats posed by the right wing in Finland and then from the Soviet Union during and after World War II.

Tanner was instrumental in concluding the 1920 Tartu Treaty and the 1940 Moscow Treaty, both of which eased Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union. He transformed the SDP into a party that offered a Scandinavian brand of socialism. His pragmatic leadership helped heal the wounds of the civil war following World War I, and he led his party to power in 1926 and again in 1937. He served as premier of Finland from December 1926 to December 1927.

When the Winter War with the Soviet Union began in November 1939, as foreign minister Tanner championed his government's resistance to Soviet demands. A cabinet minister throughout World War II, he helped rally the Finnish working class behind the war effort.

Following World War II, Moscow considered Tanner its greatest nemesis. On Soviet insistence, in 1946 a Finnish court sentenced him to five and a half years of imprisonment under the vague charge of "war responsibility." Pardoned in 1949, he made an energetic political comeback and was reelected chairman of his party in 1957. Suspicious of Tanner's attempts to oust Urho Kekkonen from the presidency, in October 1961 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev staged the so-called Note Crisis in which he demanded that Finland reaffirm its neutrality. This secured the reelection of the incumbent president after his quick moves to placate the Soviets.

In 1963 Tanner retired from the chairmanship of the SDP. He died in Helsinki on 19 April 1966.

Silviu Miloiu

See also
Finland; Kekkonen, Urho

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Tanzania

East African nation. Tanzania covers 364,898 square miles and is bordered by Uganda and Kenya to the north; Burundi, Rwanda, and Congo to the west; Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi to the south; and the Indian Ocean to the east. A former German protectorate, subsequently under British administration after World War I, Tanzania achieved its current form in 1964, after Zanzibar and Tanganyika joined. Because the nation was a conglomeration that did not exist in 1945, there is no population data from that year. Tanzania's population was 12.3 million people in 1967, the first year of an official census.

In accordance with the 1885 Berlin Conference, a territory coinciding roughly with modern Tanzania was declared a German protectorate, while Zanzibar and Pemba became British protectorates. As a result of World War I, German East Africa, named Tanganyika in 1920, was placed under a League of Nations mandate, with Great Britain as the administering power. In 1922 the Tanganyika Civil Service Association (TCSA) was founded, and in 1929 the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) was created. In 1954, these groups merged into the singular Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), under the leadership of Julius Nyerere.

Since 1954, when TANU was allowed to function as a political organization, Nyerere's leadership turned it into the main political force in the country. From 1955 on, it also gained the support of the Tanganyika Federation of Labor (TFL), established by Rashidi Kawawa. Worried that TANU would agitate for independence, the British attempted to counterbalance the growing power of the organization by backing the Tanganyika United Party (TUP). Nevertheless, in the 1959–1960 general elections, TANU emerged as the winning political party, and Nyerere became chief minister and then prime minister when Tanganyika became independent in 1961. Kawawa became prime minister in 1962, and Nyerere went on to become president of the new republic.

Neighboring Zanzibar, after becoming a sultanate in 1963, witnessed the triumph of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) under Abeid Karume, an ally of TANU, over the minority coalition that had been formed by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP). In 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a union, with the new political entity named Tanzania. Karume became vice president under Nyerere.

Communist-trained Zanzibar soldiers march in review past Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere (*left*) and Vice President Abeid Karume during ceremonies celebrating the fourth anniversary of the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika, 12 January 1968. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Tanzania adopted a new constitution in 1965. Nyerere remained president of the now one-party state and held power until 1985. Over two decades, he oriented the country toward socialism, with the aim of self-reliance. He tried to achieve this through the exploitation of native agriculture, concentrating the means of production in the hands of workers; state control of industry, inculcating the spirit of *Ujamaa* (brotherhood) that opposed human exploitation; and the redistribution of income. He also eschewed foreign aid, arguing that it brought with it binding, long-term commitments. His socialist policies took written form in the 1967 Arusha Declaration.

In 1972, Kawawa was reappointed prime minister, and Karume was assassinated. Karume's successor, Aboud Jumbe, extended the powers of the ASP, and in 1979 the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar adopted a separate constitution. In February 1977, TANU and ASP merged to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Revolutionary Party) with Nyerere as chairman.

Deteriorating economic conditions saw half the members of the National Assembly lose their seats in the 1980 elections. In 1984, the presidential term was reduced to two years, giving more power to the National Assembly. The next year, Nyerere was forced to retire amid a serious economic crisis.

Nyerere staged something of a comeback, however, and was reelected chairman of the CCM for a five-year term in October 1987. In 1990, Nyerere's CCM initiated a broad campaign against government corruption. The issue of democracy, which had been raised several times since he left office, was raised once more in December 1991, when a presidential commission recommended the establishment of a pluralistic political system. Finally, in 1995, multiparty legislative elections were held, and a democratically elected parliament came into being.

Abel Polese

See also

Africa; Nyerere, Julius Kambarage

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Taylor, Maxwell Davenport
(1901–1987)

U.S. Army general, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), ambassador, and presidential consultant. Born in Keytesville, Missouri, on 26 August 1901, Maxwell Taylor graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1922 and was commissioned in the engineers. In 1926 he transferred to the field artillery. A talented linguist, he taught French and Spanish for five years at West Point before graduating from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1935. He then was an assistant military attaché in Japan.

Taylor graduated from the Army War College in 1940 and served on the staff of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and was promoted to lieutenant colonel. In July 1942, Taylor became chief of staff of the 82nd Airborne Division as a colonel. In December he was advanced to brigadier general and assumed command of the divisional artillery. He fought in Sicily and, in September 1943, carried out a mission behind enemy lines to Rome, determining that a planned airborne drop there was not feasible.

In March 1944, Taylor assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division. Promoted to major general in March 1944, he participated with his division in the Normandy invasion and then in Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the failed attempt to seize a crossing over the Rhine at Arnhem, in which he was wounded. He was in Washington when the Battle of the Ardennes (also known as the Battle of the Bulge) began on 16 December 1945 but rejoined his division on 25 December and fought with it in the remainder of that battle and in the Ruhr.

U.S. Army General Maxwell D. Taylor was one of America's most distinguished military leaders. During the Cold War, he was sharply critical of U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces and advocated flexible response for fighting limited wars. (Harry S. Truman Library)

In September 1945, Taylor became superintendent of West Point and initiated a number of curriculum changes. Between 1949 and 1951 he headed the Berlin Command. In 1951 he was promoted to lieutenant general and became deputy chief of staff for Operations and Training. In February 1953 he assumed command of the Eighth Army in Korea as a full general. He was then commanding general of the Army Forces Far East in 1954 and commander in chief of the Far East Command in 1955.

Taylor served as army chief of staff during 1955–1959. His views differed sharply from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation. Taylor urged greater emphasis on conventional forces and the ability to fight limited wars, which later became known as flexible response. Retiring in 1959, he expressed his views publicly in his book *The Uncertain Trumpet*, which caught the attention of John F. Kennedy.

President Kennedy brought Taylor from retirement to serve as his military advisor during 1961–1962. Taylor advocated the dispatch of 8,000 U.S. ground combat troops to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Kennedy then appointed Taylor chairman of the JCS, a post he held during 1962–1964. Named by President Lyndon Johnson as ambassador to South Vietnam (1964–1965), Taylor urged escalation of the war through bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) as a means to bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table. For the remainder of his life, he defended U.S. policies in Vietnam and blamed America's defeat there on the media. He was president of the Institute for Defense Analysis during 1966–1969 and president of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during 1965–1970. Taylor died in Washington, D.C., on 19 April 1987.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Flexible Response; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Marshall, George Catlett; McNamara, Robert Strange; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; United States Army; Vietnam War

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Teller, Edward
(1908–2003)

U.S. atomic scientist, known as the father of the hydrogen bomb. Born in Budapest, Hungary, on 15 January 1908 to a Jewish family, Edward Teller received his doctorate in theoretical physics from the University of Leipzig in 1930. He immigrated to the United States in 1935. During World War II he worked at Los Alamos, New Mexico, on the Manhattan Project, which produced the world's first atomic bomb in 1945. After the Soviets tested their first atomic weapon in August 1949, Teller strongly pushed for a hydrogen bomb program, which President Harry S. Truman authorized in January 1950.

Teller's advocacy of the hydrogen bomb alienated him from many other nuclear scientists, who did not see the need for such a weapon and worried that production of one would lead inexorably to a nuclear arms race. In late 1950 Teller left Los Alamos for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California when he was not selected to head the hydrogen bomb project. He served as associate director of the laboratory during 1953–1958 and director during 1958–1960. While he was director, the lab worked on the nuclear warhead for the U.S. Navy's new Polaris missile.

In 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) denied Robert Oppenheimer, head scientist on the Manhattan Project, a renewal of his government security clearance. Teller had testified at AEC hearings against Oppenheimer, furthering the rift between himself and much of the scientific community. Undeterred by this, Teller spent his life devoted to scientific advancement and was an advocate of strong national defenses. During the 1980s, he ardently supported President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Teller was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in July 2003. He died in Stanford, California, on 9 September 2003.

Valerie Adams

Edward Teller was a nuclear physicist who worked with J. Robert Oppenheimer on the Manhattan Project, helping to create the world's first atomic bomb in 1945. After the war, Teller was instrumental in the development of the hydrogen bomb for the United States. (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)

See also

Hydrogen Bomb; Missiles, Polaris; Nuclear Arms Race; Oppenheimer, Robert

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Templer, Sir Gerald
(1898–1979)

British field marshal. Born in Colchester on 11 September 1898, Gerald Walter Robert Templer was educated at Wellington College and Sandhurst Military Academy in 1916, when he was commissioned in the Royal Irish Fusiliers. He then saw combat service in France. Between the world wars he served in both the Middle East and England and graduated from the Staff College in 1929. At the outbreak of World War II, he was assigned to the intelligence section in the War Office. In November 1940 he was appointed to command a brigade, and in April 1941 he took command of the 47th Division as a temporary major general. In September 1942 he commanded II Corps, part of the British home defense, becoming the youngest lieutenant general in the army. However, ten months later he requested command of a field division and reverted to major general. In October 1943 he was assigned command of the 56th Division in Italy, which he led at Volturno River, Monte Camino, and Anzio. He was sent home the following August to recuperate after being wounded when his vehicle hit a mine.

In 1945 Templer was named director of civil affairs/military government in the British occupation zone in Germany. The following year he returned to the War Office, where he served successively as director of Military Intelligence and vice chief of the Imperial General Staff. He was promoted to lieutenant general in April 1948 and to general in June 1950. In 1952, following two years as chief of the Eastern Command, he was personally chosen by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to become high commissioner in Malaya, then in the midst of the Malayan Emergency.

To restore order in Malaya, Templer selectively built on his predecessors' initiatives while insisting on strict discipline and implementation of reforms, most notably in the police, intelligence, and information services. This approach was closely associated with what became known as the hearts and minds philosophy of counterinsurgency. By the time of his departure in 1954, the insurgents had essentially been defeated. He subsequently served as chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1955 to 1958 and was promoted to field marshal in November 1956. Templer died in London on 25 October 1979.

George M. Brooke III

See also

Anticolonialism; Churchill, Winston; Communist Revolutionary Warfare; Malayan Emergency; Southeast Asia

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Territorial Changes after World War II

World War II and the attendant postwar settlements produced major territorial changes. In Europe, Germany was divided into four occupation zones, as was the capital city of Berlin. In a few years, these gave way to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Germany was not reconstituted as a whole nation until 1990 and the end of the Cold War.

Germany lost all territory that it had taken during the war. France secured the small border areas of Tenda and Briga. France also temporarily secured control of the coal-rich Saar region. Paris sacrificed efforts to secure the Saar permanently in return for a rapprochement with Bonn. Following a plebiscite in November 1955 in which Saarlanders voted two to one to reject internationalization, the Saar joined West Germany in 1957.

East Germans drive through Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin as they take advantage of relaxed travel restrictions to visit the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), November 1989. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Poland's postwar borders had been the topic of much rancor and debate in the wartime meetings of Allied leaders at Tehran (November–December 1943) and Yalta (February 1945). Germany lost all of former East Prussia to the Soviets and Poles. The Soviet Union annexed Königsberg (renamed Kaliningrad), Memel (now Klaipeda), and northern East Prussia, with the remainder of the province going to Poland. West of the former Polish corridor, Germany was forced to cede to Poland all German territory up to the Oder and Neisse Rivers as well as the city of Stettin east of the Oder. The Western powers agreed to only a temporary administration of this territory, pending a formal German peace treaty. Nonetheless, the arrangement became permanent and was formally recognized as such in the signing of a peace treaty with Germany in 1991.

Territory taken from Germany and given to Poland was to compensate that country for the loss of much of its eastern territory to the Soviet Union. The Western powers had agreed at Yalta that the Soviet western frontier should be the old Curzon Line, set as the boundary between Poland and Russia by a commission of the Western powers in 1919. The settlement of Poland's postwar frontiers thus moved Poland west, but it also eliminated the old Polish corridor and the territorial division of Germany that had been the stated cause of the German invasion of Poland in 1939, marking the beginning of World War II in Europe.

Without treaty or agreement by the Western powers, the Soviet Union also annexed the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (which had been extended eastward in 1939 to include Vilnius). The Soviets had forcibly annexed these three states in 1940. Finland was forced to cede to the Soviet Union the Karelian Isthmus and the Arctic seaport of Petsamo (now Pechenga). This latter gave the Soviet Union a frontier with Norway. The Soviet Union also secured from Finland a fifty-year lease on a naval base at Porkkala.

The Allies agreed in 1943 that Czechoslovakia, declared a belligerent state on the Allied side, was to be returned to its pre-1938 Munich Agreement frontiers, but in November 1944, with the Red Army in occupation, a self-proclaimed council met in sub–Carpathian Rus' (which the Paris Peace Conference had awarded to the new state of Czechoslovakia in 1919 in order to provide a land link with Romania) and declared its desire to be reunited with the "Soviet Ukrainian motherland." This "voluntary" action was confirmed by a bilateral treaty between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in June 1945.

In east-central Europe, the victorious powers rejected Hungary's claims to retain control of Transylvania. That area was returned to Romania, and Hungary shrunk back to its 1919 Treaty of Trianon borders, with the exception of a small bit of land south of the Danube near Bratislava, which went to Czechoslovakia.

Romania recovered its prewar western boundary, with the return of Transylvania. In the 1947 Treaty of Paris, however, it was forced to yield to the Soviet Union both Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Romania was also compelled to recognize the loss in 1940 to Bulgaria of the southern Dobrudja, including the Danubian port of Silistra.

Italy's frontiers were also redrawn. In addition to losing some small territory to France, the 1947 treaty recognized the Yugoslavian acquisition of all former Italian land east of the Adriatic Sea. This included the Dalmatian city of Zadar (Zara) and the Adriatic islands of Cres (Cherso), Lošinj (Lusino), and Lastovo (Lagosta) as well as the long-contested city of Rijeka (Fiume) and, to the north, western Slovenia and part of Istria. The chiefly Italian city of Trieste was initially declared a free territory and was administered by Anglo-American forces. Trieste was finally incorporated into Italy in 1954. The 1947 treaty also awarded Italy's Dodecanese Islands to Greece, and Italy lost sovereignty over its North African colonies of Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland.

In Asia, the victorious Allies had agreed early on that Japan would be reduced to its home islands. At the Yalta Conference, in return for a Soviet pledge to enter the war against Japan "two or three months" after the defeat of Germany, the Allies agreed that the Soviet Union would receive South Sakhalin Island (lost by Russia to Japan following the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War), concessions in the port of Darien, the return of Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base, and control over railroads leading to these ports. The Kurile Islands, which had never been in Russian possession, also passed to the Soviet Union. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union returned to the People's Republic of China (PRC) the various concessions granted to it in Chinese territory.

Also as a result of World War II, China regained sovereignty over Manchuria, Taiwan (Formosa), and the Pescadores Islands, while Outer Mongolia continued to be independent of China. In effect, these concessions sanctioned the replacement of Japanese imperialism with Soviet domination, but the Western leaders believed this a necessary evil to secure timely Soviet entry into the Pacific war. The allies also agreed that Korea would in due course be restored to independence. Soviet forces were to disarm Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel, while American forces would do the same south of the 38th Parallel.

The former German islands mandated to Japan after World War I now passed to U.S. control. These were the Gilbert, Caroline, and Northern Mariana Islands. They became a U.S. Trust Territory in 1947. The Japanese islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were taken from Japan but were restored in 1968 and 1972, respectively. Guam, taken by the United States in 1898 and occupied by Japan during the war, was restored to U.S. control. It became an incorporated territory of the United States in 1950. The United States granted independence to the Philippines in 1946.

Other territorial changes occurred indirectly as a result of the war. Within a few years of the end of the war, decolonization had wrought great changes in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The former French colonies of Lebanon and Syria retained the independence they had gained during the war, for instance. Jordan became a sovereign state in 1946. The European powers, spurred by the horrors of the Holocaust, also supported the creation of a Jewish national homeland (Israel) in the former British mandate of Palestine. This initiative, which was mediated by the United Nations (UN) in 1948,

remains one of the most controversial territorial changes stemming from World War II.

Independence came gradually to African and Asian nations, and not without conflict. This movement was largely a result of the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 that called for the self-determination of peoples; pressure on the colonial powers by the Soviet Union and the United States; the occupation of Asian territories by Japan; and the weakened positions of Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands immediately after the war. Within a decade of the end of the war, these circumstances would lead to the dismantling of most of the European colonial empires and to more than a few wars.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

World War II, Allied Conferences

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Terrorism

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of global consciousness, yet politically motivated violence is nothing new. During the Cold War, the instances of both domestic and international terrorism were ample, with no region of the world free from its dangers. And while terrorism is rightfully considered a great modern evil, to ignore the fundamentally political nature of such violence is to miss the central point of its occurrence, especially within the context of the ideological, postcolonial politics of the Cold War.

In very general terms, terrorism involves the use of violence (or the threat thereof) against mainly civilian targets for political ends. The goal is to either coerce a government into radically altering policy or to intimidate the public into abandoning support for the existing regime. Specific definitions of terrorism vary depending on the particular governmental or scholarly agendas, and terrorists themselves often claim to be revolutionaries, reluctant warriors, or freedom fighters. Additionally, some scholarship—primarily

leftist in orientation—seeks to define virtually all military action as terrorism, but to do so only obfuscates the issue. Illegitimate state-sponsored violence can more appropriately be classified as either war crimes or genocide.

Terrorism throughout the Cold War impacted all regions of the world, but it can best be grouped into three distinct yet overlapping categories: the nature of Cold War competition made ideological groups, predominantly Marxist groups, most prevalent; several prominent ethnonational separatist groups must be considered; and a host of Middle Eastern terrorist groups emerged, most of which were initially motivated by Arab nationalist causes but became increasingly Pan-Islamic or religiously based as the Cold War evolved. In addition, state-sponsored terrorism was an aspect of the Cold War, but it is an issue that deals more with sources of funding and support for terrorism rather than being a motivating factor for political violence.

Widespread student revolts in Europe and the United States in the late 1960s signified the ascendancy of the New Left, which was young, radical, and founded upon an ideology that was revolutionary rather than reformist. The terrorists who emerged from this movement had romantic notions of working-class struggles, even if they themselves were almost exclusively from middle-class backgrounds.

Typical of this lack of proletarian credentials was the Weather Underground Organization (also known as the Weathermen) in the United States. An offshoot of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Weathermen were essentially embroiled in an identity crisis, motivated by boredom and a desire for excitement. This was in direct contrast to members of the Black Panthers, who as products of America's inner cities were more authentically radical and could more genuinely connect their struggle with the plight of the oppressed in the developing world.

In Europe, several groups established a sort of European International, a loose but coordinated federation of leftist groups united against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) imperialism. These groups often received logistical and matériel aid from the Soviet Union via its East European satellites. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), the Red Army Faction (RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, grew out of a rejection of postwar capitalist consumerism but also considered itself the champion of the oppressed developing world. Aligned with the RAF was France's Action Directe (AD). Together these two groups sought to establish a network of West European revolutionaries who would fight on behalf of developing-world victims of Western imperialism. The Italian Red Brigades was also included in this milieu, but it went further by attempting to form alliances with terrorists in Ireland and Spain (whose causes were entirely

An automobile destroyed in the street outside a Renault office building bombed in September 1985. The French group Action Directe (AD) claimed responsibility for the bombing in Issy-les-Moulineaux and La Defense, Paris. (Jacques Langevin/Corbis Sygma)

Terrorist Organizations by Home Country

Group Name	*Home Country*
Weather Underground Organization	United States
Red Army Faction	Federal Republic of Germany
Action Directe	France
Red Brigades	Italy
17 November	Greece
Japanese Red Army	Japan
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	Colombia
Sendero Luminoso	Peru
Irgun	Palestine
Stern Gang	Palestine
Irish Republican Army	Ireland
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna	Spain
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	Sri Lanka
National Liberation Front	Algeria
Hezbollah	Iran
Kurdistan Workers' Party	Kurdistan
Abu Nidal Organization	N/A
Palestinian Liberation Organization	Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	Palestine
Black September	Palestine

different in nature). An organization known as November 17 (N17) followed the Marxist, anti-Western model in Greece but had an additional and more specific grievance against the United States, which they blamed for the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. In Eastern Europe, however, strong police states effectively negated any chance for the rise of such revolutionary movements.

The Japanese Red Army (JRA) shared N17's explicit anti-Americanism. Founded in large part upon a rejection of the United States–Japan Security Treaty, the JRA had explicit ties to European terrorists but also maintained connections with Middle Eastern terrorists. The JRA was more internationalist in its worldview than its European counterparts.

Communist revolutionary fervor was quite evident in Latin America, where virtually every nation was affected. Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela were all plagued with guerrilla armies, but in contrast to European terrorism, violence in Latin America was founded upon genuine peasant uprisings. A more organized urban guerrilla warfare substituted for the clandestine student-oriented groups in Western Europe. Colombia watched guerrilla warfare quickly turn from revolutionary insurgency into the narcoterrorism that defines the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) today, whereas in Peru, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) remains and is often cited as the prototype of a Marxist insurgency group. Shining Path can also be likened to the many ethnonational groups, but their claims in this regard were always secondary to the group's revolutionary goals.

In the United States, Western Europe, and Latin America, the revolutionaries overestimated the salience of their Marxist ideology, and as a result they never received significant public support. Russian revolutionaries Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky had warned against the use of revolutionary terrorism because, they believed, it lacked a genuine connection to the working-class struggle. The radical terrorists of the late 1960s favored immediate action. In

the end, because of often indiscriminate violence, such movements tended to reduce rather than increase popular support for the Left.

The second category of Cold War terrorism, ethnonational separatists, typically operated within an existing state but made irredentist claims based on the shared perception that the territory was the group's ancestral homeland. During the Cold War, many of these groups claimed some form of Marxist solidarity, but in fact their true motivations were entirely nationalistic. Ethnonational groups have been far more prolific than their ideological counterparts, and their longevity has been generally greater. In several cases, however, they have operated in democratic nations, which limited the amount of public sympathy they received, even among coethnics.

Perhaps the earliest Cold War example of this type of terrorism are the Zionist terrorists of the Irgun and Stern Gang, who undertook terrorist operations against both British and Arab targets in Palestine prior to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 but disbanded after 1948 because such clandestine groups are unnecessary once they achieve their goal.

One of the more recognizable of all terrorist groups is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), perhaps because its demand that Northern Ireland be reunified with the Republic of Ireland calls into question two of the pillars of Western Cold War dogma: the pluralist assumptions of representation and self-determination. Similarly, Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Liberty) seeks an independent state in the Basque region of Spain (and a small portion of France), but their suppression under Spanish dictator Francisco Franco and Spain's subsequent granting of semiautonomy to the region lessened the appeal of their cause.

It is inexplicable that the most deadly of all terrorist groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, Tamil Tigers), is relatively unknown. The LTTE seeks to annex the northern portion of Sri Lanka, a territory they claim as the Tamil homeland. It is estimated that the Tamil Tigers have killed more than 50,000 people to date, most notably two world leaders, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.

It is estimated that the Tamil Tigers have killed over 50,000 people to date, most notably Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.

Equally inexplicable is that there is one terrorist group that was entirely successful in achieving its political goals, which were anticolonial rather than separatist. The National Liberation Front (FLN) managed to drive French colonial forces out of Algeria and established itself as the new Algerian government.

While it is true that most, if not all, ethnonational separatist groups have relied on one another in a type of international network of matériel support, it is a mistake to conclude from this that during the Cold War they were not completely autonomous. Connections and mutual support existed, but this was not international terrorism as it is properly defined.

The third category of Cold War terrorism, Middle Eastern terrorism, is perhaps the most difficult to define because violence in the Middle East has been based on a combination of ideology, Arab nationalism, and what is aptly described as political religion. Contrary to popular belief, much Middle

Eastern terrorism has until relatively recently been limited to Arabs attacking other Arabs. Palestinians have attacked Jordanians, Iraqis and Syrians have fought one another, and the Lebanese Civil War pitted Iranian and other Shiite Muslims against Lebanon's Christian majority as well as Sunni Muslims. Iranian support gave rise to Hezbollah (Party of God), which in a 1983 act of international terrorism killed 241 U.S. servicemen in a truck bombing at a Marine barracks in Beirut. Thus, the distinction between terrorist typologies is easily blurred.

One group that especially typifies the difficulty in categorizing Middle Eastern terrorist groups is the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is at once Marxist, separatist, and Arab nationalist (not Islamic) in orientation. There is also the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), which operated much like a terrorist contractor or gun for hire and was often employed by one Middle Eastern interest against another.

However, the more obvious and virulent strain of such violence is that between Arabs and Jews. After World War II, several hundred thousand Palestinians (estimates range from 500,000 to more than a million) were forcibly removed from their homes to facilitate the creation of Israel. Thus, it is no surprise that much Middle Eastern antipathy is aimed at Israelis and Americans, who are seen as Israel's unstinting benefactor.

Throughout the Cold War, the most prominent of these groups was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its ancillary organization, the

Armed police drop into position on a terrace directly above the apartments where members of the Israeli Olympic team were being held hostage by Arab Black September terrorists. The attack ended in a shootout with German police. Munich, 5 September 1972. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). While there had been prior attacks against Israeli settlements and minor border skirmishes, Palestinian groups began their campaign in earnest after the 1967 War and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The PLO acted as an umbrella organization, receiving funds from Arab oil states and channeling them to its secondary partners. Most notably, Black September, a commando unit of the PLO and PFLP, was responsible for the deaths of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. This event effectively brought the Palestinian cause as well as international terrorism to the attention of the global community. Objectively, though, Palestinian terrorism has been highly ineffective. Any tactical/operational successes were mitigated by Israeli (and others') countermeasures. Yet Palestinian terrorism was effective in unifying among the Arab peoples the anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiments that continue today.

While the universal hope was that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new era of peace, the fall of the Soviet Union simply eliminated the financial support and ideological validation for one particular type of terrorism. It did nothing, however, to alter the nature of the grievances of the working classes or the genuinely oppressed, and it actually may have removed some constraints on violence, allowing terrorists to become more global and deadly in scope. Indeed, Middle East-based terrorism expounding political religion as its ideological basis may have been aided and emboldened by the end of the Cold War. Whereas both the Soviets and Americans sought to restrain violence in the Middle East during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union gone, an important countervailing force has been lost. Politically motivated violence has not abated but instead has merely changed forms.

Matthew O'Gara

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Black Panthers; Communist Revolutionary Warfare; Decolonization; Eurocommunism; Irish Republican Army; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in; Nationalism; Radical Islam; Red Army Faction; Red Brigades; Shining Path; Weathermen

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Tet Offensive
(1968)

Military offensive by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) and the Viet Cong (VC) that proved to be a critical turning

TET OFFENSIVE, 1968

A medic and two aides try to avoid gunfire as they run to aid a wounded Marine in Hue, Vietnam, 16 February 1968. (Bettmann/Corbis)

point of the American war in Vietnam. Beginning early on 30 January 1968, the Vietnamese new year (Tet) truce was broken when Viet Cong forces attacked 13 cities in the central region of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). By the end of the day on 31 January, the communists had attacked 5 of 6 cities, 36 of 44 provincial capitals, and 64 of 245 district capitals. In one of the boldest attacks, a VC platoon managed to penetrate the grounds of the U.S. embassy in Saigon for several hours. Although U.S. troops repelled the incursion, this bold challenge to American power in the heart of Saigon gained wide publicity, especially in the U.S. press.

In heavy fighting over the next several days, all the attacks throughout South Vietnam were countered by U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) forces. The communist attackers incurred heavy casualties. The most bitter and prolonged fighting occurred in the city of Hue, where the communists made a major investment of forces, and in Cholon, the Chinese section of Saigon. In these locations fighting raged for weeks, and in Hue much of the city was destroyed.

Militarily, the Tet Offensive failed to achieve Hanoi's military objectives. PAVN commander General Vo Nguyen Giap, although not completely in agreement with the decision to launch the offensive, believed that the plan might break the bloody stalemate between his troops and the large American expeditionary force. By launching a general offensive of simultaneous attacks throughout South Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

(DRV, North Vietnam) hoped that the ARVN would collapse and that South Vietnamese civilians would join the VC in a general uprising against Saigon. With its puppet government overthrown, the North Vietnamese government reasoned, the United States would be unable to continue the war. Initially, the scheme worked well. In several well-conceived diversions by Giap's troops, including the siege of the Khe Sanh Marine base, he lured several U.S. units to outlying areas. Meanwhile, he secretly supplied VC units and moved them into position for attacks on the cities and towns.

One of the myths of the Tet Offensive is that it caught U.S. and ARVN forces by surprise. The U.S. command anticipated the offensive but not its timing and intensity. U.S. commanders did not think that the communists would alienate the South Vietnamese population by attacking during Tet, nor did they anticipate that the communists would mount an offensive with all their available forces. As the offensive unfolded, however, the ARVN fought surprisingly well, no uprising occurred, and the PAVN and VC suffered perhaps 45,000 casualties, half of the force engaged. The VC units were so decimated that troops from North Vietnam had to take over most of the combat operations for the remainder of the war.

The offensive compounded problems for the South Vietnamese government, as it dramatically increased the number of refugees. It also proved to be both a strategic and public relations success for the South Vietnamese government, because the magnitude of the attack led Washington to begin a reassessment of costs and objectives in the war. Spokesmen for President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, including the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, had claimed right before Tet that the end of the war was in sight, but the offensive led many to challenge that claim. Westmoreland saw in the Tet Offensive an opportunity and requested 206,000 additional troops to mount a decisive counteroffensive. When news of his request appeared in the *New York Times,* however, many Americans interpreted it as an act of desperation and began demanding an end to the escalation. President Johnson, stunned by the ferocity and scope of the offensive and counseled by a number of his advisors against a widening of the war, denied Westmoreland's request.

In a nationally televised address on 31 March 1968, Johnson announced to a stunned nation that he was limiting the bombing of North Vietnam, calling for negotiations, and bowing out of the 1968 presidential election. The Tet Offensive did not end the American war, but it dramatically contradicted the Johnson administration's optimistic claims that the war was all but won. It also helped contribute to Richard M. Nixon's close victory in the November 1968 election. Although the fighting in Vietnam continued for another four years, the Tet Offensive marked a watershed in America's involvement in the war as well as in the tenor of American politics.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Vietnam; Vietnam War; Vo Nguyen Giap; Westmoreland, William Childs

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Thailand

Southeast Asian nation covering 198,455 square miles, roughly the size of France. Thailand is bordered by Burma (Myanmar) to the north and west, Laos to the northeast, Cambodia due east, and Malaysia and the Gulf of Thailand to the south. In 1945 the nation had a population of roughly 19 million people. The only Southeast Asian country never colonized, Thailand largely avoided the divisions that consumed other states in the region. It was nonetheless center stage during the Cold War as America's forward base against communist expansion. Despite communist victories throughout Indochina, Thailand became a relatively stable, noncommunist, and prosperous country.

Thailand allied with Japan during World War II, but its position was ignored by the United States, which instead recognized an exile government in Washington. The United States also opposed Allied demands on Thailand after the war, protecting it from European colonialism. American interests developed further with the communist revolution in China and the Korean War (1950–1953). Concerned that Southeast Asia would fall to communism like dominoes, Washington began economic and military aid programs in the region. The Americans also sponsored strong anticommunist leaders. In Thailand, this brought back to power Phibun (Phibunsongkhram), who ruled during 1938–1944 and 1948–1957. Washington valued Phibun's anticommunism, ignored his previous ties to Japan, and welcomed the return of his military rule.

In 1950 Thailand joined the U.S. Military Defense Assistance Program. President Harry S. Truman then sent a Military Advisory Assistance Group to Bangkok. By 1953 American aid to Thailand exceeded $56 million per year. Washington also helped Thailand secure the first World Bank loan in Southeast Asia and funded extensive expansions of Thai transportation and communication networks. This aid led to an intimate relationship predicated on the containment of communism. For the United States, Thailand represented a stable ally and a base for military operations in the region. Thailand hosted myriad clandestine operations through which the United States

established logistical and intelligence networks during the Vietnam War. Thailand also became the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

For Thailand, the United States represented more than a wealthy benefactor. Economic incentives unquestionably motivated Thai leaders. Connections with Washington also legitimized military government. However, the Thais were no mercenaries. Communism threatened not only the country but also Thai culture. Deeply reverent of the monarchy and the Buddhist faith, most Thais considered communism anathema. Moreover, behind communist threats loomed the ancient specter of Chinese domination. Countering these concerns necessitated close relations with the Americans.

Particularly worrisome to Thailand was chaotic Laos, which by the early 1960s was partly controlled by the communist Pathet Lao. To help navigate the labyrinthine world of Lao politics, the United States depended on Thai Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (1958–1963). Part Lao, Sarit wielded considerable influence in the region. He also supported factions without American support, as he did in troubled Cambodia. To secure neutrality in both countries, the United States required Thai assistance, which was difficult given Bangkok's concern about its neighbors.

Deeply reverent of the monarchy and Buddhist faith, most Thais considered communism anathema.

Another threat manifested itself in a communist insurgency in Thailand's remote northeastern region. Although smaller than other Southeast Asian movements, the insurgency alarmed Thai and U.S. officials. Concerned about Laos and disenchanted with SEATO, Sarit lobbied Washington for a bilateral security agreement. In March 1962, President John F. Kennedy's administration responded with the Rusk-Thanat Agreement, which was not, however, a formal alliance, much to Thai dismay.

Based on the agreement, 6,500 U.S. Marines landed in Thailand in May 1963 when communist advances in Laos precipitated a tense standoff along the Mekong River. Although war was averted and U.S. forces were quickly withdrawn, the deployment led to expanded military facilities and operations in Thailand, with air bases taking top priority. During 1960–1966 six major bases were built with U.S. assistance. During December 1965–November 1968, 1,500 weekly bombing runs originated in Thailand, 80 percent of ordnance dropped on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and Laos in Operations ROLLING THUNDER and BARREL ROLL, respectively.

Thai officials continually denied existence of the bases and maintained that the 25,000 U.S. servicemen in Thailand by 1967 were simply advisors. In fact, Thailand was very much part of the American war in Vietnam. Under Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn (1963–1973), 11,000 Thai soldiers—15 percent of the armed forces—served in Vietnam, while approximately 22,000 fought in Laos, comprising much of the strength of irregular forces there. Thailand also hosted American servicemen on leave, generating $22 million annually in revenues from rest and relaxation facilities.

Congressional scrutiny ultimately undermined U.S.-Thai relations. So too did failure in Vietnam. In 1966 Thai leaders considered dialogue with Hanoi and Beijing and by 1969, resigned to U.S. disengagement, sought an

Demonstrating students hurling tear gas canisters back at Thai Army tanks attempting to disperse them on 14 October 1973. Antigovernment riots that left 400 people dead toppled the ten-year-old military regime of Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn. (Bettmann/Corbis)

independent regional policy. That August, Thanom announced the end of Thai participation in Vietnam and asked President Richard M. Nixon to remove U.S. forces from Thailand.

However, many covert Thai operations continued. Some American soldiers remained, and Thai air bases were still used. Many Thais resented this presence, especially while Nixon pursued détente with China and peace talks with North Vietnam. Demands for foreign policy change and domestic reform culminated in violent protests in October 1973. Only through the intervention of King Bhumipol was major conflict averted. Thanom fled the country in the fall of 1973, and a new civilian government opened talks with Hanoi and Beijing. After the fall of Saigon and Cambodia in 1975, another revolution developed in October 1976, bringing military government back to Thailand.

The communist threat, however, had subsided, and the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War revealed serious divisions between communists. Moreover, the insurgency in Thailand waned. Thereafter, economic development became the priority, and Thailand in the 1980s underwent a radical transformation, becoming one of Asia's economic tigers. Security and prosperity led to democratic reforms, which became the focus of the 1990s.

With a more homogeneous population, Thailand avoided ethnic tensions seen elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Buddhism and the monarchy undoubtedly helped stabilize Thai politics. Shrewd diplomacy and the economic benefits of U.S. aid also factored into Thailand's success. Indeed, it emerged from the Cold War more unified and prosperous than most Southeast Asian nations.

Arne Kislenko

See also

Bhumipol Adulyadej, King of Thailand; Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of; Domino Theory; Laos; Southeast Asia; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Vietnam War

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Thatcher, Margaret
(1925–)

British politician and prime minister (1979–1990). Born in Grantham, Lincolnshire, on 13 October 1925, Margaret Hilda Roberts attended Kesteven and Grantham High School for Girls, then read chemistry at Somerville College, Oxford, becoming president of the Oxford University Conservative Association. Upon graduation in 1947, she worked as a research chemist and in 1951 was called to the bar as a lawyer. In 1951 she married Denis Thatcher, a wealthy businessman.

After two failed attempts, in 1959 Margaret Thatcher won election to Parliament as Conservative member for Finchley. In 1961 she was parliamentary secretary at the Ministry of Pensions and in 1970 secretary of state for education and science under Edward Heath until his government lost the 1974 election to Harold Wilson's Labour Party. The following year, Thatcher became Conservative leader, the first woman to head either major British political party, and after four years, during which she broke decisively with the centrist consensus on the mixed economy and welfare state that had dominated all British governments since 1945, led her party to electoral victory over Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan in 1979. This was the first of three successive general election triumphs for Thatcher, the others occurring in 1983 and 1987.

As British prime minister—the first woman to hold that position—Thatcher used monetarist measures to moderate the prevailing high inflation of the 1970s, cut taxes dramatically, trim back the welfare state, privatize many nationalized industries, and drastically curtail the power of labor in bitter confrontations with major trade unions. Far more ideological than her predecessors, she accepted double-digit unemployment rates, which peaked at 3 million in the early 1980s, and the consequent short-term political unpopularity as the inevitable price of such policies.

Strongly anticommunist in outlook, while still in opposition in 1976 Thatcher had assailed Soviet policies for opposing "genuine détente" through intervention in Angola and opposed any weakening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Dubbed the "Iron Lady" by the Soviet press, she accepted the sobriquet with pride and worked to strengthen British defenses and repair strained relations with the United States. She consciously modeled herself on Winston Churchill, another maverick Conservative prime minister who supported tough foreign policies. Her uncompromising rhetoric, strong principles, and forceful personality soon made her a major international figure, admired by conservatives and often reviled by liberals.

Known as the "Iron Lady," Margaret Thatcher was Britain's first woman prime minister (1979–1990). As leader of the Conservative Party, Thatcher was a strong ally of U.S. President Ronald Reagan. (Corel)

From early 1981, Thatcher worked closely with U.S. President Ronald Reagan, whose political views on both domestic and international issues coincided almost exactly with her own, and the two soon developed a warm friendship. Internationally, she almost always backed the United States, even when Reagan's fiercely antiterrorist and anticommunist policies toward such countries as Libya, Nicaragua, and Chile generated considerable domestic and foreign criticism. She did, however, break with Reagan over his 1983 invasion of Grenada, a British Commonwealth country, and refused to endorse the economic sanctions that the U.S. Congress imposed, albeit without Reagan's backing, on apartheid South Africa. She consistently backed NATO, endorsing the controversial 1979 decision to deploy nuclear-armed intermediate-range cruise missiles in Western Europe and replace Britain's Polaris submarine fleet with modern Trident II submarines. In doing so, she ignored protests, including the revival of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the encampment of protestors for several years outside the American air base of Greenham Common, Berkshire. Splits within the Labour Party over defense and British membership in NATO contributed to Thatcher's subsequent reelection victories.

While taking a tough line on defense and rearmament, initially Thatcher concentrated on economic and domestic issues, leaving her foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, responsible for handling such thorny issues as negotiating a settlement in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) in 1980 that replaced the state's breakaway white government with one dominated by Africans. From 1982, however,

when against much advice she chose to send a military expedition to the South Atlantic to regain the British-controlled Falkland Islands after their seizure by Argentina, Thatcher became far more active in international affairs. She played a major part in negotiating the 1984 Joint Declaration whereby, against her own initial instincts, Britain agreed to return Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1997. Always somewhat suspicious of the European Community (EC), she did not withdraw Britain from membership but undertook hard bargaining to ensure that Britain's overall budgetary contributions to the EC declined substantially.

During the early 1980s, Thatcher's relations with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko were frosty. Meeting Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1983 shortly before he became Soviet Communist Party secretary, she quickly developed a rapport with him and urged Reagan to give credence to Gorbachev's calls for major reductions in nuclear and conventional forces as well as his attempts at economic reform. Interestingly, fearing that Gorbachev's political survival was precarious and that more hard-line Soviet officials might well replace him, Thatcher was more cautious than Reagan in sanctioning such reductions, including the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and urged the Western alliance to proceed relatively slowly. She was therefore somewhat uncomfortable with the sweeping agreements that Reagan and Gorbachev reached at Reykjavík in 1986, a meeting that, like several others between Gorbachev and Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, she did not attend.

Well-founded doubts over the effectiveness of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) system of antinuclear defenses that Reagan favored made Thatcher reluctant to dismantle both nuclear weapons and antinuclear defenses. Memories of German involvement in two world wars also led her to unavailingly oppose the unification of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). In the summer of 1990, she reportedly urged President Bush to remain firm in opposition to the seizure of Kuwait by President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, support that many believed contributed to Bush's decision to launch a war against Iraq the following year, a conflict in which British forces participated.

In November 1990, Conservative opposition to Thatcher's domestic policies, especially the highly unpopular new poll tax, created a rebellion within her own party that forced her from office. Ennobled as Baroness Thatcher, she then published several volumes of memoirs and speeches, made numerous public addresses, and somewhat ineffectively attempted to pressure her successors to follow her policies. She opposed any further strengthening of the European Union (EU) but strongly supported the continuation and enlargement of NATO. She also established a foundation to promote and encourage her free enterprise and antisocialist political views. In failing health by the early twenty-first century, in June 2004 she nonetheless insisted on attending her old friend Reagan's funeral and burial services, for which she had recorded a eulogy lauding his domestic and international achievements. Although her own country lacked the superpower status of

the United States, much of her praise of Reagan's courage, determination, and political skills was equally applicable to Thatcher herself.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

British Commonwealth of Nations; Bush, George Herbert Walker; Callaghan, James; Détente; Falklands War; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Grenada Invasion; Heath, Edward; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Iraq; Kuwait; Missiles, Cruise; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; Missiles, Polaris; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Reykjavík Meeting; Soviet Union; Strategic Defense Initiative; Submarines; United Kingdom; United States; Zimbabwe

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Thompson, Sir Robert
(1916–1992)

British counterinsurgency expert. Born on 12 April 1916 in Charlwood, Robert Grainger Ker Thompson was educated at Marlborough and Sidney Sussex College, from which he graduated in 1938. Later that same year he was posted as a Malayan Civil Service (MCS) cadet. During 1942–1944 he served as Royal Air Force liaison officer with Orde Charles Wingate's Chindits, rising to wing commander. In 1946 he returned to the MCS as assistant commissioner of labor in Perak. During the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), he was closely involved with the successful effort to defeat the insurgents, and he advanced up the MCS ranks, becoming permanent secretary for defense in 1959.

In September 1961, now retired from the MCS, Thompson went to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) as head of a small British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) to President Ngo Dinh Diem. Thompson established cordial relations with the Americans, but he was unable to convince the Vietnamese to adopt the approach that had worked in Malaya, and BRIAM was

subsequently dissolved in 1965. Later that year he was hired as a consultant by the RAND Corporation and wrote *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, which compared Malaya and Vietnam and established principles for defeating similar insurgencies. He severely criticized President Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam War strategy, adopted in 1966, as a failure to understand the nature of the war. In *No Exit from Vietnam* (1968), Thompson explained how the Americans' flawed policy had led to the January 1968 Tet Offensive. In 1969 he was hired as an independent observer by President Richard M. Nixon, whose new strategy for Vietnam was more attuned to Thompson's ideas. Thompson remained an observer until the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975. However, his disillusionment with the 1973 Paris Agreement led him to conclude that the lack of American will to enforce it was the ultimate cause of defeat. Thompson died on 16 May 1992 in Winsford, England.

George M. Brooke III

See also

Communist Revolutionary Warfare; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Malayan Emergency; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nixon, Richard Milhous; RAND Corporation; Tet Offensive; Vietnam War

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Thorez, Maurice
(1900–1964)

French politician and leader of the French Communist Party (PCF) during 1930–1964. Born in Noyelle-Godault in the Pas-de-Calais region of northern France, the son of an impoverished coal miner, on 28 April 1900, Maurice Thorez attended only a few years of primary school before he became a coal miner at age twelve. He joined the PCF in 1920, became a local party secretary in 1923, and rose to secretary-general of the party in July 1930. He would lead the PCF until his death in 1964, taking a staunchly Stalinist line and resisting the currents of reform associated with Eurocommunism in Italy and other European countries.

Thorez was elected to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1932 and served until 1939. In 1934, he abandoned the class-against-class strategy of the 1920s and adopted a new policy of cooperation with the socialists, a shift that culminated in communist support for the Popular Front government of Léon Blum following the legislative elections of 1936. The key objectives of the policy shift were to block the spread of fascism to France and to support the Soviet Union internationally.

With the conclusion of the nonaggression pact of 23 August 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union and the outbreak of World War II barely a

Maurice Thorez, leader of the French Communist Party, October 1947. (Bettmann/Corbis)

week later, the PCF adopted a new political line dictated by the Comintern that denounced the war as a clash of rival imperialisms. Thorez was mobilized into the French Army but, on Comintern orders, deserted and made his way to Moscow, leaving Jacques Duclos in charge of the party. Thorez remained in Moscow until November 1944, even as the PCF, following the June 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union, emerged as a leading force in the French Resistance.

After the French liberation in August 1944, Thorez was once more elected to the French Chamber of Deputies and served as minister and deputy prime minister in the tripartite (communist-socialist–Christian Democratic) governments of November 1945–November 1947. With the establishment of the Cominform in September 1947, Soviet leader Josef Stalin effectively compelled the PCF once more to turn sharply to the Left. Thorez subsequently confessed that the PCF had erred in cooperating with other political forces, and he mobilized the party to combat French participation in the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In December 1950, Thorez suffered a stroke and went to Moscow for treatment. He returned to France in April 1953, following the death of Stalin

the previous month. Thorez strongly resisted Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign when it was launched in late 1956, not least because Thorez himself had established a personality cult patterned after Stalin's that went back to his 1937 fictionalized autobiography *Fils du Peuple* (Son of the People).

Thorez strongly opposed General Charles de Gaulle's return to power in May 1958, calling for unity with the socialists that paved the way for the union of the Left in the 1980s. Throughout Thorez's tenure, the electoral base of the PCF remained remarkably constant. The party received 28.6 percent of the vote in the national elections of 1946, 25.6 percent in 1951, and 25.7 percent in 1956. This support fell to 18.9 percent in 1958, following de Gaulle's return to power, but rebounded to 21.7 percent in 1962. Thorez died on 12 July 1964 while en route to a vacation at a dacha on the Soviet Black Sea coast.

John Van Oudenaren

See also
Duclos, Jacques; France

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Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(1974)

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBN), signed on 3 July 1974 between the United States and the Soviet Union, set limitations on underground nuclear tests. The TTBN followed the 1963 Partial Teat Ban Treaty (PTBT). The TTBN limited the size of any nuclear test by setting a ceiling threshold of 150 kilotons for any underground nuclear test. This limit was designed specifically to prevent both the Soviets and Americans from developing warheads that would allow for a first-strike capability. Treaty terms included provisions for exchange of data and designation of the test sites. Complementing the TTBN was the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty, signed in April 1976.

Critics of the TTBN focused on Soviet violations; the 150 kiloton limit, which many regarded as too high; and the lack of adequate verification procedures. Following agreement on the latter in July 1990, the U.S. Senate ratified both the TTBN and the PNE in December 1990.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Tests

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Tiananmen Square
(4 June 1989)

A large public plaza in Beijing, capital of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Tiananmen Square, literally meaning "Gate of Heavenly Peace," has been the site of student movements since the 1919 May Fourth Movement. The Tiananmen Square protests of 15 April–4 June 1989 were of the utmost importance in both their domestic and international contexts. The protests began on 15 April when Beijing's students gathered in the square, mourning the death of Hu Yaobang, former secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during 1980–1987. That Hu was ousted from office in January 1987 because of his sympathetic stance toward the prodemocracy student movement of 1986 helped transform mourning activities into a series of nationwide student demonstrations. Students renewed their calls for immediate democratization and demanded direct dialogues with senior leaders. The movement employed mass sit-ins, boycotts of classes, public forums, bicycle demonstrations, and hunger strikes.

On 4 May 1989, organized prodemocracy demonstrations occurred in fifty-one Chinese cities. Other sectors also expressed their discontent with the CCP. Coincident with the visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in mid-May, the protests received global media coverage.

The worldwide attention and escalation of the student movement irritated PRC leaders. The handling of students' demands renewed the factional struggles between the liberal reformers and the conservatives, whose origins dated to 1979, when the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping introduced a market economy and open-door policy to modernize China. This time, the struggle was personalized by the liberal reformist CCP Secretary-General Zhao Ziyang and the conservative hard-liner Premier Li Peng. Zhao preferred a conciliatory stance, arguing that the protest was of a patriotic nature and that political reform should be accelerated to facilitate economic modernization. Li, by contrast, insisted on clear-cut coercive measures to disperse the demonstrators and restore stability.

Although away from the front line since the early 1980s, Deng remained highly influential as the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Fearing that his economic program would be jeopardized, he supported Zhao's soft-line, accommodating posture. The government's dialogues with students, however, proved fruitless. With no sign that the protests would soon end, Deng's patience was exhausted, and he decided to adopt Li's hard-line approach.

Student democracy demonstrators carry a severely wounded comrade away from Tiananmen Square in Beijing amid the Chinese military crackdown that began on 3 June 1989. (Corbis/David Turnley)

On 20 May 1989, Li declared martial law in Beijing, ordering the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to clear Tiananmen Square on the condition that no bloodshed occur. Owing to the students' blockade, the army stopped on the outskirts of Beijing city, resulting in a stalemate for the rest of the month. Meanwhile, the government was preoccupied with two issues: preparing a change in leadership to end the factional struggles and regaining Tiananmen Square to end the protests. On 28 May, Zhao was placed under house arrest and was replaced by Jiang Zemin, the party secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, whose decisive action in closing down a newspaper for reporting the Tiananmen Square protests drew the conservatives' attention.

After consulting retired elder statesmen such as Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, and PRC President Yang Shangkun, Deng finally agreed on more forceful means to end the standoff, implying the clearance of the square at all costs. On 2 June, Yang ordered a military crackdown on the student demonstrators and the clearance of Tiananmen Square on the grounds that an alleged counterrevolutionary riot was fermenting and that continued instability would retard economic reform. On 4 June at midnight, the PLA marched into the square, and by dawn it had fulfilled its orders, thereby ending the seven-week-long protests. Because of a press blackout, the estimated deaths and injuries on that night vary from 240 to 10,000.

To prevent a recurrence, on 9 June the government ordered the arrest of all student leaders and activists. Some leaders, such as Wang Dan, were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms, while others such as Chai Ling and Wuer Kaixi fled abroad. On 10 June, the PRC claimed that a total of 468 "troublemakers" had been arrested and that calm had been restored in Beijing.

The PRC's use of the PLA to suppress the student demonstrations stunned the world. Some contemporaries labeled the incident the Tiananmen Massacre. Foreign condemnations, including those from the Soviet bloc, flooded in, followed by a number of punitive sanctions, including the suspension of arms sale to China, the linking of human rights issues to the PRC's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and economic embargoes. From a broader perspective, the legacy of the Tiananmen Square protests was twofold. In the PRC, the protests enabled the conservatives to gain the upper hand. In November 1989, Deng relinquished his remaining post to Jiang, passing the ruling power to the third generation, and his economic modernization was slowed down. In the Cold War context, there is a consensus that the Tiananmen Square protests in some ways inspired the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet control, precipitating the Cold War's end.

Law Yuk-fun

On 2 June, Yang ordered a military crackdown on the student-demonstrators and the clearance of Tiananmen Square.

See also

China, People's Republic of; Deng Xiaoping; Hu Yaobang; Li Peng; Yang Shangkun; Zhao Ziyang

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Tibet

A provincial-level administrative region of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1951, officially known as the Xizang Autonomous Region, with the capital at Lhasa. Tibet covers an area of 461,700 square miles and is located in southwestern China. It is bordered on the south by Myanmar, India, Bhutan, and Nepal; on the west by India; and on the east and north by the PRC. It had a 1945 population of some 4–5 million people.

With the introduction of Indian Buddhism in the seventh century, Tibet grew into an independent theocracy. In the seventeenth century, the Yellow Hat sect gained supremacy and practiced Lamaism, a hierarchical organization of Tibetan Buddhist monks (lamas). Atop the hierarchy was the Dalai Lama, both the spiritual and political head of Tibetans. Just below him was the Panchen Lama.

Isolated Tibet was forced to open itself to the world in 1904 by the British, who sought to secure a trade route to China and erect a buffer against Russian expansion into British India, bordering on the south of Tibet. In 1907 Britain, Russia, and China agreed on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and pledged noninterference in Tibetan affairs. Tibet declared its independence in late 1911 after the overthrow of China's ruling Qing dynasty. Although the two post-Qing successors, the Nationalist Chinese (1912–1949) and the Chinese communists since 1949, refused to acknowledge Tibetan independence, Tibet's resumption of Lamaism remained undisturbed, strengthening Tibetans' visions of lasting independence.

A year after the PRC's birth in October 1949, Chinese communist leaders sent 80,000 troops into Tibet in October 1950. Unable to defend his people, the fourteenth Dalai Lama unsuccessfully appealed to the United Nations (UN), the United States, Britain, and India for assistance. In May 1951, the Tibetan government reluctantly accepted the PRC's 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, which instituted a joint Chinese-Tibetan authority. This promised Tibetans apparent autonomy.

To modernize and continue the socialist revolution, during the early 1950s PRC officials implemented a number of measures that brought Tibetan

A Chinese soldier keeps watch in a village in Tibet. China sent troops into Tibet in 1950 and controlled it thereafter. (Corel)

autonomy into question. These modernization efforts included land reform, heavy industrialization, the introduction of secular education, the opening of Tibet through construction of nationwide communication networks, and a purge of anti-PRC officials. Tibetans found these measures antithetical to their traditional practices of feudalism and socioeconomic simplicity and threatening to Tibetan homogeneity. Tibetans, who considered themselves a unique race, responded with a series of anti-Chinese revolts, transforming the Tibet question into an interethnic dispute between Tibetans and the Han Chinese.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) capitalized on Tibetan disaffection to advance American strategic interests. In early 1956, the CIA began to provide military training to Tibetan rebels. In autumn 1957, the CIA launched a covert operation by air-dropping into Tibet U.S.-trained Tibetan rebels along with American-made weapons and radios. This Tibetan-CIA operation led to a full-scale rebellion in Lhasa in March 1959. Chinese leaders deployed 40,000 troops to put down the rebellion, resulting in nearly 8,700 Tibetan deaths and the exile of the Dalai Lama to India. To resolve the Tibet question, the PRC named the tenth Panchen Lama as Tibet's acting head while concurrently preparing Tibet as an autonomous administrative region. In 1965, the PRC replaced Tibet's theocracy with a Chinese communist administration, making it an Autonomous Region.

With CIA assistance, the Dalai Lama and 80,000 followers settled in northern India, where they founded the Government of Tibet in Exile at Dharamsala. The Dalai Lama internationalized the Tibet question by appealing to the UN, successfully securing two Tibet resolutions in 1961 and 1965 denouncing the PRC's violation of human rights in the March 1959 rebellion. Since then, the Dalai Lama has pursued an active posture in international affairs, championing Tibet's independence and self-determination, human rights, and peace and freedom.

After 1959, the Americans reversed their previous indifference to the Tibet question and publicly supported Tibetan independence. The CIA remained active in Tibet, chiefly in intelligence gathering, especially concerning the PRC's nuclear program in the neighboring Xinjiang Province. In Tibet, the anti-Chinese movement continued after the 1959 rebellion, and the PRC has responded with periodic crackdowns. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) marked the low point of the Tibetan-Chinese relationship, during which religious practices were condemned, monasteries were destroyed, and monks and nuns were persecuted. This triggered a massive exodus of Tibetans to India, Nepal, and Bhutan.

Two breakthroughs regarding the Tibet question were realized in the 1970s. First, to facilitate the Sino-American rapprochement, the CIA dimin-

ished its assistance to Tibetan rebels beginning in 1969. This ended altogether in 1974. Shortly before the establishment of formal Sino-American diplomatic relations, in 1978 the U.S. government recognized Tibet as part of China, thus reducing the issue to an internal Chinese affair. Second, PRC leaders moderated their policy toward Tibet after 1976. On the one hand, the government implemented a number of reforms to modernize Tibet, intending to win Tibetans' approval by raising their living standards. To curb Tibetan rebels, the PRC allowed a certain degree of religious freedom while also relocating huge numbers of Han Chinese to Tibet, intending to keep Tibetans under control through assimilation. The Tibetan cause attracted support and publicity from a number of international celebrities, such as the American movie star Richard Gere. In the 1990s, a dramatic dispute over which of two young boys was the rightful candidate to succeed as Panchen Lama, the second most influential Tibetan Buddhist figure, damaged Sino-Tibetan relations.

On the other hand, the PRC signaled its willingness to resolve the Tibet question with the Tibetan government-in-exile. Negotiations between the PRC and the Dalai Lama's exiled government began in 1979 but broke off in 1988 due to irreconcilable differences. In the early twenty-first century, the Tibet question remained unresolved.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Dalai Lama

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Tildy, Zoltán
(1889–1961)

Hungarian politician, prime minister (1945–1946), and president of Hungary (1946–1948). Born in Losonc on 18 November 1889, Zoltán Tildy studied theology at the Protestant Theological Academy in Pápa, Hungary, then worked as a protestant minister and teacher until 1946. In 1930 he had cofounded the Independent Smallholders' Party, becoming its chairman in 1945. His engagement with politics and the cause of rural welfare dated back to 1917, when he joined the National Independence and Peasant Party.

Following the November 1945 elections, Tildy was chosen premier, leading the coalition government until 31 January 1946. On 1 February 1946 he became the president of the newly declared republic. However, in August

1948 he was forced to resign after his son-in-law Viktor Csornoky was arrested, charged with spying for the West, and executed. Tildy remained under house arrest until May 1956.

During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Tildy acted as minister of state in Imre Nagy's short-lived reform government. Following the failed revolution, Tildy was imprisoned for six years for his role in the 1956 uprising. Because of advanced age and poor health, he was released in April 1959. Tildy died in Budapest on 4 August 1961.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Europe, Eastern; Hungarian Revolution; Hungary; Nagy, Imre

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Tito, Josip Broz

(1892–1980)

Yugoslav communist leader, major figure in the Yugoslav resistance during World War II, and leader of Yugoslavia. Born on 7 May 1892 into a peasant family in the village of Kumrovec in Croatia on the border with Slovenia (then part of Austria), Josip Broz was one of fifteen children of a Croat blacksmith and a Slovene mother. Much of his early life remains obscure. With little formal education, he became a metalworker and machinist. Active in the Social-Democratic Party, he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1913. He fought in World War I and rose to the rank of sergeant, commanding a platoon in a Croatian regiment before being captured in 1915 on the Russian Front.

While in the camp, Broz became fluent in Russian. Released following the March 1917 Revolution, he made his way to Petrograd, where he joined the Bolsheviks but was imprisoned until the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917. He fought on the communist side in the Russian Civil War but returned to Croatia in 1920 and helped organize the Yugoslav Communist Party (YPJ). Rising rapidly in responsibility and position, he became a member of the YPJ Politburo and Central Committee. It was at this time that he took the pseudonym of "Tito" to conceal his identity. He was imprisoned from 1929 to 1934. In 1937 Stalin appointed Tito to head the YPJ as its secretary-general. Tito knew little of communist ideology, but Stalin was interested in loyalty.

Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Tito took command of the communist Partisan resistance movement with the twin goals of fighting the Axis occupiers and then seizing power in Yugoslavia once the Allies had won. Tito and the Partisans did not hesitate to attack German garrisons, sparking retaliation and the execution of many more innocent hostages

than Germans slain. Tito's Partisans became archrivals of the Serb-dominated Četniks (Chetniks) led by General Draža Mihajlović, minister of war in the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London. The Četniks eschewed the types of attacks undertaken by the Partisans, rightly fearing German reprisals. In a controversial decision that had far-reaching repercussions for the future of Yugoslavia, in 1943 the British government, which headed the Allied effort to assist the Yugoslav resistance, shifted all support to the Partisans.

By the end of the war, the Partisans had grown to a force of 800,000 people and had in fact liberated most of Yugoslavia themselves, placing Tito in a strong bargaining position with Stalin. Tito attempted to annex the southern provinces of Austria, moving Yugoslav forces into Carinthia, but was prevented in this design by the timely arrival of the British V Corps and was convinced to quit Austrian territory in mid-May 1945.

Tito extracted vengeance on the Croats, many of whom had been loyal to the Axis, as had many Slovenes. Perhaps 100,000 people who had sided with the Axis occupiers were executed by the Partisans without trial within weeks of the war's end. The majority of German prisoners taken in the war also perished in the long March of Hate across Yugoslavia.

Dedicated Yugoslav communist Josip Broz Tito led the Partisan guerrilla movement against the German occupiers of his country during World War II. Tito then crushed all opposition and ruled Yugoslavia until his death in 1980. (Library of Congress)

With the support of the Red Army, Tito formed the National Front and consolidated his power. Although superficially there appeared to be a coalition government in Yugoslavia, Tito dominated. In the November 1945 elections for a constituent assembly, the National Front headed by the Partisans won 96 percent of the vote. The assembly promptly deposed Peter II and proclaimed a republic. Yugoslavia's new constitution was modeled on that of the Soviet Union. Tito elaborated the twin ideas of national self-determination for Yugoslavia's nationalities and a strong, centralized communist party organization that would be the sole political expression of each national group's will. Under Tito, Yugoslavia became a federal republic, a beneficial change for a country that had suffered severely from rivalries among its various peoples. Tito also nationalized the economy and built it on the Soviet model.

Following the war, Tito had General Mihajlović and some other leading Četniks put on trial under trumped-up charges of collaboration with the Germans. Despite vigorous Western protests, they were executed in July 1946. Equally destructive of European goodwill was the sentencing of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac to life imprisonment for his anticommunist role during the war.

For thirty-five years, Tito held Yugoslavia together by ruling as a despot. In a departure from his past record of sharing hardships with his men, once

in power he developed a taste for a luxurious lifestyle. He muzzled dissent, but repression and fear of outside powers, chiefly the Soviet Union, solidified his rule.

In 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the international communist movement. The break sprang in large part from Tito's desire to form under his leadership a Balkan confederation of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. There were also differences with Moscow over Yugoslav support for the communist side in the Greek Civil War, as Moscow lived up to its bargain with Winston Churchill during the war not to contest British control in Greece.

The break with Moscow and fears of a Russian invasion led Tito to build up a large military establishment. In this he was assisted by the West, chiefly the United States. By the time of Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav standing army and reserves totaled 2 million men. To protect his freedom of movement, Tito also joined Yugoslavia to the Non-Aligned Movement, and in the 1960s he became a leader of this group along with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru of India.

Before the break, Tito was as doctrinaire as Stalin. After the schism, Tito became more flexible. He allowed peasants to withdraw from cooperative farms and halted the compulsory delivery of crops. He decentralized industry by permitting the establishment of workers' councils with a say in running the factories. He permitted citizens more rights in the courts and limited freedom of speech, and he opened cultural ties with the West and released Archbishop Stepinac (although he was not restored to authority). In 1949 Tito even wrote an article in the influential American journal *Foreign Affairs* titled "Different Paths to Socialism," giving birth to polycentralism.

By 1954, however, reform had ended. Tito reacted sharply to Milován Djilas's proposal to establish a more liberal socialist movement in the country that would in effect turn Yugoslavia into a two-party state. Djilas's book, *The New Class* (1957), charged that a new class of bureaucrats exploited the masses as much as or more than their predecessors. Djilas was condemned to prison. Meanwhile, financial problems multiplied. By the end of the 1970s, inflation was surging, Yugoslavia's foreign debt was up dramatically, its goods could not compete in the world marketplace, and there were dramatic economic differences between the prosperous North and impoverished South that threatened to break up the state.

As long as Tito lived, Yugoslavia held together. In 1974, Tito had set up a complicated collective leadership. The constitution of that year provided for an association of equals that helped to minimize the power of Serbia, diminish Yugoslavia's ethnic and religious hatreds and rivalries, and keep the lid on nationalism. There was a multiethnic, eight-man State Presidency representing the six republics and two autonomous regions. Each of the six republics had virtual veto power over federal decision making. Djilas claimed that Tito deliberately set things up so that after his death, no one would ever possess as much power as he did.

Tito died in Lubljana on 4 May 1980. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the end of the threat of Soviet invasion and

with the discrediting of communism, the federal system that Tito had put together came apart in bloodshed and war.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Djilas, Milován; Soviet-Yugoslav Split; Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Armed Forces

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Todorov, Stanko
(1920–1976)

Bulgarian politician and prime minister. Born in Klenovik, Bulgaria, on 10 December 1920, Stanko Todorov attended only primary school and then apprenticed as a tailor. By age sixteen, he was politically active and had joined both the leftist Worker Youth Federation (RMS) and the tailors' union. Todorov served in the Bulgarian Army in World War II during 1941–1943 but deserted and joined the illegal Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). He was a key leader in the September 1944 rebellion that formally ended Bulgaria's monarchy and established the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Later in the 1940s, Todorov remained active in the RMS and BCP, holding increasingly prominent positions in both organizations. During 1952–1957 he served as minister of agriculture. In 1954 he was elected to the BCP's Central Committee and in 1957 became its secretary. During 1959–1962 he served as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, led the National Planning Commission, and represented Bulgaria in the Comecon. By 1962 he was also a full member of the Politburo.

In 1971, BCP chief Todor Zhivkov became the new Bulgarian head of state, which left Todorov as prime minister and head of the Council of Ministers. Over the next ten years, he improved relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in an attempt to stimulate trade with the West. He resigned as council president and prime minister in 1981 to become parliamentary president. In 1988 he was ousted from the Politburo. By then, he had become a proponent of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika policies although favoring a more gradual approach than that of the Soviet Union. Todorov's support of perestroika no doubt marginalized him within the BCP. As communist regimes began to fall in Central Europe, he was reelected to parliament in 1990. His health quickly failed, however, and

he withdrew from public life within months of election. Todorov died in Sofia on 17 December 1996.

Luc Stenger

See also

Bulgaria; Comecon; Europe, Eastern; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Zhivkov, Todor

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Tökés, László

(1952–)

Protestant minister of Hungarian ancestry residing in Transylvania (Romania) who helped trigger the overthrow of the Romanian government of Nicolae Ceauşescu in 1989. Born on 1 April 1952 in Cluj, Romania, László Tökés graduated from the Protestant Theological Institute in 1975. During 1975–1984 he worked as an assistant pastor in Braşov and Dej. In 1984 he was discharged from his duties for political reasons.

In 1986 Tökés was reinstalled in Timişoara, first as chaplain and then as pastor of a small Hungarian Reformed church. In November 1989 the Reformed Church of Romania, under pressure from the Romanian Communist Party, decided to banish him from Timişoara and threatened him with deportation. Residents of Timişoara soon began gathering outside Tökés's residence to demonstrate their support for him. On 15 December 1989, the police broke through the crowd, seized Tökés, and exiled him to Mineu, Romania. The crowd then moved to the main square of the city, where the demonstration evolved into a full-scale assault against the Romanian communist government during 16–20 December 1989, interrupted by military intervention that left 122 dead. Rioting there led to violence in Bucharest, culminating in the collapse of the communist regime in Romania on 22 December.

In 1990 Tökés was appointed bishop of the Királyhágómellék Diocese in Romania and commenced doctoral studies at the Theological Academy in Debrecen, Hungary. During 1990–1991 he studied in the United States. He is the honorary president of both the Democratic Union of Ethnic Hungarians in Romania and the Hungarian World Federation. In recognition of his commitment to democracy and the role he played in Romanian politics, in 1999 the Hungarian government awarded Tökés the Grand Cross of the Republic of Hungary.

Anna Boros-McGee

See also

Ceauşescu, Nicolae; Europe, Eastern; Grósz, Károly; Hungary; Németh, Miklós; Romania

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Tomášek, František
(1899–1992)

Archbishop of Prague. František Tomášek was born in Studénka, Moravia, on 30 June 1899, the son of a teacher. He served in the Austro-Hungarian Army during World War I, after which he entered the Roman Catholic seminary in Olomouc. He was ordained in 1922. He received two doctorates in theology from and taught at the Theological Faculty of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Olomouc before the Germans and later the communists closed the school in 1940 and 1948, respectively.

Shortly after Tomášek became bishop of Buto and auxiliary bishop of Olomouc in 1949, Czechoslovak authorities arrested him on antigovernment

Archbishop František Tomášek, Sofia, Bulgaria, 1968. (Miroslav Zajíc/Corbis)

charges and sent him to a labor camp. Following his release in 1954, he served as a parish priest until 1965. The Czechoslovak government permitted him to attend the Vatican Council II in Rome during 1962–1965.

When the communists refused to allow Archbishop Josef Beran to return to Prague from Rome in 1965, Tomášek became the apostolic administrator of the archdiocese. He supported the 1968 Prague Spring reforms, attempted to revitalize the Roman Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, and urged religious freedom. After the Warsaw Pact invasion ended the Prague Spring, he discreetly sought concessions from the government and openly criticized Charter 77, much to the dismay of Czechoslovak dissidents.

In 1976 Pope Paul VI secretly named Tomášek cardinal and archbishop of Prague, publicly releasing the news in 1977. With the election of Pope John Paul II in October 1978, Tomášek attacked the government-sanctioned organization of priests in Czechoslovakia and, in 1985, led the celebrations of the 1,100th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius.

In 1988, Tomášek supported a petition demanding religious freedom in Czechoslovakia and actively backed the 1989 Velvet Revolution by celebrating the first televised mass in Czechoslovakia, on 21 November 1989. In 1990 he hosted John Paul II's visit to Czechoslovakia. Tomášek retired in 1991 and died in Prague on 4 August 1992.

Gregory C. Ference

See also

Charter 77; Czechoslovakia; Prague Spring

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Tonkin Gulf Incidents and Resolution
(August 1964)

On 2 August 1964, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) torpedo boats attacked the U.S. Navy destroyer *Maddox* while it was on a DESOTO electronic intelligence–gathering patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin some 28 miles off the North Vietnamese coast. This was probably the consequence of two Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) PT boat attacks on 31 July, a fact unknown to Captain John Herrick of the *Maddox*. The South Vietnamese PT boat raids were part of OPLAN (operations plan) 34A harassment activities run by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), against North Vietnam.

Captain Herrick sought approval from commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp to terminate his patrol. Sharp feared that this might call into question U.S. resolve or the right to steam in international waters, and he secured permission from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) to strengthen the patrol by adding a second destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, to Herrick's command.

On 3 August another OPLAN 34A raid took place, and on the next night Herrick reported a possible torpedo boat attack on the two destroyers. Almost all of those on the two destroyers believed that an attack of up to two hours had occurred, but there were no visual sightings of North Vietnamese patrol craft in the area. Only hours after learning of the American claim of a second attack, the North Vietnamese government issued a public denial, a position that it has maintained ever since.

In February 1968, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session and said that he had "unimpeachable" proof of a second attack. In November 1995, however, he met with General Vo Nguyen Giap, former North Vietnamese defense minister, in Hanoi. Giap confirmed the first attack, which he said was the work of "a local coast guard unit," but he denied that there had been any second attack. He also charged President Lyndon Johnson's administration with a deliberate plan to fabricate the attack in order to seek the approval of Congress for the war.

Undoubtedly, there was no attack on 4 August. The reports of it are probably attributable to stormy weather, evasive maneuvering, and inexperienced and fatigued radar and sonar operators. On the other hand, there is no evidence to support Giap's charge that the Johnson administration knowingly faked the incident to escalate the war. It was a genuine mistake rather than a deliberate deception.

In Washington, President Johnson and U.S. military leaders did not want the North Vietnamese leadership to equate lack of U.S. response with lack of resolve, especially as Johnson was then locked in an election campaign against Republican hawk and airpower advocate Senator Barry Goldwater. Secure in his belief of an attack, Johnson also wanted to be able to announce a U.S. military response on the evening television news. Despite a radio message from Herrick that "review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful" and a later message to Sharp that "details of action present a confusing picture," on 5 August Johnson ordered Operation PIERCE ARROW, a retaliatory U.S. Navy strike against North Vietnamese coastal naval facilities.

As it turned out, Johnson's public announcement came before some of the U.S. aircraft from the carriers *Ticonderoga* and *Constellation* had reached their targets—oil storage tanks and torpedo boat bases at Thanh Hoa, Hoa Ngu, Vinh, and Quang Khe. U.S. aircraft flew sixty-four sorties. Two planes were shot down, with one pilot killed and the other captured.

Even before the incidents, Johnson had told congressional leaders of his intention to seek a resolution of support for his Southeast Asia policy. Such a request reached Congress on 5 August. Two days later, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by a vote of 416–0 in the House and 88–*2* in the Senate.

The resolution styled North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. ships as "part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression . . . against its neighbors

U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on 10 August 1964. Apart from annual military appropriations, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was the closest Congress came to authorizing the president to conduct the war in Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration)

and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom." It authorized the president to take those steps necessary "to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression." It also held that the United States regarded the maintenance of peace and security in Southeast Asia as "vital to the national interest and to world peace" and was thus "prepared, as the president determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

In effect what became known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution gave Johnson blanket authority to wage war in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war. Contrary to later charges, the implications of the resolution were fully, albeit briefly, aired before the vote.

Following the public revelation of President Richard M. Nixon's clandestine bombing of Cambodia, Congress rescinded the resolution in June 1970. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act, which quite specifically prescribed the president's power to wage war and the role of Congress in any such endeavor. Unlike the carte blanche wording of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the War Powers Act was very deliberate in its attempt to avoid another Vietnam.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam War

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Touré, Ahmed Sékou
(1922–1984)

Nationalist African premier (1958) and president (1959–1984) of the Republic of Guinea. Born in Faranah, Guinea, on 9 January 1922 to a poor family, Ahmed Sékou Touré worked for the postal service and helped organize a union of its workers in 1945, which he then headed. In 1952 he became the head of the Partie Démocratique de Guinée (PDG, Democratic Party of Guinea). In 1954 he was elected president of the General Confederation of

African Workers, and in January 1956 he was elected mayor of the capital city of Conakry and Guinea's representative to the French National Assembly. In November 1957 he became vice premier of Guinea, and in July 1958 he became premier.

In May 1958, the French Fourth Republic had collapsed and Charles de Gaulle came to power. The new constitution of the Fifth Republic established the French Community in place of the former French Union, and de Gaulle called on the French African states to vote on the new constitutional arrangement. A vote of no would mean independence. With much of French Africa desperately poor and dependent on aid from Paris, the vote was expected to be favorable.

Touré opposed membership in the French Community, however. He claimed that "dignity" was more important, and that there could "be no dignity without true liberty." The community would still mean a degree of French control, and as Touré put it, "We prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery." The charismatic Touré helped stay the vote in Guinea. On 28 September 1958, Guinea was the only state in French Africa to vote against the constitution. The negative vote was by an overwhelming 95 percent majority.

Guinea received its independence on 2 October 1958. In national elections that same year, Touré's PDG won fifty-seven of sixty seats. He became president of Guinea in January 1959. He then pushed through a new constitution that made the PDG the sole legal political party.

Ahmed Sékou Touré, the nationalist who became the first president of independent Guinea in 1959. His defiant attitude ended ties with France. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)

Touré immediately moved Guinea into the socialist camp. Relations with France deteriorated and were broken off altogether in 1965, not to be renewed until 1975. In 1978 French President Valéry Giscard d'Éstaing undertook a state trip to Guinea, and Touré reciprocated with a visit to Paris in 1982.

Touré sought to follow a nonaligned foreign policy. Thus, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, he refused to allow Soviet aircraft to refuel in Guinea during flights to Cuba. At the end of the 1970s, he established closer relations with the Muslim world and cemented relationships with those states and with Islamic organizations. His hold on power was weakened by two assassination attempts, in June 1969 and April 1971. Constantly reelected president (for the fifth time in 1982), Touré was visiting Saudi Arabia when he became ill from a heart aliment. He preferred to go to the United States for treatment and died in Cleveland, Ohio, on 24 March 1984.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also
Africa; France

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Triad

U.S. strategic nuclear force comprised of three components: manned bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The nuclear delivery capability of the United States originally relied upon the long-range bomber force of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). During the late 1950s, the strategic delivery force began to expand to include U.S. Air Force–controlled ICBMs and the U.S. Navy's SLBMs. The early triad structure was a natural evolution of new technological capabilities, but military planners also developed a strong strategic rationale based on the realities of each type of weapon system and the need to create a stable deterrent force structure.

The manned bomber force was the most accurate delivery platform. Additionally, bombers provided the most flexibility. Aircraft could be launched or forward-deployed as a show of force, and having a crew in the loop allowed bombers to be recalled or redirected while in flight. The bombers could also conduct visual assessments of targets or search for specific types of targets in a general area to counter new or mobile targets. But bombers had major vulnerabilities. They could be attacked before they launched, especially by missiles, and the aircraft were relatively vulnerable to air defense systems. Bombers were also relatively slow, taking many hours to deliver nuclear weapons over intercontinental ranges.

The ICBM force provided the capability for rapid strikes against enemy targets, with flight times of approximately thirty minutes, and the ability to maintain a large percentage of the force in a high-alert status. Although the land-based missiles were potentially vulnerable due to their fixed locations, they could be launched relatively quickly before being hit and were often placed in hardened silos for protection. Mobile ICBM options were developed in response to improved Soviet accuracy but were not deployed. Early ICBMs were much less accurate than bombers, although the differences were significantly reduced over time. The submarine force was the most survivable of the three systems. Although communications with the submarines were initially a concern and accuracies were initially below those of the other two legs of the triad, these performance issues were steadily rectified over time.

The triad's offensive capability was melded together in the Single Integrated Operations Plan by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, which was

colocated with SAC headquarters. The use of different weapons delivery platforms complicated the defensive preparations of the Soviet Union, the primary target of American strategic nuclear planning. More importantly, the varying characteristics of the three weapons systems made an effective enemy attack, especially a surprise attack, much more difficult. Although the Soviet force structure was also referred to as a triad, that structure was much less balanced and relied heavily on land-based ICBMs, with a secondary capability in SLBMs, and a limited long-range bomber force. The American triad and its contribution to nuclear deterrence was the foundation of geopolitical stability and military balance during the Cold War.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Poseidon; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; United States Air Force

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Trieste

Italian city at the northern head of the Adriatic Sea near the border with Yugoslavia (now Slovenia and Croatia) whose sovereignty was hotly contested between Italy and Yugoslavia. Securing Trieste from the Austro-Hungarian Empire was one of the main objectives of Italian intervention in World War I, which explains the emotion bound with its name among many Italians. Mainly surrounded by hills that have limited its size, Trieste became important when it was occupied at the end of World War II by the Yugoslav Partisans, led by veteran communist Josip Broz Tito. Meanwhile, the British and Americans pushed the 2nd New Zealand Armored Division to Trieste to prevent Yugoslavia from securing full control of the city's important harbor. Some observers saw in this development the first sign of the forthcoming Cold War.

The Yugoslav occupation elicited violence against the majority Italian population and against noncommunist Slovenians, but an agreement brokered between the British and Tito's representatives on 8 August 1945 restored at least partial order. The former Italian territory now under Yugoslav control was divided into two areas by the Morgan Line. The British and Americans occupied the western zone comprising Trieste Harbor, and the Yugoslavs controlled the eastern territory, which contained important strategic natural resources such as mercury, bauxite, and coal.

Trieste straddled two worlds: the Eastern communist bloc and the Western democratic bloc. Certainly, the Soviet Union supported communist Yugoslavia's claims on the region. For their part, the Allies actually encouraged Tito in the sense that they assisted him economically and diplomatically following his 1948 break with the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslavs reinforced their troop presence in the area, and in 1951 the Italians deployed the first groups of former partisans in a covert stay-behind organization known as "O," which later would be integrated into the Gladio organization under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In the Paris Peace Treaty signed on 10 February 1947 between Italy and the Allies, Yugoslavia secured the Istrian Peninsula, forcing some 250,000 Italians to abandon the area and find refuge in Italy. The Trieste area was designated a Free Territory under the administration of the United Nations

A young resident of Trieste waves the Italian tricolor flag, celebrating the return of that port city to Italy, 10 October 1954. (Bettmann/Corbis)

(UN). Meanwhile, Yugoslavs killed perhaps 10,000 Italians in the *foibe* (karstic sinkholes), which were effective natural cemeteries.

Because neither Italy nor Yugoslavia could agree on a governor for Trieste, the area was divided into area "A" (from Duino to Trieste) and area "B" (Capodistria to Cittanova). On several occasions, the Italian population of Trieste protested against the Allied occupation, resulting in civilian fatalities when British troops overreacted to the demonstrations. At the same time, Yugoslavia continued to threaten the annexation of area "B."

According to some historians, the Italian government mounted covert paramilitary operations in Istria that were designed to discourage Yugoslavia's aspirations and plans regarding annexation. The Trieste crisis also played an important role in Italian domestic politics because it fueled Italian right-wing movements. Several youth organizations volunteered to mount strong protests against Tito and the Allied occupation of the city.

Finally, an agreement was signed in London on 10 May 1954 stipulating that Istria was to be administered by Yugoslavia and Trieste by Italy, with mutual respect of minority rights. This led to the Anglo-American withdrawal of troops from Trieste, which now passed to Italian sovereignty. On 10 December 1975, Italy and Yugoslavia signed the Osimo Treaty that finalized the border permanently with only a few slight modifications.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia after the Velvet Revolution of 1989–1990 did not change the Trieste situation. In June 1991, war broke out in the former Yugoslav territories, which led to the end of the Yugoslav federal state, as Croatia and Slovenia gained their independence. Both declared that they would respect the Yugoslav state's legacy and would therefore honor the Osimo Treaty. Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo expressed Italy's satisfaction with this decision.

Alessandro Massignani

See also

Italy; Paris Peace Conference and Treaties; Tito, Josip Broz; Yugoslavia

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Trudeau, Pierre
(1919–2000)

Canadian Liberal Party politician and prime minister (1968–1979, 1980–1984). Born in Montreal on 18 October 1919, Pierre Elliott Trudeau received his BA degree from College Jean de Brébeuf in 1940 and earned a law degree in

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canadian Liberal Party leader and prime minister. (Corel)

1943 from the University of Montreal and a master's degree in political economy from Harvard University in 1945. After working chiefly as a lawyer and law professor, he was elected to the Canadian House of Commons in 1965. In 1967 he became both minister of justice and attorney general in the Lester Pearson cabinet. In 1968, Trudeau became prime minister and leader of the Liberal Party. With the exception of a brief ten-month interlude during 1979–1980, he remained prime minister until 1984, casting a long shadow on Canadian politics that endures to this day.

As prime minister, Trudeau sought increased independence from U.S. political and economic hegemony. As such, his government frequently parted company with the United States on foreign policy. In 1970 the Trudeau government officially recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Trudeau embarked on a lifelong campaign for nuclear disarmament, leading efforts to ensure nuclear nonproliferation. Also in 1970, faced with terrorist attacks by the radical Quebecois separatist group Front de la libération de Québec (Liberation Front of Quebec), Trudeau briefly invoked martial law to diffuse the crisis. Although quite popular, he weathered several political storms throughout the 1970s, many of which revolved around economic policy. As with other Western nations in that era, Canada experienced periods of high unemployment and inflation, made worse by the 1973–1974 oil crisis.

Perhaps Trudeau's most significant impact as it relates to the Cold War was to distance Canada from the Western orbit so as to become more involved in the developing world. In doing so, the Trudeau government left Canada's armed forces chronically underfunded, much to the chagrin of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By the late 1970s, Trudeau's vision of a quasi-neutral Canada was shaken by its NATO partners, who had begun to suggest that if Canada did not wish to participate in collective security, then Europe might look elsewhere when it came to trade. Thus, in the early 1980s small increases in defense spending were implemented to mollify the Europeans and Americans. In 1983, however, when he undertook his Peace Initiative, convinced that the world stood at the brink of nuclear war, he once more raised the hackles of Canada's defense partners. Trudeau retired from politics in 1984 and died on 28 September 2000 in Montreal.

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See also

Canada; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Trujillo, Rafael Leónidas
(1891–1961)

President and dictator of the Dominican Republic (1930–1938, 1942–1952). Born in San Cristóbal on 24 October 1891, Rafael Leónidas Trujillo received only a rudimentary education. Trained by U.S. Marines during the American occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916–1924), he rose in 1925 to the rank of colonel in the National Guard, which the Americans had helped establish. In 1927 he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general.

Trujillo came to power in 1930 after a coup against President Horacio Vásquez. Almost immediately, Trujillo put in place a repressive dictatorial regime and promoted a cult of personality that rivaled any of the world's worst despots. He tried to modernize the country, but widespread graft and corruption in his government blunted the effort. In an attempt to "lighten" the population, he invited Jews to immigrate to the Dominican Republic and ordered the purging of Haitian workers. During 1937 alone, he was responsible for the deaths of some 15,000 Haitians.

Trujillo, a rabid anticommunist, allowed the Dominican Communist Party (PCD) to exist until 1947, when at the suggestion of the United States he outlawed the party. He gained financial support from the United States and other Western nations to modernize the Dominican Republic but also siphoned off vast amounts of government funds for his personal use. Through his extended family—much of which reaped a small fortune from his financial shenanigans—Trujillo controlled most of the nation's industry and commerce. It is worth noting that while he held the presidency in name for some eighteen years, he was firmly in control at all times, preferring to work behind the scenes while a pliant puppet occupied the post of president. Trujillo enjoyed the support of the island's powerful "100 Families" until 1960, when he ordered the three socialite Mirabal sisters killed for their part in a plot against him.

The year 1960 also saw Trujillo lose the support of some of his powerful international patrons, including the United States. His henchmen were nearly successful in assassinating Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt in 1960, forcing the United States to withdraw much of its support to the Dominican Republic. On 30 May 1961, members of the Dominican military assassinated Trujillo in Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo). His son Ramfis tried

Rafael Trujillo was the dominant political figure of the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961. Trujillo's strong anticommunist stance engendered support from the United States, despite his despotic rule. (Library of Congress)

During 1937 alone Trujillo was responsible for the deaths of some 15,000 Haitians.

to assume power but was exiled following a coup. Nonetheless, Trujillo's supporters continued to exercise power in the country until well beyond the Cold War era. Joaquín Balaguer, who had served under Trujillo, secured the presidency several times until the United Nations (UN) brokered a deal forcing him to step down permanently in 1996.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. and David H. Richards

See also

Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio; Dominican Republic

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Truman, Harry S.

(1884–1972)

U.S. senator (1935–1944), vice president (January–April 1945), and president (1945–1953). Born in Lamar, Missouri, on 8 May 1884, Harry S. Truman worked as a construction timekeeper, bank teller, and farmer before seeing combat in World War I as an artillery captain in France. He then opened a clothing store in Kansas City, but it soon failed, leaving him with large debts. He won election as county judge in 1922 with the backing of the political machine of Tom Pendergast in nearby Kansas City. Truman's record of efficiency and fair-mindedness earned him considerable praise. A Democrat, he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1934, where colleagues appreciated his hard work, modesty, and amiability. Reelected in 1940, he gained national prominence during World War II as chair of a Senate committee investigating corporate waste, bureaucratic incompetence, contractor fraud, and labor abuse in the defense industry.

Truman, the surprise choice for the vice presidential candidate on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's successful 1944 reelection ticket, had no international experience when he assumed the presidency upon Roosevelt's death in April 1945. Truman closely guarded his authority and took actions that were decisive and at times impulsive. This was especially true in foreign affairs, where he immediately faced the challenge of emerging discord with the Soviet Union. As a senator, Truman had favored wartime aid to the Soviets but suggested shifting U.S. support to the Nazis once communist forces had the advantage. Only days into his presidency, he sharply rebuked Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav I. Molotov, sternly lecturing him about trying to dominate Poland. This contretemps was a harbinger of Truman's hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union.

In July 1945, Truman and Soviet leader Josef Stalin met at the Potsdam Conference but did not reach agreement on any major issues. While there, the president received word that the test explosion of an atomic bomb had

succeeded, although he only made an ambiguous reference about this to Stalin. Truman subsequently ordered atomic attacks on two Japanese cities in August. His justification was to save lives, but he may have also used Hiroshima and Nagasaki to intimidate the Soviets and keep them out of the Pacific war. Just before Japan surrendered, the Soviets entered the war in the Pacific, resulting in Korea's division into two zones of occupation. Truman rejected Stalin's request for a similar arrangement in Japan, appointing General Douglas MacArthur to implement sweeping reforms there under complete U.S. control. After 1947, a reverse course in U.S. policy transformed Japan into an anticommunist bulwark in Asia and a security partner of the United States in the Cold War.

Meanwhile, Truman struggled to end the civil war in China between the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong. Late in 1945, Truman sent General George C. Marshall to negotiate a cease-fire and a political settlement, which never took hold. Marshall returned home in early 1947, became secretary of state, and advised Truman to disengage from China. By then, Truman had decided to implement the containment policy against the Soviet Union.

Truman's application of pressure at the United Nations (UN) had forced Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946. His Truman Doctrine speech in March 1947 called for U.S. aid to any nation resisting communist domination. Congress then approved Truman's request for $400 million for Greece (to suppress a communist insurgency) and Turkey (to check Soviet advances). A proposal in June 1947 to help Europe avert economic collapse and keep communism at bay led to the Marshall Plan, an ambitious and successful endeavor that helped reconstruct war-torn economies.

Democrat Harry Truman became president of the United States in April 1945 following the death of President Franklin Roosevelt. Truman oversaw the end of World War II, took the decision to drop the atomic bomb, and decided to come to the aid of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) in June 1950. In many ways, his policies helped to shape the postwar world. (Library of Congress)

Stalin's reaction to Truman's successes greatly intensified the Cold War, beginning early in 1948 with the communist coup in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets then blockaded West Berlin to force U.S. and British abandonment of the city, but Truman ordered an airlift of food and supplies that compelled Stalin to restore access one year later. Countering the Soviet threat led to the 1949 creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a U.S. commitment of military defense for Western Europe. Truman sent U.S. troops and huge amounts of military assistance across the Atlantic, but he refused to replicate this policy in China, resisting Republican pressure to expand support for Jiang Jieshi's Nationalist regime. This led to charges that Truman had allowed disloyal American diplomats to undermine the Nationalists and lose China after the communists triumphed in October 1949. The Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb that September only increased popular anxiety in the United States. As fears of internal subversion grew, Truman appeared to be

soft on communism when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, an obscure Wisconsin Republican, charged that 205 communists worked in the State Department.

Early in 1950, Truman approved development of a hydrogen bomb but initially refused to implement National Security Council Report NSC-68, which called for massive rearmament. He would not approve NSC-68 until September of that year. When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) attacked the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) in June, Truman committed troops because he believed that Stalin had ordered the invasion and that inaction would encourage more expansionist acts. He then ordered military protection for Jiang's regime on Taiwan and greater support for the anticommunist efforts of the British in Malaya and the French in Indochina. Even before MacArthur, whom he had named UN commander, had halted the invasion, Truman approved an offensive into North Korea that provoked Chinese intervention. Truman's courageous decision to recall MacArthur in April 1951 for trying to widen the war was highly unpopular but won acclaim from most military observers and European allies. Armistice talks began in July 1951 but deadlocked after Truman refused to force repatriation of communist prisoners. Unable to end the Korean War, he had made the Cold War more dangerous and intense with the implementation of NSC-68, military strengthening of NATO, and the rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).

Truman left office in January 1953 and returned to Independence, Missouri, to write his memoirs. He died on 26 December 1972 in Kansas City, Missouri.

James I. Matray

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Chinese Civil War; Containment Policy; Greek Civil War; Korean War; Marshall Mission to China; Marshall Plan; McCarthyism; National Security Council Report NSC-68; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Stalin, Josef; Truman Doctrine; Truman Loyalty Program

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Truman Doctrine
(12 March 1947)

U.S. foreign policy doctrine enunciated by President Harry S. Truman that formally committed the United States to fight communist expansionism

abroad. On 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and stated: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." He was of course referring to communist "pressures" and thereby committed the United States to uphold the containment policy, which pledged that all necessary measures would be taken to check the spread of communism and Soviet influence.

The catalyst for the Truman Doctrine had been Britain's February 1947 announcement that it could no longer afford to provide military or financial support to Greece and Turkey. This meant that these nations might fall to communism, and this was especially true for Greece, whose pro-Western government was fighting a communist guerrilla insurgency in the northern part of the country.

The eastern basin of the Mediterranean, including the Middle East, had historically been under British influence since the nineteenth century. The area was still important to Britain after World War II, but it took on great importance in light of the developing Cold War. Soviet presence in the region would jeopardize the ability of the Western powers to launch strategic air strikes on the Soviet Union from bases in the area. The defense of the region had been a British preserve and rested on British military bases, the largest of which was in Egypt. British power was declining, however, while at the same time Soviet activity in the region seemed on the increase.

The Soviet Union had demanded that the Turkish government change the rules governing ship movements through the Dardanelles and allow it to participate, along with other Black Sea nations, in the defense of the straits. The U.S. interpretation of the Soviets' demand was that they intended to secure hegemony over Turkey, build bases there, and then gain control over Greece. From there it could dominate much of the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. The demand in itself was of relatively minor importance because it was made in the form of a diplomatic note, not supported by any explicit or implicit military threats.

For planners in Washington, there seemed to be a power vacuum in the region, the result of Britain's declining strength. Britain was providing military aid to Turkey, but the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thought that because of its strategic importance and in order to increase its ability to meet Soviet aggression, the United States should increase its economic and military aid to Turkey. As long as the British furnished military assistance, however, the Truman administration would provide only economic aid.

American attitudes toward the situation in Turkey were linked to the situation in Greece. Like Turkey, Greece was considered a barrier between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean. The struggle in Greece was not one inspired by the Soviet Union but rather resulted from conflict between rightists seeking to restore the monarchy who were also failing to tackle the grave economic situation and left-wing parties seeking to install a communist regime. Washington, however, chose to view the Greek Civil War through the lens of the Cold War. A loss in Greece to the communists would not only

result in a victory for the Soviets but, it was argued, would also open the entire region to communist subversion. Thus, the Americans could not tolerate the establishment of a communist regime in Athens whether or not it was inspired by Moscow. Despite the shortcomings of the anticommunist Greek government, the Truman administration now moved to provide assistance to it. The decisive turning point came with London's announcement in February 1947 that Britain would be unable to continue its support to Greece and Turkey. It was obvious to U.S. State Department officials that the United States had to fill the breach. While preparing the draft legislation for the 1947 Greco-Turkish aid package, however, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson found it difficult to justify the assistance request for Turkey, as it was not under a direct threat from either the Kremlin or an indigenous communist insurgency. Acheson also knew that Congress was in no mood to approve a large foreign aid request without proper justification, as it was engaged in efforts to curtail spending and pay down the national debt accrued during World War II. Also, Moscow was issuing conciliatory messages, further reducing the incentive in Congress to take strong measures against the Soviet Union.

Truman and his advisors, determined to provide military and economic assistance to both Greece and Turkey, had to find a way to sell this foreign aid package to Congress. Just prior to Truman's speech, Acheson described to the congressional leadership in stark terms the implications of Soviet domination over the eastern Mediterranean and the worldwide geopolitical consequences of such a scenario. In response, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a formerly steadfast isolationist, informed Truman that if he were to present his request to Congress in the manner that had been used by Acheson, he and the majority of Congress would support the aid deal. As a result, Truman's request for a $400 million aid package earmarked for Turkey and Greece was presented in the Cold War terms of a struggle "between alternate ways of life," marking the emergence of the Truman Doctrine, which came to represent a concerted long-term effort to resist communist aggression around the world. Vandenberg kept his promise. The Greco-Turkish aid package was speedily approved.

David Tal

See also

Acheson, Dean Gooderham; Containment Policy; Greek Civil War; Middle East; Truman, Harry S.; Turkey

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Truman Loyalty Program
(1947)

Program launched by U.S. President Harry S. Truman requiring federal employees to take an oath of loyalty to the government, which enabled federal agencies to investigate employees and, if warranted, dismiss them for activities considered suspect. In the first years after World War II, as fears of malfeasant Soviet power abroad and communist subversion at home mounted, the politics of anticommunism became a potent weapon. Charges that Soviet spies or disloyal Americans were serving in important government posts began to circulate, and the Truman administration was powerless to stop the largely untruthful allegations. Soon, a Red Scare set in, and Truman felt obliged to take action to quell the resultant paranoia.

The Democrats lost control of Congress to the Republicans in 1946, putting great pressure on Truman, a Democrat. At the same time, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was uncovering alleged communist subversion in nearly all American institutions, including the government. Under political pressure from the Republicans and the right wing of his own party, Truman ordered the Department of Justice to develop a list of possibly subversive government employees, who were then required to sign a loyalty oath. Truman unwittingly added to the general atmosphere of paranoia by feeding the flames of anticommunist fervor.

The Loyalty Program established by Executive Order 9835 on 21 March 1947 mandated that all federal employees be subjected to background checks and sign a pledge of loyalty to the U.S. government. To aid in this endeavor, loyalty boards in each of the federal agencies were created. These boards performed security checks and background investigations. The loyalty review boards investigated more than 3 million federal workers, of whom roughly 3,000 were forced to resign or lost their jobs without indictment. Truman personally fired 212 executive-level employees. Soon, the loyalty oath program spread to other government agencies, especially in education.

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At the time, the program seemed to some, at least, to be a violation of civil liberties and an infringement on Americans' constitutionally guaranteed rights. In the federal government, employees lost their right to openly criticize U.S. foreign policy, own books on socialism, or attend certain foreign films. In 1951, under Executive Order 10241, if the government had "reasonable" grounds for believing that a person was disloyal, it could fire that person.

When Truman left office in January 1953, McCarthyism was in full swing. Truman's Executive Orders 9835 and 10241 and Public Law 733 were precedents for Executive Order 10450 on 17 April 1953, which President Dwight Eisenhower used to purge additional alleged subversives or security risks from the government. As a result, 600 federal workers resigned, and 1,500 more were fired.

In 1947, Julia Steiner of the Los Angeles County Library System, along with two unions, tried to obtain an injunction prohibiting supervisors from asking employees about reading interests, political views, or past associations.

This challenge became the first of thirty-three cases to eventually challenge the entire Loyalty Program. From the 1950s into the late 1960s, a series of court cases gradually dismantled the various elements of the Truman-Eisenhower loyalty oath programs, largely on procedural grounds. But the concept of a loyalty oath was not overturned.

In 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the legitimacy of loyalty oaths, which remain in use, most commonly by licensing boards and in public education. While the issue of such oaths has become muted, it is clear that Truman's original 1947 action helped set the stage for the corrosive politics and excesses of the McCarthy era (1950–1954) and the attendant civil liberty violations that ensued.

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See also

Civil Liberties in the United States; McCarthy, Joseph Raymond; McCarthyism; Truman, Harry S.

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Tuđman, Franjo

(1922–1999)

Yugoslav military officer and first president of the Republic of Croatia (1990–1999). Born in Veliko, Trgovišće, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (now Croatia) on 14 May 1922, Franjo Tuđman attended secondary school in Zagreb and graduated from the Military Academy in Belgrade in 1957.

Tuđman worked in the Yugoslav Ministry of National Defense during 1945–1961, becoming one of the youngest generals in the Yugoslav Army in 1960. He left active military service the next year and began a new career as head of the Institute for the History of the Labor Movement of Croatia (1961–1967). During 1963–1967 he was also an associate professor of history at Zagreb University, where he earned a doctorate in political science in 1965.

Tuđman was a member of the Socialist Republic of Croatia's parliament during 1965–1969. After participating in the Croatian Spring movement, he

was imprisoned for two years beginning in October 1972. He was again imprisoned during 1981–1984 for his political activities aimed at Croatian independence.

In 1989 Tuđman was one of the founding members of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). After the HDZ won the first democratic elections in 1990, he joined the parliament, which designated him president of the new Republic of Croatia. In 1991 Tuđman led his country to full independence from Yugoslavia and in the subsequent war with Serbia, which lasted until 1995 and claimed thousands of lives.

Tuđman was reelected president in direct elections in 1992 and 1997. His regime was characterized by both significant human rights abuses and political repression. In 1995 he signed the Dayton Agreement but refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal. Tuđman died on 10 December 1999 in Zagreb.

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See also

Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Armed Forces

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Tunisia

North African nation. The Republic of Tunisia, an overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim nation, covers 63,170 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of South Carolina, and had a 1945 population of approximately 3 million people. Tunisia borders Algeria to the west, Libya to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the east and north. Until the late nineteenth century, Tunisia had been dominated by various larger powers as well as Arab and Berber dynasties. In 1881, the French signed an agreement with the bey, the local Tunisian ruler, establishing a French protectorate there. Prior to that, Tunisia had been part of the Ottoman Empire. Tunisian culture was greatly affected by the long period of French colonial rule, which did not officially end until 1956.

Following World War II, a strong nationalist movement in Tunisia engaged in a protracted struggle against French colonial rule. On 20 March 1956, following arduous, delicate, and behind-the-scenes negotiations, an independence protocol was signed by French Foreign Minister Christian Paul Francis Pineau and Tunisian Prime Minister Tahar ben Amara. On 25 July 1957, the Tunisian Constituent Assembly ousted the bey, Muhammad VIII al-Amin, who was sympathetic to France and had long been unpopular;

Celebrating crowds carry Tunisian leader Habib Bourguiba upon his return from Paris after the signing of the Franco-Tunisian Common Protocol proclaiming the independence of Tunisia, 23 March 1956. (Bettmann/Corbis)

declared the formation of the Tunisian Republic; and elected Habib Bourguiba as president.

Bourguiba, who ruled until 1987, was decidedly pro-Western in his ideas and foreign policy. He also maintained cordial relations with France. As he tried to transform Tunisia into a modern, democratic state, he was backed by the majority of young, Westernized Tunisian intellectuals. His main political support came from the well-organized Neo-Destour Party, which he had founded in 1934, that constituted the country's chief political force.

Bourguiba was not without political rivals, however. Early in his presidency, he was strongly challenged by Salah ben Youssef, who leaned toward Egypt and Pan-Arabism and who championed the continuation of Tunisia's ancient Islamic traditions. Youssef was generally supported by conservative, wealthy urbanites and traditionalist Muslims.

The constitution of Tunisia was introduced in 1959 and amended in 1988. It provides for a presidential system not unlike that of the current French Fifth Republic. The president is elected by popular vote for a five-year term, while the prime minister is appointed by the president.

During the Cold War, Tunisia aligned itself squarely with the West and was considered a strong American ally. During the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, for example, Bourguiba refused to sever relations with the United States

over its support of Israel, despite considerable pressure to do so from other Arab states.

In spite of its support of Western-style democracy, the Bourguiba regime exerted strong, centralized authority. The economy was closely controlled by Tunis, and as fears of Islamic fundamentalism increased, especially after the late 1970s, the government increasingly relied on censorship and illegal detentions to smother radical movements. Bourguiba's heavy-handedness and frail health combined to bring about his ouster on 7 November 1987 during a bloodless coup led by General Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who succeeded him as president.

In recent years, under Ben Ali's tenure, Tunisia has taken a moderate, nonaligned stance in its foreign relations. Domestically, it has sought to diffuse rising pressures for a more open political system while at the same time dealing with increased Islamic fundamentalist activities and growing anti-Western sentiments. These efforts have resulted in significant government-sponsored repression and a deteriorating human rights record.

Tunisia's principal industries have been agriculture, mining, tourism, and light manufacturing. Petroleum is the chief mineral resource. Government control of economic affairs, while still heavy, has gradually moved toward privatization, simplified tax codes, and a more prudent approach to debt management. Since the late 1990s, Tunisia's economy has witnessed significant growth, which has begun to attract foreign investment. In 1995, Tunisia also signed an agreement with the European Union (EU) to remove trade barriers over the next decade. Broader privatization, increased government efficiency, and further reductions in the trade deficit are among the challenges that still lie ahead.

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See also

Africa; Arab Nationalism; Bourguiba, Habib; Decolonization; France

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Turkey

Straddling both Europe and Asia Minor, Turkey occupied an important strategic position during the Cold War. With an area of 300,948 square miles,

Turkey is larger than the U.S. state of Texas. European Turkey borders Greece and Bulgaria to the east and north, while in Asia Minor it shares common borders with Georgia to the northwest, Armenia and Iran to the east, and Syria and Iraq to the south. Its 1945 population was some 18.79 million people, while at the end of the Cold War in 1990 it had grown to some 56.47 million people.

In the early-modern period, the Ottoman Empire controlled the Balkans and on two occasions threatened Vienna. The empire also dominated the Middle East and North Africa. Turkish power receded in the nineteenth century, however. Regarded as the "Sick Man of Europe," the Ottoman Empire was forced to yield most of its territory in the Balkans. The empire was also on the losing side in World War I and suffered substantial territorial losses, especially in the Middle East.

Turkey became a republic in October 1923 with the abolition of the sultanate. Domestically, Turkey had been a secular state since 1924, but it was hardly a democracy. Only one political group, the Republican People's Party, was permitted.

The father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, known as Atatürk ("the father of the Turks"), mounted a successful military effort against the Greeks, whose army had occupied western Anatolia (including Izmir/Smyrna) after World War I. Atatürk also carried out a rapid and enforced Westernization, insisting on strict separation of religion and state. In 1924 religious instruction in the schools was forbidden. Turkish replaced Arabic as the national language, and the nation adopted Roman letters. Islamic law was abolished in favor of a new civil code.

Atatürk died in 1938. Premier Ismet Inönü, his closest associate, succeeded him as leader of the nation and the Republican People's Party. Inönü was reelected president in 1943. He and other Turkish leaders were determined to maintain Turkish neutrality in World War II. They kept the large Turkish Army mobilized, alarmed by the ambitions of Germany and the Soviet Union and especially concerned that the two might combine against Turkey. Italian ambitions in the Balkans were also a concern.

Once the Germans controlled the Balkans, in June 1941 Ankara signed a Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship with Germany that offered economic concessions. Inönü, however, strongly resisted pressure from Berlin to enter the war on its side. As soon as the Allies were ascendant, Turkey resumed its pro-Western position, although it also resisted pressure from the United States and Britain to join them in the war. Not until February 1945 did Turkey declare war on Germany, and this was done to assure membership in the United Nations (UN).

Following the war, the Soviet Union applied tremendous pressure on Turkey in an effort to annex Kars and Ardahan. These two northeastern Turkish provinces had long been in contention between the two states. Moscow also demanded a share of control over the defense of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean (the Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles).

Soviet pressure on Turkey along with the communist threat to Greece led to the 1947 Truman Doctrine and U.S. aid. Turkey sought to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at its founding in 1949 but was rebuffed. Not until Turkey hinted that it might pursue a neutral course was it admitted to NATO membership, along with Greece, in 1952.

In fulfillment of its obligations to defend the West, Turkey sent a brigade to fight on the UN side in the Korean War (1950–1953). There, Turkey established an excellent combat record. Turkey also provided bases to the United States for communications intelligence gathering on the Soviet Union and in 1955 joined the Baghdad Pact.

Internally, Turkey struggled to achieve a Western economy and style of government. After World War II, Inönü allowed the formation of a genuine second political party. The 1946 elections were held so abruptly, however, that the new Democratic Party, led by Celal Bayar, lacked time to organize properly and was only able to secure 63 of 465 seats.

In the 1950 elections, by contrast, the Democratic Party won a landslide victory, taking 408 seats to only 69 for the Republican People's Party. Bayar became the president, with Adnan Menderes as premier. The Democratic Party held power until 1960 and emphasized private enterprise. Under the leadership of Menderes, Turkey embarked on an economic development program. Agrarian reform had already been introduced by the previous regime, but the Menderes government continued the process of breaking up the large estates, government holdings, and ecclesiastical lands and transferring these to the peasants. It also sought to introduce modern farming methods, with agricultural production doubling over the next decade. As more than 80 percent of the Turkish population lived in the countryside, the benefits of these reforms, including new roads and rural electrification, provided a powerful base for the Democratic Party. Some state-owned industries were also turned over to private ownership, and new factories were built to produce sugar, textiles, cement, and steel.

Voter placing ballot in box during voting in Istanbul, Turkey, 1950. Following the legalization of multiple political parties in 1946, the Democratic Party, which promoted political and economic liberalism, quickly rose to power and dominated the Turkish government throughout the 1950s. (Library of Congress)

Rapid development, however, brought both large government deficits and inflation. Some $3 billion in U.S. aid as well as loans from Europe drove up both prices and the cost of living. As its unpopularity increased in the cities, the Menderes government began to restrict political liberties. It won an easy election victory in 1954, but only repressive measures kept it in power thereafter. Then, in 1957, all other Turkish political parties combined against the government. The government struck back by declaring this illegal and denying the opposition access to the media.

In May 1960 the Turkish armed forces stepped in, seizing power. The armed forces repeated this process two more times, in 1971 and in 1980.

Turkish fishermen in the Marmara Sea using nets made possible as a result of Marshall Plan assistance, 1951. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Much to its credit, each time the army also peacefully relinquished power. General Cemal Gürsel headed the new government, made up chiefly of younger army officers. In 1961 the government submitted for voter approval a new constitution that established a bicameral parliament and proportional representation, along with a constitutional court. New elections gave the Republican People's Party 173 of 450 seats in the national assembly, and Inönü became premier. Unfortunately, the system of proportional representation led to many small blocs in parliament and political stalemate. At first the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party (successor to the Democrat Party) shared power, but in 1962 Inönü formed a new ministry made up of members of the Republican People's Party and smaller political parties. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 affected Turkey, for as part of the settlement President John F. Kennedy agreed to remove obsolete U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Seemingly intractable problems remained in regard to a large foreign debt and annual budget deficits. Help came in the form of a $100 million loan from a consortium of twelve nations. Turkey also benefited from admission as an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963. The Turks resented the fact that they could not secure full membership, a consequence not only of Turkey's economic problems but also of concerns among many West Europeans that Turkey was a Muslim nation.

Early in 1965, the Justice Party brought down the government in a vote of no-confidence, and Inönü again relinquished power. Elections later that year gave the Justice Party 240 seats and the Republican People's Party only 134 seats of 450 in the assembly. Süleyman Demirel became premier. The Justice Party continued to draw the bulk of its support from the countryside, conservative Muslims, and part of the middle class, while the Republican People's Party drew its support chiefly from the cities.

In March 1971, with Turkey sharply polarized between Right and Left and strikes occurring, the military again seized power. The generals modified the constitution, and in October 1973 new elections brought an odd coalition of leftists and Islamists to power.

A crisis with Greece over the island of Cyprus complicated matters. In July 1974, Greeks on the island seized power in order to reunite Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish government appealed to the British for a joint military intervention, but London refused. That same month, Turkey sent 40,000 troops to northern Cyprus. They drove out some of the Greeks there and occupied 37 percent of the island. Turkish troops remain on the island, with Ankara claiming that they are there to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. Talks to resolve the impasse have been unsuccessful, and the Turks have set up a de facto Turkish Cypriot state. With Greece and Turkey longtime enemies, concern remained through the Cold War and afterward that these two NATO members might go to war with each other. The Turks believed that their allies, particularly the United States, had let them down, and by the mid-1960s Ankara was distancing itself a bit from Washington and seeking improved ties with Moscow. A U.S. embargo on the sale of arms to Turkey plunged relations between the United States and Turkey to a new low.

Turkey benefited from the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both in 1979. That same year the United States substantially increased its assistance to Turkey. Aid went from $300 million a year to $500 million. The United States also continued to maintain military bases in Turkey.

For most of the 1970s, the government was run by the left-of-center Republican People's Party headed by Bulent Ecevit or, at the end of the decade, Demirel's rightist Justice Party. As neither party was able to win a majority in parliament, both were forced to form uneasy alliances with smaller parties and independents. Meanwhile, many of Turkey's fundamental problems went unaddressed.

In September 1980 the army, led by Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren, again took power. The junta dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution and some civil liberties, and arrested Premier Demirel and more than

100 other politicians. The army also arrested thousands of suspected terrorists and executed a number of them. The army's action had again been sparked by political infighting; neglect of the nation's serious economic problems, including an inflation rate of nearly 100 percent a year; and right- and left-wing terrorists who had killed more than 2,000 people in 1980 alone. The generals were particularly concerned with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in view of recent events in Iran.

The army takeover led to Turkey's expulsion from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, a halt in negotiations with the EEC, and investigations by the European Commission on Human Rights in Strasbourg. But General Evren saw himself as a leader in the mold of Atatürk. In 1982 Evren became president for a seven-year term in a referendum that was also a vote for a new constitution. The referendum received a 92 percent favorable vote. The new constitution was framed to increase presidential powers and, in the case of the Grand National Assembly, the Turkish parliament, to encourage the development of a stable two-party system.

In the 1983 parliamentary elections, the party favored by the military, the Nationalist Democratic Party, came in third. The big winner was the Motherland Party, led by Turgut Özal, that won an absolute majority in the Grand National Assembly, the first party to enjoy such power since the 1960s. Özal put the nation back into financial order and created a free market economy. In 1985 Turkey was readmitted into the Council of Europe. There was some resentment toward the West, with Turkey's leaders believing that their allies had failed to appreciate the situation that had necessitated military rule.

In 1989 there was a crisis with neighboring Bulgaria when that country drove out many members of its Turkish minority (1.5 million people out of a total population of 10 million) into Turkey. Turkey did benefit from the crisis over Iraq's seizure of Kuwait. Özal was quick to join his country to the anti–Saddam Hussein coalition, but Turkey suffered economically. By November 1990, rigid enforcement of the economic blockade had cost Turkey an estimated $3 billion in revenues, chiefly from shutting down an oil pipeline through the country.

Turks resented the phobia expressed by many Americans and West Europeans toward its Muslim identity and what it perceived as a lack of support for Ankara's efforts to stamp out demands for autonomy by its Kurdish minority (20 percent of the country's overall population) in southern Turkey. This was evident in Operation STEEL CURTAIN in March 1995, when Turkey sent 35,000 troops into the Kurdish zone of northern Iraq in an effort to trap several thousand guerrillas and halt cross-border raids by the Marxist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). The PKK had been fighting for more than a decade in southeastern Turkey to establish a separate Kurdish state. More than 15,000 people had been killed since 1984, and Turkey mounted the military campaign in an effort to wipe out the movement. Economic problems in the cities also led to a rise in Muslim fundamentalism, perhaps the greatest threat to the secular Turkish state. At the end of the Cold War,

Turkey nonetheless remained committed to NATO and sought to become a full-fledged member of the European Community.

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See also

Cyprus; Demirel, Süleyman; European Economic Community; Greece; Inönü, Ismet; Menderes, Adnan; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Özal, Turgut

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Turkey, Armed Forces

The Turkish armed forces consist of the Territorial Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Gendarmerie. The last is used for policing duties in rural areas. Turkey's armed forces played important roles during the Cold War both in Turkish domestic developments and internationally.

The Turkish military remained fully mobilized during World War II. Following Soviet pressure on Turkey at the end of the war and the country's alliance with the West, Turkey sent a brigade to fight in the Korean War. Commanded by Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici, the brigade was attached to the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and secured an enviable reputation for its fighting ability. Turkish military involvement in the Korean War helped improve the Turkish image in the West. However, Turkey did not become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until February 1952.

With NATO membership, the role of the Turkish armed forces changed from protecting the country and safeguarding Westernization to active involvement in NATO. Turkey received substantial military assistance from the United States to modernize its armed forces and achieve NATO compatibility. The army also saw itself as the guarantor of law and order in the nation, and three times it seized power: in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Each time, once order had been restored and much to its credit, the military voluntarily relinquished power back to an elected civilian government.

Turkish troops in Korea crowd into a landing craft, which will carry them to a waiting transport that will take them home, 9 August 1953. (U.S. Department of Defense)

In the late 1960s, with the rise of tension with Greece over Cyprus, Turkey began a military modernization effort aimed at producing its own warships, landing ships, and other military equipment. In 1974, when Greeks on Cyprus tried to bring about union of the island with Greece, Turkish forces invaded the island. Some 35,000 troops were deployed in the operation, which seized 37 percent of the island. Some 30,000 Turkish troops remain in northern Cyprus.

Turkish military intervention in Cyprus led the U.S. Congress in February 1975 to impose an embargo on the sale of military equipment to Turkey. As a result, the Turkish government declared the suspension of the 1969 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement and announced that the Turkish armed forces would have complete control and jurisdiction over American bases and installations in Turkey. A new Defense Cooperation Agreement was concluded on 26 March 1976, but the U.S. embargo continued until 1978.

In 1985, Turkey embarked on an ambitious ten-year, $10 billion military modernization program. In 1990, Turkey had an army of approximately 800,000 men, the second-largest standing force in NATO, plus several hundred thousand more in the reserves. Resentment toward the United States lingered, especially over the 10–7 rule imposed by Washington. The rule required that Greece receive $7 in U.S. military aid for every $10 for Turkey.

The Turkish Army consists of four armies, ten army corps, two mechanized infantry division headquarters, one infantry division, one infantry training division, fourteen mechanized infantry brigades, fourteen armored brigades, twelve infantry/domestic security brigades, five commando brigades, and five training brigades. The Turkish Air Force is composed of nineteen fighter squadrons as well as two reconnaissance, five training, six transport, one tanker, and eight surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons. It has the largest number of F-16 fighters after the United States. The Turkish Navy deploys twenty-one frigates, twenty-two mine countermeasures support ships, twenty-one cruise missile gunboats, thirteen submarines, fifty-two landing craft, twenty-three naval patrol airplanes and helicopters, and one amphibious Marine Corps brigade.

The Turkish armed forces can field an army corps of 40,000–50,000 troops for joint operations on very short notice and can transfer a force of five to six battalions over a long distance in limited time through night and day airborne assault. In the wake of the Cold War, the Turkish armed forces actively participated in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities in such locations as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

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See also

Cyprus; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Turkey

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Twentieth Party Congress
(February 1956)

The February 1956 meeting of the governing body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that formally denounced Stalinism. Theoretically the ruling body of the CPSU, the party congress was usually a pro forma, ceremonial event. However, the Twentieth Party Congress, held in Moscow, was a watershed in the history of international communism and the Cold War. In his celebrated so-called secret speech, First Secretary of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev revealed to dumbstruck delegates that the late Soviet leader Josef Stalin was a bloodthirsty criminal responsible for systematic killing and mass terror instead of a wise and beneficent ruler to be adored and idolized.

Khrushchev delivered his speech in the very early hours of 25 February 1956 to a closed session of the congress from which all foreign delegates had been excluded. Khrushchev himself was largely responsible for the decision to issue a stinging denunciation of Stalin's rule. It had been opposed by the overwhelming majority in the presidium, who did manage to prevent the incorporation of the speech into Khrushchev's formal, open report. Khrushchev limited his comments to Stalin's use of terror against "loyal communists" after 1934. Revelation of Stalin's "violations of socialist legality" (the term "crimes" was avoided) was restricted to abuses against the party elite. Khrushchev went on to speak approvingly of Stalin's struggle against Trotskyist and Bukharinist "oppositionists" in the 1920s and during the industrialization drive. Khrushchev did not question the one-party system, land collectivization, or the command economy, all of which he sought to preserve.

In spite of these limitations, the speech was a political bombshell, exposing the mechanism of terror and the system of arbitrary rule that had dominated the Soviet Union for thirty years. Khrushchev employed dozens of government papers and a wealth of detail to document the brutal character of Stalin's reign of terror. One such document, which Khrushchev read aloud, was a letter from a Politburo member whose spine was broken by his interrogator. Khrushchev convincingly demonstrated that the history of the CPSU under Stalin consisted of a pattern of criminal acts, unlawful mass deportations of non-Russian peoples, political errors such as the break with Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia, inept leadership, the methodical falsification of history directed by Stalin himself, and the abandonment of Leninist principles of collective leadership in favor of the cult of personality. In short, Khrushchev entirely debunked the mystical aura that surrounded Stalin.

The allegedly secret speech, deliberately leaked to a Western correspondent through a former Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) official, has long overshadowed the rest of the Twentieth Party Congress's proceedings. Yet Khrushchev's 14 February open speech on peaceful coexistence

with the West was almost as significant. He jettisoned the classic thesis of Marxism-Leninism, namely that war with the West was inevitable as long as capitalism survived. He also called for nonviolent competition between capitalism and communism; argued that communism would inevitably prevail over capitalism because it was a fairer system; acknowledged that there were different transitional forms from capitalism to socialism, including the parliamentary route of free elections; and insisted that the Soviet Union did not seek to export revolution.

The implications of Khrushchev's secret and public speeches reinforced each other with overwhelming effect. On the one hand, Stalin's authoritarian methods were discredited; on the other hand, a peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism was acclaimed. For authoritarian communist parties such as those in Albania, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), this was heresy, but for others, such as Poland's, it was liberating. The nation most profoundly affected by the Twentieth Party Congress was Hungary. Within the Hungarian Workers' Party, a movement seeking greater democratization and national independence soon gathered momentum. In July 1956, Hungary's first secretary of the Central Committee, Mátyás Rákosi, was dismissed. In early October, László Rajk and other Hungarian victims of the 1949 Stalinesque trials were paid tribute, and in late October the new regime of Imre Nagy replaced that of Ernő Gerő. Unfortunately, however, the Budapest uprising of 1956 was soon quashed by the Soviet Army.

The Twentieth Party Congress did not reverberate only in Eastern Europe. It also shattered the chimera of ideological continuity between 1917 and 1956. In so doing, it created the possibility for a new, more independent direction for world communist movements.

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See also

Hungarian Revolution; Khrushchev, Nikita; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Yugoslavia

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U

U Nu
(1907–1995)

Burmese nationalist and prime minister (1948–1956, 1957–1958, 1960–1962). Born in Wakema on 25 May 1907, U Nu secured a BA degree from the University of Rangoon in 1929 and served as headmaster and superintendent of the Pantanaw National High School. In 1936 he was expelled from the University of Rangoon law school along with fellow nationalist Aung San for his anti-British political activity. Imprisoned in 1942 by British authorities, Nu was released upon the Japanese occupation of Burma. He subsequently served as foreign minister in the Baw Maw Japanese-sponsored puppet government while retaining links with resistance guerrillas.

Following the war, Nu became vice president of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) and was also unanimously elected president of the Constituent Assembly in June 1947. When Aung San, then deputy chairman of the interim government, was assassinated in the summer of 1947, Nu succeeded him at the colonial governor's request. Nu worked to hasten Burmese independence and signed the independence treaty with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 17 October 1947. Nu began serving as independent Burma's first prime minister on 4 January 1948 while introducing parliamentary democracy.

Nu was immediately confronted with a war-ravaged economy, communist subversive activity, and ethnic strife. Burma's neutrality in the Chinese Civil War was compromised when Chinese Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) troops launched raids from Burmese territory, forcing Nu's government to lodge a protest with the United Nations (UN). He resigned in 1956 and returned to power in 1957 but was ultimately forced to yield to General Ne Win and the Burmese military in 1958, which headed a caretaker

Burmese nationalist and Prime Minister U Nu. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)

government until April 1960. Nu returned to power when his party won the February 1960 elections, but civil unrest persisted. This instability enabled Ne Win to stage a coup on 2 March 1962.

Nu was imprisoned until 1966 and then fled in exile to Bangkok, where he attempted to organize a prodemocratic, anti–Ne Win movement under the United National Liberation Front in 1969. Nu shifted his base of operations to India during 1974–1980 and, on assurances from Ne Win, returned to Burma (now Myanmar) in 1980. Following increased government repression, on 8 August 1988 Nu announced the establishment of a largely symbolic provisional government. In 1989 he was arrested and was kept under house arrest until 1992. Nu died in Yangon (Rangoon) on 14 February 1995.

Udai Bhanu Singh

See also
Aung San Suu Kyi; Burma

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U Thant
(1909–1974)

Burmese politician and secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) during 1961–1971. Born in Pantanaw, Burma, on 22 January 1909, U Thant worked as an educator and freelance journalist before going into government service. During 1947–1957 he served as press director of the government of Burma, director of national broadcasting, secretary to the Ministry of Information, secretary of projects in the Office of Prime Minister, and executive secretary of Burma's Economic and Social Board. In 1957 he became Burma's representative to the UN. He quickly became a leading figure in the UN effort to broker a solution to the war in Algeria. As a moderate neutralist, he was elected to complete the term of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who died in a September 1961 plane crash.

As secretary-general, Thant preferred quiet diplomacy and tended to rely more heavily on superpower initiatives than had his predecessor. But he could also be quite forceful in policy implementation, as in the case of the UN effort to end the secession crisis involving the Congolese province of Katanga. When U.S. President John F. Kennedy sponsored a plan for national reconciliation in the Congo, Thant adopted the idea, which became known as the U Thant Plan. It was Thant's decision to send UN forces into Katanga on two occasions, once in November 1961 and again in December 1962, that finally ended the secession of Katanga and helped reunify the Congo.

In other crises, Thant helped facilitate negotiations between the Netherlands and Indochina over West New Guinea in 1962, sent a UN observation

mission to Yemen in 1963, and initiated a 1963 fact-finding mission to North Borneo (and Sarawak) regarding its recent inclusion in the Federation of Malaysia. His most notable successes included sending UN peacekeeping forces to Cyprus in 1964 and his 1965 brokering of a cease-fire in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir.

At the height of the Cold War, however, Thant's efforts were at times marginalized. In the midst of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, he sent identical appeals to President Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to end the crisis. Those appeals were ignored. Thant's attempts after 1963 to sponsor negotiations among the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and the Soviet Union were continually rebuffed by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. Thant made his most controversial decision as UN secretary-general in 1967, when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser asked him to withdraw the UN Emergency Force from the Sinai. Believing that he had little choice but to pull out the UN troops, Thant unwittingly opened the way for the Six-Day War, ultimately weakening the UN's role in the Middle East. He retired from the UN in December 1971, at the end of his term of office. Thant died on 25 November 1974 in New York City.

Lise Namikas

Burmese politician U Thant served as secretary-general of the United Nations during the turbulent period of 1961–1971. (Corel)

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Cuban Missile Crisis; Cyprus; Hammarskjöld, Dag; United Nations; Vietnam War

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U-2 Incident
(May 1960)

A period of heightened Soviet-U.S. tensions precipitated by the Soviet Union's 1 May 1960 downing of an American U-2 reconnaissance plane that was clandestinely taking high-altitude photographs of Soviet defense installations. The plane's wreckage, together with the confession of the captured pilot, offered irrefutable proof of previously unacknowledged American surveillance of the Soviet Union. The incident increased international tensions

Official Soviet photo showing people viewing the wreckage of a Turkey-based U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane shot down over Soviet territory, 1 May 1960. (Bettmann/Corbis)

and caused Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to cancel a much-anticipated summit with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Because the closed nature of Soviet society made it difficult to determine that nation's military capabilities, in 1954 Eisenhower secretly ordered the fabrication of a small number of special reconnaissance aircraft, built by Lockheed and dubbed the U-2, to secretly overfly the Soviet Union. The U-2 was an engineering marvel, essentially a glider outfitted with a jet engine and capable of flying at 70,000 feet and more than 4,000 miles without refueling. On 4 July 1956, civilians under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began piloting U-2 aircraft on twenty-four missions over the Soviet Union, taking photographs and gathering other electronic data. The U-2 overflights showed that the Soviets had been exaggerating their bomber and missile capabilities. Eisenhower feared that revelation of the flights could be considered a hostile action, but he believed that the need to obtain intelligence outweighed the potential risks of the U-2 program.

Although initial studies suggested that the Soviet Union's defenses would be incapable of reliably tracking or attacking the U-2s at their normal flying altitude, the planes were nevertheless monitored closely and were frequently targeted by Soviet interceptors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Soviets lodged objections with the United States after the early flights but did

not complain publicly, probably because of their reluctance to acknowledge their inability to destroy the planes.

In February and March 1960, having authorized only four overflights since 1958, Eisenhower approved two missions for the coming weeks. Although he was worried about harming East-West rapport on the eve of a summit among American, Soviet, British, and French leaders scheduled to begin on 16 May in Paris, he was convinced of the need to gather details about recent Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) developments before the meeting. Midway through the second of these flights, the U-2 jet piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down by Soviet air defenses, and he parachuted into Soviet hands. The Soviets also collected—largely intact—the camera and other remnants of the plane.

To Khrushchev, this overflight was a particular affront because it occurred on a communist holiday (May Day) and because he saw it as an intentional presummit provocation. Correctly assuming that the United States did not know that the Soviets had captured Powers and secured incriminating aircraft components, Khrushchev set out to embarrass the Eisenhower administration. After the United States announced that the downed plane was a weather research aircraft, the Soviet leader publicly revealed the damning evidence to the contrary and announced his intent to try Powers for espionage. The eventual confirmation of the Americans' activities and their attempts to cover them up created an international sensation and torpedoed the forthcoming Paris summit.

Eisenhower tried to explain the overflights as regrettable infringements upon Soviet sovereignty that were nonetheless necessary to understand Soviet military capacity. He hoped that the summit would continue as planned and thus allow his presidential term to conclude on a high note by building upon the improved relations that had resulted from Khrushchev's celebrated 1959 visit to the United States. Some of Eisenhower's advisors thought that the CIA had been ill-prepared for the possibility of a downed plane and failed to advise the president of the likelihood of an interception, especially given persistent Soviet efforts to achieve such. Some aides proposed that Eisenhower avoid responsibility by claiming that the overflights occurred without his authorization, a suggestion the president rejected because it would improperly place blame on subordinates and would incorrectly suggest that underlings had the latitude to authorize such significant activity. Some officials, not privy to the details of what to do if captured, blamed Powers for allowing himself to be taken prisoner and too readily admitting to his activities.

While it is more difficult to assess Soviet reactions, many U.S. analysts believe that Khrushchev shared Eisenhower's quest for relaxed relations but faced resistance from hard-liners in the Kremlin. This forced Khrushchev to balance anger with interest in a rapprochement, although he did lash out against Pakistan and Norway, nations that he knew had facilitated some U-2 missions. When he arrived in Paris putatively for a preliminary meeting, he made it clear that he would not assent to the formal convening of the summit without a public apology from Eisenhower. The U.S. leader refused, although he renounced any further aircraft overflights. This stance was unacceptable

The U-2 was an engineering marvel, essentially a glider outfitted with a jet engine and capable of flying at 70,000 feet and more than 4,000 miles without refueling.

to Khrushchev, who therefore refused to participate in the summit and canceled arrangements for Eisenhower's state visit to the Soviet Union.

Although global reaction varied as to which party was responsible for the meeting's failure (some believed that Khrushchev exaggerated his position for propaganda purposes), Eisenhower considered it a great loss. After an August 1960 show trial, Powers was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. In February 1962, however, he was traded for Colonel Rudolf Abel, a Soviet spy being held in U.S. custody. Subsequent investigations determined that Powers had acted properly during his mission and time in captivity. By the late summer of 1960, U.S. photographic intelligence of the Soviet Union began to rely on secret orbiting satellites that passed over Soviet territory. Because they traveled through space, international law did not consider them violations of sovereign airspace.

Christopher John Bright

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; Khrushchev, Nikita; Paris Conference; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

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U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union

In the early days of the Cold War, British and American aircraft and U.S. balloons flew over Soviet territory to obtain otherwise unavailable details about Soviet military capabilities. While most of these overflights were known to the Soviets, none of them were acknowledged to be reconnaissance missions until the United States took belated responsibility for a U-2 spy plane shot down over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. The use of piloted aircraft to obtain detailed intelligence information was supplanted shortly thereafter by orbiting space satellites.

The closed nature of Soviet society allowed the West little understanding of Soviet military preparations at the Cold War's onset. There was great concern in the West about a possible surprise Soviet attack on Europe, North America, or elsewhere, particularly after September 1949 and the detonation of the first Soviet atomic weapon. Thus, American and British officials considered aerial reconnaissance a military necessity, albeit potentially provocative and a violation of Soviet airspace.

Beginning in 1949, various types of specially modified aircraft took high-altitude photographs of Soviet air bases and other defense installations or

A Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady spy plane in flight. (U.S. Air Force)

used radar to map strategic areas. Some aircraft also recorded electronic signals emanating from Soviet radar stations and other facilities, allowing them to be precisely located and their specific functions determined. Hundreds of these risky flights were undertaken. One program operated occasionally just inside Soviet borders. Other flights routinely penetrated further into Soviet airspace. In one particularly ambitious effort in 1956, twenty-one U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft flew 156 missions over Siberia in the course of seven weeks, including one mission that involved six RB-47E aircraft flying abreast in broad daylight. All returned safely.

In other instances, however, the Soviet Union and its allies reacted with hostility to such incursions. From 1949 to 1969, sixteen American planes were shot down and 163 crew members killed. The Soviets also lodged vigorous diplomatic protests, but the British and American governments claimed that the aircraft were engaged in weather research or other innocuous activities and had not intentionally crossed into Soviet territory.

In order to reduce dangers to crewmen and decrease the likelihood of interceptions, the United States briefly used high-flying unmanned balloons to supplement its photographic intelligence efforts. In Project GENETRIX during January and February 1956, 516 balloons were sent aloft from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), Scotland, and Turkey. The balloons were carried by the prevailing winds higher than the maximum ceiling of most Soviet interceptor aircraft. After leaving Soviet airspace, exposed film canisters were ejected and then recovered in midair by awaiting aircraft. Only thirty-four GENETRIX film loads were recovered and produced

In one particularly ambitious effort in 1956, twenty-one U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft flew 156 missions over Siberia in the course of seven weeks.

usable photographs. The balloons carrying the remainder either failed, descended prematurely, traveled off course, or were shot down. This short-lived balloon program nonetheless provided an understanding of high-altitude wind currents, Soviet radars, and interception techniques. All were details helpful in preparing for U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union that were to begin a few months later.

In 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) placed intelligence operative Richard W. Bissell in charge of developing and operating the secret U-2 spy plane. The U-2 was designed by Kelly Johnson, of the Lockheed Corporation, who had also designed many other aircraft, including the P-38 and F-104 fighters. The U-2, the first prototype of which was launched in 1956, was a reconnaissance aircraft with photographic and electronic surveillance capabilities designed to overcome limitations posed by other planes. The exceedingly light plane was modeled after a glider and was equipped with a jet engine, allowing it to fly at very high speeds. With a maximum speed of more than 530 mph, the U-2 cruised at 70,000 feet—beyond the range of Soviet fighters or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)—and could travel more than 4,000 miles on a single load of fuel. These features made the plane seemingly immune to attack and maximized intelligence gathering.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the first U-2 mission over the Soviet Union on 4 July 1956. The unarmed aircraft were operated by the CIA and flown by former U.S. Air Force pilots under contract with the CIA. Civilian rather than military aircraft and crews were used so that if the Soviets learned about the flights, they might consider them less threatening. This thinking proved prescient, because the Soviets tracked nearly every U-2 incursion, finally downing one with near misses by three SAMs detonated below the aircraft on 1 May 1960. The Soviets retrieved a substantial amount of the aircraft's wreckage and equipment. Coupled with the capture of pilot Francis Gary Powers and his admission of the flight's purpose, the downing of the U-2 forced the United States to concede publicly that it had been conducting aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, although the scope and extent of the effort were not specified.

The data gathered by the U-2 and other reconnaissance programs was an enormous intelligence windfall that helped shape Western military planning and diplomacy at the time. For example, for the limited number of individuals privy to such information, the data helped confirm the absence of a missile gap between the Soviet Union and United States. The persistent overflights also may have influenced the advent of certain Soviet armaments. For example, the prospect of countering increasingly higher- and faster-flying planes required the development of more capable fighter interceptors and anti-aircraft weapons. This, in turn, led the United States to rely more on reconnaissance satellites invulnerable to these arms.

Christopher John Bright

See also

Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr.; Missile Gap; Open Skies Proposal; Powers, Francis Gary; U-2 Incident

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Uganda

East African nation covering an area of 91,135 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. The Republic of Uganda borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west, Sudan to the north, Kenya to the east, and Rwanda and Tanzania to the south. Uganda's economy was largely agricultural, and its major exports included coffee and cotton. The nation demonstrated the defining influence of European colonialism on African national boundaries. Formerly part of the British Empire, Uganda gained its independence in 1962. The history of the nation during the Cold War serves as an excellent example of the difficulties faced by much of post-colonial Africa, including instability, internal division, authoritarian government, and civil war.

In the decades after World War II, European colonialism quickly faded, creating dozens of new states by 1970. In Britain's African possessions, local resistance movements accelerated the independence process. The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the early 1950s led the British to plan for the gradual independence of their African colonies over a period of two to three decades. However, further unrest in Malawi and East Africa in 1959 and 1960 forced them to expedite the process. As a result, Uganda and other nations acquired independence in the early 1960s without the established institutions necessary for a stable transfer of power. This institutional weakness, coupled with the multiethnic character of the new nations, created a serious threat of internal conflict.

Uganda's situation at the time of independence appeared promising. Prime Minister Milton Obote presided over the various groups within the country. The largest of these, the Buganda, enjoyed semiautonomous status in their homeland of Buganda; a role for their traditional ruler, the Kabaka; and a separate parliament, the Lukiiko. Obote sought greater power, however,

and in 1966 he dissolved the National Assembly and produced a new constitution concentrating authority in his own hands. During the same period, he acted against the autonomy of the Buganda, removing the authority of the Kabaka and sending troops against the parliament. He formally eliminated the separate status of Buganda in 1967.

Obote had appointed Idi Amin head of the army in 1966. Amin, a former member of the British colonial army, had risen in status as a result of independence and the lack of trained officers in Uganda. In 1971, he took advantage of Obote's absence from the country and staged a successful coup with the support of the military. As a result of Obote's concentration of power, no institution existed to stand in Amin's way. Amin acted ruthlessly and began the systematic elimination of Obote's supporters. Because Obote's roots lay with the Langi and Acholi tribes of northern Uganda, Amin also ordered the wholesale slaughter of those groups. Over the eight years of his regime, hundreds of thousands of people were killed, as Amin eliminated anyone who appeared to oppose him.

As a former subject of British colonialism, Amin also sought to act against imperialism and its vestiges. He delighted in humiliating the remnants of Uganda's British community. More importantly, in 1972 he expelled much of the Asian population, immigrants from other areas of the British Empire (mostly India) who had gone to Uganda during the years of British rule. Asians were resented because of their prosperity and because the British had given them preferential treatment. Amin gained popularity by forcing them to leave and confiscating their property. He used the proceeds of the seizures to buy the support of the army. The departure of as many as 60,000 Asians, including much of the business and professional sectors, took a catastrophic toll on the already fragile economy.

Amin also tried to make a mark on the world stage as an opponent of Western imperialism. He purchased weapons from the Soviet Union and secured support from Saudi Arabia and Libya. His most well-known venture involved his participation in the hijacking of an Air France flight on 27 June 1976. Pro-Palestinian terrorists seized the plane and forced it to fly to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where they held 105 Israeli and Jewish passengers hostage (the non-Jewish passengers were released) and demanded the release of prisoners held by Israel. The Israelis agreed to negotiate but used the time to plan a daring rescue attempt. Two hundred Israeli soldiers landed at Entebbe, killed the terrorists, and successfully recovered the hostages on 3 July. Three hostages died in the operation. In the process, Amin's force of Soviet MiG fighters was destroyed.

In 1979, in an attempt to retain control of the army, Amin allowed the looting of parts of northern Tanzania. When the Tanzanian Army responded with an invasion of Uganda, Amin was forced into exile in Saudi Arabia. Obote resumed power in 1980, but his electoral victory was contested, and violence quickly broke out. Like Amin, he used ruthless force to eliminate his opponents. Again, thousands were killed. When Obote fell from power in 1985, Uganda lay in ruins, gutted by twenty years of authoritarian rule and internal violence. In 1986 Yoweri Museveni was declared president amid a

chaotic power struggle and continues to serve in that position. In the years following his election, Uganda's economy experienced an impressive recovery. Museveni cracked down on corruption and invested millions in education and public health. Despite Uganda's economic miracle, it remains one of Africa's poorest countries.

Robert Kiely

See also

Africa; Amin, Idi; Anticolonialism; Decolonization; Entebbe Raid; Mau Mau; Obote, Apollo Milton

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Ukraine

Former Soviet republic located in Eastern Europe that declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 24 August 1991. Ukraine had an estimated 1945 population of nearly 40 million people and covers 233,089 square miles, making it roughly twice the size of the U.S. state of Arizona. Ukraine is bordered by Belarus to the north; Russia to the north, northeast, and east; the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea to the south; Moldova and Romania to the southwest; and Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland to the west. Throughout history, Ukraine's position as a strategic frontier region has brought repeated invasions and constantly shifting borders as well as a rich cultural heritage.

The country's geographic position on the southwestern border of the Soviet Union clearly gave it a vital role during the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War, Ukrainians had the distinction of being the largest European population without an independent state. It is impossible to understand the role of Ukraine and the Ukrainians during the Cold War without at least some passing reference to pre–Cold War Ukrainian history. The most important aspects of this relevant to the Cold War period include Ukraine's position as a battleground of empires and ideas and the country's long and often troubled association with Russia. During the 1917 Russian Revolutions and ensuing civil war, Ukrainians attempted to establish an independent state, which was ultimately defeated by the Bolsheviks. Ukrainian lands were thereby divided between Poland and the newly established Soviet Union in the early 1920s.

The political, economic, and social upheavals of the revolutionary era in Ukraine were followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture under Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, which resulted in a devastating man-made famine that claimed the lives of millions of Ukrainians during 1932–1933. This demographic and humanitarian disaster was then quickly succeeded by extensive purges of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which led to further population losses especially among the educated elite.

In September 1939, in the wake of the German invasion of Poland and in accordance with the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin moved Soviet forces into eastern Poland, which was largely inhabited by Ukrainians and Belarusians. Ukrainians suffered tremendously during the war, and Ukraine became one of the major sites for the extermination of European Jewry during the Holocaust. The reunification of the two parts of Ukraine under Soviet rule in 1939 was made permanent at the end of World War II when the Western Allies accepted Stalin's plan to move Poland's border with Germany significantly west to compensate for the loss of western Ukraine and western Belarus.

Ukrainian resistance to both Nazi and Soviet rule during the war, led by both the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA), continued well into the 1950s, until a combination of internal friction and Soviet countermeasures resulted in the defeat of the insurgents. Polish and Soviet armed forces undertook extensive anti-insurgency operations, which were accompanied by ethnic cleansing throughout the border regions.

Ukraine figured prominently in the early stages of the Cold War, as Stalin attempted to ensure a large Soviet presence at the newly created United Nations (UN). Despite Western refusal to allow Stalin's demand that each of the Soviet republics enjoy individual representation at the UN, Ukraine and Belarus were granted seats in the UN General Assembly. Ukrainian diplomats were completely subordinated to the policies laid down by the Soviet leadership in Moscow, however.

Throughout the 1950s, the Ukrainian Diaspora, many Ukranians had become refugees during World War II, attempted to draw attention to the situation in their homeland, most notably through the founding of the Anti–Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), which had ties to other organizations representing the subject nationalities of the Soviet Union.

During the late 1940s and the 1950s, Ukraine underwent extensive social, political, and economic change. Shifting borders, enormous loss of life, and extensive wartime destruction of both the industrial and agricultural infrastructure created difficult living conditions in the Ukrainian countryside as well as in the major cities. Nevertheless, by the 1960s Ukraine had begun to recover economically, and living standards were on the rise. Politically, however, the situation in Ukraine remained tense, especially in the aftermath of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which quashed the Prague Spring and increased Ukrainian dissatisfaction with Soviet rule. An active dissident movement opposed to Soviet rule developed in Ukraine, and many activists were arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in the gulags.

By the 1970s, Ukrainian political, social, and economic life mirrored trends elsewhere in the Soviet Union and also suffered under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's Era of Stagnation. A Brezhnev loyalist, Volodymir Shcherbitsky, replaced the leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Petro Shelest, and restored obedience to Moscow. This state of affairs continued well into the 1980s, until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the

Demonstrators marking the fifth anniversary of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. (Chuck Nacke/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985. A major catalyst for change in Ukraine was the April 1986 nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the north of the country near the border with Belarus. The immediate impact of Chernobyl was to irradiate large parts of the surrounding area and its population, creating a human and environmental tragedy of unprecedented proportions. Gorbachev's failure to adequately respond to Chernobyl drew increased attention to the failings of the Soviet system. Soon, there were increased calls for dramatic reform throughout Ukraine.

As Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika reforms developed and as people in the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, were freer to discuss the issues confronting Soviet society, a nascent democratic movement, called the Rukh National Movement for Perestroika (also known as the People's Movement), was formed in Ukraine by the Writers' Union in 1989. Rukh led the drive for reform and eventually Ukrainian independence. Shcherbitsky was removed as leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and was replaced by Leonid Kravchuk, who went on to become Ukraine's first president. In the March 1990 Supreme Soviet elections, Rukh and its allies did relatively well at the polls. By July 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, in defiance of Moscow and the central Soviet authorities, declared the economic and political sovereignty

of Ukraine. This tense and anomalous situation of being a sovereign country within the Soviet Union was finally resolved in August 1991 in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev. On 24 August 1991, Ukraine declared itself fully independent.

Robert Owen Krikorian

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Chernobyl; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gulags; Perestroika; Prague Spring; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Ulbricht, Walter
(1893–1973)

Head of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) during 1949–1971. Born in Leipzig on 30 June 1893, Walter Ulbricht was the son of a tailor, and both his parents were members of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). After serving in the German Army during World War I from 1915 to 1918, Ulbricht migrated to the radical wing of the party during the German Revolution of 1918–1919 and became a founding member of the German Communist Party (KPD).

In 1924, Ulbricht left Germany to attend Communist International (Comintern) courses in Moscow. On his return in 1926, he was elected to the state parliament of Saxony. He subsequently won election to the national parliament in 1928 and served there until 1933. He fled Germany when Adolf Hitler came to power, moving first to Paris and then to Prague. Ulbricht also fought with the International Brigades on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. He then fled to Moscow in 1938.

In the Soviet Union during World War II, Ulbricht and many other national communist leaders trained in preparation for their return after the war. Ulbricht returned to Germany with the Soviet Red Army in 1945 and established his group as the core of the revived KPD. Supported by the Soviet Military Administration, Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck negotiated a merger with the SPD in the Soviet zone of Germany, forming the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Ulbricht emerged as secretary-general of the party and led the drive to embed Soviet-style policies. When the East German government was formed in October 1949, the leading role of the SED was enshrined in the constitution and Ulbricht became deputy premier.

Ulbricht worked behind the scenes but was generally acknowledged as the real power within East Germany. Along with Willi Stoph, Ulbricht managed a purge of the SED, leaving hard-line communists in all the key positions

in both the party and the government. He adopted hardline Stalinist policies, promoting rapid industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture.

After the death of Stalin in 1953, it appeared that Ulbricht might fall from power when he refused to implement reforms suggested by the new Soviet leadership. His intransigence sparked riots in East Berlin and across East Germany on 16–17 June 1953, and Red Army tanks had to be called in to restore order.

Ironically, the threat of rebellion wedded the Soviet leadership more firmly to Ulbricht. He was one of the main forces behind the 1955 formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, designed to counter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the perceived Western threat to East German government. When Pieck, who had been elected president of East Germany in 1949, died in 1960, Ulbricht assumed the title of head of state. Not until after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 did he institute even limited reforms.

The New Economic System of 1963 was designed to free up market forces within East Germany while maintaining the SED's constitutional grip on political power. Instead, the economy stagnated, and critics of the SED regime who might have immigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) now emerged within East Germany. Ulbricht refused to compromise, and when Warsaw Pact forces entered Czechoslovakia to suppress the reforms of the Prague Spring, Ulbricht dispatched a division to assist. By 1970, however, it was clear that he was out of touch and out of favor among the East German leadership. Erich Honecker, long recognized as the "crown prince" of the SED, effectively organized Ulbricht's ouster in 1971. Ulbricht remained as head of state, but Honecker became secretary-general of the SED and the real power in East German government.

Longtime communist Walter Ulbricht spent World War II in the Soviet Union. Returning to Germany after the war, he was the de facto leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) during 1949–1971. (Library of Congress)

Ulbricht died in the Berlin suburb of Döllnsee on 1 August 1973. His legacy is that of a true Cold Warrior who clung to Stalinist policies regardless of cost. His insistence on collectivization and industrialization in the 1940s and 1950s nearly broke the fledgling state's economy. By 1961, Ulbricht's regime was forced to imprison its own citizens behind the Berlin Wall. Because of such decisions, East Germany remained largely isolated under his regime, a symbol of the deep divisions of the Cold War.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic; Honecker, Erich; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pieck, Wilhelm; Stalin, Josef; Warsaw Pact

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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

See Soviet Union

United Kingdom

In the early 1960s, former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson controversially stated that Britain had "lost an empire and failed to find a role." Britain's post-1945 foreign policies were driven by the desire to maintain, insofar as possible, great-power status, which made it crucial to forge a special relationship with the United States whereby Britain could obtain economic and military assistance from the United States, not least in implementing anti-Soviet policies in Europe. Although Britain was usually the closest U.S. ally, British leaders often found galling their new disparity in status, as the United States replaced Britain as the world's strongest power.

By 1943, British leaders were apprehensive that when World War II ended, Soviet military power and territorial holdings would be greatly enhanced, allowing the communist Soviet Union to dominate much of Eastern Europe. In October 1944, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill negotiated an informal percentages agreement with Soviet Premier Josef Stalin whereby the two leaders delineated their countries' respective spheres of influence. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt both acquiesced in effective Soviet domination of most of Eastern Europe. The three leaders also agreed to divide Germany into three separate occupation zones, to be administered by their occupying military forces but ultimately to be reunited as one state. In April 1945, Churchill unavailingly urged American military commanders to disregard their existing understandings with Soviet forces and take and—he apparently hoped—retain Berlin, the symbolically important German capital.

Churchill's successor as prime minister, Labour Party leader Clement Attlee, and his foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, a firmly anticommunist trade

unionist, were equally strong advocates of a policy of firm resistance to Soviet expansion in Europe. Their position, however, was one of relative weakness, as Britain ended the war near bankruptcy, heavily indebted to the United States for Lend-Lease aid—obligations canceled in return for British pledges to dismantle the sterling area—and faced with heavy and expensive military commitments in Germany, Japan, and Greece and around its far-flung empire. London's foreign debt increased sevenfold during the war, standing at £13.3 billion in June 1945. To finance the war, the British had liquidated most of their overseas investments, and the country was running a substantial adverse balance of trade, while wartime bombing had badly damaged existing factories and plants, squeezing Britain's export capacities. In addition, the new Labour government sought to institute ambitious social welfare policies. Without U.S. assistance, Attlee and Bevin believed, Britain's foreign policy goals would remain unattainable.

In 1945, Britain still ruled the greatest empire in history, significant portions of which in Asia were regained in the last months of the war. Budgetary considerations and the desire to allay American anticolonialist sentiment mandated the speedy jettisoning of much of the empire, as did the Labour Party's stated anti-imperialist outlook and the strength of nationalist sentiment, especially in India. In February 1946, Attlee proudly announced plans to grant that country full independence in the near future. This occurred in August 1947, with the largely Muslim northwestern and northeastern provinces choosing to separate from the predominantly Hindu remainder, leaving what became Pakistan. Within a few years, Burma followed suit, although Britain retook and retained for some years those Asian colonies—Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong—whose continued possession and administration remained economically profitable.

British initiatives and prompts were highly significant to the making of early U.S. Cold War policies. Conscious of British weakness, especially vis-à-vis the newly menacing Soviet Union, with its power now ensconced across Central and Eastern Europe to the Elbe, Attlee sought to encourage the United States to maintain a close Anglo-American alliance. He was privy to and endorsed Churchill's intention to sound these themes in a major address in the United States, which Churchill did in his famous February 1946 "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech) at Fulton, Missouri.

By late 1946, budgetary problems left British leaders little alternative but to reduce expensive military commitments. They chose to do so in Greece and Turkey. Greece was facing a major internal communist insurgency, while Turkey was experiencing heavy Soviet pressure for rights to the strategic Dardanelles straits. Attlee and Bevin privately informed President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall of their intention to withdraw sometime before the public announcement, which became the occasion for Truman's February 1947 speech (known as the Truman Doctrine), placing U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey in the broader context of a worldwide anticommunist strategy.

The harsh winter of 1946–1947 caused economic difficulties and generated unrest across Western Europe, bringing further British pleas for U.S.

Marshall Plan aid benefited all segments of society. Here, new machinery financed under the plan helps the T. S. Cunningham Nylon Factory in Scotland increase production. The new production rate is represented by the five stockings on the table, while the old rate is shown in the single stocking, held by the women. (National Archives and Records Administration)

aid. This helped to generate the Marshall Plan, a coordinated program for European economic recovery. British acquiescence in the merging of their and the American occupation zone of Germany and the area's inclusion in the Marshall Plan were contributing factors in the 1948–1949 Berlin Blockade. Attlee and Bevin, already instrumental in establishing a Western European Union defense pact under the March 1948 Treaty of Brussels, urged that only if the United States itself joined a defensive pact would Europe feel secure. This in turn led to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington in April 1949 by the United States, Canada, and ten West European states. The members of the resultant North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pledged to come to each other's defense should one be attacked.

By 1950, major differences existed between the United States and Britain on Asian policy over Hong Kong, Indochina, anticolonialism, and especially

the new communist People's Republic of China (PRC). Britain, unlike the United States, pragmatically accorded the PRC almost immediate recognition and traded extensively with it. The Korean conflict gave British leaders an opportunity to demonstrate their continuing loyalty and regain the international status that Britain's economic problems and the 1949 devaluation of the pound had eroded. Due to Bevin's poor health and eventual death, during the Korean crisis Attlee was central to British policymaking. Urged on by his ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, in July 1950 Attlee overrode his reluctant chiefs of staff and committed British troops to the American-led United Nations (UN) forces.

British officials welcomed the massive American enhancement of NATO forces that quickly resulted from the Korean conflict. Fearful, however, of UN commander General Douglas MacArthur's bellicose rhetoric on the potential use of nuclear weapons, they welcomed his removal. Churchill, who regained office in 1951, rejoiced when his old colleague Dwight David Eisenhower, former World War II commander of Allied forces in Europe, became president of the United States in 1953. Fearful of the destructive consequences of nuclear war, especially since both the Americans and the Soviets were developing thermonuclear weapons and since Eisenhower's New Look defense strategy relied primarily upon nuclear rather than conventional forces, Churchill urged Eisenhower to seek rapprochement and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union—advice that reinforced Eisenhower's own proclivities and contributed to his search for coexistence with the new Soviet general secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. Although Eisenhower probably only used this as a convenient excuse to justify his own preexisting inclinations, he cited Churchill's refusal in 1954 to join the United States in mounting air strikes to relieve beleaguered French forces at Dien Bien Phu as the reason that the American government declined to intervene there and help the French continue the conflict.

In 1956, nonetheless, Eisenhower made Britain's reduced status and dependence upon the United States humiliatingly apparent. In 1953 the nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser took power in Egypt. Initially, he sought both military and economic aid from the United States, but the Israeli lobby pressured Congress to deny aid, whereupon Nasser obtained arms from the Soviet bloc. This, in turn, led U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1956 to rescind an earlier American pledge to provide Nasser with funding for his Aswan Dam project, whereupon Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, co-owned by the British and French governments. While joining Dulles in negotiations to resolve the crisis, Britain and France secretly collaborated with Israel on war against Egypt to regain the canal, mounting an invasion in early November 1956, just prior to the U.S. presidential election. Dulles and Eisenhower exerted financial and military pressure on all three powers to withdraw, which they eventually did, but the episode greatly embittered Anglo-American relations.

Anthony Eden's successor as prime minister, the half-American Harold Macmillan, an old wartime colleague of Eisenhower's who was also connected by marriage to John F. Kennedy, valiantly attempted to restore the

relationship. From 1957 to 1962, the two countries signed a series of defense agreements on the sharing of nuclear information, according Britain exclusive rights to use American nuclear technology in return for U.S. rights to deploy military weapons on British bases. The United States also promised Skybolt missiles and then sold Polaris missiles to Britain. In addition, in 1959 Eisenhower finally committed the United States to defend the British colony of Hong Kong, once an embarrassing colonial survival, now a free world bastion.

As they became increasingly embroiled in both the Middle East and Asia, American leaders perceived Britain's military forces and imperial holdings as useful adjuncts to their own undertakings. Between 1948 and 1960, British troops successfully suppressed a communist insurgency in Malaya, after which the country received its independence. Plagued by various financially and militarily burdensome nationalist and guerrilla movements in many of Britain's African colonies, in 1960 Macmillan publicly announced that in response to "winds of change," Britain would speedily grant independence to its remaining colonies, a pledge largely fulfilled by 1970. During the 1960s, growing U.S. military involvement in Vietnam helped to divide the United States from its European NATO allies, all of whom ignored forceful American requests to commit military forces to the conflict, in part because of strong domestic political opposition and major antiwar protests.

Britain did, however, provide intelligence information and logistical support to U.S. forces in Vietnam. In addition, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson cited British anticommunist efforts in Malaysia and Indonesia as major contributions supplementing American efforts elsewhere in Southeast Asia. President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration deplored Britain's 1967 decision to withdraw British military forces east of the Suez and the near-contemporaneous devaluation of the pound, which undercut U.S. efforts to maintain the post–World War II Bretton Woods international exchange system of fixed-rate currencies. Johnson was nonetheless grateful these had not come earlier.

Wracked by major economic and social problems for much of the 1970s, Britain was less significant to American foreign policy, and the relationship languished. Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath (1970–1974) looked toward Europe, not the United States. He finally succeeded in negotiating British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, after two earlier failed attempts during the 1960s. Many believed that this marked a permanent reorientation of British foreign policy in favor of Europe at the expense of both the United States and the British Commonwealth. The Labour government that replaced Heath in 1974 faced serious internal problems, including a strong party faction favoring withdrawal from NATO. So severe were British economic difficulties that in 1976 the country had to seek a substantial and humiliating loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was granted only in return for major cuts in British public spending.

In 1979, however, the right-wing Conservative Party politician Margaret Thatcher won election as prime minister. She was determined to restore

British greatness and the free market and was staunchly anticommunist and pro-American in outlook. The more jovial but equally ideological Ronald Reagan, elected U.S. president in November 1980, admired and respected her as an intellectual soul mate. They soon forged a close political and personal friendship. Initially, the two embarked on firmly anti-Soviet policies, cutting social welfare spending but increasing defense budgets. In the 1982 Falklands War, Thatcher's determination to resist Argentine seizure of British-owned islands won Reagan's admiration and ultimately received significant military and intelligence support from his administration. The two governments cooperated closely on defense and other issues. Thatcher was the only European leader to support Reagan's 1986 bombing of the Libyan capital of Tripoli, an action taken in retaliation for alleged terrorist activities. She also overrode substantial domestic opposition to stationing short- and intermediate-range American nuclear-armed cruise missiles on British soil, symbolized by the camp that antinuclear protestors established in 1980 and maintained for several years outside Greenham Common Air Base in Berkshire.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with President Ronald Reagan at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland, 6 November 1986. (Ronald Reagan Library)

After the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet general secretary in March 1985, Thatcher met with him and urged Reagan to have faith in his expressed desire to moderate the Cold War. Her prompts apparently weighed heavily with Reagan in his own subsequent meetings with Gorbachev, which began the process of Soviet-American rapprochement that eventually brought an end to the Cold War. When Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait in 1990, Thatcher reputedly helped to persuade President George H. W. Bush, Reagan's successor, to stand firm. Her successor, John Major, dispatched the second-largest military contingent—after that of the United States—to the consequent 1991 Persian Gulf War.

This pattern continued even after the Cold War ended, with Britain the most reliable military ally of the United States. Having forged a close relationship with President William "Bill" Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair developed an equally strong bond with President George W. Bush, breaking with much of his own Labour Party to join the war against Iraq in 2003. Regardless of political affiliation, and temporary estrangements notwithstanding, from 1945 onward most British prime ministers looked to the United States as their perennial and most reliable ally.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Anticolonialism; Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl; Bevin, Ernest; British Commonwealth of Nations; Churchill, Winston; Containment Policy; Decolonization;

Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander Frederick; Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Elizabeth II, Queen of England; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; Foot, Michael; Gaitskell, Hugh; George VI, King of Great Britain; Germany, Federal Republic of; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Healey, Denis; Heath, Edward; Heseltine, Michael; Hong Kong; India; Indonesia; International Monetary Fund; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Korean War; Macmillan, Maurice Harold; Malayan Emergency; Marshall Plan; MI5; MI6; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Poseidon; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Nixon, Richard Milhous; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; "Sinews of Peace" Speech; Singapore; Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Suez Crisis; Thatcher, Margaret; Truman, Harry S.; Vietnam; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests; World War II, Allied Conferences

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See United Kingdom, Air Force; United Kingdom, Army; United Kingdom, Navy

United Kingdom, Armed Forces

United Kingdom, Air Force

During the Cold War, Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) paralleled the narrowing in focus of Britain's overseas commitments and the reduction of its armed forces. Two predominant forces that shaped the RAF were sharp downsizing and spiraling technological sophistication, which combined to transform the 1945 great power air arm into the only second-tier air force capable of global operations by 1991.

The RAF's contraction from its World War II end strength of 1 million men to only 89,000 by 1991 had a number of important effects. Foremost, the end of conscription in 1960, coupled with ever more complex aircraft, accelerated the professionalization of the service. Additionally, fewer resources and Britain's narrowing strategic interests eliminated most overseas postings outside the United Kingdom after the withdrawal from east of the Suez in 1967.

The growing technological sophistication of airpower also decisively shaped the postwar RAF. The advent of jet technology and swept wings in the 1940s, supersonic flight, electronic warfare, British nuclear weapons and variable-geometry aircraft in the 1950s, and terrain-following flight in the 1960s presented too hostile an environment for most of the British aeronautical industry. Radical downsizing and consolidation reduced Britain's industry to a handful of companies. The cancellation of the TSR.2 in 1965 forced cooperation with allied powers in projects such as the Jaguar and Tornado or wholesale adoption of American weapon systems such as the F-111 and C-130. Despite the evisceration of Britain's aeronautical industry, the RAF remained capable of applying cutting-edge technology and by 1991 was one of only a handful of powers capable of worldwide operations with precision munitions.

The initial role of the RAF in the postwar world emanated from its heritage as a strategic bombing force. Following a 1947 decision to develop an independent nuclear program, the RAF engaged in a tortuous process of developing both usable weapons and the platforms capable of delivering them. Britain achieved the former in a test at the Monte Bello Islands in 1952, but the latter turned out to be more problematic. Although Lincolns (upgraded wartime Lancasters) and Washingtons (U.S.-loaned B-29s) provided an interim nuclear delivery capability, they were ultimately unsatisfactory in the long run. A ten-year development cycle resulted in a generation of swept-wing, all-jet V-bombers—the Valiant, Vulcan, and Victor—that by 1957 were only marginally capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses. An attempt to evade Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems by switching

Despite the evisceration of Britain's aeronautical industry, the RAF remained capable of applying cutting-edge technology.

from high- to low-altitude penetration exceeded the design capacity of the V-bombers and mandated their phased withdrawal from frontline strategic service beginning in 1964. That together with the cancellation of the Anglo-American Skybolt tactical missile that was to extend the V-bomber's strike range and the offer of the U.S. Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to the Royal Navy (RN) all but ended the RAF's strategic role.

As a result, in a general overhaul reflecting changed missions and resource constraints, the RAF drastically reorganized at the end of the 1960s. The dissolution of Bomber and Fighter Commands in 1968 and the creation of the Strike Command was followed by the RN's Polaris-equipped submarines formally assuming responsibility for the British nuclear deterrent in 1969.

Despite the eclipse of the RAF's strategic role, both before and after 1969 it played an active part in almost every British military operation. After teaming with the U.S. Air Force in the 1948–1949 Berlin Airlift, the RAF successfully aided in defeating insurgencies in Malaya, Cyprus, and Kenya. The strength required for the former precluded large-scale conventional involvement in the Korean War. While fighting instability in erstwhile colonies during the 1950s, the RAF also participated in Britain's military campaign during the 1956 Suez Crisis, effectively destroying the Egyptian Air Force in two days. Smaller conventional operations punctuated the 1960s, including the defense of Kuwait in 1961, extended deployments to contain Indonesia during 1963–1966, and the evacuation of Aden in 1967, a part of the overall withdrawal from east of the Suez.

The slow pace of the 1970s erupted into a major independent campaign in 1982 against Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Operation CORPORATE, which featured joint RN-RAF operations more than 8,000 miles from Britain and required robust logistics, highlighted the RAF as the only European air force still capable of projecting force outside the region. During the 1991 Gulf War, the RAF again showed its prowess by adapting low-level, high-speed delivery techniques developed for the European theater to destroy Iraqi air defenses. Both the RAF's 6,000-plus sorties and extensive Special Air Service operations were a critical component of the Coalition's swift victory. The RAF's performance in the Gulf War underscored its role as a uniquely capable Cold War force that adroitly projected regional and global airpower to advance British and allied interests.

EDWARD KAPLAN

See also

Anticolonialism; Atomic Bomb; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bombers, Strategic; British Army; Hydrogen Bomb; Malayan Emergency; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; United Kingdom, Royal Navy; Suez Crisis; United Kingdom

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United Kingdom, Army

The period of the Cold War was punctuated by a number of small wars for the British Army. British troops were deployed in conflicts around the world, including Java and Sumatra (1945), India (1945–1948), Palestine (1945–1948), Malaya (1948–1960), Korea (1950–1953), the Suez Canal (1951–1956), Kenya (1952–1960), Cyprus (1955–1959), Aden and Radfan (1955–1967), Borneo (1962–1966), Oman (1969–1976), the Falkland (Mariana) Islands (1982), and the Persian Gulf (1990–1991). During this period, the British Army was awarded a total of twenty-three battle honors for action in the Korean War, the Falklands War, and the Persian Gulf War.

Following World War II, Britain found itself weighed down by its postwar obligations, colonial holdings, and the outbreak of the Cold War. The British Army of the Rhine, comprising some 50,000 troops in three divisions, participated in the Allied occupation of Germany. An additional 3,000 troops were stationed in divided Berlin. There was often a colonial/Cold War overlap, such as when Britain faced problems with the Soviet Union in Germany while dealing with independence movements in India, Palestine, and Malaya.

The British Army at the close of World War II numbered 2.931 million men. By August 1947, it had shrunk to a little more than 750,000 men. Even so, the peace dividend was limited. Although military spending dramatically decreased in the initial postwar years, imperial overstretch combined with the Cold War led to defense expenditures taking up a significant portion of the total British budget; indeed, in the period 1948–1954, defense allocations took up 22–42 percent of the aggregate budget. It was not until 1960 that conscription was ended, leading to a volunteer army of roughly 165,000 men, including 19,000 officers. During this time, the annual expenditure for arms was £1.6 million.

The times placed great stress on the British Army, occasionally leading to outbreaks of rebellion among the troops. For example, in 1946 at Muar Camp near Kuala Lumpur in Malaya, 258 men of the 13th Battalion Parachute Regiment, many of whom were veterans of the D-Day invasion, mutinied over living conditions. That same year, there was a Royal Air Force mutiny of nearly 50,000 men at bases in India, Ceylon, Singapore, and the Far East. The servicemen's complaints included dissatisfaction with working conditions as well as disagreement over British imperialism.

In 1946, anti-British riots broke out across India. For five days in August 1946, six British battalions skirmished with violent mobs in Calcutta, and hundreds of Indians were killed. Violence spread to Bombay, Delhi, and the

In the various deployments and military operations of the Cold War era, more than 3,500 British soldiers were killed and an additional 17,000 wounded.

British troops on patrol in Calcutta, India, following riots that claimed the lives of 250 people, 24 February 1946. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Punjab region. India finally gained its independence on 15 August 1947, and six months later the last of the British soldiers departed, dramatically ending more than two centuries of British occupation. London now no longer controlled the Indian Army, reducing by half the troops it had available for colonial policing.

The Middle East also proved to be a policing problem. As Zionists worked toward establishing a Jewish homeland, British forces fought to restrict the flow of refugees from Europe to Palestine, provoking a violent response. The British 1st Infantry Division had to be reinforced by the 6th Airborne Division and the 3rd Infantry Division. Some of these reinforcements were diverted from European security duties in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). Ironically, some of the rebels had been part of the British-trained Jewish Brigade Group, which during World War II had fought in Italy under the British Eighth Army.

During the Korean War (1950–1953), the postwar British Army peaked at more than 440,000 men. Sixteen battalions of British infantry participated in the fighting. Armored and artillery units also played a key role. Britain's only role in the Vietnam War that followed was to provide a jungle-warfare training team in Malaya.



In Egypt, a British presence protected the Suez Canal, an occupation that was also met with resistance. During 1950–1956, more than 50 British servicemen were killed, leading to retaliatory incidents. In March 1956, the last of the British troops left the Suez Canal zone. When Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the British-owned Suez Canal Company, the British government called up 20,000 reservists and bolstered its forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel, France, and Britain then combined to attack Egypt but were pressured by the United States and the United Nations (UN) to withdraw.

In 1961, Kuwait became independent and was immediately threatened by the Iraqi regime under General Abdul Kassem, leading to the deployment of British troops. The incident was a prelude to the Persian Gulf War three decades later, when British forces totaled 45,000 men. In the 1982 Falkland (Marianas) War, a British task force of 27,000 personnel arrived in the Falkland Islands on 117 ships and defeated an Argentine garrison of 12,000 men.

In the various deployments and military operations of the Cold War era, more than 3,500 British soldiers were killed and an additional 17,000 wounded. Following the end of World War II, 1968 marked the first year in which no British soldiers died in combat. The postwar tally shows that the British Army suffered 223 dead and 478 wounded in Palestine, 489 dead and 961 wounded in Malaya, 865 dead and 2,589 wounded in Korea, 12 dead and 69 wounded in Kenya, 79 dead and 414 wounded in Cyprus, 12 dead and 63 wounded in Suez, 59 dead and 123 wounded in Malaysia, 52 dead and 510 wounded in Aden, 225 killed and 777 wounded in the Falklands, and 87 dead and 1,700 wounded in the Persian Gulf.

During the Cold War, the British Army primarily tended to unrest in its former colonial holdings, problems that were directly and indirectly related to the larger struggle between the East and the West. Britain's resolve to commit troops around the world in crisis situations played a role in containing communism by limiting opportunities for Kremlin designs. By the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when Britain partnered with the United States in opposing Saddam Hussein, the Soviet Union had practically reached its end as leaders of the West proclaimed a new world order.

ROGER CHAPMAN

See also

Falklands War; Korean War; Malayan Emergency; Mau Mau; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Persian Gulf War; Suez Crisis; United Kingdom

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United Kingdom, Navy

The United Kingdom's Royal Navy (RN) was gradually streamlined and downsized during the Cold War, shifting its strategic capability from that of a surface fleet to one that primarily employed submarines and antisubmarine warfare. In 1945 Britain still maintained naval bases around the world. Its domestic fleet bases were located at Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham. There was also a dockyard at Rosyth in Scotland. Overseas bases were situated in Malta; Ceylon; (Trincomalee); Singapore; and Simonstown, South Africa (near Capetown), with Gibraltar and Bermuda serving as dockyards. In 1954, the navy had more than 600 vessels and a regular force strength of 117,700. By 1991, its active-duty force had been downsized to 60,000. During 1950–1990 there were major reductions in the number of aircraft carriers (from 12 to 3), cruisers (from 29 to 0), destroyers/frigates (from 280 to 51), and conventional submarines (from 66 to 9).

The financial realities of waging the Cold War had a major impact on Great Britain beginning in 1951, the year after the outbreak of the Korean War, when military expenditures doubled. At that time, British troops were already in Malaya and Hong Kong in response to perceived communist threats. The RN was a major participant in the Korean War, utilizing aircraft carriers (the *Glory*, *Ocean*, *Theseus*, and *Triumph*); cruisers (the *Birmingham*, *Belfast*, *Jamaica*, *Kenya*, and *New Castle*); destroyers (the *Charity*, *Cockade*, *Comus*, *Consort*, and *Cossack*); frigates (the *Alacrity*, *Black Swan*, *Heart*, *Morecome Bay*,

Mounts Bay, and *Whitesand Bay*); a hospital ship (the *Maine*); and other vessels. RN aircraft employed in Korea included the Sea Fury, Firefly, and Seafire.

Prior to the Korean War, the RN experienced several incidents in the Mediterranean and the Far East. In 1947, the Mediterranean Fleet had attempted to stem the tide of illegal Jewish immigrants from Europe to Palestine. In 1949, the destroyers *Saumarez* and *Volage*, during a show of force against the communists, struck mines off the coast of Albania, resulting in the loss of forty-four lives. Also in 1949, the frigate HMS *Amethyst* came under attack by Chinese communist forces when it patrolled up the Yangtze River. In 1951, the RN responded to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute by imposing a blockade on the port of Abadan to prevent oil from being exported.

In 1956 Britain, France, and Israel carried out a coordinated attack on Egypt. During the Suez Crisis, the RN dispatched the aircraft carriers *Eagle*, *Albion*, and *Bulwark* to the Canal Zone. In that conflict, the *Ocean* at Port Said launched the first helicopter-borne amphibious landing in history. The Suez Crisis revealed serious shortcomings in Britain's military reach and indicated that it was no longer able to undertake major unilateral military action. Britain's military position was also affected by the hydrogen bomb. A Defence White Paper of April 1957 concluded that "the role of naval forces in total war is uncertain." Conscription came to an end that same year, and greater reliance was placed on nuclear weaponry. The same year, after successfully lobbying the United States to amend its Atomic Energy Act, British officials were able to purchase from the Americans a nuclear propulsion plant for the first British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS *Dreadnought*.

The *Dreadnought*, commissioned in 1963, represented a new strategy. From this point in the RN, traditional aircraft carriers declined in importance. HMS *Ark Royal*, the last such vessel, was decommissioned in 1978. Beginning in 1980, smaller carriers—the *Invincible*, *Illustrious*, and *Ark Royal*—transported helicopters and vertical-lift Sea Harrier jets. Beginning in the 1970s, a Polaris submarine fleet of four boats—the *Resolution*, *Repulse*, *Renown*, and *Revenge*—also strengthened Britain's nuclear capability. Each submarine could carry sixteen missiles armed with nuclear warheads with a striking range of 2,500 nautical miles.

Despite naval spending cuts during the 1960s and 1970s, defense costs remained high, and by the early 1980s there was pressure for an even leaner military. On 25 June 1981, Secretary of State for Defence John Nott submitted to Parliament "The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward." This report recommended a strategic emphasis on Europe, in conjunction with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, with less emphasis on global capability. Since the British Army and the Royal Air Force were already largely oriented toward West European defense, the brunt of the cuts was earmarked for the RN. Fortunately for the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the crisis in the Falklands broke out prior to the implementation of this new approach.

In 1982, Britain went to war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. It was Britain's first engagement with a modern navy since 1945 and proved a challenging undertaking, as it was fought 8,000 miles from the British Isles.

Royal Navy Resolution-class submarine, 1966. The Resolution-class were the first British strategic ballistic missile submarines and carried the Polaris missile. (Art-Tech)

During the Falklands War, the RN provided essential reach and support for a British expeditionary force to reconquer the islands from Argentina. In all, the United Kingdom committed 117 ships and 27,000 personnel, led by Rear Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward. On 2 May 1982, the British nuclear-powered submarine *Conqueror* torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano*. Under Argentine Air Force attack with French-made Exocet missiles, Britain lost the Type 42 destroyers *Sheffeld* and *Coventry*, the Type 21s *Antelope* and *Ardent*, the landing ship *Sir Galahad*, and the container ship *Atlantic Conveyor*. British war dead tallied 255, with another 777 wounded. The war prompted British officials to reconsider their drastic downsizing of the RN.

In 1991, Britain began replacing the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with larger Tridents. With the end of the Cold War, aside from the submarine-missiles deterrent, the RN's primary role has been antisubmarine warfare, which was aided by three antisubmarine warfare carriers lifting Sea King antisubmarine and early warning helicopters.

Roger Chapman

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Falklands War; Hydrogen Bomb; Korean War; Missiles, Polaris; Submarines; Suez Crisis; Thatcher, Margaret; Warships, Surface

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United Nations

Multinational organization established in 1945 and designed to promote four primary objectives: collective security, international economic and cultural cooperation, multilateral humanitarian assistance, and human rights. The creation of the United Nations (UN) represented an attempt by the World War II Allies to establish an international organization more effective than the interwar League of Nations, which had failed to mitigate the worldwide economic depression of the 1930s or prevent a second world war. UN architects were heavily influenced by the belief that during the 1930s, nationalist policies, economic and political rivalries, and the absence of international collaboration to help resolve outstanding disputes had contributed substantially to the outbreak of World War II.

Even before the United States officially joined the war effort, in the early months of World War II U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull established a departmental planning group for the purpose of creating the UN. At a meeting off the Newfoundland coast in August 1941, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill included a broad proposal for an international security system in the Atlantic Charter, which was their declaration of overall war objectives.

On 1 January 1942, the governments of twenty-six nations fighting Germany, Italy, and Japan issued the Declaration by the United Nations affirming their alliance against the Axis powers and also stating their commitment to liberal war objectives, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and the restoration of the principles of international law. In 1943, both houses of the U.S. Congress also passed resolutions demanding the creation of a postwar international security organization in which, they implied, their own country should take the leading role that it had abdicated in the League of Nations. Meeting in Moscow in October 1943, foreign ministers of the four leading Allied powers—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—



British Prime Minister Clement Atlee addressing the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946. (Corel)

signed the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, committing their nations in general terms to the creation of a postwar international organization.

More specific proposals came out of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in Washington, D.C., from August to October 1944 in which thirty-nine nations participated. These recommendations represented a compromise between the ideas of Roosevelt and other devotees of realpolitik—that agreement between the Big Four Allied powers, "the four policemen," must be the foundation of postwar international security—and more idealistic popular visions of a world in which all powers, great and small, enjoyed equal status and protection. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference agreed to create a bipartite UN modeled on the earlier League of Nations but reserving ultimate authority to the dominant Allied states. Any peace-loving state that was prepared to accept the terms of the UN Charter would be eligible to apply for membership. All member states would be represented in the UN General Assembly, which would debate, discuss, and vote on issues that came before it. Executive authority rested with the eleven-member UN Security Council, which would have five permanent members: Britain, France, the United States, Russia, and China. The remaining Security Council representatives were drawn from other UN states, all of which would serve two-year terms in rotation. Besides providing an international security mechanism, the UN was also expected to promote international cooperation on economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian issues.

Executive authority rested with the eleven-member UN Security Council, which would have five permanent members: Britain, France, the United States, Russia, and China.

Membership of the United Nations

Year Joined	*Countries*
1945	Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia (Soviet Union), Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela
1946	Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, Thailand
1947	Pakistan, Yemen
1948	Myanmar
1949	Israel
1950	Indonesia
1955	Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka
1956	Japan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia
1957	Ghana, Malaysia
1958	Guinea
1960	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo
1961	Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania
1962	Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda
1963	Kenya, Kuwait
1964	Malawi, Malta, Zambia
1965	Gambia, Maldives, Singapore
1966	Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho
1968	Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Swaziland
1970	Fiji
1971	Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates
1973	Bahamas, West Germany
1974	Bangladesh, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau
1975	Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Principe, Suriname
1976	Angola, Samoa, Seychelles
1977	Djibouti, Vietnam
1978	Dominica, Solomon Islands
1979	Saint Lucia
1980	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Zimbabwe
1981	Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Vanuatu
1983	Saint Kitts and Nevis
1984	Brunei
1990	Lichtenstein, Namibia
2002	East Timor

At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the Allies—at Soviet insistence—agreed that each permanent Security Council member should enjoy veto power over all General Assembly decisions. The Soviet Union also obtained separate representation for Belorussia (Belarus) and Ukraine. The Yalta Conference further agreed on a UN trustee system to administer both former League of Nations mandatory territories—originally colonies taken from Germany and Turkey after World War I—and areas seized from the Axis powers when the current war ended.

The Yalta Conference formally invited all Allied and most neutral powers to attend a conference that would open in San Francisco on 25 April 1945 to establish the UN. Representatives of fifty-one nations attended this gathering, which ended on 25 July 1945, and hammered out the details of the UN

Charter, which accorded smaller states slightly more authority than had the original Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The charter incorporated the International Labor Organization (ILO), established under the original 1919 League of Nations Covenant. To pursue its stated nonsecurity objectives, the charter also created the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), together with an eighteen-member Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat, which administered the organization. By the end of 1945, all fifty-one states represented at San Francisco had ratified the UN Charter. In 1946 the body held its first session in London and in 1947 moved permanently to the United States, where its headquarters was completed soon afterward in New York City.

So vast were the mandate and responsibilities of the UN that much regarding its future role remained open when it was founded in 1945. As is not uncommon with bureaucracies, additional agencies proliferated, and its structure gradually became more complex. As former colonies won independence and large states were sometimes partitioned into smaller units, by the end of the twentieth century the membership had expanded from the original 51 member states to close to 200. As the number of members soared, the Security Council grew from 11 to 15 members, and the Economic and Social Council rose first to 27 members and eventually to 54. By the mid-1990s, the UN system embraced fifteen specialized institutions, among them the ILO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group, UNESCO, and the World Health Organization (WHO); two semiautonomous affiliates, including the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA); fifteen specific organizations established by and responsible to the General Assembly; six functional commissions; five regional commissions; and seventy-five special committees. By the mid-1990s, more than 29,000 international civil servants worked for the UN in its New York headquarters and its subsidiary offices in Geneva and Vienna.

The UN soon became an arena for Cold War contests and disputes in which the major powers tested their strength, while third world nations came to see the UN as a forum where, given their growing numbers, the concerns of less-developed countries could be voiced and made effective, especially in the General Assembly, which was empowered to discuss all international questions of interest to members. In the Cold War context, the UN became a venue in which the Western and communist camps contended for power. Despite its stated security role, the organization proved remarkably unsuccessful in defusing the growing tensions that, during the second half of the 1940s, rapidly came to divide the former World War II Allies such that the Western powers of Britain, France, and the United States were soon fiercely at odds with the Soviet Union.

With UN endorsement, in 1948 the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) established a pro-Western and noncommunist government, while the communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) failed to win UN recognition. A much greater test of strength came after the communist takeover of Mainland China in October 1949, when the United

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is formally seated at the United Nations in 1971. At the same time, the world body expelled the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), heralding the de facto end of world recognition of Taiwan as representing China. (Corel)

States vetoed Soviet-backed efforts to transfer UN representation for China from the rejected Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government—which still controlled the island of Taiwan—to Mao Zedong's new People's Republic of China (PRC). In protest against the veto, the Soviet delegation withdrew from the UN, a boycott that was maintained for several months. Only in 1970 did the PRC win UN membership and China's Security Council seat.

When the UN was founded, it was anticipated that peacekeeping and the restoration of international security and order, if necessary by military means, would be among its major functions. Under Article 43 of the UN's charter, member states were originally expected to agree to make specified military forces available to the UN for deployment under the organization's control, for use on occasions when military intervention was required to maintain or reestablish international peace and security. In practice, no nation signed any such agreement relinquishing control of any military forces to UN authority.

The Soviet boycott permitted the United States in June 1950 to win UN endorsement for military intervention in Korea after North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Subsequent Soviet attempts later that year to veto the continuation of UN intervention in Korea were blocked when the United States persuaded the General Assembly, where it possessed a majority, to pass the Uniting for Peace Resolution, allowing the assembly to recommend

measures to member states to implement the restoration of international peace and security. The Korean War was the only occasion until the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War on which the UN itself intervened militarily to restore the status quo. In practice, the United States provided the bulk of troops involved, although other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, most notably Britain and Canada, provided substantial forces, as did Australia and New Zealand. The fact that the stalemated Korean War lasted for approximately three years, despite all UN efforts at mediation, illustrated the limitations of the peacekeeping functions of the organization.

Between 1945 and 1988 the UN did, however, undertake eleven limited peacekeeping operations, deploying an Emergency Force of troops—usually from states such as Canada, Colombia, Sweden, Norway, and Pakistan that were not permanent members of the Security Council—at the request and on the territory of at least one nation involved in a conflict or crisis in efforts to maintain peace. The first such occasion was the Suez Crisis of October 1956, when British, French, and Israeli forces attacked Egypt. The UN responded to a request from Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser by sending a contingent of 6,000 lightly armed personnel to oversee truce arrangements and the withdrawal of the invading forces. Although such arrangements were supposedly neutral, in practice the UN normally acted on the request of one party or the other in a dispute, and its forces often came to be identified with that side. When UN forces were dispatched to the Congo for several years in the early 1960s, they were soon perceived as working closely with Lieutenant General (and future president) Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko and against Prime Minister Moise Tshombe, a situation that soon led to increased casualties among UN forces.

Apart from such peacekeeping efforts, the UN responded to most international crises, such as the successive Arab-Israeli wars, with calls for ceasefires and truces and offers of mediation. After the failure to implement the Geneva Accords of 1954, which mandated the unification of Vietnam after nationwide elections, the UN refused to admit either the northern or southern Vietnamese states as members. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, successive UN secretary-generals nonetheless made repeated though unavailing efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in Vietnam. The UN verbally condemned the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the imposition of martial rule in Poland in 1981. Often, too, the UN embargoed the shipment of military equipment to states at war, although the effectiveness of such sanctions varied according to the willingness of member states to enforce them.

The UN General Assembly was the arena for some of the most significant pronouncements and dramatic confrontations of the Cold War. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" address before the assembly, calling for international cooperation to develop peaceful uses for nuclear energy. More tense occasions included those when the flamboyant Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev openly defied the Western powers, and U.S. representative Adlai Stevenson's challenge to his Soviet counterpart in October 1962 to confirm the presence of Soviet missiles in

Cuba. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, UN Secretary-General U Thant offered to mediate a settlement, an offer that President John F. Kennedy might have accepted had his own efforts proved unsuccessful. More embarrassingly for the United States, during the American-backed Bay of Pigs invasion attempt against Cuba in April 1961, Stevenson initially denied that his country was involved, a statement that he was later forced to retract. The UN generally encouraged all international efforts toward arms control and provided the arena for the negotiation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1992 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons.

The rapid increase in UN member-states during the 1950s and 1960s, largely the result of decolonization, brought growing numbers of African and Asian representatives to the General Assembly. In 1964, African, Asian, and Latin American nations formed the Group of Seventy-Seven, whose numbers eventually grew to 120 states from third world or developing nations and who frequently voted as a bloc and constituted more than a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Cuba, the bête noire of successive American presidents, took a prominent role in this grouping. The group's concerns focused primarily on economic issues (including the global distribution of wealth, resources, and power), the Arab-Israeli conflict, and South Africa rather than the Cold War per se. These concerns nonetheless frequently put them at odds with the United States, while the Soviet Union endorsed most Group of Seventy-Seven positions. It was largely at the group's instigation, for example, that the UN in 1970 expelled the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), admitting the PRC in its place, and sought to impose international economic sanctions on countries such as Israel, Rhodesia (subsequently Zimbabwe), and South Africa that defied UN resolutions. Western moral authority within the UN was also affected by the revelation in the late 1970s that as a young man during World War II, the Austrian-born UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim had belonged not just to the Nazi party but also to a military unit that had committed atrocities in Yugoslavia. No secretary-general since Waldheim has been of European origin.

Faced with declining influence in the UN and from the mid-1960s finding itself on the winning side less than 50 percent of the time in General Assembly votes, from the late 1960s onward the United States became decidedly less enthusiastic toward the organization. In the mid-1970s, U.S. representative to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan chose to adopt more confrontational tactics, aggressively putting forward his country's position and its commitment to the values of liberty and democracy. For the rest of the 1970s his successor, Andrew Young, nominated by President Jimmy Carter, was more conciliatory, but under President Ronald Reagan UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick once again adopted a confrontational stance, fiercely defending American values and the U.S. commitment to authoritarian but noncommunist regimes and assailing the communist position around the world. In Nicaragua, the United States not only supported the Contras who sought to undermine the left-wing Sandinista government but also defied

the International Court of Justice by mining the harbor of Managua, the capital. In 1985, distaste for the organization's policies, outlook, and management led the United States to withdraw from UNESCO, an action that the United Kingdom and Singapore soon emulated. Even more significantly, citing financial mismanagement and inefficiency, in 1985 the United States, which normally contributed at least 25 percent of the UN's budget, declined to pay a substantial portion of its assessed contribution, a decision reversed only in the mid-1990s.

The announcement in 1988 by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that his country intended to renounce the "use or threat of force" as an "instrument of foreign policy" and to cut dramatically its military forces in Eastern Europe marked the beginning of a new era for the UN. Initially skeptical, U.S. leaders gradually came to credit Gorbachev's good faith. The Soviet Union and the United States were no longer at odds in the Security Council, and the Group of Seventy-Seven could no more rely automatically on Soviet, or subsequently Russian, support. Between 1988 and 1994, the Security Council undertook twenty peacekeeping operations, while the UN helped to bring about a settlement of the Iran-Iraq War and to facilitate Soviet withdrawal from its lengthy and fruitless intervention in Afghanistan. The UN also encouraged negotiation by the Soviet Union and the United States of wide-ranging arms control agreements that, by the mid-1990s, had massively reduced the numbers of nuclear weapons each side deployed on its own soil and elsewhere.

Although less controversial and publicized than its efforts to maintain peace and resolve international conflicts, at all times many of the UN's energies were devoted to economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian efforts, including the eradication and prevention of disease, environmental and climatic issues, human rights, women's and children's rights, immigration, education, the care of refugees, and measures to combat such transnational problems as international dealings in human beings and the narcotics trade. The UN was perhaps most successful in promoting joint international action on humanitarian, economic, social, and environmental issues that transcended national boundaries and demanded concerted international action, such as food and hunger, health, trade policies, social justice, women's rights, pollution, and other ecological concerns. The ending of the Cold War facilitated UN endeavors to promote such objectives by removing some of the East-West barriers to their successful implementation.

Although sometimes derided as ineffective and handicapped in international crises by its reliance upon military forces contributed by member states, the UN often provided a valuable forum for the quiet exchange of views and the promotion of humanitarian and social goals. On occasion, it also conveniently furnished a useful alternative channel of communications among powers whose diplomatic relations were otherwise limited or even nonexistent. While never as effective in terms of resolving international conflicts as its founders envisaged, the UN proved considerably more successful than its predecessor, the League of Nations, in attracting and retaining as members most of the world's major as well as minor states, whose continuing

A United Nations doctor examines a baby under a mango tree, Mzizima, Uganda, 1967. (Corel)

membership implicitly bestowed authority and legitimacy upon the organization's statements and actions. Although often hampered by Cold War antagonisms, during the forty-five years from 1945 to 1990 the UN played a significant role in moderating Cold War tensions and defusing at least some international crises, providing an arena in which disputes could be nonviolently resolved.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Afghanistan War; Arab-Israeli Wars; Arms Control; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Churchill, Winston; Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Hammarskjöld, Dag; Iran-Iraq War; Khrushchev, Nikita; Kirkpatrick, Jeane Jordan; Korean War; Lie, Trygve;

Mobutu Sese Seko; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Nicaragua; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Roosevelt, Eleanor; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Suez Crisis; U Thant; United States; Waldheim, Kurt; World War II, Allied Conferences

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United States

The United States of America, arguably the world's most influential nation during the second half of the twentieth century, is located on the North American continent. With a 1945 population of approximately 140 million, the United States is bordered to the north by Canada and to the south by Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico. Its eastern borders are defined by the Atlantic Ocean and its western borders by the Pacific Ocean. The United States, including its territories of American Samoa and Guam in the Pacific Ocean and Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, has an area of 3.539 million square miles, making it the fourth-largest country in the world.

In World War I, the United States was a reluctant belligerent, not entering the war until April 1917, some thirty-two months after the conflict began. It emerged from the Great War in a position of preponderant economic and political strength, having been spared completely the devastation that had been wrought on the other major belligerents. Despite its putative policy of neutrality during much of the war, its economy had also benefited handsomely from the sale of war matériel and other goods to its allies, chiefly France and

Great Britain. By the end of the war, in fact, New York City had supplanted London as the world's chief financial center.

At the end of World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson attempted to construct a New World Order, one in which future military conflagrations would be unlikely and in which all nations would participate on a more-or-less equal footing. Wilson's internationalism policy was predicated upon three tenets. First, the postwar order was to be based upon a free-market liberal capitalist system, modeled after the United States, in which the United States would play a central role. Second, new international economic arrangements were to stress free trade, equal access to markets, and the reduction of ruinous competition. And third, international arrangements and the peace would be enforced by a supranational body known as the League of Nations—the precursor to the post–World War II United Nations (UN)—to which all nations would belong and contribute. Wilson, who referred to the League of Nations as "an alliance to end all alliances," had clearly envisioned an activist, proactive role for U.S. foreign policy. But his vision remained just that—a vision.

The U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and by doing so refused to sanction U.S. membership in the League of Nations. Thus, the United States never participated in the body, and by the late 1920s Republican-led administrations had turned American foreign policy into one of unilateral, limited internationalism rather than multilateral internationalism. The onset of the Great Depression saw the United States become even more isolationist, so much so that Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts to keep the nation out of a future war. Only with the obvious aggression of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s was President Franklin D. Roosevelt able to wrench his nation off the path of neutrality and isolationism, and even then it took the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to bring the nation into the war, more than two years after it had begun.

World War II silenced all but the most intransigent American isolationists. The war proved that isolationism had only invited aggression and that if a third world war was to be avoided, the United States had to take the lead in international affairs, essentially filling the vast power vacuums left in the war's wake. In 1945, America was in a unique position to do just that.

Unlike all the other major World War II belligerents, the American homeland had been left entirely undamaged, and its industrial capacity, which grew exponentially throughout the war, was capable of providing much of the world's manufactured goods. While once-mighty empires such as that of the British had been brought low because of the war, the United States emerged from the war as the world's most powerful nation. Its war casualties were comparatively small, it boasted the most technologically advanced armed forces in history, and it alone possessed the atomic bomb. And although the Soviet Red Army may have had numerical superiority at war's end, the Soviet Union was no match for American economic and military power. Before World War II had ended, U.S. policymakers had already begun to plan for the postwar world, which included the establishment of the UN, another supranational organization in which the United States would, this time, play a pivotal role.

The United States took on the role of leader of noncommunist nations in the Cold War and vied with the communist powers, most prominently the Soviet Union, for influence in decolonized and third world countries. For Americans, the Cold War was a military, political, economic, and ideological contest between democracy and totalitarianism, between capitalism and communism. Yet in establishing anticommunist alliances, the U.S. government sometimes backed undemocratic governments that did not share American ideals of democracy and freedom but were anticommunist and willing to cooperate with U.S. diplomatic aims. The Cold War was the primary focus of American foreign relations and military policy for more than four decades, and as such it also influenced American politics, society, and culture.

Even before the end of World War II, American policymakers feared Soviet expansion into Western Europe and Asia. Soon after the war, deteriorating relations between East and West, the drawing of what British Prime Minister Winston Churchill termed the Iron Curtain, and the imposition of communist governments in Eastern Europe bolstered these fears. In 1947, President Harry S. Truman declared that the United States would assist any free nation in opposing takeover by hostile powers, serving as one of the earliest public announcements of the U.S. containment policy to prevent the spread of communism. This commitment, known as the Truman Doctrine, was to be the operative anticommunist policy for the duration of the Cold War, in the process making the United States the world's policeman. The Marshall Plan, also announced in 1947, represented a massive U.S. effort to rebuild Western Europe's war-torn economies and in so doing construct a citadel against Soviet encroachments in the region.

International developments in the late 1940s and early 1950s stoked Americans' fears of the global reach of communism, reinforced U.S. determination to counter it, and fueled the post–World War II defense buildup and nuclear arms race. In 1948, Congress reinstated the Selective Service Act, which until 1973 required all eligible young men to register for military service. The Soviet-led Berlin Blockade (1948–1949) fortified Americans' suspicions of communist expansionism in Europe. In 1949, the United States entered into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a security pact with Canada and West European nations committing all signatories to come to the defense of any one attacked by a hostile power—implicitly understood to be the Soviet Union. This was a radical departure in U.S. foreign policy, as the nation had not been part of any permanent military alliance since the Revolutionary War in the late eighteenth century. A few months later, Americans grimly received the news of the triumph of Mao Zedong's communist forces in China, fast upon the heels of the shocking revelation that the Soviets had obliterated the U.S. atomic monopoly by exploding their first A-bomb in September.

This development led the Americans to embark on the construction of a thermonuclear—or hydrogen—bomb in January 1950, which was successfully detonated in 1952. In April 1950, Truman's National Security Council (NSC) produced a report, NSC-68, advocating a massive military buildup to prevent the spread of communism and to demonstrate U.S. determination

Secretary of State Dean Acheson signing the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of the United States, 4 April 1949. (NATO Photos)

to meet communist expansion head-on. Truman did not act on the report's recommendations until after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Within hours of the attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), he committed U.S. troops to the fight via the UN. The Korean War lasted three years and caused the loss of nearly 37,000 American lives. Korea also forced Truman to implement the prescriptions in NSC-68, resulting in a huge military rearmament program and the permanent stationing of troops in both Asia and Western Europe.

Cold War events overseas greatly influenced American domestic politics. Although anticommunism was no stranger to the United States, it exploded after World War II. War hawks and Truman critics accused his administration of losing China to the communists and branded the Democrats as soft on communism. In February 1950, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy helped perpetuate the second American Red Scare of the twentieth century (the first one occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War I) by charging that communists had infiltrated the highest levels of the U.S. government. Although his tactics were abhorrent and his charges mostly scurrilous, McCarthy

created a four-year-long anticommunist witch-hunt—subsequently dubbed "McCarthyism"—that ruined myriad careers and stifled political discourse. Simultaneously, investigations of former State Department official Alger Hiss and the atomic espionage trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg contributed to Americans' notions that fellow citizens might indeed be aiding a communist takeover from within the United States.

The Cold War also influenced American society and culture. Hundreds of thousands of people relied on the defense industry for employment between the 1950s and 1980s. For example, aerospace companies under contract by the U.S. government burgeoned in southern California, stimulating a mass migration to the region. Soon, a new defense economy, or military-industrial complex, had transformed the nation by attracting millions of people from the old industrial heartland of the Northeast and Midwest to the new industrial areas of the South and Southwest. This major demographic shift resulted in a realignment of political power, moving it farther west and south. It is little coincidence that since 1964, America has had three presidents from Texas, two from California, and two from the Deep South. In the declining cities of the North, however, urban decay, deindustrialization, high unemployment, and a diminishing tax base resulted in the creation of a permanent underclass of people unable to access reputable educational opportunities or decent jobs. Military service was expected of able young men, millions of whom served overseas in hot and cold wars in the 1950s and 1960s.

U.S. civil defense authorities asked all Americans, including housewives and children, to prepare for the possibility of nuclear war by storing foodstuffs, building homemade fallout shelters, and ducking and covering in the event of atomic attack. The Cold War shaped not only work opportunities and civic duties but also ideas about gender relations, family, and home life. For Americans, modern suburban life featuring fashionable furnishings, the latest appliances and gadgets, and a resplendently chromed automobile symbolized the superiority of the American way of life over that of communism. During the 1950s and 1960s, suburbs of cities both large and small sprang up like mushrooms in damp soil. Indeed, in American thought at the time, the ideal suburban family—with the father as sole breadwinner and the wife as dutiful homemaker and mother—had to be protected and encouraged at almost any cost. Not surprisingly, advertisements, movies, and—most famously—television promoted this alleged domestic ideal. Indeed, the family unit itself was believed to be a powerful defense against the communist subversion that Americans worried would take root in a disordered society characterized by the rejection of traditional gender roles and family arrangements. The nuclear family and an idealized home also symbolized security in an age of anxiety concerning nuclear conflict. Television sets, which proliferated in the 1950s, occasionally broadcast programs on the evils of communism, Soviet spies, and the possibility of nuclear warfare.

Because of their nation's superpower status and its role as the leader of the anticommunist world, Americans were aware that the peoples of other nations paid attention to how they behaved at home and abroad. The excesses of McCarthyism and the trial and execution of the Rosenbergs caused

Two women volunteers demonstrate meal preparation from canned goods in an emergency fallout shelter set up at the National Canners Association convention in Chicago, 1961. (National Archives and Records Administration)

those in other nations to question whether the United States actually guaranteed its citizens the constitutional rights it held up to the world as evidence of its moral authority. The civil rights movement, which gained momentum in the mid-1950s, also drew international attention to how the United States treated its African American population. The Soviets as well as U.S. allies and citizens in nonaligned nations closely followed the Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955–1956) and the attempt of nine African American students to integrate into a Little Rock, Arkansas, all-white high school in 1957. Onlookers in other nations condemned America's racist Jim Crow laws and violence against people of color and asked whether the United States could truthfully proclaim itself the beacon of democracy when it tolerated such patently unjust treatment of its own citizens.

Concerns about white Americans' conduct abroad also intensified in the 1950s. The widely read 1958 novel *The Ugly American*, by Americans William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, portrayed U.S. foreign service employees as boorish and ignorant of Southeast Asian languages and customs and argued

that their incompetence endangered U.S. Cold War policies and even pushed potential allies toward the communist camp. To counter global negative perceptions of Americans, the U.S. government attempted to project a positive image of itself through cultural diplomacy, including informational pamphlets, student exchanges, international exhibitions, and jazz concerts.

By the dawn of the 1960s, McCarthyism was largely a thing of the past, although anticommunist policies and sentiments remained strong. In his 1960 presidential campaign, President John F. Kennedy sharply criticized President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration as being weak in its fight against communism. In less than three years, Kennedy's administration demonstrated a tough and bellicose (if not always successful) anticommunist posture in its botched attempt to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, clashes with the Soviets over Berlin in the summer of 1961, nuclear brinkmanship with the Russians over the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962, and the dramatic increase of U.S. military advisors assisting the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, while expanding the role of the government in protecting public welfare and promoting civil rights, sought to carry on Kennedy's tough anticommunist policies. Congress's August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing Johnson to enlarge the role of the United States in fighting the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) provoked a massive escalation in the Vietnam War. Johnson's Vietnam War policies were expensive and divisive. By 1968, America was being torn apart by a burgeoning antiwar movement, race riots, political assassinations, and a virtual clash of cultures between the old ruling elite and the new generation of politically active college students and other young adults.

Internationally, however, the Vietnam War cost the United States much of its credibility in global affairs and its claim to moral leadership in the struggle against communism.

In American culture and society in the 1960s, irreverent critiques of Cold War dogma became popular. Joseph Heller's novel *Catch-22* (1961) ridiculed the armed forces as ineffectual and its missions as self-destructively irrational. Kurt Vonnegut's *Cat's Cradle* (1963) satirized the assumption that science ensured progress, portraying a nuclear scientist's invention intended to benefit the military as a threat to the existence of humankind. Among those who criticized the U.S. military engagement in Vietnam were many youths who had grown up practicing duck and cover exercises at school, reading textbooks that uncritically lauded the United States as the heroic leader in the crusade against the evils of communism, and watching films and television programs that depicted devious communists outwitted by resourceful American heroes. The counterculture movement, which influenced and was heavily influenced by anti–Vietnam War and antidraft activists, also rejected the consumerism and militarism of American society.

Despite challenges to the Cold War consensus forged in the previous decades, anticommunist attitudes persisted throughout the 1960s. Many Americans, whom President Richard M. Nixon termed "the silent majority," resented the hippies, protestors, and radicals who were seen as destroyers of the American way of life and backed conservative domestic and foreign policies. Although all the major candidates for president in 1968 had promised to

remove U.S. troops from Vietnam, many Americans supported the continued air war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in the early 1970s. Despite his pledge to end the war quickly, Nixon did not remove American troops from Vietnam until the beginning of his second term in 1973. Internationally, however, the Vietnam War cost the United States much of its credibility in global affairs and its claim to moral leadership in the struggle against communism. It also fueled anti-Americanism worldwide.

The 1970s saw détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the end of the Vietnam War, and the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was recognized by President Jimmy Carter's administration in 1979. In the wake of the destructive Watergate scandal, which forced Nixon from office, Americans wrestled with the role of their nation internationally and the conduct of their government at home. The takeover of the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) by the communist nationalists on the heels of the hasty American departure from Saigon in April 1975 made many Americans wonder why their nation had invested so much money, so many lives, and so many years to preserve a small, volatile nation on the other side of the world.

The costs of the war were indeed high, and ultimately the United States had not achieved its goal of preventing the reunification of Vietnam under communist rule. The disclosure of America's secret bombings in Cambodia and Laos, reports of war atrocities committed by U.S. forces, Nixon's ignominious resignation in August 1974, the fall of South Vietnam, and revelations about nefarious activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at home and abroad badly shook the American psyche. At the same time, skyrocketing oil prices, inflation, unemployment, and a stagnant economy seemed to show that the American Dream was becoming a nightmare by the end of the 1970s. The public mood turned inward, more concerned about problems at home than abroad.

Cold War tensions flared once more when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in an effort to uphold a pro-Soviet government there. President Carter had initially envisioned a foreign policy that emphasized the advancement of human rights rather than a harsh anti-communist stance entailing accelerated defense spending. The Soviet invasion, however, galvanized him to demonstrate U.S. opposition to Soviet expansionism by supporting the Afghan resistance, suspending arms limitation talks with the Soviets, placing embargoes on sales of grain and technology to Russia, reinstating registration for the draft, and boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. To make matters worse, the United States was gripped by the Iran Hostage Crisis between November 1979 and January

Cars lined up at a gas station in California on 9 May 1979, the first day of gas rationing following the Arab oil embargo. (UPI-Bettmann/Corbis)

1981, which only seemed to prove America's international weakness and Carter's inability to solve thorny foreign policy issues. Although it must be said that Carter was largely a victim of circumstances beyond his control, he nevertheless bore the brunt of Americans' frustration with a reeling economy and international crises.

Carter lost the 1980 presidential race to Ronald Reagan, who simultaneously ushered in a sometimes frighteningly militaristic anticommunism and uplifting pro-American rhetoric. In condemning the Soviet Union as an evil empire, Reagan revived in many Americans the belief in the United States as the champion of freedom and justice in the world, which appealed to those still galled by the U.S. failure in Vietnam, its loss of status in the world, and a flagging economy. In Reagan's first term as president, his administration pushed through billions of dollars of cuts to social programs, tax cuts, and major increases in defense spending.

While many Americans supported the nuclear buildup—including in 1983 Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), nicknamed "Star Wars," a space-based system to shield the United States from incoming nuclear missiles—as necessary to counter Soviet power, others were alarmed. In June 1982, 750,000 people gathered in New York City's Central Park to protest the accelerating nuclear arms race. Apprehension over the possibility of nuclear destruction emerged in many cultural forms during the 1980s, including the controversial television movie *The Day After* (1983), which graphically depicted a nuclear attack on a Midwestern city, showing the instant vaporization of humans, slow death by radiation poisoning, and the collapse of society. Popular music and literature served as additional outlets for fears of nuclear annihilation. Prince's 1983 song "1999" advocated enjoying life to its fullest as nuclear war loomed. Doug Coupland's 1991 novel *Generation X: Tales from an Accelerated Culture* depicted an unambitious group of friends in their twenties, living in the southern California desert to escape from the consumerist society of the 1980s, as deeply troubled by fears of nuclear destruction and radiation.



People marching in New York City during a rally against nuclear arms, 12 June 1982. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The mid-1980s, however, saw a rapid deceleration in Cold War tensions. The personal rapport between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, who became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, inspired international optimism that perhaps the two superpowers could find solutions to their differences and step back from the nuclear abyss. Summits between the two leaders yielded an agreement in 1987 for mutual inspections of nuclear arms. Between 1989 and 1991, Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, and Gorbachev negotiated momentous economic and arms reduction agreements.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, those who study it continue to pursue answers to many questions. Was the

Soviet Union as expansionist as American policymakers in the 1940s assumed? Might the United States have learned to coexist with communist states, or was conflict unavoidable? To what extent were pro-Soviet agents working in the United States as spies and saboteurs? Access to archival sources in the former Soviet Union as well as declassified U.S. historical documents are helping scholars to answer these questions.

Why the Cold War ended remains the subject of lively debate. Some analysts primarily credit U.S. resolve, demonstrated by a mighty (and massively expensive) defense, a steadfast opposition to communist ideology, and economic strategies that thwarted Soviet expansion over the decades. The costs to the Soviets of countering U.S. power, according to this view, contributed greatly to the demise of the Soviet Union. Other scholars give greater weight to economic and political problems inherent in the Soviet system and to Gorbachev's reforms. While Cold War triumphalists claimed that the fall of the Soviet Union proved the superiority of capitalism and democracy over communism, others pointed to U.S. failures to adhere to its own proclaimed democratic principles over the course of the Cold War, such as its covert and possibly illegal operations to help remove governments in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973) and the subversion of the U.S. constitutional process in the Iran-Contra Affair (1984–1986).

In the early twenty-first century, remnants of the Cold War persist in U.S. foreign relations. The U.S. government still refuses to recognize the Cuban government of communist Fidel Castro. The PRC's human rights abuses and suppression of democracy continued to trouble Americans, although Sino-American relations, especially in trade, had improved. North Korea, perhaps the last lonely outpost of the Cold War, remained intractably bellicose.

Donna Alvah and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Civil Defense; Containment Policy; Cuba; Détente; Duck and Cover Drill; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Guatemala; Iran; Iran-Contra Affair; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Korean War; Marshall Plan; McCarthyism; Military-Industrial Complex; National Security Council Report NSC-68; Nixon, Richard Milhous; North Atlantic Treaty; Nuclear Arms Race; Race Relations, United States; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Rosenberg, Julius; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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United States, Air Force

The U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) ended World War II as the largest and most powerful air force in the world. By the end of the conflict, the AAF comprised some 2.4 million personnel in 16 separate air forces (12 of them overseas) and 243 groups (later designated as wings). The important role played by the AAF in the war helped bring about realization of the goal long sought by its leaders of an independent air force.

The National Security Act, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Harry S. Truman in July 1947, established the U.S. Air Force (USAF) as an independent armed service. The USAF established three major combat commands in the United States: the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Tactical Air Command (TAC), and the Air Defense Command (ADC). The concept of strategic bombardment, which the AAF had embraced in World War II, continued to receive emphasis, and under General Curtis E. LeMay, SAC became the dominant USAF command. It controlled the long-range bomber force and the nation's nuclear delivery capability. SAC also assumed responsibility for aerial tankers to extend the strike range of the bombers. SAC gained responsibility for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) when they entered the U.S. force structure in the late 1950s.

Created in 1946, the ADC and TAC were initially merged into the Continental Air Command in December 1948 but were separated two years later. The USAF used TAC and theater commands overseas to conduct aviation missions in support of theater operations, including air superiority, ground attack (close air support and interdiction), reconnaissance, and airlift in the



Military Air Transport Service (MATS). MATS demonstrated its importance during the 1948–1949 Berlin Airlift.

First Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington (1947–1950) and air force leaders argued for a 70-wing air force, but budget retrenchment following World War II led to aggressive force reductions, resulting in an actual force structure of 48 wings. Nonetheless, because of the perception of airpower and atomic weapons as a war-winning combination, the USAF became the dominant service in terms of funding and political support, and SAC was clearly the most influential command in the U.S. defense establishment during the 1950s. The onset of the Korean War (1950–1953) brought significant improvement and increased spending for more personnel and new aircraft, leading to a 235-wing force in 1956.

Airpower did play a key role in the Korean War. It was certainly one of the most important factors in enabling United Nations Command (UNC) personnel to stand at the Pusan Perimeter until the United States could effect its military buildup and take the offensive. Propeller-driven Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers destroyed the industrial base of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and soon ran out of meaningful targets. U.S. airpower continued to savage North Korean and, later, Chinese supply lines and exacted a heavy toll on their ground personnel. Communist Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 interceptor aircraft, initially flown by Soviet pilots, however, forced the UNC to abandon strategic daytime bombing. The Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star, the first U.S. mass-produced jet

A U.S. Air Force North American F-86 Sabre jet launching 5-inch rockets. America's first swept-wing jet and the world's first air-superiority fighter, the Sabre played an important role in the Korean War. (U.S. Air Force)

aircraft, and the more capable Republic F-84 Thunderjet proved no match for the MiG-15, although on 8 November 1950 an F-80 did shoot down a MiG-15 in the first clash between jet aircraft in history. A worthy opponent for the MiG appeared in the North American F-86 Sabre, hastily rushed to Korea. These two jet aircraft were well matched, but the F-86s racked up an impressive kill ratio thanks to superior pilot training.

Top USAF leaders nonetheless concluded that the Korean War had been an anomaly, and they continued to invest significant resources in SAC programs. SAC's first strategic bomber was the propeller-driven Boeing B-50 Superfortress, introduced in 1947. Basically a vastly improved B-29, it was certainly outclassed by jet aircraft. In 1948 the Convair B-36 Peacemaker six-engine bomber entered service. With a gross weight of 410,000 pounds, it was the world's largest aircraft. The B-36 was also the world's first intercontinental bomber and was capable of carrying up to 72,000 pounds of munitions. It remained in service until 1959. The first four-engine American jet bomber was the North American B-45 Tornado. Produced beginning in 1948, it served in Korea in a reconnaissance role and was in service for a decade. The Boeing

B-47 Stratojet medium bomber was one of the most important of USAF aircraft. Sleek and futuristic and the first swept-wing bomber ever in production, the B-47 entered service in 1951. Boeing's follow-on aircraft to the B-47, the B-52 Stratofortress, entered service in 1955. The Stratofortress has been in service for more than fifty years. Certainly one of the most important aircraft ever produced, it was capable of carrying a 40,000-pound payload 8,800 miles. B-52s are closely identified with the Cold War and played a leading role in the Vietnam War, even acting in support of ground operations. They are best remembered, however, for their role in the December 1972 Christmas Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. In 1960, SAC received the sleek Convair B-58 Hustler. In service for a decade, the large delta-configuration B-58 was capable of a speed of 1,385 mph—the world's first supersonic bomber.

The Vietnam War saw the USAF carry out operations in direct support of ground troops but also conduct the highly publicized bombing of North Vietnam (Operations ROLLING THUNDER, LINEBACKER I, and LINEBACKER II) and the secret bombing of Laos (Operations BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER) and Cambodia (Operation MENU). The interdiction campaigns were frustrating in that they never could completely halt the infiltration of men and supplies by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), but they certainly did make it much more difficult for the communist side in the war and kept many North Vietnamese troops and weapons out of South Vietnam. The campaigns did reveal the limitations of airpower in nonconventional warfare, however. U.S. airpower, to include the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps, did play an important role in such battles as the action in the Ia Drang Valley, the 1968 Tet Offensive, and the siege of Khe Sanh, and certainly airpower was a key factor in North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam in the Spring or Easter Offensive of 1972.

A worthy opponent for the MiG appeared in the North American F-86 Sabre, hastily rushed to Korea.

In 1957, the United States launched its first ICBM, and shortly thereafter SAC also controlled nuclear-armed ICBMs. By the end of the 1960s, SAC controlled more than 1,000 ICBMs as the number of nuclear-capable bombers dwindled. The bombers and ICBMs combined with the navy's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to create the triad nuclear deterrence force. Coordination in targeting and the development of the nuclear Single Integrated Operations Plan was the responsibility of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, collocated at Offutt Air Force Base with SAC headquarters. SAC was disestablished on 1 June 1992, following the end of the Cold War. Its nuclear planning and command and control role continued in the Unified Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and its operational forces were dispersed to other USAF major commands: bombers and missiles to Air Combat Command (missiles later moved to Space Command) and tankers to Air Mobility Command.

In the early Cold War years, the offensive capability of SAC was complemented by extensive USAF air defense forces. The ADC was responsible for the interceptor fighters dedicated to the defense of the continental United States. The command also directed the early warning radar system and the command and control structure that coordinated all air defense resources,

including resources provided by other services in an emergency. The ADC became the U.S. component of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), and the ADC commander normally served simultaneously as the NORAD commander as well. As space systems became increasingly important to warning and defensive operations, the USAF renamed the command the Aerospace Defense Command in 1968. The ADC was headquartered at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, and then at Peterson Field, Colorado. The ADC was inactivated in March 1980, and its functions were dispersed to other major commands, primarily SAC, TAC, and, eventually, Space Command.

Prominent interceptor aircraft flown by the USAF in this period included the Northrop F-89 Scorpion and the Lockheed F-94 Starfire. These aircraft entered service in 1950 and served for a decade, bringing radar intercept capabilities for night and bad weather operations. The North American F-86D Sabre of 1951 was the first USAF single-seat all-weather jet interceptor. The North American F-100 Super Sabre appeared in 1954 and served until 1979. It was the first USAF fighter to cruise at supersonic speeds and was designed as an interceptor. The Lockheed F-104 Starfighter appeared in 1958 as an interceptor but ended its career as a ground attack aircraft. The second generation of air defense systems included the McDonnell Douglas F-101B Voodoo, Convair F-102 Delta Dart, and Convair F-106 Delta Dagger interceptors.

The TAC was established in 1946 to control and train forces that would work with U.S. Army units in theater operations. TAC's primary missions were securing air superiority and providing support to the ground forces through close air support, interdiction, and reconnaissance missions. TAC was merged into the Continental Air Command in 1948. In December 1950, the USAF returned TAC to major command status, reflecting the demands of the Korean War on theater air resources. TAC was headquartered at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. The USAF converted TAC to Air Combat Command in 1992 as part of the post–Cold War reorganization.

The F-80, F-84, and F-86 were among the first jet fighters. They were followed in the 1950s by day-fighter designs that had a secondary ground-attack role, especially the Super Sabre and the Starfighter. Over time, both the F-100 and the F-104 became primarily ground-attack platforms. In the mid-1960s, the USAF adapted the navy-designed McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom as a multirole aircraft to perform the air superiority and ground-attack roles. The McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle was the first USAF design specifically for air superiority. It entered service in 1974 and saw extensive service in the 1991 Gulf War. It also performed brilliantly for the Israeli Air Force. The General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon of 1980, conceived as a lightweight multirole complement to the F-15, combined air-to-air and ground-attack capabilities.

Fighter-bomber, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft included the Thunderjet of 1947. It saw extensive service in a variety of missions during the Korean War. Reflecting the nuclear-oriented force structure of Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency, the USAF embraced the Republic F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bomber as a supersonic nuclear weapons delivery system. In a conventional bombing role, it bore the brunt of the air war over North Vietnam.

The superb Phantom entered service in 1960 and served extensively in Vietnam, where it established an enviable combat record. The Phantom remained in service throughout the Cold War period. The General Dynamics F/FB-111 Aardvark of 1968 was the first operational combat aircraft with a swing-wing. Finally, mention must be made of the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter. In appearance unlike any other aircraft and making use of radar absorbent materials, the triangular-shaped F-117A appeared in 1983 and first saw action in the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama. It also participated extensively in the Gulf War, hitting targets with great precision. Of reconnaissance aircraft, Lockheed produced perhaps the world's two best in the Cold War: the U-2 (1956) and the SR-71 (1964).

Of major USAF overseas commands, the two most important were the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). USAFE was established in August 1945 and served as the air force component of the U.S. European Command. USAF theater forces in the Pacific were initially organized as the Far East Air Forces. In 1957, the designation shifted to Pacific Air Forces. PACAF was the USAF component of the U.S. Pacific Command.

Two-ship formation of Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter aircraft. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Airlift emerged as a vitally important function during World War II. This continued in the Cold War. In 1948, the Air Force Air Transport Command and the Navy Air Transport Service were merged to create MATS, which was charged with providing all necessary airlift support to the U.S. military. The USAF changed MATS to the Military Airlift Command (MAC) in 1966. MAC became the air force component to U.S. Transportation Command, the unified command responsible for moving and sustaining U.S. combat forces. In addition to military aircraft, MAC managed contracted airlift and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), which provided an additional surge airlift capacity in national emergencies. MAC was headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. During the post–Cold War USAF reorganization in 1992, MAC was renamed Air Mobility Command and gained control of the tanker aircraft that had previously been assigned to SAC.

McDonnell Douglas provided a large number of transport aircraft in this period. Among these were the workhorse C-47 Skytrain (the military version of the DC-3); the C-54 Skymaster (the civilian DC-4), the first four-engine U.S. military transport; the C-74 Globemaster, at its introduction in 1945 the world's largest transport plane; the C-118 Liftmaster (the DC-6 in civilian service); the C-124 Globemaster, the USAF's first strategic cargo plane; and the C-133 Cargomaster. Lockheed also provided noteworthy Cold War transport aircraft, including the C-121 Super Constellation, the C-130 Hercules, and the C-141 Starlifter, in 1965 the world's first all-jet air transport aircraft. Lockheed's giant C-5 Galaxy entered service in 1969 and held the title as

A Delta launch vehicle carrying an active magnetospheric particle tracer explorer satellite lifts off from the Kennedy Space Center, 16 August 1984. (U.S. Department of Defense)

the world's largest operational aircraft for more than fifteen years. The twin-engine Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar entered service in 1949 and served with distinction in Korea and in Vietnam. Tanker aircraft include the McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender and Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker.

The USAF was heavily involved in the development of space systems from its origin as a separate service and became the lead agency for space launches, working closely with other government agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Reconnaissance Office, to develop a wide range of space-based capabilities. Initially, the development and launch of satellite systems were the responsibilities of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), which also dealt with aircraft and other weapons system designs. The USAF redesignated ARDC the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) in 1961. The rapidly increasing importance of space led the USAF to establish the Air Force Space Command in September 1982. Air Force Space Command provided launch support and operational control of space platforms and became the lead agency for U.S. military space activities. It also assumed some of the ADC component functions in NORAD and in 1985 became the air force component of the U.S. Space Command.

The USAF relied on a number of supporting major commands to develop and sustain its capabilities. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC, Air Matériel Command until 1961) provided supply and maintenance support. In the post–Cold War reorganization of 1992, the USAF merged the AFLC and the AFSC into Air Force Matériel Command. An additional important command for the USAF was Air Training Command (ATC), the organization that provided all of the formal training for USAF personnel, including flying training for pilots and navigators and technical training for all career fields. The USAF later renamed the ATC the Air Education and Training Command.

USAF doctrinal emphasis on deep attacks in pursuit of decisive effects often placed it in conflict with the other services, which believed that airpower should be used in a support role to assist the surface forces in traditional campaigns against enemy surface forces. In addition to seeking decisive offensive victories, USAF doctrine emphasized the importance of technological dominance and the need for pursuing advanced capabilities. As the Cold War ended, USAF theater airpower and space power, developed to deter and if necessary engage Soviet power, was nonetheless highly effective in providing the foundation for victory in Operation DESERT STORM, the 1991 campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

The end of the Cold War brought a considerable decline in USAF strength. In 1987 the USAF had 171 wings, 7,245 active duty aircraft, and 607,000 personnel. By 1991 these numbers had fallen to 153 wings (115 wings

by 1995), 4,710 aircraft, and 388,100 personnel. Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFR) totals experienced similar declines, from 263,000 to 181,000 personnel.

Jerome V. Martin and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Aircraft; Aircraft Carriers; Bombers, Strategic; Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic; North American Aerospace Defense Command; Nuclear Arms Race; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; Triad

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United States, Army

The U.S. Army emerged from World War II as the best-armed, most-mobile, best-equipped, best-supplied, most-educated, and highest-paid army in history. Immediately following the end of the war, President Harry S. Truman supported a measured reduction from 8.2 million to 1.5 million men, but domestic political pressures resulted in an army drawdown to fewer than 591,000 personnel in ten divisions and five regiments by June 1950. The 1947 National Security Act, designed to unify the nation's armed forces and decrease interservice rivalries, established the U.S. Air Force as independent from the army and designated the army as having primary responsibility for land-based operations.

Despite streamlining of command structure in the late 1940s, low budgets contributed to a dramatic decline in army combat effectiveness. By 1950, few of the army's ten divisions were fully capable of deployment outside the

The U.S. Army emerged from World War II as the best-armed, most-mobile, best-equipped, best-supplied, most-educated, and highest-paid army in history.

continental United States. Four understrength, poorly trained, and inadequately equipped divisions were in occupation in Japan, while 80,000 men were in Germany.

The Korean War began in June 1950. American advisors and troops rushed from Japan helped purchase just enough time to prevent Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) forces from completely overrunning the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) before substantial forces could be sent from the United States. This also presented serious difficulties, as the army was stretched thin trying to keep up its guard in Europe with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

The war revealed the appalling state of the U.S. military, especially the army, which had undergone major cutbacks under Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, who favored the air force over both the army and navy. Troops were often sent into combat without proper training, and equipment was both obsolete and inadequate. The buildup in Korea was made possible only by calling up reserve and National Guard units, which also had the effect of securing experienced combat veterans. Most of the weaponry employed by the army in Korea was of World War II vintage.

Massive U.S. artillery fire and airpower helped to offset Chinese numbers. The war also saw the army carry out extensive experimentation with the helicopter for medical evacuation but also for resupply and the movement of troops. In addition, the war speeded up desegregation of the army. During the conflict, the defense budget quadrupled, and the army grew dramatically in size. By 1953, army strength stood at twenty divisions and eighteen regiments with a total of 1.5 million personnel. The Korean War also acted as a stimulus to research and development programs, which brought new weapons into the field in the latter 1950s and early 1960s, and ensured that the United States maintained a significant military establishment. After every previous conflict, the United States had largely disarmed.

With an armistice in Korea in July 1953, the new administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to shift emphasis to nuclear deterrence in the so-called New Look policy (popularly known as "more bang for the buck"). By 1958, army strength had again decreased, this time to fifteen divisions. Under the New Look, the army prepared to use flexible but short-range nuclear munitions to offset the greater manpower of potential enemies in Europe and Asia. In the mid-1950s, the army developed the Jupiter and Nike missiles as well as artillery systems capable of firing nuclear munitions. In order to increase survivability and mobility on nuclear battlefields, the army introduced the M41, M47, and M48 tanks, reestablishing four armored divisions by 1956.

Structurally, because nuclear weapons could easily destroy concentrated groups of soldiers, the army reorganized its units into decentralized and autonomous pentomic divisions, consisting of five battle groups, that could operate independently or join together to provide mass and firepower. By 1958, the army had divided all of its infantry and airborne divisions into pentomic structures.



In the early 1960s, political events in Latin America as well as the Berlin Crises and the Cuban Missile Crisis intensified the Cold War. President John F. Kennedy's administration became concerned with combating the domino effect of encroaching communism while providing a more balanced approach to military threats. This strategy, known as flexible response, called for an increase in the army's conventional force structure to provide a nonnuclear response to future threats. It also emphasized counterinsurgency warfare.

In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara spearheaded a wholesale reorganization of the army that consolidated redundant structures and decreased inefficiencies. Largely due to previous programs coming to fruition, the army received the M60 machine gun and the M60 tank and replaced its outdated M-1 Garand rifle with the M-14 and a few years later the M-16. The army also abandoned the pentomic division structure and established traditional three-brigade Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROADs), including mechanized divisions equipped with the M113 armored personnel carrier. While the army's doctrine for its ROADs centered on fighting in nonnuclear battlefields, its primary focus remained linear battles in the European theater.

As the Soviet Union and the United States approached nuclear parity, however, the army also began to prepare to counter a newly emerging threat of guerrilla-style communist insurgencies. In 1961, Kennedy significantly increased the size and scope of Special Forces units for counterinsurgency operations. Special Forces soldiers became expert in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of both defeating guerrilla movements and training indigenous soldiers, particularly as special advisors in Vietnam.

America's involvement in Vietnam, which had begun with support for the French in the Indochina War (1946–1954), rapidly escalated with the renewal of the insurgency in the late 1950s. President Kennedy sent only advisors and helicopters, but in mid-1965 his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson,

introduced U.S. ground troops. The war gradually escalated, and at peak strength in early 1969 the United States had 543,400 men in Vietnam.

For the U.S. Army, the Vietnam War meant adapting to an assortment of new challenges. Enemy force capabilities ranged from squad-sized local Viet Cong units employing guerrilla tactics to well-trained North Vietnamese Army regiments and divisions supported by conventional artillery assets. The enemy could slip into local population centers and the jungle underbrush, which made locating him difficult. Additionally, enemy forces often compensated for their comparative lack of firepower by fighting at night and establishing well-placed ambushes, booby traps, and mines.

The army adapted to these challenges by employing a mixture of new tactics and new weapon systems to fight in this nonlinear battlefield. The Vietnam War also saw the United States make extensive use of the helicopter, and in August 1965 it introduced in Vietnam the 1st Air Cavalry Division, which was entirely air mobile. Helicopter operations significantly improved the ability to mass, reinforce, and withdraw forces if necessary in remote areas not easily accessible to ground transportation.

Despite the army's overwhelming success in pitched battles with North Vietnamese regulars, the United States failed to secure victory in Vietnam. It had concentrated on big-unit actions and body counts rather than on pacification programs as measurements of success.

The army emerged from Vietnam in terrible condition. The war exacted a shocking toll on both discipline and morale. Racial problems abounded as did insubordination, and a general permissiveness led to careerism or "ticket-punching" among the officer corps and an abrogation of authority by noncommissioned officers. During the mid-1970s, all branches of the armed services, but particularly the army, suffered from underfunding and congressional and executive neglect.

The army sought an all-volunteer force. Its Volunteer Army Project (VOLAR), begun in 1970, received President Richard Nixon's warm support. He embraced the plan as a means of ending middle-class opposition to his Vietnam War policies, and he abolished the draft in 1973. The U.S. armed forces, including the army, became all-volunteer.

Recruiting standards were upgraded, and discharge programs helped to rid the army of drug users and those unsuited for military life. In 1975 the army insisted on a high school diploma for its recruits. It also began a massive educational program to eradicate perceived and actual racial discrimination. The number of African American officers increased, and promotion boards ensured that minorities were promoted equally based on percentages of numbers of those serving. Other initiatives such as barracks renovation and involving enlisted men by seeking their ideas on how to improve quality of life ended many irritants of the draft era. Another major change was allowing women increased opportunities in occupational specialties, although supposedly not in combat units. Army chief of staff General Creighton Abrams (1972–1974) and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (1969–1974) also did much to create a total force policy that restructured the entire army to make it impossible for political leaders to commit the army to war without mobi-

lizing its reserve components. This was successively the case in the Persian Gulf War, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

As the Vietnam War faded, the army refocused its attention on what had always been considered the most significant threat: a potential Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War convinced U.S. Army leaders that new advances in the lethality of tank munitions, artillery, and wire-guided antitank weapons created dramatic advantages for defenders in a conventional mechanized war. Technologically, these new advances required the army to modernize its antiquated equipment and develop a new tank, infantry fighting vehicle, and helicopter. Doctrinally, in 1976 the army emphasized establishing an active defense policy, an elastic strategy comprised of battle positions organized in depth that focused on firepower and attrition.

It was not until the advent in 1981 of President Ronald Reagan's administration, which focused on directly confronting Soviet capabilities in Europe, that the army received full modernization funding. The M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, supported by the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, became the basis of maneuver warfare. In 1982, under the direction of General Donn Starry, the army adopted the AirLand Battle doctrine. Designed to deter the Soviet Union, AirLand Battle revolutionized army doctrine by shifting emphasis from defensive to offense operations and employing maneuver warfare that involved coordination of joint forces, especially close air support. Units

A U.S. Army field training exercise involving M60 main battle tanks and AH-1 Cobra helicopters, 1974. (U.S. Department of Defense)

would train to strike hard and fast to disrupt and attack the enemy's critical second-echelon forces. The U.S. Army proved the effectiveness of its training, doctrine, and equipment-modernization efforts shortly after the Cold War ended during the one hundred–hour ground offensive against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

At the end of the Cold War in 1991, U.S. Army strength stood at 739,594 active duty and close to 1.085 million Army Reserve and National Guard personnel.

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See also

AirLand Battle; Flexible Response; Korean War; New Look Defense Policy; Persian Gulf War; Tanks; Vietnam War

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United States Commander in Chief, Europe

Established on 1 August 1952, the United States Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) is responsible for executing the military and defense policies of the United States by ensuring that combat-ready forces from the U.S. Army, Navy (including Marines), and Air Force are in the region. These forces may conduct operations alone or in concert with other countries. When originally formed, the area of responsibility included Europe from the North Cape in Norway south to the Mediterranean Sea as well as North Africa and Turkey. The area was eventually expanded to include the Middle East as far south as Saudi Arabia, east to Iran, and south to include Africa all the way to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa.

The officer in this position also serves as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Because the flag officer serving at USCINCEUR also serves as the SACEUR, the Deputy Commander in Chief, Europe (DCINCEUR), has the authority to make decisions and direct U.S. military

matters for the USCINICEUR. The first USCINCEUR was General Matthew B. Ridgway, who served during 1 August 1952–11 July 1953.

Dallace W. Unger Jr.

See also

Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker

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United States Information Agency

American foreign information/media service agency responsible for the propagation and dissemination of anticommunist propaganda, the circulation of news and other information to Eastern bloc nations, and the arrangement of certain cultural and educational exchanges during the Cold War. The United States was the last major power to engage in permanent foreign propaganda operations in support of political and cultural objectives. This reluctance changed abruptly after the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. In 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of War Information (OWI), whose mission was to publicize American policies to overseas audiences. The agency mounted the largest overseas propaganda operation of all the major combatants, including the Voice of America (VOA) shortwave radio network as well as the establishment of information centers on all continents. These activities set the tone and organizational structure of the OWI's Cold War successor, the United States Information Agency (USIA).

The OWI was shut down shortly after the end of World War II. Its operations were drastically reduced and transferred to the Department of State. By 1948, however, Cold War concerns led Congress to authorize a sharp expansion of the program. Congress also approved the U.S. Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1948, which gave permanent status to an overseas information (and propaganda) effort.

In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to transfer the program from the State Department to the new USIA. This decision was motivated in large part by Republican campaign promises to give greater attention to propaganda operations as part of a coordinated political and military effort that would roll back the Soviet threat. The agency's budgets were later increased to provide for more VOA broadcasting facilities, including programs in more than forty languages.

Although VOA radio was the USIA's best-known operation to most Americans, the bulk of the agency's operations took place at its 275 overseas posts. Known locally as the United States Information Service (USIS), the posts were



USIA propaganda leaflet contrasting education in Thailand: a teacher lecturing students under communism (*left*) and students performing scientific experiments and math in a democratic society (*right*), 1966. (Library of Congress)

an extension of the local American embassy, although they were usually located outside the embassy building, often on a main street. The most visible USIS activity was a street-front library. In many Asian, African, and Latin American cities, these were the first open-shelf libraries from which books could be checked out and taken home. As a result, they were often so crowded with students and other information seekers that patrons had to make advanced reservations to be admitted.

USIS centers provided a wide variety of other media and cultural activities. These included a daily news file on American events, transmitted overnight from Washington and then sent in translated form to local newspapers and other media outlets. By 1960, the USIA was also the largest periodical publisher in the world, with magazines in twenty languages and twenty-two newspapers in fourteen languages. Their combined circulation at the time was 110 million copies.

The best known of the agency's publications was *America Illustrated*, published in Russian and distributed in the Soviet Union under a cultural agreement that provided for reciprocal sale of a Soviet magazine, *Soviet Life*, in the United States. Sales of *Soviet Life* languished, however, largely because of its heavy-handed propaganda approach, typically featuring happy peasants and brawny steelworkers in heroic poses as they filled their production

quotas. *America Illustrated* was more eclectic, and its wide-ranging descriptions of American life made it hugely popular among Soviet readers. Each issue became a black market item, with copies resold or rented until they became too tattered to read.

The USIA was also a major producer of foreign exhibits, films, and television programs. One of its television projects was a Spanish-language soap opera, *Nuestro Barrio* (Our Neighborhood), chronicling daily life in an unnamed Latin American city. The series was popular throughout Latin American nations, where it was telecast on local stations, bringing a subtle message of American support for social and economic progress.

The majority of observers agree that the USIA's most effective operation was its management of academic and cultural exchanges to and from the United States. In 1940 there were fewer than 20,000 foreign students in American colleges and universities. By 1999, this number had risen to more than a half million. The USIA was the leading American agency in recruiting foreign students and helping process their admission to American colleges. It also played a major role in administering the best known of the exchange programs, the Fulbright scholarships, awarded to more than a quarter million American and foreign academics and students since 1947.

Another exchange effort identified up-and-coming young foreign leaders and brought them to the United States for a tour that included a personalized itinerary to visit wherever they wanted to go or to meet whomever they wanted to meet. Participants in these tours included Britain's Tony Blair and Margaret Thatcher, Egypt's Anwar Sadat, Germany's Willy Brandt, India's Indira Gandhi, and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere. More than forty participants in the program became heads of government in the years after their visits.

A definitive assessment of the USIA's effectiveness is difficult to make. Famed television journalist Edward R. Murrow, who was a director of the agency in the 1960s, once told a congressional committee that no cash register rang when someone overseas viewed the United States more positively as the result of a USIA message. The agency's role, he said, was to state the American case as clearly as possible. He also believed that USIA should participate in the early formation of foreign policy decisions, stressing the importance of overseas public opinion in implementing policy. Indeed, in the later decades of the Cold War, the agency did play an increasingly significant role in foreign policy decisions.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the easing of tensions with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the USIA's role as a Cold War agency was altered. In 1999, President Bill Clinton transferred its functions to the State Department where, under the new rubric of public diplomacy, the USIA deals with the complex public-opinion challenges created by the resurgence of international terrorism.

Wilson Dizard Jr.

See also
Voice of America

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United States–Japan Security Treaty
(8 September 1951)

Security and defense treaty, signed on 8 September 1951, guaranteeing U.S. defense of Japan from armed external aggression and internal insurrection. The United States–Japan Security Treaty was signed simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace with the Allied powers, which together restored full sovereignty to Japan. The Security Treaty granted the United States the right "to dispose of United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan" in order "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and the security of Japan against armed attack." It also stipulated that U.S. forces "may be utilized to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan."

The United States–Japan Security Treaty differed from other defensive arrangements entered into by the American government, such as the U.S.–South Korea and the U.S.-Philippines treaties, in that Japan did not have an obligation to defend U.S. territory. This fundamental difference is explained by limitations placed on postwar Japan's military structure, which was only allowed to exercise the right of self-defense under the war renunciation clause established in the Japanese constitution of 3 May 1947. Japan's limited military capabilities turned the Security Treaty into a rather asymmetrical agreement in that the United States would provide military protection in return for basing rights in Japan.

This asymmetry engendered Japanese criticism of the treaty, which was considered one-sided and unfair. The Japanese government was concerned about the risk of becoming involved in an American military confrontation in the Far East, despite the fact that the treaty did not obligate the Japanese to mutual defense. In addition, the "internal disturbance" clause raised Japanese suspicions that the agreement essentially retained vestigial remnants of the postwar U.S. occupation period.

After a review process in the late 1950s, Japan and the United States concluded a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security on 19 January 1960. The asymmetrical nature of the original Security Treaty remained relatively unchanged in the 1960 revision, as it granted U.S. forces the use of "facilities and areas in Japan" for "the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." However, the revision improved on the reciprocity of the Security Treaty.

First, it acknowledged Japan's obligation to maintain and develop its own capabilities to resist armed attack in conjunction with the U.S. obligation to defend Japan, recognizing that Japan now had an obligation to assist American forces in a future conflict involving Japanese territories. Second, the revised treaty introduced a consultative mechanism regarding the implementation of the agreement. Now, "the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations" would be "subject to prior consultation with the Government of Japan." Third, it encouraged political and economic cooperation between the two signatories. Finally, and perhaps most important to the Japanese, the 1960 treaty eliminated the so-called internal disturbance clause and established a ten-year term for the treaty, subject to renegotiation upon notice of each party.

Takeda Yasuhiro

See also

Japan; Japan, Armed Forces; Japan, Occupation after World War II

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United States, Marine Corps

Marines are similar to soldiers in that their primary mission is to fight on land. However, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is part of the Department of the Navy and serves in close coordination with the U.S. Navy. Thus, primary Marine Corps missions are amphibious invasions, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), and internal security onboard ships. Moreover, Marines have traditionally guarded U.S. embassies.

During the Cold War, the USMC fought in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf. They were also involved in smaller-scale operations, such as interventions in both Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, NEOs from Cyprus and Cambodia, the *Mayaguez* Incident, and Lebanon. The USMC also stood prepared to wage a third world war against the Soviet Union by reinforcing Norway and Denmark's Jutland Peninsula.

The USMC drastically downsized as part of the demobilization following World War II, going from a peak of 485,053 personnel during the war to 107,000 by the late 1940s. Some politicians, including President Harry S. Truman, wanted to disband the USMC, as they thought that amphibious operations were obsolete in the atomic age and that the army could absorb the USMC's mission. However, the performance of the USMC in Korea in 1950 quelled this debate.

A U.S. Marine Corps combat patrol in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam). (National Archives and Records Administration)

Marines took part in the desperate fighting along the Pusan Perimeter. They also spearheaded the amphibious landing at Inchon that turned the tide in the war in September 1950. Marines subsequently helped liberate Seoul in bloody house-to-house fighting. General Douglas MacArthur then ordered the Marines to seize Wonsan in an unopposed amphibious assault and simultaneous drive north to the Yalu River. The drive to the Yalu, however, brought Chinese intervention, and in late November 1950, some 100,000 men of the Chinese 9th Army Group cut off the 1st Marine Division near the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir in bitter winter weather. Despite the desperate situation, in one of the great military withdrawals in all history, the Marines fought their way south, bringing out their wounded, dead, and equipment. The USMC later participated in United Nations Command (UNC) offensives, defense against the 1951 Chinese Spring Offensive, and UNC counteroffensives.

Following the Korean War, the USMC enjoyed a period of relative calm punctuated by smaller operations. In July 1958, following a request by the Lebanese government, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent Marines to Beirut. The Marines maintained general order there before being withdrawn in mid-October. The April 1965 Dominican Intervention saw the Marines evacuate more than 3,000 U.S. citizens during political upheaval there. Subsequently, more than 8,000 Marines and additional U.S. Army troops enforced the peace.

Marines also served as advisors to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). The USMC deployed its first operational unit, the Medium Helicopter Squadron 362, to Vietnam on 15 April 1962. The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade deployed to Vietnam as the first USMC ground combat unit on 8 March 1965. The Marines were deployed to the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Marines played a crucial role in defeating the January 1968 Tet Offensive, especially in retaking Hue. They also held the Khe Sanh base during a prolonged siege by Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) troops. The Marines were active in pacification programs, especially with their innovative Combined Action Platoons. Marine units began withdrawing from South Vietnam in 1970. All USMC ground and air operations in Vietnam ceased in June 1971. The final Marine role came in April 1975, when Marine units assisted with the evacuation of Americans and South Vietnamese during the fall of Saigon to communist forces.

The early 1970s marked a period of recovery for the USMC, which had been badly bruised during the decade-long Vietnam involvement. Once again, the USMC prepared for traditional amphibious operations missions. However, Marines did evacuate U.S. citizens from Cyprus in July 1974 and from Cambodia in April 1975. Conflict with Cambodia continued with the

capture of the U.S. ship *Mayaguez* and its crew on 12 May 1975. President Gerald R. Ford ordered in the Marines, who retook the ship three days later.

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan sent Marines to Lebanon to monitor the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). However, attacks on the Marines culminated in the 23 October 1983 suicide truck bombing of the office building holding the Marine headquarters. The blast killed 239 Americans, 220 of them Marines. Reagan pulled all American forces out by late February 1984 in large part because of this devastating attack. The USMC participated in Operation URGENT FURY, the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 ordered by Reagan. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Reagan deployed Marines to help protect oil tankers in the Persian Gulf against attack, a mission that lasted from 1986 to 1989.

Marines also participated in the 1989 Panama invasion, Operation JUST CAUSE, securing key installations, seizing critical bridgeheads, controlling vital crossroads, and processing 1,200 captured Panamanians.

When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, President George H. W. Bush deployed the Marines to protect Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi incursion (Operation DESERT SHIELD). During the ground offensive (Operation DESERT STORM), in an advance on Kuwait City in the Battle of Khafji, Marine units easily repulsed two Iraqi armored columns in the largest tank battle in USMC history. Two Marine brigades feigned an amphibious landing from ships in the Persian Gulf, which fixed Iraqis in eastern Kuwait and facilitated the Coalition's western envelopment. Undoubtedly, the USMC played an important role during the Cold War.

JONATHAN P. KLUG

See also

Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Grenada Invasion; Iran-Iraq War; Korean War; Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in; Persian Gulf War; United States Navy; Vietnam War

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United States, Navy

The U.S. Navy's primary mission was, and is, to ensure the command of the seas. Command of the seas allows unfettered U.S. commerce and military sea

lines of communication. Thus, the U.S. economy can continue to operate, and U.S. forces can move across the sea to foreign soil. Conversely, the U.S. Navy's command of the seas interdicts the maritime commerce and military activities by enemies of the United States. After Japan's formal surrender on the deck of the U.S. battleship *Missouri* on 2 September 1945, the U.S. Navy's mission to maintain command of the seas took many forms, from launching carrier strikes to diplomatic shows of force. During the Cold War, the navy fought in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf; enforced a quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis; and helped prevent a communist Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The navy's submarines armed with nuclear missiles, which formed one leg of the U.S. strategic triad, also played a key role. Finally, if a president needed a show of muscle, he often sent a carrier task force to impress a foreign power or intimidate a potential adversary.

The U.S. Navy drastically downsized as part of the post–World War II general demobilization, shrinking from 3 million to 1 million sailors. It also ceased construction of more than 150 warships and several thousand small craft and decommissioned 2,600 others. Nevertheless, the navy's commitments were still immense, and the American government called upon the navy frequently. A show of force to deter a possible communist coup during the Italian elections of 1948 was one of the first examples of the navy in action during the Cold War. Twenty-five percent of the aircraft that participated in the Berlin Airlift belonged to the navy. Furthermore, U.S. Navy units protected Taiwan from the threat of a communist Chinese invasion.

After World War II, many U.S. political leaders believed that a large navy was no longer necessary. Thus, the U.S. Navy continually had to fight for funding for operations and new equipment. For example, twenty-seven days after taking office, on 23 April 1949 Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson canceled the navy's new 60,000-ton supercarrier *United States* without consulting either the secretary of the navy or the chief of naval operations. The navy argued that it needed the new supercarriers, as existing carriers were too small to handle multiengine jet aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Johnson, a former secretary of the air force, favored the B-36 bomber, but his decision precipitated a vicious battle over the roles of the services. The navy fought back against Johnson to the extent that some senior officers went to the press. The media referred to this fight as the Revolt of the Admirals.

Despite this temporary setback, the U.S. Navy was able to start construction of four frigates and three hunter-killer submarines. It also began development of new carrier aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons as well as development of nuclear ship propulsion. Especially important in the latter area was the work by Captain Hyman Rickover in developing nuclear power plants for submarines.

The U.S. Navy did not have a serious or prolonged fight to gain command of the seas during the Korean War, but it did play a vital role in the conflict. Naval air and gun support slowed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) drive to conquer the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and assisted in maintaining United Nations Command (UNC)

The advent of nuclear weapons prompted the U.S. Navy to procure long-range aircraft capable of delivering the weapons from aircraft carriers. The North American AJ-1 Savage, pictured here in 1951, was the first U.S. Navy aircraft specifically designed for this purpose. (National Museum of Naval Aviation)

forces in the Pusan Perimeter. The navy transported X Corps in the Inchon amphibious assault and provided air and naval gunfire support. The navy also cleared mines from Korean harbors, including Wonsan, on the eastern coast of North Korea and it made possible the withdrawal of X Corps from Hungnam and other points on the northeastern coast of Korea following Chinese entry into the war at the end of 1950. The navy continued to provide key air and naval gunfire support for ground operations until the armistice on 27 July 1953.

The performance of the U.S. Navy during the Korean War demonstrated its key role in U.S. global security operations and led to more political support and funding, including new programs under National Security Council Report NSC-68. This included Forrestal-class supercarriers, new naval aircraft, and destroyers and guided-missile cruisers. The submarine *Nautilus*, the world's first nuclear-powered warship, entered active service in early 1955. The navy began development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 1959, and USS *George Washington* made the first operational patrol armed with SLBMs in November 1960. The navy's nuclear submarines became one-third of the U.S. strategic triad, alongside intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs) and strategic bombers carrying nuclear bombs. During this period of rebuilding, the navy also supported the Marines in the Lebanon Intervention of 1958 and in the evacuation of U.S. civilians during the Dominican Intervention of 1965.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a signal event in the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union came closest to nuclear Armageddon. In October 1962, U.S. policymakers learned that Cuba, with Soviet assistance, was building medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites. After much deliberation, President John F. Kennedy ordered the navy to impose a blockade of Cuba and prevent the Soviet Union from bringing in additional supplies and missiles for the MRBM launch sites. The navy enforced the quarantine and was prepared to conduct combat operations if necessary. After Soviet leaders backed down, Second Fleet warships closely monitored the dismantling of the Cuban MRBM threat to the continental United States.

After the crisis, the Soviets began building a balanced navy due to their inability to challenge the U.S. Navy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. While the U.S. Navy tried to develop enhanced strategic capabilities in the form of an extended-range Polaris missile and an improved submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles, another threat loomed on the horizon in the form of the Vietnam War.

U.S. Navy ships were involved in intelligence gathering (DESOTO patrols) in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) when on 1 August 1964 North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the destroyer *Maddox*. A second alleged attack on 4 August on the *Maddox* and another destroyer, the *Turner Joy,* almost certainly did not occur. President Lyndon B. Johnson nonetheless ordered retaliatory air raids against North Vietnamese coastal targets, and the U.S. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, authorizing the president to use U.S. military resources as he deemed fit in Vietnam.

The U.S. Navy's involvement in Vietnam took many forms. In Operation MARKET TIME, the navy executed offshore interdiction of North Vietnamese vessels seeking to infiltrate men and supplies into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and, in Operation GAME WARDEN, it fought the communist Viet Cong for control of South Vietnam's vital and extensive river systems. Navy aircraft provided key air support to ground troops in South Vietnam from carriers off the coast of South Vietnam (Dixie Station). The navy also provided important gunfire support to operations near the coast as well as shelled North Vietnam, and it supported amphibious operations by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.

U.S. Navy aircraft participated in Operation ROLLING THUNDER, the air war against North Vietnam, from carriers stationed off the coast of North Vietnam (Yankee Station). Washington's goals for ROLLING THUNDER were to halt the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam and to force North Vietnamese leaders to abandon their support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam and come to the negotiating table. Although the operation exacted a considerable toll on North Vietnam, it failed to achieve its goals. The cost was also high due to the sophisticated and growing North

Vietnamese air defense network. In thirty-seven months between 1965 and 1968, the navy lost 421 planes and 450 aviators. The navy also helped train personnel and then turned over substantial assets in vessels and equipment to the South Vietnamese Navy as part of the Vietnamization program.

Washington subsequently called upon the U.S. Navy to execute numerous other missions. The navy supported the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cyprus in July 1974 and then from Cambodia and from South Vietnam in April 1975. The navy also assisted in operations to retake the *Mayaguez* and its crew when they were taken captive by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in May 1975.

The U.S. Navy struggled during Jimmy Carter's presidency as a consequence of the standoff between the president and Congress. Despite being a former naval officer, President Carter did not wish to expend large sums on the navy, while Congress sought to increase its funding. The election of Ronald Reagan as president in November 1980 led to a massive military buildup that revitalized the navy and saw it come close to Reagan's goal of 600 ships.

When President Reagan sent Marines into Lebanon in 1983, Arab attacks of Marine installations escalated, and the U.S. Navy provided naval gunfire support to thwart the attacks. Nevertheless, the suicide truck-bomb attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut effectively ended U.S. involvement in Lebanon in February 1984. The navy also provided key assistance in the Grenada Invasion of October 1983 and in the invasion of Panama during December 1989–January 1990.

During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, the belligerents began attacking oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy executed freedom of navigation operations to ensure U.S. access to oil from the Persian Gulf, clearly maintaining command of the sea. However, unique operational difficulties existed in a confined area such as the Persian Gulf. Iranian mines and antiship missiles were significant threats. A missile attack on USS *Stark* on 17 March 1987 killed 37 American sailors. In another major incident in the area, on 3 July 1988 the U.S. cruiser *Vincennes* mistakenly fired on an Iranian civilian jetliner, killing 290 passengers.

When Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, President George H. W. Bush ordered the U.S. Navy to protect Saudi Arabia from potential Iraqi aggression in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Naval aircraft and gunfire assisted UN Coalition forces in significantly deterring Iraqi attacks. Navy Harpoon precision-guided missiles played a vital role in attacking Iraqi targets. Furthermore, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft made up 30 percent of the sorties flown in the resultant coalition war with Iraq, Operation DESERT STORM, that ultimately liberated Kuwait and crushed Iraqi forces.

The U.S. Navy had proven its indispensable mettle during more than forty years of Cold War tension and in countless hot wars between 1945 and 1991, when the Cold War officially ended.

JONATHAN P. KLUG

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Louis Arthur; Korean War; Missiles, Polaris; Missiles, Poseidon; Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic; Persian Gulf War; Submarines; Triad; United States; United States Marine Corps; Vietnam War; Warships, Surface

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Uruguay

Spanish-speaking South American nation covering 68,039 square miles, equivalent in size to the U.S. state of Washington. Uruguay, with a 1945 population of 2.26 million people, is bordered by Brazil to the north, Argentina to the west, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south and east. Uruguay enjoyed prosperity and financial stability in the early Cold War era. In a sense it was a showcase, as U.S. foreign policymakers advocated that Latin American nations open their economies to free trade and investment as a means of spurring economic growth, which is what Uruguay did.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, however, falling export earnings required cuts in imports of industrial materials as well as consumer goods. Despite assistance from the Alliance for Progress, the Uruguayan economy in the 1960s was weak, and inflation became uncontrollable. With economic problems came political problems. In response to the growing power of the Tupamaro urban guerrilla movement, on 13 June 1968 the government of Jorge Pacheco Areco curtailed public liberties and implemented security measures, maintained by the government intermittently through the 1980s. The Tupamaros aimed to overthrow the government and replace it with a socialist regime in the style of Fidel Castro's regime.

With rising anti–North American sentiment in the late 1960s, Washington feared that left-wing Latin Americans would use Uruguay as a base for operations throughout South America. Uruguay, with its open political culture and society, had traditionally provided a friendly environment for such activity. However, the U.S. government maintained a degree of influence over the Uruguayan military by giving military assistance through the Civic Action Program, which was implemented in a number of Latin American

nations and provided funding for the military to construct roads, schools, and other infrastructure projects in rural areas.

Until the early 1970s, U.S. officials took cordial relations with Uruguay for granted. With Salvador Allende's rise to power in Chile, however, and with the advent of guerrilla movements in the region, policymakers in Washington began to fear a leftward drift in South America. Two events in the early 1970s significantly shook U.S.-Uruguayan relations. First, the Tupamaros kidnapped two U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials and killed one of them, Daniel Mittrone, in August 1970. Next, American officials feared that a left-wing coalition, the Frente Amplio (FA, Broad Front), would win the November 1971 elections. In the end, the FA fared poorly, and the traditional parties garnered the majority of the votes. Juan María Bordaberry of the Blanco Party was elected president.

During April–September 1972, a number of Tupamaros escaped from prison and assassinated military leaders. Because the General Assembly was investigating allegations of torture by the military and because the military disliked Bordaberry's choice of a civilian for defense minister, it forced Bordaberry to dissolve the Assembly in June 1973 and create a Council of State in its place that, along with the military, held effective power. Finally, the military forced Bordaberry to resign in June 1976. In July 1976 the military and Council of State appointed Dr. Aparicio Méndez president.

After 1973, Uruguay's military-controlled government became more anticommunist and pro–United States than its civilian predecessors. This thoroughly suited Washington. As was typical for U.S. relations with Latin America during the Cold War, the administrations of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford supported Uruguay's military-controlled regime as a bulwark against communism. In part because of the revelations by the U.S. Congress of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activity in Cuba and Chile in the 1960s and 1970s, however, and because of human rights violations by the Uruguayan military regime —including torture, assassination, and imprisonment without trial—in September 1976 the U.S. Congress curtailed military assistance to Uruguay and other Latin American nations.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a combination of Uruguayan religious (mainly Catholic) and secular activists worked to return Uruguay to democracy. These groups were heartened that President Jimmy Carter further reduced military assistance to a number of Latin American dictatorships.

Prodded by civilian activists, in 1980 the Uruguayan military drafted a new constitution, which was rejected in a plebiscite in November that same year. Méndez resigned in 1981, and the military appointed Gregorio Álvarez president in 1982. In 1984, military and civilian groups agreed

Uruguayan President Julio María Sanguinetti waves to the crowd during a parade following his election, 1 March 1985. (Carlos Carrion/Sygma/Corbis)

to elections, which were held that November. Colorado Party leader Julio María Sanguinetti won the presidency and took office in 1985. In keeping with its policy toward Latin America in the 1980s, Washington supported Uruguay's transition to democracy.

James F. Siekmeier

See also

Alliance for Progress; Americas; Brazil; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; Central Intelligence Agency; Dirty War; Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in

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U.S. Armed Forces in Asia

See Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in

U.S. Armed Forces in Europe

See Europe, U.S. Armed Forces in

U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Security Treaty

See Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.–Republic of China

V

Vance, Cyrus Roberts
(1917–2002)

U.S. secretary of the army (1962–1964), deputy secretary of defense (1964–1967), and secretary of state (1977–1980). Born in Clarksburg, West Virginia, on 27 March 1917, Cyrus Vance graduated from Yale University in 1939 and from Yale Law School in 1942. He saw combat service in the Pacific as a naval gunnery officer during World War II, after which he joined the New York law firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, his professional base throughout his career.

Vance's first government assignment came in 1957 as special counsel to the Senate Preparedness Investigation Committee chaired by majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson. In 1961 Vance became general counsel to the Department of Defense, in which post he negotiated the release of Cuban prisoners after the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, implemented a major restructuring of departmental organization, and modernized weapons and personnel systems.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appointed Vance secretary of the army in 1962, and in that capacity he advised President John F. Kennedy to deploy federal troops to quell growing civil rights violence in the South. From January 1964 until June 1967, Vance was deputy secretary of defense, serving primarily as a troubleshooter in efforts to resolve difficulties with Panama in 1964 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 and to mediate the 1967 civil war in Cyprus.

Vance was initially a hawk on Vietnam. By mid-1966, however, he was skeptical of continued American air and ground escalation, and he left office disillusioned with American Vietnam policies. As one of the senior advisors, or "Wise Men," with whom President Johnson consulted after the communist Tet Offensive in January 1968, Vance recommended that the United States cease bombing and open peace negotiations. He then served as deputy to chief negotiator W. Averell Harriman in the fruitless 1968 Paris peace talks.

In 1971 Vance met future president and fellow Trilateral Commission member Jimmy Carter. Vance then served as a foreign policy advisor to Carter's 1976 presidential campaign and became his secretary of state. Suspicious of grand theories of geopolitical and strategic designs and of attempts

One of the ablest U.S. diplomats and troubleshooters, Cyrus R. Vance is shown here during a visit to Korea in February 1968. Vance was U.S. secretary of state during 1977–1980. (National Archives and Records Administration)

to discern linkages between different aspects of foreign policy, Vance believed that the international situation no longer fit the early Cold War bipolar model. Instead, he sought to adapt U.S. diplomacy to a more complicated and less schematic world. He was strongly committed to continuing the two previous administrations' policies of arms control and détente with the communist world, but he soon clashed with Carter's assertive national security advisor, the fiercely anti-Soviet Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Vance negotiated the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet Union, imposing ceilings on the number of nuclear missiles and delivery vehicles and banning the introduction of new missile and antimissile systems. His other major accomplishments included the negotiation of the 1977–1978 treaties returning the Panama Canal to Panamanian ownership and operation, the 1978 Camp David Accords, the full normalization in 1978 of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the conclusion of a settlement in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) that brought black majority rule in 1979.

On other issues, however, Brzezinski undercut Vance, especially after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused a dramatic cooling between the two superpowers, and Carter increasingly favored Brzezinski's advice. In early 1980, Vance urged direct talks with the Soviets in an effort to resolve the Afghan crisis, but Carter refused. Vance's early hopes to normalize American relations with Cuba also fell victim to the deteriorating U.S.-Soviet situation and to revelations that Cuban troops were deployed in Ethiopia. After Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in November 1978, American efforts to reopen relations with Vietnam also stalled in part due to a massive outflow of refugee boat people and because of Vietnam's failure to resolve to America's satisfaction the issue of soldiers still missing in action.

In Iran, where growing popular discontent threatened the government's stability, Vance unsuccessfully advised the autocratic Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi that the introduction of genuine reforms was the best means to counter growing domestic unrest. In January 1979 the shah fled Iran, and an anti-American fundamentalist Muslim regime took power. Ten months later, on 4 November 1979, Iranian students sacked the American embassy in Tehran and took fifty-three Americans hostage. Vance believed that quiet diplomacy was the best means of freeing them, but Brzezinski insisted that the United States mount a dramatic rescue. On 11 April 1980, the National Security Council (NSC) met during Vance's absence and authorized a rescue mission, a decision that Vance unavailingly protested upon his return as foolhardy and poorly planned. In protest, he submitted his resignation on 21 April,

becoming only the third secretary of state to resign over a matter of principle. Three days later the rescue mission was aborted at the loss of eight American lives.

Vance returned to his law practice and in 1983 published his memoirs. He also accepted several further diplomatic assignments from the United Nations (UN). During the 1980s he helped to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and a peaceful end to white rule in South Africa. In the early 1990s he helped to broker a cease-fire in Croatia. Vance died in New York City on 12 January 2002.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Afghanistan; Afghanistan War; Arms Control; Bay of Pigs; Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Camp David Accords; Carter, James Earl, Jr.; China, People's Republic of; Cuba; Cyprus; Dominican Republic; Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in; Egypt; Ethiopia; Human Rights; Iran; Israel; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khomeini, Ruhollah; McNamara, Robert Strange; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Panama; Panama Canal Treaties; *Pueblo* Incident; Radical Islam; Somalia; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Tet Offensive; United States Army; Vietnam; Vietnam War; Zimbabwe

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Vandenberg, Hoyt Sanford
(1899–1954)

U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force general and chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force (1948–1953). Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on 24 January 1899, Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg—the nephew of future Michigan Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, whose political influence probably smoothed his nephew's

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, U.S. Air Force chief of staff. (U.S. Department of Defense)

career—graduated in 1923 from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and immediately joined the U.S. Army Air Service. Selected in October 1927 as a flight instructor, until 1939 he rotated between teaching and taking advanced flying and staff courses.

In 1939 Vandenberg joined the Plans Division under Lieutenant General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, chief of the U.S. Air Corps. Vandenberg's excellent staff work directing the rapid air force expansion consequent to the start of World War II won him promotion to colonel in 1942. In the summer of 1942 he moved to Britain to work on air support for the forthcoming North African invasion. Promoted to brigadier general that December, he accompanied Major General James Harold Doolittle to Northwest Africa as his chief of staff, flying twenty-six combat missions and attending the 1943 Quebec, Tehran, and Cairo Conferences. In August 1944 Vandenberg took command of the Ninth Air Force of more than 4,000 aircraft that provided tactical support to Allied ground forces throughout the West European theater. He was promoted to major general in March 1945.

Following staff appointments in Washington, in 1946 Vandenberg became director of the Central Intelligence Group, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), substantially expanding and centralizing its activities. Promoted to full general in October 1947 and appointed the newly independent U.S. Air Force's vice chief of staff under General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, six months later Vandenberg succeeded him. Almost immediately, the air force was confronted by the Berlin Blockade and for fifteen months sustained a massive airlift to keep West Berlin supplied. Vandenberg advocated a seventy-group air force, but President Harry S. Truman's stringent budgetary policies initially restricted him to fifty-five or fewer. Vandenberg concentrated resources on developing strategic air offensive capabilities, ably presenting air force views in the heated 1949 controversy over the U.S. Navy's strategic deterrent role, and strongly supported development of the hydrogen bomb.

When the Korean War began in June 1950, the air force quickly established air superiority in Korea and provided vital support to United Nations (UN) ground forces. The war also brought the expansion that Vandenberg had long advocated, doubling the air force to 106 wings, although he furiously protested the decision to defer for several years after his June 1953 retirement a promised further increase to his ideal 143 wings. Vandenberg died in Washington, D.C., on 2 April 1954. His indefatigable efforts to build up the air force effectively ensured the United States a Cold War strategic striking strength far surpassing that of any other nation.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Atomic Bomb; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Bombers, Strategic; Central Intelligence Agency; Containment Policy; LeMay, Curtis Emerson; Nuclear Weapons, Tactical; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; United States, Air Force

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Vandenberg Resolution
(11 June 1948)

U.S. Senate resolution named for its sponsor, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, that embraced internationalism and collective security. The Vandenberg Resolution, passed on 11 June 1948, was a defining moment in the diplomatic history of the United States. Confronting the growing challenges of the Cold War, the U.S. Senate, using the United Nations (UN) Charter as a model, paved the way for American membership in a defensive alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was formed in 1949. Vandenberg's sponsorship constituted a revolution in American foreign policy, which had traditionally eschewed military alliances, and guaranteed America's preeminence in international affairs. All the more remarkable was Vandenberg's support, as he had been an ardent isolationist prior to World War II.

Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan, had developed a keen interest in foreign affairs since the advent of World War II. He was a U.S. delegate to the UN Conference in San Francisco (1945) and to the meetings of the UN General Assembly in London and New York (1946); had served as American advisor during the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, Paris, and New York (1946); was an American delegate to the Rio de Janeiro Conference that drafted the Rio Treaty on inter-American defense assistance; and, most critically, had chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during 1947–1949.

On 11 April 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall and Undersecretary of State Robert M. Lovett initiated a series of conversations with Senator Tom Connally of Texas (the ranking Democrat on the SFRC) and Senator Vandenberg on the topic of the Soviet threat in general and the need for security in the North Atlantic in particular. Since March 1946, when former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave his "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech) in Fulton, Missouri, relations

U.S. Republican senator from Michigan Arthur H. Vandenberg played a key role in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and in Senate approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (Library of Congress)

between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had deteriorated badly. At the same time, the Canadian government was proposing the creation of a collective defense system for the West, with the British seemingly in support. The conversations and proposals ultimately led to Vandenberg championing American involvement in a politico-military alliance.

During April 1948, Vandenberg carefully prepared a resolution based on the precepts of the UN Charter. The six major clauses of the resolution were suspension of the veto on admitting new UN members and on concerns involving the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the establishment of bilateral or multilateral agreements to secure self-defense, involvement of the United States in such agreements that were in its national interests, the reinforcement of Article 51 of the UN Charter on the right to self-defense, reaffirmation of the role of the UN to secure world peace, and the need to strengthen the UN to render it more effective in its peacekeeping operations. The third component was perhaps the most significant, as it created a constitutional basis for the United States to enter into mutual defense agreements.

The Vandenberg Resolution (Senate Resolution 239 of the 80th Congress, 2nd Session) was approved by the Senate on 11 June 1948 by a vote of 64 to 4. The Vandenberg Resolution was a significant development in the history of the Cold War, as it provided a firm basis for American involvement in NATO.

William T. Walker

See also

Marshall, George Catlett; North Atlantic Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of

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Van Fleet, James Alward

(1892–1992)

U.S. Army general and commander of the Eighth Army in Korea (1951–1953). Born in Coytesville, New Jersey, on 19 March 1892, James Alward Van Fleet graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1915. He

saw service in the 1916–1917 Mexican Punitive Expedition and in World War I, fighting with the American Expeditionary Forces. Between the wars he served in the infantry and as an instructor. In 1941, now a colonel, he took command of the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division, leading its assault on Utah Beach in the June 1944 D-Day Normandy invasion. Promoted to brigadier general and then to major general, during the drive against Germany Van Fleet led various divisions in heavy fighting at Metz, in the Ardennes, at Remagen, in the Ruhr, and in Austria.

After the war, Van Fleet served in the United States and Germany, and in early 1948 he became, as a lieutenant general, director of the Athens-based Joint U.S. Military and Planning Group advising the Greek government on suppressing communist rebels. Appointed to the Greek National Council, for two years he successfully directed the training and use of Greek military forces in that nation's civil war.

In April 1951 Van Fleet, now a four-star general, took command of the Eighth Army in the Korean War from General Matthew Ridgway, who had just replaced Douglas MacArthur as commander of the United Nations (UN) forces. For much of 1951, Van Fleet's troops saw fierce fighting, driving north in mid-1951 and again after peace talks stalled from August to October. Thereafter, he was restricted to maintaining frontline defensive positions, as the war became largely one of attrition and stalemate. He became increasingly frustrated when superiors repeatedly turned down his plans for major offensives, although in mid-1952 his forceful protests eventually persuaded them to authorize limited smaller operations against communist positions, assaults that proved largely fruitless. Serious ammunition shortages damaging to troop effectiveness and morale also irritated Van Fleet, although some blamed these on his prodigality with artillery barrages. He devoted much effort to reforming, rebuilding and strengthening the demoralized South Korean forces, who by late 1952 comprised almost three-quarters of his frontline troops.

U.S. Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, shown here visiting a regimental command post on the front lines in Korea, 17 April 1951. Eighth Army was the chief U.S. ground combat force in the Korean War. (National Archives and Records Administration)

In February 1953, shortly before the war ended, Van Fleet turned over the Eighth Army to General Maxwell D. Taylor before resigning from the army in protest in April 1953. The following month, Van Fleet published articles echoing MacArthur's assertions that had the political leaders uncompromisingly exercised American power, they could have achieved total victory in 1951. These charges delighted Republican critics but infuriated Ridgway, Taylor, and Army Chief of Staff General Joseph Lawton Collins.

In 1954 Van Fleet served as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's special envoy to the Far East. As a Defense Department consultant in the early 1960s, Van Fleet suggested that Adlai Stevenson's failure to defend the botched Bay

of Pigs invasion required his dismissal as his country's UN representative. Van Fleet died in Washington, D.C., on 23 September 1992. Like many great combat soldiers, he was an inspiring battlefield leader but deficient in broader diplomatic skills.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Bay of Pigs; Bradley, Omar Nelson; Collins, Joseph Lawton; Containment Policy; Eisenhower, Dwight David; Germany, Federal Republic of; Greece; Greek Civil War; Korea, Republic of, Armed Forces; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas; Marshall, George Catlett; McNamara, Robert Strange; Ridgway, Matthew Bunker; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; Taylor, Maxwell Davenport; United States, Army

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Vatican City

Independent city-state and seat of the Roman Catholic Church covering 108.7 acres within the city limits of Rome, Italy, on the west bank of the Tiber River. In 1945, Vatican City had an estimated population of 800 people. Residents of Vatican City include the pope, head of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church; numerous high-ranking and support Catholic clergy; and some nuns. As head of the Church and bishop of Rome, the pope is the absolute ruler of the city-state.

Vatican City has all the attributes of an autonomous state: citizenship, currency, postage, a flag, and a large diplomatic corps. It also has its own newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano* (The Roman Observer), broadcasting facilities, and a railroad station. The political autonomy of the Vatican is guaranteed and protected by Italy via concordat.

The city-state has a civil government for conducting day-to-day business, run by a lay governor and a council who are all appointed by and responsible to the pope. The judicial system is essentially that of the Church, relying on canon law and several courts. There is a court of first instance, dedicated to both civil and criminal cases arising in the city. Over time, an elaborate Vatican bureaucracy has developed, called the Curia Romana, with the pope as head of state in charge of temporal as well as spiritual affairs. Although his power is absolute, the pope often relies on the College of Cardinals for advice as well as for the administration of church governance.

St. Peter's Basilica in the Vatican City, Rome. The dome, or cupola, was designed by Renaissance painter and sculptor Michelangelo. (iStockPhoto.com)

In the twentieth century, the emergence of communist parties and governments, officially committed to an ideology fiercely opposed to religion of every kind, presented challenges for the Vatican. In the case of Soviet Russia, the fact that the great majority of the population belonged to the official Russian Orthodox Church made it relatively simple for the Vatican to keep its distance from the Bolshevik state. In a number of countries that often had a radical and anticlerical tradition, Catholic clergy broadly discouraged parishioners from joining or working with local communist parties and opposed communist politicians almost on principle. During the bitter 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, representatives of the Catholic Church generally supported Francisco Franco's Nationalist forces against the Republican government, which received assistance from Soviet communist operatives.

As World War II progressed, the Vatican under Pope Pius XII apprehensively watched the spread of Soviet power into East European states, where there were strong national Catholic churches in Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and smaller but substantial communions in Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. From 1945 onward, the Vatican was forced to steer a middle path in the Cold War, balancing its genuine and deep-rooted antipathy toward communism against the need to seek to protect the status of those churches under communist rule. In Eastern Europe, Church

lands were often expropriated under communist-initiated land reform programs. Immediately after World War II, the Vatican took a strongly anti-Soviet line, appointing the staunchly anticommunist Hungarian nationalist Cardinal József Mindszenty as primate of Hungary in 1945, for example, and deploring the extension of communist rule well into Central Europe.

Throughout the Cold War, the Catholic Church also experienced pressure, especially from the United States, to favor the West and support its containment policies. Under Pope Pius XII, the Roman Catholic Church came out strongly against the Italian Communist Party in the 1948 elections, which hinged in part on whether Italy should align itself firmly with the Western alliance. However, by that time the Church also openly deprecated the division of Europe resulting from the containment policy, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military alliance, which threatened to isolate Catholics within the communist bloc from the remainder of the Church. In 1949, after the Romanian and Bulgarian governments effectively closed down their countries' Catholic churches and Mindszenty was arrested, convicted of treason, and imprisoned, Pius XII went so far as to threaten excommunication for Catholics who collaborated with communist regimes. In practice, by 1950 several stronger East European Catholic churches, including those in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, reached formal or informal accommodation with the communist authorities. Even so, in the early 1950s the Czechoslovak Archbishop Josef Beran, Polish Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, and Archbishop József Grösz of Hungary were all incarcerated. Other less prominent priests and bishops were arrested or executed, essentially because their respective governments perceived them as political threats. From the 1950s onward, the Vatican tended to employ quiet diplomacy rather than confrontational tactics to secure such individuals' release and to ensure that East European Catholics could still practice their faith. Such pragmatic practices sometimes, however, exposed Vatican officials to charges that they had abandoned principle in order to cravenly appease communist regimes.

Seeking to steer a middle course and to defuse the attractions of communism, from 1949 on well-publicized Vatican pronouncements deplored the growing emphasis on materialism, especially in the Western world, and supported social justice, welfare policies, and measures designed to aid impoverished nations around the world. Vatican Council II, held from 1962 to 1965—during which the popular and outgoing Pope John XXIII died, to be replaced in 1963 by the more austere but reformist Pope Paul VI—resisted an internal Church movement to condemn communism outright, emphasized the common good, and defended the right of all individuals to enjoy access to food, shelter, medical care, and social services. The pronouncements effectively demanded that capitalism transcend the profit motive and promote the well-being of the entire community. In 1967 and 1971 encyclicals, Paul VI also criticized the asymmetries of wealth and power that existed between rich, largely Western nations and poor nations, ascribing these in part to the legacy of colonialism. Although Ngo Dinh Diem, president of Vietnam from 1955 to 1963, was a Catholic, the Vatican refused to endorse

the U.S. position in the Vietnam War, instead making repeated though unsuccessful offers of mediation. The emergence in the early 1970s of liberation theology—Catholic teachings arguing that revolution and violent resistance to state power were sometimes acceptable in the interests of social justice—emboldened some priests, bishops, and nuns in Latin America and Africa to align themselves with leftist and radical movements against authoritarian governments. The Vatican refused to endorse this stance and in the 1980s appointed conservative bishops strongly opposed to liberation theology. The Church did, however, condemn states' forcible repression via such tactics as torture, rape, and murder of opponents. The most spectacular example of the latter was the 1980 assassination while celebrating mass in his own cathedral of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez of San Salvador.

In Asia, the post–World War II emergence of communist states, especially the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, posed particular problems for the Roman Catholic Church, whose missions—in China dating back to the late sixteenth century—were heavily tainted by association with colonialism. Mao Zedong's China had expelled virtually all foreign missionaries by late 1952, in some cases accusing them of espionage. Many noncommunist Chinese also fled, some to Hong Kong and Taiwan, others farther afield. Some 70 percent of Chinese bishoprics were left vacant, allowing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to appoint self-elected and self-consecrated local bishops and establish a self-styled patriotic church independent of Vatican control. Under land reform programs, Catholic properties were often confiscated. Despite official religious toleration policies, Chinese Christians of all persuasions were viewed as a threat to communist control and were therefore liable to attract fierce persecution as rightists.

This attitude peaked during the 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution but continued sporadically thereafter. Although the officially sponsored church, the Chinese Catholics' Patriotic Association, existed, some Chinese Catholics and priests also kept in existence an underground church that maintained clandestine ties with Rome. The late twentieth century saw a great upsurge of all forms of religion in Mainland China. Some estimate that by the early twenty-first century the underground Catholic church had twice as many members as its officially sanctioned counterpart and that altogether China had 12 million Catholics.

Further complicating the situation, the Vatican maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, where there was a sizable Catholic community, and stated its intention to keep these intact, citing the fact that it had never broken such links with any state, even communist Cuba. The last Vatican ambassador to live in Taiwan was, however, recalled in 1971 after Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations (UN). The PRC's move to more pragmatic polices from the mid-1970s onward brought sporadic though inconclusive negotiations between Chinese and Vatican officials, with other top Asian Catholic representatives often serving as intermediaries, aimed at a rapprochement and potential regularization of the status of the Chinese Catholic Church. These generally foundered on Chinese insistence that the Vatican cease to recognize Taiwan and refrain from any

interference in what the PRC considered its own internal affairs, including human rights and the treatment of Chinese Christians—conditions that the Vatican was unwilling to meet. In 2000 Pope John Paul II infuriated the PRC government by canonizing 120 Chinese and foreign Christians martyred in China and terminating promised negotiations for a rapprochement whereby the Vatican would end the protracted standoff in China and switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Although tensions rose at times as local bishops and clergy publicly criticized PRC policies, Mainland China did respect the independence of the Vatican-affiliated Catholic churches in Hong Kong and Macau after those territories returned to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, observing the provisions for religious freedom mandated in the handover agreements previously concluded with Britain and Portugal.

In Poland, the Roman Catholic Church was the leading national institution to survive German occupation. The Church hierarchy, by tradition decidedly independent of Rome, was prepared to work with the incoming communist regime if Church rights were respected. Acquiescence nonetheless did not necessarily imply approval, as demonstrated after the 1978 election of Archbishop Karol Wojtyła of Kraków, Poland, as the first non-Italian pope in more than four centuries. The charismatic John Paul II traveled tirelessly around the world, winning new adherents to the Catholic faith in the developing world, particularly Africa and Asia, and gaining immense personal respect and authority during his twenty-six-year papacy.

On an early visit to his native Poland in 1979, John Paul II quietly encouraged the leaders of the Solidarity labor movement to stand firm and work to challenge and undermine communist rule. Such pressures contributed to the eventual collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. There were rumors that John Paul II's support for the Solidarity-orchestrated strike at the Gdańsk shipyard in 1980 so infuriated the Kremlin that in 1981 on Soviet orders the Bulgarian secret service organized an assassination attempt on his life that almost succeeded.

Pope John Paul II also apologized for past Catholic implication in anti-Semitic persecution of Jews. In the early twenty-first century, the Vatican and Russia nonetheless failed to open diplomatic relations. The Russian Orthodox Church would not sanction the Catholic demand to be allowed to proselytize in Russia, and Russian nationalists resented the pope's efforts to further the collapse of the Soviet Union. John Paul II nonetheless continued his predecessors' criticisms of unfettered market forces and materialism, charging that neither communism nor capitalism could meet humanity's spiritual needs unaided.

A social conservative, John Paul II also affronted many Western liberals by deprecating the pursuit of individual—especially women's—rights and sexual freedoms. Within the Catholic Church, his appointment of growing numbers of African, Asian, and Latin American cardinals, many of conservative, fundamentalist religious views, diluted the power of American and European liberals and meant that the influence of his own outlook would probably remain strong for many years after his death in 2005.

Luc Stenger and Priscilla Roberts

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; John XXIII, Pope; John Paul II, Pope; Mindszenty, József; Paul VI, Pope; Pius XII, Pope; Roman Catholic Church; Stepinac, Aloysius, Archbishop; Vatican Council II; World Council of Churches; Wyszyński, Stefan, Cardinal

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Vatican Council II
(1962–1965)

Roman Catholic ecumenical council convened in four separate sessions during 1962–1965. On 25 January 1959, Pope John XXIII announced his intention to call an ecumenical council for the Roman Catholic Church. Serious preparations for the council began in June 1959, when the pope sought advice and suggestions from 2,600 members of the Church's hierarchy in 134 countries. On 5 June 1960, John XXIII announced the formation of various

commissions to prepare the documents to be debated during council sessions. In *Humanae Salutis* (Of Human Salvation), issued on 25 December 1961, the pope formally chartered the council and announced that it would be held at St. Peter's Basilica at the Vatican. In February 1962, the Holy See set the council's opening date for 11 October 1962.

Vatican Council II opened with a public session. In his address, John XXIII declared that the council was to meet the specific needs of the present-day Roman Catholic Church. He also emphasized that work must be undertaken to achieve unity with other Christians as well as with non-Christians. The council met for the first day of work on 13 October 1962 but adjourned after an hour. A group of progressive cardinals made a motion to adjourn so that national groups at the council had an opportunity to review the lists of names selected to serve on the ten commissions that would guide debate. The first session eventually debated issues relating to the structure and purpose of the liturgy, the church's relationship with the media, and a document calling for unity with Eastern churches. The ailing John XXIII closed the first session on 8 December 1962.

On 23 September 1964, 15 women took their seats as auditors of the council, the first women to ever participate in a Roman Catholic ecumenical council.

During the period between the sessions, the commissions met to draft documents to be voted on in the next session. John XXIII's death on 3 June 1963 ended all work until a new pope was elected. In his first message, Pope Paul VI, John XXIII's successor, promised that the council would continue and set the opening date for the second session for 29 September 1963.

In an opening address to the second session, the new pope outlined the four primary purposes of the council: to define the Church more fully, especially the role of bishops; to renew the Church; to restore unity among all Christians; and to "start a dialogue with contemporary men."

During the second session, the council's progress stalled over the document outlining the constitution of the Church. Among the questions raised by this document were the role of laypeople, the relationship with other churches, the importance of religious orders, and the relationship between church and state. Eventually work continued, and the council approved reforms of the liturgy, including the use of vernacular languages in the mass. A document on the use of modern communications media was also approved. The session debated a document stating that the Jews were not responsible for the death of Jesus, but the document was not approved before the second session closed on 4 December 1963.

The third session opened on 14 September 1964. Early in the session, the council approved a series of documents outlining the nature of the Church and the relationship between the Church and its people. On 23 September 1964, fifteen women took their seats as auditors of the council, the first women to ever participate in a Roman Catholic ecumenical council. The session continued the debate on ecumenical issues and the role of laypeople in the Church. During the debate over the position of the Church in the modern world, the pope told the council to remove discussion on artificial contraception from its agenda. A separate commission was studying the issue, and the pope did not want the council to vote in anticipation of the commission's decisions.

According to observers at the council, the third session was the most contentious. Before the session closed on 21 November 1964, the council approved documents on the Church in the modern world, ecumenism, and the relationship with the Eastern churches.

The fourth session opened on 14 September 1965. In his opening speech Paul VI announced that he would be visiting the United Nations (UN). He also announced his intention to establish a synod of bishops to advise him, part of an effort to increase collegiality within the Church hierarchy. The debate during the fourth session was wide-ranging. Documents were approved outlining religious freedom, the role of the Church in the modern world, and the relationship with non-Christian religions. The role of women in the Church was debated, as was the significance of Christian marriage. The law governing clerical celibacy was strengthened. An attempt to include a strong condemnation of communism was defeated. The council also emphasized the role of the common good in society and defended the rights of all individuals to enjoy access to adequate food, shelter, medical care, and basic social services, pronouncements that effectively expected capitalism to transcend the profit motive and promote the well-being of the entire community. The fourth session thus ended, and Vatican Council II officially closed on 8 December 1965.

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See also

John XXIII, Pope; Paul VI, Pope; Roman Catholic Church

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Venezuela

South American nation covering 352,143 square miles, roughly a third larger than the U.S. state of Texas. With a 1945 population of approximately 4.25 million, the Republic of Venezuela is located on South America's northern coast and borders the Caribbean Sea to the north, Guyana to the east, Brazil to the south, and Colombia to the west. In 1830, Venezuela was proclaimed a republic. However, a string of dictatorial regimes followed that crippled the country's development. Under the government of Antonio Guzmán Blanco (1870–1888), a modern infrastructure was constructed, while foreign investment increased. During 1908–1935, Venezuela was governed by the brutal dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, who developed the nation's oil-exporting industry.

Following his death, a military junta took control until the leftist Rómulo Betancourt and his Acción Democrática (AD, Democratic Action) party seized the political initiative beginning in 1945.

During 1945–1948, the reformist government in Venezuela enacted policies that hurt U.S. economic interests. However, Washington supported the regime because it seemed a bulwark against economic nationalism and communism. Because the United States became a net importer of oil in 1947, interest in Venezuela was all the more pronounced.

In 1948, conservative military leaders overthrew the populist government. With Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez as head of state, the Venezuelan government suppressed popular dissent and became one of Washington's staunchest regional allies. As such, the U.S. government extended substantial military and economic support. Despite Washington's backing, however, a coup toppled the regime in early 1958, and elections were scheduled for the next year. Nevertheless, the Pérez Jiménez regime cast a long shadow on Venezuelan relations with the United States. In May 1958, anti-American riots erupted when U.S. Vice President Richard M. Nixon arrived on a state visit. Angry protestors practically overturned his car. After he returned home to a triumphal greeting, Washington accelerated the process of focusing more attention on the region.

Both a majority of Venezuelans and U.S. officials hoped to put the repression of the Pérez Jiménez years behind them and welcomed the election of Betancourt of the AD in February 1959. Betancourt had cut his political teeth as a student in the late 1920s when he had actively supported the ouster of Gómez. Betancourt's reformist vision resonated with New Deal liberals in the United States.

Although U.S. President John F. Kennedy's record of supporting democracies in Latin America was spotty, Kennedy supported Betancourt because he was a moderate reformer who led an oil-rich nation and valued harmonious relations with the United States. Indeed, reformist pro-American governments seemed the best antidote for preventing the spread of Fidel Castro's brand of communism. As Betancourt's tumultuous tenure in office proceeded, the U.S. government offered increasing support as part of the Alliance for Progress, despite the implementation of state-capitalist policies. A hotline was even set up between the White House and the Venezuelan presidential residence in Caracas. Betancourt served as president until 1964.

Of particular importance to U.S. officials was the Venezuelan military. American leaders perceived strong anticommunist militaries as the only sure defense against radical or communist takeovers in Latin America, and Venezuela was no different. During Betancourt's time in office, military aid accounted for $64.5 million of the $180.1 million in U.S. assistance. U.S. military assistance to Venezuela was critically important, because the fear of Castroism spreading to Venezuela seemed more tangible compared to the risk to the rest of the region. In 1963, the Venezuelans discovered a small cache of Cuban weapons hidden on an isolated stretch of coastline. The uncovering of this clumsy attempt to aid pro-Castro insurgents in Venezuela prompted the Organization of American States (OAS) to apply economic

In 1975, Puerto Miranda was the largest oil port in the Western world, capable of pumping 145,000 tons per day and receiving supertankers with a capacity of 80,000 tons. (Diego Goldberg/Sygma/Corbis)

sanctions against Cuba. In 1966, Venezuelan officials also captured four Cuban officers who were apparently training Venezuelan guerrillas.

There was one persistent sticking point in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. From the U.S. point of view, free trade and private investment were to be the engines of economic growth in Venezuela and ultimately of pro-American stability. But from Venezuela's viewpoint, free trade translated into lower prices for oil, its principal export, and thus deteriorating terms of trade for the import of finished goods. To garner additional income from oil exports, in 1960 Venezuela helped to organize the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although OPEC did not register on U.S. policymakers' radar screens until the 1970s when it burst on the world scene as a major economic player, its formation and maturation (aided by Venezuela throughout the 1960s) represented a significant challenge to U.S. influence in the world economy.

For years, Venezuela had sought a hemispheric preference for its imports to the United States, which the United States refused because worldwide oil supplies were plentiful. This preference would have allowed Venezuela to estimate the revenue flow from oil and create long-term economic development plans. Thus, once the energy crisis of the mid-1970s hit the United States, Venezuelan officials expressed little sympathy for their major purchaser of petroleum. However, because of the historically close relationship between

Venezuela and the United States, Venezuela stepped up exports of oil to a grateful United States during the 1973–1974 Arab oil embargo.

Relations between the United States and Venezuela cooled somewhat with the December 1973 election of the AD's Carlos Andrés Pérez. Arguing that the industrial world had used its economic power to take advantage of third world producers of primary products, Pérez took action to garner greater income from Venezuela's sale of oil and steel. These industries were nationalized on 1 January 1975.

Expropriation with an indemnity was made possible with the run-up in oil prices starting in late 1973. The higher prices gave Venezuela the capital to offer compensation for the nationalization. Despite the AD's leftist rhetoric, Venezuela (most particularly the elite) thought it important to offer compensation to the oil companies in order to stay on good terms with them and with the United States. Cordial relations with the companies and the United States were important because the South American nation was still dependent on the United States for high-technology items, finished products, and technicians. Although the expropriated companies were not entirely happy with the settlement, they ultimately accepted Venezuela's offer of compensation.

The early 1970s marked an important turning point in contemporary Venezuelan history. With increased revenue from oil sales, Venezuela transformed itself from a relatively impoverished nation to an important contributor of foreign assistance, even donating up to 12 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) for foreign assistance to the developing world.

As petroleum prices slid in the mid-1980s and the Latin American debt crisis reverberated around the hemisphere, Venezuela entered a time of economic and political crisis, which included rioting in 1989 and two political coups in 1992. Venezuelan relations with the United States, however, remained close during the 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, Venezuela was the only developing nation to secure F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States in the 1980s. Although Venezuela worked with Mexico, Colombia, and Panama in the Contadora Group to help resolve deepening tensions between the United States and Nicaragua, the Venezuelans downplayed their participation by playing a quiet role in the process, as the U.S. pointedly frowned upon the Contadora Group.

Lower oil prices meant that Washington officials were less concerned with U.S.-Venezuelan relations. Crises in the Middle East in the early 1990s, however, again highlighted the importance of a large Western Hemispheric source of petroleum. Even as the Cold War faded away, and in part because of the large amount of U.S. investment in the nation and the continuing importance of a close supplier of petroleum, Washington officials and Venezuela still valued close relations.

James F. Siekmeier

See also

Alliance for Progress; Americas; Betancourt, Rómulo; Castro, Fidel; Contadora Group; Organization of American States; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

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Venona Project

U.S. code-breaking operation that revealed extensive Soviet spying in the United States during World War II and the early years of the Cold War. Beginning on 1 February 1943, the U.S. Army Signal Security Agency—commonly known as Arlington Hall and the predecessor organization to the National Security Agency (NSA)—began a secret program to decrypt and analyze thousands of encoded messages intercepted between Moscow and its diplomatic missions in the West. This program, which underwent at least a dozen code names, came to be known finally as Venona. In the course of decyphering the encoded diplomatic communications, the analysts uncovered evidence of espionage activities by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Soviet intelligence agency.

Gene Graebel, a former schoolteacher, began the project, and it took two years for Arlington Hall to break into the Soviet communications. Arlington Hall's Lieutenant Richard Halleck, a Signal Corps reserve officer who had been an archeologist at the University of Chicago, discovered weaknesses in the Soviet cryptographic system, namely that the Soviets were reusing some of the encoding in many of their messages. Halleck and his colleagues, many of whom were young women, went on to break into a significant quantity of Soviet trade traffic having to do with Lend-Lease and the Soviet Purchasing Commission. Cryptanalyst Meredith Gardner (a former language instructor at the University of Akron who spent twenty-seven years on the project) then employed these breakthroughs to decipher NKVD and Soviet Army General Staff Intelligence Directorate (GRU) communications, first breaking into these in December 1946. Arlington Hall worked in close collaboration with other U.S. agencies and the British MI5 intelligence agency, which joined the effort in 1948. Information provided by defecting Soviet cryptologist Igor Gouzenko also helped.

Among Venona's revelations were confirmation of the spying activities of Klaus Fuchs, David Greenglass, Bruno Pontecorvo, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Venona also contributed to the unmasking of the Cambridge Five spy ring of British communist agents.

Soviet agents were able to inform the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) of the Venona secret in 1948, after which Soviet communications became unreadable, but much valuable information was obtained. The Venona program continued until 1980. Beginning in July 1995, the NSA

made six public releases of Venona translations and related documents. The first of these dealt with Soviet efforts to secure information on U.S. atomic bomb research. The remainder are a variety of NKVD communications, most of them during World War II.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cambridge Five; Espionage; Fuchs, Klaus; Gouzenko, Igor; MI5; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Rosenberg, Julius

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Vienna Conference
(3–4 June 1961)

Summit meeting between U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna, Austria, on 3–4 June 1961. Shortly after Kennedy took office in January 1961, Khrushchev suggested a meeting with his American counterpart. After the embarrassing and abortive Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion in April, Kennedy's advisors were adamantly opposed to the conference, believing that Khrushchev would exploit the failed invasion either by berating the president or using it as a propaganda ploy. Kennedy rejected their advice.

Kennedy wanted the meeting to focus on a nuclear test–ban treaty and the neutralization of Laos, where a communist insurgency was threatening the government. The president believed that these agreements would be important steps toward easing Cold War tensions, which had grown more intense since the May 1960 U-2 Crisis. He also hoped that the summit might lead to a wider détente.

Khrushchev had little interest in a test ban and almost no interest in Laos, however. His primary concern was the fate of Berlin. He wanted an agreement that would stanch the flow of East Germans fleeing to the West via Berlin. His earlier attempt to pressure President Dwight D. Eisenhower into accepting a Berlin settlement by threatening to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), which would have given it full control of the city, had failed embarrassingly.

Following President Kennedy's death in 1963, his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, reported that he had laid the groundwork for the summit during secret meetings with Khrushchev's conduit Georgi Bolshakov,

U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev meet in Vienna, Austria, for their summit on 3–4 June 1961. (John F. Kennedy Library)

a Soviet intelligence officer who worked undercover as a reporter. Kennedy later claimed that Khrushchev had used the correspondence to trick his brother into believing that he would limit the Vienna discussions to Laos and the test-ban treaty, which Khrushchev hinted could be verified by numerous on-site inspections. Robert Kennedy had not saved the messages, but the Soviets had. Their records verified that Khrushchev was not interested in either Laos or a nuclear test ban and that he had never agreed to on-site inspections. Instead, Khrushchev's notes to Kennedy focused on Berlin, reiterating his earlier threats.

Khrushchev's recalcitrance concerned the president. In hopes of making the summit a success, President Kennedy sent the attorney general to Bolshakov, offering concessions and assurances that he wanted a good working relationship. Shortly before leaving for Europe, the president severely injured his back, leaving him in constant pain throughout the conference. Many suggest that the president was not at the top of his form as a result. Shortly before leaving for Vienna, Khrushchev met with his advisors, berating those who suggested that he work seriously with Kennedy and telling them that the president was weak and would buckle under his threats.

The summit had no formal agenda, allowing the two men to roam from topic to topic. Kennedy told his aides that when he broached the subject of

the dangers of war through miscalculation, Khrushchev became almost uncontrollably hostile. The Soviet leader also rebuffed Kennedy's efforts to discuss the nuclear test ban, telling him that it "meant nothing" outside the context of total nuclear disarmament. Predictably, Khrushchev taunted Kennedy over Cuba. On Berlin, Khrushchev again threatened to sign a peace treaty if Kennedy did not agree to neutralize the city. Although Kennedy had been badgered, he did not back down.

The following day, Khrushchev hinted at possible future discussions concerning Laos, although no progress was made on the test ban. In his last meeting with the president that day, Khrushchev told Kennedy that he was going to give East Germany control over West Berlin's access routes, adding that if the United States used force to keep them open, there would be war. Kennedy icily replied, "Then there will be war, Mr. Chairman. It's going to be a very cold winter." Despite Kennedy's bold counterpunch, Khrushchev believed that he had sufficiently cowed the president.

Although Kennedy's aides told him that the meeting had been typical for Khrushchev, the president refused to believe it and began to prepare for war over Berlin. In a 25 July 1961 speech, Kennedy announced that he was dramatically expanding the armed forces, reinforcing Berlin, and calling for increased congressional appropriations for civil defense. The administration even advised Americans to build backyard bomb shelters.

Khrushchev soon realized that he had badly miscalculated by bullying Kennedy. Believing that Kennedy had lost control of his government to militarists, Khrushchev concluded that the only way to solve the Berlin Crisis and avoid a war was to construct the Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, largely because of Vienna, Khrushchev continued to believe that Kennedy was weak. It took the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to dispel that notion.

Robert Anthony Waters Jr.

See also

Bay of Pigs; Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Cuba; Cuban Missile Crisis; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Nuclear Tests; Partial Test Ban Treaty; U-2 Incident

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Viet Minh

Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) front organization. The Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Viet Minh, or Vietnam Independence League) was

founded by Ho Chi Minh at the Eighth Plenum of the ICP in May 1941 as a means of mobilizing the Vietnamese population into a National United Front in order to defeat both the French and Japanese. As such, the Viet Minh served a tactical rather than a strategic purpose, for the ICP's ultimate objective remained the creation of a communist-dominated government in Vietnam. Consequently, during World War II, less stress was placed on class struggle, while more emphasis was placed on working with all elements of Vietnamese society, including those normally branded as class enemies.

The leaders of the Viet Minh placed particular effort on forming and training armed guerrilla detachments. When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the Viet Minh was the best prepared of all resistance groups to seize power. As a result, it was at the forefront of the August Revolution that followed. On 2 September 1945 in Hanoi, Ho declared Vietnam's independence and an end to the Nguyen dynasty. Soon thereafter, the dissolution of the ICP was officially announced, which ostensibly left the Viet Minh as the sole party apparatus.

The Viet Minh led the resistance effort following the outbreak of the Indochina War in late 1946. To rebuild the strength of the National United Front, since the broad mass of the Vietnamese population had come to identify it with the communist leadership, the Viet Minh was merged into the newly created Hoi Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam (Lien Viet Front, or League for the National Union of Vietnam) in early 1951. The basic tactical elements of the front did not change, however, as the redesignation was made chiefly to accommodate communist revolutionary theory, which dictated that such a step was required when the historical situation was radically altered. The Lien Viet Front would also be reconstituted following the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords, when it would be replaced by the Fatherland Front.

Concurrent with the creation of the Lien Viet Front, the ICP was publicly resurrected with a new name, Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (Vietnamese Worker's Party), in order to recognize the growing Chinese communist influence on domestic policy and to reinforce the critical importance of gaining the support of the general Vietnamese population. These changes and the reasons for them notwithstanding, popular and historical accounts of the Indochina War have usually referred to the Vietnamese resistance forces throughout as the Viet Minh.

George M. Brooke III

See also

Geneva Conference (1954); Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Nationalism; Vietnam

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Vietnam

Southeast Asian nation and the easternmost state of Indochina. Vietnam is bordered by China to the north, Laos and Cambodia to the west, and the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea to the east and south. It encompasses some 127,300 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of New Mexico. Vietnam's 1945 population was roughly 24.5 million. During the course of the Cold War, the population more than doubled. By 1996 it had grown to 70 million. Vietnam contains at least fifty-eight distinct national groups, but 85 percent of the population is ethnically Vietnamese, rendering the country largely culturally and ethnically homogenous. The French identified the original aboriginal inhabitants—chiefly the Thai, Muong, and Meo peoples—as Montagnards (mountain people). Other important ethnic minorities are the Chinese and the Khmer (Cambodians). In 1967, there were about 1 million Chinese in Vietnam and perhaps 700,000 Khmer.

In 938, the Vietnamese freed themselves from more than 1,000 years of Chinese rule. It remains a source of great national pride that Vietnam then maintained its independence, defeating subsequent Chinese attempts to reestablish control. Vietnam is, however, unique among countries of Southeast Asia in having adopted many Chinese cultural patterns.

The French arrived in the second half of the nineteenth century, establishing control first over southern Vietnam (Cochin China) by 1867, then expanding it to central Vietnam (Annam) and northern Vietnam (Tonkin). The French also dominated Cambodia. In 1887 Paris created the administrative structure of French Indochina. Laos was added in 1893. Technically, only Cochin China was an outright colony. The others were protectorates, but French officials made all the key decisions.



Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet Minh that fought against the Japanese and the French and president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), shown here in October 1954. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Nationalism spread in Vietnam after World War I. The French crushed the moderates, with the result that the more radical Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) took over the leadership against the French. In September 1940, the Japanese arrived. Taking advantage of the defeat of France by Germany, Tokyo sent troops and established bases in Vietnam. Japan's move into southern Vietnam in July 1941 brought U.S. economic sanctions that led to the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

During World War II, ICP leader Ho Chi Minh formed the Vietnam Independence League (Viet Minh) to fight both the Japanese and the French. By the end of the conflict, with Chinese and American assistance, the Viet Minh had liberated much of Tonkin. The French, meanwhile, planned an insurrection against the Japanese, but in March 1945 the Japanese arrested all the French soldiers and administrators they could find. There was thus a political vacuum at the end of the war, into which Ho moved. On

Ho Chi Minh Campaign, 1975

2 September in Hanoi, he publicly proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam).

Acting in accordance with wartime agreements, British forces occupied southern Indochina, and Nationalist Chinese forces arrived in northern Indochina. Ho was able to secure the departure of the Chinese, while the British released the French prisoners in southern Indochina and allowed them to reestablish their control there. Appeals by Ho to the Soviet Union and the United States fell on deaf ears, and Ho, forced into negotiations with the French, concluded an agreement on 6 March 1946 with French diplomat Jean Sainteny.

In the Ho-Sainteny Agreement, the French recognized the independence of North Vietnam and agreed to a plebiscite in southern Vietnam to see if it wished to join the North Vietnamese government, while Ho allowed the return of some French troops to North Vietnam to protect French interests there. The collapse of subsequent talks in France led to the outbreak of fighting in November 1946. This occurred because the French wanted to reassert control over their richest colony; there was a long-standing mutual mistrust; and on 1 June 1946, without prior approval from Paris, French High Commissioner for Indochina Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu issued a proclamation for an independent Republic of Cochin China.

The Indochina War lasted until 1954. The conflict was unpopular in France, and Paris never committed the resources necessary to win it. The war was lost for all practical purposes with the 1949 communist victory in China, for this gave the Viet Minh secure basing areas and supplies. In 1949, in part to win U.S. support, the French government negotiated the Elysée Agreement with ex-Emperor Bao Dai. The agreement officially granted independence to Vietnam. The new State of Vietnam was, however, a sham, completely dominated by the French until the end of the war.

With the French military defeat in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the politicians in Paris shifted the blame onto the military and extricated France from the war. The July 1956 Geneva Accords granted independence to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Vietnam was to be temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel, pending national elections in two years to reunify the country.

In southern Vietnam, Catholic politician Ngo Dinh Diem took charge and brought a semblance of order. His power base rested on some 1 million northern Catholics who had relocated there after the Indochina War. In 1955 Diem staged a referendum, calling on the people of southern Vietnam to choose between Emperor Bao Dai and himself. Diem won the vote handily and proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), with himself as president. He held power until his assassination in November 1963. Claiming that he was not bound by the Geneva Accords, he refused to hold the promised elections, and U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration supported this position. When the date for the elections passed, Viet Minh political cadres in South Vietnam resumed the armed struggle, this time against the Diem government. Diem, meanwhile, received substantial economic aid and increasing military assistance from the United States.

In North Vietnam, Ho and other leaders were not displeased with Diem's establishment of order in South Vietnam pending the national elections. North Vietnam did face serious economic problems, for while it contained the bulk of the industry, South Vietnam had most of the food. Ruthless moves against small landholders brought actual rebellion, crushed by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops. When the Viet Minh began guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese leadership voted to support this, beginning the Vietnam War. The war was extraordinarily costly to North Vietnam economically and in terms of casualties, but the desire to reunify the country overrode all other considerations. During the war, North Vietnam received substantial economic and military assistance from the communist bloc, including China but especially the Soviet Union.

The Vietnam War raged until 1975, although U.S. forces departed in early 1973. In April 1975, PAVN forces were victorious militarily, capturing the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon. Vietnam was now reunited, but under communist rule. In April 1976, general elections occurred for a single National Assembly. It met in June and the next month proclaimed the reunified country the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) with Hanoi as its capital. Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City. In September 1977, Vietnam was admitted to the United Nations (UN).

The new Vietnam faced staggering problems. These included rebuilding the war-ravaged country, knitting together the two very different halves of the country with their opposing patterns of economic development, and providing for the needs of a burgeoning population. The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) retained its monopoly on power. Indeed, the constitution guaranteed it as the only legal force capable of leading the state and society.

Immediately after the war, the government also carried out a political purge in southern Vietnam, although it was nothing like the bloodbath feared and so often predicted by Washington. Thousands of former South Vietnamese officials and military officers were sent to reeducation camps for varying terms, there to be politically indoctrinated and to undergo varying degrees of physical and mental discomfort, even torture. The government also undertook a program to reduce the urban populations in south Vietnam, especially in Ho Chi Minh City, by far the nation's largest metropolitan area. People had fled to the cities during the war, and perhaps one-third of the arable land lay idle. The government established so-called New Economic Areas to develop new agricultural land and return other areas to cultivation.

The government sent some 200,000 of its citizens to work in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They sent home an estimated $150 million a year. Finally, the government introduced farm collectivization in south Vietnam and new regulations that governed business practices. These led to the collapse of light and medium industry. With the economy deteriorating, in 1981 the government introduced an incentive system. Peasants paid fixed rents for the use of the land and were able to sell surplus produce on the private market. Vietnam had no official ties with the United States, although both countries would have benefited economically had such a relationship been established early on.

Meanwhile, relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea (Cambodia) deteriorated, the result of traditional animosity between the two countries and Khmer Rouge persecution of its Vietnamese minority and its claims of Vietnamese territory. By 1977 there was serious fighting. The two states became proxies in the developing Sino-Soviet rivalry. Kampuchea was a client state of China, and Vietnam was a client state of the Soviet Union.

In December 1978, PAVN forces invaded Cambodia, and ultimately there were 200,000 Vietnamese troops there. The Khmer Rouge and other resistance groups fought back, receiving military assistance from China and the United States. Ironically, it was only the Vietnamese occupation that prevented the Khmer Rouge from returning to power and continuing its genocidal policies, and it was only thanks to the Vietnamese invasion that mass killings of Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge were confirmed.

China meanwhile threatened the Vietnamese government with force to punish Hanoi for the invasion of Kampuchea and Vietnamese treatment of its Chinese minority. Indeed, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) actually invaded Vietnam briefly during February–March 1979, but this short Sino-Vietnamese War did not force the Vietnamese to quit Cambodia. That came only from the great expense of the operation and its drain on the Vietnamese economy as well as the government's attendant isolation in the international community at a time when the nation desperately needed foreign investment. The Vietnamese leadership then decided to quit Cambodia, and by September 1989 all Vietnamese troops had departed.

The Vietnamese government continued to maintain an extremely large military establishment. In the mid-1980s it had 1.2 million people under arms, the world's fourth-largest armed force. This figure did not include numerous public security personnel. Military expenditures regularly consumed up to a third of the national budget. This and a bloated government bureaucracy consumed revenues badly needed elsewhere.

By 1986 the economy was in shambles. Famine—the result of failed farm collectivization and botched currency reform—and rampant inflation took their tolls. An economic growth rate of only 2 percent a year was outstripped by a 3 percent per year birthrate, one of the highest in the world. These developments brought striking changes at the December 1986 Sixth National Communist Party Congress. Among these were material incentives, decentralized decision making, and limited free enterprise. Many of the old hardline leadership, including Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho, retired. Nguyen Van Linh, a proponent of change, became party secretary and the most powerful figure in the state.

Linh had overseen the tentative steps toward a free market economy that had helped southern Vietnam remain more prosperous than northern Vietnam. His reform program, known as *Doi Moi* (Renovation), produced results. It introduced a profit incentive for farmers and allowed individuals to set up private businesses. Companies producing for export were granted tax concessions, and foreign-owned firms could operate in Vietnam and repatriate their profits with a guarantee against being nationalized. Linh rejected opposition political parties and free elections, however.

Official ceremony in front of the Presidential Palace in Phnom Penh during the withdrawal of the Vietnamese occupation troops, 25 September 1989. (Jacques Langevin/Corbis Sygma)

Inflation dropped dramatically, production went up, and consumerism spread. But reform was uneven, inhibited by party bureaucrats and conservatives. Most advances came in the cities rather than in the countryside, where 80 percent of the population lived.

Toward the end of normalizing relations with the United States (achieved under President Bill Clinton in 1995), in 1987 the Vietnamese government released more than 6,000 military and political prisoners, including generals and senior officials of the former South Vietnamese government. Another incentive for the Vietnamese leadership to reach out to the West was the sharp reduction in Soviet aid, which ended altogether in 1991. The conservatives, however, used the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe to halt any movement toward political pluralism.

At the end of the Cold War, Vietnam was still plagued by serious problems. PAVN influence, despite a sharp decline in its size, remained strong. Divisions between northern and southern Vietnam also remained, and one of the highest birthrates in the world ate into economic gains. Annual per capita income ($250 a year) was among the world's lowest. The central issue for the aging communist leadership was whether Vietnam could modernize using the Chinese model of economic liberalism while maintaining strict party control.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cambodia; Cambodia, Vietnamese Occupation of; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Le Duc Tho; Ngo Dinh Diem; Pham Van Dong; Sino-Vietnamese War; Southeast Asia; Vietnam War

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Vietnam War
(1957–1975)

The Vietnam War grew out of the Indochina War (1946–1954). The 1954 Geneva Conference, ending the Indochina War between France and the nationalist-communist Viet Minh, provided for the independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Agreements reached at Geneva temporally divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, pending national elections in 1956. In the meantime, Viet Minh military forces were to withdraw north of that line and the French forces south of it. The war left two competing entities, the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the southern French-dominated State of Vietnam (SV), each claiming to be the legitimate government of a united Vietnam.

In June 1954, SV titular head Emperor Bao Dai appointed as premier the Roman Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem, whom Bao Dai believed had Washington's backing. Diem's base of support was narrow but had recently been strengthened by the addition of some 800,000 northern Catholics who relocated to southern Vietnam. In a subsequent power struggle between Bao Dai and Diem, in October 1955 Diem established the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), with himself as president. The United States then extended Diem aid, most of which went to the South Vietnamese military budget. Only minor sums went to education and social welfare programs. Thus, the aid seldom touched the lives of the preponderantly rural populace. As Diem consolidated his power, U.S. military advisors also reorganized the South Vietnamese armed forces. Known as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and equipped with American weaponry, it was designed to fight a conventional invasion from North Vietnam rather than deal with insurgency warfare.

Fearing a loss, Diem refused to hold the scheduled 1956 elections. This jolted veteran communist North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh. Ho had not been displeased with Diem's crushing of his internal opposition but was now ready to reunite the country under his sway and believed that he would win the elections. North Vietnam was more populous than South Vietnam, and the communists were well organized there. Fortified by the containment policy, the domino theory, and the belief that the communists, if they came to power, would never permit a democratic regime, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration backed Diem's defiance of the Geneva Agreements.

Diem's decision led to a renewal of fighting, which became the Vietnam War. Fighting resumed in 1957 when Diem moved against the 6,000–7,000 Viet Minh political cadres who had been allowed to remain in South Vietnam to prepare for the 1956 elections. The Viet Minh began the insurgency on their own initiative but were subsequently supported by the North Vietnamese government. The South Vietnamese communist insurgents came to be known as the Viet Cong (VC). In December 1960 they established the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam. Supposedly independent, the NLF was controlled by Hanoi. The NLF program called for the overthrow of the Saigon government, its replacement by a "broad national democratic coalition," and the "peaceful" reunification of Vietnam.

In September 1959, North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap established Transportation Group 559 to send supplies and men south along what came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, much of which ran through supposedly neutral Laos. The first wave of infiltrators were native southerners and Viet Minh who had relocated to North Vietnam in 1954. Viet Cong sway expanded, spreading out from safe bases to one village after another. The insurgency was fed by the weaknesses of the central government, by the use of terror and assassination, and by Saigon's appalling ignorance of the movement. By the end of 1958, the insurgency had reached the status of conventional warfare in several provinces. In 1960, the communists carried out even more assassinations, and guerrilla units attacked ARVN regulars, overran district and provincial capitals, and ambushed convoys and reaction forces.

People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A network of roads and trails that stretched from North Vietnam through eastern Laos to South Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh Trail formed the main supply route for troops and equipment supporting Hanoi's war against the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). (AFP/Getty Images)

By mid-1961, the Saigon government had lost control over much of rural South Vietnam. Infiltration was as yet not significant, and most of the insurgents' weapons were either captured from ARVN forces or were left over from the war with France. Diem rejected American calls for meaningful reform until the establishment of full security. He did not understand that the war was primarily a political problem and could be solved only through political means.

Diem, who practiced the divide and rule concept of leadership, increasingly delegated authority to his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his secret police. Isolated from his people and relying only on trusted family members and a few other advisors, Diem resisted U.S. demands that he promote his senior officials and officers on the basis of ability and pursue the war aggressively.

By now, U.S. President John F. Kennedy's administration was forced to reevaluate its position toward the war, but increased U.S. involvement was inevitable, given Washington's commitment to resist communist expansion



and the belief that all of Southeast Asia would become communist if South Vietnam fell. Domestic political considerations also influenced the decision.

In May 1961, Kennedy sent several fact-finding missions to Vietnam. These led to the Strategic Hamlet program as part of a general strategy emphasizing local militia defense and to the commitment of additional U.S. manpower. By the end of 1961, U.S. strength in Vietnam had grown to around 3,200 men, most in helicopter units or serving as advisors. In February 1962, the United States also established a military headquarters in Saigon, when the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) was replaced by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to direct the enlarged American commitment. The infusion of U.S. helicopters and additional support for the ARVN probably prevented a VC military victory in 1962. The VC soon learned to cope with the helicopters, however, and again the tide of battle turned.

Meanwhile, Nhu's crackdown on the Buddhists led to increased opposition to Diem's rule. South Vietnamese generals now planned a coup, and after Diem rejected reforms, the United States gave the plotters tacit support. On 1 November 1963 the generals overthrew Diem, murdering both him and Nhu. Within three weeks Kennedy was also dead, succeeded by Lyndon B. Johnson.

The United States seemed unable to win the war either with or without Diem. A military junta now took power, but none of those who followed Diem had his prestige. Coups and countercoups occurred, and much of South Vietnam remained in turmoil. Not until General Nguyen Van Thieu became president in 1967 was there a degree of political stability.

Both sides steadily increased the stakes, apparently without foreseeing that the other might do the same. In 1964 Hanoi made three decisions. The first was to send to South Vietnam units of its regular army, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), known to the Americans as the North Vietnamese

Army (NVA). The second was to rearm its forces in South Vietnam with modern communist-bloc weapons, giving them a firepower advantage over the ARVN, which was still equipped largely with World War II–era U.S. infantry weapons. And the third was to order direct attacks on American installations, provoking a U.S. response.

On 2 August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred when North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack on the *Maddox* and another U.S. destroyer, the *Turner Joy,* reported two days later, probably never occurred, but Washington believed that it had, and this led the Johnson administration to order retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases and fuel depots. It also led to a near-unanimous vote in Congress for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the president to use whatever force he deemed necessary to protect U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.

Johnson would not break off U.S. involvement in Vietnam, evidently fearing possible impeachment if he did so. At the same time, he refused to make the tough decision of fully mobilizing the country and committing the resources necessary to win, concerned that this would destroy his cherished Great Society social programs. He also feared a widened war, possibly involving the People's Republic of China (PRC).

By 1965, Ho and his generals expected to win the war. Taking their cue from Johnson's own pronouncements to the American people, they mistakenly believed that Washington would not commit ground troops to the fight. Yet Johnson did just that. Faced with Hanoi's escalation, in March 1965 U.S. Marines arrived to protect the large American air base at Da Nang. A direct attack on U.S. advisors at Pleiku in February 1965 also led to a U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam.

Ultimately more than 2.5 million Americans served in Vietnam, and nearly 58,000 of them died there. At its height, Washington was spending $30 billion per year on the war. Although the conflict was the best-covered war in American history (it became known as the first television war), it was conversely the least understood by the American people.

More than 2,500,000 Americans served in Vietnam, and nearly 58,000 of them died there. At its height, Washington was spending $30 billion per year on the war.

Johnson hoped to win the war on the cheap, relying heavily on airpower. Known as Operation ROLLING THUNDER and paralleled by Operation BARREL ROLL, the secret bombing of Laos (which became the most heavily bombed country in the history of warfare), the air campaign would be pursued in varying degrees of intensity over the next three and a half years. Its goals were to force Hanoi to negotiate peace and to halt infiltration into South Vietnam. During the war, the United States dropped more bombs than in all of World War II, but the campaign failed in both its objectives.

In the air war, Johnson decided on graduated response rather than the massive strikes advocated by the military. Gradualism became the grand strategy employed by the United States in Vietnam. Haunted by the Korean War, at no time would Johnson consider an invasion of North Vietnam, fearful of provoking a Chinese reaction.

By May and June 1965, with PAVN forces regularly destroying ARVN units, MACV commander General William Westmoreland appealed for U.S.

After a firefight, two soldiers of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade wait for a helicopter to evacuate them and a dead companion. (National Archives and Records Administration)

ground units, which Johnson committed. PAVN regiments appeared ready to launch an offensive in the rugged Central Highlands and then drive to the sea, splitting South Vietnam in two. Westmoreland mounted a spoiling attack with the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) formed around some 450 helicopters. During October–November 1965, the 1st Cavalry won one of the war's rare decisive encounters in the Battle of Ia Drang and may have derailed Hanoi's hopes of winning a decisive victory before full American might could be deployed.

Heavy personnel losses on the battlefield, while regrettable, were entirely acceptable to the North Vietnamese leadership. Ho remarked at one point that North Vietnam could absorb an unfavorable loss ratio of ten to one and still win the war. Washington never did understand this and continued to view the war through its own lens of what would be unacceptable in terms of casualties. From 1966 on, Vietnam was an escalating military stalemate, as Westmoreland requested increasing numbers of men from Washington. By the end of 1966, 400,000 U.S. troops were in Vietnam. In 1968, U.S. strength was more than 500,000 men. Johnson also secured some 60,000 troops from other nations—most of them from the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)—surpassing the 39,000-man international coalition of the Korean War.

Vietnam War, 1964 – 1967

Terrain was not judged important. The goals were to protect the population and kill the enemy, with success measured in terms of body counts that, in turn, led to abuses. During 1966, MACV mounted eighteen major operations, each resulting in more than 500 supposedly verified VC/PAVN dead. Fifty thousand enemy combatants were supposedly killed in 1966. By the beginning of 1967, the PAVN and VC had 300,000 men versus 625,000 ARVN and 400,000 Americans.

Hanoi, meanwhile, had reached a point of decision, with casualties exceeding available replacements. Instead of scaling back, North Vietnam prepared a major offensive that would employ all available troops to secure a quick victory. Hanoi believed that a major military defeat for the United States would end its political will to continue.

Giap now prepared a series of peripheral attacks, including a modified siege of some 6,000 U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh near the demilitarized zone (DMZ), beginning in January 1968. With U.S. attention riveted on Khe Sanh, Giap planned a massive offensive to occur over Tet, the lunar new year holidays, called the General Offensive–General Uprising. The North Vietnamese government believed that this massive offensive would lead people in South Vietnam to rise up and overthrow the South Vietnamese government, bringing an American withdrawal. The attacks were mounted against the cities. In a major intelligence failure, U.S. and South Vietnamese officials misread both the timing and strength of the attack, finding it inconceivable that the attack would come during Tet, sacrificing public goodwill.

The Tet Offensive began on 31 January and ended on 24 February 1968. Poor communication and coordination plagued Hanoi's plans. Attacks in one province occurred a day early, alerting the authorities. Hue, the former imperial capital, was especially hard hit. Fighting there destroyed half the city.

Hanoi's plan failed. ARVN forces generally fought well, and the people of South Vietnam did not support the attackers. In Hue, the communists executed 3,000 people, and news of this caused many South Vietnamese to rally to the South Vietnamese government. Half of the 85,000 VC and PAVN soldiers who took part in the offensive were killed or captured. It was the worst military setback for North Vietnam in the war.

Paradoxically, it was also its most resounding victory, in part because the Johnson administration and Westmoreland had trumpeted prior Allied successes, and the intensity of the fighting came as a profound shock to the American people. Disillusioned and despite the victory, they turned against the war. At the end of March, Johnson announced a partial cessation of bombing and withdrew from the November presidential election.

Hanoi persisted, however. In the first six months of 1968, communist forces sustained more than 100,000 casualties, and the VC was virtually wiped out. In the same period, 20,000 Allied troops died. All sides now opted for talks in Paris in an effort to negotiate an end to the war.

American disillusionment with the war was a key factor in Republican Richard Nixon's razor-thin victory over Democrat Hubert Humphrey in the November 1968 presidential election. With no plan of his own, Nixon embraced Vietnamization, actually begun under Johnson. This turned over more

of the war to the ARVN, and U.S. troop withdrawals began. Peak U.S. strength of 550,000 men occurred in early 1969. There were 475,000 men by the end of the year, 335,000 by the end of 1970, and 157,000 at the end of 1971. Massive amounts of equipment were turned over to the ARVN, including 1 million M-16 rifles and sufficient aircraft to make the South Vietmese Air Force the world's fourth largest. Extensive retraining of the ARVN was begun, and training schools were established. The controversial counterinsurgency PHOENIX program also operated against the VC infrastructure, reducing the insurgency by 67,000 people between 1968 and 1971, but PAVN forces remained secure in sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia.

Nixon's policy was to limit outside assistance to Hanoi and pressure the North Vietnamese government to end the war. For years, American and South Vietnamese military leaders had sought approval to attack the sanctuaries. In March 1970 a coup in Cambodia ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk. General Lon Nol replaced him, and secret operations against the PAVN Cambodian sanctuaries soon began. Over a two-month span, there were twelve cross-border operations, known as the Cambodian Incursion. Despite widespread opposition in the United States to the widened war, the incursions raised the allies' morale, allowed U.S. withdrawals to continue on schedule, and purchased additional time for Vietnamization. PAVN forces now concentrated on bases in southern Laos and on enlarging the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In the spring of 1971, ARVN forces mounted a major invasion into southern Laos, known as Operation LAM SON 719. There were no U.S. advisors, and ARVN units took heavy casualties. The operation set back Hanoi's plans to invade South Vietnam but took a great toll on the ARVN's younger officers and pointed out serious command weaknesses.

By 1972, PAVN forces had recovered and had been substantially strengthened with new weapons, including heavy artillery and tanks, from the Soviet Union. They now mounted a major conventional invasion of South Vietnam. Hanoi believed that the United States would not interfere. Giap had fifteen divisions. He left only one in North Vietnam and two in Laos and committed the remaining twelve to the invasion.

The attack began on 29 March 1972. Known as the Spring or Easter Offensive, it began with a direct armor strike across the DMZ at the 17th Parallel and caught the best South Vietnamese troops facing Laos. Allied intelligence misread its scale and precise timing. Giap risked catastrophic losses but hoped for a quick victory before ARVN forces could recover. At first it appeared that the PAVN would be successful. Quang Tri fell, and rain limited the effectiveness of airpower.

In May, President Nixon authorized B-52 bomber strikes on North Vietnam's principal port of Haiphong and the mining of its harbor. This new air campaign was dubbed LINEBACKER I and involved the use of new precision-guided munitions (so-called or smart bombs). The bombing cut off much of the supplies for the invading PAVN forces. Allied aircraft also destroyed 400–500 PAVN tanks. In June and July, the ARVN counterattacked. The invasion cost Hanoi half its force—some 100,000 men died—while ARVN losses were only 25,000.

With both Soviet and Chinese leaders anxious for better relations with the United States in order to obtain Western technology, Hanoi gave way and switched to negotiations. Finally, an agreement was hammered out in Paris that December, but President Thieu balked and refused to sign, whereupon Hanoi made the agreements public. A furious Nixon blamed Hanoi for the impasse, and in December he ordered a resumption of the bombing, dubbed LINEBACKER II but also known as the December or Christmas Bombings. Although fifteen B-52s were lost, Hanoi had fired away virtually its entire stock of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and now agreed to resume talks.

After a few cosmetic changes, an agreement was signed on 23 January 1973, with Nixon forcing Thieu to agree or risk the end of all U.S. aid. The United States recovered its prisoners of war and departed Vietnam. The Soviet Union and China continued to supply arms to North Vietnam, however, while Congress constricted U.S. supplies to South Vietnam. Tanks and planes were not replaced on the promised one-for-one basis as they were lost, and spare parts and fuel were both in short supply. All this had a devastating effect on ARVN morale.

In South Vietnam, both sides violated the cease-fire, and fighting steadily increased in intensity. In January 1975, communist forces attacked and quickly seized Phuoc Long Province on the Cambodian border north of Saigon. Washington took no action. The communists next took Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, then in mid-March President Thieu decided to abandon

Saigon falls to the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army), April 1975. (Francoise de Mulder/Corbis)

the northern part of his country. Confusion became disorder, then disaster, and six weeks later PAVN forces controlled all of South Vietnam. Saigon fell on 30 April 1975, to be renamed Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam was now reunited, but under a communist government. An estimated 3 million Vietnamese, soldiers and civilians, had died in the struggle. Much of the country was devastated by the fighting, and Vietnam suffered from the effects of the widespread use of chemical defoliants.

The effects were also profound in the United States. The American military was shattered by the war and had to be rebuilt. Inflation was rampant from the failure to face up to the true costs of the war. Many questioned U.S. willingness to embark on such a crusade again, at least to go it alone. In this sense, the war forced Washington into a more realistic appraisal of U.S. power.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cambodia; Containment Policy; Domino Theory; Geneva Conference (1954); Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Laos; Ngo Dinh Diem; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam

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Vietnam War Protests

The Vietnam War protest movement brought together numerous organizations and activists with different agendas under the unifying banner of opposition to the war. Initially, this opposition came from the Old Left, a group of traditionally socialist and pacifist groups. Representative of the Old Left was the War Resisters League (WRL), founded in 1923. By 1963, the WRL focused its protests on the expanding U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam.

On 16 May 1964, the WRL sponsored a demonstration in New York City during which twelve men burned their draft cards. Soon thereafter, leadership for the antiwar movement shifted to what became known as the New Left. One of the most prominent New Left groups was the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), formed in 1960. The SDS first focused on domestic concerns but began expressing growing concern with the military-industrial-academic establishment and the Vietnam War.

In February 1965, the United States began bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), providing a unifying catalyst that brought a number of groups together in opposition to the war. However, the

focus of the movement shifted to college campuses. Beginning in March 1965, a series of nationwide college campus teach-ins were held, the first of them at the University of Michigan. On 17 April the SDS organized a march on Washington, D.C., in which 20,000 people participated.

As the U.S. effort in Vietnam escalated, the antiwar movement grew steadily, attracting new allies. Soon, social activists, celebrities, and musicians such as Abbie Hoffman, Timothy Leary, Allen Ginsberg, Jane Fonda, Jefferson Airplane, and others took up the antiwar cause. As the war intensified, other New Left groups such as the Catholic Peace Fellowship, the Emergency Citizens Group Concerned About Vietnam, and the National Emergency Committee of Clergy Concerned About Vietnam joined in the antiwar protests.

Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights leaders also began to denounce the war on moral grounds. By 1966, the antiwar movement gained strength and had formed an informal alliance with the civil rights movement. The movement received new support from former officials in the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson such as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and John Kenneth Galbraith, who spoke out against the war. In Congress, a rising antiwar group led by Democratic Senators Wayne Morse, Mike Mansfield, and J. William Fulbright gained momentum.

As sentiment against the war grew, protests against the war took root abroad. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), numerous student-led demonstrations against the war occurred. In France, which had fought its own war in Indochina, demonstrations were reinforced by President Charles de Gaulle, who publicly declared that North Vietnam would ultimately win the war. There were antiwar protests throughout Europe, even in Great Britain, a staunch American ally. In Australia, which had sent troops to Vietnam, the antiwar movement paralleled that in the United States and grew rapidly. In communist bloc nations, students also took to the streets to protest America's war. Indeed, the international antiwar movement helped solidify and legitimize the American antiwar movement.

Back in the United States, the movement gained in strength as the number of American troops in Vietnam approached half a million. In 1967, the Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam, a coalition composed of teachers, students, and Old and New Left organizations, sponsored mass demonstrations. As a result, on 15 April more than 130,000 antiwar protestors marched in New York and 70,000 protested in San Francisco. The most significant antiwar event of 1967 was October's march on the Pentagon. By then, the antiwar movement was crippling Johnson's presidency and threatening to paralyze the nation. Even some of Johnson's closest advisors began to question the war effort.

With public support for the war plummeting, Johnson fought back by overselling modest gains in the war. This set the stage for the stunning 30 January 1968 Tet Offensive debacle. By 31 January, communist forces in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) had attacked five major cities, thirty-six provincial capitals, and sixty-four district capitals. In one of the

A female demonstrator offers a flower to military police on guard at the Pentagon during an anti–Vietnam War demonstration, 21 October 1967. (National Archives and Records Administration)

boldest attacks, a Viet Cong (VC) platoon briefly penetrated the grounds of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Although the communist forces were soundly defeated, the Tet Offensive demonstrated that Johnson had grossly overstated the war's progress, costing the government and the military the confidence of the American people. Now with fully half of all Americans opposed to the Vietnam War, the antiwar movement gained further momentum.

In March 1968, Johnson announced a halt to the bombing campaign and stood down for reelection. This did not, however, curtail the antiwar protests, which soon turned violent. Students occupied Columbia University's administration building and had to be forcibly evicted. Raids on draft boards began, during which protestors smeared blood on records and shredded files. Other demonstrations occurred at the offices and production facilities of Dow Chemical, the manufacturer of napalm. Perhaps the most widely publicized protests took place in the streets of Chicago outside the 1968 Democratic National Convention, resulting in a bloody confrontation between demonstrators and police.

During the 1968 elections, presidential candidate Richard Nixon claimed to have a plan to end the war. However, when casualties continued to mount and Nixon did not immediately scale the war back, antiwar critics turned their sights on the Nixon White House. A new round of demonstrations erupted in the fall of 1969. In October, a series of nationwide demonstrations was organized by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC). More than 100,000 people gathered in Boston Common. In November 1969, the VMC called a march on Washington, drawing some 500,000 participants. At this point, the antiwar leadership began to change. Clean-cut SDS leaders who had supported the 1968 peace candidate Eugene McCarthy were being eclipsed by movement leaders who favored more radical measures. This shift elicited a public backlash, as Americans, even those who opposed the war, became fearful and angry with the movement's radicalization.

The antiwar movement regained a measure of renewed solidarity in April 1970 when Nixon gambled that he could reduce U.S. troop strength in Vietnam by bombing communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. The result was a new round of college campus demonstrations. On 4 May 1970, Ohio National Guardsmen killed four students at Kent State University, unleashing a firestorm of student demonstrations around the country and virtually paralyzing America's college and university campuses. That same week, 100,000 people gathered to protest the killings in Washington.

The June 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers won more converts to the movement. Nixon's decision to bomb North Vietnam in December 1972 set off a new round of protests at home and abroad. Nixon was denounced as a war criminal in Europe. Even the pope sharply criticized Nixon. This latest uproar did not substantially subside until January 1973, when the Paris Peace Accords had been signed, virtually ending America's Vietnam odyssey.

The antiwar movement revealed the sharp divisions in American society and encouraged the North Vietnamese to fight on long enough to break the back of the American war effort. The movement also greatly influenced the American political and military establishments and eroded support for both Johnson and Nixon. Finally, it is axiomatic that the movement had a significant impact on the Vietnam War's outcome.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Military-Industrial Complex; Music; Students for a Democratic Society; Tet Offensive; Vietnam War

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Vo Nguyen Giap
(1911–)

Senior general in the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese Army) during 1946–1972 and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) during 1946–1986. Vo Nguyen Giap was born in An Xa, Quang Binh Province, in central Vietnam on 15 August 1911. He attended the Lycée Nationale in Hue but was labeled an agitator and expelled. He then worked for a time as a journalist, and he joined the secret Revolutionary Party for a New Vietnam.

Giap was arrested by the French in 1930 and was sentenced to two years' hard labor. Upon his release from prison, he studied at the Lycée Albert Sarraut at Hanoi, graduating in 1934. He then taught history and French at the Lycée Thuong Long. He also published a number of journals and newspapers, most of which were shut down by the authorities. In 1938 he earned a law degree from the University of Hanoi.

Giap joined the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1937. The ICP ordered him to southern China in 1940. He was forced to leave behind his wife and daughter, and in 1941 the French arrested his wife. She was subsequently tortured to death.

He was forced to leave behind his wife and daughter. The French arrested his wife in 1941; she was subsequently tortured to death.

In China, Giap met Ho Chi Minh. Under Ho's orders, Giap returned to northern Tonkin, where he organized opposition to the French and became a leader of the Vietnam Independence League (Viet Minh), formed in 1942.

In December 1944 Giap formed thirty-four men into the Vietnam Armed Propaganda and Liberation Brigade, the beginnings of the PAVN. His troops underwent strict political indoctrination and military training. Giap was responsible for refining the rural revolutionary warfare theories of Mao Zedong that combined political and military activity into revolutionary warfare.

At the end of World War II, Giap became minister of the interior in the new North Vietnamese government formed in September 1945. He was subsequently named minister of defense with the rank of full general and command of all North Vietnamese military forces.

Giap led the Viet Minh against the French in the long Indochina War (1946–1954), in the course of which he built an army of nearly 300,000 men. He suffered heavy losses when he went over prematurely to major pitched battles against the French Army, but he achieved victory in May 1954 at Dien Bien Phu in the most important battle of the war.

Giap also led PAVN forces in fighting in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) after President Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal to hold the elections called for in 1956 by the 1954 Geneva Accords. Giap often engaged in intense debates with military commanders and political leaders over strategy. He generally cautioned patience, while others sought more aggressive action against South Vietnamese and U.S. forces. He opposed the 1968 Tet Offensive and was proven correct, as the offensive failed, producing high casualties for his own troops and no popular uprising in South Vietnam. However, the Tet Offensive also produced an unexpected psychological victory for Hanoi and led Washington to seek a way out of the war.

General Vo Nguyen Giap, minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), in Hanoi on 29 May 1969. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In 1972, Giap reluctantly ordered a massive invasion of South Vietnam in what became known as the Easter Offensive. Once again, he was proven correct when the South Vietnamese, supported by massive U.S. airpower, blunted the attack and inflicted heavy casualties on the North Vietnamese. Still, when the offensive was over, PAVN forces occupied territory that they had not previously controlled, and the subsequent 1973 peace agreement did not require their removal.

Sharp disagreements within the North Vietnamese leadership regarding Giap's military judgment led to him being stripped of his command of the PAVN, although he retained the post of minister of defense until 1986. His protégé, General Van Tien Dung, directed the final offensive in 1975 that resulted in the defeat of South Vietnam. Appointed to head the Ministry of Science and Technology, Giap opposed the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In 1991 he was forced to give up his last post as vice premier in charge of family planning. After his retirement, the government designated Giap a national treasure.

James H. Willbanks

See also

Communist Revolutionary Warfare; Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Ho Chi Minh; Indochina War; Southeast Asia; Tet Offensive; Vietnam; Vietnam War

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Vogel, Hans-Jochen

(1926–)

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) politician, minister for regional and city planning (1972–1974), minister of justice (1974–1981), and mayor of West Berlin (1981). Born on 3 February 1926 in Göttingen, Hans-Jochen Vogel studied law at the University of Marburg, where he received his doctorate in 1950. That same year he joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

Vogel served in the Bavarian state chancellery during 1955–1958 and was head of the law division of Munich's municipal council during 1958–1960. He was also mayor of Munich during 1960–1972. In November 1972 he entered the Bundestag, where he stayed until 1981. He served again in the Bundestag during 1983–1994.

Under Chancellor Willy Brandt, Vogel became minister for regional and city planning in December 1972. In the Helmut Schmidt government, Vogel served as minister for justice during 1974–1981. The greatest challenge he faced as justice minister was the terrorist activities of the Red Army Faction, which sought to overthrow the government through the kidnapping and assassination of politicians, diplomats, and industrialists. He cooperated closely with Schmidt to crush the terrorists. By the time Vogel left office in January 1981, thirty-two people had been killed by terrorist attacks, while twenty-two terrorists had been sentenced to long-term imprisonments.

In January 1981, the Berlin House of Deputies elected Vogel governing mayor of West Berlin. After just four months, however, he was defeated in the general elections and resigned. During 1981–1983, he was SPD opposition leader in the Berlin House of Deputies. In 1983 he reentered the Bundestag, and in June 1987 a special party convention elected him SPD chairman, replacing the aging Brandt. Vogel resigned as SPD opposition leader in the Bundestag in November 1991 but retained his seat for another three years.

Bert Becker

See also

Brandt, Willy; Germany, Federal Republic of; Kohl, Helmut; Schmidt, Helmut

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Voice of America

U.S. government global broadcasting service established in 1942. During the Cold War, the Voice of America (VOA) audience in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries grew to an estimated 52 million listeners a week. Principal languages beamed to that region and the Balkans over the years were Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, and English. Others included Albanian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Bulgarian, Belarusian, Czech, Estonian, Georgian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, Slovene, Tatar, Turkmenistani, and Uzbek.

From its inception in 1942 until the advent of multimedia in the 1990s, most VOA broadcasts were sent via shortwave with some medium-wave, or the standard AM, frequencies. Other delivery means included long-wave and occasional placement of recordings for rebroadcast by local radio outlets.

VOA Russia, which peaked at seventeen-hour broadcast days late in the Cold War, began transmissions on 17 February 1947 under the leadership of VOA Director Charles Thayer, a prominent American diplomat and Soviet affairs specialist. Programming of VOA services to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe consisted of news, topical analyses, official U.S. policy statements, and a full range of features about life in America and the individual audience regions. A flagship program in Russian, *Events and Opinions*, was broadcast at the peak listening hour, midnight Moscow time. The offerings of it and other programs reflected American thought and ideas, democratic practices in a civil society, history, cultural developments, economic and scientific news, and music.

In English, VOA jazz impresario Willis Conover broadcast more than 10,000 programs (1955–1996). He inspired countless Russian and East European artists and others with what he called "the music of freedom."

Communist governments feared the impact of the two principal U.S. networks, VOA and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The BBC estimated that the Soviet cost of jamming Western broadcasts was more than $900 million annually, considerably more than the combined budgets at the time of all American and British publicly funded international networks worldwide. The attempt to

block incoming broadcasts, in any case, was only partially effective.

European communist governments' jamming of VOA shortwave varied with the ebb and flow of East-West tensions and crises, within and outside the target countries. Jamming ceased beginning in 1963 and commenced again after the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Jamming was again curtailed in 1974 until shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Jamming of VOA finally ended in 1987 as glasnost and perestroika took hold. Other countries blocking U.S.-funded broadcasts included Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Poland, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Cuba.

Polish President Lech Wałęsa, in assessing the influence of Western broadcasts, said in 1997: "When it comes to radio waves, the Iron Curtain was helpless. Nothing could stop the news from coming through—neither sputniks nor minefields, high walls or barbed wire. The frontiers could be closed; words could not."

Alan Heil

Baseball player Jackie Robinson with Bob Allison, Voice of America sports editor, while preparing for a special English-language interview to be heard on VOA's *In the Sportlight*, airing during 1951–1953. (National Archives and Records Administration)

See also

Glasnost; Perestroika; Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; Wałęsa, Lech

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Vorster, Balthazar Johannes
(1915–1983)

South African apartheid leader, prime minister (1966–1978), and president (1978–1979). Born in Jamestown, South Africa, on 13 December 1915, the son of an Afrikaner sheep farmer, Balthazar Johannes "John" Vorster studied law at South Africa's Stellenbosch University, graduating in 1938. After briefly clerking for a judge, he took up practice as an attorney. During World War II he was interned for more than two years because of his pro-Nazi sympathies.

In the 1953 all-white elections, Vorster was elected to parliament on the Nationalist Party ticket. In 1961 he was appointed minister of justice and of social welfare and pensions. As such, he organized a crackdown on the rising tide of black opposition to his government's apartheid plans. His suppression methods included detention without trial and the use of anticommunist legislation to quash government opposition.

After Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd's 1966 assassination, Vorster became the National Party leader and prime minister. His term in office was marked by a significant shift to the Right as his government tried to cope with deepening international isolation, the threat of sanctions, and the rising anger of the black majority. In July 1971 Vorster caused an international controversy when he announced that South Africa had acquired uranium-enrichment technology. Suspicions that South Africa possessed a nuclear bomb increased in the summer of 1977, following the alleged detection by Soviet satellites of a nuclear testing facility in the Kalahari Desert. Vorster's government never provided an explanation on the nature of the facility.

Pragmatic in his approach to foreign affairs, Vorster sought to end South Africa's estrangement from its regional neighbors. In 1974, under pressure from the United States, he convinced Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to accept that minority rule would end there. In 1976, again under pressure from the Americans, Vorster agreed that South African troops should enter war-torn Angola, marking the beginning of South Africa's twenty-year involvement in the Angolan Civil War.

The Angolan war strengthened the position of the military in South African politics and weakened Vorster's party position. In 1978 he was elected president, but he was forced to resign in 1979 because of a political scandal involving allegations of misappropriation of funds. Vorster died in Cape Town on 10 September 1983.

Peter Vale

See also

Africa; Cuba and Africa; Namibia; South Africa; South African Destabilization Campaign

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Vranitzky, Franz
(1937–)

Austrian banker, finance minister (1984–1986), and federal chancellor (1986–1997). Born on 4 October 1937 in Vienna, Franz Vranitzky studied inter-

national trade and commerce at the College of Commerce and graduated in 1960. In 1961 he joined the research staff of the Austrian Central Bank. In 1969 he received a doctorate in economics.

Active in Social Democratic politics since his student days, in 1970 Vranitzky became a financial advisor in the Ministry of Finance. In 1976 he was named deputy chairman of the board of directors of Creditanstalt Bankverein and in 1981 chairman of Länderbank. In 1984 Chancellor Fred Sinowatz appointed Vranitzky minister of finance. Following Sinowatz's resignation, in June 1986 Vranitzky became federal chancellor.

Franz Vranitzky, Austrian chancellor and leader of the Social Democratic Party of Austria. (Austrian Press and Information Service)

Vranitzky's tenure as chancellor was marked by strained Austro-American and Austro-Israeli relations over the 1986 election of Kurt Waldheim as president of Austria. Vranitzky continued Austria's policy of pursuing cordial economic and political relations with the Soviets and allowing Austria to serve as a transit point for emigrating Soviet Jews. He traveled to Moscow for a summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1988 and oversaw Austria's hosting of the 1986–1989 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Vienna Review Conference. In September 1989 Austria opened its borders to thousands of citizens from the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) who were trying to reach the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) via Hungary, thereby helping to precipitate the collapse of the East German regime.

From 1989 on, Vranitzky was increasingly preoccupied with adjusting to the implications for Austria, both positive and negative, of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia and other ex-communist states poured into the country, giving rise to a political backlash centered in Jörg Haider's Freedom Party of Austria. On the other hand, Austria stepped up its integration with Western Europe and moved out from under the constraints on its external freedom of action imposed by the 1955 Austrian State Treaty. Austria successfully negotiated entrance into the European Union (EU), which it formally joined on 1 January 1995. In addition to leading Austria's drive for EU membership, Vranitzky forged a new relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as Austria joined the Partnership for Peace program in February 1995. Vranitzky resigned the chancellorship in January 1997. That same year, he was named special envoy of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe to Albania.

John Van Oudenaren

See also

Austria; Austrian State Treaty; Waldheim Affair

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Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuarevich
(1883–1954)

Soviet politician, chief prosecutor for Soviet leader Josef Stalin's show trials in the 1930s, and Soviet foreign minister (1949–1953). Born on 10 December 1883 in Odessa to a Polish family, Andrei Ianuarevich Vyshinskii fraternized with Marxists while at the University of Kiev studying law, and in 1920 he joined the Bolshevik Party. Working in the Soviet legal system, he demonstrated a talent for prosecuting alleged saboteurs and wreckers in the Shakhty Trial (1928) and the Industrial Party Trial (1930). In 1933 he became deputy prosecutor of the Soviet Union, further proving his skills in the creation and manipulation of evidence and the histrionic abuse of defendants. In the aftermath of the assassination of the Leningrad party boss Sergei Kirov in December 1934, Vyshinskii was involved in the secret trial of the Nikolayev-Kotolynov group, which was blamed for the murder.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei I. Vyshinskii. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

The trial of the alleged conspirators in the assassination of Kirov led to the great show trials of 1935–1939 in which leading Bolsheviks were arrested, tortured, humiliated in court, and sentenced to death or imprisonment on the basis of fraudulent confessions. It was Vyshinskii, as chief prosecutor during 1935–1939 and faithful servant of Stalin, who dominated the trials with his wild, dramatic, vitriolic denunciations of the defendants and the use of falsified evidence. His reward was a seat in the Soviet parliament (1938) and the deputy premiership during 1939–1944.

After 1939, Vyshinskii's career was mainly in foreign affairs. He served as deputy foreign minister during 1939–1949 and then foreign minister during 1949–1953. Stalin had ousted Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov after the humiliating setback of the failed Berlin Blockade (1948–1949).

Vyshinskii's tenure in office was singularly unremarkable. He made no major foreign policy decisions and was content merely to carry out Stalin's mandates. After Stalin's death in March 1953, Molotov assumed his old post, and Vyshinskii was cast aside. As a sort of consolation prize, Moscow's new collective leadership sent Vyshinskii to the United Nations (UN) in New York as a permanent Soviet delegate. There he became well known for his acerbic wit and scathing denunciations of the West and the

United States in particular. Vyshinskii died in New York City on 22 November 1954.

Paul Wingrove

See also

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; United States

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W

Waldheim, Kurt
(1918–2007)

President of Austria and secretary-general of the United Nations (UN). Born in St. Andra-Wordern, Austria, on 21 December 1918, Kurt Waldheim entered the University of Vienna in 1937, intending to pursue a course of study that would lead to law and diplomacy, and earned a law degree in 1944. At the same time, during World War II he served as a junior officer in the German Army in the Balkans.

Waldheim entered the diplomatic service in 1945 and quickly rose through the ranks. He served as first secretary of the Austrian Legation in Paris (1948–1951) and worked in the Foreign Ministry in Vienna before being appointed as Austria's representative to the UN in 1955. Although he served only one year, the appointment marked the beginning of his long association with the UN.

After a stint in Canada (1956–1960), Waldheim again returned to Vienna, rising to the post of director-general for political affairs in 1962. Two years later, he was reappointed as Austria's representative to the UN. In 1968, he became minister for foreign affairs under Josef Klaus. Waldheim left the Austrian government in 1970 to serve as chairman of the Safeguards Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He became Austria's representative to the UN for a third time later that year.

Following an unsuccessful campaign for the presidency of Austria in 1971, Waldheim won election as secretary-general of the UN that December, succeeding U Thant. As secretary-general, Waldheim campaigned for peace around the globe. He traveled frequently to the Middle East, visited Cyprus several times, and attempted to establish peace talks among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. He took part in the Paris International Conference on Vietnam and presided over the opening session of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East in 1973. In his second term, he

Kurt Waldheim served as secretary-general of the United Nations from 1971 to 1982. He was elected president of Austria in 1986 despite concerns over revelations regarding his German Army service in World War II. (Austrian Press and Information Service)

negotiated, unsuccessfully, for the release of American hostages from Iran. The People's Republic of China (PRC) blocked his attempt to win a third term in 1981.

In 1986, Waldheim ran again for the post of president in Austria as the candidate of the Austrian People's Party (OVP). His campaign presented him as "a man the people trust" and emphasized his humanitarian role with the UN. Journalistic investigations into his background, however, uncovered evidence that he had been part of a German Army unit guilty of atrocities during World War II. Waldheim claimed that he had been on leave in Vienna when the crimes were committed and knew nothing about them.

Older Austrians rallied behind Waldheim, and he was elected president following a run-off election in June 1986. The decision proved troublesome, as the international community quickly ostracized Austria. Only the Vatican, the Soviet Union, a few nations in Eastern Europe, and some Arab states allowed Waldheim to visit as head of state. The opposition within Austria called for his resignation. Instead, the government launched its own inquiry into Waldheim's past.

The results of the investigation, released in February 1988, largely exonerated Waldheim. His response was to make a televised speech noting that the Holocaust was one of the most tragic events in history and, for the first time, admitting that Austrians had played a shameful role in it. Waldheim served the rest of his term in relative anonymity and chose not to run again in 1992. He died in Vienna on 14 June 2007.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Austria; United Nations; Waldheim Affair

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Waldheim Affair
(1986)

Allegations of involvement in Nazi atrocities against Kurt Waldheim, the former secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) who was running for president of the Austrian Republic. Waldheim began his second campaign to become president of Austria in late 1985. He had run unsuccessfully in 1971

but lessened the sting of that defeat by negotiating his election as secretary-general of the UN the following year. He served two terms as secretary-general and established a reputation as a man of peace. His attempt to win a third term in 1981 was blocked by the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), however, and Waldheim retired to Vienna. He published his autobiography in 1985.

Despite Waldheim's presence, the Austrian presidential campaign of 1986 merited little international attention until *Profil,* an Austrian news magazine, printed a series of articles alleging that Waldheim had omitted crucial details about his service in the German Army during World War II in both his autobiography and in his presidential campaign. Waldheim's account claimed that although a junior officer in a German SA unit before 1939, he had spent most of the war in Vienna recuperating from wounds and studying law. *Profil* revealed evidence that Waldheim had spent considerable time on duty in the Balkans and in Salonika, Greece. Although the magazine did not accuse Waldheim directly, it did note that his unit had murdered Yugoslav partisans and deported Jews to concentration camps during his service. Waldheim responded by saying that he had no knowledge of any atrocities and had simply "done his duty as a soldier."

The affair quickly became the focus of the presidential election. Older Austrians generally supported Waldheim, claiming that Austria was a victim of Nazi aggression and an unwilling participant in the war. Younger Austrians, however, tended to be more suspicious and called for an open discussion of Austria's Nazi past. After heated debate and a run-off election, Waldheim emerged as president of Austria in June 1986, winning 54 percent of the vote.

His presidency put Austria in the international spotlight, but in a most unfavorable way. After an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, Waldheim became the first head of state ever placed on a watch list of undesirable aliens and was denied entry to the United States. Many other states also treated Waldheim as persona non grata, leaving Austria isolated internationally. Only the Vatican, the Soviet Union and its satellites, and a few Middle Eastern states that had received similar treatment allowed Waldheim to visit.

After an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, Waldheim became the first head of state ever placed on a watch list of undesirable aliens and was denied entry to the United States.

Amid growing tensions, the Austrian government launched its own investigation, which largely exonerated Waldheim. Where the U.S. report had concluded that there was "a *prima facie* case that Kurt Waldheim assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of persons because of race, religion, national origin or political opinion," these new findings found no evidence that Waldheim had participated in war crimes. At the same time, the report concluded that as a translator in the unit, Waldheim must have had knowledge of the atrocities.

Waldheim remained in office after this ambiguous finding, claiming that he did so in the best interests of the Austrian people. He also went on Austrian television to plead his case. He admitted that Austrians had played some role in the Holocaust, which he described as one of the greatest tragedies in human history, and he condemned fanaticism and intolerance in all forms. The international community remained unmoved. Whether or not Waldheim

affected Austrian opinion is hard to say. He chose not to run for reelection in 1992. At the very least, Waldheim gave Austrians the chance to discuss a complicated past that had been kept under wraps for nearly fifty years.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Austria; United Nations; Waldheim, Kurt

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Wałęsa, Lech

(1943–)

Polish labor activist, Nobel Peace Prize winner (1983), and president of Poland (1990–1995). Born to a peasant family in the village of Popowo on 29 September 1943, Lech Wałęsa completed vocational school and from 1961 was employed as a car mechanic. During 1965–1967 he performed his mandatory service in the Polish Army.

Wałęsa then began work as an electrician in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. In December 1970, following government announcement of price increases, Wałęsa was one of the leaders in a strike at the shipyard. Arrested, he was convicted of antisocialist behavior and sentenced to a year in prison. On his release, he was elected to the new workers' council and acted as a voluntary work inspector. He also participated in various labor demonstrations and rallies.

In 1976, Wałęsa was fired from his job at the shipyard for collecting signatures on a petition to build a memorial to commemorate the 1970 casualties. He supported his family by taking temporary jobs. In 1978, together with Andrzej Gwiazda, Aleksander Hall, and other activists, Wałęsa took the lead in the organization of free, independent, noncommunist trade unions in the Baltic region. The security forces closely observed this activity. Wałęsa was often detained and arrested and could not find a permanent job.

In August 1980 Poland was struck by yet another wave of strikes. When this agitation reached Gdańsk, Wałęsa became the leader of the strike committee. As a result of the wave of strikes and negotiations with the communist government of Poland, he and the strike committee reached an agreement

with the government on 31 August that allowed workers to organize their own independent, noncommunist trade unions.

This was the beginning of the Solidarność (Solidarity) trade union. One year later, in 1981, Wałęsa became president of Solidarity, which was joined by some 10 million Polish wage earners, about 70 percent of the employed population. Solidarity became a vast movement that sought sweeping social and economic changes. Although there were voices raised against the Soviet Union and Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact, Wałęsa and the Solidarity leadership never let the union drift fully into the political arena.

On 13 December 1981, with the Soviet Union threatening military invasion, Polish General Wojciech Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law, whereupon Wałęsa and other Solidarity leaders were arrested. Released in November 1982, Wałęsa returned to work at the Gdańsk shipyard and maintained contact with underground Solidarity leaders.

Although martial law ended in July 1983, not much had changed. With many of the legal restrictions continuing in place, Wałęsa refused to collaborate with the government. In October 1983, at the time virtually under house arrest, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

In 1989, faced with no economic improvement and a steadily worsening political climate in Poland, Jaruzelski agreed to talks with Wałęsa and his colleagues. These occurred during February–April 1989, with Wałęsa leading the opposition side. The two sides reached agreement allowing semifree national elections to be held in June 1989 that resulted in a new government under noncommunist Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Wałęsa's choice.

Lech Wałęsa led the Solidarity Trade Union movement in Poland and was later president of Poland from 1990 to 1995. (Embassy of the Republic of Poland)

With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, Wałęsa, still head of the now-legal Solidarity labor union, traveled widely abroad and met with world leaders. In November 1989 he addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress.

In national elections in December 1990, Wałęsa was elected president. His tenure as president was a mixed one, and his effort to make that office a strong one was only partially successful, bringing with it frequent clashes with premiers and parliament. He lost his bid for reelection in 1995. Wałęsa nonetheless remains one of the most important figures in twentieth-century Poland.

Jakub Basista

See also

Berman, Jakub; Bierut, Bolesław; Gierek, Edward; Gomułka, Władysław; Jaruzelski, Wojciech; Kania, Stanisław; Mazowiecki, Tadeusz; Mikołajczyk, Stanisław; Poland; Poland, Armed Forces; Rapacki, Adam; Solidarity Movement; Światło, Józef; Wałęsa, Lech; Wyszyński, Stefan, Cardinal

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Walker, Edwin Anderson
(1909–1993)

U.S. Army general and controversial right-wing ideologue. Born in Center Point, Texas, on 10 November 1909, Edwin Walker graduated from the New Mexico Military Institute in 1927 and the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1931. During World War II he led the so-called Devil's Brigade of commandos who fought at Anzio and in the invasion of southern France. By 1951 a colonel, Walker commanded an artillery unit in the Korean War, then commanded the Arkansas Military District. After *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), he was tasked with desegregating Little Rock's Central High School. Although he himself adamantly opposed desegregation, he ordered his troops to protect from segregationist mobs nine African American students entering the high school. Promoted to major general in 1959, he commanded the 24th Infantry Division in Augsburg, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany).

In the early 1960s, Walker became embroiled in controversy after he developed a broad campaign to warn soldiers and civilians about the growing menace of communism. Its centerpiece was a propaganda program known as Pro-Blue that included everything from the scheduling of ultraconservative speakers to the distribution of voting guides, approved reading lists, and literature from the reactionary, right-wing John Birch Society. In April 1961 a U.S. Army investigation accused Walker of attempting to indoctrinate troops under his command with ultrarightist views and literature. Public pressure against him quickly mounted, with *The New York Times* and numerous other publications calling for his ouster. He resigned in November 1961, retiring as a major general.

Walker never fully capitalized on the fame generated by his brush-up with the U.S. Army. He frequently wrote and spoke on anticommunist and right-wing topics, but his only serious effort to gain elective office ended in defeat in the 1962 Texas gubernatorial primaries. Walker, who died in Dallas, Texas, on 31 October 1993, is perhaps best remembered as being Lee Harvey Oswald's first assassination target. Oswald shot at Walker but missed as the general sat at his desk in his Dallas home on 10 April 1963.

Shawn Francis Peters

See also
John Birch Society

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Walker, John Anthony, Jr.
(1937–)

U.S. naval officer and spy. Born in Washington, D.C., on 28 July 1937, John Walker Jr. has been assessed as the most damaging Soviet spy in the United States during the Cold War. He actually headed a family of spies, including his son Michael Walker (b. 1962) and a brother, Arthur Walker (b. 1934). The other member of John Walker's espionage ring was his good friend and colleague Jerry Whitworth (b. 1939). All were members of the U.S. Navy, and their treachery involved the sale of vital navy secrets to the Soviet intelligence agency Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB).

Walker graduated from high school but did not attend college. He enlisted in the navy in 1965 and was trained in electronic communications. By the date of his retirement in 1976, he had attained the rank of chief warrant officer. He served tours of duty on nuclear-powered submarines and worked shore assignments in San Diego, Norfolk, and Charleston. In the fall of 1967 he contacted the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., and in return for appropriate compensation offered his services to the KGB. For eighteen years he delivered to the Soviets Navy cryptological materials, including secret codes, key lists, and manuals on the internal operations of U.S. cryptographic equipment. Former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin has estimated that Walker was paid at least $1 million during his espionage career.

Walker enjoyed the considerable income that spying offered. Thus, upon retirement he found it necessary to recruit agents to provide him with the desired information. Walker's brother, Arthur, was a retired naval lieutenant commander and worked for the VSE (Value Systems Engineering) Corporation, which provided services to the navy. Arthur was able to provide his brother with material sought by the Soviets. John Walker's son Michael enlisted in the navy in December 1982. After an assignment on the U.S. aircraft carrier *Nimitz* in January 1984, he too became a source for secret material. Michael was placed in charge of the burn bag and could easily look for valuable documents on their way to destruction. He hid the selected material aboard ship until it could be delivered to his father. Perhaps John Walker's most valuable agent was not a family member but rather a former colleague and a senior chief radioman, Jerry Whitworth. During 1975–1979, Whitworth secured for Walker a wide range of secret material in cryptology. Whitworth's spying income was estimated to be about $330,000.

John Walker was an unscrupulous person, an accomplished liar, a heavy drinker, and a womanizer. His former wife, Barbara Crowley Walker, knew of

Walker actually headed a family of spies, including his son, a brother, and his good friend and colleague Jerry Whitworth.

John Walker Jr., leader of the notorious spy ring bearing his name, is led from the Rockville, Maryland, detention center on his way to the U.S. District Court in Baltimore on 18 October 1985. One of the most damaging spies in U.S. history, Walker sold U.S. secrets to the Soviets for seventeen years. (Bettmann/Corbis)

his spying activity. Finally disenchanted by his corrupt behavior, she reported him to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in November 1984. Walker was placed under surveillance and was finally arrested while servicing a dead-drop zone in a rural area near Washington, D.C. His spy ring quickly unraveled upon his arrest. Walker and son Michael turned against Whitworth and bargained for a lighter sentence for Michael. Whitworth and Arthur Walker were left to the mercy of a judge and jury. On 7 November 1986, Michael Walker received a sentence of 25 years in prison. He was released on parole on 17 February 2000. Whitworth was given the harshest sentence: 365 years in prison and a $410,000 fine. Arthur Walker received life imprisonment coupled with a $250,000 fine. John Walker, the prime culprit and spy mastermind, received a life sentence.

Ernie Teagarden

See also

Espionage; Intelligence Collection; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti

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Wallace, Henry Agard
(1888–1965)

U.S. politician, New Deal administrator, and vice president of the United States (1941–1945). Henry Wallace was born on 7 October 1888 on his family's farm in Adair County, Iowa. His father was an amateur publisher whose magazine *Wallace's Farmer* became so influential that he served as agriculture secretary for Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. The younger Wallace broke with his family's Republican leanings and, as editor of the *Farmer*, endorsed Franklin D. Roosevelt for president in 1932. Wallace was subsequently rewarded with his father's old job in the Department of Agriculture. For the next eight years, he was a fiercely loyal member of the New Deal elite, using the powers of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) and the Farm Security Administrations (FSA) to shore

up crop market prices and modernize small farm holdings. His visibility in office persuaded Roosevelt to choose him as his vice presidential running mate in 1940, despite the misgivings of conservative Democratic Party members who claimed that Wallace was too intellectual for the office. Such suspicions deepened during World War II as Wallace espoused an increasingly radical left-wing agenda, particularly in international matters, in which he was accused of being naïvely sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. A combination of southern Democrats and urban northeasterners prevented Wallace's renomination at the 1944 party convention, during which Senator Harry S. Truman was chosen instead. When Truman became president in April 1945, Wallace was shunted to the political sidelines with the post of commerce secretary.

Henry A. Wallace, vice president of the United States. (Library of Congress)

Wallace refused to stay quiet, however, and soon became a leading critic of Truman's hard-line stance toward the Soviet Union, forcing the president to dismiss him in September 1946. Recognizing that his future as a prominent Democrat had ended, Wallace decided to run in the 1948 election as a third-party candidate on a platform that advocated socialist-style reform and racial integration at home and rapprochement with the Soviet Union's Eastern bloc abroad. Hawkish liberal organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) accused Wallace's neophyte party of being a communist front, an exaggeration but one that its leader did nothing to quash. Whether or not the Progressives were conscious fellow travelers, their opposition to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan on the grounds that they frustrated Russo-American amity was, by 1948, viewed as foolish utopianism. Wallace's national support slipped away under a barrage of criticism, and his 2.7 percent of the November 1948 vote left him in fourth place behind Strom Thurmond, a humiliating defeat that shattered the anti-Truman Left. Wallace withdrew from public life and spent his remaining years as a successful gentleman farmer. He died in Danbury, Connecticut, on 18 November 1965.

Alan Allport

See also

Americans for Democratic Action; Marshall Plan; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Truman, Harry S.; Truman Doctrine

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Wang Bingnan
(1906–1988)

Chinese communist politician and foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Sanyuan, Shaanxi Province, Wang Bingnan joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. He enrolled at the University of Berlin in 1931 and graduated in 1935, after which he returned to China and became chief assistant to Zhou Enlai. Throughout both the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), Wang assisted Zhou in handling the CCP's liaison and foreign affairs.

Following the birth of the PRC in October 1949, Wang became director of the Foreign Ministry's Staff Office, a post he held until the end of 1954, and accompanied Zhou to the Geneva Conference in April 1954. In January 1955, Wang was appointed ambassador to Poland. As a result of the Bandung Conference in July 1955, he was named the Chinese representative to the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, the only direct diplomatic channel between the PRC and the United States since 1949. The talks began on 1 August 1955, and initially the negotiations went smoothly on the issue of the mutual release of nationals. However, they soon deadlocked over the status of Taiwan. The talks were suspended in December 1957 when the U.S. representative U. Alexis Johnson was recalled. The ambassadorial talks were resumed in September 1958 after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, with Wang remaining the Chinese representative.

In April 1964, Wang was appointed vice foreign minister. His tenure, which lasted until July 1975, coincided with the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), and his previous overseas service invited revisionist criticism. In 1968, he was taken into custody and imprisoned until 1972. In August 1975 he was assigned to head the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, resuming his diplomatic activity as the head of Chinese delegations to many nations until he was elected chairman of the Organizing Committee for the International Peace Year 1986. Wang died on 22 December 1988 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also
Bandung Conference; Cultural Revolution; Geneva Conference (1954); Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second; Zhou Enlai

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Warsaw Pact

Politico-military alliance among the Soviet Union and its East European satellite states. The multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed on 14 May 1955 in Warsaw, Poland, formally institutionalized the East European alliance system, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, known as the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Treaty was identical to bilateral treaties concluded during 1945–1949 between the Soviet Union and its East European client states to assure Moscow's continued military presence on their territory. The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia pledged to defend each other if one or more of the members were attacked.

Warsaw Pact officials and generals observing military maneuvers near the Polish border, 6 April 1981. Polish Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski is second from right. To his right is General Viktor Kulikov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. (Keystone/Getty Images)

The Warsaw Pact was created as a political instrument for Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev's Cold War policy in Europe. The immediate trigger was the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 5 May 1955 and the Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955, which provided for Austrian neutrality and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The creation of the Warsaw Pact sent important signals to both Eastern Europe and the West. On the one hand, the Soviet Union made clear to its satellite states that Austria's neutral status would not likewise be granted to them. On the other hand, Khrushchev allured the West with a standing offer to disband the Warsaw Pact simultaneously with NATO, contingent upon East-West agreement on a new collective security system in Europe.

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was established as the alliance's highest governing body, consisting of the member states' party leaders. The PCC met almost annually in one of the capitals of the Warsaw Pact states. On the military side, a unified command and a joint staff were created to organize the actual defense of the Warsaw Treaty states. Soviet Marshal Ivan G. Konev was appointed as the first supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces.

In its early years, the Warsaw Pact served primarily as a Soviet propaganda tool in East-West diplomacy. Khrushchev used the PCC to publicize his disarmament, disengagement, and peace offensives and to accord them a multilateral umbrella. The first concrete military step taken was the admission of the East German Army into the unified command, but not until the Berlin Crisis (1958–1961) was there a systematic militarization of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet General Staff and the Warsaw Pact unified command prepared East European armies for a possible military conflict in Central Europe. In 1961, the Soviets replaced the old defensive strategy of Soviet leader Josef Stalin with an offensive strategy that provided for a deep thrust into Western Europe. In the early 1960s, the Warsaw Pact began to conduct joint military exercises to prepare for fighting a nuclear war in Europe. The new strategy remained in place until 1987. Despite détente, the militarization of the Warsaw Pact accelerated under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s.

Behind the façade of unity, however, growing differences hounded the Eastern alliance. Following Khrushchev's campaign of de-Stalinization, Poles and Hungarians in the fall of 1956 demanded a reform of the Warsaw Pact to reduce overwhelming Soviet dominance within the alliance. Polish generals issued a memorandum that proposed modeling the Warsaw Pact more after NATO, while Hungary's new Communist Party leader, Imre Nagy, declared his country's neutrality and plans to leave the Warsaw Pact. In November 1956, the Soviet Army invaded Hungary and soon crushed all resistance.

In 1958, Romania demanded the withdrawal from its territory of all Soviet troops and military advisors. To cover Soviet embarrassment, Khrushchev termed this a unilateral troop reduction contributing to greater European security. At the height of the Berlin Crisis (1961), the Warsaw Pact's weakest and strategically least-important country, Albania, stopped supporting the pact and formally withdrew from the alliance in 1968.

Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968



The Warsaw Pact was left in ignorance when Khrushchev provoked the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Only after the crisis was ended did East European leaders learn in a secret meeting that a nuclear war had been narrowly avoided. Romania reacted promptly to Moscow's nonconsultation in such a serious matter. In 1963, the Romanian government gave secret assurances to the United States that it would remain neutral in the event of a confrontation between the superpowers. In the same year, Romanian and Polish opposition prevented Khrushchev's plan to admit Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact.

In the mid-1960s the Warsaw Pact, like NATO, underwent a major crisis. The 1965 PCC meeting, convened by East Germany, demonstrated profound disagreements among Warsaw Pact allies on matters such as the German question, nuclear weapons' sharing, nuclear nonproliferation, and the Sino-Soviet split. In early 1966, Brezhnev proposed a Soviet plan to reform and institutionalize the Warsaw Pact. But resistance by Moscow's allies prevented the implementation of the scheme for more than three years.

In 1968, the Czechoslovak Crisis resulting from the Prague Spring seriously threatened the cohesion of the alliance. While the Soviet Union tried to intimidate Alexander Dubček's liberal Czechoslovak government with multilateral Warsaw Pact military maneuvers, the invading forces sent in on 20 August 1968 were mostly from the Soviet Union with token Polish, Hungarian, and East German contingents but no Romanian troops. Romania denounced the invasion as a violation of international law and demanded the

NATO and Warsaw Pact Nations

NATO nations	*Warsaw Pact nations*
Belgium	Albania
Canada	Bulgaria
Denmark	Czechoslovakia
Federal Republic of Germany	German Democratic Republic
France	Hungary
Greece	Poland
Iceland	Romania
Italy	Soviet Union
Luxembourg	
Netherlands	
Norway	
Portugal	
Spain	
Turkey	
United Kingdom	
United States	

withdrawal of all Soviet troops and military advisors from its territory. It also refused to allow additional Soviet forces to cross or conduct exercises on its territory.

The consolidation that resulted from the PCC session in Budapest in March 1969 transformed the Warsaw Pact into a more consultative organization. It established a committee of defense ministers, a military council, and a committee on technology. With these three new joint bodies, the Warsaw Pact finally became a genuine multilateral military alliance.

In 1976, previous informal gatherings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers were institutionalized into a committee of ministers of foreign affairs. In the 1970s, consultations within Warsaw Pact bodies primarily dealt with the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. Despite détente, preparations for a deep offensive thrust into Western Europe accelerated and intensified during numerous military exercises. In 1979, a statute on the command of the alliance in wartime was finally accepted by all but Romania after a year-long controversy.

During 1980–1981, the Solidarity Crisis in Poland heralded the end of Moscow's domination of Eastern Europe. Yet it did not pose a serious threat to the Warsaw Pact's integrity. At first, Moscow was tempted to threaten the opposition with military exercises and, eventually, military intervention. To avoid the high political costs of such a move, however, Moscow in the end trusted that the loyal Polish military would suppress the opposition on its own. The imposition of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski was a major success for Moscow, as it demonstrated that the Moscow-educated Polish generals were protecting the interests of the Warsaw Pact even against their own people.

During the renewed Cold War of the 1980s, internal disputes in the Warsaw Pact increased. Romania demanded cuts in nuclear and conventional forces as well as in national defense budgets. It also called for the dissolution of both Cold War alliances and for the withdrawal of both U.S. and Soviet forces from Europe.

The issue of an appropriate Warsaw Pact response to NATO's 1983 deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, matching Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) aimed at West European targets, proved to be most divisive for the Eastern alliance. In 1983, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania engaged in a damage control exercise to maintain their ties with the West, which they had established during the era of détente in the 1970s.

At the time of the Warsaw Pact's thirtieth anniversary in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader and improved the role of Warsaw Pact consultations on the desired nuclear and conventional cuts in the Eastern alliance. At the PCC meeting in Berlin in May 1987, he changed Warsaw Pact military doctrine from offensive to defensive. In the late 1980s, however, East Germany, Bulgaria, and—in a reversal of its earlier opposition—even

Romania proposed to strengthen the Warsaw Pact by improving its intrabloc political consultative functions.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, East and West at first saw merit in keeping both Cold War alliances in place. In January and February 1991, however, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria declared that they would withdraw all support by 1 July of that year. The Warsaw Pact thus came to an end on 31 March 1991 and was officially dissolved at a meeting in Prague on 1 July 1991.

Christian Nuenlist

See also

Brezhnev, Leonid; Détente; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Khrushchev, Nikita

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Warships, Surface

Although aircraft carriers and submarines drew the headlines during the Cold War, nonaviation surface ships constituted the bulk of the world's navies and conducted most naval operations. The nature, size, and armament of those ships changed gradually as the Cold War advanced. Radar and torpedo technology limitations eliminated small coastal fast-attack craft that had proven effective against ships lacking radar during World War II. The aircraft carrier and the expense of operation drove the battleships out of service by 1960 and relegated World War II–era gun cruisers to the flagship role based on their ability to carry extensive communications suites.

In fact, in Western navies, fleet surface combatants served primarily as escorts that protected the aircraft carrier. Thus, air defense and antisubmarine warfare became their dominant missions. For most U.S. Navy cruisers, that meant carrying long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but the United States was the only country that could afford to operate such ships. Thus, the unarmored general-purpose destroyer was the mainstay of the world's surface fleets for most of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was the first country to equip these units with a surface-strike capability, and that development, combined with microminiaturization technology, drove the development and missions for nonaviation surface combatants during the Cold War's final years. Of course, there were also specialized surface ships such as logistics ships,

mine countermeasures, and rescue/salvage ships, which were critical to naval operations.

Having been reduced primarily to the limited roles of providing naval gunfire support for amphibious assaults and supplementing the aircraft carrier's close-in air defense, battleships became the first major surface combatants to go. Britain's last battleship, the *Vanguard,* was commissioned in 1946, but the Royal Navy scrapped eleven of its surviving pre–World War II battleships before 1949. The *Vanguard* and the four King George V–class units were decommissioned by 1957 and scrapped in 1960. Similarly, the United States decommissioned all of its pre–World War II battleships by 1948, and the remainder left service by 1960. Naval planners briefly flirted with the idea of converting the four Iowa-class units into massive air defense and nuclear missile strike platforms but abandoned the idea because of the costs involved in modifying the heavily armored hulls.

The United States briefly brought the Iowa-class battleship *New Jersey* into service for a year during the Vietnam War and then returned all four Iowa-class battleships into service in the early 1980s but spent millions of dollars modifying them with new air defense systems and surface-to-surface missiles for both antiship and land attack missions. However, the age of their operating systems and the heavy manning required to operate those systems necessitated their retirement within two years of the Soviet Union's collapse. A 1995 review determined that they were no longer cost-effective to operate and surplus to naval requirements. All are now museum ships.

Although Soviet leader Josef Stalin flirted briefly with building battleships after the war, the Soviet Union in 1956 decommissioned its two surviving battleships, initially commissioned in the 1920s, and scrapped them in 1957. France discarded its two surviving battleships as well, the *Richelieu* and *Jean Bart,* in 1959 and 1960, respectively.

The Soviet Sverdlov-class gun cruisers carried 152mm guns and were based on a blend of Italian and German World War II–era designs and technology. However, the Soviets retained them primarily as flagships and naval gunfire support platforms. Interestingly, some of the U.S. Navy's latest cruiser designs were decommissioned relatively soon after entering service. The large light cruisers *Worcester* and *Roanoke,* for example, mounted a troublesome new main armament suite and served only from 1948 to 1958. The large Des Moines–class ships were used primarily as flagships in the U.S. Sixth Fleet, with the *Newport News* serving until 1975.

The British and French simply decommissioned most of their gun cruisers. The Royal Navy discarded all of its pre–World War II cruisers by 1949, and all but two of its modern cruisers had been decommissioned by 1965. Those two, the *Lion* and *Tiger*, were converted into helicopter cruisers after 1965, retaining only one forward 6-inch gun turret. Both were reduced to reserve status by 1979 and scrapped in 1986.

The United States modified a number of its cruisers to carry heavy long-range SAMs. The first of these, the former heavy cruiser *Boston,* was recommissioned as a guided missile heavy cruiser in November 1955, carrying two

The first nuclear-powered large combatant ship, the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser *Long Beach*, shown under way at sea, June 1989. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Terrier SAM systems in place of its aft 8-inch gun turret. The *Canberra* followed eighteen months later.

Other cruisers were subjected to a more radical modification. The former heavy cruisers *Albany* and *Chicago* were completely converted to air defense cruisers during 1959–1964, losing all of their guns to make room for two short-range (10 nautical miles, NM) Tartar SAM systems and two long-range (80 NM) Talos SAM systems. They were also equipped with sonars and antisubmarine rockets (ASROC) to become the world's first multipurpose cruisers (capable of antisurface, antiair, and antisubmarine warfare). Several U.S. Navy light cruisers surrendered their aft 6-inch gun turrets for Talos or Terrier SAM systems.

Finally, the United States built the *Long Beach* (CGN-9) as the first cruiser designed as a guided missile platform. More importantly, upon its 9 September 1961 commissioning, it became the world's first nuclear-powered surface warship. Initially completed without guns, the *Long Beach* had two single 5-inch gun mounts added in 1963 at the direct request of President John F. Kennedy, who thought it unwise to rely entirely on missiles for defense.

These conversions and decommissionings left destroyers as the workhorses for all the world's navies, including some whose missions were little more than coastal defense. The need to improve the destroyers' antiair warfare (AAW) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities meant adding more radars, missiles, and eventually helicopters in order to increase their surveillance and attack ranges. As a result, destroyers become increasingly complex and expensive as the Cold War entered its second decade. A ship type that had averaged 2,200 tons of standard displacement in 1945 had grown to more than 7,000 tons by 1975.

In fact, among the democracies, legislative resistance to funding such expensive destroyers led to a complete reclassification of warships. The heavily modified classification system that dated back to the London Naval Limitation Treaties was abandoned completely. Now, destroyers were ships that focused on a single mission but had limited capabilities in another. Many multipurpose destroyers were then redesignated as cruisers. Ships that had once been designated as destroyer escorts (ASW-focused destroyers) became frigates, and coastal attack craft became corvettes.

Interestingly, perhaps the greatest changes in surface warship design came about because of Soviet developments in naval weaponry. Lacking the resources to build aircraft carriers during the Cold War's early years, the Soviet Union focused on developing long-range antiship missiles (ASMs) as well as SAMs for its ships. Thus, the Soviets introduced the world's first operational guided surface-launched antiship missile (SASM) into service aboard the destroyer *Bedoviy* in 1961. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designated the ship as a Kilden-class DDG (guided missile destroyer). Its P-1 Strela Shchuka-A (NATO designation, SS-N-1 Scrubber) cruise missile with a nuclear warhead had a range of more than 90 nautical miles (NM), far beyond the *Bedoviy*'s onboard radars and other sensors. The missile system's weight also affected the ship's handling capabilities and stability.

The Soviets then developed a smaller and shorter-ranged missile, the now famous SS-N-2 that NATO designated the Styx missile. Entering service in 1962, the Styx, with a range of 30 NM, equipped small coastal attack boats not much larger than the American PT boats of World War II. The much longer-ranged (300 NM) SS-N-3 also entered service that year when the Soviet Union's first Kynda-class cruiser entered service. As with the Kilden-class DDG, however, the *Kynda*'s command-guided missiles far outranged the ship's sensors. To support a long-range engagement, the ship required an aircraft to remain within radar range of the target and provide its location to the ship throughout the engagement. For a reconnaissance or targeting aircraft to survive an engagement that close to the carrier seemed improbable in wartime. As a result, the Soviet Union focused on starting and winning the war with the first shot: finding and targeting the aircraft carrier and then launching the attack during the war's early minutes.

Soviet technology and tactics had a profound effect on the U.S. Navy's tactical thinking and ship designs into the 1990s.

The United States had studied surface-to-surface missiles during the 1950s but abandoned them due to funding issues. It was hard to justify put-

A Soviet Kynda-class guided missile cruiser under way, October 1985. (U.S. Department of Defense)

ting surface-to-surface missiles on surface ships after investing billions in aircraft carriers, aircraft, and SAM systems. Developing a guidance system for a surface-to-surface missile such as the then-existing Regulus missile did not seem cost-effective. More importantly, battleships and cruisers were the only units large enough to carry them. With their resources focused on aircraft carrier, aviation, and submarine technology, the West abandoned development of surface-launched antiship missiles in 1956. It was a mistake that would prove costly and embarrassing in the Cold War's third decade.

Secure in the belief that the carriers would always be there, Western intelligence agencies largely ignored the Soviet antiship missile threat. During the Vietnam War, since U.S. naval aircraft had destroyed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV, North Vietnam) missile patrol boat force, these craft were not considered a serious problem. Certainly, they were not seen as a threat that warranted new solutions. All that changed on 21 October 1967, when a Soviet-supplied Egyptian missile patrol boat sank the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* with a single Styx missile without even leaving port. Fast coastal attack craft could no longer be taken lightly. One hit was enough to cripple, if not destroy, a $100 million unarmored warship.

The United States and France reacted swiftly, introducing high-priority programs to develop new missiles specifically designed to take out ships.

The United States went a step further, developing long-range surveillance and targeting systems to support over-the-horizon engagements. Some were satellite-based, some were installed on ships, and others were installed on submarines and aircraft. All navies began to develop electronic and infrared detection and countermeasures systems to defeat these missiles' terminal guidance. Electronic warfare now encompassed more than the need to defeat an enemy's air defense systems. By 1972, a ship's electronic warfare capabilities were as critical to the ship's survival as its weapons systems.

These developments occurred parallel to the U.S. Navy's development of a global naval monitoring system driven by the Soviet Navy's first worldwide naval exercise, OKEAN-70, and the introduction of the first exercises demonstrating its first-shot tactics. The resulting Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) entered service in 1972. By the late 1970s, OSIS had taken on the additional mission of supporting rapid over-the-horizon targeting by U.S. Navy and NATO missile-equipped ships. Although the Soviets never developed a similar global oceanic monitoring capability, they did develop an extensive array of electronic air- and space-based targeting systems to support their naval units. Both sides developed increasingly complex and long-ranged antiship, air defense, and surveillance systems.

All this led to navies pursuing two completely different paths of surface warship development. Smaller navies could no longer afford oceangoing ships equipped with all of these systems. This forced them to seek smaller ships that carried weapons and sensors more suited to the missions of coastal defense, environmental protection, and patrol and control of economic exclusion zones.

The rebirth of mine warfare after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War also rejuvenated interest in mine countermeasures ships in the U.S. Navy and in Asian navies. (North Korea's and Europe's navies had never lost interest in mine warfare.) General-purpose corvettes with limited AAW and ASW capabilities and mine countermeasures ships have become the predominant units of the world's smaller navies. Occasionally, these navies employ frigates as their flagships and on long-distance patrols, but 900–1,100-ton corvettes are these navies' workhorses. Destroyers and 10,000-ton all-purpose guided missile cruisers are found only in oceangoing navies—those whose country can afford the ships and the expensive shore facilities and ocean surveillance networks required to support their operations.

Surface ships execute the majority of naval operations, from show-the-flag and gunboat diplomacy, through disaster relief and emergency evacuation operations, to land attack and maritime transport operations. Although the combatant ships garner the headlines and are most often featured in the recruiting posters, a balanced fleet includes tankers, transports, repair and rescue ships, and even range and telemetry ships to help with the calibration of weapons systems and electronics. The Cold War saw these ships evolve from the simple, manually operated systems and uncomplicated designs of World War II to the highly automated, lightly crewed ships of today. Moreover, the Cold War's end brought new missions beyond the traditional ones of the past. Environmental and resource concerns and disaster relief are now

major naval missions, and ship designs are being modified to accommodate those new missions.

Carl Otis Schuster and Dallace W. Unger Jr.

See also

Aircraft Carriers; Antiaircraft Guns and Missiles; France, Navy; Gorshkov, Sergey Georgyevich; Missiles, Cruise; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Royal Navy; Soviet Union, Navy; Submarines; United States Navy

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Washington Summit Meeting, Nixon and Brezhnev
(16–25 June 1973)

Summit meeting between U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev during 16–25 June 1973. Despite growing tensions in the Middle East and in Indochina, in early 1973 the United States and the Soviet Union continued to build upon détente. Indeed, one major outcome of Nixon's 1972 visit to the Soviet Union had been the resolution to hold regular summit meetings. Although neither side's expectations of the Washington summit were as high as for the earlier Moscow meeting, the 1973 meeting nonetheless reaffirmed the U.S. and Soviet commitment to improving relations. As with the Moscow summit, daily bilateral agreements were signed, and two major agreements pertaining to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were concluded.

In 1973, Nixon's domestic problems were legion. Congressional hearings on the building Watergate scandal were drawing closer to incriminating the president, and there was a dramatic increase in inflation coupled with sluggish economic growth. These economic problems only fueled growing discontent. The summit offered Nixon a respite from his domestic problems, an opportunity to divert attention from Watergate, and the chance to demonstrate the continuing success of détente.

Brezhnev gave a television address to the American people emulating Nixon's speech in Moscow a year prior. The Soviet leader spoke to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and engaged in daily discussions with

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Richard Nixon toasting the signing of agreements between their two nations in Washington, D.C., on 19 June 1973. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Nixon. One of Brezhnev's important goals was to further the Soviet Union's case for most-favored nation (MFN) trade status from the United States. Brezhnev viewed MFN status as a key to the continuation of détente, with the hope that it would revive a declining Soviet economy. In discussions with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Brezhnev conceded that the main obstacle to receiving MFN status was congressional opposition to Moscow's policy restricting Jewish emigration. Despite his eloquent plea and soft-pedaling of the emigration policy, he was not successful in making his case.

Nixon and Brezhnev discussed bilateral issues concerning agriculture, transportation, atomic energy, commercial relations, education, culture, oceanography, taxation, and air services. The two conferees reached agreements on Indochina and Europe but differed on policies concerning the Middle East. In the spirit of the 1972 Moscow Meeting, two important agreements concerning nuclear disarmament were reached. The Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War reaffirmed American and Soviet commitments to continuing SALT. Although the Basic Principles agreement was not groundbreaking, it nevertheless served as a new impetus to the continuation of détente and the SALT process. On 21 June, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Basic Principles framework. The following day, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed. Nixon's national

security advisor, Henry Kissinger, pointedly revealed the importance of this document. The principal problem in the current global situation was how to prevent a nuclear war, not how to conduct one.

As the summit concluded, Nixon and Brezhnev issued a joint communiqué summarizing the intentions and outcomes of the summit. As with the previous year's Basic Principles of Mutual Relations, the document reaffirmed both parties' commitment to détente. Although there were no completely new initiatives addressed during Brezhnev's visit, it strengthened the precedent of annual summits between American and Soviet leaders. Despite mounting public criticism of the Nixon administration over the Vietnam War, the state of the American economy, and the Watergate scandal, Nixon appeared to be successfully reducing Cold War tensions. Unfortunately, technological advances in nuclear weaponry and Nixon's weakening political position prior to his last visit to Moscow in 1974 largely stalled the forward momentum of détente, a process that had been the cornerstone of both Nixon's and Brezhnev's Cold War foreign policies. The meeting also alarmed the leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC), who feared that the two superpowers would cement an understanding on détente at the expense of the burgeoning Sino-American rapprochement.

Jonathan H. L'Hommedieu

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Brezhnev, Leonid; Détente; Kissinger, Henry; Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Nuclear Arms Race; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

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Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev (7–10 December 1987)

Summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on 7–10 December 1987. The principal agenda item for the meeting was nuclear arms reduction. The Washington Meeting showcased not only Gorbachev's new style of leadership but also the unprecedented thaw in the Cold War, which would by 1991 end upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The conference marked the first superpower summit on U.S. soil in fourteen years and endeavored to build upon the November 1985 Geneva Meeting, during which Reagan and Gorbachev

agreed to a 50 percent mutual reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, and the Reykjavík Meeting of October 1986, which ended on a negative note over disagreements concerning Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The summit in Washington saw both sides agree to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons (land-based intermediate-range missiles), codified by the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Moscow during Reagan and Gorbachev's final meeting together in May–June 1988.

In spite of the breakthrough in superpower relations, Reagan and Gorbachev still found themselves in disagreement on key issues during the 1987 negotiations. First, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was interpreted differently by the Americans and the Soviets, which underscored the problems posed by SDI, colloquially referred to as "Star Wars." Gorbachev believed that SDI violated the ABM Treaty, while Reagan tried to legitimize SDI by arguing that it fell into a category of space-based testing and development that did not violate previous agreements. Neither leader even mentioned SDI during postconference speeches to their respective nations, which may explain why the conference was deemed a success. Further, Reagan and Gorbachev failed to come to terms on regional issues in American and Soviet spheres of influence. Reagan criticized Gorbachev for turning a blind eye to the human rights record of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and also for failing to establish a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Gorbachev, in a press conference held three hours after the departure ceremony, stated that a proposal for withdrawal would be instituted as soon as the United States agreed to halt arms shipments and financial aid to insurgent forces battling Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Gorbachev also criticized Reagan over the Iran-Contra scandal and argued that the time had not yet come for the United Nations (UN) Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran for refusing to accept an earlier UN resolution demanding a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War.

Even if deemed a marginal success, the 1987 Washington meeting should be considered a significant turning point in Cold War history. Americans were well aware of Gorbachev's internal reforms (glasnost and perestroika) and saw his visit as powerfully symbolic, perhaps even foreshadowing the end of the Cold War. People crowded the streets to get a glimpse of Gorbachev, and many scholars indeed argue that Reagan needed the Soviet leader's cooperation in order to improve the image of the United States. Reagan had little choice but to address Gorbachev's initiatives regarding nuclear disarmament as an opportunity to divert public attention from domestic issues, such as the Iran-Contra scandal, to those that involved a dynamic new approach to foreign policy.

Whatever the ramifications of the 1987 Washington Meeting, it must be remembered not as the culmination of a process but rather as the beginning of both a new route to nuclear arms reductions and, perhaps more importantly, the end of the Cold War.

John C. Horn

See also

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Iran-Contra Affair; Moscow Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan; Perestroika; Reykjavík Meeting; Strategic Defense Initiative

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See North Atlantic Treaty

Washington Treaty

Watergate
(1972–1974)

Far-reaching political scandal involving President Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974) that lasted from 1972 to 1974 and led to a constitutional crisis and the resignation of Nixon in August 1974. Nixon was by nature a secretive and untrusting man, and it was this mild paranoia that drove the Watergate scandal into a colossal political and constitutional crisis.

The genesis of Watergate can be traced to the leaking of the top-secret *United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*, often referred to as the Pentagon Papers, that occurred beginning in June 1971. The papers revealed highly classified—not to mention embarrassing—policy decisions made vis-à-vis the Vietnam War going back to the 1940s. By 1971, the Vietnam War had become a political nightmare for Nixon and had deeply divided the nation. The Pentagon Papers served only to heighten public distrust and discontent with the war. Nixon was livid at the leaks and vowed to get even with the man who had released the information, RAND Corporation employee Daniel Ellsberg. In fact, the first illegal break-in encouraged by the Nixon administration occurred in September 1971, when quasi-government operatives ransacked the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist in an attempt to discredit the RAND employee. Meanwhile, the Nixon administration tried unsuccessfully to halt the publication of more sensitive information.

Now obsessed with plugging any leaks from within, Nixon's aides formed an informal committee of secret operatives whose job was to stop leaks, stonewall Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) probes, and retaliate against those who did leak information. The committee was fittingly called the "Plumbers."

On 17 June 1972, Washington, D.C., police arrested five men for burglarizing the offices of the Democratic National Committee, located in the Watergate complex (hence the name of the scandal). While the motive of the break-in is still unclear, one of the burglars, James W. McCord Jr., was on the payroll of the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP). This seemed to implicate White House involvement, although the connection would not be made in full for many months.

Officials at the White House, meanwhile, began to cover their tracks, engaging in an ever-widening cover-up that only bred more illegal activities. When questioned about the Watergate break-in, Nixon's press secretary famously dismissed it as a "third-rate burglary" of which the White House had no knowledge, and Americans believed him.

Nixon's secret taping system recorded a discussion on 23 June 1972 between the president and his chief of staff in which Nixon agreed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should be employed to block the FBI investigation into the Watergate affair. This was clear evidence that the White House was involved in the botched break-in. Nixon went on to win a landslide reelection in November 1972, and Watergate seemed all but forgotten. But the walls were about to close in beginning with the trial of the Watergate burglars in January 1973.

The five burglars pled guilty but said nothing. Indeed, CREEP had paid them hush money not to reveal anything that would implicate the president. But McCord, encouraged by the fact that he would receive leniency if he cooperated, recanted his testimony and implicated CREEP in instigating the break-in and in paying hush money to the accused. The rope was now getting tighter for Nixon, who continued to deny any involvement in the growing scandal. Congress now clamored for bipartisan hearings on the Watergate scandal, which began in May 1973 and lasted until August. The nation was riveted by the televised hearings, which revealed one bombshell after another. Perhaps as much as 85 percent of the American public viewed some or all of the hearings. The first bombshell was the realization that the White House had been directly involved in the scandal, indicated by the testimony of John Dean, Nixon's lawyer. The second was the revelation that Nixon had employed a secret taping system in the Oval Office that recorded virtually all conversations. Nixon's popularity began to plummet, and there were sporadic calls for his impeachment, even by stalwart Republicans.

As soon as the existence of the taped conversations was revealed, Archibald Cox, Watergate special prosecutor, and the U.S. Senate moved to subpoena the tapes. Nixon refused to surrender them, citing executive privilege and "national security concerns." Neither party agreed with that logic, however, and many Americans now believed that Nixon was either directly involved in the scandal or was trying to cover something up. In October 1973,

when Nixon ordered Cox to withdraw his subpoena, the special prosecutor refused. The White House promptly fired him. That in turn led Nixon's attorney general and his deputy to resign in protest. A new prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, again subpoenaed the tapes. Nixon, now under immense pressure, responded by releasing selectively edited transcripts of the tapes, which pleased no one. Worse yet, one of the tapes that the White House did release to Jaworski had an unexplained gap, which White House officials blamed on a clerical error committed by Nixon's personal secretary. In the spring of 1974, Congress continued to insist that it receive all of the contested tape recordings. Nixon stood firm.

In July 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Nixon administration must turn over all of the tapes requested by Congress. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, articles of impeachment were being prepared against the president. Nixon now had no choice but to surrender the tapes, which he knew would condemn him. On 27 July 1974, the House of Representatives passed the first of three impeachment articles against Nixon, citing him for obstruction of justice. On 29 and 30 July, respectively, two more articles of impeachment passed—one for abuse of power, the other for contempt of Congress. After being told by a delegation from his own party that he would not survive an impeachment trial in Congress, Nixon decided to resign the office of the presidency on 9 August 1974. He was succeeded by his vice president, Gerald R. Ford.

Richard Nixon boards a helicopter to depart from the White House lawn after resigning the presidency on 9 August 1974. He flashes his trademark "V for Victory" sign at this moment of disgrace. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Although the immediate crisis that was Watergate ended with Nixon's resignation, the episode had troubling and long-term implications for American politics and government. Many Americans rightly conflated Watergate with Vietnam. Indeed, just as U.S. policymakers led the nation into a costly, unpopular, and unwinnable war with little public discussion and no real congressional oversight, so too had the Nixon administration engaged in secretive and unsavory activities in the name of national security. As a result, Americans' trust in their politicians—and their political system—suffered a major blow. Many also talked with consternation about the unchecked powers of the presidency, which the Nixonian abuses of power so clearly highlighted. Watergate undermined the power of the Republican Party for a time and may indeed have led to the rise of President Jimmy Carter, who won the presidency in 1976 based in large part on his outsider status, personal integrity, and self-effacing manner. In the end, Watergate displayed in shocking clarity the results of the so-called imperial presidency and a national security state in which personal freedoms were subordinated to political whim and alleged public safety.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Ford, Gerald Rudolph; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Vietnam War

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Weathermen

American left-wing organization supportive of the worldwide struggle against alleged American imperialism that initiated terrorist attacks against the U.S. government in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Weathermen emerged in late 1968 as one of several militant factions within the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the anti–Vietnam War protests of the 1960s, Bernardine Dohrn, Bill Ayers, Kathy Boudin, and other members of the Weathermen called for a white revolutionary movement that would support African American militants such as the Black Panthers and developing-world revolutionaries in an international struggle against what they viewed as U.S. imperialism. The group took its name from its first position paper, "You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows," a line adopted from a Bob Dylan song. This founding statement was circulated during the last SDS convention in June 1969 in Chicago, where the Weathermen and their allies gained control of the organization.

Following Marxist-Leninist logic, the Weathermen believed that American imperialism would compel the American working class to unite in a revolutionary struggle to transform the United States into a socialist state. The Weathermen, who were mainly upper-middle-class college students, considered themselves the vanguard of the coming revolution and intended to spur workers to join the struggle. The group focused its initial recruiting efforts on white working-class youth, but most high school students opposed their militancy and refused to join the group.

The Weathermen's attempt to bring the war home failed—a large police force quickly quelled the attack with tear gas, mace, and clubs.

As the putative vanguard group of the revolution, the Weathermen also intended to create revolutionary chaos in the United States. One of the group's first campaigns was the so-called Days of Rage that began on 8 October 1969, when the Weathermen and a few hundred supporters smashed windows and battled police in downtown Chicago. Although their attempt to bring the war home failed—a large police force quickly quelled the attack with tear gas, mace, and clubs—the group considered the melee an important inspiration for fellow white radicals. In mid-November 1969, the Weathermen precipitated a similar scuffle in Washington, D.C., where members damaged cars

and windows, threw smoke bombs at the Justice Department building, and blocked streets with burning barriers until 2,000 police officers intervened.

When it became clear that their plan to bring about a revolution had failed, the Weathermen decided to continue the armed struggle as a clandestine group of terrorist cells that would attack the American government. During a meeting in Flint, Michigan, on 24 December 1969, the Weathermen, who never had more than a few hundred members, announced that they intended to go underground. In the ensuing years, small Weathermen cells initiated a wave of bombings against government buildings, military installations, and private companies that they believed supported American imperialism. On 9 June 1970, for example, the group bombed the New York City police headquarters as a response to the American invasion of Cambodia.

In December 1970, the Weathermen announced in a letter to the underground press that they had modified their ideology. They no longer considered violence their only revolutionary tool and assigned revolutionary qualities to the counterculture of the New Left. In response to criticism of the group's sexism, the Weathermen also embraced gender equality, changing the organization's name to the gender-neutral Weather Underground. Despite these tactical changes, attacks against federal buildings and private companies continued. Nevertheless, the illegal methods used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to prosecute members of the group led to the dismissal of charges against most of them in 1974.

That same year, the Weather Underground once more announced programmatic changes, calling upon American revolutionaries to organize for mass action clandestinely as well as publicly. As a result, the organization began to form the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC) as an official support group. In 1976, internal factionalism led to the split of the organization into a reformist New York PFOC, or Central Committee, and a militant Bay Area Revolutionary Committee (BARC), which became the Weather Underground Organization later that year. While the Central Committee abjured violence, the BARC continued its terrorist activities. After 1977, when several leading members of the original Weathermen surrendered to federal authorities, the Weather Underground splintered into a number of separate organizations, some of which continued to advocate violence. In 1987, U.S. authorities arrested the last fugitive member of the Weathermen, Silas Bissell, and sentenced him to two years in prison.

Simon Wendt

See also

Black Panthers; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Students for a Democratic Society; Terrorism; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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Weinberger, Caspar
(1917–2006)

U.S. politician and secretary of defense (1981–1987). Born in San Francisco, California, on 18 August 1917, Caspar Willard Weinberger attended Harvard University, where he earned an AB degree in 1938 and a law degree in 1941. He served in the army during World War II, reaching the rank of captain. Following his discharge, he clerked for a federal judge and entered politics, winning election to the California State Assembly in 1952 and later serving as chairman of the California Republican Party.

After working in California Governor Ronald Reagan's cabinet in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Weinberger moved on to Washington, where he was director of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1970, deputy director during 1970–1972, and director during 1972–1973 of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) during 1973–1975.

Weinberger served as an advisor to Reagan during the 1980 presidential campaign, and Reagan subsequently appointed him as secretary of defense in 1981. When Reagan nominated Weinberger, many conservative Republicans feared that given his reputation as a budget cutter, Weinberger would not support Reagan's calls for increased military spending. As director of the OMB, Weinberger had earned the nickname "Cap the Knife," and Jesse Helms, a right-wing Republican senator from North Carolina, voted against his confirmation based on those fears. However, Weinberger soon developed a reputation as one of the strongest proponents of Reagan's defense buildup.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who directed an unprecedented peacetime buildup of U.S. military forces. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Reagan and Weinberger identified several major goals, including nuclear arms reduction. But during Reagan's first term as president, his administration embarked upon a major buildup of nuclear weapons. Weinberger also pushed to deploy more nuclear warheads in Europe and supported Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for the establishment of a laser-guided defense system in outer space to destroy incoming ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. These and other measures were controversial and costly, but Reagan and Weinberger defended them as necessary to meet the Soviet threat. Weinberger resigned his post in November 1987, citing his wife's poor health.

In November 1992 a grand jury investigating the Iran-Contra Affair indicted Weinberger on four counts of lying to a congressional committee and the independent counsel's office and one count of obstruction of justice. During the mid-1980s the Reagan administration sold weapons to Iran in exchange for the freeing of American hostages being held in the Middle East. Some of the proceeds from the sale were illegally diverted to the Contra rebels who were fighting the communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Once the story became public, Congress created a committee to investigate the affair, and an independent counsel was appointed to probe any criminal wrongdoing. Its office claimed that Weinberger had lied about his knowledge of the sale of arms to Iran. Weinberger declared his innocence and his intention of fighting the charges, but the case never went to trial. On 24 December 1992, President George H. W. Bush issued a full and complete pardon to Weinberger and several other Reagan administration figures. Weinberger died in Bangor, Maine, on 26 March 2006.

Justin P. Coffey

See also

Bush, George Herbert Walker; Contras; Iran-Contra Affair; Nicaragua; Reagan, Ronald Wilson; Sandinistas; Strategic Defense Initiative

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Welch, Robert Henry Winborne, Jr.

(1899–1985)

Conservative American extremist and founder of the right-wing John Birch Society. Born in rural Chowan County, North Carolina, on 1 December 1899, Robert Welch graduated from the University of North Carolina in 1916, then attended the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, during 1917–1919 and Harvard Law School during 1919–1921.

In 1922 Welch went to work as vice president of his brother's candy manufacturing company, retiring in 1956. He served on the board of directors of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). From this forum, he gravitated toward Republican Party politics. Through his work with NAM, he formed relationships with numerous conservative business leaders such as Texas oil magnate H. L. Hunt, the sponsor of radical right-wing groups and radio programming.

Deeply affected by the anticommunist crusade of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and other hard-line conservatives, Welch developed a conspiratorial interpretation of U.S. politics and recent historical events. In December 1958, he and eleven other right-wing ideologues founded the John Birch Society, named after a U.S. intelligence operative executed by the Chinese communists in 1945. The society espoused the bizarre belief that the entire U.S. federal government, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower and numerous high officials such as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Allen W. Dulles and Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, were part of a vast communist conspiracy to subvert American ideals and surrender the nation to communism. Welch and his compatriots wielded considerable

influence within conservative circles of the Republican Party, especially among the supporters of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, a fierce anti-communist and the party's 1964 presidential nominee.

Welch's John Birch Society reached its peak of influence in the early 1960s, when fears over *Sputnik 1*, the illusory missile gap, and the Cuban Missile Crisis held the nation in thrall. Welch's organization claimed between 60,000 and 100,000 members with $5 million in annual contributions during this period. The society closely guarded the anonymity of its members, behaving as secretively as the supposed conspirators it condemned. The 1960 publication of Welch's defamatory Eisenhower exposé, *The Politician*, which named the president as "a willing agent of the Soviet Union," forced a break between Birchites and most mainstream conservatives.

Welch's ideology proved a product of deeply held Cold War fears and McCarthy-era hysteria that resonated well beyond the 1950s. Welch died on 6 January 1985 in Winchester, Massachusetts. His organization survived him, focusing on the threat of "one world government," the growth of federal "socialist" powers, and alleged plans of the United Nations (UN) to take over U.S. society through the "treason" of establishment politicians.

Michael E. Donoghue

See also

Communist Fronts; Cuban Missile Crisis; Goldwater, Barry Morris; McCarthyism; Missile Gap; *Sputnik;* Walker, Edwin Anderson

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West Germany

See Germany, Federal Republic of

Western European Union

(23 October 1954)

A defensive alliance formed by West European states in 1954 to establish a framework to make the controversial rearming of Germany more palatable. On 17 March 1948, the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) signed the Brussels Treaty (Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense), which created the European Union (EU). The formation of this alliance was a response to the extension of Soviet power in Central and East-

ern Europe. In addition to pledging mutual support in response to an attack on any member and agreeing to integrate their air defenses and command structure, the signatories agreed to work toward European integration. The EU was superseded by the broader military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established in 1949.

When General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in late 1950, the members of EU merged their military organization into NATO. However, the EU continued to exist. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, there was deep concern about the ability of the United States to fight a major war in Asia while simultaneously bearing the brunt of European defense. Thus, the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) was perceived as critical, but there were misgivings, especially in France. The French were naturally wary of a rearmed Germany on its eastern border, having been invaded from the east three times since 1870. When a proposal to integrate the West German forces into a European Defense Community was rejected by the French parliament in August 1954, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden proposed including West Germany and Italy in the EU and changing its name to the Western European Union (WEU).

At a special conference in London in September 1954, the signatories to the Brussels Treaty and the United States and Canada agreed to invite West Germany and Italy to accede to the treaty. They did so on 23 October 1954, creating the WEU. West Germany thereby agreed to allow the WEU to exercise control over the size of its military. This concession on the part of the Germans and Britain's commitment to keep its forces in West Germany assuaged the French, who agreed to permit the entry of West Germany into NATO.

The eclipse of the WEU continued. NATO assumed its military role, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) replaced the EU's economic functions, and its social and cultural roles passed to the Council of Europe, which was initiated on 5 May 1949. Nevertheless, the WEU still existed and in fact played a role in the 1956 Saar settlement and continued to serve as a link between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United Kingdom before Britain joined the European Community in 1973.

The moribund WEU was resurrected in 1984 in Rome to serve as a European counterpoint to NATO. It was viewed as a body in which European countries could consult and coordinate their responses to security issues. WEU members agreed that the foreign and defense ministers of the member states would meet twice annually to discuss the implications of ongoing crises. At a conference in The Hague in 1987, it was agreed that security issues were inseparable from the process of European integration. In effect, the WEU became the security component of the European Union (EU), which had developed from the European Community following the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht.

The WEU was expanded to include Portugal and Spain in 1990 and Greece in 1992. In 1992 Iceland, Norway, and Turkey became associate members of the WEU, and Denmark and Ireland became observers. In 1995

Austria, Finland, and Sweden became observers. In 1994 the category of associate partner was created for countries of Central and Eastern Europe that had signed the Europe Agreement with the EU. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia became associate partners in 1994, and Slovenia became an associate partner in 1996. In 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became associate members.

Bernard Cook

See also

Brussels Treaty; European Defense Community; European Economic Community; European Integration Movement; European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Organization for European Economic Cooperation

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Western Sahara

Northwest African region. Western Sahara covers 102,700 square miles and is bordered by Morocco to the north, Algeria to the northeast, Mauritania to the east and south, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. Western Sahara's territory is contested, and its sovereignty remains in legal limbo. In 1945, it had an estimated population of 160,000 people. Mostly desert and sparsely populated but rich in phosphate resources, this part of Africa became a part of the Spanish Empire in 1884 and was known as the Spanish Sahara.

In the nineteenth-century European scramble for control of Africa, Spain took over the Western Sahara in 1884, primarily because of the proximity of the region to the Spanish Canary Islands and to match French claims of suzerainty in neighboring Morocco and Algeria. The Spanish and French agreed on the border between Morocco and the Spanish Sahara in negotiations conducted in 1900 and 1912. Spanish control was actually limited to coastal areas, as tribes in the interior continued to operate with considerable independence. After World War II, European empires collapsed, and decolonization swept much of the African continent. Northwest Africa was no exception, and Morocco became independent in 1956. There were also independence movements in adjacent areas, such as the bitter conflict for independence in French Algeria. The native Sahrawi of the Western Sahara began a struggle for independence before World War II that intensified in 1956.

The Spanish proved reluctant to commit the resources necessary to maintain control of the Spanish Sahara, and the United States did not view this area as key to the larger Cold War conflict. Independent Morocco remained firmly in the Western camp, and American support for Spanish claims in the region was primarily verbal. Agitation for independence increased after the creation of the Polisario (Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro) in 1973. Although this was a movement rooted in communist ideology, that fact did not deter the United States from pressuring Spain to accept the recommendations by the United Nations (UN) in 1966 for a referendum to determine the future of the Spanish Sahara. Spain finally withdrew its forces in 1975 after agreements for a partition of the Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania.

Almost immediately thereafter, both Morocco and Mauritania sent troops to enforce control over their parts of the Western Sahara. The focus of Polisario then turned toward creation of a Western Sahara, independent of both Morocco and Mauritania. Both Morocco and Mauritania wanted access to the abundant phosphate deposits in the area, which were discovered in geological explorations beginning in 1949 and are among the world's largest.

In the 1970s, the issue of Western Sahara's sovereignty was relegated to the back burner of international relations, where it remains. Polisario continues to fight for independence. Mauritania has for the time being withdrawn from the conflict, but Morocco continues to press forward, as it has done since settling 350,000 Moroccans, backed by military force, in the area in 1976. The result of Moroccan policy has been the expulsion of as many as 165,000 Sahrawi natives, many of whom settled in Algeria. The UN has made repeated attempts to resolve the issue, as has the United States, but to no avail.

Daniel E. Spector

See also

Africa; Algeria; Decolonization; France; Morocco; Spain

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Westmoreland, William Childs
(1914–2005)

U.S. Army general, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam (1964–1968), and U.S. Army chief of staff (1968–1972). Born in Spartanburg County, South Carolina, on 26 March 1914, William Westmoreland graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1936. Commissioned a lieutenant of field artillery, he served with distinction in World War II and the Korean War and was promoted to brigadier general in November 1952.

General William Westmoreland, who commanded U.S. forces in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) during 1964–1968. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Promoted to major general in December 1956, Westmoreland commanded the 101st Airborne Division (1958–1960) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. During 1960–1963, he was superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Promoted to lieutenant general, he returned to Fort Campbell to command the XVIII Airborne Corps in 1963. In June 1964 he was named commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), as a full general.

Westmoreland subsequently presided over the steep escalation of the Vietnam War and eventually commanded more than half a million American troops there. He embarked on an effort to seek out and engage communist forces, defeating them in a war of attrition. He had little interest in pacification programs. Westmoreland and planners in Washington never did understand the extent to which Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) leaders were prepared to sacrifice manpower to inflict American casualties and influence opinion in the United States. Casualty rates heavily unfavorable to the communists, taken as proof by Westmoreland that the war was being won, were nonetheless acceptable to Hanoi.

Westmoreland's overly optimistic predictions regarding the war in late 1967 helped feed public disillusionment in the United States following the heavy casualties of the January 1968 communist Tet Offensive, nonetheless lost by the communist side. Westmoreland interpreted the situation after the offensive as an opportunity and proposed the dispatch of additional troops to Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson, although he sent some emergency reinforcements, denied Westmoreland's request.

In June 1968, Johnson recalled Westmoreland to Washington as chief of staff of the army. Westmoreland held that post until his retirement in July 1972, with much of his energies devoted to planning the transition to an all-volunteer force. Following retirement, he continued to speak out on the Vietnam War, published his memoirs, and ran unsuccessfully for governor of South Carolina. He remained a major and controversial figure in the postwar debate over U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Westmoreland died in Charleston, South Carolina, on 18 July 2005.

James H. Willbanks

Westmoreland embarked on an effort to seek out and engage communist forces, defeating them in a war of attrition.

See also

Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Tet Offensive; Vietnam

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Wheeler, Earle Gilmore
(1908–1975)

U.S. Army general, chief of staff of the army during 1962–1964, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during 1964–1970. Born in Washington, D.C., on 13 January 1908, Earle Wheeler joined the National Guard at age sixteen and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1932. Commissioned in the infantry, during 1937–1938 he served in Tianjin, China. After training troops in World War II, from late 1944 he saw combat service in Europe as chief of staff of the 63rd Infantry Division.

From 1946 to 1949 Wheeler held various staff positions in France and Germany, and in November 1951, now a full colonel, he commanded the 351st Infantry in Trieste, Italy. From then until 1962, he alternated European and U.S. commands with Pentagon staff positions, being promoted to brigadier general in November 1952, major general in December 1955, lieutenant general in April 1960, and full general in March 1962.

In October 1962, President John F. Kennedy appointed Wheeler U.S. Army chief of staff. Almost immediately, his deft handling of racial confrontations at the University of Mississippi in Oxford impressed administration officials. In July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Wheeler chairman of the JCS. He held this position for six years, a record that no subsequent incumbent has yet surpassed. Although he sought to enhance the bargaining power of the JCS by persuading all service heads to maintain a unanimous united front on military issues, in practice decision making often rested with Robert S. McNamara, the dominating secretary of defense.

The most controversial issue facing Wheeler was the Vietnam War, on which he consistently took a strongly hawkish line. He disliked the Johnson administration's gradual escalation of the war, an ad hoc strategy that Wheeler thought likely to prove ineffective, and unavailingly pressed political leaders to call up reserve forces to supply the manpower needed to meet American commitments in Vietnam and elsewhere. The JCS never, however, came out forthrightly to their civilian superiors to condemn the graduated response strategy and demand the application of overwhelming force against the enemy, an omission that subsequent historians have fiercely criticized. Nor did the JCS, including Wheeler, express their reservations over the Johnson administration's limited rather than full-scale air bombing campaigns.

Wheeler consistently endorsed commanding General William C. Westmoreland's requests for additional manpower. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, Wheeler urged Westmoreland to demand an additional 206,000 troops, a requirement that he apparently hoped would trigger the call-up of reserves but instead helped to precipitate the Johnson administration's March 1968 decision to open negotiations with a view to withdrawing American forces.

General Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1964–1970. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Wheeler also supported President Richard M. Nixon's controversial 1969 decision to begin secret air strikes on communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

After suffering several heart attacks, at least partly due to stress and frustration over Vietnam, Wheeler retired in July 1970. He died in Frederick, Maryland, on 18 December 1975. One significant legacy of his tenure as chairman of the JCS was that subsequent American military leaders came to believe that the United States should not intervene in military situations unless civilian officials were prepared to endorse the employment of forces sufficient to guarantee swift and overwhelming victory.

Priscilla Roberts

See also

Cambodia; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; McNamara, Robert Strange; Nixon, Richard Milhous; Tet Offensive; Vietnam War; Westmoreland, William Childs

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Whisky on the Rocks Crisis
(27 October 1981)

Grounding of a Soviet submarine on the Swedish coast that caused an international incident in October 1981. Throughout the 1980s, neutral Sweden was plagued by a series of Soviet submarine intrusions into its territorial waters. The most significant and public of these events was the grounding of a Soviet Whisky-class diesel-powered attack submarine inside a restricted zone located near the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. The sub ran aground on the night of 27 October 1981 and was discovered by a Swedish fisherman as its crew was attempting unsuccessfully to extricate themselves.

When queried by astonished Swedish Navy officials, the Soviet captain declared that a "navigation error" brought the submarine to its resting place. Swedish signals intelligence, however, intercepted orders from a Soviet Kashin-class destroyer instructing the captain to concoct a cover story. Sweden formally complained to Soviet officials and asked them to apologize, pay

for salvage costs, permit a Swedish salvage crew to do the job, and allow the submarine's captain to be interrogated. The Swedish ambassador to the Soviet Union was then confronted by a Soviet deputy foreign minister—and ten silent Soviet admirals behind him—who agreed to the first three demands but refused to allow the submarine captain to be questioned.

Meanwhile, a formidable Soviet naval task force assembled off the Swedish coast in international waters to intimidate the Swedish government. Six days passed. Then, a Swedish radiological survey team discovered that radiation was leaking from the Soviet sub's torpedo tube area. At that point, the Swedes concluded that the Whisky-class boat contained nuclear weapons. Sweden eventually permitted the submarine to depart after having taken full advantage of the crisis for propaganda purposes. It was later determined that the Whisky-class boat had been covertly observing classified Swedish torpedo trials off Karlskrona.

In 1982, unidentified submarine intrusions into Swedish territorial waters increased dramatically. It was assumed that they were of Soviet origin. Small submersibles, some using a tracked propulsion system, infiltrated Swedish minefields, and divers tampered with the mine suspension chains. On a number of occasions, Swedish antisubmarine forces dropped depth charges on suspected submarine contacts. The number of intrusions increased to sixty in 1983, finally tapering off to fifteen in 1986. The reasons behind this Soviet submarine activity are uncertain, although it is assumed that this was prompted by a combination of reconnaissance, intimidation, and training exercises.

Sean M. Maloney

See also

Soviet Union, Navy; Submarines; Sweden

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White, Thomas Dresser
(1902–1965)

U.S. Air Force general and chief of staff (1957–1961). Born in Walker, Minnesota, on 6 August 1902, Thomas White graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1920. Before World War II, he served in the U.S. Army's infantry and aviation branches and in a series of attaché positions, among them duty posts in China (1927–1931), the Soviet Union (1934), Italy (1934–1937), and Brazil (1940–1942), where he was stationed when the United States entered World War II. During the war, White served in a series of senior staff positions and rose to become deputy commander of

the Thirteenth Air Force and commander of the Seventh Air Force in the Pacific theater.

After the war, White first commanded the Fifth Air Force in Japan and then returned to the United States to work in several staff positions on the air force staff. In June 1953 he was named vice chief of staff and promoted to full general. In July 1957 he was elevated to chief of staff of the air force.

During his tenure at the top of the air force, White was a strong advocate of the primacy of strategic nuclear airpower and the development of modern weapons-delivery technologies. He was especially aggressive in pursuing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities and military operations in space. He was responsible for inserting the term "aerospace" into air force doctrine and using the concept to claim a lead role for the air force in the military use of space. White retired in June 1961 and died in Washington, D.C., on 22 December 1965.

Jerome V. Martin

See also

Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic; United States Air Force

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Whitlam, Edward Gough

(1916–)

Australian Labour Party politician and prime minister (1972–1975). Born on 11 July 1916 at Kew, Victoria, Gough Whitlam was educated in the Canberra public schools. He graduated with a degree in arts and law from the University of Sydney in 1938 and served in the Royal Australian Air Force during 1941–1945, leaving the service as a flight lieutenant.

After the war, Whitlam returned to the University of Sydney to study law and was admitted to the bar in 1947. He joined the Labour Party in 1945 and entered politics in 1950 when he attempted but failed to win election to the New South Wales state parliament. In 1952 he won election to the national Parliament as a member from Werriwa, a seat he held for more than twenty years. In 1967 he became the head of the Labour Party.

Whitlam led his party to a resounding victory in 1972 and began a reform program based on his campaign platform. His ambitious program included abolishing conscription, withdrawing Australian troops from the Vietnam War, banning South African sports teams from participating in events in Australia, establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), reforming state- and church-run schools, and negotiating aboriginal

land rights. However, his reform agenda was crippled by rocketing oil prices and a stagnant economy.

Against a backdrop of rising unemployment and inflation, members of his party tried to secure $2 billion in overseas loans and then provided incomplete answers when this activity was discovered. The party was also handicapped by a sex scandal involving a senior Labour Party official. These events and the Australian Senate's blocking of the budget led to a showdown on 11 February 1975, when Whitlam refused to call a general election. Governor-General Sir John Kerr then dismissed the Whitlam government, and the ensuing election brought a new coalition government to power.

Following a second electoral defeat in 1977, Whitlam resigned as head of the Labour Party in 1978. During 1982–1986 he served as ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Herbert Merrick

Prime minister of Australia Edward Gough Whitlam, 1973. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also
Australia

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Wilson, Charles Erwin
(1890–1961)

U.S. secretary of defense (1953–1957) and president of General Motors (1941–1953). Born on 18 July 1890 in Minerva, Ohio, Charles Wilson earned an electrical engineering degree in 1909 from the Carnegie Institute of Technology. He began his business career at Westinghouse Electric Corporation, where he was involved in the engineering of military radio equipment during World War I. He joined General Motors in 1919 and eventually became its president in 1941. During World War II, he oversaw the company's massive production of military equipment.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower selected Wilson as secretary of defense in January 1953. Wilson's experience running a large corporation with significant dealings with the Department of Defense was viewed as an asset. During his nomination hearing, however, his business background led to controversy, including his initial refusal to sell his General Motors stock and

a statement he made that was famously simplified to "What is good for General Motors is good for the country."

Wilson shared Eisenhower's goals of maintaining a strong defense while also reducing the defense budget and reorganizing the armed forces. This was reflected most clearly in the New Look military policy, which relied upon nuclear deterrent forces and strategic airpower in place of mass conventional forces. To implement this, Wilson gradually reduced the defense budget and shifted the defense emphasis to the U.S. Air Force, leading to tensions with the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. This policy transformation was most clearly seen in his 1956 decision to give the air force control over intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) while sharply limiting the army's role in strategic missile forces.

Wilson resigned his post in October 1957 and returned to the private sector. He died in Norwood, Louisiana, on 26 September 1961.

Michael A. George

See also

Eisenhower, Dwight David; New Look Defense Policy; United States Air Force

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Wolf, Markus

(1923–2006)

Head of German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) intelligence. Born in Hechingen, Germany, on 19 January 1923, the son of communist writer and doctor Friedrich Wolf, Markus Wolf fled with his family to Moscow when Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933. Wolf eventually joined the Communist International (Comintern) and was trained as an operative. He became a member of Walter Ulbricht's group while in exile and was sent back to Berlin in 1945. Throughout the Cold War, Wolf was known as "the man without a face" because no reliable pictures of him existed.

Wolf initially worked as a journalist, but in 1953 he became one of the founding members of the new foreign intelligence service within the East German Ministry of State Security (Stasi) headed by Erich Mielke. Among Wolf's tasks was organizing teams of so-called Romeo spies (also referred to as "swallows") who seduced their targets to obtain information. His agents successfully penetrated the office of Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) Chancellor Willy Brandt in the early 1970s, causing an international scandal, and Wolf gained an international reputation as a spymaster. He retired in 1986 and gained a different sort of notoriety as a prominent

supporter of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika.

When the East German state collapsed in 1989, Wolf was one of the first targets of scrutiny. Although he claims that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) offered him sanctuary, he remained in Berlin. He was subsequently arrested on charges of treason after the reunification of Germany and was tried and sentenced to six years in prison. That conviction was overturned, but he was later tried and convicted on charges of kidnapping East German citizens during the Cold War and received a two-year suspended sentence. He testified in several court cases about his activities and written several books, but he remains unapologetic. Wolf died in Berlin on 9 November 2006.

Timothy C. Dowling

See also

Brandt, Willy; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Stasi; Ulbricht, Walter

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Woodstock
(14–16 August 1969)

Outdoor music festival held near Woodstock, New York, on 14–16 August 1969. Billed in advance as the greatest rock concert ever, the event was perhaps the high point of the countercultural movement of the 1960s.

Neither the concert organizers nor the government officials of this small upstate New York community were prepared for the number of people who gathered for the three-day concert. Called together for a musical celebration of peace and love, the watchwords of the counterculture, individuals and groups of all descriptions poured into Woodstock from all over the United States. As the song later written by Joni Mitchell to commemorate the event suggested, most of the participants thought of themselves as coming together with other young people who were "stardust" and "golden." Observers from outside the counterculture, however, formed an entirely different impression.

The 500,000 people who showed up for the concert quickly overwhelmed the supply of food, the provisions for sanitation, and various other health services. There was no apparent shortage of drugs or alcohol, however. Planned as a camping event, a torrential rainstorm turned the occupied 600-



John Sebastian, formerly of The Lovin' Spoonful, performs at the free Woodstock Music and Art Fair in August 1969. Perhaps 450,000 people attended the three-day affair, which is remembered as an important symbol of the liberal spirit of the 1960s. (Henry Diltz/Corbis)

acre area into a huge sea of mud. In spite of these and other inconveniences, including a 20-mile-long traffic jam, the gathering ended without violence and was a huge success in the minds of most participants.

Press coverage focusing on the nudity, drug consumption, and casual sex enjoyed by many participants who often overlooked the real reason for the gathering: the music. There were well over thirty bands at Woodstock that managed to play in spite of enormous technical difficulties. The concert brought together folk, rock and roll, blues, and uncategorized musicians from the western, eastern, and southern United States as well as many groups from England. Several performers were well known when they arrived, while for others, Woodstock launched their careers. Musicians delighted their followers and made many new fans. Among the well-known musicians were Joan Baez; Sly and the Family Stone; Jefferson Airplane; the Who; the Grateful Dead; Blood, Sweat and Tears; Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young; Santana; Jimi Hendrix; Janis Joplin; Country Joe and the Fish; and the Paul Butterfield Blues Band.

With such a diversity of artists present, the musicians coalesced into something much closer to a movement than had been the case among disorganized countercultural elements before Woodstock. A similar phenomenon occurred with most of the crowd as well. Yet in many ways, Woodstock was the last innocent celebration of the counterculture. Not long after the event, the ravages of the drug culture became more obvious with the deaths of Hendrix and Joplin (among others), who had turned in two of Woodstock's most memorable performances. At the same time, Woodstock's very success alerted recording companies and other business ventures to the massive market potential of the counterculture, whose messages of peace and love were gradually diluted by commercialization.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Music

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World Bank

An organization of the United Nations (UN), the aim of which is to spur economic growth and curb poverty in the developing world by providing loans, policy advice, and technical assistance. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or World Bank as it is more commonly known, came into existence in 1945. Its charter was drafted at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. As of 2007, 185 countries were World Bank members. Membership in the World Bank requires prior membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In July 1944, the UN convened a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to discuss economic cooperation after the war. Concerns over monetary stability were most pressing, and thus the IMF was established at the conference. Postwar reconstruction and economic development issues were also addressed, which gave birth to the World Bank. In December 1945, the first members signed its charter, and in 1946 the organization began its lending operations with a loan of $250 million for French postwar reconstruction. After the initial postwar reconstruction period in Europe, the second task of the World Bank, economic development, became most prominent. The World Bank used its status as a first-class debtor to pass on low-interest loan rates on funds raised on international capital markets to project countries. Among these nations were newly independent states in Africa and Asia.

Among the first World Bank signatories were Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1950, however, the Soviets forced them to withdraw, as they considered the World Bank an instrument of U.S. economic imperialism. Since then, World Bank members have consisted largely of nations with market-oriented economies. Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) became members in 1952 and later were among the biggest donors of soft loans. The World Bank Charter specifically prohibits the body from interfering in the political affairs of states receiving World Bank aid and holds that only economic considerations will be used to determine need. Nevertheless, because the seat of Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) was in Washington, D.C., and the World Bank maintained close relations with American-based banking institutions, politics did come into play over the years. The United States has remained the most influential World Bank member, and the president of the World Bank has always been an American.

Because the establishment of credibility in capital markets was based on World Bank recipient nations' ability to repay loans, in the first fifteen years of its existence the body focused on lending not to the poorest countries, which posed too high a risk of default, but rather to middle- or upper-middle-income countries, such as those in Latin America. This policy, however, did little to alleviate poverty. It also became problematic in terms of Cold War geopolitics. Poverty presented itself as a powerful precondition for successful communist or nationalist movements throughout the developing world.

Delegates from forty-four nations gather for a group photograph outside the Mount Washington Hotel at Bretton Woods, where a conference occurred in July 1944 to discuss programs of economic cooperation and progress after World War II. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In recognition of this, in 1960 the International Development Association (IDA) was created as part of the World Bank. The aim of the IDA was to make concessional loans to the world's poorest nations, funded by contributions of member states. The two largest contributors were the United States and Japan.

During 1962–1968, under the leadership of President George Woods, the World Bank broadened its conception of economic development, which had been formerly restricted to large high-tech projects such as highways or power plants. Because earnings from these initial projects allowed increased funding, the World Bank's new lending policy included longer repayment periods, involved technical and direct assistance, and provided loans for agricultural purposes, which became a major focus of World Bank priorities.

During 1968–1981, Robert McNamara, a former Ford Motor Company chief executive officer (CEO) and secretary of defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, served as the World Bank's pres-

ident and profoundly changed the institution. During McNamara's tenure, the World Bank became involved foremost in poverty mitigation programs and increased its lending operations from $1 billion in 1968 to more than $12 billion in 1981. He also had to cope with the 1971 breakdown of the international monetary system designed at Bretton Woods, the oil price shocks of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980, and the developing world debt crisis. The first oil price shock led to the emergence of the so-called petrodollar market of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) countries. Some of these funds were borrowed by the World Bank to finance development projects, especially rural development projects in Africa. Unfortunately, the expansion of lending did not always contribute to the reduction of poverty but, on the contrary, locked many states into a vicious cycle of higher and higher debt with no ability to pay the debt or accruing interest.

Because the World Bank raises its funds from international capital markets, it is largely independent of interventions by member governments. During the 1960s and early 1970s particularly, the World Bank witnessed active intervention by the United States to prevent lending to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and other U.S. adversaries. This obviously politicized the World Bank. Due to successful World Bank–sponsored development projects in East Asia and Latin America, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of a consensus view of economic development based on free markets. World perception of the East Asian miracle in nations such as the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), Taiwan, and Singapore was largely based on a seminal book published by the World Bank in 1993. The end of the Cold War brought a host of nations clamoring to join the World Bank, many of them in former communist bloc areas. Today, the World Bank focuses on creating sustainable economic growth by combating corruption in recipient nations and by ameliorating the situation of the poorest, most heavily indebted countries with poor growth records.

Bernhard Johannes Seliger

See also

International Monetary Fund; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

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World Council of Churches

Ecumenical, religious organization dedicated to world peace and the preservation of human rights. As early as 1937, religious leaders had agreed to establish a World Council of Churches (WCC), but World War II delayed the founding of the organization until August 1948, when representatives of 147 churches assembled in Amsterdam to create the WCC. Today, the WCC consists of 342 member churches in 120 countries. The WCC is the institutional expression of the modern ecumenical movement, the goal of which is to achieve Christian unity. WCC-affiliated churches are mainly Protestant (Lutheran, Reformed, Methodist, Baptist), Anglican, and Orthodox churches. The Roman Catholic Church is the only major Christian church that does not belong to the WCC.

The Cold War decided the political framework of the WCC from its start in 1948, when U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Czechoslovak theologian Josef Hromádka argued about whether the churches should combat communism or champion such socialist ideals as class justice and equality. The WCC's first secretary-general, Willem Visser 't Hooft, partly settled the issue by advocating that the churches promote reconciliation rather than competition between East and West.

This stance changed, however, after the Third Assembly in New Delhi in 1961, when churches from former colonies in Africa and Asia and Orthodox churches from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe entered the WCC. These overwhelmed the older member churches and influenced WCC policy in a more anti-West direction. Philip Potter from Dominica, as secretary-general after 1964, was a voice of the former colonies. Western churches now saw themselves confronted with the indignation of developing-world and Eastern churches. Consequently, the WCC adopted the Program to Combat Racism, which proved a valuable contribution to the struggle against South Africa's apartheid government. The WCC also came to the defense of human rights in Latin America during the 1960s–1980s.

In 1975 the WCC Assembly faced a short period of Western criticism over human rights violations in Eastern Europe. However, Orthodox church officials—some of them Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) or Stasi informers—progressive Western officials, and church deputies from Africa and Asia soon stanched this criticism and concentrated on anticolonialist, antiracist, and peace programs. In Boston in 1979 the WCC announced a program to combat militarism that inspired many peace organizations throughout the world, such as Aktion Sühnezeichen in Germany and Pax Christi International.

In 1983 in Vancouver, the WCC sought to combine peace, social justice, and environmentalism into one large conciliar process. This policy bore fruit, particularly in North America, the Netherlands, and the two Germanies. In the West, it tied many loose church groups together. In East Germany it went further, stimulating protest against the regime from within the churches. The conclusion of the conciliar process took place in Seoul in 1990.

By that time, the world had changed significantly. The Cold War had all but ended, and politically driven WCC discussions had receded in importance. The WCC then had to cope with the accusations of East European dissidents and oppressed churches who believed that the WCC had not adequately defended them. Council officials were also confronted with revelations about their spying activities on behalf of communist regimes. Because of these scandals and the WCC's alleged pro-Soviet inclination, the organization lost a great deal of credibility. At the same time, Orthodox churches criticized the WCC because of its progressive positions concerning the ordination of women or the acceptance of homosexuality.

Beatrice de Graaf

See also

Anticolonialism; Human Rights

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World Peace Council

Organization formally established in 1949 ostensibly to promote world peace but actually a front organization of the Soviet Union's Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (known in the West as the Cominform). The origins of the World Peace Council (WPC), sometimes known as the World Council of Peace, are rather murky, befitting a communist front organization. Some sources trace its beginning to Poland in 1948, but 1949 is the year in which the WPC began its activities on a significant level. For the entire Cold War, the WPC was strategically located in Helsinki. Publicly, the WPC had a beneficent and worthy goal of promoting peaceful coexistence and nuclear disarmament.

Almost immediately, however, Western nations, particularly the United States, accused the WPC of having ulterior motives—that is, the advancement of Soviet foreign policy goals, disinformation, and propaganda and the infiltration of various Western peace movements. In 1950, Washington openly accused the WPC of being a front organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly had evidence that the WPC was being funded by communist bloc nations. This was proven true in 1989 when the WPC admitted to having received 90 percent of its funding from the Soviet Union. At its height in the early 1960s, the WPC may have received more than $50 million a year from

Moscow. In an attempt to hide Soviet involvement, money earmarked for the WPC was heavily laundered to make it difficult to trace the source of the funding.

In 1951, the WPC was expelled from France for its fifth-column activities. Some evidence exists that the WPC helped circulate stories in 1952 about the American use of biological weapons in the Korean War, a completely bogus accusation. The WPC worked independently but also played a role in other presumably legitimate peace organizations, mainly through infiltration and co-option. One of its tenets was aggressive insistence on nuclear disarmament, and unilateral Western nuclear disarmament became one of its favorite causes. Tellingly, British philosopher and peace activist Bertrand Russell, who had spurred on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), denounced the WPC in 1958 (the year the CND was born) for having failed to condemn the 1956 Soviet intervention in the Hungarian Revolution.

In spite of its dubious parentage and financing, the WPC attracted many adherents. Quick to condemn U.S. foreign and military policy, the WPC organized anti–Vietnam War protests in several West European nations. The WPC was especially active in Australia, where it orchestrated massive antiwar rallies in the 1960s. At the same time, the WPC remained silent during the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The WPC lost some of its luster in the late 1960s, therefore, as the New Left came to distrust Soviet communism. Another blow to the organization came in 1966 when the People's Republic of China (PRC) withdrew from the WPC, citing the growing Sino-Soviet split.

Despite the doubts of many, the WPC continued its work and was no doubt active in the nuclear disarmament movement of the 1980s. The WPC is still in existence today, but it has been badly discredited. The end of the Cold War took away much of its mission.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Communist Fronts; Peace Movements; Russell, Bertrand; Vietnam War Protests

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World War II, Allied Conferences

During World War I (1914–1918), the Entente powers were notably unsuccessful in coordinating their strategic goals and war aims. It was not until Italy's catastrophic failure at Caporetto in November 1917 that a Supreme

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (*left*), U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (*center*), and Soviet leader Josef Stalin (*right*) at the Yalta Conference. The "Big Three" met in Yalta, Crimea (in what is now the Ukraine), on 4–11 February 1945 to discuss military and political strategies for ending World War II. (Library of Congress)

War Council was established, and it was a similar near-disaster on the Western Front in April 1918 that finally persuaded the British, French, and Americans to name a single Allied commander in chief. This disunity persisted into the postwar period, hindering the Versailles Treaty negotiations in 1919 and helping to prevent the establishment of a lasting peace structure.

Given such abysmal precedents, it is not surprising that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt placed great emphasis on maintaining a smooth working relationship among the Allied powers during World War II. This complex relationship was hammered out in a series of conferences held throughout the war, several involving direct dialogues among the various heads of government. For Churchill and Roosevelt, who prided themselves on their ability to finesse negotiations through charisma, such meetings provided a perfect medium for deal making.

The conference system produced a remarkable degree of harmony between the British and Americans. While relations with Soviet leader Josef

Allied Conferences during World War II

Name	*Date*	*Location*	*Nations Involved*	*Function and Outcome*
Arcadia Conference	December 1941–January 1942	Washington, D.C., United States	United States, Britain	discuss strategy and cooperative agreements
Casablanca Conference	January 1943	Casablanca, Morocco	United States, Britain	discuss strategy, demand for "unconditional surrender"
Quebec Conference	August 1943	Quebec, Canada	United States, Britain, Canada, China	discuss strategic bombing, Operation OVERLORD, Pacific Theater
Moscow Conference	October 1943	Moscow, Soviet Union	United States, Britain, Soviet Union	creation of Four Power Declaration, establishment of commissions of postsurrender issues
Cairo Conference	November–December 1943	Cairo, Egypt	United States, Britain, Nationalist China	discuss military strategy and postwar territorial changes
Tehran Conference	November–December 1943	Tehran, Iran	United States, Britain, Soviet Union	discuss invasion of France, postwar division of Germany and Poland, and Soviiet invovlement in war with Japan
Dumbarton Oaks Conference	August–October 1944	Washington, D.C., United States	thirty-nine nations	discuss nature and structure of the United Nations
Yalta Conference	February 1945	Yalta, Ukraine	United States, Britain, Soviet Union	discuss postwar divisions, Soviet resolution to enter war with Japan, Declaration on Liberated Europe
Potsdam Conference	July–August 1945	Potsdam, Germany	United States, Britain, Soviet Union	discuss future of Germany and Eastern Europe, reparations, and Soviet involvement in war with Japan

Stalin, the third principal in the Allied triumvirate, were never so straightforward, it was at least possible to keep the Soviet Union committed to the fight against the Axis powers. The conferences also established workable, if far from ideal, settlements of postwar issues.

When Churchill and Roosevelt first met at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in August 1941, there were technically no Allied powers because there was no alliance of which to speak. The United States was still (nominally) neutral, and while the Soviet Union was engaged in a bitter fight with German forces, it was doing so neither with support from nor in coordination with the West. The Newfoundland conference was therefore more symbolic than substantive, although it did produce a powerful statement of democratic principles in the form of the Atlantic Charter. Perhaps more significantly, it led the way for the so-called Three-Power Conference in Moscow (29 September–1 October 1941), at which Churchill and Roosevelt's representatives, Lord Beaverbrook and W. Averell Harriman, agreed to extend American Lend-Lease support to the Soviets.

After the United States entered the war in December 1941, these tentative contacts were supplanted by full-fledged diplomatic commitments. Churchill traveled to Washington in the immediate wake of the Pearl Harbor attack, and at the resulting Anglo-American conference (code name ARCADIA) during 22 December 1941–14 January 1942, the two nations negotiated the mechanisms through which they would fight the remainder of World War II

together, including the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee and joint boards to coordinate shipping, raw material usage, and industrial production. In May 1942 the two Western powers drew the Soviets closer to the new alliance system—known since January as the United Nations (UN)—via an Anglo-Soviet Treaty (26 May 1942) and a meeting between Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on 29 May 1942. These somewhat tentative steps helped reduce mutual suspicions between the liberal-capitalist and communist powers.

It should be noted, however, that the American-British relationship was not without tension. At the Second Washington Conference in June 1942, it became clear that American and British leaders had very different ideas about the conduct of the war. Although the Germany First strategy went largely unquestioned, the Americans' eagerness to launch a full-scale invasion of the European mainland as soon as possible clashed with the more cautious British proposal to restrict activities to the periphery until the Axis had been sufficiently worn down. At this stage in the war, the British view tended to predominate, as much for practical reasons as for the cogency of its appeal: the two allies simply lacked the means to launch anything more than secondary operations. It remained vital to keep the Soviets in the fight, however, hence Churchill's August 1943 visit to Moscow, an uncomfortable meeting in which the British leader had to inform Stalin that a second European front remained, for the time being, an impossibility.

The successful Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942 was followed by the Casablanca Conference (14–24 January 1943) at which a more confident Roosevelt declared for the first time the Allied policy of unconditional surrender. He and Churchill also approved the round-the-clock strategic bombing campaign against Germany. At a follow-up conference four months later in Washington, D.C. (11–25 May 1943), the Americans agreed to delay a cross-channel attack for another year, but they extracted from the still-skeptical British a deadline for such action of 1 May 1944. The details of this future offensive were elaborated at the first conference between the Western Allies in Quebec in August 1943, at which the top secret plans for the Manhattan Project—the atomic bomb program—were also thrashed out. By mid-1943, with the German assault on the Eastern Front finally blunted at Kursk and with Italy on the verge of collapse after the invasion of Sicily, the main issue for the alliance was not so much the defeat of the Axis but rather how and when that defeat would come.

There remained, nonetheless, great concern about the West's relationship with the Soviet Union. Might Stalin negotiate a separate peace with Germany? And what of the future map of Europe after an Allied victory? Such concerns were central to the four-power Moscow Conference (19 October–1 November 1943), at which representatives of the Big Three powers and Nationalist-controlled China ratified the unconditional surrender doctrine and agreed to the establishment of a postwar organization for global security. To solidify the still-shaky Allied relationship, Churchill and Roosevelt also suggested a personal meeting with Stalin. At the preparatory Anglo-American talks in Cairo in November 1943, Churchill believed that he had persuaded

his American colleague to take a less emphatic line on the timing of the Normandy landings. To his considerable dismay, however, Roosevelt ignored his concession in face-to-face discussions with Stalin at the Tehran Conference (28 November–1 December 1943), where he enthusiastically embraced the cross-channel invasion, Operation OVERLORD. Tehran marked the fulcrum point at which American diplomatic efforts shifted decisively toward a bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, thereby marginalizing its weaker British ally.

By 1944, conference proceedings were dominated by the shaping of the postwar world. At Bretton Woods (1 July–15 July 1944) and Dumbarton Oaks (21–29 August 1944), the Allies drafted constitutions for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN, centerpieces of the new postwar financial and political order. Such bold declarations of idealistic principle contrasted with the rather murkier realpolitik conducted at the same time behind closed doors. At the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, Churchill attempted, without much success, to shift the focus of the Pacific war toward the reconstitution of the British Empire in Southeast Asia. While in Moscow the following month, he made the notorious percentages agreement with Stalin that divided Eastern Europe and the Balkans into western and eastern spheres of influence. This spirit of cynicism or, from another point of view, sober realism pervaded the last meeting among Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill at Yalta (4 February–11 February 1945), at which the de facto division of Europe was confirmed and a number of Russo-American agreements on the future shape of East Asia were drawn up without regard for the British or Chinese.

The Allied conference era was rapidly concluding. The war against Germany was in its closing days when the delegates of the new UN met in San Francisco in April 1945 for their inaugural session. A month later President Harry S. Truman traveled to the ruins of Hitler's defeated Reich to meet Churchill, his soon-to-be replacement Clement Attlee, and Stalin at Potsdam from 17 July–2 August 1945. At Potsdam, the three partners delivered to Japan a final ultimatum for surrender and attempted to settle the disputed future of Poland, but despite the glow of certain victory, it was evident that an alliance born of expedience could not survive in the postwar environment. Potsdam marked the effective end of wartime comradeship between East and West and the beginning of forty years of Cold War.

ALAN ALLPORT

See also

Allied Control Council of Germany; Churchill, Winston; Declaration on Liberated Europe; International Monetary Fund; Lend-Lease; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef; Territorial Changes after World War II; Truman, Harry S.; United Kingdom; United Nations; United States

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World War II, Legacy of

By virtually any measurement, World War II was the most devastating conflict in human history. All the world was touched by it to some degree. The war's economic and financial cost alone has been calculated at perhaps five times that of World War I. In human terms, World War II claimed half again as many military lives: 15 million versus 10 million for World War I. Total deaths from World War II, including civilians, came to 41–49 million people, a figure that would have been much higher without new sulfa and penicillin drugs and blood plasma transfusions.

When the war finally ended, vast stretches of Europe and parts of Asia lay in ruins. Whole populations were utterly exhausted, and many people were starving and living in makeshift shelters. Millions more had been uprooted from their homes and displaced. Many of them had been transported to Nazi Germany to work as slave laborers in German industry and agriculture. Transportation—especially in parts of Western and Central Europe and in Japan—was at a standstill. Bridges were blown, rail lines destroyed, and highways cratered and blocked. Ports, especially in Northwestern Europe and Japan, were especially hard-hit, and many would have to be rebuilt. Most of the large cities of Germany and Japan were piles of rubble and their buildings mere shells.

Some countries had fared reasonably well, however. Damage in Britain was not too extensive, and civilian deaths were relatively slight. Denmark and Norway escaped with little destruction. The rapid Allied advance had largely spared Belgium, although the port of Antwerp had been badly damaged. The Netherlands, however, sustained considerable destruction, and portions of the population were starving. The situation in Greece was also dire, and Poland suffered horribly from the brutal German and Soviet occupation policies and from armies sweeping back and forth across its territory.

Among major powers, the Soviet Union was the hardest hit. Its 27 million dead in the war dramatically affect national demographics to the present day. In 1959, Moscow announced that the ratio of males to females in the Soviet Union was 45 to 55. Aside from the catastrophic human costs, the Germans had occupied its most productive regions, and the scorched-earth policy practiced by both the Soviets and the Germans resulted in the total or partial destruction of 1,700 towns, 70,000 villages, and 6 million buildings, including 84,000 schools. The Soviet Union also lost 71 million farm animals, including 7 million horses. There was widespread destruction in such great

Among major powers, the Soviet Union was the hardest hit. Its 27 million dead in the war dramatically affect national demographics to the present day.

cities as Kiev, Odessa, and Leningrad. Perhaps a quarter of the property value of the Soviet Union was lost in the war, and tens of millions of Soviet citizens were homeless. Simply feeding the Soviet population became a staggering task. All of this goes far to explain subsequent Russian policies, both internal and external.

Recovery efforts in Europe as well as in Asia centered for several years on the pressing problems of food, housing, and employment. As it turned out, much of the damage was not as extensive as initially thought, and many machines were still operational once the rubble was removed. In a perverse sense, Germany and Japan benefited from the bombing in that they rebuilt with the most modern infrastructure and factories.

With the end of the war, the liberated nations carried out purges of fascists and collaborators. Many were slain without benefit of trial. In France, 8,000–9,000 people were so executed, while afterward 1,500 were sentenced to death and executed following regular court procedures. The victorious Allies were determined to bring to justice the leaders of Germany and Japan, whom they held responsible for the war. Two great trials were held in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Afterward, interest in bringing the guilty to justice waned, even in the cases of those responsible for wartime atrocities. Punishment varied greatly according to nation and circumstance, and working out acceptable formulas that might punish the guilty when so many people had to some degree collaborated with the occupiers proved virtually impossible.

At the end of the war it appeared as if the idealistic, Left-leaning Resistance movements might realize their goals of new political, economic, and social institutions to implement meaningful change. Most people thought that a return to prewar democratic structures was impossible, but the bright hopes were soon dashed. Resistance leaders fell to quarreling among themselves. The fracturing of the Left, as in France and Italy, made room for the return of the old but still powerful conservative elites. The political structures that ultimately emerged from the war, at least in Western Europe, were little changed from those that had preceded it. Even so, extensive social welfare reforms were implemented throughout Western Europe, in part to compensate ordinary people in those nations for their wartime privations. In the United States, wartime rhetoric of democracy and equality encouraged African Americans, many of whom saw military service, to demand an end ro segregation and second-class status, which gave new impetus to the civil rights movement. In much of Central and Eastern Europe, where the Soviet Union now held sway, there was significant change including land reform, although this was seldom to the real benefit of the populations involved. Soviet rule also brought widespread financial exactions in the form of war reparations to the Soviet Union and the stifling of democracy.

The war did serve to intensify the movement for European unity. Many European statesmen believed that some means had to be found to contain nationalism, especially German nationalism, and that the best vehicle for that would be the economic integration of their nations, with political unification to follow in what some called a "United States of Europe." They believed

that a Germany integrated into the European economy would not be able to act unilaterally. Although steps in that direction were slow, such thinking led, a decade after the end of the war, to the European Common Market.

Asia was also greatly affected by the war. In China, the bitter prewar contest between the Chinese Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resumed in a protracted civil war when Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi sent troops into Manchuria in an effort to reestablish Nationalist control of that important region. The conflict ended in 1949 with a communist victory. To the west, British imperial India dissolved into an independent India and Pakistan in 1947.

The United States granted the Philippines delayed independence, but in other areas, such as French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, the colonizers endeavored to continue their control. Where the European powers sought to hold on to their empires after August 1945, there would be further bloodshed. The French government, determined to maintain France as a great power, insisted on retaining its empire, which led to the protracted Indochina War and a bitter insurgency in Algeria. Fighting also erupted in many other places around the world, including Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Even where the European powers chose to withdraw voluntarily, as in the case of Britain in Palestine and on the Indian subcontinent, there was often heavy fighting as competing nationalities sought to fill the vacuum. Nonetheless, independence movements in Africa and Asia, stimulated by the long absence of European control during the war, gathered momentum, and over the next two decades, much of Africa and Asia became independent.

One of the supreme ironies of World War II is that Adolf Hitler had waged the conflict with the stated goal of destroying communism. In the end, he had gravely weakened Europe. Rather than eradicating his ideological adversary, he had strengthened it. In 1945, the Soviet Union was one of the two leading world powers, and its international prestige was at an all-time high. In France and Italy, powerful communist parties were seemingly poised to take power. The Soviet Union also established governments friendly to it in Central and Eastern Europe. Under the pressure of confrontation with the West, these states became openly communist in the years after World War II. In 1948, the communists made their last acquisition in Central Europe in a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia. Communists also nearly came to power in Greece.

Indeed, far from destroying the Soviet Union and containing the United States, Germany and Japan had enhanced the international position of both. Western and Soviet differences meant that while treaties were negotiated with some of the smaller Axis powers, there were no big-power agreements concerning the future of Germany and Japan. Germany, initially divided into four occupation zones, in 1949 became two states: the Western-style Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Korea also had been temporarily divided at the 38th Parallel for the purposes of a Japanese surrender. Unlike Germany, which was reunited in 1990, in 2007 Korea still remained divided, another legacy of World War II.

South Korean soldiers patrol their side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the 38th Parallel in Korea in 1990. The DMZ dividing Korea remains one of the world's flash points. (Michel Setboun/Corbis)

Despite the continued importance of secondary powers such as Britain and France, the year 1945 witnessed the emergence of a bipolar world in which there were two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Added to the confrontational mix was the threat of nuclear war as both governments embarked on a new struggle, known as the Cold War.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Jiang Jieshi; Paris Peace Conference and Treaties; Territorial Changes after World War II

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Wu Xiuquan
(1908–1997)

Chinese diplomat and vice foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Wuhan, Hubei Province, on 6 March 1908, Wu Xiuquan joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a youth and served in the Red Army—later renamed the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—as a political instructor, translator, and deputy chief of staff. In 1936 he began his diplomatic career as director of the Foreign Affairs Department.

During the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, Wu served on several military commissions in Northwest and Northeast China, where he was responsible for liaison and military coordination programs. After the PRC was established in 1949, he became director of the USSR and Eastern Europe Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he accompanied Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai to Moscow in February 1950 to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty. In November 1950 Wu, as the PRC's special envoy, attended a United Nations (UN) Security Council meeting in which he condemned U.S. Korean War measures in the Taiwan Strait, calling them an invasion of Chinese territory. In 1955 he became the vice foreign minister, a position he held until March 1955, when he was appointed Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia. He returned home in late 1956 and became a member of the CCP Central Committee and in March 1959 became director of the party's International Liaison Department. He held both posts until the mid-1960s, during which time he led a number of delegations abroad, primarily to communist bloc countries.

In 1966 during the Cultural Revolution, Wu was purged from the government and imprisoned. In 1975 he returned to the public scene, first as deputy chief of the PLA General Staff. In 1980 he was named director of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies and was also named vice foreign minister, in which capacities he played an active role in enhancing the PRC's international status. Wu died on 9 November 1997 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Korean War; Sino-Soviet Treaty; Zhou Enlai

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Wu Xueqian
(1921–)

Vice premier and foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born on 19 December 1921 in Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, Wu Xueqian enrolled at the Jinan University in 1939, where he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Throughout the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, he lived in Shanghai, where he engaged in student underground work. He went on to serve the new PRC as deputy director of the International Liaison Department of the New Democratic Youth League of the CCP's Central Committee until 1953. Shortly thereafter, he became director of the International Liaison Department and simultaneously retained membership in both the New Democratic Youth League and the National Committee of the Federation of Democratic Youth. He held these posts until the mid-1960s, during which time he led a number of youth delegations abroad to foster closer ties among the PRC and other socialist nations as well Asian and African nations.

In 1967, as a result of the Cultural Revolution, Wu was relieved of all of his posts and was forced into private life. In early 1978 he reemerged publicly and resumed his former position in the International Liaison Department. From May 1982 to April 1988 he served as the PRC's foreign minister, during which time he accompanied PRC leaders on visits abroad, notably to Western Europe and North America. He also reinforced the Sino-American rapprochement begun by his predecessor. In April 1988 he became vice premier and continued his efforts to boost China's international standing. He relinquished the vice premiership in March 1993, although he retained his membership in the CCP Central Committee and Politburo, where he continues to serve.

Law Yuk-fun

See also
China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution

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Wyszyński, Stefan, Cardinal
(1901–1981)

Roman Catholic prelate and prominent Polish dissident. Born on 3 August 1901 in Zuzela, Poland (then a part of the Russian Empire), Stephan Wyszyński studied at the Włocławek seminary and was ordained a priest in August 1924. He continued his studies at the Catholic University in Lublin and earned a PhD in sociology and ecclesiastical law in 1929. He then returned to Poland, where he taught at the Włocławek seminary and edited a theological review.

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński at the Vatican, October 1958. (Bettmann/Corbis)

During World War II, he served as a chaplain in the Polish underground army.

In 1946, Wyszyński was named bishop of Lublin. Two years later he became archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw, making him primate of the Polish Roman Catholic Church. In 1953 he was named a cardinal. He was a fierce opponent of the postwar Polish government, which used Stalinist methods to seize and retain power. Nevertheless, in 1950 Wyszyński signed an agreement with the government that ostensibly allowed considerable freedom to the Roman Catholic Church in return for its tacit support of the Polish government. But Polish authorities refused to respect the agreement. Communist

officials in fact severely repressed organized religion. In 1953, Wyszyński issued a public repudiation of the government and declared an end to the Church's accommodative policies. He was subsequently arrested and imprisoned during 1953–1956.

In 1956, Wyszyński resumed his duties under the new anti-Stalinist government of Władysław Gomułka. The years after 1956 were less repressive than the early postwar years, but Wyszyński still faced constant challenges from the communist government. The cardinal maintained cordial and close relations with Rome and participated in Vatican Council II.

In 1978, when Pope John Paul II became the Roman Catholic Church's first Polish pope, the new pontiff praised Wyszyński for his steadfast commitment to human rights and thanked him for his sacrifices. In 1979, John Paul II made a triumphant pilgrimage to his native Poland, a true high point in the cardinal's life. Wyszyński was disappointed, however, when the pope's visit did not bring about any immediate change in the Polish government's policy toward the Church. Wyszyński died in Warsaw on 28 May 1981.

Jakub Basista

See also

John Paul II, Pope; Poland; Roman Catholic Church; Vatican Council II

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Y

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad
(1917–1980)

Indian and Pakistani military leader and president of Pakistan (1969–1971). Born on 4 February 1917 in Peshawar, India (now Pakistan), Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan graduated from Punjab University and the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. Commissioned in the Indian Army in 1938, during World War II he served with the British Army in North Africa, Iraq, and Italy.

Upon the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Yahya Khan cofounded the Pakistan Staff College at Quetta. He also helped to bring Muhammad Ayub Khan to power. During the Second Pakistan-India War in 1965, Yahya Khan commanded an infantry division. The following year he was appointed commander in chief of the Pakistani Army.

On 25 March 1969, civil unrest prompted Muhammad Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, to declare martial law. He promptly resigned after naming Yahya Khan chief martial law administrator and president. Yahya Khan moved swiftly to abolish the 1962 constitution and dissolve the National Assembly. He served as president for the next two years.

On 29 March 1970 Yahya Khan promulgated the Legal Framework Order of 1970, which functioned as an interim constitution and under which an election could be held. Then in December 1970 Yahya Khan oversaw the first free elections in Pakistani history. The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman captured 160 out of 165 seats in East Pakistan but no seats in West Pakistan. Instead of brokering a compromise between Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, majority leader of the West Pakistani Assembly, Yahya Khan used military force to repress the opposition in East Pakistan, and a civil war ensued. The Third Pakistan-India War (3–17 December 1971) began when India interceded. West Pakistan was defeated, and East Pakistan seceded to become Bangladesh in 1971.

Yahya Khan resigned the presidency on 20 December 1971 and was replaced by the Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1972 Bhutto placed Yahya Khan under house arrest. Yahya Khan died on 10 August 1980 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, after suffering a stroke.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also

Ayub Khan, Muhammad; Bangladesh; India; India, Armed Forces; India-Pakistan Wars; Pakistan; Pakistan, Armed Forces; Rahman, Mujibur

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Yang Shangkun

(1907–1998)

Politician, diplomat, and president of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in 1907 in Shuangjiang, Sichuan Province, Yang Shangkun enrolled at the Shanghai University in 1925 and joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1926. In 1927 he continued his studies at the Sun Yixian University, graduating in 1930. Returning to China in 1931, he served in the Red Army as director of the Political Department. During the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, he served in North China, engaging in the CCP's organizational, propaganda, and liaison efforts.

Upon the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Yang became director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and handled the party's daily administrative affairs, a post that familiarized him with all aspects of party operations. In 1966 he was purged during the Cultural Revolution and imprisoned. In 1979 he returned to power, first as secretary and then as vice governor of Guangdong Province. In 1981 he transferred to Beijing as a Politburo member and permanent vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, in which capacities he became active in foreign affairs, leading a number of delegations abroad to promote the PRC's international standing. In 1988 he was elected the PRC's president and concurrently appointed the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, thus becoming the second most powerful figure in Chinese politics after Deng Xiaoping. On 4 June 1989, Yang ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to crack down on the prodemocracy student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. In 1993 he retreated from his duties. Yang died on 14 September 1998 in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Tiananmen Square

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Yao Wenyuan
(1931–2005)

Chinese writer and Communist Party official in the People's Republic of China (PRC), best known as a member of the Gang of Four. Born in Zhuji, Zhejiang Province, in 1931, Yao Wenyuan was the son of a well-known leftist writer. Yao too became a writer and a literary critic in Shanghai. As a member of the Shanghai group known as the Proletarian Writers for Purity, he became a champion of the orthodox Chinese Communist Party (CCP) literary line against liberalism. He opposed the Hundred Flowers movement and became known as "the Cudgel" for his hard-line approach (later he was dubbed "the Killer by Pen").

In November 1961 Yao published an article, "Notes on the New Historical Drama 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office,'" first in *Wenhui bao* and then, after considerable opposition, in the *People's Daily*. The article was a critique of a play written by former vice mayor of Beijing Wu Han that was an allegory in support of former Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, who had been dismissed in 1959 by communist leader Mao Zedong for his criticism of the Great Leap Forward. In short, the play was sharply critical of Mao, and Yao's article was a defense of Mao. Believed to have been ordered by Mao, Yao's article in effect launched the Cultural Revolution in China.

Closely identified both with Mao and his wife Jiang Qing, a former Shanghai actress, in October 1966 Yao joined the Cultural Revolution Group headed by Jiang and Chen Boda that directed some of the more violent aspects of the Cultural Revolution. Together with Jiang, Wang Hongwen, and Zhang Chunqiao, Yao formed what became known as the Gang of Four. In April 1969 he became a member of both the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CCP, where he directed the regime's propaganda efforts.

Expelled from the CCP and arrested in October 1976, Yao was brought to trial with the other members of the Gang of Four and charged with responsibility for the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution. According to the Chinese government, he also admitted forging documents that led to the purge of Deng Xiaoping, later China's leader. In October 1981 Yao received twenty years in prison, the lightest sentence of the four defendants. He was released in October 1996. He spent the remainder of his life working on a history of China. Following the death of Zhang Chunqiao in April 2005, Yao became the last surviving member of the Gang of Four. Yao died in Shanghai of diabetes on 23 December 2005.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Jiang Qing; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai

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Yeltsin, Boris
(1931–2007)

Soviet reform politician during the last years of the Soviet Union and first elected president of Russia (1991–1999). Born on 1 February 1931 in Butka in the Sverdlovsk Oblast in the Ural Mountains, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin graduated from the Urals Polytechnical Institute in 1955 as a construction engineer. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1961 and worked on various construction projects in the Sverdlovsk area until 1968.

Yeltsin rose through the party ranks in the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee. He was elected the region's industry secretary in 1975 and first sec-



Boris Yeltsin, shown here campaigning for the presidency of the Russian Federation on 1 June 1991. (Reuters/Corbis)

retary in 1976. During 1976–1985, he moved through the national ranks of the CPSU. He served as a deputy in the Council of the Union (1978–1989), a member of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Transport and Communication (1979–1984), a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1984–1985), and chief of the Central Committee Department of Construction in 1985. The new CPSU general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, summoned Yeltsin to Moscow in April 1985 as part of a team of reform-minded party members.

Gorbachev asked Yeltsin to reform the Moscow City Committee. Yeltsin began to clear the city's Party Committee of corrupt officials, which endeared him to Muscovites. Eventually, he became dissatisfied with the slow pace of the perestroika reforms and openly criticized the CPSU officials. This was directed at the power base of Yegor Ligachev, who endorsed a moderate party–led reform. In 1987, Yeltsin resigned to force Gorbachev to take sides. Gorbachev needed Yeltsin to counterbalance Ligachev's growing skepticism and rejected his resignation, asking him to curb his critiques. Yeltsin ignored Gorbachev's plea. Thus, Gorbachev allowed Ligachev to continue the campaign against Yeltsin, which finally led to Yeltsin's dismissal as first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. In 1988 Yeltsin was also expelled from the Politburo, but he remained in Moscow as the first deputy chair of the State Committee for Construction.

Yeltsin went on to win a landslide victory in the newly established Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialistic Republic (RSFSR) in March 1989. In May 1990 he became chairman of the RSFSR. By 12 June 1990 the RSFSR, along with the other fourteen Soviet republics, had declared its independence. Yeltsin was directly elected to the newly created office of president of the now-independent RSFSR on 12 June 1991. He then demanded Gorbachev's resignation. Gorbachev refused to step down, but he did agree to sign a new union treaty in late August 1991.

Yeltsin climbed atop of one of the tanks surrounding the parliament building, denounced the CPSU coup as illegal, and called for a general strike.

Hard-line conservative forces within the CPSU tried to prevent the signing of the treaty, which would lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On 19 August 1991, the conservatives dispatched troops to key positions around Moscow and held Gorbachev under house arrest. Yeltsin climbed atop one of the tanks surrounding the parliament building, denounced the CPSU coup as illegal, and called for a general strike. He and his supporters remained in the parliament building as they rallied international support. For three days, thousands of people demonstrated in front of parliament, holding off an expected attack on the building.

The failed putsch and massive street demonstrations quickly destroyed the credibility of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost reforms. On 24 December 1991 the RSFSR and then later Russia took the Soviet Union's seat in the United Nation (UN) Security Council. The next day Gorbachev resigned, an act that officially dissolved the Soviet Union. Yeltsin, as president of Russia, immediately abolished the CPSU. In the meantime, he had negotiated with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus to form the Commonwealth of Independent States as a federation of most of the former Soviet republics.

With a stagnating economy, a hostile legislature, and an attempted coup, Yeltsin was not expected to win reelection in 1996. However, he staged an amazing comeback. Despite becoming increasingly unpopular and suffering from ill health, he continued as president of Russia until 31 December 1999, when he surprisingly named Vladimir Putin acting president. Yeltsin died in Moscow on 23 April 2007.

Frank Beyersdorf

See also

Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich; Perestroika; Soviet Union

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Yemen

Middle Eastern nation located in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. The Republic of Yemen borders Saudi Arabia to the north, Oman to the east, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the south, and the Red Sea to the west. Not far off the western and southern coasts of the country are the East African nations of Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Yemen's total area encompasses 203,846 square miles and is slightly larger than twice the size of the U.S. state of Wyoming. It had an estimated 1945 population of 4.77 million people.

Since 1918, Yemen had been divided into North Yemen (Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen during 1918–1962 and the Yemen Arab Republic during 1962–1990) and South Yemen (People's Republic of Yemen during 1967–1990). In 1970, when South Yemen formally declared itself a Marxist state, many hundreds of thousands of Yemenis fled north. This precipitated a virtual civil war between North and South Yemen that would endure for twenty years. Not until 1990 did the two states reconcile, forming a single state known as the Republic of Yemen. Since then, there have been several unsuccessful attempts by groups in southern Yemen to secede from the republic. The most serious secessionist move came in 1994.

As with most areas in this part of the world, Yemen's climate is characterized by torridly hot weather especially in the eastern desert regions, where rainfall is scant. The western coast has a hot and somewhat humid climate, while the mountainous regions in western Yemen are more temperate and have more rainfall. Much of the country can be characterized as a desert. Topographically, Yemen features a narrow strip of coastal plains and immediately behind them low hills that give way to high mountains. High-desert plains farther east descend to hot desert in the interior. The nation's chief

resources include oil, marble, fish, minor coal deposits, gold, lead, nickel, and copper. The bulk of Yemen's arable land is located in the western part of the country and comprises less than 3 percent of the entire landmass.

Yemen's population is overwhelmingly Muslim and of Arabic descent. Arabic is the official language. Of the nation's Muslims, about 52 percent are Sunni Muslims and 48 percent are Shia Muslims. The Sunnis live principally in the southern and southeastern parts of the country. Yemen has one of the world's highest birth rates, and as a result its population as a whole is quite young. Indeed, some 46 percent of the population is age fourteen and under, while less than 3 percent is over age sixty-five. The median age is sixteen years.

Yemen is a representative republic that has a popularly elected president and a prime minister appointed by the president. The executive branch shares power with the bicameral legislature. The legal system in Yemen is a mix of Islamic law, Turkish law (a vestige of the Ottoman Empire), English common law, and local tribal dictates. Nevertheless, Islamic laws almost always take precedence in accordance with the Koran. Ali Abdullah Saleh has served as president of the Republic of Yemen since the 1990 unification. Before that, he had served as the president of North Yemen since 1978.

Recorded human habitation in the region of Yemen can be traced as far back as the ninth century BC. Yemen's strategic location on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has made it an important crossroad for East-West trade as well as for trade from Asia to Africa. Around the seventh century AD, Muslim caliphs began to exert their influence over the region and gradually ceded authority to dynastic imams, who retained the caliph's theocratic government until the modern era. Over the centuries, Egyptian caliphs also held sway in Yemen. The Ottoman Empire controlled some or most of Yemen sporadically between the 1500s and 1918, when the empire crumbled as a result of World War I. Ottoman influence was most keen in northern Yemen. In southern Yemen, imams tended to control the local scene, although they were usually overseen to some extent by the central authorities in Constantinople (Istanbul).

In 1918 North Yemen won its independence from the Ottoman Empire and finally became a republic in 1962, which precipitated an eight-year-long civil war. The conflict pitted royalists in the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen against republicans. In southern Yemen until 1967, the British dominated, having established a protectorate in Aden in 1839. Soon, the British created a formal colony that incorporated Aden and southern Yemen. As such, the British had great command of the strategic waterways of the region. After World War II, however, Yemenis in the southern part of the country came to resent the British presence, and before long they had organized an anti-British insurgency with aid from the Egyptians.

Several attacks against British interests sponsored by Egypt's government under Gamal Abdel Nasser as well as by insurgents from North Yemen essentially forced the British out in 1967. The former British colony now became South Yemen. In 1970, the South Yemen government declared a Marxist state and aligned itself squarely with the Soviet Union. As a result,

several hundred thousand South Yemenis fled to North Yemen, overwhelming that nation's resources. The South Yemen government did nothing to stop the mass exodus.

Before 1962, the ruling imams in North Yemen pursued an isolationist foreign policy. That country did have commercial and cultural ties with Saudi Arabia, however. In the late 1950s, the Chinese and Soviets attempted to lure North Yemen into their orbit with technological missions. By the early 1960s, North Yemen had become dependent upon Egypt for financial and technical support. Later still, the Saudis supplanted the Egyptians as the main conduit of support. During the civil war, the Saudis backed the royalists while Egypt and the Soviet Union aided the republicans. In the 1970s and 1980s, many North Yemenis found jobs in neighboring Saudi Arabia, boosting North Yemen's flagging economy.

After 1967, when South Yemen declared itself a Marxist state, it maintained tense—and sometimes hostile—relations with its conservative Arab neighbors. In addition to the ongoing conflict with North Yemen, South Yemeni insurgents engaged the Saudis in military actions first in 1969 and again in 1973. They also openly aided the Dhofar rebellion in Oman.

After the 1990 unification, the Republic of Yemen has generally pursued a pragmatic foreign policy. It is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and attempted to stay impartial during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and subsequent wars in the Middle East. Its noncommittal stance in these areas, however, has not endeared it to the Gulf States or Western nations.

Yemen is among the poorest nations in the Arab world. The long civil war of 1962–1970 wrought great havoc on an already struggling economy, and the agricultural sector has been hit by periodic droughts. Coffee production, once a mainstay of northern Yemeni crops, has fallen off dramatically. The Port of Aden in southern Yemen suffered dramatic curtailments in its cargo handling after the 1967 Six-Day War and the British exit that same year. Since 1990, the return of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the Gulf States because of Yemen's nonalignment in the Persian Gulf War brought with it staggering unemployment. Reduced aid from other nations at this time and a brief secessionist movement in 1994 conspired to keep Yemen's economy depressed. Yemen does have significant oil deposits, but they are not of the same quality as Persian Gulf oil and thus have not brought in a windfall profit. Yemen does have major natural gas reserves, but that industry remains underdeveloped. As of 2006, the Yemeni government continues to struggle with high inflation, excessive spending, and widespread corruption.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Egypt; Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Non-Aligned Movement; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Persian Gulf War; Saudi Arabia; Soviet Union; Yemen Civil War

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Yemen Civil War
(1962–1972)

Civil conflict in North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) lasting from 1962 until 1970 that pitted royalist forces of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen against those seeking to establish a republic. In addition to the ongoing civil divisions in North Yemen (southern Yemen was controlled by Great Britain until 1967), the immediate catalyst of the civil war was the death of Ahmad bin Yahya in September 1962. Ahmad was the ruling imam in the region and represented the hereditary monarchy, which had controlled northern Yemen for many years. His repressive reign, which had begun in 1948, had gained few new adherents during its twenty-four-year history. Ahmad harbored visions of uniting all of Yemen but was unable to garner sufficient support to end British rule in the southern part of the country. In 1955, he had to fend off a serious coup effort instigated by two of his brothers and disgruntled army officers.

To bolster his position, Ahmad entered into a formal military pact with Egypt in 1956 that placed Yemeni military forces under a unified command structure. That same year, he also named his son Muhammad al-Badr crown prince and heir apparent and established formal ties with the Soviet Union. In 1960, Ahmad left North Yemen to seek medical treatment. In his absence, Crown Prince al-Badr began to implement several reform measures that his father had promised to implement but as yet had gone unfulfilled. Outraged that his son made such moves without his knowledge or assent, Ahmad promptly reversed the measures when he returned home. This did not, of course, endear him to his subjects, and several weeks of civil unrest ensued, which the government quashed with a heavy hand. The 1955 coup attempt and growing resentment toward Ahmad rendered the last years of his rule both paranoid and reactionary.

Ahmad died at age sixty-seven on 18 September 1962, and al-Badr then became imam. One of his first official acts was to grant a blanket amnesty to all political prisoners who had been imprisoned during his father's reign. He did so in hopes of maintaining power and keeping the kingdom's detractors at bay. But al-Badr's tactics did not stave off discord for long. On 26 September 1962 Abdullah as-Sallal, commander of the royal guard and recently appointed to that post by al-Badr, launched a coup and declared himself president of the Arab Republic of Yemen.

Al-Badr, meanwhile, managed to escape an assassination attempt and went to the northern reaches of the kingdom, where he was able to stir up support among the royalist tribes there. Within days, clashes began between royalist fighters and the republicans that soon grew into a full-scale civil war. Soliciting support from another hereditary kingdom, al-Badr gained the

support of Saudi Arabia, the proximity of which to northern Yemen made it a natural ally. As-Sallal, meanwhile, rallied republican forces and had soon gained the support of Egypt. Both the Saudis and Egyptians dispatched military troops to Yemen, adding to the destructiveness of the civil conflict.

By the mid-1960s, the royalists had also enlisted the help of Iran and Jordan, while the Soviets and several other communist nations backed the republicans. From a larger perspective, the Yemen Civil War saw the more conservative Middle East regimes (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan) pitted against the more radical and Pan-Arab forces in the region, as represented by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Soviet Union. The conflict also became politicized along Cold War lines, as the United States, Great Britain, and other Western powers tended to side with the royalists.

On several occasions, the United Nations (UN) attempted to mediate an end to the bloodshed, but the regional and international dynamics of the struggle made this task nearly impossible. At the height of its involvement in the Yemen Civil War, Egypt, which had sent the most forces into Yemen, was fielding some 75,000 troops there. This was not only acting as a huge drain on the Egyptian treasury and military but was also stoking inter-Arab enmity. Saudi-Egyptian relations were particularly tense. It was in fact the 1967 Six-Day War and Egypt's ignominious defeat in that conflict that began to turn the tide in the civil war. After June 1967, a weakened and chastened Nasser was compelled to begin withdrawing his troops from Yemen. That same year saw the British withdrawal from southern Yemen. This presented a diplomatic opening that would ultimately lead to an end to the fighting in 1970.

By 1969, both sides in the struggle agreed that the first step to ending the war would be the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Yemeni territory. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed. The removal of foreign forces ultimately led to the 1970 compromise that allowed for the continuation of the republican government in which several key positions would be occupied by royalists. There was, however, no role for Imam al-Badr, and part of the compromise stipulated that he and his family leave the country. Al-Badr sought exile in Britain, where he lived until his death in 1996. Sadly, the Yemen Civil War left deep scars on that country's society and politics that have not yet healed. Worse yet, it is estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 Yemenis lost their lives in the eight years of fighting.

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See also

Arab-Israeli Wars; Egypt; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Saudi Arabia; Soviet Union; United Kingdom; Yemen

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Yoshida Shigeru
(1878–1967)

Japanese diplomat and prime minister (1946–1947, 1948–1954). Born in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, on 22 September 1878, Yoshida Shigeru graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1906. He entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as deputy foreign minister in 1928 and then ambassador to Italy and Great Britain during 1936–1938. During World War II, he tried to bring the war to an end with an early Japanese surrender but was arrested by the military police.

During the U.S. occupation after the war, Yoshida headed the Japan Liberal Party and served as prime minister during May 1946–May 1947 and again during October 1948–December 1954. While he was in office, the Cold War heated up, altering U.S. policy toward Japan. President Harry S. Truman's administration recognized Japan's geopolitical importance in East Asia and changed its policies to revitalize Japan's economy, retain the use of Japanese military bases, and rearm Japan. Demand for Japanese rearmament became far stronger after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

In January 1951, Yoshida held a series of talks with U.S. diplomat John Foster Dulles, assigned to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan. Dulles wanted Japan to conclude a peace treaty as a U.S. ally and to maintain adequate armed forces. Yoshida agreed to an alliance with the United States but resisted Dulles's request for rearmament. Yoshida ultimately compromised with Dulles and secretly promised to create Japanese security forces. On 8 September 1951, Yoshida signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. That same day, he also signed the United States–Japan Security Treaty.

Yoshida Shigeru served as prime minister of Japan from 1946–1947 and 1948–1954. Because he was uninvolved in Japan's wartime government, he was able to emerge as the leader and rebuilder of the nation after the conflict. (Library of Congress)

In October 1952, Yoshida created the National Security Forces, which succeeded the National Police Reserve established in 1950. With continuous pressure from Washington to strengthen defense forces, he transformed the National Security Forces into the Self-Defense Forces in June 1954. A few months before this, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed, strengthening military and economic ties between the two nations. By that time the Japanese economy was flourishing, as the Korean War had pumped billions of dollars into Japanese factories.

Yoshida's diplomacy put top priority on Japanese economic development, followed by retaining defense forces at the minimum level possible. Yoshida remained a strong supporter of the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government on Taiwan. In domestic matters, he increased centralization of government.

The year 1954 saw the biggest challenge to his diplomacy. The *Lucky Dragon* incident in March caused massive protests against U.S. testing of nuclear weapons. The *Lucky*

Dragon was a Japanese fishing vessel that had become caught in radioactive fallout after an American nuclear test in the Pacific Ocean.

Yoshida's political power and popularity decreased during this tumultuous year, and his premiership came to end in December 1954. He died on 20 October 1967 in Oiso, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan.

Iikura Akira

See also

Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Japan, Armed Forces; Japan, Occupation after World War II; Korean War; Nuclear Tests; San Francisco Peace Treaty; United States–Japan Security Treaty

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Yugoslavia

Former Southeast European nation. Yugoslavia, with a 1945 population of some 15 million people, covered roughly 98,000 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Wyoming. It was bordered by Italy, Austria, and Hungary to the north; Romania and Bulgaria to the east; Greece and Albania to the south; and the Adriatic Sea to the east.

During the twentieth century, two states bearing the name "Yugoslavia" exemplified the international standard for ethnic strife and political fragmentation. Over the course of its seventy-year history, Yugoslavia staggered from crisis to crisis, swapping one volatile form of political union for another. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, renamed in 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (the land of the South Slavs), was created in the aftermath of World War I and disintegrated under German invasion in 1941. The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, renamed in 1963 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, dissolved on its own in 1991 into a brutal civil war that for the first time since World War II unleashed in Europe the horrors of genocide and concentration camps.

The survival of both states depended on the political, social, and cultural harmony of the multinational, multiethnic, and multireligious population of the federation who during the Cold War lived an ostensibly peaceful life in six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,

Serbia, and Slovenia) and two autonomous regions (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The breakdown of relations between Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats badly weakened the interwar Yugoslavia, making it easy prey for the Axis powers in 1941. After World War II, Josip Broz Tito and the communists subdued the interwar nationalistic tensions and put Yugoslavia on the world map as a socialist, nonaligned, self-managed alternative to Western capitalism and Soviet-style communism. In the wake of Tito's thirty-five-year benevolent dictatorship, the apparent lack of common values accentuated historical differences that were exploited by power-hungry politicians, who hastened the bloody collapse of the country in the early 1990s.

Eleven percent of Yugoslavia's 1940 population had been killed in World War II, and that conflict and subsequent resettlements completely disrupted the region's agriculture, industry, communications, and infrastructure, bringing about widespread suffering and starvation. The communist-led Partisans under Tito emerged from the war as sole rulers of Yugoslavia without significant Soviet assistance. During 1945–1948, Tito's government adopted a Soviet-style constitution that provided for a federation united under a strong central government. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ) adopted a Stalinist model for rapid industrial development. Through forced collectivization, nationalization, and the establishment of a strict central planning system, the government took control of virtually all of the country's wealth.

The communist regime further consolidated its grip on power by punishing wartime collaborators and eliminating political and religious opposition. The show trial and execution of Chetnik leader General Draža Mihajlović in Belgrade and the Zagreb trial and imprisonment of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac sent strong signals to all opponents of the new regime, strengthening a siege mentality that remained a major hallmark of postwar Yugoslavia. Tito and his communist comrades recognized clearly the dangers inherent in national and religious chauvinism. To generate social tolerance, the communists introduced the brotherhood and unity concept under the national ideology of Yugoslavism as a substitute for individual ethnic nationalisms, but their efforts ultimately foundered.

Although Yugoslavia's communists began as devoted Stalinists, the image of Yugoslavia as the Soviets' staunchest ally changed dramatically in reaction to the Soviet attempt to dominate all domestic and foreign aspects of Yugoslavian affairs. In the wake of the Yugoslav-Soviet split, by 1948 Tito was seen as a hero in the West. Yugoslavia's ensuing expulsion from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) and Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) led to a crisis that convinced Yugoslav leaders that a Soviet-led invasion was imminent. American and British assistance kept Tito afloat, saved the country from starvation in 1950, and contained much of Yugoslavia's trade deficit over the next decade. Yet neither Western economic aid nor U.S. military assistance resulted in Yugoslavia moving closer to the Western bloc. American officials wondered if the split with the Soviets was permanent, while Tito distrusted the United States and fretted over the Soviet reaction to American aid.

The renaming of the KPJ as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952 as well as the introduction of a new economic mechanism, workers' self-management, and market socialism of the 1960s confirmed that Yugoslavia was pursuing a unique, un-Soviet version of socialism. Yugoslavia's market socialism was based on worker-managed enterprises that used domestic and foreign forces as a management guide. Tito undoubtedly proved to be the most skillful politician in Yugoslavia's history because of his role in founding the Non-Aligned Movement, which became the keystone of the country's foreign policy during the Cold War. Yugoslavia's role in the movement stoked the competition between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc, and Tito encouraged the competition for his political gain while extracting valuable economic concessions from both sides. Despite the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement after Josef Stalin's death in 1953, Tito transformed one of the most isolated countries in the world into one that enjoyed reasonable diplomatic relations with more countries than any other communist regime.

During the 1960s and 1970s it appeared as if Yugoslavia's reforms were on the way to solving the most important domestic problems. Yet decentralization in 1960 in the wake of the fall of Aleksandar Ranković, the chief of the secret police who resisted reforms, did not introduce liberalization. Instead, it created deep institutional fractures, such as the introduction of a confederated system of republics with greater autonomy than before. This would ultimately result in the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia. The rise of nationalism in Croatia and elsewhere further obstructed reforms and the liberalization movement. The 1974 constitution, one of the world's longest, aimed to provide political stability by using ethnic quotas, rotation of cadres, and the republics' right to veto federal legislation but proved to be counterproductive. Steep increases in oil prices during the mid-1970s worsened the economic situation, which had been deteriorating for decades. Economic hardships were also partially attributable to the regime's inability to successfully tackle mounting foreign debts, budget deficits, and galloping inflation.

During his last years, Tito ignored worsening economic conditions. His death in 1980 deprived the country of strong leadership capable of unifying the nation and solving its mounting problems. Anti-Serbian rioting in Kosovo only contributed to the sense of crisis. The communist system of collective rotating leadership that replaced Tito's rule was unable to cope with the mounting crises. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević exploited the situation and greatly contributed to the breakdown of the sense of community by stockpiling weaponry, abolishing the autonomous provinces, and encouraging Serbian nationalism not in an attempt to preserve Yugoslavia but rather to create a greater Serbia.

Following a decade of political inertia and deepening economic crisis, the armed conflict in Slovenia in June 1991 between the forces of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Slovenian territorial defense forces marked the beginning of the collapse of Yugoslavia. The relatively minor dispute over Slovenia's independence carried over to Croatia, which had a substantial Serbian minority who demanded Serbian annexation and feared the new nationalist Croatian government led by Franjo Tuđman. After pulling out of

Slovenia, the army, strengthened by local Serbian forces, outmatched the Croats and occupied one-third of Croatian territory by December 1991. The occupied territories received the status of United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) replaced the Yugoslav People's Army.

This situation and sporadic fighting endured until May 1995, when the U.S.-trained Croatian Army overran the UNPA in western Slovenia. In August 1995 the Croats, in a lightning offensive, overran Serb-occupied Krajina. Both military actions received tacit approval from the West, but there was an exodus of Croatian Serb refugees who fled for fear of retaliation. The last UNPA in eastern Slovenia was peacefully reintegrated into Croatia in 1998 under the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords.

By the time the Bosnian state led by Alija Izetbegović received international recognition on 6 April 1992, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats had already formed satellite states as a part of a covert agreement between Milošević and Tuđman. Republika Srpska led by Radovan Karadžić was backed by Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army, while Croatia supported Bosnia and Herzegovina. A three-sided ethnic war soon erupted. By the end of 1992, the Serbs controlled about 70 percent of Bosnia and laid siege to Sarajevo for three years, carrying out ethnic cleansing and torturing and murdering thousands of people in concentration camps. Croatian forces launched a war against the Muslims in May 1993 and then laid siege to the city of Mostar. The Muslims were initially poorly armed but by fighting a largely defensive war managed to hold off their opponents using equally atrocious tactics.

By the end of 1992, the Serbs controlled about 70 percent of Bosnia and laid siege to Sarajevo for three years.

Peace in Bosnia was secured by the American team of negotiators led by Richard Holbrooke, who invited Tuđman, Izetbegović, and Milošević to Dayton, Ohio, to negotiate peace terms. After three weeks of intense negotiations, on 21 November 1995 the Muslim-Croat federation received control of 51 percent of the territory, while the Serbs received 49 percent. All three parties agreed to create a union in which each side would have control over its own defense, security, and taxes. The peace was enforced by 60,000 United Nations (UN) troops, reduced to a 24,000-strong international Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1997.

The campaign of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes, led by the United States, against Serbia's atrocious Kosovo policy lasted from late March until June 1999. These strikes were precipitated by Milošević's rejection of the 1991 Rambouillet peace agreement, which stipulated that NATO forces would have unobstructed access to all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to maintain peace in Kosovo. The steady suppression of the Albanian majority (90 percent of the population according to the 1991 census) erupted into an outright war with the paramilitary forces of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). During 1998 and early 1999, the conflict drove from their homes more than 200,000 people, while thousands were killed. The air strikes destroyed military targets as well as factories and infrastructure throughout Serbia, including Belgrade. Milošević agreed to a peace plan on 3 June 1999 that created another international protectorate in the Balkans. A peacekeeping force, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) of 50,000 troops, was sent to

ensure the safe return of refugees and maintain peace in Kosovo, which remains a part of Serbia.

The name "Yugoslavia" was officially erased from the map on 14 March 2002, when the two remaining republics that comprised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia voted to rename the country Serbia and Montenegro.

Josip Močnik

See also

Comecon; Cominform; Djilas, Milován; Market Socialism; Milošević, Slobodan; Nationalism; Non-Aligned Movement; Soviet-Yugoslav Split; Stepinac, Aloysius, Archbishop; Territorial Changes after World War II; Tito, Josip Broz; Trieste; Tuđman, Franjo; Warsaw Pact; Yugoslavia, Armed Forces

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Yugoslavia, Armed Forces

The large, expensive, and apparently effective armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were formed in 1945 from the 400,000-strong victorious, multiethnic Partisan National Liberation Army and gradually reduced to 180,000 soldiers, containing more than 100,000 conscripts, by 1990. All male citizens were subject to conscription after their seventeenth birthday, while women served as volunteers.

The Yugoslav People's Army was of colossal importance to the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state because during most of the Cold War, communist nonaligned Yugoslavia was a member of neither the Soviet bloc nor the Western bloc. Fear of a Soviet invasion was the primary factor in defense planning. President Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party relied on the doctrine of total military defense, stressing brotherhood and unity ideology as well as coordination between the army and the Territorial Defense Force to safeguard and secure the regime's legitimacy.

The Yugoslav People's Army consisted of the army, air force, and navy organized into four military regions and further divided into districts that

controlled draft registration, mobilization, and military facilities. The army generally controlled the large Territorial Defense Forces (more than a million strong), exercised autonomy in military matters, and exerted substantial influence within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In 1990 more than 100,000 army personnel belonged to the league. As with the country at large, the armed forces were beset by ethnic tensions that intensified after Tito's death in 1980.

The army contained more than half of Yugoslavia's active-duty soldiers (including conscripts) and could rapidly mobilize close to half a million trained reservists. It was comprised of infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, signal, engineering, and chemical defense corps and was organized into three military regions (Slovenia and northern Croatia; eastern Croatia, Vojvodina, and Serbia; and Kosovo and Macedonia) and ten army headquarters. The brigade was the largest operational unit.

The army operated Soviet T-34, T-54, and T-55 tanks and Yugoslav M-84 tanks, among others. It also maintained some American M-4 and M-47 tanks. Although artillery and antitank regiments were well equipped with Soviet, American, and domestic tactical systems, mechanized infantry brigades lacked sufficient armored combat vehicles and personnel carriers.

The air force operated more than 400 combat aircraft (including Orao-2, Super Galeb, Jastreb, and P-2 Kraguj, some armed with American AGM-65 Maverick or Soviet AS-7 and AS-9 missiles) and 200 armed helicopters (among others, Mi-8 helicopter gunships and domestic Partisan helicopters) with the support of approximately 30,000 personnel and only a few thousand conscripts. There were also nine squadrons of 130 MiG-21 fighters armed with Soviet AA-2, AA-8, SA-2, or SA-3 missiles, some of which were obsolete by the time Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991.

The navy provided an adequate coastal defense force of more than 10,000 sailors and marines charged with protecting the country's 1,000-mile shoreline, the coastal islands, and the strategic Strait of Otranto. It had its headquarters at Split and was organized into missile, torpedo, and patrol boat brigades; a submarine division; minesweeper flotillas; and an antisubmarine warfare helicopter squadron.

Most males and females between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five participated in national defense as part of the Territorial Defense Forces. Although the Territorial Defense Forces was originally independent, the nearest army command usually exerted authority over it and its lightly armored infantry units, battalions, and regiments that were trained exclusively for defensive actions on familiar local terrain.

No form of alternative service was available for conscientious objectors, and the penalty for refusing to serve ranged from five years in prison to execution. It is indeed ironic that the same armed forces that were considered the biggest school of brotherhood and unity and one of the strongest unifying institutions guaranteeing Yugoslav statehood metamorphosed into the main instrument against it during the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Josip Močnik

See also

Communist Revolutionary Warfare; Non-Aligned Movement; Soviet-Yugoslav Split; Tito, Josip Broz; Warsaw Pact; Yugoslavia

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Z

See Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Congo Civil War

Zaire

Zápotocký, Antonín
(1884–1957)

Czech communist politician, prime minister (1948–1953), and president of Czechoslovakia (1953). Born on 19 December 1884 in Zákolany, Bohemia, to a politically active working-class family, Antonín Zápotocký trained as a mason and joined the workers' movement and the Social Democratic Party in Kladno. He became known for his union-organizing abilities and was elected to the Kladno town council in 1911. Arrested several times for his political activities, he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, serving on various fronts during World War I.

After the war, Zápotocký returned to Kladno, resumed his activity with the Social Democrats, and wrote poetry and several novels about his involvement with the workers' movement. He received a two-year prison sentence for leading the 1920 general strike of Kladno ironworkers and miners. Released early, he became a founding member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) in 1921. He also assisted in the formation of its press and trade union movement.

In 1925 Zápotocký was elected as a deputy to the National Assembly, later serving as a senator. In 1929 he became head of the communist trade union in Czechoslovakia. After the Germans occupied Czechoslovakia in March 1939, he was arrested and interned at Sachsenhausen concentration camp until the end of World War II.

In 1945, Zápotocký joined the CPCz Politburo and became head of the Revolutionary Trade Union Organization (RTUO), the blanket union organization in Czechoslovakia. He was again elected to the National Assembly in 1946. He was instrumental in the CPCz's February 1948 coup by rallying his workers in the People's Militia to support the communist takeover.

Consequently, he became a deputy prime minister and, after CPCz leader and Premier Klement Gottwald became president in June 1948, succeeded him as premier.

Under Zápotocký's leadership, Czechoslovakia became a hard-line Stalinist state that attacked organized religion, private enterprise, and civil rights while unconditionally supporting Soviet policies at home and abroad. He also played an important role in events leading up to the 1950s purges and show trials in Czechoslovakia.

In 1950 Zápotocký helped reorganize the CPCz and resigned from the RTUO after being elected to the CPCz secretariat and presidium. Upon Gottwald's death in March 1953, Zápotocký became president, holding the position until his death in Prague on 13 November 1953.

Gregory C. Ference

See also

Czechoslovakia; Gottwald, Klement

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Zhang Hanfu

(1905–1972)

Vice foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Wujin, Jiangsu Province, on 7 November 1905, Zhang Hanfu studied at China's Qinghua University and also took up studies in the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1920s. Returning to China in 1929, he found work as a journalist in Shanghai. In 1938 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and served throughout the Sino-Japanese War as editor of the CCP's wartime publications. In 1945 he accompanied Zhou Enlai, the PRC's future foreign minister, to the San Francisco conference that drafted the United Nations (UN) Charter.

During the Chinese Civil War, Zhang served in Hong Kong, where he continued his editing career. He returned to China in late 1948 and became director of the Alien Affairs Office of the Municipal People's Government in Jiangsu. Upon the establishment of the PRC in 1949, he was appointed vice foreign minister, working directly under Zhou. In December 1949, Zhang also became director of the Foreign Ministry's Committee on Foreign Treaties, where he was responsible for developing China's diplomatic relationships with Western Asian and African nations. In April 1955 he accompanied Zhou to the Bandung Conference, at which Zhou's "Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence" were first enunciated in public.

Zhang went on to serve under Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi, traveling with them on a number of Asian and African tours to promote the Bandung Spirit. Zhang died in Beijing on 1 January 1972.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Bandung Conference; Chen Yi; China, People's Republic of; Liu Shaoqi; United Nations; Zhou Enlai

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Zhang Wentian
(1900–1976)

Chinese diplomat and vice foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1955–1959. Born in Nanhui, Jiangsu Province, on 30 August 1900, Zhang Wentian joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925 and then enrolled at Moscow's Sun Yixian University. Upon his return to China in 1931, he became minister of publicity for the CCP, responsible for editing the party's journals.

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), Zhang served in Yan'an, Shaanxi, as editor of party publications and president of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism. After the war, he was sent to Northeast China, where he stayed throughout the final stages of the Chinese Civil War (1947–1949), working on organizational and economic matters.

In January 1950, Zhang was transferred to Beijing to lead a delegation to the United Nations (UN) and was concurrently appointed as the PRC representative to the UN Security Council. Realizing that the PRC could not be seated in the UN, Beijing named Zhang ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1951. In April 1954 he was appointed vice foreign minister and attended the Geneva Conference held that the same month. Returning to China in early 1955, he formally assumed his ministerial duties. During his tenure, which lasted until 1959, he was responsible for the PRC's relationship with the Soviet communist bloc. In September 1959, he was relieved of his post on charges that he had developed close ties with antiparty elements. He was forced to retreat from the diplomatic front line, taking up a research fellowship in the Economic Institute, a job he held until 1965.

With the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution, Zhang was first purged and then internally exiled. He died in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, on 1 July 1976.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Geneva Conference (1954); Zhou Enlai

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Zhao Ziyang
(1919–2005)

Chinese communist politician and premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1980–1987. Born in Huaxian, Henan Province, on 17 October 1919, Zhao Ziyang completed his secondary education in 1937 at Wuhan, the capital of his native province. The next year, he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), becoming secretary of the Third Special District in the Hebei-Shandong Border Region, where he also fought in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, shown here during a meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan during talks at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, 27 April 1984. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Following World War II, Zhao was responsible for rural reform work in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region. During the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), he served in his native province as the CCP's secretary of the Luoyang District. During October 1949–1965, he was assigned to Guangdong Province, holding a secretariat in the South China subbureau of the Central–South China Bureau. In mid-1965, he was promoted to the bureau level as the first secretary of Guangdong.

In October 1967, as a result of the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution, Zhao was denounced as a counterrevolutionary, a member of the landowning class, and an agent of PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi, a rival of Mao Zedong. Thereafter, Zhao was exiled from public life, spending four years at forced labor in a factory until May 1971, when he was assigned to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region as the party's secretary. In April 1972 he returned to Guangdong, resuming his former posts. In 1976 he went to Sichuan, where he assumed similar positions. His successful economic modernization of Sichuan soon captured Beijing's attention.

In 1980, Zhao became premier, a post he held until 1987, during which he frequently traveled abroad to promote the PRC's international image. In 1987 he became the general-secretary and the first vice chairman of the CCP

Central Committee's Military Commission. On 19 May 1989, he visited with the student prodemocracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. He begged them to depart, apologized for having arrived "too late," and warned the students that the state authorities were planning to take action against them. In June 1989, shortly after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, he was stripped of all his posts because of his support of the student demonstrators.

Zhao was then detained under house arrest in Beijing not far from the government offices where he once led China. During his long confinement, he became a powerful symbol for those who believed that the Chinese government should reassess its policies in the 3–4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Zhao died in Beijing on 17 January 2005, and nervous Chinese government officials strongly discouraged any public demonstrations or mourning to mark the occasion.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; Tiananmen Square

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Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich

(1896–1948)

Soviet political leader and his country's chief communist ideologue in the early Cold War. Born in Mariupol, Ukraine, on 14 February 1896, Andrei Zhdanov joined the Bolshevik Party in 1915. Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917, he served as a party official in several regions of the country. A close associate of Josef Stalin, Zhdanov enjoyed rapid advancement in the party hierarchy. He took the lead in developing Soviet cultural policy, helping to establish both the Union of Soviet Writers and the doctrine of socialist realism, whereby literature and art should be realistic and instructive in order to advance the communist ideal.

Following the assassination of Sergei Kirov in 1934, Stalin appointed Zhdanov to the powerful post of party boss in Leningrad. Zhdanov played a leading part in the Great Purges of the late 1930s, sending tens of thousands of suspect communists and their families to Siberia. During World War II, he

In 1946, Zhdanov mounted an intense ideological crusade against Western influence, or bourgeois cosmopolitanism, and culture.

took a key role in the defense of Leningrad during the long German siege of that city. Following the capitulation of Finland, which had reentered the war against the Soviet Union, he supervised reparations from that country to the Soviet Union.

Immediately after the war, Zhdanov was instrumental in the establishment of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) and in ensuring Soviet control over Eastern Europe. In line with this, he developed an anti-Western ideology that played on the intense patriotism roused by Soviet military accomplishments and suffering in the war to enforce discipline and stifle dissent.

In the summer of 1946, with the full support of Stalin, Zhdanov mounted an intense ideological crusade against Western influence, or bourgeois cosmopolitanism, and culture. Known as the Zhdanovshchina, it had three key elements: the glorification of Stalin, to whom all accomplishments were attributed; the achievements of the Soviet people, above all the Great Russians, in the war and in science and the arts (firsts were claimed for a variety of scientific advances); and communism. Numerous writers, artists, and scientists were sent to labor camps for failing to toe the party line.

Zhdanov, regarded by many as Stalin's heir apparent, was a heavy drinker and also suffered from heart disease. He battled a prolonged and unspecified illness for some time before his death at Valdai Heights near Moscow on 31 August 1948. Zhdanov's death precipitated a power struggle and triggered the Leningrad Affair, a sudden purge of thousands of government and party officials in and around Leningrad.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Cominform; Soviet Union; Stalin, Josef

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Zhivkov, Todor
(1911–1998)

Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) leader and head of state during 1971–1989. Born on 17 September 1911 in Pravets, Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov received only a modest primary education before becoming a typographer. He became politically engaged at age nineteen when he joined the clandestine Communist Youth organization. He joined the BCP in 1932. During World War II, he joined the antimonarchist partisans and fought against the Bulgarian Royal

Army, which was allied with Nazi Germany. At war's end, he became a member of the BCP's Central Committee and went on to serve as secretary of the Municipal Committee of Sophia, the equivalent of the city's mayor.

By the late 1940s, Zhivkov had become the protégé of Valko Tchervenkov, who at the time was the strongman of the BCP. In 1951 Zhivkov joined the BCP Politburo as his meteoric political ascendancy continued. He soon became secretary of the Politburo's Central Committee, which gave him control over much of that body as a whole. In 1954 Tchervenkov tapped Zhivkov to be first secretary of the BCP. A cunning politician, Zhivkov soon pushed his mentor aside, with Moscow's implicit blessing. From 1962 until 1971, Zhivkov functioned as the leader of the BCP and as Bulgaria's premier, which afforded him vast powers over Bulgarian affairs. He was a hard-liner with dictatorial tendencies. Even while the Soviet Union implemented de-Stalinization policies in the mid-1950s, he refused to release Bulgaria's political prisoners. Indeed, the Bulgarian gulag would not be abandoned until 1962.

In 1971 Zhivkov proclaimed himself head of state as chair of the Council of State, essentially rubber-stamping his own authority as Bulgaria's leader. He continued to rule with an iron fist, choosing to surround himself mainly with family members acting as advisors and administrators. By the mid-1980s, with significant political changes afoot in Russia, he decided to crack down on his nation's Turkish minority of some 800,000 people. His repression of the Turks led to their mass exodus, with many crossing the border into Turkey. This debacle destabilized Bulgaria's already weak economy and strained relations with Turkey and the West.

Simultaneously, Zhivkov attempted to give the impression that he, like Russia's President Mikhail Gorbachev, supported perestroika. In reality, Zhivkov implemented few meaningful reforms. By late 1989, Bulgaria was on the brink of economic collapse. On 10 November 1989, as the Berlin Wall was crumbling, he was driven from office. His rule had been brutal and his policies disastrous. In February 1991, he was put on trial for his abuses of power, convicted, and sentenced to seven years in prison. For health reasons, he was confined under house arrest. Zhivkov wrote his memoirs during imprisonment and died on 5 August 1998 in Sofia.

Luc Stenger

See also

Berlin Wall; Bulgaria; Europe, Eastern; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gulags; Perestroika; Todorov, Stanko

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Zhou Enlai
(1898–1976)

Premier and foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, on 5 March 1898, Zhou Enlai traveled to France in 1920 on a work-study basis and joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the following year. He returned to China in 1924 and joined the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists) upon instructions from the Comintern as a part of an alliance called the First United Front that aimed at Chinese national unification.

The United Front broke down in mid-1927 when the GMD purged the communists from its ranks, precipitating the CCP-GMD power struggle that lasted for two decades. Zhou then joined Mao Zedong, the future chairman of both the CCP and the PRC, in the two CCP power bases at Juijin, Jiangsi Province, from 1927 to 1934 and Yan'an, Shaanxi Province, from 1935 to 1945. After the PRC's birth in 1949, Zhou became the first PRC premier and concurrently the first PRC foreign minister. Within the CCP, he took on the vice chairmanship of both the Central Committee and Central Military Committee, making him second only to Mao in rank.

Zhou's responsibilities were wide-ranging, including the restructuring of the political system, the drafting of the constitution, the implementation of mass socialization, and the launching of economic reforms such as the five-year plans and collectivization. Despite occasional differences with Mao on such matters as intervention in the Korean War and the radical Great Leap Forward economic program, Zhou always fully supported Mao. This loyalty, together with Zhou's own popularity, enabled him to remain in office and survive the Cultural Revolution, during which many senior party and government officials were purged or imprisoned.

Premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Zhou Enlai. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Zhou's most notable achievements were in the diplomatic realm. Although his foreign minister post was technically transferred to Chen Yi in April 1958, Zhou remained the chief architect of the PRC's foreign policy. In his capacity as premier, he spent much of his time abroad, boosting the PRC's international standing. His diplomatic approach was flexible and pragmatic, and his liaison service can be divided into three areas: the Soviet bloc, the developing world, and the Western bloc. In pursuing Mao's lean-to-one-side policy, Zhou's first task was to build a diplomatic partnership with the Soviet Union, the first nation to accord official recognition to the PRC. To reinforce Sino-Soviet ties, in January 1950 he visited Moscow and the next month secured the Sino-Soviet Treaty, which not only acknowledged Sino-Soviet solidarity but also promised Soviet aid to modernize the PRC's economy. Despite reservations as to the PRC's military readiness, he eventually supported Mao's decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950 so as to prove the PRC's faithfulness to the socialist bloc.

Zhou's interest in the developing world became readily apparent in 1953. He perceived alignment with Asian and African nations as another path to elevating the PRC's image abroad. His approach to the developing world, termed the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," was first publicized at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. He called for the mutual respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, nonintervention in internal affairs, equal mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. These became part of the so-called Bandung Spirit, which the conference participants pledged to uphold and promote.

Zhou's policy toward the developing world soon paid off, as the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, advocated peaceful coexistence with the West, but Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. Meanwhile, Mao vituperatively attacked Khrushchev's revisionism, and by 1963 Sino-Soviet solidarity had all but disappeared. To redress the loss of the PRC's erstwhile ally, Zhou looked to the developing world, although the onset of the Cultural Revolution prevented him from forging closer ties with the Asian-African bloc.

The PRC's early alliance with the Soviet Union inevitably meant an anti-U.S. stance. Zhou's problems with the United States centered on two main issues. The first was PRC representation in the United Nations (UN). Following the PRC's birth, Zhou had demanded that Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) representative to the UN be unseated and replaced with a PRC representative. America, however, blocked such an attempt. The second issue was the island of Taiwan, which Jiang's GMD still retained and to which the United States was still attached. During his tenure, Zhou frequently reiterated the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and harshly criticized U.S. policies toward Taiwan.

Zhou never excluded the possibility of maintaining unofficial communications with the United States. His position bore fruit after the mid-1950s, when the PRC found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically. At the Bandung Conference, Zhou initiated what later became the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, first held in August 1958, that provided the first direct channel for U.S.-PRC communications. Although these talks were often suspended due to the deadlock over Taiwan, Zhou did not abandon the hope of reaching an understanding with the United States with a view toward breaking his nation's diplomatic isolation resulting from the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution. In late 1969, he proposed to Mao a normalization of Sino-American relations. Once the proposal was approved, Zhou was wholly responsible for the rapprochement that ultimately led to U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's historic trip to China in February 1972. This top-level summit laid the foundation for the formal establishment of a Sino-American diplomatic relationship, which was completed in 1979. Zhou died in Beijing on 8 January 1976. His death triggered mourning demonstrations that contributed to the overthrow of the radical Gang of Four, who succeeded Mao following his death later that year, and their replacement by the more pragmatic Deng Xiaoping, who emphasized economic development rather than communist ideology.

Law Yuk-fun

See also

Bandung Conference; Beijing Meeting; Chen Yi; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second

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Zhu De
(1886–1976)

Chinese military leader, politician, and vice chairman of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1954–1959. Born in Yilong, Sichuan Province, on 18 December 1886, Zhu De went to Germany in 1922, studying in Berlin and Göttingen, and joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the same year. He returned to China in 1926 and engaged in covert military activities. His two most innovative contributions were the development of the CCP's Red Army in 1927, which later became the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the conceptualization of modern guerrilla warfare with its emphasis on control of the countryside. His military leadership and talents ensured the CCP's victories in both the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). In both struggles, he commanded the CCP's armed forces.

After the birth of the PRC in October 1949, Zhu held a number of top positions, including commander in chief of the PLA, one of the vice chairmen of both the Central People's Government Council and the People's Revolutionary Council, and a member of the Standing Committee of the party's Central Committee. In September 1954 he gave up these posts and became the PRC's sole vice chairman and the first-ranking vice chairman of the National Defense Council, in political importance ranking second only to Chairman Mao Zedong. In 1955, Zhu was named one of the ten marshals of the PLA. Given his advanced age, he became less active in military affairs, participating only in important military conferences.

In foreign relations, however, Zhu became more active. During his tenure, he frequently traveled abroad on inspection tours to Moscow, Eastern Europe, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). In April 1959 he relinquished his two vice chairmanships and served as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, a

nominal legislative body. Thereafter he seldom made public appearances until the mid-1960s, when he was persecuted during the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) simply because of his military background and was perceived as a threat to Mao's leadership. Zhu died in Beijing on 6 July 1976.

Law Yuk-fun

See also
Cultural Revolution; Mao Zedong

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Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich
(1917–1974)

Marshal of the Soviet Union and minister of defense (1955–1957). Born in a peasant family in Strelkovka, Kaluga Province, Russia, on 1 December 1896, Georgi Zhukov was conscripted into the Russian Army in 1915 and served in the cavalry during World War I. He received a severe wound in late 1916 and did not participate in the fighting in 1917. He joined the Red Army in 1918, received a commission, and rose to squadron commander during the Russian Civil War.

In 1923 Zhukov took command of a cavalry regiment and in 1930 of a brigade. He attended several service schools, including the Frunze during 1929–1930, rising steadily in rank and responsibilities. In 1933 he had charge of a cavalry division and in 1937 of a corps. He was one of the few senior officers to survive Josef Stalin's purge of the military leadership in the late 1930s. In 1938 Zhukov was appointed deputy commander of the Bialystok Military District, and in June 1939 he received command of Soviet forces battling the Japanese in Mongolia. By the end of August, he had defeated the Japanese in the Battle of Khalkin Gol.

Promoted to full general, in June 1940 Zhukov took command of the Kiev Military District. In January 1941 he became chief of the General Staff, in effect Soviet dictator Stalin's chief military advisor. Following the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Zhukov took part in almost every major battle on the Eastern Front, earning the nickname "Stalin's Fireman." He participated in the unsuccessful defense of Smolensk in August and successfully organized the defense of Leningrad in October and of Moscow, launching the counteroffensive against the Germans there in December 1941. In the fall of 1942, Zhukov helped plan the counteroffensive that trapped the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Promoted to marshal of the Soviet Union and appointed deputy supreme commander of the Red Army, he helped raise the siege of Leningrad in 1943, and that July he assisted in the defense of the Kursk salient.

Georgi Zhukov was a prominent Soviet general during World War II. Known as "Stalin's Fireman," Zhukov fought in almost all major Soviet battles against Germany in the war and was undoubtedly the best known of Soviet generals in the West. (Library of Congress)

In the summer and autumn of 1944, Zhukov directed the great Belorussian Campaign that destroyed the German Army Group Center, and in April 1945 he personally commanded the final Soviet assault on Berlin. He was the Soviet representative at the formal German surrender of 8 May 1945, and he remained in Germany to command Soviet occupation forces there and serve as the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission for Germany.

In March 1946, Zhukov was recalled to the Soviet Union as commander in chief of Soviet Land Forces and deputy defense minister, but he lasted only three months in this post. In July, Stalin—no doubt jealous of Zhukov's popularity and viewing him as a potential threat—relegated Zhukov to a series of minor commands, first the Odessa Military District and in February 1948 the Ural Military District.

Following Stalin's death in March 1953, Nikita Khrushchev brought Zhukov back to the senior leadership, apparently anxious to use Zhukov's status to ensure support from the armed forces. He became first deputy minister of defense in 1953 and defense minister in February 1955. During this period, he pushed modernization of the force structure, including the integration of missiles and nuclear weapons and improving the mobility of the armed forces. He also spearheaded major revisions in doctrine and strategy to exploit advances in technology and pursued a parallel effort to professionalize the officer corps.

Zhukov organized the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. In June 1957, he supported Khrushchev during an effort to oust the Soviet leader and was rewarded by appointment to the Politburo, the first professional military man to reach this top-level leadership body. Khrushchev strongly opposed Zhukov's proposed military reorganization that would reduce political influence in the armed forces and on 26 October 1957 dismissed Zhukov from his posts. He was rehabilitated after Khrushchev's fall from power in October 1964 but never again played a major role in policy making. Zhukov died in Moscow on 18 June 1974.

Jerome V. Martin and Spencer C. Tucker

See also

Khrushchev, Nikita; Soviet Union, Army; Stalin, Josef

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Zia ul Haq, Muhammad
(1924–1988)

Pakistani Army general, later dictator of Pakistan (1978–1988). Muhammad Zia ul Haq was born in Jullundur, Punjab (present-day India), on 12 August 1924 to a lower-middle-class family with strong Muslim beliefs. His father was an army clerical officer. Zia attended Delhi's prestigious St. Stephen's College, graduating in 1944. He then joined the British Indian Army, serving in World War II throughout Southeast Asia.

Upon British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947, Zia's birthplace was located in the newly independent (and predominantly Hindu) India. As with millions of other Muslims, he and his family migrated to Pakistan, settling in Peshawar, and he joined the officer corps of the Pakistani Army. After Zia received further training in the United States and steady promotions, Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appointed him chief of the army staff in 1976.

The following year Zia led a coup by fellow army officers, removing Bhutto from power. Over the next several years, Zia was the head of the military junta, amassing increasing power. He ruled Pakistan as its self-appointed president by disbanding parliament, increasing the power of the presidency, and imposing martial law. His assault on political opponents included the execution of Bhutto on 4 April 1979 for allegedly participating in a murder plot against his own rivals while in office.

Although a ruthless dictator, Zia was nevertheless popular among the lower classes in Pakistan. This was largely because of his reputation as a pious Muslim and his efforts at increasing the role of Islam in government, including the creation of Islamic courts. Zia was killed under mysterious circumstances in a plane crash on 17 August 1988 in Bahawalpur, Pakistan.

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

Muhammad Zia ul Haq (*left*), president of Pakistan (1978–1988), with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz during a visit to the United States in December 1982. (U.S. Department of Defense)

See also

Afghanistan War; Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; India-Pakistan Wars; Kashmir Dispute; Pakistan; Pakistan, Armed Forces; Radical Islam

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Zimbabwe

Landlocked nation in South-Central Africa. Zimbabwe covers 150,803 square miles, about the size of the U.S. state of Montana, and is bordered by Botswana to the west, Mozambique to the east, Zambia to the north, and South Africa to the south. In 1945 the population was about 2.5 million people, with a ratio of Africans to whites of about 16 to 1. The whites of what was then known as Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing British colony since 1923, found themselves in the 1950s incorporated by Britain into a Central African Federation with the two neighboring territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Following the break-up of the federation in the early 1960s, Southern Rhodesia's whites voted in the right-wing Rhodesian Front headed by Ian Smith. It was Smith who in November 1965 unilaterally declared independence from Britain and launched the country as Rhodesia. The British government had ruled out the use of force against the settlers, who therefore got away with the illegal act. By then, a white population of some 200,000 ruled more than 4 million Africans. For a time it seemed that the settlers would be able to retain power indefinitely. As their position was increasingly challenged, Cold War involvement grew in the struggle to turn Rhodesia into an independent Zimbabwe.

In the early 1960s two major nationalist parties emerged, first the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under Joshua Nkomo, which developed ties with the Soviet Union, and then a rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which was courted by the People's Republic of China (PRC). These links to communist countries were in both cases forged mainly for practical reasons and because of what the African nationalists believed to be Western support for the settler regime rather than from ideological commitment to communism.

In response to the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions against Rhodesia, but these were flouted by South Africa, which crucially continued to supply oil by Portugal and, for a time, by the United States. In 1971, Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia piloted through Congress an amendment to sanction legislation that permitted the United States to import chrome ore, used for steelmaking, from Rhodesia. It was argued that because the only other source of chrome was the Soviet Union, the United States must put Cold War concerns above any antipathy to white supremacist regimes in southern Africa. In 1969 the National Security Council (NSC), under Henry Kissinger, had recommended that U.S. policy should be based on the assumption that the white settler

By 1965 a white population of some 200,000 ruled more than 4 million Africans.



A white Rhodesian soldier is on watch as black voters line up at a polling station at Lundi to vote in the Rhodesian election, 19 April 1979. The vote resulted in the country's first black-dominated parliament. (Bettmann/Corbis)

regimes in southern Africa would remain in power for the foreseeable future. Dubbed the Tar Baby Option by its critics, this meant that the United States would give tacit support to the settler regimes.

ZAPU and ZANU had launched an armed struggle against the settler regime in the mid-1960s, and during 1967–1968 ZAPU had forged an alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and had sent guerrillas into Rhodesia. But until 1972 the Rhodesian regime, with South African police support, was able to contain the insurgency with relative ease. Internal feuds divided ZAPU and helped render it ineffective, but the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU's military wing, began to operate from Mozambique in the early 1970s and was there given active support by the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo), which came to power at independence from Portugal in 1975.

From 1972 the liberation war began to intensify, and by the time Cuban military forces intervened in Angola in late 1975, the military wings of ZAPU and ZANU were making inroads into Rhodesia from neighboring territories. Although the Rhodesian Air Force began in the mid-1970s to bomb their camps in both Mozambique and Zambia, causing large-scale loss of life, the guerrillas increasingly operated openly in parts of rural Rhodesia, having won the support of the local people. The war dragged on and became more brutal,

with both sides using terror tactics. By the time the war came to an end in 1979, more than 30,000 lives, most of them black, had been lost. There was considerable white emigration during the war, and the ratio of Africans to whites rose by the end of the decade to about 25 to 1.

By early 1976 Kissinger, now U.S. secretary of state, was concerned that unless he could bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, the war would escalate and the Cubans might become involved there as well. With Marxist regimes having come to power in Angola and Mozambique, he feared the creation of more radical pro-Soviet regimes in Africa, and he was worried that Rhodesia might be the next domino to fall. He thus traveled to Africa in April 1976 and in Zambia's capital, Lusaka, announced that the United States favored majority rule in Rhodesia. He then put pressure on Ian Smith via South African Prime Minister John Vorster, who was himself under domestic pressure, to accept the principle of majority rule, which Smith reluctantly did in October 1976 after the South Africans threatened to withdraw support from his regime. Attempts by President Jimmy Carter's administration and the British government to mediate in the conflict to produce a moderate black successor regime initially bore little fruit.

Soon after he became president, Carter pushed Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which it did in March 1977, ending American violation of UN sanctions against Rhodesia. As Smith moved toward implementing a new constitution in which black Africans would take nominal power, there were many in the United States who argued that the time had come to lift sanctions. At the invitation of U.S. Senator Jesse Helms and others, Smith visited the United States in October 1978 to court support for the lifting of sanctions. Carter, however, stood firm against this and supported the British position that a settlement must include ZAPU and ZANU, which had now come together under pressure from the neighboring states in an uneasy Patriotic Front (PF).

The internal election that Smith organized and that the nationalists boycotted ushered in the majority-rule government of Abel Muzorewa. Margaret Thatcher, who became British prime minister following the Conservative Party's victory in Britain's April 1979 general election, was tempted to recognize the Muzorewa government. Instead, she invited all parties, including Smith, Muzorewa, Nkomo, and Robert Mugabe, to attend a conference at Lancaster House in London in order to reach an internationally recognized settlement. Mugabe reluctantly agreed to attend, only because Samora Machel of Mozambique threatened that if he did not, ZANU would lose its bases in his country.

British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Lord Carrington followed a brilliant negotiating strategy. He insisted, for example, that negotiations take place one step at a time. Thus, in the last months of 1979, the constitution for an independent Zimbabwe was agreed to, and then a process was approved for a transition to independence via a direct British presence. Mugabe in particular disliked the terms of the settlement, but Machel again put pressure on him. A British governor, Christopher Soames, was sent out to

Rhodesia to oversee the holding of elections. Plots by white supremacists to assassinate Mugabe and stage a coup were foiled.

Thanks to U.S. and British diplomacy and to the cost of the war, the bitterest liberation war fought in southern Africa came to an end, and an internationally recognized, independent Zimbabwe was born. To the dismay of the British and U.S. governments, however, it was not the moderates who triumphed in the election held in early 1980 but rather Mugabe of ZANU-PF, the austere revolutionary who had served eleven years in Smith's detention centers.

Coming into office, Mugabe initially preached reconciliation, but he had never absorbed democratic norms and was prepared to act with force to suppress any opposition to his rule. Nevertheless, when Zimbabwe became independent in April 1980, the United States provided an aid package of $225 million to the new government, hoping that Mugabe's radicalism might be tempered, that Zimbabwe would remain stable and prosperous, and that it might serve as a role model for white South Africans. Whatever doubts they had about Mugabe, the Western powers had successfully prevented any significant involvement by communist countries in Rhodesia beyond the training of guerrillas and the supply of military materiél to ZAPU and ZANU.

For its first two decades after independence, Zimbabwe remained relatively stable and prosperous, although Mugabe used brutal measures in 1982, sending a brigade trained by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) to stamp out opposition in southwestern Zimbabwe. More than 10,000 people are thought to have been killed in an episode that largely escaped the world's attention. Although Mugabe did not allow the ANC's armed wing to operate from Zimbabwe, his country was nevertheless the victim of a number of acts of South African aggression during the 1980s. Even as Zimbabwe moved toward becoming a de facto one-party state, the Lancaster House agreement prevented expropriation of land for ten years, and no moves were made to take land from whites by force until well after the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, Zimbabwe remained a viable state, but the rise of an effective opposition brought out Mugabe's dictatorial tendencies. By the end of the century, the country was plunging into economic ruination, with massive confiscations of white-owned farms, declining agricultural production, an AIDS epidemic, and political violence leading to rigged elections.

Christopher Saunders

See also

Africa; African National Congress; Constructive Engagement; Kissinger, Henry; Mozambique; Mugabe, Robert Gabriel; National Security Study Memorandum 39; Smith, Ian Douglas; South Africa; Thatcher, Margaret

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Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich
(1902–1986)

Soviet diplomat. Born in Novocherkassk in the Rostov Oblast on 14 January 1902, Valerian Zorin joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1922. Following a decade in various party posts, he attended the Higher Communist Institute of Education, graduating in 1935. He taught and served as a party official in several posts until joining the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1941. He served as assistant secretary-general during 1941–1942, deputy commissar during 1942–1943, and head of the Fourth (Central European) Department during 1943–1945.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian A. Zorin at a United Nations Security Council meeting during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 23 October 1962. (Library of Congress)

In March 1945, Zorin was appointed Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, where he served until the spring of 1947. He then served as Soviet representative to the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Europe and later served on the Soviet delegation to the UN before returning to Moscow in November 1947 as deputy foreign minister, a post he held until 1955. He was dispatched to Prague to help oversee the February 1948 coup that installed a communist government.

From October 1952 to April 1953, Zorin was Soviet ambassador to the UN while retaining his foreign ministry post. In 1955 he was named Soviet ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) before returning as deputy foreign minister the following year. Remaining in this post until 1965, he also served once again as Soviet ambassador to the UN from 1960 to 1963. During this appointment, he was involved in a now-famous exchange with U.S. ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. In 1965, Zorin was named Soviet ambassador to France, where he served until his retirement in 1971. In retirement, he served occasionally as an ambassador-at-large with responsibility for human rights issues. Elected a candidate mem-

ber of the CPSU Central Committee in 1956, he became a full member in 1965. He died in Moscow on 14 January 1986.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also

Cuban Missile Crisis; Czechoslovakia; Kennedy, John Fitzgerald; Khrushchev, Nikita; Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II; United Nations

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Documents

1. Henry R. Luce: "The American Century," February 1941

Introduction

Born in 1898 in China to American missionary parents, Henry R. Luce became one of the most influential journalists and publishers in U.S. media history. In 1923 he founded *Time*, the first weekly news magazine in the United States, and subsequently established several other publications, most notably the business magazine *Fortune* in 1930, *Life* magazine in 1936, and *Sports Illustrated* in 1954. By the late 1930s, Luce's publications dominated the market for popular middle-brow news in the United States, and he had become immensely wealthy. His missionary background, from which he took a near messianic sense of his own destiny and that of his country, probably contributed to his broader political ambitions. In February 1941 *Life* published Luce's essay "The American Century." In this piece, whose title would be used as a cliché to describe the twentieth-century international role of the United States, Luce argued that his country was already effectively in the current war and that it should in the future play a far greater part in world affairs than before. Luce made Herculean efforts to publicize his views beyond *Life*'s 12 million readers. He reprinted the piece in full-page advertisements in newspapers throughout the country and sent copies of a reprint pamphlet edition, bolstered by generally favorable commentary by several well-known journalists and commentators, to hundreds of influential friends and associates. "The American Century" used high-flown language to urge that Americans should address themselves to "the authentic creation of the 20th Century—our Century." Luce argued that the United States had a choice as to whether to enter the war and that if it did so, the country must therefore decide what it was fighting for and what it hoped to get out of the war, in terms of "a workable Peace." In his view, the United States, although it had already become "the most powerful and the most vital nation in the world," did not know how to deploy its strength, and to date Americans had "failed to play their part as a world power—a failure which has had disastrous consequences for themselves and for all mankind." The remedy he prescribed was that the country should "accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world, and in consequence exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit." The United States should "shar[e] with all peoples . . . our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills." Luce's article sounded many of the themes that would characterize postwar American internationalism. Implicit in it was the message that if Americans did not rise to this challenge and become actively involved in the outside world, they would themselves suffer materially and psychologically. Rather than simply pursuing its own interests, the United States was also to propagate American political, economic, and cultural values, serving as a model to other countries. Luce envisaged his country disseminating the American way of life around the world, pointing to the extent to which "American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products" had already spread internationally so that, in his view, "America is already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world." He urged Americans to consciously provide scientific, technological, educational, and cultural leadership. He suggested that a free American economy depended on the acceptance of "free economic system[s]" elsewhere in the world and that the United States should therefore ensure freedom of the seas and the air and become the top international trading nation. Luce also believed that Americans must provide humanitarian aid to a world facing famine and destitution. Lastly, he called upon the United States to propagate and spread abroad both specifically American ideals and those more broadly associated with Western civilization generally. He clearly hoped that this would be only the beginning of American

world dominance, finishing his article by stating that Americans should work together "to create the first great American Century." As he intended, Luce's article provoked wide-ranging discussion throughout the United States and beyond. Then and afterward, many on the Left condemned him for envisaging a new international order run in the interests of American capitalism and business, a world system in which U.S. imperialism and militarism would replace those of the European colonial powers. In its confident messianic sense of American international destiny, the article drew not only on Luce's personal missionary heritage but also on the long-standing broader sense of the United States as an exceptional chosen nation whose Manifest Destiny gave it a special mission to the world, an outlook epitomized earlier in the twentieth century in the rhetoric of President Woodrow Wilson during World War I. Somewhat optimistically, but very much in the Wilsonian tradition, Luce affirmed that whereas other great powers were distrusted, "throughout the world [there] is faith in the good intentions . . . of the whole American people." The absence of any real humility in Luce's writing, his blunt insistence that his country was already the world's greatest power, was undoubtedly less than tactful and an example of the kind of triumphalist rhetoric that has so often repelled even nations friendly to the United States. Scores of future books—and many, no doubt, still to come—would bear the title or discuss the concept of "The American Century." If he had intended to set the terms of popular debate, Luce undoubtedly succeeded. In retrospect, "The American Century" would seem both prophetic and symptomatic, a seminal essay that both accurately predicted the nature of the future American international role during the Cold War and beyond and in itself embodied the hubris and exaggerated sense of omnipotence that would on occasion be highly detrimental to the effective exercise of U.S. power.

Primary Source

There is one fundamental issue which faces America as it faces no other nation. It is an issue peculiar to America and peculiar to America in the 20th Century—now. It is deeper even than the immediate issue of War. If America meets it correctly, then despite hosts of dangers and difficulties, we can look forward and move forward to a future worthy of men, with peace in our hearts.

If we dodge the issue, we shall flounder for ten or 20 or 30 bitter years in a chartless and meaningless series of disasters. . . .

Where are we? We are in the war. All this talk about whether this or that might not get us into the war is wasted effort. We are, for a fact, in the war. . . .

Now that we are in this war, how did we get in? We got in on the basis of defense. Even that very word, defense, has been full of deceit and self-deceit.

To the average American the plain meaning of the word defense is defense of the American territory. Is our national policy today limited to the defense of the American homeland by whatever means may seem wise? It is not. We are now in a war to promote, encourage and incite so-called democratic principles throughout the world. The average American begins to realize now that's the kind of war he's in. And he's halfway for it. But he wonders how he ever got there, since a year ago he had not the slightest intention of getting into any such thing. Well, he can see now how he got there. He got there via "defense."

Behind the doubts in the American mind there were and are two different picture-patterns. One of them stressing the appalling consequences of the fall of England leads us to a war of intervention. As a plain matter of defense of American territory is that picture necessarily true? It is not necessarily true. For the other picture is roughly this: while it would be much better for us if Hitler were severely checked, nevertheless regardless of what happens in Europe it would be entirely possible for us to organize a defense of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere so that this country could not be successfully attacked. . . . No man can say that that picture of America as an impregnable armed camp is false. No man can honestly say that as a pure matter of defense—defense of our homeland—it is necessary to get into or be in this war.

The question before us then is not primarily one of necessity and survival. It is a question of choice and calculation. The true questions are: Do we want to be in this war? Do we prefer to be in it? And, if so, for what? . . .

This questioning reflects our truest instincts as Americans. But more than that. Our urgent desire to give this war its proper name has a desperate practical importance. If we know what we are fighting for, then we can drive confidently toward a victorious conclusion and, what's more, have at least an even chance of establishing a workable Peace.

Furthermore—and this is an extraordinary and profoundly historical fact which deserves to be examined in detail—America and only America can effectively state the war aims of this war. . . .

The big, important point to be made here is simply that the complete opportunity of leadership is ours. . . . [I]f our trouble is that we don't know what we are fighting for, then it's up to us to figure it out. Don't expect some other country to tell us. Stop this Nazi propaganda about fighting somebody else's war. We fight no wars except our wars. "Arsenal of Democracy?" We may prove to be that. But today we must be the arsenal of America and of the friends and allies of America. . . .

In the field of national policy, the fundamental trouble with America has been, and is, that whereas their nation became in the 20th Century the most powerful and the most vital nation in the world, nevertheless Americans were unable to accommodate themselves spiritually and practically to their fate. Hence they have failed to play their part as a world power—a failure which has had disastrous consequences for themselves and for all mankind. And the cure is this: to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world, and in consequence exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit. . . .

Consider the 20th Century. It is ours not only in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours also because it is America's first century as a dominant power in the world. So far, this century of ours has been a profound and tragic disappointment. No other century has been so big with promise for human progress and happiness. And in no one century have so many men and women and children suffered such pain and anguish and bitter death. . . .

What can we say about an American Century? It is meaningless merely to say that we reject isolationism and accept the logic of internationalism. What internationalism? Rome had a great internationalism. So had the Vatican and Genghis Khan and the Ottoman Turks and the Chinese Emperors and 19th Century England. After the first World War, Lenin had one in mind. Today Hitler seems to have one in mind—one which appeals strongly to some American isolationists whose opinion of Europe is so low that they would gladly hand it over to anyone who would guarantee to destroy it for ever. But what internationalism have we Americans to offer?

Ours cannot come out of the vision of any one man. It must be the product of the imaginations of many men. It must be a sharing with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills. It must be an internationalism of the people, by the people and for the people. . . .

Once we cease to distract ourselves with lifeless arguments about isolationism, we shall discover that there is already an immense American internationalism. American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products, are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common. Blindly, unintentionally, accidentally and really in spite of ourselves, we are already a world power in all the trivial ways—in very human ways. But there is a great deal more than that. America is already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world. Americans—Midwestern Americans—are today the least provincial people in the world. They have traveled the most and they know more about the world than the people of any other country. America's worldwide experience in commerce is also far greater than most of us realize.

Most important of all, we have that indefinable, unmistakable sign of leadership: prestige. And unlike the prestige of Rome or Genghis Khan or 19th Century England, American prestige throughout the world is faith in the good intentions as well as in the ultimate intelligence and ultimate strength of the whole American

people. We have lost some of that prestige in the last few years. But most of it is still there. . . .

No narrow definition can be given to the American internationalism of the 20th Century. It will take shape, as all civilizations take shape, by the living of it, by work and effort, by trial and error, by enterprise and adventure and experience.

And by imagination!

As America enters dynamically upon the world scene, we need most of all to seek and to bring forth a vision of America as a world power which is authentically American and which can inspire us to live and work and fight with vigor and enthusiasm. And as we come now to the great test, it may yet turn out that in all of our trials and tribulations of spirit during the first part of this century we as a people have been painfully apprehending the meaning of our time and now in this moment of testing there may come clear at last the vision which will guide us to the authentic creation of the 20th Century—our Century. . . .

Consider four areas of life and thought in which we may seek to realize such a vision:

First, the economic. It is for America and for America alone to determine whether a system of free economic enterprise—an economic order compatible with freedom and progress—shall or shall not prevail in this century. We know perfectly well that there is not the slightest chance of anything faintly resembling a free economic system prevailing in this country if it prevails nowhere else. What then does America have to decide? Some few decisions are quite simple. For example: we have to decide whether or not we shall have for ourselves and our friends freedom of the seas—the right to go with our ships and our ocean-going airplanes where we wish, when we wish and as we wish. The vision of Americas [*sic*] as the principal guarantor of the freedom of the seas, the vision of America as the dynamic leader of world trade, has within it the possibilities of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination. Let us not be staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities. Our thinking of world trade today is on ridiculously small terms. For example, we think of Asia as being worth only a few hundred million a year to us. Actually, in the decades to come Asia will be worth to us exactly zero—or else it will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year. And the latter are the terms we must think in, or else confess a pitiful impotence.

Closely akin to the purely economic area and yet quite different from it, there is the picture of an America which will send out through the world its technical and artistic skills. Engineers, scientists, doctors, movie men, makers of entertainment, developers of airlines, builders of roads, teachers, educators. Throughout the world, these skills, this training, this leadership is needed and will be eagerly welcomed, if only we have the imagination to see it and the sincerity and good will to create the world of the 20th Century.

But now there is a third thing which our vision must immediately be concerned with. We must undertake now to be the Good Samaritan of the entire world. It is the manifest duty of this country to undertake to feed all the people of the world who as a result of this world-wide collapse of civilization are hungry and destitute—all of them, that is, whom we can from time to time reach consistently with a very tough attitude toward all hostile governments. For every dollar we spend on armaments, we should spend at least a dime in a gigantic effort to feed the world—and all the world should know that we have dedicated ourselves to this task. Every farmer in America should be encouraged to produce all the crops he can, and all that we cannot eat—and perhaps some of us could eat less—should forthwith be dispatched to the four quarters of the globe as a free gift, administered by a humanitarian army of Americans, to every man, woman and child on this earth, who is really hungry.

But all this is not enough. All this will fail and none of it will happen unless our vision of America as a world power includes a passionate devotion to great American ideals. We have some things in this country which are infinitely precious and especially American—a love of freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity, a tradition of self-reliance and independence and also of co-operation. In addition to ideals and notions which are especially American, we are the inheritors of

all the great principles of Western civilization—above all Justice, the love of Truth, the ideal of Charity. The other day Herbert Hoover said that America was fast becoming the sanctuary of the ideals of civilization. For the moment it may be enough to be the sanctuary of these ideals. But not for long. It now becomes our time to be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.

America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, America as the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the Good Samaritan, really believing again that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and America as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice—out of these elements surely can be fashioned a vision of the 20th Century to which we can and will devote ourselves in joy and gladness and vigor and enthusiasm. . . .

It is in this spirit that all of us are called, each to his own measure of capacity, and each in the widest horizon of his vision, to create the first great American Century.

Source: Henry Luce, "The American Century," *Life* 10 (February 1941).

2. The Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941

Introduction

Drafted and signed while President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met secretly at sea in Argentia Harbor, off Placentia Bay on the Newfoundland coast, during 8–12 August 1941, the Atlantic Charter was issued publicly by Britain and the United States on 14 August 1941. This was the first time these two men, who had already encountered each other briefly in 1918 when both held less-eminent government positions in their own countries, met as president and prime minister. In August 1941, Britain had been at war with Germany for two years and with Italy since June 1940, but strictly speaking the United States was still neutral in the war. In reality, Roosevelt had so directed his country's policies that he was serving as an undeclared ally of Britain. By this time it seemed quite likely that Roosevelt, who had already launched a massive defense buildup at home, would make some minor military or naval clash between U.S. and German forces into the pretext for declaring outright war against Germany. Roosevelt sought an idealistic program of liberal war aims around which he could rally American and international public opinion, thereby legitimizing and justifying his steady incremental moves toward war as part of a broader quest toward a fairer and better liberal world order that could be achieved in no other way. The Atlantic Charter represented the first formal statement of the principles and objectives for which both original signatory powers were fighting. British officials were nonetheless concerned that the principles enunciated therein might compromise their special economic relations with the rest of the British empire and later added a rider specifically exempting all such arrangements from the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. The Soviet Union had not been consulted at all and before adhering to the charter also later made significant reservations regarding its own rights in other territories. All such caveats notwithstanding, the Atlantic Charter nonetheless encapsulated the objectives for which the victorious World War II powers claimed to have waged that conflict and thereby effectively served to de-legitimize subsequent efforts by those states either to maintain control of their colonial possessions or to dominate smaller nations by force.

Primary Source

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 2.

3. Winston Churchill: Percentages Agreement, 9 October 1944

Introduction

By fall 1944 it was clear that the decision by British and American officials to defer a second front in Europe until June 1944 meant that when the war ended, Soviet forces would effectively control most if not all of Eastern Europe. Despite the various Allied declarations endorsing the postwar self-determination of all nations, both British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized that, in practice, there was little they could do that would substantively affect Soviet policies in those areas. Soviet leader Josef Stalin had already stated fairly unequivocally that he regarded the maintenance of friendly governments in the region separating the Soviet Union from Germany as essential to his own country's security, and this was something on which he would not compromise. Seeking to protect and preserve British interests in the Balkans and Central Europe as Soviet forces advanced relentlessly across the continent, in October 1944 Churchill flew to Moscow to meet with Stalin. The two men reached an informal agreement as to the delineation and weighting of their countries' respective spheres of influence in those areas, one that reflected old-fashioned balance of power politics rather than the liberal principles enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and other wartime Allied declarations. Britain would have a virtually free hand in Greece, while Romania and Bulgaria were largely resigned to Soviet rule, and Britain and the Soviet Union agreed to share influence equally in Yugoslavia and Hungary. Certain portions of Eastern Europe fell outside the scope of the agreement, since Poland, the largest East European state, was considered too significant to include, and Czechoslovakia, well over to the west, was ignored. Roosevelt, although informed by Churchill of the "percentages agreement," never formally endorsed it but raised no objections to it. The episode was a revelation of the extent to which postwar Europe was likely to be shaped by the disposition on the ground of the various Allies' military forces.

Primary Source

We [the British party] alighted at Moscow on the afternoon of October 9, and were received very heartily and with full ceremonial by [Russian Foreign Minister V. I.] Molotov and many high Russian personages. This time we were lodged in Moscow itself, with every care and comfort. I had one small, perfectly appointed house, and Anthony [Eden, the British Foreign Secretary] another near by. We were glad to dine together and rest. At ten o'clock that night we held our first important meeting in the Kremlin. There were only Stalin, Molotov, Eden, and I, with Major Birse and Pavlov as interpreters. . . .

The moment was apt for business, so I said, "Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?" While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:

Rumania	
Russia	90%
The others	10%
Greece	
Great Britain	90%
(in accord with U.S.A.)	
Russia	10%
Yugoslavia	50–50%
Hungary	50–50%
Bulgaria	
Russia	75%
The others	25%

I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down.

Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point, and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won.

After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, "Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper." "No, you keep it," said Stalin.

[. . .]

After our first meeting I reflected on our relations with Russia throughout Eastern Europe, and in order to clarify my ideas drafted a letter to Stalin on the subject, enclosing a memorandum stating our interpretation of the percentages which we had accepted across the table. In the end I did not send this letter, deeming it wiser to let well alone. I print it only as an authentic account of my thought.

Moscow
October 11, 1944

I deem it profoundly important that Britain and Russia should have a common policy in the Balkans which is also acceptable to the United States. The fact that Britain and Russia have a twenty-year alliance makes it especially important for us to be in broad accord and to work together easily and trustfully and for a long time. I realise that nothing we can do here can be more than preliminary to the final decisions we shall have to take when all three of us are gathered together at the table of victory. Nevertheless I hope that we may reach understandings, and in some cases agreements, which will help us through immediate emergencies, and will afford a solid foundation for long-enduring world peace.

These percentages which I have put down are no more than a method by which in our thoughts we can see how near we are together, and then decide upon the necessary steps to bring us into full agreement. As I said, they would be considered crude, and even callous, if they were exposed to the scrutiny of the Foreign Offices and diplomats all over the world. Therefore they could not be the basis of any public document, certainly not at the present time. They might however

be a good guide for the conduct of our affairs. If we manage these affairs well we shall perhaps prevent several civil wars and much bloodshed and strife in the small countries concerned. Our broad principle should be to let every country have the form of government which its people desire. We certainly do not wish to force on any Balkan State monarchic or republican institutions. We have however established certain relations of faithfulness with the Kings of Greece and Yugoslavia. They have sought our shelter from the Nazi foe, and we think that when normal tranquillity is re-established and the enemy has been driven out the peoples of these countries should have a free and fair chance of choosing. It might even be that Commissioners of the three Great Powers should be stationed there at the time of the elections so as to see that the people have a genuine free choice. There are good precedents for this.

However, besides the institutional question there exists in all these countries the ideological issue between totalitarian forms of government and those we call free enterprise controlled by universal suffrage. We are very glad that you have declared yourselves against trying to change by force or by Communist propaganda the established systems in the various Balkan countries. Let them work out their own fortunes during the years that lie ahead. One thing however we cannot allow—Fascism or Nazism in any of their forms, which give to the toiling masses neither the securities offered by your system nor those offered by ours, but, on the contrary, lead to the build-up of tyrannies at home and aggression abroad. In principle I feel that Great Britain and Russia should feel easy about the internal government of these countries, and not worry about them or interfere with them once conditions of tranquillity have been restored after this terrible blood-bath which they, and indeed we, have all been through.

It is from this point of view that I have sought to adumbrate the degrees of interest which each of us takes in these countries with the full assent of the other, and subject to the approval of the United States, which may go far away for a long time and then come back again unexpectedly with gigantic strength.

In writing to you, with your experience and wisdom, I do not need to go through a lot of arguments. Hitler has tried to exploit the fear of an aggressive, proselytising Communism which exists throughout Western Europe, and he is being decisively beaten to the ground. But, as you know well, this fear exists in every country, because, whatever the merits of our different systems, no country wishes to go through the bloody revolution which will certainly be necessary in nearly every case before so drastic a change could be made in the life, habits, and outlook of their society. We feel we were right in interpreting your dissolution of the Comintem as a decision by the Soviet Government not to interfere in the internal political affairs of other countries. The more this can be established in people's minds the smoother everything will go. We, on the other hand, and I am sure the United States as well, have Governments which stand on very broad bases, where privilege and class are under continual scrutiny and correction. We have the feeling that, viewed from afar and on a grand scale, the differences between our systems will tend to get smaller, and the great common ground which we share of making life richer and happier for the mass of the people is growing every year. Probably if there were peace for fifty years the differences which now might cause such grave troubles to the world would become matters for academic discussion.

At this point, Mr. Stalin, I want to impress upon you the great desire there is in the heart of Britain for a long, stable friendship and cooperation between our two countries, and that with the United States we shall be able to keep the world engine on the rails.

To my colleagues at home I sent the following:

12 Oct 44

The system of percentage is not intended to prescribe the numbers sitting on commissions for the different Balkan countries, but rather to express the interest and sentiment with which the British and Soviet Governments approach the problems of these countries, and so that they might reveal their minds to each other in some way that could be comprehended. It is not intended to be more than a guide, and of course in no

way commits the United States, nor does it attempt to set up a rigid system of spheres of interest. It may however help the United States to see how their two principal Allies feel about these regions when the picture is presented as a whole.

2. Thus it is seen that quite naturally Soviet Russia has vital interests in the countries bordering on the Black Sea, by one of whom, Rumania, she has been most wantonly attacked with twenty-six divisions, and with the other of whom, Bulgaria, she has ancient ties. Great Britain feels it right to show particular respect to Russian views about these two countries, and to the Soviet desire to take the lead in a practical way in guiding them in the name of the common cause.

3. Similarly, Great Britain has a long tradition of friendship with Greece, and a direct interest as a Mediterranean Power in her future. In this war Great Britain lost 30,000 men in trying to resist the German-Italian invasion of Greece, and wishes to play a leading part in guiding Greece out of her present troubles, maintaining that close agreement with the United States which has hitherto characterised Anglo-American policy in this quarter. Here it is understood that Great Britain will take the lead in a military sense and try to help the existing Royal Greek Government to establish itself in Athens upon as broad and united a basis as possible. Soviet Russia would be ready to concede this position and function to Great Britain in the same sort of way as Britain would recognise the intimate relationship between Russia and Rumania. This would prevent in Greece the growth of hostile factions waging civil war upon each other and involving the British and Russian Governments in vexatious arguments and conflict of policy.

4. Coming to the case of Yugoslavia, the numerical symbol 50-50 is intended to be the foundation of joint action and an agreed policy between the two Powers now closely involved, so as to favour the creation of a united Yugoslavia after all elements there have been joined together to the utmost in driving out the Nazi invaders. It is intended to prevent, for instance, armed strife between the Croats and Slovenes on the one side and powerful and numerous elements in Serbia on the other, and also to produce a joint and friendly policy towards Marshal Tito, while ensuring that weapons furnished to him are used against the common Nazi foe rather than for internal purposes. Such a policy, pursued in common by Britain and Soviet Russia, without any thought of special advantages to themselves, would be of real benefit.

5. As it is the Soviet armies which are obtaining control of Hungary, it would be natural that a major share of influence should rest with them, subject of course to agreement with Great Britain and probably the United States, who, though not actually operating in Hungary, must view it as a Central European and not a Balkan State.

6. It muse be emphasised that this broad disclosure of Soviet and British feelings in the countries mentioned above is only an interim guide for the immediate wartime future, and will be surveyed by the Great Powers when they meet at the armistice or peace table to make a general settlement of Europe.

Source: Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 6, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953). Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. Reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, Ltd., London, on behalf of The Estate of Winston Churchill.

4. Declaration on Liberated Europe: The Yalta Conference, February 1945

Introduction

The most controversial of the wartime summit meetings of the Big Three Allied leaders—Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt—was that held at Yalta in the Crimea in February 1945. With victory in both Europe and Asia looming ever closer on the horizon, the

three men discussed numerous questions relating to the future government of many enemy or "liberated" states in both Europe and Asia. High on the agenda was the question of exactly who would control the new governments established in such countries. The Allied powers' wartime declarations had formally endorsed the principles of national self-determination, but in practice authority would ultimately rest with the state or states whose armed forces controlled a particular country. Apparently seeking to soothe the fears of his Western Allies that Soviet forces would exercise uncurbed and arbitrary power in those countries under their control, Stalin agreed to sign a declaration that promised all "liberated" European countries "democratic" governments chosen through "free elections" as soon as possible, in accordance with the principles stated earlier in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations. In practice, this statement failed to define precisely what constituted "democratic" or "free" governments, a deliberate resort to vagueness that effectively permitted the occupying powers to make their own determination on the subject. Before long, East Europeans and U.S. Republican Party politicians alike would attack the Yalta agreements on the grounds that they effectively acquiesced in Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Given Soviet military dominance of the area, however, no matter how harshly Russian rule might be implemented and exercised, Roosevelt and Churchill had few real alternatives to accepting Stalin's control there.

Primary Source

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

[. . .]

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and
(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis

satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 24–25.

5. Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi: Statements on the Situation in China, 1945

Introduction

In China in 1945, the prospect of victory in the relatively near future did little to bring peace. Since the late 1930s the Guomindang (Nationalist) government headed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the revolutionary Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong had observed an uneasy and fragile truce, as both collaborated in fighting the Japanese. Even so, clashes between the two groupings frequently occurred, since neither trusted the other and each had sought to eliminate its rival in the first half of the 1930s. The impending end of the war with Japan was merely a signal for renewed hostilities between the two Chinese political groupings. As victory over Japan seemed increasingly likely, in March 1945 Jiang announced his intention of summoning a national assembly to reestablish constitutional government in China. He also took the opportunity to assert the Guomindang party's status as the sole legitimate government of China, appeal for national unity, and demand that Chinese communist forces lay down their arms as a precondition for their inclusion in the forthcoming assembly. The Chinese communists, who already controlled substantial areas of the country, were highly unlikely to do so, as they feared—with some justification—that any such move would put them at the mercy of the Guomindang's own forces. Each party sought to place on the other the blame for the civil war that was brewing. In August 1945 the communists' leader, Mao, condemned Jiang's order that only Guomindang representatives could accept the surrender of Japanese forces in China. Mao feared that if communist cadres accepted this ruling, Guomindang officials would augment their existing weaponry with surrendered Japanese arms, putting the Chinese communists in a disadvantageous position if actual fighting did break out between them and the Guomindang. Within a few months, civil war had indeed begun between the two opponents, a conflict that, with intervals for mediation in 1946, lasted until October 1949, when Jiang's forces fled to the island of Taiwan and the victorious communists established the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Primary Source

Speech by President Chiang Kai-shek before the Preparatory Commission for Constitutional Government in Chungking
1 March 1945
Chinese News Service

You will recall that in 1936 the Government decided to summon a National Assembly on November 12, 1937 for the inauguration of constitutional government and the termination of the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang. On July 7, 1937 Japan suddenly made war on us, and the plan had to be shelved. However, the determination of the Kuomintang to realize constitutional government remained as strong as ever. Had it not been for the recommendation of further postponement by the People's Political Council, the National Assembly would have been convened during 1940 in accordance with another Government decision.

This year, on the first of January, on behalf of the Government, I announced that the National Assembly will be summoned before the close of the year, unless untoward and unexpected military developments should in the meanwhile intervene.

The Kuomintang is the historical party of national revolution; it overthrew the Manchu dynasty; it destroyed Yuan Shih-kai who would be emperor; it utterly defeated the militarists that succeeded Yuan Shih-kai; it brought about national unification; it achieved the removal of the unequal treaties; and it led the country into the eight-year-old struggle against Japan. It is we who are the party of liberation and progress. In summoning the National Assembly and returning the rule to the people in conformity with the sacred will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang is performing its historical role.

We must emerge from this war a united nation. Only a united nation can effectively perform the tasks of political and economic reconstruction to raise the lot of our toiling masses and handle the problems of external relations in a new, uncharted world. Before the Japanese invasion, we were a united nation. Today, but for the Communists and their armed forces, we are a united nation. There are no independent warlords or local governments challenging the central authority.

I have long held the conviction that the solution of the Communist question must be through political means. The Government has labored to make the settlement a political one. As the public is not well informed on our recent efforts to reach a settlement with the Communists, time has come for me to clarify the atmosphere.

As you know, negotiations with the Communists have been a perennial problem for many years. It has been our unvarying experience that no sooner is a demand met than fresh ones are raised. The latest demand of the Communists is that the Government should forthwith liquidate the Kuomintang rule, and surrender all power to a coalition of various parties. The position of the Government is that it is ready to admit other parties, including the Communist as well as non-partisan leaders, to participate in the Government without, however, relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convocation of the National Assembly. We have even offered to include the Communists and other parties in an organ to be established along the line of what is known abroad as a "war cabinet." To go beyond this and to yield to the Communist demand would not only place the Government in open contravention of the political program of Dr. Yat-sen, but also create insurmountable practical difficulties for the country.

During the past eight years, the country has withstood all the vicissitudes of military reverses and of unbelievable privation and has ridden through the storm for the simple reason that it has been led by a stable and strong Government. The war remains to be won, the future is still fraught with peril. If the Government shirks its responsibility and surrenders its power of ultimate decision to a combination of political parties, the result would be unending friction and fears, leading to a collapse of the central authorities. Bear in mind that in such a contingency, unlike in other countries, there exists in our country at present no responsible body representing the people for government to appeal to.

I repeat, whether by accident or design, the Kuomintang has had the responsibility of leading the country during the turbulent last decade and more. It will return the supreme power to the people through the instrumentality of the National Assembly, and in the meanwhile, it will be ready to admit other parties to a share in the government, but it definitely cannot abdicate to a loose combination of parties. Such a surrender would not mean returning power to the people.

We must emerge from the war with a united army. The Communists should not keep a separate army. Here allow me to digress a little. The Chinese Communist propaganda abroad has tried to justify this private army on the ground that if it becomes incorporated in the National Army, it will be in danger of being destroyed or discriminated against. Their propaganda also magnify, out of all proportion, the actual military strength of the Communists. To you, I need hardly say that Government forces have always without exception borne the brunt of Japanese attack and will continue to do so. Today, with the wholehearted co-operation of our Allies, powerful armies are being equipped and conditioned

to assume the offensive. We are synchronizing our efforts with those of our Allies in expelling Japan from the Asiatic mainland.

[. . .]

No one mindful of the future of our 450,000,000 people and conscious of standing at the bar of history, would wish to plunge the country into a civil war. The Government has shown its readiness and is always ready to confer with the Communists to bring about a real and lasting settlement with them.

I have explained the Government's position on the Communist problem at length, because today that is the main problem to unity and constitutional government.

I now turn to the concrete measures which the Government proposes to take to realize constitutional government, which I wish to announce briefly:

(1) The National Assembly to inaugurate constitutional government will be convened on November 12, this year the eightieth birthday anniversary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, subject to the approval by the Kuomintang Congress which is due to meet in May.

(2) Upon the inauguration of constitutional government, all political parties will have legal status and enjoy equality. The Government has offered to give legal recognition to the Communist party as soon as the latter agrees to incorporate their army and local administration in the National Army and Government. The offer still stands.

(3) The next session of the People's Political Council with a larger membership as well as more extensive powers will soon be sitting. The Government will consider with the Council the measures in regard to the convening of the National Assembly and all related matters.

I am optimistic of national unification and the future of democratic government in our country. The torrent of public opinion demanding national unity and reconstruction is mounting ever stronger and will soon become an irresistible force. No individual or political party can afford to disregard this force any longer. Let all of us, regardless of party affiliations, work together for the twin objectives of our people-national unity and reconstruction.

Chiang Kai-shek Is Provoking Civil War
Mao Zedong
13 August 1945

A spokesman for the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee has made a statement describing as "a presumptuous and illegal act" the order setting a time-limit for the surrender of the enemy and the puppets, which was issued by Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Group Army, on August 10 from the General Headquarters in Yenan. This comment is absolutely preposterous. Its logical implication is that it was wrong of Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh to act in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and with the enemy's declared intention of surrendering and to order his troops to effect the surrender of the enemy and the puppets, and that on the contrary it would have been right and legitimate to advise the enemy and puppets to refuse to surrender. No wonder that even before the enemy's actual surrender, Chiang Kai-shek, China's fascist ringleader, autocrat and traitor to the people, had the audacity to "order" the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to "stay where they are, pending further orders", that is, to tie their own hands and let the enemy attack them. No wonder this selfsame fascist ringleader dared to "order" the so-called underground forces (who are, in fact, puppet troops "saving the nation by a devious path" and Tai Li's secret police collaborating with the Japanese and puppets) as well as other puppet troops to "be responsible for maintaining local order", while forbidding the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Liberated Areas to "take presumptuous action on their own" against enemy and puppet forces. This transposition of the enemy and the Chinese is in truth a confession by Chiang Kai-shek; it gives a vivid picture of his whole psychology, which is one of consistent collusion with the enemy and puppets and of liquidation of all those not of his ilk. However, the people's anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas will never be taken in by this venomous scheme. They know that Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh's order is precisely the resolute fulfilment of

the provision in paragraph 2 of the Potsdam Declaration, "prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist". On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek's so-called "orders" are precisely violations of the Potsdam Declaration which he himself signed. One has only to make the comparison to see at once who is not "adhering faithfully to the provisions of the common agreements of the Allies".

Both the comment by the spokesman for the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and Chiang Kai-shek's "orders" are from beginning to end provocations to civil war; at this moment, when attention at home and abroad is focussed on Japan's unconditional surrender, their aim is to find a pretext for switching to civil war as soon as the War of Resistance ends. . . . So now they are saying that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should not demand that the enemy and puppet troops surrender their guns. In the eight years of the War of Resistance, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have suffered enough from the attacks and encirclements of both Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese. And now, with the War of Resistance coming to an end, Chiang Kai-shek is hinting to the Japanese (and to his beloved puppet troops) that they should not surrender their guns to the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army but "only to me, Chiang Kai-shek". One thing, however, Chiang Kai-shek has left unsaid, " . . . so that I can use these guns to kill the Communists and wreck the peace of China and the world." Isn't this the truth? What will be the result of telling the Japanese to hand over their guns to Chiang Kai-shek and telling the puppet troops to "be responsible for maintaining local order"? The result can only be that a merger of the Nanking and Chungking regimes and co-operation between Chiang Kai-shek and the puppets will take the place of "Sino-Japanese collaboration" and of co-operation between the Japanese and the puppets, and that Chiang Kai-shek's "anti-communism and national reconstruction" will take the place of the "anti-communism and national reconstruction" of the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei. Isn't this a violation of the Potsdam Declaration? Can there be any doubt that the grave danger of civil war will confront the people of the whole country the moment the War of Resistance is over? We now appeal to all our fellow-countrymen and to the Allied countries to take action, together with the people of the Liberated Areas, resolutely to prevent a civil war in China, which would endanger world peace.

After all, who has the right to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppets? Relying solely on their own efforts and the support of the people, the anti-Japanese armed forces in China's Liberated Areas, to whom the Kuomintang government refused all supplies and recognition, have succeeded by themselves in liberating vast territories and more than 100 million people and have resisted and pinned down 56 per cent of the invading enemy troops in China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. If not for these armed forces, the situation in China would never have been what it is today! To speak plainly, in China only the anti-Japanese armed forces of the Liberated Areas have the right to accept the surrender of the enemy and puppet troops. As for Chiang Kai-shek, his policy has been to look on with folded arms and sit around and wait for victory; indeed he has no right at all to accept the surrender of the enemy and the puppets.

We declare to all our fellow-countrymen and to the people of the whole world: The Supreme Command in Chungking cannot represent the Chinese people and those Chinese armed forces which have really fought Japan; the Chinese people demand the right of the anti-Japanese armed forces of China's Liberated Areas under Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh to send their representatives directly in order to participate in the acceptance of Japan's surrender and in the military control over Japan by the four Allied Powers and also to participate in the future peace conference. If this is not done, the Chinese people will deem it most improper.

Source: Chiang Kai-shek, "Speech by President Chiang Kai-shek before the Preparatory Commission for Constitutional Government in Chungking," http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450301b.html. Mao Tse-Tung. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press), 27–29. Also available at Maoist Documentation Project, http://www.maoism.org/msw/vol4/mswv4_02.htm. Used by permission of the Foreign Language Press, Beijing.

6. United Nations Charter, 1945

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) Charter was written at the organization's first meeting, from 25 April to 26 June 1945. Fifty delegates from around the world met in San Francisco to create the new international peacekeeping organization. The UN was formed to encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts and to maintain world order, goals established in the initial charter and evidenced in the UN's prominent role in world events in subsequent years. Its charter, which revealed the influence of the prewar League of Nations, represented a compromise between the idea that all nations should be equal, with all entitled to vote in the General Assembly, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's four policemen vision of a concert of the great powers who would run the world between them. Five member states—Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and France, the coalition that had won the war—each had a permanent seat and veto power on the UN Security Council, which had to approve all executive action taken by the UN. In conjunction with the new UN, the Allies also created an international court of justice. A lineal descendant of the prewar international court of justice, its function was to rule on and settle disputes between states. Although originally intended as a peacekeeping body, almost inevitably the UN was affected by Cold War antagonisms, as the various permanent Security Council members used their veto power to block initiatives that they considered disadvantageous to their own Cold War positions. For more than twenty years, member states were divided, generally on ideological lines, on the issue of whether the noncommunist Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan or the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland should fill China's UN seat, an objective that the PRC attained in 1971. The UN General Assembly was the arena for some of the most significant pronouncements and dramatic confrontations of the Cold War. In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" address before the General Assembly, calling for international cooperation to develop peaceful uses for nuclear energy. More tense occasions included those when the flamboyant Soviet president, Nikita Khrushchev, openly defied the Western powers, and U.S. representative Adlai Stevenson challenged his Soviet counterpart in October 1962 to confirm the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, UN Secretary-General U Thant offered to try to mediate a settlement, an offer that President John F. Kennedy might have accepted had his own efforts proved unavailing. More embarrassingly for his country, during the U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion attempt against Cuba in March 1961, Stevenson initially denied that his country was involved, a statement he was later forced to retract. The UN generally encouraged all international efforts toward arms control and provided the arena for the negotiation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1992 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons. Although less controversial and publicized than its efforts to maintain peace and resolve international conflicts, at all times many of the UN's energies were devoted to economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian efforts, including the eradication and prevention of disease, environmental and climatic issues, human rights, women's and children's rights, immigration, education, the care of refugees, and measures to combat such transnational problems as international dealings in human beings and the narcotics trade. The UN was perhaps most successful in promoting joint international action on humanitarian, economic, social, and environmental issues that transcended national boundaries and demanded concerted international action, such as food and hunger, health, trade policies, social justice, women's rights, pollution, and other ecological concerns. The ending of the Cold War facilitated UN endeavors to promote such objectives by removing some of the East-West barriers to their successful implementation. Although sometimes derided as ineffective and handicapped in international crises by its reliance upon military forces contributed by member states, the UN often provided a valuable forum for the quiet exchange of views and the promotion of humanitarian and social goals. On occasion, it also conveniently furnished a useful alternative channel of communications among powers whose diplomatic relations were otherwise limited or even nonexistent. While never as effective in terms

of resolving international conflicts as its founders envisaged, the UN proved considerably more successful than its predecessor, the League of Nations, in attracting and retaining as members most of the world's major as well as minor states, whose continuing membership implicitly bestowed authority and legitimacy upon the organization's statements and actions. Although often hampered by Cold War antagonisms, during the forty-five years from 1945 to 1990 the UN played a significant role in moderating Cold War tensions and defusing at least some international crises, providing an arena where disputes could be quietly resolved.

Primary Source

[. . .]

CHAPTER I. PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

ARTICLE 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II. MEMBERSHIP

ARTICLE 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Decla-

ration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

ARTICLE 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

ARTICLE 5

A member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

ARTICLE 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III. ORGANS

ARTICLE 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

ARTICLE 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

ARTICLE 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

ARTICLE 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

ARTICLE 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

ARTICLE 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
   a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;
   b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

ARTICLE 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.
2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

ARTICLE 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

VOTING

ARTICLE 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 86,

the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, Composition including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

[. . .]

CHAPTER V. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

ARTICLE 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

ARTICLE 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

ARTICLE 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

ARTICLE 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

VOTING

ARTICLE 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.
2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

ARTICLE 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

ARTICLE 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

ARTICLE 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

ARTICLE 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

[. . .]

CHAPTER VII. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

ARTICLE 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

ARTICLE 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

ARTICLE 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

ARTICLE 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international

peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces. their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

ARTICLE 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

ARTICLE 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

ARTICLE 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

ARTICLE 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

ARTICLE 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

ARTICLE 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

ARTICLE 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not,

which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

ARTICLE 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

[. . .]

CHAPTER IX. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION

ARTICLE 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

[. . .]

CHAPTER XIV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

ARTICLE 92

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

ARTICLE 93

1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

ARTICLE 94

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950).

7. Harry S. Truman: Diary Entries on Joint Meetings, July 1945

Introduction

The last of the wartime summit meetings among the Allied leaders took place at Potsdam, near the German capital of Berlin, in July 1945. This was the first occasion on which new U.S. President Harry S. Truman, who succeeded

Franklin D. Roosevelt following the latter's death in April 1945, met Soviet leader Josef Stalin. Berlin had been devastated by Allied bombing in the final years of the war and was under joint occupation by the four Allied powers: Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Berlin also lay deep within the Soviet occupation sector. Truman was shocked by the dismal state of Berlin's German population, especially in the Soviet zone, yet recognized that German forces had treated Russians equally badly. Germany was already defeated, but the Pacific war against Japan was continuing, and Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would end its existing state of neutrality in that conflict and declare war on Japan in the near future. His allies hoped, however, that this might be unnecessary. During the Potsdam Conference, Truman and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill learned that their joint Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb had successfully detonated an immensely powerful weapon, which they resolved to use against Japan as soon as possible. Truman stated in his diary that he hoped that such devices would only be employed against a military target, but in practice many civilians died when U.S. bombers dropped two atomic weapons on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki early in August. At Potsdam, Truman and Churchill also agreed to inform Stalin that they had successfully developed a nuclear bomb, something of which he was in fact already aware through Soviet intelligence agents within the Manhattan Project. The fact that until then the British and Americans had kept the Soviets in formal ignorance of this initiative was, however, striking evidence that they did not fully trust their wartime communist ally, a bias that was also clearly apparent in Truman's diary entries. The Potsdam Conference also raised issues as to the final disposition of German and Polish territory, as the Soviets—who were occupying both countries—unilaterally decided to annex a substantial portion of East Poland and compensate Poland with sections of East Germany. While Truman refused to recognize this arrangement, in practice there was little the Americans or British could do to change it. The leaders at Potsdam also discussed the question of reparations from Germany but again reached no real agreement on that subject and, more broadly, also failed to devise any scheme for the future treatment of Germany that would be acceptable to all the occupying powers. As the Cold War intensified in the latter 1940s, the issues left open at Potsdam would prove highly contentious.

Primary Source

Potsdam, July 16, 1945

[. . .]

To get down to today. Mr. Churchill called by phone last night and said he'd like to call—for me to set the hour. I did—for 11 A.M. this morning. He was on time to the dot. His daughter told Gen. Vaughan he hadn't been up so early in ten years! I'd been up for four and one half hours.

We had a most pleasant conversation. He is a most charming and a very clever person—meaning clever in the English not the Kentucky sense. He gave me a lot of hooey about how great my country is and how he loved Roosevelt and how he intended to love me etc. etc. Well. I gave him as cordial a reception as I could—being naturally (I hope) a polite and agreeable person.

I am sure we can get along if he doesn't try to give me too much soft soap. You know soft soap is made of ash hopper lye and it burns to beat hell when it gets into the eyes. It's fine for chigger bites but not so good for rose complexions. But I haven't a rose complexion.

We struck a "blow for liberty" when he left in Scotch—not the right brand for the purpose as the old V.P. Jack Garner can testify.

The photo men had a field day when he left.

[. . .]

Then we went on to Berlin and saw absolute ruin. Hitler's folly. He overreached himself by trying to take in too much territory. He had no morals and his people backed him up. Never did I see a more sorrowful sight, nor witness retribution to the nth degree.

The most sorrowful part of the situation is the deluded Hitlerian populace. Of course the Russians have kidnaped the able bodied and I suppose have made involuntary workmen of them. They have also looted every house left standing and have sent the loot to Russia. But Hitler did the same thing to them.

It is the Golden Rule in reverse—and it is not an uplifting sight. What a pity that the human animal is not able to put his moral thinking into practice!

We saw old men, old women, young women, children from tots to teens carrying packs, pushing carts, pulling carts, evidently ejected by the conquerors and carrying what they could of their belongings to nowhere in particular.

I thought of Carthage, Baalbek, Jerusalem, Rome, Atlantis, Peking, Babylon, Nineveh; Scipio, Rameses II, Titus, Herman, Sherman, Jenghis Khan, Alexander, Darius the Great—but Hitler only destroyed Stalingrad—and Berlin. I hope for some sort of peace —but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there'll be no reason for any of it.

I hope not. But we are only termites on a planet and maybe when we bore too deeply into the planet there'll [be] a reckoning—who knows.

Potsdam, July 17, 1945

Just spent a couple of hours with Stalin. Joe Davies called on Maisky and made the date last night for noon today. Promptly a few minutes before twelve I looked up from the desk and there stood Stalin in the doorway. I got to my feet and advanced to meet him. He put out his hand and smiled. I did the same, we shook, I greeted Molotov and the interpreter, and we sat down. After the usual polite remarks we got down to business. I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but usually said yes & no to questions after hearing all the argument. It pleased him. I asked him if he had the agenda for the meeting. He said he had and that he had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite—but I have some dynamite too which I'm not exploding now. He wants to fire Franco, to which I wouldn't object, and divide up the Italian colonies and other mandates, some no doubt that the British have. Then he got on the Chinese situation, told us what agreements had been reached and what was in abeyance. Most of the big points are settled. He'll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about. We had lunch, talked socially, put on a real show drinking toasts to everyone, then had pictures made in the back yard. I can deal with Stalin. He is honest—but smart as hell.

Potsdam, July 18, 1945

. . . Went to lunch with P.M. at 1:30. Walked around to British Hqtrs. Met at the gate by Mr. Churchill. Guard of honor drawn up. Fine body of men, Scottish Guards. Band played Star Spangled Banner. Inspected Guard and went in for lunch. P.M. & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in.

I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland. I shall inform Stalin about it at an opportune time. Stalin's luncheon was a most satisfactory meeting. I invited him to come to the U.S. Told him I'd send the Battleship Missouri for him if he'd come. He said he wanted to cooperate with U.S. in peace as we had cooperated in War but it would be harder. Said he was grossly misunderstood in U.S. and I was misunderstood in Russia. I told him that we each could help to remedy that situation in our home countries and that I intended to try with all I had to do my part at home. He gave me a most cordial smile and said he would do as much in Russia.

We then went to the conference and it was my job to present the Ministers' proposed agenda. There were three proposals and I banged them through in short order, much to the surprise of Mr. Churchill. Stalin was very much pleased. Churchill was too after he had recovered. I'm not going to stay around this terrible place all summer just to listen to speeches. I'll go home to the Senate for that.

[. . .]

Potsdam, July 25, 1945

We met at 11 A.M. today. That is Stalin, Churchill and the U.S. President. But I had a most important session with Lord Mountbatten & General Marshall before that. We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.

Anyway we "think" we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexican desert was startling—to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and 1,200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower ½ mile away and knocked

men down 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more.

This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old Capital or the new.

He & I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.

At 10:15 I had Gen. Marshall come in and discuss with me the tactical and political situation. He is a level headed man—so is Mountbatten.

At the Conference Poland and the Bolsheviki land grab came up. Russia helped herself to a slice of Poland and gave Poland a nice slice of Germany, taking also a good slice of East Prussia for herself. Poland has moved in up to the Oder and the west Neisse, taking Stettin and Silesia as a fact accomplished. My position is that, according to commitments made at Yalta by my predecessor, Germany was to be divided into four occupation zones, one each for Britain, Russia and France and the U.S. If Russia chooses to allow Poland to occupy a part of her zone I am agreeable but title to territory cannot and will not be settled here. For the fourth time I restated my position and explained that territorial sessions had to be made by treaty and ratified by the Senate.

We discussed reparations and movement of populations from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy and elsewhere. Churchill said Maisky had so defined war booty as to include the German fleet and Merchant Marine. It was a bombshell and sort of paralyzed the Russkies, but it has a lot of merit.

Potsdam, July 26, 1945

Last night talked to Gen. Somervell on time for universal military training. Regular Army wants a straight year. I am very sure it cannot be put into effect. Talked to Mr. Caffery about France. He is scared stiff of Communism, the Russian variety which isn't communism at all but just police government pure and simple. A few top hands just take clubs, pistols and concentration camps and rule the people on the lower levels.

The Communist Party in Moscow is no different in its methods and actions toward the common man than were the Czar and the Russian Noblemen (so-called: they were anything but noble). Nazis and Fascists were worse. It seems that Sweden, Norway, Denmark and perhaps Switzerland have the only real people's governments on the Continent of Europe. But the rest are a bad lot, from the standpoint of the people who do not believe in tyranny.

Potsdam, July 30, 1945

[. . .] Conference is delayed. Stalin and Molotov were to call on me yesterday to discuss Polish question and Reparations. Molotov came but no Stalin. Said he is sick. No Big Three meeting yesterday and none today as a result of Stalin's indisposition. Sent him a note expressing regret at his illness. . . .

If Stalin should suddenly cash in it would end the original Big Three. First Roosevelt by death, then Churchill by political failure and then Stalin. I am wondering what would happen to Russia and Central Europe if Joe suddenly passed out. If some demagogue on horseback gained control of the efficient Russian military machine he could play havoc with European peace for a while. I also wonder if there is a man with the necessary strength and following to step into Stalin's place and maintain peace and solidarity at home. It isn't customary for dictators to train leaders to follow them in power. I've seen no one at this Conference in the Russian line-up who can do the job. Molotov is not able to do it. He lacks sincerity. Vishinsky same thing and Maisky is short on honesty. Well, we shall see what we shall see. Uncle Joe's pretty tough mentally and physically but there is an end to every man and we can't help but speculate.

We are at an impasse on Poland and its western boundary and on Reparations. Russia and Poland have agreed on the Oder and West Neisse to the Czechoslovakian border. Just a unilateral arrangement without so much as a by your leave. I don't like it. Roosevelt let Maisky mention twenty billions as reparations—half

for Russia and half for everybody else. Experts say no such figure is available.

I've made it plain that the United States of America does not intend to pay reparations this time. I want the German war industry machine completely dismantled and [as] far as U.S. is concerned the other allies can divide it up on any basis they choose. Food and other necessities we send into the restored countries and Germany must be first lien on exports before reparations. If Russians strip country and carry off population of course there'll be no reparations.

I have offered a waterway program and a suggestion for free intercourse between Central European nations which will help keep future peace. Our only hope for good from the European War is restored prosperity to Europe and future trade with them. It is a sick situation at best.

Source: Harry S. Truman, "The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb," Notes by Harry S. Truman on the Potsdam Conference, July 16–30, 1945," Truman Presidential Museum and Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/index.

8. Harry S. Truman: Telegram to Jiang Jieshi, 1945

Introduction

During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had revealed himself as unsympathetic to French colonial rule in Indochina. Roosevelt particularly resented the fact that the Vichy authorities in the area (present-day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) cooperated with the Japanese until 1944, when the latter took over Indochina entirely. By June 1945, Roosevelt was dead. The U.S. position on Indochina was now more nuanced. An internal U.S. State Department memorandum of 22 June titled "Postwar Policy toward Asia and the Pacific" declared that "the United States recognizes French sovereignty over Indochina." It went on, however, to state that it was "the general policy of the United States to favor a policy which would allow colonial peoples an opportunity to prepare themselves for increased participation in their own government with eventual self-government as their goal." As victory in the Pacific approached, the Allies had to decide precisely which among their various forces would take over responsibility for particular areas of Asia. During the Potsdam Conference of top Allied leaders, which ended on 2 August 1945, Truman and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill reached agreement on Indochina. The northern portion, above the 16th Parallel of latitude, would come within the China Theater, under the control of Chinese Guomindang (Nationalist) President Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), who resented Western colonialism but was also a staunch anticommunist. Below the 16th parallel, Indochina fell within the Southeast Asian Command, headed by the British commander Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. Since indigenous nationalist forces in French Indochina were headed by the veteran Vietnamese communist Ho Chi Minh, neither the Chinese nor the British authorities was likely to be particularly sympathetic to Ho's demands for the immediate independence of Indochina from the French. In practice, in September 1945 the British helped the French to regain control of the southern portion, while in February 1946 Jiang agreed to withdraw his forces from the northern portion and allow the French to return, in exchange for concessions from them on Shanghai and other Chinese treaty ports. The Americans, for whom the restoration of France as a great power and potential ally against communism was now a higher priority than the independence of Indochina, quietly acquiesced in these arrangements.

Primary Source

Top secret from the President to Ambassador Hurley.

Please deliver the following message from me to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

"1. At the Potsdam Conference the Prime Minister of Great Britain and I, in consultation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, have had under consideration future military operations in Southeast Asia.

2. On the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff we have reached the conclusion that for operational purposes it is desirable to include that portion of French Indo-China lying south of 16° north latitude in the Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would

leave in the China Theater that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China and would at the same time enable Admiral Mountbatten to develop operations in the southern half of Indo-China.

3. I greatly hope that the above conclusions will recommend themselves to Your Excellency and that, for the purpose of facilitating operations against the common enemy, Your Excellency will feel able to concur in the proposed arrangements.

4. I understand that the Prime Minister of Great Britain is addressing a communication to Your Excellency in a similar sense.

Signed Harry S. Truman."

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers; The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 1321.

9. William J. Donovan's Letter to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget, 25 August 1945

Introduction

At the end of World War II, many U.S. officials who had been part of the wartime national security and defense apparatus were convinced that in order to remain an international great power, their country should retain much of the associated bureaucracy that had developed during the conflict. One of the more effective advocates was General William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS had functioned as a wartime foreign intelligence agency, collecting information and mounting covert operations. In August 1945, President Harry S. Truman formally disbanded the OSS, stating that now the war was over, the United States no longer required an intelligence agency functioning outside American borders. As he gradually liquidated his existing operations, Donovan also mounted a coordinated lobbying campaign designed to convince influential bureaucrats, politicians, and media representatives of the need to reestablish the OSS on a more permanent basis as an integral part of the U.S. national security apparatus. Increasing Cold War tensions soon helped to convince officials in Washington that the United States did indeed require a formal overseas intelligence and espionage capability, leading within two years to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although Donovan himself did not join the new organization, in its early years it was largely staffed by former OSS operatives.

Primary Source

It is our estimate . . . the effectiveness of OSS as a War Agency will end as of January 1, or at latest February 1946, at which time liquidation should be completed. At that point I wish to return to private life. Therefore, in considering the disposition to be made of the assets created by OSS, I speak as a private citizen concerned with the future of his country.

In our government today there is no permanent agency to take over the functions which OSS will have then ceased to perform. These functions while carried on as incident to the war are in reality essential in the effective discharge by this nation of its responsibilities in the organization and maintenance of the peace.

Since last November I have pointed out the immediate necessity of setting up such an agency to take over valuable assets created by OSS. Among these assets was establishment for the first time in our nation's history of a foreign secret intelligence service which reported information as seen through American eyes. As an integral and inseparable part of this service there is a group of specialists to analyze and evaluate the material for presentation to those who determine national policy.

It is not easy to set up a modern intelligence system. It is more difficult to do so in time of peace than in time of war.

It is important therefore that it be done before the War Agency has disappeared so that profit may be made of

its experience and "know how" in deciding how the new agency may best be conducted.

I have already submitted a plan for the establishment of centralized system. However, the discussion of that proposal indicated the need of an agreement upon certain fundamental principles before a detailed plan is formulated. If those concerned could agree upon the principles with which such a system should be established, acceptance of a common plan would be more easily achieved.

Accordingly, I attach a statement of principles, the soundness of which I believe has been established by study and by practical experience.

PRINCIPLES—THE SOUNDNESS OF WHICH IT IS BELIEVED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY OUR OWN EXPERIENCE AND FIRST-HAND STUDY OF THE SYSTEMS OF OTHER NATIONS —WHICH SHOULD GOVERN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRALIZED UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. The formulation of a national policy both in its political and military aspects is influence and determined by knowledge (or ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, intentions, and policies of other nations.

All major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent world-wide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of their governments. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service. It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.

The defects and dangers of this situation have been generally recognized. Adherence to the following would remedy this defect in peace as well as war so that American policy could be based upon information obtained through its own sources on foreign intentions, capabilities, and developments as seen and interpreted by Americans.

1. That each department of Government should have its own intelligence bureau for the collection and processing of such informational material as it finds necessary in the actual performance of its functions and duties. Such a bureau should be under the sole control of the department head and should not be encroached upon or impaired by the functions granted any other governmental intelligence agency.

Because secret intelligence covers all fields and because of possible embarrassment, no executive department should be permitted to engage in secret intelligence but in a proper case call upon the central agency for service.

2. That in addition to the intelligence unit for each department there should be established a national centralized foreign intelligence agency which should have the authority:

A. To serve all departments of the Government.

B. To procure and obtain political, economic, psychological, sociological, military and other information which may bear upon the national interest and which has been collected by the different Governmental departments or agencies.

C. To collect when necessary supplemental information either at its own instance or at the request of any Governmental departments or agencies.

D. To integrate, analyze, process, and disseminate, to authorized Governmental agencies and officials, intelligence in the form of strategic interpretive studies.

3. That such an agency should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities within the United States and should be forbidden the exercise of any police functions at home or abroad.

4. That since the nature of its work requires it to have status, it should be independent of any department of the government (since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the natural bias of an operating department). It should be under a director, appointed by the President, and be administered under Presidential direction, or in the event of a General Manager being

appointed, should be established in the Executive Office of the President, under his direction.

5. That subject to the approval of the President or the General Manager the policy of such a service should be determined by the Director with the advice and assistance of a Board on which the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Treasury should be represented.

6. That this agency, as the sole agency for secret intelligence, should be authorized, in the foreign field only, to carry on services such as espionage, counterespionage, and those special operations (including morale and psychological) designed to anticipate and counter any attempted penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action.

7. That such a service have an independent budget granted directly by the Congress.

8. That such a service should have its own system of codes and should be furnished facilities by departments of Government proper and necessary for the performance of its duties.

9. That such a service should include in its staff specialties (within Governmental departments, civil and military, and in private life) professionally trained in analysis of information and possessing a high degree of linguistic, regional, or functional competence, to analyze, coordinate and evaluate incoming information, to make special intelligence reports, and to provide guidance for the collecting branches of the agency.

10. That in time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of such agency in areas of actual and projected military operations shall be coordinated with military plans, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or if there be consolidation of the armed services, under the supreme commander. Parts of such programs which are to be executed in the theater of military operations shall be subject to control of the military commander.

Source: William J. Donovan, "Gen. Donovan's Letter to the Director of the Bureau of Budget, Harold D. Smith," Counterintelligence in World War II, National Counterintelligence Center, http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch3_c.htm.

10. George C. Marshall: "For the Common Defense," 1 September 1945

Introduction

As World War II ended, leading U.S. military officials clearly envisaged a greatly expanded international role for their country, one that would mandate a much-enhanced American military. In his final report as army chief of staff, George C. Marshall put forward proposals for a peacetime security policy for the United States. He envisaged a relatively small permanent standing army of military professionals buttressed by a citizen soldiery who could be called to arms in case of need. The latter he hoped to create through a program of universal military training, required of all young American men. Marshall expected the regular army to be "a strategic force, heavy in air power, partially deployed in the Pacific and the Caribbean ready to protect the Nation against a sudden hostile thrust and immediately available for emergency action wherever required." In addition, he called for the creation of substantial national stockpiles of arms, ammunition, and other military equipment and a heavy emphasis on the promotion of scientific research and development in the defense field. Marshall was heavily influenced by his experience of the rapid rundown of U.S. military forces in the aftermath of World War I, a policy he blamed for the inability of the United States to respond quickly to the onset of World War II when his country had to launch massive crash programs of rebuilding its vestigial forces for a two-front war against Germany and Japan. Largely due to popular opposition, the United States did not introduce universal military training, but most of Marshall's other recommendations were put into effect within a few years. Once their country had attained global power during World War II, top American leaders were clearly unwilling to relinquish that position.

Primary Source

Our present national policies require us to: Maintain occupation forces in Europe and the Pacific; prepare for a possible contribution of forces to a world security organization; maintain national security while the world remains unstable and later on a more permanent or stable basis.

[. . .]

FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE

To fulfill its responsibility for protecting this Nation against foreign enemies, the Army must project its planning beyond the immediate future. In this connection I feel that I have a duty, a responsibility, to present publicly at this time my conception, from a military point of view, of what is required to prevent another international catastrophe.

For years men have been concerned with individual security. Modern nations have given considerable study and effort to the establishment of social security systems for those unable or unwise enough to provide for themselves. But effective insurance against the disasters which have slaughtered millions of people and leveled their homes is long overdue.

We finish each bloody war with a feeling of acute revulsion against this savage form of human behavior, and yet on each occasion we confuse military preparedness with the causes of war and then drift almost deliberately into another catastrophe. . . .

It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And the peace can only be maintained by the strong.

What then must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt ourselves on military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively expensive professional army even if one could be recruited? President Washington answered that question in recommendations to the first Congress to convene under the United States Constitution. He proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen army. At that time the conception of a large professional Regular Army was considered dangerous to the liberties of the Nation. It is still so today. But the determining factor in solving this problem will inevitably be the relation between the maintenance of military power and the cost in annual appropriations. No system, even if actually adopted in the near future, can survive the political pressure to reduce the military budget if the costs are high—and professional armies are very costly.

There is now another disadvantage to a large professional standing army. Wars in the twentieth century are fought with the total resources, economic, scientific, and human of entire nations. Every specialized field of human knowledge is employed. Modern war requires the skill and knowledge of the individuals of a nation.

Obviously we cannot all put on uniforms and stand ready to repel invasion. The greatest energy in peacetime of any successful nation must be devoted to productive and gainful labor. But all Americans can, in the next generations, prepare themselves to serve their country in maintaining the peace or against the tragic hour when peace is broken, if such a misfortune again overtakes us. This is what is meant by Universal Military *Training*. It is not universal military *service*—the actual induction of men into the combatant forces. Such forces would be composed during peacetime of volunteers. The trainees would be in separate organizations maintained for training purposes only. Once trained, young men would be freed from further connection with the Army unless they chose, as they now may, to enroll in the National Guard or an organized reserve unit, or to volunteer for service in the small professional army. When the Nation is in jeopardy they could be called, just as men are now called, by a committee of local neighbors, in an order of priority and under such conditions as directed at that time by the Congress.

The concept of universal military training is not founded, as some may believe, on the principle of a mass Army. The Army has been accused of rigidly holding to this doctrine in the face of modern developments. Nothing, I think, could be farther from the fact, as the record of the mobilization for this war demonstrates. Earlier in this report I explained how we had allocated manpower to exploit American technology. Out of our entire military mobilization of 14,000,000 men, the number of infantry troops was less than 1,500,000 Army and Marine.

The remainder of our armed forces, sea, air, and ground, was largely fighting a war of machinery. Counting those engaged in war production there were probably 75 to 80,000,000 Americans directly involved in

prosecution of the war. To technological warfare we devoted 98 percent of our entire effort.

Nor is it proposed now to abandon this formula which has been so amazingly successful. The harnessing of the basic power of the universe will further spur our efforts to use brain for brawn in safeguarding the United States of America.

However, technology does not eliminate the need for men in war. The Air Forces, which were the highest developed technologically of any of our armed forces in this war, required millions of men to do their job. Every B-29 that winged over Japan was dependent on the efforts of 12 officers and 73 men in the immediate combat area alone. . . .

This war has made it clear that the security of the Nation, when challenged by an armed enemy, requires the services of virtually all able-bodied male citizens within the effective military group.

In war the Nation cannot depend on the numbers of men willing to volunteer for active service; nor can our security in peace.

In another national emergency, the existence of a substantial portion of the Nation's young manpower already trained or in process of training, would make it possible to fill out immediately the peacetime ranks of the Navy, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. As a result our Armed Forces would be ready for almost immediate deployment to counter initial hostile moves, ready to prevent an enemy from gaining footholds from which he could launch destructive attack against our industries and our homes. By this method we would establish, for the generations to come, a national military policy: (1) which is entirely within the financial capabilities of our peacetime economy and is absolutely democratic in its nature, and (2) which places the military world and therefore the political world on notice that this vast power, linked to our tremendous resources, wealth, and production, is immediately available. There can be no question that all the nations of the world will respect our views accordingly, creating at least a probability of peace on earth and of good will among men rather than disaster upon disaster in a tormented world where the very processes of civilization itself are constantly threatened. . . .

The terms of the final peace settlement will provide a basis for determining the strength of the regular or permanent postwar military forces of the United States, air, ground, and naval, but they cannot, in my opinion, alter the necessity for a system of Universal Military Training.

The yardstick by which the size of the permanent force must be measured is maximum security with minimum cost in men, materiel, and maintenance. So far as they can foresee world conditions a decade from now, War Department planners, who have taken every conceivable factor into consideration, believe that our position will be sound if we set up machinery which will permit the mobilization of an Army of 4,000,000 men within a period of 1 year following any international crisis resulting in a national emergency for the United States.

The Regular Army must be comprised largely of a strategic force, heavy in air power, partially deployed in the Pacific and the Caribbean ready to protect the Nation against a sudden hostile thrust and immediately available for emergency action wherever required. It is obvious that another war would start with a lightning attack to take us unaware. The pace of the attack would be at supersonic speeds of rocket weapons closely followed by a striking force which would seek to exploit the initial and critical advantage. We must be sufficiently prepared against such a threat to hold the enemy at a distance until we can rapidly mobilize our strength. The Regular Army, and the National Guard, must be prepared to meet such a crisis.

Another mission of the Regular Army is to provide the security garrisons for the outlying bases. We quickly lost the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Islands at the beginning of this war and are still expending lives and wealth in recovering them.

The third mission of the permanent Army is to furnish the overhead, the higher headquarters which must keep the machine and the plans up to date for whatever national emergency we may face in the future. This overhead includes the War Department, the War College, the service schools, and the headquarters of the military area into which continental United States is subdivided to facilitate decentralized command and coordination of the peacetime military machine. This was about all we had on the eve of this war, planners and a small number of men who had little to handle in practice but sound ideas on how to employ the wartime hosts that would be gathered in the

storm. Had it not been for the time the British Empire and the Soviets bought us, those plans and ideas would have been of little use.

The fourth and probably the most important mission of the Regular Army is to provide the knowledge, the expert personnel, and the installations for training the citizen-soldier upon whom, in my view, the future peace of the world largely depends. . . .

Only by Universal Military Training can full vigor and life be instilled in to the Reserve system. It creates a pool of well-trained men and officers from which the National Guard and the Organized Reserve can draw volunteers; it provides opportunities for the Guard and Reserve units to participate in corps and Army maneuvers, which are vital preparations to success in military campaigns. Without these trained men and officers, without such opportunities to develop skill through actual practice in realistic maneuvers, neither the Regular Army, the National Guard, nor the Reserve can hope to bring efficiency to their vital missions. . . .

An unbroken period of 1 year's training appears essential to the success of a sound security plan based on the concept of a citizen army.

It is possible to train individual soldiers as replacements for veteran divisions and air groups as we now do in a comparatively short period of time. The training of the unit itself cannot be accomplished at best in less than a year; air units require even more time. The principle is identical to that of coaching a football team. A halfback can quickly learn how to run with the ball, but it takes time and much practice and long hours of team scrimmage before he is proficient at carrying the ball through an opposing team. So it is with an army division or combat air group. Men learn to fire a rifle or machine gun quickly, but it takes long hours of scrimmage, which the army calls maneuver, before the firing of the rifle is coordinated with the activities of more than 14,000 other men on the team.

[. . .]

The peacetime army must not only be prepared for immediate mobilization of an effective war army, but it must have in reserve the weapons needed for the first months of the fighting and clear-cut plans for immediately producing the tremendous additional quantities of materiel necessary in total war. We must never again face a great national crisis with ammunition lacking to serve our guns, few guns to fire, and no decisive procedures for procuring vital arms in sufficient quantities.

The necessity for continuous research into the military ramifications of man's scientific advance is now clear to all and it should not be too difficult to obtain the necessary appropriations for this purpose in peacetime. There is, however, always much reluctance to expenditure of funds for improvement of war-making instruments, particularly where there is no peacetime usefulness in the product.

The development of combat airplanes is closely allied with development of civil aeronautics; the prototypes of many of our present transport planes and those soon to come were originally bombers. Many of the aeronautical principles that helped give this Nation the greatest Air Force in the world grew out of commercial development and our production know-how at the start of this war was partially the fruit of peacetime commercial enterprise. Since many vital types of weapons have no commercial counterpart, the peacetime development of these weapons has been grossly neglected. Antiaircraft weapons are a good example. The highly efficient antiaircraft of today did not materialize until long after the fighting began. The consequent cost in time, life, and money of this failure to spend the necessary sums on such activity in peacetime has been appalling.

There is another phase of scientific research which I think has been somewhat ignored—the development of expeditious methods for the mass production of war materiel. This is of great importance since it determines how quickly we can mobilize our resources if war comes and how large and costly our reserve stocks of war materiel must be. Serious thought and planning along this line can save millions of tax dollars.

We can be certain that the next war, if there is one, will be even more total than this one. The nature of war is such that once it now begins it can end only as this one is ending, in the destruction of the vanquished, and it should be assumed that another reconversion from peace to war production will take place initially under distant enemy bombardment. Industrial mobilization plans must be founded on these assumptions and so organized that they will meet them and any other situation that may develop. Yet they must in no way retard or inhibit the course of peacetime production.

If this Nation is to remain great it must bear in mind now and in the future that war is not the choice of those who wish passionately for peace. It is the choice of those who are willing to resort to violence for political advantage. We can fortify ourselves against disaster, I am convinced, by the measures I have here outlined. In these protections we can face the future with a reasonable hope for the best and with quiet assurance that even though the worst may come, we are prepared for it.

Source: George C. Marshall, *General Marshall's Report: The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific; Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 116–123.

11. Ho Chi Minh: Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 2 September 1945

Introduction

On 2 September 1945, as the provinces of colonial French Indochina waited for the defeated Japanese forces to leave, Ho Chi Minh, the most prominent Vietnamese communist and nationalist leader, declared in Hanoi that an independent state now existed in Vietnam. Until taken over by Japan during the war, Vietnam, together with present-day Laos and Cambodia, had been under French colonial rule. Hoping to secure the support of the United States, which was officially committed to anticolonialism, Ho deliberately modeled his statement on the American Declaration of Independence. This strategy failed to persuade the administration of President Harry S. Truman to endorse his claim for an independent Vietnamese state. Although French forces, assisted by British troops, returned to Indochina in the fall of 1945 and temporarily ousted Ho, he continued to lead the Vietnamese battle for independence, eventually driving out the French in 1954. During the final years of colonial rule in Vietnam, the U.S. government, by this time strongly committed to opposing communism in Asia, provided extensive economic and military aid to the French, although American ground forces were never deployed in French Indochina. Under the 1954 Geneva Accords, the country was temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel, with elections to choose a government for a united Vietnam supposedly scheduled within the next two years. Subsequent American attempts to maintain the southern portion of Vietnam as an independent noncommunist state and prevent its unification with the communist northern portion ruled by Ho ultimately embroiled the United States in the lengthy and divisive Vietnam War, the most frustrating and humiliating American military intervention of the entire Cold War.

Primary Source

All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.

This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free.

The Declaration of the French Revolution made in 1791 on the Rights of Man and the Citizen also states: "All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights."

Those are undeniable truths.

Nevertheless, for more than eighty years, the French imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland and oppressed our fellow citizens. They have acted contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice.

In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty.

They have enforced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, the Center, and the South of Viet-Nam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united.

They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots; they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood.

They have fettered public opinion; they have practiced obscurantism against our people.

To weaken our race they have forced us to use opium and alcohol.

In the field of economics, they have fleeced us to the backbone, impoverished our people and devastated our land.

They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials. They have monopolized the issuing of bank notes and the export trade.

They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty.

They have hampered the prospering of our national bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our workers.

In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese fascists violated Indochina's territory to establish new bases in their fight against the Allies, the French imperialists went down on their bended knees and handed over our country to them.

Thus, from that date, our people were subjected to the double yoke of the French and the Japanese. Their sufferings and miseries increased. The result was that, from the end of last year to the beginning of this year, from Quang Tri Province to the North of Viet-Nam, more than two million of our fellow citizens died from starvation. On March 9 [1945], the French troops were disarmed by the Japanese. The French colonialists either fled or surrendered, showing that not only were they incapable of "protecting" us, but that, in the span of five years, they had twice sold our country to the Japanese.

On several occasions before March 9, the Viet Minh League urged the French to ally themselves with it against the Japanese. Instead of agreeing to this proposal, the French colonialists so intensified their terrorist activities against the Viet Minh members that before fleeing they massacred a great number of our political prisoners detained at Yen Bay and Cao Bang.

Notwithstanding all this, our fellow citizens have always manifested toward the French a tolerant and humane attitude. Even after the Japanese *Putsch* of March, 1945, the Viet Minh League helped many Frenchmen to cross the frontier, rescued some of them from Japanese jails, and protected French lives and property.

From the autumn of 1940, our country had in fact ceased to be a French colony and had become a Japanese possession.

After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French.

The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the Fatherland. Our people at the same time have overthrown the monarchic regime that has reigned supreme for dozens of centuries. In its place has been established the present Democratic Republic.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government, representing the whole Vietnamese people, declare that from now on we break off all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the international obligation[s] that France has so far subscribed to on behalf of Viet-Nam, and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Fatherland.

The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists to reconquer their country.

We are convinced that the Allied nations, which at Teheran and San Francisco have acknowledged the principles of self-determination and equality of nations,

will not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Viet-Nam.

A people who have courageously opposed French domination for more than eighty years, a people who have fought side by side with the Allies against the fascists during these last years, such a people must be free and independent.

For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, solemnly declare to the world that Viet-Nam has the right to be a free and independent country—and in fact it is so already. The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilize all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty.

Source: Bernard B. Fall, ed., *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920–66* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 143–145.

12. Josef Stalin: "Conflict Is Inevitable," 9 February 1946

Introduction

Within six months of the ending of World War II, Soviet leader Josef Stalin was showing himself to be suspicious of his Western allies. Addressing the Supreme Soviet as it prepared to "elect" him to a new term as general secretary, he cited Marxist-Leninist ideological teaching and blamed the two world wars on conflicts among the various capitalist powers. Implicitly, Stalin was suggesting that a third such conflict was likely to occur, for which the Soviet Union must be prepared. Announcing the next Five-Year Plan, Stalin stated that its priorities would include not just the restoration of agricultural and industrial production to prewar levels and the provision of cheaper more abundant cheaper consumer goods but also a major initiative in scientific research. By this he meant primarily the development of nuclear weapons and other technological innovations to improve Soviet armaments. Aiming to make the country self-sufficient and immune to potential attack, he had long-term plans to triple production of iron, coal, and oil. His resumption of anticapitalist ideological rhetoric marked a break with his public addresses since June 1941 and was symptomatic of growing disharmony among the ill-assorted wartime allies: the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.

Primary Source

Comrades! Eight years have elapsed since the last election to the Supreme Soviet. This was a period abounding in events of decisive moment. The first four years passed in intensive effort on the part of Soviet men and women to fulfill the third Five-Year Plan. The second four years embrace the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors, the events of the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the war was the principal event in the past period.

It would be wrong to think that the Second World War was a casual occurrence or the result of mistakes of any particular statesmen, though mistakes undoubtedly were made. Actually, the war was the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism. Marxists have declared more than once that the capitalist system of world economy harbors elements of general crises and armed conflicts and that, hence, the development of world capitalism in our time proceeds not in the form of smooth and even progress but through crises and military catastrophes.

The fact is, that the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries usually leads in time to violent disturbance of equilibrium in the world system of capitalism, that one group of capitalism considers itself worse provided than others with raw materials and markets usually making attempts to alter the situation and repartition the "spheres of influence" in its favor by armed force. The result is a splitting of the capitalist world into two hostile camps and war between them.

Perhaps military catastrophes might be avoided if it were possible for raw materials and markets to be

periodically redistributed among the various countries in accordance with their economic importance, by agreement and peaceable settlement. But that is impossible to do under present capitalist conditions of the development of world economy.

Thus the First World War was the result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, and the Second World War was the result of a second crisis.

[. . .]

Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As is known these plans are set forth in the new Five-Year Plan which is shortly to be endorsed. The principal aims of the new Five-Year Plan are to rehabilitate the ravaged areas of the country, to restore the prewar level in industry and agriculture, and then to surpass this level in more or less substantial measure. To say nothing of the fact that the rationing system will shortly be abolished [*stormy, prolonged applause*], special attention will be devoted to extending the production of consumer goods, to raising the living standard of the working people by steadily lowering the prices of all goods [*stormy, prolonged applause*], and to the widespread construction of all manner of scientific research institutions [*applause*] that can give science the opportunity to develop its potentialities. [*Stormy applause.*]

I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the near future not only to overtake but to surpass the achievements of science beyond the boundaries of our country. [*Prolonged applause.*]

As regards the plans for a longer period ahead, the Party means to organize a new mighty upsurge in the national economy, which would allow us to increase our industrial production, for example three times over as compared with the prewar period. We must achieve a situation where our industry can produce annually up to 50 million tons of pig iron [*prolonged applause*], up to 500 million tons of coal [*prolonged applause*], and up to 60 million tons of oil [*prolonged applause*]. Only under such conditions can we consider that our homeland will be guaranteed against all possible accidents. [*Stormy applause.*] That will take three more Five-Year Plans, I should think, if not more. But it can be done and we must do it. [*Stormy applause.*]

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Strategy and Tactics of World Communism* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948).

13. George F. Kennan: Containment Doctrine, 1946

Introduction

By February 1946, Soviet relations with the Western Allies had deteriorated dramatically as crises erupted over Soviet demands on Iran and Turkey and the occupying powers found it impossible to reach agreement on the treatment of Germany. At this juncture, the State Department in Washington, D.C., cabled the U.S. embassy in Moscow requesting an assessment of Soviet behavior and recommendations on future policies toward the Soviet Union. The request was handed to the highly erudite diplomat George F. Kennan, minister-counselor at the embassy and one of the State Department's leading experts on Russian and Soviet policy. Kennan quickly drafted the 8,000-word "Long Telegram" in which he stated that Soviet leaders were firmly committed to Marxist-communist ideology, according to whose dictates there existed no possibility of "permanent peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist world. Soviet officials, he argued, had inherited the "traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity" toward the West and, to justify the harshness of their own rule, needed the excuse of an external enemy, just as the former tsarist state had done. Given this mind-set, little chance existed of genuine understanding or cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union. Kennan expected that the Soviet Union would seek to take advantage of every opportunity to enhance Soviet power and to weaken the position of the West. "In summary," he stated, "we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no perma-

nent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure." According to Kennan, the United States nonetheless possessed viable options when dealing with the Soviet Union. Soviet policy, he argued, was normally opportunistic and "highly sensitive to logic of force"—meaning that Soviet leaders would draw back when they encountered firm opposition—and the United States must have faith in its own principles. Kennan's telegram arrived at precisely the right psychological moment, as officials in Washington sought to understand Soviet behavior and also wanted guidance on future policy. The document was circulated extensively within the foreign policy bureaucracy, and Kennan was soon recalled to Washington to become the first director of the State Department's new Policy Planning Staff. In July 1947, he published an article elaborating his views, titled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs,* which was widely read by the foreign policy elite. Due to his official position, he signed it simply "X." The article articulated his policy of containing communism where it already existed at that time and actively preventing its spread to other countries. Although the article was published anonymously, Kennan's authorship was quickly established. Dubbed the Containment Doctrine, this policy became the foundation of U.S. policy during the Cold War and was enthusiastically embraced by U.S. President Harry Truman. Kennan, who left the diplomatic service in the early 1950s for a lengthy second career as a historian and political commentator, later claimed that he had failed to make it sufficiently clear that containment as he envisaged it would be implemented primarily through nonmilitary means, employing force only as a last resort. Some historians have suggested that Kennan retrospectively minimized the military aspects of containment as he originally conceived it. He subsequently opposed U.S. establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the conclusion of the bilateral U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty two years later, and he repeatedly urged that Germany should be reunited and neutralized in the Cold War, a proposal that would have demanded a degree of trust in their opponents that neither the Western powers nor the Soviet Union demonstrated. Even though the father of containment soon parted company with official Washington, for the remainder of the Cold War the strategy he had formulated remained the guiding principle of U.S. policy.

Primary Source

[. . .]

PART THREE: PROJECTION OF SOVIET OUTLOOK IN PRACTICAL POLICY ON OFFICIAL LEVEL

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation? . . .

On official plane we must look for following:

(A) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state's intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(B) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly" Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(C) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO [United Nations Organization] not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that

it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal, to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, and to replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which these nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(D) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken western influence among such peoples.

(E) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(F) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in nineteen-thirties to desirability of building up international economic exchange in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(G) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with super-abundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(H) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol, as distinct from good manners.

PART FOUR: FOLLOWING MAY BE SAID AS TO WHAT WE MAY EXPECT BY WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC SOVIET POLICIES ON UNOFFICIAL, OR SUBTERRANEAN PLANE, I.E., ON PLANE FOR WHICH SOVIET GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS NO RESPONSIBILITY

(A) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white,

young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(B) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of western powers of colonial, backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. . . .

(C) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. . . .

(D) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. . . .

(E) Everything possible will be done to set major western powers against each other. . . .

(F) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when communist power is dominant. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in gauging Soviet motives.

PART FIVE

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve—and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(One) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does—when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige engaging showdowns.

(Two) Gauged against western world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which western world can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(Three) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its

effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years after. Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of communist party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and—for the moment—highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(Four) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(One) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(Two) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter of fact basis.

(Three) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit —Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(Four) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(Five) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

Source: George F. Kennan Telegram, U.S. Department of State Files, 861.00/2-2246, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

14. Winston Churchill: "The Sinews of Peace" (Iron Curtain Speech), 5 March 1946

Introduction

In a commencement address entitled "The Sinews of Peace" delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, former British prime minister Winston Churchill painted a picture of the post–World War II world and the emerging struggle between democracy and communism. Although Churchill was out of office, he spoke with all the prestige of "the greatest living Englishman," the charismatic British leader who in 1940 had caught the world's imagination when he proclaimed his country's determination to stand alone against Adolf Hitler's German forces, which had already conquered Western Europe. President Harry S. Truman escorted Churchill when he gave this speech, which Truman had seen in advance and which—although Churchill was supposedly speaking as a private citizen—had also been quietly cleared with the British government. Describing the birth of the Cold War, Churchill proclaimed that an "iron curtain" had descended across Europe behind which the Soviet Union exercised unlimited control with no regard for basic human rights. He called upon the United States to join with Great Britain in preventing the further extension of Soviet power. Churchill's phrase caught the popular imagination, and the speech was widely publicized throughout the Western world. The iron curtain metaphor remained in prominent use throughout the Cold War.

Primary Source

[. . .]

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone—Greece with its immortal glories—is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.

[. . .]

In front of the iron curtain which lies across Europe are other causes for anxiety. In Italy the Communist Party is seriously hampered by having to support the Communist-trained Marshal Tito's claims to former Italian territory at the head of the Adriatic. Nevertheless the future of Italy hangs in the balance. Again one cannot imagine a regenerated Europe without a strong France. All my public life I have worked for a strong France and I never lost faith in her destiny, even in the darkest hours. I will not lose faith now. However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. These are somber facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy; but we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains.

[. . .]

On the other hand I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become.

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If however they become divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

[. . .]

Source: Winston S. Churchill, *Sinews of Peace: Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*, edited by Randolph S. Churchill (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949).

15. Josef Stalin: Reply to Winston Churchill, 13 March 1946

Introduction

One week after former British prime minister Winston Churchill delivered his "Sinews of Peace" speech in Fulton, Missouri, Soviet leader Josef Stalin responded angrily, using an official newspaper interview to denounce Churchill as a "warmonger." Irked by Churchill's calls for an alliance of the "English-speaking peoples"—the British Empire, Canada, and the United States—Stalin charged that Churchill and his like-minded British and American friends were displaying a sense of racist superiority over all other nations closely akin to what German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler had shown. Churchill's speech, according to Stalin, amounted to "a call for war on the U.S.S.R." Defending the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Stalin recalled the "colossal" wartime casualties, far greater than those of Britain and the United States combined, that his country had suffered in World War II. While pointing out that East European governments included some noncommunists, Stalin defended communist predominance in those states on the grounds that these were the individuals who had been most involved in wartime antifascist resistance. In practice, Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe normally favored the communist political parties and facilitated their access to power. Clearly, however, Stalin was not prepared to loosen the Soviet hold on these governments. Defiantly, Stalin ended by recalling Churchill's 1918–1920 efforts as British minister of war to overthrow the new Bolshevik government that had seized power in Russia and reminding him that these had been unsuccessful. Although symptoms rather than causes of the growing estrangement between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, Churchill's speech and Stalin's response clearly did nothing to improve their relations.

Primary Source

Question: How do you assess the recent speech of Mr. Churchill, which was made in the United States?

Answer: I assess it as a dangerous act, calculated to sow the seed of discord among the Allied governments and hamper their cooperation.

[. . .]

Q: How do you assess that part of Mr. Churchill's speech in which he attacks the democratic regime of the European countries which are our neighbors and in which he criticizes the good neighborly relations established between these countries and the Soviet Union?

A: This part of Mr. Churchill's speech is a mixture of the elements of the libel with the elements of rudeness and lack of tact. Mr. Churchill maintains that Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations of those areas, are within the Soviet sphere and are all subjected to Soviet influence and to the increasing control of Moscow.

Mr. Churchill qualifies this as the "boundless expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union." It requires no special effort to show that Mr. Churchill rudely and shamelessly libels not only Moscow but also the above-mentioned States neighborly to the U.S.S.R.

To begin with, it is quite absurd to speak of the exclusive control of the U.S.S.R. in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied control councils with representatives of four States, where the U.S.S.R. has only one-fourth of the voices.

It happens sometimes that some people are unable to refrain from libel, but still they should know a limit.

Secondly, one cannot forget the following fact: the Germans carried out an invasion of the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Germans were able to carry out the invasion through these countries by reason of the fact that these countries had governments inimical to the Soviet Union.

As a result of the German invasion, the Soviet Union has irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans, and also during the German occupation and through the expulsion of Soviet citizens to German slave labor camps, about 7,000,000 people. In other words, the Soviet Union has lost in men several times more than Britain and the United States together.

It may be that some quarters are trying to push into oblivion these sacrifices of the Soviet people which insured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke.

But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. One can ask, therefore, what can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union, in a desire to ensure its security for the future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose relations to the Soviet Union are loyal? How can one, without having lost one's reason, qualify these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as "expansionist tendencies" of our Government?

Mr. Churchill further maintains that the Polish Government under Russian lordship has been spurred to an unjust and criminal spoliation against Germany. Here, every word is a rude and offensive libel. Contemporary, democratic Poland is led by outstanding men. They have shown in deeds that they know how to defend the interests and worth of their homeland, as the predecessors failed to do.

What reason has Mr. Churchill to maintain that the leaders of contemporary Poland can submit their country to a lordship by representatives of any country whatever? Does Mr. Churchill here libel the Russians because he has intentions of sowing the seeds of discord between Poland and the Soviet Union?

Mr. Churchill is not pleased that Poland should have turned her policy toward friendship and alliance with the U.S.S.R. There was a time when in the mutual relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. there prevailed an element of conflict and contradiction. This gave a possibility to statesmen, of the kind of Mr. Churchill, to play on these contradictions, to take Poland in hand under the guise of protection from the Russians, to frighten Russia by specters of a war between Poland and herself, and to take for themselves the role of arbiters.

But this time is past. For enmity between Poland and Russia has given place to friendship between them, and Poland, present democratic Poland, does not wish any longer to be a playing-ball in the hands of foreigners. It

seems to be that this is just what annoys Mr. Churchill and urges him to rude, tactless outbursts against Poland. After all, it is no laughing matter for him. He is not allowed to play for other people's stakes.

As for Mr. Churchill's attack on the Soviet Union in connection with the extending of the western boundaries of Poland, as compensation for the territories seized by the Germans in the past, there it seems to me that he quite blatantly distorts the facts.

As is known, the western frontiers of Poland were decided upon at the Berlin conference of the three powers, on the basis of Poland's demands.

The Soviet Union repeatedly declared that it considered Poland's demands just and correct. It may well be that Mr. Churchill is not pleased with this decision. But why does Mr. Churchill, not sparing his darts against the Russians in the matter, conceal from his readers the fact that the decision was taken at the Berlin conference unanimously, that not only the Russians voted for this decision but also the English and Americans?

Why did Mr. Churchill have to delude people? Mr. Churchill further maintains that the Communist parties were very insignificant in all these Eastern European countries but reached exceptional strength, exceeding their numbers by far, and are attempting to establish totalitarian control everywhere; that police-government prevailed in almost all these countries, even up to now, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, and that there exists in them no real democracy.

As is known in Britain at present there is one party which rules the country—the Labour party. The rest of the parties are barred from the Government of the country. This is called by Churchill a true democracy, meanwhile Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary are governed by several parties—from four to six parties. And besides, the opposition, if it is loyal, is guaranteed the right to participate in the Government. This, Churchill calls totalitarian and the Government of police.

On what grounds? Do you expect an answer from Churchill? Does he not understand the ridiculous situation he is putting himself in by such speeches on the basis of totalitarianism and police rule. Churchill would have liked Poland to be ruled by Sosnkowski and Anders, Yugoslavia by Mikhailovitch, Rumania by Prince Stirbey and Radescu, Hungary and Austria by some king from the House of Habsburg, and so on.

Mr. Churchill wants to assure us that these gentlemen from the Fascist servants' hall can ensure true democracy. Such is the Democracy of Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill wanders around the truth when he speaks of the growth of the influence of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. It should, however, be noted that he is not quite accurate. The influence of Communist parties grew not only in Eastern Europe but in almost every country of Europe where fascism has ruled before: Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland, and in countries which have suffered German, Italian or Hungarian occupation. France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union and so on.

The growth of the influence of communism cannot be considered accidental. It is a normal function. The influence of the Communists grew because during the hard years of the mastery of fascism in Europe, Communists showed themselves to be reliable, daring and self-sacrificing fighters against fascist regimes for the liberty of peoples.

Mr. Churchill sometimes recalls in his speeches the common people from small houses, patting them on the shoulder in a lordly manner and pretending to be their friend. But these people are not so simple-minded as it might appear at first sight. Common people, too, have their opinions and their own politics. And they know how to stand up for themselves.

It is they, millions of these common people, who voted Mr. Churchill and his party out in England, giving their votes to the Labor party. It is they, millions of these common people, who isolated reactionaries in Europe, collaborators with fascism, and gave preference to Left democratic parties.

It is they, millions of these common people, having tried the Communists in the fire of struggle and resist-

ance to fascism, who decided that the Communists deserve completely the confidence of the people. Thus grew the Communists' influence in Europe. Such is the law of historical development.

Of course, Mr. Churchill does not like such a development of events. And he raised the alarm, appealing to force. But he also did not like the appearance of the Soviet regime in Russia after the First World War. Then, too, he raised the alarm and organized an armed expedition of fourteen states against Russia with the aim of turning back the wheel of history.

But history turned out to be stronger than Churchill's intervention and the quixotic antics of Churchill resulted in his complete defeat. I do not know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organizing after the Second World War a new military expedition against eastern Europe. But if they succeed in this, which is not very probable, since millions of common people stand on guard over the peace, then one man confidently says that they will be beaten, just as they were beaten twenty-six years ago.

Source: "Stalin Interview with Pravda on Churchill," *New York Times,* 14 March 1946, Copyright © 1946 by The New York Times Co., Reprinted with permission.

16. Harry S. Truman: The Truman Doctrine, 1947

Introduction

The growing economic and military weakness of Great Britain was one reason that the United States gradually assumed the role of being the major protagonist in the developing Cold War. In February 1947, British officials informed the U.S. government that economic difficulties prevented them from continuing their previous aid to Greece and Turkey, countries bordering the strategically important supply routes for Middle Eastern oil. In Greece a civil war between communists and noncommunists was in progress, while Turkey faced Soviet pressure to grant the Russians partial control of the Dardanelles straits separating Europe and Asia, the only route that Soviet vessels could take to pass from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. President Harry S. Truman responded on 12 March 1947. In an address before the U.S. Congress, he laid out foreign policy guidelines for the United States in the early days of the Cold War that subsequently became known as the Truman Doctrine. At heart, the policy was one that mandated an active role for the United States in containing the spread of communism around the world. Truman specifically requested aid, primarily financial, for Greece and Turkey but placed this in the broader context of a wide-ranging international communist threat around the world, which he argued mandated American assistance to any nation menaced by either internal or external communist forces. He portrayed a world divided between the forces of freedom and democracy and the forces of authoritarian totalitarianism, and he effectively pledged virtually unlimited U.S. assistance to the former. In this case, the aid that Truman envisaged was primarily financial, which Congress granted by appropriating $400 million to the two countries. The Truman Doctrine laid the groundwork for the Marshall Plan, announced three months later, that extended similar aid to all of Western Europe. More broadly, it also formed the backbone of America's Cold War policy and led to both financial and military entanglements throughout the world, including the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Truman's speech was drafted in part by future Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who later stated that although he might have exaggerated the communist threat and depicted the international situation in overly black-and-white apocalyptic terms, such tactics were necessary to win support for these policies from the somewhat reluctant American people and their representatives in Congress.

Primary Source

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance.

Preliminary reports from the American economic mission now in Greece and reports from the American ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

[. . .]

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will and their way of life upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties

to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400 million for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350 million which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.

The United States contributed $341 billion toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 176–180.

17. Harry S. Truman: Executive Order 9835, Truman Loyalty Oath, 1947

Introduction

On 12 March 1947, President Harry S. Truman addressed Congress and declared that the United States should assist any country that faced a communist threat, either through internal subversion or outside pressure from another

state. This stance, christened the Truman Doctrine, made it more difficult for his administration to resist demands that the U.S. government move decisively against communists and radicals at home. Since the 1930s, conservatives in Congress had claimed that the Democratic administrations of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman himself were riddled with leftists, socialists, and potential traitors whose first loyalties were to the Soviet Union rather than their own country. In 1938 Congressman Martin Dies established the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which until its abolition in 1975 investigated the role of leftists in New Deal and other government programs and numerous private organizations and businesses, including the movie industry and the media, suspected of being communist fronts. Hoping to avert further criticism and to control the process, less than ten days after announcing the Truman Doctrine the president instituted a wide-ranging loyalty program covering all federal employees. Every individual who took any civilian federal position was liable to being subjected to extensive investigation intended to prove beyond doubt his or her loyalty to the U.S. government. Loyalty review boards were established for that purpose. The creation of the loyalty program failed to satisfy conservative critics, who continued their own parallel activities within and outside government and in some ways even encouraged a climate in which not just dissent but even independent thinking became suspect and dangerous. In many cases, much of the evidence submitted to the loyalty review boards consisted of malicious hearsay, subjective opinions, or innuendo, and even when they initially gave an individual appropriate security clearance, this was liable to further challenges, causing particular employees to become targets of repeated investigation. Assorted junior American diplomats who correctly predicted a communist victory in China became favorite targets of the loyalty review boards, as their professional assessments were taken as evidence that they were fellow travelers if not actual communist agents.

Primary Source

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9835 PRESCRIBING PROCEDURES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN EMPLOYEES LOYALTY PROGRAM IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

Whereas each employee of the Government of the United States is endowed with a measure of trusteeship over the democratic processes which are the heart and sinew of the United States; and

Whereas it is of vital importance that persons employed in the Federal service be of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States; and

Whereas, although the loyalty of by far the overwhelming majority of all Government employees is beyond question, the presence within the Government service of any disloyal or subversive person constitutes a threat to our democratic processes; and

Whereas maximum protection must be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees, and equal protection from unfounded accusations of disloyalty must be afforded the loyal employees of the Government:

Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403), as amended, and section 9A of the act approved August 2, 1939 (18 U.S.C. 61i), and as President and Chief Executive of the United States, it is hereby, in the interest of the internal management of the Government, ordered as follows:

PART I—INVESTIGATION OF APPLICANTS

1. There shall be a loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian employment of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government. . . .
2. The investigations of persons entering the employ of the executive branch may be conducted after any such person enters upon actual employment therein, but in any such case the appointment of such person shall be conditioned upon a favorable determination with respect to his loyalty. . . .
3. An investigation shall be made of all applicants at all available pertinent sources of information and shall include reference to:
   a. Federal Bureau of Investigation files.
   b. Civil Service Commission files.

c. Military and naval intelligence files.
d. The files of any other appropriate government investigative or intelligence agency.
e. House Committee on un-American Activities files.
f. Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the applicant, including municipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.
g. Schools and colleges attended by applicant.
h. Former employers of applicant.
i. References given by applicant.
j. Any other appropriate source.

4. Whenever derogatory information with respect to loyalty of an applicant is revealed a full investigation shall be conducted. A full field investigation shall also be conducted of those applicants, or of applicants for particular positions, as may be designated by the head of the employing department or agency, such designations to be based on the determination by any such head of the best interests of national security.

PART II—INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYEES

1. The head of each department and agency in the executive branch of the Government shall be personally responsible for an effective program to assure that disloyal civilian officers or employees are not retained in employment in his department or agency. . . .
2. The head of each department and agency shall appoint one or more loyalty boards, each composed of not less than three representatives of the department or agency concerned, for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases arising within such department or agency and making recommendations with respect to the removal of any officer or employee of such department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty, and he shall prescribe regulations for the conduct of the proceedings before such boards. . . .
3. A recommendation of removal by a loyalty board shall be subject to appeal by the officer or employee affected, prior to his removal, to the head of the employing department or agency or to such person or persons as may be designated by such head, under such regulations as may be prescribed by him, and the decision of the department or agency concerned shall be subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, for an advisory recommendation.
4. The rights of hearing, notice thereof, and appeal therefrom shall be accorded to every officer or employee prior to his removal on grounds of disloyalty, irrespective of tenure, or of manner, method, or nature of appointment, but the head of the employing department or agency may suspend any officer or employee at any time pending a determination with respect to loyalty.
5. The loyalty boards of the various departments and agencies shall furnish to the Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, such reports as may be requested concerning the operation of the loyalty program in any such department or agency.

[. . .]

PART V—STANDARDS

1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States.
2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following:
   a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs;
   b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof;
   c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States;
   d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States;

e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
f. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Source: Harry Truman, Executive Order 9835, *Code of Federal Regulations*, Title 3, Sec. 675 (1943–1948).

18. George C. Marshall: Remarks by the Secretary of State (Marshall Plan), 5 June 1947

Introduction

By spring 1947, it was becoming clear that Western Europe was unlikely to recover from the devastation of World War II without a major infusion of outside funds. The harsh winter of 1946–1947 brought short-time working, power cuts, food and fuel shortages, and social unrest in France and Italy, enhancing the political position of domestic communist parties in the latter two countries. European leaders, spearheaded by the British, appealed to the United States for economic aid. State Department officials such as Undersecretary of State Will Clayton who toured Europe in early 1947 returned convinced that without such assistance, the West European nations were likely to collapse, and communist regimes that looked to Moscow for guidance might well come to power there. On 5 June 1947 in a speech at the commencement ceremony of Harvard College in Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed that the United States grant financial aid to countries in need to prevent them from succumbing to communism. U.S. President Harry S. Truman later dubbed the proposal the Marshall Plan, and it became one of the major U.S. initiatives of the early Cold War. American officials invited all European countries, including the communist satellite states in Eastern Europe, to participate in the plan, which envisaged a carefully coordinated scheme to revive the economies of all the European nations rather than a series of bilateral programs between the individual countries and the United States. To join the enterprise, each nation had to provide accurate and detailed economic information. Several East European states initially expressed interest in taking part but, on Soviet instructions, eventually withdrew. Congress debated the Marshall Plan throughout 1948 and eventually enacted a series of laws to implement the plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program and run by the Economic Cooperation Administration. By 1953 the United States had provided approximately $13 billion in aid under the Marshall Plan, most of it directed to European nations but some to China, whose political allies in Congress demanded that China be included. The Marshall Plan gave a great boost to European economic recovery and helped to usher in two decades of prosperity in Western Europe. The plan also helped to intensify the Cold War. The inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in the Marshall Plan led Soviet leader Josef Stalin to fear that any German economic revival would eventually lead to a German military resurgence that would once more threaten the security of the Soviet state, and this was one reason for the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949, a period when for almost a year East German and Soviet forces denied the Western powers land access to West Berlin. In 1948 Soviet-backed coups in Hungary and Czechoslovakia also ejected all noncommunist elements from the governments of those two states, tightening Soviet control. In response, in 1949 the Western powers established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization security pact in which the United States, Canada, and ten West European states agreed to come to each other's assistance should any of them be attacked by another power.

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I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reaction of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of the European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies and shipping companies disappeared, through the loss of capital, absorption through nationalization or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that 2 years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply.

Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next 3 or 4 years of foreign food and other essential products —principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in

the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibilities which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

Source: George C. Marshall, "European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery," *Department of State Bulletin* 16(415) (1947): 1159–1160.

19. National Security Act, 26 July 1947

Introduction

At the end of World War II, American officials believed that the demands of national security required a major overhaul of the associated bureaucracy, aimed at the consolidated administration of the country's armed forces and foreign policy apparatus. Until that time, the army and the navy had functioned as two separate and often rival bureaucracies that often had difficulty consolidating their operations. Against considerable opposition from the navy, on 26 July 1947 the National Security Act placed the various branches of the U.S. armed forces under one administrative unit, the National Military Establishment, that replaced the War and Navy Departments. The National Military Establishment was to be overseen by the secretary of defense. This position was a new one, replacing the secretary of war, and was superior to the subordinated individual service secretaries of the army, navy, and air force. The air force, which had been a branch of the U.S. Army, became a separate service. This reorganization suited the needs of the country in light of the ongoing Cold War, which because of its unique characteristic of not being an actual military war had fallen outside the purview of the secretary of war. The National Military Establishment was renamed the Department of Defense two years later, at which time the authority of the secretary of defense over the individual services was also strengthened. The National Security Act also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the first overseas espionage organization created in the United States in time of peace, with a mandate both to gather information and to mount covert operations; the National Security Agency, a surveillance and decrypting organization; the Defense Intelligence Agency, part of the new Defense Department;

and a National Intelligence Council to coordinate all the various governmental intelligence bureaus. In addition, the act established a National Security Council (NSC), its members to include the president and vice president and the heads of all the organizations, including the State and Defense Departments and the CIA, involved in the formulation of diplomatic and military policies to coordinate their making and direction. Every year, the president was required to submit a National Security Strategy Report to Congress. The NSC, based in the White House, fell under the direction of the president's national security advisor, a new position intended to synchronize and integrate the activities of all the bureaucratic agencies involved. Since the national security advisor enjoyed ready access to the president, from the 1960s onward the incumbent of that position often rivaled the secretary of state in influence over the making of foreign policy. The National Security Act gave striking evidence of the dramatic post–World War II expansion of U.S. international activities as the country became the world's greatest economic and military power. Many of the individuals working within the national security apparatus were extremely and assertively conscious of their country's new global stature and wished to maintain it on a permanent basis, a development that the National Security Act facilitated.

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Section 401. Congressional declaration of purpose

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff.

[. . .]

SUBCHAPTER I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Section 402. National Security Council

(a) Establishment; presiding officer; functions; composition. There is established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. The Council shall be composed of—

(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
(6) the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions

Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.

(b) Additional functions. In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

[. . .]

Section 403. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

(a) Director of Central Intelligence. There is a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall—

(1) serve as head of the United States intelligence community;
(2) act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security; and
(3) serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

[. . .]

Section 403-1. Central Intelligence Agency

There is a Central Intelligence Agency. The function of the Agency shall be to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities referred to in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 403–3(d) of this title.

Section 403-2. Intelligence Community contracting

The Director of Central Intelligence shall direct that elements of the Intelligence Community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with the operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, shall award contracts in a manner that would maximize the procurement of products in the United States. For purposes of this provision, the term "Intelligence Community" has the same meaning as set forth in paragraph 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333, dated December 4, 1981, or successor orders.

[. . .]

Section 403-7. Prohibition on using journalists as agents or assets

(a) Policy. It is the policy of the United States that an element of the Intelligence Community may not use as an agent or asset for the purposes of collecting intelligence any individual who—

(1) is authorized by contract or by the issuance of press credentials to represent himself or herself, either in the United States or abroad, as a correspondent of a United States news media organization; or
(2) is officially recognized by a foreign government as a representative of a United States media organization.

(b) Waiver. Pursuant to such procedures as the President may prescribe, the President or the Director of Central Intelligence may waive subsection (a) of this section in the case of an individual if the President or the Director, as the case may be, makes a written determination that the waiver is necessary to address the overriding national security interest of the United States. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall be notified of any waiver under this subsection.

(c) Voluntary cooperation. Subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed to prohibit the voluntary cooperation of any person who is aware that the cooperation is being provided to an element of the United States Intelligence Community.

[. . .]

Section 404. Emergency preparedness

(a) Employment of personnel. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, subject to the direction of the President, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist him in carrying out his functions.

(b) Functions. It shall be the function of the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including—

(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;
(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;
(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;
(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;
(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;
(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

(c) Utilization of Government resources and facilities. In performing his functions, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

[. . .]

Source: National Security Act, U.S. Code 50, §§ 401 et seq.

20. Soviet Announcement of the Establishment of the Cominform, 1 September 1947

Introduction

U.S. plans announced by Secretary of State George Marshall in June 1947 to mount and fund a major coordinated initiative for the economic revival of the West European nations, the western sectors of Germany included, alarmed Soviet leader Josef Stalin. The Russians feared that a revitalized Germany would once again pose a military threat to the countries to its east. They were also concerned that the new economic aid plan would serve as a means of detaching their East European satellites from the Soviet bloc. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary all initially expressed interest in attending the meetings held in Paris in July 1947 by states interested in joining the plan but, under Soviet pressure, eventually declined to do so. The episode impelled the Soviets to develop closer bonds among the various European communist parties in order to coordinate their policies and enhance Soviet influence. In September 1947 representatives of the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy attended a conference at Sklarska Poreba, Poland. The meeting established the Cominform, a bureau whose functions included both propaganda and the harmonization of policies among the various European communist parties. Although restricted to European communist parties, the new

organization was a successor to the Comintern, established by the Soviet Union at the end of World War I to promote and direct international revolution, that had been disbanded during World War II. Cominform headquarters were originally set up in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital. In 1948, however, the growing independence of Marshal Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslav communist leader, caused Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Comintern, and the body moved to Bucharest, Romania. The Cominform effectively provided an apparatus that facilitated Soviet attempts to control the policies of the assorted European communist parties. In 1956, shortly after a reconciliation had been effected between the Soviet and Yugoslav communist governments, the Cominform was disbanded. The measure was considered part of the campaign for de-Stalinization launched by new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to dismantle the worst aspects of his predecessor's rule.

Primary Source

The conference states that the absence of connections between Communist parties who have taken part in this conference is in the present situation a serious shortcoming. Experience has shown that such division between Communist parties is incorrect and harmful. The requirement for an exchange of experience and voluntary coordination of actions of the separate parties has become particularly necessary now in conditions of the complicated post-war international situation and when the disunity of Communist parties may lead to damage for the working class.

Because of this, members of the conference agreed on the following:

First, to set up an Information Bureau of representatives of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers party (of Communists) of Rumania, the Hungarian Communist party, the Polish Workers party, the All-Union Communist party (bolshevik), the Communist party of France, the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, the Communist party of Italy.

Second, the task given to the Information Bureau is to organize and exchange experiences and, in case of necessity, coordinate the activity of communist parties on foundation of mutual agreement.

Third, the Information Bureau will have in it representatives of the Central Committee—two from each Central Committee. Delegations of the Central Committee must be appointed and replaced by the Central Committees.

Fourth, the Information Bureau is to have printed an organ—fortnightly and, later on, weekly. The organ is to be published in French and Russian and, if possible, in other languages.

Fifth, the Information Bureau is to be in Belgrade.

Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Strategy and Tactics of World Communism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948).

21. Rio de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security (Rio Pact), August–September 1947

Introduction

Since the early nineteenth century, the United States had arrogated to itself a position of predominance in the Western Hemisphere. After World War II, the administration of President Harry S. Truman moved to safeguard U.S. interests in Latin America, including the strategically important Panama Canal. During the 1930s, American officials had been particularly alarmed by the readiness of some nations, especially those such as Argentina and Paraguay that were ruled by autocratic dictators, to contemplate military cooperation with the Axis states: Germany, Italy, and Japan. Once the United States entered World War II, however, all the Latin American states with the exception of Uruguay, which remained neutral, followed suit and declared war on the Axis. Under the Act of Cha-

pultepec, signed at the Conference on Inter-American Problems of War and Peace held in Mexico City in 1945, the United States and the Latin American nations—but not Canada—agreed to establish a regional organization to maintain peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. This was accomplished at a conference held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, two years later during which the United States and nineteen Latin American signatory states agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American states." To allay fears by some Latin American signatories that this might involve their countries in unwanted conflicts, the pact included a provision that any collective action required the consent of two-thirds of the parties and that no one state could be forced to take action if it did not wish to do so. The delegates also found it impossible to agree on precisely what constituted "an act of aggression" or on just how the signatories should respond. These reservations reflected the fears of many Latin American nations that the treaty opened the way for future American intervention in their affairs, although small states also perceived it as a guarantee against encroachments by larger and more powerful neighbors. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter had provided for such regional defensive arrangements, and the Rio Pact was the first such to be negotiated. The U.S. Senate, which perceived the agreement as tangible evidence of their country's effective hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, gave the treaty an enthusiastic reception, with a 72–1 vote in favor of ratification. Latin American leaders hoped that the U.S. government would complement the Rio Pact with a substantial economic assistance and development program, resembling the contemporaneous Marshall Plan for European recovery, but the Truman administration preferred to leave this largely to the private sector. The Rio Pact was first invoked in December 1948 when Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle sponsored an invasion of Costa Rica by a right-wing exile force and the Costa Rican government requested its withdrawal, which ultimately occurred. During the 1950s and 1960s, Rio Pact signatories frequently sought assistance under its provisions. Unilateral U.S. interventions, often covert, against communist or leftist regimes in Guatemala in 1953, Cuba in 1961, and the Dominican Republic in 1965 were undertaken outside the Rio Pact framework, evidence of the extent to which the United States not only dominated the Rio Pact but could at its pleasure ignore the treaty's stipulations. Again, in Chile, top American officials were at least cognizant of a projected 1973 coup against populist President Salvador Allende, in the course of which Allende died. Although several newly independent small states later joined the pact—Trinidad and Tobago in 1967, Belize in 1981, and the Bahamas in 1982—during the 1980s and 1990s it became something of a dead letter, as the Reagan administration and its successors responded forcefully to crises in Nicaragua, Central America, Panama, and Haiti without reference to the treaty. The United States did, however, resort to invoking the Rio Pact in 2001 after the radical Muslim organization al-Qaeda launched terrorist attacks against the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C., and the World Trade Center in New York City.

Primary Source

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

[. . .]

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty.

Article 2. As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding Article, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the Inter-American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations.

Article 3.

1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.
3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.
4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

[. . .]

Article 5. The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security.

Article 6. If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

Article 7. In the case of a conflict between two or more American States, without prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the High Contracting Parties, meeting in consultation shall call upon the contending States to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the *status quo ante bellum*, and shall take in addition all other necessary measures to reestablish or maintain inter-American peace and security and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. The rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and in the application of the measures which the consultative meeting may agree upon.

Article 8. For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.

Article 9. In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following shall be considered as such:

a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or air forces of another State;
b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another State.

Article 10. None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 421–426.

22. Charter of the Organization of American States, Bogotá Conference of American States, 30 March–2 May 1948

Introduction

The Organization of American States (OAS), a Pan-American body to encourage regional cooperation, traces its origins back to the International Union of American Republics, founded in 1890, a body that later, in 1910, became the Pan American Union. The current OAS was established at the Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogotá from March to May 1948, an occasion marred by fierce anti-American protests directed at U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Twenty-one American countries signed the organization's charter, binding themselves to battle communism in the Western Hemisphere and adopting the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the first human rights manifesto accepted by any international gathering of states. The OAS was designed to supplement the Rio Pact, a defensive military and security alliance concluded in September 1947 that linked the United States (but not, until 1990, Canada) and nineteen Latin American nations. According to the OAS Charter, the broad purposes of its signatories were "to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence." The principles and objectives that the new body sought to facilitate included strengthening peace and security throughout the Western Hemisphere; the promotion of democracy; nonintervention in the affairs of other states; the peaceful settlement of disputes among member states; common action against aggression; the resolution of political, economic, and judicial problems; the promotion of economic, social, and cultural development; the eradication of poverty; and arms control and limitation. Modeled on the United Nations, the OAS was headquartered in Washington, D.C., and possessed a General Secretariat headed by a secretary general, a Permanent Council, and a General Assembly. The OAS held regular meetings. As more Latin American states, mostly in the Caribbean, gained independence, all joined the OAS, which had thirty-five members by the early twenty-first century. The OAS member states could undertake collective action against transgressors, but this required a two-thirds majority of the foreign ministers. The OAS sought to mediate disagreements among members in order to prevent them from exploding into outright confrontation and successfully resolved a substantial number of border disputes. Between 1962 and 2002, OAS observers supervised more than one hundred elections in member states in order to ensure that they were free and fair. During the Cold War, the OAS tended to endorse American Cold War policies, suspending Cuba's membership in 1961 after that state had declared itself a Marxist-Leninist nation but leaving undisturbed as members American-backed military dictatorships that held power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala. In response to Cuban efforts to promote revolution elsewhere in Latin America, between 1964 and 1975 the OAS imposed economic sanctions on Cuba while withdrawing diplomatic recognition. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the OAS supported President John F. Kennedy's naval quarantine of Cuba, and in 1965 it endorsed the unilateral U.S. intervention to prevent a leftist government from gaining power in the Dominican Republic. Toward the end of the Cold War, the OAS began to exhibit greater independence of the United States. It declined to oppose the left-wing Sandinista government that ruled Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990 on the grounds that however opprobrious it was to the United States, this regime posed no real threat to hemispheric security. The OAS also issued regular reports on the state of human rights in the various Latin American nations and increasingly stressed its role in encouraging peace, social justice, democracy, and economic development.

Primary Source

In the name of their peoples, the States represented at the Ninth International Conference of American States,

[. . .]

Have agreed upon the following

CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
PART ONE
CHAPTER 1: NATURE AND PURPOSES

ARTICLE 1

The American States establish by this Charter the international organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence. Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency.

ARTICLE 2

All American States that ratify the present Charter are Members of the Organization.

ARTICLE 3

Any new political entity that arises from the union of several Member States and that, as such, ratifies the present Charter, shall become a Member of the Organization. The entry of the new political entity into the Organization shall result in the loss of membership of each one of the States which constitute it.

ARTICLE 4

The Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following essential purposes:

a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
b) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States;
c) To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression;
d) To seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that may arise among them; and
e) To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development.

CHAPTER II: PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 5

The American States reaffirm the following principles:

a) International law is the standard of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations;
b) International order consists essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law;
c) Good faith shall govern the relations between States;
d) The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy;
e) The American States condemn war of aggression: victory does not give rights;
f) An act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States;
g) Controversies of an international character arising between two or more American States shall be settled by peaceful procedures;
h) Social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace;
i) Economic cooperation is essential to the common welfare and prosperity of the peoples of the continent;
j) The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex;
k) The spiritual unity of the continent is based on respect for the cultural values of the American countries and requires their close cooperation for the high purposes of civilization;
l) The education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom and peace.

CHAPTER III: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES

ARTICLE 6

States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise these rights, and have equal duties. The rights of each State depend not upon its power to ensure the exercise thereof, but upon the mere fact of its existence as a person under international law.

ARTICLE 7

Every American State has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed by every other State in accordance with international law.

ARTICLE 8

The fundamental rights of States may not be impaired in any manner whatsoever.

ARTICLE 9

The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other States. Even before being recognized, the State has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise of the rights of other States in accordance with international law.

ARTICLE 10

Recognition implies that the State granting it accepts the personality of the new State, with all the rights and duties that international law prescribes for the two States.

ARTICLE 11

The right of each State to protect itself and to live its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another State.

ARTICLE 12

The jurisdiction of States within the limits of their national territory is exercised equally over all the inhabitants, whether nationals or aliens.

ARTICLE 13

Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality.

ARTICLE 14

Respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitute standards for the development of peaceful relations among States. International treaties and agreements should be public.

ARTICLE 15

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

ARTICLE 16

No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

ARTICLE 17

The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

ARTICLE 18

The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.

ARTICLE 19

Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17.

CHAPTER IV: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 20

All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 21

The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time.

ARTICLE 22

In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American States which, in the opinion of one of them, cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channels, the Parties shall agree on some other peaceful procedure that will enable them to reach a solution.

ARTICLE 23

A special treaty will establish adequate procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes and will determine the appropriate means for their application, so that no dispute between American States shall fail of definitive settlement within a reasonable period.

CHAPTER V: COLLECTIVE SECURITY

ARTICLE 24

Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States.

ARTICLE 25

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.

CHAPTER VI: ECONOMIC STANDARDS

ARTICLE 26

The Member States agree to cooperate with one another, as far as their resources may permit and their laws may provide, in the broadest spirit of good neighborliness, in order to strengthen their economic structure, develop their agriculture and mining, promote their industry and increase their trade.

ARTICLE 27

If the economy of an American State is affected by serious conditions that cannot be satisfactorily remedied by its own unaided effort, such State may place its economic problems before the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to seek through consultation the most appropriate solution for such problems.

CHAPTER VII: SOCIAL STANDARDS

ARTICLE 28

The Member States agree to cooperate with one another to achieve just and decent living conditions for their entire populations.

ARTICLE 29

The Member States agree upon the desirability of developing their social legislation on the following bases:

a) All human beings, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, creed or social condition, have the right to attain material well-being and spiritual growth under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security;
b) Work is a right and a social duty; it shall not be considered as an article of commerce; it demands respect for freedom of association and for the dignity of the worker; and it is to be performed under conditions that ensure life, health and a decent standard of living, both during the working years and during old age, or when any circumstance deprives the individual of the possibility of working.

CHAPTER VIII: CULTURAL STANDARDS

ARTICLE 30

The Member States agree to promote, in accordance with their constitutional provisions and their material resources, the exercise of the right to education, on the following bases:

a) Elementary education shall be compulsory and, when provided by the State, shall be without cost;
b) Higher education shall be available to all, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, language, creed or social condition.

ARTICLE 31

With due consideration for the national character of each State, the Member States undertake to facilitate free cultural interchange by every medium of expression.

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 427–445.

23. Harry S. Truman: Statement Recognizing the Creation of Israel, 15 May 1948

Introduction

Since well before World War I, Zionists around the world had sought the reestablishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, the biblical Holy Land. In the November 1917 Balfour Declaration, Great Britain, which took administration of the area under a League of Nations mandate after World War I, promised international Jewry a homeland in Palestine, although the terms of this statement left it unclear whether or not this would be a separate state. Between the world wars, hundreds of thousands of Jews immigrated to Palestine, where the local Arab community deeply resented their presence. After World War II, Zionists, often citing the deaths of 6 million European Jews at the hands of Hitler's Germany, again took up the cause of an independent Jewish state. Against the advice of Secretary of State George Marshall, who feared that creating such an entity would permanently alienate Arab countries throughout the oil-rich Middle East, President Harry S. Truman supported its creation in the former British mandate. As soon as the state of Israel came into existence, Truman recognized it. Israel was immediately confronted by a military attack from its Arab neighbors, and the Soviet Union, which had also recognized the new state, sent massive arms shipments as they competed for its allegiance. Caught between the passionate support that American Jews accorded Israel and their fear of further alienating resentful and oil-rich Arab states, whose anger might propel them toward the Soviets, in 1948 U.S. officials launched the first of many successive and still-continuing efforts to negotiate a lasting Middle East peace settlement between Arabs and Israelis. Meanwhile, the powerful domestic Jewish lobby ensured that the small beleaguered Israeli state quickly became the single largest recipient of American military and economic aid, a virtual U.S. client.

Primary Source

Text of Letter from the Agent of the Provisional Government of Israel to the President of the U.S. [Released to the press by the White House on 15 May]

My Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the provisional government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations.

Very respectfully yours,
Eliahu Epstein
Agent, Provisional Government of Israel

Statement by President Truman [Released to the press by the White House on 14 May]
This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel.

Source: "Israel Proclaimed As an Independent Republic," *Department of State Bulletin* 18(464) (1948): 673.

24. Vandenberg Resolution (Senate Resolution 239), 80th Congress, 11 June 1948

Introduction

Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1948, was a leading Republican senator who played a major role in converting his once isolationist party to support for internationalist policies during World War II. As a delegate to the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drew up the final United Nations Charter, Vandenberg, already suspicious of Soviet communism, obtained the inclusion of an article permitting the creation of separate regional security organizations. Seeking to ensure Republican support for its foreign policy initiatives, the Democratic administration of President Harry S. Truman sedulously cultivated Vandenberg, including him in the U.S. delegations to postwar meetings of Big Four (U.S., Soviet, British, and Chinese) foreign ministers in New York, Paris, and London intended to resolve remaining outstanding questions from World War II. These assignments convinced Vandenberg of the impossibility of reaching agreements with the Soviet Union. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1947 and 1948, he therefore worked diligently to implement the Truman Doctrine aid program for Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan. In 1948 he introduced a resolution in the Senate endorsing the creation of regional collective security arrangements among specific nations. Passed in June 1948, the Vandenberg Resolution paved the way for the Senate to approve the creation in April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a defensive security pact whereby twelve North American and West European countries, including the United States, pledged themselves to come to each other's assistance should any be attacked by another power. Although no potential enemy was mentioned, this was implicitly an anti-Soviet alliance, designed to protect the signatories from any potential Soviet or communist threat.

Primary Source

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

2. Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.
3. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.
4. Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.
5. Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.
6. If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Source: U.S. Congress, Vandenberg Resolution, S Res 283, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 June 1948.

25. Cominform Resolution on Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Reply, June–July 1948

Introduction

Soviet demands that all other communist parties subordinate themselves to Soviet direction gave rise to major divisions within the communist bloc. Within Eastern Europe, Soviet military forces driving the German armies back at the end of World War II had normally installed communist governments in those states that they liberated or conquered. In mountainous Yugoslavia, however, indigenous communist resistance forces had waged a brutal guerrilla war against both German occupying forces and their own political rivals. At the end of World War II, Soviet forces had temporarily entered Yugoslavia to assist the communist partisans led by Josip Broz Tito in defeating the Germans, but at the end of hostilities the Soviet troops left. Tito soon followed an independent line in foreign policy. Although Soviet leader Josef Stalin had agreed with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that Greece would fall within the British sphere of influence, for several years Tito encouraged and assisted a serious communist insurgency in that country. He was also eager to unite Yugoslavia with Bulgaria and Albania, a policy that although initially favored by Stalin may have aroused the Russian dictator's fears that such territorial aggrandizement would unduly enhance Tito's own power. Ideological differences over agricultural policy and internal party structure also divided the Soviet Union and Russia. In June 1948 the newly established Cominform, set up in September 1947 to coordinate the activities of European communist parties with Soviet policy and headquartered in Belgrade, passed a resolution denouncing Tito's policies and expelling Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia responded defiantly, rejecting all the Cominform's charges and stating that the Cominform was in breach of its founding principles, under which every member communist party was free to reach its own conclusions and should not be subject to Cominform dictation. Stalin, perhaps remembering the Germans' inability to subdue Yugoslavia during World War II and bearing in mind Tito's proven prowess as a guerrilla leader, refrained from any military attack on Yugoslavia. Instead, the Soviets turned to rooting out Titoism and undesirable symptoms of independence in any other East European communist party. Tito, meanwhile, turned to the Western powers for economic assistance. U.S. officials welcomed this evidence of internal dissensions within the communist camp and hoped that other communist parties, including that of China, would emulate Tito in breaking with the Soviet Union. In 1956 Nikita Khrushchev, who rejected much of Stalin's legacy, initiated a reconciliation with Tito, but Yugoslavia always remained outside the Warsaw Pact and chose to follow its own course, independent of Soviet direction.

Primary Source

Cominform Communiqué, 28 June 1948

Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

The Information Bureau, composed of the representatives of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), Rumanian Workers' Party, Hungarian Workers' party, Polish Workers' Party, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (CPSU (B)), Communist Party of France, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy, upon discussing the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and announcing that the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had refused to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, unanimously reached the following conclusions:

1. The Information Bureau notes that recently the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this connection the Information Bureau approves the action of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B), which took the initiative in exposing this incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, particularly the incorrect policy of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic.

2. The Information Bureau declares that the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU (B). An undignified policy of defaming Soviet military experts and discrediting the Soviet Union, has been carried out in Yugoslavia. A special regime was instituted for Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia, whereby they were under surveillance of Yugoslav state security organs and were continually followed. The representative of the CPSU (B) in the Information Bureau, Comrade Yudin, and a number of official representatives of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia, were followed and kept under observation by Yugoslav state security organs.

All these and similar facts show that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have taken a stand unworthy of Communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave to the bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the 'degeneration' of the CPSU (B), about the 'degeneration' of the USSR, and so on, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau denounces this anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as being incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and only appropriate to nationalists.

3. In home policy, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are departing from the positions of the working class and are breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. They deny that there is a growth of capitalist elements in their country, and consequently, a sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside. This denial is the direct result of the opportunist tenet that the class struggle does not become sharper during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, as Marxism-Leninism teaches, but dies down, as was affirmed by opportunists of the Bukharin type, who propagated the theory of the peaceful growing over of capitalism into socialism.

[. . .]

4. The Information Bureau considers that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is revising the Marxist-Leninist teachings about the Party. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Party is the main guiding and leading force in the country, which has its own, specific programme, and does not dissolve itself among the non-Party masses. The Party is the highest form of organization and the most important weapon of the working class.

In Yugoslavia, however, the People's Front, and not the Communist Party, is considered to be the main leading force in the country. The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Communist Party and actually dissolve the Party in the non-party People's Front, which is com-

posed of the most varied class elements (workers, peasants engaged in individual farming, kulaks, traders, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, etc.) as well as mixed political groups which include certain bourgeois parties. The Yugoslav leaders stubbornly refuse to recognize the falseness of their tenet that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia allegedly cannot and should not have its own specific programme and that it should be satisfied with the programme of the People's Front.

[. . .]

The Information Bureau believes that this policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia threatens the very existence of the Communist Party, and ultimately carries with it the danger of the degeneration of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

5. The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party. Despite the unfounded assurances of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, the majority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is composed of co-opted, and not of elected members. The Communist Party is actually in a position of semi-legality. Party meetings are either not held at all, or meet in secret—a fact which can only undermine the influence of the Party among the masses. This type of organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party cannot be described as anything but a sectarian-bureaucratic organization. It leads to the liquidation of the Party as an active, self-acting organism, it cultivates military methods of leadership in the Party similar to the methods advocated in his day by Trotsky.

It is a completely intolerable state of affairs when the most elementary rights of members in the Yugoslav Communist Party are suppressed, when the slightest criticism of incorrect measures in the Party is brutally repressed.

The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the Central Committee members, Comrades Djuiovic and Hebrang, because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

The Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely Turkish, terrorist regime cannot be tolerated in the Communist Party. The interests of the very existence and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party demand that an end be put to this regime.

6. The Information Bureau considers that the criticism made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and Central Committees of the other Communist Parties of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and who in this way rendered fraternal assistance to the Yugoslav Communist Party, provides the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with all the conditions necessary to speedily correct the mistakes committed.

However, instead of honestly accepting this criticism and taking the Bolshevik path of correcting these mistakes, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, suffering from boundless ambition, arrogance and conceit, met this criticism with belligerence and hostility. They took the anti-Party path of indiscriminately denying all their mistakes, violated the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism regarding the attitude of a political party to its mistakes and thus aggravated their anti-Party mistakes.

[. . .]

7. Taking into account the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and seeking to show the leaders of the Party the way out of this situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and the Central Committees of other fraternal parties, suggested that the matter of the Yugoslav Communist Party should be discussed at a meeting of the Information Bureau, on the same, normal party footing as that on which the activities of other Communist Parties were discussed at the first meeting of the Information Bureau.

However, the Yugoslav leaders rejected the repeated suggestions of the fraternal Communist Parties to discuss the situation in the Yugoslav Party at a meeting of the Information Bureau.

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8. In view of this, the Information Bureau expresses complete agreement with the estimation of the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party, with the criticism of the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Party, and with the political analysis of these mistakes contained in letters from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between March and May 1948.

The Information Bureau unanimously concludes that by their anti-Party and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the Information Bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the united socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism.

The Information Bureau condemns this anti-Party policy and attitude of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Information Bureau considers that, in view of all this, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.

The Information Bureau considers that the basis of these mistakes made by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia lies in the undoubted fact that nationalist elements, which previously existed in a disguised form, managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that consequently the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party has broken with the international traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and has taken the road of nationalism.

Considerably overestimating the internal, national forces of Yugoslavia and their influence, the Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and build socialism without the support of the Communist Parties of other countries, without the support of the people's democracies, without the support of the Soviet Union. They think that the new Yugoslavia can do without the help of these revolutionary forces.

Showing their poor understanding of the international situation and their intimidation by the blackmailing threats of the imperialists, the Yugoslav leaders think that by making concessions they can curry favour with the Imperialist states. They think they will be able to bargain with them for Yugoslavia's independence and, gradually, get the people of Yugoslavia orientated on these states, that is, on capitalism. In this they proceed tacitly from the well-known bourgeois-nationalist thesis that 'capitalist states are a lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union'.

The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united socialist front.

Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism.

Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honourable task.

Statement of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the Resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties on the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 29 June 1948
[. . .]

In connection with the publication of the Resolution of the Information Bureau, the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) makes the following statement:

1. The criticism contained in the Resolution is based on inaccurate and unfounded assertions and represents an attempt to destroy the prestige of the CPY both abroad and in the country, to arouse confusion amongst the masses in the country and in the international workers' movement, to weaken the unity within the CPY and its leading role. . . .

2. The Resolution maintains, without citing any proof, that the leadership of the CPY carried out a hostile policy towards the USSR. The statement that Soviet military specialists in Yugoslavia have been treated with scant respect, and that Soviet civilian citizens have been under the surveillance of state security agents does not in the least correspond to the truth.

[. . .]

On the contrary, it is correct, as stated in the letter to the CC of the CPSU of 13 April, and based on numerous reports of members of the CPY to their Party organizations as well as on statements of other citizens of our country, that from the liberation up to date the Soviet intelligence service sought to enroll them. The CC of the CPY considered and considers that such an attitude towards a country where the communists are the ruling party and which is advancing toward socialism is impermissible—and that it leads towards the demoralization of the citizens of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia and towards the weakening and undermining of the governmental and Party leadership. The CC of the CPY considered and considers that the relationship of Yugoslavia toward the USSR must be based exclusively on confidence and sincerity and, in keeping with this principle, Yugoslav State organs never even dreamed of following or exercising any control over Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia.

[. . .]

8. The CC of the CPY does not consider that by refusing to discuss the mistakes of which it is not guilty, it has in any way injured the unity of the communist front. The unity of this front is not based on the admission of invented or fabricated errors and slanders, but on the fact of whether or not the policy of a Party is actually internationalist. One cannot, however, ignore the fact that the Information Bureau has committed a breach of the principles on which it was based and which provide for the voluntary adoption of conclusions by every Party. The Informbureau, however, not only forces the leaders of the CPY to admit errors which they did not commit but also calls members of the CPY to rebellion within the Party, to shatter the unity of the Party. The CC of the CPY can never agree to a discussion about its policy on the basis of inventions and uncomradely behaviour without mutual confidence. Such a basis is not one of principle and in this and only in this sense the CC of the CPY considered that it was not on an equal footing in the discussion and that it could not accept discussion on that basis. Further, in connection with the above, the CC of the CPY resolutely rejects the accusation that the CPY has passed on to positions of nationalism. By its entire internal and foreign policy, and especially by its struggle during the national liberation war and the proper solution of the national question in Yugoslavia, the CPY has given proof of the exact opposite.

By the above-mentioned unjust charges, the greatest historical injustice has been done to our Party, our

working class and working masses, the peoples in Yugoslavia in general and their unselfish and heroic struggle.

It is clear to the CC of the CPY that the charges of the CC of the CPSU against the CC of the CPY will be used by enemy propaganda for the purpose of slandering the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other democratic countries. The CC of the CPY, however, declares that it bears no responsibility for all these phenomena as it did not provoke them by any act of its own.

The CC of the CPY calls upon the Party membership to close their ranks in the struggle for the realization of the Party line and for even greater strengthening of Party unity, while it calls upon the working class and other working masses, gathered in the People's Front, to continue to work even more persistently on the building of our socialist homeland. This is the only way, the only method to prove in full and by deeds the unjustness of the abovementioned charges.

The Plenum of the CC of the CPY
Belgrade

Source: *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 61–79.

26. Soviet and Allied Statements on the Berlin Blockade, July 1948

Introduction

From spring 1945 when the World War II Allies defeated Germany until 1948, growing Cold War tensions meant that the former Allies were unable to reach agreement on the future government of Germany. In May 1948 the three Western powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, each of which, with the Soviet Union, had since 1945 occupied one sector of Berlin, the symbolically significant former German capital—decided to merge their zones and introduce the new west German deutsche mark there. They also announced that western Germany would definitely participate in the newly formulated European Recovery Program (also known as the Marshall Plan), designed to facilitate Europe's postwar economic revival. From late March 1948 onward the apprehensive Soviet Union had begun to tighten its grip on freight traffic into Berlin. On 24 June the Soviets dramatically cut off all land access—by rail, road, or water—to western Berlin, which lay deep within the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, soon to become the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The Soviet objective was to take over all Berlin, where they announced that the four-power administration had ceased and the Allies no longer possessed any rights. This would have eliminated the western bastion of Berlin, which not only possessed symbolic significance but also served as a conduit through which, between 1945 and 1952, 2 million East Germans migrated to the West, an embarrassing hemorrhage that also deprived the East of many young, well-qualified workers. Soviet obduracy met Western resolve. Beginning on 26 June, a massive American and British airlift ferried all essential supplies into West Berlin and also transported West Berlin's greatly reduced industrial exports to the West. A Western counterblockade of the Soviet zone in turn proved economically damaging, and each side progressively took incremental steps to tighten its control. In February 1949, for example, the West announced that in the future only German marks were legal tender in Berlin, while the Soviets expropriated the homes, land, and businesses of East Berlin residents deemed to be bourgeois or capitalist in outlook. Although the Soviets lifted the blockade in May 1949, flights continued until September, and during a fifteen-month period 275,000 flights transported in all more than 2.323 million tons of food, fuel, machinery, and other supplies at a cost of $224 million. Initially, international tensions continued to increase. The two sides exchanged hostile notes, each affirming their own position, and compromise seemed unlikely. By mid-July the Soviet army of occupation in East Germany had swelled to forty divisions, whereas the Allies still had only eight divisions in the western sectors. Both sides nonetheless demonstrated the practical caution that often characterized Cold War crises. The Western powers avoided any potential direct military confrontation with Soviet forces by eschewing attempts to resupply Berlin by road across Soviet-occupied territory, rejecting early recommendations from General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the U.S. zone of Germany, that armed supply convoys be sent along East German highways to Berlin. Despite their strong protests and sporadic public

announcements that they required the air corridors for their own military maneuvers, the Soviets likewise refrained from shooting down Western aircraft resupplying Berlin, although during the fifteen months in which such missions were flown, sixty fliers lost their lives in airplane crashes. The Berlin Blockade contributed to the Western decision to abandon hope of German reunification and establish a separate state, the Federal Republic of Germany, in the former Western occupation sectors. With its foundation and that of East Germany in 1949, the territorial borders of Cold War Europe were clearly delineated, in many ways helping to stabilize a division that lasted until 1989. The first Berlin crisis also persuaded the United States to sign the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, concluding a permanent military alliance with most West European states to which it extended a security guarantee. The blockade helped to persuade West Germans that their future lay in an alliance with the West.

Primary Source

Note from the United States to the Soviet Union, 6 July 1948

The United States Government wishes to call to the attention of the Soviet Government the extremely serious international situation which has been brought about by the actions of the Soviet Government in imposing restrictive measures on transport which amount now to a blockade against the sectors in Berlin occupied by the United States, United Kingdom and France. The United States Government regards these measures of blockade as a clear violation of existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin by the four occupying powers.

The rights of the United States as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. The international agreements undertaken in connection therewith by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union defined the zones in Germany and the sectors in Berlin which are occupied by these powers. They established the quadripartite control of Berlin on a basis of friendly cooperation which the Government of the United States earnestly desires to continue to pursue.

These agreements implied the right of free access to Berlin. This right has long been confirmed by usage. It was directly specified in a message sent by President Truman to Premier Stalin on June 14, 1945, which agreed to the withdrawal of United States forces to the zonal boundaries, provided satisfactory arrangements could be entered into between the military commanders, which would give access by rail, road and air to United States forces in Berlin. Premier Stalin replied on June 16 suggesting a change in date but no other alteration in the plan proposed by the President. Premier Stalin then gave assurances that all necessary measures would be taken in accordance with the plan. Correspondence in a similar sense took place between Premier Stalin and Mr. Churchill. In accordance with this understanding, the United States, whose armies had penetrated deep into Saxony and Thuringia, parts of the Soviet zone, withdrew its forces to its own area of occupation in Germany and took up its position in its own sector in Berlin. Thereupon the agreements in regard to the occupation of Germany and Berlin went into effect. The United States would not have so withdrawn its troops from a large area now occupied by the Soviet Union had there been any doubt whatsoever about the observance of its agreed right of free access to its sector of Berlin. The right of the United States to its position in Berlin thus stems from precisely the same source as the right of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to assert the latter and deny the former.

It clearly results from these undertakings that Berlin is not a part of the Soviet zone, but is an international zone of occupation. Commitments entered into in good faith by the zone commanders, and subsequently confirmed by the Allied Control Authority, as well as practices sanctioned by usage, guarantee the United States together with other powers, free access to Berlin for the purpose of fulfilling its responsibilities as an occupying power. The facts are plain. Their meaning is clear. Any other interpretation would offend all the rules of comity and reason.

In order that there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever on this point, the United States Government categorically asserts that it is in occupation of its sector in Berlin with free access thereto as a matter of established right deriving from the defeat and surrender

of Germany and confirmed by formal agreements among the principal Allies. It further declares that it will not be induced by threats, pressures or other actions to abandon these rights. It is hoped that the Soviet Government entertains no doubts whatsoever on this point.

This Government now shares with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom the responsibility initially undertaken at Soviet request on July 7, 1945, for the physical well-being of 2,400,000 persons in the western sectors of Berlin. Restrictions recently imposed by the Soviet authorities in Berlin have operated to prevent this Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France from fulfilling that responsibility in an adequate manner.

The responsibility which this Government bears for the physical well-being and the safety of the German population in its sector of Berlin is outstandingly humanitarian in character. This population includes hundreds of thousands of women and children, whose health and safety are dependent on the continued use of adequate facilities for moving food, medical supplies and other items indispensable to the maintenance of human life in the western sectors of Berlin. The most elemental of these human rights which both our Governments are solemnly pledged to protect are thus placed in jeopardy by these restrictions. It is intolerable that any one of the occupying authorities should attempt to impose a blockade upon the people of Berlin.

The United States Government is therefore obliged to insist that in accordance with existing agreements the arrangements for the movement of freight and passenger traffic between the western zones and Berlin be fully restored. There can be no question of delay in the restoration of these essential services, since the needs of the civilian population in the Berlin area are imperative.

Holding these urgent views regarding its rights and obligations in the United States sector of Berlin, yet eager always to resolve controversies in the spirit of fair consideration for the viewpoints of all concerned, the Government of the United States declares that duress should not be invoked as a method of attempting to dispose of any disagreements which may exist between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States in respect of any aspect of the Berlin situation.

Such disagreements if any should be settled by negotiation or by any of the other peaceful methods provided for in Article 33 of the Charter in keeping with our mutual pledges as copartners in the United Nations. For these reasons the Government of the United States is ready as a first step to participate in negotiations in Berlin among the four Allied Occupying Authorities for the settlement of any question in dispute arising out of the administration of the city of Berlin. It is, however, a prerequisite that the lines of communication and the movement of persons and goods between the United Kingdom, the United States and the French sectors in Berlin and the Western Zones shall have been fully restored.

[. . .]

Note from the Soviet Union to the United States, 14 July 1948

1. The Soviet Government has familiarized itself with the note of the Government of the United States of America of July 6, 1948 in which the situation which has been created at the present time in Berlin is described as a result of measures taken by the Soviet side. The Soviet Government cannot agree with this statement of the Government of the United States and considers that the situation which has been created in Berlin has arisen as a result of violation by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France of agreed decisions taken by the four powers in regard to Germany and Berlin which [violation] has found its expression in the carrying out of a separate currency reform, in the introduction of a special currency for the western sectors of Berlin and in the policy of the dismemberment of Germany. The Soviet Government has more than once warned the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France in regard to the responsibility which they would take upon themselves in following along the path of the violation of agreed decisions previously adopted by the four powers in regard to Germany. The decisions adopted at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences and also the agreement of the four powers concerning the

control mechanism in Germany have as their aim the demilitarization and democratization of Germany, the removal of the base itself of German militarism and the prevention of the revival of Germany as an aggressive power and thereby the transformation of Germany into a peace-loving and democratic state. These agreements envisage the obligation of Germany to pay reparations and thereby to make at least partial compensation for the damage to those countries which suffered from German aggression. In accordance with these agreements the Governments of the four powers took upon themselves the responsibility for the administration of Germany and bound themselves jointly to draw up a statute for Germany or for any areas including Berlin which were part of German territory and to conclude with Germany a peace treaty which should be signed by a Government of a democratic Germany adequate for that purpose.

These most important agreements of the four powers in regard to Germany have been violated by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France. Measures for the demilitarization of Germany have not been completed and such a very important center of German military industry as the Ruhr district has been taken out from under the control of the four powers. The execution of decisions concerning reparations from the western zones of occupation of Germany has been interrupted by the Governments of the U. S. A., the U. K., and France. By the separate actions of the Governments of the U. S. A., Great Britain, and France the four power control mechanism in Germany has been destroyed and the Control Council as a result thereof has ceased its activity.

Following the London meeting of the three powers with the participation of Benelux, measures have been undertaken by the Governments of the U. S. A., Great Britain, and France directed towards the division and dismemberment of Germany including preparations which are now in progress for the designation of a separate Government for the western zones of Germany and the separate currency reform for the western zones of occupation carried out on June 18th of this year.

In as much as the situation created in Berlin as well as in all Germany is the direct result of the systematic violation by the Governments of the U. S. A., Great Britain, and France of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and also of the agreement of the four powers concerning the control mechanism in Germany, the Soviet Government must reject as completely unfounded the statement of the Government of the U. S. to the effect that the measures for the restriction of transport communications between Berlin and the western zones of occupation of Germany introduced by the Soviet command for the defense of the economy of the Soviet zone against its disorganization are allegedly in violation of the existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin.

2. The Government of the U. S. declares that it is occupying its sector in Berlin by right arising out of the defeat and capitulation of Germany, referring in this connection to agreements between the four powers in regard to Germany and Berlin. This merely confirms the fact that the exercise of the above mentioned right in regard to Berlin is linked to the obligatory execution by the powers occupying Germany of the four power agreements, concluded among themselves in regard to Germany as a whole. In conformity with these agreements Berlin was envisaged as the seat of the supreme authority of the four powers occupying Germany, in which connection the agreement concerning the administration of 'Greater Berlin' under the direction of the Control Council was reached.

Thus the agreement concerning the four power administration of Berlin is an inseparable component part of the agreement for the four power administration of Germany as a whole. After the U. S. A., Great Britain, and France by their separate actions in the western zones of Germany destroyed the system of four power administration of Germany and had begun to set up a capital for a Government for Western Germany in Frankfurt-am-Main, they thereby undermined as well the legal basis which assured their right to participation in the administration of Berlin.

The Government of the United States in its note points out that its right to be in Berlin is based also on the fact that the United States withdrew its forces from certain regions of the Soviet zone of occupation into which they had penetrated during the period of

hostilities in Germany, and that if it [the United States Government] had foreseen the situation, which has been created in Berlin, it would not have withdrawn its forces from those regions. However, the Government of the United States well knows that in removing its troops to the boundaries of the American zone established by agreement of the four powers concerning zones of occupation in Germany it was only carrying out an obligation which it had taken upon itself, the execution of which could alone accord the right of the entry of the troops of the U. S. into Berlin. An examination of the letter referred to in the note of the Government of the U. S. A. of President Truman to Premier Stalin of June 14, 1945 and the letter in reply of Premier Stalin of June 16, 1945 confirms the fact that, thanks to the agreement then reached, the forces of the U. S. A., Great Britain, and France were given the opportunity to enter not only the capital of Germany Berlin, but also the capital of Austria, Vienna, which as is known, were taken only by the forces of the Soviet Army. In addition, it is known that the agreements referred to concerning the question of Berlin and also of Vienna were only a part of the agreements concerning Germany and Austria upon the fulfillment of which the Soviet Government continues to insist.

3. The Government of the United States declares that the temporary measures put into effect by the Soviet Command for the restriction of transport communications between Berlin and the western zones have created difficulties in supplying the Berlin population of the western sectors. It is impossible, however, to deny the fact that these difficulties were occasioned by the actions of the Governments of the U. S. A., Great Britain and France, and primarily by their separate actions in the introduction of new currency in the western zones of Germany and special currency in the western sectors of Berlin.

Berlin lies in the center of the Soviet zone and is a part of that zone. The interests of the Berlin population do not permit a situation in which in Berlin or only in the western sectors of Berlin there shall be introduced special currency which has no validity in the Soviet zone. Moreover, the carrying out of a separate monetary reform in the western zones of Germany has placed Berlin and the whole Soviet zone of occupation as well in a situation in which the entire mass of currency notes which were cancelled in the western zone threatened to pour into Berlin and the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany.

The Soviet Command has been forced therefore to adopt certain urgent measures for the protection of the interests of the German population and also of the economy of the Soviet zone of occupation and the area of 'Greater Berlin'. The danger of the disruption of the normal economic activity of the Soviet zone and of Berlin has not been eliminated even at the present time, in as much as the United States, Great Britain and France continue to maintain in Berlin their special currency.

Furthermore, the Soviet Command has consistently displayed and is displaying concern for the well being of the Berlin population and for assuring to them normal supply in all essentials and is striving for the speediest elimination of the difficulties which have arisen recently in this matter. In this connection, if the situation requires, the Soviet Government would not object to assuring by its own means adequate supply for all 'Greater Berlin'.

With reference to the statement of the Government of the United States that it will not be compelled by threats, pressure or other actions to renounce its right to participation in the occupation of Berlin, the Soviet Government does not intend to enter into discussion of this statement since it has no need for a policy of pressure, since by violation of the agreed decisions concerning the administration of Berlin the above-mentioned Governments themselves are reducing to naught their right to participation in the occupation of Berlin.

4. The Government of the United States in its note of July 6 expresses the readiness to begin negotiations between the four Allied occupying authorities for consideration of the situation created in Berlin but passes by in silence the question of Germany as a whole.

The Soviet Government, while not objecting to negotiations, considers, however, it necessary to state that it cannot link the inauguration of these negotiations with the fulfilling of any preliminary conditions whatsoever

and that, in the second place, four-power conversations could be effective only in the event that they were not limited to the question of the administration of Berlin, since that question cannot be severed from the general question of four-power control in regard to Germany.

Source: U.S. Department of State, *The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948, Including Text of a Note Addressed to the Soviet Government on September 26 by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, Publication 3298* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948).

27. United Nations: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

Introduction

The Holocaust and revelations of other World War II atrocities made international leaders more sensitive to the need to protect basic human rights. Soon after the United Nations (UN) was established in 1945, delegates suggested that the UN Charter did not define with sufficient clarity those rights that were protected. The UN secretariat therefore decided to formulate a declaration on the subject. The burden of drafting rested primarily on John Peters Humphrey of Canada, with substantial assistance from fellow delegate Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who took a strong interest in the subject. René Cassin of France, Charles Malik of Lebanon, and P. C. Chang of China also contributed to the declaration. Individuals were guaranteed the right to life, liberty, and security of person; access to education; freedom from torture and from cruel and inhumane treatment or punishment; and freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression, and opinion. Many ideals expressed in the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776) are reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly as Resolution 217 A(III) on 10 December 1948, at a time when the U.S. presence in the organization was especially powerful. Eight countries, including all the Soviet bloc, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia, abstained from voting, the communist powers because they feared that it might undermine their control over their populations, South Africa due to fears of criticism of its racial policies, and Saudi Arabia because of its statements on the position of women. The declaration does not formally constitute international law, but it does facilitate the application of moral and diplomatic pressures to governments. Since its adoption, the UN's declaration has justified the organization's involvement in a wide variety of situations around the globe. It has also served as the foundation of two legally binding UN covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

Primary Source

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for an observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore, the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

ARTICLE 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

ARTICLE 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

ARTICLE 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

ARTICLE 5
No one shall be submitted to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.

ARTICLE 6
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

ARTICLE 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

ARTICLE 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

ARTICLE 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

ARTICLE 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

ARTICLE 11
1. Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.

2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offense was committed.

ARTICLE 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

ARTICLE 13

1. Everyone has the rights to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.

2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

ARTICLE 14

1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

ARTICLE 16

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

ARTICLE 17

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

ARTICLE 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

ARTICLE 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

ARTICLE 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

ARTICLE 21

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

ARTICLE 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

ARTICLE 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

4. Everyone has the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

ARTICLE 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays and pay.

ARTICLE 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

ARTICLE 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

ARTICLE 27
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, and to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

ARTICLE 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

ARTICLE 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 30
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Source: United Nations, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.

28. North Atlantic Treaty, 1949

Introduction

Signed on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a mutual defense alliance of nations from Europe and North America. NATO was organized to defend member nations from the possible aggression of the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe, which formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization six years later. Originally NATO was comprised of the United States, Canada, and ten West European nations, including Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal. In 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) became a member, a move that reawakened bitter Soviet memories of past German attacks on Russia and impelled Soviet leaders to respond by establishing the Warsaw Pact. Greece and Turkey both joined NATO in 1952, and Spain joined in 1982 after dictator Francisco Franco's death brought the restoration of democracy in that country. NATO was intended as a purely defensive alliance whose very existence would deter any Soviet attack on any of the signatory nations, since all of them were bound to come to the assistance of any member that came under attack from an outside power. The alliance did not cover attacks on or uprisings within the colonies of the various European signatories. Perhaps one of the greatest successes of NATO was that no signatory ever found it necessary to invoke the alliance during the Cold War, a fact that was either a tribute to its deterrent effect or, perhaps, evidence that the Soviet Union never had any intention of attacking any of its signatories. NATO was the first permanent military alliance ever concluded by the United States, a development that marked a new departure in American foreign policy. Although it was initially intended that NATO military forces in Europe should be small and the United States only committed two divisions there, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 soon brought the dispatch of an additional four divisions to Western Europe. One unspoken purpose of the alliance was to counter any potential future military resurgence on the part of Germany, whose belligerent record since the mid-nineteenth century prompted fears on the part of other NATO members, especially France, that German leaders might once again seek to dominate Europe by force of arms. Despite differences among members and the withdrawal of France in the mid-1960s, NATO endured even the end of the Cold War. As East-West tensions eased, former Soviet satellites—including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999 and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004—joined the alliance, perceiving it in part as a guarantee of their own security should Russia once again seek to dominate them. The Warsaw Pact, by contrast, collapsed. NATO also sought to redefine its role, participating in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and seeking to maintain peace in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The NATO alliance was formally invoked for the first time in September 2001 after Muslim al-Qaeda extremists mounted suicide aircraft attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C., when NATO forces took part in the subsequent war against Afghanistan.

Primary Source

Treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in

such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the [United Nations] Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

(a) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
(b) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

ARTICLE 7
The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

[. . .]

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "The North Atlantic Treaty," Online Library, NATO Basic Texts, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

29. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

Introduction

World War II was perhaps the most brutal war in human history, with prisoners frequently mistreated and civilians subjected to bombing and other attacks and in some cases imprisoned in death camps. Since 1864, when the first Geneva Convention was held, several attempts had been made to codify the humane treatment of soldiers and civilians during wars. From April to August 1949, international representatives held a conference at Geneva that passed four conventions, updating the various existing conventions on the humane conduct of warfare. The subjects covered included the treatment of the sick and wounded, including captured enemies, during wartime; the treatment of prisoners of war; and civilians in areas where hostilities were in progress. Prisoners of war could not be murdered, tortured, used as hostages, or subjected to humiliating treatment and were entitled to regular medical attention; the terms of their labor, mail, living conditions, and receipt of care packages were also enumerated in detail. Prisoners of war were only required to provide basic personal details to their captors and were not to be subjected to threats or torture in an effort to force them to divulge further information. The conventions also covered noncombatant civilians in war zones, who were entitled to access to education and medical care and could not be put at risk. Noncombatants, including both prisoners and civilians, were at all times to be treated humanely, and if they were accused of any crime, they were entitled to legal representation and fair trial. Neither prisoners of war nor civilians in areas affected by hostilities could renounce any of their rights under the Geneva Conventions. The International Red Cross or neutral nonbelligerent countries were expected to supervise the implementation of the Geneva Conventions in areas where hostilities existed. More than 200 countries ratified the new conventions, although breaches of their stipulations still frequently occurred.

Primary Source

PART I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

[. . .]

Article 3

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Article 4

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
   (a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
   (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
   (c) That of carrying arms openly;
   (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:

1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58–67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those

Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

[. . .]

Article 7
Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.

[. . .]

Article 9
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.

[. . .]

PART II
GENERAL PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Article 12
Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.

Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.

Nevertheless if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.

Article 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.

Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

Article 14
Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour. Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as that granted to men. Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining Power may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights such capacity confers except in so far as the captivity requires.

Article 15
The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance and for the medical attention required by their state of health.

Article 16
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention relating to rank and sex, and subject to any

privileged treatment which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.

PART III
CAPTIVITY

SECTION I
BEGINNING OF CAPTIVITY

Article 17

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.

Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 × 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.

[. . .]

Article 19

Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.

Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.

Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.

Article 20

The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions similar to those for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station.

The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food and potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take all suitable precautions to ensure their safety during evacuation, and shall establish as soon as possible a list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated.

If prisoners of war must, during evacuation, pass through transit camps, their stay in such camps shall be as brief as possible.

SECTION II
INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Chapter I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Article 21

The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of

not going outside its perimeter. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary.

[. . .]

Article 22
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.

Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as possible to a more favourable climate.

[. . .]

Article 23
No prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.

Prisoners of war shall have shelters against air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the same extent as the local civilian population. With the exception of those engaged in the protection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards, they may enter such shelters as soon as possible after the giving of the alarm. Any other protective measure taken in favour of the population shall also apply to them.

Detaining Powers shall give the Powers concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers, all useful information regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps.

Whenever military considerations permit, prisoner of war camps shall be indicated in the day-time by the letters PW or PG, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air. The Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. Only prisoner of war camps shall be marked as such.

Article 24
Transit or screening camps of a permanent kind shall be fitted out under conditions similar to those described in the present Section, and the prisoners therein shall have the same treatment as in other camps.

Chapter II
QUARTERS, FOOD AND CLOTHING OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 25
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.

The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as regards both total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and blankets.

The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. All precautions must be taken against the danger of fire.

In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated, separate dormitories shall be provided for them.

Article 26
The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.

The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labour on which they are employed.

Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.

Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession.

Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.

Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.

Article 27
Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities by the Detaining Power, which shall make allowance for the climate of the region where the prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces captured by the Detaining Power should, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.

The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining Power. In addition, prisoners of war who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever the nature of the work demands.

[. . .]

Chapter III
HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION
Article 29
The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.

Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women prisoners of war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for them.

Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished, prisoners of war shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; the necessary installations, facilities and time shall be granted them for that purpose.

Article 30
Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war may have the attention they require, as well as appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set aside for cases of contagious or mental disease.

Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the near future. Special facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in particular to the blind, and for their rehabilitation, pending repatriation.

Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if possible, of their nationality.

[. . .]

Chapter V
RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES
Article 34
Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities.

Adequate premises shall be provided where religious services may be held.

Article 35
Chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy Power and who remain or are retained with a view to assisting prisoners of war, shall be allowed to minister to them and to exercise freely their ministry amongst prisoners of war of the same religion, in accordance with their religious conscience. They shall be allocated among

the various camps and labour detachments containing prisoners of war belonging to the same forces, speaking the same language or practising the same religion. They shall enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means of transport provided for in Article 33, for visiting the prisoners of war outside their camp. They shall be free to correspond, subject to censorship, on matters concerning their religious duties with the ecclesiastical authorities in the country of detention and with international religious organizations. Letters and cards which they may send for this purpose shall be in addition to the quota provided for in Article 71.

Article 36
Prisoners of war who are ministers of religion, without having officiated as chaplains to their own forces, shall be at liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to the members of their community. For this purpose, they shall receive the same treatment as the chaplains retained by the Detaining Power. They shall not be obliged to do any other work.

Article 37
When prisoners of war have not the assistance of a retained chaplain or of a prisoner of war minister of their faith, a minister belonging to the prisoners' or a similar denomination, or in his absence a qualified layman, if such a course is feasible from a confessional point of view, shall be appointed, at the request of the prisoners concerned, to fill this office. This appointment, subject to the approval of the Detaining Power, shall take place with the agreement of the community of prisoners concerned and, wherever necessary, with the approval of the local religious authorities of the same faith. The person thus appointed shall comply with all regulations established by the Detaining Power in the interests of discipline and military security.

Article 38
While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst prisoners, and shall take the measures necessary to ensure the exercise thereof by providing them with adequate premises and necessary equipment.

Prisoners shall have opportunities for taking physical exercise, including sports and games, and for being out of doors. Sufficient open spaces shall be provided for this purpose in all camps.

Chapter VI
DISCIPLINE
[. . .]

Article 42
The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances.

[. . .]

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm.

30. First U.S. Acknowledgment of Soviet Atomic Bomb Detonation, September 1949

Introduction

From July 1945 until August 1949, the United States and Britain enjoyed a nuclear monopoly that the Soviet Union was determined to break. On learning of the success of the first U.S. atomic test, Soviet leader Josef Stalin immediately launched a crash program to build a Soviet bomb. Due in part to the help of spies within the Anglo-American Manhattan Project laboratories at Los Alamos, New Mexico, four years later, on 29 August 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic device. Three days later, specially equipped U.S. radar airplanes detected atmospheric debris from the test. The newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had predicted that Soviet scientists would eventually develop a bomb but had not expected this to occur for several more years. Soviet success

in doing so led to a rapid re-evaluation of the U.S. national security position. In late September, President Harry S. Truman tersely informed the American people that the Soviet Union now possessed atomic weapons, stating that this reinforced the need to bring nuclear power under "truly effective enforceable international control." In practice, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared to relinquish direction of its own atomic weapons to an outside body. At that juncture, American scientists and government officials were debating whether or not to mount an expensive program to develop thermonuclear weapons in the form of the immensely more powerful hydrogen bomb. On 31 January 1950, Truman authorized this project and ordered that it be implemented as expeditiously as possible. Soviet scientists likewise began work on such weapons, which both sides developed in the mid-1950s, bringing a mutual escalation of the nuclear arms race that eventually helped to generate growing popular and official support for arms control negotiations. In early 1950 the president also instructed the State Department Policy Planning Staff and the National Security Council (NSC) to undertake a major review of U.S. national security policies, which resulted in the April 1950 paper NSC-68, a document that urged major increases in U.S. defense spending and overseas commitments and bases and envisaged the quadrupling of military budgets. Truman initially rejected these conclusions on the grounds that they were too expensive, but with the outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950, most of NSC-68's recommendations were eventually implemented. Russian possession of atomic weapons contributed to a new sense of U.S. vulnerability, one reason that the domestic anticommunism of Senator Joseph McCarthy and other Truman administration critics appealed to so many Americans in the early 1950s.

Primary Source

President Harry S. Truman
September 23, 1949.

I believe the American people, to the fullest extent consistent with national security, are entitled to be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public the following information.

We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.

Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us.

Nearly 4 years ago I pointed out that "scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time." And, in the Three-Nation Declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Canada, dated November 15, 1945, it was emphasized that no single nation could in fact have a monopoly of atomic weapons.

This recent development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity for that truly effective enforceable international control of atomic energy which this Government and the large majority of the members of the United Nations support.

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 485.

31. Dean Acheson: National Press Club Speech, "Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy," 12 January 1950

Introduction

By late 1947 or early 1948, the U.S. Department of State anticipated that the Chinese communists would emerge victorious from their civil war with the Guomindang (Nationalist) government. This, in turn, called for a reorientation of American Pacific strategy, as a communist China was unlikely to be a dependable ally for the United States

and might indeed become an opponent. Speaking at the National Press Club in January 1950 three months after the Chinese communists took power, Secretary of State Dean Acheson expounded American policy in Asia in light of this new development. Seeking to defuse domestic criticisms that the Guomindang government in China had collapsed due to lack of support from the United States and that communist fellow travelers within the administration of President Harry S. Truman had been responsible for this, Acheson ascribed the Guomindang's downfall to its own incompetence. As he also had in private sessions with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he stated that the Soviet Union sought to exploit China and take over the northern regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, policies that Acheson believed would soon cause the two states to become antagonists. Acheson also expounded the new American strategy toward Asia. By the time the communists proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, the Truman administration had come to accept that Japan, the defeated enemy of World War II, would become the key U.S. ally in Asia. American strategy would be organized around a great crescent or arc of countries along the fringes of the Asian mainland, from Pakistan through Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, and Japan, forming a defensive perimeter of friendly nations that would contain the further outward spread of communism. Acheson stated that the United States would almost certainly come to the defense of Japan and the Philippines if either were attacked. Other areas, including the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), Southeast Asia, and India and Pakistan, were not necessarily of vital strategic interest to the United States but could turn to the United Nations for assistance if needed. After the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) launched a war against South Korea in late June 1950, Acheson's speech attracted heavy retrospective criticism, as his political enemies argued that excluding South Korea from U.S. vital security interests was tantamount to an invitation to North Korea to invade South Korea. It does seem that Soviet leader Josef Stalin and North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung both interpreted this address as a green light to mount such an attack, and both believed—wrongly, as it transpired—that the United States would not respond. Radical critics later suggested that Acheson had deliberately intended to provoke such a war in order to implement the major expansion of U.S. defense spending and commitments envisaged in the planning paper NSC-68. Although such conspiratorial interpretations are far-fetched, Acheson's words on this occasion were undoubtedly some of his most controversial utterances as secretary of state.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Recent Developments in China

Now, may I suggest to you that much of the bewilderment which has seized the minds of many of us about recent developments in China comes from a failure to understand this basic revolutionary force which is loose in Asia. The reasons for the fall of the Nationalist Government in China are preoccupying many people. All sorts of reasons have been attributed to it. Most commonly, it is said in various speeches and publications that it is the result of American bungling, that we are incompetent, that we did not understand, that American aid was too little, that we did the wrong things at the wrong time. Other people go on and say: "No it is not quite like that, but that an American general did not like Chiang Kai-shek and out of all that relationship grows the real trouble." And they say: "Well, you have to add to that there are a lot of women fooling around in politics in China."

Nobody, I think, says that the Nationalist Government fell because it was confronted by overwhelming military force which it could not resist. Certainly no one in his right mind suggests that. Now, what I ask you to do is to stop looking for a moment under the bed and under the chair and under the rug to find out these reasons, but rather to look at the broad picture and see whether something doesn't suggest itself.

The broad picture is that after the war, Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the undisputed leader of the Chinese people. Only one faction, the Communists, up in the hills, ill-equipped, ragged, a very small force, was determinedly opposed to his position. He had overwhelming military power, greater military power than any ruler had ever had in the entire history of China. He had tremendous economic and military support and backing from the United States. He had the acceptance of all other foreign countries, whether sincerely or insincerely in the case of the Soviet Union is not really material to this matter. Here he was in this position,

and 4 years later what do we find? We find that his armies have melted away. His support largely outside the country has melted away, and he is a refugee on a small island off the coast of China with the remnants of his forces.

As I said, no one says that vast armies moved out of the hills and defeated him. To attribute this to the inadequacy of American aid is only to point out the depth and power of the forces which were miscalculated or ignored. What has happened in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. There was really nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it throughout the country. They took the solution of their immediate village problems into their own hands. If there was any trouble or interference with the representatives of the government, they simply brushed them aside. They completely withdrew their support from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole military establishment disintegrated. Added to the grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military command was this total lack of support both in the armies and in the country, and so the whole matter just simply disintegrated.

The Communists did not create this. The Communists did not create this condition. They did not create this revolutionary spirit. They did not create a great force which moved out from under Chiang Kai-shek. But they were shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this thing into victory and into power.

That, I suggest to you, is an explanation which has certain roots in realism and which does not require all this examination of intricate and perhaps irrelevant details. So much for the attitudes of the peoples of Asia.

U.S. Attitude Toward Asia

Let's consider for a moment another important factor in this relationship. That is the attitude of our own people to Asia. What is that fundamental attitude out of which our policy has grown? What is the history of it? Because history is very important, and history furnishes the belief on the one side in the reality and truth of the attitude.

What has our attitude been toward the peoples of Asia? It has been, I submit to you, that Americans as individuals are interested in the peoples of Asia. We are not interested in them as pawns or as subjects for exploitation but just as people.

For 100 years some Americans have gone to Asia to bring in what they thought was the most valuable thing they had their faith. They wanted to tell them what they thought about the nature and relationship of man to God. Others went to them to bring to them what they knew of learning. Others went to them to bring them healing of their bodies. Others and perhaps fewer went to them to learn the depth and beauty of their own cultures, and some went to them to trade and they traded with them. But this trade was a very small part of American interest in the Far East, and it was a very small part of American interest in trade. It was a valid interest; it was a good interest. There was nothing wrong about it, but out of the total sum of the interests of the American people in Asia, it was a comparatively small part.

Through all this period of time also, we had, and still have great interests in Asia. But let me point out to you one very important factor about our interests in Asia. That is that our interests have been parallel to the interests of the people of Asia. For 50 years, it has been the fundamental belief of the American people—and I am not talking about announcements of government but I mean a belief of people in little towns and villages and churches and missionary forces and labor unions throughout the United State—it has been their profound belief that the control of China by a foreign power was contrary to American interests. The interesting part about that is it was not contrary to the interests of the people of China. There was not conflict but parallelism in that interest. And so from the time of the announcement of the open door policy through the 9-power treaty to the very latest resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we have stated that principle and we believe it. And similarly in all the rest of Asia in the Philippines, in India, in Pakistan and Indonesia, and in Korea for years and years and years, the interests of Americans throughout this country have been in favor of their independence. This is where their independence, societies, and their patriotic groups

have come for funds and sympathy. The whole policy of our government insofar as we have responsibility in the Philippines was to bring about the accomplishment of independence and our sympathy and help. The very real help which we have given other nations in Asia has been in that direction, and it is still in that direction.

The Factor of Communism

Now, I stress this, which you may think is a platitude, because of a very important fact: I hear almost every day someone say that the real interest of the United States is to stop the spread of communism. Nothing seems to me to put the cart before the horse more completely than that. Of course we are interested in stopping the spread of communism. But we are interested for a far deeper reason than any conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. We are interested in stopping the spread of communism because communism is a doctrine that we don't happen to like. Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has ever been devised, and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism which would, if it could, take from these people what they have won, what we want them to keep and develop, which is their own national independence, their own individual independence, their own development of their own resources for their own good and not as mere tributary states to this great Soviet Union.

Now, it is fortunate that this point that I made does not represent any real conflict. It is an important point because people will do more damage and create more misrepresentation in the Far East by saying our interest is merely to stop the spread of communism than any other way. Our real interest is in those people as people. It is because communism is hostile to that interest that we want to stop it. But it happens that the best way of doing things is to do just exactly what the peoples of Asia want to do and what we want to help them to do, which is to develop a soundness of administration of these new governments and to develop their resources and their technical skills so that they are not subject to penetration either through ignorance, or because they believe these false promises, or because there is real distress in their areas. If we can help that development, if we can go forward with it, then we have brought about the best way that anyone knows of stopping this spread of communism.

It is important to take this attitude not as a mere negative reaction to communism but as the most positive affirmation of the most affirmative truth that we hold, which is in the dignity and right of every nation, of every people, and of every individual to develop in their own way, making their own mistakes, reaching their own triumphs but acting under their own responsibility. That is what we are pressing for in the Far East, and that is what we must affirm and not get mixed up with purely negative and inconsequential statements.

Soviet Attitude

Now, let me come to another underlying and important factor which determines our relations and, in turn, our policy with the peoples of Asia. That is the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Asia, and particularly towards those parts of Asia which are contiguous to the Soviet Union, and with great particularity this afternoon, to north China.

The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, long antedates communism. This is not something that has come out of communism at all. It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills, and new concepts to the thrust [of] Russian imperialism. This Communistic concept and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces [areas] of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchuria, and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are very happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what is going on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast areas—populated by Chinese—the detachment of these areas from China and their attachment to the Soviet Union.

I wish to state this and perhaps sin against my doctrine of nondogmatism, but I should like to suggest at any

rate that this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power with Asia.

[. . .]

What does that mean for us? It means something very, very significant. It means that nothing that we do and nothing that we say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this fact. All the efforts of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only thing that can obscure it is the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part which easily could do so, and I urge all who are thinking about these foolish adventures to remember that we must not seize the unenviable position which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken—that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest to you this afternoon, is the first and the greatest rule in regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia.

I suggest that the second rule is very like the first. That is to keep our own purposes perfectly straight, perfectly pure, and perfectly aboveboard and do not get them mixed-up with legal quibbles or the attempt to do one thing and really achieve another.

The consequences of this Russian attitude and this Russian action in China are perfectly enormous. They are saddling all those in China who are proclaiming their loyalty to Moscow, and who are allowing themselves to be used as puppets of Moscow, with the most awful responsibility which they must pay for. Furthermore, these actions of the Russians are making plainer than any speech, or any utterance, or any legislation can make throughout all of Asia, what the true purposes of the Soviet Union are and what the true function of communism as an agent of Russian imperialism is. These I suggest to you are the fundamental factors, fundamental realities of attitude out of which our relations and policies must grow.

Military Security in the Pacific

Now, let's in the light of that consider some of these policies. First of all, let's deal with the question of military security. I deal with it first because it is important and because, having stated our policy in that regard, we must clearly understand that the military menace is not the most immediate.

What is the situation with regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?

In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interests of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American—and there are Australian—troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We

are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say that an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to say that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly necessary or sensible within the real of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then on the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these problems are not capable of solution through military means. These problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by military means.

Susceptibility to Penetration

The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments which have little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from some very serious economic problems, some of them growing directly out of the last war, others growing indirectly out of the last war because of the disruptions of trade with other parts of the world, with the disruption of arrangements which furnished credit and management to these areas for many years. That has resulted in dislocation of economic effort and in a good deal of suffering among the peoples concerned. In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the great social upheaval about which I have been speaking, an upheaval which was carried on and confused a great deal by the Japanese occupation and by the propaganda which has gone on from Soviet sources since the war.

Here, then, are the problems in these other areas which require some policy on our part, and I should like to point out two facts to you and then discuss in more detail some of these areas.

The first fact is the great difference between our responsibility and our opportunities in the northern part of the Pacific area and in the southern part of the Pacific area. In the north, we have direct responsibility in Japan and we have direct opportunity to act. The same thing to a lesser degree is true in Korea. There we had direct responsibility, and there we did act, and there we have a greater opportunity to be effective than we have in the more southerly part.

In the southerly part of the area, we are one of many nations who can do no more than help. The direct responsibility lies with the peoples concerned. They are proud of their new national responsibility. You cannot sit around in Washington, or London, or Paris, or The Hague and determine what the policies are going to be in those areas. You can be willing to help, and you can help only when the conditions are right for help to be effective.

Limitations of U.S. Assistance

That leads me to the other thing I wanted to point out, and that is the limitation of effective American assistance. American assistance can be effective when it is the missing component in a situation which might otherwise be solved. The United States cannot furnish all these components to solve the question. It can not furnish determination, it can not furnish the will, and it can not furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. But if the will and if the determination exists and if the people are behind their government, then, and not always then, is there a very good chance. In that situation American help can be effective, and it can lead to an accomplishment which could not otherwise be achieved.

Japan.—Let's take the situation in Japan for a moment. There are three great factors to be faced. The security matter I have dealt with. Aside from that, there are the

economic questions and the political questions. In the political field, General MacArthur has been very successful and the Japanese are hammering out with some effort, and with some backsliding, and regaining again of progress, a political system which is based on nonmilitaristic institutions.

In the economic field, we have not been so successful. That is in very large part due to the inherent difficulty of the problem. The problem arises with the necessity of Japan being able to buy raw materials and sell goods. The former connections of Japan with the mainland and with some of the islands have been disrupted. That has produced difficulties. The willingness of other countries to receive Japanese goods has very much contracted since the war.

Difficulties of currency have added to those problems. But those matters have got to be faced and have got to be solved. Whether they are solved under a treaty or if the procedural difficulties of that are too great under some other mechanism, they must be solved along lines which permit the Japanese greater freedom—complete freedom if possible—to buy what they need in the world and to sell what they have to offer on the mainland of Asia, in southeast Asia, and in other parts of the world. That is the nature of the problem and it is a very tough one. It is one on which the occupation authorities, the Japanese government, ourselves, and others are working. There can be no magic solution to it.

Korea.—In Korea, we have taken great steps which have ended our military occupation, and in cooperation with the United Nations we have established an independent and sovereign country recognized by nearly all the rest of the world. We have given that nation great help in getting itself established. We are asking the Congress to continue that help until it is firmly established, and that legislation is now pending before the Congress. The idea that we should scrap all of that, that we should stop half way through the achievement of the establishment of the country, seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and utter madness in our interests in Asia. But there our responsibilities are more direct and our opportunities more clear. When you move to the south, you find that our opportunity is much slighter and that our responsibilities, except in the Philippines and there indirectly, are very small. Those problems are very confusing.

Philippines.—In the Philippines, we acted with vigor and speed to set up an independent sovereign nation which we have done. We have given the Philippines a billion dollars of direct economic aid since the war. We have spent another billion dollars in such matters as veterans' benefits and other payments in the Philippines. Much of that money has not been used as wisely as we wish it had been used, but here again, we come up against the matter of responsibility. It is the Philippine government which is responsible. It is the Philippine government which must make its own mistakes. What we can do is advise and urge, and if help continues to be misused, to stop giving the help. We can not direct, we should not direct, we have not the slightest desire to direct. I believe that there are indications that the Philippines may be facing serious economic difficulties. With energetic, determined action, they can perhaps be avoided or certainly minimized. Whether that will be true or not, I can not say, but it does not rest within the power of the American Government to determine that. We are always ready to help and to advise. That is all we can and all we should do.

Asia.—Elsewhere in southeast Asia, the limits of what we can do are to help where we are wanted. We are organizing the machinery through which we can make effective help possible. The western powers are all interested. We all know the techniques. We have all had experiences which can be useful to those governments which are newly starting out if they want it. It can not be useful if they don't want it. We know techniques of administration. We know techniques of organizing school districts, and road districts, and taxation districts. We know agricultural and industrial techniques, all of which can be helpful, and those we are preparing to make available if they are wanted, where they are wanted, and under circumstances where they have a fighting chance to be successful. We will not do these things for the mere purpose of being active. They will not be done for the mere purpose of running around and doing good, but for the purpose of moving in where we are wanted to a situation where we have the missing component which, if put into the rest of the picture, will spell success.

The situation in the different countries of southeast Asia is difficult. It is highly confused in Burma where five different factions have utterly disrupted the immediate government of the country. Progress is being made in Indochina where the French, although moving slowly, are moving. There are noticeable signs of progress in transferring responsibility to a local administration and getting the adherence of the population to this local administration. We hope that the situation will be such that the French can make further progress and make it quickly, but I know full well the difficulties which are faced by the Foreign Minister of France and my admiration and respect for him are so great that I would not want one word I say to add a feather to the burden that he carries.

In Malaya, the British have and are discharging their responsibility harmoniously with the people of Malaya and are making progress.

Indonesia.—In Indonesia, a great success has been achieved within the last few weeks and over a period of months. The round table conferences at The Hague in which great statesmanship and restraint were displayed, both on the Dutch and the Indonesian side, have resulted in this new government being formed. Relations of this government with the Dutch will be very good, and the Dutch can furnish them great help and advice, and we will be willing to stand by to give whatever help we can rightly and profitably give. The situation is one which is full of encouragement although it is full of difficulty also.

India and Pakistan.—As one goes to the end of this semicircle and comes to India and Pakistan, we find really grave troubles facing the world and facing these two countries there, both with respect to Kashmir, and to the utter difficulties—economic difficulties growing out of the differences in devaluation, settlement of monetary plans back and forth, et cetera. We know that they have assured one another, and they have assured the world, that as stubborn as these difficulties may be and difficult as they may be of solution, they are not going to resort to war to solve them. We are glad to hear those assurances and the whole world is glad to hear it, but we know also that the problems are in such a situation and in such an area that they are most inflammable, and we believe that in addition to these most desirable assurances there should be some accommodation of wills to bring about a result as soon as possible.

In India and Pakistan we are willing to be of such help as we can be. Again, the responsibility is not ours. Again we can only be helpful friends. Again the responsibility lies with people who have won their freedom and who are very proud of it.

The New Day for Asia

So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitation, and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them.

Source: Dean Acheson, "Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 22(551) (1950): 111–118.

32. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, 14 February 1950

Introduction

After a lengthy civil war, in October 1949 the Chinese Communist Party, led by Chairman Mao Zedong, won control of Mainland China and established the People's Republic of China (PRC). Soviet leader Josef Stalin had initially been willing to cooperate with the Guomindang (Nationalist) government of China headed by Jiang Jieshi and had earlier attempted to moderate Mao's ambitions, suggesting that the Chinese communists only seek to control China north of the Yangtse River. When communist victory in China was assured, however, Stalin quickly moved to demonstrate fraternal solidarity with the new regime. Despite some hopes by American officials, including U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that China would ultimately turn to the United States, Mao regarded his party as the standard-bearer of international revolution, particularly in Asia, and regarded the United States as the ultimate capitalist enemy. He also resented the fact that during World War II and his subsequent civil war against the Guomindang, massive amounts of American economic and military aid had been directed to Jiang's government, strengthening it against the communists. In January and February 1950, Mao and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Moscow. Their first order of business was to negotiate a formal thirty-year alliance with the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the alliance, the two agreed to come to each other's aid if either were attacked by Japan or an ally of Japan. Secret protocols to the treaty, which have never been published, gave the Soviet Union special rights amounting to a virtual sphere of influence in the border provinces of Manchuria and Xinjiang. All other foreigners were excluded from Xinjiang. Russia kept its existing railway and naval concessions in Manchuria until 1954, including a share in the administration of the East Changchun Railway and a naval base at Lushun (Port Arthur). China also received a $300 million low-interest loan from Russia. While in Moscow, Mao also asked Stalin for Russian economic and military assistance in the projected Chinese invasion of the island of Taiwan, to which Jiang and the remnants of his Guomindang forces had retreated. The conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty was an international demonstration that, in a polarized world increasingly perceived in terms of ideological and strategic competition between communist and noncommunist states, the new Chinese government had aligned itself firmly with the Soviet Union.

Primary Source

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China,

Being determined, by strengthening friendship and co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, jointly to prevent the revival of Japanese imperialism and the repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or of any other State that might in any way join with Japan in acts of aggression,

Being anxious to promote a lasting peace and general security in the Far East and throughout the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Being firmly convinced that the strengthening of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China is in accordance with the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and China,

Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Andrei Yanuarevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China: Chou En-lai, Chairman of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China.

The two plenipotentiary representatives, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1
The two Contracting Parties undertake to carry out jointly all necessary measures within their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and breach of the peace by Japan or any other State which might directly or indirectly join with Japan in acts of aggression. Should either of the Contracting Parties be attacked by Japan or by States allied with Japan and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

The Contracting Parties likewise declare that they are prepared to participate, in a spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international action designed to safeguard peace and security throughout the world, and will devote all their energies to the speediest realization of these aims.

Article 2
The two Contracting Parties undertake, by common agreement, to strive for the conclusion at the earliest possible date, in conjunction with the other Powers which were their Allies during the Second World War, of a Peace Treaty with Japan.

Article 3
Neither of the Contracting Parties shall enter into any alliance directed against the other Party, or participate in any coalition or in any action or measures directed against the other Party.

Article 4
The two Contracting Parties shall consult together on all important international questions involving the common interests of the Soviet Union and China, with a view to strengthening peace and universal security.

Article 5
The two Contracting Parties undertake, in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equal rights, mutual interests, mutual respect for State sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the other Party, to develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to render each other all possible economic assistance and to effect the necessary economic co-operation.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, February 14, 1950," *United Nations Treaty Series* 226: 12, 14, 16.

33. Joseph McCarthy: Speech on the Spread of Communism in the United States, 20 February 1950

Introduction

In February 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin spoke before the Women's Club of Wheeling, West Virginia, and claimed that he had a list of 205 known communists working in the U.S. State Department. McCarthy, whose senate record was decidedly mediocre, was apparently looking for an issue that would help him win reelection in 1952. His allegations came a few months after the Chinese Communist Party had won the four-year Chinese Civil War and established the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1949 the Soviet Union also successfully tested an atomic bomb, an event that made the United States feel more vulnerable to sudden and devastating external attack than ever before in its history. It soon became public that some Canadian, American, and British scientists working in the American-financed nuclear program had passed information to the Soviets, accelerating the development of Russian atomic weapons. In 1949 Alger Hiss, a former State Department official accused of passing secret government information to the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s, had also been tried and convicted for perjury, although his former associate Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly refused to condemn him. McCarthy's accusations therefore came at a psychologically fertile moment. They quickly made him into the foremost leader of the eponymous McCarthyism, the movement in the early 1950s to weed out communists and communist

sympathizers in the U.S. government and American society in general. McCarthy was not inhibited by any considerations of accuracy or even credibility, accusing such leading Cold Warriors as Acheson and former secretary of state George Marshall of being communist sympathizers or dupes, if not outright agents. McCarthy's charges touched off a hailstorm of controversy that led to loyalty investigations of numerous diplomats, especially those concerned with China policy, and other government officials. As chairman of the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee, McCarthy held well-broadcast public hearings to determine the political ideologies of political figures and public personalities, including movie stars. He was taking advantage of a climate of increasing suspicion of leftist dissent, exemplified by the antiradical activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) from the 1930s onward and later by President Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 9835, issued in March 1947, establishing a loyalty-security program for federal employees. McCarthy later submitted his speech to Congress so that it could be recorded in the Congressional Record, but he changed the number of known communists to 57. For several years, few Americans dared to challenge McCarthy, fearing that they themselves would be attacked as communist agents. McCarthy also appealed to the populist resentment that many ordinary Americans harbored toward the internationally oriented East Coast elite, whose members tended to dominate the U.S. diplomatic and national security apparatus. In the long run, however, his inaccuracies and a general disregard of facts led to McCarthy's downfall, although he ruined the reputations of several prominent people in the process and generated a climate of fear that discouraged dissent from or even honest criticism of American foreign policies.

Primary Source

Five years after a world war has been won, men's hearts should anticipate a long peace, and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes from war. But this is not such a period—for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of the "cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile armed camps. . . .

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate or members of minority groups who have been selling this Nation out, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on earth has to offer—the finest homes, the finest college education, and the finest jobs in Government.

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the worst. . . . In my opinion, the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with Communists.

I have in my hand 205 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy. . . .

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes —of being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefor, and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, proclaimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and a betrayal of a sacred trust, the blasphemy was so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of national honesty and decency in government.

Source: U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record,* 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1954–1957.

34. Dean Acheson: "The Situation in the Far East," U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 29 March 1950

Introduction

In October 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which had for several years been locked in civil war with the Guomindang (Nationalist) government headed by President Jiang Jieshi, won control of Mainland China and proclaimed the new People's Republic of China (PRC). Jiang and his followers fled to the island of Taiwan, about one hundred miles off the coast of Fujian Province. U.S. President Harry S. Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, had anticipated this development for some time. They now faced the question of whether the United States should withdraw recognition from the Nationalists and accord diplomatic recognition to the new communist state headed by Mao Zedong. Speaking in a closed session to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1949, Acheson chose to defer the matter of recognition, stating "that nobody will profit by any precipitate recognition of the Communist government." The secretary believed that the United States should not offer the new regime any gifts or loans but declined to consider either blockading China or equipping Chinese forces that sought to attack the new regime, "vastly expensive and in the long run . . . futile" measures that he feared would only "solidify the Chinese people against us and in favor of the Communist government." Acheson reiterated these principles in January 1950. Three months later, he provided the committee with a clearer reasoned exposition of his thinking on both China and Taiwan (Formosa). His first priority was to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union and "do everything you can to separate them from Moscow." He expected that relations between the two communist powers would soon deteriorate. He also anticipated that China would soon mount an invasion of the island of Taiwan, which Jiang was using as a platform from which to mount major bombing raids on Chinese cities. American assistance to Jiang on Taiwan, Acheson argued, would only alienate the new Chinese government and drive it closer to Russia, and the island was not "vital" to U.S. security interests. A mainland takeover of Taiwan would, of course, have settled the issue of which Chinese government the United States should recognize, as the People's Republic of China would then have been the only one still surviving. The outbreak of the Korean War three months later changed this strategy, as the Truman administration deployed the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent a mainland invasion of the island. From then on, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan would effectively fall under the protection of the United States, and not until 1979 would the U.S. government switch diplomatic recognition to the mainland regime.

Primary Source

SENATOR SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Secretary, I get the impression, and I got it from Mr. Jessup's statement, that there is no immediate prospect of our recognizing China.

SECRETARY ACHESON. I see no immediate prospect of that.

SENATOR SMITH of New Jersey. It seems to me that it would be a terrible mistake.

SECRETARY ACHESON. I see no prospect; I see no particular advantage. It is something on which I think we should not take a position that we do not reconsider the matter from time to time. We want to be flexible on it.

SENATOR SMITH of New Jersey. I just wanted to be relieved, that there is no immediate step of recognizing them contemplated.

THE CHAIRMAN. He has said three times since he has been there that there is no prospect of that.

[. . .]

SECRETARY ACHESON. I think there is a tendency all the time to discuss Formosa as a question of Formosa, so it becomes one of the major questions of American foreign policy.

Now, in and of itself, simply the island of Formosa is not a great question in American foreign policy, but it

may become a very great question if it obscures or changes or interferes with what we are trying to do in regard to China. Formosa is of importance only as it relates to our hopes and our activities in regard to China.

[. . .]

What we are concerned with in China are two great things. The first one is that whoever runs China, even if the devil himself runs China, if he is an independent devil. That is infinitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow or China comes under Russia. The No. 1 objective is, whoever runs it, good, bad, indifferent, whatever his politics, if his group is independent and is doing better or worse but what they think is the right thing for Formosa and for China, that is an objective of our policy.

The second thing is, if we can have somebody other than Communists running China, we would like that, because Communists try to gravitate to Moscow. Those are the objectives.

Now you find that the Communists are in control of China, and therefore when you look at the problem you see that there are two great objects or methods in which you can operate. One is to fight them. You can send over, directly or indirectly, airplanes, ships, soldiers, and go in and fight.

The other one is to do everything you can to separate them from Moscow.

Now, which of those is the most productive? On which of those would you put your money?

I would put my money clearly on the second. I do not think we are going to or can put the amount of money, men, and material that would be necessary into a military overthrow of Communist China.

SENATOR SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. You and I agree entirely on that.

SECRETARY ACHESON. That is the purpose. We agree entirely on that. We think we have a great force operating with us, and instead of fighting that force if what you do is roll with it, you get the advantage of the gravitation of the earth or the turning of the earth, whatever it is that is behind that force: That is, that the Chinese inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with Moscow, because the very basic objectives of Moscow are hostile to the very basic objectives of China, and that is what we have been trying to point out, what we have been trying to hammer by propaganda, leaflets, and everything we can get into China, including the speeches I made in California and elsewhere.

What we want to say to the Chinese is: watch out! Look what has happened. You will see that all this area, swinging around from Sinkiang all the way around to the north to the China Sea, you will find little by little, or sometimes very swiftly, that the Russians will be moving in. Watch and see if there aren't some secret clauses to these treaties by which the Russians have military posts under the guise of protecting the northern area of China. Watch and see what happens about that. See what develops about this great gesture where they say they are going to give up Port Arthur and their rights. They aren't even going to talk about this for some years. See if they do it. We bet they don't do it. We bet they will say you have breached your agreements and it will never come to pass.

Watch and see whether the control of the Russians over the railways doesn't turn into a situation where there is an area on each side of the road patrolled by Russian troops. Watch all of this and see if there aren't airfields with Russian airmen established in China. See if there aren't controls put up as Russian bases.

Now, we are putting all of these into our propaganda. Some of them are going to happen, because we think what the Russians are primarily interested in is nailing down these great northern border areas. That is the No. 1 objective.

No. 2 is all of China if they can get it, but much better take something which they are sure of, than gamble on the whole.

Then we say, look at this economic help that you are going to get. What have you got? A little piddling loan over 5 years, $60 million a year, and the first thing they

do is to revalue the ruble so that they cheat you out of $15 million and get it down to $45 million each year.

In order to get that, what have you done? You have entered into arrangements under which you are sure you are always going to have a colonial economy. You are going to be contributary to the development of Siberia. All of your valuables are going to Siberia, and the dream of the Chinese that there is going to be a great industrial development of China will never come true. Here is this pitiful loan of $45 million a year, compared to a grant in 1 year, in 1948, when the U.S. Congress gave you $400 million. They gave you more than these people are going to lend you over five years in one year. We are building up all of that.

SENATOR SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. How do you plan to get that information through to the Chinese? I agree with you entirely. How are we going to get it through, through the broadcasting business, the "Voice of America"?

SECRETARY ACHESON. The "Voice of America" does it, people do it, radio does it. This is one of the main efforts. There are various other ways which we do not want to discuss here but that can be done also.

These are the ideas that we are planting there, and they are not fake ideas, because this is what is happening.

Now, we believe that as the Moscow dominated group begins to try and exercise the central control which is the core of the Communist strategy in China, they are going to get into trouble, as all central governments have in China, and there will be a tendency to split off, and that tendency we want to increase and work with when it develops, and that is what we think is the best bet in China.

Now, it is against that that you talk about Formosa. How does what you do in Formosa affect the objectives that I have just discussed? The fundamental facts that you have about Formosa are, first of all, that it is controlled and run by Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Jessup has told you what the feeling in Asia is about Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever his merits, whatever he may have done in the past, he is not the person who is going to liberate China. He cannot get anyone to rally to him and any kind of effort which is made by him through military attack is going to have exactly the opposite result. It is going to solidify everybody against him.

SENATOR SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I do not want to argue with you, but I want the record to show I do not share your conclusions.

Now, assuming you can't use him, what are we going to do with Formosa?

SECRETARY ACHESON. The fact I am pointing out is that he is there, he is running it. How is he running it? He is running it by carrying on an aggressive, offensive war against the mainland, bombing Nanking and other cities. Each of these bombing raids results in the deaths of between one thousand and two thousand Chinese civilians. All of these raids are carried out by American planes, the bombs dropped are American. All of these have been given to him by the United States Government.

That does not make for the popularity of the United States in China. You are not going, and we are not trying, to win a popularity contest, but we do not want to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the historic Chinese xenophobia, and that is what is happening.

SENATOR LODGE. Then why isn't it true that the sooner we disconnect ourselves completely from China the better?

SECRETARY ACHESON. There are many reasons why that is not upon us, including the attitude of a large number of people in the United States and Congress.

SENATOR LODGE. I am of the Congress and I am of the United States, and my attitude is that we ought to. It seems to me it is just fatal to carry that old man of the sea on our backs all the time.

SECRETARY ACHESON. We have it very definitely on our backs.

SENATOR LODGE. Wouldn't we be much better off if we got him off?

SECRETARY ACHESON. If, instead of carrying on an aggressive way, he was doing something else, then you might perhaps decide it would be very important to see if you can build up Formosa something like a good show. These are the choices that we now have.

Now, the second thing, not only is Chiang Kai-shek in charge, not only is he behaving in this way, but whether by this conduct or whether by the opposite conduct, but chiefly by this one, he is inviting a first-class invasion of his island from the mainland. Under present circumstances, the Communists would be criminally crazy if they did not put an end to it just as soon as possible.

SENATOR SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I might say that was one of the reasons I wanted to explore the possibility of militarization of the island. That is over the dam now.

SECRETARY ACHESON. This probably is inevitable, that there will be an assault on the island. He is in a position where, if he husbanded his resources instead of wasting them in what he is doing now, he could for a very considerable time, if he had decent administration on the island, hold it. But if he runs out of supplies, then he won't be able to.

Furthermore, if the nuisance of this thing is great enough and both the blockade of Shanghai and these bombings are a very serious nuisance, then the Communists will accelerate their cooperation with the Russian military, bomb the life out of the place, and before long they will take it.

Very well. Now that is what you are faced with.

SENATOR SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. You think the Russians would participate in that actively?

SECRETARY ACHESON. I am sure they would, and I am sure we think they are now.

SENATOR SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I think so too.

SECRETARY ACHESON. I do not mean they would send their own forces, but they would fix it so they would help.

[. . .]

The situation therefore being that by reason of present conduct and past conduct an assault is inevitable on this island, the question then arises, what are we going to do? Now, if we go to Chiang Kai-shek and say "If you will stop doing this we will guarantee your safety," in the first place I do not think he would do it, because everyone who has talked with him comes back with one thought, and that is that he believes World War III is absolutely inevitable, that the United States will have to go back and conquer China, and that he will come riding in on our coat tails. That is quite wrong, but he believes it. He has no other thought.

What he is doing with this bombing is purely provocative, to provoke the very thing we have been talking about, to get us involved, to get us committed to the thing, and then we are either in World War III or in a war with the Chinese.

Supposing we go in and say, "If you stop this, we will do that." The only thing he knows and our military knows and everybody else knows, the only way you can ever assure that Taiwan is not going to fall in the face of Chinese assault, which I now say is inevitable, is by the intervention of American military force. We could beat it back. Nobody else could beat it back.

Now, do we want to assume that commitment? And, if so, why? What do we gain by doing that? We lose the very things that I was trying to point out at the beginning are the objectives of our policy in China. We become militarily committed to continue a long guerrilla warfare with the Chinese for the purpose of holding an island which as a military outpost is not one which we must hold. It will be better for us to have it in friendly hands than enemy hands, but it is not one of our vital security points in the Far East.

Why should we reverse our entire objectives as regards China in order to fight the Chinese for an island which is not vital?

That is the situation as we see it. There may be all sorts of developments. I am not saying that this is a complete writing off or that we are through or anything more than

giving you the analysis of the matter as it stands at the present time, and the reasons why we cannot assume responsibility for Chiang Kai-shek. We cannot tell him what he has to do because he asks a price for it, and the price is that we guarantee the security of the island.

You can say that you can assume a whole lot of things might happen, and maybe they might, and if they did we would reconsider this thing, but they are not happening and the thing is marching now down this road.

Source: Dean Acheson, *Reviews of the World Situation, 1949–1950: Hearings Held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second Sessions, On the World Situation* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 271–277.

35. NSC-68: U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security, 1950

Introduction

By 1949 the European Cold War was rapidly stabilizing as the Marshall Plan took effect and NATO was established. At least some American officials nonetheless felt a pervasive sense of threat, due in part to Russia's successful detonation of an atomic bomb in August 1949 and the seizure of power by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October. U.S. President Harry S. Truman met on 31 January 1950 with Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission David Lilienthal to discuss the status of the U.S. nuclear program. Truman asked the National Security Council (NSC) to draw up a report on the state of U.S. defenses and the country's position in regard to world affairs. Various officials in the State and Defense Departments, led by Paul H. Nitze, who had replaced George F. Kennan as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, argued that should war break out, the United States lacked the military resources to meet even its existing international commitments. Implicitly, they endorsed the 1947 Truman Doctrine pledging American assistance to any nation facing internal or external communist threat. The planning paper NSC-68, which they drafted and submitted to Truman on 7 April 1950, is widely regarded as the U.S. military blueprint for much of the Cold War. NSC-68 demanded massive enhancements in American conventional and nuclear military capabilities, including substantially increased American troop contributions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe. The paper envisaged increasing the existing U.S. defense budget from $13.5 billion to anywhere between $18 billion and $50 billion, recommendations that the economy-conscious Truman initially rejected, although ultimately he might well have endorsed more modest increases. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 proved crucial both in implementing NSC-68 and in effectively globalizing the Cold War. American officials regarded this conflict as proof positive that in Asia and globally, the international communist camp, united under Soviet leadership, actively sought to expand its territory. U.S. defense spending soared in Europe as well as in Asia, reaching $48 billion in fiscal 1951 and $61 billion the following year. After the 1953 Korean armistice, U.S. defense budgets still remained far higher than in the past. In June 1950 the United States had 1.46 million military personnel, of whom 280,000 were stationed abroad. Four years later, the totals were 3.555 million and 963,000, respectively. Fearing that Korea was only a feint intended to divert attention from a forthcoming threat to Europe, in late 1950 Truman sent four additional American divisions to join the two understrength formations already on the continent, a deployment that effectively soon became permanent. These measures were only part of a broader expansion of American overseas commitments and alliances in Asia and the Middle East during the 1950s, a web of bases, treaties, and economic and military assistance that, by the end of the decade, made U.S. Cold War strategy global in nature.

Primary Source

TOP SECRET

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads:

That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.

The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part: It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudges the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons—viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R.

ANALYSIS

[. . .]

IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas and Values between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design

A. Nature of Conflict

The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict between idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.

The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self-discipline and self-restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.

For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas,

secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.

The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breadth of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power —the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will— all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system—even Gandhian non-violence is not acceptable—for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.

The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism," is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.

The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.

The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.

Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

B. Objectives

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.

2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is

only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.

3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions.

All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the preconditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.

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C. Means

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.

Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

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Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change

the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.

For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and use of military force.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the *Federalist* (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

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VII. Present Risks

A. General

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free society, accentuated many fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirement of freedom. We would face the fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. The Kremlin design seeks to impose order among nations by means which would destroy our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the jeopardy to our system. It adds new strains to the uneasy equilibrium-without-order which exists in the world and raises new doubts in men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this tension without moving toward some kind of order, on somebody's terms.

The risks we face are of a new order of magnitude, commensurate with the total struggle in which we are engaged. For a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never wholly attained, are always in the process of being attained. But defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is total defeat. These risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice, ultimately, between meeting them effectively or being overcome by them.

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VIII. Atomic Armaments

A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and USSR Atomic Capabilities

1. The United States now has an atomic capability, including both numbers and deliverability, estimated to be adequate, if effectively utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making capacity of the USSR. It is doubted whether such a blow, even if it resulted in the complete destruction of the contemplated target systems, would cause the USSR to sue for terms or prevent Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe against such ground resistance as could presently be mobilized. A very serious initial blow could, however, so reduce the capabilities of the USSR to supply and equip its military organization and its civilian population as to give the United States the prospect of developing a general military superiority in a war of long duration.

2. As the atomic capability of the USSR increases, it will have an increased ability to hit at our atomic bases and installations and thus seriously hamper the ability of the United States to carry out an attack such as that outlined above. It is quite possible that in the near future the USSR will have a sufficient number of atomic bombs and a sufficient deliverability to raise a question whether Britain with its present inadequate air defense could be relied upon as an advance base from which a major portion of the U.S. attack could be launched.

It is estimated that, within the next four years, the USSR will attain the capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the United States, provided it strikes a surprise blow and provided further that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than we now have programmed. Such a blow could so seriously damage the United States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential.

Effective opposition to this Soviet capability will require among other measures greatly increased air warning systems, air defenses, and vigorous development and implementation of a civilian defense program which has been thoroughly integrated with the military defense systems.

In time the atomic capability of the USSR can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.

3. In the initial phases of an atomic war, the advantages of initiative and surprise would be very great. A police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the necessary security and centralization of decision required to capitalize on this advantage.

4. For the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably adequate to deter the Kremlin from a deliberate direct military attack against ourselves or other free peoples. However, when it calculates that it has a sufficient atomic capability to make a surprise attack on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a military situation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike swiftly and with stealth. The existence of two large atomic capabilities in such a relationship might well act, therefore, not as a deterrent, but as an incitement to war.

5. A further increase in the number and power of our atomic weapons is necessary in order to assure the effectiveness of any U.S. retaliatory blow, but would not of itself seem to change the basic logic of the above points. Greatly increased general air, ground, and sea strength, and increased air defense and civilian defense programs would also be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the free world could survive an initial surprise atomic attack of the weight which it is estimated the USSR will be capable of delivering by 1954 and still permit the free world to go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. Furthermore, such a build-up of strength could safeguard and increase our retaliatory power, and thus might put off for some time the date when the Soviet Union could calculate that a surprise blow would be advantageous. This would provide additional time for the effects of our policies to produce a modification of the Soviet system.

6. If the USSR develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S., the risks of greatly increased Soviet pressure against all the free world, or an attack against the U.S., will be greatly increased.

7. If the U.S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the USSR, the U.S. should for the time being be able to bring increased pressure on the USSR.

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IX. Possible Courses of Action

Introduction. Four possible courses of action by the United States in the present situation can be distinguished. They are:

a. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies;
b. Isolation;
c. War; and
d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under a, with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked.

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A. THE FIRST COURSE—CONTINUATION OF CURRENT POLICIES, WITH CURRENT AND CURRENTLY PROJECTED PROGRAMS FOR CARRYING OUT THESE POLICIES

1. Military aspects. On the basis of current programs, the United States has a large potential military capability but an actual capability which, though improving, is declining relative to the USSR, particularly in light of its probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The same holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet world as a whole. If war breaks out in 1950 or in the next few years, the United States and its allies, apart from a powerful atomic blow, will be compelled to conduct delaying actions, while building up their strength for a general offensive. A frank evaluation of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital interests and to support a vigorous initiative in the cold war, on the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other, indicates that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them.

A review of Soviet policy shows that the military capabilities, actual and potential, of the United States and the rest of the free world, together with the apparent determination of the free world to resist further Soviet expansion, have not induced the Kremlin to relax its pressures generally or to give up the initiative in the cold war. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has consistently pursued a bold foreign policy, modified only when its probing revealed a determination and an ability of the free world to resist encroachment upon it. The relative military capabilities of the free world are declining, with the result that its determination to resist may also decline and that the security of the United States and the free world as a whole will be jeopardized.

From the military point of view, the actual and potential capabilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war deterrent. Improvement of the state of readiness will become more and more important not only to inhibit the launching of war by the Soviet Union but also to support a national policy designed to reverse the present ominous trends in international relations. A building up of the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is a pre-condition to the achievement of the objectives outlined in this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster.

Fortunately, the United States military establishment has been developed into a unified and effective force as a result of the policies laid down by the Congress and the vigorous carrying out of these policies by the Administration in the fields of both organization and economy. It is, therefore, a base upon which increased strength can be rapidly built with maximum efficiency and economy.

2. Political aspects. The Soviet Union is pursuing the initiative in the conflict with the free world. Its atomic capabilities, together with its successes in the Far East, have led to an increasing confidence on its part and to an increasing nervousness in Western Europe and the rest of the free world. We cannot be sure, of course, how vigorously the Soviet Union will pursue its initiative, nor can we be sure of the strength or weakness of

the other free countries in reacting to it. There are, however, ominous signs of further deterioration in the Far East. There are also some indications that a decline in morale and confidence in Western Europe may be expected. In particular, the situation in Germany is unsettled. Should the belief or suspicion spread that the free nations are not now able to prevent the Soviet Union from taking, if it chooses, the military actions outlined in Chapter V, the determination of the free countries to resist probably would lessen and there would be an increasing temptation for them to seek a position of neutrality.

Politically, recognition of the military implications of a continuation of present trends will mean that the United States and especially other free countries will tend to shift to the defensive, or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff, because the maintenance of a firm initiative in the cold war is closely related to aggregate strength in being and readily available.

This is largely a problem of the incongruity of the current actual capabilities of the free world and the threat to it, for the free world has an economic and military potential far superior to the potential of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The shadow of Soviet force falls darkly on Western Europe and Asia and supports a policy of encroachment. The free world lacks adequate means—in the form of forces in being—to thwart such expansion locally. The United States will therefore be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of reacting totally to a limited extension of Soviet control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual protests and half measures). Continuation of present trends is likely to lead, therefore, to a gradual withdrawal under the direct or indirect pressure of the Soviet Union, until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. In other words, the United States would have chosen, by lack of the necessary decisions and actions, to fall back to isolation in the Western Hemisphere. This course would at best result in only a relatively brief truce and would be ended either by our capitulation or by a defensive war —on unfavorable terms from unfavorable positions— against a Soviet Empire compromising all or most of Eurasia. (See Section B.)

3. Economic and social aspects. As was pointed out in Chapter Vl, the present foreign economic policies and programs of the United States will not produce a solution to the problem of international economic equilibrium, notably the problem of the dollar gap, and will not create an economic base conducive to political stability in many important free countries.

The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting the restoration and expansion of production in Western Europe and has been a major factor in checking the dry rot of Communism in Western Europe. However, little progress has been made toward the resumption by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commensurate with its potential strength. Progress in this direction will require integrated political, economic, and military policies and programs, which are supported by the United States and the Western European countries and which will probably require a deeper participation by the United States than has been contemplated.

The Point IV Program and other assistance programs will not adequately supplement, as now projected, the efforts of other important countries to develop effective institutions, to improve the administration of their affairs, and to achieve a sufficient measure of economic development. The moderate regimes now in power in many countries, like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, will probably be unable to restore or retain their popular support and authority unless they are assisted in bringing about a more rapid improvement of the economic and social structure than present programs will make possible.

The Executive Branch is now undertaking a study of the problem of the United States balance of payments and of the measures which might be taken by the United States to assist in establishing international economic equilibrium. This is a very important project and work on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an economic program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted and vigorous political and military program, we will not be successful in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.

4. Negotiation. In short, by continuing along its present course the free world will not succeed in making effective use of its vastly superior political, economic, and military potential to build a tolerable state of order among nations. On the contrary, the political, economic, and military situation of the free world is already unsatisfactory and will become less favorable unless we act to reverse present trends.

This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to build up our strength.

This is true despite the fact that the United States now has the capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for one of the present realities is that the United States is not prepared to threaten the use of our present atomic superiority to coerce the Soviet Union into acceptable agreements. In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not withdraw and the only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence and of no influenced "settlement" which the Kremlin could readily exploit to its great advantage. The idea that Germany or Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of neutrality in a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design for world domination.

B. THE SECOND COURSE—ISOLATION

Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its present commitments in Europe and Asia and to our isolation in the Western Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from a conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our present Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless they have confidence in our determination to accelerate our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.

There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a course of action, for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by reducing the former and by concentrating our present, or perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the United States.

This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete submission to its will. Therefore isolation would in the end condemn us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities, unless we are prepared to risk the future on the hazard that the Soviet Empire, because of over-extension or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy itself from within.)

The argument also overlooks the imponderable, but nevertheless drastic, effects on our belief in ourselves and in our way of life of a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their former friends and allies. As the Soviet Union mobilized the resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities, and heightened its threat to our security, some would be tempted to accept

"peace" on its terms, while many would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.

Under this course of action, there would be no negotiation, unless on the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of importance.

It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation, many Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter decisively the balance of power by an overwhelming blow with modern weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would wait for such an attack before launching one of its own. But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is clear that the United States would face appalling tasks in establishing a tolerable state of order among nations after such a war and after Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years. These tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.

C. THE THIRD COURSE—WAR

Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of "preventive" war—in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies—is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is probably unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct its resources to the checking and rolling back of the Kremlin's drive for world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.

The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.

Apart from this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive. Many would doubt that it was a "just war" and that all reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been explored in good faith. Many more, proportionately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly in Western Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only because the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It would, therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfactory international order among nations. Victory in such a war would have brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict.

These considerations are no less weighty because they are imponderable, and they rule out an attack unless it is demonstrably in the nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to be delivered. (The military advantages of landing the first blow become increasingly important with modern weapons, and this is a fact which requires us to be on the alert in order to strike with our full weight as soon as we are attacked, and, if possible, before the Soviet blow is actually delivered.) If the argument of Chapter IV is accepted, it follows that there is no "easy" solution and that the only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin

design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.

D. THE REMAINING COURSE OF ACTION—A RAPID BUILD-UP OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE FREE WORLD

A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character. The potential strength of the free world is great; its ability to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet expansion will be determined by the wisdom and will with which it undertakes to meet its political and economic problems.

1. Military aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI that U.S. military capabilities are strategically more defensive in nature than offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evident, from an analysis of the past and of the trend of weapon development, that there is now and will be in the future no absolute defense. The history of war also indicates that a favorable decision can only be achieved through offensive action. Even a defensive strategy, if it is to be successful, calls not only for defensive forces to hold vital positions while mobilizing and preparing for the offensive, but also for offensive forces to attack the enemy and keep him off balance.

The two fundamental requirements which must be met by forces in being or readily available are support of foreign policy and protection against disaster. To meet the second requirement, the forces in being or readily available must be able, at a minimum, to perform certain basic tasks:

a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their war-making capabilities can be developed;
b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory are being built up;
c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be brought to bear;
d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; and
e. To provide such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of their role in the above tasks.

In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these tasks requires a build-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to match item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States and our allies.

Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for protection against disaster but also to support our foreign policy. In fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily available are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to provide the nucleus of strength and the mobilization base on which the tremendous forces required for victory can be built. For example, in both World Wars I and II the ultimate

victors had the strength, in the end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or readily available to prevent the outbreak of war. In part, at least, this was because they had not had the military strength on which to base a strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.

Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local moves the occasion for war—for which we are not prepared. This situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particularly in Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet occupation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased, our allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a firm foreign policy on our part and increasingly anxious to seek other solutions, even though they are aware that appeasement means defeat. An important advantage in adopting the fourth course of action lies in its psychological impact—the revival of confidence and hope in the future. It is recognized, of course, that any announcement of the recommended course of action could be exploited by the Soviet Union in its peace campaign and would have adverse psychological effects in certain parts of the free world until the necessary increase in strength has been achieved. Therefore, in any announcement of policy and in the character of the measures adopted, emphasis should be given to the essentially defensive character and care should be taken to minimize, so far as possible, unfavorable domestic and foreign reactions.

2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate objectives—to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary though not a sufficient condition—are a renewed initiative in the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.

At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance, and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.

A program for rapidly building up strength and improving political and economic conditions will place heavy demands on our courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half-measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. It would probably involve:

1. The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.
2. A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed in Section D-1.
3. A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the

requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to in Section D-l-e.

4. Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.
5. A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.
6. Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.
7. Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.
8. Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.
9. Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.
10. Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.
11. Increased taxes.

Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program would be (a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and (b) a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of present international trends.

The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the disproportion between the potential capabilities of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V and VI). The Soviet Union is currently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about $65 billion) to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent), much of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these purposes to about 50 percent, or by one-fourth.

The United States is currently devoting about 22 percent of its gross national product ($255 billion in 1949) to military expenditures (6 percent), foreign assistance (2 percent), and investment (14 percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As was pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dollar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that obtained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low military and civilian living standards in the Soviet Union.) In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.

From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy had in the meantime increased the amount of resources going into Government use by $60–$65 billion (in 1939 prices).

This comparison between the potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States also holds true for the Soviet world and the free world and is of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States.

The comparison gives renewed emphasis to the fact that the problems faced by the free countries in their efforts to build a successfully functioning system lie not so much in the field of economics as in the field of politics. The building of such a system may require

more rapid progress toward the closer association of the free countries in harmony with the concept of the United Nations. It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice. It also seems clear that a unifying ideal of this kind might awaken and arouse the latent spiritual energies of free men everywhere and obtain their enthusiastic support for a positive program for peace going far beyond the frustration of the Kremlin design and opening vistas to the future that would outweigh short-run sacrifices.

The threat to the free world involved in the development of the Soviet Union's atomic and other capabilities will rise steadily and rather rapidly. For the time being, the United States possesses a marked atomic superiority over the Soviet Union which, together with the potential capabilities of the United States and other free countries in other forces and weapons, inhibits aggressive Soviet action. This provides an opportunity for the United States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch a build-up of strength which will support a firm policy directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design. The immediate goal of our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world backed by adequate military strength is to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability, might arise in 1954 on a continuation of our present programs. By acting promptly and vigorously in such a way that this date is, so to speak, pushed into the future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation, withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war attendant upon a decision to build up strength will steadily increase the longer we defer it.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In return, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.

[. . .]

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations

of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program—harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives—is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

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Source: U.S. Department of State, "NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.

36. Josef Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai: Telegram Exchange, 1950

Introduction

After General Douglas MacArthur led a surprise invasion at Inchon in central Korea in September 1950, United Nations (UN) troops crossed the 38th Parallel into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), turning the tide in the Korean War. As UN forces neared complete victory at the beginning of October, Soviet leader Josef Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong exchanged telegrams on how they should react to the UN advance. Stalin, clearly not prepared to commit Soviet troops, begged Mao to send his own forces, in the guise of volunteers, to aid beleaguered North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. According to the official Chinese published version, Mao promptly did so, cabling back the next day. Documents now available in Soviet archives, however, give a more complex picture, revealing that the Soviets did not receive this message. Mao initially refused to dispatch Chinese troops to the Korean War, arguing that there was a danger that this would expand the war into a full-scale confrontation between China and the United States, which might even involve the Soviet Union. V. N. Roshchin, Soviet ambassador in Beijing, commented that Mao had retreated from earlier promises of military assistance to North Korea. It is not clear whether Mao was genuinely wavering, whether he sought to obtain more generous aid from Stalin for China's war effort, or whether, facing substantial opposition within the Chinese politburo, he felt unable to promise Chinese intervention. Within two weeks, Roshchin was able to inform Stalin that Mao had reversed his position, a decision that quickly triggered large-scale Chinese troop deployments in North Korea. The new Chinese forces quickly drove the surprised UN troops back well beyond the 38th Parallel but were unable to achieve a total victory over their opponents. By spring of the following year, the war had settled into a near stalemate that would last until an armistice was signed in summer 1953.

Primary Source

Telegram from Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950

I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea. However, judging by the information that I have received from Moscow today, I see that the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate.

It was on 16 September already that Moscow warned our Korean friends that the landing of the U.S. troops at Chemulp'o [Inchon] had great significance and was aimed at cutting off the First and Second Army Groups of the North Koreans from their rear in the North. Moscow admonished them to withdraw at least four divisions from the South immediately, to set up a frontline to the north and east of Seoul, and later to gradually pull out most of the troops fighting in the South northward, thereby providing for the defense of the 38th parallel. However, the 1 and 2 Army Groups' Commands failed to implement Kim Il Sung's order for the withdrawal of troops northward, which allowed the U.S. troops to cut them off and surround them. Our Korean friends have no troops capable of resistance in the vicinity of Seoul. Hence, one needs to consider the way toward the 38th parallel wide open.

I think that if in the current situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five–six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course.

I have not informed and am not going to inform our Korean friends about this idea, but I have no doubt in my mind that they will be glad when they learn about it. I await your reply.

Telegram from Mao Zedong to Josef Stalin, 2 October 1950

1. We have decided to send some of our troops to Korea under the name of [Chinese People's] Volunteers to fight the United States and its lackey Syngman Rhee and to aid our Korean comrades. From the following considerations, we think it necessary to do so:

the Korean revolutionary force will meet with a fundamental defeat, and the American aggressors will rampage unchecked once they occupy the whole of Korea. This will be unfavorable to the entire East.

2. Since we have decided to send Chinese troops to fight the Americans in Korea, we hold that, first, we should be able to solve the problem; that is, [we are] ready to annihilate and drive out the invading armies of the United States and other countries. Second, since Chinese troops are to fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name Volunteers), we must be prepared for a declaration of war by the United States and for the subsequent use of the U.S. air force to bomb many of China's main cities and industrial bases, as well as an attack by the U.S. Navy on [our] coastal areas.

3. Of these two problems, the primary problem is whether or not the Chinese troops can annihilate the American troops in Korea and effectively resolve the Korean issue. Only when it is possible for our troops to annihilate the American troops in Korea, principally the Eighth Army (an old army with combat effectiveness), can the situation become favorable to the revolutionary camp and to China, although the second problem (a declaration of war by the United States) is still a serious one. This means that the Korean issue will be solved in reality along with the defeat of American troops (in name it probably will remain unsolved because the United States most likely will not admit Korea's victory for a considerable period of time). Consequently, even if the United States declares war on China, the war will probably not be of great scope or last long. The most unfavorable situation, we hold, would result from the inability of the Chinese troops to annihilate American troops in Korea and the involvement of the two countries' troops in a stalemate while the United States publicly declares war on China, undermines the plans for China's economic reconstruction, which has already begun, and sparks the dissatisfaction of [China's] national bourgeoisie and other segments of the people (they are very afraid of war).

4. Under the current situation, we have reached a decision to order the 12 divisions stationed in advance in South Manchuria to set off on October 15. They will be deployed in appropriate areas in North Korea (not necessarily reaching to the 38th Parallel). On the one hand, they will fight the enemies who dare to cross the 38th Parallel. At the initial stage, they will merely engage in defensive warfare to wipe out small detachments of enemy troops and ascertain the enemy's situation; on the other hand, they will wait for the delivery of Soviet weapons. Once they are [well] equipped, they will cooperate with the Korean comrades in counterattacks to annihilate American aggressor troops.

5. According to our intelligence to date, an American corps (composed of two infantry divisions and a mechanized division) has 1,500 guns of 70mm to 240mm caliber, including tank cannons and anti-air-craft guns. In comparison, each of our corps (composed of three divisions) has only 36 such guns. The enemy dominates the air. By comparison, we have only just started training pilots. We shall not be able to employ more than 300 aircraft in combat until February 1951. Accordingly, we do not now have any certainty of success in annihilating a single American corps in one blow. Since we have made the decision to fight the Americans, we certainly must be prepared to deal with a situation in which the U.S. headquarters will employ one American corps against our troops in one [of the Korean] theaters. For the purpose of eliminating completely one enemy corps with a certainty of success, we should in such a situation assemble four times as many troops as the enemy (employing four corps to deal with one enemy corps) and firepower from one-and-a-half times to twice as heavy as the enemy's (using 2,200 to 3,000 guns of more than 70mm caliber to deal with 1,500 enemy guns of the same caliber).

6. In addition to the above-mentioned 12 divisions, we are moving 24 divisions from south of the Yangtze River and from Shaanzi and Gansu provinces to areas along the Xuzhou-Lanzhou, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Shenyang railroad lines. We plan to employ these divisions as the second and third groups of troops sent to aid Korea in the spring and summer of next year as the future situation requires.

Source: "Ciphered Telegram," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995): 114–115.

37. Harry S. Truman and Clement Attlee: Joint Communiqué, 8 December 1950

Introduction

The intervention of communist China in the Korean War in November 1950 came as a major shock to the Western powers. Before this event, United Nations (UN) commander Douglas MacArthur had promised that the war would be over by Christmas. The entry of China transformed the war. Initially, the Chinese drove South Korean and UN forces back down the Korean peninsula and well across the former 38th Parallel border dividing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). By spring of 1951, the noncommunist forces had recovered some of the lost ground, and the two sides eventually found themselves facing each other in positions not far removed from the original frontier between the two states. Even so, the conflict had changed decisively from one in which full-scale victory was anticipated in the near future to a limited war of attrition in which all the major powers were seeking to restrain the further spread of hostilities and prevent any broadening of the war beyond its existing boundaries. The British, who had contributed substantial forces to the UN Korea force, were particularly eager to avoid any expansion of the war. Using this opportunity to demonstrate his country's loyalty to the United States, its foremost NATO ally, in July 1950 British Prime Minister Clement Attlee committed British troops to the American-led UN forces. British officials welcomed the massive American enhancement of NATO forces that quickly resulted from the Korean conflict. Even so, Attlee was anxious to restrain the United States, fearing that American leaders might escalate the Korean intervention into full-scale war with China and perhaps even the Soviet Union, jeopardizing Britain's Asian colonies, alienating India, diverting American forces from Europe and the Middle East, and, in the worst eventuality, risking Soviet devastation of Western Europe. Attlee supported the fall 1950 UN decision to cross the 38th Parallel, believing that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would intervene. When the Chinese did so, British leaders sought to prevent the conflict's further expansion. President Harry S. Truman's public comments that month that the United States might employ atomic weapons reinforced their anxieties. In early December, Attlee flew to Washington seeking to reassure the British public, restrain the United States, and reaffirm Britain's status within the Atlantic alliance. In a series of six meetings with Attlee, Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson endorsed Attlee's view that UN forces in Korea should not seek total victory but should only aim to achieve an acceptable battlefield position giving them a line along which they could negotiate an armistice. They refused, however, to offer China political or diplomatic concessions in exchange for a cease-fire. Publicly, the two Western leaders issued a joint communiqué announcing that they would continue their strong support of UN forces in Korea and cooperate in building up their military forces in Europe as well as in Asia. They did, however, open the door to negotiations with their opponents and left open the question of the future status of Taiwan. Attlee exaggerated his successes when he returned to Britain, and the belief became widespread that he had prevented further American escalation of the war. Alarmed by UN commander General Douglas MacArthur's bellicose subsequent pronouncements on the potential use of nuclear weapons, Attlee welcomed the general's dismissal by Truman in April 1951.

Primary Source

[. . .]

We have reviewed together the outstanding problems facing our two countries in international affairs. The objectives of our two nations in foreign policy are the same: to maintain world peace and respect for the fights and interests of all peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life.

We first reviewed the changed aspect of world affairs arising from the massive intervention of Chinese Communists in Korea. We have discussed the problems of the Far East and the situation as it now presents itself in Europe. We have surveyed the economic problems and the defense programs of our respective countries,

and particularly the existing and threatened shortages of raw materials. We have considered the arrangements for the defense of the Atlantic community, and our future course in the United Nations.

The unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the discussions. There is no difference between us as to the nature of the threat which our countries face or the basic policies which must be pursued to overcome it. We recognize that many of the problems which we have discussed can only be decided through the procedures of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The peoples of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace which recent weeks have made clear to all.

The situation in Korea is one of great gravity and far-reaching consequences. By the end of October, the forces of the United Nations had all but completed the mission set for them by the United Nations "to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." A free and unified Korea—the objective which the United Nations has long sought—was well on the way to being realized. At that point Chinese Communist forces entered Korea in large numbers, and on November 27 launched a large-scale attack on the United Nations troops. The United Nations forces have the advantage of superior air power and naval support, but on the ground they are confronted by a heavy numerical superiority.

The United Nations forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the recommendation of the United Nations. The United Nations has not changed the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will continue to discharge their responsibilities.

We were in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting peace and the future of the United Nations as an instrument for world peace depend upon strong support for resistance against aggression.

For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation. The same principles of international conduct should be applied to this situation as are applied, in accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to any threat to world peace. Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. We are confident that the great majority of the United Nations takes the same view. If the Chinese on their side display any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best be maintained. For our part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold them.

We considered two questions regarding China which are already before the United Nations. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People's Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the seating of the Chinese communist representatives in the United Nations. We have discussed our difference of view on this point and are determined to prevent it from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.

On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends.

The free nations of Asia have given strong support to the United Nations and have worked for world peace. Communist aggression in Korea increases the danger

to the security and independence of these nations. We reaffirm our intention to continue to help them.

The pressure of communist expansion existed in Europe and elsewhere long before the aggression against Korea, and measures were taken to meet it. The need to strengthen the forces of collective security had already been recognized and action for this purpose is under way. Clearly, decisions regarding the Far East have their repercussions and effects elsewhere. In considering the necessities of the Far Eastern situation, we have kept in mind the urgency of building up the strength of the whole free world. We are in complete agreement on the need for immediate action by all the North Atlantic Treaty countries to intensify their efforts to build up their defenses and to strength[en] the Atlantic Community.

We recognize that adequate defense forces are essential if war is to be prevented.

Accordingly, we have reached the following conclusions:

1. The military capabilities of the United States and the United Kingdom should be increased as rapidly as possible.
2. The two countries should expand the production of arms which can be used by the forces of all the free nations that are joined together in common defense. Together with those other nations the United States and the United Kingdom should continue to work out mutual arrangements by which all will contribute appropriately to the common defense.

We agreed that as soon as the plan now nearing completion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for an effective integrated force for the defense of Europe is approved, a Supreme Commander should be appointed. It is our joint desire that this appointment shall be made soon.

In addition to these decisions on increasing our military strength, we have agreed that the maintenance of healthy civilian economies is of vital importance to the success of our defense efforts. We agreed that, while defense production must be given the highest practicable priority in the case of raw materials whose supply is inadequate, the essential civilian requirements of the free countries must be met so far as practicable. In order to obtain the necessary materials and to devote them as rapidly as possible to these priority purposes, we have agreed to work closely together for the purpose of increasing supplies of raw materials. We have recognized the necessity of international action to assure that basic raw materials are distributed equitably in accordance with defense and essential civilian needs. We discussed certain immediate problems of raw materials shortages and consideration of these specific matters will continue. We are fully conscious of the increasing necessity of preventing materials and items of strategic importance from flowing into the hands of those who might use them against the free world.

In the circumstances which confront us throughout the world our nations have no other choice but to devote themselves with all vigor to the building up of our defense forces. We shall do this purely as a defensive measure. We believe that the communist leaders of the Soviet Union and China could, if they chose, modify their conduct in such a way as to make these defense preparations unnecessary. We shall do everything that we can, through whatever channels are open to us, to impress this view upon them and to seek a peaceful solution of existing issues.

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.

In this critical period, it is a source of satisfaction to us that the views of our governments on basic problems are so similar. We believe that this identity of aims will enable our governments to carry out their determination to work together to strengthen the unity which has already been achieved among the free nations and to defend those values which are of fundamental importance to the people we represent.

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 738–740.

38. Harry S. Truman: Truman's Declaration of a National Emergency, 16 December 1950

Introduction

Until late November 1950, when it became apparent that communist Chinese forces had intervened in large numbers in the Korean War, the Democratic administration of President Harry S. Truman assumed that by the end of 1950 the conflict would be over and would have ended in a sweeping United Nations (UN) victory, uniting all Korea under a pro-Western government. Chinese intervention ensured that the fighting would be protracted and would eventually end in a stalemate, a compromise that completely satisfied none of the combatants. It also meant that the United States would have to make far greater efforts than originally expected to attain even these limited goals. As the forces under General Douglas MacArthur's command retreated in a near rout throughout December, Truman proclaimed a national state of emergency, urging the American people to make all necessary sacrifices to ensure their country's ultimate triumph over communism. In apocalyptic terms, Truman warned that unless they did so, they faced a communist threat to their way of life, which would mean that Americans would lose the freedoms of religion, speech, thought, education, and political and economic activity that they currently enjoyed. The draft was reinstated for young men of military age, and rationing and price controls were imposed. The United States also launched a massive military buildup, implementing the permanent expansion of its armed forces and American overseas bases and commitments envisaged the previous year in the policy planning paper NSC-68.

Primary Source

By the President of the United States of America a Proclamation

WHEREAS recent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat to the peace of the world and imperil the efforts of this country and those of the United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict; and

WHEREAS world conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world; and

WHEREAS, if the goal of communist imperialism were to be achieved, the people of this country would no longer enjoy the full and rich life they have with God's help built for themselves and their children; they would no longer enjoy the blessings of the freedom of worshipping as they severally choose, the freedom of reading and listening to what they choose, the right of free speech including the right to criticize their Government, the right to choose those who conduct their Government, the right to engage freely in collective bargaining, the right to engage freely in their own business enterprises, and the many other freedoms and rights which are a part of our way of life; and

WHEREAS the increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as speedily as possible:

Now, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, do proclaim the existence of a national emergency, which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made through the United Nations and otherwise to bring about lasting peace.

I summon all citizens to make a united effort for the security and well-being of our beloved country and to place its needs foremost in thought and action that the full moral and material strength of the Nation may be readied for the dangers which threaten us.

I summon our farmers, our workers in industry, and our businessmen to make a mighty production effort to meet the defense requirements of the Nation and to this end to eliminate all waste and inefficiency and to subordinate all lesser interests to the common good.

I summon every person and every community to make, with a spirit of neighborliness, whatever sacrifices are necessary for the welfare of the Nation.

I summon all State and local leaders and officials to cooperate fully with the military and civilian defense agencies of the United States in the national defense program.

I summon all citizens to be loyal to the principles upon which our Nation is founded, to keep faith with our friends and allies, and to be firm in our devotion to the peaceful purposes for which the United Nations was founded.

I am confident that we will meet the dangers that confront us with courage and determination, strong in the faith that we can thereby "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

[. . .]

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 746–747.

39. Irving Kaufman: Rosenberg Trial, Statement upon Sentencing, 1951

Introduction

On 5 April 1951, U.S. judge Irving Kaufman sentenced American husband and wife Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to death after they had been convicted on charges of revealing nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union. The charges against the Rosenbergs were brought soon after the Soviet Union had successfully detonated an atomic bomb, a development for which the couple were—probably wrongly—held partly responsible. When sentencing them, Kaufman went so far as to argue that had the Soviets not possessed the atomic bomb, the Korean War would not have begun, holding the Rosenbergs directly responsible for this. Their prosecution became a radical cause célèbre, with leftist sympathizers arguing that the pair were innocent as well as drawing attention to numerous legal shortcomings in their defense and alleging that from the beginning the judge was prejudiced against them, depriving them of a fair trial. The case became extremely controversial and excited a great deal of public interest in the United States and around the globe, especially as the Rosenbergs appeared at first as such ordinary citizens. Both were Jewish, and to some it seemed that their prosecution had anti-Semitic overtones. Their conviction, however, heightened fears of a communist insurgency in America during the apex of the Cold War and gave additional impetus to the forces of McCarthyism. The Venona transcripts of intercepted Soviet cables and Soviet materials that have become available since the ending of the Cold War have confirmed that Julius Rosenberg, an aeronautical engineer who, like Ethel, had been a communist since the mid-1930s, had passed on documents on radar and aviation design to the Soviet Union, although nothing substantive relating to atomic weapons. Ethel's brother, Sergeant David Greenglass, who worked on the Los Alamos nuclear project, had also furnished information to Soviet representatives. Ethel Rosenberg's role was less clear. At most, it seems, she typed up some notes for her brother and husband. Her trial on charges of conspiracy to commit treason was apparently initiated largely as an unsuccessful effort to exert pressure on her husband to cooperate with the prosecution and finger other potential Soviet agents. Greenglass, who was spared the death penalty, later stated that he had exaggerated Ethel's involvement in order to reduce his own sentence. In the overheated anticommunist atmosphere of the early 1950s, however, with the Korean War in progress and McCarthyism at its height, leniency was in short supply. Although the Rosenbergs appealed their case to the U.S. Supreme Court, both of them were executed in the electric chair on 19 June 1953.

Primary Source

Citizens of this country who betray their fellow-countrymen can be under none of the delusions about the benignity of Soviet power that they might have been prior to World War II. The nature of Russian terrorism is now self-evident. Idealism as a rationale dissolves . . .

I consider your crime worse than murder. Plain deliberate contemplated murder is dwarfed in magnitude by comparison with the crime you have committed. In committing the act of murder, the criminal kills only his victim. The immediate family is brought to grief and when justice is meted out the chapter is closed. But in your case, I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country.

No one can say that we do not live in a constant state of tension. We have evidence of your treachery all around us every day—for the civilian defense activities throughout the nation are aimed at preparing us for an atom bomb attack. Nor can it be said in mitigation of the offense that the power which set the conspiracy in motion and profited from it was not openly hostile to the United States at the time of the conspiracy. If this was your excuse the error of your ways in setting yourselves above our properly constituted authorities and the decision of those authorities not to share the information with Russia must now be obvious . . .

In the light of this, I can only conclude that the defendants entered into this most serious conspiracy against their country with full realization of its implications . . .

The statute of which the defendants at the bar stand convicted is clear. I have previously stated my view that the verdict of guilty was amply justified by the evidence. In the light of the circumstances, I feel that I must pass such sentence upon the principals in this diabolical conspiracy to destroy a God-fearing nation, which will demonstrate with finality that this nation's security must remain inviolate; that traffic in military secrets, whether promoted by slavish devotion to a foreign ideology or by a desire for monetary gains must cease.

The evidence indicated quite clearly that Julius Rosenberg was the prime mover in this conspiracy. However, let no mistake be made about the role which his wife, Ethel Rosenberg, played in this conspiracy. Instead of deterring him from pursuing his ignoble cause, she encouraged and assisted the cause. She was a mature woman—almost three years older than her husband and almost seven years older than her younger brother. She was a full-fledged partner in this crime.

Indeed the defendants Julius and Ethel Rosenberg placed their devotion to their cause above their own personal safety and were conscious that they were sacrificing their own children, should their misdeeds be detected—all of which did not deter them from pursuing their course. Love for their cause dominated their lives—it was even greater than their love for their children.

Source: *United States of America vs. Rosenberg et al.*, Trial Transcript, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, C.134–245, 6 March–6 April 1951, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/rosenb/ROS_SENT.HTM.

40. Harry S. Truman: Statement and Order by the President on Relieving General MacArthur, April 1951

Introduction

Communist Chinese intervention in the Korean War in November 1950 helped bring to a head simmering tensions between President Harry S. Truman, by virtue of his position as commander in chief of all U.S. military forces, and General Douglas MacArthur, the strong-willed commander of United Nations (UN) forces in Korea. Truman feared that unduly forceful prosecution of the war might escalate it into a full-scale, nuclear-armed world war between the United States and the Soviet Union, which to date had only provided limited assistance to the North

Korean and Chinese armies. He was, moreover, mindful that since 1949 the Soviets had possessed usable nuclear weapons. Truman therefore sought to keep the conflict a limited war and confine it to the territory of Korea itself. The president took his cue in part from the fact that the Chinese troops fighting in Korea were nominally "volunteers," a diplomatic fig leaf that allowed the new People's Republic of China (PRC) to disclaim formal responsibility for its actions as and when Chinese leaders pleased, on the pretext that China itself had not gone to war. MacArthur favored a far more aggressive strategy, involving notably the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese industrial heartland of Manchuria, close to the North Korean border, and against other major Chinese cities as well as assisting Guomindang (Nationalist) Chinese troops now confined to Taiwan to mount a counterinvasion of the mainland. Such policies might well have brought open war between the United States and China. MacArthur's open support for such tactics in the spring of 1951, in defiance of Truman's expressed wishes, came at a time when the United States sought to open peace negotiations with the Chinese and North Koreans. Stating that the subordination of the military to civilian authority was one of the basic principles of the U.S. Constitution, in April 1951 Truman finally relieved the general of his command. Explaining his decision in a radio address to the American people that evening, Truman warned that had the United States adopted the strategy MacArthur advocated, it risked full-scale war with China and possibly even with the Soviet Union, although he suspected that the Soviet Union would sit on the sidelines and perhaps seek gains in Europe while the United States was preoccupied in Asia. While affirming his determination to maintain the independence of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), Truman argued that a war for limited objectives was the only prudent course open to the United States. His outlook epitomized one fundamental dilemma facing all the major powers throughout the Cold War: while none of the great powers wished to diminish its own credibility, none could afford to risk full-scale warfare with each other.

Primary Source

Statement by the President

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

Order by the President to General MacArthur

I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message. [See Statement by the President.]

Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East, 11 April 1951

My fellow, Americans:

I want to talk to you plainly tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea now. It was right last June. It is right today.

[. . .]

The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made.

The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia.

I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which came to us after the attack on Korea. It is a report of a speech a Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs last May, one month before South Korea was invaded. The report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully prepared plot. Here, in part, is what the Communist officer, who had been trained in Moscow, told his men: "Our forces," he said, "are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June. . . . The coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia."

Notice that he used the word "liberation." This is Communist doubletalk meaning "conquest."

I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: "In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world revolution, we must first unify Asia. . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets. . . . The United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all the countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States." Again, "liberation" in "commie" language means conquest.

That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and that is what they have been trying to do.

They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin.

[. . .]

So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding, and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight, and that they will stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the timetable of conquest.

In Korea itself there are signs that the enemy is building up his ground forces for a new mass offensive. We also know that there have been large increases in the enemy's available air forces.

If a new attack comes, I feel confident it will be turned back. The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well equipped. They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world.

[. . .]

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.

Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea—and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is much more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: The fighting must stop.
Two: Concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.
Three: There must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective—to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

Free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing, we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 222–227.

41. Douglas MacArthur: Postrecall Speech to Congress, 19 April 1951

Introduction

U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, Allied commander of United Nation (UN) forces during the Korean War, was an able general but also a controversial figure whom top American officials in Washington feared might readily use nuclear weapons to ignite World War III. MacArthur, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific during World War II, headed the postwar Allied forces that occupied Japan. In early July 1950, shortly after the onset of the Korean War, he was appointed commander of the UN forces that were to be deployed to Korea. MacArthur, a fierce anticommunist, also had close ties to Jiang Jieshi, the Chinese Guomindang (Nationalist) leader who fled to Taiwan in 1949 with the remnants of his forces as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conquered Mainland China. In defiance of Secretary of State Dean Acheson's policies, by June 1950 MacArthur already favored a continuing American commitment to Taiwan and hoped that U.S. forces would ultimately attack and overthrow the new People's Republic of China (PRC). As UN commander, in September 1950 MacArthur reversed the initial North Korean advances in the war by taking the enemy from behind after a daring amphibious landing at Inchon. The original remit of the UN resolution authorizing military intervention in Korea had been merely to drive North Korean troops out of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), but MacArthur's UN forces quickly drove the enemy back well beyond the earlier 38th Parallel border that had previously divided the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). MacArthur ignored Chinese warnings that should non-Korean troops cross this boundary and try to unite Korea under a noncommunist government, the PRC would in its turn intervene. In November 1950 hundreds of thousands of Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PLA) troops came to the assistance of North Korea, once more driving the UN army back well beyond the 38th Parallel boundary. Ignoring repeated instructions from President Harry S. Truman that he would not authorize the use of nuclear weapons against the PRC, a move that Truman feared might provoke Soviet intervention, in early 1951 MacArthur publicly advocated the employment of atomic bombs to devastate the northeastern Manchurian provinces, the Chinese industrial heartland bordering on North Korea, and thirty to fifty Chinese cities. Whereas Truman wished to wage a limited war, MacArthur favored total war, even at the risk of provoking World War III. MacArthur's bellicose

rhetoric was intended to undercut moves by Truman to open peace negotiations with the North Koreans and Chinese. It deeply alarmed the European allies of the United States, most of whom were contributing military contingents to the UN army but who feared that the Korean conflict might escalate into a full-scale great-power confrontation. Infuriated by the arrogant general's constant insubordination, Truman relieved MacArthur of his office on 11 April 1951. Eight days later, on 19 April, the still charismatic MacArthur used masterly rhetoric to deliver a farewell address to Congress, offering a defense of his actions in Korea. His speech was interrupted by thirty ovations. MacArthur's public popularity soared and that of Truman declined, but although MacArthur harbored political ambitions, he never served again in any significant public office. His criticisms of Truman's policies did, however, give additional ammunition to Senator Joseph McCarthy and others who repeatedly attacked Truman administration officials, claiming that they were overly soft on communism and that such figures as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall were communist agents or at least gullible fellow travelers. During the Truman administration's final two years in office, such allegations helped to make both the Korean War and many of Truman's top officials extremely unpopular.

Primary Source

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and distinguished members of the Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride—humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.

[. . .]

Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignify, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration of the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism, and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population and 60 per cent of its natural resources, these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments.

Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers, as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.

In this situation it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now passed and the Asian peoples covet the fight to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding and support, not imperious direction; the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake.

World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the people strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, and a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom.

These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto, the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas

with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway and Guam to the Philippines.

That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack. The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it.

Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free allies.

From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore—with sea and air power, as I said, every port from Vladivostok to Singapore—and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance.

With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure. Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake.

Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression.

The holding of this littoral defense line in the Western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof. For any major breach of this line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.

This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception.

For that reason I have strongly recommended in the past as a matter of military urgency that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control.

Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.

[. . .]

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary, first, the intensification of our economic blockade against China; second, the imposition

of a naval blockade against the China coast; third, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; fourth, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that, if not permitted to destroy the enemy–built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver, and at an approximate area where our supply-line advantages were in balance with the supply-line disadvantages of the enemy. But we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential.

I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution. Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing, to me, is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the battleship *Missouri*, I formally cautioned as follows:

"Men, since the beginning of time, have sought peace. Various methods, through the ages, have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start, workable methods were found insofar as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war."

The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door.

The problem basically is still logical and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2,000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory. There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches, with unmistakable emphasis, that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Source: U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, Vol. 97: 4124–4125.

42. Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS Pact), 1 September 1951

Introduction

The ANZUS Treaty was a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States signed on 1 September 1951 and named after the initial letters of the signatory states. Its intent was to establish a coalition of Western powers in the Pacific region for mutual defense in case of attack. The establishment of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 followed by the onset of the Korean War in June 1950 alarmed Australia and New Zealand, small countries that felt vulnerable to outside attack from communist neighbors. Given that World War II had ended only six years earlier, both powers also feared the revival of Japan, as anticipated in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed one week after the ANZUS Pact. Australia and New Zealand were both British dominions but recognized that Great Britain lacked the military strength to protect them against regional threats. The two Pacific nations therefore sought alliance and protection from the United States, and to bolster their efforts to obtain this both sent troops to support the United States in the contemporaneous Korean War. The ANZUS Pact was striking evidence of the manner in which the United States had by the early 1950s taken over Great Britain's earlier hegemonic international role.

Primary Source

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area. . . .

Desiring further to co-ordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 3

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article 4

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. . . .

Article 6

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. . . .

Article 10

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.

Source: Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, 1 September 1951, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 3: 3420–3425.

43. United States–Japan Security Treaty, 8 September 1951

Introduction

Japan ended World War II a defeated enemy, but within six years it became the cornerstone of U.S. security in Asia. As it became increasingly likely in the late 1940s that communist forces would win the civil war in China, the United States began to regard Japan as its major potential ally in Asia. U.S. policy lost much of its punitive emphasis and turned to facilitating the regeneration of Japan. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 made Japan even more significant in security terms. The United States–Japan Security Treaty was signed on 8 September 1951, the same day as the U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty, and went into effect on 28 April 1952. In order to regain control of their own affairs under the peace treaty, the Japanese subordinated their foreign and national security policies to those of the United States. By signing the treaty, the United States committed itself to defending Japan, and in return Japan provided bases for U.S. forces. The United States, together with Australia, New Zealand, and many Southeast Asian powers, all of whom had bitter memories of World War II, feared a resurgence of Japanese military ambitions and therefore deliberately left the Japanese armed forces extremely weak. Japanese defense spending was restricted to 1 percent of gross national product, and the armed forces remained restricted to those needed for internal security and could not serve outside Japan. To further reassure its Pacific allies as well as provide them with assistance against any potential Chinese communist threat, the United States simultaneously signed the ANZUS Pact, a security pact with Australia and New Zealand. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was designed to provide Japan with a strong basis for economic and social recovery after World War II. With its security guaranteed by the United States—along with generous financial aid—Japan was able to achieve a successful economic recovery, effectively trading its independence in external affairs for wealth and influence. By the early twenty-first century, the continued presence of U.S. bases had become a somewhat contentious domestic political issue in Japan, while American officials—still welcoming the subordination of Japanese security policies to their own country's—sometimes appeared to wish that Japan would carry more of the burden of its own defense.

Primary Source

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a Sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the

security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

ARTICLE II
During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

ARTICLE III
The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

ARTICLE IV
This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

Source: Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 8 September 1951, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 3.3, pt. 3329 (1952).

44. Bricker Amendment, 1952

Introduction

As foreign policy came to bulk ever larger in American politics after World War II, the U.S. Congress showed itself wary of the concomitant expansion of presidential power and also of a potential loss of U.S. independence to such international institutions as the United Nations. In the 1950s, John Bricker, a conservative Republican senator from Ohio, spearheaded a drive for a constitutional amendment related to treaties and executive agreements granting Congress more say in such matters. From 1951 onward, Bricker repeatedly introduced congressional resolutions to this effect. The only occasion on which Congress voted on this amendment was in 1953, after its introduction as Senate Joint Resolution 1 of the 83rd Congress. Although the amendment fell just short of receiving the necessary two-thirds majority in Congress, in the ensuing years politicians offered more than sixty-five other proposals along the same lines, none of which passed. Only after the demoralizing Vietnam War, during which Congress had given President Lyndon B. Johnson virtually a free hand in determining policy, did Congress succeed in partially reining in the imperial presidency by passing the War Powers Act of November 1973.

Primary Source

Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.

Section 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.

Section 3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.

Section 4. The congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Source: U.S. Congress, *Bricker Amendment* S J Res. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 7 January 1953.

45. Korean Armistice Agreement, 1953

Introduction

By the spring of 1951 the Korean War was effectively stalemated, with neither side able to attain full victory. Hostilities, however, continued until June 1953, although armistice negotiations intended to end actual fighting in the Korean War opened in July 1951 and continued, with intermissions, for two years. One major stumbling block was the repatriation of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who did not wish to return to their home countries, an issue eventually resolved by permitting those who wished to return to do so and handing over the remainder to a neutral commission, leaving their ultimate disposition undetermined or at least unstated. South Korean President Syngman Rhee hoped that hostilities would continue until, with American assistance, he had unified his country, but U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who took office in January 1953, was determined to end the unpopular war as soon as possible. In exchange for Rhee's acquiescence in the armistice, the following November the United States signed a bilateral security treaty with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). The death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin in March 1953 was another factor facilitating an armistice. Whereas Stalin apparently welcomed the entanglement of both communist China, a potential rival, and the United States, his major opponent, in the costly and protracted war, his successors were more inclined to end the stalemated conflict, which placed some aid burdens upon the Soviet Union. On 27 July 1953, representatives from the United Nations, which included delegates from both the United States and South Korea, met with top communist officials from China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) to sign an armistice ending the Korean War, which had raged on the Korean peninsula since June 1950. The signatories intended that a formal peace treaty, to be negotiated at a conference to be held in Geneva the following summer, would follow the armistice, but when the Geneva Conference took place, it proved impossible for the interested parties to agree on any such permanent settlement. The supposedly temporary armistice therefore remained in force into the twenty-first century, with the demilitarized zone separating the two opposed Korean states flanked by massive defenses on each side. Numerous minor violations of the cease-fire became almost routine occurrences, but in the half century following the armistice, the war was not resumed.

Primary Source

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA.

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I: MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

[. . .]

ARTICLE III: ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who

insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission".

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, "[Korean characters]" (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and "[Chinese characters]" (CH'IEN FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

[. . .]

Source: "Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement," U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31006.htm.

46. Loy Henderson: Letter from the Ambassador in Iran to the Department of State on the Coup in Iran, 23 August 1953

Introduction

By the early 1950s, the United States had taken on commitments that implied it would oppose the emergence of communist regimes anywhere in the world. Successive American Cold War presidents turned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help overthrow foreign governments that appeared unfriendly to the United States, due either to their ideological complexion or their antagonism toward U.S. economic or strategic interests. The first occasion when the CIA was instrumental in successfully ousting another government came in Iran in 1953. Until the early Cold War, Iran had been largely under British and Russian influence. The British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company controlled Iran's petroleum resources, and during World War II the British and Russians overthrew the Nazi-oriented monarch, Shah Reza Pahlavi I, and jointly occupied Iran to deny those resources to Germany and safeguard supply routes to the Soviet Union. In 1946 British and Russian forces left Iran, the Russians at least reluctantly, as they had hoped to set up a pro-Soviet republic in the north that they had previously controlled. As early

as World War II, U.S. diplomats already believed that their own nation, which they felt the Iranians knew was untainted by past exploitation of Iran, had an opportunity to win that country's loyalties. In 1951 the Iranian government announced its intention of nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The British, who controlled the refineries, withdrew their technicians and blockaded all exports of Iranian oil, provoking severe economic difficulties within Iran. The government headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh stood firm, and eventually, after an abortive attempt to replace him by the young Shah Reza Pahlavi II, declared a national emergency and took control of the Iranian military. In alliance with radical Muslims and the leftist Soviet-leaning Tudeh Party, in 1952 Mossadegh implemented socialist reforms, especially in agriculture, and broke diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. Britain turned to the United States for assistance, characterizing Mossadegh as a radical who was edging toward communism and steering Iran into the Soviet orbit. The administration of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which took office in January 1953, proved sympathetic and authorized the CIA to spend up to US$1 million removing Mossadegh. CIA agents in Tehran spread rumors and disinformation and in some cases acted as agents provocateurs. Economic problems intensified, and Mossadegh suspended parliament and extended his emergency powers. The CIA sought to persuade the indecisive young shah to dismiss Mossadegh, while Mossadegh urged the monarch to leave the country. Eventually, in 1953, the shah dismissed Mossadegh, but the latter refused to step down from office, and the shah took refuge in Italy. Major protests for and against the monarchy took place throughout the country, as Iranians of all political stripes assumed that before long Mossadegh would declare Iran a republic and himself head of state. Promonarchy forces, heavily funded by the CIA, gained the upper hand, and Iranian tanks and troops entered Tehran, the Iranian capital, and besieged the prime minister's residence until Mossadegh surrendered. He was subsequently put on trial for treason and sentenced to three years in prison. General Fazlollah Zahedi, one of the military leaders who arrested Mossadegh, became prime minister, and the shah flew back and resumed power. From then until his overthrow in 1979, Iran would be a key U.S. ally in the Middle East. Speaking to Loy Henderson, the U.S. ambassador in Iran, the shah expressed his fervent gratitude to the Americans for their role in his return, adroitly stressed his wish to carry out social reforms that would benefit the poorest Iranians, and declared that a communist regime was the only alternative to his own. He made it very clear that to carry out such policies he badly needed American aid and also discreetly intimated that the Americans should not "interfere in personnel matters of [the Iranian] Government." The shah soon reached an agreement with the British and Americans, under whose terms the foreign oil companies still made substantial profits, and large amounts of Iranian oil once more flowed to world markets. These revenues enabled the shah to modernize his country and make it a strong military state, but his authoritarian policies, persecution of opponents, and the social disruptions caused by his reforms eventually alienated many Iranians and were among the reasons that in 1979 an Islamic fundamentalist revolt ended his rule. Only in the late 1990s did the U.S. government publicly acknowledge the extent of CIA involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh. The eventual success of this undertaking subsequently emboldened CIA director Allen W. Dulles and other agency officials to try to orchestrate comparable operations against several other foreign governments—in Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Chile—that many U.S. leaders found unpalatable.

Primary Source

[1.] At Shah's request that I visit him privately without publicity, I saw him six o'clock this evening. Pirnia, master of ceremonies, who met me rear entrance Palace, said I would find Shah changed man. He was right. Shah showed vigor, decisiveness and certain amount clear thinking which I had not found in him before. Only time will determine whether this change merely temporary result discovery that people of country had deeper sense of loyalty him than he had realized. In any event, I did not find hesitation, brooding, discouragement and air "what can I do" which I had noticed practically all previous conversations.

2. He greeted me warmly and expressed deep appreciation of friendship which US had shown him and Iran during period. I read oral message from President to which I had taken liberty of adding introductory paragraph as follows: "I congratulate you for the great moral courage which you displayed at a critical time in your

country's history. I am convinced that by your action you contributed much to the preservation of the independence and to the future prosperity of Iran." The Shah wept as I read this message and asked me in reply to tell the President how grateful he was for interest which President and Government of US had shown in Iran. He would always feel deeply indebted for this proof of genuine friendship. Miracle of saving Iran which had just been wrought was due to friendship West, to patriotism Iranian people and to intermediation God. It impossible for him believe so many factors could have contributed simultaneously to this salvation his country unless Providence had so willed.

3. Shah dwelt for some time on part which "common people of Iran" had played. People of poorest classes who were ill-clad and hungry had been willing sacrifice their lives on his behalf. He could never forget this and he would never be satisfied until hunger had been eliminated from his country. Iran had been saved but victory would be short-lived unless substantial aid came from US immediately. No time could be lost. This was Iran's last chance to survive as an independent country. I said I agreed that if present government should fail, Communism seemed to be only alternative. He said "if I fail, no alternative but Communism. People have shown their trust in me and it rests upon me prove their trust merited. I must help new government live up to expectations and I cannot do that without quick aid from the US. How soon can this aid come and in what quantities and form?"

4. I replied US prepared extend aid but it must be given in orderly way and in circumstances which would be acceptable US public as well as Iranian public. I had been endeavoring all day to get in touch with financial and economic experts new government in order begin conversations. If he wished quick aid, he should take steps see that conversations begin immediately. He promised talk to Zahedi this evening in effort accelerate.

5. Shah said he not completely happy re Cabinet which Zahedi had presented him on his arrival. Same old faces which had been rotating in office for years. He had hoped for Cabinet which would stimulate country particularly youth. He had been told Americans had insisted Amini be included as Minister Finance and that Cabinet be selected before his arrival and presented to him as *fait accompli*. I told him information incorrect.

I do not know who had selected Amini. Certainly not Americans. There had been feeling in Embassy that Cabinet should be formed quickly so Government could begin to function earliest possible moment, no idea endeavoring have members selected without consultation with him. He said he relieved hear me say this. He sure Americans would not begin trying interfere in personnel matters of Government. They should know from experience this would be surest way change friendship into suspicion. Particularly important no interference in future in his control armed forces. Neither foreigners nor Iranians should come between him and army. Razmara had been unsuccessful in trying to separate army from Shah. Mosadeq had been able to break down army unity. It was his task and it would be difficult and delicate one to rebuild army as solid block loyal to him. Otherwise there would be no stability in country.

6. I asked if I to infer he dissatisfied with way Zahedi had been conducting affairs or if he under impression Zahedi attempting exert authority which should be vested in him. He replied negative insisting he had complete confidence in Zahedi. He did not believe Zahedi had ambitions other than serve Iran and its Shah, nevertheless he thought that certain advisers around Zahedi were pressing latter to take actions without proper consultation with him. He had had several discussions with Zahedi and was sure that he had achieved understanding with him re extent consultation in future.

I said Zahedi and many other army officers had risked their lives for Shah and country. I hoped Shah would show in some way his appreciation. He said he intended to do so but he must disappoint many retired army officers expecting resume active service. Most of them outmoded, some corrupt. He could give them decorations and other awards but not jobs.

7. In discussing failure of plans on night of August 15 he said someone must have betrayed them. Could it have been British agents?

I expressed surprise. I pointed out on various previous conversations he had said if Iran to be saved necessary for British and Americans to have common policy re Iran and work with mutual confidence. This situation had been achieved and I hoped he would never again make either to British or Americans remarks which might tend undermine that mutual confidence. I knew for fact that British were dealing honestly with him and he should get out of his head once for all idea they engaging in double dealing. He said he relieved hear this and believed me. I told him Communists espionage facilities well developed. They had many dangerous hearing devices. He said perhaps they had broken down code telegrams exchanged between Tehran and Ramsar. I agreed this quite possible.

8. I said if Iran wanted British and US pursue common policy re Iran Government should not expect receive substantial aid from US while it was making British whipping boy. I worried lest when Majlis reassembled there would again take place long tirades against British. I also concerned re Tudeh press in this respect. He said he would endeavor arrange for those members Majlis who had not resigned to meet and vote dissolution Majlis. Elections would then be held in spring so Government could accomplish much with-out interference Majlis. It was his intention also not to convene Senate until new Majlis elected. He intended taking steps also to reward in some way although not with Cabinet positions small band Majlis members who had at risk lives refused resign. It also his intention completely root out subversive press. He determined completely wreck Tudeh organization while at same time maintaining as correct relations as possible with USSR.

9. In terminating conversation he again urged me impress on US Government importance receiving substantial and immediate financial and economic aid. In absence Majlis it would be difficult arrange for loan. Therefore most of this aid must be in form grant. I said if this true we might be severely hampered in our efforts. For instance it might be easier quickly to obtain funds for road building and similar programs through loans rather than grants. He promised look into legal aspects this problem but said he feared it might be impossible for Iranian Government to accept loans without consent Majlis.

HENDERSON

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954*, Vol. 10, *Iran, 1951–1954* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 762–765.

47. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, 1 October 1953

Introduction

As the United States and China came close to agreeing to terms for an armistice settlement to the Korean War, Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) President Syngman Rhee proved extremely obstructive. Ideally, Rhee hoped that the war would continue until U.S. forces had unified the entire Korean peninsula under his rule. On 4 June 1953, after the peace negotiators at Panmunjom had finally agreed on all aspects of the repatriation of prisoners of war, Rhee publicly stated that he would only endorse a settlement that mandated the simultaneous withdrawal of all United Nations (UN) and communist troops from Korean territory on the conditions that South Korea should conclude a mutual security pact with the United States and receive massive economic aid and the commitment of substantial American military and naval forces to South Korea. He made these demands secure in the knowledge that the communist forces would find them unacceptable and continue to fight on. After threatening to withdraw his troops, who comprised two-thirds of those manning the front line, from the UN command, Rhee hinted that even after an armistice they might refuse to lay down their arms. He then ordered the release of 27,000 prisoners of war who were not scheduled for repatriation, formed them into labor battalions, and enlisted them in the ROK Army. Rhee hoped that this incident, which led the communist negotiators to question the ability of UN representatives to speak for him and his armed forces, would generate recriminations so bitter as to sabotage the negotiations completely, but if anything it made the exasperated participants on both sides even more determined

to reach an agreement in which he would be forced to acquiesce. UN and communist representatives alike united in denouncing his action and agreed to resume their truce talks on 12 July 1953. The same day, the United States dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to Seoul to persuade Rhee not to obstruct any settlement, and after two weeks Robertson finally extorted the president's pledge to accept a cease-fire that was signed immediately, on 27 July 1953. In return, Rhee was promised a U.S.-ROK mutual security treaty, which was concluded almost immediately, on 8 August 1953; was signed on 1 October; and became effective on 17 November 1954. The U.S. government also stationed large contingents of American forces in South Korea and agreed to provide $200 million in immediate economic aid, only the first installment of a long-term assistance program, to assist in expanding the ROK Army to twenty divisions. The Mutual Security Treaty, a bilateral security alliance outside the broader Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) framework negotiated by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was a definite guarantee that should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) once again attack South Korea, the Republic of Korea could count on the United States to assist in its defense. The original expectation after the armistice was that a comprehensive Korean peace treaty would subsequently be negotiated at the 1954 Geneva Conference, but the two Korean states found themselves unable to agree on terms acceptable to both, so the supposedly temporary armistice remained in force indefinitely, enduring well into the twenty-first century. The fact that the situation in Korea was still often precarious and volatile was probably one reason that the South Korean state was excluded from the weaker September 1954 SEATO pact, which bound its signatories to consult should one or more of them face a threat but not necessarily to take any definite action.

Primary Source

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE V
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

ARTICLE VI
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

[. . .]

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES
Whereas the Senate of the United States of America by their resolution of January 26, 1954, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said Treaty with the following understanding:

"It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."

Source: "Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea," 1 October 1953, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 5.3, p. 2368.

48. Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Atoms for Peace" Speech, 8 December 1953

Introduction

As Cold War tensions escalated, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered this address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York City on 8 December 1953 discussing the buildup of nuclear weapons and the U.S. goals involved. In November 1952 the United States detonated its first thermonuclear device, a weapon whose destructive capacity alarmed many officials and ordinary people. Eisenhower sought to direct nuclear power away from weaponry and instead to utilize its potential for productive, peaceful development. His speech generated a variety of peaceful nuclear programs. The most important of these was the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established under the aegis of the UN to stockpile uranium and fissionable materials designated for peaceful development. Eisenhower hoped that his speech would also provide the impetus for talks with the Soviet Union on the control and limitation of ever more destructive nuclear weapons.

Primary Source

Madam President and Members of the General Assembly;

When Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation to address the General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset our world. During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honor. That honor is mine today as I stand here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly. Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes.

But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those

accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, of the courage and of the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well-being for all men.

[. . .]

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been well explored—an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In its resolution of 28 November 1953 (resolution 715 (VIII)) this General Assembly suggested: "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report . . . on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954."

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally involved," to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.

We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception. The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. The capability, already proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage?

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds the people and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.

I therefore make the following proposal.

The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized

to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.

Thus the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing—it would be proud to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would, first, encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that the investigators had all the material needed for the conducting of all experiments that were appropriate; second, begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great Powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth, open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress towards peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace. The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of the world, in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or governors, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.

To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 813–822.

49. John Foster Dulles: Speech on Massive Retaliation, 12 January 1954

Introduction

At the height of the Cold War, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles delivered this address, an excerpt of which appears below, to the Council on Foreign Relations on 12 January 1954, discussing the defense policies of the administration of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Primarily for budgetary reasons, the Eisenhower administration had adopted the New Look strategic doctrine that was heavily dependent upon nuclear weapons, which were less expensive than conventional forces. Dulles implied that in any international crisis, the United States would be prepared to use nuclear weapons, regardless of their highly destructive nature. U.S. allies found rather alarming Dulles's apparent readiness to escalate relatively minor confrontations to the level of outright nuclear war, which they feared might easily spiral out of control and provoke a third world war.

Primary Source

It is now nearly a year since the Eisenhower administration took office. During that year I have often spoken of various parts of our foreign policies. Tonight I should like to present an overall view of those policies which relate to our security.

First of all, let us recognize that many of the preceding foreign policies were good. Aid to Greece and Turkey had checked the Communist drive to the Mediterranean. The European Recovery Program had helped the peoples of Western Europe to pull out of the postwar morass. The Western powers were steadfast in Berlin and overcame the blockade with their airlift. As a loyal member of the United Nations, we had reacted with force to repel the Communist attack in Korea. When that effort exposed our military weakness, we rebuilt rapidly our military establishment. We also sought a quick buildup of armed strength in Western Europe.

These were the acts of a nation which saw the danger of Soviet communism; which realized that its own safety was tied up with that of others; which was capable of responding boldly and promptly to emergencies. These are precious values to be acclaimed. Also, we can pay tribute to congressional bipartisanship which puts the nation above politics.

But we need to recall that what we did was in the main emergency action, imposed on us by our enemies.

Let me illustrate.

1. We did not send our army into Korea because we judged in advance that it was sound military strategy to commit our Army to fight land battles in Asia. Our decision had been to pull out of Korea. It was Soviet-inspired action that pulled us back.

2. We did not decide in advance that it was wise to grant billions annually as foreign economic aid. We adopted that policy in response to the Communist efforts to sabotage the free economies of Western Europe.

3. We did not build up our military establishment at a rate which involved huge budget deficits, a depreciating currency, and a feverish economy because this seemed, in advance, a good policy. Indeed, we decided otherwise until the Soviet military threat was clearly revealed.

We live in a world where emergencies are always possible and our survival may depend upon our capacity to meet emergencies. Let us pray that we shall always have that capacity. But, having said that, it is necessary also to say that emergency measures—however good for the emergency—do not necessarily make good permanent policies. Emergency measures are costly; they are superficial; and they imply that the enemy has the initiative. They cannot be depended on to serve our long-time interests.

This "long time" factor is of critical importance.

The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an entire historical era," and we should do the same. They seek, through many types of maneuvers, gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by overextending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength, so that they come to practical bankruptcy." Then, said Lenin, "our victory is assured." Then, said Stalin, will be "the moment for the decisive blow."

In the face of this strategy, measures cannot be judged adequate merely because they ward off an immediate danger. It is essential to do this, but it is also essential to do so without exhausting ourselves.

When the Eisenhower administration applied this test, we felt that some transformations were needed.

It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit U.S. land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves.

It is not sound economics, or good foreign policy, to support permanently other countries; for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good will.

Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to "practical bankruptcy." . . .

What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a . . . maximum deterrent at a bearable cost. . . .

The total cost of our security efforts, at home and abroad, was over $50 billion per annum, and involved, for 1953, a projected budgetary deficit of $9 billion; and $11 billion for 1954. This was on top of taxes compa-

rable to wartime taxes; and the dollar was depreciating in effective value. Our allies were similarly weighed down. This could not be continued for long without grave budgetary, economic, and social consequences.

But before military planning could be changed, the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions. This has been done. The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost.

Let us now see how this concept has been applied to foreign policy, taking first the Far East.

In Korea this administration effected a major transformation. The fighting has been stopped on honorable terms. That was possible because the aggressor, already thrown back to and behind his place of beginning, was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected. . . .

I have said in relation to Indochina that, if there were open Red Chinese army aggression there, that would have "grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina."

I expressed last month the intention of the United States to maintain its position in Okinawa. This is needed to insure adequate striking power to implement the collective security concept which I describe. . . .

We have persisted, with our allies, in seeking the unification of Germany and the liberation of Austria. Now the Soviet rulers have agreed to discuss these questions. We expect to meet them soon in Berlin. I hope they will come with sincerity which will equal our own.

We have sought a conference to unify Korea and relieve it of foreign troops. So far, our persistence is unrewarded; but we have not given up.

These efforts at negotiation are normal initiatives that breathe the spirit of freedom. They involve no plan for a partnership division of world power with those who suppress freedom. . . .

Source: John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 30(761) (1954): 107–110.

50. Dwight D. Eisenhower: "The Row of Dominoes," Presidential Press Conference, 7 April 1954

Introduction

From summer 1945 onward, France sought to restore French colonial rule in French Indochina but faced increasingly effective opposition from the nationalist and communist Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi Minh, who had declared Vietnam's independence in September 1945. Despite substantial U.S. financial support, by early 1954 French efforts to defeat Ho's forces in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) had stalled. In mid-March that year, the French Army found itself encircled by Viet Minh forces at the mountain fortress of Dien Bien Phu. France urged the United States to intervene militarily, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on finding that Britain was not prepared to join in any such effort, refused to commit American forces to Indochina. The beleaguered French Army surrendered in early May, a humiliating defeat for France that marked the end of almost a decade of French efforts to maintain its colonial position in Indochina. Despite his decision against intervention, Eisenhower clearly disliked the prospect of a communist Indochina. At a press conference held while the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu was still besieged and the United States had made no formal decision, the president set out the domino theory that would become so influential as a justification for subsequent American assistance to

Vietnam: that if one nation went communist its neighbors would inevitably be affected, and eventually the communist infection would spread from state to state throughout Asia and beyond.

Primary Source

Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press: Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina for the free world? I think there has been, across the country, some lack of understanding on just what it means to us.

The President. You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.

First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.

Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.

Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.

But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through the loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.

Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.

It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go—that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.

So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world. . . .

Q. Raymond Brandt, St. Louis Post-Dispatch: Mr. President, what response has Secretary Dulles and the administration got [from Great Britain] to the request for united action in Indochina?

The President. So far as I know, there are no positive reactions as yet, because the time element would almost forbid.

Q. Robert G. Spivack, New York Post: Mr. President, do you agree with Senator [John F.] Kennedy that independence must be guaranteed the people of Indochina in order to justify an allout effort there?

The President. Well, I don't know, of course, exactly in what way a Senator was talking about this thing.

I will say this: for many years, in talking to different countries, different governments, I have tried to insist on this principle: no outside country can come in and be really helpful unless it is doing something that the local people want.

Now, let me call your attention to this independence theory. Senator Lodge, on my instructions, stood up in the United Nations and offered one country independence if they would just simply pass a resolution saying they wanted it, or at least said, "I would work for it." They didn't accept it. So I can't say that the associated states want independence in the sense that the United States is independent. I do not know what they want.

I do say this: the aspirations of those people must be met, otherwise there is in the long run no final answer to the problem.

Q. Joseph Dear, Capital Times: Do you favor bringing this Indochina situation before the United Nations?

The President. I really can't say. I wouldn't want to comment at too great a length at this moment, but I do believe this: this is the kind of thing that must not be handled by one nation trying to act alone. We must have a concert of opinion, and a concert of readiness to react in whatever way is necessary.

Of course, the hope is always that it is peaceful conciliation and accommodation of these problems.

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 382–385.

51. Army-McCarthy Hearings Testimony, 1954

Introduction

On 22 April 1954, after several years of enduring Senator Joseph McCarthy's false charges about subversion in the military forces, the U.S. Army, represented by attorney Joseph N. Welch, went on the offensive and attacked McCarthy with a charge of corruption at the height of his public campaign to weed out communists from the U.S. government. The army's charge was based on the fact that McCarthy and his counsel, Roy Cohn, had demanded special treatment for former associate Private G. David Schine. Cohn had threatened that if he were not satisfied, he would use his political influence as McCarthy's aide to "wreck the army." In more than a month of televised congressional hearings, Welch proceeded to show how McCarthy had doctored photographs and created other false documents to provide evidence for his unsubstantiated earlier charges. McCarthy's erratic behavior and the constant traps that Welch laid to catch him lying made it obvious to the television audience which side was telling the truth. After the televised hearings and McCarthy's public humiliation, a majority of senators finally felt sufficiently secure enough to vote to censure him on 2 December 1954. This dramatic excerpt from the hearings of 9 June 1954, when Welch responded to charges by McCarthy that one of Welch's aides had ties to a communist organization, includes as participants Welch (chief counsel for the U.S. Army), Cohn (special counsel to the Special Senate Committee on Charges and Countercharges), Senator Karl E. Mundt, and McCarthy himself.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Mr. Welch: Mr. Cohn, tell me once more: Every time you learn of a Communist or a spy anywhere, is it your policy to get them out as fast as possible?

Mr. Cohn: Surely, we want them out as fast as possible, sir.

Mr. Welch: And whenever you learn of one from now on, Mr. Cohn, I beg of you, will you tell somebody about them quick?

Mr. Cohn: Mr. Welch, with great respect, I work for the committee here. They know how we go about handling situations of Communist infiltration. If they are displeased with the speed with which I and the group of men who work with me proceed, if they are displeased with the order in which we move, I am sure they will give me appropriate instructions along those lines, and I will follow any which they give me.

Mr. Welch: May I add my small voice, sir, and say whenever you know about a subversive or a Communist or a spy, please hurry. Will you remember those words? . . .

Senator McCarthy: Mr. Chairman, in view of that question—

Senator Mundt: Have you a point of order?

Senator McCarthy: Not exactly, Mr. Chairman, but in view of Mr. Welch's request that the information be

given once we know of anyone who might be performing any work for the Communist Party, I think we should tell him that he has in his law firm a young man named Fisher whom he recommended, incidentally, to do work on this committee, who has been for a number of years a member of an organization which was named, oh, years and years ago, as the legal bulwark of the Communist Party, an organization which always swings to the defense of . . . [any] Communists. I certainly assume that Mr. Welch did not know of this young man at the time he recommended him as the assistant counsel for this committee, but he has such terror and such a great desire to know where anyone is located who may be serving the Communist cause, Mr. Welch, that I thought we should just call to your attention the fact that your Mr. Fisher, who is still in your law firm today, whom you asked to have down here looking over the secret and classified material, is a member of an organization, not named by me but named by various committees, named by the Attorney General, as I recall, and I think I quote this verbatim, as "the legal bulwark of the Communist Party." He belonged to that for a sizeable number of years, according to his own admission, and he belonged to it long after it had been exposed as the legal arm of the Communist Party.

Knowing that, Mr. Welch, I just felt that I had a duty to respond to your urgent request that before sundown, when we know of anyone serving the Communist cause, we let the agency know. We are now letting you know that your man did belong to this organization for either three or four years, belonged to it long after he was out of law school. . . . I have hesitated bringing that up, but I have been rather bored with your phony requests to Mr. Cohn here that he personally get every Communist out of government before sundown. Therefore, we will give you information about the young man in your own organization.

I am not asking you at this time to explain why you tried to foist him on this committee. Whether you knew he was a member of that Communist organization or not, I don't know. I assume you did not, Mr. Welch, because I get the impression that, while you are quite an actor, you play for a laugh. I don't think you have any conception of the danger of the Communist Party. I don't think you yourself would ever knowingly aid the Communist cause. I think you are unknowingly aiding it when you try to burlesque this hearing in which we are attempting to bring out the facts, however . . .

Mr. Welch: Mr. Chairman, under these circumstances I must have something approaching a personal privilege.

Senator Mundt: You may have it, sir. It will not be taken out of your time.

Mr. Welch: Senator McCarthy, I did not know—Senator, sometimes you say "May I have your attention?"

Senator McCarthy: I am listening to you. I can listen with one ear.

Mr. Welch: This time I want you to listen with both.

Senator McCarthy: Yes.

Mr. Welch: Senator McCarthy, I think until this moment—

Senator McCarthy: Jim, will you get the news story to the effect that this man belonged to this Communist-front organization? Will you get the citations showing that this was the legal arm of the Communist Party, and the length of time that he belonged, and the fact that he was recommended by Mr. Welch? I think that should be in the record.

Mr. Welch: You won't need anything in the record when I have finished telling you this.

Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gaged your cruelty or your recklessness. Fred Fisher is a young man who went to the Harvard Law School and came into my firm and is starting what looks to be a brilliant career with us.

When I decided to work for this committee I asked Jim St. Clair, who sits on my right, to be my first assistant. I said to Jim, "Pick somebody in the firm who works under you that you would like." He chose Fred

Fisher and they came down on an afternoon plane. That night, when he had taken a little stab at trying to see what the case was about, Fred Fisher and Jim St. Clair and I went to dinner together. I then said to these two young men, "Boys, I don't know anything about you except I have always liked you, but if there is anything funny in the life of either one of you that would hurt anybody in this case you speak up quick."

Fred Fisher said, "Mr. Welch, when I was in law school and for a period of months after, I belonged to the Lawyers Guild," as you have suggested, Senator. He went on to say, "I am secretary of the Young Republicans League in Newton with the son of Massachusetts' Governor, and I have the respect and admiration of my community and I am sure I have the respect and admiration of the twenty-five lawyers or so in Hale & Dorr."

I said, "Fred, I just don't think I am going to ask you to work on the case. If I do, one of these days that will come out and go over national television and it will just hurt like the dickens."

So, Senator, I asked him to go back to Boston.

Little did I dream you could be so reckless and so cruel as to do injury to that lad. It is true he is still with Hale & Dorr. It is, I regret to say, equally true that I fear he shall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you. If it were in my power to forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I will do so. I like to think I am a gentleman, but your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than me.

Senator McCarthy: Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mundt: Senator McCarthy?

Senator McCarthy: May I say that Mr. Welch talks about this being cruel and reckless. He was just baiting; he has been baiting Mr. Cohn here for hours, requesting that Mr. Cohn, before sundown, get out of any department of Government anyone who is serving the Communist cause. I just give this man's record, and I want to say, Mr. Welch, that it has been labeled long before he became a member, as early as 1944—

Mr. Welch: Senator, may we not drop this? We know he belonged to the Lawyers Guild, and Mr. Cohn nods his head at me. I did you, I think, no personal injury, Mr. Cohn.

Mr. Cohn: No, sir.

Mr. Welch: I meant to do you no personal injury, and if I did, I beg your pardon.

Let us not assassinate this lad further, Senator. You have done enough. Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?

Source: U.S. Senate, *Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges Involving: Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G. Adams, H. Struve Hensel and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn, and Francis P. Carr. Hearings* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1954), 2424–2430.

52. *Brown v. Board of Education,* Topeka, Kansas, 1954

Introduction

By the mid-twentieth century, continuing racial segregation in the Southern states of the United States had become a serious embarrassment to American leaders' Cold War claims that their country represented democracy, freedom, and equal rights. Despite fierce opposition from the Southern states, political and legal challenges to segregation intensified after World War II. Few if any twentieth-century cases better demonstrate the ability of the U.S. Supreme Court to alter understandings of the U.S. Constitution—and thus provide a substitute for constitutional amendment—than *Brown v. Board of Education*. Here, the Court overturned the doctrine of separate but equal that had been sanctioned in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) and declared that segregation would have no place in U.S. public education. This opinion, in turn, sparked both support and opposition in the battle over segregation in all aspects of American life that culminated in the civil rights movement.

Primary Source

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in *Plessy v. Ferguson*. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, involving not education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over

half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. In *Cumming v. County Board of Education*, and *Gong Lum v. Rice*, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. . . . In none of these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in *Sweatt v. Painter*, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether *Plessy v. Ferguson* should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike *Sweatt v. Painter*, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when *Plessy v. Ferguson* was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

In *Sweatt v. Painter*, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents*, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: " . . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

> Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in *Plessy v. Ferguson* contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question—the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.

It is so ordered.

Source: *Brown v. Board of Education*. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), FindLaw for Legal Professionals, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=347&invol=483.

53. Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China, 21 July 1954

Introduction

The Geneva Conference, an international meeting cochaired by Great Britain and the Soviet Union, took place in Switzerland from April to July 1954. The conference's first weeks were spent in an unsuccessful effort to reach a final peace settlement in Korea. The conferees then switched their attention to Indochina, where the French, defeated earlier that year at Dien Bien Phu, had announced their intention to withdraw and grant independence to the constituent states. In Cambodia and Laos, where communist insurgencies were relatively weak, monarchical governments headed by traditional indigenous leaders were established. In each country, rebel forces disbanded and were integrated into the royal militaries. Vietnam, where the nationalist communist leader Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh forces were far stronger, was more complicated. Neither the People's Republic of China (PRC) nor the Soviet Union, two powers that had only within the previous year extricated themselves from their involvement in the Korean War, was eager to become embroiled in another protracted Asian conflict. Both communist big powers therefore put pressure upon Ho to sign the Geneva Accords, under whose terms Vietnam would be temporarily partitioned at the 17th Parallel of latitude, with the Viet Minh controlling the northern portion (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and noncommunist Vietnamese representatives the southern portion (later the Republic of Vietnam). The Geneva Accords called for countrywide elections to be held within two years to choose a government for a united Vietnam. The agreement was supposedly made between Cambodia, the two Vietnams, France, Laos, the PRC, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were the only two states that actually signed the accords. The United States refused to recognize them and encouraged the southern Republic of Vietnam and its first president, Ngo Dinh Diem, to also ignore them and to become a permanent independent state, backed by massive quantities of U.S. economic and

military aid. It was widely expected that Ho's nationalist credentials would ensure the Viet Minh victory in the national elections, so when the date scheduled for them arrived, the southern government simply ignored this. The accords established an International Control Commission of three neutral states—India, Canada, and Poland—to supervise the implementation of these agreements but had no powers to enforce them, so they became a dead letter. In the late 1950s the northern communist state, determined to unite the country, had begun a policy of armed struggle in the southern portion, intended to destabilize and destroy Diem's government and bring about national unification.

Primary Source

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vietnam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot.

In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from April 20, 1955, onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Vietnam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Vietnam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the reestablishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the abovementioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are respected.

Source: "Text of Final Declaration," *Department of State Bulletin* 31(788) (1954): 164.

54. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Manila, Philippines, 8 September 1954

Introduction

By the mid-1950s, the reach of the United States had become truly global. After the Korean War, the administration of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to construct a security pact among its Asian-Pacific allies that might serve as the counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. Their concern for the region was sharpened by the outcome of the Geneva conference of great powers, held from April to July 1954, to discuss outstanding problems in Korea and Vietnam, especially the situation in Korea and Indochina. The conference failed to negotiate a permanent settlement of the Korean War, leaving the peninsula in a state of armistice that would endure for more than half a century. In Indochina, the French colonial authorities withdrew entirely. Laos and Cambodia became independent kingdoms, while Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th Parallel of latitude into northern communist and southern noncommunist states, whose unification after countrywide elections was anticipated within two years. In Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam alike, communist forces carried consider-

able weight, although only in Vietnam were they thought likely to control the country within the near future. Only in 1954 did the Philippine authorities, assisted by American diplomats, covert operatives, and aid programs, suppress the agrarian rebellion of the communist-led Hukbalahaps, which since the late 1940s had come close to toppling the government. In Malaya, the British colonial authorities were still in the process of overcoming a communist insurgency. In September 1954 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took the lead in negotiating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a defensive alliance of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The new body was based in Bangkok, the Thai capital. Unlike the NATO alliance, this treaty did not oblige its members to come to each other's defense should one be attacked but rather only to consult with each other and to respond—although how was left unspecified—in collaboration with the United Nations (UN). The agreement did, however, envisage extensive military cooperation among the members at all times as well as comparable collaboration for economic and social development. The United States provided a specific "understanding" that the treaty's scope was not restricted to attacks by communist forces against its members. SEATO proved a rather ineffective alliance. Britain and France were included primarily because both still possessed colonial interests in Asia, but to many critics their presence in the grouping, together with Australia and New Zealand, made it appear primarily a white man's club, with just a few token Asian members. The political status of both the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and Taiwan was so sensitive that neither was included, although both came under the protection of separate bilateral security treaties with the United States. Japan, which also had such a bilateral arrangement with the United States, was likewise excluded, although this was probably because memories of Japanese behavior before and during World War II still rankled member states. Stipulations in the Geneva Accords on the status of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam meant that none of those countries could join. The military forces of the eight member states held joint exercises and maneuvers on an annual basis. During the 1960s, SEATO's members failed to take joint action on conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, as they found themselves unable to agree on appropriate responses. After communist forces took power in all three Indochinese states, the organization was widely perceived as a largely ineffective dead letter and was dissolved in 1977.

Primary Source

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

[. . .]

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

[. . .]

Source: "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," 8 September 1954, *United Nations Treaty Series* 209(2819).

55. Joseph McCarthy: Censure by the U.S. Senate, 10 November 1954

Introduction

In a speech delivered on 9 February 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy brandished a piece of paper on which he claimed was a list supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of 205 names of U.S. State Department employees who were known to be "card-carrying communists." It was a false claim, but his dramatic demeanor and the fact that he was a senator lent credibility to the charges, thus sparking mass public hysteria regarding the pervasiveness of communism in American society. Fueling the public's paranoia, McCarthy then led a series of congressional hearings into communist activity that lasted well into 1954—gaining prestige and power as he went—despite the fact that he could not produce any evidence and kept changing the number of names he had when pressed by reporters. Many of his congressional colleagues joined him in this modern-day witch-hunt. Prominent Republican politicians did not necessarily believe his charges, but since most of the charges were aimed at Democrats and the Republicans wished to discredit the Democratic administration of President Harry S. Truman and win the 1952 presidential election, they were prepared to tolerate McCarthy's behavior. During the 1952 election campaign, Republican candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to repudiate McCarthy, even when he attacked former Secretary of State General George C. Marshall, Eisenhower's wartime superior, as a communist or a fellow traveler. Once Eisenhower had won the election, however, McCarthy began to represent something of a domestic and international embarrassment to the United States, and support for him declined. Finally, in 1954, McCarthy's reign of terror was brought to an end after it was shown by an attorney for the U.S. Army that McCarthy had produced false evidence in the televised Army-McCarthy Hearings. After the televised hearings and McCarthy's public humiliation, a majority of senators finally felt sufficiently secure to vote to censure him on 2 December 1954. By this time, however, McCarthy and his followers had ruined numerous careers and created a broader intellectual climate in which diplomats, government officials, politicians, and opinion leaders often feared to state their views forthrightly if these might conceivably brand them as procommunist. Such practical caution contributed to U.S. involvement in Vietnam and to successive presidents' reluctance to recognize Mainland China.

Primary Source

Resolved, That the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, failed to cooperate with the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration in clearing up matters referred to that subcommittee which concerned his conduct as a Senator and affected the honor of the Senate and, instead, repeatedly abused the subcommittee and its members who were trying to carry out assigned duties, thereby obstructing the constitutional processes of the Senate, and that this conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, is contrary to senatorial traditions and is hereby condemned.

Section 2. The Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, in writing to the chairman of the Select Committee to Study Censure Charges (Mr. Watkins) after the Select Committee had issued its report and before the report was presented to the Senate charging three members of the Select Committee with "deliberate deception" and "fraud" for failure to disqualify themselves; in stating to the press on November 4, 1954, that the special

Senate session that was to begin November 8, 1954, was a "lynch-party"; in repeatedly describing this special Senate session as a "lynch bee" in a nationwide television and radio show on November 7, 1954; in stating to the public press on November 13, 1954, that the chairman of the Select Committee (Mr. Watkins) was guilty of "the most unusual, most cowardly things I've ever heard of" and stating further: "I expected he would be afraid to answer the questions, but didn't think he'd be stupid enough to make a public statement"; and in characterizing the said committee as the "unwitting handmaiden," "involuntary agent" and "attorneys-in-fact" of the Communist Party and in charging that the said committee in writing its report "imitated Communist methods—that it distorted, misrepresented, and omitted in its effort to manufacture a plausible rationalization" in support of its recommendations to the Senate, which characterizations and charges were contained in a statement released to the press and inserted in the Congressional Record of November 10, 1954, acted contrary to senatorial ethics and tended to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute, to obstruct the constitutional processes of the Senate, and to impair its dignity; and such conduct is hereby condemned.

Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, "Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy," S Res 301, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess. (December 2, 1954), U.S. Department of State, InfoUSA, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/60.htm.

56. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, 2 December 1954

Introduction

Before the Korean War began in June 1950, the administration of U.S. President Harry S. Truman had considered simply acquiescing should the Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) take over the island of Taiwan, to which the remnants of the Guomindang (Nationalist) had fled. The outbreak of that war, however, had led American officials to block any such move by interposing the U.S. Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland. By the time the Korean War ended in 1953, the U.S. government would have found it extremely difficult to abandon Taiwan, a client and ally, to communist rule. As it would do for over two decades more, the United States still recognized the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, headed by President Jiang Jieshi, as the only legal government of China. At the same time, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and other officials in his administration feared that Jiang, desperate to regain the mainland, was liable to provoke a major war with China in the hopes that the United States would come to his assistance and restore him to power in Beijing. In September 1954 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles negotiated the Manila Treaty, which established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a security pact based on the earlier North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) alliance whereby Canada, the United States, and the West European states promised to come to the aid of any cosignatory that suffered an external military attack. SEATO members included Thailand, the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom, all of whom feared the destabilizing effect that subversion, probably backed by Mainland China, might have on their own territory or that of their Asian colonies. Jiang's bellicosity and the vulnerability of both Taiwan itself and, even more, of several of its associated offshore islands to mainland attack made American officials and their SEATO partners extremely wary of including Taiwan in the SEATO alliance. Mainland China might have also considered this a provocative move and responded by launching an all-out attack on Taiwan. Instead, Dulles offered Jiang a bilateral defensive security treaty under whose terms the United States would be obliged to defend the territory of Taiwan against external attack. The status of the various offshore islands, including Jinmen, Mazu, and the Pescadores, was deliberately left ambivalent, as the Eisenhower administration was not eager to risk outright hostilities over these strategically insignificant and rather vulnerable islands yet did not wish to seem to encourage their forcible annexation by the Mainland. When major crises between Taiwan and the Mainland over these islands erupted in 1954–1955 and again in 1958 as the

PRC shelled Taiwan heavily, the Eisenhower administration still left its precise commitments and potential responses under this treaty sedulously ambiguous and undefined. While seeking to prevent a Mainland takeover of Taiwan itself, the United States did not want to find itself involved in a major war with communist China.

Primary Source

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America

accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VIII
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE IX
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

ARTICLE X
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

[. . .]

Exchange of Notes between John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs George K. C. Yeh on 10 December 1954

To Yeh from Dulles
EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations, as follows:

The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the Republic of China, and the United States of America signed on December 2, 1954, at Washington and other territory. It possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said Treaty and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State of the
United States of America

To Dulles from Yeh
EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations, as follows:

"The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the Republic of China and the United States of America signed on December 2, 1954, at Washington and other territory. It possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said Treaty and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement."

I have the honor to confirm, on behalf of my Government, the understanding set forth in Your Excellency's Note under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

GEORGE K. C. YEH
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China

Source: "Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China," 2 December 1954, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 6.1, pt. 433 (1955).

57. CIA Memorandum: CIA's Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz, 1954

Introduction

By the 1950s, the new U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was aggressively waging the Cold War, attempting to prevent not just communist but also leftist governments from attaining power and, when they did, seeking to overthrow them. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who became president in 1953, later proudly boasted that during his two terms in office no American soldier lost his life in combat. The reason for this was in part that Eisenhower preferred to rely on covert operations. In 1953 CIA agents working with local Iranians succeeding in ousting from power Mohammed Mossadegh, the nationalist and Left-leaning prime minister of Iran, and concentrating power in the hands of the young monarch Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was expected to follow more pro-American policies. CIA officials adopted similar tactics when a radical nationalist government headed by President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán won the 1951 elections in the small Central American state of Guatemala. In 1952 Arbenz instituted sweeping agrarian redistribution policies and other social and economic reforms, which put him at odds not just with wealthy landowners and some of the Guatemalan military but also with the United Fruit Company, a U.S. corporation that dominated much of the Guatemalan economy. In 1953 the Arbenz government expropriated United Fruit from much of its massive landholdings, causing the company's executives to file complaints with the U.S. State Department for assistance. American diplomats, concerned not just with the interests of United Fruit but also more broadly with the radical character of the Arbenz government, which they feared would encourage the spread of leftist infection throughout the Western Hemisphere, reduced economic aid drastically and also quietly placed obstacles in the way of Guatemalan commerce with the United States. The CIA initially began planning for a coup in 1952 but called off an early operation when an indiscreet collaborator, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, leaked information on the scheme to fellow Latin American leaders. In early 1953 Guatemalan rebels launched a second coup, a premature attempt that failed. In August 1953 after the successful Iranian coup, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) reactivated the Guatemala project. The CIA trained Guatemalan exiles in camps in neighboring Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador, while American businessmen were encouraged to block trade with Guatemala, reducing foreign earnings and creating shortages of vital imports. U.S. propaganda organs deliberately disseminated false allegations that Guatemala was receiving Soviet arms, reports triumphantly vindicated when it became known that Arbenz had negotiated secretly with Czechoslovakia to purchase 2,000 tons of surplus German weapons captured in World War II. The U.S. Navy imposed a full-scale sea blockade against Guatemala, inspecting all ships bound for Guatemala for illicit armaments. The Organization of American States (OAS) acquiesced in the U.S. campaign against Guatemala. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) launched a massive psychological warfare offensive, utilizing rumors, pamphlets, posters, and radio broadcasts. Sympathetic student groups within Guatemala undertook propaganda and harassment against the regime and its sympathizers, while covert operatives also worked to win the loyalties of the army. On 18 June 1953, 400 Guatemalan exiles led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas entered the country. They were initially rebuffed, but Arbenz then allowed them to proceed deep into the country in the hope that they would be conclusively crushed. Radio reports untruthfully claimed that additional contingents of exiles and U.S. forces had entered the country. The Guatemalan military, fearing U.S. intervention, declined to move against the rebels, and on 27 June Arbenz resigned, eventually to be replaced as president by Armas, who proved both ineffective and corrupt. The United Nations (UN) and the international press condemned

the invasion as an example of U.S. neocolonialism. Postcoup CIA investigations of Guatemalan official files unearthed little documentary evidence of links between Arbenz and the Soviet Union, and it became apparent that Guatemalan socialism was largely homegrown. The Guatemalan operation nonetheless served as a model for other such efforts, notably the less successful 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion attempt of Cuba and moves in 1970 to prevent President Salvador Allende Gossens from assuming office in Chile. It was an example of the manner in which successive American presidential administrations for decades felt entitled to destabilize and try to bring about the downfall of foreign governments that they considered unacceptably procommunist or leftist. Such policies discredited U.S. pledges in numerous international agreements eschewing intervention in the internal affairs of other states. For many years, the U.S. government downplayed the CIA's role in the coup against Arbenz. Initially, the relevant volume of the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, published in 1983, concealed the extent of CIA involvement. Twenty years later, the department published a supplementary volume that documented in detail the U.S. government's central role in overthrowing Arbenz.

Primary Source

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. May 12, 1975
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 153, Folder 3. Secret.
Subject: CIA's Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz

In August 1953, the Operations Coordinating Board directed CIA to assume responsibility for operations against the Arbenz regime. Appropriate authorization was issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support the Agency in this task. The plan of operations called for cutting off military aid to Guatemala, increasing aid to its neighbors, exerting diplomatic and economic pressure against Arbenz and attempts to subvert and or defect Army and political leaders, broad scale psychological warfare and paramilitary actions. During the period August through December 1953 a CIA staff was assembled and operational plans were prepared.

Following are the specific operational mechanisms utilized by the Agency in the overall missions against the Arbenz government:

a. Paramilitary Operations. Approximately 85 members of the Castillo Armas group received training in Nicaragua. Thirty were trained in sabotage, six as shock troop leaders and 20 others as support-type personnel. Eighty-nine tons of equipment were prepared. The support of this operation was staged inside the borders of Honduras and Nicaragua. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] There were an estimated 250 men in Honduras and El Salvador for use as shock troops and specialists, outside of the training personnel that had been sent to Nicaragua.
b. Air Operations. The planning for providing air operational support was broken down into three phases; i.e. the initial stockpiling of equipment; the delivering of equipment to advance bases by black flight; and the aerial resupply of troops in the field. Thirty days prior to D-day, a fourth phase, fighter support, was initiated. There were approximately 80 missions flown during the 14–29 June 1954 period, by various type aircraft such as C-47's, F-47's and Cessnas which were used to discharge cargo, distribute propaganda and for strafing and bombing missions.
c. Clandestine Communications. A clandestine radio broadcasting station was established in Nicaragua. The purpose of these broadcasts was to intimidate members of the Communist Party and public officials who were sympathetic to the Communist cause. The radio station, prior to D-day, broadcasted programs on why they were on the air; dramatized examples of Communist tyranny; the ideologies and aims of the Liberation Movement and what effect was intended vis-à-vis each individual who was listening; an aggressive program outlining the activities which would ultimately bring down the Communist threat, etc.
d. Q Program. The objective was spreading responsibility for the operation throughout as many Latin American countries as possible in order to lessen the impact of United States participation.

e. Indigenous agent radio operator training program. This included 13 radio operators, including seven residents and six tactical, and one cryptographer who were trained in Nicaragua from 6 March–9 June 1954.

One of the propaganda ploys was to fabricate reports of Soviet arms deliveries to Guatemala by submarine, and then arranging to have a CIA planted cache of Soviet arms discovered and publicized. The mythical arms deliveries were superseded by the real thing when a ship carrying 2,000 tons of Czech weapons and ammunition arrived. This shipment created an international furor and provided clinching proof of what had been the main CIA propaganda theme, that Guatemala under Arbenz had become a Soviet satellite.

The results of the operational efforts described above were positive, however key Guatemalan Army officers wanted either official assurance of U.S. Government support or an overt military incident which would demonstrate Castillo's power and determination. On 1 June the Arbenz regime began a wave of arrests which obliterated Castillo's intelligence nets and action assets inside the country and on 8 June a 30-day suspension of all constitutional liberties was announced.

On 17–18 June five shock teams trained by the Agency crossed into Guatemala. The turning point came on 25 June when Castillo's forces repulsed a counterattack and later bombed a fortress in Guatemala City.

On 27 June Arbenz resigned and turned the government over to another Communist, Carlos Enrique Diaz, chief of the armed forces. Following the resignation the Chief of Station and another agency officer held a negotiating session with Guatemalan Army officers. The Agency representatives argued that Diaz was unacceptable [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Following assurances from the U.S. Ambassador that Monzon was indeed the U.S. choice, those present agreed that Monzon would be the head of a junta. The agreement soon broke down when Diaz doublecrossed Monzon by appointing him as Minister of Government while Diaz retained his position. Diaz caved in following bombings by F-47's.

Negotiations took place between Castillo and Monzon, President of the Junta, who agreed to accept Castillo as a member. In early July Castillo became President of the Junta with Major Enrique Oliva and Monzon as the other two members.

The budget allocation for this activity was $3,000,000 and the actual cost, less recoverable assets, was just under the original allocation.

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954 Guatemala*, edited by Susan Holly (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), Document 287, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/guat/.

58. Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey, Baghdad, Iraq, 24 February 1955

Introduction

The Baghdad Pact was originally a mutual security agreement modeled on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and the United Kingdom signed in 1955. The United States encouraged the development of this organization by promising military and economic aid and established a military liaison arrangement with it but initially chose not to join itself, fearing that doing so might lose it the goodwill of various other Middle Eastern states that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration also sought to cultivate. The objective was to encourage the signatories to collaborate against potential Soviet expansionism in the area by erecting a bastion of anticommunist states along the Soviet Union's southwestern frontier. The alliance was originally known as the Middle Eastern Treaty Organization (METO). After Iraq, the only Arab member, withdrew in 1958 in the aftermath of a bloody revolution led by the leftist and Moscow-oriented Baath Party, the United States

joined as a full member, and the grouping became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The organization proved largely ineffective in preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union simply bypassed the CENTO states to develop close military and economic ties with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya, establishing bases in Egypt, Somalia, and Yemen. CENTO lacked a single military command structure, and the links between the member states remained relatively loose. The organization did facilitate American access to bases in Iran with useful communications and intelligence capabilities, while from the late 1950s onward Pakistan allowed the United States to utilize airfields on its own soil to launch U-2 espionage and surveillance flights over Soviet territory. Great Britain at times also made use of bases in Pakistan and, like the United States, of similar facilities in Turkey, although the latter arrangements were organized through the NATO alliance. Never a particularly successful alliance, CENTO largely fell into disuse after Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, causing the British to withdraw their forces from CENTO. In 1979 Islamic radicals overthrew the Iranian monarchy, whose collapse brought the formal end of CENTO.

Primary Source

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of friendship and good neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty The King of Iraq and His Excellency The President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on the 29th of March, 1946 which recognised the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the Nations of the world and in particular the Nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that Treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect any of the rights and obligations accruing to the contracting parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries . . . who, having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

Article 2

In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the co-operation provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present Pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present Pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third state or states. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present Pact.

Article 5
This Pact shall be open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the state concerned is deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State Party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with one or more states Parties to the present Pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the Parties concerned.

Article 6
A Permanent Council at Ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four Powers become parties to the Pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

Article 7
This Pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the Pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the Pact remains valid for the other Parties.

[. . .]

Source: "Pact of Mutual Co-Operation Between Iraq and Turkey," 24 February 1955, *United Nations Treaty Series* 233(3264).

59. Sukarno: Speech at the Opening of the Bandung Conference, 18 April 1955

Introduction

Many states, especially decolonized nations and those in the developing world, resented both Soviet and American demands that they favor one side or the other in the Cold War. As early as 1946, Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong suggested that there existed a "vast intermediate zone," to which he thought China belonged, of countries that professed allegiance to neither Cold War superpower. A formal Non-Aligned Movement was only established in the 1970s, but ad hoc conferences were held at symbolically important locations: Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955, Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in 1961, and Cairo (Egypt) in 1962. India and Egypt led the movement, which attracted communist mavericks such as Yugoslavia and Albania as well as numerous Asian, African, and Latin American countries. They tended to focus primarily on postcolonial issues and the problems that developing economies shared. Reflecting a certain geographic and psychological distance from Eurocentric Cold War preoccupations, and for China perhaps also growing Sino-Soviet dissension, even China and Japan sent representatives to these meetings. As Asian states whose past bitter experiences of humiliation at Western hands meant that they often felt real sympathy for decolonizing countries, both nations directed substantial amounts of economic aid to nonaligned states, a strategy that also helped to enhance their own international influence. From the mid-1950s the Soviet Union, following a pragmatic united front rationale that treated as friendly any country not allied with the West, endorsed the movement. Representatives from almost thirty states in Africa and Asia attended the first such conference in Bandung, with the intent of establishing their independence from either superpower during the Cold War and thus reaffirming their status as nonaligned nations. Speaking as host on this occasion, President Sukarno of Indonesia, a nationalist leader who had fought for his country's independence, articulated the resentment that many of those

attending felt toward the continuing formal or informal "colonial" dominance exercised by the great powers and warned that they often failed to consider the interests of smaller nations, for whom peace and economic development rather than Cold War strategic or ideological rivalries were often the highest priorities.

Primary Source

This twentieth century has been a period of terrific dynamism. Perhaps the last fifty years have seen more developments and more material progress than the previous five hundred years. Man has learned to control many of the scourges which once threatened him. He has learned to consume distance. He has learned to project his voice and his picture across oceans and continents. He has probed deep into the secrets of nature and learned how to make the desert bloom and the plants of the earth increase their bounty. He has learned how to release the immense forces locked in the smallest particles of matter.

But has man's political skill marched hand-in-hand with his technical and scientific skill? Man can chain lightning to his command—can he control the society in which he lives? The answer is No! The political skill of man has been far outstripped by technical skill, and what lie has made he cannot be sure of controlling.

The result of this is fear. And man gasps for safety and morality.

Perhaps now more than at any other moment in the history of the world, society, government and statesmanship need to be based upon the highest code of morality and ethics. And in political terms, what is the highest code of morality? It is the subordination of everything to the well-being of mankind. But today we are faced with a situation where the well-being of mankind is not always the primary consideration. Many who are in places of high power think, rather, of controlling the world.

Yes, we are living in a world of fear. The life of man today is corroded and made bitter by fear. Fear of the future, fear of the hydrogen bomb, fear of ideologies. Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself, because it is fear which drives men to act foolishly, to act thoughtlessly, to act dangerously. . . .

All of us, I am certain, are united by more important things than those which superficially divide us. We are united, for instance, by a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common detestation of racialism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilise peace in the world. . . .

We are often told "Colonialism is dead." Let us not be deceived or even soothed by that. I say to you, colonialism is not yet dead. How can we say it is dead, so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree.

And, I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth. . . .

Not so very long ago we argued that peace was necessary for us because an outbreak of fighting in our part of the world would imperil our precious independence, so recently won at such great cost.

Today, the picture is more black. War would not only mean a threat to our independence, it may mean the end of civilisation and even of human life. There is a force loose in the world whose potentiality for evil no man truly knows. Even in practice and rehearsal for war the effects may well be building up into something of unknown horror.

Not so long ago it was possible to take some little comfort from the idea that the clash, if it came, could perhaps be settled by what were called "conventional weapons "—bombs, tanks, cannon and men. Today that little grain of comfort is denied us for it has been made clear that the weapons of ultimate horror will certainly be used, and the military planning of nations

is on that basis. The unconventional has become the conventional, and who knows what other examples of misguided and diabolical scientific skill have been discovered as a plague on humanity.

And do not think that the oceans and the seas will protect us. The food that we eat, the water that we drink, yes, even the very air that we breathe can be contaminated by poisons originating from thousands of miles away. And it could be that, even if we ourselves escaped lightly, the unborn generations of our children would bear on their distorted bodies the marks of our failure to control the forces which have been released on the world.

No task is more urgent than that of preserving peace. Without peace our independence means little. The rehabilitation and upbuilding of our countries will have little meaning. Our revolutions will not be allowed to run their course. . . .

What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilise all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the majority are for peace, not for war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on to the side of peace.

In this struggle, some success has already been scored. I think it is generally recognised that the activity of the Prime Ministers of the Sponsoring Countries which invited you here had a not unimportant role to play in ending the fighting in Indo-China.

Look, the peoples of Asia raised their voices, and the world listened. It was no small victory and no negligible precedent! The five Prime Ministers did not make threats. They issued no ultimatum, they mobilised no troops. Instead they consulted together, discussed the issues, pooled their ideas, added together their individual political skills and came forward with sound and reasoned suggestions which formed the basis for a settlement of the long struggle in Indo-China.

I have often since then asked myself why these five were successful when others, with long records of diplomacy, were unsuccessful, and, in fact, had allowed a bad situation to get worse, so that there was a danger of the conflict spreading. . . . I think that the answer really lies in the fact that those five Prime Ministers brought a fresh approach to bear on the problem. They were not seeking advantage for their own countries. They had no axe of power-politics to grind. They had but one interest—how to end the fighting in such a way that the chances of continuing peace and stability were enhanced. . . .

So, let this Asian-African Conference be a great success! Make the "Live and let live" principle and the "Unity in Diversity" motto [be] the unifying force which brings us all together—to seek in friendly, uninhibited discussion, ways and means by which each of us can live his own life, and let others live their own lives, in their own way, in harmony, and in peace.

If we succeed in doing so, the effect of it for the freedom, independence and the welfare of man will be great on the world at large. The Light of Understanding has again been lit, the Pillar of Cooperation again erected. The likelihood of success of this Conference is proved already by the very presence of you all here today. It is for us to give it strength, to give it the power of inspiration—to spread its message all over the World.

Source: Sukarno, Speech, *Africa-Asia Speaks at Bandong* (Djakarta, Indonesia: Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955), 19–29.

60. Warsaw Security Pact, 1955

Introduction

Signed on 14 May 1955, the Warsaw Security Pact established a mutual defense alliance between the countries of Eastern Europe, all of which were under Soviet control. Besides the Soviet Union, member states were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The pact was intended to function as a counterbalance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established by the countries of Western Europe and the United States in 1949. The immediate impetus for the formation of the Warsaw Pact was NATO's acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) into its alliance, a move that aroused bitter memories of past German eastward military attacks and fears of their recurrence. The Soviet Union directed Warsaw Pact policies and operations, and the organization had no independent headquarters of its own. In practice, another major function of the Warsaw Pact was to maintain Soviet control of Eastern Europe, as Poland and Hungary proved recalcitrant in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland during the early 1980s. Hungary's announcement in October 1956 of its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact triggered a Soviet invasion. The Warsaw Pact remained in effect until the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 but then collapsed as the East European states all withdrew, in several cases entering NATO soon afterward.

Primary Source

Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Republic, May 1, 1955

The contracting parties, Reaffirming their desire for the organization of a system of collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the European states, irrespective of their social and state systems, which would make it possible to combine their efforts in the interests of securing peace in Europe,

Taking into consideration at the same time the situation obtaining in Europe as the result of ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide for the formation of a new military grouping in the shape of the "Western European Union" together with a remilitarised Western Germany, and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the threat of another war and creates a menace to the national security of the peaceloving states,

Convinced that, under these circumstances, the peaceloving states of Europe should take the necessary measures for safeguarding their security, and in the interests of maintaining peace in Europe,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

In the interests of further strengthening and promoting friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the principle of noninterference in their internal affairs,

Have resolved to conclude this Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.

Article 1.
The contracting parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so as not to endanger international peace and security.

Article 2.
The contracting parties declare their readiness to take part, in the spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international undertakings intended to safeguard international peace and security and they shall use all their energies for the realization of these aims.

Moreover, the contracting parties shall work for the adoption, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this matter, of effective measures

towards a general reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 3.
The contracting parties shall take council among themselves on all important international questions relating to their common interests, guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security.

They shall take council among themselves immediately, whenever, in the opinion of any of them, there has arisen the threat of an armed attack on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty, in the interests of organizing their joint defense and of upholding peace and security.

Article 4.
In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty by any state or group of states, each state that is a party to this treaty shall, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, render the state or states so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with other states that are parties to this treaty, by all the means it may consider necessary, including the use of armed force. The states that are parties to this treaty shall immediately take council among themselves concerning the necessary joint measures to be adopted for the purpose of restoring and upholding international peace and security.

In accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, the Security Council shall be advised of the measures taken on the basis of the present article. These measures shall be stopped as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for restoring and upholding international peace and security.

Article 5.
The contracting parties have agreed on the establishment of a joint command for their armed forces, which shall be placed, by agreement among these parties, under this command, which shall function on the basis of jointly defined principles. They shall also take other concerted measures necessary for strengthening their defense capacity, in order to safeguard the peaceful labour of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and to provide safeguards against possible aggression.

Article 6.
For the purpose of holding the consultations provided for in the present treaty among the states that are parties to the treaty, and for the purpose of considering problems arising in connection with the implementation of this treaty, a political consultative committee shall be formed in which each state that is a party to this treaty shall be represented by a member of the government, or any other specially appointed representative.

The committee may form the auxiliary organs for which the need may arise.

Article 7.
The contracting parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions and alliances, and not to conclude any agreements the purposes of which would be at variance with those of the present treaty.

The contracting parties declare that their obligations under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of this treaty.

Article 8.
The contracting parties declare that they will act in the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the object of furthering the development of, and strengthening the economic and cultural relations between them, adhering to the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

Article 9.
The present treaty is open to be acceded to by other states—irrespective of their social and state systems—which may express their readiness to assist, through participation in the present treaty, in combining the efforts of the peaceloving states for the purpose of safeguarding the peace and security of nations. This act of acceding to the treaty shall become effective, with the

consent of the states that are parties to this treaty, after the instrument of accedence has been deposited with the government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 10.
The present treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the government of the Polish People's Republic.

The treaty shall take effect on the date on which the last ratification instrument is deposited. The government of the Polish People's Republic shall advise the other states that are parties to the treaty of each ratification instrument deposited with it.

Article 11.
The present treaty shall remain in force for 20 years. For the contracting parties which will not have submitted to the government of the Polish People's Republic a statement denouncing the treaty a year before the expiration of its term, it shall remain in force throughout the following ten years.

In the event of the organization of a system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion of a general European treaty of collective security to that end, which the contracting parties shall unceasingly seek to bring about, the present treaty shall cease to be effective on the date the general European treaty comes into force.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Czechoslovakia," 14 May 1955, *Soviet News* 3165 (16 May 1955): 1–2.

61. Einstein-Russell Appeal, 1955

Introduction

The development of ever more destructive atomic and then thermonuclear weapons during the 1940s and 1950s alarmed many including some scientists, notably physicist Albert Einstein, who had originally urged the U.S. government to establish an atomic program. In July 1955 Einstein and British philosopher Bertrand Russell called a packed public meeting in London, shortly after the successful testing of the hydrogen bomb, to discuss measures that might be taken to bring nuclear weapons under control. Their final resolution, the Einstein-Russell Appeal, published by Einstein and Russell in the *New York Times* on 10 July 1955, was an impassioned plea for world peace and argued that the development of nuclear weapons made the threat of worldwide destruction more ominous and more likely than ever before. Russell had long aligned himself with international pacifism, but Einstein's support for the movement brought it new respect and made many scientists rethink their positions on the role of science in the world. Fears of the destructive impact of nuclear war soon became one of the forces behind the establishment in 1957 of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Especially after Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the Soviet Union's leader in the mid-1950s, such apprehensions also impelled President Dwight D. Eisenhower to seek to open a Soviet-American dialogue on the control of nuclear weapons.

Primary Source

In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction, and to discuss a resolution in the spirit of the appended draft.

We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent or creed, but as human beings, members of the species man, whose continued existence is in doubt. The world is full of conflicts; and, overshadowing all minor conflicts, the titanic struggle between Communism and anti-Communism.

Almost everybody who is politically conscious has strong feelings about one or more of these issues; but we want you, if you can, to set aside such feelings and consider yourselves only as members of a biological species which has had a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can desire.

[. . .]

Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. What they do say is that these results are possible, and no one can be sure that they will not be realized. We have not yet found that the views of experts depend in any degree upon their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as our researches have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert's knowledge. We have found that the men who know most are the most gloomy.

The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything else is that the term *mankind* feels vague and abstract. People scarcely realize in imagination that the danger is to themselves and their children and their grandchildren, and not only to a dimly apprehended humanity. They can scarcely bring themselves to grasp that they, individually, and those whom they love are in imminent danger of perishing agonizingly. And so they hope that perhaps war may be allowed to continue provided modern weapons are prohibited.

This hope is illusory. Whatever agreements not to use the H-bombs had been reached in time of peace, they would no longer be considered binding in time of war, and both sides would set to work to manufacture H-bombs as soon as war broke out, for, if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side that manufactured them would inevitably be victorious.

Although an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments would not afford an ultimate solution, it would serve certain important purposes.

First: Any agreement between East and West is to the good in so far as it tends to diminish tension. Second: The abolition of thermonuclear weapons, if each side believed that the other had carried it out sincerely, would lessen the fear of a sudden attack in the style of Pearl Harbor, which at present keeps both sides in a state of nervous apprehension. We should, therefore, welcome such an agreement, though only as a first step.

Most of us are not neutral in feeling, but as human beings, we have to remember that, if the issues between East and West are to be decided in any manner that can give any possible satisfaction to anybody, whether Communist or anti-Communist, whether Asian or European or American, whether white or black, then these issues must not be decided by war. We should wish this to be understood, both in the East and in the West.

There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.

Resolution
We invite this congress [to be convened], and through it the scientists of the world and the general public, to subscribe to the following resolution:

"In view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will certainly be employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued existence of mankind, we urge the governments of the world to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purposes cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them."

Source: Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, "The Russell-Einstein Manifesto, Issued in London, 9 July 1955," Pugwash Online, Conferences on Science and World Affairs, http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm.

62. Nikita Khrushchev: Speech on the Cult of Personality (Secret Speech), 25 February 1956

Introduction

The death in 1953 of Soviet leader Josef Stalin, who had ruled his country with great brutality ever since the late 1920s, marked a new era in the Cold War. After a protracted power struggle, in 1955 Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the supreme Soviet leader. A former factory worker whose personal style was somewhat uncouth and erratic, Khrushchev nonetheless rejected much of his predecessor's legacy, particularly Stalin's emphasis on terror and his cult of personality. As an aspiring Communist Party official, Khrushchev had himself acquiesced in Stalin's brutal treatment of supposed opponents, and the new Soviet leader apparently resented Stalin's past ability to force him to carry out policies for which he subsequently felt considerable guilt. Addressing the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 25 February 1956, in a "secret speech" Khrushchev shocked his colleagues by denouncing Stalin's policies and the cult of personality he had erected around himself, behavior that Khrushchev claimed ran counter to the teachings of Vladimir Lenin, communist Russia's founding father. From this point on Khrushchev, with the vigorous support of his party, attacked Stalin's legacy within the Soviet Union and abroad. At home, Khrushchev placed more emphasis on improving the performance of agriculture and providing more consumer goods to the Soviet people. Although Soviet communism still ultimately depended on the sanction of force, the use of terror against political opponents became less egregious. When Khrushchev himself was ousted from power in 1964, for example, he retained no formal authority but was allowed to live in reasonable comfort rather than being imprisoned or executed. While still committed to the belief that ultimately the entire world would become communist, Khrushchev thought it possible that this would occur through relatively nonviolent change rather than force and proclaimed his belief in peaceful coexistence with the West, seeking to open serious arms control negotiations. This did not, however, mean that he eschewed the use of force. In late 1956 Soviet troops intervened to prevent Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact military alliance and institution of multiparty democracy and elections, killing or later executing hundreds of Hungarian rebels. Khrushchev's rejection of Stalin's legacy was one reason that Soviet relations with communist China deteriorated. Mao Zedong, the dominating Chinese leader who had constructed a massive personality cult around himself, felt personally threatened by the degrading of Stalin, which he feared might inspire his own comrades to treat him likewise. Mao, who had ambitions to be the greatest communist theoretician of all time, was also committed to an ideology of permanent revolution and ceaseless confrontation with the capitalist world that led him to consider Khrushchev's espousal of peaceful coexistence a betrayal of basic communist principles. By the late 1950s, therefore, Khrushchev's policies had contributed to an open schism between the two communist great powers that grew much wider during the 1960s.

Primary Source

Comrades, in the report of the Central Committee of the party at the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/CPSU sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences. . . .

Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German political worker, Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute." . . .

The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always

stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organizational role of the party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the central committee.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the workers' class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement.

While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual, inexorably combated the foreign-to-Marxism views about a "hero" and a "crowd" and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the party follow the people—workers, peasants and intelligentsia. "Only he will win and retain the power," said Lenin, "who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the people." . . .

During Lenin's life the central committee of the party was a real expression of collective leadership of the party and of the Nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of party life were realized, that the party statute was enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the central committee took place at the proper intervals.

In addition to the great accomplishments of V. I. Lenin for the victory of the working class and of the working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application of the ideas of scientific communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself also in this that he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretary General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that he is capricious, and abuses his power. . . .

Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man, who above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness, and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc."

As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified; in the first period after Lenin's death Stalin still paid attention to his (i.e., Lenin's) advice, but, later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.

When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the party and of the country, when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party. . . .

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position, was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period following the 17th party congress, when many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism. . . .

Stalin originated the concept enemy of the people. This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. This concept, enemy of the people, actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the confession of the accused himself, and, as subsequent probing proved, confessions were acquired through physical pressures against the accused. . . .

Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for survival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.

Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated, and Socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet Government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed V. I. Lenin. . . .

[. . .]

Comrades, the cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person. This is supported by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of his Short Biography, which was published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an example of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest leader," "sublime strategist of all times and nations." Finally no other words could be found with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens.

We need not give here examples of the loathsome adulation filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book. . . .

Comrades, if we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the party and the country for 30 years and many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet State, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet society. . . .

Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the party, to the many provincial organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual. . . .

Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after the 19th party congress when Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich

Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our party were guilty of some baseless charges. It is not excluded that had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered any speeches at this congress.

Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the political bureau. He often stated that political bureau members should be replaced by new ones. . . .

We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation of the old political bureau members and in this way a cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering.

Comrades, in order not to repeat errors of the past, the central committee has declared itself resolutely against the cult of the individual. We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin doubtless performed great services to the party, to the working class, and to the international workers' movement. . . .

We should in all seriousness consider the question of the cult of the individual. We cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegates to the congress will understand and assess properly all these proposals.

Comrades, we must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work.

It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.

To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work, the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as the creator of history and as the creator of all material and spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society, about the victory of communism.

In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy, economy, and of other sciences, as well as in the literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the civil war and the great patriotic war.

Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's central committee during the last years, a work characterized by minute observation in all party organizations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles of party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observation of the norms of party life described in the statutes of our party, and, finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy, expressed in the constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.

Comrades, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our party, its cohesiveness around the central committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building communism. And the fact that we present in all the ramifications the basic

problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is an evidence of the great moral and political strength of our party.

We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historical resolutions of the 20th Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories.

Long live the victorious banner of our party—Leninism.

Source: U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record,* Proceedings and Debates of the 84th Congress, 2nd Sess., 2 May–11 June 1956, C11, Pt. 7, pp. 9389–9403.

63. John Foster Dulles: "The Cost of Peace," Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, 9 June 1956

Introduction

U.S. leaders tended to assume that their position in the Cold War was so self-evidently justified and the conflict so clearly one between right and wrong that no other state could afford to stand on the sidelines. Republican Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, by that time well known for tactless pronouncements, riled the sensibilities of nonaligned nations in 1956 when, in the course of a lengthy address justifying his country's very substantial defense and foreign aid expenditures, which absorbed 10 percent of the U.S. gross national product, as essential to the maintenance of peace, he attacked "the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others." Dulles proclaimed that neutrality had "increasingly become an obsolete conception, and except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception." His speech promptly became controversial and was frequently cited as an example of overbearing American behavior toward other nations. Ironically, Dulles included these words in an effort to defuse the tensions already caused three days earlier by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had stated in a 6 June 1956 press conference that while all countries were entitled and in some cases might find it most prudent to hold themselves aloof from military alliances, and some openly and clearly stated that they considered themselves "neutral," this should not "be interpreted to mean, neutral as between right and wrong or decency and indecency." One day later, on 7 June, the White House issued a clarification, stating that "the President does believe that there are special conditions which justify political neutrality but that no nation has the right to be indifferent to the fate of another." Such rather clumsy assumptions of moral superiority by top American officials irritated rather than soothed those states who preferred to consider themselves nonaligned. Equally galling and more damaging to U.S. credibility, in his address Dulles welcomed signs that the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself were demanding greater freedom, yet four months later, during the Hungarian revolt, the United States offered nothing beyond rhetorical assistance as Soviet military forces brutally suppressed the uprising.

Primary Source

Each one of you is going out into a world where you hope to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty.

That is the kind of a world which United States foreign policy tries to provide.

Today we have peace; no nation is at war with the United States.

Also, we have many blessings. We have good relations with most of the nations of the world. We do not fear them nor do they fear us. We trade with each other and our peoples visit back and forth, all to our mutual profit and enjoyment.

For that peace, and for those blessings that we enjoy, we can be profoundly grateful.

But all of this is not to be had for nothing. Others before you have gone out into the world with eager hopes. But those hopes ended on the field of battle. And those at home were heavy of heart. And the means

for economic well-being were dissipated in the wastages of war.

That kind of a price, paid in the coin of war, will always be paid unless men are willing, in time of peace, to pay to preserve peace.

That lesson seems never to be learned. The illusion constantly persists that peace is to be had merely by wanting it. If that were true, war would have been abolished many centuries ago. The fact is that to keep peace is as hard, indeed harder, than to win a war. Wars have been won. But lasting peace has never yet been won. To win a final victory over war will take planning and action that is farsighted, well calculated, courageous, and at times sacrificial. Such sacrifice will be required under conditions less dramatic and apparently less urgent than those of war. But peace will never be enduring as long as men reserve for war their finest qualities of mind and spirit. Peace, too, has its price.

I want to illustrate that in terms of one phase of the peace effort our Nation is now making. It could be described as a peace insurance policy, and it costs about $40 billion a year.

Our Peace Insurance Policy

The basic elements of this peace insurance policy are drawn from early and successful American foreign policy. We go back to the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1823 President Monroe proclaimed to the despotic alliance then headed by Czarist Russia that "we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety" and that we would not "behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

It was indeed farsighted and bold for our young Nation thus to identify its own self-interest with the fate of freedom thousands of miles away. Yet the pronouncement of that principle, Webster recorded, was greeted with "one general glow of exultation."

That principle has now been extended. Its broadest application is found in the United Nations Charter. But because veto power makes United Nations action undependable, many nations have made with each other treaties which embody the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Within the last 10 years the United States, always acting in a bipartisan manner, has made such treaties with 42 countries of America, Europe, and Asia.

These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception. The free world today is stronger, and peace is more secure, because so many free nations courageously recognize the now demonstrated fact that their own peace and safety would be endangered by assault on freedom elsewhere.

However, it is not enough under present conditions for the free nations merely to proclaim their purpose to stand together. There is need for forces-in-being to give authority to those words.

At the outset of World War I and World War II, the United States had little military strength in being. In the case of the Korean War, our initial strength was inadequate. But on these past occasions the conditions of warfare gave us time within which to build up our strength.

But since then, man's capacity to destroy has suddenly expanded to a degree that passes comprehension. Today, a single bomb can release destructive power equal to that used in the 5 years of World War II. Potential enemies could destroy so much, so quickly, if initially unopposed, that we dare not gamble on developing military power after an attack has occurred. To deter aggression, to prevent miscalculation, we need not only to warn but to back that warning by forces-in-being which include retaliatory striking power. That is why our peace insurance policy is so expensive.

The cost of our United States military establishment, at home and abroad, is about $36 billion a year. That is about 90 percent of the total of a little over $40 billion a year which our peace insurance policy costs.

The other 10 percent, roughly $4 billion, goes to promote strength in other lands under our mutual security program. I want to discuss that program and explain why it is part of our total peace insurance policy.

I shall be speaking in terms of expected expenditures. But to keep going at this rate we shall for next year need an appropriation larger than expected expenditures, because the appropriation for this year is less than current expenditures by about $1 billion.

The Far East

The largest expenditures under our mutual security program are in the Pacific and Far East. They help strengthen countries with which we have collective defense treaties. This area is today under obvious hostile pressure.

In Korea there is an armistice. But the Chinese Communists have never been willing to make a peace which would unify Korea through free elections held under the auspices of the United Nations. So hostile armed forces face each other across an armistice line.

In Taiwan (Formosa), where the Republic of China now has its home, there is the constant menace of war. The Chinese Communist regime persistently refuses to make a meaningful renunciation of force covering this area.

Then there is Viet-Nam, where again there is an armistice but no formal peace.

I have already pointed out that we have, by treaties, solemnly recognized that an armed attack in these areas would be dangerous to our own peace and security. And Congress, with only four dissenting votes, has authorized the President to use United States forces to defend Taiwan (Formosa) if he deems it necessary. But we do not want it to be necessary to fight to save freedom in these areas. Our purpose is to deter war. So we give military and financial aid to enable the free governments there to maintain their own armed forces to an extent which we and they judge reasonably related to the threat of aggression and our coordinated plans to prevent it.

We expect next year to spend about $1.5 billion for military aid and defense-support assistance in this area. It goes mostly to the Republics of Korea and China and to the three nations of Indochina. There are lesser amounts for other area allies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan.

The Middle East

Let me turn now to the Middle East. This area produces the oil required for the industry of Western Europe and for the military establishment of NATO. If this were unavailable, it would involve tragedy for the producing countries, which are largely dependent upon the oil royalties. Also, it would require us to share with Europe the oil resources of this hemisphere, and there would be scarcity instead of plenty.

So we assist those four Middle East countries which hold the gateway to the south where the oil reserves are located; and just beyond is the gateway to Africa.

The estimate of expenditure for military aid and defense support for these countries in the next year is in the neighborhood of $800 million.

NATO

I turn next to Western Europe. There the military forces of NATO stand guard over the greatest industrial and military treasure that there is within the free world except for the United States itself. So important do we consider this area that nearly six divisions of the United States Armed Forces are stationed in Western Europe for its defense. The European members of NATO themselves make a large contribution to the defense of the area. However, we help by supplying them with certain types of weapons, the cost of which is in our mutual security budget.

We help to support West Berlin as a symbol of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. We are developing bases in Spain, and this involves substantial costs. We also think it prudent to help Yugoslavia, so long as it remains determined to maintain genuine independence. It does not have the form of society that we like. But Marshal Tito defied Moscow and won out. And even though that struggle is today calmed, Yugoslavia pro-

vides a notable example of national independence in Eastern Europe.

This European aspect of the mutual security program involves an estimated cost for next year of approximately $1 billion.

The expenditures I have described are designed to make secure, at minimum cost to us, countries whose safety is part of our own safety. The resultant widespread, interlocking system of security provides, as a valuable byproduct, diversified locations around the globe from which we and our allies could strike back at an aggressor if he struck any of us. Diversification, in this respect, is immensely valuable; for launching facilities limited to a single area could be wiped out by an initial assault. Also, the present system enables less expensive planes with shorter range to carry out missions which otherwise would require far more costly planes.

Thus, these expenditures serve our peace and our safety.

Economic Aid

There remains about $700 million to be accounted for, or about 2 percent of our total peace insurance cost. This is so-called economic aid. The primary purpose is to help newly independent nations and less developed countries to maintain their independence, as against the plotting of international communism.

As the Caracas Resolution pointed out in relation to this hemisphere, if international communism obtains control of the political institutions of any nation, that endangers peace and security elsewhere. This portion of the mutual security program offsets efforts by hostile forces to expand their power by gaining new human and material resources and new strategic locations. But it has a broader justification.

The United States has far and away the most highly developed economy of any nation in the world. Our productivity almost equals that of all the rest of the world put together.

Always the economically developed nations have helped less developed countries to develop. We were helped from Europe when we were beginning to develop this continent. That is a law of social life and we cannot violate it except at our peril.

The burden on us is lessened by the fact that a considerable part of our economic assistance goes in the form of surplus agricultural products. Also, upwards of $200 million takes the form of repayable loans, not gifts.

The importance of this economic part of our peace insurance policy is emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Union is now pushing its own interests by means of credits extended to other countries.

The new Communist tactics make it more than ever imperative that we should continue, and perhaps enlarge, the economic phase of our mutual security program. It would indeed be ironical if we should drop out of that field just at the time when the Soviet Union is moving into it.

These programs which I have described—$36 billion, plus $3.3 billion, plus $700 million—make up the grand total of about $40 billion, which is the annual cost of our peace insurance policy. As to the $36 billion spent on our own military establishment, there are differences of opinion as to *how* it shall be spent. But few deny that this much money should be spent. There is more controversy about the $4 billion which is used, in ways I have described, under our mutual security program.

I should like now to answer some questions about that.

No "Give Away"

First of all, is this a "give away" program, whereby Americans are taxed merely to aid foreigners?

Emphatically no. I hope what I have said already makes that clear. It is quite true that the mutual security money does help others. But no program can properly be labeled "give away" merely because it helps others. Often by helping others we help ourselves more effectively than we could do in any other way. That is the case with our mutual security program. It makes our freedom safer by creating an environment of freedom.

The decisive reason for each item of expense is our own enlightened self-interest.

Let me be specific and emphatic on this point of motivation: not a single dollar is sought for this program for any reason other than an American reason. Our Nation has recognized, since its infancy, that liberty elsewhere was vital to our own peace and safety. When that liberty has been jeopardized by war, we have gone into war to save it. That is the most costly way to protect ourselves. We hope now to protect ourselves in less costly ways. That is the reason for our mutual security program.

[. . .]

Are Local Forces Needed?
Another question sometimes asked is, Does not the deterrent striking power of the United States make local forces unnecessary, so that their cost could be saved? Certainly our strategic power reduces the need for local forces. It would indeed be impractical to have local forces all around the orbit of the Soviet world sufficient to stop a large scale attack wherever it might be mounted. But we cannot rely wholly on centrally located strategic power. Nations that are menaced feel an impelling need to be able to fight in their own defense. Indeed, if they did not feel that way, support from us might not be merited or effective. Also, there needs to be loyal local strength to prevent subversion backed by international communism.

The deterrent to aggression is found not only in our strategic power but in the knowledge that subversion cannot be easily achieved and that an open armed attack would be met at once by brave and competent resistance. This, when reinforced by treaty pledges of collective action, will assure consequences which no aggressor could control or limit. That knowledge is the great deterrent.

This problem of balance between the strategic power of the U.S.A. and local power is admittedly difficult. Equally difficult is the problem of balance between military and economic effort. These problems are constantly receiving the closest attention of the National Security Council. In each case, the balance is subject to adjustment in the light of changing conditions.

Is There an End?
Finally, it will be asked, Will this cost go on forever? Can we see no end to this gigantic expenditure, totaling about $40 billion a year, as the cost of our peace insurance policy?

The answer is that, so long as the danger persists, for so long must we pay to combat that danger.

The Soviet rulers are engaged in a gigantic effort to build up their military establishment and to extend the area of their dominance. They maintain a military establishment approximately comparable to our own and spare no cost in striving to excel us. They give military aid to Communist China and to their Eastern European satellite allies. This is measured in terms of billions of dollars. They now woo free nations by offers of credit for economic and military goods. Credits totaling nearly $500 million have already been concluded, and several hundred more million have been offered. They devote about $500 million a year to foreign propaganda.

The Soviet Union is spending, for military and foreign-policy purposes hostile to us, about 20 percent of the gross product of the Soviet nation. So long as this is going on, we may have to expend about 10 percent of our gross national product, as we are now doing, for peace insurance purposes.

We can do so while at the same time raising our living standards. The demonstration of that fact has had a potent influence on the international scene.

Never will a responsible administration put its faith in protestations of peace and good will that have no dependable foundation, or expose the Nation to being isolated in the world, or deny it the retaliatory facilities needed to deter surprise attack.

But there are signs that a new day may be dawning. The Soviet rulers now profess to renounce the doctrine that violence is a necessary part of their foreign policy. They are debasing Stalin, who for 25 years was treated as a demigod. Writings of his, which for 25 years formed the Communist creed, are now withdrawn from circulation. This year, for the first time since the Bol-

shevik revolution, the Christian Bible is being printed and sold in Russia. The Russian people are getting more personal security, and labor is getting increased freedom of choice.

Obviously, there is a rising demand on the part of the captive nations to have more independence and on the part of the subject people, within and without Russia, to have more freedom from fear and to enjoy more of the fruits of their labor instead of having those fruits diverted to serve policies of aggrandizement. This popular demand must be broad in scope and intense in degree. Only that can explain the extraordinary exertions being made by the Soviet rulers to make it seem that they are offering a change. Out of all of this there may come—not this year, or next year, but some year—a government which is responsive to the just aspirations of the people and which renounces expansionist goals.

Enough is happening to make us confident that if we remain strong, if we support freedom and make evident the blessings of liberty, that policy will prevail.

The time will never come when we can safely stop planning and working for peace and making sacrifices for peace. But we can see that, if we remain steadfast, the time may come when the danger will be much less and when the cost can be correspondingly reduced. Until that time is here, the clear course of patriotic duty is to hold fast that which has proved good.

Source: John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 34(886) (1956): 999–1004.

64. Mao Zedong: "U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger," 14 July 1956

Introduction

For international communist revolutionaries during the Cold War, the United States represented the head and front of the capitalist forces raised against them. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman Mao Zedong regarded the United States as the foremost enemy that China would ultimately have to confront and overcome. A leader who favored dramatic and grandiloquent rhetoric, Mao nonetheless urged his countrymen and leftists around the world not to fear the United States, characterizing it as a "paper tiger" that was far less formidable than it appeared. Strong though the United States was in military and economic terms, its power could, he proclaimed, be destroyed piecemeal and incrementally, although this would take time. In the mid-1950s Mao called on all the oppressed peoples of the world to launch armed struggle against the United States and its allies, and China provided training and military aid to a wider variety of international revolutionary movements. His approach differed from that of the new Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, who now sought peaceful coexistence with the West, and contributed to growing divisions between Soviet Russia and Communist China that culminated in an outright split by the end of the decade. Soviet leaders thought Mao's policies likely to destabilize the international system and perhaps provoke nuclear war. Ironically, in practice Mao was far more cautious than his rhetoric implied in challenging the United States, suggesting that he himself may have been something of a paper tiger. After intervening in 1950 against United Nations forces in the lengthy, expensive, and wearing Korean War, which ended in stalemate, Mao was careful in successive international crises over Taiwan and Vietnam to avoid provoking outright war between China and the United States (UN). Eventually, moreover, when Sino-Soviet hostility led to outright fighting on the joint border in 1969, Mao even initiated a rapprochement with the United States, for two decades supposedly China's greatest enemy, as a means of countering the potential Soviet menace.

Primary Source

The United States is flaunting the anti-communist banner everywhere in order to perpetrate aggression against other countries.

The United States owes debts everywhere. It owes debts not only to the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, but also to the countries of Europe and Oceania. The whole world, Britain included, dislikes

the United States. The masses of the people dislike it. Japan dislikes the United States because it oppresses her. None of the countries in the East is free from U.S. aggression. The United States has invaded our Taiwan Province. Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Viet Nam and Pakistan all suffer from U.S. aggression, although some of them are allies of the United States. The people are dissatisfied and in some countries so are the authorities.

All oppressed nations want independence.

Everything is subject to change. The big decadent forces will give way to the small new-born forces. The small forces will change into big forces because the majority of the people demand this change. The U.S. imperialist forces will change from big to small because the American people, too, are dissatisfied with their government.

In my own lifetime I myself have witnessed such changes. Some of us present were born in the Ching Dynasty and others after the 1911 Revolution.

The Ching Dynasty was overthrown long ago. By whom? By the party led by Sun Yat-sen, together with the people. Sun Yat-sen's forces were so small that the Ching officials didn't take him seriously. He led many uprisings which failed each time. In the end, however, it was Sun Yat-sen who brought down the Ching Dynasty. Bigness is nothing to be afraid of. The big will be overthrown by the small. The small will become big. After overthrowing the Ching Dynasty, Sun Yat-sen met with defeat. For he failed to satisfy the demands of the people, such as their demands for land and for opposition to imperialism. Nor did he understand the necessity of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries who were then moving about freely. Later, he suffered defeat at the hands of Yuan Shih-kai, the chieftain of the Northern warlords. Yuan Shih-kai's forces were larger than Sun Yat-sen's. But here again this law operated: small forces linked with the people become strong, while big forces opposed to the people become weak. Subsequently Sun Yat-sen's bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries co-operated with us Communists and together we defeated the warlord set-up left behind by Yuan Shih-kai.

Chiang Kai-shek's rule in China was recognized by the governments of all countries and lasted twenty-two years, and his forces were the biggest. Our forces were small, fifty thousand Party members at first but only a few thousand after counter-revolutionary suppressions. The enemy made trouble everywhere. Again this law operated: the big and strong end up in defeat because they are divorced from the people, whereas the small and weak emerge victorious because they are linked with the people and work in their interest. That's how things turned out in the end.

During the anti-Japanese war, Japan was very powerful, the Kuomintang troops were driven to the hinterland, and the armed forces led by the Communist Party could only conduct guerrilla warfare in the rural areas behind the enemy lines. Japan occupied large Chinese cities such as Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan and Canton. Nevertheless, like Germany's Hitler the Japanese militarists collapsed in a few years, in accordance with the same law.

We underwent innumerable difficulties and were driven from the south to the north, while our forces fell from several hundred thousand strong to a few tens of thousands. At the end of the 25,000-*li* Long March we had only 25,000 men left.

[. . .]

During the War of Resistance, our troops grew and became 900,000 strong through fighting against Japan. Then came the War of Liberation. Our arms were inferior to those of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang troops then numbered four million, but in three years of fighting we wiped out eight million of them all told. The Kuomintang, though aided by U.S. imperialism, could not defeat us. The big and strong cannot win, it is always the small and weak who win out.

Now U.S. imperialism is quite powerful, but in reality it isn't. It is very weak politically because it is divorced from the masses of the people and is disliked by everybody and by the American people too. In appearance it is very powerful but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of, it is a paper tiger. Outwardly a tiger, it is made of

paper, unable to withstand the wind and the rain. I believe the United States is nothing but a paper tiger.

History as a whole, the history of class society for thousands of years, has proved this point: the strong must give way to the weak. This holds true for the Americas as well.

Only when imperialism is eliminated can peace prevail. The day will come when the paper tigers will be wiped out. But they won't become extinct of their own accord, they need to be battered by the wind and the rain.

When we say U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, we are speaking in terms of strategy. Regarding it as a whole, we must despise it. But regarding each part, we must take it seriously. It has claws and fangs. We have to destroy it piecemeal. For instance, if it has ten fangs, knock off one the first time, and there will be nine left; knock off another, and there will be eight left. When all the fangs are gone, it will still have claws. If we deal with it step by step and in earnest, we will certainly succeed in the end.

Strategically, we must utterly despise U.S. imperialism. Tactically, we must take it seriously. In struggling against it, we must take each battle, each encounter, seriously. At present, the United States is powerful, but when looked at in a broader perspective, as a whole and from a long-term viewpoint, it has no popular support, its policies are disliked by the people, because it oppresses and exploits them. For this reason, the tiger is doomed. Therefore, it is nothing to be afraid of and can be despised. But today the United States still has strength, turning out more than 100 million tons of steel a year and hitting out everywhere. That is why we must continue to wage struggles against it, fight it with all our might and wrest one position after another from it. And that takes time.

It seems that the countries of the Americas, Asia and Africa will have to go on quarrelling with the United States till the very end, till the paper tiger is destroyed by the wind and the rain.

To oppose U.S. imperialism, people of European origin in the Latin-American countries should unite with the indigenous Indians. Perhaps the white immigrants from Europe can be divided into two groups, one composed of rulers and the other of ruled. This should make it easier for the group of oppressed white people to get close to the local people, for their position is the same.

Our friends in Latin America, Asia and Africa are in the same position as we and are doing the same kind of work, doing something for the people to lessen their oppression by imperialism. If we do a good job, we can root out imperialist oppression. In this we are comrades.

We are of the same nature as you in our opposition to imperialist oppression, differing only in geographical position, nationality and language. But we are different in nature from imperialism, and the very sight of it makes us sick.

What use is imperialism? The Chinese people will have none of it, nor will the people in the rest of the world. There is no reason for the existence of imperialism.

Source: Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 308–311.

65. Hungarian Revolution: Sixteen Political, Economic, and Ideological Points

Introduction

Soviet control of Eastern Europe was rarely popular. In 1956, reformers in both Hungary and Poland challenged Soviet dominance and sought greater autonomy and an end to Soviet intervention in their countries' affairs. In Poland, Władyslaw Gomułka, who took power in summer 1956, withstood Soviet pressure and, after pledging his

country's continuing loyalty to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and promising to end press criticism of the Soviet Union, was left in power. The Polish example and Gomułka's successful retention of some autonomy helped to embolden Hungarian rebels. On 22 October 1956, a group of students in Budapest issued this manifesto as a call to arms in the Hungarian Revolution. The following day, what was initially a small pro-Gomulka demonstration soon escalated into a major threat to Soviet control as more than 100,000 Hungarians demonstrated against continued Soviet rule. Students and reformers vowed to free Hungary from the repressive rule of Soviet leader Josef Stalin and quickly gained support for their measures from both the public and many of Hungary's political leaders. On 23 October the government of Ernô Gerô collapsed, and Imre Nagy replaced him as prime minister. The Hungarians announced their intention to leave the Warsaw Pact military alliance of the Soviet Union's East European satellites and also planned to introduce a multiparty democratic system, a direct challenge to communist control. In response, Stalin ordered the Soviet Army into Budapest. An early intervention by Soviet troops already present in Hungary proved ineffective, but on 4 November additional Soviet forces entered the country, where they brutally suppressed the uprising, killing or imprisoning hundreds of people in the process of regaining Soviet control of the country. Sporadic fighting and resistance continued until 10 November. With Soviet backing, in December 1956 Janos Kádár formed a new government. Apart from those killed in the actual fighting, approximately 1,200 Hungarians, including former prime minister Nagy, were tried and executed. The episode was a forceful demonstration of Soviet determination to retain military control of Eastern Europe, which Russian leaders considered vital to their own country's security, and also of Western reluctance to risk war with the Soviet Union by giving any kind of military assistance to East European rebels.

Primary Source

RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT PLENARY MEETING OF THE BUILDING INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY UNIVERSITY

Students of Budapest!

The following resolution was born on 22 October 1956, at the dawn of a new period in Hungarian history, in the Hall of the Building Industry Technological University as a result of the spontaneous movement of several thousand of the Hungarian youth who love their Fatherland:

(1) We demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

(2) We demand the election of new leaders in the Hungarian Workers' Party on the low, medium and high levels by secret ballot from the ranks upwards. These leaders should convene the Party Congress within the shortest possible time and should elect a new central body of leaders.

(3) The Government should be reconstituted under the leadership of Comrade Imre Nagy; all criminal leaders of the Stalinist-Rádkosi era should be relieved of their posts at once.

(4) We demand a public trial in the criminal case of Mihály Farkas and his accomplices. Mátyás Rákosi, who is primarily responsible for all the crimes of the recent past and for the ruin of this country, should be brought home and brought before a People's Court of judgment.

(5) We demand general elections in this country, with universal suffrage, secret ballot and the participation of several Parties for the purpose of electing a new National Assembly. We demand that the workers should have the right to strike.

(6) We demand a re-examination and re-adjustment of Hungarian-Soviet and Hungarian-Yugoslav political, economic and intellectual relations on the basis of complete political and economic equality and of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs.

(7) We demand the re-organization of the entire economic life of Hungary, with the assistance of specialists. Our whole economic system based on planned economy should be re-examined with an eye to Hun-

garian conditions and to the vital interests of the Hungarian people.

(8) Our foreign trade agreements and the real figures in respect of reparations that can never be paid should be made public. We demand frank and sincere information concerning the country's uranium deposits, their exploitation and the Russian concession. We demand that Hungary should have the right to sell the uranium ore freely at world market prices in exchange for hard currency.

(9) We demand the complete revision of norms in industry and an urgent and radical adjustment of wages to meet the demands of workers and intellectuals. We demand that minimum living wages for workers should be fixed.

(10) We demand that the delivery system should be placed on a new basis and that produce should be used rationally. We demand equal treatment of peasants farming individually.

(11) We demand the re-examination of all political and economic trials by independent courts and the release and rehabilitation of innocent persons. We demand the immediate repatriation of prisoners-of-war and of civilians deported to the Soviet Union, including prisoners who have been condemned beyond the frontiers of Hungary.

(12) We demand complete freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of the Press and a free Radio, as well as a new daily newspaper of large circulation for the MEFESZ [League of Hungarian University and College Student Associations] organization. We demand that the existing "screening material" should be made public and destroyed.

(13) We demand that the Stalin statue—the symbol of Stalinist tyranny and political oppression—should be removed as quickly as possible and that a memorial worthy of the freedom fighters and martyrs of 1848–49 should be erected on its site.

(14) In place of the existing coat of arms, which is foreign to the Hungarian people, we wish the re-introduction of the old Hungarian Kossuth arms. We demand for the Hungarian Army new uniforms worthy of our national traditions. We demand that 15 March should be a national holiday and a non-working day and that 6 October should be a day of national mourning and a school holiday.

(15) The youth of the Technological University of Budapest unanimously express their complete solidarity with the Polish and Warsaw workers and youth in connexion with the Polish national independence movement.

(16) The students of the Building Industry Technological University will organize local units of MEFESZ as quickly as possible, and have resolved to convene a Youth Parliament in Budapest for the 27th of this month (Saturday) at which the entire youth of this country will be represented by their delegates. The students of the Technological University and of the various other Universities will gather in the Gorkij Fasor before the Writers' Union Headquarters tomorrow, the 23rd. of this month, at 2.30 P.M., whence they will proceed to the Pálffy Tér (Bern Ter) to the Bern statue, on which they will lay wreaths in sign of their sympathy with the Polish freedom movement. The workers of the factories are invited to join in this procession.

Source: "Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary," *UN General Assembly, Official Records*, 11th Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592): 69.

66. Hungarian Revolution: Declaration of the Soviet Government, 30 October 1956

Introduction

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a popular uprising of students and reformers in communist Hungary bent on changing several key aspects of Hungarian society and modifying the version of communism that existed there.

However, as a satellite state of the Soviet Union and part of the Eastern bloc, Hungary played an important role in maintaining the idea that Soviet control over Eastern Europe was inviolable. Therefore, in the fall of 1956 the Soviet Army marched into Hungary and brutally suppressed the revolution, executing all of its leaders and imprisoning hundreds of people for their involvement. On 30 October 1956, the Soviet government issued an official explanation regarding the army's action. The Hungarian revolution nonetheless had a major impact on Soviet credibility, impelling many prominent communists outside the Soviet Union to leave the party on the grounds that Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of another communist state was unacceptable. U.S. inaction during the Hungarian Revolution also greatly disappointed many around Europe and beyond. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had campaigned in 1952 as Republicans who would wage the Cold War more aggressively than Democrats such as President Harry S. Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson. Eisenhower and Dulles had promised that rather than simply acquiescing in Soviet control of Eastern Europe, they would actively seek to roll back Soviet domination of that area. When Hungarian revolutionaries appealed for U.S. support, however, Dulles and Eisenhower, unwilling to risk nuclear war over an area that the Soviets considered part of their own sphere of influence and essential to Soviet security, refused to provide anything more than rhetorical support to the beleaguered Hungarians, a stance that for many tarnished the international image of the United States.

Primary Source

[. . .]

The Soviet Government regards it as indispensable to make a statement in connection with the events in Hungary.

The course of the events has shown that the working people of Hungary, who have achieved great progress on the basis of their people's democratic order, correctly raised the question of the necessity of eliminating serious shortcomings in the field of economic building, the further raising of the material well-being of the population, and the struggle against bureaucratic excesses in the state apparatus.

However, this just and progressive movement of the working people was soon joined by forces of black reaction and counterrevolution, which are trying to take advantage of the discontent of part of the working people to undermine the foundations of the people's democratic order in Hungary and to restore the old landlord and capitalist order.

The Soviet Government and all the Soviet people deeply regret that the development of events in Hungary has led to bloodshed. On the request of the Hungarian People's Government the Soviet Government consented to the entry into Budapest of the Soviet Army units to assist the Hungarian People's Army and the Hungarian authorities to establish order in the town. Believing that the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for even greater deterioration of the situation, the Soviet Government has given instructions to its military command to withdraw the Soviet Army units from Budapest as soon as this is recognized as necessary by the Hungarian Government.

At the same time, the Soviet Government is ready to enter into relevant negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other participants of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.

[. . .]

Source: "Text of Soviet Statement of October 30," *Department of State Bulletin* 35(907) (1956): 746.

67. Imre Nagy: Final Message to the Hungarian People, 1956

Introduction

Imre Nagy served as prime minister of Hungary from 1953 to 1955 before falling from Soviet favor and losing office. He proved a sympathetic supporter of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, during which students and reformers attempted to undermine Soviet control of Hungary and revise the communist system in a democratic and multiparty direction. On 23 October 1956, as demonstrations against Soviet rule expanded almost uncontrollably, Nagy was reappointed as prime minister. Fearing Soviet intervention, he sought to bring events under control, introducing reforms and offering amnesty to demonstrators while placating the Soviets and seeking to negotiate the peaceable withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. When Nagy realized that his efforts had failed to persuade the Soviets to eschew military intervention, he finally announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-run military alliance of its East European satellite states. On 4 November 1956 Soviet troops invaded Hungary, capturing Nagy and numerous other Hungarian leaders. As Soviet troops surrounded the capital city of Budapest, Nagy delivered his final message to the Hungarian people, appealing for support from other countries. His hopes of assistance from the Western powers or the United Nations (UN) were illusory, since—despite their proclaimed wish to roll back communism in Eastern Europe—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, were not prepared to risk nuclear war over an area that they knew the Soviet Union considered essential to its own national security. In 1958, the Soviets executed Nagy for his involvement in the revolution. After the Soviets relinquished control of Eastern Europe in 1989, Nagy was posthumously rehabilitated.

Primary Source

This fight is the fight for freedom by the Hungarian people against the Russian intervention, and it is possible that I shall only be able to stay at my post for one or two hours. The whole world will see how the Russian armed forces, contrary to all treaties and conventions, are crushing the resistance of the Hungarian people. They will also see how they are kidnapping the Prime Minister of a country which is a Member of the United Nations, taking him from the capital, and therefore it cannot be doubted at all that this is the most brutal form of intervention. I should like in these last moments to ask the leaders of the revolution, if they can, to leave the country. I ask that all that I have said in my broadcast, and what we have agreed on with the revolutionary leaders during meetings in Parliament, should be put in a memorandum, and the leaders should turn to all the peoples of the world for help and explain that today it is Hungary and tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, it will be the turn of other countries because the imperialism of Moscow does not know borders, and is only trying to play for time.

Source: *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 November 1956, pp. 746–747.

68. Nikita Khrushchev: Report from the *London Times* on "We Will Bury You" Speech, 19 November 1956

Introduction

Nikita Khrushchev, who eventually succeeded Josef Stalin as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), was less formidable than his predecessor but at times could be erratic. He frequently expressed his hopes for peaceful coexistence with the West, believing that nonsocialist countries would either evolve into communist states or experience autonomous revolutions that were not fomented by Soviet operatives. Fearing the devastating potential impact of nuclear war, Khrushchev also sought to reach understandings on arms control. This did not, however, mean that he had abandoned his faith in communism, the political creed he had embraced as a young factory worker before World War I. Khrushchev was also notorious for somewhat erratic behavior, especially when he had imbibed plentiful quantities of vodka. In mid-1956, shortly after Soviet troops

brutally suppressed the Hungarian Revolution and before the resolution of the Suez Crisis that occurred when Israel, Great Britain, and France invaded Egypt and the United States exerted economic pressure to force the three powers to withdraw, Khrushchev attended receptions at the Kremlin and the Polish embassy. In remarks at both venues, he took the opportunity to condemn the Suez invasion while characterizing Soviet intervention in Hungary as a justifiable exercise in counterrevolution. Warning that "Fascist bands" sought to destroy communist parties in Italy, France, and elsewhere outside the Soviet sphere, Khrushchev proclaimed that "history is on our side" and warned the Western diplomats present: "We will bury you." In practice, the Russian words Khrushchev used were less menacing than they appeared in translation and in the original meant something approximating: "We will attend your funeral." Khrushchev apparently meant that the Western powers would collapse of their own volition, but the journalists present reported a somewhat sensational version of his remarks. Indeed, some years later Khrushchev himself looked back on this episode and commented that he had "got into trouble for it" when he had only wished to say that the working classes of the Western states would themselves overthrow their rulers. Khrushchev's speech nonetheless impelled all the Western ambassadors to leave, and the episode was widely reported around the world as an instance of his bullying, blustering style and was taken as a threat to the West. In the popular memory, "we will bury you" would become one of Khrushchev's best-remembered utterances.

Primary Source

Sir William Hayter, the British Ambassador, and diplomatic representatives of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, walked out from a Kremlin reception last night in protest at a speech by Mr. Khrushchev, the Soviet Communist Party chairman, in which he used the words "Fascist" and "bandits" in referring to Britain and France and Israel.

The reception was in honour of Mr. Gomulka, who was concluding his visit to Moscow.

Out of courtesy to Mr. Gomulka, the N.A.T.O. ambassadors and representative of Israel waited until Mr. Gomulka had responded with a toast that was devoid of references to Egypt or Hungary and limited to advocating friendly ties with the Soviet Union based on equality and mutual benefit. Immediately on the conclusion of the translation into Russian of Mr. Gomulka's toast, read in Polish, the western diplomatists strode from the long white and gold St. George's Hall.

Mr. Khrushchev declared that the "bandit-like attack by Britain, France, and their puppet, Israel, on Egypt is a desperate attempt by colonializers to regain their lost positions, to frighten the peoples of dependent countries with force. But the time has passed when imperialists could seize weak countries with impunity. The freedom-loving people of Egypt have administered a fitting rebuff to the aggressors, and its just struggle against foreign invaders has evoked warm support all over the world."

Mr. Khrushchev, words tumbling from his lips in rapid fashion, continued by extending his accusations against other Powers besides Britain, France, and Israel. "Feverish activity is now in progress on the part of all the forces of reaction against the forces of Socialism and democracy. Fascist bands are making frenzied attacks on the advanced detachments of the working class, on the Communist parties of France, Italy, and other countries."

At a reception this evening at the Polish Embassy, Mr. Khrushchev delivered himself of a longer but more mildly worded address criticizing the western Powers. However, most western ambassadors, including Sir William Hayter, restricted themselves to wandering to an adjoining room while Mr. Khrushchev spoke.

Moscow, Nov. 18.—In his speech Mr. Khrushchev, who appeared to be directing his remarks to the western diplomatists, said: "We say this not only for the socialist States, who are more akin to us. We base ourselves on the idea that we must peacefully co-exist. About the capitalist States, it doesn't depend on you whether or not we exist. If you don't like us, don't accept our invitations and don't invite us to come to see you. Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you."

There was applause from Mr. Khrushchev's colleagues, and Mr. Gomulka, who had been standing at one side rather glumly, laughed.

Mr. Khrushchev said that many mistakes had been made in building socialism in the Soviet Union because of the lack of examples and the lack of personnel. He continued: "If we could have the revolution over again we would carry it out more sensibly and with smaller losses; but history does not repeat itself. The situation is favourable for us. If God existed, we would thank him for this.

"We had Hungary thrust upon us. We are very sorry that such a situation exists there. We are sure that the Hungarian working class will find the strength to overcome the difficulties. But most important is that the counter-revolution must be shattered."

Turning to Mr. Gomulka, he said: "I am sorry to be making such a speech on the territory of a foreign State. The western Powers are trying to denigrate Nasser. He is not a Communist. Politically, he is closer to those who are waging war on him and he has even put Communists in gaol."

"We sent sharp letters to Britain, France, and Israel—well, Israel, that was just for form, because, as you know, Israel carries no weight in the world, and if it plays any role it was just to start a fight. If Israel hadn't felt the support of Britain, France, and others, the Arabs would have been able to box her ears and she would have remained at peace.

"The situation is serious and we are realists. The fire must be put out. I think the British and French will be wise enough to withdraw their forces, and then Egypt will emerge stronger than ever. We must seek a *rapprochement*. We must seek a settlement so that coexistence will be peaceful and advantageous."

Referring to the Soviet Government's latest disarmament plan, he said: "You say we want war, but you have now got yourselves into a position I would call idiotic. (Mr. Mikoyan interjected: "Let's say delicate.") But we don't want to profit by it.

"If you withdraw your troops from Germany, France, and Britain—I'm speaking of American troops—we will not stay one day in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. But we, Mr. Capitalists, we are beginning to understand your methods. You have given us a lesson in Egypt. If we had a quarter of our present friendship for the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks before the war, the war would never have started.

"Nobody should pretend to know the best methods of socialism. The Bulgarians, Poles, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, Czechs, and Soviets—all have their own; but, comrades, it is really better to hawk one's own wares, and if they are good, they will find a buyer on their own. So when our enemies try to bring us into conflict over which is the best method of socialism we reject this. It is not in the interests of socialism."

Source: "Ambassador Walks Out," *London Times,* 19 November 1956.

69. Dwight D. Eisenhower: The Eisenhower Doctrine, 5 January 1957

Introduction

On 5 January 1957, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed a special joint session of the U.S. Congress regarding unfolding events in the Middle East. During the Suez Crisis the previous November—when Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt and tried to retake the Suez Canal, only to retreat under U.S. financial and diplomatic pressure—the Soviet Union had threatened to intervene unless the attackers withdrew. The Middle East had the world's most substantial oil reserves, strategic resources that were increasingly vital to the heavily energy-dependent U.S. domestic economy as well as to its war-making capacity. Convinced that the tumultuous political situation in the Middle East had become a battleground of the Cold War, Eisenhower demanded that Congress grant him the military and financial resources to aid those Middle Eastern powers attempting to fend off communism,

advocating a high level of U.S. involvement in the Middle East that became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Congress complied, thus initiating a period of extensive U.S. involvement in the Middle East that continues to this day.

Primary Source

In my forthcoming State of the Union Message, I shall review the international situation generally. There are worldwide hopes which we can reasonably entertain, and there are worldwide responsibilities which we must carry to make certain that freedom—including our own—may be secure.

There is, however, a special situation in the Middle East which I feel I should, even now, lay before you.

Before doing so it is well to remind ourselves that our basic national objective in international affairs remains peace—a world peace based on justice. Such a peace must include all areas, all peoples of the world if it is to be enduring. There is no nation, great or small, with which we would refuse to negotiate, in mutual good faith, with patience and in the determination to secure a better understanding between us. Out of such understandings must, and eventually will, grow confidence and trust, indispensable ingredients to a program of peace and to plans for lifting from us all the burdens of expensive armaments. To promote these objectives, our government works tirelessly, day by day, month by month, year by year. But until a degree of success crowns our efforts that will assure to all nations peaceful existence, we must, in the interests of peace itself, remain vigilant, alert and strong.

I. The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the security of the region was largely built around their power. But since the First World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged. Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East.

The evolution to independence has in the main been a peaceful process. But the area has been often troubled. Persistent cross-currents of distrust and fear with raids back and forth across national boundaries have brought about a high degree of instability in much of the Mid East. Just recently there have been hostilities involving Western European nations that once exercised much influence in the area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been heightened and, at times, manipulated by International Communism.

II. Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks. The reasons are not hard to find. They do not affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United States entertained such a thought.

The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first resort to aggression.

That statement I make solemnly and emphatically.

Neither does Russia's desire to dominate the Middle East spring from its own economic interest in the area. Russia does not appreciably use or depend upon the Suez Canal. In 1955 Soviet traffic through the Canal represented only about three fourths of 1% of the total. The Soviets have no need for, and could provide no market for, the petroleum resources which constitute the principal natural wealth of the area. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a substantial exporter of petroleum products.

The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East.

This region has always been the crossroads of the continents of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Suez Canal

enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the commerce that is essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded and prosperous economies. The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa.

It contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as to production! This has been vividly demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipelines. Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate sources of power can, if necessary, be developed. But these cannot be considered as early prospects.

These things stress the immense importance of the Middle East. If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The free nations of Asia and Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy. And the countries of the Middle East would lose the markets upon which their economies depend. All this would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's economic life and political prospects.

Then there are other factors which transcend the material. The Middle East is the birthplace of three great religions—Moslem, Christian and Hebrew. Mecca and Jerusalem are more than places on the map. They symbolize religions which teach that the spirit has supremacy over matter and that the individual has a dignity and rights of which no despotic government can rightfully deprive him. It would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle East should be subjected to a rule that glorifies atheistic materialism.

International Communism, of course, seeks to mask its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and by superficially attractive offers of political, economic and military aid. But any free nation, which is the subject of Soviet enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look behind the mask.

Remember Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania! In 1939 the Soviet Union entered into mutual assistance pacts with these then independent countries; and the Soviet Foreign Minister, addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet in October 1939, solemnly and publicly declared that "we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs." Yet in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Soviet control of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe has been forcibly maintained in spite of solemn promises of a contrary intent, made during World War II.

Stalin's death brought hope that this pattern would change. And we read the pledge of the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 that the Soviet Union would follow in satellite countries "the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs." But we have just seen the subjugation of Hungary by naked armed force. In the aftermath of this Hungarian tragedy, world respect for and belief in Soviet promises have sunk to a new low. International Communism needs and seeks a recognizable success.

Thus, we have these simple and indisputable facts:

1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism.
2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends.
3. The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.

III. Our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a protector of small nations. Its charter gives it primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Our country has given the United Nations its full support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in Egypt. The United Nations was able to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General Assembly. But in the case of Hungary, the situation was different. The Soviet Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly. The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.

IV. Under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a nation's dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours during recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.

If the Middle East is to continue its geographic role of uniting rather than separating East and West; if its vast economic resources are to serve the well-being of the peoples there, as well as that of others; and if its cultures and religions and their shrines are to be preserved for the uplifting of the spirits of the peoples, then the United States must make more evident its willingness to support the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area.

V. Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world.

[. . .]

VI. It is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security.

[. . .]

The action which I propose would have the following features.

It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding

authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations.

The legislation now requested should not include the authorization or appropriation of funds because I believe that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal year ending June 30. I shall, however, seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of $200,000,000 to be available during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programs for the area hereafter provided for by the Congress.

[. . .]

VIII. Let me refer again to the requested authority to employ the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression. Such authority would not be exercised except at the desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all.

Nothing is more necessary to assure this than that our policy with respect to the defense of the area be promptly and clearly determined and declared. Thus the United Nations and all friendly governments, and indeed governments which are not friendly, will know where we stand.

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would of course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session.

In the situation now existing, the greatest risk, as is often the case, is that ambitious despots may miscalculate. If power-hungry Communists should either falsely or correctly estimate that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they might be tempted to use open measures of armed attack. If so, that would start a chain of circumstances which would almost surely involve the United States in military action. I am convinced that the best insurance against this dangerous contingency is to make clear now our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East in ways consonant with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. I intend promptly to send a special mission to the Middle East to explain the cooperation we are prepared to give.

[. . .]

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958).

70. Nikita Khruschev and Richard Nixon: Kitchen Debate, 1959

Introduction

In July 1959 U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon, who had a reputation as a staunch anticommunist, visited Moscow to attend the opening of the American National Exhibition. The highlight of the U.S. pavilion was an entire house that, it was claimed, demonstrated the kind of dwelling that an average, ordinary American family could afford. The exhibit featured numerous new devices and technologies, including a television, an electric oven, a washing machine, central heating, air conditioners, and the like. The U.S. government was eager to prove that despite the Soviets' success of 1957 in launching *Sputnik 1,* the first satellite in space, their own country had the technological edge in other areas. Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev attended the exhibition with Nixon, and when

the two men reached the kitchen they had an impromptu debate as to which economic system—capitalism or communism—was superior. Nixon drew Khrushchev's attention to the various household appliances, such as the washing machine and television, seeking to show that ordinary Americans enjoyed a far better lifestyle under capitalism than they would under communism. Nixon also wished to divert attention from Soviet attainments in the military field, not least because U.S. leaders regarded their rival's proficiency in space technology as a national humiliation. He argued that it was the American free market system that permitted his countrymen to afford such houses, built according to their own individual specifications. Khrushchev, by contrast, proclaimed himself appalled when he entered the kitchen, on the grounds that the appliances—he termed them "gadgets"—were too luxurious, unnecessary, and wasteful, with "no useful purpose," and he repeatedly declared that the Russian people focused not just on material comfort but on building things that genuinely mattered. He also claimed that the Soviet Union was ahead not just in space technology but also in such areas as the development of color television and that Soviet houses were just as well equipped as their American counterparts. The encounter, conducted through interpreters, was filmed in color on videotape and later aired on national television in the United States. The publicity that Nixon gained in his own country from this debate, from which most Americans believed he came out the winner, helped to enhance his political standing and win him the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1960. Ironically, thirty years later, when Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reform the communist system and permit more interchange with the West, the screening of imported television shows with sets that included American kitchens apparently helped to make Soviet citizens dissatisfied with the incomparably more spartan cooking facilities they possessed under communism.

Primary Source

Khrushchev: "We want to live in peace and friendship with Americans because we are the two most powerful countries and if we live in friendship then other countries will also live in friendship. But if there is a country that is too war-minded we could pull its ears a little and say: Don't you dare; fighting is not allowed now; this is a period of atomic armament; some foolish one could start a war and then even a wise one couldn't finish the war. Therefore, we are governed by this idea in our policy—internal and foreign. How long has America existed? Three hundred years?"

Nixon: "One hundred and fifty years."

Khrushchev: "One hundred and fifty years? Well, then, we will say America has been in existence for 150 years and this is the level she has reached. We have existed not quite forty-two years and in another seven years we will be on the same level as America.

"When we catch you up, in passing you by, we will wave to you. Then if you wish we can stop and say: Please follow up. Plainly speaking, if you want capitalism you can live that way. That is your own affair and doesn't concern us. We can still feel sorry for you but since you don't understand us—live as you do understand.

"We are all glad to be here at the exhibition with Vice President Nixon. I personally, and on behalf of my colleagues, express my thanks for the President's message. I have not as yet read it but I know beforehand that it contains good wishes. I think you will be satisfied with your visit and if I cannot go on without saying it—if you would not take such a decision [proclamation by the United States Government of Captive Nations Week, a week of prayer for peoples enslaved by the Soviet Union] which has not been thought out thoroughly, as was approved by Congress, your trip would be excellent. But you have churned the water yourselves—why this was necessary God only knows.

"What happened? What black cat crossed your path and confused you? But that is your affair, we do not interfere with your problems. [Wrapping his arms about a Soviet workman] Does this man look like a slave laborer? [Waving at others] With men with such spirit how can we lose?"

[. . .]

Nixon: "You must not be afraid of ideas."

Khrushchev: "We are telling you not to be afraid of ideas. We have no reason to be afraid. We have already broken free from such a situation."

Nixon: "Well, then, let's have more exchange of them. We are all agreed on that. All right? All right?"

Khrushchev: "Fine. [Aside] Agree to what? All right, I am in agreement. But I want to stress what I am in agreement with. I know that I am dealing with a very good lawyer. I also want to uphold my own miner's flag so that the coal miners can say: Our man does not concede."

Nixon: "No question about that."

Khrushchev: "You are a lawyer for capitalism and I am a lawyer for communism. Let's compete."

Nixon: "The way you dominate the conversation you would make a good lawyer yourself. If you were in the United States Senate you would be accused of filibustering." [Halting Khrushchev at model kitchen in model house]: "You had a very nice house in your exhibition in New York. My wife and I saw and enjoyed it very much. I want to show you this kitchen. It is like those of our houses in California."

Khrushchev [after Nixon called attention to a built-in panel-controlled washing machine]: "We have such things."

Nixon: "This is the newest model. This is the kind which is built in thousands of units for direct installation in the houses." He added that Americans were interested in making life easier for their women.

Mr. Khrushchev remarked that in the Soviet Union, they did not have "the capitalist attitude toward women."

Nixon: "I think that this attitude toward women is universal. What we want to do is make easier the life of our housewives."

He explained that the house could be built for $14,000 and that most veterans had bought houses for between $10,000 and $15,000.

Nixon: "Let me give you an example you can appreciate. Our steelworkers, as you know, are on strike. But any steelworker could buy this house. They earn $3 an hour. This house costs about $100 a month to buy on a contract running twenty-five to thirty years."

Khrushchev: "We have steel workers and we have peasants who also can afford to spend $14,000 for a house." He said American houses were built to last only twenty years, so builders could sell new houses at the end of that period. "We build firmly. We build for our children and grandchildren."

Mr. Nixon said he thought American houses would last more than twenty years, but even so, after twenty years many Americans want a new home or a new kitchen, which would be obsolete then. The American system is designed to take advantage of new inventions and new techniques, he said.

Khrushchev: "This theory does not hold water."

He said some things never got out of date—furniture and furnishings, perhaps, but not houses. He said he did not think that what Americans had written about their houses was all strictly accurate.

Nixon [pointing to television screen]: "We can see here what is happening in other parts of the home."

Khrushchev: "This is probably always out of order."

Nixon: "Da [yes]."

Khrushchev: "Don't you have a machine that puts food into the mouth and pushes it down? Many things you've shown us are interesting but they are not needed in life. They have no useful purpose. They are merely gadgets. We have a saying, if you have bedbugs you have to catch one and pour boiling water into the ear."

Nixon: "We have another saying. This is that the way to kill a fly is to make it drink whisky. But we have a better use for whisky. [Aside] I like to have this battle of wits with the Chairman. He knows his business."

Khrushchev [manifesting a lack of interest in a data processing machine that answers questions about the United States]: "I have heard of your engineers. I am

well aware of what they can do. You know for launching our missiles we need lots of calculating machines."

[. . .]

Khrushchev: "The Americans have created their own image of the Soviet man and think he is as you want him to be. But he is not as you think. You think the Russian people will be dumbfounded to see these things, but the fact is that newly built Russian houses have all this equipment right now. Moreover, all you have to do to get a house is to be born in the Soviet Union. You are entitled to housing. I was born in the Soviet Union. So I have a right to a house. In America, if you don't have a dollar—you have the right to choose between sleeping in a house or on the pavement. Yet you say that we are slaves of communism."

Nixon: "I appreciate that you are very articulate and energetic."

Khrushchev: "Energetic is not the same as wise."

Nixon: "If you were in our Senate, we would call you a filibusterer. You do all the talking and don't let anyone else talk. To us, diversity, the right to choose, the fact that we have 1,000 builders building 1,000 different houses, is the most important thing. We don't have one decision made at the top by one government official. This is the difference."

Khrushchev: "On political problems we will never agree with you. For instance Mikoyan likes very peppery soup. I do not. But this does not mean that we do not get along."

Nixon: "You can learn from us and we can learn from you. There must be a free exchange. Let the people choose the kind of house, the kind of soup, the kind of ideas they want."

Mr. Khrushchev shifted the talk back to washing machines.

Nixon: "We have many different manufacturers and many different kinds of washing machines so that the housewives have a choice."

Khrushchev [noting Nixon gazing admiringly at young women modeling bathing suits and sports clothes]: "You are for the girls too."

Nixon [indicating a floor sweeper that works by itself and other appliances]: "You don't need a wife."

Khrushchev chuckled.

Nixon: "We do not claim to astonish the Russian people. We hope to show our diversity and our right to choose. We do not wish to have decisions made at the top by government officials who say that all homes should be built in the same way. Would it not be better to compete in the relative merits of washing machines than in the strength of rockets. Is this the kind of competition you want?"

Khrushchev: "Yes that's the kind of competition we want. But your generals say: 'Let's compete in rockets. We are strong and we can beat you.' But in this respect we can also show you something."

Nixon: "To me you are strong and we are strong. In some ways, you are stronger than we are. In others, we are stronger. We are both strong not only from the standpoint of weapons but from the standpoint of will and spirit. Neither should use that strength to put the other in a position where he in effect has an ultimatum. In this day and age that misses the point. With modern weapons it does not make any difference if war comes. We both have had it."

Khrushchev: "For the fourth time I have to say I cannot recognize my friend Mr. Nixon. If all Americans agree with you then who don't we agree [with]? This is what we want."

Nixon: "Anyone who believes the American Government does not reflect the people is not an accurate observer of the American scene. I hope the Prime Minister understands all the implications of what I have just said. Whether you place either one of the powerful nations or any other in a position so that they have no choice but to accept dictation or fight, then you are playing with the most destructive force in the world.

"This is very important in the present world context. It is very dangerous. When we sit down at a conference table it cannot all be one way. One side cannot put an ultimatum to another. It is impossible. But I shall talk to you about this later."

Khrushchev: "Who is raising an ultimatum?"

Nixon: "We will discuss that later."

Khrushchev: "If you have raised the questions, why not go on with it now while it now while the people are listening? We know something about politics, too. Let your correspondents compare watches and see who is filibustering. You put great emphasis on 'diktat' [dictation]. Our country has never been guided by 'diktat'. 'Diktat' is a foolish policy."

Nixon: "I am talking about it in the international sense."

Khrushchev: "It sounds to me like a threat. We, too, are giants. You want to threaten—we will answer threats with threats."

Nixon: "That's not my point. We will never engage in threats."

Khrushchev: "You wanted indirectly to threaten me. But we have the means to threaten too."

Nixon: "Who wants to threaten?"

Khrushchev: "You are talking about implications. I have not been. We have the means at our disposal. Ours are better than yours. It is you who want to compete. Da Da Da."

Nixon: "We are well aware of that. To me who is best is not material."

Khrushchev: "You raised the point. We want peace and friendship with all nations, especially with America."

Nixon: "We want peace too and I believe that you do also."

Khrushchev: "Yes, I believe that."

Nixon: "I see that you want to build a good life. But I don't think that the cause of peace is helped by reminders that you have greater strength than us because that is a threat too."

Khrushchev: "I was answering your words. You challenged me. Let's argue fairly."

Nixon: "My point was that in today's world it is immaterial which of the two great countries at any particular moment has the advantage. In war, these advantages are illusory. Can we agree on that?"

Khrushchev: "Not quite. Let's not beat around the bush."

Nixon: "I like the way he talks."

Khrushchev: "We want to liquidate all bases from foreign lands. Until that happens, we will speak different languages. One who is for putting an end to bases on foreign lands is for peace. One who is against it is for war. We have liquidated our forces and offered to make a peace treaty and eliminate the point of friction in Berlin. Until we settle that question, we will talk different languages."

Nixon: "Do you think it can be settled at Geneva?"

Khrushchev: "If we considered it otherwise, we would not have incurred the expense of sending our foreign minister to Geneva. Gromyko [foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko] is not an idler. He is a very good man."

Nixon: "We have great respect for Mr. Gromyko. Some people say he looks like me. I think he is better looking. I hope it [the Geneva conference] will be successful."

Khrushchev: "It does not depend on us."

Nixon: "It takes two to make an agreement. You cannot have it all your own way."

Khrushchev: "These are questions that have the same aim. To put an end to the vestiges of war, to make a peace treaty with Germany—that is what we want. It is

very bad that we quarrel over the question of war and peace."

Nixon: "There is no question but that your people and you want the Government of the United States being for peace—anyone who thinks that it is not for peace is not an accurate observer of America. In order to have peace, Mr. Prime Minister, even in an argument between friends, there must be sitting down around a round table. There must be discussion. Each side must find areas where it looks at the other's point of view. The world looks to you today with regard to Geneva. I believe it would be a grave mistake and a blow to peace if it were allowed to fail."

Khrushchev: "That is our understanding as well."

Nixon: "So this is something. The present position is stalemate. Ways must be found to discuss it."

Khrushchev: "The two sides must seek ways of agreement."

In the evening, after formal speeches, Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Nixon, in departing, stopped by a table laden with glasses of wine, Mr. Khrushchev proposed a toast to "elimination of all military bases in foreign lands." Mr. Nixon sidestepped, suggested that they drink to peace instead.

Khrushchev: "We stand for peace and elimination of bases. Those are our words and they do not conflict with our deeds. If you are not willing to eliminate bases—then I won't drink this toast."

Nixon: "I don't like this wine."

Khrushchev: "I like this wine but not the policy."

Nixon: "I have always heard that the Prime Minister is a vigorous defender of his policy, not only officially but unofficially."

Khrushchev: "I defend the real policy, which is to assure peace. How can peace be assured when we are surrounded by military bases?"

Nixon: "We will talk about that later. Let's drink to talking—as long as we are talking we are not fighting."

Khrushchev [indicating a waitress]: "Let's drink to the ladies!"

Nixon: "We can all drink to the ladies."

A Waiter: "A hundred years of life to Mr. Khrushchev."

Nixon: "I will drink to that. We may disagree but we want you to be in good health."

Khrushchev: "We accept your hundred years' proposal. But when I reach 99 we will discuss it further—why should we be in haste?"

[. . .]

Source: "The Two Worlds: A Day-Long Debate," *New York Times*, 25 July 1959. © 1959 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.

71. Nikita Khrushchev: "On Peaceful Coexistence," October 1959

Introduction

From 1955 onward, Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, who succeeded the far less conciliatory and suspicious Josef Stalin after the latter's death in 1953, frequently proclaimed his belief in peaceful coexistence with the Western powers. This did not imply that he thought communism and capitalism would both endure indefinitely. An orthodox Marxist since his teens, Khrushchev believed that internal weaknesses within capitalist states would lead them to collapse of their own volition, without any outside encouragement from the Soviet Union or other communist states. One advantage, from his perspective, was that this outlook left the Soviet Union free to divert its attention from military spending to the improvement of agriculture and the provision of more consumer goods for ordinary Russians. Khrushchev's new approach by no means eliminated all international tensions. He

remained quite willing to use force to maintain Soviet control of its East European satellites, as he did when Soviet troops intervened to restore order in East Berlin in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. He was also prepared to provoke international crises, including a protracted dispute over the status and control of West Berlin that lasted from 1958 until the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1962. As he prepared to visit the United States in September 1959, a trip that he hoped might result in a treaty of peace and friendship with the United States and the expansion of bilateral trade between the two countries, Khrushchev contributed an article, "On Peaceful Coexistence," to *Foreign Affairs*, the premier and highly prestigious U.S. journal of international relations. He suggested that the only alternative to peaceful coexistence was full-scale thermonuclear war, which both great powers clearly had an interest in avoiding, and urged that both powers renounce war as a means of settling international disputes. He contended that peaceful coexistence would allow the two rival economic and ideological systems of communism and capitalism to compete as to which could best satisfy human needs, and he reaffirmed his belief that ultimately communism would prove superior to and vanquish capitalism. Khrushchev put forward several specific demands, asking the West to recognize the permanence of socialist systems wherever these existed, end all political and economic discrimination against the Soviet Union and other communist powers, and accept Soviet proposals on the status of Berlin and Germany that would have effectively left West Berlin under East German control. American officials had made it clear that if they had no other alternative, they would use nuclear weapons to defend the status quo resulting from the Potsdam Agreements, whereby West Berlin's independent status ultimately rested on its continuing postwar occupation by the United States, Britain, and France. In several public addresses during his visit to the United States, Khrushchev further affirmed his desire for peace and reiterated his belief that nuclear war had become so devastating that it was unthinkable. His embrace of peaceful coexistence helped to alleviate Soviet-Western tensions but was also a factor in causing a major breach between the Soviet Union and the Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) from the late 1950s onward. PRC leader Mao Zedong, who saw himself as a preeminent communist theoretician, believed in continuous revolution and publicly claimed that Khrushchev's efforts to assuage Western fears represented an unacceptable betrayal of communist ideological purity.

Primary Source

I have been told that the question of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is uppermost today in the minds of many Americans—and not only Americans. The question of coexistence, particularly in our day, interests literally every man and woman on the globe.

We all of us well know that tremendous changes have taken place in the world. Gone, indeed, are the days when it took weeks to cross the ocean from one continent to the other or when a trip from Europe to America, or from Asia to Africa, seemed a very complicated undertaking. The progress of modern technology has reduced our planet to a rather small place; it has even become, in this sense, quite congested. And if in our daily life it is a matter of considerable importance to establish normal relations with our neighbors in a densely inhabited settlement, this is so much the more necessary in the relations between states, in particular states belonging to different social systems.

You may like your neighbor or dislike him. You are not obliged to be friends with him or visit him. But you live side by side, and what can you do if neither you nor he has any desire to quit the old home and move to another town? All the more so in relations between states. It would be unreasonable to assume that you can make it so hot for your undesirable neighbor that he will decide to move to Mars or Venus. And vice versa, of course.

What, then, remains to be done? There may be two ways out: either war—and war in the rocket and H-bomb age is fraught with the most dire consequences for all nations—or peaceful coexistence. Whether you like your neighbor or not, nothing can be done about it, you have to find some way of getting on with him, for you both live on one and the same planet.

But the very concept of peaceful coexistence, it is said, by its alleged complexity frightens certain people who have become unaccustomed to trusting their neighbors and who see a double bottom in each suitcase. People

of this kind, on hearing the word "coexistence," begin to play around with it in one way and another, sizing it up and applying various yardsticks to it. Isn't it a fraud? Isn't it a trap? Does not coexistence signify the division of the world into areas separated by high fences, which do not communicate with each other? And what is going to happen behind those fences?

The more such questions are piled up artificially by the cold-war mongers, the more difficult it is for the ordinary man to make head or tail of them. It would therefore be timely to rid the essence of this question of all superfluous elements and to attempt to look soberly at the most pressing problem of our day—the problem of peaceful competition.

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What, then, is the policy of peaceful coexistence?

In its simplest expression it signifies the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues. However, this does not cover the entire concept of peaceful coexistence. Apart from the commitment to non-aggression, it also presupposes an obligation on the part of all states to desist from violating each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty in any form and under any pretext whatsoever. The principle of peaceful coexistence signifies a renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the object of altering their system of government or mode of life or for any other motives. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence also presupposes that political and economic relations between countries are to be based upon complete equality of the parties concerned, and on mutual benefit.

It is often said in the West that peaceful coexistence is nothing else than a tactical method of the socialist states. There is not a grain of truth in such allegations. Our desire for peace and peaceful coexistence is not conditioned by any time-serving or tactical considerations. It springs from the very nature of socialist society in which there are no classes or social groups interested in profiting by war or seizing and enslaving other people's territories. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, thanks to their socialist system, have an unlimited home market and for this reason they have no need to pursue an expansionist policy of conquest and an effort to subordinate other countries to their influence.

It is the people who determine the destinies of the socialist states. The socialist states are ruled by the working people themselves, the workers and peasants, the people who themselves create all the material and spiritual values of society. And people of labor cannot want war. For to them war spells grief and tears, death, devastation and misery. Ordinary people have no need for war.

Contrary to what certain propagandists hostile to us say, the coexistence of states with different social systems does not mean that they will only fence themselves off from one another by a high wall and undertake the mutual obligation not to throw stones over the wall or pour dirt upon each other. No! Peaceful coexistence does not mean merely living side by side in the absence of war but with the constantly remaining threat of its breaking out in the future. *Peaceful coexistence can and should develop into peaceful competition for the purpose of satisfying man's needs in the best possible way.*

We say to the leaders of the capitalist states: Let us try out in practice whose system is better, let us compete without war. This is much better than competing in who will produce more arms and who will smash whom. We stand and always will stand for such competition as will help to raise the well-being of the people to a higher level.

The principle of peaceful competition does not at all demand that one or another state abandon the system and ideology adopted by it. It goes without saying that the acceptance of this principle cannot lead to the immediate end of disputes and contradictions which are inevitable between countries adhering to different social systems. But the main thing is ensured: the states which decided to adopt the path of peaceful coexistence repudiate the use of force in any form and agree on a peaceful settlement of possible disputes and conflicts, bearing in mind the mutual interests of the parties concerned. In our age of the H-bomb and atomic techniques this is the main thing of interest to every man.

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The Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its Twentieth Congress made it perfectly clear and obvious that the allegations that the Soviet Union intends to overthrow capitalism in other countries by means of "exporting" revolution are absolutely unfounded. I cannot refrain from reminding you of my words at the Twentieth Congress: "It goes without saying that among us Communists there are no adherents of capitalism. But this does not mean that we have interfered or plan to interfere in the internal affairs of countries where capitalism still exists. Romain Rolland was right when he said that 'freedom is not brought in from abroad in baggage trains like Bourbons.' It is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order."

We Communists believe that the idea of Communism will ultimately be victorious throughout the world, just as it has been victorious in our country, in China and in many other states. Many readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS will probably disagree with us. Perhaps they think that the idea of capitalism will ultimately triumph. It is their right to think so. We may argue, we may disagree with one another. *The main thing is to keep to the positions of ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove that one is right.* The point is that with military techniques what they are today, there are no inaccessible places in the world. Should a world war break out, no country will be able to shut itself off from a crushing blow.

We believe that ultimately that system will be victorious on the globe which will offer the nations greater opportunities for improving their material and spiritual life. It is precisely socialism that creates unprecedentedly great prospects for the inexhaustible creative enthusiasm of the masses, for a genuine flourishing of science and culture, for the realization of man's dream of a happy life, a life without destitute and unemployed people, of a happy childhood and tranquil old age, of the realization of the most audacious and ambitious human projects, of man's right to create in a truly free manner in the interests of the people.

But when we say that in the competition between the two systems, the capitalist and the socialist, our system will win, this does not mean, of course, that we shall achieve victory by interfering in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries. Our confidence in the victory of Communism is of a different kind. It is based on a knowledge of the laws governing the development of society. Just as in its time capitalism, as the more progressive system, took the place of feudalism, so will capitalism be inevitably superseded by Communism—the more progressive and more equitable social system. We are confident of the victory of the socialist system because it is a more progressive system than the capitalist system. Soviet power has been in existence for only a little more than 40 years, and during these years we have gone through two of the worst wars, repulsing the attacks of enemies who attempted to strangle us. Capitalism in the United States has been in existence for more than a century and a half, and the history of the United States has developed in such a way that never once have enemies landed on American territory.

Yet the dynamics of the development of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are such that the 42-year-old land of the Soviets is already able to challenge the 150-year-old capitalist state to economic competition; and the most farsighted American leaders are admitting that the Soviet Union is fast catching up with the United States and will ultimately outstrip it. Watching the progress of this competition, anyone can judge which is the better system, and we believe that in the long run all the peoples will embark on the path of struggle for the building of socialist societies.

[. . .]

So we come back to what we started with. In our day there are only two ways: peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third choice.

The problem of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems has become particularly pressing in view of the fact that since the Second World War the development of relations between states has entered a new stage, that now we have approached a period in the life of mankind when there is a real chance of excluding war once and for all from the life of society. The new alignment of international forces which has developed since the Second World War offers

ground for the assertion that a new world war is no longer a fatal inevitability, that it can be averted.

First, today not only all the socialist states, but many countries in Asia and Africa which have embarked upon the road of independent national statehood, and many other states outside the aggressive military groupings, are actively fighting for peace.

Secondly, the peace policy enjoys the powerful "support of the broad masses of the people all over the world.

Thirdly, the peaceful socialist states are in possession of very potent material means, which cannot but have a deterring effect upon the aggressors.

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What does the future hold in store for us?

As a result of the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the present Seven Year Plan of economic development of the U.S.S.R., as well as of the plans of the other socialist countries of Europe and Asia, the countries of the socialist system will then account for a little more than half of the world output. Their economic power will grow immeasurably, and this will help to an even greater extent to consolidate world peace: the material might and moral influence of the peace-loving states will be so great that any bellicose militarist will have to think ten times before risking going to war. It is the good fortune of mankind that a community of socialist states which are not interested in new war has been set up, because to build socialism and Communism the socialist countries need peace. Today the community of socialist countries which has sprung up on the basis of complete equality holds such a position in the development of all branches of economy, science and culture as to be able to exert an influence towards preventing the outbreak of new world wars.

Hence we are already in a practical sense near to that stage in the life of humanity when nothing will prevent people from devoting themselves wholly to peaceful labor, when war will be wholly excluded from the life of society.

But if we say that there is no fatal inevitability of war at present, this by no means signifies that we can rest on our laurels, fold our arms and bask in the sun in the hope that an end has been put to wars once and for all. Those in the West who believe that war is to their benefit have not yet abandoned their schemes. They control considerable material forces, as well as military and political levers, and there is no guarantee that some tragic day they will not attempt to set them in motion. That is why it is so much the more necessary to continue an active struggle in order that the policy of peaceful coexistence may triumph throughout the world not in words but in deeds.

Of much importance, of course, is the fact that this policy has in our day merited not only the widest moral approval but also international legal recognition. The countries of the socialist camp in their relations with the capitalist states are guided precisely by this policy. The principles of peaceful coexistence are reflected in the decisions of the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries. Furthermore, many countries of Europe, Asia and Africa have solemnly proclaimed this principle as the basis of their foreign policy. Finally, the idea of peaceful coexistence has found unanimous support in the decisions of the twelfth and thirteenth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

[. . .]

What, then, is preventing us from making the principles of peaceful coexistence an unshakable international standard and daily practice in the relations between the West and East?

Of course, different answers may be given to this question. But in order to be frank to the end, we should also say the following: *It is necessary that everybody should understand the irrevocable fact that the historic process is irreversible.* It is impossible to bring back yesterday. It is high time to understand that the world of the twentieth century is not the world of the nineteenth century, that two diametrically opposed social and economic systems exist in the world today side by side, and that the socialist system, in spite of all the attacks upon it, has grown so strong, has developed into such a force, as to make any return to the past impossible.

[. . .]

We have always considered the Americans realistic people. All the more are we astonished to find that leading representatives of the United States still number in their midst individuals who insist on their own way in the face of the obvious failure of the policy of "rolling back" Communism. But is it not high time to take a sober view of things and to draw conclusions from the lessons of the last 15 years? Is it not yet clear to everybody that consistent adherence to the policy of peaceful coexistence would make it possible to improve the international situation, to bring about a drastic cut in military expenditures and to release vast material resources for wiser purposes?

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It is readily seen that the policy of peaceful coexistence receives a firm foundation only with increase in extensive and absolutely unrestricted international trade. It can be said without fear of exaggeration that there is no good basis for improvement of relations between our countries other than development of international trade.

If the principle of peaceful coexistence of states is to be adhered to, not in words, but in deeds, it is perfectly obvious that no ideological differences should be an obstacle to the development and extension of mutually advantageous economic contacts, to the exchange of everything produced by human genius in the sphere of peaceful branches of material production.

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Peaceful coexistence is the only way which is in keeping with the interests of all nations. To reject it would mean under existing conditions to doom the whole world to a terrible and destructive war at a time when it is fully possible to avoid it.

Is it possible that when mankind has advanced to a plane where it has proved capable of the greatest discoveries and of making its first steps into outer space, it should not be able to use the colossal achievements of its genius for the establishment of a stable peace, for the good of man, rather than for the preparation of another war and for the destruction of all that has been created by its labor over many millenniums? Reason refuses to believe this. It protests.

The Soviet people have stated and declare again that they do not want war. If the Soviet Union and the countries friendly to it are not attacked, we shall never use any weapons either against the United States or against any other countries. We do not want any horrors of war, destruction, suffering and death for ourselves or for any other peoples. We say this not because we fear anyone. Together with our friends, we are united and stronger than ever. But precisely because of that do we say that war can and should be prevented. Precisely because we want to rid mankind of war, we urge the Western powers to peaceful and lofty competition. We say to all: Let us prove to each other the advantages of one's own system not with fists, not by war, but by peaceful economic competition in conditions of peaceful coexistence.

As for the social system in some state or other, that is the domestic affair of the people of each country. We always have stood and we stand today for non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. We have always abided, and we shall abide, by these positions. The question, for example, what system will exist in the United States or in other capitalist countries cannot be decided by other peoples or states. This question can and will be decided only by the American people themselves, only by the people of each country.

The existence of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries is a real fact. It is also a real fact that the United States of America and the other capitalist countries live in different social conditions, in the conditions of capitalism. Then let us recognize this real situation and proceed from it in order not to go against reality, against life itself. Let us not try to change this situation by interferences from without, by means of war on the part of some states against other states.

I repeat, there is only one way to peace, one way out of the existing tension: peaceful coexistence.

Source: Nikita Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs* 38(1) (1959): 1–18.

72. Harold Macmillan: "Winds of Change," Cape Town, South Africa, 3 February 1960

Introduction

Decolonization of the Western empires was a major development of the Cold War period, with both the Soviet Union and the United States competing for the loyalty of these newly independent nations. European states often found that maintaining their colonial position, especially when faced with strong and often violent nationalist opposition movements, was too burdensome and expensive. This was particularly the case since, after World War II, the forcible imposition of one nation's rule over another, especially when the colonizers were generally white and the colonized were Asians or Africans, became increasingly unacceptable on the international scene. During the 1950s, the majority of European colonies in Asia became independent countries. In the 1960s, the focus switched to the continent of Africa, divided among the European nations during the late nineteenth century and still largely under colonial rule at the beginning of the decade. Conservative British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave great impetus to the process when, at the end of a lengthy tour of Africa, he addressed the South African houses of parliament in February 1960, famously stating that a nationalist "wind of change" was blowing throughout the continent, as the various African colonies demanded their independence. He also took the opportunity to criticize, albeit in relatively tactful terms, the racial segregationist policies known as apartheid introduced in South Africa since World War II, and his remarks provoked a bitter response from South African Prime Minister Henrik Verwoerd. Macmillan's speech inaugurated a decade during which most of Britain's African colonies, together with those ruled by other Western powers, including France and Belgium, were granted independence and established governments dominated by local Africans, although in Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) resentful white settlers unilaterally declared independence in 1965 and black majority rule was not introduced until 1980. Despite Macmillan's pleas for greater racial harmony in South Africa, for several more decades that country followed racially repressive and segregationist policies, which were enforced with considerable violence. Apartheid was not dismantled until 1992, and a black majority government only came into existence in 1994.

Primary Source

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As I have traveled through the Union I have found everywhere, as I expected, a deep preoccupation with what is happening in the rest of the African continent. I understand and sympathize with your interest in these events, and your anxiety about them.

Ever since the break-up of the Roman Empire one of the constant facts of political life in Europe has been the emergence of independent nations. They have come into existence over the centuries in different shapes with different forms of government. But all have been inspired with a keen feeling of nationalism, which has grown as nations have grown.

In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation-states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence on some other power.

Fifteen years ago this movement spread through Asia. Many countries there, of different races and civilizations, pressed their claim to an independent national life.

Today the same thing is happening in Africa. The most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of different places. It may take different forms but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through the continent.

Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take account of it.

Of course, you understand this as well as anyone. You are sprung from Europe, the home of nationalism. And here in Africa you have yourselves created a full nation—a new nation. Indeed, in the history of our times yours will be recorded as the first of the African nationalisms.

And this tide of national consciousness which is now rising in Africa is a fact for which you and we and the other nations of the western world are ultimately responsible.

For its causes are to be found in the achievement of western civilization in pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge, applying science in the service of human needs, expanding food production, speeding and multiplying means of communication, and, above all, spreading education.

As I have said, the growth of national consciousness in Africa is a political fact and we must accept it as such. I sincerely believe that if we cannot do so, we may imperil the precarious balance of east and west on which the peace of the world depends.

The world today is divided into three great groups. First, there are what we call the western Powers. You in South Africa and we in Britain belong to this group, together with our friends and allies in other parts of the Commonwealth, in the United States of America, and in Europe.

Secondly, there are the Communists—Russia and her satellites in Europe and China, whose population will rise by 1970 to the staggering total of 800 million. Thirdly, there are those parts of the world whose people are at present uncommitted either to Communism or to our western ideas. In this context we think first of Asia and of Africa.

As I see it, the great issue in this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the east or to the west. Will they be drawn into the Communist camp? Or will the great experiments in self-government that are now being made in Asia and Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful, and by their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour of freedom and order and justice?

The struggle is joined and it is a struggle for the minds of men. What is now on trial is much more than our military strength or our diplomatic and administrative skill. It is our way of life.

The uncommitted nations want to see before they choose. What can we show them to help them choose aright? Each of the independent members of the Commonwealth must answer that question for itself.

It is the basic principle for our modern Commonwealth that we respect each other's sovereignty in matters of internal policy. At the same time, we must recognize that, today, the internal policies of one nation may have effects outside it. We may sometimes be tempted to say to each other, "Mind your own business." But in these days I would myself expand the old saying so that it runs, "Mind your own business, but mind how it affects my business, too."

Let me be very frank with you, my friends. What Governments and Parliaments in the United Kingdom have done since the war in according independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and Ghana, and what they will do for Nigeria and the other countries now nearing independence—all this, though we take full and sole responsibility for it, we do in the belief that it is the only way to establish the future of the Commonwealth and of the free world on sound foundations.

All this, of course, is also of deep and close concern to you, for nothing we do in this small world can be done in a corner or remain hidden. What we do today in West, Central, and East Africa becomes known to everyone in the Union, whatever his language, colour, or tradition.

Let me assure you in all friendliness that we are well aware of this, and that we have acted and will act with full knowledge of the responsibility we have to you and to all our friends. Nevertheless, I am sure you will agree that in our own areas of responsibility we must each do what we think right. What we think right derives from long experience, both of failure and success, in the management of our own affairs.

We have tried to learn and apply the lessons of both. Our judgment of right and wrong and of justice is rooted in the same soil as yours—in Christianity and in the rule of law as the basis of a free society.

This experience of our own explains why it has been our aim, in countries for which we have borne responsibility, not only to raise the material standards of living but to create a society which respects the right of individuals—a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full stature, and that must in our view include the opportunity to have an increasing share in political power and responsibility; a society in which individual merit, and individual merit alone, is the criterion for man's advancement whether political or economic.

Finally, in countries inhabited by several different races, it has been our aim to find the means by which the community can become more of a community, and fellowship can be fostered between its various parts.

This problem is by no means confined to Africa, nor is it always the problem of the European minority. In Malaya, for instance, though there are Indian and European minorities, Malays and Chinese make up the great bulk of the population, and the Chinese are not much fewer in numbers than Malays. Yet these two peoples must learn to live together in harmony and unity, and the strength of Malaya as a nation will depend on the different contributions which the two races can make.

The attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards this problem was clearly expressed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on September 17, 1959. These are his words:—

"In those territories where different races or tribes live side by side, the task is to ensure that all the people may enjoy security and freedom and the chance to contribute as individuals to the progress and well being of these countries. We reject the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another. Our policy therefore is non-racial. It offers a future in which Africans, Europeans, Asians, the peoples of the Pacific, and others with whom we are concerned, will all play their full part as citizens in the countries where they live and in which feelings of race will be submerged in loyalty to the new nations."

I have thought you would wish me to state plainly and with full candour the policy for which we in Britain stand.

[. . .]

Source: "Mr. Macmillan's Appeal to South Africans," *London Times*, 4 February 1960.

73. Soviet Statement on the U-2 Crisis, May 1960

Introduction

In May 1960 the Soviet capture of a U.S. U-2 spy plane on an espionage mission over Soviet territory provoked an international crisis and effectively aborted a major summit meeting between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. On 1 May 1960 a Soviet missile battery shot down an American U-2 surveillance plane deep over Soviet territory, capturing the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, alive and obtaining his public confession that he had undertaken an espionage mission planned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Between 1956 and 1960 the United States used the light, jet-powered sailplane to make twenty to thirty high-altitude photographic reconnaissance flights along an arc that ran from Pakistan to Norway, violating Soviet airspace but providing vital information on the number, strength, and location of Soviet nuclear missiles and other weapons. Numerous other less-controversial missions were flown along the Soviet borders. Pilots, who could rejoin the American military without loss of seniority after their tour, were officially employed by Lockheed and were attached to a Weather Observation Squadron based in Turkey and making heavy use of bases in Pakistan. The United States initially denied any espionage, claiming that a meteorological observation flight had accidentally violated Soviet

airspace, but on 7 May Soviet authorities revealed that Powers was alive and had not only told his captors of his CIA affiliation but also provided numerous details of his espionage mission and the program of which it was part. Turkey, Pakistan, and Norway all protested publicly to the United States over the involvement of their facilities in the American surveillance program. Ignoring Soviet hints that he should disavow all knowledge of the operation, Eisenhower took full responsibility, arguing that failure to do so would suggest that as chief executive he was incompetent to control his own government. He declined to promise to cease all such flights or publicly apologize for them. The capture of Powers effectively derailed Eisenhower's hopes that before he left office in early 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union might conclude a nuclear test ban treaty and settle their ongoing dispute over West Berlin, which Khrushchev claimed should be entirely under East German control. In early 1960 the two superpowers and Britain progressed steadily toward acceptable treaty terms, expecting to finalize the agreement at a May 1960 Paris summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. An atmosphere of acute hostility pervaded the summit, no progress was made toward the contemplated treaty, and Eisenhower left after two days. Even so, each side made certain conciliatory gestures. Khrushchev affirmed continuing Soviet support for peaceful coexistence and arms control negotiations, while Eisenhower stated that the espionage flights, although not formally abandoned, had been suspended and likewise reiterated his support for disarmament negotiations. Despite frequent crises and confrontations, in practice the two great powers had a mutual interest in communicating with each other and limiting the nuclear arms race.

Primary Source

A provocative act is known to have been committed recently with regard to the Soviet Union by the American Air Force. It consisted in the fact that on May 1 a United States military reconnaissance aircraft invaded the Soviet Union while executing a specific espionage mission to obtain information on military and industrial installations on the territory of the U.S.S.R. After the aggressive purpose of its flight became known, the aircraft was shot down by units of the Soviet rocket troops. Unfortunately, this was not the only case of aggressive and espionage actions by the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the Soviet Government was compelled to give appropriate qualification to these acts and show up their treacherous nature, which is incompatible with the elementary requirements of the maintenance of normal relations between states in time of peace, not to speak of its being in gross contradiction to the task of lessening international tension and creating the necessary conditions for the fruitful work of the summit conferences. This was done both in my speeches at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and in a special note of protest sent to the United States Government.

At first, the United States State Department launched the ridiculous version that the American plane had violated the borders of the U.S.S.R. by accident and had no espionage or sabotage assignments. When irrefutable facts clearly proved the falsity of this version, the United States State Department on May 7, and then the Secretary of State on May 9, stated on behalf of the United States Government that American aircraft made incursions into the Soviet Union with military espionage aims in accordance with a program endorsed by the United States Government and by the President, personally.

Two days later, President Eisenhower himself confirmed that execution of flights of American aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union had been and remained the calculated policy of the United States. The same was declared by the United States Government in a note to the Soviet Government on May 12. Thereby the United States Government is crudely flouting the universally accepted standards of international law and the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter, under which stands the signature of the United States of America also.

The Soviet Government and the entire people of the Soviet Union met these declarations of leading statesmen of the U.S.A. with indignation, as did every honest man and woman in the world who displays concern for the destinies of peace.

[. . .]

The Soviet Government reserves the right in all such cases to take the appropriate retaliatory measures against those who violate the state sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. and engage in such espionage and sabotage regarding the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. Government reiterates that, with regard to those states that, by making their territory available for America military bases, become accomplices in aggressive actions against the U.S.S.R., the appropriate measures will also be taken, not excluding a blow against these bases.

In this connection it is impossible to ignore the statement by President Eisenhower to the effect that under the threat of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic he could not take part in the summit conference, though what he called a threat was merely the declaration by the Soviet Government of its firm resolve to do away with the vestiges of war in Europe and conclude a peace, and thus to bring the situation—particularly in West Berlin—in line with the requirements of life and the interests of insuring the peace and security of the European nations.

How then can the Soviet Government take part in negotiations under conditions of an actual threat emanating from the United States Government which declared that it would continue to violate the U.S.S.R. borders and that American aircraft had flown and would continue to fly over the Soviet Union's territory? The United States government has thereby declared its intention to continue unheard of and unprecedented actions directed against the sovereignty of the Soviet state, which constitutes a sacred and immutable principle in international relations.

[. . .]

It stands to reason that if the United States Government were to declare that in the future the United States will not violate the state borders of the U.S.S.R. with its aircraft, that it deplores the provocative actions undertaken in the past and will punish those directly guilty of such actions, which would assure the Soviet Union equal conditions with other powers, I, as head of the Soviet Government, would be ready to participate in the conference and exert all efforts to contribute to its success.

As a result of the provocative flights of American military aircraft and, above all, as a result of such provocative flights being declared national policy of the United States of America for the future in regard to the Socialist countries, new conditions have appeared in international relationships.

Naturally, under such conditions, we cannot work at the conference; we cannot because we see the positions from which it is intended to talk with us: under the threat of aggressive reconnaissance flights. Espionage flights are known to be undertaken with reconnaissance purposes with the object of starting a war. We, therefore, reject the conditions the United States of America is creating for us. We cannot participate in any negotiations and in the solution of even those questions which have already matured; we cannot because we see that the United States has no desire to reach a settlement.

It is considered to be a leader in the Western countries. Therefore, the conference would at present be a useless waste of time and a deception of the public opinion of all countries. I repeat, we cannot under the obtaining situation take part in the negotiations.

We want to participate in the talks only on an equal footing, with equal opportunities for both one and the other side.

We consider it necessary for the peoples of all the countries of the world to understand us correctly. The Soviet Union is not renouncing efforts to achieve agreement. And we are sure that reasonable agreements are possible, but, evidently, not at this but at another time.

For this, however, it is necessary first of all that the United States admits that the provocative policy it has declared by a policy of "unrestricted" flights over our country is to be condemned and that it rejects it and admits that it has committed aggression and admits that it regrets it.

[. . .]

The Soviet Union on its part, will not lessen its effort to reach an agreement. I think that public opinion will

correctly understand our position, will understand that we were deprived of the possibility to participate in these negotiations.

However, we firmly believe in the necessity of peaceful coexistence because to lose faith in peaceful coexistence would mean to doom mankind to war, would mean to agree with the inevitability of wars, and under the circumstances it is known what disasters would be brought by a war to all nations on our planet.

I wish to address the people of the United States of America. I was in the U.S.A. and met there with various sections of the American people and I am deeply convinced that all the strata of the American people do not want war. An exception constitutes but a small frantic group in the Pentagon and, supporting it, militarist quarters that benefit from the armaments race, gaining huge profits, which disregard the interests of the American people and in general the interests of the peoples of all countries, and which pursue an adventurous policy.

[. . .]

We regret that this meeting has been torpedoed by the reactionary circles of the United States of America by provocative flights of American military planes over the Soviet Union.

We regret that this meeting has not brought about the results expected by all nations of the world.

Let the disgrace and responsibility for this rest with those who have proclaimed a bandit polity toward the Soviet Union.

[. . .]

The Soviet Government states that on its part it will continue to do its utmost to facilitate the relaxation of international tension, to facilitate the solution of problems that still divide us today. In that we shall be guided by the interests of strengthening the great cause of peace on the basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Source: "Text of Khrushchev Statement on Summit and the Plane Case," *New York Times*, 17 May 1960.

74. Dwight D. Eisenhower: U-2 Incident Speech, 25 May 1960

Introduction

On 1 May 1960, the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane flying at high altitude over Soviet territory. Although U.S. officials initially tried to pass the mission off as a weather flight, they were later compelled to publicly admit that the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, had been spying on the Soviet Union. Two weeks later, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev met in Paris for a previously arranged summit meeting. The U-2 incident greatly heightened tensions at the meeting, however, especially as Eisenhower refused to apologize for the U.S. spying missions and even admitted that they had been going on for more than four years. Khrushchev ended the talks abruptly and left Paris in a rage. Back in the United States, on 25 May 1960 Eisenhower delivered this address to the nation regarding the entire episode.

Primary Source

My Fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk with you about the remarkable events last week in Paris, and their meaning to our future.

[. . .]

Our safety, and that of the free world, demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capabilities of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free-world security.

This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part of my grave responsibility within the overall problem of protecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise attack.

During the period leading up to World War II, we learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, the maintenance of military communications and contact, and alertness of command.

An additional word seems appropriate about this matter of communications and command. While the secretary of defense and I were in Paris, we were, of course, away from our normal command posts. He recommended that under the circumstances we test the continuing readiness of our military communications. I personally approved. Such tests are valuable and will be frequently repeated in the future.

Moreover, as President, charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as commander in chief, charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our armed forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our government to secure and evaluate military intelligence.

It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.

Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it. Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these flights several years ago. Only last week, in this Paris press conference, Chairman Khrushchev confirmed that he knew of these flights when he visited the United States last September.

Incidentally, this raises the natural question—why all the furor concerning one particular flight? He did not, when in America last September, charge that these flights were any threat to Soviet safety. He did not then see any reason to refuse to confer with American representatives. This he did only about the flight that unfortunately failed, on May 1, far inside Russia.

Now, two questions have been raised about this particular flight: first, as to its timing, considering the imminence of the summit meeting; second, our initial statements when we learned the flight had failed.

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forgo the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted. The plain truth is this: When a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack.

Next, as to our government's initial statement about the flight, this was issued to protect the pilot, his mission, and our intelligence processes, at a time when the true facts were still undetermined.

Our first information about the failure of this mission did not disclose whether the pilot was still alive, was trying to escape, was avoiding interrogation, or whether both plane and pilot had been destroyed. Protection of our intelligence system and the pilot, and concealment of the plane's mission, seemed imperative. It must be remembered that over a long period these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the nation's security. In fact, their success has been nothing short of remarkable.

For these reasons, what is known in intelligence circles as a "covering statement" was issued. It was issued on assumptions that were later proved incorrect. Consequently, when later the status of the pilot was definitely established and there was no further possibility of avoiding exposure of the project, the factual details were set forth.

I then made two facts clear to the public: First, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this government is compelled

to keep abreast, by one means or another, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world. Our necessity to proceed with such activities was also asserted by our secretary of state, who, however, had been careful—as was I—not to say that these particular flights would be continued.

In fact, before leaving Washington I had directed that these U-2 flights be stopped. Clearly their usefulness was impaired. Moreover, continuing this particular activity in these new circumstances could not but complicate the relations of certain of our allies with the Soviets. And of course, new techniques, other than aircraft, are constantly being developed.

Now, I wanted no public announcement of this decision until I could personally disclose it at the summit meeting in conjunction with certain proposals I had prepared for the conference.

At my first Paris meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and before his tirade was made public, I informed him of this discontinuance and the character of the constructive proposals I planned to make. These contemplated the establishment of a system of aerial surveillance operated by the United Nations. The day before the first scheduled meeting, Mr. Khrushchev had advised President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he would make certain demands upon the United States as a precondition for beginning a summit conference. Although the United States was the only power against which he expressed his displeasure, he did not communicate this information to me. I was, of course, informed by our allies.

At the four-power meeting on Monday morning, he demanded of the United States four things: first, condemnation of U-2 flights as a method of espionage; second, assurance that they would not be continued; third, a public apology on behalf of the United States; and, fourth, punishment of all those who had any responsibility respecting this particular mission.

I replied by advising the Soviet leader that I had, during the previous week, stopped these flights and that they would not be resumed. I offered also to discuss the matter with him in personal meetings, while the regular business of the summit might proceed. Obviously, I would not respond to his extreme demands. He knew, of course, by holding to those demands the Soviet Union was scuttling the summit conference.

In torpedoing the conference, Mr. Khrushchev claimed that he acted as the result of his own high moral indignation over alleged American acts of aggression. As I said earlier, he had known of these flights for a long time. It is apparent that the Soviets had decided even before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet Union should be canceled and that nothing constructive from their viewpoint would come out of the summit conference.

In evaluating the results, however, I think we must not write the record all in red ink. There are several things to be written in the black. Perhaps the Soviet action has turned the clock back in some measure, but it should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev did not go beyond invective—a timeworn Soviet device to achieve an immediate objective, in this case, the wrecking of the conference.

On our side, at Paris, we demonstrated once again America's willingness, and that of her allies, always to go the extra mile in behalf of peace. Once again Soviet intransigence reminded us all of the unpredictability of despotic rule and the need for those who work for freedom to stand together in determination and in strength.

The conduct of our allies was magnificent. My colleagues and friends—President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan—stood sturdily with the American delegation in spite of persistent Soviet attempts to split the Western group. The NATO meeting after the Paris conference showed unprecedented unity and support for the alliance and for the position taken at the summit meeting. I salute our allies for us all.

And now, most importantly, what about the future?

All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally, global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be no victors—only

losers. Even despots understand this. Mr. Khrushchev stated last week that he well realizes that general nuclear war would bring catastrophe for both sides. Recognition of this mutual destructive capability is the basic reality of our present relations. Most assuredly, however, this does not mean that we shall ever give up trying to build a more sane and hopeful reality—a better foundation for our common relations.

To do this, here are the policies we must follow, and to these I am confident the great majority of our people, regardless of party, give their support:

First, we must keep up our strength, and hold it steady for the long pull—a strength not neglected in complacency nor overbuilt in hysteria. So doing, we can make it clear to everyone that there can be no gain in the use of pressure tactics or aggression against us and our allies.

Second, we must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and the Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

Third, to improve world conditions in which human freedom can flourish, we must continue to move ahead with positive programs at home and abroad, in collaboration with free nations everywhere. In doing so, we shall continue to give our strong support to the United Nations and the great principles for which it stands.

Now as to the first of these purposes—our defenses are sound. They are tailored to the situation confronting us. Their adequacy has been my primary concern for these past seven years—indeed, throughout my adult life. In no respect have the composition and size of our forces been based on or affected by any Soviet blandishment. Nor will they be. We will continue to carry forward the great improvements already planned in these forces. They will be kept ready and under constant review. Any changes made necessary by technological advances or world events will be recommended at once.

This strength—by far the most potent on earth—is, I emphasize, for deterrent, defensive, and retaliatory purposes only without threat or aggressive intent toward anyone.

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 437–446.

75. Nikita Khrushchev: Speech on Decolonization, 23 September 1960

Introduction

On 23 September 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) that set forth the Soviet position on a variety of outstanding international issues. Khrushchev enthusiastically endorsed decolonization efforts around the globe, representing himself as the champion of freedom, liberty, and self-determination. In truth, he encouraged decolonization because he knew that it would undermine the power of Great Britain and France, both of which were in the process of dismantling large overseas empires. Most important, the Soviet Union saw the political instability that almost always followed decolonization as an opportunity to spread communism around the world. Many decolonizing and newly independent countries resented their former domination by Western powers, and such nationalist sentiments often inclined them to turn toward the Soviet Union for assistance. Within the UN itself, the growing numbers of independent Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states often functioned as an anti-Western voting bloc, enabling the Soviet Union to put pressure on its international opponents. Besides expressing his support for decolonization, Khrushchev also took the opportunity offered by his UN address to condemn overflights of the Soviet Union by American U-2 photographic spy planes, recalling how when Russian antiaircraft batteries downed one of these aircraft the previous May, he had

aborted his Paris summit meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Khrushchev also assailed the United States for its opposition to the new revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba, charging that Cuba's economic backwardness was the product of decades of exploitation by American business. Predictably but with little hope of success, Khrushchev called for the reunification of both Germany and Korea on terms that would facilitate communist domination of such united states. He also suggested that the UN should be headed not by one secretary-general but by a three-man executive, one each from the capitalist, communist, and neutral blocs. Perhaps most significantly, the Soviet leader appealed for the resumption of disarmament negotiations, which had stalled the previous year. Although his proposals for the complete elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons were unlikely to appeal to the Western powers, the fact that he raised the subject was evidence of the fact that neither Soviet nor Western leaders could afford to ignore the enormously destructive power of such weapons but were effectively compelled to find some means of bringing this under control.

Primary Source

Our century is the century of the struggle for freedom, the century in which nations are liberating themselves from foreign domination. The peoples desire a worthwhile life and are fighting to secure it.

[. . .]

The peoples of all countries—workers, peasants, intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, excluding a small handful of militarists and monopolists—want not war but peace, and peace alone. And if, therefore, the peoples actively fight to tie the hands of the militarist and monopolist circles, peace can be ensured. . . .

No one can dispute the fact that the Soviet Union has been unsparing in its efforts to ensure the continuation of this welcome trend in the development of international relations. But the sinister forces which profit from the maintenance of international tension are clinging tenaciously to their positions. Though only a handful of individuals is involved, they are quite powerful and exert a strong influence on the policy of their respective States. A major effort is therefore required to break their resistance. As soon as the policy of causing international tension begins to yield tangible results, they immediately resort to extreme measures in order to ensure that the people should feel no relief; they strain every nerve to plunge the world back again and again into an atmosphere of gloom and to exacerbate international tension.

We saw a dangerous manifestation of the work of these forces last spring when the aircraft of one of the largest State Members of the United Nations, the United States of America, treacherously invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and that of other States. What is more, the United States has elevated such violations of international law into a principle of deliberate State policy.

The aggressive intrusion into our country by a United States aircraft and the whole course of the United States Government's subsequent behaviour showed the peoples that they were dealing with a calculated policy on the part of the United States Government, which was trying to substitute brigandage for international law and treachery for honest negotiations between sovereign and equal States. . . .

The flights by the United States spy aircraft are also instructive in another respect. They have shown us the danger to peace presented by the network of United States bases in which dozens of States in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America are enmeshed.

Like a deep-seated form of acute infection in a living organism, these bases disrupt the normal political and economic life of the States upon which they have been foisted. They hinder the establishment of normal relations between those States and their neighbours. How, indeed, can there be any question of normal relations if the people of these neighbouring countries cannot sleep peacefully, if they have to live with the threat of being subjected to an annihilating blow whenever the United States militarists take it into their heads to embark on fresh acts of provocation? . . .

United States relations with Cuba are illuminating. As you know, before the victory of the popular revolution,

all branches of the Cuban economy were wholly dominated by United States monopolies which earned vast profits from exploiting the working people of Cuba and the wealth of their fertile soil.

Some people in the United States occasionally like to boast that the standard of living in their country is higher than that in other countries. There is no gainsaying the fact that the standard of living in the United States is now higher than in Cuba, but why is that so? Is it because the Cuban people are less industrious or because the Cuban soil is less fertile? No, this of course is not the reason. The Cuban people are well known for their industry and for their attachment to their country and to their soil. The explanation is entirely different. For many years the fruits of the Cuban people's toil were enjoyed not by the Cuban people but by United States monopolies. Is it therefore surprising that in 1958, for example, the per capita income in Cuba was 6.5 times lower than in the United States? This telling fact speaks for itself. . . .

We are all witnesses to the fact that many peoples are being continually subjected to hostile acts and crude pressure by a certain group of States which seek to set at naught the legitimate interests and rights of other countries. This is why the international situation is fraught with acute conflicts, the danger of which is intensified by the mounting arms race.

[. . .]

As regards the Soviet Union, I can say frankly that we are glad to see a great number of new States making their appearance in the United Nations. We have always opposed and we shall continue to oppose any curtailment of the rights of peoples who have won their national independence. We share with these States the desire to preserve and strengthen peace, to create on our planet conditions for the peaceful coexistence and co-operation of countries regardless of their political and social structure, in accordance with the peaceful principles proclaimed at the Conference of African and Asia States at Bandung. The facts show that the liberation of nations and peoples under colonial domination leads to an improvement in international relations, an increase in international co-operation and the reinforcement of world peace. . . .

It would be difficult to exaggerate the vast significance which the abolition of the colonial system would have for the entire world. Everyone knows that the economies of the colonies and the Trust Territories are at present subordinated to the mercenary interests of foreign monopolies, and the industrialization of these countries is being deliberately impeded. Imagine that the situation has changed and that these countries and territories, having become independent, are in a position to make ample use of their rich natural resources and to proceed with their industrialization, and that a better life has begun for their peoples. This would lead to a tremendous growth in the capacity of the world market, which would no doubt have a beneficial effect, not only on the economic development of the countries of the East but also on the economies of the industrially developed countries of the West. . . .

[. . .]

The peoples of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are striving unremittingly to have the principles of peaceful coexistence firmly established in relations between States, and to ensure that these principles become the fundamental law of life for the whole of modern society. There is no communist-devised "trick" behind these principles, but simple truths dictated by life itself, such as that relations between all States should develop peacefully, without the use of force, without war and without interference in each other's internal affairs.

I am revealing no secret when I say that we have no liking for capitalism. But we do not want to impose our system on other peoples by force. Let those, then, who determine the policy of States with a different social system from ours, renounce their fruitless and dangerous attempts to dictate their will. It is time they also recognized that the choice of a particular way of life is the domestic concern of every people. Let us build up our relations having regard to actual realities. That is true peaceful coexistence. . . .

The policy of peaceful coexistence assumes a readiness to solve all outstanding issues without resort to force, by means of negotiations and reasonable compromises. We all know that during the cold war years such ques-

tions for the most part did not find a solution, and that led to the creation of dangerous foci of tension in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world.

The Soviet Union considers that, in order to strengthen peace in the Far East and throughout the world, it is most essential to settle the Korean question.

Only madmen could think of settling the Korean question by armed force. The only correct proposal, namely to leave the solution of the question of the peaceful reunification of Korea to the Koreans themselves with no interference from outside, is finding ever wider acceptance. An essential condition for this is the immediate and complete withdrawal of all United States troops from South Korea, for their presence poisons the atmosphere not only in Korea but throughout the Far East and has made possible such shameful facts as the rigging of elections in South Korea. The proposal of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to establish a confederation of North and South Korea is just as reasonable as the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to set up a confederation of the two German States. It is the only way to lay a sound foundation for the reunification of these States. . . .

We are now firmly convinced that the time has come to take steps to create conditions for an improved functioning both of the United Nations as a whole and of the Organization's executive, working organ. I repeat, the matter relates primarily to the Secretary-General and his staff. We must particularly bear in mind the necessity for certain changes and improvements, with a view to the immediate future. . . .

We consider it reasonable and just for the executive organ of the United Nations to consist not of a single person—the Secretary-General—but of three persons invested with the highest trust of the United Nations, persons representing the States belonging to the three basic groups I have mentioned. The point at issue is not the title of the organ but that this executive organ should represent the States belonging to the military block of the Western Powers, the socialist States and the neutralist States. This composition of the United Nations executive organ would create conditions for a more correct implementation of the decisions taken. . . .

The Soviet Government hopes that the proposals it has raised for questions to be considered at the present session of the General Assembly will meet with support and understanding, since they are prompted by a sincere desire to secure a better life and tranquillity on our planet. . . .

The Soviet Government is ready to do its utmost in order that colonial servitude may be destroyed here and now, that here and now the problems of disarmament may find their concrete and effective solution.

The Soviet Government is ready to do its utmost in order that the testing of nuclear weapons may be prohibited here and now, that this means of mass destruction may be prohibited and destroyed.

It could be said that these are complicated problems and that they cannot be solved at one stroke. But these are problems posed by life itself and they must be solved before it is too late. Their solution cannot be evaded.

In concluding my statement I wish to emphasize once again that the Soviet Government, guided by the interests of the Soviet people, by the interests of the citizens of a free socialist State, once again proposes to all: let us talk, let us argue, but let us settle the questions of general and complete disarmament and let us bury colonialism that is accursed of all mankind.

Source: United Nations, *General Assembly, Official Records*, Fifteenth Session, pp. 68–84.

76. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Farewell Address, 17 January 1961

Introduction

On 17 January 1961, just days before he left office after completing his second term, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered this radio and television broadcast to the American people. The speech, with its warnings against a growing military-industrial complex at the federal level—consisting of the U.S. military and industries associated with it, a grouping with a vested interest in heavy military expenditures and therefore in maintaining a state of crisis—alarmed many Americans. Eisenhower cautioned that overly heavy military expenditures could be responsible for high levels of taxation and might also divert limited funds from more productive economic development. He also expressed concern that the national security state disregarded civil liberties, effectively compromising the very democratic values that the United States supposedly represented in the Cold War. Eisenhower was probably responding in part to unfounded Democratic claims during the past presidential campaign that a missile gap existed and that the United States had fallen badly behind the Soviet Union in nuclear missiles, allegations that Eisenhower had resented but felt unable for national security reasons to rebut. It is perhaps worth asking whether his misgivings would have been more effective had he expressed them somewhat earlier in his presidency. His address represented the first crack in the American public's faith in the U.S. government, which found full expression with the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal in the coming decades.

Primary Source

My Fellow Americans:

[. . .]

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts, America is today the strongest, the most influential, and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this preeminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches, and military strength but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

Throughout America's adventure in free government our basic purposes have been to keep the peace, to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity, and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully there is called for not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense, development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture, a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research—these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost

and hoped-for advantage, balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable, balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual, balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, 3.5 million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for, the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of the federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we—you and I, and our government—must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and

convenience the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written, America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent, I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war, as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years, I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But so much remains to be done. As a private citizen I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

So, in this, my last good night to you as your President, I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

[. . .]

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 1035–1040.

77. John F. Kennedy: Executive Order 10924, Creation of the Peace Corps, 1 March 1961

Introduction

The Peace Corps, established in March 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, was inspired by fears current in the 1950s that U.S. officials were overly remote from the day-to-day concerns and lives of ordinary people in developing countries, anxieties well expressed in the influential best-selling novel by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer, *The Ugly American* (1958). Alarmed that emphasis on military rather than economic aid and American support for elites risked losing for the United States support from the third world in the Cold War, in his presidential campaign Kennedy called on Americans, particularly though not exclusively the young, to spend two years working in education, community development, or technological assistance programs in such countries, receiving relatively low salaries and sharing their hosts' living and working conditions. While abroad, Peace Corps workers worked on a wide variety of projects such as building schools, introducing medical reforms, and constructing irrigation systems. Such efforts were intended to restore the original goals of President Harry S. Truman's Point Four program of assistance to underdeveloped areas. Created by executive order, the Peace Corps became one of the Kennedy administration's signature programs, as young college graduates and others responded to his appeal for public service. Kennedy felt that the establishment of the Peace Corps was sufficiently important to warrant a personal speech. The Peace Corps was extremely popular with recent college graduates in the 1960s, although its membership waned subsequently. Headed for its first five years by Sargent Shriver, Kennedy's brother-in-law, the Peace

Corps rapidly sent thousands of volunteers each year to what would eventually be more than 138 countries throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America and, with the ending of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Numbers of volunteers peaked at 15,000 in 1966, then fell rapidly during the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s were somewhere below 5,000 annually. By 2005, 178,000 Americans had served as Peace Corps volunteers. The majority of volunteers provided educational services, but agriculture, food production, health, environmental, conservation, and community development services were also well represented. Initially an independent agency created by the Peace Corps Act of 1961, in 1971 the organization was placed under the umbrella federal agency ACTION, established to coordinate both domestic and overseas volunteer programs, before regaining its independence in 1981. Winning over initially skeptical congressmen, the Peace Corps quickly succeeded in attracting strong bipartisan support for its relatively modest and unassuming programs and appropriations that has continued to the present. Although the Peace Corps' inception owed much to Cold War preoccupations and both American radicals and host countries on occasion characterized it as an agent of U.S. cultural imperialism, the agency made strenuous efforts to remain apolitical. Volunteers, the majority recent college graduates, were sent only to countries that specifically requested their services and were strictly forbidden to become involved in local politics or to have any contact with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The emphasis was on person-to-person contact. Volunteers did not bring expensive equipment with them, only their own skills and abilities. Even so, potential host countries often viewed the Peace Corps as an agent of cultural imperialism. Supporters promoted the organization as an effective way of fostering peace and understanding between different cultures.

Primary Source

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 832, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1750 *et seq.*), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. *Establishment of the Peace Corps.* The Secretary of State shall establish an agency in the Department of State which shall be known as the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps shall be headed by a Director.

Section 2. *Functions of the Peace Corps.* (a) The Peace Corps shall be responsible for the training and service abroad of men and women of the United States in new programs of assistance to nations and areas of the world, and in conjunction with or in support of existing economic assistance programs of the United States and of the United Nations and other international organizations.

(b) The Secretary of State shall delegate, or cause to be delegated, to the Director of the Peace Corps such of the functions under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, vested in the President and delegated to the Secretary, or vested in the Secretary, as the Secretary shall deem necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Peace Corps.

Section 3. *Financing of the Peace Corps.* The Secretary of State shall provide for the financing of the Peace Corps with funds available to the Secretary for the performance of functions under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

Section 4. *Relation to Executive Order No. 10893.* This order shall not be deemed to supersede or derogate from any provision of Executive Order No. 10893 of November 8, 1960, as amended, and any delegation made by or pursuant to this order shall, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, be deemed to be in addition to any delegation made by or pursuant to that order.

Source: "Executive Order 10924, Establishment and Administration of the Peace Corps in the Department of State, 1 March 1961, General Records of the United States Government, Record Group 11, National Archives," Our Documents, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=92.

78. John F. Kennedy: Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the Bay of Pigs, 20 April 1961

Introduction

On 1 January 1959 an indigenous revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro seized power from Fulgencio Batista, dictator of Cuba since 1933 and a U.S. client. Although Castro initially declared that he was not a communist, from the spring of 1959 he covertly sought Soviet aid and military protection, and American economic pressure and boycotts soon gave him an excuse to move openly into the Soviet camp. In response, in March 1960 President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to devise a scheme to train Cuban exiles based in Guatemala to invade the island and overthrow Castro, reserving to himself the right to decide whether or not this plan should ultimately be implemented. On taking office in January 1961, President John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower's successor, inherited this projected operation. Perhaps fearing to appear soft on communism, despite lukewarm assessments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the risk of failure and the misgivings of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in March the president approved its implementation. Kennedy also insisted on modifications that greatly jeopardized the operation's chances of success, refusing to allow any American troops or pilots to participate in the venture. Initial air strikes against Cuba's airbases launched on 15 April 1961 by Cuban exile pilots flying surplus American B-26s inflicted damage but failed to destroy the entire Cuban Air Force. Alarmed by news reports exposing the deceptive American cover story that, as U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson publicly stated in the United Nations (UN), defectors from Castro's military had flown these missions, Kennedy refused to authorize a scheduled second air strike, which had been expected to eliminate the remaining Cuban airplanes. On 17 April 1961, 1,400 Cuban exiles mounted an invasion landing attempt at the Bay of Pigs, south of the city of Matanzas, only to meet strong opposition from Castro's air, naval, and ground forces. A few escaped, but 114 were killed and 1,113 captured. The U.S. government initially denied any involvement in the invasion attempt, but after three days Kennedy publicly took full responsibility for the operation, justifying it as a measure required to defend freedom and democracy and prevent communist penetration of Latin America. Privately, he blamed Allen Welsh Dulles, the near-legendary CIA director, for the mission's failure and replaced him the following year. The Bay of Pigs represented a humiliating international failure for the United States, vindicating those critics who characterized it as an overbearing, imperialist state that backed unpopular right-wing forces around the globe. Coming only three months after the grandiose rhetoric of Kennedy's inaugural address, the episode suggested that he possessed more style than substance. Kennedy's reckless authorization and subsequent halfhearted implementation of the operation may have helped to convince Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev that Kennedy was a lightweight who ultimately lacked the resolve to confront the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the botched invasion and Castro's fear of another such attempt were major reasons impelling him to ask Khrushchev to install in Cuba those Soviet missiles whose presence provoked the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Primary Source

The President of a great democracy such as ours, and the editors of great newspapers such as yours, owe a common obligation to the people: an obligation to present the facts, to present them with candor, and to present them in perspective. It is with that obligation in mind that I have decided in the last 24 hours to discuss briefly at this time the recent events in Cuba.

On that unhappy island, as in so many other arenas of the contest for freedom, the news has grown worse instead of better. I have emphasized before that this was a struggle of Cuban patriots against a Cuban dictator. While we could not be expected to hide our sympathies, we made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would not intervene in any way.

Any unilateral American intervention, in the absence of an external attack upon ourselves or an ally, would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations. But let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that

the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration —then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation!

Should that time ever come, we do not intend to be lectured on "intervention" by those whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest! Nor would we expect or accept the same outcome which this small band of gallant Cuban refugees must have known that they were chancing, determined as they were against heavy odds to pursue their courageous attempts to regain their Island's freedom.

But Cuba is not an island unto itself; and our concern is not ended by mere expressions of non-intervention or regret. This is not the first time in either ancient or recent history that a small band of freedom fighters has engaged the armor of totalitarianism.

It is not the first time that Communist tanks have rolled over gallant men and women fighting to redeem the independence of their homeland. Nor is it by any means the final episode in the eternal struggle of liberty against tyranny, anywhere on the face of the globe, including Cuba itself.

Mr. Castro has said that these were mercenaries. According to press reports, the final message to be relayed from the refugee forces on the beach came from the rebel commander when asked if he wished to be evacuated. His answer was: "I will never leave this country." That is not the reply of a mercenary. He has gone now to join in the mountains countless other guerrilla fighters, who are equally determined that the dedication of those who gave their lives shall not be forgotten, and that Cuba must not be abandoned to the Communists. And we do not intend to abandon it either!

The Cuban people have not yet spoken their final piece. And I have no doubt that they and their Revolutionary Council, led by Dr. Cardona—and members of the families of the Revolutionary Council, I am informed by the Doctor yesterday, are involved themselves in the Islands—will continue to speak up for a free and independent Cuba.

Meanwhile we will not accept Mr. Castro's attempts to blame this nation for the hatred which his onetime supporters now regard his repression. But there are from this sobering episode useful lessons for us all to learn. Some may be still obscure, and await further information. Some are clear today.

First, it is clear that the forces of communism are not to be underestimated, in Cuba or anywhere else in the world. The advantages of a police state—its use of mass terror and arrests to prevent the spread of free dissent—cannot be overlooked by those who expect the fall of every fanatic tyrant. If the self-discipline of the free cannot match the iron discipline of the mailed fist—in economic, political, scientific and all the other kinds of struggles as well as the military—then the peril to freedom will continue to rise.

Secondly, it is clear that this Nation, in concert with all the free nations of this hemisphere, must take an ever closer and more realistic look at the menace of external Communist intervention and domination in Cuba. The American people are not complacent about Iron Curtain tanks and planes less than 90 miles from their shore. But a nation of Cuba's size is less a threat to our survival than it is a base for subverting the survival of other free nations throughout the hemisphere. It is not primarily our interest or our security but theirs which is now, today, in the greater peril. It is for their sake as well as our own that we must show our will.

The evidence is clear—and the hour is late. We and our Latin friends will have to face the fact that we cannot postpone any longer the real issue of survival of freedom in this hemisphere itself. On that issue, unlike perhaps some others, there can be no middle ground. Together we must build a hemisphere where freedom can flourish; and where any free nation under outside attack of any kind can be assured that all of our resources stand ready to respond to any request for assistance.

Third, and finally, it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that

goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments. The armies are there, and in large number. The nuclear armaments are there. But they serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics steadily advance, picking off vulnerable areas one by one in situations which do not permit our own armed intervention.

Power is the hallmark of this offensive—power and discipline and deceit. The legitimate discontent of yearning people is exploited. The legitimate trappings of self-determination are employed. But once in power, all talk of discontent is repressed, all self-determination disappears, and the promise of a revolution of hope is betrayed, as in Cuba, into a reign of terror. Those who on instruction staged automatic "riots" in the streets of free nations over the efforts of a small group of young Cubans to regain their freedom should recall the long roll call of refugees who cannot now go back—to Hungary, to North Korea, to North Viet-Nam, to East Germany, or to Poland, or to any of the other lands from which a steady stream of refugees pours forth, in eloquent testimony to the cruel oppression now holding sway in their homeland.

We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it—whether in Cuba or South Viet-Nam. And we dare not fail to realize that this struggle is taking place every day, without fanfare, in thousands of villages and markets—day and night—and in classrooms all over the globe.

The message of Cuba, of Laos, of the rising din of Communist voices in Asia and Latin America—these messages are all the same. The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong, only the industrious, only the determined, only the courageous, only the visionary who determine the real nature of our struggle can possibly survive.

No greater task faces this country or this administration. No other challenge is more deserving of our every effort and energy. Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders, on missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough—that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.

We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to reexamine and reorient our forces of all kinds—our tactics and our institutions here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war, where disappointment will often accompany us.

For I am convinced that we in this country and in the free world possess the necessary resource, and the skill, and the added strength that comes from a belief in the freedom of man. And I am equally convinced that history will record the fact that this bitter struggle reached its climax in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril!

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 304–306.

79. Charles de Gaulle: Speech Denouncing the Algiers Putsch, 23 April 1961

Introduction

The dismantling of colonial empires could on occasion prove both bloody and divisive. This was certainly the case in Algeria, a French colony since 1830, when it was incorporated outright into France as a province. In 1954 nationalist groups in Algeria launched an uprising whose objective was full independence from France. Since 1840, numerous French settlers had moved to Algeria, and the colons, as they were known, were for the most part unrelentingly opposed to Algerian independence. The war was fought with great brutality on both sides, as nationalist

forces in the National Liberation Front (FLN) intimidated the local population when necessary, assassinating opponents and detonating bombs in public places, while the French Army showed equal savagery toward both the FLN and anyone suspected of supporting it, frequently resorting to torture. By 1956 the situation was out of control, with 400,000 French troops in Algeria unable to maintain order. In May 1958 dissident army officers and Algerian colons, working with supporters of General Charles de Gaulle, successfully mounted a coup against the Fourth French Republic to put the general in power. The French Parliament approved de Gaulle's appointment as president, and a new constitution was approved, establishing the Fifth French Republic that, unlike its predecessor in which presidents had rarely retained office for more than a year, featured a strong president elected for a seven-year term. The Algerian colons and the French military hoped that de Gaulle would prove more effective in prosecuting the war, and he initially made a broad if vague appeal to all Algerians, urging them to work together as part of France and promising extensive economic, social, and political reforms that would benefit the mass of native Algerians. These inducements failed to persuade the FLN to renounce its objectives. In 1958–1959 the French Army made major gains in Algeria, but the French public turned against the war, in part because it was extremely expensive and costly in terms of lives and also because revelations of the extensive torture and brutality that the French military employed when waging war in Algeria helped to discredit their cause. In September 1959 de Gaulle, who had decided that the war could be won but was impossible to defend on the international scene, pledged self-determination for Algeria, albeit in some kind of formal association with France. The following January the colons, with tacit support from the French military and police, launched an insurrection in Algiers, demanding de Gaulle's resignation, but he rallied the French Army behind him, and after a week the uprising fizzled out. In April 1961 the Generals' Putsch—a second attempt to overthrow de Gaulle—took place. In the wake of a referendum held in both France and Algeria on the future status of the colony in which 75 percent approved self-determination for Algeria, several retired generals in France joined forces with the colons and the French military in Algeria to stage a revolt and demanded de Gaulle's resignation. Donning his military uniform, he addressed the nation on television, urging the army to support him, the rule of law, and the Fifth French Republic. The constitution was amended to permit de Gaulle to assume emergency powers. His exhortations were successful. Within four days the revolt in Algeria was suppressed, and peace talks with the FLN continued. The Evian Accords, the peace settlement reached in March 1962, guaranteed all existing residents of Algeria equal political and civil rights and protected their property but required them to choose between French and Algerian citizenship within three years. Those who remained French would then become aliens and lose their political rights. A new colon organization, the Secret Army Organization (OAS), promptly mounted a major terrorist campaign in Algeria, one that targeted both FLN and French representatives and was designed to sabotage the peace settlement by provoking the FLN into breaking the cease-fire. In March, the OAS detonated on average 120 bombs per day, hitting hospitals and schools as well as military and government targets. In a June 1962 referendum on the accords, 91 percent of the French electorate nonetheless approved them. The OAS and FLN concluded a truce, and within a year the great majority of the colons, at least 1.75 million, had left Algeria, as did many of the indigenous Algerian Muslims who had fought in the French Army during the civil war. Something over half a million Algerians died during the Algerian Civil War, while the French Army lost 18,000 dead and 65,000 wounded, and perhaps 2 million Algerians became refugees. The Algerian war was testimony to just how brutal and divisive anticolonial struggles could become. The bitter past experience of civil war, during which violence had become habitual and acceptable, may have been one reason that during the 1990s, Algeria endured another protracted internal conflict.

Primary Source

An insurrectional power has set itself up in Algeria by a military pronunciamento. Those guilty of this usurpation have exploited the passion of officers of certain special units, the inflamed support of one part of the population of European origin, misguided by fears and myths, the impotence of authorities overwhelmed by the military conspiracy.

This power has an appearance: a quartet of retired generals. It has a reality: a group of partisan, ambitious and fanatical officers. This group and this quartet possess a

limited and expeditious ability, but they see and know the nation and the world only as deformed by their fanaticism.

Their venture cannot but lead to a national disaster. For the immense effort of recovery in France—begun at the depths of the abyss on June 18, 1940; continued later despite everything until victory was gained, independence assured, the Republic restored; resumed three years ago in order to remake the State, maintain the national unity, rebuild our power, restore our position in the world, pursue our task overseas through a necessary decolonization—all this risks being made useless, on the very eve of success, by the odious and stupid adventure in Algeria.

Now the State is flouted, the nation defied, our power degraded, our international prestige lowered, our role and our place in Africa jeopardized. And by whom? Alas! Alas! By men whose duty, honor and reason for being was to serve and obey.

In the name of France, I order that all means—I say all means—be employed everywhere to bar the route to these men, until they are subjugated. I forbid any Frenchmen, and first of all any soldier, to execute any of their orders. The argument that it might be locally necessary to accept their command under the pretext of operational or administrative obligations can fool no one.

The civil and military leaders who have the right to assume responsibilities are those who have been legally named and precisely those the insurgents prevent from doing so.

The future of the usurpers should only be that provided for them by the rigor of the law.

In the face of the misfortune which looms over the country and of the threat that hangs over the Republic, I have decided, having formally consulted the Constitutional Council, the Premier, the President of the Senate, the President of the National Assembly, to put into force Article 16 of our Constitution. As of today, I will take, if necessary directly, the measures that appear to me to be required by the circumstances.

In this way, I confirm myself in the French and republican legality which was conferred upon me by the nation and which I will maintain no matter what happens until the end of my term, or until I lack either force or life; and I will take measures to make sure that this legality remains after me.

Frenchwomen, Frenchmen, see where France risks going, compared with what she was again becoming.

Frenchwomen, Frenchmen, help me.

Source: Charles de Gaulle, *Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964* (New York: French Embassy Press and Information Division, 1964), 127–128.

80. John F. Kennedy: Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs on Space, 25 May 1961

Introduction

The early excitement generated by the glamorous John F. Kennedy's accession to the presidency and his appeals to "get this country moving again" fizzled out rather quickly. In April 1961 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed a bungled invasion of the island of Cuba, where a procommunist government headed by the radical Fidel Castro had seized power in 1959. The operation ended in humiliating failure for the United States, tarnishing the first months of Kennedy's presidency. Soon afterward, on 21 April 1961, the Soviet Union sent into space the first human astronaut, Yuri Gagarin, who returned safely and became an instant celebrity. This was only the latest of several scientific triumphs for the Soviets, who in 1957 had launched Sputnik, the first nonmanned satellite. In a press conference earlier in April, Kennedy had already mentioned his frustration that the United States had fallen into second place to the Soviet Union in space travel and exploration and warned that it would be some time

before the United States caught up with its rival. In a State of the Union address to Congress the following month, he announced a bold initiative to redress the balance in favor of his own country, pledging that the United States would send a manned spaceflight to the moon by the end of the 1960s. Kennedy requested a greatly increased budget for space exploration and the National Aeronautical and Space Agency (NASA), including $611 million of additional spending to supplement his request for more than $1.235 billion the previous March. He also sought to improve American satellite and rocket technology. Although Kennedy did not live to see them attained, these eye-catching goals reflected his personal preference for striking, high-profile initiatives. After his assassination in November 1963, their fulfillment was seen as a tribute to the dead president. In July 1969 the United States launched a successful manned mission to the moon, the first of several such American flights. Since no other nation felt able to mount such an expensive program, for the rest of the twentieth century travel to the moon remained an American monopoly.

Primary Source

[. . .]

These are extraordinary times. And we face an extraordinary challenge. Our strength as well as our convictions have imposed upon this nation the role of leader in freedom's cause.

No role in history could be more difficult or more important. We stand for freedom. That is our conviction for ourselves—that is our only commitment to others. No friend, no neutral and no adversary should think otherwise. We are not against any man—or any nation—or any system—except as it is hostile to freedom. Nor am I here to present a new military doctrine, bearing any one name or aimed at any one area. I am here to promote the freedom doctrine.

[. . .]

IX. SPACE

Finally, if we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men everywhere, who are attempting to make a determination of which road they should take. Since early in my term, our efforts in space have been under review. With the advice of the Vice President, who is Chairman of the National Space Council, we have examined where we are strong and where we are not, where we may succeed and where we may not. Now it is time to take longer strides—time for a great new American enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth.

I believe we possess all the resources and talents necessary. But the facts of the matter are that we have never made the national decisions or marshalled the national resources required for such leadership. We have never specified long-range goals on an urgent time schedule, or managed our resources and our time so as to insure their fulfillment.

Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets with their large rocket engines, which gives them many months of lead-time, and recognizing the likelihood that they will exploit this lead for some time to come in still more impressive successes, we nevertheless are required to make new efforts on our own. For while we cannot guarantee that we shall one day be first, we can guarantee that any failure to make this effort will make us last. We take an additional risk by making it in full view of the world, but as shown by the feat of astronaut Shepard, this very risk enhances our stature when we are successful. But this is not merely a race. Space is open to us now; and our eagerness to share its meaning is not governed by the efforts of others. We go into space because whatever mankind must undertake, free men must fully share.

I therefore ask the Congress, above and beyond the increases I have earlier requested for space activities, to provide the funds which are needed to meet the following national goals:

First, I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing

a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish. We propose to accelerate the development of the appropriate lunar space craft. We propose to develop alternate liquid and solid fuel boosters, much larger than any now being developed, until certain which is superior. We propose additional funds for other engine development and for unmanned explorations—explorations which are particularly important for one purpose which this nation will never overlook: the survival of the man who first makes this daring flight. But in a very real sense, it will not be one man going to the moon—if we make this judgment affirmatively, it will be an entire nation. For all of us must work to put him there.

Secondly, an additional 23 million dollars, together with 7 million dollars already available, will accelerate development of the Rover nuclear rocket. This gives promise of some day providing a means for even more exciting and ambitious exploration of space, perhaps beyond the moon, perhaps, to the very end of the solar system itself.

Third, an additional 50 million dollars will make the most of our present leadership, by accelerating the use of space satellites for world-wide communications.

Fourth, an additional 75 million dollars—of which 53 million dollars is for the Weather Bureau—will help give us at the earliest possible time a satellite system for world-wide weather observation.

Let it be clear—and this is a judgment which the Members of the Congress must finally make—let it be clear that I am asking the Congress and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action—a course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs: 531 million dollars in fiscal '62—an estimated seven to nine billion dollars additional over the next five years. If we are to go only half way, or reduce our sights in the face of difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to go at all.

Now this is a choice which this country must make, and I am confident that under the leadership of the Space Committees of the Congress, and the Appropriating Committees, that you will consider the matter carefully.

It is a most important decision that we make as a nation. But all of you have lived through the last four years and have seen the significance of space and the adventures in space, and no one can predict with certainty what the ultimate meaning will be of mastery of space.

I believe we should go to the moon. But I think every citizen of this country as well as the Members of the Congress should consider the matter carefully in making their judgment, to which we have given attention over many weeks and months, because it is a heavy burden, and there is no sense in agreeing or desiring that the United States take an affirmative position in outer space, unless we are prepared to do the work and bear the burdens to make it successful. If we are not, we should decide today and this year.

This decision demands a major national commitment of scientific and technical manpower, materiel and facilities, and the possibility of their diversion from other important activities where they are already thinly spread. It means a degree of dedication, organization and discipline which have not always characterized our research and development efforts. It means we cannot afford undue work stoppages, inflated costs of material or talent, wasteful interagency rivalries, or a high turnover of key personnel.

New objectives and new money cannot solve these problems. They could in fact, aggravate them further —unless every scientist, every engineer, every serviceman, every technician, contractor, and civil servant gives his personal pledge that this nation will move forward, with the full speed of freedom, in the exciting adventure of space.

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 396–406.

81. Alliance for Progress Charter, 17 August 1961

Introduction

President John F. Kennedy assumed office in 1961 proclaiming his determination that the United States should win the Cold War. One means whereby he hoped to accomplish this was to gain the loyalties of the developing world, including Latin America, through economic assistance and development programs. American collusion with authoritarian dictators and episodes such as the June 1953 coup that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated against President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán of Guatemala after the latter threatened to take over land owned by U.S. businesses had damaged U.S. credibility. So, too, did Kennedy's own unsuccessful April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion attempt against leftist President Fidel Castro of Cuba. To many on the Left and in developing countries, U.S. protestations of liberal ideals and support for freedom and democracy appeared mere hypocritical propaganda rationalizing its imperialist economic and political exploitation of Latin American nations. Attempting to allay such suspicions while alleviating poverty, illiteracy, and disease, widely perceived as precipitating factors in communist insurgencies in the region, in March 1961 Kennedy proposed a ten-year, $100 billion aid and development program for Latin American nations. Modeled on the very successful 1948 Marshall Plan that had encouraged and facilitated West European economic recovery after World War II, this undertaking was designed to integrate the separate Latin American economies and promote annual growth rates of 2.5 percent, fair wages, stable prices, agrarian reform, tax revision, housing development, health, sanitation, and literacy. It also aimed to facilitate the development of democratic governments in place of military dictatorships. In August 1961 the United States and all Latin American nations except Cuba signed an agreement under which the United States promised the hemisphere $20 billion over the next decade, while the other nations pledged capital investment of $80 billion. U.S. aid to Latin America initially tripled, and the United States eventually committed $22.3 billion to the region in aid and investment, although debt payments and repatriation of profits substantially reduced the amount of net transfers. Overall, the Latin American growth rate during the 1960s was 2.4 percent, with seven out of twenty-one countries surpassing the 2.5 percent target rate. Access to secondary and tertiary education increased, but adult illiteracy rates remained stable. Effective land reform often proved impossible, and in Honduras the Kennedy administration itself blocked measures that would have expropriated American-owned landholdings. The promotion of democracy proved an elusive goal, as military coups overthrew no less than six popularly elected presidents. Like many Cold War programs, the Alliance for Progress was at best only partially successful in accomplishing its ambitious objectives.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Title I. Objective of the Alliance for Progress

It is the purpose of the Alliance for Progress to enlist the full energies of the people and governments of the American republics in a great cooperative effort to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of well-being, with equal opportunities for all, in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires.

The American Republics agree to work toward the achievement of the following fundamental goals in the present decade:

1. To achieve in the participating Latin American countries a substantial and sustained growth of per capita income at a rate designed to attain, at the earliest possible date, levels of income capable of assuring self-sustaining development, and sufficient to make Latin American income levels constantly larger in relation to the levels of the more industrialized nations. In this way the gap between the living standards of Latin America and those of the more developed countries can be narrowed. Similarly, presently existing differences in income levels among the Latin American countries will be reduced by accelerating the development of the relatively less developed countries and granting them maximum priority in the distribution of resources and in international

cooperation in general. In evaluating the degree of relative development, account will be taken not only of average levels of real income and gross product per capita, but also of indices of infant mortality, illiteracy, and per capita daily caloric intake.

It is recognized that, in order to reach these objectives within a reasonable time, the rate of economic growth in any country of Latin America should be not less than 2.5 percent per capita per year, and that each participating country should determine its own growth target in the light of its stage of social and economic evolution, resource endowment, and ability to mobilize national efforts for development.

2. To make the benefits of economic progress available to all citizens of all economic and social groups through a more equitable distribution of national income, raising more rapidly the income and standard of living of the needier sectors of the population, at the same time that a higher proportion of the national product is devoted to investment.
3. To achieve balanced diversification in national economic structures, both regional and functional, making them increasingly free from dependence on the export of a limited number of primary products and the importation of capital goods awhile attaining stability in the prices of exports or in income derived from exports.
4. To accelerate the process of rational industrialization so as to increase the productivity of the economy as a whole, taking full advantage of the talents and energies of both the private and public sectors, utilizing the natural resources of the country and providing productive and remunerative employment for unemployed or part-time workers. Within this process of industrialization, special attention should be given to the establishment and development of capital-goods industries.
5. To raise greatly the level of agricultural productivity and output and to improve related storage transportation, and marketing services.
6. To encourage, in accordance with the characteristics of each country, programs of comprehensive agrarian reform leading to the effective transformation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use, with a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of land tenure so that, with the help of timely and adequate credit, technical assistance and facilities for the marketing and distribution of products, the land will become for the man who works it the basis of his economic stability, the foundation of his increasing welfare, and the guarantee of his freedom and dignity.
7. To eliminate adult illiteracy and by 1970 to assure, as a minimum, access to 6 years of primary education for each school-age child in Latin America; to modernize and expand vocational, secondary and higher educational and training facilities, to strengthen the capacity for basic and applied research; and to provide the competent personnel required in rapidly-growing societies.
8. To increase life expectancy at birth by a minimum of 5 years, and to increase the ability to learn and produce, by improving individual and public health. To attain this goal it will be necessary, among other measures, to provide adequate potable water supply and sewage disposal to not less than 70 percent of the urban and 50 percent of the rural population; to reduce the mortality rate of children less than 5 years of age by at least one-half; to control the more serious communicable diseases, according to their importance as a cause of sickness, disability, and death; to eradicate those illnesses, especially malaria, for which effective techniques are known; to improve nutrition; to train medical and health personnel to meet at least minimum requirements; to improve basic health services at national and local levels; and to intensify scientific research and apply its results more fully and effectively to the prevention and cure of illness.
9. To increase the construction of low-cost houses for low-income families in order to replace inadequate and deficient housing and to reduce housing shortages; and to provide necessary public services to both urban and rural centers of population.
10. To maintain stable price levels, avoiding inflation or deflation and the consequent social hard-

ships and maldistribution of resources, always bearing in mind the necessity of maintaining an adequate rate of economic growth.

11. To strengthen existing agreements on economic integration, with a view to the ultimate fulfillment of aspirations for a Latin American common market that will expand and diversify trade among the Latin American countries and thus contribute to the economic growth of the region.
12. To develop cooperative programs designed to prevent the harmful effects of excessive fluctuations in the foreign exchange earnings derived from exports of primary products, which are of vital importance to economic and social development; and to adopt the measures necessary to facilitate the access of Latin American exports to goals it will be necessary:

Title II. Economic and Social Development
Chapter I. Basic Requirements for Economic and Social Development

The American Republics recognize that to achieve the foregoing goals it will be necessary:

1. That comprehensive and well-conceived national programs of economic and social development, aimed at the achievement of self-sustaining growth, be carried out in accordance with democratic principles.
2. That national programs of economic and social development be based on the principle of self-help—as established in the Act of Bogota—and on the maximum use of domestic resources, taking into account the special conditions of each country.
3. That in the preparation and execution of plans for economic and social development, women should be placed on an equal footing with men.
4. That the Latin American countries obtain sufficient external financial assistance, a substantial portion of which should be extended on flexible conditions with respect to periods and terms of repayment and forms of utilization, in order to supplement domestic capital formation and reinforce their import capacity; and that, in support of well-conceived programs, which include the necessary structural reforms and measures for the mobilization of internal resources, a supply of capital from all external sources during the coming 10 years of at least 20 billion dollars be made available to the Latin American countries, with priority to the relatively less developed countries. The greater part of this sum should be in public funds.
5. That institutions in both the public and private sectors, including labor organizations, cooperatives, and commercial, industrial, and financial institutions, be strengthened and improved for the increasing and effective use of domestic resources, and that the social reforms necessary to permit a fair distribution of the fruits of economic and social progress be carried out.

Chapter II. National Development Programs

1. Participating Latin American countries agree to introduce or strengthen systems for the preparation, execution, and periodic revision of national programs for economic and social development consistent with the principles, objectives, and requirements contained in this document. Participating Latin American countries should formulate, if possible within the next eighteen months, long-term development programs. Such programs should embrace, according to the characteristics of each country, the elements outlined in the Appendix.
2. National development programs should incorporate self-help efforts directed to:
   a. Improvement of human resources and widening of opportunities by raising general standards of education and health; improving and extending technical education and professional training with emphasis on science and technology; providing adequate remuneration for work performed, encouraging the talents of managers, entrepreneurs, and wage earners; providing more productive employment for underemployed manpower; establishing effective systems of labor relations, and procedures for consultation and collaboration among public authorities, employer associations, and labor organizations; promoting the establishment and expansion of local institutions for basic and applied research; and improving the standards of public administration.

b. Wider development and more efficient use of natural resources, especially those which are now idle or under-utilized, including measures for the processing of raw materials.
c. The strengthening of the agricultural base, progressively, extending the benefits of the land to those who work it, and ensuring in countries with Indian populations the integration of these populations into the economic, social, and cultural processes of modern life. To carry out these aims, measures should be adopted, among others, to establish or improve, as the case may be, the following services: extension, credit, technical assistance, agricultural research and mechanization; health and education; storage and distribution; cooperatives and farmers' associations; and community development.
d. More effective, rational and equitable mobilization and use of financial resources through the reform of tax structures, including fair and adequate taxation of large incomes and real estate, and the strict application of measures to improve fiscal administration. Development programs should include the adaptation of budget expenditures to development needs, measures for the maintenance of price stability, the creation of essential credit facilities at reasonable rates of interest, and the encouragement of private savings.
e. Promotion through appropriate measures, including the signing of agreements for the purpose of reducing or eliminating double taxation, of conditions that will encourage the flow of foreign investments and help to increase the capital resources of participating countries in need of capital.
f. Improvement of systems distribution and sales in order to make markets more competitive and prevent monopolistic practices.

Chapter III. Immediate and Short-term Action Measures

1. Recognizing that a number of Latin American countries, despite their best efforts, may require emergency financial assistance, the United States will provide assistance from the funds which are or may be established for such purposes. The United States stands ready to take prompt action on applications for such assistance. Applications relating to existing situations should be submitted within the next 60 days.
2. Participating Latin American countries should, in addition to creating or strengthening machinery for long-term development programming, immediately increase their efforts to accelerate their development by giving special emphasis to the following objectives:
   a. The completion of projects already underway and the initiation of projects for which the basic studies have been made, in order to accelerate their financing and execution.
   b. The implementation of new projects which are designed:
      (1) To meet the most pressing social needs and benefit directly the greatest number of people;
      (2) To concentrate efforts within each country in the less developed or more depressed areas in which particularly serious social problems exist;
      (3) To utilize idle capacity or resources, particularly under-employed manpower; and
      (4) To survey and assess natural resources.
   c. The facilitation of the preparation and execution of long-term programs through measures designed:
      (1) To train teachers, technicians, and specialists;
      (2) To provide accelerated training to workers and farmers;
      (3) To improve basic statistics;
      (4) To establish needed credit and marketing facilities; and
      (5) To improve services and administration.
3. The United States will assist in carrying out these short-term measures with a view to achieving concrete results from the Alliance for Progress at the earliest possible moment. In connection with the measures set forth above, and in accordance with the statement of President Kennedy, the United States will provide assistance under the Alliance, including assistance for the financing of short-term measures, totaling more than one billion dollars in a year ending March 1962.

Chapter IV. External Assistance in Support of National Development Programs

1. The economic and social development of Latin America will require a large amount of additional public and private financial assistance on the part of capital-exporting countries, including the members of the Development Assistance Group and international lending agencies. The measures provided for in the Act of Bogota and the new measures provided for in this Charter, are designed to create a framework within which such additional assistance can be provided and effectively utilized.
2. The United States will assist those participating countries whose development programs establish self-help measures and economic and social policies and programs consistent with the goals and principles of this Charter. To supplement the domestic efforts of such countries, the United States is prepared to allocate resources which, along with those anticipated from other external sources, will be of a scope and magnitude adequate to realize the goals envisaged in this Charter. Such assistance will be allocated to both social and economic development and, where appropriate, will take the form of grants or loans on flexible terms and conditions. The participating countries will request the assistance of other capital-exporting countries and appropriate institutions so that they may provide assistance for the attainment of these objectives.
3. The United States will assist in the financing of technical assistance projects proposed by a participating country or by the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States for the purpose of:
   a. Providing experts contracted in agreement with governments to work under their direction and to assist them in the preparation of specific investment projects and the strengthening of national mechanisms for preparing projects, using specialized engineering firms where appropriate;
   b. Carrying out, pursuant to existing agreements for cooperation among the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Inter-American Development Bank, field investigations and studies, including those relating to development problems, the organization of national planning agencies and the preparation of development programs, agrarian reform and rural development, health, cooperatives, housing, education and professional training, and taxation and tax administration; and
   c. Convening meetings of experts and officials on development and related problems.

   The governments or above mentioned organizations should, when appropriate, seek the cooperation of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the execution of these activities.
4. The participating Latin American countries recognize that each has in varying degree a capacity to assist fellow republics by providing technical and financial assistance. They recognize that this capacity will increase as their economies grow. They therefore affirm their intention to assist fellow republics increasingly as their individual circumstances permit.

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Source: U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Inter-American Relations: A Collection of Documents, Legislation, Descriptions of Inter-American Organizations, and Other Material Pertaining to Inter-American Affairs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), The Avalon Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam16.htm.

82. John F. Kennedy: Inaugural Address, 20 January 1961

Introduction

The young Democrat John F. Kennedy became president of the United States in January 1961, the youngest man ever elected to that office, succeeding the Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower, the oldest man until that time to be president. Kennedy subscribed almost unthinkingly to orthodox Cold War ideology and proclaimed the need for

the United States to fight Soviet communism more energetically than in the past. Despite serious health problems of which the American people were largely unaware, Kennedy projected an image of youthful dynamism and vigor, and his administration made almost a cult of physical fitness. Young, handsome, and a master of appealing rhetoric, through his style Kennedy caught the imagination not just of Americans but of young people around the world. He appealed to Americans to be prepared to make sacrifices for their country and to wage the Cold War until victory was attained, pledging that the United States would help its allies whatever the price. Breaking with Eisenhower's New Look strategy, which was heavily reliant upon the threat of nuclear weapons, Kennedy sought to make American military forces better able to fight conventional and guerrilla wars. Seeking to win the loyalties of decolonizing and relatively poor states, he also urged ordinary Americans to work closely with their counterparts in developing countries, sharing their living standards and cooperating on projects designed to benefit those nations, an appeal that led to the establishment of the Peace Corps. Despite promising to build up American military forces and to stand firm in the Cold War, he also sought to open serious arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, evidence of his recognition that neither power could afford an outright nuclear war. In Kennedy's inaugural address, therefore, one can discern the seeds of many of his subsequent policies, including his 1961 decision to support West Berlin, his moves to increase the American commitment to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), his demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its missiles from nearby Cuba in 1962, and his support for serious disarmament negotiations and the Atmospheric Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

Primary Source

We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom—symbolizing an end as well as a beginning—signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago.

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

This much we pledge—and more.

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do—for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom—and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.

To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge—to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support—to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective—to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak—and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.

We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course—both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war.

So let us begin anew—remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us.

Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms—and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.

Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and commerce.

Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah—to "undo the heavy burdens . . . [and] let the oppressed go free."

And if a beachhead of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin.

In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need—not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation"—a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.

Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—I welcome it. I do not believe that any

of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 1–3.

83. Fidel Castro: Second Declaration of Havana, 4 February 1962

Introduction

On 4 February 1962, Cuban communist leader Fidel Castro delivered this address, which became known as the Second Declaration of Havana. In it, he stated his goal of creating a communist society in Cuba based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, with its principles of spreading communist revolution around the globe. Such a goal ensured that Cuba openly challenged U.S.-based notions of democracy and capitalism, positioning itself as the leader of international revolution in Latin America. Castro was motivated to make such a strong statement in part because the U.S. government had already launched several covert operations in Cuba in an attempt to overthrow his government. Seeking protection and security, Castro, in response, turned to the Soviet Union, which was by then supplying him with substantial military aid, and offered to provide bases in Cuba for Soviet nuclear missiles. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev accepted and sent substantial numbers of Soviet short- and medium-range missiles to Cuba, together with thousands of Soviet troops. U.S. surveillance planes discovered the missiles in October 1962, sparking what was probably the most dangerous crisis of the entire Cold War.

Primary Source

[. . .]

What is Cuba's history but that of Latin America? What is the history of Latin America but the history of Asia, Africa, and Oceania? And what is the history of all these peoples but the history of the cruelest exploitation of the world by imperialism?

At the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, a handful of economically developed nations had divided the world among themselves subjecting two thirds of humanity to their economic and political domination. Humanity was forced to work for the dominating classes of the group of nations which had a developed capitalist economy.

The historic circumstances which permitted certain European countries and the United States of North America to attain a high industrial development level, put them in a position which enabled them to subject and exploit the rest of the world.

What motives lay behind this expansion of the industrial powers? Were they moral, "civilizing" reasons, as they claimed? No: their motives were economic.

The discovery of America sent the European conquerors across the seas to occupy and to exploit the lands and peoples of other continents; the lust for riches was the basic motivation for their conduct. America's discovery took place in the search for shorter ways to the Orient, whose products Europe valued highly.

A new social class, the merchants and the producers of articles manufactured for commerce, arose from the feudal society of lords and serfs in the latter part of the Middle Ages.

The lust for gold promoted the efforts of the new class. The lust for profit was the incentive of their behavior throughout its history. As industry and trade developed, the social influence of the new class grew. The new productive forces maturing in the midst of the feudal society increasingly clashed with feudalism and its serfdom, its laws, its institutions, its philosophy, its morals, its art, and its political ideology.

[. . .]

Since the end of the Second World War, the Latin American nations are becoming pauperized constantly. The value of their exports keeps diminishing, costs of imports increase, the per capita income falls. The dreadful percentages of child death rate do not decrease, the number of illiterates grows higher, the peoples lack employment, land, adequate housing, schools, hospitals, communication systems and the means of subsistence. On the other hand, North American investments exceed 10 billion dollars. Latin America, moreover, supplies cheap raw materials and pays high prices for manufactured articles. Like the first Spanish conquerors, who exchanged mirrors and trinkets with the Indians for silver and gold, so the United States trades with Latin America. To hold on to this torrent of wealth, to take greater possession of America's resources and to exploit its long-suffering peoples: this is what is hidden behind the military pacts, the military missions and Washington's diplomatic lobbying.

[. . .]

Wherever roads are closed to the peoples, where repression of workers and peasants is fierce, where the domination of Yankee monopolies is strongest, the first and most important lesson is to understand that it is neither just nor correct to divert the peoples with the vain and fanciful illusion that the dominant classes can be uprooted by legal means which do not and will not exist. The ruling classes are entrenched in all positions of state power. They monopolize the teaching field. They dominate all means of mass communication. They have infinite financial resources. Theirs is a power which the monopolies and the ruling few will defend by blood and fire with the strength of their police and their armies.

The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution. We know that in America and throughout the world the revolution will be victorious. But revolutionaries cannot sit in the doorways of their homes to watch the corpse of imperialism pass by. The role of Job does not behoove a revolutionary. Each year by which America's liberation may be hastened will mean millions of children rescued from death, millions of minds freed for learning, infinitudes of sorrow spared the peoples. Even though the Yankee imperialists are preparing a bloodbath for America they will not succeed in drowning the people's struggles. They will evoke universal hatred against themselves. This will be the last act of their rapacious and caveman system.

[. . .]

The People of Cuba

The National General Assembly of the People of Cuba hereby resolves, that this Declaration be known as the Second Declaration of Havana and be translated into the principal languages and distributed throughout the world. It also agrees to request from all the friends of the Cuban Revolution in Latin America that it be widely spread among the working, peasant, student and intellectual masses of the fraternal lands of this continent. We certify that the Second Declaration of Havana was read and approved by the National General Assembly of the People of Cuba, held in the Martí Plaza, Havana, Cuba, Free Territory of America, on 4 February 1962.

Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, President
Fidel Castro Ruz, Prime Minister

Source: Fidel Castro, *Declarations of Havana* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962).

84. Port Huron Manifesto, 1962

Introduction

In the early 1960s, young people in the United States, inspired by President John F. Kennedy's appeal to "ask what you can do for your country," actively sought to change their society and the world for the better. Many took part in the civil rights movement, but they envisaged trying to extend the cause of reform to cover other aspects of political life. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the decade's most significant manifestation of student radicalism, was founded in 1960 and constituted part of the New Left movement. The first major statement published by the SDS was the Port Huron Manifesto of June 1962, written at a convention of the organization held in Port Huron, Michigan. Its major author was the youthful Tom Hayden, a student from a working-class family at the University of Michigan. The manifesto reflected the dissatisfaction that, despite the comfortable lives they enjoyed, many young Americans of the late 1950s and early 1960s felt toward their society. The ongoing civil rights struggle convinced them that many African Americans were living in conditions of personal and social degradation that contravened the basic promises of equality enshrined in the American way of life and democratic tradition. The Cold War, by this time simply an accepted part of the backdrop of life in the United States, exposed all Americans to the risk of nuclear destruction, while the American armed forces and business had major "economic and military investments in the Cold War status quo." Despite the habitual employment of the rhetoric of democracy, the American political system, the manifesto charged, was dominated by "the irresponsible power of military and business interests," with no demand for fundamental structural change. In an era of economic prosperity, poverty and deprivation were widespread, and work was often unfulfilling. Individuals felt powerless, unable to make any major changes in their community. In idealistic and sweepingly ambitious terms, the manifesto called for the creation of a "new left," dedicated to revitalizing society, politics, the international system, and human relationships and objectives. Among the specific goals were the fairer distribution of resources, tackling both urban and rural poverty, forcing corporations to behave with a sense of public responsibility, strengthening the existing labor movement, and cutting military spending. Students were urged to reform their universities, to make them less bureaucratic and more democratic and responsive to student wishes to focus on social reform and change. The United States, in company with the Soviet Union, was criticized for failing to work for or implement international peace. Both nations were urged to make serious efforts to effect nuclear disarmament and end the Cold War, including the international acceptance by all parties of the divisions of such contentious states as Korea, China, Germany, and Vietnam. Hayden, president of SDS for the academic year 1962–1963, included this criticism of U.S. international policies over the wishes of more conciliatory colleagues, who preferred to avoid controversy by restricting their caveats merely to Soviet policies. The authors of the Port Huron Manifesto demonstrated an almost limitless confidence in what it might be possible for young Americans to achieve, a near utopian faith in their ability to change society and the world that was characteristic of the early 1960s. By the mid-1960s, and especially after President Lyndon B. Johnson committed American ground forces to Vietnam in the spring of 1965, the organization also focused heavily on opposition to the Vietnam War, helping to organize student resistance to the draft that made all young American men liable to conscription and organizing massive antiwar demonstrations and teach-ins. By 1969 SDS had disintegrated into numerous competing factions, divided in terms of political ideology and also over the issue of whether or not to endorse violence as a political tool. By 1972 SDS was defunct, although several of its members, including Hayden, subsequently became significant mainstream political figures.

Primary Source

Introduction: Agenda for a Generation

We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.

When we were kids the United States was the wealthiest and strongest country in the world; the only one with the atom bomb, the least scarred by modern war, an initiator of the United Nations that we thought would distribute Western influence throughout the

world. Freedom and equality for each individual, government of, by, and for the people—these American values we found good principles by which we could live as men. Many of us began maturing in complacency.

As we grew, however, our comfort was penetrated by events too troubling to dismiss. First, the permeating and victimizing fact of human degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle against racial bigotry, compelled most of us from silence to activism. Second, the enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of the Bomb, brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract "others" we knew more directly because of our common peril, might die at any time. We might deliberately ignore, or avoid, or fail to feel all other human problems, but not these two, for these were too immediate and crushing in their impact, too challenging in the demand that we as individuals take the responsibility for encounter and resolution.

While these and other problems either directly oppressed us or rankled our consciences and became our own subjective concerns, we began to see complicated and disturbing paradoxes in our surrounding America. The declaration "all men are created equal . . ." rang hollow before the facts of Negro life in the South and the big cities of the North. The proclaimed peaceful intentions of the United States contradicted its economic and military investments in the Cold War status quo.

We witnessed, and continue to witness, other paradoxes. With nuclear energy whole cities can easily be powered, yet the dominant nation-states seem more likely to unleash destruction greater than that incurred in all wars of human history. Although our own technology is destroying old and creating new forms of social organization, men still tolerate meaningless work and idleness. While two-thirds of mankind suffers under nourishment, our own upper classes revel amidst superfluous abundance. Although world population is expected to double in forty years, the nations still tolerate anarchy as a major principle of international conduct and uncontrolled exploitation governs the sapping of the earth's physical resources. Although mankind desperately needs revolutionary leadership, America rests in national stalemate, its goals ambiguous and tradition-bound instead of informed and clear, its democratic system apathetic and manipulated rather than "of, by, and for the people."

Not only did tarnish appear on our image of American virtue, not only did disillusion occur when the hypocrisy of American ideals was discovered, but we began to sense that what we had originally seen as the American Golden Age was actually the decline of an era. The worldwide outbreak of revolution against colonialism and imperialism, the entrenchment of totalitarian states, the menace of war, overpopulation, international disorder, supertechnology—these trends were testing the tenacity of our own commitment to democracy and freedom and our abilities to visualize their application to a world in upheaval.

Our work is guided by the sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living. But we are a minority—the vast majority of our people regard the temporary equilibriums of our society and world as eternally functional parts. In this is perhaps the outstanding paradox; we ourselves are imbued with urgency, yet the message of our society is that there is no viable alternative to the present. Beneath the reassuring tones of the politicians, beneath the common opinion that America will "muddle through," beneath the stagnation of those who have closed their minds to the future, is the pervading feeling that there simply are no alternatives, that our times have witnessed the exhaustion not only of Utopias, but of any new departures as well. Feeling the press of complexity upon the emptiness of life, people are fearful of the thought that at any moment things might be thrust out of control. They fear change itself, since change might smash whatever invisible framework seems to hold back chaos for them now. For most Americans, all crusades are suspect, threatening. The fact that each individual sees apathy in his fellows perpetuates the common reluctance to organize for change. The dominant institutions are complex enough to blunt the minds of their potential critics, and entrenched enough to swiftly dissipate or entirely repel the energies of protest and reform, thus limiting human expectancies. Then, too, we are a materially improved society, and by our own improvements we seem to have weakened the case for further change.

Some would have us believe that Americans feel contentment amidst prosperity—but might it not better be called a glaze above deeply felt anxieties about their role in the new world? And if these anxieties produce a developed indifference to human affairs, do they not as well produce a yearning to believe that there is an alternative to the present, that something can be done to change circumstances in the school, the workplaces, the bureaucracies, the government? It is to this latter yearning, at once the spark and engine of change, that we direct our present appeal. The search for truly democratic alternatives to the present, and a commitment to social experimentation with them, is a worthy and fulfilling human enterprise, one which moves us and, we hope, others today. On such a basis do we offer this document of our convictions and analysis: as an effort in understanding and changing the conditions of humanity in the late twentieth century, an effort rooted in the ancient, still unfulfilled conception of man attaining determining influence over his circumstances of life.

Values

Making values explicit—an initial task in establishing alternatives—is an activity that has been devalued and corrupted. The conventional moral terms of the age, the politician moralities—"free world," "people's democracies"—reflect realities poorly, if at all, and seem to function more as ruling myths than as descriptive principles. But neither has our experience in the universities brought us moral enlightenment. Our professors and administrators sacrifice controversy to public relations; their curriculums change more slowly than the living events of the world; their skills and silence are purchased by investors in the arms race; passion is called unscholastic. The questions we might want raised—what is really important? can we live in a different and better way? if we wanted to change society, how would we do it?—are not thought to be questions of a "fruitful, empirical nature," and thus are brushed aside.

Unlike youth in other countries we are used to moral leadership being exercised and moral dimensions being clarified by our elders. But today, for us, not even the liberal and socialist preachments of the past seem adequate to the forms of the present. Consider the old slogans: Capitalism Cannot Reform Itself, United Front Against Fascism, General Strike, All Out on May Day. Or, more recently, No Cooperation with Commies and Fellow Travelers, Ideologies Are Exhausted, Bipartisanship, No Utopias. These are incomplete, and there are few new prophets. It has been said that our liberal and socialist predecessors were plagued by vision without program, while our own generation is plagued by program without vision. All around us there is astute grasp of method, technique—the committee, the ad hoc group, the lobbyist, the hard and soft sell, the make, the projected image—but, if pressed critically, such expertise in incompetent to explain its implicit ideals. It is highly fashionable to identify oneself by old categories, or by naming a respected political figure, or by explaining "how we would vote" on various issues.

Theoretic chaos has replaced the idealistic thinking of old—and, unable to reconstitute theoretic order, men have condemned idealism itself. Doubt has replaced hopefulness—and men act out a defeatism that is labeled realistic. The decline of utopia and hope is in fact one of the defining features of social life today. The reasons are various: the dreams of the older left were perverted by Stalinism and never re-created; the congressional stalemate makes men narrow their view of the possible; the specialization of human activity leaves little room for sweeping thought; the horrors of the twentieth century symbolized in the gas ovens and concentration camps and atom bombs, have blasted hopefulness. To be idealistic is to be considered apocalyptic, deluded. To have no serious aspirations, on the contrary, is to be "tough-minded."

In suggesting social goals and values, therefore, we are aware of entering a sphere of some disrepute. Perhaps matured by the past, we have no formulas, no closed theories—but that does not mean values are beyond discussion and tentative determination. A first task of any social movement is to convince people that the search for orienting theories and the creation of human values is complex but worthwhile. We are aware that to avoid platitudes we must analyze the concrete conditions of social order. But to direct such an analysis we

must use the guideposts of basic principles. Our own social values involve conceptions of human beings, human relationships, and social systems.

We regard men as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love. In affirming these principles we are aware of countering perhaps the dominant conceptions of man in the twentieth century: that he is a thing to be manipulated, and that he is inherently incapable of directing his own affairs. We oppose the depersonalization that reduces human being to the status of things—if anything, the brutalities of the twentieth century teach that means and ends are intimately related, that vague appeals to "posterity" cannot justify the mutilations of the present. We oppose, too, the doctrine of human incompetence because it rests essentially on the modern fact that men have been "competently" manipulated into incompetence—we see little reason why men cannot meet with increasing skill the complexities and responsibilities of their situation, if society is organized not for minority, but for majority, participation in decision-making.

Men have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity. It is this potential that we regard as crucial and to which we appeal, not to the human potentiality for violence, unreason, and submission to authority. The goal of man and society should be human independence: a concern not with image of popularity but with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic; a quality of mind not compulsively driven by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts status values, nor one which represses all threats to its habits, but one which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly faces problems which are troubling and unresolved; one with an intuitive awareness of possibilities, an active sense of curiosity, an ability and willingness to learn.

This kind of independence does not mean egotistic individualism—the object is not to have one's way so much as it is to have a way that is one's own. Nor do we deify man—we merely have faith in his potential.

Human relationships should involve fraternity and honesty. Human interdependence is contemporary fact; human brotherhood must be willed, however, as a condition of future survival and as the most appropriate form of social relations. Personal links between man and man are needed, especially to go beyond the partial and fragmentary bonds of function that bind men only as worker to worker, employer to employee, teacher to student, American to Russian.

Loneliness, estrangement, isolation describe the vast distance between man and man today. These dominant tendencies cannot be overcome by better personnel management, nor by improved gadgets, but only when a love of man overcomes the idolatrous worship of things by man.

As the individualism we affirm is not egoism, the selflessness we affirm is not self-elimination. On the contrary, we believe in generosity of a kind that imprints one's unique individual qualities in the relation to other men, and to all human activity. Further, to dislike isolation is not to favor the abolition of privacy; the latter differs from isolation in that it occurs or is abolished according to individual will. We would replace power rooted in possession, privilege, or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, and creativity.

As a social system we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.

In a participatory democracy, the political life would be based in several root principles:

—that decision-making of basic social consequence be carried on by public groupings;
—that politics be seen positively, as the art of collectively creating an acceptable pattern of social relations;
—that politics has the function of bringing people out of isolation and into community, thus being a

necessary, though not sufficient, means of finding meaning in personal life;
—that the political order should serve to clarify problems in a way instrumental to their solution; it should provide outlets for the expression of personal grievance and aspiration; opposing views should be organized so as to illuminate choices and facilitate the attainment of goals; channels should be commonly available to relate men to knowledge and to power so that private problems—from bad recreation facilities to personal alienation—are formulated as general issues.

The economic sphere would have as its basis the principles:

—that work should involve incentives worthier than money or survival. It should be educative, not stultifying; creative, not mechanical; self-directed, not manipulated, encouraging independence, a respect for others, a sense of dignity, and a willingness to accept social responsibility, since it is this experience that has crucial influence on habits, perceptions and individual ethics;
—that the economic experience is so personally decisive that the individual must share in its full determination;
—that the economy itself is of such social importance that its major resources and means of production should be open to democratic participation and subject to democratic social regulation.

Like the political and economic ones, major social institutions—cultural, educational, rehabilitative, and others—should be generally organized with the well-being and dignity of man as the essential measure of success.

In social change or interchange, we find violence to be abhorrent because it requires generally the transformation of the target, be it a human being or a community of people, into a depersonalized object of hate. It is imperative that the means of violence be abolished and the institutions—local, national, international—that encourage non-violence as a condition of conflict be developed.

These are our central values, in skeletal form. It remains vital to understand their denial or attainment in the context of the modern world.

[. . .]

Source: Tom Hayden, "Port Huron Statement," http://www.tomhayden.com/porthuron.htm.

85. John F. Kennedy: President Kennedy and Staff Discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis, 18 October 1962

Introduction

On the morning of 16 October 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy learned in an intelligence briefing that a large number of Soviet missiles had been installed on the nearby island of Cuba and were apparently close to operational. Since 1959 Cuba had been ruled by a socialist revolutionary government headed by Fidel Castro, which Kennedy and his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had both unavailingly tried to topple. The Kennedy administration regarded the secret deployment of these missiles as an unfriendly act. This news marked the beginning of fourteen days of intensive meetings among the president and his top national security advisors, the Executive Committee (Excom) of the administration's most prominent cabinet members, including Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson; Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his deputy; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his deputy; Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon; CIA Director John McCone; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy; and, on occasion, leading congressmen and senators. The question facing the president and his advisors was how they should respond. At this early stage, they were considering five graduated plans of action (Options I–V) against the missile installations, ranging from various levels of air strikes up to full scale

invasion. Rusk thought that if the United States did not react forcefully to the presence of these missiles in Cuba, it would lose all credibility with both its allies and the Soviet Union. McNamara stated his "personal" view that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba did not "change the military equation . . . at all" but nonetheless agreed with Rusk that their presence was "primarily a political problem." McNamara felt that "holding the alliance together" and "conditioning [Soviet leader Nikita] Khrushchev for our future moves," together with domestic political considerations, "all require[d] action that . . . the shift in military balance does not require." Kennedy feared that most U.S. allies regarded its past problems with Cuba as "a fixation of the United States and not a serious military threat." General Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the JCS, warned that time was not in favor of the United States, as increasing numbers of missile sites were likely to become operational on a daily basis. All those attending the meeting were clearly conscious that the situation was extremely dangerous and could easily spiral out of control into a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet in the very early stages of the crisis, all the courses of action under consideration involved direct military action against Cuba. Only later did U.S. officials opt for the quarantine option, publicly demanding that the Soviet Union remove the missiles while imposing a naval blockade around Cuba.

Primary Source

[. . .]

McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that there are a series of alternative planned arrangements. Roman numeral I was about 50 sorties, directed solely against the known MRBMs, known as of last night, to Roman numeral V, which covers an alternative invasion plan.

All of these plans are based on one very important assumption: That we would attack, with conventional weapons, against an enemy who is not equipped with operational nuclear weapons. If there's any possibility that the enemy is equipped with operational nuclear weapons, I'm certain the plans would have to be changed.

Last evening we were discussing the relative merits of these forms of military action, assuming that at some point military action was required. It has been the view of the Chiefs, based on discussions within the last two days, and it was certainly my view, that either Roman numeral I or Roman numeral II, very limited air strikes against very limited targets, would be quite inconclusive, very risky, and almost certainly lead to further military action prior to which we would have paid an unnecessary price for the gains we had achieved.

And, therefore, the Chiefs and I would certainly have recommended last night, and I would recommend more strongly today, that we not consider undertaking either Roman numeral I or Roman numeral II, so that we would consider nothing short of a full invasion as a military action. And this only on the assumption that we're operating against a force that does not possess operational nuclear weapons.

President Kennedy: Why does this information change the recommendation?

McNamara: Last evening, it was my personal belief that there were more targets than we knew of, and it was probable there would be more targets than we could know of at the start of anyone of these strikes. The information of this morning, I think, simply demonstrates the validity of that conclusion of last evening.

Secondly, when we're talking of Roman numeral I, it's a very limited strike against MRBMs only, and it leaves in existence IL-28s with nuclear weapon-carrying capability, and a number of other aircraft with nuclear weapon-carrying capability, and aircraft with strike capability that could be exercised during our attack, or immediately following our attack on the MRBMs, with great possible risk of loss to either Guantanamo and/or the eastern coast of the U.S.

I say great loss, I'm not thinking in terms of tens of thousands, but I'm thinking in terms of sporadic attacks against our civilian population, which would

lead to losses I think we would find it hard to justify in relation to the alternative courses open to us, and in relation to the very limited accomplishment of our limited number of strikes.

Robert Kennedy: What about alternative number II, on the basis that you're going against offensive weapons. You're going to go against the missiles, and you're going to go against the planes. What's the argument against that? I mean that would prevent them from knocking our population base.

McNamara: It must be preferred over number I, in my opinion. It would have to be larger than is shown now because of the additional number of targets required, and it gets very close to alternative III, compared to the number of sorties. The number II [strike] was prepared before we had the additional information of last night's [photo] interpretation. We showed a hundred sorties. I think it more likely that number II, with the information of now, and the information we're likely to have today and tomorrow, will turn into number III, which is a 200-sortie strike. I doubt very much we could stop there.

Taylor: I would agree with that statement of the Secretary's. Really, II is hardly possible now. We're really talking about III, because we have to take the SAM sites out, if you want to go for [unclear] airfield strikes [unclear] targets related [unclear]. I think that's particularly true if we expect to have follow-up surveillance. SAM site facilities have become operational, and even though we take out [unclear] I and II, we [are] still going to have a requirement to know what's going on. [unclear] a long air war I would say, [unclear] under I, II, or III, actually.

President Kennedy: [With] number II, you don't need to take out the SAM sites before they become operational.

Taylor: They'll be operational at the same time.

McNamara: We have almost certainly added 2 more targets than are indicated here. Sixteen targets shown. We have at least 3 more targets from evidence since last night, and we will certainly have some more tonight and tomorrow. And, therefore, II merges very directly into III. If the SAM sites become operational, II becomes III because, in a very real sense, that's maybe the . . .

President Kennedy: Let me ask you this: If I remember, [we're] talking about III versus V, isn't it?

McNamara: Yes, sir.

President Kennedy: Well, now, the advantage of III is that you would hope to do it in a day.

McNamara: Yes. It could be done in a day.

President Kennedy: Invasion, that would be V, would be 7, 8, or 9 days, with all the consequences . . .

McNamara: That is correct.

President Kennedy: We would increase the tension.

Now, if we did III, we would assume that by the end of the day their ability to use planes against us—after all, we don't have that much range, so they'd have to come back to the field and [unclear]. You would say—

McNamara: You would assume, by the end of the day, their air force could be nearly destroyed. I say nearly because there might be a few sporadic weapons around.

Taylor: And I would just want to say that there'll never be a guarantee of 100 percent.

President Kennedy: As least as far as their [unclear]. I would think you [the Soviets would] have to go on the defensive, are not going to commit nuclear weapons to be used against the United States from Cuba unless you're going to be using them for everyplace.

McNamara: Well, I'm not certain they can stop it, this is why I emphasized the plan I did. I don't believe the Soviets would authorize their use against the U.S., but they might nonetheless be used, and, therefore, I underline this assumption, that all of these cases are premised on the assumption there are no operational nuclear weapons there.

If there's any possibility of that I would strongly recommend that these plans be modified substantially. Now, I evaded the question Secretary Rusk asked me, and I evaded it because I wanted this information. This stuff first. The question he asked me was: How does, in effect, how does the introduction of these weapons to Cuba change the military equation, the military position of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R.?

And, speaking strictly in military terms, really in terms of weapons, it doesn't change it at all, in my personal opinion. My personal views are not shared by the Chiefs. They are not shared by many others in the Department. However, I feel very strongly on this point, and I think I could argue a case, a strong case, in defense of my position.

This doesn't really have any bearing on the issue, in my opinion, because it is not a military problem that we're facing. It's a political problem. It's a problem of holding the alliance together. It's a problem of properly conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves. And the problem of holding the alliance together, and the problem of conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves, the problem of dealing with our domestic public, all requires action that, in my opinion, the shift in military balance does not require.

President Kennedy: On holding the alliance. Which one would strain the alliance more: this attack by us on Cuba, which most allies regard as a fixation of the United States and not a serious military threat? And you'd have to outline a condition you have to go in, before they would accept, support our action against Cuba, because they think that we're slightly demented on this subject.

So there isn't any doubt that, whatever action we take against Cuba, no matter how good our films are, or what this is going to cause in Latin America, a lot of people would regard this as a mad act by the United States, which is due to a loss of nerve because they will argue that taken at its worst, the presence of these missiles really doesn't change the balance. We started to think the other way, I mean, the view in America. But what's everybody else going to think when it's done to this guy?

McNamara: Aren't the others going to think exactly as I do?

Taylor: May I comment, sir?

With regard to what we've just seen in intelligence, it seems to me three things stand out. The first is the very rapid energy with which they are developing the movement in the first 24 hours since Sunday [October 14]. They are moving very fast to make these weapons operational.

Whether they're operational today? I would agree with the Secretary that probably not, but I don't think anyone can assure you that at any time, that at least one or more of these missiles will not become operational.

Now, number two, the IL-28s. We've been expecting this. But now it turns up in a very powerful location, I would say, and [unclear] ideal place to take them out.

Third, the IRBMs. This really put a new perspective on the way I look at it [this problem]. Yesterday, when we only had a few of the mobile type, I was far from convinced that the big showdown would be required. And we're getting new pictures, and the vision of an island that's going to be a forward base of major importance to the Soviets.

All of the targets that we're seeing, however, are the kind that air attack [words unclear] we can't take this threat out by actions from here. So we had argued more and more that if, indeed, you're going to prevent that kind of thing . . .

Bundy: But you don't mean that you can't prevent it in the sense of stopping it from happening the next day. You mean that—

Taylor: For the long pull—

Bundy:—you're going to have to take the island?

Taylor: Yes, you can't destroy a hole in the ground. We can't prevent these constructions going ahead by any threat. Diplomatic action might stop it, but a totally

diplomatic action [unclear] will not stop a threat of this kind from building up.

Now, if those statements are roughly correct, then what would it mean in terms of time? Well, it means that, insofar as getting the mobile missiles out, time is of the essence. But the faster the better, because it's not already too late. And I would say that, again, we're not sure that it is not too late, with respect to one or more of the missiles.

Source: Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1997), 126–135.

86. John F. Kennedy: Cuban Missile Crisis Speech, 22 October 1962

Introduction

The nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States intensified during the 1950s and 1960s, triggering the most dangerous crisis of the entire Cold War. In the late 1950s many Americans, including Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy during the 1960 election campaign, alleged that a missile gap existed between the Soviet Union and the United States, with the Soviets far surpassing their American rivals in the number of missiles deployed. In reality, the U.S. edge in missiles targeted on the Soviet Union was approximately seventeen to one. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was eager to reduce this imbalance. After a botched American-backed invasion attempt in March 1961 to overthrow the left-wing procommunist regime that Fidel Castro had established in Cuba in 1959, less than 100 miles from American soil, Khrushchev also sought to protect the Cuban revolutionary from further U.S. efforts to destabilize and topple him. In 1962 the Soviet Union therefore secretly installed substantial numbers of short- and medium-range missiles in Cuba, protected by more than 40,000 Soviet troops. These weapons were capable of reaching every American city except Seattle. On 17 October 1962, photographs taken by an American U-2 spy plane revealed the presence of Soviet missile installations and troops, the beginning of eleven days of excruciating tensions. Kennedy and his advisors debated the various options intensely, initially in secret. The choices before them were whether to launch a preemptive strike to destroy the missiles, to mount a full-scale invasion of Cuba, or to follow the more moderate course of mounting a naval blockade of the island. American officials were not aware that some of the missiles were already operational and underestimated the number of Soviet military personnel on the island. On 22 October 1962, Kennedy spoke to the American people in a televised address, explaining to them the developments of the previous week and announcing the imposition of a naval quarantine, or blockade, of Cuba. Several tense days of Soviet-American negotiations ensued before the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles in return for a U.S. pledge that American forces would not invade Cuba and a secret understanding that assorted North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear missiles deployed in Turkey, bordering on the Soviet Union, would also be dismantled. The so-called Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest that the Cold War ever came to exploding into an actual nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It had a sobering impact on both great powers, impelling them to behave more cautiously in the future. Kennedy, whose relatively low-key and moderate approach toward the crisis was at odds with much of his earlier bellicose Cold War rhetoric, as seen in his 1961 inaugural address, showed a new interest in arms control after the crisis, and in 1963 he signed a treaty with the Soviet Union banning the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. The perceived Soviet humiliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis was one reason that an internal Kremlin coup removed Khrushchev from power in the summer of 1964. The sense of Soviet impotence during the crisis also led the Russian military to mount a major nuclear buildup for the rest of the 1960s, which brought the Soviet Union to nuclear parity with the United States but also seriously strained and weakened the Soviet economy.

Primary Source

Good evening, my fellow citizens. This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in

preparation on that imprisoned island. The purposes of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning (October 16) at 9:00 A.M., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and Hemisphere, the joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13.

This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive antiaircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, "The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," and, and I quote the Soviet Government, "There is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote the Government, "The Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false.

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive build-up was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that "if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic

nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history, unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.

In that sense missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger—although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat. But this secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of Communist missiles —in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

[. . .]

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive build-up, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back: This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States in their communiqué of October 3 rejected secrecy on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interests of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation, under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles six and eight of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements—and the nations of this Hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations

between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction—by returning to his Government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba—by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis—and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful—without limiting our freedom of action.

We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides—including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union, for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat—or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week—must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed—including in particular the brave people of West Berlin—will be met by whatever action is needed.

[. . .]

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 806–809.

87. John F. Kennedy: Commencement Address at American University in Washington, D.C., 10 June 1963

Introduction

From the 1950s onward, American, Soviet, and European leaders alike, conscious of the dangers that full-scale nuclear warfare posed to their countries, showed considerable interest in disarmament proposals. Little that was concrete came of these, however, until the signature in the summer of 1963 by the Soviet Union and the United States of a treaty banning atmospheric nuclear testing, a practice that had previously been responsible for the release of substantial amounts of radioactive fallout. Somewhat sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis the previous year, the originally somewhat brash President John F. Kennedy mounted a major lobbying effort to secure the ratification of this treaty by the U.S. Senate. Around the same time, he also announced his intention to mount a major initiative for peace and disarmament and to open serious discussions with the Soviet Union for this purpose. Kennedy expressed his understanding of Soviet sufferings during World War II, which he believed predisposed Russian leaders to wish to avoid future destructive conflicts. Declaring that "both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race," Kennedy expressed his willingness to tolerate diverse political systems while hoping that the Soviet bloc would eventually change. While affirming American commitments to the various U.S. allies, he pledged the United States to work with the Soviet Union for peace and disarmament. He also announced that the two great powers were establishing a direct telephone hot line to facilitate communication in times of crisis and thereby prevent "dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions." Kennedy's assassination the following November and the subsequent U.S. preoccupation with the escalating Vietnam War meant that only in the early 1970s, under President Richard Nixon, did the United States and the Soviet Union sign major arms

limitation agreements. Kennedy's address nonetheless indicated a sharpened awareness by American leaders in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis that both great powers had a shared stake in avoiding nuclear war and in preventing an unrestrained arms race.

Primary Source

[. . .]

I have, therefore, chose this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is to rarely perceived—yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace.

What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables man and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.

I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles —which can only destroy and never create—is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace.

I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war—and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

[. . .]

First: Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many of us think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable —that mankind is doomed—that we are gripped by forces we cannot control.

We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade—therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable— and we believe they can do it again.

I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of universal peace and good will of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the values of hopes and dreams but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal.

Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace—based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace—no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process—a way of solving problems.

[. . .]

So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and

less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.

Second: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. It is discouraging to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on *Military Strategy* and find, on page after page, wholly baseless and incredible claims—such as the allegation that "American imperialist circles are preparing to unleash different types of wars . . . that there is a very real threat of a preventive war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union . . . [and that] the political aims of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries . . . [and] to achieve world domination . . . by means of aggressive wars."

Truly, as it was written long ago: "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements—to realize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a warning—a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodations as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.

[. . .]

Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so many countries, including this Nation's closest allies—our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combating ignorance, poverty and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counterweapons.

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours—and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

Third: Let us re-examine our attitude toward the cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had history of the last eighteen years been different.

We must, therefore, preserve in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our vital interest, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world.

To secure these ends, America's weapons are nonprovocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility.

For we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove that we are resolute. We do not need

to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people—but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth.

Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system—a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished.

At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention or which threaten to erupt into war. Our efforts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East and in the Indian subcontinent, have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others—by seeking to adjust small but significant differences with our own closest neighbors in Mexico and in Canada.

Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many nations by alliances. These alliances exist because our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also because their interests and ours converge.

Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom, but in pursuing the paths of peace. It is our hope—and the purpose of allied policies—to convince the Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice does not interfere with the choices of others. The communist drive to impose their political and economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no doubt that if all nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, then peace would be much more assured.

This will require a new effort to achieve world law—a new context for world discussions. It will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And increased understanding will require increased contact and communications. One step in this direction is the proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur at a time of crisis.

[. . .]

I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard.

First: Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history—but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind.

Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament, but I hope it will help us achieve it.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude toward peace and freedom here at home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedication of our own lives—as many of you who are graduating today will have a unique opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home.

But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom

walk together. In too many of our duties today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete.

It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government—local, State and National—to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within their authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever that authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the land.

All this is not unrelated to world peace. "When a man's ways please the Lord," the Scriptures tell us, "he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him." And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights—the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation—the right to breathe air as nature provided it—the right of future generations to a healthy existence?

While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both. No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can—if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers—offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on—not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 459–464.

88. John F. Kennedy: Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin, "Ich bin ein Berliner" Speech, 26 June 1963

Introduction

From 1958 to 1962, a protracted crisis over Berlin inflamed relations between the Western powers, on one side, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and the Soviet Union, on the other. Throughout the 1950s, hundreds of thousands of East Germans, many of them well-educated professionals, chose to move to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), a major propaganda and economic blow for the communist East. Often they did so simply by crossing into the western sector of Berlin, the East German capital, that remained a noncommunist enclave deep in the socialist East. Seeking to stem this hemorrhage, during the late 1950s both the Soviets and the East Germans threatened to annex West Berlin, despite its formal status as part of West Germany, and sought to force the Western occupation powers completely out of Berlin. The United States responded firmly to recurrent Soviet and East German threats, sending additional troops to Berlin and orchestrating visits by such high-profile figures as General Lucius D. Clay, U.S. military governor of West Germany during the 1948–1949 Berlin Airlift. Eventually, in August 1961, Walter Ulbricht, the East German president, chose to construct a massive and highly fortified wall to separate East and West Berlin, a barrier that made further defections close to impossible but was nonetheless a major propaganda embarrassment to the East German regime and, more broadly, the communist bloc. West Berliners were also forbidden to visit East Berlin. Visiting Germany in 1963, Kennedy forcefully affirmed the American commitment to Berlin, making the symbolic announcement "Ich bin ein Berliner." He sought in part to allay complaints that the United States had not reacted forcefully enough to the erection of the

Berlin Wall but rather had simply acquiesced in its construction. Until its demolition in 1989, the Berlin Wall remained the epitome of the iron curtain dividing Cold War Europe.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was "*civis Romanus sum*." Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is "*Ich bin ein Berliner*."

[. . .]

There are many people in the world who really don't understand, or say they don't, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it permits us to make economic progress. *Lass' sie nach Berlin kommen.* Let them come to Berlin.

Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us. I want to say, on behalf of my countrymen, who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic, who are far distant from you, that they take the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you, even from a distance, the story of the last 18 years. I know of no town, no city, that has been besieged for 18 years that still lives with the vitality and the force, and the hope and the determination of the city of West Berlin. While the wall is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures of the Communist system, for all the world to see, we take no satisfaction in it, for it is, as your Mayor has said, an offense not only against history but an offense against humanity, separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters, and dividing a people who wish to be joined together.

What is true of this city is true of Germany—real, lasting peace in Europe can never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice. In 18 years of peace and good faith, this generation of Germans has earned the right to be free, including the right to unite their families and their nation in lasting peace, with good will to all people. You live in a defended island of freedom, but your life is part of the main. So let me ask you as I close, to lift your eyes beyond the dangers of today, to the hopes of tomorrow, beyond the freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your country of Germany, to the advance of freedom everywhere, beyond the wall to the day of peace with justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind.

Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great Continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe. When that day finally comes, as it will, the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the front lines for almost two decades.

All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words "*Ich bin ein Berliner*."

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to November 22, 1963* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 524–525.

89. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963

Introduction

By the mid-1950s it had become apparent that tests of nuclear weapons contaminated the atmosphere with radioactive fallout, which could be highly detrimental to both human health and the environment. In March 1954 the *Lucky Dragon,* a Japanese fishing boat with a crew of twenty-three, was exposed to fallout from the Bikini Island

hydrogen bomb test. The fishermen suffered from radiation sickness, and one of them died, leading to an international furor in Japan. Scientists also demonstrated that radioactive fallout was carried around the world by the wind system and that no area was immune to it, leading to fears of cumulative genetic damage to humans and others. Negotiations among nuclear powers to ban atmospheric and underwater testing of nuclear weapons began in 1955 but foundered over issues of verification. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 gave renewed impetus to negotiations for a test ban treaty, and representatives from the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain signed an agreement at Moscow on 5 August 1963. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was intended to be the first step toward total nuclear disarmament. It prohibited any of the signatory countries from testing nuclear weapons in outer space, the Earth's atmosphere, or underwater, although underground testing was not banned. During the two months before the treaty went into effect on 10 October, more than one hundred countries around the world added their names to the treaty. Notable exceptions were France and China, two powers that regarded the treaty as an example of collusive Soviet-American ambitions to dominate the rest of the world and reserved the right to test nuclear weapons as they saw fit.

Primary Source

TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

The governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE 2

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty,

including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

ARTICLE 3

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

[. . .]

[. . .]

ARTICLE 4

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water," 5 August 1963, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4797.htm.

90. Martin Luther King Jr.: "I Have a Dream," 28 August 1963

Introduction

By 1963, the civil rights movement demanding the equality of blacks with white Americans and the ending of legalized segregation and discrimination in the South had become a major political force in the United States. Given the stated American commitment to international freedom, democracy, and liberty, it was also potentially a considerable embarrassment to the country's Cold War position. The administration of President John F. Kennedy initially largely ignored the issue, although he did provide some assistance to African Americans who sought to enforce federal rulings and enroll in previously segregated Southern universities. In late August 1963, civil rights leaders organized the March on Washington by black Americans, an event that built on plans for a march devised by veteran civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph in 1941 as a means of pressuring the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to accord African Americans more equal treatment during World War II. The highlight of this occasion was the address by the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a young minister who had come to prominence during the 1955–1956 black bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama. King, who was heavily influenced by the nonviolent teachings of the Indian independence leader Mohandas Gandhi, was committed to policies of peaceful protest. He also had a gift for stirring and appealing rhetoric. His March on Washington address made adroit and moving use of imagery drawn both from the Bible and also from the American democratic tradition, urging his countrymen to live up to the principles enshrined in the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bible. Civil rights, he proclaimed, was an issue that the United States could no longer afford to ignore. Many white Americans found King to be a nonthreatening, attractive, and persuasive black leader, and his prominence in the civil rights movement helped to win considerable public support for the Voting Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1965.

Primary Source

I am happy to join with you today in what will go down in history as the greatest demonstration for freedom in the history of our nation.

Fivescore years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today, signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of their captivity.

But one hundred years later, the Negro still is not free; one hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the

chains of discrimination; one hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity; one hundred years later, the Negro is still languished in the corners of American society and finds himself in exile in his own land.

So we've come here today to dramatize a shameful condition. In a sense we've come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was the promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the "unalienable Rights of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."

It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note in so far as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check; a check which has come back marked "insufficient funds." We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. And so we've come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice.

We have also come to this hallowed Spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of now. This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy; now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice; now is the time to lift our nation from the quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood; now is the time to make justice a reality for all God's children. It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality.

Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning. And those who hope that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content, will have a rude awakening if the nation returns to business as usual.

There will be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges.

But there is something that I must say to my people who stand on the warm threshold which leads into the palace of justice. In the process of gaining our rightful place we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds.

Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.

The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us to a distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny. And they have come to realize that their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom. This offense we share mounted to storm the battlements of injustice must be carried forth by a biracial army. We cannot walk alone.

And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall always march ahead. We cannot turn back. There are those who are asking the devotees of civil rights, "When will you be satisfied?" We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the victim of the unspeakable horrors of police brutality.

We can never be satisfied as long as our bodies, heavy with fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in the motels of the highways and the hotels of the cities. We cannot be satisfied as long as the Negro's basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one.

We can never be satisfied as long as our children are stripped of their selfhood and robbed of their dignity by signs stating "for whites only." We cannot be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi cannot vote and a

Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote. No, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until "justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream."

I am not unmindful that some of you have come here out of excessive trials and tribulation. Some of you have come fresh from narrow jail cells. Some of you have come from areas where your quest for freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the veterans of creative suffering. Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive.

Go back to Mississippi; go back to Alabama; go back to South Carolina; go back to Georgia; go back to Louisiana; go back to the slums and ghettos of the northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed. Let us not wallow in the valley of despair.

So I say to you, my friends, that even though we must face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal."

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, sons of former slaves and sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.

I have a dream that one day, even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.

I have a dream my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by content of their character. I have a dream today!

I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its governor having his lips dripping with the words of "interposition" and "nullification," that one day, right there in Alabama, little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers. I have a dream today!

I have a dream that one day "every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places shall be made plain, and the crooked places shall be made straight and the glory of the Lord will be revealed and all flesh shall see it together."

This is our hope. This is the faith that I go back to the South with.

With this faith we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood.

With this faith we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day. This will be the day when all of God's children will be able to sing with new meaning—"my country 'tis of thee; sweet land of liberty; of thee I sing; land where my fathers died, land of the pilgrim's pride; from every mountain side, let freedom ring"—and if America is to be a great nation, this must become true.

So let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire.

Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York.

Let freedom ring from the heightening Alleghenies of Pennsylvania.

Let freedom ring from the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado.

Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of California.

But not only that.

Let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia.

Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee.

Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi, from every mountainside, let freedom ring.

And when we allow freedom to ring, when we let it ring from every village and hamlet, from every state and city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God's children—black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Catholics and Protestants—will be able to join hands and to sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual: "Free at last, free at last; thank God Almighty, we are free at last."

Source: James Melvin Washington, ed., *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), 217–220.

91. "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," *People's Daily,* 6 September 1963

Introduction

A dramatic deterioration in relations between the communist governments of Mainland China and the Soviet Union was one of the major international developments of the late 1950s and 1960s, breaking the ideological solidarity of the communist bloc and eventually providing an opportunity for the United States under President Richard Nixon to play one big power against the other. Both ideological and practical differences precipitated the Sino-Soviet split, which became public in October 1961 at the Twenty-Second Soviet Party Congress. Tensions between Soviet and Chinese nationalist interests had characterized the relationship since well before Mao Zedong attained power in China in 1949. Soviet reluctance to give wholehearted backing to China or risk nuclear war during the Taiwan Strait crises, particularly that of 1958, galled the Chinese, as did the Soviet tilt toward India in the 1959 Sino-Indian border crisis. Chinese officials constantly criticized the poor quality of many Russian economic aid items. Soviet advisors deplored the disastrous Great Leap Forward economic program launched by China in 1958. As tensions grew, in 1960 the Soviet Union unilaterally abrogated its Chinese aid programs, withdrawing all of its remaining experts and advisors. On the ideological front, Mao found Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and his readiness to embrace peaceful coexistence with the United States virtual heresy, revisionist backsliding from the international communist cause. The Chinese increasingly presented themselves as guardians of the true communist faith. By the late 1950s, Mao became ever more preoccupied with defining a personal, highly revolutionary brand of communism that made even many of his colleagues uncomfortable and that reached its apogee in the late 1960s in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Soviets considered Chinese readiness to risk nuclear confrontation with the Americans foolhardy adventurism. Dissension climaxed over the Chinese nuclear program, which the Soviet Union assisted in the early 1950s. China was determined to acquire an independent nuclear capability. Initially, in October 1957, Soviet officials promised substantial technical and material assistance to this, but they quickly insisted that all weapons must remain under Soviet control, and in 1959 they abrogated the entire agreement. Chinese leaders characterized the gradual warming in Sino-American relations and the nuclear test ban treaties as joint hegemonic attempts to maintain an international monopoly of power and nuclear armaments. By 1962, relations between the two great communist states were almost unrelievedly hostile, and Soviet revisionist influences became a major Cultural Revolution target. Both sought to win support from smaller communist nations and from international communist parties, many of which found the choice between the two embarrassing and fruitlessly sought to encourage a reconciliation. The propaganda agencies and news media of each of the two communist big powers competed in offering expositions of their own country's position and attacking their ideological rival. A 1963 article in the Chinese *People's Daily,* a government mouthpiece, traced the origins of the Sino-Soviet split back to the 1956 Soviet Party Congress, when General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev harshly condemned most

of his predecessor Josef Stalin's legacies, including his deliberate fostering of a personality cult. Mao, who had encouraged a similar cult centering on himself, apparently feared that his own colleagues might seek to emulate their Russian comrades and reject his leadership. By 1969, the Sino-Soviet split had led to open military clashes between the two along their joint border on the Ussuri River. The breach was not healed until the late 1980s, when the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping had come to power in China and the reformer Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the Kremlin.

Primary Source

It is more than a month since the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union published its open letter of July 14 to Party organizations and all Communists in the Soviet Union. This Open Letter, and the steps taken by the leadership of the CPSU since its publication, have pushed Sino-Soviet relations to the brink of a split and have carried the differences in the international communist movement to a new stage of unprecedented gravity.

Now Moscow, Washington, New Delhi and Belgrade are joined in a love feast and the Soviet press is running an endless assortment of fantastic stories and theories attacking China. The leadership of the CPSU has allied itself with U.S. imperialism, the Indian reactionaries and the renegade Tito clique against socialist China and against all Marxist-Leninist parties, in open betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, in brazen repudiation of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement and in flagrant violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.

The present differences within the international communist movement and between the Chinese and Soviet Parties involve a whole series of important questions of principle. In its letter of June 14 to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Central Committee of the CPC systematically and comprehensively discussed the essence of these differences. It pointed out that, in the last analysis, the present differences within the international communist movement and between the Chinese and Soviet Parties involve the questions of whether or not to accept the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, whether or not to accept Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, whether or not there is need for revolution, whether or not imperialism is to be opposed, and whether or not the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement is desired.

How have the differences in the international communist movement and between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves arisen? And how have they grown to their present serious dimensions? Everybody is concerned about these questions.

[. . .]

Source: *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 57–58.

92. Mao Zedong, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* (The Little Red Book), 1964

Introduction

In 1949, a communist revolution took place in Mainland China, the culmination of a lengthy civil war at the end of which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) headed by the charismatic Mao Zedong overthrew the Guomindang (Nationalist) government of Jiang Jieshi. Mao, an able military leader with an arrogant and overbearing personality, was also a self-taught intellectual who aspired to become the world's greatest communist theoretician. Fearing that the CCP would eventually generate its own class of elite functionaries, he developed theories of continuing revolution intended to prevent such degeneration. Mao tended to use and sometimes even provoke international crises to eliminate threats to communist control and also to discredit his personal enemies. His actions were largely responsible for both the Sino-Soviet split that began in the late 1950s and the disastrous economic policies of the

Great Leap Forward of 1958–1962, a program of collectivization and back yard industrialization whose effects included a major famine in which several million Chinese died. Massively egotistical, Mao, like Stalin, also deliberately encouraged a cult based on his own personality, which exalted his near-godlike status as the ultimate Chinese communist leader and authority. Seeking to reinforce his power after the Great Leap Forward, in 1964 Mao authorized publication of the volume *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, also known as the Little Red Book. The book was a series of statements on different aspects of Chinese society and communism made by Mao, a prolific writer and speaker, at various points. Millions of copies were distributed throughout China and abroad, and during the 1960s he became something of a cult figure among Western leftists. In 1966 Mao, seeking both to radicalize China and to shore up his political position and eliminate rivals within the Politburo, launched the Cultural Revolution, which quickly expanded into an attack on all elites, characterized by mass demonstrations and the public humiliation and persecution of any individuals and groups who were characterized as class enemies. For several years, teenagers were withdrawn from education to serve as Red Guards, whose main duty was to enforce the principles of the Cultural Revolution on China's large population. Many urban young people and intellectuals were sent to the countryside or to factories to share the experiences of poor peasants and workers. The book, which articulated Mao's theory of continuous revolution and went through several editions, played a large role in fostering China's Cultural Revolution and became particularly popular among the Red Guards, who were often seen waving copies of the Little Red Book while marching through the streets. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, any Chinese person found to be without a copy was liable to instant punishment.

Primary Source

Chapter 1. The Communist Party

The force at the core leading our cause forward is the Chinese Communist Party. The theoretical basis guiding our thinking is Marxism-Leninism.—Opening address at the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (September 15, 1954).

If there is to be revolution, there must be a revolutionary party. Without a revolutionary party, without a party built on the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary style, it is impossible to lead the working class and the broad masses of the people in defeating imperialism and its running dogs.—"Revolutionary Forces of the World Unite, Fight Against Imperialist Aggression!" (November 1948), *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 284.

Without the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, without the Chinese Communists as the mainstay of the Chinese people, China can never achieve independence and liberation, or industrialization and the modernization of her agriculture.—"On Coalition Government" (April 24, 1945), *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 318.

The Chinese Communist Party is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. Without this core, the cause of socialism cannot be victorious.—Talk at the general reception for the delegates to the Third National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League of China (May 25, 1957).

A well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party—these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy.—"On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" (June 30, 1949), *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 422.

We must have faith in the masses and we must have faith in the Party. These are two cardinal principles. If we doubt these principles, we shall accomplish nothing. —*On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation* (July 31, 1955), 3rd ed., p. 7.

Armed with Marxist-Leninist theory and ideology, the Communist Party of China has brought a new style of work to the Chinese people. A style of work which essentially entails integrating theory with practice, forging close links with the masses and practicing self-criticism.—"On Coalition Government" (April 24, 1945), *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 314.

No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and knowledge of history and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.—"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" (October 1938), *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 208.

As we used to say, the rectification movement is "a widespread movement of Marxist education". Rectification means the whole Party studying Marxism through criticism and self-criticism. We can certainly learn more about Marxism in the course of the rectification movement.—Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work (March 12, l957), 1st pocket ed., p. 14.

It is an arduous task to ensure a better life for the several hundred million people of China and to build our economically and culturally backward country into a prosperous and powerful one with a high level of culture. And it is precisely in order to be able to shoulder this task more competently and work better together with all non-Party people who are actuated by high ideals and determined to institute reforms that we must conduct rectification movements both now and in the future, and constantly rid ourselves of whatever is wrong.—Ibid., pp. 15–16.

Policy is the starting-point of all the practical actions of a revolutionary party and manifests itself in the process and the end-result of that party's actions. A revolutionary party is carrying out a policy whenever it takes any action. If it is not carrying out a correct policy, it is carrying out a wrong policy; if it is not carrying out a given policy consciously, it is doing so blindly. What we call experience is the process and the end-result of carrying out a policy. Only through the practice of the people, that is, through experience, can we verify whether a policy is correct or wrong and determine to what extent it is correct or wrong. However, people's practice, especially the practice of a revolutionary party and the revolutionary masses, cannot but be bound up with one policy or another. Therefore, before any action is taken, we must explain the policy, which we have formulated in the light of the given circumstances, to Party members and to the masses. Otherwise, Party members and the masses will depart from the guidance of our policy, act blindly and carry out a wrong policy.—"On the Policy Concerning Industry and Commerce" (February 27, 1948), *Selected Works*, Vol. IV. Pp. 204–05.

Our Party has laid down the general line and general policy of the Chinese revolution as well as various specific lines for work and specific policies. However, while many comrades remember our Party's specific lines for work and specific policies, they often forget its general line and general policy. If we actually forget the Party's general line and general policy, then we shall be blind, half-baked, muddle-headed revolutionaries, and when we carry out a specific line for work and a specific policy, we shall lose our bearings and vacillate now to the left and now to the right, and the work will suffer.—"Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area" (April 1, 1948), *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 238.

Policy and tactics are the life of the Party; leading comrades at all levels must give them full attention and must never on any account be negligent.—"A Circular on the Situation" (March 20, 1948), Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 220.

Source: Mao Tse-Tung, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967).

93. Civil Rights Act, 1964

Introduction

A major demand of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was effective legislation that would end decisively all racial segregation and discrimination. Acts passed in the 1940s and 1950s during the administrations of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower were half-hearted measures that failed to achieve this. In 1963 a civil rights bill was introduced in Congress, and President John F. Kennedy placed himself firmly behind it

in a June 1963 speech. After Kennedy's November 1963 assassination, his successor, the Texan politician Lyndon B. Johnson, a former senator majority leader whose political bargaining skills far surpassed Kennedy's, took it up. Southern politicians initially tried to filibuster the bill but eventually ceased to do so, and in late June 1964 the Senate passed the bill by a majority of 73 votes to 27. The new Civil Rights Act outlawed discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or religion in all public places and in education, housing, and employment. Any project receiving federal funding was liable to lose this if discrimination occurred. The Civil Rights Act also sought—not entirely successfully—to address literacy tests, poll taxes, and other devices used in the South to deny African Americans the vote without contravening the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The following year, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, a more effective measure that banned all such efforts to deny blacks the right to vote. The two pieces of legislation provided the legal foundation on which all subsequent efforts to ensure racial equality in the United States rested. Southern politicians still vowed to resist them, and some last-ditch opposition remained, but by the end of the decade the system of legalized segregation was practically dismantled. As the twenty-first century began, however, poverty and social and economic deprivation were still disproportionately concentrated within the African American population. White resentment of the new legislation, especially in the South, did much to move the once solidly Democratic Deep South into the Republican camp, contributing to a new conservative atmosphere and essentially ending the Democratic dominance that had characterized U.S. politics from the 1930s through the 1960s.

Primary Source

[. . .]

AN ACT to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That this Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1964."

TITLE I—VOTING RIGHTS

Section 101. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1971), as amended by section 131 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71 Stat. 637), and as further amended by section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (74 Stat. 90), is further amended as follows:

(a) Insert "1" after "(a)" in subsection (a) and add at the end of subsection (a) the following new paragraphs:

"(2) No person acting under color of law shall—

"(A) in determining whether any individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any Federal election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote;

"(B) deny the right of any individual to vote in any Federal election because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election; or

"(C) employ any literacy test as a qualification for voting in any Federal election unless (i) such test is administered to each individual and is conducted wholly in writing, and (ii) a certified copy of the test and of the answers given by the individual is furnished to him within twenty-five days of the submission of his request made within the period of time during which records and papers are required to be retained and preserved pursuant to Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (42 U.S.C. 1974–74e; 74 Stat. 88):

[. . .]

TITLE II—INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

Section 201. (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.

[. . .]

Section 202. All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.

Section 203. No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202.

Section 204. (a) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 203, a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved and, upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to intervene in such civil action if he certifies that the case is of general public importance. Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the civil action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.

[. . .]

TITLE III—DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES

Section 301. (a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing signed by an individual to the effect that he is being deprived of or threatened with the loss of his right to the equal protection of the laws, on account of his race, color, religion, or national origin, by being denied equal utilization of any public

facility which is owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of any State or subdivision thereof, other than a public school or public college as defined in section 401 of title IV hereof, and the Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action will materially further the orderly progress of desegregation in public facilities, the Attorney General is authorized to institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any appropriate district court of the United States against such parties and for such relief as may be appropriate, and such court shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section. The Attorney General may implead as defendants such additional parties as are or become necessary to the grant of effective relief hereunder.

(b) The Attorney General may deem a person or persons unable to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section when such person or persons are unable, either directly or through other interested persons or organizations, to bear the expense of the litigation or to obtain effective legal representation: or whenever he is satisfied that the institution of such litigation would jeopardize the personal safety, employment, or economic standing of such person or persons, their families, or their property.

Section 302. In any action or proceeding under this title the United States shall be liable for costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, the same as a private person.

Section 303. Nothing in this title shall affect adversely the right of any person to sue for or obtain relief in any court against discrimination in any facility covered by this title.

Section 304. A complaint as used in this title is a writing or document within the meaning of section 1001, title 18, United States Code.

TITLE IV—DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

[. . .]

Survey and Report of Educational Opportunities

Section 402. The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a report to the President and the Congress, within two years of the enactment of this title, concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions at all levels in the United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia.

[. . .]

TITLE VII—EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

[. . .]

Discrimination Because of Race, Color, Religion, Sex, or National Origin

Section 703.

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization—

(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or

(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.

(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.

(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school college university or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.

(f) As used in this title, the phrase "unlawful employment practice" shall not be deemed to include any action or measure taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or employment agency with respect to an individual who is a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other organization required to register as a Commission-action or Commission-front organization by final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.

(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if—

(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any statute of the United States or any Executive order of the President; and

(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.

(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it

be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages of compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206 (d)).

(i) Nothing contained in this title shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.

(j) Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by an employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.

Other Unlawful Employment Practices
Section 704.

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.

(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for employment by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.

[. . .]

TITLE VIII—REGISTRATION AND VOTING STATISTICS
Section 801.

The Secretary of Commerce shall promptly conduct a survey to compile registration and voting statistics in such geographic areas as may be recommended by the Commission on Civil Rights. Such a survey and compilation shall, to the extent recommended by the Commission on Civil Rights, only include a count of persons of voting age by race, color, and national origin, and determination of the extent to which such persons are registered to vote, and have voted in any statewide primary or general election in which the Members of the United States House of Representatives are nominated or elected, since January 1, 1960. Such information shall also be collected and compiled in connection with the Nineteenth Decennial Census, and at such other times as the Congress may prescribe. The provisions of section 9 and chapter 7 of title 13, United States Code, shall apply to any survey, collection,

or compilation of registration and voting statistics carried out under this title: Provided, however, That no person shall be compelled to disclose his race, color, national origin, or questioned about his political party affiliation, how he voted, or the reasons therefore, nor shall any penalty be imposed for his failure or refusal to make such disclosure. Every person interrogated orally, by written survey or questionnaire or by any other means with respect to such information shall be fully advised with respect to his right to fail or refuse to furnish such information.

[. . .]

Source: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law 88-352, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 78 (1964): 241.

94. Charles de Gaulle: Speech on the State of Europe, 23 July 1964

Introduction

President Charles de Gaulle, one of the most dominating political figures of twentieth-century France, delivered this speech on Europe's role in world affairs on 23 July 1964. Although he oversaw the diminution of the French Empire, he worked hard to secure for France a leading role in European affairs in the 1960s, primarily by undermining British influence in this arena. Twice, in 1963 and 1967, he vetoed British applications to join the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market. He hoped that France would serve as a bridge between the communist and noncommunist worlds and consciously sought to differentiate French policies from those of the United States. In 1964 France recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC), and in early March 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sparking a crisis as NATO headquarters relocated from Paris to Brussels. He also encouraged the creation of a Franco-German partnership, which he anticipated would dominate the making of European international policies.

Primary Source

[. . .]

In discussing Europe and in trying to distinguish what it should be, it is always necessary to ascertain what the world is.

At the end of the last World War, the distribution of forces in the world was as simple, as brutal as possible. It appeared suddenly at Yalta. Only America and Russia had remained powers and all the more considerable powers in that all the rest found themselves dislocated, the vanquished engulfed in their unconditional defeat and the European victors destroyed to their foundations.

For the countries of the free world, threatened by the Soviets' ambition, American leadership could then seem inevitable. The New World was, of all of them, the great victor of the war. Under the command of the United States, owner of atomic bombs—the Atlantic Alliance ensured their security. Thanks to the Marshall Plan their economics were being revived. Wherever the colonial powers were effecting, under more or less violent conditions, the transfer of their sovereignty to self-governing regimes, there pressure was felt, openly or not, from Washington. At the same time, America was seen to assume the conduct of political and strategic affairs in all the regions where the free world found itself in contact with the direct or indirect action of the Soviets. It did this either unilaterally or through the channels of regional international bodies which in practice were at its disposal: in Europe, NATO; in Western Asia, CENTO; in Southeast Asia, SEATO; in America, the OAS; or, thanks to its supremacy in the North Pacific, or, finally, through military or diplomatic intervention, in Korea, in the Congo, or during the Suez crisis through the offices of the United Nations Organization which it dominated by its preponderance.

It is clear that things have changed. The Western States of our old continent have rebuilt their economies. They are rebuilding their military forces. One of them—France—is becoming a nuclear power. Above all they have become aware of their natural ties. In short, Western Europe appears likely to constitute a major entity full of merit and resources, capable of living its own

life, indeed, not in opposition to the New World, but right alongside it.

On the other hand, the monolithic nature of the totalitarian world is in the process of dislocation. China, separated from Moscow, enters on the world scene by its mass, its needs and its resources, avid for progress and consideration. The Soviet Empire, the last and the largest colonial power of this time, is seeing first the Chinese contest the domination it exercises over vast regions of Asia and second is seeing the European satellites which it had subjugated by force moving further and further away. At the same time the Communist regime, despite the enormous effort it has been making in Russia for a half a century and despite the results it has achieved in certain massive undertakings, is meeting with failure with respect to the standard of living, the satisfaction and the dignity of men in comparison with the system applied in Western Europe which combines *dirigisme* with freedom. Lastly, great aspirations and great difficulties are deeply agitating the developing countries.

The result of all these new factors, complicated, and interrelated, is that the division of the world into two camps led by Washington and Moscow respectively corresponds less and less to the real situation. With respect to the gradually splitting totalitarian world or the problems posed by China, the conduct to be adopted toward many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, or the remodeling of the United Nations Organization that necessarily ensues, or the adjustment of world exchanges of all kinds, etc., it appears that Europe, provided that it wishes it, is henceforth called upon to play a role which is its own.

Undoubtedly it should maintain an alliance with America, in which, in the North Atlantic, both are interested so long as the Soviet threat remains. But, the reasons which, for Europe, made this alliance a form of subordination are fading away day by day. Europe must assume its share of the responsibilities. Everything indicates, moreover, that this event would be in accordance with the interest of the United States, whatever may be its merit, its power and its good intentions, for the multiplicity and complexity of the tasks henceforth go beyond, and perhaps dangerously, its means and its capacity. That is why the United States declares that it wishes to see the old continent unite and organize itself while many among the Gallic, Germanic and Latin peoples cry out "Let us build Europe!"

But which Europe? That is the question. Indeed, the established conveniences, the accepted renunciations, the deep-rooted reservations do not fade away easily. According to us French, it is a question of Europe's being made in order for it to be European. A European Europe means that it exists by itself for itself, in other words in the midst of the world—it has its own policy. But that is precisely what is rejected consciously or unconsciously by some who claim, however, to want it to be established. In reality, the fact that Europe, not having a policy, would be subject to the policy that came to it from the other side of the Atlantic appears to them, even today, normal and satisfactory.

We have seen many people—quite often, what is more, worthy and sincere—advocate for Europe not an independent policy, which in reality they do not visualize, but an organization unsuited to have one, linked in this field as in that of defense and of the economy, to an Atlantic system, in other words, American, and consequently subordinate to what the United States calls its leadership. This organization, entitled federal, would have had as its bases: on the one hand, a council of experts withdrawn from the affiliation to the States, and which would have been dubbed "executive," and on the other hand a Parliament without national qualifications and which would have been called "legislative." Doubtless each of these two elements would have supplied that for which it would have been fitted, that is to say, studies for the council and debates for the Parliament. But, without a doubt, neither of the two would have made what indeed no one wanted them to make, that is a policy, for if the policy must take the debates and studies into account, it is another thing entirely than studies and debates.

A policy is an action, that is to say a body of decisions taken, of things done, of risks assumed, all this with the support of a people. The governments of nations alone can be capable of and responsible for making policy. It is of course not forbidden to imagine that a day will come when all the peoples of our continent will

become one and that then there could be a Government of Europe, but it would be ridiculous to act as if that day had come.

That is why France—refusing to let Europe get bogged down, becoming bogged down herself in a guileful undertaking that would have stripped States, misled peoples and prevented the independence of our continent—took the initiative of proposing to her five partners of the Rome Treaty a beginning for the organization of their cooperation. Thus, we would begin to live in common, pending the time when habit and evolution would gradually draw the ties closer together. We know that the German Government adhered in principle to this project. We know that a meeting of the six States in Paris, then another one in Bonn, seemed at first on the road to success, but that Rome refused to call the decisive meeting, its objections, joined with those of The Hague and Brussels, being powerful enough to halt everything. Finally, we know that the opponents invoked two arguments, moreover contradictory. The first argument: the French plan, which maintains the sovereignty of the States, does not conform to our conception of a Europe having as its Executive a commission of experts, and as its Legislative a Parliament cut off from national realities. The second argument: although Britain does not agree to lose its sovereignty, we will not enter into any European political organization to which it would not belong.

The French plan for European organization not being adopted by Italy and by the Benelux countries; moreover, integration not being able to lead to anything other than an American protectorate; finally, Great Britain having shown throughout the interminable Brussels negotiations that it was not in a position to accept the common economic rules and, by the Nassau agreement, that its defense force, particularly in the nuclear domain, would not be European for lack of being autonomous in relation to the United States—it seemed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the Government of the French Republic that their bilateral cooperation could have some value. It was then that, on the proposal of the German Government, the French-German Treaty of January 22, 1963 was concluded, which I had the honor of signing right here with Chancellor Adenauer.

However, it must be noted that, if the French-German Treaty made possible limited results in some areas, also if it led the two Governments and their services to establish contacts which, for our part, and altogether, we judge can be useful and which are, in any case, very pleasant, up to now a common line of conduct has not changed. Assuredly there is not, and there could not be any opposition, strictly speaking, between Bonn and Paris. But, whether it is a matter of the effective solidarity of France and Germany concerning their defense, or even of the stand to take and the action to pursue toward the East, above all the Moscow satellites, or correlatively of the question of boundaries and nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe, or of the recognition of China and of the diplomatic and economic mission which can be opened to Europe in relation to that great people, or of peace in Asia and particularly Indochina and Indonesia, or of the aid to give to the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, or of the organization of the agricultural common market and consequently the future of the Community of the Six—one could not say that Germany and France have yet agreed to make together a policy and one could not dispute that this results from the fact that Bonn has not believed, up to now, that this policy should be European and independent. If this state of affairs were to last, there would be the risk, in the long run, of doubts among the French people, of misgivings among the German people and, among their four partners of the Rome Treaty, an increased tendency to leave things as they are, while waiting, perhaps, to be split up.

But, throughout the world, the force of things is doing its work. In wanting and in proposing the organization of a Europe having its own policy, France is sure of serving the balance, the peace and the progress of the world. Moreover, she is now strong enough and sure enough of herself to be able to be patient, except for major external changes which would jeopardize everything and therefore lead her to change her direction. Besides, at the last meeting just held between the Governments in Bonn and Paris, Chancellor Erhard gave an indication of a forthcoming German initiative. In waiting for the sky to clear, France is pursuing, by her own means, that which a European and independent policy can and should be. It is a fact that people

everywhere are pleased with it and that for herself it is not an unsatisfactory situation.

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Source: Charles de Gaulle, *Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle: March 17, 1964–May 16, 1967* (New York: French Embassy Press and Information Division, 1967).

95. Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 7 August 1964

Introduction

Passed by the U.S. Congress in August 1964, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution permitted President Lyndon B. Johnson to take whatever measures he considered appropriate to deal with the growing crisis in Vietnam. As the military situation in Vietnam deteriorated in early 1964, Johnson and his advisors decided that only with heavy support from the United States could the government of the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) survive. Johnson, running for reelection against hard-line Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, feared that a major escalation might jeopardize his campaign, so he relied extensively on covert operations, including DeSoto intelligence-gathering missions undertaken by American destroyers to test North Vietnamese radar efficiency or land South Vietnamese forces on North Vietnamese territory. On the morning of 2 August, three North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the destroyer USS *Maddox* as it undertook one such mission in the Tonkin Gulf, beyond the 3-mile Vietnamese territorial limits that the United States recognized but within the 12-mile zone that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) claimed. Aircraft from the nearby USS *Ticonderoga* came to its assistance, sinking one patrol boat and disabling the others, and Johnson ordered the *Maddox* to continue patrolling farther offshore in the Gulf, accompanied by a fellow destroyer, the *C. Turner Joy*. On the night of 4 August, both vessels reported hostile attacks, although it was later suggested that nervous radar and sonar operators or malfunctioning equipment probably triggered false alarms. North Vietnam subsequently claimed that none of its patrol boats were responsible, alleging that the U.S. government deliberately fabricated the incident as a pretext to escalate the war. Johnson, nettled by Goldwater's repeated criticisms that his Vietnam policy was irresolute and ineffective, made no attempt to verify or question the reports. Without mentioning their involvement in covert operations, Johnson announced that American ships had encountered an unprovoked "deliberate attack," and he ordered retaliatory American bombing raids on an oil depot and North Vietnamese patrol boat bases. He also submitted to Congress a draft resolution authorizing him to "take all necessary measures" to "repel any armed attack" on U.S. forces, "prevent further aggression," and give any aid necessary, "including the use of armed force," to help any country that requested assistance through the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), to which South Vietnam belonged. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed unanimously by the House and with only two dissenting Senate votes, provided the legal basis for the conflict's future expansion, including massive bombing raids on North Vietnam, which began in February 1965, and two months later a major deployment of American ground troops and the drastic expansion of such forces' operational activities within Vietnam. Only on 30 December 1970, after the Cambodian incursion authorized by President Richard Nixon that spring, did an increasingly restive Congress repeal the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Skeptical congressional reluctance to ever again give a president a similar blank check was a major factor in the passage of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, drastically limiting the chief executive's future ability to deploy U.S. troops in combat situations.

Primary Source

[H.J. Res. 1145]

To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have

thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Source: "Text of Joint Resolution, August 7," *Department of State Bulletin* 51(1313) (1964): 268.

96. Lyndon B. Johnson: "Peace without Conquest," Address at Johns Hopkins University, 7 April 1965

Introduction

After the U.S. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August 1964 authorizing President Lyndon B. Johnson to take action against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), he remained relatively cautious until the 1964 presidential election campaign was behind him. Once safely returned to office for a full four-year term, he decided to mount a major bombing campaign against targets in North Vietnam, an initiative that he hoped would force North Vietnam's leaders to end hostile operations against the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) and come to the negotiating table. Operation ROLLING THUNDER began in February 1965, with the American airplanes launching these raids based at airfields in South Vietnam, which almost immediately became the target of guerrilla attacks. In March 1965, Johnson and his advisors decided that in order to protect these airstrips, it was necessary to deploy U.S. ground forces in South Vietnam to assist the military forces of South Vietnam. The first such American troops—two battalions of U.S. Marines, as opposed to military advisors—landed in March 1965 and came ashore at Da Nang. On 1 April 1965 the president approved the deployment of two further Marine battalions and one Marine air squadron, plus an additional 18,000–20,000 men for existing support forces in Vietnam. By the end of the year, 150,000 American military personnel were stationed in Vietnam, and by the end of 1966 the number had risen to 385,000. The peak came in early 1968, when more than 500,000 American troops were in the country. As the first deployments were under way, the Johnson administration deliberately tried to keep the news low-key and sought to avoid conveying any impression that a major change in policy had occurred. Addressing an audience at Johns Hopkins University during the first week of April 1965, Johnson defended U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam on the grounds that should the United States abandon South Vietnam, this would

destroy the credibility of American commitments to other allies. Like many other Cold War leaders, he recalled the lessons of the pre–World War II period during which appeasement of dictators and totalitarian governments only whetted their appetite for further conquest. Johnson did not directly discuss the new troop deployments, nor did he give any prognosis on the course of the war. Instead, the highlight of his address was the announcement of increased economic assistance to South Vietnam and the launching of an ambitious major project, modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority of the New Deal years, to develop Vietnam's Mekong River Delta so that it would provide food, water, and power for the entire region, eradicating poverty and hunger, revitalizing the country's people, and providing the long-term basis for lasting peace and prosperity. The success of any such efforts largely depended, however, on winning the war, something that the Johnson administration was never able to achieve.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change.

This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road?

Why must this Nation hazard its ease, and its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace.

We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest.

Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to south.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

WHY ARE WE IN VIET-NAM?

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the

people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

OUR OBJECTIVE IN VIET-NAM

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a very simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery, the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: Armed hostility is futile. Our resources are equal to any challenge. Because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam —securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again, fifty times and more, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready, with this purpose, for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

A COOPERATIVE EFFORT FOR DEVELOPMENT

These countries of southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrestle existence from the soil. They are often wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the work of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works. Now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area. As far back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office, and his deep knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway.

And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and the existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA.

The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care.

Schools can be established to train people in the skills that are needed to manage the process of development.

And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn, rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

In areas that are still ripped by conflict, of course development will not be easy. Peace will be necessary for final success. But we cannot and must not wait for peace to begin this job.

THE DREAM OF WORLD ORDER

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country now—does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful; or because we have made some mistakes; or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam—of China and India—of Russia and America—are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

CONCLUSION

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this

happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American Nation believes to be impressive.

And, if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we could? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand.

We can do all these things on a scale never dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. In so doing we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

[. . .]

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 394–399.

97. Freedom of Information Act, 1966

Introduction

The 1966 Freedom of Information Act is the most important U.S. legislation regarding public access to government records. Until the passage of this act, there was no law requiring that federal records be opened to the public. The result was that the federal bureaucracy often operated in secrecy, withholding substantial information from the public. In the 1950s, Representative John Moss of California began a concerted effort to enact legislation reducing government secrecy. After more than a decade of effort, at the height of the Vietnam War, his work resulted in the passage of this act. Congress strengthened the law in 1974 to force greater compliance. Once the legislation was in place, individuals and organizations were able to use it to obtain accurate information on such subjects as illicit government surveillance of suspected subversives and others and U.S. involvement, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other bodies in destabilizing other governments overseas. The information thus obtained contributed to a growing climate of public distrust of the U.S. government's good faith and probity and a loss of confidence that President Jimmy Carter characterized in the late 1970s as a national malaise.

Primary Source

Section 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings

(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:

(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public—

(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established places at which, the employees

(and in the case of a uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;

(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available;

(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;

(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency; and

(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing. Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. For the purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.

(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying—

(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;

(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and

(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public; unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale. To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction. However, in each case the justification for the deletion shall be explained fully in writing. Each agency shall also maintain and make available for public inspection and copying current indexes providing identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made available or published. Each agency shall promptly publish, quarterly or more frequently, and distribute (by sale or otherwise) copies of each index or supplements thereto unless it determines by order published in the Federal Register that the publication would be unnecessary and impracticable, in which case the agency shall nonetheless provide copies of such index on request at a cost not to exceed the direct cost of duplication. A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if—

(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by this paragraph; or

(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.

(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.

(4)(A)(i) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency shall promulgate regulations, pursuant to notice and receipt of public comment, specifying the schedule of fees applicable to the processing of requests under this section and establishing procedures and guidelines for determining when such fees should be waived or reduced. Such schedule shall conform to the guidelines which shall be promulgated, pursuant to notice and receipt of public comment, by

the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and which shall provide for a uniform schedule of fees for all agencies.

(ii) Such agency regulations shall provide that—

(I) fees shall be limited to reasonable standard charges for document search, duplication, and review, when records are requested for commercial use;

(II) fees shall be limited to reasonable standard charges for document duplication when records are not sought for commercial use and the request is made by an educational or noncommercial scientific institution, whose purpose is scholarly or scientific research; or a representative of the news media; and

(III) for any request not described in (I) or (II), fees shall be limited to reasonable standard charges for document search and duplication.

(iii) Documents shall be furnished without any charge or at a charge reduced below the fees established under clause (ii) if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.

(iv) Fee schedules shall provide for the recovery of only the direct costs of search, duplication, or review. Review costs shall include only the direct costs incurred during the initial examination of a document for the purposes of determining whether the documents must be disclosed under this section and for the purposes of withholding any portions exempt from disclosure under this section. Review costs may not include any costs incurred in resolving issues of law or policy that may be raised in the course of processing a request under this section. No fee may be charged by any agency under this section—

(I) if the costs of routine collection and processing of the fee are likely to equal or exceed the amount of the fee; or

(II) for any request described in clause (ii) (II) or (III) of this subparagraph for the first two hours of search time or for the first one hundred pages of duplication.

(v) No agency may require advance payment of any fee unless the requester has previously failed to pay fees in a timely fashion, or the agency has determined that the fee will exceed $250.

(vi) Nothing in this subparagraph shall supersede fees chargeable under a statute specifically providing for setting the level of fees for particular types of records.

(vii) In any action by a requester regarding the waiver of fees under this section, the court shall determine the matter de novo: Provided, That the court's review of the matter shall be limited to the record before the agency.

(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.

(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the defendant shall serve an answer or otherwise plead to any complaint made under this subsection within thirty days after service upon the defendant of the pleading in which such complaint is made, unless the court otherwise directs for good cause shown.

[. . .]

(6)(A) Each agency, upon any request for records made under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection, shall—

(i) determine within ten days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of

any such request whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination; and

(ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of such appeal. If on appeal the denial of the request for records is in whole or in part upheld, the agency shall notify the person making such request of the provisions for judicial review of that determination under paragraph (4) of this subsection.

(B) In unusual circumstances as specified in this subparagraph, the time limits prescribed in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) may be extended by written notice to the person making such request setting forth the reasons for such extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched. No such notice shall specify a date that would result in an extension for more than ten working days. As used in this subparagraph, "unusual circumstances" means, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular request—

(i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request;

(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or

(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein.

(C) Any person making a request to any agency for records under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails to comply with the applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph. If the Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its review of the records. Upon any determination by an agency to comply with a request for records, the records shall be made promptly available to such person making such request. Any notification of denial of any request for records under this subsection shall set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial of such request.

(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—

(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;

(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute

(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or

(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information

(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,

(B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,

(C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,

(D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source,

(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or

(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection

(c)(1) Whenever a request is made which involves access to records described in subsection (b)(7)(A) and—

(A) the investigation or proceeding involves a possible violation of criminal law; and

(B) there is reason to believe that

(i) the subject of the investigation or proceeding is not aware of its pendency, and

(ii) disclosure of the existence of the records could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, the agency may, during only such time as that circumstance continues, treat the records as not subject to the requirements of this section.

(2) Whenever informant records maintained by a criminal law enforcement agency under an informant's name or personal identifier are requested by a third party according to the informant's name or personal identifier, the agency may treat the records as not subject to the requirements of this section unless the informant's status as an informant has been officially confirmed.

(3) Whenever a request is made which involves access to records maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, or international terrorism, and the existence of the records is classified information as provided in subsection (b)(1), the Bureau may, as long as the existence of the records remains classified information, treat the records as not subject to the requirements of this section.

(d) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section. This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress.

[. . .]

Source: Freedom of Information Act (1966), U.S. Code 5, §552.

98. Outer Space Treaty, 27 January 1967

Introduction

During the 1960s, ever-increasing activity in space on the part of both the Soviet Union and the United States brought concern that the nuclear arms race would spread even beyond Earth and its atmosphere. Fears were also rife that one or another power would seek to annex and lay claim to the moon or other celestial bodies. In 1967 the three powers then involved in space exploration—Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—signed a treaty governing these subjects. Each pledged not to install nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around Earth. The moon and other celestial bodies, such as planets and asteroids, were also declared to be off-limits to any military use. The signatories agreed that they would not place any nuclear or other weapons of mass destructions or establish military bases, installations, or fortifications on the moon, planets, or other celestial bodies for the purposes of testing weapons or conducting military maneuvers. In addition, all such celestial bodies were declared to belong to all humankind and could therefore not be subjected to colonization, occupation, or sovereignty by any one nation. The treaty was one indication of how, despite their fierce competition to explore space, the expensive prospect of expanding Cold War rivalries and hostilities beyond the stratosphere was something that the great powers found decidedly unenticing.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Article I

The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation.

Article II

Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

Article III

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.

Article IV

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

Article V

States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, dis-

tress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.

In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.

States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.

Article VI

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.

Article VII

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.

Article VIII

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party of the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.

Article IX

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

Article X

In order to promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.

The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

[. . .]

Article XIV

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

[. . .]

Source: United Nations, "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html.

99. Stokely Carmichael: Black Power Speech, Seattle, Washington, 19 April 1967

Introduction

Over time, the civil rights movement became increasingly violent, a development that in turn helped to provoke a white backlash. In 1966 the flamboyant Stokely Carmichael became head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Carmichael's experiences as a civil rights activist fighting segregation in the South, where protestors were beaten and sometimes killed, radicalized him. Arrested well over thirty times, he lost patience with tactics of passive resistance and soon became a vocal advocate of violence, at first only in self-defense and later as a means of revolutionary opposition to oppression. In a speech in Greenwood, Mississippi, in June 1966, he coined the slogan and enunciated the principles of black power, declining to cooperate with whites and advocating tactics of black separatism as opposed to accommodation. More moderate civil rights leaders such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) deplored Carmichael's speech and his tactics, which they feared would turn the white majority against civil rights. Financial contributions to the civil rights movement declined dramatically, and the election results of November 1966 demonstrated the beginnings of a white backlash. Carmichael expelled white staff and volunteers from the SNCC before leaving the organization in June 1967 to join the more extreme Black Panther Party, which appealed to blacks to "smash everything Western civilization has created." He applauded the 1967 racial riots in Detroit and other American cities, threatening to train groups of "urban guerrillas" to fight to the death for black rights. Men wearing black berets and carrying guns featured prominently among his supporters. In 1966 and 1967 Carmichael lectured around the United States, urging young African Americans to rise up against whites and identify themselves with African nations. Seeking to nurture their self-esteem, he told them that they should not try to resemble whites but rather should take pride in themselves and believe that "black is beautiful." Carmichael also condemned the Vietnam War, charging that it was a racist, capitalist, and unjust conflict, and, moreover, one in which casualties among black soldiers were disproportionately high. In 1968 Carmichael changed his name to Kwame Toure in honor of two of his friends, the African socialist leaders Kwame Nkrumah and Ahmed Sekou Touré. In 1969 Toure moved permanently to Guinea, West Africa, claiming that there was no real place for blacks in the United States and urging other African Americans to follow his example. From then onward he was very much on the margins of the civil rights movement. By that time, however, the extremism that he had helped to foster had done much to turn average Americans against that movement.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Tonight we want to do several things. We want to talk about some of the basic assumptions from which the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee moves, and then move into an area of pragmatics and what, in fact, black people gonna have to do if we going to survive in this country and live as human beings.

[. . .]

We want to talk about self-condemnation. Self-condemnation is impossible; nobody can condemn themselves or no people can condemn themselves. If they do they have to punish themselves. See, if I did something wrong, and I admitted that I did it wrong, then I have to punish myself, see. But if I can keep telling lies or if I can rationalize away my guilt, then I'll never feel guilty. Hmm, let me give you some examples.

The Nazis who were brought to trial after Hitler was—after the Hitler regime was brought down, they said, the ones who allowed themselves to live, they said that they killed Jews but that Jews weren't human beings—they were inferior—so they didn't really commit a crime. Or they said that they didn't know what was going on in Germany at the time that Hitler was killing all the Jews. Or they said what most white Americans are saying today, that they were just following law and order.

Now, if they . . . if they said that, they just rationalized away their guilt—they just served their sentences and waited until they got out. But now the ones who admitted that they killed human beings had to commit suicide—they had to commit suicide. You got to understand that. For us in this country, a clear example of that would be in Neshoba County in Philadelphia, Mississippi, a honky by the name of Rainey, decides with eighteen other honkies to kill three people. Now the entire county of Neshoba cannot indict Rainey because they elected him to do just what he was doing, to kill anybody who troubled with the status quo. If they indicted him, then all of them will be guilty, and they can't do that. See, they cannot admit that they are guilty. And in SNCC we say that white America, the total community, cannot condemn herself for the acts [of] brutality and bestiality that she has heaped upon us as a race, black people. It is impossible for her to do it. She must rationalize away her guilt. She must blame everybody else but herself cause if she were to blame herself she would have to commit suicide. My brother Leroy Jones reminds me that wouldn't be such a bad idea.

Now we want to move from there to the concept of denying one one's freedom. And this is very very important because white people have assumed that they're gods; that they can give somebody your freedom, and so if they don't like the way you act, they won't give you your freedom.

So now what you have to get crystal clear in your mind is that nobody gives anybody their freedom. People can only deny somebody their freedom. It's very important. We are all born free. We are enslaved by the institutions of racism that white America produces. Our job is to stop America from being racist; not to . . . not to give us our freedom. So in reality, our fight is to civilize white America, 'cause it's uncivilized.

Now then, if you take that to its logical conclusion, you would say that any civil rights bill that was passed in this country might have eased the struggle for black people but helped civilize white America.

[. . .]

Now then, we want to talk about definitions 'cause they're very very important. See, white, western society—and you should use the words "western society", never "western civilization" 'cause they don't know nothin' about it—white western society has been able to define everybody. They just define them to put them in places. And once they're defined, they can't get out of those definitions. And people just stay there. Let me give you some examples so you can understand it much better.

You've watched the red man and the white man on TV? Fighting each other? If the red man is winning, then the white man calls for the cavalry. I mean, here comes the cavalry, and they're riding very white and

very proper, and when they get up to where the battle is, they all get off their horses and they get out their guns and they systematically shoot all the red men; you know, kill 'em dead. They get back on their horses and they ride back to the fort, and at the fort there's always a white woman standing there and she says, [in falsetto] "What happened?" and there's always this lieutenant who says, "We had a victory. We killed all the Indians." This is very good, you know. Now the next time when the reverse happens, when the red man beats the hell out of the white man, you know, and there's one of them left draggin' on the horse, and she says, [in falsetto] "What happened?" "Those dirty Indians; they massacred us."

See, what they are saying, is that a massacre is not as good as a victory. A victory is much better. So here are these poor red people who all their lives gonna fight and they ain't never gonna have a victory. Here's Sitting Bull, the greatest strategist you have in a war; he's won all these wars, but he ain't never gonna have a victory; he's always gonna win a massacre. And a massacre is dirty, so you gotta understand that one in your minds.

You see that on television all the time. Even today about the Vietnam war; do you ever see 'em? Those dirty, filthy, rotten, Communist, rebels threw a Molotov cocktail and killed civilians. And then the other guy comes on and says, "And in the meantime, our good GI boys have been bombing the hell out of North Vietnam."

Or even better, would be a group of students at Nashville decide to take care of some honky cops 'cause they pickin' on them and it's "Fiske Students Riot!" And in Fort Lauderdale, honkies gonna throw bottles and beer at policemen and they gonna say "College Students go on a Spree."

So the white people have been defining us all our lives and we have been forced to react to those definitions. And see, they call you all Negroes. I guess you all came from Negroland. [laughs] You got 'em! Yeah! But see you have allowed white people to name you. When we were in Puerto Rico a couple of months ago we were speaking in Spanish. I was looking through the dictionary to find the word for Negro in Puerto Rican. There is no such word. The closest word is negro: it means black. In French, there is no word for Negro. In German, there is no word for Negro. In Swahili, there is no word for Negro.

[. . .]

But now they do something even more insidious with definitions. Let me give you an example so then we can get into Black Power and the definitions of Black Power. Now you remember, especially from my generation, when the whole thing broke out with integration and we used to sit glued to the TV set. You know, our black leaders would get up and say, "We want to integrate." In our minds, we knew the cat was talking about good schools, good houses, good jobs, and a good way of life. That was in the minds of all black people. But some dumb honky gonna jump up and say, [in a drawl] "You want to marry my daughter don't you?"

And instead of our black leaders being aggressive and saying "Later for you honky," at that time they would react to the honky. See they would let the honky define their own term "integration" and they would say, "Uh, uh, we don't want to be your brother. We just want to be your brother. Ah, ah." Yeah, yeah, you know! And they just go to sweating and puffing, "We don't want to sleep in your bedroom. We just want to live next door to you." Yeah, yeah! And so what they were doing was that here was a honky who defined their term and they were reacting to his definition. They don't pull that junk with us at SNCC 'cause we tell them right out when they say that nonsense about "marrying my daughter". Your daughter, your sister, your mama, we tell them to the point! To the point, to the point! We tell them crystal clear: "The white woman is not the queen of the world—she's not! She's not the Virgin Mary. She can be made like anyone else. Let's move on to something important! Let's move on to something important."

So that we will not be caught in a bind about reacting to their definitions. And the same thing happens, see, we say Black Power and some honky goin' to jump up and say, "You mean violence." And he wants us to say "Uh-uh, boss man, we don't mean violence." Later for the honky! It's our term—we know what it means. Later for him!

Black Power is the coming together of black people to fight for their liberation by any means necessary.

Now we want to talk about violence. Because I understand that some of your so-called Negro leaders have been saying that we violent. I won't deny it. Yeah, I'm violent. Somebody touch me, I'll break their arm. But the problem isn't one of violence, see. The problem is one of hitting back white people when they hit you. That's the real problem 'cause we've never done that all our lives. They've been able to walk over us, bomb our churches, beat us up, shoot into our houses, lynch us, and do everything they wanted to do and we would just sit there and whisper about it behind closed doors.

It's . . . a . . . new day . . . today! It's a new day today.

But what really upsets me is that these people who talk about violence are not concerned about black people. Because there is more violence in our neighborhood on Friday and Saturday night than there is anyplace else, anyplace else. We cut and we shoot each other more then we touch anybody in the world, and don't nobody talk out against that violence—nobody talking about it! And the reason they don't do it is because they don't give a damn about us. They're only concerned about white folk. If they were against violence, they would be preaching non-violence in the black communities, 'cause that's where we need it most. We need it there. We need to learn to love and to respect each other and stop cutting and shooting each other. But they don't care about us, they don't care about us, no! The only time you hear these preachers talk about nonviolence is when a honky hits you and you gettin' ready to take care of business. That's the only time you hear them talking about non-violence.

[. . .]

Now we want talk then pragmatically about how these things affect our lives as black people. What white America has done in order to rationalize away her guilt for what she's done to us, is that she's told a number of lies about us that she believes. Now that's expected. Hitler said if you tell a lie long enough, and hard enough, everybody will think it's the truth. And white American has done that. But what is pathetic and what is bad is that some black people believe those lies about themselves. Yes. And so what we have to do tonight is begin to clarify those lies for ourselves.

[. . .]

Now the first lie that white America told about us is that we are lazy people. Now are you hip to that. And here goes some of us down the street, "Oh, oh, we just lazy people. We could be just like white folk, they always working hard and trying to get somewhere. We so lazy." You ought to get it in your minds, we not lazy. We hardworking. White people are lazy. Look here. They so lazy they came to Africa to steal us to do their work for them. We're not lazy. We are the hardest working people in this country. We are! The trouble is we are the lowest paid and the most oppressed and the most exploited people in this country. In this country, yeah! We're not lazy people. If you ride up and down the Delta in the South today, you will see black people chopping and picking cotton for $2.00 a day while white folks sit on the porch, drink Scotch, and talk about us. We're not a lazy people. It is our mothers who take care of their own family and then go cross town to take care of Miss Ann's family. So you should get that out of your mind: we're not lazy. We are a hard working, industrious people. Always have been—our sweat built this country. Built this country.

Now the next lie she tells is what she tells our kids in school. If you work hard, you will succeed. Now you all ought to know that's a lot of Junk. 'Cause if that were true, black people would own this country lock, stock, and barrel. It's not a question of hard-working. It is a question of who has power and who has control. That's all. That's all it's about. Because we are the people who really built this country. We are the domestics, we are the share-croppers, we are the fruit-pickers, we are the janitors, we are the elevator men, we are the garbage men, we are the hardest working people in this country. We are. See then if it were true that you had to work hard to succeed, then the contrary of that would be true, that people who didn't work hard would be poor. And Bobby Kennedy would be the poorest honky in this country. So then we must begin to get it crystal clear in our minds, it is simply a question of who has power. And we don't have that. We got

everything else but that and the white man ain't got nothing but that.

You ever dig that? We got love, we got nonviolence, we got morality, we got Christianity, we got rhythm, we got everything you need. But we ain't got power. We ain't got power.

The honkies don't have love, can't spell nonviolence, don't know what religion is all about, and you know they ain't got rhythm. But they have power, that's what they have. Power over our lives! So we got to get it clear, the thing we need is power.

The next lie they tell us is this thing about education. If you go to school and get a degree you gonna make it, you know. All our college students when they get out of college with a college degree, make less money than a honky with a high school degree. Not only that, the education system that they teach us is riddled with racism. It is filled with racism! We can't see ourselves projected anywhere. They show us as a stupid people. They let us keep thinking we're stupid. They start off with their elementary books about Tom, Dick, and Jane. Tom is white, Dick is white, Jane is white, even their dog Spot is white. And the only time we see ourselves is little black Sambo on the last page eating watermelon.

But not only is it riddled with outright racism, it is riddled with subtle racism, and the history books just lie. They lie! And they have to lie because white people have got to lie to themselves. They cannot tell the truth about themselves. And what happens is they fill our minds with all those lies and we have to accept them as truths. Let me give you an example; one that is very hard but you gonna dig it.

If I said to you Mr. Kwame Nkrumah, who is a brilliant black man—he's out of sight, don't let them white folk fool you; he should be your hero, he's out of sight—and if I said to you Mr. Cusmian Krumm (you wouldn't know about him because he's a leader in Africa) (or was until the CIA overthrew him) and if I said to you that Mr. Cusmian Krumm discovered England in 1961, you'd laugh huh? That was the first time that that black man had set foot on England since we as black people did not recognize the existence of nonblack people, he would have discovered England, huh? If I said to you that Christopher Columbus discovered American in 1492 you would say that that is right. If you were my teacher, you'd give me an A.

Alright, now dig. Here comes this honky from Europe, sets foot on this country, the red people are here, but they don't exist, so he discovered it. This has been the history of white society, they have never recognized anybody who is non-white, so nothing happens until they come and find you. Ha!

But now you've got to dig this thing about Columbus real deep, because when they tell you he discovered America and he was a dumb honky, I mean he was real stupid. He died thinking he was in India that is how dumb he was. And because he was stupid, he titled the Red man Indians. That's why they have the name, because some dumb honky thought he was in India.

So you've got to understand that. That's how riddled with racism it is—that you can't even recognize it. They don't even recognize how racist it is to say that Christopher Columbus discovered America. And they never will admit it; they can't, they can't.

Not only that, if you go to writing the real history of this country you would say that this country is a country of thieves. They started off by stealing this country from the red men and committing genocide against them. Not only did it steal the country from the red men—that didn't satisfy them—they stole us from Africa. You've got to understand that this nation is a nation of thieves and is becoming a nation of murderers in Vietnam, we've got to stop it, we've got to stop it. Because we have to save our humanity! Let white America do as it will, but as black people we have to save our humanity. That is very very important .

They start our kids off with the Roman Empire, the Greek Empire, and never teach you about Africa. They make you ashamed of Africa.

You ask kids, "Where you from?"

"My mother is from Seattle."

"Where's your grandmother from?"

"From Kansas."

"And where are your great grandparents from?"

"From Texas."

"And where your great-great-grandmother from?"

"Mmm-umm." [I don't know.]

She is from Africa!

Africa!

But you don't know anything about Africa 'cause you have white people who define Africa as savages. You let them define them for you and you don't want to be a savage. You want to be white. Yeah! Yeah. Um-hmm. You want to be so white that you don't want to part of your brothers in Africa. You want to be so white that you go to the movies to watch Tarzan. Yeah. You want to be so white that you sit up on your movie seats and yell for Tarzan to beat up your black brothers. That's how white you want to be. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You should recognize what they're doing to you. Here you are jumping up and down identifying with a white man—and he's dumb! He's dumb—he can't even speak. All he says is "Uh-ah-yuh-ah-yah!" [Tarzan's yell].

And you over there identifying with this white man because what they telling you is here comes this honky from Europe, and because he's so smart and so intelligent, and we are black and so stupid, he comes over to Africa and knows the jungle better than us, and we been living there all our lives. Are you hip to that? And whenever we get into trouble with the elephants, we have to go to the great white father to keep the elephants from us. Ain't that some junk? But what you have to recognize is that what they have done is brainwashed us. When you see Tarzan on TV, you yell for your black brothers to come and beat the hell out that white man. Beat him up!

But you see that has been calculated by white America, that we will never find out about ourselves. Because a people without its roots, a people without its history is like a tree without its roots and we have been floating for 400 hundred years. Just floating. Just floating. They didn't tell you that the first university in the world was the university in Timbuktu in Africa, did they? Africa, did they? They couldn't tell you that because you would begin to identify with Africa and see a part of other black people. They tell you about the Roman Empire conquering the world, they didn't tell you that Hannibal, a black man, crossed the Alps and beat the living daylights out the Romans. That's right, Hannibal did it!

[. . .]

But they won't give you that in the history books. They give white heroes to identify with. They mesmerize our minds. They give you George Washington. He's supposed to be your hero. He's the man who had you enslaved—sold a black woman for a barrel of molasses—and he's supposed to be my hero? Later for him! Later for him.

They can't tell you about the Nat Turners and the Denmark Veseys, can they? They can't tell you because they were fighters who beat up all kinds of white folk who were trying to make them slaves. That's why they can't tell you because they want you to keep on being slaves, so they can define your very actions. It ain't going to happen to today!

All of those things in the schools are calculated to make us ashamed of ourselves. But the most insidious things they could have done to us is to make us believe as a people that we are ugly. The criteria for beauty in this society is set by white folk. In the books you read, in the television programs you see, the movies, the magazines and the newspaper. If she's beautiful she's got a thin nose, thin lips, stringy hair and white skin—and that's beauty. And they believe in that beauty so much, that our women run around day and night bathing in beauty cream from morning to night.

They have got us believing that so that all these young men go out and process their hair so they can have straight hair to look beautiful. I hope you can take the truth, because they mesmerized our women's minds so

that they process their hair every Friday night. And the rest of them get their fifty dollars and buy wigs. We have to as a people gather strength to stand up on our feet and say "Our noses are broad, our lips are thick, our hair is nappy—we are black and beautiful!" Black and beautiful!

So that we don't have to any longer be ashamed of ourselves and make our children think that they are shamed. Black parents won't tell us, "Don't drink coffee, because it makes you black. Bite in your lip, 'cause it's too thick." I was surprised in college to find a young man who wore a nose-clip on his nose every night. But that's how they have messed up our minds. They messed it up so much that every time we begin to think somebody's beautiful, they pick somebody who is light, bright, and damned near white. And then they are beautiful.

And when you marry somebody, our mothers keep telling us, "Make sure you marry somebody with hair that's, you know, straight. Because I don't want to be . . ."

That's how much they have messed up our minds. We are ashamed of ourselves and of our color of our skin.

If you want to start a fight, call somebody black. "I ain't black they's black, they's black, I ain't black. What you talkin' 'bout?"

You are black and beautiful! Stop being ashamed of what you are!

Once we stop being ashamed, we can move on because we can then begin to develop a concept of people-hood. We so ashamed of each other. "Now I'm on the bus, and here comes a black sister, there are five of us standing there. She is going to stand next to us. We are so clannish we got to be together." We are so ashamed we don't even want to see each other in a group. We are so ashamed that we go walking down the street and see a honky cop beating up on one of us, and know he beating him because he's black and we keep walking right on by.

We are so ashamed of ourselves, that we watch our brothers and sisters get put out of their houses, put their furniture on the street, and we wait until night time to go and steal what we want. We are so ashamed of ourselves that we're raping, plundering, and murdering each other. We have to build a concept of people-hood where we recognize that we are all the same people, the same brothers and sisters. So that we can move to the strength to tell them "When you touch one of us, you've got to touch all of us." And when we have got the strength to move to that position, ain't none of them going to mess with any of us.

[. . .]

Source: "Stokely Carmichael," Instructional Resources Center, University of Washington, http://courses.washington.edu/spcmu/carmichael/transcript.htm. Reprinted with permission.

100. Lyndon B. Johnson: Announcement about Not Seeking Reelection, 31 March 1968

Introduction

The January 1968 Tet Offensive, when Viet Cong forces launched a countrywide offensive throughout Vietnam during the Vietnamese New Year holiday, had a major impact on U.S. domestic politics. The Tet Offensive convinced many Americans, including the influential television broadcaster Walter Cronkite, that victory in Vietnam was unattainable. It also triggered a major review of American policies in Vietnam by the so-called Wise Men, senior advisors and past American officials headed by Dean Acheson, former secretary of state, who recommended that the United States open serious negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and

accept a compromise settlement in South Vietnam if that was the price for the withdrawal of American troops. The Tet Offensive also triggered further major domestic and international protests against American policies in Vietnam. Many Democrats strongly disagreed with President Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam policies. Primary contests for nominations for the 1968 presidential election had begun, and Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, running on an antiwar platform and supported by hundreds of student volunteers, mounted a challenge to Johnson. In mid-March, McCarthy won 42 percent of the vote in the New Hampshire primary, only seven points behind Johnson's 49 percent, a considerable humiliation for an incumbent president. Unwilling to face a bruising, divisive, and possibly unsuccessful primary fight against McCarthy, on 31 March 1968 Johnson shocked the nation when he announced in a televised address that he would not serve another term as president. He also announced his intention of opening serious peace talks with the North Vietnamese and offered a complete bombing halt of North Vietnam if the enemy would agree to come to the negotiating table in good faith. Johnson's address marked the moment when the United States officially decided to accept a compromise settlement in Vietnam rather than continuing the war in an effort to attain victory. It also represented a bitter and anticlimactic end to his presidency and political career, which Johnson, an extremely able politician, had begun with great hopes of implementing a major domestic reform program and aspirations to become a towering president who left a great historical legacy. Johnson's escalation of American intervention in Vietnam effectively destroyed all these hopes, and he died six years later a sad and disappointed man.

Primary Source

Fifty-two months and ten days ago, in a moment of tragedy and trauma, the duties of this office fell upon me. I asked then for your help and God's, that we might continue America on its course, binding up our wounds, healing our history, moving forward in new unity, to clear the American agenda and to keep the American commitment for all of our people.

United we have kept that commitment. United we have enlarged that commitment. Through all time to come, I think America will be a stronger nation, a more just society, and a land of greater opportunity and fulfillment because of what we have all done together in these years of unparalleled achievement. Our reward will come in the life of freedom, peace, and hope that our children will enjoy through ages ahead.

What we won when all of our people united must not now be lost in suspicion, distrust, selfishness, and politics among any of our people.

Believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permit the Presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that are developing in this political year.

With America's sons in the fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office—the Presidency of your country.

Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President.

But let men everywhere know, however, that a strong, a confident, and a vigilant America stands ready tonight to seek an honorable peace—and stands ready tonight to defend an honored cause—whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifice that duty may require.

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–1969*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 475–476.

101. The Prague Spring: The Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), 5 April 1968

Introduction

For most of the Cold War, any sign that the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe were taking an unduly independent line was likely to attract harsh repression. In January 1968 the Czech communist Alexander Dubček was appointed head of his party and sought to introduce "communism with a human face." For six months, it seemed that it might be possible to do so. In April 1968 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) adopted the Action Program that, while not rejecting Marxist-Leninism, denied that the Communist Party should be "the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and sought to restrict its role in social, economic, and political life. The Action Program accepted political pluralism and the existence of other parties, to be organized in a "National Front" in which divergent views were accepted. The program envisaged independent, noncommunist trade unions and called for freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech, and an end to censorship of political and artistic expression. The State Security apparatus was to be barred from investigating individuals' internal activities unless there was good reason to believe that they were acting in collaboration with "enemy centers" abroad. Individual property rights were to be protected, and economic market reforms were to be launched that would make public enterprises responsible for both their profits and losses. While economic relations with other communist countries would continue, these were to be based more on "economic calculations" of profitability and less on ideological considerations. The Action Program affirmed that the alliance with the Soviet Union would remain the fundamental principle of Czech foreign policy, in tandem with peaceful coexistence with "advanced capitalist countries." In the first half of 1968, known as the Prague Spring, Czechs enjoyed unprecedented intellectual and cultural freedom, but these in turn provoked great uneasiness among the other Soviet bloc states, which repeatedly but unavailingly urged the Czechs to moderate their policies. Czech efforts to reassure fellow European communist leaders that their country remained a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact failed to convince Soviet party secretary Leonid Brezhnev and his communist colleagues within the Soviet Politburo and around Eastern Europe, many of whom feared that their own peoples might seek to emulate the Czechs. Hard-line Czech communists urged the Soviet leadership to take military action. On 20–21 August 1968, Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia, and Soviet troops remained in occupation for the next twenty years. Dub√ek, Czech President Ludvík Svoboda, and other prominent Czech leaders were flown to Moscow and forced to sign a memorandum accepting the presence of Soviet troops. Hard-line Czech communist officials quickly replaced them. Around half a million Czechs lost their communist party membership, and many of the intellectual elite who had been active in the Prague Spring found themselves relegated to menial jobs. Dub√ek himself spent two decades working in forestry. About 150,000 Czechs and Slovaks fled to the West. As Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 had done, repression of the Prague Spring tarnished the image of Soviet communism among many Western intellectuals. Brezhnev used the occasion to promulgate the Brezhnev Doctrine, stating that the Soviet Union arrogated to itself the right to intervene in the affairs of any communist state when socialism was threatened there. This declaration alarmed not just the East European nations, including those such as Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia that prided themselves on their independence from Soviet control, but also the People's Republic of China (PRC), where Chinese Communist Party Chairman (CCP) Mao Zedong had fiercely attacked the Soviet Union on ideological and doctrinal grounds. Brezhnev's stance was one reason that within a few years, China began to look to the United States for potential protection against any Soviet incursions.

Primary Source

[. . .]

For the development of socialist democracy, for a new system of the political management of society

[. . .]

The main thing is to reform the whole political system so that it will permit the dynamic development of socialist social relations, combine broad democracy with a scientific, highly

qualified management, strengthen the social order, stabilize socialist relations and maintain social discipline. The basic structure of the political system must, at the same time, *provide firm guarantees against a return to the old methods of subjectivism and highhandedness form a position of power.* Party activity has, so far, not been turned systematically to that end, in fact, obstacles have frequently been put in the way of such efforts. All these changes necessarily call for *commencement of work on a new Czechoslovak constitution* so that the draft of the new constitution may be thoroughly discussed among professionals and in public in all important points and submitted to the National Assembly shortly after the Party Congress.

[. . .]

No responsibility without right
[. . .]

The whole *National Front,* the political parties which form it, and the social organisations, will take part in the creation of state policy. *The political parties* of the National Front are partners whose political work is based on the joint political programme of the National Front and is naturally bound by the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, is fully based on the socialist character of social relations in our country. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia considers the National Front to be a political platform which does not separate the political parties into the government and the opposition in the sense that opposition would be created to the state policy as the policy of the whole National Front and a struggle for political power in the state were to exist. Possible differences in the viewpoints of individual component parts of the National Front, or divergency of views as to the policy of the state, are all to be settled on the basis of the common socialist conception of the National Front policy by way of political agreement and unification of all component parts of the National Front. Formation of political forces striving to negate this concept of the National Front, to remove the National Front as a whole from political power, was ruled out as long ago as 1945 after the tragic experience of both our nations with the prewar political development of the then Czechoslovak Republic; it is naturally unacceptable for our present republic.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia considers the *political management* of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the development of socialism as a precondition for the right development of our socialist society. It will assert the Marxist-Leninist concept as the leading political principle in the National Front and in our political system by seeking, through the means of political work, such support in all the component parts of our system and *directly among the masses of workers and all working people* that will ensure its leading role in a democratic way.

Voluntary social organisations of the working people cannot replace political parties, *but the contrary is also true: political parties in our country cannot exclude common-interest organisations or workers and other working people from directly influencing state policy,* its creation and application. Socialist state power cannot be monopolized either by a single party, or by a coalition of parties. It must be open to all political organisations of the people. *The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia will use every means to develop such forms of political life that will ensure the expression of the direct say and will of the working class and all working people in political decision-taking in our country.*

The whole existing organisation, forms of activities, and incorporation of the various organisations in the National Front must be revised in principle under the new conditions and built up so that the National Front may carry out the qualitatively new tasks. *The National Front as a whole and all its component parts must be allowed independent rights and their own responsibility for the management of our country and society.*

Voluntary social organisations must be based on really voluntary membership and activity. People join these organisations because they express their interests, therefore they have the right to choose their own officials and representatives who cannot be appointed from outside. These principles should be the foundation of our unified mass organisations the activities of which are still indispensable but which should meet, by their structure, their working methods, and their ties with their members, the new social conditions.

The implementation of *constitutional freedoms of assembly and association* must be insured this year so that the

possibility of setting up voluntary organisations, special-interest associations, societies, etc. is guaranteed by law to meet the actual interests and needs of various strata and categories of our citizens, without bureaucratic interference and without monopoly of any individual organisation. Any restrictions in this respect can be imposed only by law and only the law can stipulate what is anti-social, forbidden, or punishable. Freedoms guaranteed by law are applicable in this sense, in compliance with the constitution, also to citizens of individual creeds and religious denominations.

The effective influence of views and opinions of the working people on all our policy, opposition to all tendencies to suppress the criticism and initiative of the people, cannot be guaranteed if we do not ensure constitution-based freedom of speech and all political and personal rights of all citizens, systematically and consistently, by all legal means available. *Socialism cannot mean only liberation of the working people from the domination of exploiting class relations, but must make more provisions for a fuller life of the personality than any bourgeois democracy.* The working people, who are no longer ordered about by any class of exploiters, can no longer be prescribed by any arbitrary interpretation from a position of power, what information they may or may not be given, which of their opinions can or cannot be expressed publicly, where public opinion may play a role and where not. Public opinion polls must be systematically used in preparing important decisions and the main results of the research are to be published. Any restriction may be imposed only on the basis of a law stipulating what is anti-social—which in our country is mainly the criminal law. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia considers it necessary to define more exactly than hitherto in the shortest possible time by a press law, when a state body can forbid the propagation of certain information —in the press, radio, television, etc.—and exclude the possibility of preliminary factual censorship. It is necessary to overcome the holding up, distortion, and incompleteness of information, to remove any unwarranted secrecy of political and economic facts, to publish the annual balance sheets of enterprises, to publish even alternatives to various suggestions and measures, to extend the import and sale of foreign press. Leading representatives of state, social and cultural organisations are obliged to organize regular press conferences and give their views on topical issues on television, radio, and in the press. In the press, it is necessary to make a distinction between official standpoints of state, Party and journalist bodies; the Party press especially must express the Party's own life, development and criticisms of various opinions among the communists, etc., and cannot be made fully identical with the official viewpoints of the state.

[. . .]

Legal norms must guarantee more exactly *the freedom of speech of minority interests and opinions* also again within the framework of socialist laws and in harmony with the principle that decisions are taken in accordance with the will of the majority. The constitutional freedom of movement, particularly the travelling of our citizens abroad, *must be precisely guaranteed by law;* in particular, this means that a citizen should have the legal right to long-term or permanent sojourn abroad and that people should not be groundlessly placed in the position of emigrants; at the same time it is necessary to protect by law the interests of the state, for example, as regards the drain of some categories of specialists, etc.

We must gradually solve in the whole legal code the task of how to *protect in a better and more consistent way the personal rights and property of citizens*, we must especially remove those stipulations that virtually put individual citizens at a disadvantage against the state and other institutions. We must in future prevent various institutions from disregarding personal rights and the interests of individual citizens as far as personal ownership of family houses, gardens, etc. is concerned. It will be necessary to adopt, in the shortest possible time, the long-prepared law on compensation for any damage caused to any individual or to an organisation by an unlawful decision of a state organ.

[. . .]

Division and supervision of power—guarantees against highhandedness
[. . .]

The Party policy is based on the principle that no undue concentration of power must occur, throughout the state machin-

ery, in one sector, one body, or in a single individual. It is necessary to provide for such a division of power and such a system of mutual supervision that any faults or encroachments of any of its links are rectified in time, by the activities of another link. This principle must be applied not only to relations between the elected and executive bodies, but also to the inner relations of the state administration machinery and to the standing and activities of courts of law.

[. . .]

The Party considers the problem of a correct incorporation of the security force in the state as politically very important. The security of our lives will only benefit, if everything is eliminated that helps to maintain a public view of the security force marred by the past period of law violations and by the privileged position of the security force in the political system. That past period impaired the progressive traditions of our security force as a force advancing side by side with our people. These traditions must be renewed. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia deems it necessary *to change the organisation of the security force* and to split the joint organisation into two mutually independent parts—State Security and Public Security. *The State Security* service must have such a status, organisational structure, numerical state, equipment, methods of work, and qualifications which are in keeping with its work of defending the state from the activities of enemy centres abroad. Every citizen who has not been culpable in this respect must know with certainty that his political convictions and opinions, his personal beliefs and activities, cannot be the object of attention of the bodies of the State Security service. The Party declares clearly that this apparatus *should not be directed and used to solve internal political questions* and controversies in socialist society.

[. . .]

Socialism cannot do without enterprises

The programme of democratization in economy links the economic reform more closely with the processes facing us in the sphere of politics and the general management of society, and stimulates the determination and application of new elements which would develop the economic reform even further. *The programme of democratization of the economy includes particularly the provision of ensuring the independence of enterprises and enterprise groupings and their relative independence from state bodies, a full and real implementation of the right of the consumer to determine his consumption and his style of life, the right of a free choice of working activity, the right and real possibility of different groups of the working people and different social groups to formulate and defend their economic interests in shaping the economic policy.*

In developing democratic relations in the economy we at present consider as the most important task the final formulation of the economic position of enterprises, their authority and responsibility.

The economic reform will increasingly push whole working teams of socialist enterprises into positions in which they will feel directly the consequences of both the good and bad management of enterprises. The Party therefore deems it necessary that the whole working team which bears the consequences should also be able to influence the management of the enterprise. There arises the need of democratic bodies in enterprises with determined rights towards the management of the enterprise. Managers and head executives of the enterprises, which would also appoint them to their functions would be accountable to these bodies for the overall results of their work. These bodies must become a direct part of the managing mechanism of enterprises, and not a social organisation—they cannot therefore be identified with trade unions. These bodies would be formed by elected representatives of the working team and by representatives of certain components outside the enterprise ensuring the influence of the interests of the entire society and an expert and qualified level of decision-making; the representation of these components must also be subordinated to democratic forms of control. At the same time it is necessary to define the degree of responsibility of these bodies for the results of the management of socialist property. In the spirit of these principles it is important to solve many concrete questions; at the same time it will be necessary to propose a statute of these bodies and to use certain traditions of our works councils from the years 1945–48 and experiences in modern enterprises.

[. . .]

Problems of the standard of living—an urgent task of the economic policy
The basic aim of the Party in developing the economic policy is the steady growth of the standard of living. However, the development of the economy was in the past one-sidedly focussed on the growth of heavy industry with long-term returnability of investments. This was done to a considerable extent at the expense of the development of agriculture and the consumer goods industry, the development of the production of building materials, trade, services and non-productive basic assets, particularly in housing construction. This one-sided character of the former economic development cannot be changed overnight. If, however, we take advantage of the great reserve existing in the organisation of production and work, as well as in the technical and economic standard of production and products, if we consider the possibilities offered by a skillful utilization of the new system of management, we can substantially speed up the creation of resources and on this basis raise the growth of nominal wages and the general standard of living.

[. . .]

Source: Komunistická strana Ceskoslovenska, *The Action Programme of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Prague, April 1968* (Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1970).

102. Martin Luther King Jr.: "I See the Promised Land," Memphis, Tennessee, 3 April 1968

Introduction

By 1968, the civil rights movement was divided. From the mid-1960s onward, black riots occurred in major American cities, while the Black Panthers and Black Muslims rejected Martin Luther King's emphasis on working with the white majority and instead emphasized violent tactics and black separatism. The United States was also riven by dissension over the Vietnam War, with massive antiwar demonstrations taking place on university campuses and elsewhere. King himself had now become more radical, opposing the Vietnam War as a conflict in which white wealthy American troops were killing poor Asian people and placing more emphasis on social justice and the alleviation of black poverty both in the United States and elsewhere. In April 1968 he visited Memphis, Tennessee, in order to show support for municipal sanitation workers who were on strike for better working conditions. Looking back over years of the civil rights struggle, King urged black activists not to abandon their tactics of peaceful nonviolent protest but rather to supplement these with economic boycotts of businesses and banks that refused to treat African Americans fairly. As always, he appealed to the stated principles of American democracy and to the Christian Bible for endorsement of both his objectives and his tactics. He seems to have had a premonition that he might soon suffer a violent death, saying that he, like the Jewish leader Moses, had "seen the promised land" even if he did not reach it with his people. The following day King was assassinated, a demoralizing and shocking event that, like the murders of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and his brother Robert in June 1968, helped to convince many Americans that their country was falling apart and could no longer afford safety or protection to its most inspiring leaders.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Something is happening in Memphis, something is happening in our world.

As you know, if I were standing at the beginning of time, with the possibility of general and panoramic view of the whole human history up to now, and the Almighty said to me, "Martin Luther King, which age would you like to live in?"—I would take my mental flight by Egypt through, or rather across the Red Sea, through the wilderness on toward the promised land. And in spite of its magnificence, I wouldn't stop there. I would move on by Greece, and take my mind to Mount Olympus. And I would see Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, Euripides and Aristophanes assembled around the Parthenon as they discussed the great and eternal issues of reality.

But I wouldn't stop there. I would go on, even to the great heyday of the Roman Empire. And I would see developments around there, through various emperors and leaders. But I wouldn't stop there. I would even come up to the day of the Renaissance, and get a quick picture of all that the Renaissance did for the cultural and esthetic life of man. But I wouldn't stop there. I would even go by the way that the man for whom I'm named had his habitat. And I would watch Martin Luther as he tacked his ninety-five theses on the door at the church in Wittenberg.

But I wouldn't stop there. I would come on up even to 1863, and watch a vacillating president by the name of Abraham Lincoln finally come to the conclusion that he had to sign the Emancipation Proclamation. But I wouldn't stop there. I would even come up the early thirties, and see a man grappling with the problems of the bankruptcy of his nation. And come with an eloquent cry that we have nothing to fear but fear itself.

But I wouldn't stop there. Strangely enough, I would turn to the Almighty, and say, "If you allow me to live just a few years in the second half of the twentieth century, I will be happy." Now that's a strange statement to make, because the world is all messed up. The nation is sick. Trouble is in the land. Confusion all around. That's a strange statement. But I know, somehow, that only when it is dark enough, can you see the stars. And I see God working in this period of the twentieth century in a way that men, in some strange way, are responding—something is happening in our world. The masses of people are rising up. And wherever they are assembled today, whether they are in Johannesburg, South Africa; Nairobi, Kenya: Accra, Ghana; New York City; Atlanta, Georgia; Jackson, Mississippi; or Memphis, Tennessee—the cry is always the same—"We want to be free."

[. . .]

[. . .]

It's alright to talk about "long white robes over yonder," in all of its symbolism. But ultimately people want some suits and dresses and shoes to wear down here. It's alright to talk about "streets flowing with milk and honey," but God has commanded us to be concerned about the slums down here, and his children who can't eat three square meals a day. It's alright to talk about the new Jerusalem, but one day, God's preacher must talk about the new New York, the new Atlanta, the new Philadelphia, the new Los Angeles, the new Memphis, Tennessee. This is what we have to do.

Now the other thing we'll have to do is this: Always anchor our external direct action with the power of economic withdrawal. Now, we are poor people, individually, we are poor when you compare us with white society in America. We are poor. Never stop and forget that collectively, that means all of us together, collectively we are richer than all the nations in the world, with the exception of nine. Did you ever think about that? After you leave the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, West Germany, France, and I could name the others, the Negro collectively is richer than most nations of the world. We have an annual income of more than thirty billion dollars a year, which is more than all of the exports of the United States, and more than the national budget of Canada. Did you know that? That's power right there, if we know how to pool it.

We don't have to argue with anybody. We don't have to curse and go around acting bad with our words. We don't need any bricks and bottles; we don't need any Molotov cocktails. We just need to go around to these stores, and to these massive industries in our country, and say, "God sent us by here to say to you that you're not treating his children right.) And we've come by here to ask you to make the first item on your agenda fair treatment where God's children are concerned. Now, if you are not prepared to do that, we do have an agenda that we must follow. And our agenda calls for withdrawing economic support from you."

And so, as a result of this, we are asking you tonight to go out and tell your neighbors not to buy Coca-Cola in Memphis. Go by and tell them not to buy Sealtest milk. Tell them not to buy—what is the other bread?—Wonder Bread. And what is the other bread company, Jesse? Tell them not to buy Hart's bread. As Jesse Jackson has said, up to now only the garbage men have been feeling pain, now we must kind of redistribute the pain. We are choosing these companies because

they haven't been fair in their hiring policies, and we are choosing them because they can begin the process of saying they are going to support the needs and the rights of these men who are on strike. And then they can move on downtown and tell Mayor Loeb to do what is right.

But not only that, we've got to strengthen black institutions. I call upon you to take your money out of the banks downtown and deposit your money in Tri-State Bank—we want a "bank-in" movement in Memphis. So go by the savings and loan association. I'm not asking you something that we don't do ourselves at SCLC. Judge Hooks and others will tell you that we have an account here in the savings and loan association from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. We're just telling you to follow what we're doing. Put your money there. You have six or seven black insurance companies in Memphis. Take out your insurance there. We want to have an "insurance-in."

Now there are some practical things we can do. We begin the process of building a greater economic base. And at the same time, we are putting pressure where it really hurts. I ask you to follow through here.

Now, let me say as I move to my conclusion that we've got to give ourselves to this struggle until the end. Nothing would be more tragic than to stop at this point, in Memphis. We've got to see it through. And when we have our march, you need to be there. Be concerned about your brother. You may not be on strike. But either we go up together, or we go down together.

Let us develop a kind of dangerous unselfishness. One day a man came to Jesus; and he wanted to raise some questions about some vital matters in life. At points, he wanted to trick Jesus, and show him that he knew a little more than Jesus knew, and through this, throw him off base. Now that question could have easily ended up in a philosophical and theological debate. But Jesus immediately pulled that question from mid-air, and placed it on a dangerous curve between Jerusalem and Jericho. And he talked about a certain man, who fell among thieves. You remember that a Levite and a priest passed by on the other side. They didn't stop to help him. And finally a man of another race came by. He got down from his beast, decided not to be compassionate by proxy. But with him, administered first aid, and helped the man in need. Jesus ended up saying, this was the good man, because he had the capacity to project the "I" into the "thou," and to be concerned about his brother. Now you know, we use our imagination a great deal to try to determine why the priest and the Levite didn't stop. At times we say they were busy going to church meetings—an ecclesiastical gathering—and they had to get on down to Jerusalem so they wouldn't be late for their meeting. At other times we would speculate that there was a religious law that "One who was engaged in religious ceremonials was not to touch a human body twenty-four hours before the ceremony." And every now and then we begin to wonder whether maybe they were not going down to Jerusalem, or down to Jericho, rather to organize a "Jericho Road Improvement Association." That's a possibility. Maybe they felt that it was better to deal with the problem from the causal root, rather than to get bogged down with an individual effort.

But I'm going to tell you what my imagination tells me. It's possible that these men were afraid. You see, the Jericho road is a dangerous road. I remember when Mrs. King and I were first in Jerusalem. We rented a car and drove from Jerusalem down to Jericho. And as soon as we got on that road, I said to my wife, "I can see why Jesus used this as a setting for his parable." It's a winding, meandering road. It's really conducive for ambushing. You start out in Jerusalem, which is about 1200 miles, or rather 1200 feet above sea level. And by the time you get down to Jericho, fifteen or twenty minutes later, you're about 2200 feet below sea level. That's a dangerous road. In the day of Jesus it came to be known as the "Bloody Pass." And you know, it's possible that the priest and the Levite looked over that man on the ground and wondered if the robbers were still around. Or it's possible that they felt that the man on the ground was merely faking. And he was acting like he had been robbed and hurt, in order to seize them over there, lure them there for quick and easy seizure. And so the first question that the Levite asked was, "If I stop to help this man, what will happen to me?" But then the Good Samaritan came by. And he

reversed the question: "If I do not stop to help this man, what will happen to him?"

That's the question before you tonight. Not, "If I stop to help the sanitation workers, what will happen to all of the hours that I usually spend in my office every day and every week as a pastor?" The question is not, "If I stop to help this man in need, what will happen to me?" "If I do not stop to help the sanitation workers, what will happen to them?" That's the question.

Let us rise up tonight with a greater readiness. Let us stand with a greater determination. And let us move on in these powerful days, these days of challenge to make America what it ought to be. We have an opportunity to make America a better nation. And I want to thank God, once more, for allowing me to be here with you.

You know, several years ago, I was in New York City autographing the first book that I had written. And while sitting there autographing books, a demented black woman came up. The only question I heard from her was, "Are you Martin Luther King?"

And I was looking down writing, and I said yes. And the next minute I felt something beating on my chest. Before I knew it I had been stabbed by this demented woman. I was rushed to Harlem Hospital. It was a dark Saturday afternoon. And that blade had gone through, and the X-rays revealed that the tip of the blade was on the edge of my aorta, the main artery. And once that's punctured, you drown in your own blood—that's the end of you.

It came out in *The New York Times* the next morning, that if I had sneezed, I would have died. Well, about four days later, they allowed me, after the operation, after my chest had been opened, and the blade had been taken out, to move around in the wheel chair in the hospital. They allowed me to read some of the mail that came in, and from all over the states, and the world, kind letters came in. I read a few, but one of them I will never forget. I had received one from the President and the Vice-President. I've forgotten what those telegrams said. I'd received a visit and a letter from the Governor of New York, but I've forgotten what the letter said. But there was another letter that came from a little girl, a young girl who was a student at the White Plains High School. And I looked at that letter, and I'll never forget it. It said simply, "Dear Dr. King: I am a ninth-grade student at the Whites Plains High School." She said, "While it should not matter, I would like to mention that I am a white girl. I read in the paper of your misfortune, and of your suffering. And I read that if you had sneezed, you would have died. And I'm simply writing you to say that I'm so happy that you didn't sneeze."

And I want to say tonight, I want to say that I am happy that I didn't sneeze. Because if I had sneezed, I wouldn't have been around here in 1960, when students all over the South started sitting-in at lunch counters. And I knew that as they were sitting in, they were really standing up for the best in the American dream. And taking the whole nation back to those great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the Founding Fathers in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. If I had sneezed, I wouldn't have been around in 1962, when Negroes in Albany, Georgia, decided to straighten their backs up. And whenever men and women straighten their backs up, they are going somewhere, because a man can't ride your back unless it is bent. If I had sneezed, I wouldn't have been here in 1963, when the black people of Birmingham, Alabama, aroused the conscience of this nation, and brought into being the Civil Rights Bill. If I had sneezed, I wouldn't have had a chance later that year, in August, to try to tell America about a dream that I had had. If I had sneezed, I wouldn't have been down in Selma, Alabama, to see the great movement there. If I had sneezed, I wouldn't have been in Memphis to see a community rally around those brothers and sisters who are suffering. I'm so happy that I didn't sneeze.

[. . .]

Well, I don't know what will happen now. We've got some difficult days ahead. But it doesn't matter with me now. Because I've been to the mountaintop. And I don't mind. Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place. But I'm not concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will. And He's

allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the promised land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people will get to the promised land. And I'm happy, tonight. I'm not worried about anything. I'm not fearing any man. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.

Source: James Melvin Washington, ed., *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), 279–286.

103. General Association of Clermont Students Leaflet, Paris, 5 May 1968

Introduction

In May 1968, spontaneous protests by students and workers came close to overthrowing the government of President Charles de Gaulle. In early May, several months of confrontations between students and university administrators in Paris peaked when the authorities closed the University of Paris at Nanterre. On 3 May students at the Sorbonne protested in sympathy, and the police surrounded that university, used tear gas, and arrested various student leaders and, eventually, several hundred other students. The French student union quickly published leaflets describing these events. On 6 May university teachers, high school students, and workers began a series of major protests, with huge crowds congregating in Paris, to be met by the riot police. Bloody clashes took place as the crowds raised barricades that the police violently stormed. A one-day general strike was called for 13 May, and more than a million demonstrators marched in Paris the same day as the government announced the reopening of the Sorbonne. Students promptly occupied the Sorbonne, declaring it an independent "people's university." The movement's focus soon spread beyond Paris, and by the end of that week workers had occupied approximately fifty factories, demanding de Gaulle's resignation and in many cases more say in running their own industries. Union leaders took the opportunity to negotiate substantial pay raises, but the workers occupying the factories still declined to leave them and return to work as normal. On 29 May several hundred thousand people marched through Paris protesting de Gaulle. The president, however, confident that he still had the support of most of the French military, took strong action to restore order. On 30 May he took to the radio to order workers to return to work, warning that if they did not do so he would declare a national state of emergency. He also announced the dissolution of the National Assembly and called elections for 23 June. During the first half of June the protests fizzled out, as the police gradually regained control of factories, workers returned to their jobs, the national student union called off scheduled protests, and the police regained the Sorbonne on 16 June. De Gaulle won a solid victory in the scheduled elections. The Old French Left based in the trade unions and the Socialist and Communist Parties rejected the protestors of May 1968, who represented a mix of anarchists and left-wing radicals typical of the 1960s, and sought not just economic justice but a social order that would provide fulfillment and individual satisfaction in terms of educational methods, sexual freedom, free love, and all other aspects of life. They were seeking to create the utopian, harmonious society that was the ultimate goal of many of the student and counterculture movements of that decade.

Primary Source

Halt Repression!

For the first time in the history of the University, the Sorbonne has been invaded by police, to prevent the meeting for solidarity with the Nanterre students organized by the UNEF. "Although no incident had occurred during the meeting" (communiqué of the Sorbonne *Lettres* department of the SNESUP), nearly 600 students were arrested.

The *gardes-mobiles* came inside the Sorbonne and forced the demonstrators to evacuate the premises in small groups which were directed toward Black Marias. . . .

Students who happened to be outside the Sorbonne protesting against this deliberate violation of the fundamental right of assembly, spontaneously demonstrated throughout the Latin Quarter, where they were

chased and brutally hit by the *gardes-mobiles* and the so-called "*gardiens de la paix*."

The CRS were leading the fight. They even charged into the halls of apartment houses, invaded several hotels and came out with the young people whom they beat up while the public booed. Because of the general reprobation, they stopped, but one of them was heard to say to another, "You won't lose anything by waiting. . . ."

The police reaction reached its climax when the order was given to "clear everything." Blackjacks held high, the CRS attacked, hitting with all their might in all directions. Old women were caught in the general turmoil. A passing motorist shouted his indignation, CRS swooped down on his car and tried to pull him out of it, hitting him while he was still seated. They succeeded at last in getting him out of the vehicle, his face bloodied. . . .

This brutal repression has been in the making for several weeks, the result of a systematic campaign of intoxication and calls for police intervention via the press, the radio, and the television. The student movement is presented as being the action of a "minority of '*enragés*.'"

Rector Roche: "a small group of students."

Dean Grappin: "the excesses of a few."

Minister Peyrefitte: "a handful of trouble makers. . . ."

On May 3, 1968, Paris students provided proof that the struggle is not just the affair of a minority. Their spontaneous demonstration brought our more than 2,000 students.

Reform and Blackjacks

The Government has shown, through the use of blackjacks, that it will not stop at any means in order *to liquidate the student movement* before the examination period, when its plan to eliminate hundreds of thousands of us will be implemented.

After the closing of Nanterre (for which the FNEF congratulates itself!), the blackjacking in the Latin Quarter, the closing of the Sorbonne, the forbidding of the UNEF Paris demonstration on Monday, May 6, *how far will the government go* to muzzle the students and liquidate their union movement? How repressive will M. Fouchet, Minister of the Interior, become, in order to have "his" reforms applied?

Students, we should not let ourselves be intimidated by repression and threats!

Occident has asserted its intention to "clean up the University!"

Students, we must organize a rebuttal, we must defend our organization, the UNEF!

SOLIDARITY

With our jailed comrades!

With our comrades who are fighting to protect freedom to unionize!

NO

To police repression!

To mass elimination!

The Syndicat national de l'enseignement supérieur (National Union of Higher Education [FEN]) "*in solidarity with the students, calls on the faculty in higher education to strike, in all universities.*"

L'UNEF calls on all students to join the

GENERAL STRIKE
MONDAY, May 6, 1968

Source: Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *The French Student Uprising, November 1967–June 1968* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 156–158. English translation by Maria Jones, English translation copyright © 1971 by Beacon Press. Copyright © 1969 Éditions du Seuil. Original publisher, Paris: Seuil, 1969. English translation, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

104. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 1968

Introduction

By the early 1960s, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and France had all developed nuclear weapons. Although wedded to maintaining their own nuclear forces, the first three of these powers were all keen to keep the "nuclear club" exclusive and to prevent the further spread of such weapons to smaller and weaker nations. One fear was that weak governments might not be able to maintain adequate security over their nuclear programs. For much of the 1960s, negotiations on the subject continued at the United Nations (UN). The goal of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was to prevent the spread and development of nuclear weaponry. The treaty was signed by 130 nations in 1968 and went into effect on 5 March 1970. Signatory powers who possessed nuclear weapons bound themselves not to transfer such technology to nonnuclear powers, while those who did not possess nuclear weapons pledged not to develop them. Neither France nor China agreed to sign the treaty until 1992, and despite widespread international condemnation, both countries continued to develop their nuclear arsenals and on occasion to provide assistance that enabled other states to develop nuclear weapons. It was widely believed, though never confirmed, that Israel possessed a nuclear deterrent. By the late twentieth century, several states had disregarded the treaty's provisions. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, and both Pakistan and India detonated nuclear devices in May 1998. In the early twenty-first century, Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) also mounted programs apparently intended to develop nuclear weapons, causing much alarm to the United States and West European powers, as the number of nuclear-armed states seemed likely to increase appreciably over the next decades.

Primary Source

[. . .]

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or pre-

pared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

[. . .]

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its

entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

[. . .]

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," July 1, 1968, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 2.1, pt. 484.

105. Leonid Brezhnev: The Brezhnev Doctrine, September 1968

Introduction

In his September 1968 speech to a group of Polish workers, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev announced a policy of cracking down on antisocialist forces within Soviet-controlled states. The policy became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. Brezhnev decided to adopt this public position to defend the actions of the Soviet military in repressing the Prague Spring movement, which had sought to introduce reforms in Czechoslovakia, earlier that year. While Brezhnev made this statement primarily to justify Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia, he couched it in terms sufficiently general that it seemed to arrogate to the Soviet Union the right to intervene in any communist country, within or outside the Soviet bloc, where socialism appeared to be threatened. Brezhnev's proclamation alarmed leaders of other communist states such as Albania and, most significantly, the People's Republic of China (PRC), which were then at odds with the Soviet Union, as they feared that it might herald Soviet attempts to use military force against themselves.

Primary Source

In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, the question of the correlation and interdependence of the national interests of the socialist countries and their international duties acquires particular topical and acute importance.

The measures taken by the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, in defending the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of great significance for strengthening the socialist community, which is the main achievement of the international working class.

We cannot ignore the assertions, made in some places, that the actions of the five socialist countries run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the rights of nations to self-determination.

The groundlessness of such reasoning consists primarily in that it is based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the question of sovereignty and the rights of nations to self-determination.

The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective countries.

However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental inter-

ests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism.

This means that each Communist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist party, becomes one-sided. He deviates from his international duty.

Marxist dialectics are opposed to one-sidedness. They demand that each phenomenon be examined concretely, in general connection with other phenomena, with other processes.

Just as, in Lenin's words, a man living in a society cannot be free from the society, a particular socialist state, staying in a system of other states composing the socialist community, cannot be free from the common interests of that community.

The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin demanded that all Communists fight against small-nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation, consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest.

The socialist states respect the democratic norms of international law. They have proved this more than once in practice, by coming out resolutely against the attempts of imperialism to violate the sovereignty and independence of nations.

It is from these same positions that they reject the leftist, adventurist conception of "exporting revolution," of "bringing happiness" to other peoples.

However, from a Marxist point of view, the norms of law, including the norms of mutual relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and in isolation from the general context of class struggle in the modern world. The socialist countries resolutely come out against the exporting and importing of counterrevolution.

Each Communist party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism Leninism and of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles (assuming, naturally, that it remains a Communist party).

Concretely, this means, first of all, that, in its activity, each Communist party cannot but take into account such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between two opposing social systems—capitalism and socialism.

This is an objective struggle, a fact not depending on the will of the people, and stipulated by the world's being split into two opposite social systems. Lenin said: "Each man must choose between joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking sides in this issue must end in fiasco."

It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist country seems to adopt a "non-affiliated" stand, it retains its national independence, in effect, precisely because of the might of the socialist community, and above all the Soviet Union as a central force, which also includes the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, which cannot look indifferently upon this.

The antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia actually covered up the demand for so-called neutrality and Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the socialist community with talking about the right of nations to self-determination.

However, the implementation of such "self-determination," in other words, Czechoslovakia's detachment from the socialist community, would have come into conflict with its own vital interests and would have been detrimental to the other socialist states.

Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops would have been able to come up to the Soviet border, while the community of European socialist countries would have been split, in effect encroaches upon the vital interests of the peoples of these countries and conflicts, at the very root of it, with the right of these people to socialist self-determination.

Discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states had to act decisively and they did act against the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia.

Source: "Text of Pravda Article Justifying Invasion of Czechoslovakia," Original published 25 September 1968, Translation in *New York Times*, 27 September 1968. © 1968 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.

106. Soviet and Chinese Statements on Border Clashes, March 1969

Introduction

China and the Soviet Union shared the world's longest land border, 2,738 miles in all, and their precise boundaries were not always well defined. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, China had ceded substantial amounts of territory—1.1 million square miles—to the then tsarist Russian Empire under treaties whose validity successive Chinese governments had subsequently rejected. In the first decade after he won control of China in October 1949, Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong accepted these boundaries, but tensions over and along the border increased after the Sino-Soviet split developed in the late 1950s. In 1963 the Chinese government began to challenge Russian occupation of these disputed lands, prompting both sides to begin a major military buildup in the area. Japanese newspapers cited statements by Mao that had it not been for the so-called unequal treaties of the nineteenth century, the Soviet Far Eastern cities of Vladivostok and Khabarovsk would both have been part of China. Between 1965 and 1969 the Soviet Union increased its ground forces along the Chinese border from thirteen to twenty-one divisions, rising to thirty in 1970 and forty-four in 1971, while China gained a nuclear capability in 1964 and began to deploy nuclear missiles in 1968. The August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's proclamation that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any socialist state where communism was threatened further alarmed the Chinese. By early 1969, the Soviet Union had 658,000 troops while China had 814,000 Chinese military personnel, and each side perceived the military threat from the other as increasing. On 2 March 1969 a Soviet patrol clashed with Chinese forces near Damansky (Zhenbao) Island on the Ussuri River dividing Heilongjiang Province, Manchuria, from Siberia. Each government subsequently claimed, in official statements, that the other side had deliberately provoked the incident. Historians now believe that the Chinese made the first move. Initially, thirty-one Soviet soldiers died and fourteen were wounded. In retaliation, Soviet forces then shelled and bombed Chinese troop formations based in Manchuria and stormed and took Damansky Island. The Soviet Union claimed to have inflicted 800 casualties on the Chinese and suffered only 60 themselves, while the Chinese proclaimed—probably untruthfully, given the superior training of the Soviet military—that their losses had been far lower than those of the Soviets. Further incidents and intrusions occurred over the next six months, the first on 14–15 March when Chinese forces attacked the new Soviet deployments on Damansky Island but were repelled. Each side publicly demanded that the other withdraw. In September 1969 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met Soviet Foreign Minister Alexei Kosygin in Beijing and reopened border talks that had begun in 1964 but were subsequently dropped. For almost two decades, minor Sino-Soviet hostilities flared up sporadically along the border, but, apparently fearing to escalate these incidents to the point of outright war, both sides tacitly agreed not to employ air power on such occasions. The Sino-Soviet border disputes seemingly played a substantial role in convincing Zhou, Mao Zedong, and other Chinese leaders that the communist Soviet Union, not the capitalist United States, constituted China's most menacing enemy. In the early 1970s this, in turn, impelled the Chinese Politburo to move toward rapprochement with the administration of Republican President Richard Nixon, reversing more than two decades of deep ideological hostility toward the United States. Under President Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1986 the Soviet Union opened serious negotiations with China to settle the border questions. Under an agreement signed in 1990, the two states substantially reduced their forces along the border. As the negotiations to define their precise boundary proceeded, between 1991 and 2004 China and Russia eventually concluded several agreements that resolved all their outstanding border issues.

Primary Source

Note from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 2 March 1969

On the morning of March 2, 1969, Soviet frontier guards intruded into the area of Chenpao [Zhen Bao] Island, Heilunkiang Province, China, and killed and wounded many Chinese frontier guards by opening fire on them, thus creating an extremely grave border armed conflict. Against this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China is instructed to lodge the strongest protest with the Soviet Government.

At 0917 hours on March 2, large numbers of fully armed soldiers, together with four armored vehicles and cars, sent out by the Soviet frontier authorities, flagrantly intruded into the area of Chenpao Island which is indisputable Chinese territory, carried out blatant provocations against the Chinese frontier guards on normal patrol duty and were the first to open cannon and gun fire, killing and wounding many Chinese frontier guards. The Chinese frontier guards were compelled to fight back in self-defence when they reached the end of their forbearance after their repeated warnings to the Soviet frontier guards had produced no effect. This grave incident of bloodshed was entirely and solely created by the Soviet authorities . . . which have long been deliberately encroaching upon China's territory, carrying out armed provocations and creating ceaseless incidents of bloodshed.

The Chinese Government firmly demands that the Soviet Government punish the culprits of this incident and immediately stop its encroachment upon China's territory and its armed provocations, and reserves the right to demand compensation from the Soviet side for all the losses suffered by the Chinese side. The Chinese Government once again sternly warns the Soviet Government: China's sacred territory brooks no violation; if you should willfully cling to your reckless course and continue to provoke armed conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border, you will certainly receive resolute counterblows from the Chinese people; and it is the Soviet Government that must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom. . . .

Statement by the Soviet Government, 29 March 1969

Recently on the Ussuri River in the region of Damanskii [Zhen Bao] Island there have occurred armed border incidents provoked by the Chinese side. The Chinese authorities did not and cannot have any justification for the organization of these incidents or for the resulting clashes and bloodshed. Such events can only gladden those who want by any means to dig an abyss of enmity between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. They have nothing in common with the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

The circumstances of the armed attacks on Soviet border guards on the Ussuri River are well known. These were premeditated and previously planned actions.

On the morning of 2 March of this year, an observation post detected a transgression of the Soviet border at Damanskii Island by approximately 30 Chinese soldiers. A group of Soviet border guards headed by an officer made their way toward the transgressors with the aim of filing a protest, as was done on earlier occasions, and insisting that they leave Soviet territory. The Chinese soldiers allowed the Soviet border guards to approach within several meters and then suddenly, without any warning, opened fire at them from point-blank range.

At the same time, from an ambush on Damanskii Island where the Chinese soldiers had earlier secretly moved under cover of darkness, and from the Chinese shore, artillery guns, mortars, and automatic weapons opened fire on another group of Soviet border guards located near the Soviet shore. They joined the battle and, with the support of a neighboring border post, drove the transgressors out of Soviet territory. As a result of this treacherous attack there were dead and wounded on both sides.

In spite of a warning from the Soviet government and a call to refrain from such provocations, on 14–15 March in this same region the Chinese side launched new attempts at armed intrusion into the Soviet Union. Elements of the regular Chinese army, supported by artillery and mortar fire, attacked the Soviet border troops protecting Damanskii Island. The attack was decisively repelled, and the transgressors were driven from Soviet territory. This provocation by the Chinese side generated new casualties.

Now the Chinese authorities in their statements are trying to avoid responsibility for the armed clashes. They claim that it was not the Chinese but the Soviet border guards who transgressed the state frontier, and that this land supposedly does not belong to the Soviet Union. The Chinese side does not dispute the fact that its military personnel acted according to a prepared plan, although by having recourse to a false assertion, it presents the use of arms by the Chinese transgressors as a "necessary measure." . . .

Source: Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon, eds., *The Cold War: A History through Documents* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 150–152.

107. Barry Goldwater: Defense of the Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 15 April 1969

Introduction

Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Republican presidential candidate in 1964, was the foremost leader of the conservative political forces in his party during the 1960s. The fiercely anticommunist Goldwater lost by a landslide to Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, in part because American voters feared that Goldwater was too bellicose and could not be trusted to handle nuclear weapons responsibly enough to avoid a third world war. Goldwater nonetheless retained considerable support from conservatives in the Republican Party, many of whom felt that the United States had been insufficiently aggressive in prosecuting the Vietnam War. In 1969 Goldwater returned to the Senate, where he remained for the next eighteen years, serving on the Armed Services Committee. Goldwater, a politician who deplored the halfhearted manner in which he believed American troops were fighting the Vietnam War and would gladly have removed all restrictions on U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), three months after his return to the Senate delivered a speech defending the military-industrial complex. He justified and even celebrated its existence with the argument that the worldwide responsibilities of the United States made a large defense industry essential. His only caveat was that the U.S. government had not gone far enough in developing the military-industrial complex. He was a strong critic of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his "whiz kid" management team of technocrats, whom Goldwater believed had mishandled the Vietnam War over the previous eight years, cut back projected military programs on budgetary grounds, and shown insufficient deference to military leaders. Goldwater's views epitomized the right-wing beliefs in a strong defense that were temporarily shelved by Republicans during President Richard Nixon's time in office but nonetheless became ever more influential during the 1970s. By the late 1970s, conservatives such as future president Ronald Reagan, who shared many of Goldwater's staunchly anticommunist views, felt bold enough to attack the policies of détente with the Soviet Union orchestrated by Nixon, his successor President Gerald R. Ford, and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and, during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, successfully blocked Senate ratification of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). During Reagan's presidency, in the 1980s the United States once again mounted a massive defense buildup, which Goldwater supported from his Senate base.

Primary Source

[. . .]

I believe it is long past the time when questions relating fundamentally to the defense of this nation should be placed in their proper perspective. Let us take the military-industrial complex and examine it closely. What it amounts to is that we have a big military establishment, and we have a big industrial plant which helps to supply that establishment. This apparently constitutes a "complex." If so, I certainly can find nothing to criticize but much to be thankful for in its existence. Ask yourselves, for example, why we have a large, expensive military establishment and why we have a large and capable defense industry. The answer is simply this: We have huge worldwide responsibilities. We face tremendous worldwide challenges. In short, we urgently require both a big defense establishment and

a big industrial capacity. Both are essential to our safety and to the preservation of freedom in a world fraught with totalitarian aggression.

Merely because our huge responsibilities necessitate the existence of a military-industrial complex does not automatically make that complex something we must fear or feel ashamed of. You might consider where we would be in any negotiations which might be entered into with the Soviet Union if we did not have a big military backed by a big industrial complex to support our arguments. You might wonder how we could possibly pretend to be interested in the freedom of smaller nations if the only military-industrial complex in the world was possessed by Communist Russia or Communist China.

Mr. President, in many respects I am reminded of the problem which confronted our nation in the early days of World War II. The madman Hitler was running rampant. Freedom was being trampled throughout all of Europe. Suddenly the United States found itself forced to fill the role of the "arsenal of democracy." This nation had to start from scratch and finally out-produce the combined efforts of the Axis powers. And we had to do it quickly. The very existence of freedom in the world as we knew it in the early 1940's depended on it. And how did we perform this miracle? Well, I'll tell you that we performed it with the help of an industrial giant called an integrated steel industry. Although this industry and others like it performed miracles of production at a time when the chips were down all over the world, it still was the subject of long and harassing investigation after the war because of its "bigness." Incredible as it seems, the very size of an industry which enable us to defeat the Fascists armies and remain free became the reason for investigation by liberals in the Congress during the immediate postwar period.

We never, Mr. President, seem to understand that size is not necessarily an evil. When the Russian Sputnik went up, this nation was deeply concerned. And that concern had to do with our inability at that time to duplicate the Soviet feat. Now that we have the industrial capacity to equal the Russians in space or in matters related to defense, there seems to be a nationwide effort to make us feel guilty.

What would the critics of the military-industrial complex have us do? Would they have us ignore the fact that progress occurs in the field of national defense as well as in the field of social sciences? Do they want us to turn back the clock, disband our military establishment, and do away with our defense-related industrial capacity? Mr. President, do these critics of what they term a military-industrial complex really want us to default on our worldwide responsibilities, turn our backs on aggression and slavery and develop a national policy of selfish isolation?

Rather than deploring the existence of a military-industrial complex, I say we should thank heaven for it. That complex gives us our protective shield. It is the bubble under which our nation thrives and prospers. It is the armor which is unfortunately required in a world divided.

For all those who rant and rave about the military-industrial complex, I ask this question: What would you replace it with?

What is more, I believe it is fair to inquire whether the name presently applied is inclusive enough. Consider the large number of scientists who contributed all of the fundamental research necessary to develop and build nuclear weapons and other products of today's defense industries. Viewing this, shouldn't we call it the "scientific-military-industrial complex." By the same token, do not forget the amount of research that has gone on in our colleges and universities in support of our defense-related projects. Maybe we should call it an "educational-scientific-military-industrial complex." Then, of course, the vast financing that goes into this effort certainly makes the economic community an integral part of any such complex. Now we have a name that runs like this: "An economic-educational-scientific-military-industrial complex."

What we are talking about, Mr. President, is an undertaking which grew up from necessity. It is the product of American initiative, incentive and genius responding to a huge global challenge. It is perhaps the most effective and efficient complex ever built to fill a worldwide function. Its ultimate aim is peace in our time regardless of the aggressive, militaristic image which the left wing is attempting to give it.

Mr. President, I don't find the employment of military officers by 100 of the largest companies in this nation alarming or menacing. Many of those officers were technically trained to provide special services, many of which are required by the companies involved. And I hasten to point out that these same companies employ other free Americans, some of them former Senators, some of them former Congressmen, some of them former civilian employees of the government. It is my contention that a retired military officer is a private citizen. He has a right to seek employment wherever he can. It is only natural that he should look to sources of employment which involve matters he was trained to work in. The fact that he once was an Army officer and the company he works for does business with the Army does not automatically insure an undesirable relationship from the public viewpoint. I would like to say that anyone who has evidence of wrongdoing, of deliberate and unlawful favoritism in the dealings which involve defense industries and former military officers should come forth and make the circumstances clear. I say that anyone who has evidence that a conspiracy exists between the Pentagon on one hand and former military officers on the other should say so and produce evidence to back it up. I say that anyone who charges that a "military elite" is at work trying to turn the United States into an aggressive nation should stop dealing in generalities and come forward with names, specific dates, meeting place locations, and all the rest of the kind of data it takes to back up such a charge.

So far, Mr. President, I have yet to hear of any specific case of wrongdoing involving former military officers working for companies that do business with the Pentagon.

[. . .]

Mr. President, I hope I shall be fully understood in this respect. If there is wrongdoing, whether of a conflict of interest nature or something else, in our defense establishment I want it investigated and stopped and the guilty parties punished. And this goes for wrongdoing by anyone concerned, whether he be a military man, a former military man, a defense industry executive or a civilian officer of the government. I feel that this is our true concern. Maybe the hugeness of the system which we are now compelled to maintain does lend itself to improprieties. If so, let us concern ourselves with such improprieties and find means to deal with them legislatively. This is the constructive way to proceed. It does no good for us to gaze with awe on the tremendous increase in defense expenditures with which the McNamara Era saddled us and then pretend that denunciation of a military-industrial complex will somehow make it all right.

In the attacks on the military also you will find repeated reference to a speech once made by former President Eisenhower.

But I would remind you that when Dwight Eisenhower mentioned the possibility of unwarranted influence being acquired by such a complex, he had some other profound things to say. I want to quote one passage in particular. He said and I quote, "We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is call for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment. . . .

"A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction."

As I have pointed out, many of the problems that are being encountered in the area of national defense today stem not so much from a military-industrial complex as they do from the mistakes and miscalculations of a "civilian complex" or perhaps I should say a "civilian-computer-complex." My reference here, of course, is to the Pentagon hierarchy of young civilians (often referred to as the "whiz kids") which was erected during the McNamara era in the questionable name of

"cost effectiveness." And this complex, Mr. President, was built in some measure to shut out the military voice in a large area of defense policy decision making.

I suggest that the military-industrial complex is not the all-powerful structure that our liberal friends would have us believe. Certainly nobody can deny that this combination took a drubbing at the hands of Mr. McNamara and his civilian cadres during the last eight years.

If the military-industrial complex had been as strong and as cohesive as its critics would have us believe, it is entirely possible this nation and its taxpayers would not today be facing the need for rebuilding the defense of freedom. . . .

If the military-industrial complex had been the irresistible giant its critics describe, we would certainly today be better equipped. We would undoubtedly have a nuclear-powered Navy adequate to the challenge presented by the Soviet naval might. We would certainly have in the air—and not just on a drawing board—a manned, carry-on bomber. We would never have encountered the kind of shortages which cropped up in every area of the military as a result of the demands from Vietnam. There would have been no shortage of military helicopters. There would have been no shortage of trained helicopter pilots. There would have been no need to use outdated and faulty equipment. No concern ever would have arisen over whether our supply of bombs was sufficient to the task in Southeast Asia.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to point out that a very strong case can by made for the need for a more powerful military-industrial complex than we have had during the past eight years. At the very least, I wish to say that the employment practices of industries doing business with the Pentagon—practices which lead them to hire the most knowledgeable men to do their work—are no cause for shock. Nor are these practices dangerous to the American people.

I have great faith in the civilian leaders of our Government and of our military services. I have no desire to see the voice of the military become all-powerful or even dominant in our national affairs. But I do believe that the military viewpoint must always be heard in the highest councils of our Government in all matters directly affecting the protection and security of our nation.

Source: Barry Goldwater, Papers, Arizona Historical Foundation, Tempe, Arizona.

108. Nelson A. Rockefeller: The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, 1969

Introduction

By the end of the 1960s, it was clear that the Alliance for Progress that President John F. Kennedy had announced with such fanfare in 1961 had at best been only partially successful in promoting democracy and economic development throughout Latin America. Shortly after taking office in January 1969, Republican President Richard Nixon authorized the dispatch of a major official mission to Latin America. It was headed by one of his past rivals for his party's presidential nomination, former Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York, who had extensive long-term business and philanthropic interests in Latin America. Accompanied each time by around two dozen leading U.S. experts, Rockefeller made four forays, during which he visited twenty of the twenty-six Latin American nations, and he and his entourage had intensive meetings with officials and others in the various host countries. Violent student protests in Honduras and other states against the mission's presence led the governments of Peru, Chile, and Venezuela to request that Rockefeller postpone his visit indefinitely. Rockefeller ascribed such demonstrations in large part to "general frustration over the failure [of the Alliance for Progress] to achieve a more rapid improvement in standards of living." His report, submitted to Nixon in August 1969, warned that the United States had "allowed the special relationship it has historically maintained with the other nations of the Western Hemisphere to deteriorate

badly." Latin America was not an important priority in U.S. foreign policy, which was marred by "a paternalistic attitude toward the other nations of the hemisphere" and by efforts to "direct the[ir] internal affairs to an unseemly degree." Around the region the forces of nationalism were growing, "with strong anti-United States overtones." Both democracy and the free enterprise system were facing strong challenges, in some cases from authoritarian and sometimes Left-leaning military governments, in others from communist insurgencies backed by Fidel Castro's Cuba. Rockefeller recommended that the U.S. government pay more attention to Latin America and develop a genuine partnership with other countries in the Western Hemisphere; provide much more in the way of both military and economic assistance; adjust its own trade policies to make them more favorable to Latin American nations; renegotiate the international debts owed by foreign governments in order to reduce their service payments; promote U.S. private investment in the region; encourage both rural and urban development to raise basic living standards and promote agricultural improvements; put more effort into lifting the overall level of public health; enable Latin American women to develop their potential; and enhance educational and cultural aid, exchanges, and propaganda. The specifics of this program, which was couched in rather high-flown and even woolly rhetoric, with no estimate provided of just how much it would cost the United States, were broadly in line with the fundamental principles governing American Cold War aid programs around the developing world. Rockefeller's report also reflected growing apprehensions within the foreign policy bureaucracy that U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam and consequent neglect of Latin America had contributed to a mounting wave of anti-American radicalism around the hemisphere, threatening American predominance in an area that the United States had since the early nineteenth century considered its own backyard and private sphere of influence.

Primary Source

Chapter One: The Quality of Life in the Western Hemisphere

A. The Special Relationship in the Western Hemisphere

The mission heard many details about relations between the United States and the other American republics from the leaders of the hemisphere, but they can best be summed up in one phrase: The United States has allowed the special relationship it has historically maintained with the other nations of the Western Hemisphere to deteriorate badly.

[. . .]

This report tries to understand some of the issues we must face in attempting to reinvigorate and re-shape our special relationship—and it offers some specific recommendations for action now.

B. The Existing Situation

Everywhere in the Western Hemisphere today, including the United States, men and women are enjoying a fuller life, but still for many the realities of life are in sharp contrast with the deepest felt human needs and goals of the people.

[. . .]

The upheavals in international systems over the past three decades have subjected the member states of the Western Hemisphere to external economic, political and ideological stresses that magnify domestic antagonisms.

At the same time, the issue of political legitimacy has challenged "accepted" systems of government, not only in the United States but particularly in the other American republics. With the disintegration of old orders which lacked a popular base, newly-emerging domestic structures have had difficulty in establishing their legitimacy. This makes the problem of creating a system of political order in the Western Hemisphere more difficult.

Some nations have retained their democratic institutions. In others, when democratic forms of government have not been successful, nations have moved to authoritarian forms as a solution to political and social dilemmas. Governments everywhere are struggling to cope with often conflicting demands for social reform and economic growth. The problem is compounded by the 400-year-old heritage of intense individualism which permeates all phases of life in the Latin countries of the Americas. Nationalism is burgeoning in most of the region with strong anti-United States overtones.

Increasing frustration is evidenced over political instability, *limited* educational and economic opportunities, and the incapacity or slowness of existing government structures to solve the people's problems. Subversive forces working throughout the hemisphere are quick to exploit and exacerbate each and every situation.

Change and the stresses and problems brought about by the processes of change characterize the existing situation in the hemisphere. The momentum of industrialization and modernization has strained the fabric of social and political structures. Political and social instability increased pressure for radical answers to the problems, and a growing tendency to nationalistic independence from the United States dominate the setting.

The restless yearning of individuals for a better life, particularly when accompanied by a well-developed sense of social responsibility, is chipping away at the very order and institutions by which society makes it possible for man to fulfill his personal dignity. The seeds of nihilism and anarchy are spreading throughout the hemisphere.

C. The Forces of Change

Change is the crucial characteristic of our time. It is erupting, and disrupting, in all cultures. It creates anxiety and uncertainty. It is demanding of all peoples an adjustment and flexibility which test the limits of individual and collective capacities.

Change is everywhere about us: in the explosion of new knowledge, the acceleration of all communication, the massive mobility of people, the multiplicity of human contacts, the pace and diversity of experience, the increasingly transitory nature of all relationships and the uprooting of the values to which differing cultures are anchored.

There is no society today, whether industrialized or developing, that is not coping with these hurricane forces of change. It is plain that, depending on how we respond to the need for change and the demands of these forces, the results can be tremendously constructive or tremendously destructive.

The sweeping change occurring in the hemisphere will affect our interests and our relationships with the other nations of the hemisphere. We must recognize that the United States cannot control the forces of change. However, we can and must try to *understand* the forces at work in the hemisphere—as well as at home—and how they may affect our national interests, if we are to shape intelligently and realistically our relationships.

Throughout the hemisphere, although people are constantly moving out of poverty and degradation in varying numbers, the gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged, within nations as well as between nations, is ever sharper and ever more difficult to endure. It is made to seem all the worse by the facility of modern communications.

The Military

In many South and Central American countries, the military is the single most powerful political grouping in society. Military men are symbols of power, authority and sovereignty and a focus of national pride. They have traditionally been regarded in most countries as the ultimate arbiters of the nation's welfare.

The tendency of the military to intervene when it judges that the government in office has failed to carry out its responsibilities properly has generally been accepted in Central and South America. Virtually all military governments in the hemisphere have assumed power to "rescue" the country from an incompetent government, or an intolerable economic or political situation. Historically, these regimes have varied widely in their attitudes toward civil liberties, social reform and repression.

Like the Church, the military was traditionally a conservative force resistant to change. Most officers came from the landowner class. In recent years, however, the owners of land have shifted more and more to an urban industrial life. The military service has been less attractive to their sons. As a result, opportunities have opened up for young men of ambition and ability from poor families who have neither land nor professional and business connections. These ambitious sons of the working classes have entered the military to seek an education and the opportunity for advancement.

This pattern has become almost universal throughout the American republics to the south. The ablest of these young officers have gone abroad for education and are now assuming top positions of leadership in almost all of the military groups in the hemisphere. And while their loyalties are with the armed forces, their emotional ties are often with the people. Increasingly, their concern and dedication is to the eradication of poverty and the improvement of the lot of the oppressed, both in rural and urban areas.

In short, a new type of military man is coming to the fore and often becoming a major force for constructive social change in the American republics. Motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency, and a stagnant political order, the new military man is prepared to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the goals of social and economic progress.

This new role by the military, however, is not free from perils and dilemmas. There is always the risk that the authoritarian style will result in repression. The temptation to expand measures for security or discipline or efficiency to the point of curtailing individual liberties, beyond what is required for the restoration of order and social progress, is not easy to resist.

[. . .]

The critical test, ultimately, is whether the new military can and will move the nation, with sensitivity and conscious design, toward a transition from military control for a social purpose to a more pluralistic form of government which will enable individual talent and dignity to flourish. Or will they become radicalized, statist and anti-U.S.?

In this connection, special mention should be made of the appeal to the new military, on a theoretical level, of Marxism: (1) It justifies, through its elitist-vanguard theories, government by a relatively small group or single institution (such as the Army) and, at the same time, (2) produces a rationale for state-enforced sacrifices to further economic development.

One important influence counteracting this simplistic Marxist approach is the exposure to the fundamental achievements of the U.S. way of life that many of the military from the other American countries have received through the military training programs which the U.S. conducts in Panama and the United States.

Communist Subversion

In every country, there is a restless striving for a better life. Coming as it does at a time of uprooting change, it brings to many a vague unease that all the systems of society are out of control. In such a setting, all of the American nations are a tempting target for Communist subversion. In fact, it is plainly evident that such subversion is a reality today with alarming potential.

Castro has consistently recruited from the other American republics, and trained in Cuba, guerrillas to export the Cuban-type Communist agrarian revolution. Fortunately, the governments of the American republics have gradually improved their capabilities for dealing with Castro-type agrarian guerrillas. However, radical revolutionary elements in the hemisphere appear to be increasingly turning toward urban terrorism in their attempts to bring down the existing order. This type of subversion is more difficult to control, and governments are forced to use increasingly repressive measures to deal with it. Thus, a cycle of terrorist actions and repressive counter-reactions tends to polarize and unsettle the political situation, creating more fertile ground for radical solutions among large segments of the population.

There are also Maoist Communist forces in the hemisphere. Although they are relatively small in numbers they are fanatically dedicated to the use of violence and intimidation to achieve their ends. The mystique of Maoism has appealed most to the idealism of the young and, thus, has been the means for widespread subversion.

Now it appears in some cases that Castro and Maoist forces have joined for acts of subversion, terror and violence in the cities. These forces also concentrate on mass student demonstrations and disruptions of various institutions, public and private, calling on the support of Communist labor front organizations to the degree possible.

Although Castro's propaganda casts him as a leader of the down-trodden who is opposed to United States imperialism and independent of Soviet Communism, it is clear that the Soviet Union presently has an important degree of financial, economic, and military influence over Communist Cuba. The recent visit of the Soviet fleet to Havana is one evidence of growing warmth in their relations.

This Soviet performance in Cuba and throughout the hemisphere is to be contrasted with the official Soviet government and Communist party protestations not only of peaceful coexistence but of disassociation from Castro and his program of terror in the American republics.

Clearly, the opinion in the United States that Communism is no longer a serious factor in the Western Hemisphere is thoroughly wrong.

We found almost universally that the other American republics are deeply concerned about the threat that it poses to them—and the United States must be alert to and concerned about the ultimate threat it poses to the United States and the hemisphere as a whole.

Changes in the Decade Ahead

The nations of the Western Hemisphere in the decade ahead will differ greatly from their present situation. They will reflect the rapid and widespread changes now occurring, which will alter the institutions and processes by which the American republics govern and progress. While it is not possible to predict with any precision the precise course of change, the hemisphere is likely to exhibit the following characteristics in the next few years:

—Rising frustration with the pace of development, intensified by industrialization, urbanization and population growth;
—Political and social instability;
—An increased tendency to turn to authoritarian or radical solutions;
—Continuation of the trend of the military to take power for the purpose of guiding social and economic progress; and,
—Growing nationalism, across the spectrum of political groupings, which will often find expression in terms of independence from U.S. domination and influence.

Chapter Two: The Challenge to Political and Economic Freedom

A. The Nature of the Challenge

The pace and intensity of change, imposed on rampant inflation, urban violence, grinding poverty, embittering injustice and flaming nationalism, put the nations of the Western Hemisphere at a crossroads. The question of whether systems of freedom with order and justice will survive and prosper is no longer rhetorical; it is reality.

The key issue is whether government of free peoples can be made effective, and can set the necessary priorities, to cope with the people's present needs and their aspirations for the future; whether political and social institutions can hold the confidence not only of a questioning young generation but of adults as well.

For the United States, the challenge is a double one: First, to demonstrate by its example that a free society can resolve its own internal problems and provide a more rewarding life for all its people; second, to find ways in which its tremendous human and material resources can effectively supplement the efforts of the other American nations themselves, in a climate of growing instability, extremism, and anti-U.S. nationalism.

A new relationship between the United States and the other American republics must be shaped with a recognition that devotion to our long-term community of interests will often require sensitive handling of our short-term differences. In forging this relationship we have the opportunity to demonstrate how sovereign nations, working together, can solve common problems and thus to establish a model for cooperative arrangements for the fulfillment of men and women throughout the world.

It is a fortunate and striking fact of the modern world that, for the first time, the scientific know-how and managerial competence required to meet the economic

aspects of the challenge are available. Moreover, we believe the Western Hemisphere possesses the human, material and spiritual resources that are needed for the task in all its aspects—economic, social and political.

B. The United States National Interest

The moral and spiritual strength of the United States in the world, the political credibility of our leadership, the security of our nation, the future of our social and economic progress are now at stake.

Rising frustrations throughout the Western Hemisphere over poverty and political instability have led increasing numbers of people to pick the United States as a scapegoat and to seek out Marxist solutions to their socioeconomic problems. At the moment, there is only one Castro among the 26 nations of the hemisphere; there can well be more in the future. And a Castro on the mainland, supported militarily and economically by the Communist world, would present the gravest kind of threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and pose an extremely difficult problem for the United States.

Just as the other American republics depend upon the United States for their capital equipment requirements, so the United States depends on them to provide a vast market for our manufactured goods. And as these countries look to the United States for a market for their primary products whose sale enables them to buy equipment for their development at home, so the United States looks to them for raw materials for our industries, on which depend the jobs of many of our citizens.

But these forces of economic interdependence are changing, and must change. An increasing flow of two-way trade in industrial products must supplement the present interchange of manufactured goods and primary products.

Today's 250 million people in South and Central America will become 643 million in just 30 years. If the current anti-US. trend continues, one can foresee a time when the United States would be politically and morally isolated from part or much of the Western Hemisphere. If this should happen, the barriers to our collective growth would become formidable indeed.

It is plainly evident that the countries of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, have become increasingly dependent on each other.

Historically, the United States has had a special relationship with the other American republics. It is based upon long association, geography and, above all, on the psychological acceptance of a concept of hemisphere community. It is embodied in the web of organizations, treaties and commitments of the inter-American system. Beyond conventional security and economic interests, the political and psychological value of the special relationship cannot be overestimated. Failure to maintain that special relationship would imply a failure of our capacity and responsibility as a great power. If we cannot maintain a constructive relationship in the Western Hemisphere, we will hardly be able to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world. Moreover, failure to maintain the special relationship would create a vacuum in the hemisphere and facilitate the influence in the region of hostile foreign powers.

It is clear, then, that our national interest requires the maintenance of our special relationship which should have as its goal the creation of a community of self-reliant, independent nations linked in a mutually beneficial regional system, and seeking to improve the efficiency of their societies and the quality of life of their peoples.

C. Our National Objective

There is no system in all of history better than our own flexible structure of political democracy, individual initiative, and responsible citizenship in elevating the quality of man's life. It makes the individual of central importance; it subordinates the role of government as a servant of the people; it works with people and for people—it has no other justification.

Our job at home is far from finished. We must keep our emphasis on people, our priority concern for people. This will mean shaping the forces of change and

stretching out or deferring those programs not related to the urgent needs of people. Unless human needs are met, democracy will have failed of its purpose and cannot survive.

What is true at home is essentially also true for the hemisphere. Our concern must be for people. What we in the hemisphere have to do is work together, multiplying our relations with the people of the hemisphere nations, helping each other develop more effective societies that can enhance the health, freedom and security of all the people, to the end that the quality of the life of each and every person in the hemisphere is enhanced.

We must work with our fellow Americans to the end that no one is exploited or degraded to enrich another and every man and woman has a full opportunity to make the most of his endowments.

However, we must recognize that the specific forms or processes by which each nation moves towards a pluralistic system will vary with its own traditions and situation. We know that we, in the United States, cannot determine the internal political structure of any other nation, except by example.

Our ability to affect or influence the course of events in other nations is limited. We may find that other nations may perceive their interests in ways which conflict with ours. What we must do is take a long-term view of our interests and objectives, always maintaining a sense of our own priorities and of the special Western Hemisphere relationship we hope to achieve. Such a view will require a high degree of tolerance for diversity and for nationalistic expression often directed against the United States, and a recognition that our style may often have a more important effect than what we actually do in the hemisphere.

The kind of paternalistic relationship the United States has had in the past with other hemisphere nations will be increasingly costly and counter-productive in the years ahead. We believe the United States must move increasingly toward a relationship of true partnership, in which it will cooperate with other nations of the hemisphere in those areas where its cooperation can be helpful and is wanted.

The United States must face several important practical issues in trying to shape this new relationship:

1. The United States should determine its attitude towards internal political developments in a more pragmatic way;
2. The United States should decide how it can shift increasing responsibility to the other American nations (through multi-lateral channels) for the development process; and,
3. The United States should decide how its interests are affected by insurgency and subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere and the extent to which its programs can and should assist in meeting the security requirements of its neighbors.

The task is difficult but by no means impossible. It will require discipline and energy and above all a very clear and consistent sense of purpose at home and abroad. To grasp the opportunity that lies in the hemisphere, the United States must make some major and fundamental changes in, first, the structure of the government mechanisms through which we work with our hemisphere neighbors, and, second, in our policies and programs as they relate to the Western Hemisphere.

[. . .]

Source: Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Quality of Life in the Americas: Report of a U.S. Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere," *Department of State Bulletin* 61(1589) (1969).

109. Richard Nixon: "Vietnamization" Speech, 3 November 1969

Introduction

When the Republican Richard Nixon became president in 1969, the United States was mired in a war in Vietnam that seemed unwinnable. Nixon and his influential National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, who became

secretary of state in 1973, effectively directed U.S. foreign policies between them. The two men were both conscious that their country no longer enjoyed the undisputed supremacy of the immediate post-1945 period and that growing economic difficulties mandated cuts in defense budgets. The United States was also suffering from a dollar gap in terms of the imbalance between its overseas expenditures and what foreigners spent in the United States. Since 1945 the U.S. dollar had been linked to gold at a fixed exchange rate, making the American currency the effective regulator of the international currency system. In August 1971, however, Nixon removed the dollar from the gold standard, an action that symbolized his country's declining hegemonic status. From the beginning of his presidency, however, Nixon was determined to force America's European and Asian allies, who had become wealthy in part because the United States subsidized their defense costs, to bear more of the burden of covering their own military expenditures. During a July 1969 trip to Asia, the president announced this policy in a press conference at Guam. He stated that the United States would honor its treaty commitments and use its own nuclear umbrella to protect any "nation whose survival we consider vital to our security" from outside nuclear threats. He warned, however, that while the United States would when necessary provide supplementary "economic and military assistance" to allies facing other security challenges, "we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." Nixon had campaigned for the presidency announcing that he had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. Citing the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine, in November 1969 he informed the American people that this involved the new strategy of Vietnamization, whereby the United States would gradually reduce American forces in the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) while furnishing that country with massive military aid in the expectation that its own troops would take up the slack. Nixon intended to couple this approach with aggressive U.S. moves against Vietnamese guerrilla sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos and heavy bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), measures that he hoped would persuade North Vietnam to make concessions at the negotiating table that would facilitate the survival of South Vietnam as an independent country and so enable the United States to withdraw completely. In November 1969, Nixon informed the American people that the military situation in Vietnam was improving, meaning that the United States could with a clear conscience reduce its commitments there. Despite Nixon's bold rhetoric that he was not abandoning South Vietnam, the knowledge that the Americans were gradually but inexorably drawing down their forces in Vietnam probably encouraged North Vietnamese representatives to maintain their faith in their ultimate victory over South Vietnam.

Primary Source

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world—the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

[. . .]

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist govern-

ment on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others—I among them—have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

—They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.
—We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
—With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation—and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

[. . .]

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

—A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.
—Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.
—This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

—We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.
—We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.
—We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon

Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiation I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

[. . .]

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth—the bad news as well as the good news—where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

—First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
—Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with US or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
—Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

[. . .]

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in a Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must—in all candor—leave one note of caution.

If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

[. . .]

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

—I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.
—Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary, a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.

It is not the easy way.

It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace—not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

[. . .]

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do.

[. . .]

—And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

[. . .]

And so tonight—to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans—I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Source: Richard M. Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 901–909.

110. Willy Brandt: The Federal Government's Report on the State of the Nation to the Bundestag, 28 January 1971

Introduction

During the 1960s, European nations took much of the initiative in trying to resolve the divisions and alleviate tensions between the continent's western and eastern halves. Willy Brandt, the first Social Democratic chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), launched a campaign that he termed Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) to improve his country's relations with its communist neighbors to the east. Brandt had good credentials for doing so. As a boy his involvement in the antifascist resistance had forced him to flee Nazi Germany, yet as the defiant mayor of West Berlin during the 1948–1949 airlift, he had become a symbol of opposition to communist bullying. Until Brandt became chancellor, West Germany had refused to accord diplomatic recognition to any state except Soviet Russia that had diplomatic dealings with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Under Brandt, West Germany moved decisively to normalize dealings with Soviet bloc countries and between 1967 and 1974 established diplomatic relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Even though his stance was controversial with large portions of the West German electorate, attracting strong criticism from those Germans who had once lived in what was now Poland, Brandt was prepared to accept the Soviet-backed cession to Poland in 1945 of large portions of what had been German territory in eastern Prussia, and in 1970 West Germany accepted the existing borders of Poland. Treaties with the Soviet Union in 1970 and East Germany in 1973 ratified the existing European borders and renounced the use of force to rectify them, even while leaving open the possibility of future German reunification. In return, trade and travel between the two Germanies became much easier, facilitating not just commerce but also the reunion of families separated by the iron curtain. Brandt's Ostpolitik paved the way for the policies of détente with the Soviet Union implemented by U.S. President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the early 1970s. Brandt's decision to recognize East Germany as a separate state was particularly contentious domestically, as it involved recognizing that Germany's division into two states was likely to be indefinite. His efforts won him the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize. Revelations in 1974 that one of his closest aides, Gunter Guillaume, a supposed refugee from East Germany, had been a spy led to Brandt's resignation. It does not seem that Guillaume had any great input into Brandt's policies, but his revelations to his masters that Brandt was indeed in earnest in seeking reconciliation with East Germany may have facilitated the Soviet bloc's acceptance of Ostpolitik. In 1990 Brandt welcomed the reunification of Germany, which occurred two years before his death.

Primary Source

This government is now making its second report on the position in divided Germany. At the same time, this High House has been presented with the Federal Government's answer to a major question from the S.P.D. [Social Democratic Party] and F.D.P. [Free Democratic Party] Parties on foreign policy.

As I promised here before the end of last year, papers intended to facilitate a comparison of conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany and the G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic or East Germany] in various important fields have also been put at the disposal of this House in connection with the report on the State of the Nation.

I.

Ladies and gentlemen, in our reply to this major question—which the Government will explain in detail in the course of the following debate—the political tendencies and conditions are described which result from the state of the Federal Republic and which affect our country from outside. The state of affairs in Germany cannot, of course, be judged independently either of general international or European tendencies. So it is appropriate to clarify the significant events of 1970, to re-emphasize our working principles and to re-examine the attitudes of our allies.

Our reply to the major question states that our Eastern policy has the unanimous support of our allies. The

fact that the leading representatives of the allied powers have not confined the expression of their support to confidential discussions has given us all the more encouragement to continue on the road that we regard as necessary. Our policy has been expressly supported in conferences of the West European communities and the Atlantic Alliance. I can take it that the published communiqués are well known to you.

[. . .]

Even in the eastern world, it is today hardly doubted that German policy is directed towards peace. And it is known that we are making no exceptions, not even in the case of the G.D.R., in our efforts to reach understanding.

Seen from this point of view, it was only logical, when signing the Moscow Treaty on the 12th August last year, to declare our agreement with the Soviet Union that all treaties we may want to conclude with the partners of the Warsaw Pact will form a political whole.

No one will be able to speak of effective relaxation of tension in Central Europe until all these elements are present.

Over and above this, I want to establish here that these treaties—to be exact, the treaty with the Soviet Union and that with the People's Republic of Poland—in no way contradict our position as a member of the European Community or as an ally of N.A.T.O. In neither West nor East, North nor South are there particular German interests or special German reservations, which could diminish or influence our decision in favour of a policy of settlement. However, we made it clear in Moscow that no treaty either can or may prevent us from striving for a state of peace in which our nation can recover its unity in freedom and self-determination. This reflects the task laid down in our constitution as well as our own convictions. But no one believes that aspirations come any nearer to fulfillment by being committed to paper.

We also have German interests in the widest sense at heart in our relationship to Poland, in doing what we can to ensure that the name of Germany shall no longer be used as a symbol of injustice and horror, but as a sign of hope for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. That this hope is not in vain may be seen in the number of Germans who will cross to the Federal Republic in the coming months.

With regard to relations with the G.D.R.: as laid down in the principles of the United Nations regarding relations between states, peaceful settlement of relations on the basis of human rights, equality, peaceful coexistence and non-discrimination must occupy the foreground of all efforts in this case as well.

[. . .]

This survey of developments since my last report a year ago makes clear the extent to which the settlement of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the G.D.R. must be seen in relation to the whole. An isolated solution to the problems affecting our people is just as impossible as, say, an attempt to secure peace on our own. History has taught us that crises can be created by one, but the maintenance of peace requires the cooperation of all.

What is possible between the states of Europe must also be possible between the two states in Germany; the artificial severance which has now lasted more than two decades has brought neither stability nor tranquillity. On the contrary, it has aroused tensions and crises which must now be overcome in the interests of Europe and Germany.

[. . .]

1970 has seen the return of the German question to the agenda of European and international politics, in a partly new form but certainly with greater urgency. What has been started must now be consistently and patiently pursued. . . .

To complicate things even further, since 1970 the G.D.R. has adopted the terms "socialist state of the German nation" and "socialist German national state," thereby both confirming and denying the continuance of one German nation. These observations and indications show how difficult discussions are when the part-

ner wants to have and be two things at the same time. For whereas the G.D.R., pointing to the "socialist German national state," declares that there can be no "special relations" between the two German states, the same leadership claims the right to undertake what it calls "an offensive policy of peaceful coexistence towards the F.R.G." With no other state in the world does the G.D.R. concern itself so thoroughly and so actively as with the Federal Republic.

And now I would ask: is this not the same intervention in the affairs of another state, otherwise so eagerly pilloried by the leadership of the G.D.R.? And does it not often go as far as encouraging our citizens to resist the internal order of their state?

I say this not only for the sake of necessary demarcation. I also want to make it clear that such conduct, negative though it be, shows a special interest in that part of the German nation living in the Federal Republic. Clearly, there is here an interest of a special kind and the involuntary documentation of the "special relations" otherwise denied. But this special interest is manifested in such a way that it makes the gulf between the two parts of Germany deeper than between other states with different ideological and social structures. Our common national basis leads the government in East Berlin not to playing down but to exaggerating the antitheses between East and West.

The other side frequently appeals to political realities. This is why we should now declare with all urgency: freedom, democracy and social justice are not formal concepts for us. They are the tasks laid down by our constitution, by the Basic Law, and they form the inalienable foundations of our political and social existence. We are ready to enter any contest concerned with more personal freedom and more social justice.

But there is one point on which we are in agreement with Herr Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council and First Secretary, when he speaks of demarcation: neither ideologically nor socially can there be any mixing of antitheses nor any minimization of differences of opinion; this is—unfortunately—specially true of the two states in Germany, which belong to such different systems. But even these two states must be able to achieve a form of peaceful coexistence in which neither holds the other in tutelage, but both provide an example abroad that even between such different political and social systems, peaceful cooperation is possible.

Nationhood is a question of consciousness and will. The polemics of East Berlin against the nation confirm the existence of this consciousness and will, which have also been preserved over there to a great extent. Differing interpretations of this theme need not hinder efforts for a settled, objective coexistence of the two German states. However, both sides must respect the fact that the Four Powers hold and will continue to hold responsibility for Germany as a whole and for Berlin. This situation is not an obstacle to the intentions of the Federal Government to reach with the G.D.R. agreements setting out clear obligations, such as are normal and necessary between states.

[. . .]

IV.

The division of Germany inherited from the War also struck hard on some areas this side of the border; what had been a heartland became a fringe area remote from the economic centre. Historic, political, cultural and economic ties were broken.

In accordance with a resolution by the German Bundestag on 2nd July, 1953, successive federal governments have repeatedly stressed their intentions of giving priority to this inner-German fringe area. This Government has presented the House with the draft of a Bill aimed at coordinating previous promotional measures and preferences for the affected areas. It also foresees considerable improvements in the fields of housing and social facilities.

A further 80 million DM are to be set aside from the Federal Budget, whereby future plans will concentrate not only on economic promotion but also on measures to improve the infrastructure.

V.

In our efforts to the best of our ability to render the results of the division of Germany more bearable to all those affected, I am thinking particularly today of the

large group of our population who lost their old homelands 25 years ago as a result of the war.

Nobody should presume to disparage those who still today suffer pain and sadness over the loss of their homelands in the East. They bore a heavier burden than many other Germans. Yet it was their delegates who, 20 years ago in the Charter of Stuttgart, abjured hate and sought for settlement with our eastern neighbours. That Charter was a document of humanity and reason, which turned its gaze to the future and expressed a clear rejection of the barbaric methods of the past.

Certain people now want to awaken an impression among the exiles that a real possibility of return has been lost through the Treaty we have signed with Poland, that their real exile dates from now and that a renunciation of attainable rights has taken place. On this occasion, I would just like to say the following:

—If today we are willing for the sake of peace to proceed from the existing borders in Europe, that is also those in Eastern Europe, and to respect them, this does not by any means imply a legitimation or silent approval of the eviction of Germans from these areas that took place in 1945 and 1946. We have not just lost the war today—as we all know—and there has been plenty of time to orientate ourselves and obtain information on the attitude of foreign powers, including our closest allies.

—We want to break down barriers—and not just through this Treaty—between the German and Polish peoples, barriers resulting from a difficult historical heritage and particularly from the Second World War.

—Among the losses of eviction were not just the bases of material existence; we are concerned with an area which brought forth great achievements and contributions to German cultural and intellectual life. The Federal Government will assist in fostering this cultural heritage.

—As far as material losses are concerned, the Federal Republic has not even approached full compensation. However, in most cases economic assimilation has been successful. Personal ability and skill and also the favourable economic development of our Federal Republic have played their part in this. Nevertheless, I ask our citizens who have not had to pay for the war with the loss of their homeland and all its inestimable associations to give their understanding and help to all those who still do not feel quite at home here.

—Following the conclusion of the treaty with Poland, many families can look forward to receiving their relations now living there. As you know, the first small groups are already arriving in the Federal Republic. Adjustment to life here will at first not be easy for some of these people. The Federal Government and the Lander governments will do everything in their power to help; but we need the cooperation of everyone to ease the burdens of acclimatization and a new start for these Germans who are coming to us.

Furthermore, I appeal to all citizens of the Federal Republic, men and women alike—whatever their origins, to play their part in seeing that the reconciliation with the Polish people becomes a lasting reality. The same applies in our efforts to achieve a settlement with the peoples of Czechoslovakia and to all reconciliation and cooperation with the East.

VI.

Our efforts to normalize relations with the East European states and the other part of Germany have led in past months not only to legitimate differences of opinion on content and form—as they will also be expressed in this House—but also to very vehement actions on the part of small groups whose volume has borne and bears no relation to their numbers. These groups, which are trying—under the misused and in this case macabre slogan of "resistance"—to exploit some of the exiles for their aims, represent neither the policy of our country nor the will of the people. They consist of a residue of radical organizations who are constantly trying out new methods of attracting dissatisfied citizens to their contemptible purposes.

We know what effect such campaigns, set against the background of history, have on our neighbours and on

our friends in the West. The evil committed under the Hitler regime has left deep scars, not only in the public opinion of neighbouring countries. We may prefer to dismiss exaggerated reaction in these countries, but we must try to understand it even if it is not justified by the facts.

The Federal Government believes that the overwhelming majority of our population rejects the aims and methods of the groups just mentioned, all the more so as many of our citizens still remember how destructive such forces can be. In any case, recent elections have clearly demonstrated that our people is not willing to entrust itself to extremists and obvious political adventurers.

We must defend ourselves energetically against those —whichever side they may come from—who wish to make violence or terror an instrument of political confrontation. And nationalistic agitation is forbidden both by bitter experience and the principles of our free constitution.

VII.

It has been said and written that, in view of events in Europe, the first year of this new decade is seen by some people as a kind of "German year." In the old Berlin manner, I would ask whether we might not have it "a size smaller." In any case, we should not forget that others have been involved in these efforts. However, we can say without complacency that in these difficult efforts to secure peace—and they are still difficult—the Federal Republic of Germany has not been a silent partner but a driving force and will continue to be so. This also applies to Western, especially West European cooperation with our Eastern neighbours.

Our policy does not suffer from a lack of balance. The promotion of West European cooperation, the further development of the Atlantic Alliance and the cultivation of trusted friendships remain the foundations of our policy. We stand with both feet firmly in the Western community. Close and indissoluble partnership with our friends and allies is not only the basis of our common efforts towards the pacification of Europe, it is of great value in itself.

On the other hand we cannot and do not want to rest content with this, any more than our partners in the West. In this process, with its ultimate aim of relaxing tension in Europe, the Federal Republic has taken over an appointed but independent role. Important as it is to go hand in hand with our Western partners, it is just as clear that a number of barriers and obstacles can only be cleared away by Germans, by ourselves. If we are to make a fresh start, we ourselves must deal with a major part of the inheritance of the war begun and lost by the Third Reich. The overcoming of European tensions is also dependent on our own contribution, especially with regard to the establishment of a tolerable contractual relationship between the two states in Germany. This is a task of which nobody can relieve us; we must tackle it ourselves.

In summing up, I want to affirm that we are proceeding on the basis of the following facts and expectations:

1. The right to self-determination laid down in the United Nations Charter must be conceded to the Germans in the historical process.
2. The German nation remains a reality, even if divided into differing state and social systems.
3. The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is pledged to the preservation of peace, requires a contractual settlement of relations with the G.D.R. The principles and contractual elements established in the 20 Points of Kassel remain our valid basis for negotiations.
4. The judicial status of Berlin may not be called in question. In the framework of the rights and undertakings approved by the Three Powers responsible, the Federal Republic of Germany will do its part to ensure that the viability of West Berlin is better safeguarded than previously.
5. A satisfactory result of the Four Power negotiations on the improvement of the situation in and around Berlin will enable the Federal Government to present the treaty signed in Moscow on 12th August, 1970, to the legislative bodies for ratification.
6. The same timing and political connection applies to the decision of the legislative bodies on the

treaty signed in Warsaw on 7th December, 1970, with the People's Republic of Poland.

I have tried to report objectively, for I am convinced that we can only do justice to the state of the nation if we are capable of conducting the exchange of opinion in a manner fitting to the matter in hand and to our responsibility

Source: Willy Brandt, *Peace: Writings and Speeches of the Nobel Peace Prize Winner 1971* (Bonn, Germany: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1971), 114–128.

111. Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 28 February 1972

Introduction

By 1969 the protracted split between the Soviet Union and the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) had become so pronounced that serious military clashes between the two occurred on their joint border, at Zhenbao (Damanski) Island on the Ussuri River. Soviet diplomats responded with inquiries to Richard Nixon, the new U.S. president, as to his country's probable reaction should they mount a first strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Although these overtures may have been intended more to intimidate the Chinese than as serious inquiries, they alarmed Chinese leader Mao Zedong and impelled him, despite the ongoing Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, to explore the possibility of a rapprochement with the United States, until that time Mainland China's greatest ideological and strategic enemy. Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, responded positively. Exploratory visits by Kissinger were followed in February 1972 by a state visit by Nixon, who always considered the opening of China one of the greatest achievements of his presidency. At this juncture, the two countries did not resume full diplomatic relations, as the United States still recognized the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, a stance that did not change until the end of 1978. At the end of Nixon's trip, during which he met Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai and visited both Beijing, China's capital, and Shanghai, its greatest commercial metropolis, the two countries did, however, issue a communiqué that immediately became one of the key documents governing Sino-American relations well into the next century. Although Nixon and Kissinger hoped that China would exert pressure on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) to reach an acceptable peace settlement in ongoing negotiations seeking to end the Vietnam War, China affirmed its support for revolutionary efforts in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Both sides agreed that full diplomatic normalization was their ultimate goal. The major stumbling block to this was the position of Taiwan, which PRC leaders considered an integral part of China. To finesse this issue, both the Chinese and the Americans stated their own position on Taiwan. The Chinese declared that they would not tolerate any moves toward the permanent separation of Taiwan from China, while the United States "acknowledge[d] that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." U.S. officials also proclaimed their wish that the issue should be settled by peaceful means and their eventual intention of withdrawing "all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan." Both China and the United States also supported increased person-to-person contacts through cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges and the encouragement of more bilateral trade.

Primary Source

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between

the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace; just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two

key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

—progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
—both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
—neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

[. . .]

Source: "Text of Joint Communiqué, Issued at Shanghai, February 27," *Department of State Bulletin* 66(435) (1972): 435–438.

112. Equal Rights Amendment, 1972

Introduction

As American women became more assertive during the 1960s, they demanded constitutional protection for their right to equal treatment. This was not a new demand. In 1923, an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was introduced in Congress, but although resubmitted every year between then and 1970, it never reached the floor of either house for a vote. In October 1971 the U.S. House adopted the amendment as Joint Resolution 208, and the Senate followed suit in March 1972. To be accepted as an amendment to the Constitution, the measure still required ratification within seven years by three-quarters of the state legislatures. When that deadline arrived, only thirty-five of the necessary thirty-eight states had ratified the amendment, and four had voted to rescind their original ratification, a constitutionally dubious procedure. In 1978 the U.S. House voted to extend the deadline by three years, but no further states ratified during the additional period. The Republican Party withdrew its original support for the ERA, and conservatives, especially those who argued that the growing absorption of women in the labor force jeopardized the survival of the American family, argued that the amendment's passage would further enhance the power of Congress and the federal courts, who would be empowered to enforce it. Other opponents charged that the amendment would make women eligible for the draft and military service and would remove laws that gave special protection to women in, for example, heavy industry. The failure to ratify the ERA fundamentally reflected the rightward shift of the American political climate during the 1970s and 1980s and the associated conservative backlash against women's rights.

Primary Source

Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

Source: U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 22 March 1972, p. 9598.

113. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I, 26 May 1972

Introduction

One major objective of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in seeking détente with the Soviet Union was to conclude agreements limiting the further growth of nuclear weapons and antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. At a May 1972 summit meeting in Moscow, Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed two strategic arms limitation treaties, jointly known as SALT I, which took effect the following October. The ABM Treaty limited antiballistic missile defense sites in each country to two, neither hosting more than one hundred ABMs. The Interim Agreement froze for five years the number of nuclear warheads each side possessed, giving the Soviets numerical superiority (2,328 to the American 1,710) in exchange for accepting the American lead in multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the delivery system. SALT I allowed its signatories to upgrade their nuclear weaponry provided they observed these limits. Although American conservatives regarded them with suspicion, these treaties were widely viewed as a diplomatic triumph for Nixon and were the first major arms control agreements concluded since the beginning of the Cold War. Further warming in Soviet-American relations was anticipated. Several Soviet-American commercial agreements followed the disarmament accords, providing for Soviet purchases of $750 million of American grain, largely financed by American credits; various business contracts; maritime understandings; and comprehensive trade agreements settling outstanding Soviet debts to the United States and promising the Soviets most-favored trading nation status. At a second Nixon-Brezhnev summit,

held in Washington in June 1973, the two leaders signed the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, binding them to consult whenever international crises that might precipitate nuclear war between them or with other states arose and to act "in such a manner as to help prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations." They also concluded four executive agreements on oceanography, transport, agricultural research, and cultural exchange and issued a declaration of principles intended to accelerate talks at Geneva designed to produce a second and permanent nuclear arms limitation agreement (SALT II). Airline services were expanded, and trade missions were established. The SALT agreements seemed a triumph for Nixon-Kissinger triangular diplomacy, promising further progress in the direction of Soviet-American détente, but in practice they marked its high tide.

Primary Source

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII
1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

[. . .]

Source: "Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," 26 May 1972, U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4795.htm.

114. Salvador Allende: Speech to the United Nations, 4 December 1972

Introduction

Despite repeated attempts by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to sabotage his chances, in 1970 Salvador Allende Gossens, leader of the Popular Unity coalition, was elected president of Chile. The socialist Allende was an outspoken Marxist and a strong critic of capitalism. Several major American corporations, including ITT and the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies, feared that once Allende was in power, he would expropriate their holdings. U.S. President Richard Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, immediately decided to do all they could to destabilize Allende's government, with the aim of bringing about his overthrow. Even before Allende was sworn in, Nixon and Kissinger unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Chilean military to block his taking office. Unbeknownst to Allende, the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) had provided several hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding for Allende's campaign as the United States had done for his opponents, an indication of the manner in which both superpowers competed for influence in developing nations. Allende began to implement sweeping social reforms in health care, education, and agriculture, and he also nationalized major industries, including copper and banking. His government announced its intention of seizing all landholdings larger than eighty hectares and of providing employment on public works projects for all who needed it. Facing economic difficulties, Chile proclaimed a moratorium on payments on foreign debts and therefore went into default to international creditors and other governments. In 1971 Allende recognized President Fidel Castro's communist regime in Cuba, making Chile the only nation in the Western Hemisphere except Mexico to have diplomatic relations with that government, and welcomed Castro on a month-long visit to Chile, during which Castro held mass rallies and ostentatiously proffered copious advice to Allende. Allende also established close relations with Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe. Negative growth rates, government budgetary deficits, declining foreign reserves, falling commodity prices (especially in copper), and high inflation caused social unrest and a wave of

confrontational strikes and protests, many by small businessmen. The Nixon administration blocked all loans or aid to Allende's government by multilateral or U.S. agencies. Facing growing crises at home, in December 1972 Allende attended the United Nations (UN) assembly in New York, where he defended his actions and complained fiercely that American policies toward Chile and other Latin American and developing nations were imperialist and exploitative in nature. His accusations had no impact in terms of changing the Nixon administration's attitude. In September 1973 the Chilean military, strongly encouraged by CIA operations and other Nixon administration officials, mounted a coup led by General Augusto Pinochet, commander of the army, against Allende. Besieged in the presidential palace, Allende apparently committed suicide, using a gun that had been a gift from Castro, but for many years his admirers believed he had not committed suicide. For many on the Left, the overthrow and death of Allende made him an iconic figure who combined socialist beliefs with a commitment to democracy. The human rights abuses toward political opponents—at least 3,000 Chileans were killed and another 27,000 subjected to arbitrary imprisonment or torture—that characterized Pinochet's authoritarian military government, which remained in power until 1990, also helped to burnish his posthumous reputation.

Primary Source

I come from Chile, a small country but one where today any citizen is free to express himself as he so desires. A country of unlimited cultural, religious and ideological tolerance and where there is no room for racial discrimination. A country with its working class united in a single trade union organization, where universal and secret suffrage is the vehicle of determination of a multiparty regime, with a Parliament that has been operating constantly since it was created 160 years ago; where the courts of justice are independent of the executive and where the constitution has only been changed once since 1833, and has almost always been in effect. A country where public life is organized in civilian institutions and where the armed forces are of a proven professional background and deep democratic spirit. A country with a population of almost 10,000,000 people that in one generation has had two first-place Nobel Prize winners in literature, Gabriela Mistral and Pablo Neruda, both children of simple workers. In my country, history, land and man are united in a great national feeling.

But Chile is also a country whose retarded economy has been subjected and even alienated to foreign capitalist firms, resulting in a foreign debt of more than US$4,000 million whose yearly services represent more than 30 per cent of the value of the country's exports; whose economy is extremely sensitive to the external situation, suffering from chronic stagnation and inflation; and where millions of people have been forced to live amidst conditions of exploitation and misery, of open or concealed unemployment.

Today I have come because my country is confronting problems of universal significance that are the object of the permanent attention of this assembly of nations: the struggle for social liberation, the effort for well-being and intellectual progress and the defence of national identity and dignity.

The outlook which faced my country, just like many other countries of the Third World, was a model of reflex modernization, which, as technical studies and the most tragic realities demonstrate, excludes from the possibilities of progress, well being and social liberation more and more millions of people, destining them to a subhuman life. It is a model that will produce a greater shortage of housing, that will condemn an ever-greater number of citizens to unemployment, illiteracy, ignorance and physiological misery.

In short, the same perspective that has kept us in a relationship of colonization or dependency and exploitation in times of cold war, has also operated in times of military conflict or in times of peace. There is an attempt to condemn us, the underdeveloped countries, to being second-class realities, always subordinated.

This is the model that the Chilean working class, coming on the scene as protagonist of its own destiny, has decided to reject, searching in turn for a speedy, autonomous development of its own, and transforming the traditional structures in a revolutionary manner.

[. . .]

The Revolutionary Path that Chile is Following

The change in the power structure that we are carrying out, the progressive leadership role of the workers in it, the national recovery of basic riches, the liberation of our country from subordination to foreign powers, are all crowning points of a long historical process; of efforts to impose political and social freedoms, of heroic struggle of several generations of workers and farmers to organize themselves as a social force to obtain political power and drive the capitalists from economic power.

Its tradition, personality and revolutionary awareness make it possible for the Chilean people to give a boost to the process towards socialism, strengthening civic liberties, collective and individual, and respecting cultural and ideological pluralism. Ours is a permanent battle to install social freedoms and economic democracy through full exercise of political freedoms.

The democratic will of our people has taken upon itself the challenge of giving a boost to the revolutionary process in the framework of a highly institutionalized state of law, that has been flexible to changes and is today faced by the need to adjust to the new socioeconomic reality.

We have nationalized basic riches, we have nationalized copper, we have done so by a unanimous decision of Parliament, where the government parties are in a minority. We want everyone to clearly understand that we have not confiscated the large foreign copper mining firms. In keeping with constitutional provisions, we have righted a historic injustice by deducting from the compensation all profits above 12 per cent a year that they had made since 1955.

Some of the nationalized firms had made such huge profits in the last 15 years that when 12 per cent a year was applied as the limit of reasonable profits, they were affected by important deductions. Such is the case, for example, of a branch of the Anaconda Company, which made profits in Chile of 21.5 per cent a year over its book value between 1955 and 1970, while Anaconda's profits in other countries were only 3.6 per cent a year. That is the situation of a branch of the Kennecott Copper Corporation, which in the same period of time, made an average of 52.8 per cent profits a year in Chile—and in some years it made really incredible profits like 106 per cent in 1967, 113 per cent in 1968 and more than 205 per cent in 1969. In the same period of time, Kennecott was making less than 10 per cent a year in profits in other countries. However, the application of the constitutional norm has kept other copper firms from suffering deductions because their profits did not exceed the reasonable limit of 12 per cent a year.

[. . .]

The nationalization of copper has been carried out while strictly observing internal judicial order and with respect for the norms of international law, which there is no reason to identify with the interests of the big capitalist firms.

In short, this is the process my country is going through, and I feel it is useful to present it to this assembly, with the authority given to us by the fact that we are strictly fulfilling the recommendations of the United Nations and relying on internal efforts as the base for economic and social development. Here, in this forum, the change of institutions and backward structures has been advised, along with the redistribution of income, priority for education and health and care for the poorest sectors. All this is a[n] essential part of our policy and it is in the process of being carried out.

The Financial Blockade

That is why it is even more painful to have to come here to this rostrum to proclaim the fact that my country is the victim of grave aggression.

We had foreseen problems and foreign resistance to our carrying out our process of changes, especially in view of our nationalization of natural resources. Imperialism and its cruelty have a long and ominous history in Latin America and the dramatic and heroic experience of Cuba is still fresh. The same is the case with Peru, which has had to suffer the consequences of its decision to exercise sovereign control over its oil.

In the decade of the 70s, after so many agreements and resolutions of the international community, in which the sovereign right of every state to control its natural

resources for the benefit of its people is recognized, after the adoption of international agreements on economic, social and cultural rights and the strategy of the second decade of development, which formalized those agreements, we are the victims of a new expression of imperialism—more subtle, more sneaky, and terribly effective—to block the exercise of our rights as a sovereign state.

From the very moment of our election victory on 4 September 1970, we were affected by the development of large-scale foreign pressures, aimed at blocking the inauguration of a government freely elected by the people and then overthrowing it. There have been efforts to isolate us from the world, strangle the economy and paralyze the sale of copper, our main export product, and keep us from access to sources of international financing.

We realize that when we denounce the financial-economic blockade with which we were attacked, it is hard for international public opinion and even for many of our compatriots to easily understand the situation because it is not open aggression, publicly proclaimed before the whole world. Quite the contrary, it is a sneaky and double-crossing attack, which is just as damaging to Chile.

We find ourselves opposed by forces that operate in the shadows, without a flag, with powerful weapons that are placed in a wide range of influential positions.

[. . .]

Chile, like most of the nations of the Third World, is very vulnerable to the situation of the external sector of its economy. In the last 12 months, the decline in the international price of copper has represented a loss of about US$200 million in income for a nation whose exports total a bit more than US$1,000 million, while the products, both industrial and agricultural, that we must import are much more expensive now, in some cases as much as 60 per cent.

As is almost always the case, Chile buys at high prices and sells at low prices.

It has been at these moments, in themselves difficult for our balance of payments, that we have had to face, among others, the following simultaneous actions, apparently designed to take revenge on the Chilean people for their decision to nationalize copper.

Until the moment my Government took office, every year Chile received almost US$80 million in loans from international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. This financing has been violently interrupted.

In the past decade, Chile received loans from the Agency for International Development of the Government of the United States (AID) totaling US$50 million a year.

We are not asking for those loans to be reinstated. The United States has the sovereign right to grant or not to grant foreign aid to any country. All we want to point out is that the drastic elimination of those credits has resulted in important restrictions in our balance of payments.

Upon taking office as President, my country had short-term credit lines from private US banks, destined to finance our foreign trade, that amounted to US$220 million. In a short period of time those credits were suspended and about US$190 million have been deducted, a sum we had to pay, since the respective operations were not renewed.

[. . .]

As a result of the operations directed against the sale of copper in the nations of Western Europe, our short-term operations with private banks on that continent, mainly based on payment of that metal, have been greatly blocked. This has resulted in more than US$20 million in credit lines not being renewed, the suspension of financial negotiations for more than US$200 million that were almost complete, and the creation of a climate that blocks the normal handling of our purchases in those countries and acutely distorts all our activities in the field of external financing.

This financial stranglehold of a brutal nature, given the characteristics of the Chilean economy, has resulted in a severe limitation of our possibilities to purchase equipment, spare parts, supplies, food and medicine. Every Chilean is suffering the consequences of those measures, which bring suffering and grief into the daily life of all and, naturally, make themselves felt in internal political life.

Source: Salvador Allende, "Speech to the United Nations, December 4, 1972," RRojas Databank: The Robinson Rojas Archive, http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/foh12.htm.

115. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (Paris Peace Accords), 27 January 1973

Introduction

The Paris Peace Accords, which permitted the withdrawal by the end of March 1973 of all remaining United States forces and supposedly ended hostilities in Vietnam, were the product of almost five years of tortuous negotiations between the United States and representatives of the governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) and the National Liberation Front (NLF, Viet Cong). Under their terms, NLF and North Vietnamese military personnel, including regular troops and guerrillas, were left in place rather than withdrawn. North Vietnam opened an embassy in Saigon, the southern capital, but no such arrangements were made for South Vietnam to do likewise in Hanoi. President Nguyen Van Thieu, head of the South Vietnamese government, was extremely reluctant to sign the accords and accepted these terms only because U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who headed the American negotiating team, warned him that the United States would sign the agreement if Thieu did not sign. After eight years of major warfare in Vietnam, U.S. officials were under heavy domestic political pressure to withdraw, no matter what the consequences. The Paris Peace Accords provided for the speedy return of all U.S. prisoners of war, another significant American priority. Even at the time, many observers believed that the accords marked only a temporary truce in the war and that North Vietnamese leaders intended to resume it after a "decent interval" that would allow the United States to claim that it had not deserted an ally. Although American assistance after the accords had been signed was restricted to merely replacing existing stocks, President Richard Nixon promised Thieu massive economic and military aid if North Vietnam reopened hostilities or broke the accords. In practice, the war in Vietnam had become so unpopular that the U.S. Congress was unlikely to fulfill any such pledges. The two chief negotiators, Kissinger and North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho, were jointly awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize, an honor that Tho refused to accept on the grounds that these accords did not represent a genuine peace. After the accords had been concluded, communist China and the Soviet Union continued to send large quantities of military supplies to North Vietnam. In December 1974 North Vietnam launched a new military offensive. On 30 April 1975 the South Vietnamese government surrendered, and Vietnam was finally united. Until 1995, however, successive U.S. presidential administrations refused to open either diplomatic or trade relations with the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV).

Primary Source

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

Chapter I
The Vietnamese People's Fundamental National Rights

Article 1

The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam.

Chapter II
Cessation of Hostilities—Withdrawal of Troops

Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Viet-Nam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Viet-Nam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

Article 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

—All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;
—All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

Article 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam.

Article 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Viet-Nam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this agreement.

Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Article 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on

the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

Chapter III
The Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians, and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel

Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Viet-Nam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

Chapter IV
The Exercise of the South Vietnamese People's Right to Self-Determination

Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Viet-Nam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.

Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

—achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;
—ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed

its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and ensurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

Article 14

South Viet-Nam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Viet-Nam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Viet-Nam provided for in Article 9 (b).

Chapter V
The Reunification of Viet-Nam and the Relationship between North and South Viet-Nam

Article 15

The reunification of Viet-Nam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Viet-Nam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Viet-Nam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Viet-Nam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Viet-Nam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Viet-Nam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam.

Source: "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," 27 January 1973, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 24(1): 4–23.

116. United States War Powers Act, 7 November 1973

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, many American senators and congressmen resented the way in which President Lyndon B. Johnson, after the passage of the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorizing him to take such measures as he considered appropriate to deal with the situation in Vietnam, had sought no further congressional authorization before committing more than 500,000 military personnel to that country. Congress also resented the way in which Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, had felt free to expand the war beyond Vietnam, launching heavy bombing raids on both Laos and Cambodia and even sending American forces to invade the latter country for two months in May and June 1970. In November 1973 Congress passed a joint resolution under whose terms the president was required to consult with Congress before beginning hostilities with another country and at regular intervals during the course of such hostilities. Unless Congress voted either to declare war or to approve the use of U.S. forces in a hostile situation, the president was required to withdraw all military personnel within sixty days, with at most an additional thirty days should circumstances make such an extension unavoidable. President Nixon vetoed the resolution, but Congress found the two-thirds majority necessary to pass it. Successive presidents stated that they considered it unconstitutional but nonetheless observed its provisions, and by the early twenty-first century, presidents had submitted 118 reports to Congress in connection with the War Powers Act. The occasions on which it was invoked included U.S. participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions as well as before the interventions in Grenada and Panama and prior to the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

Primary Source

Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President.

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Short Title

Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

Purpose and Policy

Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Consultation

Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

Reporting

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

Congressional Action

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

[. . .]

Source: *War Powers Resolution*, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (November 7, 1973).

117. Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile, 11 March 1974, As Excerpted in the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, 9 September 1985

Introduction

The military government that took power in Chile in September 1974 by means of a violent coup, in the course of which the leftist President Salvador Allende Gossens committed suicide, justified its action on the grounds that the country had faced a serious internal communist threat from his government. The new regime received appreciable support and aid from the United States. Before restoring any kind of democratic government, the new regime, headed by army commander General Augusto Pinochet, was determined to eradicate all radical dissent. Until that was accomplished, military rule would remain in force. As was often the case when anticommunist military governments came to power during the Cold War, the junta's proclaimed objective of a return to normally functioning political institutions was to be long deferred. In March 1974 the Chilean government made a public declaration of the principles on which it intended to run Chile. The "right to dissent" was supposedly recognized, but Marxist political groups were banned. The junta set no time limit to its retention of power, proclaiming its intention to "initiate a new stage in the national destiny" and eventually to hand over power to "new generations of Chileans trained in a school of healthy civic habits." Trade unions and other associations, "whether labor, business, professional, or student bodies," were to be banned from all political activity. Five years later, in December 1979, President Pinochet made a speech in which he stated that "democracy" and "universal suffrage" were not ends in themselves but merely the means of attaining efficient and harmonious government. Proclaiming his belief in strong presidential leadership, he warned of the continuing danger from "Soviet imperialism" and "Marxism" and said that the country was "not yet ready" for elections. The Pinochet government quickly reversed Allende's past recognition of the Marxist regime in Cuba and collaborated intimately with several other Latin American military dictatorships in Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina in Operation CONDOR, a coordinated program to eliminate communists and radicals in all six states. A new Chilean constitution promulgated in 1980 provided for a plebiscite on the president in 1988, essentially a vote on whether or not the electorate approved of the incumbent's performance. If he lost, multiparty presidential elections would follow in 1989, to be followed by a return to civilian rule. For fifteen years, Pinochet followed policies of free market economic reform. Human rights abuses were frequent: 27,000 of the regime's political opponents were imprisoned and often tortured, and another 3,000 were killed. Pinochet lost the 1988 plebiscite, and in 1990 he handed over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, a democratically elected successor, but remained military commander in chief until 1998. At that time he moved to a lifetime seat in the Chilean senate, still retaining substantial political influence. After a dramatic incident when Pinochet was arrested on human rights charges while in London in October 1998 but was eventually declared mentally unfit to stand trial, he returned to Chile in 2002, resigning his senate seat soon afterward. In subsequent years the Chilean courts stripped Pinochet of his senatorial immunity, arraigning him on charges of major human rights abuses and serious financial corruption. His death in December 2006 in Santiago, the Chilean capital, where he was under house arrest, prompted violent clashes in several cities between demonstrators celebrating Pinochet's demise and supporters of the former dictator.

Primary Source

[. . .]

14. On March 11, 1974, the Government Junta announced the ideological basis of its governance, which was contained in the "Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile". This document is of particular importance as regards both the diagnosis of the situation that caused the intervention of the Armed and Security Forces and the objectives, which the Government intends to achieve. This document also refers to human rights, in general, and the exercise of political rights, in particular.

15. With respect to the "legal order respectful of human rights: the framework for the present Government"

the Declaration of Principles of the Government states that:

Chile has always lived within a legal framework. The majesty of the law invariably has been present in our social development. But, in addition, that legal framework has always been a reflection of the deep respect Chileans feel for the spiritual dignity of the human person and, consequently, for his fundamental rights. It is in that respect for human rights rather than in its tradition of popular generation and constitutional succession of governments in which the essence of Chilean democracy is to be found.

Another important characteristic of our juridical tradition has been respect for freedom of conscience and the right to dissent. These two aspects must be preserved by the Rule of Law which the movement of 11 September intends to recreate, but whose fundamental effectiveness has been maintained within the emergency measures that it itself contemplates. Human rights must be strengthened, so their exercise can be effectively enjoyed by all, and must be extended to encompass their most modern social expressions. The right to dissent must be maintained, but the experience of recent years indicates the need to establish the admissible limits of such dissent. Never again can we allow an ingenuous democracy, in the name of a misunderstood pluralism, to permit organized groups that sponsor guerrilla violence to achieve power, or, feigning acceptance of the rules of democracy, to advocate a doctrine and a morality, the objective of which is to build a totalitarian state. Consequently, Marxist parties and movements will never again be admitted to civic life.

Hence it follows that Chile is not neutral to Marxism. It is precluded from being so by its conception of man and of society, which is fundamentally opposed to that of Marxism. Consequently, the present Government does not fear or hesitate to declare itself anti-Marxist.

16. With respect to "a new and modern institutional system; task of the present Government", the Declaration of Principles states that:

. . . the Government of the Armed and Security Forces has assumed the historical mission of giving Chile a new institutional system that will embody the radical changes modern times have been producing. Only in this way will it be possible to endow our democracy with firm stability and to purge our democratic system of the faults that facilitated its destruction, but it will go beyond a mere corrective effort and enter fully into the audacious field of creation. Central to this new institutional system will be "the decentralization of power", both in the operational and in the territorial sphere, which will enable the country to advance towards a "modernized society of authentic social participation".

a. Functional decentralization: political and social power.

The new institutional system that is being created today will differentiate political power from social power and will clearly separate those who exercise it from the forms of exercising it.

"Political Power" or the power to decide matters of general interest to the nation properly constitutes the function of governing the country.

"Social Power", on the other hand, must be understood as the power of the intermediate institutions of society to develop with legitimate independence towards achieving their respective ends thereby becoming vehicles of limitation as well as of enrichment of the action of political power.

Because of the lengthy erosion caused in our country by many years of demagoguery and the systematic destruction of all aspects of national life that has been accentuated by Marxism since 1970, the Armed and Security Forces of Chile, in fulfilling their classical doctrine and their duties towards continued existence of the nation, had to assume full political power on September 11. They did so by overthrowing an illegitimate, immoral and failed government and thus fulfilled a widespread national aspiration that is today expressed in the support of a majority of the population for the new government.

The Armed and Security forces are not establishing any time limit for their Government operation, since the task of rebuilding the country morally, institutionally, and materially [is] essential to change the mental-

ity of Chileans. But, more than that, the present government has been categorical in declaring that it does not intend to limit itself to being a government of mere administration, which means a pause between two similar party governments; in other words, it is not a "truce" for reorganization only to return power to the same politicians who were so largely responsible, by acts of commission and omission, for the virtual destruction of the country. The government of the Armed and Security Forces wishes to initiate a new stage in the national destiny and to open the way to new generations of Chileans trained in a school of healthy civic habits.

Nevertheless, although it does not establish any time limit, the Government Junta will in due course hand over political power to those whom the people elect through universal, free, secret and informed suffrage. The Armed and Security Forces will then assume the specifically institutional role of participation that the new Constitution assigns them, which will be that which must devolve upon those responsible for ensuring National Security, in the broad sense this concept has in modern times.

What has been said does not mean that the Armed and Security Forces are going to wash their hands of their governmental succession and to observe its resolution as mere spectators. On the very contrary, and as stated by the President of the Government Junta itself, "the Junta considers part of its mission to be that of inspiring a new and great civic-military movement", which is already arising from the reality of events and will project the work of the present government in a fruitful and lasting manner towards the future.

17. With respect to the "social power", the Declaration of Principles affirms that it "is called upon to become the most important organizational source of civic expression", for which purpose it is necessary:

To ensure the independence and depolarization of all intermediate bodies between man and the State. Of particular importance are the organized unions, whether labor, business, professional or student bodies. In addition, the principle of subordination already set forth requires these bodies to develop autonomously to achieve their specific purposes, without the State taking control of them, nor with their objectives distorted by political party manipulation by them or their leaders. Therefore, any political party intervention, direct or indirect, in the creation and work of the boards of directors of these unions, regardless of its nature, will be expressly prohibited. It is essential to understand that the above-mentioned depolarization is the only possible way of ensuring that these unions and other intermediate organizations are authentic vehicles of social participation, thereby fulfilling a desire that may be distinguished as a true sign of our times. There can be no talk of social participation if the bodies called upon to channel it, instead of being vehicles of the genuine thought of the organized people, become docile spokesmen of the instructions of some political party, which instructions are also frequently based on the narrow electoral interests of that party. The same requirements apply to the Municipalities.

18. The passages transcribed indicate the central aspects guiding the action of the Government of Chile with respect to the exercise of political rights, and the institutional forms that exercise is to assume. First, mention should be made of the explicit recognition that "formal democracy" practiced in the past has led to its own destruction by being infiltrated by Marxism-Leninism—a doctrine which, according to Decree Law No. 77 of 1973, the new Government has the mission of eradicating—which has been permitted by other political parties. Second, this document sets forth the need to build a protected democracy, in the subsequent operation of which an important role will be assigned to the Armed and Security Forces, in accordance with the wide meaning the concept of national security has in modern times. In the new institutional system, the intermediate groups will become the "most important organizational channel of civic expression" and therefore must be de-politicized, which will be complemented by a great civic-military movement inspired by the Government. Third, the absence of time limits for the task proposed, which includes the ambitious purpose of changing the mentality of Chileans, is evident. Once this profound reorganization, which includes the economic aspects, is achieved, the Government Junta will hand over political

power to the person who is chosen by elections based on universal, free, secret, and informed suffrage.

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Source: "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile," 9 September 1985," Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Chile85eng/chap.12.htm.

118. Richard Nixon: Presidential Resignation, 8 August 1974

Introduction

Richard Nixon was one of the most able of Cold War presidents. He conceived and implemented a major reorientation of U.S. international policies, away from ideology and toward a more realistic balance-of-power system, taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to win concessions from both major communist powers by pursuing policies of détente with the Soviet Union and reopening relations with China. A decline in the hegemonic position of the United States forced Nixon to reconceptualize American Cold War strategy so as to make the best use of his country's limited resources. At home, he was also the major architect of a strategy that reconfigured the American domestic political scene to ensure that with only a few breaks, from the late 1960s onward the Republicans became the majority party, their dominance still much apparent in the early twenty-first century. Despite these accomplishments, Nixon's own character flaws brought him low, as he acquiesced in efforts by White House aides and other administration officials to conceal their own and the White House's involvement in a botched burglary of the rival Democratic National Committee's Washington, D.C., headquarters in the Watergate Hotel. Fearful that he would not win reelection in 1972, Nixon had authorized or at least condoned the use of dirty tricks, including spying against and smearing potential political opponents, and abused the powers of government agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to facilitate illicit Republican fund-raising and harass political enemies. As media and congressional investigations gradually unearthed growing evidence of his own involvement and as Congress prepared to vote on articles of impeachment, Republican support for Nixon dwindled. It seemed likely that if impeached, he would be convicted and removed from office. Facing political disaster and disgrace, on 8 August 1974 Nixon resigned his office, the only president in American history to do so. Vice President Gerald Ford, whom Nixon had appointed the previous year following the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew in a separate scandal, assumed the presidency in Nixon's place and pardoned him for any crimes he might have committed in relation to Watergate. Many Americans resented this, feeling that Nixon should first have been tried and convicted, but Ford believed that the country needed to put the entire affair behind it and concentrate on tackling the assorted serious international and domestic problems then facing it. Nixon's preoccupation with Watergate for most of his truncated second term halted progress toward full normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China and hampered (but did not stop) further efforts toward détente with the Soviet Union. Although Ford retained Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Nixon's leading foreign policy advisor, the new president did not have the same deftness as Nixon in handling international affairs. After a decade in near disgrace, Nixon was able to engineer a substantial political rehabilitation. In his final two decades he published numerous books and essays highlighting his foreign policy achievements, especially his dealings with the Soviet Union and China, and successive presidents, including Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton, drew on his international expertise. When Nixon died in 1994, Clinton declared a national day of mourning and spoke at his funeral, which former presidents Ford, Jimmy Carter, Bush, and Reagan also attended.

Primary Source

This is the 37th time I have spoken to you from this office, where so many decisions have been made that shaped the history of this Nation. Each time I have done so to discuss with you some matter than I believe affected the national interest.

In all the decisions I have made in my public life, I have always tried to do what was best for the Nation. Throughout the long and difficult period of Watergate, I have felt it was my duty to persevere, to make every possible effort to complete the term of office to which you elected me.

In the past few days, however, it has become evident to me that I no longer have a strong enough political base in the Congress to justify continuing that effort. As long as there was such a base, I felt strongly that it was necessary to see the constitutional process through to its conclusion, that to do otherwise would be unfaithful to the spirit of that deliberately difficult process and a dangerously destabilizing precedent for the future.

But with the disappearance of that base, I now believe that the constitutional purpose has been served, and there is no longer a need for the process to be prolonged.

I would have preferred to carry through to the finish whatever the personal agony it would have involved, and my family unanimously urged me to do so. But the interest of the Nation must always come before any personal considerations.

From the discussions I have had with Congressional and other leaders, I have concluded that because of the Watergate matter I might not have the support of the Congress that I would consider necessary to back the very difficult decisions and carry out the duties of this office in the way the interests of the Nation would require.

I have never been a quitter. To leave office before my term is completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as President, I must put the interest of America first. America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad.

To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home.

Therefore, I shall resign the Presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office.

As I recall the high hopes for America with which we began this second term, I feel a great sadness that I will not be here in this office working on your behalf to achieve those hopes in the next 2½ years. But in turning over direction of the Government to Vice President Ford, I know, as I told the Nation when I nominated him for that office 10 months ago, that the leadership of America will be in good hands.

In passing this office to the Vice President, I also do so with the profound sense of the weight of responsibility that will fall on his shoulders tomorrow and, therefore, of the understanding, the patience, the cooperation he will need from all Americans.

As he assumes that responsibility, he will deserve the help and the support of all of us. As we look to the future, the first essential is to begin healing the wounds of this Nation, to put the bitterness and divisions of the recent past behind us, and to rediscover those shared ideals that lie at the heart of our strength and unity as a great and as a free people.

By taking this action, I hope that I will have hastened the start of that process of healing which is so desperately needed in America.

I regret deeply any injuries that may have been done in the course of the events that led to this decision. I would say only that if some of my judgments were wrong, and some were wrong, they were made in what I believed at the time to be the best interest of the Nation.

To those who have stood with me during these past difficult months, to my family, my friends, to many others who joined in supporting my cause because they believed it was right, I will be eternally grateful for your support.

And to those who have not felt able to give me your support, let me say I leave with no bitterness toward those who have opposed me, because all of us, in the final analysis, have been concerned with the good of the country, however our judgments might differ.

So, let us all now join together in affirming that common commitment and in helping our new President succeed for the benefit of all Americans.

I shall leave this office with regret at not completing my term, but with gratitude for the privilege of serving as your President for the past 5 ½ years. These years have been a momentous time in the history of our Nation and the world. They have been a time of achievement in which we can all be proud, achievements that represent the shared efforts of the Administration, the Congress, and the people.

But the challenges ahead are equally great, and they, too, will require the support and the efforts of the Congress and the people working in cooperation with the new Administration.

We have ended America's longest war, but in the work of securing a lasting peace in the world, the goals ahead are even more far-reaching and more difficult. We must complete a structure of peace so that it will be said of this generation, our generation of Americans, by the people of all nations, not only that we ended one war but that we prevented future wars.

We have unlocked the doors that for a quarter of a century stood between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

We must now ensure that the one quarter of the world's people who live in the People's Republic of China will be and remain not our enemies but our friends.

In the Middle East, 100 million people in the Arab countries, many of whom have considered us their enemy for nearly 20 years, now look on us as their friends. We must continue to build on that friendship so that peace can settle at last over the Middle East and so that the cradle of civilization will not become its grave.

Together with the Soviet Union we have made the crucial breakthroughs that have begun the process of limiting nuclear arms. But we must set as our goal not just limiting but reducing and finally destroying these terrible weapons so that they cannot destroy civilization and so that the threat of nuclear war will no longer hang over the world and the people.

We have opened the new relation with the Soviet Union. We must continue to develop and expand that new relationship so that the two strongest nations of the world will live together in cooperation rather than confrontation.

Around the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, in the Middle East, there are millions of people who live in terrible poverty, even starvation. We must keep as our goal turning away from production for war and expanding production for peace so that people everywhere on this earth can at last look forward in their children's time, if not in our own time, to having the necessities for a decent life.

Here in America, we are fortunate that most of our people have not only the blessings of liberty but also the means to live full and good and, by the world's standards, even abundant lives. We must press on, however, toward a goal of not only more and better jobs but of full opportunity for every American and of what we are striving so hard right now to achieve, prosperity without inflation.

For more than a quarter of a century in public life I have shared in the turbulent history of this era. I have fought for what I believed in. I have tried to the best of my ability to discharge those duties and meet those responsibilities that were entrusted to me.

Sometimes I have succeeded and sometimes I have failed, but always I have taken heart from what Theodore Roosevelt once said about the man in the arena, "whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes short again and again because there is not effort without error and shortcoming, but who does actually strive to do the deed, who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumphs of high achievements and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly."

I pledge to you tonight that as long as I have a breath of life in my body, I shall continue in that spirit. I shall continue to work for the great causes to which I have been dedicated throughout my years as a Congressman, a Senator, a Vice President, and President, the cause of peace not just for America but among all

nations, prosperity, justice, and opportunity for all of our people.

There is one cause above all to which I have been devoted and to which I shall always be devoted for as long as I live.

When I first took the oath of office as President 5½ years ago, I made this sacred commitment, to "consecrate my office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon to the cause of peace among nations."

I have done my very best in all the days since to be true to that pledge. As a result of these efforts, I am confident that the world is a safer place today, not only for the people of America but for the people of all nations, and that all of our children have a better chance than before of living in peace rather than dying in war.

This, more than anything, is what I hoped to achieve when I sought the Presidency. This, more than anything, is what I hope will be my legacy to you, to our country, as I leave the Presidency.

To have served in this office is to have felt a very personal sense of kinship with each and every American. In leaving it, I do so with this prayer: May God's grace be with you in all the days ahead.

Source: Richard M. Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1974* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 626–629.

119. Cambodian Khmer Rouge Party Officials' Conference on Future Policies, 20 May 1975

Introduction

On 17 April 1975, the Khmer Rouge, or Cambodian Communist Party, emerged victorious from a lengthy insurgency against the military government of President Lon Nol. Under the direction of Pol Pot, a former teacher, the Khmer Rouge embraced an extremely radical form of permanent revolution that sought to remake society on communist lines by eradicating all traces of bourgeois individualism. Hostile to city dwellers, whom they regarded as procapitalist, the Khmer Rouge leaders also decided to force all urban inhabitants back to the countryside to work in ideological purity in agriculture or occasionally in industry. Pol Pot, an admirer of Mao Zedong's theory of permanent revolution, sought to implement his mentor's teachings even more ruthlessly and comprehensively than Mao himself had done. A month after seizing power, the Central Committee of the Khmer Rouge summoned thousands of district and regional party officials and military representatives to a five-day meeting in Phnom Penh to receive instructions on the organization of the new political and socioeconomic order. Although no notes from this meeting have survived, the historian Ben Kiernan, using interviews he conducted with several former Khmer Rouge officials, was able to construct a coherent account of its major points. Two classes of citizens would exist: those with full rights (individuals who had supported the Khmer Rouge before its takeover) and those who were only candidates for such rights, particularly deportees from the cities. All officials of the former Lon Nol regime were to be executed, markets and currency would be abolished, urban dwellers were to be evacuated to the countryside to live in cooperatives and eat in communal dining halls, Buddhist monks were to be made to work in the fields, private property was abolished and all industry nationalized, all ethnic Vietnamese would be deported, and all potentially subversive elements were to be purged and killed. These instructions were interpreted with great brutality. Schools and hospitals closed, as the professionals running them were among the 3 million city dwellers who were deported. By the end of the decade, 1.7 million of Cambodia's population of 7.1 million had died, many murdered outright, others due to the abysmal living conditions in the countryside, food shortages, deprivation, and illness.

Primary Source

All military and civilian officials of the new regime were summoned to a special meeting on 20 May 1975. "District and region secretaries came from all over the country, and representatives from all armed forces and units and regions, so there were thousands." The assembly was held in the old sports center in the northern part of Phnom Penh. Its purpose was "to receive the plan distributed by the Center" and then return home to "implement the plan." The meeting lasted five days.

This was the Center's first major attempt to run its political writ throughout Cambodia. No documents from the meeting, and very few members of its audience, appear to have survived. But it has been possible to reconstruct some of the event through interviews with three of those present and with two others whose superiors attended and gave them accounts of it. (Later they were arrested; both disappeared.) The accounts are not only rare but modulated, informative despite lapses of memory, and, as we shall see, mutually corroborative without indication of prearrangement.

The earliest account dates from mid-1980. It comes from Sin Song, who in 1975 was political commissar of the 3rd Battalion of Chakrey's 1st Eastern Division. Song was stationed in Prey Veng. He did not attend the May assembly, but his immediate superior, Chhouk, the Region 24 CPK secretary, did. On his return, Chhouk told Song that Pol Pot had made eight points:

1. Evacuate people from all towns.
2. Abolish all markets.
3. Abolish Lon Nol regime currency and withhold the revolutionary currency that had been printed.
4. Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice.
5. Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders.
6. Establish high-level cooperatives throughout the country, with communal eating.
7. Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population.
8. Dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese border.

The second source is an officer named Ret, a Center battalion commander from the Northern Zone who attended the meeting. Before his arrest in 1977, he told colleagues in the north of a large meeting in Phnom Penh around 27 May 1975. Ret said that "eleven points" were discussed, but his colleagues, interviewed in 1980, could recall his mentioning only the leadership's orders to "kill Lon Nol soldiers, kill the monks, [and] expel the Vietnamese population" and its opposition to "money, schools, and hospitals."

Mat Ly, a CPK district committee member in Region 21, attended the meeting. In 1991 he agreed with Sin Song that there were eight points. He started his list with five of the first six points recalled by Song (1, 2, 3, 4, and 6). He added the following: close schools, close hospitals, and "uproot spies root and branch." Chea Sim, CPK secretary of Ponhea Krek district on the Vietnam border and a member of the Region 20 Committee, confirms Sin Song's list.

To get to the meeting, Sim traveled along Highway 7 from the border to Tonle Bet, then took a ferry down the Mekong. He arrived in the capital on 19 May, spending the night with hundreds of other participants at the Phnom Penh Technical School, west of the city center. The next morning the meeting began at 8 A.M. The assembly lasted five days. Nuon Chea spoke on the first day, Pol Pot on the second. Chea Sim recalled some of the details in a 1991 interview.

"Nuon Chea said that building socialism in Kampuchea consisted of two parts, agriculture and industry. He said agriculture would be modernized in ten to fifteen years by scientific methods, by preparing irrigation dams and canals all over the country. And the dams and canals had to be started in the coming year, 1976. Industry would be modernized in a similar period of ten to fifteen years."

"And the second issue: in order to achieve the construction of socialism progressively and advance all together in the set period, we must take care to carefully screen internal agents (*samrit samrainh phtey khnong*) in the party, in the armed forces, in the various organizations and ministries, in the government, and among the masses of the people. We have to carefully screen them, Nuon Chea said. He mentioned 'the line of carefully screening internal agents to improve and

purify, in order to implement the line of building socialism so that it advances to modernization by new scientific technology.'"

"This was a very important order to kill. Their careful screening was to take all measures so that people were pure (*borisot*). The line laid down must be followed at all costs. . . . If people could not do it, they would be taken away and killed. This was called the line of 'careful screening': It came out in concrete specifics in the eight points. . . . These came from the broad lines, the strategic principles. Socialist construction can only succeed under the line of careful screening of internal agents. The words 'carefully screen' were the killing principle . . . and were stated strongly on 20 May. It was to be done." This recalls Mat Ly's description of the slogan, "Uproot spies root and branch."

Heng Samrin, then studying military affairs under Son Sen, was also at the meeting. He recalls the use of yet another term: "They did not say 'kill,' they said 'scatter the people of the old government.' Scatter (*komchat*) them away, don't allow them to remain in the framework. It does not mean 'smash' (*komtec*). . . . Smash means 'kill' but they used a general word, 'scatter.' Nuon Chea used this phrase." This appears to be Sin Song's point number 5, though the use of varied euphemisms is an important qualification.

Samrin agrees that "mostly, it was Nuon Chea who did the talking," explaining the new Center policies in detail. Samrin did not recall eight points, but mentioned permanent evacuation of the cities (Sin Song's no. 1); the decisions to withhold the new currency and abolish the circulation of money (no. 3); establishment of "medium-level cooperatives" in the countryside (not quite no. 6); evacuation of the foreign embassies; and the division of the population into two groups: "full rights" citizens (*neak penh sith*, those who had lived in Khmer Rouge zones before 17 April); and "candidates" (*neak triem*) for such status, especially the newly evacuated deportees or "depositees" (*neak phñoe*) from the towns.

Samrin continues: "Nuon Chea talked of wiping out markets, not allowing money. If there were markets and money, there was property. The important, heavy pressure was against property. Where there was money there were markets, and if there were markets there would be people with money and those people would have property. So they wanted to wipe out property, not allow private property to exist." This is Sin Song's point number 2.

"It was Pol Pot who distributed this plan personally," says Samrin, who quoted him as saying, "Don't use money, don't let the people live in the cities." There was, however, "no mention of closing schools or hospitals." Chea Sim agrees. On the other hand, Samrin adds: "Monks, they said, were to be disbanded, put aside as a 'special class.' the most important to fight. They had to be wiped out (*lup bombat*). . . . I heard Pol Pot say this myself. . . . He said no monks were to be allowed, no festivals were to be allowed any more, meaning 'wipe out religion.'" Nuon Chea affirmed this, adding that "wats would not be allowed." This is Song's point number 4.

Samrin claims that the two leaders' views were "clearly the same." But their manner was different. I asked Chea Sim if Pol Pot spoke of killing people, or if he ever used the word *kill*. He replied, "It is difficult for us to understand. We saw Pol Pot's behavior and heard his words, and he did not seem to us to be a killer. He seemed kindly. He did not speak very much. He just smiled and smiled. . . . And his words were light, not strong. In general, you would estimate that Pol Pot was a kindly person, simple, with a mass view. But his methods were confrontational; he was just a killer."

On the other hand, Sim continued, "Nuon Chea's behavior was somewhat coarse, different from Pol Pot's. It could be observed. . . . People always say that Nuon Chea is somewhat cruel. His behavior is stronger. And they always praise Pol Pot as the kindliest person of all."

[. . .]

The party secretary did make one strong, specific point. According to Chea Sim, "Pol Pot spoke a lot about the question of Vietnam. He stressed the importance of the issue of evacuating all of the Vietnamese people out of Cambodian territory." Heng Samrin recalls Nuon Chea's adding, "We cannot allow any Vietnamese

minority" to live in Cambodia. This is Sin Song's point number 7. Pol Pot also noted that Vietnam's Mekong Delta had been Cambodian territory in the past. But Chea Sim recalls no order sending troops to the borders to attack Vietnam. That came later, he says.

[. . .]

Dissent

Contrary to Heng Samrin's account, Hou Yuon did not "disappear forever" after opposing the Center's evacuation plan in February. Monks saw him at their wat in his home district in Kompong Cham province on 8 March. An ex-monk also recognized Hou Yuon at Oudong, north of Phnom Penh, on 17 April. Yuon, escorted by soldiers, was traveling in a jeep heading very fast towards the surrendered capital. The next month Yuon's wife, Ung Yok Leang, returned to the couple's native village. According to relatives, she came to collect her daughter and take her "to live with her father and mother" now that the war was over. It is unlikely she would have done this had Hou Yuon already disappeared or been killed. But he was certainly under a cloud. Hu Nim recorded in his "confession" that "after liberation, when the Party abolished money and wages and evacuated the people, Hou Yuon again boldly took a stand against the Party line."

Chhouk told Sin Song that at the May meeting Hou Yuon had publicly dissented from some of [the] eight points. According to Song, "There was some disagreement with these points at the Assembly, especially over the creation of high-level cooperatives because three million city people and others were not familiar with revolutionary politics. And also, the country had just emerged from a war, so there were great shortages and a lack of capital and facilities. Communal eating cooperatives throughout the country was not a feasible proposition. Hou Yuon, for one, said that this was just not possible, Chhouk reported to me. . . . After that, Hou Yuon was sacked from the cabinet."

Song continues, "Some people also disagreed with the policy of execution, preferring reeducation so that the victims could then play a useful role. And there was disagreement with the abolition of money and markets. Chhouk and the secretary of the Northeast Zone, Ney Sarann, were among the main dissidents. On his return, Chhouk called a meeting of over thirty Region 24 cadres, including myself. He told us he disagreed with these policies; if the party went ahead along this road, he would not yet follow."

Battalion commander Ret, for his part, claimed that Northern Zone Secretary Koy Thuon, himself, and others had argued in favor of "money, schools and religion." Hu Nim, too, probably found himself in a difficult position in May 1975. Seng Horl, who had taken Highway 1 out of the city, was camping at Prek Eng, "waiting for news" of what would be allowed next. There he heard that Hu Nim had come to Prek Eng "to talk to the people." Another refugee saw Hu Nim in black clothes, traveling in a jeep with several soldiers; he had stopped along the way and was "asking the people how they were going." Hod says Hu Nim told the waiting evacuees that "*Angkar Loeu* had got the people to leave Phnom Penh for only three months, then they could go back again." Heng Samrin put it this way: "The people were evacuated into the environs of the city. They were not yet evacuated to distant regions. Then, after receiving the plan on the twentieth [of May], the people were evacuated to the remote countryside. . . . From that time, they were evacuated forever, not allowed to live in cities again." Thus, Horl stayed at Prek Eng for a month, until after the 20–24 May meeting. Then, forbidden to go back to Phnom Penh, he had to move further into the countryside. As Chea Sim recalled, "They just sent people on and distributed them permanently. They did not announce it, they just sent people on."

There were a few exceptions. Skilled workers were being recalled at the same checkpoints where Lon Nol's soldiers were being rounded up for execution. Nop, a railway worker who volunteered to go back, was given a house in the suburb of Tuk La'ak for his family. He was put to work on the railway line south of Phnom Penh. Factory and electrical workers went back to their jobs as well. After a month in the countryside, Tran Heng, a former textile worker, responded to a call for all textile and metal workers to go back to work. About six ferryloads of workers were taken back to the capital by river. But only fifteen workers went back to Heng's factory, of which his father had been director. They

included Heng and his wife, his parents, his three older sisters and three brothers. Three hundred female Khmer Rouge soldiers were brought in to take the place of those workers who had presumably not trusted in the regime's call to return to work.

Two fairly similar accounts indicate what happened to Hou Yuon. French journalist Jean Lacouture writes that Yuon "was killed by one of his bodyguards a few days after the capture of Phnom Penh, as he was departing on a motorcycle from a public meeting where he had criticized the plan to turn pagodas into stables." If this is true, it is more likely to have occurred after the May meeting, where Pol Pot urged people to "wipe out religion." The second account, bearing a date of August 1975, is consistent with this inference. A CPK cadre in Kompong Cham reported that Hou Yuon addressed a large gathering of evacuees and others by the Mekong River at Prek Po. He spoke out strongly against the evacuation and was applauded by the crowd. Soon after leaving this meeting, Hou Yuon was shot dead by a CPK squad, and his body was thrown into the Mekong. A confidential CPK report later confirmed that he had been murdered in 1975. His name was never officially mentioned by DK, though its representatives told foreigners Yuon was alive, "tending to organization." In September 1975, a Vietnamese official asked Koy Thuon what had happened to Yuon, and was told that Hou Yuon suffered from "heart disease."

Source: Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 55–61.

120. Helsinki Agreements, 1975

Introduction

One aspect of détente was the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki, Finland, from 30 July to 1 August 1975 after a protracted international conference that lasted for two years. Thirty-three European countries as well as Canada and the United States signed Helsinki Agreements. They covered predominantly nonmilitary matters, including European security; human rights; cooperation on economic, scientific, technological, and environmental matters; and the free movement of individuals and ideas and promised follow-up meetings to discuss enforcement, modification, and extension of the accords. All signatories recognized existing boundaries within Europe and pledged to resolve disputes peacefully, refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other signatory states, and notify each other of substantial troop movements. The Helsinki Agreements set a standard for behavior among European nations regarding human rights and respect for national sovereignty. Although the accords had no force behind them, they were considered an important statement in defense of European stability. Conservatives in the United States immediately assailed the Helsinki Accords as a betrayal of Western interests that legitimized the Soviet position in Europe in exchange for meaningless human rights assurances. In the presidential election of 1976, both the Left and the Right attacked President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—the latter of whom had taken little interest in the negotiation of these agreements—for yielding too much to the Soviets. Ironically, in practice the Helsinki Accords soon became a focal rallying point for human rights advocates and anti-Soviet protestors throughout Europe, who monitored and publicized aggressively all communist failures to live up to the standards enshrined in the Helsinki Accords.

Primary Source

[. . .]

VI. NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

VII. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS INCLUDING THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, RELIGION OR BELIEF

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavor jointly and separately, including in cooperation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

VIII. EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle. . . .

Source: "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, 1 August 1975," Hellenic Resources Institute, http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html.

121. Church Report, 1975

Introduction

In September 1973 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) watched encouragingly as a military coup overthrew the leftist government of President Salvador Allende Gossens, who had initiated major nationalization programs and expropriated American-owned businesses. The extent of the CIA's role in orchestrating past efforts to prevent Allende from winning successive Chilean elections and in his fall from power became politically controversial, prompting a wide-ranging investigation by the U.S. Senate's Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, a body chaired by liberal Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho. In the aftermath of the divisive Vietnam War, the committee's report raised broader concerns over the CIA-sponsored covert operations intended to destabilize foreign governments whose policies were considered unfriendly to the United States. The Church Report offered no specific evidence of CIA involvement in the 1973 coup in which Allende died, probably at his own hand. It did, however, reveal that during the three years of his presidency, the CIA had provided massive funding, $8 million in all, for anti-Allende activities and in election campaigns since 1964 had also been deeply involved in efforts to prevent him from gaining power. Just before Allende took office in 1970, the CIA had even gone so far as to try to foment a coup against him by the Chilean military. The Church Report expressed serious reservations over the manner in which such operations were authorized, with the central directorate of the CIA initially setting up operations and programs that then seemed to acquire an independent momentum of their own. On presidential instructions, some portions of the Chilean operations had been implemented secretly, with the 40 Committee that supposedly supervised all such activities left ignorant of them and with no consultation with knowledgeable experts. The report found that consultation with Congress had been inadequate and expressed anxiety that such extensive U.S.-backed covert activities damaged American credibility and also that of the overseas political forces that the U.S. government chose to support. It also raised concerns over the close relationships between CIA officials and American corporations with significant business interests in Chile. The report's authors asked uneasily how far the United States itself should be held responsible "for the cruelty and political suppression that have become the hallmark of the present regime in Chile." Their conclusion was blunt: "Given the costs of covert action, it should be resorted to only to counter severe threats to the national security of the United States. It is far from clear that that was the case in Chile."

Primary Source

[. . .]

Covert Action in Chile: 1963–1973.
I. Overview and Background
A. Overview: Covert Action in Chile
[. . .]

Numerous allegations have been made about U.S. covert activities in Chile during 1970–73. Several of these are false; others are half true. In most instances, the response to the allegations must be qualified:

Was the United States DIRECTLY involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile? The Committee has found no evidence that it was. However, the United States sought in 1970 to foment a military coup in Chile; after 1970 it adopted a policy both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende; and it remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in coup plotting.

Did the U.S. provide covert support to striking truckowners or other strikers during 1971–73? The 40 Committee did not approve any such support. However, the U.S. passed money to private sector groups which supported the strikers. And in at least one case, a small amount of CIA money was passed to the strikers by a private sector organization, contrary to CIA ground rules. Did the U.S. provide covert support to right-wing terrorist organizations during 1970–73?

The CIA gave support in 1970 to one group whose tactics became more violent over time. Through 1971 that group received small sums of American money through third parties for specific purpose[s]. And it is

possible that money was passed to these groups on the extreme right from CIA-supported opposition political parties.

The pattern of United States covert action in Chile is striking but not unique. It arose in the context not only of American foreign policy, but also of covert U.S. involvement in other countries within and outside Latin America. The scale of CIA involvement in Chile was unusual but by no means unprecedented.

B. Issues

The Chilean case raises most of the issues connected with covert action as an instrument of American foreign policy. It consisted of long, frequently heavy involvement in Chilean politics: it involved the gamut of covert action methods, save only covert military operations; and it revealed a variety of different authorization procedures, with different implications for oversight and control. As one case of U.S. covert action, the judgements of past actions are framed not for their own sake; rather they are intended to serve as bases for formulating recommendations for the future.

The basic questions are easily stated:

(1) Why did the United States mount such an extensive covert action program in Chile? Why was that program continued and then expanded in the early 1970's?
(2) How was this major covert action program authorized and directed? What roles were played by the President, the 40 Committee, the CIA, the Ambassadors and the Congress?
(3) Did U.S. policy-makers take into account the judgements of the intelligence analysts on Chile when they formulated and approved U.S. covert operations? Does the Chilean experience illustrate an inherent conflict between the role of the Director of Central Intelligence as a producer of intelligence and his role as a manager of covert operations?
(4) Did the perceived threat in Chile justify the level of U.S. response? What was the effect of such large concentrated programs of covert political action in Chile? What were the effects, both abroad and at home, of the relationships which developed between the intelligence agencies and American based multinational corporations?

[Sections II. through IV. Omitted]

V. Preliminary Conclusions.

Underlying all discussion of American interference in the internal affairs of Chile is the basic question of why the United States initially mounted such an extensive covert action program in Chile—and why it continued, and even expanded, in the early 1970s.

Covert action has been a key element of U.S. foreign policy toward Chile. The link between covert action and foreign policy was obvious throughout the decade between 1964 and 1974. In 1964, the United States commitment to democratic reform via the Alliance for Progress and overt foreign aid was buttressed via covert support for the election of the candidate of the Christian Democratic party, a candidate and a party for which the Alliance seemed tailor made. During 1970 the U.S. Government tried, covertly, to prevent Allende from becoming President of Chile. When that failed, covert support to his opposition formed one of a triad of official actions: covert aid to opposition forces, "cool but correct" diplomatic posture, and economic pressure. From support of what the United States considered to be democratic and progressive forces in Chile we had moved finally to advocating and encouraging the overthrow of a democratically elected government.

A. Covert Action and U.S. Foreign Policy.

In 1964, the United States became massively involved in covert activity in Chile. This involvement was seen by U.S. policy-makers as consistent with overall American foreign policy and the goals of the Alliance for Progress. The election of a moderate left candidate in Chile was a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Latin America.

It is unclear from the record whether the 1964 election project was intended to be a one-time intervention in support of a good cause. It is clear that the scale of the involvement generated commitments and expectations on both sides. For the United States, it created assets and channels of funding which could be used again. For the Chilean groups receiving CIA funds, that funding

became an expectation, counted upon. Thus, when opposition to Allende became the primary objective of covert action in 1970, the structure for covert action developed through covert assistance to political parties in 1964 was well established.

A fundamental question raised by the pattern of U.S. covert activities persists: *Did the threat to vital U.S. national security interests posed by the Presidency of Salvador Allende justify the several major covert attempts to prevent his accession to power?* Three American Presidents and their senior advisors evidently thought so.

One rationale for covert intervention in Chilean politics was spelled out by Henry Kissinger in his background briefing to the press on September 16, 1970, the day after Nixon's meeting with [CIA Director Richard] Helms. He argued that an Allende victory would be irreversible within Chile, might affect neighboring nations and would pose "massive problems" for the U.S. in Latin America.

[. . .]

Another rationale for U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of Chile was offered by a high-ranking official who testified before the Committee. He spoke of Chile's position in a worldwide strategic chess game in 1970. In this analogy, Portugal might be a bishop, Chile a couple of pawns, perhaps more. In the worldwide strategic chess game, once a position was lost, a series of consequences followed. U.S. enemies would proceed to exploit the new opportunity, and our ability to cope with the challenge would be limited by any American loss.

B. Executive Command and Control of Major Covert Action.

In pursuing the Chilean chess game, particularly the efforts to prevent Allende's accession to power or his maintaining power once elected, Executive command and control of major covert action was tight and well directed. Procedures within the CIA for controlling the programs were well defined and the procedures made Station officials accountable to their supervisors in Washington. Unilateral actions on the part of the Station were virtually impossible.

But the central issue of command and control is *Accountability:* procedures for insuring that covert actions are and remain accountable both to the senior political and foreign policy officials of the Executive Branch and to the Congress.

The record of covert activities in Chile suggests that, although established executive processes of authorization and control were generally adhered to, there were—and remain—genuine shortcomings to these processes:

Decisions about WHICH covert action projects are submitted to the 40 Committee were and are made within the CIA on the basis of the Agency's determination of the political sensitivity of a project.

The form in which covert action projects were cleared with Ambassadors and other State Department officials varied. It depended—and still depends—on how interested Ambassadors are and how forthcoming their Station Chiefs are.

Once major projects are approved by the 40 Committee, they often continue without searching re-examination by the Committee. The Agency conducts annual reviews of on-going projects, but the 40 Committee does not undertake a review unless a project is recommended for renewal, or there is some important change in content or amount.

There is also the problem of controlling clandestine projects not labeled "covert action". Clandestine collection of human intelligence is *not* the subject of 40 Committee review. But those projects may be just as politically sensitive as a "covert action"; witness U.S. contacts with the Chilean military during 1970–73. Similarly, for security reasons, ambassadors generally know CIA assets only by general description, not by name. That practice may be acceptable, provided the description is detailed enough to inform the ambassador of the risk posed by the development of a particular asset and to allow the ambassador to decide whether or not that asset should be used.

There remains the question of the dangers which arise when the very mechanisms established by the

Executive Branch for insuring internal accountability are circumvented or frustrated.

By Presidential instruction, Track II was to be operated without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, the State Department, or any 40 Committee member save Henry Kissinger. The President and his senior advisors thus denied themselves the Government's major sources of counsel about Chilean politics. And the Ambassador in Santiago was left in the position of having to deal with any adverse political spill-over from a project of which he was not informed.

The danger was greater still. Whatever the truth about communication between the CIA and the White House after October 15, 1970—an issue which is the subject of conflicting testimony—all participants agreed that Track II constituted a broad mandate to the CIA. The Agency was given to believe it had virtual *carte blanche* authority; moreover, it felt under extreme pressure to prevent Allende from coming to power, by military coup if necessary. It was given little guidance about what subsequent clearances it needed to obtain from the White House. Under these conditions, CIA consultation with the White House in advance of specific actions was less than meticulous.

C. The Role of the Congress.
In the hands of Congress rests the responsibility for insuring that the Executive Branch is held to full political accountability for covert activities. The record on Chile is mixed and muted by its incompleteness.

CIA records note a number of briefings of Congressional committees about covert action in Chile. Those records, however, do not reveal the timeliness or the level of detail of these briefings. Indeed, the record suggests that the briefings were often after the fact and incomplete. The situation improved after 1973, apparently as Congressional committees became more persistent in the exercise of their oversight function. Furthermore, Sec. 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act should make it impossible for major projects to be operated without the appropriate Congressional committees being informed.

The record leaves unanswered a number of questions. These pertain both to how forthcoming the Agency was and how interested and persistent the Congressional committees were. Were members of Congress, for instance, given the opportunity to object to specific projects before the projects were implemented? Did they want to? There is also an issue of jurisdiction. CIA and State Department officials have taken the position that they are authorized to reveal Agency operations only to the appropriate oversight committees.

D. Intelligence Judgements and Covert Operations.
A review of the intelligence judgements on Chile offered by U.S. analysts during the critical period from 1970–1973 has *not* established whether these judgements were taken into account when U.S. policymakers formulated and approved U.S. covert operations. This examination of the relevant intelligence estimates and memoranda has established that the judgements of the analysts suggested caution and restraint while the political imperatives demanded action.

Even within the Central Intelligence Agency, processes for bringing considered judgements of intelligence analysts to bear on proposed covert actions were haphazard—and generally ineffective. This situation has improved; covert action proposals now regularly come before the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the appropriate National Intelligence Officer; but the operators still are separated from the intelligence analysts, those whose exclusive business it is to understand and predict foreign politics. For instance, the analysts who drafted the government's most prestigious intelligence analyses—NIEs—may not even have known of U.S. covert actions in Chile.

The Chilean experience does suggest that the Committee give serious consideration to the possibility that lodging the responsibility for national estimates AND conduct of operational activities with the same person—the Director of Central Intelligence—creates an inherent conflict of interest and judgement.

E. Effects of Major Covert Action Programs.
Covert Action programs as costly and as complex as several mounted by the United States in Chile are unlikely to remain covert. In Chile in 1964, there was simply too much unexplained money, too many leaflets, too many broadcasts. That the United States was in-

volved in the election has been taken for granted in Latin America for many years.

The involvement in 1964 created a presumption in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America that the United States Government would again be involved in 1970. This made secrecy still harder to maintain, even though the CIA involvement was much smaller in 1970 than it had been in 1964.

When covert actions in Chile became public knowledge, the costs were obvious. The United States was seen, by its covert actions, to have contradicted not only its official declarations but its treaty commitments and principles of long standing. At the same time it was proclaiming a "low profile" in Latin American relations, the U.S. Government was seeking to foment a coup in Chile.

The costs of major covert ventures which are "blown" are clear enough. But there may be costs to pay even if the operations could remain secret for long periods of time. Some of these costs may accrue even within the calculus of covert operations: successes may turn to failures. Several officials from whom the Committee took testimony suggested that the poor showing of the Chilean Christian Democrats in 1970 was, in some part, attributable to previous American covert support. Of course there were many causes of that poor showing, but in 1964 the PDC had been spared the need of developing some of its own grass roots organizations. The CIA did much of that for it. In 1970, with less CIA activity on behalf of the Christian Democratic Party, the PDC faltered.

Of course, the more important costs, even of covert actions which remain secret, are those to American ideals of relations among nations and of constitutional government. In the case of Chile, some of those costs were far from abstract: witness the involvement of United States military officers in the Track II attempt to overthrow a constitutionally-elected civilian government.

There are also long-term effects of covert actions. Many of those may be adverse. They touch American as well as foreign institutions. The Chilean institutions that the United States most favored may have been discredited within their own societies by the fact of their covert support. In Latin America particularly, even the suspicion of CIA support may be the kiss of death. It would be the final irony of a decade of covert action in Chile if that action destroyed the credibility of the Chilean Christian Democrats.

The effects on American institutions are less obvious but no less important. U.S. private and governmental institutions with overt, legitimate purposes of their own may have been discredited by the pervasiveness of covert action. Even if particular institutions were not involved in covert action, they may have been corrupted in the perception of Latin Americans because of the pervasiveness of clandestine U.S. activity.

In the end, the whole of U.S. policy making may be affected. The availability of an "extra" means may alter officials' assessment of the costs and rationales of overt policies. It may postpone the day when outmoded policies are abandoned and new ones adopted. Arguably, the 1964 election project was part of a "progressive" approach to Chile. The project was justified, if perhaps not actually sustained, by the desire to elect democratic reformers. By 1970, covert action had become completely defensive in character: to prevent the election of Allende. The United States professed a "low profile" but at the same time acted covertly to ensure that the Chilean elections came out right, "low profile" notwithstanding.

A special case for concern is the relationship between intelligence agencies and multinational corporations.

In 1970, U.S. Government policy prohibited covert CIA support to a single party or candidate. At the same time, the CIA provided advice to an American-based multinational corporation on how to furnish just such direct support. That raised all of the dangers of exposure, and eliminated many of the safeguards and controls normally present in exclusively CIA covert operations. There was the appearance of an improperly close relationship between the CIA and multinational companies when former Director John McCone used contacts and information gained while at the CIA to advise a corporation on whose Board of Directors he sat. This appearance was heightened because the

contacts between the Agency and the corporation in 1970 extended to discussing and even planning corporate intervention in the Chilean electoral process.

The problem of cooperation is exacerbated when a cooperating company—such as ITT—is called to give testimony before an appropriate Congressional Committee. The Agency may then be confronted with the question of whether to come forward to set the record straight when it believes that testimony given on behalf of a cooperating company is untrue. The situation is difficult, for in coming forward the Agency may reveal sensitive sources and methods by which it learned the facts or may make public the existence of ongoing covert operations.

This report does no attempt to offer a final judgement on the political propriety, the morality, or even the effectiveness of American covert activity in Chile. Did the threat posed by an Allende presidency justify covert American involvement in Chile? Did it justify the specific and unusual attempt to foment a military coup to deny Allende the presidency? In 1970, the U.S. sought to foster a military coup in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power; yet after 1970 the government—according to the testimony of its officials—did not engage in coup plotting. Was 1970 a mistake, an aberration? Or was the threat posed to the national security interests of the United States so grave that the government was remiss in not seeking his downfall directly during 1970–73? What responsibility does the United States bear for the cruelty and political suppression that have become the hallmark of the present regime in Chile?

On these questions Committee members may differ. So may American citizens. Yet the Committee's mandate is less to judge the past than to recommend for the future. Moving from past cases to future guidelines, what is important to note is that covert action has been perceived as middle ground between diplomatic representation and the overt use of military force. In the case of Chile, that middle ground may have been far too broad. Given the costs of covert action, it should be resorted to only to counter severe threats to the national security of the United States. It is far from clear that that was the case in Chile.

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Senate, "Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp.

122. Announcement of the Death of Mao Zedong, 9 September 1976

Introduction

On 9 September 1976 Mao Zedong, for a quarter-century communist China's supreme ruler, finally succumbed to a variety of ailments and died. At the time of his death it seemed that an extremist faction headed by a group popularly known as the Gang of Four, consisting of Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, and several Shanghai radicals, was firmly in control of the Chinese Politburo. The previous January, Mao's most able lieutenant, the moderate Premier Zhou Enlai, had died of cancer, sparking massive demonstrations in his memory in Tiananmen Square the following April during a festival when Chinese traditionally commemorated their dead. The Gang of Four and their supporters had taken this opportunity to purge one of Zhou's closest associates, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, a tough and able pragmatist who had been ousted during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s but was brought back to power by Zhou in 1973. Deng delivered the eulogy at Zhou's funeral, giving his enemies the excuse they needed to drive him from power. Following Mao's death, the official Chinese media published an obituary that carefully highlighted his leadership of leftist and radical Chinese political forces and his criticism of Deng. The obituary exhorted the Chinese people to carry on the "class struggle" that Mao had so strongly supported, revile Deng, and carry the Cultural Revolution further. Once Mao had died, however, the Gang of Four soon lost their hold on power, and these policies were largely abandoned. In October 1976 Hua Guofeng, Mao's handpicked but uninspiring successor, mounted a coup against the Gang of Four and their associates, who were suddenly arrested. Held responsible

and vilified for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, they were put on trial in 1981 and sentenced to long prison terms. In July 1977 Hua brought Deng back as vice premier. By the end of 1978 Deng had won control of the Chinese government, although Hua remained premier until 1980. Deng instituted large-scale economic modernization programs that relied heavily on market reforms, effectively reversing the long-term leftward drift of Chinese policies and ending the ideologically driven domestic radicalism that had characterized Mao's years in power. Seeking access to foreign expertise, technology, and funds, Deng also implemented dramatically improved Chinese relations with noncommunist powers.

Primary Source

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, the State Council of the People's Republic of China and the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announce with deepest grief to the whole party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities throughout the country:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the esteemed and beloved great leader of our party, our army and the people of all nationalities of our country, the great teacher of the international proletariat and the oppressed nations and oppressed people, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Honorary Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, passed away at 00:10 hours, Sept. 9, 1976, in Peking [12:10 P.M. Wednesday, New York time] because of the worsening of his illness and despite all treatment, although meticulous medical care was given him in every way after he fell ill.

Founder and Leader of Party

Chairman Mao Tse-tung was the founder and wise leader of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the People's Republic of China. Chairman Mao led our party in waging a protracted, acute and complex struggle against the right and left opportunist lines in the party, defeating the opportunist lines pursued by Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Chiu-pai, Li Li-san, Lo Chang-lung, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih and Peng Teh-huai and again, during the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, triumphing over the counterrevolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping, thus enabling our party to develop and grow in strength steadily in class struggle and the struggle between the two lines.

Led by Chairman Mao, the Communist Party of China has developed through a tortuous path into a great, glorious and correct Marxist-Leninist party which is today exercising leadership over the People's Republic of China.

During the period of the new democratic revolution, Chairman Mao, in accordance with the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and by combining it with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, creatively laid down the general line and general policy of the new democratic revolution, founded the Chinese People's Liberation Army and pointed out that the seizure of political power by armed force in China could be achieved only by following the road of building rural base areas, using the countryside to encircle the cities and finally seizing the cities, and not by any other road.

He led our party, our army and the people of our country in using people's war to overthrow the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism, winning the great victory of the new democratic revolution and founding the People's Republic of China.

The victory of the Chinese people's revolution led by Chairman Mao changed the situation in the East and the world and blazed a new trail for the cause of liberation of the oppressed nations and oppressed people.

In the period of the Socialist revolution, Chairman Mao comprehensively summed up the positive as well as the negative experience of the international Communist movement, penetratingly analyzed the class relations in Socialist society and, for the first time in

the history of the development of Marxism, unequivocally pointed out that there are still classes and class struggle after the Socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production has in the main been completed, drew the scientific conclusion that the bourgeoisie is right in the Communist Party, put forth the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and laid down the party's basic line for the entire historical period of socialism.

All the victories of the Chinese people were achieved under the leadership of Chairman Mao; they are all great victories for Mao Tse-tung thought.

The radiance of Mao Tse-tung thought will forever illuminate the road of advance of the Chinese people.

Enriched Treasury of Marxism

Chairman Mao Tse-tung summed up the revolutionary practice in the international communist movement, put forward a series of scientific theses, enriched the theoretical treasury of Marxism and indicated the orientation of struggle for the Chinese people and the revolutionary people throughout the world.

With the great boldness and vision of a proletarian revolutionary, he initiated in the international Communist movement the great struggle to criticize modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the core, promoted the vigorous development of the cause of the world proletarian revolution and the cause of all the people of all countries against imperialism and hegemonism, and pushed the history of mankind forward.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung was the greatest Marxist of the contemporary era. In the past half century and more, basing himself on the principle of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution he inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism in the protracted struggle against the class enemies at home and abroad, both inside and outside the party, and wrote a most brilliant chapter in the history of the movement of proletarian revolution.

He dedicated all his energies throughout his life to the liberation of the Chinese people, to the emancipation of the oppressed nations and oppressed people the world over, and to the cause of communism. With the great resolve of a proletarian revolutionary, he waged a tenacious struggle against his illness, continued to lead the work of the whole party, and the whole army and the whole nation during his illness and fought till his last breath.

The magnificent contributions he made for the Chinese people, the international proletariat and the revolutionary people of the whole world are immortal. The Chinese people and the revolutionary people the world over love him from the bottom of their hearts and have boundless admiration and respect for him.

Guided by Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, our party, our army and the people of our country continued their triumphant advance and seized great victories in the Socialist revolution and Socialist construction, particularly in the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, in criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius and in criticizing Teng Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping] and repulsing the right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts. Upholding socialism and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat in the People's Republic of China, a country with a vast expanse and a large population, is a great contribution of world historic significance which Chairman Mao Tse-tung made to the present era; at the same time, it has provided fresh experience for the international Communist movement in combating and preventing revisionism, consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism.

Grief for All Revolutionaries

The passing away of Chairman Mao Tse-tung is an inestimable loss to our party, our army and the people of all the nationalities of our country, to the international proletariat and the revolutionary people of all countries and to the international Communist movement. His passing away is bound to evoke immense grief in the hearts of the people of our country and the revolutionary people of all countries.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China calls on the whole party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities throughout the country to turn their grief into strength with determination.

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and persist in taking class struggle as the key link, keep to the party's basic line and persevere in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and strengthen the centralized leadership of the party, resolutely uphold the unity and unification of the party and closely rally round the party and closely rally round the party central committee.

We must strengthen the building of the party ideologically and organizationally in the course of the struggle between the two lines and resolutely implement the principle of the three-in-one combination of the old, middle-aged and young in accordance with the five requirements for bringing up successors to the cause of the proletarian revolution.

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and consolidate the great unity of the people of all nationalities under the leadership of the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping, continue the struggle to repulse the right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, consolidate and develop the victories of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, enthusiastically support the new socialist things, restrict bourgeois right and further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country.

We should continue to unfold the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment, build our country independently and with the initiative in our own hands, through self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift, and go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism.

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and resolutely implement his line on army building, strengthen the building of the militia, strengthen preparedness against war, heighten our vigilance, and be ready at all times to wipe out any enemy that dares to intrude. We are determined to liberate Taiwan.

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and continue to carry out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policies in foreign affairs resolutely.

We must adhere to proletarian internationalism, strengthen the unity between our party and the genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations all over the world, strengthen the unity between the people of our country and the people of all other countries, especially those of the third-world countries, unite with all the forces in the world that can be knitted, and carry the struggle against imperialism, social-imperialism and modern revisionism through to the end.

We will never seek hegemony and will never be a superpower.

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and assiduously study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought, apply ourselves to the study of works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and works by Chairman Mao, fight for the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and for the triumph of socialism over capitalism, and strive to build our country into a powerful socialist state, make a still greater contribution to humanity and realize the ultimate goal of communism.

Long live invincible Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought!

Long live the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China!

Eternal glory to our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tse-tung!

Source: "Text of the Announcement Issued by Peking Reporting Death of Chairman Mao," *New York Times*, 10 September 1976.

123. Manifesto of Charter 77

Introduction

Throughout the Cold War, Soviet political dominance was never popular in Eastern Europe. On several occasions, in East Berlin in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet tanks and troops forcibly reimposed control on countries within the Soviet bloc that had sought greater autonomy. Conservatives in the United States and Europe charged that the policies of détente with the Soviet Union implemented under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and most particularly the August 1975 Helsinki Agreements on human rights, represented an ineffective and unprincipled abandonment of East European dissenters to communist mercies. In practice, the Helsinki Accords soon became a rallying force for advocates of human rights and political change. On 1 January 1977, 243 prominent Czech citizens published a manifesto with the title "Charter 77" in a West German newspaper. The document was largely drafted by the well-known playwright Václav Havel, with assistance from other dissenters including Jan Patoˇka and Jiˇr Hajek. They demanded that their government, which had signed the Helsinki Agreements and various United Nations (UN) covenants on political, economic, and human rights, live up to those undertakings. The manifesto complained that at that time the Czech government simply ignored its public pledges on freedom of expression, freedom from fear, freedom of religion, freedom of travel, the right to education, and the right to organize trade unions. Charter 77 also condemned the political role of the Communist Party and the arbitrary and unconstitutional manner in which it issued political directives and instructions. In order to skirt government prohibitions on the organization of opposition parties or groups, Charter 77 claimed to have no formal structure or institutional framework. Within Czechoslovakia it circulated only in samizdat (privately produced) form, but it was widely published outside the country. Reaction from the Czech government was fierce. The official press harshly attacked the manifesto, and those signing it often lost their jobs, driver's licenses, and citizenship; saw their children denied access to education; and suffered detention, trial, imprisonment, or exile. In April 1978 a support group was founded to publicize the persecution of those who had signed the manifesto. The following year, six members of this support group, including Havel, a staunch advocate of nonviolent passive-resistance tactics, were tried and sentenced to up to five years in prison. Such repression continued throughout the 1980s, but by the mid-1980s more than 1,200 Czechs had nonetheless signed the manifesto, and Charter 77 continued to issue reports detailing the country's human rights violations and its failure to live up to the Helsinki Accords. As Soviet controls on Eastern Europe were relaxed in the late 1980s, Charter 77 members became more politically active and were heavily involved in negotiating a smooth transition to noncommunist rule in 1989. On 29 December 1989, Havel became the first president of a democratic Czechoslovakia, and other Charter 77 members likewise took high political office but with mixed results, as few had any governmental experience. Attempts to make the organization the nucleus of a new political party, the Civic Forum, failed to prevent the country's division in 1992 into separate Czech and Slovak states.

Primary Source

In the Czechoslovak Register of Laws No. 120 of October 13, 1976, texts were published of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were signed on behalf of our republic in 1968, reiterated at Helsinki in 1975 and came into force in our country on March 23, 1976. From that date our citizens have enjoyed the rights, and our state the duties, ensuing from them.

The human rights and freedoms underwritten by these covenants constitute features of civilized life for which many progressive movements have striven throughout history and whose codification could greatly assist humane developments in our society.

We accordingly welcome the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's accession to those agreements. Their publication, however, serves as a powerful reminder of the extent to which basic human rights in our country exist, regrettably, on paper alone.

The right to freedom of expression, for example, guaranteed by Article 19 of the first-mentioned covenant, is in our case purely illusory. Tens of thousands of our

citizens are prevented from working in their own fields for the sole reason that they hold views differing from official ones, and are discriminated against and harassed in all kinds of ways by the authorities and public organizations. Deprived as they are of any means to defend themselves, they become victims of a virtual apartheid.

[. . .]

Freedom of public expression is inhibited by the centralized control of all the communication media and of publishing and cultural institutions. No philosophical, political or scientific view or artistic activity that departs ever so slightly from the narrow bounds of official ideology or aesthetics is allowed to be published; no open criticism can be made of abnormal social phenomena; no public defense is possible against false and insulting charges made in official propaganda—the legal protection against "attacks on honor and reputation" clearly guaranteed by Article 17 of the first covenant is in practice non-existent: false accusations cannot be rebutted, and any attempt to secure compensation or correction through the courts is futile; no open debate is allowed in the domain of thought and art.

Many scholars, writers, artists and others are penalized for having legally published or expressed, years ago, opinions which are condemned by those who hold political power today.

Freedom of religious confession, emphatically guaranteed by Article 18 of the first covenant, is continually curtailed by arbitrary official action; by interference with the activity of churchmen, who are constantly threatened by the refusal of the state to permit them the exercise of their functions, or by the withdrawal of such permission; by financial or other transactions against those who express their religious faith in word or action; by constraints on religious training and so forth.

One instrument for the curtailment or in many cases complete elimination of many civic rights is the system by which all national institutions and organizations are in effect subject to political directives from the machinery of the ruling party and to decisions made by powerful individuals.

The constitution of the republic, its laws and legal norms do not regulate the form or content, the issuing or application of such decisions; they are often only given out verbally, unknown to the public at large and beyond its powers to check; their originators are responsible to no one but themselves and their own hierarchy; yet they have a decisive impact on the decision-making and executive organs of government, justice, trade unions, interest groups and all other organizations, of the other political parties, enterprises, factories, institutions, offices and so on, for whom these instructions have precedence even before the law.

Where organizations or individuals, in the interpretation of their rights and duties, come into conflict with such directives, they cannot have recourse to any non-party authority, since none such exists. This constitutes, of course, a serious limitation of the right ensuing from Articles 21 and 22 of the first-mentioned covenant, which provides for freedom of association and forbids any restriction on its exercise, from Article 25 on the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, and from Article 26 stipulating equal protection by the law without discrimination.

This state of affairs likewise prevents workers and others from exercising the unrestricted right to establish trade unions and other organizations to protect their economic and social interests, and from freely enjoying the right to strike provided for in Clause 1 of Article 8 in the second-mentioned covenant.

Further civic rights, including the explicit prohibition of "arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence" (Article 17 of the first covenant), are seriously vitiated by the various forms of interference in the private life of citizens exercised by the Ministry of the Interior, for example by bugging telephones and houses, opening mail, following personal movements, searching homes, setting up networks of neighborhood informers (often recruited by illicit threats or promises) and in other ways.

The ministry frequently interferes in employers' decisions, instigates acts of discrimination by authorities and organizations, brings weight to bear on the organs of justice and even orchestrates propaganda campaigns

in the media. This activity is governed by no law and, being clandestine, affords the citizen no chance to defend himself.

In cases of prosecution on political grounds the investigative and judicial organs violate the rights of those charged and those defending them, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the first covenant and indeed by Czechoslovak law. The prison treatment of those sentenced in such cases is an affront to their human dignity and a menace to their health, being aimed at breaking their morale.

Clause 2, Article 12 of the first covenant, guaranteeing every citizen the right to leave the country, is consistently violated, or under the pretense of "defense of national security" is subjected to various unjustifiable conditions (Clause 3). The granting of entry visas to foreigners is also treated arbitrarily, and many are unable to visit Czechoslovakia merely because of professional or personal contacts with those of our citizens who are subject to discrimination.

Some of our people—either in private, at their places of work or by the only feasible public channel, the foreign media—have drawn attention to the systematic violation of human rights and democratic freedoms and demanded amends in specific cases. But their pleas have remained largely ignored or been made grounds for police investigation.

Responsibility for the maintenance of rights in our country naturally devolves in the first place on the political and state authorities. Yet not only on them: everyone bears his share of responsibility for the conditions that prevail and accordingly also for the observance of legally enshrined agreements, binding upon all individuals as well as upon governments.

It is this sense of co-responsibility, our belief in the importance of its conscious public acceptance and the general need to give it new and more effective expression that led us to the idea of creating Charter 77, whose inception we today publicly announce.

Charter 77 is a loose, informal and open association of people of various shades of opinion, faiths and professions united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respecting of civic and human rights in our own country and throughout the world—rights accorded to all men by the two mentioned international covenants, by the Final Act of the Helsinki conference and by numerous other international documents opposing war, violence and social or spiritual oppression, and which are comprehensively laid down in the U.N. Universal Charter of Human Rights.

Charter 77 springs from a background of friendship and solidarity among people who share our concern for those ideals that have inspired, and continue to inspire, their lives and their work.

Charter 77 is not an organization; it has no rules, permanent bodies or formal membership. It embraces everyone who agrees with its ideas and participates in its work. It does not form the basis for any oppositional political activity. Like many similar citizen initiatives in various countries, West and East, it seeks to promote the general public interest.

It does not aim, then, to set out its own platform of political or social reform or change, but within its own field of impact to conduct a constructive dialogue with the political and state authorities, particularly by drawing attention to individual cases where human and civic rights are violated, to document such grievances and suggest remedies, to make proposals of a more general character calculated to reinforce such rights and machinery for protecting them, to act as an intermediary in situations of conflict which may lead to violations of rights, and so forth.

By its symbolic name Charter 77 denotes that it has come into being at the start of a year proclaimed as Political Prisoners' Year—a year in which a conference in Belgrade is due to review the implementation of the obligations assumed at Helsinki.

As signatories, we hereby authorize Professor Dr. Jan Patocka, Dr. Vaclav Havel and Professor Dr. Jiri Hajek to act as the spokesmen for the Charter. These spokesmen are endowed with full authority to represent it

vis-a-vis state and other bodies, and the public at home and abroad, and their signatures attest to the authenticity of documents issued by the Charter. They will have us and others who join us as their colleagues taking part in any needful negotiations, shouldering particular tasks and sharing every responsibility.

We believe that Charter 77 will help to enable all citizens of Czechoslovakia to work and live as free human beings.

Prague, 1 January 1977

Source: "Manifesto of Charter 77," CNN.Com, http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/documents/charter.77/. Courtesy of CNN.

124. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East (Camp David Accords), 17 September 1978

Introduction

From the time of its foundation in 1948, the existence of the state of Israel was a constant grievance to neighboring Arab states. Their resentment was intensified by Israeli military successes in the 1967 Six-Day War, in the course of which Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and territory from Jordan then occupied by Palestinians, including the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 242, passed in late 1967, urged that Israel withdraw to secure frontiers—not necessarily identical to those prior to the war—in exchange for a lasting peace settlement with its Arab neighbors. The product of negotiations held in September 1978 between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the Camp David Accords established an agreement by which the two countries could work to secure peace in the Middle East. The talks were hosted by U.S. President Jimmy Carter at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, and are generally considered a high point of his administration. They marked the first occasion on which top Arab and Israeli leaders were able to meet and negotiate in a relatively friendly atmosphere.

Primary Source

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

[. . .]

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

   a. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all

the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

   i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
   ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
   iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
   iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

d. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The

police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

e. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
f. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

a. full recognition;
b. abolishing economic boycotts;
c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

[. . .]

Source: American Presidency, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29788&st=&st1=.
[Or, if you prefer, cite text from Public Papers of US Presidents, Carter, 1978]

125. Jimmy Carter: Address to the Nation, 15 December 1978

Introduction

For several years after the reopening in the early 1970s of relations between Mainland China and the United States, the two countries were still not in a state of full diplomatic recognition. The major reason for this was that although the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan was no longer a member of the United Nations (UN), it still had diplomatic relations with the United States. Chairman Mao Zedong died in 1976 and was initially succeeded by a radical faction headed by his wife Jiang Qing, whose leading members were known as the Gang of Four. They were arrested later that year, and by 1978 it was clear that the pragmatic elderly revolutionary Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping was firmly in control of the Chinese government and bent on instituting major economic reform programs. Deng was eager to increase Chinese access to American technological and business expertise and investment capital, something that he believed full recognition would facilitate. In 1978 the administration of President Jimmy Carter decided to switch diplomatic recognition from its longtime ally Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The main stumbling block to doing so was in fact the status of Taiwan, which the PRC claimed as an integral part of China. Addressing the American people on this subject, Carter expressed the hope of the U.S. government that the status of Taiwan would be resolved by peaceful rather than forceful means. He also stated that the United States intended, as many other nations already did, to maintain existing "commercial, cultural, trade, and other relations with Taiwan through nongovernmental means." The Chinese government, meanwhile, issued a statement to the effect that "the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country [was] entirely China's affair." Despite Carter's reassurances, Taiwan officials were deeply apprehensive over the new policy. For many years Taiwan had enjoyed excellent relations with numerous congressmen, and in April 1979 Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, pledging that the U.S. government would maintain its cooperation with Taiwan and would, in particular, continue to supply Taiwan with the arms that might be required to protect the island against a Chinese military attack.

Primary Source

Good evening. I would like to read a joint communiqué which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by the leaders of the People's Republic of China:

[At this point, the President read the text of the joint communiqué, which reads as follows:]

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JANUARY 1, 1979

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

—Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
—Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
—Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
—The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

—Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

Yesterday, our country and the People's Republic of China reached this final historic agreement. On January 1, 1979, a little more than 2 weeks from now, our two Governments will implement full normalization of diplomatic relations.

As a nation of gifted people who comprise about one-fourth of the total population of the Earth, China plays, already, an important role in world affairs, a role that can only grow more important in the years ahead.

We do not undertake this important step for transient tactical or expedient reasons. In recognizing the People's Republic of China, that it is the single Government of China, we are recognizing simple reality. But far more is involved in this decision than just the recognition of a fact.

[. . .]

We have already begun to inform our allies and other nations and the Members of the Congress of the details of our intended action. But I wish also tonight to convey a special message to the people of Taiwan—I have already communicated with the leaders in Taiwan—with whom the American people have had and will have extensive, close, and friendly relations. This is important between our two peoples.

As the United States asserted in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, issued on President Nixon's historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. I have paid special attention to ensuring that normalization of relations between our country and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan. The people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade, and other relations with Taiwan through nongovernmental means. Many other countries in the world are already successfully doing this.

These decisions and these actions open a new and important chapter in our country's history and also in world affairs.

[. . .]

Remarks at a White House Briefing Following the Address to the Nation, 15 December 1978

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I wanted to come by and let you know that I believe this to be an extremely important moment in the history of our Nation. It's something that I and my two predecessors have sought avidly. We have maintained our own United States position firmly, and only since the last few weeks has there been an increasing demonstration to us that Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng have been ready to normalize relations. I think the interests of Taiwan have been adequately protected. One of the briefers will explain the details to you.

Our Ambassador there, Leonard Woodcock, has done a superb job in presenting our own views strongly and clearly to the officials of the People's Republic of China. I will be preparing myself adequately for the visit of Vice Premier Teng. We invited him on one day, he accepted the next, without delay, and I think he's looking forward to this trip with a great deal of anticipation and pleasure.

I have talked personally this evening to Prime Minister Ohira [of Japan]. Early this morning we notified the officials in Taiwan, and we have also notified many of the leaders around the world of this long-awaited development in international diplomacy.

I think that one of the greatest benefits that will be derived from this is the continuation of strong trade, cultural relationships with Taiwan, the people of Taiwan, and a new vista for prosperous trade relationships with almost a billion people in the People's Republic of China. This is also, of course, enhanced by the new opportunities for us to understand the people of China, and to work avidly for peace in that region and for world peace.

This afternoon the Soviet Union officials were notified through their Ambassador here, Mr. Dobrynin. And I think the Soviets were familiar with the fact that we were anticipating normalization whenever the Chinese were willing to meet our reasonable terms, and they were not surprised. As you well know, the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China have diplomatic relations between themselves.

My own assessment is that this will be well received in almost every nation of the world, perhaps all of them, because it will add to stability. And the Soviets and others know full well, because of our own private explanations to them, not just recently but in months gone by, that we have no desire whatsoever to use our new relationships with China to the disadvantage of the Soviets or anyone else. We believe this will enhance stability and not cause instability in Asia and the rest of the world.

I'm very pleased with it. And I obviously have to give a major part of the credit to President Nixon and to President Ford, who laid the groundwork for this successful negotiation. And most of the premises that were spelled out in the Shanghai Communiqué 6 years ago or more have been implemented now.

You can tell that I'm pleased, and I know that the world is waiting for your accurate explanation of the results.

[. . .]

I'll take just one question.

Q. Mr. President, you said the response to your speech would be "massive applause throughout the Nation." What do you think the response to your speech will be in Taiwan?

THE PRESIDENT. I doubt if there will be massive applause in Taiwan, but we are going to do everything we can to assure the Taiwanese that we put at top—as one of the top priorities in our own relationships with the People's Republic and them—that the well-being of the people of Taiwan will not be damaged.

Source: Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978*, Bk. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 2264–2269.

126. Camp David Peace Treaty, 26 March 1979

Introduction

The Camp David Peace Treaty, also known as the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, was signed in 1979 as an outcome of the fall of 1978 Camp David Summit Conference that brought leaders from Israel and Egypt to U.S. President Jimmy Carter's Camp David retreat. During the thirteen-day conference, a framework for peace between Israel and Egypt was negotiated and formally agreed upon. The following year, Israel signed a peace treaty returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Carter hoped that concluding this treaty would encourage the subsequent negotiation of similar agreements between Israel and other Arab states. In practice, fellow Arab states boycotted Egypt for making peace with Israel. In October 1981, moreover, Muslim extremist gunmen who resented the peace treaty assassinated Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, who had negotiated the Camp David Accords, while he was watching a military parade in Cairo.

Primary Source

PREAMBLE

"The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel;

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 and Resolution 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David,' dated September 17, 1978. . . .

Agree to the following provisions:

ARTICLE I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine . . . and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal . . . the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations. . . .

ARTICLE II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine . . . without prejudice to the issue of the Gaza Strip. . . .

ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

ARTICLE IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers . . . and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon. . . .

ARTICLE V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea. . . . Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel," *Department of State Bulletin* 79(2026) (1979): 3–14.

127. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, 10 April 1979

Introduction

In December 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that his administration intended to transfer diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan to the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Chinese mainland. In so doing, the United States would also abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty it had signed with Taiwan in 1954. Taiwanese officials feared that this would leave the island exposed to PRC military attack and that before long Taiwan would be reunited with—or, as they saw it, annexed to—the mainland. The ROC on Taiwan enjoyed excellent relations with numerous U.S. senators and congressmen, who were equally apprehensive that such a fate might befall the former U.S. ally. In response to Carter's statement, in April 1979 Congress therefore passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which was made effective retrospectively from 1 January 1979. The act promised that it remained the policy of the U.S. government to cultivate close and friendly relations with "the people on Taiwan." It emphasized that the U.S. opening of relations with Mainland China "rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means" and that any attempt to use military or economic pressure against Taiwan to determine the islands's future would be a matter "of grave concern to the United States." Most significantly, the act pledged that the United States would continue "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character." The "nature and quantity" of such armaments required would be left entirely for Congress and the president to determine. Congress also expected to be informed by the president of any potential threat to Taiwan. For the indefinite future, the status of Taiwan would remain the most significant irritant to U.S.-PRC relations. The two sides had not reached agreement on the subject of arms sales to Taiwan prior to the decision to move to full diplomatic recognition, but China had already stated that once this had been accomplished, it expected further negotiations on the subject. In a further communiqué, signed on 17 August 1982, the PRC and the United States affirmed their continued adherence to their statements in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 and stated that the United States would not follow a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" policy. The U.S. government expressed its continued adherence to a peaceful resolution of the relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China and then "state[d] that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." American arms sales to Taiwan never tapered off as dramatically as this statement seemed to promise. As independence forces gained political strength on the island, the subject of the status of Taiwan flared up repeatedly to bedevil Sino-American relations. In practice, however, the situation stabilized and reached an uneasy equilibrium in which Taiwan and the mainland remained effectively separate states, but the United States cautiously refused to jeopardize its own relationship and perhaps risk war with the PRC by countenancing any moves by its Taiwanese client to declare formal independence.

Primary Source

An Act:

To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2.

(a) The President—having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary—

(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and

(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.

(b) It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and

(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN

SEC. 3.

(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

SEC. 4.

The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the

manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.

(b)The application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

[. . .]

(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.

(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that Act.

(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.

(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.

(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.

(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

[. . .]

Source: *Taiwan Relations Act,* Public Law 96-8, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 93 (1979): 14.

128. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: Speech on the 1979 Uprising of Khurdad 15

Introduction

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the chief political and religious leader in Iran in the 1980s, assumed power in the country at the head of a coup against Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in early 1979 in what became known as the Islamic Revolution. In this speech, delivered that same year on the anniversary of the rebellion, Khomeini discussed the uprising of Khurdad 15, an unsuccessful revolt against the shah that Khomeini helped to mount in June 1963 but that the shah's forces had brutally suppressed. This episode represented a landmark both in Khomeini's personal career—he spent almost a year in prison before leaving Iran for a lengthy exile in France—and in his efforts to depose the shah. Equally significant, Khomeini was fiercely anti-Western, and his regime became the standard-bearer of radical fundamentalist Islam. Whereas the overthrown shah had ruled with Western support and followed modernizing if authoritarian policies, Khomeini rejected the West, whose attitudes and practices he regarded as deeply inimical to Islamic beliefs and practices. Adopting Western ideas and methods in such areas as human rights would, Khomeini argued, undermine the purity of Islam. Effectively, he called on Muslims to wage religious war against the West, resonant appeals that found a ready audience throughout the Muslim world and helped to promote a new wave of anti-Western Islamic violence in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

After Islamic revolutionaries stormed the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979, taking fifty-two employees there hostage and holding them for more than a year, relations between the United States and Iran reached new lows as the American government froze Iranian assets and imposed a trade embargo. Iran was no longer, as it had been under the shah, a cornerstone of U.S. Middle Eastern policy. Indeed, when neighboring Iraq began a lengthy war against Iran in 1980, the United States tended to favor Iraq over Iran. Khomeini remained in power in Iran until his death in 1989, and for more than a quarter of a century Iran remained a theocracy at odds with the United States.

Primary Source

Those who are ignorant must be guided to a correct understanding. We must say to them: "You who imagine that something can be achieved in Iran by some means other than Islam, you who suppose that something other than Islam overthrew the Shah's regime, you who believe non-Islamic elements played a role—study the matter carefully. Look at the tombstones of those who gave their lives in the movement of Khurdad 15. If you can find a single tombstone belonging to one of the non-Islamic elements, it will mean they played a role. And if, among the tombstones of the Islamic elements, you can find a single tombstone belonging to someone from the upper echelons of society, it will mean that they too played a role. But you will not find a single tombstone belonging to either of those groups. All the tombstones belong to Muslims from the lower echelons of society: peasants, workers, tradesmen, committed religious scholars. Those who imagine that some force other than Islam could shatter the great barrier of tyranny are mistaken. As for those who oppose us because of their opposition to Islam, we must cure them by means of guidance, if it is at all possible; otherwise, we will destroy these agents of foreign powers with the same fist that destroyed the Shah's regime.

Your opponents, oppressed people, have never suffered. In the time of the taghut, they never suffered because either they were in agreement with the regime and loyal to it, or they kept silent. Now you have spread the banquet of freedom in front of them and they have sat down to eat. Xenomaniacs, people infatuated with the West, empty people, people with no content! Come to your senses; do not try to westernize everything you have! Look at the West, and see who the people are in the West that present themselves as champions of human rights and what their aims are. Is it human rights they really care about, or the rights of the superpowers? What they really want to secure are the rights of the superpowers. Our jurists should not follow or imitate them. You should implement human rights as the working classes of our society understand them. Yes, they are the real Society for the Defense of Human Rights. They are the ones who secure the well-being of humanity; they work while you talk; for they are Muslims and Islam cares about humanity. You who have chosen a course other than Islam—you do nothing for humanity. All you do is write and speak in an effort to divert our movement from its course.

But as for those who want to divert our movement from its course, who have in mind treachery against Islam and the nation, who consider Islam incapable of running the affairs of our country despite its record of 1400 years—they have nothing at all to do with our people, and this must be made clear. How much you talk about the West, claiming that we must measure Islam in accordance with Western criteria! What an error! It was the mosques that created this Revolution, the mosques that brought this movement into being. The mihrab was a place not only for preaching, but also for war—war against both the devil within and the tyrannical powers without. So preserve your mosques, O people. Intellectuals, do not be Western-style intellectuals, imported intellectuals; do your share to preserve the mosques!

Source: Ruhollah Khomeini, Speech on the Uprising of Khurdad 15, Tehran, 5 June 1979, Modern History Sourcebook, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1979khom1.html.

129. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, 18 June 1979

Introduction

When U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I) in 1972, including the Interim Agreement covering the subsequent five years, it was their expectation that more permanent arrangements would subsequently be negotiated. At a June 1974 summit in Moscow, the number of antiballistic missile (ABM) sites permitted each superpower was reduced to one, and a Threshold Test Ban Treaty forbade underground nuclear tests exceeding 160 kilotons. At Vladivostok the following November, President Gerald Ford, who had succeeded Nixon the previous August, and the Soviets accepted ceilings for the subsequent ten years on the numbers of missiles, single and multiple nuclear delivery vehicles, and heavy missile silos each power might possess, anticipating that these would shortly be enshrined in a formal SALT II Treaty. They expected further negotiations to extend and ideally increase these limitations beyond 1985. Jimmy Carter, who became president in 1977, was eager to reach such an agreement, but domestic political factors made this difficult. Conservatives within and outside his own administration, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, his Polish-born national security advisor, as well as prominent congressmen, were skeptical. Influential hawks such as Democratic Senator Henry Jackson sought deep reductions in the ceilings agreed to in the 1975 Vladivostok accords, which they feared left the Soviets undesirably strong; sought to restrict Soviet development of long-range bombers; and suggested that arms control be made contingent on a drastic reduction of Soviet activities in Africa and other developing nations. Not until 1979 did Soviet and American officials draft a SALT II Treaty that both sides could accept, one imposing both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on American and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, equalizing the ceilings on each state. Signing this treaty at a Vienna summit on 18 June 1979, Carter and Brezhnev tentatively though inconclusively discussed the potential for a SALT III agenda. The U.S. Senate, however, refused to ratify the treaty. Besides characterizing SALT II as overly favorable to the Soviets, conservatives again condemned Russian activities in Africa and the presence of Soviet training brigades in Cuba. Treaty opponents also noted that the overthrow of the shah of Iran the previous January by a radical and strongly anti-American Muslim government headed by the aged Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had deprived the United States of intelligence posts capable of monitoring Soviet treaty compliance. Concessions by Carter proved insufficient to win them over, and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter himself withdrew the treaty from consideration by the Senate. In practice, though, both nations observed the treaty provisions, evidence of the continuing value to both superpowers of tacit complicity in maintaining some degree of international nuclear stability.

Primary Source

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, TOGETHER WITH AGREED STATEMENTS AND COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING THE TREATY

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

[. . .]

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty.

[. . .]

ARTICLE III

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,

heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400.

2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number.

3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers.

3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.

[. . .]

6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.

[. . .]

7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

[. . .]

8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose.

[. . .]

9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.

[. . .]

10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date.

[. . .]

11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of reentry

vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

[. . .]

12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen.

[. . .]

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

[. . .]

14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 28 and the number of such heavy bombers.

[. . .]

ARTICLE VI

1. The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:

(a) operational;
(b) in the final stage of construction;
(c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.

[. . .]

6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon.

[. . .]

7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

ARTICLE VII

1. The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training.

[. . .]

2. The Parties agree that:

(a) there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(b) construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training;
(c) there shall be no conversion of ICBM test and training launchers or of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations provided for in Article III.

[. . .]

ARTICLE VIII

1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

[. . .]

2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II.

ARTICLE IX

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles;
(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

[. . .]

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;
(d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or launchers of such SLBMs; or
(f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

[. . .]

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," 18 June 1979, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2–2.html.

130. Jimmy Carter: National Malaise Speech, 15 July 1979

Introduction

For the United States the 1970s was a bad decade, characterized by serious domestic economic problems and a sense of international impotence and drift. The country's 1973 withdrawal from the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam) was followed two years later by a North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam. In 1974 political scandals forced the resignation first of Vice President Spiro Agnew and then of President Richard Nixon, the first sitting chief executive to step down from office in disgrace. Persistent high inflation and unemployment dogged the presidencies of both Gerald Ford (1794–1977) and Jimmy Carter (1977–1981). High energy costs, due to dramatic price hikes by OPEC from 1973 onward, contributed substantially to domestic inflation in the United States. In 1979 President Carter, facing a national energy crisis due to the cutoff of supplies from revolution-torn Iran, sought to implement a major program to make his country less dependent on foreign oil by enhancing conservation and energy efficiency, switching to natural gas, developing solar power, and improving public transportation. As he worked on presenting this program, he also felt moved to address what he considered the broader problem of the "crisis of confidence" that had afflicted the United States since the 1960s. He hoped that tackling the energy crisis would bring the nation together once more. In reality, the United States failed to attain the majority of the goals on energy policy that Carter set out in this speech, and by the early twenty-first century anxieties over long-term international energy shortfalls were once again escalating dramatically.

Primary Source

During the past three years I've spoken to you on many occasions about national concerns, the energy crisis, reorganizing the government, our nation's economy, and issues of war and especially peace. But over those years the subjects of the speeches, the talks, and

the press conferences have become increasingly narrow, focused more and more on what the isolated world of Washington thinks is important. Gradually, you've heard more and more about what the government thinks or what the government should be doing and less and less about our nation's hopes, our dreams, and our vision of the future.

Ten days ago I had planned to speak to you again about a very important subject—energy. For the fifth time I would have described the urgency of the problem and laid out a series of legislative recommendations to the Congress. But as I was preparing to speak, I began to ask myself the same question that I now know has been troubling many of you. Why have we not been able to get together as a nation to resolve our serious energy problem?

It's clear that the true problems of our Nation are much deeper—deeper than gasoline lines or energy shortages, deeper even than inflation or recession. And I realize more than ever that as president I need your help. So I decided to reach out and listen to the voices of America.

I invited to Camp David people from almost every segment of our society—business and labor, teachers and preachers, governors, mayors, and private citizens. And then I left Camp David to listen to other Americans, men and women like you.

[. . .]

These ten days confirmed my belief in the decency and the strength and the wisdom of the American people, but it also bore out some of my long-standing concerns about our nation's underlying problems.

I know, of course, being president, that government actions and legislation can be very important. That's why I've worked hard to put my campaign promises into law—and I have to admit, with just mixed success. But after listening to the American people I have been reminded again that all the legislation in the world can't fix what's wrong with America. So, I want to speak to you first tonight about a subject even more serious than energy or inflation. I want to talk to you right now about a fundamental threat to American democracy.

I do not mean our political and civil liberties. They will endure. And I do not refer to the outward strength of America, a nation that is at peace tonight everywhere in the world, with unmatched economic power and military might.

The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation.

The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America.

The confidence that we have always had as a people is not simply some romantic dream or a proverb in a dusty book that we read just on the Fourth of July.

It is the idea which founded our nation and has guided our development as a people. Confidence in the future has supported everything else—public institutions and private enterprise, our own families, and the very Constitution of the United States. Confidence has defined our course and has served as a link between generations. We've always believed in something called progress. We've always had a faith that the days of our children would be better than our own.

Our people are losing that faith, not only in government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy. As a people we know our past and we are proud of it. Our progress has been part of the living history of America, even the world. We always believed that we were part of a great movement of humanity itself called democracy, involved in the search for freedom, and that belief has always strengthened us in our purpose. But just as we are losing our confidence in the future, we are also beginning to close the door on our past.

In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by

what one does, but by what one owns. But we've discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning. We've learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose.

[. . .]

We are at a turning point in our history. There are two paths to choose. One is a path I've warned about tonight, the path that leads to fragmentation and self-interest. Down that road lies a mistaken idea of freedom, the right to grasp for ourselves some advantage over others. That path would be one of constant conflict between narrow interests ending in chaos and immobility. It is a certain route to failure.

All the traditions of our past, all the lessons of our heritage, all the promises of our future point to another path, the path of common purpose and the restoration of American values. That path leads to true freedom for our nation and ourselves. We can take the first steps down that path as we begin to solve our energy problem.

Energy will be the immediate test of our ability to unite this nation, and it can also be the standard around which we rally. On the battlefield of energy we can win for our nation a new confidence, and we can seize control again of our common destiny.

In little more than two decades we've gone from a position of energy independence to one in which almost half the oil we use comes from foreign countries, at prices that are going through the roof. Our excessive dependence on OPEC has already taken a tremendous toll on our economy and our people. This is the direct cause of the long lines which have made millions of you spend aggravating hours waiting for gasoline. It's a cause of the increased inflation and unemployment that we now face. This intolerable dependence on foreign oil threatens our economic independence and the very security of our nation. The energy crisis is real. It is worldwide. It is a clear and present danger to our nation. These are facts and we simply must face them.

What I have to say to you now about energy is simple and vitally important.

Point one: I am tonight setting a clear goal for the energy policy of the United States. Beginning this moment, this nation will never use more foreign oil than we did in 1977—never. From now on, every new addition to our demand for energy will be met from our own production and our own conservation. The generation-long growth in our dependence on foreign oil will be stopped dead in its tracks right now and then reversed as we move through the 1980s, for I am tonight setting the further goal of cutting our dependence on foreign oil by one-half by the end of the next decade—a saving of over 4½ million barrels of imported oil per day.

Point two: To ensure that we meet these targets, I will use my presidential authority to set import quotas. I'm announcing tonight that for 1979 and 1980, I will forbid the entry into this country of one drop of foreign oil more than these goals allow. These quotas will ensure a reduction in imports even below the ambitious levels we set at the recent Tokyo summit.

Point three: To give us energy security, I am asking for the most massive peacetime commitment of funds and resources in our nation's history to develop America's own alternative sources of fuel—from coal, from oil shale, from plant products for gasohol, from unconventional gas, from the sun.

I propose the creation of an energy security corporation to lead this effort to replace 2½ million barrels of imported oil per day by 1990. The corporation I will issue up to $5 billion in energy bonds, and I especially want them to be in small denominations so that average Americans can invest directly in America's energy security.

Just as a similar synthetic rubber corporation helped us win World War II, so will we mobilize American determination and ability to win the energy war. Moreover, I will soon submit legislation to Congress calling for the creation of this nation's first solar bank, which will help us achieve the crucial goal of 20 percent of our energy coming from solar power by the year 2000.

These efforts will cost money, a lot of money, and that is why Congress must enact the windfall profits tax

without delay. It will be money well spent. Unlike the billions of dollars that we ship to foreign countries to pay for foreign oil, these funds will be paid by Americans to Americans. These funds will go to fight, not to increase, inflation and unemployment.

Point four: I'm asking Congress to mandate, to require as a matter of law, that our nation's utility companies cut their massive use of oil by 50 percent within the next decade and switch to other fuels, especially coal, our most abundant energy source.

Point five: To make absolutely certain that nothing stands in the way of achieving these goals, I will urge Congress to create an energy mobilization board which, like the War Production Board in World War II, will have the responsibility and authority to cut through the red tape, the delays, and the endless roadblocks to completing key energy projects.

We will protect our environment. But when this nation critically needs a refinery or a pipeline, we will build it.

Point six: I'm proposing a bold conservation program to involve every state, county, and city and every average American in our energy battle. This effort will permit you to build conservation into your homes and your lives at a cost you can afford.

I ask Congress to give me authority for mandatory conservation and for standby gasoline rationing. To further conserve energy, I'm proposing tonight an extra $10 billion over the next decade to strengthen our public transportation systems. And I'm asking you for your good and for your nation's security to take no unnecessary trips, to use carpools or public transportation whenever you can, to park your car one extra day per week, to obey the speed limit, and to set your thermostats to save fuel. Every act of energy conservation like this is more than just common sense—I tell you it is an act of patriotism.

Our nation must be fair to the poorest among us, so we will increase aid to needy Americans to cope with rising energy prices. We often think of conservation only in terms of sacrifice. In fact, it is the most painless and immediate way of rebuilding our nation's strength. Every gallon of oil each one of us saves is a new form of production. It gives us more freedom, more confidence, that much more control over our own lives.

So, the solution of our energy crisis can also help us to conquer the crisis of the spirit in our country. It can rekindle our sense of unity, our confidence in the future, and give our nation and all of us individually a new sense of purpose.

You know we can do it. We have the natural resources. We have more oil in our shale alone than several Saudi Arabias. We have more coal than any nation on Earth. We have the world's highest level of technology. We have the most skilled work force, with innovative genius, and I firmly believe that we have the national will to win this war.

I do not promise you that this struggle for freedom will be easy. I do not promise a quick way out of our nation's problems, when the truth is that the only way out is an all-out effort. What I do promise you is that I will lead our fight, and I will enforce fairness in our struggle, and I will ensure honesty. And above all, I will act. We can manage the short-term shortages more effectively and we will, but there are no short-term solutions to our long-range problems. There is simply no way to avoid sacrifice.

[. . .]

Little by little we can and we must rebuild our confidence. We can spend until we empty our treasuries, and we may summon all the wonders of science. But we can succeed only if we tap our greatest resources —America's people, America's values, and America's confidence.

I have seen the strength of America in the inexhaustible resources of our people. In the days to come, let us renew that strength in the struggle for an energy secure nation.

In closing, let me say this: I will do my best, but I will not do it alone. Let your voice be heard. Whenever you have a chance, say something good about our country. With God's help and for the sake of our nation, it is

time for us to join hands in America. Let us commit ourselves together to a rebirth of the American spirit. Working together with our common faith we cannot fail.

Source: Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979*, Bk. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 1235–1241.

131. Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, Personal Memorandum from Yuri Andropov to Leonid Brezhnev, December 1979

Introduction

In April 1978, the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDP) overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan, executing Daoud and his family and seizing power itself. PDP Secretary General Nur Muhammad Taraki became prime minister, and in December 1978 he signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union under whose terms substantial Soviet aid and several hundred military advisors were dispatched to Kabul, the capital. Taraki was overthrown and killed in a palace coup in September 1979 that placed his deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, in power. Facing a guerrilla insurgency supported by the United States, Amin likewise relied heavily on Soviet military equipment and advisors, but on 28 December 1979 his Russian patrons, considering him too unreliable, organized a coup in which Soviet forces stormed the presidential palace and killed Amin. Former deputy prime minister Babrak Karmal, at that time ambassador to Czechoslovakia, succeeded him. Moscow apparently hoped that removing Amin would restore some kind of stability in Afghanistan. Yuri Andropov, then head of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), warned that Amin was unable to maintain order and was likely to shift to the West, follow neutralist policies, and move against his Soviet advisors. Initially, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev rejected no less than eighteen requests for assistance from Karmal and other Afghan communists outside the country, but it seems that eventually warnings that Amin was moving against "suspect persons" and might take action against the Soviet military advisors already present in the country tipped the balance. Soviet ground forces and paratroopers entered the country on 27 December 1979 and remained there for almost a decade. Anticommunist Afghan guerrillas, or mujahideen, many of them wedded to fundamentalist Islamic principles, proved as intransigent toward the Karmal government as they had been to Amin's. The coup marked the beginning of a lengthy stalemated war in which more than 15,000 Soviet troops and almost a million Afghans died in a guerrilla conflict often compared, in its effect upon the Soviet Union, to the entanglement of the United States in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

Primary Source

1. After the coup and the murder of Taraki in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan began to undertake an undesirable turn for us. The situation in the party, the army and the government apparatus has become more acute, as they were essentially destroyed as a result of the mass repressions carried out by Amin. At the same time, alarming information started to arrive about Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West. [These included:] Contacts with an American agent about issues which are kept secret from us. Promises to tribal leaders to shift away from USSR and to adopt a "policy of neutrality." Closed meetings in which attacks were made against Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. The practical removal of our headquarters in Kabul, etc. The diplomatic circles in Kabul are widely talking of Amin's differences with Moscow and his possible anti-Soviet steps.

All this has created, on the one hand, the danger of losing the gains made by the April [1978] revolution (the scale of insurgent attacks will increase by spring) within the country, while on the other hand [increasing] the threat to our positions in Afghanistan (right now there is no guarantee that Amin, in order to protect his personal power, will not shift to the West), [because there has been] a growth of anti-Soviet sentiments within the population.

2. Recently we were contacted by group of Afghan communists abroad. In the course of our contact with

Babrak [Karmal] and [Asadullah] Sarwari, it became clear (and they informed us of this) that they have worked out a plan for opposing Amin and creating new party and state organs. But Amin, as a preventive measure, has begun mass arrests of 'suspect persons' (300 people have been shot).

In these conditions, Babrak and Sarwari, without changing their plans of opposition, have raised the question of possible assistance, in case of need, including military. We have two battalions stationed in Kabul and there is the capability of rendering such assistance. It appears that this is entirely sufficient for a successful operation. But, as a precautionary measure in the event of unforeseen complications, it would be wise to have a military group close to the border. In case of the deployment of military forces we could at the same time decide various questions pertaining to the liquidation of gangs.

The implementation of the given operation would allow us to decide the question of defending the gains of the April revolution, establishing Leninist principles in the party and state leadership of Afghanistan, and securing our positions in this country.

Source: Personal Memorandum Andropov to Brezhnev, 12/01/1979, APRF, From notes taken by A. F. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute, Published in translation in Cold War International History Project Virtual Archive, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034DB5A-96B6–175C-9D886C24443BD2D4&sort=Collection&item=Soviet%20Invasion%20of%20Afghanistan.

132. Jimmy Carter: State of the Union Address, 23 January 1980.

Introduction

The idealistic Democrat Jimmy Carter, a traditional liberal in international affairs, became president in 1977 and was committed to a foreign policy agenda that envisaged the promotion of traditional American values, including human rights and peaceable relations with other nations, reductions in military spending, disarmament, and a new emphasis on economic over defense aid. Threatening events in the final years of his one-term presidency caused him to modify these preoccupations and to return to more traditional Cold War strategies. Since 1953 American Middle Eastern policy had centered on powerful oil-rich Iran. In 1978 a radical Islamic regime overthrew the autocratic but Western-oriented government of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran. The new Iranian leaders were Islamic fundamentalists who, in a major blow to American geopolitical and economic interests, abrogated the existing alliance with the United States, a country they considered the international "great Satan," and cut off oil supplies. In November 1979 radical Islamic Iranians stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding sixty-three official American personnel hostage until Carter left office in January 1981. Skyrocketing oil prices caused by the Iranian oil embargo ratcheted up inflation and again reminded American consumers how heavily their way of life depended on foreign nations over whom they often had little leverage. To compound American problems in the region, in December 1979 the Soviet Union mounted a major military intervention in previously nonaligned Afghanistan in order to maintain in power a Soviet-backed Marxist regime that had taken power in 1978. Soviet actions were probably primarily due to fears that intensifying Islamic fanaticism in Afghanistan and Iran might infect neighboring Muslim areas of Soviet territory and precipitate separatist movements there. Carter, however, perceived this episode, which he hyperbolically termed "the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War," as part of a calculated Soviet strategy to gain control of the Persian Gulf and the oil-rich states surrounding it. Convinced that Soviet-American détente had become unattainable, he reacted strongly. Addressing congress and the nation in his January 1980 annual State of the Union address, Carter proclaimed the Carter Doctrine, stating that "business as usual" with the Soviet Union was not possible and that the United States would take all measures necessary to defend the Persian Gulf. The president moved to reinstitute containment policies, demanded annual 5 percent increases in military spending, proposed that young American men be compelled to register for a potential draft, and moved to create a Persian Gulf rapid deployment force. He also called for energy policies that would make his

country less dependent on foreign oil. Carter's speech, which effectively reiterated the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East, also marked a definite break with his earlier efforts toward Soviet-American détente and disarmament, inaugurating several years of deep ideological and strategic antagonism between the two superpowers.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together, squarely and courageously. We will face these challenges, and we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our Nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail.

We continue to pursue these specific goals: first, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States; secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure, as quickly as possible, their safe release, if possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens; to enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence, which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a civilized world; and also to convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north, in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan, and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them.

If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages are released.

But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union.

Now, as during the last 3½ decades, the relationship between our country, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live at peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation.

[. . .]

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That's why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned.

We superpowers also have the responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of our great military force. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. They must know that in our presence they are secure.

But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.

The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned. But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression.

While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union. That's why the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union. I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States. I've cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products. I've limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items. And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years, you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil-producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world. We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the Five Year Defense Program. It's imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981, encompassing a 5-percent real growth in authorizations, without any reduction.

We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas. We've helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances, and recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized, intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel. Let no one doubt our commitment to the security of Israel. In a few days we will observe an historic event when Israel makes another major withdrawal from the Sinai and when Ambassadors will be exchanged between Israel and Egypt.

We've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the Western Pacific.

We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used

by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity. The United States will take action consistent with our own laws to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days.

In the weeks ahead, we will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region. We believe that there are no irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of Islam, and we are ready to cooperate with all Moslem countries.

Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation which we represent and those of our allies—in Europe and the Pacific, and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East and Southwest Asia. With your help, I will pursue these efforts with vigor and with determination. You and I will act as necessary to protect and to preserve our Nation's security.

The men and women of America's Armed Forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I'm proud of the job they are doing, and I know you share that pride. I believe that our volunteer forces are adequate for current defense needs, and I hope that it will not become necessary to impose a draft. However, we must be prepared for that possibility. For this reason, I have determined that the Selective Service System must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.

We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information, and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear. We can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engaged in promoting world peace. We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together through open, democratic methods, the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal. In the coming years, as a mighty nation we will continue to pursue peace. But to be strong abroad we must be strong at home. And in order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation's security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

[. . .]

We will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America—and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad.

Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or for quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice. Walter Lippmann once reminded us, "You

took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every good which you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer."

Our challenges are formidable. But there's a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980's with confidence and hope and a bright vision of the America we want: an America strong and free, an America at peace, an America with equal rights for all citizens—and for women, guaranteed in the United States Constitution—an America with jobs and good health and good education for every citizen, an America with a clean and bountiful life in our cities and on our farms, an America that helps to feed the world, an America secure in filling its own energy needs, an America of justice, tolerance, and compassion. For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people.

Together as one people, let us work to build our strength at home, and together as one indivisible union, let us seek peace and security throughout the world.

Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement.

Source: Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980–1981*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 194–200.

133. Jimmy Carter: Address to the Nation on Rescue Attempt for American Hostages in Iran, 25 April 1980

Introduction

President Jimmy Carter addressed his nation in this televised speech on 25 April 1980, the day after a U.S. military mission unsuccessfully attempted to rescue fifty-two Americans being held hostage in the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, taken prisoner when radical Islamic militants had stormed the embassy on 4 November 1979 to protest past American support for the ousted Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran. Eight U.S. soldiers died in the rescue effort, and the entire episode was widely regarded as a humiliation for the United States. Three days before the raid, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance had resigned in protest over what he considered an ill-advised and futile mission, which the National Security Council (NSC) had decided to implement during his absence. The hostage crisis was not ended until the inauguration of Republican President Ronald Reagan in January 1981. It was one of several international events, among them a major oil crisis and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that contributed to a sense of American impotence at this time and were also partly responsible for Reagan's victory over Carter in the 1980 election.

Primary Source

Late yesterday, I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to position our rescue team for later withdrawal of American hostages, who have been held captive there since November 4. Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission. As our team was withdrawing, after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided on the ground following a refueling operation in a remote desert location in Iran. Other information about this rescue mission will be made available to the American people when it is appropriate to do so.

There was no fighting; there was no combat. But to my deep regret, eight of the crewmen of the two aircraft which collided were killed, and several other Americans were hurt in the accident. Our people were immediately airlifted from Iran. Those who were injured have gotten medical treatment, and all of them are expected to recover.

No knowledge of this operation by any Iranian officials or authorities was evident to us until several hours after all Americans were withdrawn from Iran.

Our rescue team knew and I knew that the operation was certain to be difficult and it was certain to be dan-

gerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue operation had been commenced that it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I want to express the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.

Planning for this rescue effort began shortly after our Embassy was seized, but for a number of reasons, I waited until now to put those rescue plans into effect. To be feasible, this complex operation had to be the product of intensive planning and intensive training and repeated rehearsal. However, a resolution of this crisis through negotiations and with voluntary action on the part of the Iranian officials was obviously then, has been, and will be preferable.

This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans.

This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long-developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interests, and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued.

It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own.

In the aftermath of the attempt, we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early release of the American hostages, who have been held so long. The United States remains determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible.

As President, I know that our entire Nation feels the deep gratitude I feel for the brave men who were prepared to rescue their fellow Americans from captivity. And as President, I also know that the Nation shares not only my disappointment that the rescue effort could not be mounted, because of mechanical difficulties, but also my determination to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freedom.

We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now.

We will seek to continue, along with other nations and with the officials of Iran, a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and through peaceful and diplomatic means.

Source: Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1980–1981*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 772–773.

134. Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament, 28 April 1980

Introduction

In December 1979 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that it planned to install a new generation of Pershing II and Cruise intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter recent Soviet deployments of SS-20s in European Russia. As détente took hold during the 1970s, the Western antinuclear movement, whose most prominent organization was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), had become somewhat moribund. NATO's decision revitalized such forces, impelling old antinuclear campaigners to enter the fray again and also prompting many younger people around Europe and the United States to join. In April 1980 prominent British intellectuals, including the radical historian E. P. Thompson along with Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith, and Ken Coates, launched a new group, European Nuclear Disarmament (END), that sought a "nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal." Their founding statement impartially laid the blame for growing nuclear tensions within Europe on both sides in the Cold War, the Western powers and the Soviet bloc. The organization soon won support from a wide range of West European supporters plus some from the Soviet bloc, including former Hungarian prime minister András Hegedűs, the dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, and other East European intellectuals. Many END members were drawn from the West European peace movement and European social democratic and Eurocommunist parties. END also made great efforts to attract Soviet and East European dissidents and was vocal in its criticism of Soviet as well as U.S. and West European nuclear policies. In Britain, many Labour and Liberal members of Parliament belonged to END, together with a few maverick conservatives and communists. Whereas CND was a mass movement, END concentrated on attracting a small but influential membership, perhaps a thousand in all. The two overlapped, with much of the top leadership of CND drawn from END. At times END's insistence on condemning many Soviet actions put it at odds with CND, which included a small but extremely vocal group of communists and leftists. From 1982 to 1991 END held well-publicized annual conventions on nuclear weapons, attended by a wide range of antinuclear activists and intellectuals. The conclusion of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 brought the removal over the next three years of the NATO missiles that had sparked END's formation. As communist regimes collapsed across Eastern Europe, in 1989 END entered a new incarnation, renaming itself the European Dialogue, a forum for the continent-wide encouragement of democracy and civil society. END's earlier activities had been symptomatic of growing disillusionment with both superpowers among European intellectuals during the latter Cold War, an outlook that led them to seek to escape the straitjacket of Soviet-American rivalry and chart a more independent course for their continent.

Primary Source

We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism, and war in the third world compound the political tensions that fuel a demented arms race. In Europe, the main geographical state for the East-West confrontation, new generations of even more deadly nuclear weapons are appearing.

For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliance have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilized life. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation.

As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent their use by the other side, new, more "usable" nuclear weapons are designed and the idea of "limited" nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process can logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller countries to forgo the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that

installs them, reinforce the likelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multiplying the risks of nuclear exchanges.

Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and detente between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing proportion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though mutual extermination is already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in both East and West, contributes to growing social and political strain, setting in motion a vicious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vice versa: a deathly dialectic.

We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and of internal security forces are enlarged, limitations are placed upon free exchanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East.

We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.

The remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two superpowers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory. In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of SS 20 medium-range missiles and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Western Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT II agreement, as a necessary step toward the renewal of effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.

We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and coordinate their activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, women's organizations, trade unions, youth organizations, professional groups, and individuals, take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral, and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West,' but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East or West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from confrontation, to enforce detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.

In appealing to fellow-Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilization by engendering world war. This time

we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt the consultations and decisions of those many organizations already exercising their influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The dangers steadily advance. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome both your help and advice.

Source: E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds., *Protest and Survive* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK and New York: Penguin, 1980), 223–226. © E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, 1980. Reproduced by permission of Penguin Books, Ltd.

135. Civil Defense Instructions for Home Fallout Shelters, 1980

Introduction

During the Cold War, the U.S. government devoted enormous energy to preparations designed to enable Americans to survive a nuclear war. Top federal government officials were expected to take refuge in huge shelters hollowed out in the Catoctin Mountains near Washington, D.C. Businesses, government agencies, and other organizations were encouraged to include nuclear shelters when constructing new buildings or to adapt existing structures to include them. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also urged individual families to add their own personal fallout shelters to their homes. To assist in such undertakings, FEMA published a range of pamphlets giving detailed plans for a variety of shelters designed to suit every family's and house's particular circumstances. The majority were intended to take advantage of existing basements: individuals could choose between two models of Modified Ceiling Shelter, the Concrete Block Shelter, the Tilt-Up Storage Unit Shelter, and the Lean-To Shelter. Families without a basement were not forgotten. They could opt for the aboveground home shelter, which could double "as a tool shed or workshop," or the outside concrete shelter, whose "roof . . . can be used as an attractive patio." Each pamphlet was an illustrated manual giving detailed plans for the appropriate shelter's construction, listing the materials that would be needed, describing the topographical situations that a particular shelter was most advantageously designed to meet, and even mentioning suppliers of suitable ventilators and plumbing. Further manuals gave advice as to what supplies should be stored in a given shelter for particular family sizes. The home shelter program was intended to allay public fears and convince Americans that nuclear war was survivable but may well have simply contributed to a lurking sense of Cold War insecurity and vulnerability.

Primary Source

Aboveground Home Shelter

General information

This family shelter is intended for persons who prefer an aboveground shelter or, for some reason such as a high water table, cannot have a belowground shelter. In general, belowground shelter is superior and more economical than an aboveground shelter.

The shelter is designed to meet the standard of protection against fallout radiation that has been established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for public fallout shelters. It can also be constructed to provide significant protection from the blast and fire effects of a nuclear explosion. It has sufficient space to shelter six adults.

The shelter can be built of two rows of concrete blocks, one 12″ and one 8″, filled with sand or grout, or of poured reinforced concrete. Windows have been omitted; therefore, electric lights are recommended for day to day use.

The details and construction methods are considered typical. If materials other than shown are selected—for example, concrete block faced with brick—care should be taken to provide at least the same weight of materials per square foot: 200 lb. per sq. ft. in the walls and

100 lb. per sq. ft. in the roof. The wood frame roof over the reinforced concrete ceiling probably would be blown off by extremely high winds such as caused by a blast wave or tornado. However the wood frame roof is intended primarily for appearance; the concrete ceiling provides the protection. When using the shelter for protection against high winds, DO NOT place the concrete blocks in the doorway or windows.

This structure has been designed for areas where frost does not penetrate the ground more than 20 inches. If 20 inches is not a sufficient depth for footings, one or two additional courses of concrete blocks may be used to lower the footings. Average soil bearing pressure is 1,500 lb. per sq. ft. Most soils can be assumed to support this pressure without special testing or investigation.

The baffle wall outside the entrance to the shelter is extended out 7′4″ to allow storage of lawn equipment such as wheelbarrows and lawn mowers. If additional space is desired, extend this dimension.

Before starting to build the shelter, make certain that the plan conforms to the local building code. Obtain a building permit if required. If the shelter is to be built by a contractor, engage a reliable firm that offers protection from liability or other claims arising from its construction.

FIRST ALTERNATIVE indicates windows in the workshop area. Solid blocks, equal to a thickness of 12 inches, should be available to fill these openings to provide adequate fallout protection. Window sizes should be kept small. When using the shelter for pr otection against high winds, do not place the concrete blocks in the doorway or windows.



SECOND ALTERNATIVE shows the cement block faced with bricks. Use one course 4-inch brick and two courses of 8-inch cement block to obtain the required weight per unit area.



THIRD ALTERNATIVE is to attach the tool shed or workshop to the house, with a covered area between. In this case, the facing materials should match the house.

FOURTH ALTERNATIVE is to install built-up roofing of asphalt or tar, or other wearing surface, on top of the concrete deck.



Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Aboveground Home Shelter, Pamphlet H-12–2* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).

136. The Gdańsk Accords, "Solidarity," 31 August 1980

Introduction

In Poland, which had a lengthy history of conflict with its Russian neighbor, Soviet control was never welcome. In the fall of 1956 Soviet military intervention was narrowly avoided. During the 1970s, price increases and poor working conditions generated serious labor unrest and public demonstrations. In 1976, Polish dissenters took advantage of their country's accession to the Helsinki Agreements the previous year to establish a Committee for Social Self-Defense, demanding that the Polish government respect human rights and condemning the official trade unions for failing to protect the workers they supposedly represented. In 1980, shortages of consumer goods and price increases led to a major new wave of strikes, including one called at the Lenin Shipyard in Gda›sk in August 1980. The strikers demanded independent trade unions, the right to strike, freedom of speech, the release of political prisoners, and improvements in the workers' living standards. The shipyard workers established an independent union, christened Solidarno¥‰ (Solidarity) and headed by Lech Wałêsa, a charismatic electrician. The new organization set up an Interfactory Strike Committee, which quickly attracted tens of thousands of members from all over Poland and functioned as a political movement, launching strikes and demonstrations to show their sympathy with the original activists' demands. Solidarity's leaders received quiet encouragement from John Paul II, the former Archbishop Karol Wôjtyła of Jraków, a forceful anticommunist who had been selected as pope in 1978 and retained a special interest in Polish affairs. At the end of August 1980, the government granted the strikers' demands, and Solidarity proceeded to organize itself as a nationwide organization. The Gda›sk accords marked the first occasion on which a communist government had made such concessions to its own people. Soviet officials, alarmed that other East European states might follow Poland's lead, considered military intervention at that time and again in December 1980 but rejected that option as overly controversial. Conflicts quickly developed between Solidarity and the Polish government. After Solidarity held its first congress in September 1981 and issued a message urging workers around Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union to establish similar free trade unions, Soviet pressures on Polish leaders increased, and in December 1981 General Wojciech Jaruzelski, premier and defense minister, imposed martial law and banned Solidarity, imprisoning Wałêsa and thousands of other Solidarity leaders. The effective voiding of the Gda›sk accords was only temporary: economic difficulties afflicted Poland, and from 1985 onward a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, instituted policies that soon led to the dismantling of the Soviet empire. Released in 1986, Wałêsa openly reestablished Solidarity despite the official ban. As the Soviet Union renounced control over Eastern Europe in 1989 and labor unrest mounted in Poland, Solidarity held open negotiations with the government and was formally reinstated in April 1989. In elections held in June 1989, Solidarity candidates trounced the incumbent Communist Party and established the first democratic government in the former Soviet bloc.

Primary Source

Subsequent to consideration of the Twenty-one Demands put forward by the workforces striking on the Coast, the Government Commission and the Interfactory Strike Committee have reached the following decisions:

With regard to Point One: 'To accept free trade unions, independent of the Party and employers, in accordance with ILO Convention 87 concerning free unions, ratified by Poland', it was established:

1. Trade unions in the Polish People's Republic have not lived up to the hopes and expectations of employees. It is necessary to form new, self-governing trade unions, as authentic representatives of the working class. The right to remain in the present unions is not questioned and we envisage cooperation between unions.
2. The Interfactory Strike Committee declares that the new, independent, self-governing trade unions will accept the bases of the Polish Constitution. The new trade unions will defend the social and material interests of employees and do not intend to act as a political party. They accept the principle of the social ownership of the means of production on which the existing socialist system in Poland is based. While acknowledging the

leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party in the state and not questioning the established system of international alliances, their purpose is to provide working people with appropriate means for exercising control, expressing their opinions and defending their own interests.

The Government Commission declares that the government will guarantee and ensure full respect for the independence and self-government of the new trade unions, both as to their organisational structure and to their functioning at all levels of their activity. The government will ensure the new trade unions have every opportunity to fulfill their basic function of defending employees' interests and meeting their material, social and cultural needs. It also guarantees that the new unions will not be subject to any discrimination.

3. The creation and operation of independent self-governing trade unions accords with ILO Conventions 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and 98 on the Right to Organise and to Collective Bargaining, both ratified by Poland. The increase in the number of trade unions and other bodies representing employees, will necessitate changes in legislation. In particular, the government undertakes to introduce appropriate amendments to the laws on trade unions and workers' self-management and to the Labour Code.
4. The existing strike committees are free to become bodies representing factory employees, such as: workers' or employees' committees, workers' councils or founding committees of the new, self-governing trade unions. The Interfactory Strike Committee, as the Founding Committee of these unions, has a free choice over which form of a single union or association on the Coast to adopt. The founding committees will continue to function until elections of new officials under their statutes. The government undertakes to provide conditions for registration of the new trade unions outside the Central Trade Union Council register.
5. The new trade unions should have a genuine opportunity to express their opinion in public on the major decisions which determine the living standards of working people: the division of the national product between consumption and accumulation; the allocation of the social fund amongst various sectors (health, education and culture); the basic principles for calculation and determination of wages, including that of automatic increases to compensate for inflation; long-term economic planning; the directions of investment and price changes. The government undertakes to provide conditions for fulfillment of these functions.
6. The Interfactory Committee is establishing a centre for social and professional studies. This will undertake objective research into the circumstances of employees, welfare conditions of working people and ways in which employees' interests can best be represented. It will conduct detailed research into wage and price indexing and propose means of compensation. The centre will publish the results of its investigations. The new unions will also have their own publications.
7. The government will ensure observance of the 1949 Law on trade unions, which states in Article One, Paragraph One, that workers and employees have the right of free association in trade unions. The newly-created trade unions will not join the association represented by the Central Trade Union Council. A new law will incorporate this principle. Participation by representatives of the Interfactory Strike Committee or founding committees of self-governing trade unions and other bodies representing employees in drawing up this new law is assured.

With regard to Point Two: 'To guarantee the right to strike and personal safety for strikers and their supporters', it was established:

The right to strike will be guaranteed by the law on trade unions now in preparation. It should lay down conditions for declaring and organising a strike, methods of resolving disputes and liability for breaches of the law. Articles 52, 64 and 65 of the Labour Code will not be used against strikers. Prior to adoption of the law the government guarantees the personal safety of strikers and their helpers, together with their present positions at work.

With regard to Point Three: 'To uphold freedom of expression and publication as guaranteed by the

Constitution, not to suppress independent publishing, and to grant access to the mass media for representatives of all denominations', it was established:

1. The government will submit a draft law to the *Sejm* on the control of press and publications within three months. It will be based on the principles that censorship should protect: the state's interests, that is preservation of state and economic secrets which will be more closely defined by law; matters of state security and its major international interests; religious feelings and those of non-believers; and should prevent dissemination of morally damaging material. The draft law will also provide a right of appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against decisions taken by bodies controlling the press and publications. The right of appeal will also be incorporated into the Code of Administrative Procedure.
2. Religious associations will be granted access to the mass media as part of their religious practice, once various essential and technical questions have been resolved between the organs of state and religious associations concerned. The government will allow the radio transmission of Sunday mass, in accordance with detailed arrangements to be made with the Episcopate.
3. Broadcasting, the press and publishing should express a diversity of ideas, opinions and evaluations. They should be subject to social control.
4. The press, like members of society and their organisations, should have access to public documents such as administrative acts and social, economic or similar plans issued by the government and its subordinate organs. Exceptions to the principle of openness in administrative activity will be defined by the law, in accordance with subpoint 1.

[. . .]

With regard to Point Five: 'To put information in the mass media about the formation of the Interfactory Strike Committee and to publish its demands', it was established:

This proposal will be met by publishing the present protocol in the national mass media.

With regard to Point Six: 'To take definite steps to lead the country out of its present crisis by (a) giving the public full information about the social and economic situation and (b) enabling all social groups to participate in discussion of a reform programme', it was established:

We consider it vital to speed up work on economic reform. The authorities will define and publish the basic assumptions of this reform within the next few months. There should be wide public participation in discussing the reform. Trade unions should be involved in the preparation of laws on socialist economic organisations and workers' self-management. The reform of the economy should be based on a radical increase in the independence of enterprises and genuine participation by workers' self-governing institutions in management. There should be appropriate legislation to guarantee that trade unions are able to fulfill the functions defined in Point One of this Agreement.

Only an aware society, well-informed about reality, will be able to initiate and implement a programme for putting our economy in order. The government will radically increase the range of social and economic information made available to the public, to trade unions, and to economic and social organisations.

The Interfactory Strike Committee proposes further: creation of lasting prospects for the development of private peasant farming, the basis of Polish agriculture; equal treatment for the private, state and cooperative sectors of agriculture in access to all the means of production, including land; creation of conditions for the revival of rural self-government.

With regard to Point Seven: 'To pay all employees taking part in the strike wages equivalent to vacation pay for the duration of the strike, out of Central Trade Union Council funds', it was established:

Members of the workforces on strike will receive 40 per cent of normal wages for the duration of the strike and, on return to work, additional amounts equivalent to 100 per cent of wages for vacation pay, calculated on the basis of an eight-hour day. The Interfactory Strike Committee appeals to the workforce to increase pro-

ductivity, to economise on raw materials and energy and to improve labour discipline at all levels, in cooperation with the directors of enterprises, workplaces and institutions, once the strike has ended.

With regard to Point Eight: 'To raise the basic pay of every employee by 2000 złotys a month, to compensate for current cost of living increases', it was established:

The wages of all groups of employees will gradually be raised, above all those of the lowest paid. It was agreed in principle that wages will be raised by individual factories and sectors. They will continue to be implemented as at present, according to specific jobs and trades, by increases of one point on the scale or its equivalent in other elements of wage calculation. For white-collar workers in industry, the increase will consist of one point on the scale. Increases still under discussion will be agreed according to sector and implemented by the end of September this year.

After analysing all sectors, the government, with the agreement of trade unions, will present a programme for increasing the wages of the lowest paid, with particular attention to large families. This will be put forward by 31 October 1980 and come into force on 1 January 1981.

With regard to Point Nine: 'To guarantee automatic wage increases that keep up with price rises and a fall in the value of money', it was established:

It was deemed necessary to halt price increases on basic goods through greater control over the socialised and private sectors and in particular by putting a stop to 'hidden' inflation. The government will do research into determinants of the cost of living. Similar studies will be conducted by trade unions and research institutes. The government will work out a method of compensation for cost of living increases by the end of 1980. After public discussion and acceptance, this will be implemented. The method chosen should take into account the *social minimum*.

With regard to the related points: Ten, 'To supply sufficient food for the domestic market, exporting only and exclusively the surpluses', Eleven, 'To abolish commercial prices and sales for hard currency in shops for *Internal-Export*'; and Thirteen, 'To introduce ration cards for meat and meat products—food coupons—until the market is stabilised', it was established:

Meat supplies will be improved by 31 December 1980 as the result of greater incentives for agricultural production, reduction of meat exports to a minimum, additional meat imports and other measures. A programme for improved meat distribution, including the possibility of introducing rationing, will be presented by the same date.

Foreign currency shops (PEWEX) will not stock Polish products in short supply. Information will be published about decisions and measures taken in regard to market supplies, by the end of the year.

The Interfactory Strike Committee proposes that commercial shops should be closed and the price of meat and meat products be regulated and standardised at an average level.

With regard to Point Twelve: 'To introduce the principle that people in leading positions are chosen on the basis of qualifications rather than Party membership. To abolish privileges of the militia, security service and Party apparatus by equalizing family allowances and closing special shops, etc.', it was established:

It is accepted that people in leading positions will be selected on the bases of qualifications and ability, whether they are Party members, members of allied parties or unaffiliated. The government will present a programme for equalising the family allowances of all professional groups, by 31 December 1980. The Government Commission states that shops and cafeteria for their employees are identical to those at other workplaces and offices.

With regard to Point Fourteen: 'To lower the retirement age for women to fifty and for men to fifty-five. To allow retirement of those who have worked continuously in Poland for thirty years for women and thirty-five years for men, regardless of age', it was established:

The Government Commission considers that this proposal cannot be fulfilled in the present economic and

demographic circumstances. It may become a subject for discussion in the future.

The Interfactory Strike Committee proposes this be investigated by 31 December 1980. The possibility of retirement five years early for those working in difficult or arduous conditions, after thirty years for women and thirty-five for men, should be considered. In the case of particularly arduous work, retirement should be advanced by at least fifteen years. Early retirement should take place only at the employee's request.

[. . .]

With regard to Point Sixteen: 'To improve working conditions in the health service, so that full medical care can be provided for all employees', it was established:

It is recognised that an increase in the building capacity available for health service investment, improved supply of medicines through additional imports of raw materials, higher wages for health service employees (a change in the pay-scale for nurses) and implementation of governmental and regional programmes for the improvement of public health, are urgently needed. Other steps in this direction are appended:

1. Introducing a Charter of Rights for health service workers.

[. . .]

26. Raising the spending-limits on pharmaceuticals from 1138 złotys to 2700 złotys per hospital patient since this is the real cost of treatment, and raising the food allowance.
27. Issuing food coupons for the chronically sick.
28. Doubling the supply of medical vehicles in order to meet already existing needs.
29. Ensuring clean air, soil and water, especially along the Coast.
30. Opening new housing estates with health centres, pharmacies and chre*f*he facilities already provided.

With regard to Point Seventeen: 'To provide sufficient chreęhe and nursery places for children of working mothers', it was established:

The Commission fully supports this proposal. The regional authorities will present the necessary programme by 30 November 1980.

With regard to Point Eighteen: 'To grant paid maternity leave for three years while a mother brings up her child', it was established:

An analysis of whether the economy can afford this will be carried out by 31 December 1980, in cooperation with trade unions. The size and length of paid maternity leave for mothers whose leave is unpaid at present will be determined.

The Interfactory Strike Committee proposes the allowance be the equivalent of full pay for the first year and half pay for the second, but not less than 2000 złotys a month. The proposal should be implemented in stages from the first half of 1981.

[. . .]

With regard to Point Twenty-one: 'To make all Saturdays work-free. Employees on a three-shift and a four-brigade system will be compensated for the loss of free Saturdays by extension of annual leave of other paid days off', it was established:

Ways of introducing a programme for paid work-free Saturdays, or some other method of regulation to shorten working hours, will be drawn up and presented by 31 December 1980. The number of paid, work-free Saturdays will start to increase in 1981. Other steps in this direction are included in an appendix.

After the above had been agreed, the government undertakes:

To guarantee the personal safety and present working conditions of participants in the present strike and their helpers; that the ministries concerned will consider the specific problems of the branches put forward by the workforces on strike; immediate publication of the full text of the present Agreement in the mass media (press, radio and television).

The Interfactory Strike Committee undertakes to end the strike on 31 August 1980 at 5 P.M.

Source: A. Kemp-Welch, *The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdansk Negotiations, 1980* (London: Macmillan, 1983), 168–179.

[. . .]

137. Wojciech Jaruzelski: Declaration of Martial Law, 13 December 1981

Introduction

Despite official acceptance of the Gda›sk accords, further conflicts quickly developed between Solidarity and the Polish government. In September 1981, Solidarity held its first congress and issued a message urging workers around Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union to establish similar free trade unions. Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev demanded that the Polish government introduce martial law. Twice, in August and December 1980, Soviet officials had contemplated military intervention but, fearing that such direct action would be counterproductive, preferred to put pressure on General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had become Polish minister of defense, prime minister, and Communist Party general secretary in the previous year, to impose martial law. In December 1981 Jaruzelski did so, banning Solidarity and arresting Wałêsa and thousands of other members of the union. Martial law was not lifted in Poland until June 1983, and only in 1988, when severe economic problems had brought the country close to collapse, did the Polish government recognize Solidarity and open talks with its leaders. Jaruzelski subsequently defended his decision to declare martial law on the grounds that this represented the lesser of two evils and was preferable to a Soviet intervention. Even so, in 2006 the National Remembrance Institute charged him with communist crimes committed in connection with the imposition of martial law.

Primary Source

Citizens of the Polish People's Republic, I turn to you today as a soldier and as the head of the Polish Government. I turn to you in matters of supreme importance. Our country has found itself at the edge of an abyss. The achievements of many generations, the house erected from Polish ashes, is being ruined. The structures of the state are ceasing to function. New blows are being struck every day at the dying economy. Our living conditions are imposing on people an increasingly greater burden. Lines of painful division are running through every work enterprise and through many Polish homes. The atmosphere of endless conflicts, of misunderstandings and of hatred is sowing psychological devastation and injuring the traditions of tolerance. Strikes, strike readiness and protest actions have become the norm. Even school children are being dragged into it.

Yesterday evening many public buildings were occupied. Exhortations for a physical settling of accounts with the "Reds," with people who hold different views, are being made. Acts of terrorism, of threats, of mob trials and also of direct coercion abound. The wave of impudent crimes, of assaults and break-ins is sweeping the country. Fortunes amounting to millions are being accrued by economic underground sharks and are growing. Chaos and demoralization have assumed the proportions of a disaster.

The nation has come to the end of its psychological endurance. Many people are beginning to despair. Now it is not days but hours that separate us from a national catastrophe. Honesty compels one to ask the question: Did things have to come to this?

In assuming the office of chairman of the Council of Ministers, I believed that we could lift ourselves up. Have we thus done everything to stop the spiral of the crisis? History will assess our activities. There have been errors, and we are drawing conclusions from them. Above all, however, the past months have been a busy time for the government, a time of wrestling with enormous difficulties.

Unfortunately, however, the national economy has been turned into an arena for political struggle. A deliberate torpedoing of government activities has brought about a situation in which results are not commensurate with the work put in with our efforts. We cannot be said to lack good will, moderation and patience. Sometimes there has been, perhaps, even too much of it. . . .

The self-preservation instinct of the nation must be heard. Adventurists must have their hands tied before they push the homeland into the abyss of fratricide.

Citizens. Great is the burden of responsibility that falls on me at this dramatic moment in Polish history. It is my duty to take this responsibility. Poland's future is at stake—the future for which my generation fought and for which it gave the best years of its life.

I announce that today a Military Council of National Salvation has been established. Today at midnight, the Council of State, in accordance with the Constitution, introduced martial law throughout the country. I want everyone to understand the motives and the aims of our action. We are not striving for a military coup, for a military dictatorship. The nation has enough strength, enough wisdom to develop an efficient democratic system of socialist rule. In such a system the Armed Forces will be able to remain where they belong—in the barracks. No Polish problem can, in the long run, be solved through force. The Military Council for National Salvation is not replacing constitutional organs of power. Its sole task is the protection of legal order in the country and the creation of executive guarantees that will make it possible to restore order and discipline. This is the last path we can take to initiate the extrication of the country from the crisis, to save the country from disintegration. . . .

In this difficult moment I address myself to our socialist allies and friends. We greatly value their trust and constant aid. The Polish-Soviet alliance is, and will remain, the cornerstone of the Polish raison d'etat, the guarantee of the inviolability of our borders.

Poland is, and will remain, a lasting link in the Warsaw Pact, an unfailing member of the socialist community of nations. . . .

Source: Wojciech Jaruzelski, Warsaw Radio, 13 December 1981, Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS-Daily Report Soviet Union* (1981).

138. Ronald Reagan: The "Evil Empire," 8 March 1983

Introduction

In 1981, the former Hollywood actor and governor of California Ronald Reagan, a staunch conservative from the right wing of the Republican Party, became president. Unlike his more pragmatic predecessors, he was a fierce anticommunist who felt a deep ideological antipathy toward the Soviet Union and did not hesitate to express this antagonism. Alarmed that during the late 1970s the Soviet Union had become more assertive in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, Reagan launched a major defense buildup, improving on the increases in military spending already projected by his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. Reagan consciously sought to restore the national confidence of the United States after the demoralizing 1970s. He repeatedly proclaimed the superiority of capitalism, democracy, and free institutions over the Soviet Union and sought to encourage free enterprise, reduce the role of government, and cut taxes by curtailing spending on welfare and other social programs. Excessive intervention by the government, he proclaimed, was the problem, not the solution. One of Reagan's closest international allies was Margaret Thatcher, the equally conservative and ideologically driven prime minister of Great Britain, who shared his anticommunist and free market outlook. Reagan did not hesitate to use undiplomatic language to describe the Soviet Union. In June 1982 he made a state visit to Britain. Speaking in the British House of Commons, he relegated Soviet totalitarianism to the "ash heap of history." He deliberately drew on memories of Winston Churchill, the towering British politician who had sounded the alarm against Adolf Hitler's Germany during the 1930s, served as an inspiring prime minister during World War II, and warned in 1946 that the Soviet Union had

drawn an "iron curtain" across Europe. In the original draft of this speech, Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as "the focus of evil in the modern world" and a "militaristic empire," passages that were later cut as too provocative. Reagan did, however, proclaim his mission to "preserve freedom as well as peace" and described the conflict between totalitarianism and democracy as a battle between good and evil, optimistically stating that good would prevail. Nine months later, he recycled his uncompromising "evil empire" description of the Soviet Union when addressing the National Association of Evangelicals, a forum in which he also emphasized the antireligious aspects of communism. On this occasion, Reagan was particularly concerned to counter growing pressures in both the United States and Europe for a nuclear freeze agreement that would have halted deployments of additional short- and intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Especially in this century, America has kept alight the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves but for millions of others around the world.

And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that's their name for religion-or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930's. We see it too often today.

This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.

A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and

our own way of life were very much on people's minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, "I love my little girls more than anything "And I said to myself, "Oh, no, don't. You can't—don't say that." But I had underestimated him. He went on: "I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God."

There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important.

Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness-pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.

It was C. S. Lewis who, in his unforgettable "Screwtape Letters," wrote: "The greatest evil is not done now in those sordid 'dens of crime' that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice."

Well, because these "quiet men" do not "raise their voices," because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they're always making "their final territorial demand," some would have us accept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simple-minded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom.

So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration's efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and one day, with God's help, their total elimination.

While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.

Whittaker Chambers, the man whose own religious conversion made him a witness to one of the terrible traumas of our time, the Hiss-Chambers case, wrote that the crisis of the Western World exists to the degree in which the West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in communism's attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for Marxism-Leninism is actually the second oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, "Ye shall be as gods."

The Western World can answer this challenge, he wrote, "but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism's faith in Man."

I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the

quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: "He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength. . . . But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary. . . ."

Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, "We have it within our power to begin the world over again." We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself.

Source: Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 359–364.

139. Ronald Reagan: Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, 23 March 1983

Introduction

The centerpiece of President Ronald Reagan's defense buildup became the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars" program. Proposed by the president in March 1983, this ambitious initiative envisaged the development of a system of antimissile defenses of lasers based on satellites in space, which would make the United States impregnable to nuclear attack. So long as it was genuinely impervious to incoming missiles, the construction of such a shield would make Soviet nuclear missiles useless against the United States while leaving the Soviets vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by their rival unless they embarked on the immensely expensive task of developing similar defenses of their own. One of Reagan's purposes in announcing this scheme was almost certainly to persuade Soviet leaders to negotiate in earnest to cut nuclear armaments, although not until 1985, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, did this occur. Reagan's admirers subsequently suggested that his intention in launching this initiative was to force the Soviet Union to launch a counterprogram that would strain the weak Soviet economy to the point of collapse, but at the time the president was apparently unaware of the gravity of Soviet economic problems. Scientists working on SDI had only limited success in developing reliable interceptors. After 1987, successive arms control agreements made a full-scale Soviet attack increasingly unlikely, and SDI's emphasis shifted to smaller-scale ground-based systems that could counter accidental or limited launches. In the early 2000s, President George W. Bush revived the space-based SDI program in the guise of National Missile Defense, a shield intended to defend the United States and its European and Asian allies against nuclear attack by hostile powers. Even though it remained unclear precisely when any such scheme might be implemented, China resented the fact that Japan and Taiwan might be included under the new defense umbrella, thereby negating its own nuclear arsenal, while Russia condemned proposals to locate antimissile installations in former Warsaw Pact countries that had since joined NATO.

Primary Source

The calls for cutting back the defense budget come in nice, simple arithmetic. They're the same kind of talk that led the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930's and invited the tragedy of World War II. We must not let that grim chapter of history repeat itself through apathy or neglect.

This is why I'm speaking to you tonight—to urge you to tell your Senators and Congressmen that you know we must continue to restore our military strength. If we stop in midstream, we will send a signal of decline, of lessened will, to friends and adversaries alike. Free people must voluntarily, through open debate and democratic means, meet the challenge that totalitarians pose by compulsion. It's up to us, in our time, to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore our duty and blindly hope for the best while the enemies of freedom grow stronger day by day.

The solution is well within our grasp. But to reach it, there is simply no alternative but to continue this year,

in this budget, to provide the resources we need to preserve the peace and guarantee our freedom.

Now, thus far tonight I've shared with you my thoughts on the problems of national security we must face together. My predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before you on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and have proposed steps to address that threat. But since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps have been increasingly directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation.

This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war for more than three decades. In recent months, however, my advisers, including in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security.

Over the course of these discussions, I've become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. Feeling this way, I believe we must thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions and for introducing greater stability into the strategic calculus on both sides.

One of the most important contributions we can make is, of course, to lower the level of all arms, and particularly nuclear arms. We're engaged right now in several negotiations with the Soviet Union to bring about a mutual reduction of weapons. I will report to you a week from tomorrow my thoughts on that score. But let me just say, I'm totally committed to this course.

If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major arms reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that's a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability? I think we are. Indeed, we must.

After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it's reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is.

In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can be ensured only by modernizing our strategic forces. At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our nonnuclear capabilities.

America does possess—now—the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, nonnuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.

As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them. Their vital

interests and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments.

I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose —one all people share—is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

My fellow Americans, tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support.

Source: Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 437–443.

140. Ronald Reagan: Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, 27 October 1983

Introduction

On 23 October 1983, suicide-bombers drove trucks loaded with explosives into the barracks of peacekeeping forces of U.S. Marines and French troops stationed in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. These troops had been deployed there since late 1982 as part of an international peacekeeping force that was trying to maintain order in Beirut after Israeli forces intent on driving out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had invaded, triggering a complicated civil war among various Lebanese political factions. The bombing killed 241 American servicemen, 58 French paratroopers, and some civilians. The episode was one of the first suicide bombings in the Middle East. Addressing the nation four days later, U.S. President Ronald Reagan affirmed his country's commitment to maintaining order in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, and claimed that the attacks were themselves evidence that the Marines were succeeding in their mission of restoring stability and normal conditions in Beirut. In practice, nonetheless, shortly afterward the U.S. government, reluctant to face the prospect of further major casualties in such episodes, proclaimed that the Marines had accomplished their mission and withdrew them from Lebanon, a decision that hawks later criticized as proof that terrorist tactics were effective. In the same address, Reagan also highlighted the American invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada, an operation launched two days earlier to overthrow a Marxist government that had murdered socialist Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and seized power the previous week. Cuban troops and construction workers were present on the island building an airport that it was feared would be used for military purposes, and 1,000 American students were believed to be in danger. In conjunction with forces from seven other Caribbean countries, 5,000 United States Marines invaded the island and, after some heavy fighting, subdued the Grenadian ground and air forces and the Cuban contingents. They also found a cache of heavy weapons sufficient to arm 10,000 troops. Nineteen American soldiers died and 119 were wounded, while Grenadian casualties were 45 dead and 337 wounded. By mid-December 1983 most resistance had ended, except for some rebels who fled to the hills, and American forces were withdrawn. Parliamentary elections

held in 1984 returned the noncommunist New National Party to power. The two near-simultaneous episodes encapsulated the degree to which Reagan's bold rhetoric belied his pragmatic caution in international affairs. Like most American presidents and military men in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, he preferred to keep American military interventions brief and limited and to pick conflicts in which victory would be relatively quick and easy.

Primary Source

Some 2 months ago we were shocked by the brutal massacre of 269 men, women, and children, more than 60 of them Americans, in the shooting down of a Korean airliner. Now, in these past several days, violence has erupted again, in Lebanon and Grenada.

In Lebanon, we have some 1,600 marines, part of a multinational force that's trying to help the people of Lebanon restore order and stability to that troubled land. Our marines are assigned to the south of the city of Beirut, near the only airport operating in Lebanon. Just a mile or so to the north is the Italian contingent and not far from them, the French and a company of British soldiers.

This past Sunday, at 22 minutes after 6 Beirut time, with dawn just breaking, a truck, looking like a lot of other vehicles in the city, approached the airport on a busy, main road. There was nothing in its appearance to suggest it was any different than the trucks or cars that were normally seen on and around the airport. But this one was different. At the wheel was a young man on a suicide mission.

The truck carried some 2,000 pounds of explosives, but there was no way our marine guards could know this. Their first warning that something was wrong came when the truck crashed through a series of barriers, including a chain-link fence and barbed wire entanglements. The guards opened fire, but it was too late. The truck smashed through the doors of the headquarters building in which our marines were sleeping and instantly exploded. The four-story concrete building collapsed in a pile of rubble.

More than 200 of the sleeping men were killed in that one hideous, insane attack. Many others suffered injury and are hospitalized here or in Europe.

[. . .]

And now many of you are asking: Why should our young men be dying in Lebanon? Why is Lebanon important to us?

Well, it's true, Lebanon is a small country, more than five-and-a-half thousand miles from our shores on the edge of what we call the Middle East. But every President who has occupied this office in recent years has recognized that peace in the Middle East is of vital concern to our nation and, indeed, to our allies in Western Europe and Japan. We've been concerned because the Middle East is a powderkeg; four times in the last 30 years, the Arabs and Israelis have gone to war. And each time, the world has teetered near the edge of catastrophe.

The area is key to the economic and political life of the West. Its strategic importance, its energy resources, the Suez Canal, and the well-being of the nearly 200 million people living there—all are vital to us and to world peace. If that key should fall into the hands of a power or powers hostile to the free world, there would be a direct threat to the United States and to our allies.

We have another reason to be involved. Since 1948 our Nation has recognized and accepted a moral obligation to assure the continued existence of Israel as a nation. Israel shares our democratic values and is a formidable force an invader of the Middle East would have to reckon with.

[. . .]

In the year that our marines have been there, Lebanon has made important steps toward stability and order. The physical presence of the marines lends support to both the Lebanese Government and its army. It allows the hard work of diplomacy to go forward. Indeed, without the peacekeepers from the U.S., France, Italy, and Britain, the efforts to find a peaceful solution in Lebanon would collapse.

As to that narrower question—what exactly is the operational mission of the marines—the answer is, to secure a piece of Beirut, to keep order in their sector, and to prevent the area from becoming a battlefield. Our marines are not just sitting in an airport. Part of their task is to guard that airport. Because of their presence, the airport has remained operational. In addition, they patrol the surrounding area. This is their part—a limited, but essential part—in the larger effort that I've described.

If our marines must be there, I'm asked, why can't we make them safer? Who committed this latest atrocity against them and why?

Well, we'll do everything we can to ensure that our men are as safe as possible. We ordered the battleship *New Jersey* to join our naval forces offshore. Without even firing them, the threat of its 16-inch guns silenced those who once fired down on our marines from the hills, and they're a good part of the reason we suddenly had a cease-fire. We're doing our best to make our forces less vulnerable to those who want to snipe at them or send in future suicide missions.

[. . .]

Now then, where do we go from here? What can we do now to help Lebanon gain greater stability so that our marines can come home? Well, I believe we can take three steps now that will make a difference.

First, we will accelerate the search for peace and stability in that region. Little attention has been paid to the fact that we've had special envoys there working, literally, around the clock to bring the warring factions together. This coming Monday in Geneva, President Gemayel of Lebanon will sit down with other factions from his country to see if national reconciliation can be achieved. He has our firm support. . . .

Second, we'll work even more closely with our allies in providing support for the Government of Lebanon and for the rebuilding of a national consensus.

Third, we will ensure that the multinational peacekeeping forces, our marines, are given the greatest possible protection. . . .

Beyond our progress in Lebanon, let us remember that our main goal and purpose is to achieve a broader peace in all of the Middle East. The factions and bitterness that we see in Lebanon are just a microcosm of the difficulties that are spread across much of that region. A peace initiative for the entire Middle East, consistent with the Camp David accords and U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, still offers the best hope for bringing peace to the region.

Let me ask those who say we should get out of Lebanon: If we were to leave Lebanon now, what message would that send to those who foment instability and terrorism? If America were to walk away from Lebanon, what chance would there be for a negotiated settlement, producing a unified democratic Lebanon?

If we turned our backs on Lebanon now, what would be the future of Israel? At stake is the fate of only the second Arab country to negotiate a major agreement with Israel. That's another accomplishment of this past year, the May 17th accord signed by Lebanon and Israel.

[. . .]

We're a nation with global responsibilities. We're not somewhere else in the world protecting someone else's interests; we're there protecting our own.

[. . .]

With patience and firmness, we can help bring peace to that strifetorn region—and make our own lives more secure. Our role is to help the Lebanese put their country together, not to do it for them.

Now, I know another part of the world is very much on our minds, a place much closer to our shores: Grenada. The island is only twice the size of the District of Columbia, with a total population of about 110,000 people.

[. . .]

In 1979 trouble came to Grenada. Maurice Bishop, a protege of Fidel Castro, staged a military coup and

overthrew the government which had been elected under the constitution left to the people by the British. He sought the help of Cuba in building an airport, which he claimed was for tourist trade, but which looked suspiciously suitable for military aircraft, including Soviet-built long-range bombers.

The six sovereign countries and one remaining colony are joined together in what they call the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The six became increasingly alarmed as Bishop built an army greater than all of theirs combined. Obviously, it was not purely for defense.

In this last year or so, Prime Minister Bishop gave indications that he might like better relations with the United States. He even made a trip to our country and met with senior officials of the White House and the State Department. Whether he was serious or not, we'll never know. On October 12th, a small group in his militia seized him and put him under arrest. They were, if anything, more radical and more devoted to Castro's Cuba than he had been.

Several days later, a crowd of citizens appeared before Bishop's home, freed him, and escorted him toward the headquarters of the military council. They were fired upon. A number, including some children, were killed, and Bishop was seized. He and several members of his cabinet were subsequently executed, and a 24-hour shoot-to-kill curfew was put in effect. Grenada was without a government, its only authority exercised by a self-proclaimed band of military men.

There were then about 1,000 of our citizens on Grenada, 800 of them students in St. George's University Medical School. Concerned that they'd be harmed or held as hostages, I ordered a flotilla of ships, then on its way to Lebanon with marines, part of our regular rotation program, to circle south on a course that would put them somewhere in the vicinity of Grenada in case there should be a need to evacuate our people.

Last weekend, I was awakened in the early morning hours and told that six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, joined by Jamaica and Barbados, had sent an urgent request that we join them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada. They were proposing this action under the terms of a treaty, a mutual assistance pact that existed among them.

These small, peaceful nations needed our help. Three of them don't have armies at all, and the others have very limited forces. The legitimacy of their request, plus my own concern for our citizens, dictated my decision. I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated.

[. . .]

Two hours ago we released the first photos from Grenada. They included pictures of a warehouse of military equipment—one of three we've uncovered so far. This warehouse contained weapons and ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists. Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. Well, it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time.

I can't say enough in praise of our military—Army rangers and paratroopers, Navy, Marine, and Air Force personnel—those who planned a brilliant campaign and those who carried it out. Almost instantly, our military seized the two airports, secured the campus where most of our students were, and are now in the mopping-up phase.

It should be noted that in all the planning, a top priority was to minimize risk, to avoid casualties to our own men and also the Grenadian forces as much as humanly possible. But there were casualties, and we all owe a debt to those who lost their lives or were wounded. They were few in number, but even one is a tragic price to pay.

It's our intention to get our men out as soon as possible. . . .

The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted

and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were 30 Soviet advisers and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island. At the moment of our landing, we communicated with the Governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union and told them we would offer shelter and security to their people on Grenada. Regrettably, Castro ordered his men to fight to the death, and some did. The others will be sent to their homelands.

You know, there was a time when our national security was based on a standing army here within our own borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coasts, and, of course, a navy to keep the sea lanes open for the shipping of things necessary to our well-being. The world has changed. Today, our national security can be threatened in faraway places. It's up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be able to identify them.

Sam Rayburn once said that freedom is not something a nation can work for once and win forever. He said it's like an insurance policy; its premiums must be kept up to date. In order to keep it, we have to keep working for it and sacrificing for it just as long as we live. If we do not, our children may not know the pleasure of working to keep it, for it may not be theirs to keep.

[. . .]

Source: Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983,* Bk. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1517–1522.

141. Ronald Reagan: Radio Address to the Nation on Nuclear Weapons, 29 October 1983

Introduction

Among the more controversial actions of Ronald Reagan's presidency was the installation of intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles in Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made the initial decision to upgrade these missiles in December 1979 as a means of countering the 1977 Soviet deployments of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in European Russia. In the early 1980s, Soviet-American arms control discussions on such weapons brought proposals that the European powers refrain from installing these missiles in exchange for the removal of their Soviet counterparts, but these proved unavailing. The apparent readiness of Reagan and several of his top advisors to contemplate nuclear warfare as a serious possibility alarmed many in both the United States and Europe, and in the early 1980s significant popular antinuclear protests and demonstrations occurred in all the potential host countries. Reagan firmly supported installation of the new missiles unless the Soviet Union made concessions on its own weapons, a stance he explained to the American people shortly before their deployment was scheduled to begin. NATO's announcement in November 1983 that installation of the new cruise and Pershing missiles was about to begin triggered further but unavailing demonstrations. The Soviet delegation promptly walked out of ongoing Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks and did not return until March 1985. Ultimately, the conclusion of the INF Treaty in 1987 brought the removal of both the SS-20s and their NATO counterparts.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Now today, I'd like to talk about a very important decision that was made Thursday by the Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, as it's commonly called. This decision has great importance for us and for the NATO Alliance as a whole, because it addresses the future size and composition of our shorter range nuclear forces in Europe.

As you know, we're negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva on the longer range missiles. The current imbalance on those systems is over 350 to 0 in their favor.

But with regard to the shorter range missiles, the tactical missiles, I think you'll be very pleased with today's news. But first, a little background.

The nuclear forces in Europe are fundamental to our overall strategy of deterrence and to protecting our allies and ourselves. The weapons strengthen NATO and protect the peace because they show that the alliance is committed to sharing the risks and the benefits of mutual defense. Just by being there, these weapons deter others from aggression and, thereby, serve the cause of peace. Unfortunately, we must keep them there until we can convince the Soviets and others that the best thing would be a world in which there is no further need for nuclear weapons at all.

The alliance's goal, as General Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, has so often said, is to maintain no more military forces than are absolutely necessary for deterrence and defense.

In December of 1979 NATO reached a decision to reduce immediately the number of shorter range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. In 1980 we carried out that decision by removing 1,000 of these weapons. The same decision also committed the alliance to a further review of the remaining systems of this category, and that brings us to our decision of Thursday.

Drawing on the recommendation put forward by a special, high-level study group, the NATO Defense Ministers decided that in addition to the 1,000 nuclear weapons which we withdrew in 1980, the overall size of the NATO nuclear stockpile could be reduced by an additional 1,400 weapons.

When these 2,400 weapons have been withdrawn, the United States will have reduced its nuclear weapons in Europe by over one-third from 1979 levels, and NATO will have the lowest number of nuclear weapons in 20 years. What this means is that the alliance will have removed at least five nuclear weapons for every new missile warhead we will deploy if the negotiations in Geneva don't lead to an agreement.

This step, taken by the alliance as a whole, stands in stark contrast to the actions of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders have so far refused to negotiate in good faith at the Geneva talks. Since our 1979 decision to reduce nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has added over 600 SS-20 warheads to their arsenal. Coupled with this, they offer threats and the acceleration of previous plans, which they now call countermeasures, if NATO carries through with its deployment plan intended to restore the balance.

The comparison of Soviet actions with NATO's reductions and restraint clearly illustrates once again that the so-called arms race has only one participant—the Soviet Union.

On Thursday NATO took a dramatic and far-reaching decision, a decision that puts us a giant step along the path toward increased stability in Europe and around the world. As we reduce our nuclear warheads in Europe and, of equal importance, take the necessary actions to maintain the effectiveness of the resulting force, we will continue in the future what we've accomplished so well in the past—to deter Soviet aggression. We seek peace and we seek security, and the NATO decision serves both.

Now, let me bring you up to date on the negotiations in Geneva. Progress toward an equitable, verifiable agreement on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear missiles has been slow to come. Most recently, I proposed three initiatives which go a long way toward meeting important concerns expressed by the Soviet Union. By our actions on the talks we have ensured that all of the elements of a mutually advantageous agreement are on the table. The Soviet Union has now advanced some additional proposals of its own. We'll study these proposals, and we'll address them in the talks in Geneva.

Unfortunately, the Soviet proposals permit them to retain SS-20 missiles while not allowing NATO to deploy its own. The proposals are also coupled with an explicit threat to break off the Geneva talks. I hope that the Soviet Union is truly interested in achieving an agreement. The test will be whether the Soviets, having advanced their latest proposals, decide finally to negotiate seriously in Geneva.

For our part, we continue to seek an equitable and verifiable agreement as quickly as possible. We will stay at the negotiating table for as long as necessary to achieve such an agreement.

Source: Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, Bk. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1524–1525.

142. The Mining of Nicaraguan Harbors, 9 April 1984

Introduction

The fiercely anticommunist administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan felt justified in taking every possible measure within its power to try to overthrow the radical Sandinista government headed by Daniel Ortega Saavedra that come to power in 1979 after the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Among these was the secret mining of Nicaraguan harbors in an effort to interdict commerce and prevent the movement of all shipping. In early 1984, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), based in nearby Honduras, repeatedly laid mines around Nicaraguan harbors and in some cases also attacked oil storage facilities and Nicaraguan vessels. On 28 February 1984 and again on 8 March, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann wrote to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and formally complained of several incidents in which Nicaraguan fishing boats and assorted Dutch, Soviet, Panamanian, and Cuban vessels suffered serious damage. Brockmann also complained to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. On 9 April 1984, the Nicaraguan government took its complaint to the International Court of Justice at The Hague seeking a temporary restraining order until the case was heard, whereby the United States would "immediately cease and refrain from any action restricting, blocking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines." On 10 May the Court issued this order. The U.S. government, however, refused to observe it and had already stated, on 6 April, that it would decline to recognize any International Court decisions relating to Latin American affairs. The State Department argued that these operations were justified, as the Sandinista government was assisting leftist rebels in San Salvador. Influential congressmen, including Senator Daniel Moynihan of New York, publicly criticized this stance, charging that it weakened the international institutions on which the United States itself often relied. Senator Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was particularly annoyed that the CIA director had not informed him before proceeding to mine Nicaraguan harbors. The mining was probably undertaken in defiance of the December 1982 Boland Amendment banning the use of government funding for operations intended to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, including payments to the anti-Sandinista Contra paramilitary forces of Nicaraguan exiles. The UN Security Council condemned U.S. sabotage operations against Nicaraguan harbors. In November 1984 the International Court ruled that it did possess jurisdiction over the matter, whereupon the U.S. government withdrew from the case. U.S. reluctance to accept the authority of international institutions seemed to many observers another instance of its characteristic arrogance of power and double standards, as American officials exhorted other nations to honor their undertakings to these organizations but itself refused to show respect for such bodies.

Primary Source

Communiqué Dated 20 March 1984 Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua announces the following:

At 1.40 P.M. today, the Soviet vessel *Lugansk*, which was carrying oil to our country, was damaged while heading past buoy No. 1 towards Puerto Sandino by an explosion caused by a device placed in that sector by mercenaries in the service of the United States Government. Five Soviet seamen were wounded as a result of that criminal action. Despite the above-mentioned terrorist action, this vessel is unloading the oil in the installations at Puerto Sandino.

This latest criminal attack is to be added to those perpetrated at Bluefields and Corinto in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans of Nicaragua, which together constitute

the *de facto* blockade which the United States Government is applying against Nicaragua, as part of its undeclared war against the Nicaraguan people.

It also once again confirms the aggressive and criminal character of the policy of State terrorism pursued by the Reagan administration in its desire to restore its domination over our country.

As well as deploring the fact that Soviet seamen, in addition to the Dutch and Central American seamen affected previously, have fallen victim to the senseless policy of the United States Government, the Government of Nicaragua denounces the danger which the indiscriminate laying of mines and explosive charges poses to international shipping along the coasts of Central America.

The Government of Nicaragua reiterates its readiness to continue to struggle for peace in the Central American area and again appeals to the international community to provide Nicaragua with the necessary technical and military means to defend itself against the State terrorism unleashed by the United States Government.

Letter to CIA Director Casey from Sen. Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
April 9, 1984.
Hon. William J. Casey,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.

Dear Bill:

All this past weekend, I've been trying to figure out how I can most easily tell you my feelings about the discovery of the President having approved mining some of the harbors of Central America.

It gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off!

I understand you had briefed the House on this matter. I've heard that. Now, during the important debate we had all last week and the week before, on whether we would increase funds for the Nicaragua program, we were doing all right, until a Member of the Committee charged that the President had approved the mining. I strongly denied that because I had never heard of it. I found out the next day that the CIA had, with the written approval of the President, engaged in such mining, and the approval came in February!

Bill, this is no way to run a railroad and I find myself in a hell of a quandary. I am forced to apologize to the Members of the Intelligence Committee because I did not know the facts on this. At the same time, my counterpart in the House did know.

The President has asked us to back his foreign policy. Bill, how can we back his foreign policy when we don't know what the hell he is doing? Lebanon, yes, we all knew that he sent troops over there. But mine the harbors in Nicaragua? This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I don't see how we are going to explain it.

My simple guess is that the House is going to defeat this supplemental [aid request] and we will not be in any position to put up much of an argument after we were not given the information we were entitled to receive; particularly, if my memory serves me correctly, when you briefed us on Central America just a couple of weeks ago. And the order was signed before that.

I don't like this. I don't like it one bit from the President or from you. I don't think we need a lot of lengthy explanations. The deed has been done and, in the future, if anything like this happens, I'm going to raise one hell of a lot of fuss about it in public.

Sincerely,

Barry Goldwater, Chairman.

Source: "Communiqué Dated 20 March 1984 Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua," Warlaw, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/US-mining-nicaragua-harbors.html, and Congressional Record, 102 Cong., 1st sess., 5 November 1991, p. S15923, Library of Congress, Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/.

143. Deng Xiaoping: "Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," 30 June 1984

Introduction

After the death in 1976 of China's paramount leader, Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong, a power struggle ensued within the Politburo between radicals, notably the Gang of Four centering around Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, and pragmatists led by Deng Xiaoping, a veteran revolutionary leader then in his early seventies. The Gang of Four was quickly ousted, arrested, and put on trial, and after several years of maneuvering Deng eventually relegated Hua Guofeng, Mao's handpicked successor, to the political sidelines. From 1976 onward as Deng engineered his ascent to political power, he skillfully discredited the extremist Cultural Revolution and those associated with it. Putting a new emphasis on effective economic reform and development, from the late 1970s he broke with Mao's ideological purity and encouraged what he termed "socialism with Chinese characteristics," a phrase that covered a wide variety of quasi-capitalist practices. Deng aimed to modernize China's agriculture, industry, science and technology, and military institutions through a socialist market economy, one that represented an amalgam of statism and capitalism and ensured that the entire population shared in the benefits of economic development. He sought to quadruple China's gross national product by the year 2000. He expected reform to begin in the cities and eventually revitalize the more backward rural areas. Such practices were, he argued, best suited to China's particular conditions. Reforms were often devised by local leaders, drawing on their knowledge of conditions in their areas and, if they were successful, were gradually extended beyond their place of origin. Market mechanisms became increasingly important, and efficient management was valued more highly than ideological correctness, a major change from the years of Mao. Deng promoted a major Chinese rapprochement with Western powers, seeking access to their technological and scientific expertise. Whereas in the Soviet Union during the 1980s economic reform went hand in hand with a new openness and the weakening of communist rule, in China the Communist Party still exercised strict control over political and intellectual life and was determined to maintain its monopoly of power. This became brutally apparent in 1989 when students and workers mounted a major challenge to the party's rule and on Deng's orders were ruthlessly suppressed.

Primary Source

Since the defeat of the Gang of Four and the convocation of the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Eleventh Central Committee, we have formulated the correct ideological, political and organizational lines as well as a series of principles and policies. What is the ideological line? To adhere to Marxism and to Marxist dialectical and historical materialism, or in other words, to seek truth from facts as advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong. Adherence to Marxism is vital to China and so is adherence to socialism. For more than a century since the Opium War, China was subjected to aggression and humiliation. It is because the Chinese people embraced Marxism and kept to the road leading from New Democracy to socialism that the Chinese revolution was victorious.

People may ask: If China had taken the capitalist instead of the socialist road, could the Chinese people have liberated themselves and could China have finally stood up? The Kuomintang took that road for more than 20 years and proved that it does not work. By contrast, the Chinese Communists, by adhering to Marxism and integrating Marxism with actual conditions in China in accordance with Mao Zedong Thought, took their own road and succeeded in the revolution by encircling the cities from the countryside. Conversely, if we had not been Marxists, or if we had not integrated Marxism with Chinese conditions and followed our own road, China would have remained fragmented, with neither independence nor unity. China simply had to adhere to Marxism. If we had not fully believed in Marxism, the Chinese revolution would never have succeeded. That belief was the motive force. After the founding of the People's Republic, if we had taken the capitalist rather than the socialist road, we would not have ended the chaos in the country or changed its conditions—inflation, unstable prices, poverty and

backwardness. We started from a backward past. There was virtually no industry for us to inherit from old China, and we did not have enough grain for food. Some people ask why we chose socialism. We answer that we had to because capitalism would get China nowhere. We must solve the problems of feeding and employing the population and of reunifying China. That is why we have repeatedly declared that we shall adhere to Marxism and keep to the socialist road. But by Marxism we mean Marxism that is integrated with Chinese conditions, and by socia1ism we mean socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has Chinese characteristics.

What is socialism and what is Marxism? We were not quite clear about this before. Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the productive forces. We advocate communism. But what does that mean? It means the principle of from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs, which calls for highly developed productive forces and overwhelming material wealth. Therefore, the fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces. The superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated by faster and greater development of the productive forces than under the capitalist system. One of our shortcomings since the founding of the People's Republic was that we neglected the development of the productive forces. Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism. The superiority of the socialist system lies above all in its ability to increasingly develop the productive forces and to improve the people's material and cultural life. The problem facing us now is how China, which is still backward, is to develop the productive forces and improve the people's living standards. This brings us back to the point of whether to continue on the socialist road or to stop and turn onto the capitalist road. The capitalist road can only enrich less than 10 per cent of the Chinese population; it can never enrich the 90 per cent. That is why we must adhere to socialism. The socialist principle of distribution to each according to his work will not create an excessive gap in wealth. Consequently, no polarization will occur as our productive forces become developed over the next 20 to 30 years.

The minimum target of our four modernizations is to achieve a comparatively comfortable standard of living by the end of the century. I first mentioned this with former prime minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan during his visit here in December 1979. By a comfortable standard we mean that per capita GNP will reach U.S. $800. That is a low level for you, but it is really ambitious for us. China has a population of 1 billion now and it will reach 1.2 billion by then. If, when the GNP reaches $1,000 billion, we applied the capitalist principle of distribution, it wouldn't amount to much and couldn't help to eliminate poverty and backwardness. Less than 10 per cent of the population would enjoy a better life, while over 90 per cent remained in poverty. But the socialist principle of distribution can enable all the people to become relatively comfortable. This is why we want to uphold socialism. Without socialism, China can never achieve that goal.

However, only talking about this is not enough. The present world is an open one. China's past backwardness was due to its closed-door policy. After the founding of the People's Republic, we were blockaded by others, and so the country remained closed to some extent, which created difficulties for us. Some "Left" policies and the "cultural revolution" in particular were disastrous for us. In short, the experience of the past 30 years or more proves that a closed-door policy would hinder construction and inhibit development. Therefore, the ideological line formulated at the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Eleventh Central Committee is to adhere to the principles of integrating Marxism with Chinese conditions, seeking truth from facts, linking theory with practice and proceeding from reality. In other words, the line is to adhere to the essence of Comrade Mao Zedong's thought. Our political line focuses on the four modernizations, on continuing to develop the productive forces. Nothing short of a world war would make us release our grip on this essential point. Even should world war break out, we would engage in reconstruction after the war. A closed-door policy would not help construction. There are two kinds of exclusion: one is directed against other countries; the other is directed against China itself, with one region or department closing its doors to the others. We are suggesting that we should develop a little faster

—just a little, because it would be unrealistic to go too fast. To do this, we have to invigorate the domestic economy and open up to the outside. We must first of all solve the problem of the countryside, which contains 80 per cent of the population. China's stability depends on the stability of the countryside with this 80 per cent—this is the reality of China from which we should proceed. No matter how successful our work in the cities is, it won't mean much without the stable base of the countryside. Therefore, we must first of all solve the problem of the countryside by invigorating the economy and adopting an open policy so as to bring the initiative of 80 per cent of the population into full play. We adopted this policy at the end of 1978, and after several years in operation it has produced the desired results.

The recent Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress decided to shift the focus of reform from the countryside to the cities. The urban reform includes not only industry and commerce but science, education and all other professions as well. In short, we shall continue the reform at home. As for our relations with foreign countries, we shall pursue the policy of opening up still wider to the outside world. We have opened 14 medium and large coastal cities. We welcome foreign investment and advanced techniques. Management is also a kind of technique. Will they undermine our socialism? Not likely, because the socialist economy is our mainstay. Our socialist economic base is so huge that it can absorb tens and hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of foreign funds without shaking the socialist foundation. Besides, we adhere to the socialist principle of distribution and do not tolerate economic polarization. Thus, foreign investment will doubtless serve as a major supplement to the building of socialism in our country. And as things stand now, this supplement is indispensable. Naturally, some problems will arise in the wake of foreign investment. But the negative aspects are far less significant than the positive use we can make of it to accelerate our development. It may entail a slight risk, but not much.

Well, those are our plans. We shall accumulate experience and try new solutions as new problems arise. In general, we believe the road we have chosen—building socialism with Chinese characteristics—is the right one and will work. We have followed this road for five and a half years and have achieved satisfactory results. We want to quadruple China's GNP by the end of the century. The pace of development has so far exceeded our projections. And so I can tell our friends that we are even more confident now.

Source: Deng Xiaoping, *Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), 53–58.

144. Summary of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 2 October 1986

Introduction

During the Cold War, the U.S. government often tolerated undemocratic and illiberal behavior so long as the states in question were anticommunist and could therefore be considered allies, whether formal or informal. Successive presidential administrations chose to largely ignore the racist policies the Union of South Africa adopted after World War II, when the country established a system of segregation dividing people into three categories: blacks, whites, and coloreds. Only whites had full political and economic rights, social interactions among races were discouraged and sexual relations forbidden, and blacks were forbidden to live in white-only areas and relegated to menial occupations. From the 1950s onward as increasing numbers of African states won independence from their former colonial overlords and were able to express their views in the United Nations (UN), the British Commonwealth, and similar forums, international resentment and condemnation of South Africa's racial policies intensified. In 1961 South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth, many of whose other member states were strongly advocating the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963, likewise called on other nations to impose economic sanctions against South Africa and break diplomatic

relations with it. In 1976 hundreds of black South Africans died in riots in Soweto protesting inequalities in education. In November 1977 the UN imposed an arms embargo on South Africa. By the late 1970s numerous states refused to trade with or recognize South Africa, many U.S. companies refused to do business or invest there, and South African athletes were banned from international sports events. When Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, his administration announced that it did not favor economic sanctions on South Africa and would follow a policy of constructive engagement. The State Department initiated substantial relaxations of sanctions and other controls imposed by previous administrations, measures that attracted strong criticism from black South African nationalists, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu in 1984. In 1985 major racial violence and protests erupted in the South African townships, causing the government to declare a state of emergency. France introduced a UN resolution calling on member states to impose voluntary sanctions against South Africa, and later that year Reagan announced limited economic sanctions against South Africa. Congress remained unsatisfied and, despite strong opposition from the Reagan administration, in October 1986 overrode a presidential veto and passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Although less strict than the House of Representatives had initially proposed, the act banned loans and new investment in South Africa by American firms, prohibited trade in major categories of exports and imports, broke air links, forbade American banks to accept South African government deposits, and outlawed cooperation between U.S. government agencies and South Africa in military affairs, trade, and tourism. The act represented a major defeat for the Reagan administration, and the president issued a brief statement warning that "punitive sanctions" would only cause "violence and more repression." Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, left the sanctions in place despite pressure from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to lift them. Antiapartheid activists in South Africa as well as South African Central Bank Governor Gerhard de Kock subsequently suggested that international economic sanctions played an appreciable role in weakening the South African government to the point that in 1989 it opened negotiations with African National Congress (ANC) leaders, talks that eventually led to the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment in 1993 of a multiracial South African state.

Primary Source

Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986—Title I: Policy of the United States with respect to ending apartheid—Requires U.S. policy toward South Africa to be designed to bring about the establishment of a nonracial democracy in South Africa. Sets forth actions that the United States shall encourage South Africa to take, including releasing Nelson Mandela and establishing a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws. Requires the United States to adjust its actions toward South Africa to reflect the progress made by South Africa in establishing a nonracial democracy.

Declares that U.S. policy toward the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress, and their affiliates shall be designed to bring about a suspension of violence that will lead to the start of negotiations. Requires the United States to work toward this goal by encouraging such organizations, through diplomatic and political measures, to: (1) suspend terrorist activities; (2) make known their commitment to a free and democratic post-apartheid South Africa; (3) agree to enter into negotiations for the peaceful solution to South Africa's problems; and (4) reexamine their ties to the South African Communist Party. Requires the United States to adjust its actions toward South Africa not only to reflect progress or lack of progress made by South Africa in establishing a nonracial democracy but also to reflect progress or lack of progress made by such organizations in bringing about a suspension of violence.

Declares that U.S. policy toward the victims of apartheid is to use economic, political, diplomatic, and other means to remove the apartheid system and to assist the victims of apartheid to overcome the handicaps imposed on them by apartheid. Sets forth actions the United States will take to help the victims of apartheid.

Declares that U.S. policy toward the other countries in the region shall be designed to encourage democratic forms of government, respect for human rights, political independence, and economic development. Sets

forth actions the United States will take toward such countries.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should discuss with the African "frontline" states the effects of disruptions in economic links through South Africa.

Declares that it is U.S. policy to promote negotiations among representatives of all citizens of South Africa to determine a future political system.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that high-level U.S. officials should meet with leaders of opposition organizations in South Africa and should, in concert with other interested parties, try to bring together opposition political leaders with South African Government leaders for negotiations to achieve a transition to the post-apartheid democracy envisioned in this Act.

Declares that the United States will encourage all participants in the negotiations to respect the right of all South Africans to participate in the political process without fear of retribution. Requires the United States to work for an agreement to suspend violence and begin negotiations through coordinated actions with the major Western allies and with the governments of the countries in the region.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that the achievement of such an agreement could be promoted if the United States and its major allies would meet to develop a plan to provide multilateral assistance for South Africa in return for South Africa implementing: (1) an end to the state of emergency and the release of political prisoners; (2) the unbanning of groups willing to suspend terrorism and to participate in negotiations and a democratic process; (3) a revocation of the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act and the granting of universal citizenship to all South Africans, including homeland residents; and (4) the use of a third party to bring about negotiations to establish power-sharing with the black majority.

Urges the President to seek cooperation among all individuals, groups, and nations to end apartheid.

[. . .]

Expresses the sense of the Senate that the U.S. Ambassador should request a meeting with Nelson Mandela.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that U.S. employers operating in South Africa are obliged both generally to oppose apartheid and specifically to recruit and train black and colored South Africans for management responsibilities.

Title II: Measures to Assist Victims of Apartheid—Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to earmark a specified amount of the education and human resources development assistance funds for each of FY 1987 through 1989 to finance education, training, and scholarships for the victims of apartheid. Authorizes the use of Economic Support Fund monies for such purposes in lieu of an equal amount made through the education and human resources development assistance.

Requires the use of Economic Support Fund monies, in addition to the funds used for purposes described in the preceding paragraph, to finance scholarships for students pursuing secondary school education in South Africa. Requires the selection of such scholarship recipients to be by a nationwide panel or by regional panels appointed by the U.S. chief of diplomatic mission to South Africa. Authorizes the use of up to $1,000,000 of Economic Support Fund assistance for such purposes for each of FY 1987 through FY 1989.

Requires assistance to be provided for inservice teacher training programs in South Africa through nongovernmental organizations. Authorizes the use of up to $500,000 for FY 1987 and up to $1,000,000 for FY 1988 for such purposes.

Requires priority to be given, in providing assistance for disadvantaged South Africans, to working with and through South African nongovernmental organizations whose leadership and staff are selected on a nonracial basis and which have the support of the disadvantaged communities being served.

[. . .]

Requires the Secretary of State (the Secretary) and any other head of a Federal agency carrying out activities in South Africa to try, in procuring goods and services, to assist businesses having more than 50 percent beneficial ownership by nonwhite South Africans.

Amends the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to require the Export-Import Bank to take active steps to encourage the use of its guarantee, insurance, and credit facilities in connection with South African businesses that are majority owned by nonwhite South Africans. Exempts from a specified certification requirement exports to or purchases from such businesses.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that the labor practices used by the U.S. Government in South Africa should represent the best of U.S. labor practices and should serve as a model for U.S. nationals in South Africa. Requires the Secretary and the heads of other agencies carrying out activities in South Africa to ensure that the labor practices used in South Africa are governed by a specified Code of Conduct.

[. . .]

Requires any U.S. national who employs more than 25 persons in South Africa to insure that the Code of Conduct is implemented. Prohibits U.S. intercession with any foreign government or foreign nation on behalf of any U.S. national employing more than 25 persons in South Africa if such U.S. national does not implement the Code of Conduct.

Declares that the Code of Conduct is as follows: (1) desegregating employment facilities; (2) providing equal employment opportunity for all employees; (3) assuring that the pay system is applied to all employees; (4) establishing a minimum wage and salary structure; (5) increasing the number of persons in managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs who are disadvantaged by apartheid; (6) taking reasonable steps to improve the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment; and (7) implementing fair labor practices by recognizing the right of all employees to unionize.

[. . .]

Title III: Measures by the United States to Undermine Apartheid—Prohibits importing from South Africa: (1) any gold coin minted in South Africa or sold by its Government; and (2) arms, ammunition, or military vehicles or any manufacturing data for such articles. Prohibits the importation of any article grown, produced, or manufactured by a South African parastatal organization (an organization owned or controlled by the South African Government other than an organization that received start-up funding from the South African Industrial Development Corporation but is now privately owned) except for: (1) agricultural products during the 12 months following enactment; (2) certain strategic minerals; and (3) articles to be imported pursuant to a contract entered into before August 15, 1986, provided no shipments may be received by a U.S. national under such contract after April 1, 1987.

Prohibits exporting computers, computer software, or computer technology to or for the use of: (1) the South African military, police, prison system, national security agencies; (2) ARMSCOR and its subsidiaries or the weapons research activities of the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; (3) the administering authorities for apartheid; (4) any apartheid enforcing agency; or (5) any governmental entity which performs any of the above functions.

Permits exports of computers, computer software and technology to South Africa for other purposes only if a system of end use verification is in effect to ensure that the computers involved will not be used for any function of any of the entities listed above.

Prohibits any U.S. national from making or approving any loan to the South African Government or to any entity owned or controlled by such government. Exempts from such prohibition: (1) loans for any education, housing, or humanitarian benefit which is available to all persons on a nondiscriminatory basis or is available in a geographic area accessible to all population groups; or (2) loans entered into before enactment of this Act.

[. . .]

Prohibits, unless the Secretary certifies to the Speaker of the House and the chair of the Senate Foreign Rela-

tions Committee that South Africa maintains certain international nuclear safeguards: (1) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from issuing a license for the export to South Africa of certain nuclear facilities, material, technology, or components; (2) the Secretary of Commerce from issuing a license for the export to South Africa of certain goods or technology that may be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes; (3) the Secretary of Energy from authorizing any person to engage in the production of special nuclear material in South Africa; and (4) any executive branch agency or the NRC from approving the retransfer of nuclear goods or technology to South Africa. Exempts certain exports, retransfers, or other activities from such prohibition if specified conditions are met.

Prohibits a U.S. depository institution from accepting, receiving, or holding a deposit account from the South African Government or from any entity owned or controlled by South Africa.

Prohibits importing into the United States from South Africa any uranium ore, uranium oxide, coal, or textiles.

Prohibits any U.S. national from making any new investment in South Africa, effective 45 days after enactment of this Act. Exempts firms owned by black South Africans.

Terminates the sanctions contained in title III of this Act and certain sanctions contained in title V of this Act if South Africa: (1) releases political prisoners and Nelson Mandela from prison; (2) repeals the state of emergency and releases all detainees held under such state of emergency; (3) unbans political parties and permits political freedom for all races; (4) repeals the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act and institutes no other measures with the same purposes; and (5) agrees to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions.

Authorizes the President, unless the Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, to suspend or modify such sanctions after the President determines and reports to the Speaker of the House and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations committee that South Africa has: (1) released Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; (2) taken three of the four actions listed in phrases (2) through (5) in the preceding paragraph; and (3) made substantial progress toward dismantling apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy.

Declares that it is U.S. policy to support negotiations with the representatives of all communities. Declares that the United States will support negotiations which do not include the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress, or other organizations if the: (1) South African Government agrees to enter into negotiations without preconditions, abandons unprovoked violence against its opponents, commits itself to a free and democratic post-apartheid South Africa; and (2) African National Congress, the Pan African Congress, or other organizations refuse to participate or if such organizations refuse to abandon unprovoked violence during such negotiations and refuse to commit themselves to a free and democratic post-apartheid South Africa.

Declares that U.S. policy toward violence in South Africa shall be designed to end such violence and to promote negotiations. Declares that the United States shall work through diplomatic and other measures, to isolate those who promote terrorist attacks on unarmed civilians and those who provide assistance to such individuals.

[. . .]

Title IV: Multilateral Measures to Undermine Apartheid —Declares that it is U.S. policy to seek international cooperative agreements with other industrialized democracies to end apartheid. Declares that: (1) negotiations to reach such agreements should begin promptly and should be concluded within 180 days of enactment of this Act; and (2) the President should convene an international conference of the other industrialized democracies in order to reach such agreements. Requires the President to report to the Congress on such efforts.

Authorizes the President to modify specified sanctions imposed under title III of this Act to conform with such an agreement. Declares that each such agreement shall enter into force and effect if: (1) the President, at

least 30 days before entering into such agreement, notifies the Congress of the intention to enter into such agreement and publishes such notice; (2) after entering into the agreement, the President sends a copy of the agreement and certain other materials to the Congress; and (3) the Congress does not adopt a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 days of transmittal of such documents.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should propose that the United Nations impose the same type of measures against South Africa as are imposed by this Act.

Authorizes the President to limit the importation into the United States of any product or service of a foreign country to the extent that such country benefits from restrictions imposed on U.S. nationals by this Act.

Creates a private right of action for U.S. nationals who are required to terminate or curtail business in South Africa against anyone who benefits or takes commercial advantage of such termination or curtailment.

Title V: Future Policy Toward South Africa—Declares that it is U.S. policy to impose additional measures against South Africa if substantial progress has not been made within 12 months of enactment of this Act in ending apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy.

Requires the President to report annually to the Speaker of the House and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee beginning one year after enactment of this Act on the extent to which significant progress has been made toward ending apartheid. Requires the report to contain a recommended additional measure if the President determines that South Africa has not made significant progress in ending apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy. Provides for expedited congressional consideration of a joint resolution which would enact such additional measures.

Authorizes the President to lift any prohibition against South Africa contained in this Act if the President reports to the Congress, after six months from the date of the imposition of such prohibition, that such prohibition would increase U.S. dependence upon member or observer countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for coal or any strategic and critical material by a specified amount. Requires the Secretary of Commerce to report to the Congress on the imports of such coal and materials. Requires the President to submit periodic reports on such imports to the Congress.

Requires the Secretary to report to the Congress by December 1, 1986, on the health condition and extent of starvation and malnutrition in the "homelands" areas of South Africa.

Requires the President to report to the Congress, within 90 days of enactment of this Act, on the extent to which the United States is dependent on imports from South Africa of chromium, cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals, ferroalloys, and other strategic and critical materials. Requires the President to develop a program which reduces the U.S. dependence on such imports.

[. . .]

Requires the President to submit to specified congressional officials, within 90 days of enactment of this Act, a report on the activities of the Communist Party in South Africa.

Prohibits any person from importing any gold coin minted in, or offered for sale by, the Soviet Union.

[. . .]

Source: "Summary of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act," International Labour Organization, http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/guide/antia.htm.

145. Ronald Reagan: Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, 12 June 1987

Introduction

After Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Partyof the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, Soviet relations with the West gradually improved. Gorbachev initially sought to reform rather than destroy communism in the Soviet Union through policies of economic restructuring (perestroika) and openness (glasnost). He also began to rein back Soviet military spending and overseas interventions, and he made serious overtures for cuts in nuclear and conventional forces. While responding to such overtures with growing enthusiasm, U.S. President Ronald Reagan remained a staunch anticommunist and was as unwilling as ever to appear to countenance Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Speaking at the Brandenburg Gate in 1987, the symbolic heart of Berlin, Reagan urged Gorbachev to "tear down this wall" and allow the people of East Germany to choose their own destiny. Less than three years later, in November 1989, Reagan's hopes were fulfilled, as Gorbachev relaxed Soviet control of Eastern Europe and the people of Berlin demolished the Berlin Wall themselves.

Primary Source

[. . .]

Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East. To those listening throughout Eastern Europe, a special word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you, as I join your fellow countrymen in the West, in this firm, this unalterable belief: Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.]

Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, south, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same—still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin where the wall emerges most clearly; here, cutting across your city, where the news photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of the world. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar.

President von Weizsacker has said, "The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed." Today I say: As long as the gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even in the shadow of this wall, a message of triumph.

[. . .]

In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I saw a display commemorating this 40th anniversary of the Marshall plan. I was struck by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure that was being rebuilt. I understand that Berliners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the Western sectors of the city. The sign read simply: "The Marshall plan is helping here to strengthen the free world." A strong, free world in the West, that dream became real. Japan rose from ruin to become an economic giant. Italy, France, Belgium—virtually every nation in Western Europe saw political and economic rebirth; the European Community was founded.

In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty—that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of

speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled.

Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany—busy office blocks, fine homes and apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of park land. Where a city's culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theaters, and museums. Where there was want, today there's abundance—food, clothing, automobiles—the wonderful goods of the Ku'damm. From devastation, from utter ruin, you Berliners have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on earth. The Soviets may have had other plans. But my friends, there were a few things the Soviets didn't count on—Berliner Herz, Berliner Humor, ja, und Berliner Schnauze. [Berliner heart, Berliner humor, yes, and a Berliner Schnauze.]

In the 1950s, Khrushchev predicted: "We will bury you." But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind—too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor.

And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace.

There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent—and I pledge to you my country's efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a counter-deployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Soviets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the alliance, in turn, prepared to go forward with its counter-deployment, there were difficult days—days of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city—and the Soviets later walked away from the table.

But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then—I invite those who protest today—to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. And because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in Iceland to review the progress of our proposals for eliminating these weapons. At the talks in Geneva, we have also proposed deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. And the Western allies have likewise made far-reaching proposals to reduce

the danger of conventional war and to place a total ban on chemical weapons.

[. . .]

In Europe, only one nation and those it controls refuse to join the community of freedom. Yet in this age of redoubled economic growth, of information and innovation, the Soviet Union faces a choice: It must make fundamental changes, or it will become obsolete. Today thus represents a moment of hope. We in the West stand ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness, to break down barriers that separate people, to create a safe, freer world.

And surely there is no better place than Berlin, the meeting place of East and West, to make a start. Free people of Berlin: Today, as in the past, the United States stands for the strict observance and full implementation of all parts of the Four Power Agreement of 1971. Let us use this occasion, the 750th anniversary of this city, to usher in a new era, to seek a still fuller, richer life for the Berlin of the future. Together, let us maintain and develop the ties between the Federal Republic and the Western sectors of Berlin, which is permitted by the 1971 agreement.

[. . .]

In these four decades, as I have said, you Berliners have built a great city. You've done so in spite of threats—the Soviet attempts to impose the East-mark, the blockade. Today the city thrives in spite of the challenges implicit in the very presence of this wall. What keeps you here? Certainly there's a great deal to be said for your fortitude, for your defiant courage. But I believe there's something deeper, something that involves Berlin's whole look and feel and way of life—not mere sentiment. No one could live long in Berlin without being completely disabused of illusions. Something instead, that has seen the difficulties of life in Berlin but chose to accept them, that continues to build this good and proud city in contrast to a surrounding totalitarian presence that refuses to release human energies or aspirations. Something that speaks with a powerful voice of affirmation, that says yes to this city, yes to the future, yes to freedom. In a word, I would submit that what keeps you in Berlin is love—love both profound and abiding.

Perhaps this gets to the root of the matter, to the most fundamental distinction of all between East and West. The totalitarian world produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit, thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to worship. The totalitarian world finds even symbols of love and of worship an affront. Years ago, before the East Germans began rebuilding their churches, they erected a secular structure: the television tower at Alexander Platz. Virtually ever since, the authorities have been working to correct what they view as the tower's one major flaw, treating the glass sphere at the top with paints and chemicals of every kind. Yet even today when the sun strikes that sphere—that sphere that towers over all Berlin—the light makes the sign of the cross. There in Berlin, like the city itself, symbols of love, symbols of worship, cannot be suppressed.

As I looked out a moment ago from the Reichstag, that embodiment of German unity, I noticed words crudely spray-painted upon the wall, perhaps by a young Berliner: "This wall will fall. Beliefs become reality." Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom.

[. . .]

Source: Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1987*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 634–638.

146. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 8 December 1987

Introduction

The installation of short-range and intermediate-range cruise missiles in several West European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies—Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands—in 1983 was one of

the most visible signs that the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan was sincere in adopting more assertive policies toward Soviet communism. The new missile deployments gave rise to extensive antinuclear protests throughout Western Europe and fueled fears that the bellicose Reagan was eager to provoke outright war with the Soviet Union. Ironically, a few years later the controversial missiles would be removed. After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, he sought new disarmament agreements with the United States. At a summit meeting in Washington, D.C., on 8 December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed a treaty eliminating all intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles, the first time any such agreement had removed entire classes of nuclear weapons. The signing of this treaty, which entered into force on 1 June 1988, offered dramatic proof that the warming of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States was genuine and significant.

Primary Source

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

[. . .]

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:
   (i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;
   (ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;
   (iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range

missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

ARTICLE VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

[. . .]

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

[. . .]

ARTICLE XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or
(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles," 8 December 1987, Senate Treaty Document 100-11, 100th Congress, 2nd sess.

147. Mikhail Gorbachev: Statement on Afghanistan, 9 February 1988

Introduction

Intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 embroiled the Soviet Union in a lengthy, costly, and ultimately unwinnable war in rugged mountainous terrain against tribal Afghan guerrilla forces, the fundamentalist Islamic mujahideen. Although equipped with armored cars, tanks, and heavy artillery, the Soviet Army had little training in guerrilla warfare, and much of its weaponry proved ineffective against these opponents. The war was fought with great brutality on both sides, with the Soviets using helicopters, fighter-bombers, and bombers in a scorched-earth policy designed to raze enemy territory, regardless of civilian casualties. The military situation nonetheless remained one of stalemate. Internationally, the Soviet action attracted severe condemnation, as the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, although unable to take any concrete action due to the Soviet veto power on the Security Council, voted repeatedly for resolutions that "strongly deplored" the invasion and called on the Soviets to withdraw, while the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference almost immediately demanded the removal of Soviet forces. The Afghan resistance movement received funding, weaponry (notably FIM-92 Stinger antiaircraft missile systems), and training from the United States, and its members were able to take shelter in camps in neighboring Pakistan. Pakistani special forces quietly took part in the war, and British and U.S. special services were also believed to be involved. China, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim states also contributed funds to the mujahideen. By 1987, resistance forces were launching rocket attacks on the Afghan capital of Kabul and seemed likely to take it and overthrow the government in the near future. The war was expensive and highly unpopular in the Soviet Union, as more than 15,000 young soldiers died in combat and many more were wounded. Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov publicly denounced Soviet policies in Afghanistan and called for peace negotiations. In November 1986 a new Afghan government, headed by Mohammad Najibullah, former chief of the Afghan secret police, took office and announced policies of national reconciliation. Peace talks were opened between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in March 1988 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev publicly stated that effective 15 May 1988, a withdrawal of Soviet troops would begin, to be completed by March 1989. The future of Afghanistan would, he said, now belong to the Afghans, and he would be happy if Afghanistan chose to become "an independent, nonaligned and neutral state." Gorbachev's declaration effectively represented a defeat for the Soviet Union. In April 1988 Afghanistan and Pakistan finally reached agreement on peace terms, with the Soviet Union and the United States acting as joint guarantors. Soviet troops left on schedule, with the last departing in

March 1989, but bitter civil war continued in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the country would fall under the control of the radical Islamic Taliban and provide a haven for the Muslim terrorists linked with the al-Qaeda organization that mounted the successful airborne attacks of 11 September 2001 on landmark American buildings in Washington, D.C., and New York.

Primary Source

The military conflict in Afghanistan has been going on for a long time now. It is one of the most severe and most painful regional conflicts. Now, from all indications, definite prerequisites have been created for its political settlement. In this connection, the Soviet leadership deems it necessary to express its views and to completely clarify its position.

The next round of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, through the personal representative of the UN Secretary-General, will take place in Geneva in the near future. There is a significant chance that the coming round will be the final one.

At present, the drafting of documents covering all aspects of a settlement has almost been completed at the Geneva talks. Among these documents are Afghan-Pakistani agreements on noninterference in each other's internal affairs and on the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan; international guarantees of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan; and a document on the interrelationship of all elements of a political settlement. There is also an accord on creating a verification mechanism.

What remains to be done? A timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan that is acceptable to all sides must be established. Yes, a timetable, since we, in accord with the Afghan leadership, adopted a fundamental political decision on the withdrawal of Soviet troops some time ago, something that was announced at the time.

[. . .]

Seeking to promote a rapid and successful conclusion of the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva, the governments of the USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan have agreed to set a specific date for beginning the withdrawal of Soviet troops—May 15, 1988—and to complete their withdrawal over a period of 10 months. This date has been set based on the assumption that the agreements on a settlement will be signed no later than March 15, 1988, and, accordingly, that they will all go into effect simultaneously two months later. If the agreements are signed before March 15, the troop withdrawal will, accordingly, begin earlier.

[. . .]

Any armed conflict, including an internal one, is capable of poisoning the atmosphere in an entire region and of creating a situation of uneasiness and alarm for the neighbors of the country involved, not to mention the sufferings of and casualties among the people of the country itself. That is why we are opposed to all armed conflicts. We know that the Afghan leadership holds the same position.

As is known, all this led the Afghan leadership, headed by President Najibullah, to a profound rethinking of its political course, a process that resulted in a patriotic and realistic policy of national reconciliation. We are talking about a very bold and courageous action: It is not merely a call to end armed clashes but a proposal to create a coalition government and to share power with the opposition, including those who are waging an armed struggle against the government, and even with those who are abroad directing the actions of the rebels and supplying them with weapons and combat equipment obtained from foreign states. This has been proposed by a government that is invested with constitutional authority and wields real power in the country.

The policy of national reconciliation is an expression of new political thinking on the Afghan side. It shows not weakness but the strength of spirit, wisdom and dignity of free, honest and responsible political leaders who are concerned about their country's present and future.

The success of the policy of national reconciliation has already made it possible to begin the withdrawal of

Soviet troops from parts of Afghan territory. At present, there are no Soviet troops in 13 Afghan provinces, because armed clashes there have stopped. It is completely possible to say that the sooner peace is established on Afghan soil, the easier it will be for Soviet troops to leave.

The policy of national reconciliation has provided a political platform for all those who want peace in Afghanistan. What kind of peace? The kind that the Afghan people want. The proud, freedom-loving and valiant Afghan people, whose history of struggle for freedom and independence goes back many centuries, have been, are and will be the masters of their country, which is based, as President Najibullah has said, on the principles of multiple parties in the political field and multiple structures in the economic field.

The Afghans themselves will determine the ultimate status of their country among other states. Most often, it is said that the future, peaceful Afghanistan will be an independent, nonaligned and neutral stare. Well, we will be nothing but happy to have such a neighbor on our southern borders.

[. . .]

Now about our boys, our fighting men in Afghanistan. They have honestly fulfilled and are continuing to fulfill their duty, in the process showing selflessness and heroism.

Our people deeply respect those who performed their military service in Afghanistan. The state provides them with priority opportunities to obtain a good education and interesting, suitable work.

The memory of those who died the death of the brave in Afghanistan is sacred to us. Party and Soviet agencies are obliged to see to it that the families of the dead and their relatives and loved ones are surrounded with concern, attention and kindness.

One final point. When the Afghan knot is untied, this will have a very profound effect on other regional conflicts as well.

If the arms race, which we are so insistently seeking to halt—and with some success—is mankind's insane rush to the abyss, then regional conflicts are bleeding wounds capable of causing spots of gangrene on the body of mankind.

The earth is literally pockmarked with danger spots of this kind. Each of them means pain not only for the peoples directly involved but for everyone, whether in Afghanistan, in the Middle East, in connection with the Iran-Iraq war, in southern Africa, in Kampuchea or in Central America.

Who gains from these conflicts? No one, except arms merchants and various reactionary, expansionist circles who are accustomed to taking advantage of and turning a profit on the misfortunes of peoples.

Carrying through a political settlement in Afghanistan to conclusion will be an important break in the chain of regional conflicts.

Just as the accord on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles sets up a sequence of further major steps in the field of disarmament, steps on which negotiations are under way or are in the planning stage, so behind a political settlement in Afghanistan looms the question: Which conflict will be overcome next? It is certain that more resolutions will follow.

States and peoples have sufficient potential in terms of responsibility, political will and determination to put an end to all regional conflicts within a few years. This is something worth working for. The Soviet Union will spare no effort in this highly important cause.

Source: Mikhail Gorbachev, "Gorbachev: Afghan Exit Could Start May 15," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 40(6) (1988): 1–3.

148. Zhao Ziyang: Documents on Student Protests, May 1989

Introduction

In the spring of 1989, youthful student protestors in Beijing demanded that the Communist Party regenerate itself and allow political changes to accompany the major economic reforms it had introduced since 1978. In massive demonstrations, students called for greater democracy in their universities and in the political system, requested a dialogue with the central government, urged the eradication of corruption, and demanded a press law and media freedom. Although an official *People's Daily* editorial of 23 April directed the students to disperse, some political leaders were far more receptive. On 4 May, Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang publicly endorsed many of the students' criticisms, saying that the Communist Party should meet their "reasonable demands." He spoke particularly favorably of their opposition to corruption, a problem that he felt had spiraled out of control, something he ascribed at least in part to China's "flawed legal system" that, with the "lack of democratic supervision" and the "lack of openness and transparency," allowed corruption to rage largely unchecked. Zhao hoped that the authorities would take a conciliatory and nonconfrontational line toward the students and other protestors, opening a dialogue whereby they could "exchange ideas and promote mutual understanding through democracy and law in an atmosphere of reason and order." In conversations on 4 May and again on 13 May with other Politburo members, including Premier Li Peng, top Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, and president and Chinese Military Commission head Yang Shangkun, Zhao argued that only a very small minority of the protestors were trying to use the demonstrations to attack the government. Using policies of divide and rule, these few should, he thought, be isolated from the broader majority and discredited. The Communist Party should, he reiterated, "adjust to new times and situations," become more transparent and democratic, and move decisively against corruption. Despite Zhao's continuing support for a moderate line against the students, by 13 May it was clear that his colleagues, while ready to launch an anticorruption campaign, were becoming increasingly impatient to end the student protests. Shortly afterward, Zhao made an official visit to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. By the time he returned, his colleagues were preparing to take military action against the demonstrators, and on 18 May Zhao cast the only dissenting Politburo vote against this. Early in the morning of 19 May he visited the protestors in Tiananmen Square, begging them to disperse but praising their youthful enthusiasm. This was to be Zhao's last public appearance. By the end of May he had been removed from all his official positions and placed under house arrest, living in Beijing in comfortable conditions but under tight supervision until his death in January 2005. At least twice, he reportedly wrote to the Chinese government requesting an official reassessment of the Tiananmen Square protests, but his petitions were refused or ignored. Fearing that his death might spark popular protests, the mainland authorities kept Zhao's funeral extremely low-key, and several of his close associates were kept under house arrest until the ceremonies were over. Commemorative ceremonies and vigils for Zhao were nonetheless held in many venues around the world. Even posthumously, his memory continued to embarrass the Chinese authorities, as friends and disciples gradually divulged his sometimes critical opinions and writings on their conduct of Chinese political affairs during his final years.

Primary Source

Speech at the Meeting of the Board of governors of the Asian Development Bank, 4 May 1989

I believe the basic attitude of the great majority of the student demonstrators is one of both satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the Communist Party and the government. These students do not oppose our underlying system, but they do demand that we eliminate the flaws in our work. They are satisfied with our achievements in reform and construction over the past decade, as well as with the nation's general development. But they are irritated by mistakes we have made along the way. They are calling on us to correct those mistakes and to improve our work style, and these calls in fact correspond nicely with positions of the Party and the government, which are also to affirm our accomplishments and to correct our mistakes.

Are there attempts to exploit the student movement, and is such exploitation going on now? China is so

huge that there are always going to be at least some people who want to see us in turmoil. There will always be people ready to exploit our students, and they will miss no opportunity to do so. Such people are very few, but we must always be on guard against them. I am confident that the great majority of the students will see this point. Demonstrations are continuing in Beijing and elsewhere, but I have no doubt that the situation is going to calm down gradually and that China will be spared any major turmoil.

We should meet the students' reasonable demands through democracy and law, should be willing to reform, and should use rational and orderly methods. Let us put this more concretely: What most bothers the students right now is the scourge of corruption. But the Party and government have been working on this problem in recent years, so why are there so many voices of complaint, and why are they so loud? There are two reasons, I believe. One is that our flawed legal system and our lack of democratic supervision allow corruption to rage out of control. The other is that our lack of openness and transparency leads to rumors, inaccurate accusations, wild exaggerations, and outright fabrications about what the Party and government are doing. Most Party and government workers in fact live on low wages and have no income beyond their fixed salaries, let alone any legally sanctioned privileges. Yes, there are people who skirt the law, who grab special privileges; but there are fewer of them, and they do less harm, than people think. Of course the problem of corruption has to be solved, but that has to happen—can only happen—through reforms such as perfecting the legal system, improving democratic supervision, and increasing transparency.

And these same principles apply to how we should deal with the student demonstrations themselves. We need to use democracy and law and to reason in an atmosphere of order. We need to use dialogue to consult broadly with students, workers, intellectuals, members of the democratic parties, and citizens from all parts of society. We must exchange ideas and promote mutual understanding through democracy and law in an atmosphere of reason and order, working together to solve problems that concern everyone.

What we need most right now is calm, reason, self-restraint, and order as we move to solve problems through democracy and law. If the Party and government are willing to proceed in this way, I am confident that students and other segments of society will also find this to be the best way.

Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang Discuss Speech Later in the Day

Li Peng: "That was an excellent speech, Comrade Ziyang, and the response has been very positive. I'll echo you when I meet with the Asian Development Bank delegates tomorrow."

Zhao Ziyang: "I tried to set a mild tone. I hope it'll do some good in quieting the student movement down and in strengthening foreign investors' confidence in China's stability. . . . Comrade Li Peng, when I got back from North Korea I heard about the strong reactions to the April 26 editorial in the *People's Daily*. It seems to have turned into a real sore point that has the students all stirred up. Do you see any way to turn things around and calm them down?"

Li Peng: "Comrade Ziyang, as you know, the editorial reflected the spirit of the April 24 Politburo meeting, particularly the views of Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping. There may be problems of tone here and there, but we can't possibly change the core message."

Zhao Ziyang: "Let me tell you how I see all this. I think the student movement has two important characteristics. First, the students' slogans call for things like supporting the Constitution, promoting democracy, and fighting corruption. These demands all echo positions of the Party and the government. Second, a great many people from all parts of society are out there joining the demonstrations and backing the students. And it's not just Beijing that's flooded with protesters; it's the same story in Shanghai, Tianjin, and other major cities. This has grown into a nationwide protest. I think the best way to bring the thing to a quick end is to focus on the mainstream views of the majority. My problem with the April 26 editorial is that it sets the mainstream aside and makes a general, all-encompassing pronouncement that the majority just can't accept; it

generates an us-versus-them mentality. I have no quarrel with the view that a handful of people oppose the Four Basic Principles and are fishing in troubled waters. I said that in my speech today. But it's hard to explain, and also hard to believe, how hundreds of thousands of people all over the country could be manipulated by a tiny minority. The students feel stigmatized by the April 26 editorial, and that's the main thing that's set them off. I think we should revise the editorial, soften its tone a bit."

Li Peng: "The origins of this protest are complex, Comrade Ziyang. The editorial did not accuse the vast majority of students of creating turmoil. When Yuan Mu had his dialogue with the students, and again when he spoke with journalists, he explained the government's position several times over. The students should be quite clear about this by now. The trouble is, there's no sign the protests are subsiding. In fact, quite the opposite: Now we have illegal student organizations that are openly pressuring the government. You've read the petition from that 'AFS,' so you know they're trying to squeeze out the legal student organizations. And not just that: They want to negotiate with the Party and government as equals. They even add a lot of conditions, as if they're above the government. That petition of theirs was itself a threat. The elder comrades like Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and [Li] Xiannian are all convinced that a tiny minority of people are manipulating this protest from behind the scenes. Their purpose is quite clear: They want to negate the leadership of the CCP and negate the entire socialist system. I agree with our Elder comrades. And that's why I hold to the view that the April 26 editorial is accurate and cannot be changed."

Zhao Ziyang: "I'm not opposed to the term 'turmoil' in the editorial. But I believe that this refers only to the scale of the protest and to the degree to which it has affected social order and that it does not foreclose the question of the political nature of the protest—I mean whether it's spontaneous or antagonistic. I think we should publish another editorial distinguishing the majority of students and sympathizers from the tiny minority who are using the movement to fish in troubled waters, to create conflicts, and to attack the Party and socialism. That way we can avoid a sweeping characterization of the protests as an antagonistic conflict. We can concentrate on policies of persuasion and guidance and avoid the sharpening of conflict. This kind of approach is the best way to help calm the situation."

Li Peng: "I disagree, Comrade Ziyang."

Zhao Ziyang, Deng Xiaoping, and Yang Shangkun Meet on 13 May 1989

Zhao Ziyang: "Comrade Xiaoping, first I'd like to report to you on some of my thinking since the student movement and turmoil began. The student movement has mushroomed since mid-April; what all of us, including me, have been trying to do is to settle it down as quickly as possible. But I've noticed that this movement has two particular features we need to pay attention to: First, the student slogans all support the Constitution; they favor democracy and oppose corruption. These demands are basically in line with what the Party and government advocate, so we cannot reject them out of hand. Second, the number of demonstrators and supporters is enormous, and they include people from all parts of society. So I think we have to keep an eye on the majority and give approval to the mainstream view of the majority if we want to calm this thing down."

Deng Xiaoping: "It was obvious from the start that a tiny minority was stirring up the majority, fanning the emotions of the great majority."

Zhao Ziyang: "That's why I think we have to separate the broad masses of students and their supporters from the tiny minority who're using the movement to fish in troubled waters, stir up trouble, and attack the Party and socialism. We have to rely on guidance. We have to pursue multilevel, multichannel dialogue, get in touch with people, and build understanding. We mustn't let the conflicts get nasty if we expect things to settle down quickly."

Deng Xiaoping: "Dialogue is fine, but the point is to solve the problem. We can't be led around by the nose. This movement's dragged on too long, almost a month now. The senior comrades are getting worried. Chen

Yun, Peng Zhen, Xiannian, Wang Zhen, and Sister Deng—and me too—are all worried. We have to be decisive. I've said over and over that we need stability if we're going to develop. How can we progress when things are in an utter mess?"

Yang Shangkun: "Gorbachev will be here in two days, and today I hear that the students are going to announce a hunger strike. They obviously want to turn up the heat and get a lot of international attention."

Deng Xiaoping: "Tiananmen is the symbol of the People's Republic of China. The Square has to be in order when Gorbachev comes. We have to maintain our international image. What do we look like if the Square's a mess?"

Yang Shangkun: "The protests keep going, and now the students are starting a hunger strike. I'm afraid this major state event is going to get disrupted. Visits by heads of state are big events; all countries take them seriously. And the two sides have gone over every detail of Gorbachev's visit in advance. We must ask the students and the residents of Beijing to help us be sure everything goes forward as planned. That's something anybody with the slightest amount of patriotism should be able to accept. But I do wonder if it's going to be possible to have this welcoming ceremony as we planned it—there in the open Square, at the east entrance of the Great Hall of the People."

Zhao Ziyang: "To welcome Gorbachev in the right place and the right way involves the country's honor. I think the vast majority of students will realize this, see the big picture, and not disrupt the welcoming ceremony. I think these young students can understand this. The Beijing government and the SEC have already explained its importance to them."

Deng Xiaoping: "But if the students get carried away with extremism, they won't think of all this."

Yang Shangkun: "Still, we'll proceed as planned."

Zhao Ziyang: "I'll stress the importance of the Gorbachev visit one more time in the media this afternoon."

Deng Xiaoping: "As I've said before, the origins of this incident are not so simple. The opposition is not just some students but a bunch of rebels and a lot of riffraff, and a tiny minority who are utterly against opposing bourgeois liberalization. These people want to overthrow our Party and state. With this small handful mixed in with so many students and masses our work becomes much harder. We have to understand the complexities here; this is not just between the students and the government."

Zhao Ziyang: "The consensus in the Politburo has been to use the policies of guiding and dividing, winning over the great majority of students and intellectuals while isolating the tiny minority of anticommunist troublemakers, thereby stilling the movement through democratic and legal means. In order to get things going, Politburo members have already begun dialogues with various groups. This morning Li Peng is going to Capital Iron and Steel, and this afternoon I'm meeting with representatives of Beijing workers. In the next few days Hu Qili's people will be talking with journalists, and—"

Deng Xiaoping: "What do the ordinary people in society think?"

Zhao Ziyang: "The protests are widespread but limited to cities that have universities. The rural areas aren't affected, and the farmers are docile. So are urban workers, basically. The workers are unhappy about certain social conditions and like to let off steam from time to time, so they sympathize with the protesters. But they go to work as usual and they aren't striking, demonstrating, or traveling around like the students."

Yang Shangkun: "The thinking in the army is fully in line with the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. These protests are not going to spread to officers or soldiers in the military."

Deng Xiaoping: "This whole outbreak should lead us to think about things, to take a hard look at the past. I've told foreigners that our biggest mistakes of the past ten years have been in education. What I meant, mainly, was political education—not just in schools or

for the young but for society in general. We haven't done enough in this area, and that was a huge oversight. These last few days I've been thinking. We've been right all along that the Four Basic Principles and the policies of reform and opening are mutually beneficial. If there's been a mistake, it's that we've been lax about the Four Basic Principles. We haven't used them as the foundation in educating the people, the students, and all the Party members and officials. We have to insist on both things at once; we can't ignore the political side. We must not give an inch on the basic principle of upholding Communist Party rule and rejecting a Western multiparty system. At the same time, the Party must resolve the issue of democracy and address the problems that arise when corruption pops up in the Party or government."

Zhao Ziyang: "The Party has to adjust to new times and situations. We have to do a good job with political education but then use the methods of democracy and law to solve actual problems. You have always emphasized the need for more transparency in political life, for a full use of the NPC's supervisory role, for more and better use of the system of political consultation and Communist-led cooperation with the democratic parties, for more popular oversight of the Party and the government, and so on. These principles are extremely important, especially now. When we allow some democracy, things might look 'chaotic' on the surface; but these little 'troubles' are normal inside a democratic and legal framework. They prevent major upheavals and actually make for stability and peace in the long run."

Yang Shangkun: "We have to separate legitimate demands for democracy, including proper exercise of democratic rights, from bourgeois liberalization. We can't let people promote bourgeois liberalization under the banner of democracy; and on the other hand, when we crack down on bourgeois liberalization, we have to be sure we don't squash democracy."

Zhao Ziyang: "When you raise the banner of democracy and law, you win the hearts of the people. It has great appeal to the masses and brings them together. I remember Comrade Xiaoping saying in 1984 that it's an important task of Party leadership to lead the people in building democracy and a legal system, so that our socialist country can be justified in calling itself a nation of laws. I think we should grab the chance to build a socialist democratic system that suits China's unique circumstances. We should do it in a planned, paced, and orderly fashion, under Party leadership and based on the Four Principles."

Yang Shangkun: "We're just going to have to do everything we possibly can to beat corruption, to get rid of it. The people are gnashing their teeth at the very mention of corruption these days. They can't wait to see another embezzler get exposed."

Zhao Ziyang: "No doubt about it, getting rid of corruption is the most urgent task before us. The people are watching us, waiting to see if we really mean what we say. The Politburo's been considering whether to make clean government a major goal in the political reform plans—tying it in with democracy, a legal system, openness, transparency, supervision by the masses, and mass participation-and adopting some specific measures and procedures that really will solve the problem once and for all. The fight for clean government and against corruption has to start with the Politburo, and I've already asked the Politburo to kick things off by investigating my children. If they've been corrupt, then they must submit to the laws of the state. Wan Li has also proposed that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress set up a special 'clean government committee.'"

Deng Xiaoping: "We need to tackle the corruption issue head-on, take on at least ten or twenty major cases, and handle them with a high degree of transparency. We must seize this chance to solve the corruption problem. Recently I've been thinking about why we've had such a hard time solving this problem so far, and I've concluded that it's probably because so many high-ranking officials and their families are involved. This may well be the reason why so little has been accomplished, even though we've been talking about it for years. We can't put this off any longer. In this movement, there haven't been any slogans opposing reform or opening up. Most have homed in on corruption. Of course, this could be a smoke screen for inciting the people to other things. But that doesn't change the

fact that we need to rectify the Party and achieve our strategic goals. If we don't punish corruption, especially when it's in the Party, we're really courting disaster. . . . The Standing Committee has got to be decisive, and it has to stick with principle, when we're faced with a political crisis like this. And of course we must do everything possible to resolve this student movement peacefully."

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149. Tiananmen Square, New May Fourth Manifesto, 4 May 1989

Introduction

Although economic liberalization and political reform went hand in hand in Soviet Russia, this was not the case in China. A decade after Deng Xiaoping embarked on market reforms and opened China to the West, the Communist Party still retained strict control. In the spring of 1989, popular discontent mounted as rampant inflation and growing unemployment provoked protests among workers, while extensive corruption at every level undercut the government's authority and credibility. Students also resented the restrictions they faced in terms of lack of choice as to their careers once they graduated. The sudden death in April 1989 of former Communist Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang, who had the reputation of favoring greater democracy and rapid reform, became the occasion for major student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the symbolic political heart of China. Initially held to commemorate and mourn the dead Hu, these gatherings soon metamorphosed into a broader protest campaign demanding greater democracy, media freedom, and an end to governmental corruption. Students also called for a strike in all Beijing universities. An official and clearly government-inspired *People's Daily* editorial of 26 April demanding that students disperse further inflamed the situation, and three days later 50,000 students demonstrated in Beijing demanding that this be withdrawn. Discontented urban workers also joined the students, drawn by their condemnations of corruption, and on 4 May 1989, the seventieth anniversary of the famous 1919 student protest movement often regarded as a key moment in China's twentieth-century national regeneration, 100,000 students and workers demonstrated in Beijing. The protestors demanded that the government open a dialogue with them. Harking back to the earlier protests, the student leader Wuer Kaixi read out a manifesto demanding that the government speed up democratic political reform, respect the rule of law, allow media freedom, and eradicate corruption. The Chinese leadership was divided as to how to respond, with some, notably General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, sympathetic to the students' demands, while others, led by Premier Li Peng, favored a much tougher line. Meanwhile, students from around the country were flocking to Beijing to participate in the demonstrations, while similar protests by students and workers occurred in major cities around China. On 13 May, thousands of students occupied Tiananmen Square and began a hunger strike that attracted worldwide media attention, in part because this coincided with a state visit by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The students displayed banners in English as well as Chinese demanding democracy, which were shown internationally on television screens overseas, and constructed a "Goddess of Democracy" statue closely resembling the American Statue of Liberty. As the situation reached an impasse, on 20 May the Chinese government declared a state of emergency and imposed martial law. Public demonstrations initially blocked the entry of troops into Beijing, and these relatively untried forces withdrew, to be replaced two weeks later by more experienced troops. Meanwhile, Zhao was forced from office. On 4 June 1989, the 27th and 38th Armies of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Beijing, encountering considerable resistance from crowds of Beijing citizens, which they met with tear gas, bullets, and flame throwers. Students were cleared from the square. The precise number of casualties on each side during this operation is still disputed. The Chinese Red Cross estimated that 2,600 people died and 30,000 were injured, while the authorities claimed that 36 students and more than 100 soldiers died, with 3,000 soldiers and 6,000 civilians injured. Foreign reporters estimated that at least 3,000 people died. Many workers were subsequently arrested and executed, although students generally received lighter sentences, and many of their leaders succeeded in escaping abroad.

The authorities also cracked down fiercely on protestors elsewhere in China. The episode was a ferocious demonstration that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had no intention of loosening its hold on power and was prepared to use military force to maintain its position and prevent social disorder. Chinese leaders, many of whom, including Deng Xiaoping, had suffered severe persecution during the Cultural Revolution, placed a very high value on social stability. The events in and around Tiananmen Square also had a major impact on the West's previously favorable image of China, convincing both liberals and conservatives that despite its embrace of economic reform, Mainland China remained an authoritarian dictatorship with little respect for human rights.

Primary Source

Fellow students, fellow countrymen:

Seventy years ago today, a large group of illustrious students assembled in front of Tiananmen, and a new chapter in the history of China was opened. Today, we are once again assembled here, not only to commemorate that monumental day but more importantly, to carry forward the May Fourth spirit of science and democracy. Today, in front of the symbol of the Chinese nation, Tiananmen, we can proudly proclaim to all the people in our nation that we are worthy of the pioneers of seventy years ago.

For over one hundred years, the pioneers of the Chinese people have been searching for a path to modernize an ancient and beleaguered China. Following the Paris Peace Conference, they did not collapse in the face of imperialist oppression, but marched boldly forward. Waving the banners of science and democracy, they launched the mighty May Fourth Movement. May Fourth and the subsequent New Democratic Revolution were the first steps in the patriotic democracy movement of Chinese students. From this point on, Chinese history entered a completely new phase. Due to the socioeconomic conditions in China and the shortcomings of intellectuals, the May Fourth ideals of science and democracy have not been realized. Seventy years of history have taught us that democracy and science cannot be established in one fell swoop and that impatience and despair are of no avail. In the context of China's economy and culture, the Marxism espoused by the Chinese Communist Party cannot avoid being influenced by remnants of feudal ideology. Thus, while New China has steadily advanced toward modernization, it has greatly neglected building a democracy. Although it has emphasized the role of science, it has not valued the spirit of science—democracy. At present, our country is plagued with problems such as a bloated government bureaucracy, serious corruption, the devaluation of intellectual work, and inflation, all of which severely impede us from intensifying the reforms and carrying out modernization. This illustrates that if the spirit of science and democracy, and their actual processes, do not exist, numerous and varied feudal elements and remnants of the old system, which are fundamentally antagonistic to large-scale socialist production, will reemerge in society, and modernization will be impossible. For this reason, carrying on the May Fourth spirit, hastening the reform of the political system, protecting human rights, and strengthening rule by law have become urgent tasks of modernization that we must undertake.

Fellow students, fellow countrymen, a democratic spirit is precisely the absorption of the collective wisdom of the people, the true development of each individual's ability, and the protection of each individual's interests; a scientific spirit is precisely respect for individual nature, and the building of the country on the basis of science. Now more than ever, we need to review the experiences and lessons of all student movements since May Fourth, to make science and rationalism a system, a process. Only then can the tasks the May Fourth Movement set before us be accomplished, only then can the spirit of May Fourth be carried forward, and only then can our wish for a strong China be realized.

Fellow students, fellow countrymen, the future and fate of the Chinese nation are intimately linked to each of our hearts. This student movement has but one goal, that is, to facilitate the process of modernization by raising high the banners of democracy and science, by liberating people from the constraints of feudal ideology, and by promoting freedom, human rights, and rule by law. To this end, we urge the government to accelerate the pace of political reform, to guarantee the rights of the people vested in the law, to implement a

press law, to permit privately run newspapers, to eradicate corruption, to hasten the establishment of an honest and democratic government, to value education, to respect intellectual work, and to save the nation through science. Our views are not in conflict with those of the government. We only have one goal: the modernization of China.

. . . Our present tasks are: first, to take the lead in carrying out experiments in democratic reform at the birthplace of the student movement, the university campus, democratizing and systematizing campus life; second, to participate actively in politics, to persist in our request for a dialogue with the government, to push democratic reforms of our political system, to oppose graft and corruption, and to work for a press law. We recognize that these short-term objectives are only the first steps in democratic reform; they are tiny, unsteady steps. But we must struggle for these first steps, we must cheer for these first steps.

Fellow students, fellow countrymen, prosperity for our nation is the ultimate objective of our patriotic student movement. Democracy, science, freedom, human rights, and rule by law are the ideals that we hundreds of thousands of university students share in this struggle. Our ancient, thousand-year civilization is waiting, our great people, one billion strong, are watching. What qualms can we possibly have? What is there to fear? Fellow students, fellow countrymen, here at richly symbolic Tiananmen, let us once again search together and struggle together for democracy, for science, for freedom, for human rights, and for rule by law.

Let our cries awaken our young Republic!

Source: Han Minzhu, ed., *Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement*. © 1990 Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

150. George H. W. Bush: Press Conference, Reaction to Tiananmen Square, 8 June 1989

Introduction

U.S. leaders faced a quandary in deciding how to react to the Chinese government's repression of students and workers in Beijing and elsewhere in China on and after 4 June 1989. At a news conference with President George H. W. Bush four days later, reporters repeatedly returned to the subject of their government's China policies. Bush, who had served from 1974 to 1975 as the second head of the newly opened U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, had already imposed an embargo on sales of all military equipment to China, and shortly afterward he announced that all top-level governmental and military exchanges would be suspended for the indefinite future and the United States would veto all loans to China by U.S. institutions or international organizations to which it belonged. Bush felt it necessary to take a stand on human rights and express his administration's strong opposition to the brutal military suppression of dissent. As a staunch supporter of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's reformist policies, Bush did not, however, wish to break off all relations with China, a policy that he feared would merely weaken Deng and encourage reactionary elements within the Politburo. Bush reminded reporters that Deng himself had twice been purged during the Cultural Revolution. At this juncture, Bush was clearly still uncertain precisely who was in charge in China. He refused to recall the U.S. ambassador from Beijing or impose a total trade embargo, measures that, he argued, would simply be counterproductive. He also declined to offer Chinese students already in the United States blanket political asylum, although he promised to consider individual cases sympathetically. Congress and human rights advocates criticized the gradual relaxation of many of these sanctions over the next six months. The reluctance of the Bush administration to isolate China was demonstrated when, in July 1989, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger made a secret trip to China to consult with top officials there, a visit that was only made public when the two men made a second such visit the following December. Although the Bush administration soon sought to restore relatively normal relations with Deng's government, public opinion in the United States shifted dramatically against China, a downturn from which Sino-

American relations found it difficult to recover. For the American people and most of Congress, China's once favorable image was for many years tarnished by the widely and repeatedly televised scenes of tanks and soldiers moving against unarmed protestors in Beijing.

Primary Source

Q. Mr. President, cutting off military sales to China does not seem to have made an impression on the rulers there, and they've become more repressive. What else are you going to do to express this nation's outrage? And do you have any other plans?

The President. I think that the position we took, aiming not at the Chinese people but at the military arrangements, was well received around the world and was followed by many countries. Right after we did that, many of the European countries followed suit. The events in China are such that we, obviously, deplore the violence and the loss of life, urge restoration of order with recognition of the rights of the people. And I'm still hopeful that China will come together, respecting the urge for democracy on the part of the people. And what we will do in the future, I will announce at appropriate times; but right now, other countries are doing the same thing. And let's hope that it does have an ameliorating effect on this situation.

[. . .]

Q. Mr. President, can the United States ever have normal relations with China as long as the hardliners believed responsible for the massacre, such as Deng Xiaoping [Chairman of the Central Military Committee] and Premier Li Peng, remain in power? In other words, what will it take to get U.S.-Chinese relations back to normal?

The President. It will take a recognition of the rights of individuals and respect for the rights of those who disagree. And you have cited two leaders, one of whom I might tell you is—you mentioned Deng Xiaoping. I'm not sure the American people know this: He was thrown out by the Cultural Revolution crowd back in the late sixties; came back in 1976, was put out again because he was seen as too forward looking. And all I'm saying from that experience is: Let's not jump at conclusions as to how individual leaders in China feel when we aren't sure of that.

But the broad question that you ask—we can't have totally normal relations unless there's a recognition of the validity of the students' aspirations. And I think that that will happen. We had a visit right here, upstairs in the White House, with Mr. Wan Li [Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress]. Now, I don't know whether he's in or out, but he said something to me that I think the American people would be interested in. He said, "The army loves the people." And then you've seen soldiers from the 27th Army coming in from outside of Beijing and clearly shooting people. But having said that, I don't think we ought to judge the whole People's Liberation Army of China by that terrible incident.

What I want to do is preserve this relationship as best I can, and I hope the conditions that lie ahead will permit me to preserve this relationship. I don't want to pass judgment on individual leaders, but I want to make very clear to those leaders and to the rest of the world that the United States denounces the kind of brutality that all of us have seen on our television. . . .

Q. Mr. President, I'd like to return to China for a moment. You mentioned that your goal is to reserve our relationship with the Chinese Government. But what do you say to the American people who might wonder why we are not more forceful in being the world's leading advocate of democracy? And are we not living up to that responsibility in this situation?

The President. Well, some have suggested, for example, to show our forcefulness, that I bring the American Ambassador back. I disagree with that 180 degrees. And we've seen, in the last few days, a very good reason to have him there. In fact, one of your colleagues, Richard Roth of CBS, was released partially because of the work of our Embassy, of Jim Lilley, our very able Ambassador.

Some have suggested, well, you've got to go full sanctions on economic side. I don't want to cut off grain, and we've just sold grain to the People's Republic of

China. I think that would be counterproductive and would hurt the people.

What I do want to do is take whatever steps are most likely to demonstrate the concern that America feels. And I think I've done that, and I'll be looking for other ways to do it if we possibly can.

Q. Mr. President, Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi has taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy, apparently fearing for his own safety. The Chinese Government has called that a wanton interference in internal affairs and a violation of international law. What is your reaction to that? And will the United States grant Fang political asylum in the United States?

The President. First, let me remind the audience here that we do not discuss asylum. It's almost like a public discussion of intelligence matters. But in terms of your question, we have acted in compliance with the international law as an extraordinary measure for humanitarian reasons. His personal safety was involved here, he felt. And then we try, historically, to work these things out in consultation with the sovereign state. So, we are not violating international law, in the opinion of our attorneys. And it is awful hard for the United States when a man presents himself—a person who is a dissident—and says that his life is threatened, to turn him back. And that isn't one of the premises upon which the United States was founded. So, we have a difference with them on that, you're right, but I hope it can be resolved. . . .

[. . .]

Q. Earlier, sir, you made reference to Deng Xiaoping, suggesting that he may, if I read you right, not necessarily have been responsible for the actions. You said that he was a reformer, twice out, back in. What were you trying to say? Do you have information that he is not—

The President. I was trying to say that I don't know. And I'm trying to say you don't know, and he doesn't know, and she doesn't know. And nobody knows—outside. And that's the way the Chinese system works. So, for us to read every day some new name out there—it just isn't right. And I don't want to misrepresent this to the American people, but what I do know is that there's events over there that—it doesn't matter who's in charge—we condemn. And there's a relationship over there that is fundamentally important to the United States that I want to see preserved. And so, I'm trying to find a proper, prudent balance, not listening to the extremes that say, take your Ambassador out; cut off all food to the Chinese people so you show your concern. And I think we found a proper avenue there, but I cannot—and you ask a good question—I simply cannot tell you with authority who is calling the shots there today.

Q. Let me follow by asking you this, then: When you were in China earlier in the year, you met with Li Peng, and I believe you told him that China was exempted from your policy review because you knew China, you understood China. Have you been let down personally? Have you been misled in any way?

The President. I feel a certain sense of personal disappointment. But they weren't exempt from the norms of behavior that are accepted internationally in terms of armed people don't shoot down unarmed students. Nobody suggested that.

There was an interesting point in there—and I don't want to delve into the detail of private conversations—but one of the Chinese leaders, a very prominent name, told me, "We want change, but people have to understand it's very complicated here, how fast we move on these reforms. We've come a long way." And indeed, they did move dramatically faster on economic reforms than I think any of us in this room would have thought possible.

But what hasn't caught up is the political reforms and reforms in terms of freedom of expression. The freedom of press caught up a little bit; but it hadn't gone, obviously, near far enough, and now there's martial law and censorship. But we were cautioned on that visit about how fast China could move. Some of it was economic, and clearly, some of the message had to do with how fast they could move politically. . . .

Q. Mr. President, back to China. There are reports tonight that the Government there has begun rounding up the student leaders, who face at the very least, persecution; at the most, possibly charges of treason and whatever punishment that will bring. You have talked tonight about your strong desire to keep this relationship going and to keep the dialog and all our business as usual moving forward. If the—

The President. Not all of them. Excuse the interruption—

Q. Well, except for the military—

The President. Yes.

Q. Except for the military, sir. If we find out that the people who perpetrated the killings in Tiananmen Square and who were rounding up these students are running the Government, can the United States maintain fairly normal relationships with them, given our aim to foster human rights and promote democracy?

The President. It would make it extraordinarily difficult; but the question is so hypothetical that I'm going to avoid answering it directly. But anything that codifies the acceptance of brutality or lack of respect for human rights will make things much more difficult—there's no question about that.

Q. I have one followup. There are 20,000 Chinese students in the United States.

The President. Yes.

Q. Many of them have spoken out. Are you prepared to grant them political asylum in this country, should these—

The President. They're not seeking asylum. I'll tell you why I answer the question that way. They're not seeking asylum. We had four of them in the other day. And the first thing that one of them—Jia Hao said, "I love my country." And he wants to go back to his country. But what I have done is extend the visas so that people are not compelled to go back to our country. He's not seeking asylum. This man is not going to turn his back on his own country. He wants to change things; but he also wants to know that he is going to be safe, and I don't blame him for that. So, it's not a question of all these people—asylum is a legal status, and that's not what they're looking for.

Q.—in light of the student roundups. I mean, if they face—

The President. I think it's appalling, and so I would simply say that what we've already done would say to these people, you don't have to go back. But I'm not going to ask them to turn down the flag that they love and turn their back on China. These are patriotic young people who fear because of seeing their own brothers and sisters gunned down, but they're not seeking asylum. They don't want to flee China; they want to help change China.

Source: George H. W. Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989*, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 695–702.

151. Deng Xiaoping: Speech to Commanders of Martial Law Forces, 9 June 1989

Introduction

Although Mainland China embarked on major market-oriented economic reforms in 1978, this did not necessarily imply that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had embraced political liberalization. Chinese leaders had all lived through the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and most had in some way fallen victim to it, experiences that probably intensified their determination to maintain social stability in future. Deng Xiaoping, who although formally only a vice premier had directed China's course from 1978 onward, had himself twice been purged during the Cultural Revolution, spending several years working in a factory, and he thought himself lucky to have survived.

When students and workers demonstrated in Beijing in the spring of 1989, eventually occupying Tiananmen Square, China's symbolic political heart, Deng responded fiercely, declaring martial law and ordering the army to disperse the protestors. One reason for his draconian attitude may have been that due in considerable part to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, throughout 1989 revolutions and popular demonstrations were overturning communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, while the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) position was also becoming untenable. Five days after the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved against the protestors on 4 June 1989, causing hundreds and perhaps thousands of deaths among the students and sympathetic citizens of Beijing, Deng addressed its leaders, praising them for defending the Communist Party, which, he charged, the demonstrators had sought to topple. He nonetheless took the opportunity to emphasize that his economic reform policies remained unchanged, although political reeducation of dissenters was clearly badly needed. Deng's resort to military suppression of unarmed protestors undoubtedly permanently tarnished China's image overseas. The Western media and politicians, who had previously regarded his country as being in the process of liberalization, now characterized it as a brutal, authoritarian dictatorship. Most countries, including the United States, as well as numerous international financial agencies imposed economic and military sanctions on China, and its human rights record attracted new scrutiny. The ending of the Soviet-American Cold War also meant that China was less important to the Western alliance as a counterbalance to Soviet Russia, so that strategic self-interest no longer dictated Western tolerance of domestic repression. Even so, by the early 1990s Deng, despite opposition from hard-line ideologues within the Politburo who had hoped that the events of 1989 might enable them to reverse the country's promarket direction, had successfully reaffirmed and even accelerated China's commitment to the path of economic reform.

Primary Source

Comrades, you have been working very hard. First, I express my profound condolences to the commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army [PLA], commanders and fighters of the armed police force, and public security officers and men who died a heroic death; my cordial sympathy to the several thousand commanders and fighters of the PLA, commanders and fighters of the armed police force, and public security officers and men who were injured in this struggle; and cordial regards to all commanders and fighters of the PLA, commanders and fighters of the armed police force, and public security officers and men who took part in this struggle. I propose that we all rise and stand in silent tribute to the martyrs.

I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words.

This storm was bound to come sooner or later. This is determined by the major international climate and China's own minor climate. It was bound to happen and is independent of man's will. It was just a matter of time and scale. It is more to our advantage that this happened today. What is most advantageous to us is that we have a large group of veteran comrades who are still alive. They have experienced many storms and they know what is at stake. They support the use of resolute action to counter the rebellion. Although some comrades may not understand this for a while, they will eventually understand this and support the decision of the Central Committee.

[. . .]

The incident became very clear as soon as it broke out. They have two main slogans: One is to topple the Communist Party, and the other is to overthrow the socialist system. Their goal is to establish a totally Westernized vassalage bourgeois republic [xi fang fu yong hua de zi chan jie ji gong he guo]. The people want to combat corruption. This, of course, we accept. We should also take the so-called anticorruption slogans raised by people with ulterior motives as good advice and accept them accordingly. Of course, these slogans are just a front: The heart of these slogans is to topple the Communist Party and overthrow the socialist system.

In the course of quelling this rebellion, many of our comrades were injured or even sacrificed their lives. Their weapons were also taken from them. Why was

this? It also was because bad people mingled with the good, which made it difficult to take the drastic measures we should take.

Handling this matter amounted to a very severe political test for our army, and what happened shows that our PLA passed muster. If we had used tanks to roll across, it would have created a confusion of fact and fiction across the country. That is why I have to thank the PLA commanders and fighters for using this attitude to deal with the rebellion. Even though the losses are regrettable, this has enabled us to win over the people and made it possible for those people who can't tell right from wrong to change their viewpoint. This has made it possible for everyone to see for themselves what kind of people the PLA are, whether there was a bloodbath at Tiananmen, and who were the people who shed blood.

[. . .]

The fact that this incident broke out as it did is very worthy of our pondering. It prompts us cool-headedly to consider the past and the future. Perhaps this bad thing will enable us to go ahead with reform and the open policy at a steadier and better—even a faster—pace, more speedily correct our mistakes, and better develop our strong points. Today I cannot elaborate here. I only want to raise a point.

The first question is: Are the line, principles and policies adopted by the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, including our three-step development strategy, correct? Is it the case that because of this rebellion the correctness of the line, principles, and policies we have laid down will be called into question? Are our goals leftist ones? Should we continue to use them as the goals for our struggle in the future? We must have clear and definite answers to these important questions.

We have already accomplished our first goal, doubling the GNP. We plan to take twelve years to attain our second goal of again doubling the GNP. In the next 50 years we hope to reach the level of a moderately developed nation. A 2 to 2.9 percent annual growth rate is sufficient. This is our strategic goal.

Concerning this, I think that what we have arrived at is not a "leftist" judgment. Nor have we laid down an overly ambitious goal. That is why, in answering the first question, we cannot say that, at least up to now, we have failed in the strategic goals we laid down. After 61 years, a country with 1.5 billion people will have reached the level of a moderately developed nation. This would be an unbeatable achievement. We should be able to realize this goal. It cannot be said that our strategic goal is wrong because this happened.

The second question is: Is the general conclusion of the 13th Party Congress of one center, two basic points correct? Are the two basic points—upholding the four cardinal principles and persisting in the open policy and reforms—wrong?

In recent days, I have pondered these two points. No, we have not been wrong. There is nothing wrong with the four cardinal principles. If there is anything amiss, it is that these principles have not been thoroughly implemented: They have not been used as the basic concept to educate the people, educate the students, and educate all the cadres and Communist Party members.

The nature of the current incident is basically the confrontation between the four cardinal principles and bourgeois liberalization. It is not that we have not talked about such things as the four cardinal principles, work on political concepts, opposition to bourgeois liberalization, and opposition to spiritual pollution. What we have not done is that there has been no continuity in these talks, and there has been no action—or even that there has been hardly any talk.

What is wrong does not lie in the four cardinal principles themselves, but in wavering in upholding these principles, and in very poor work in persisting with political work and education.

In my CPPCC talk on New Year's Day in 1980, I talked about four guarantees, one of which was the enterprising spirit in hard struggle and plain living. Hard struggle and plain living are our traditions. From now on we should firmly grasp education in plain living, and we should grasp it for the next 60 to 70 years. The

more developed our country becomes, the more important it is to grasp the enterprising spirit in plain living. Promoting the enterprising spirit in plain living will also be helpful toward overcoming corruption.

After the founding of the People's Republic, we promoted the enterprising spirit in plain living. Later on, when life became a little better, we promoted spending more, leading to waste everywhere. This, together with lapses in theoretical work and an incomplete legal system, resulted in breaches of the law and corruption.

I once told foreigners that our worst omission of the past 10 years was in education. What I meant was political education, and this does not apply to schools and young students alone, but to the masses as a whole. We have not said much about plain living and enterprising spirit, about the country China is now and how it is going to turn out. This has been our biggest omission.

Is our basic concept of reform and openness wrong? No. Without reform and openness, how could we have what we have today? There has been a fairly good rise in the people's standard of living in the past 10 years, and it may be said that we have moved one stage further. The positive results of 10 years of reforms and opening to the outside world must be properly assessed, even though such issues as inflation emerged. Naturally, in carrying out our reform and opening our country to the outside world, bad influences from the West are bound to enter our country, but we have never underestimated such influences.

In the early 1980s, when we established special economic zones, I told our Guangdong comrades that they should conduct a two-pronged policy: On the one hand, they should persevere in reforms and openness, and the other they should severely deal with economic crimes, including conducting ideological-political work. This is the doctrine that everything has two aspects.

However, looking back today, it appears that there were obvious inadequacies. On the one hand, we have been fairly tough, but on the other we have been fairly soft. As a result, there hasn't been proper coordination. Being reminded of these inadequacies would help us formulate future policies. Furthermore, we must continue to persist in integrating a planned economy with a market economy. There cannot be any change in this policy. In practical work we can place more emphasis on planning in the adjustment period. At other times, there can be a little more market regulation, so as to allow more flexibility. The future policy should still be an integration of a planned economy and a market economy.

What is important is that we should never change China into a closed country. There is not even a good flow of information. Nowadays, do we not talk about the importance of information? Certainly, it is important. If one who is involved in management doesn't have information, he is no better than a man whose nose is blocked and whose ears and eyes are shut. We should never again go back to the old days of trampling the economy to death. I put forward this proposal for the Standing Committee's consideration. This is also a fairly urgent problem, a problem we'll have to deal with sooner or later.

This is the summation of our work in the past decade: Our basic proposals, ranging from our development strategy to principles and policies, including reform and opening to the outside world, are correct. If there is any inadequacy to talk about, then I should say our reforms and openness have not proceeded well enough.

The problems we face in the course of reform are far greater than those we encounter in opening our country to the outside world. In reform of the political system, we can affirm one point: We will persist in implementing the system of people's congresses rather than the American system of the separation of three powers. In fact, not all Western countries have adopted the American system of the separation of three powers.

America has criticized us for suppressing students. In handling its internal student strikes and unrest, didn't America mobilize police and troops, arrest people, and shed blood? They are suppressing students and the people, but we are quelling a counterrevolutionary rebellion. What qualifications do they have to criticize us? From now on, we should pay attention when handling such problems. As soon as a trend emerges, we should not allow it to spread.

What do we do from now on? I would say that we should continue to implement the basic line, principles, and policies we have already formulated. We will continue to implement them unswervingly. Except where there is a need to alter a word or phrase here and there, there should be no change in the basic line and basic principles and policies. Now that I have raised this question, I would like you all to consider it thoroughly.

As to how to implement these policies, such as in the areas of investment, the manipulation of capital, etcetera, I am in favor of putting the emphasis on basic industry and agriculture. Basic industry includes the raw material industry, transportation, and energy. There should be more investment in this area, and we should persist in this for 10 to 20 years, even if it involves debts. In a way, this is also openness. We need to be bold in this respect. There can not be serious mistakes. We should work for more electricity, more railway lines, more public roads, and more shipping. There's a lot we can do. As for steel, foreigners think we'll need some 120 million metric tons in the future. We are now capable of producing about 60 million metric tons, about half that amount. If we were to improve our existing facilities and increase production by 20 million metric tons, we would reduce the amount of steel we need to import. Obtaining foreign loans to improve this area is also an aspect of reform and openness. The question now confronting us is not whether or not the reform and open policies are correct or whether we should continue with these policies. The question is how to carry out these policies: Where do we go and which area should we concentrate on?

We must resolutely implement the series of line, principles, and policies formulated since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. We should conscientiously sum up our experiences, persevere with what is correct, correct what is wrong, and do a bit more where we have lagged behind. In short, we should sum up the experiences of the present and look forward to the future.

Source: Deng Xiaoping, Speech, Broadcast on Beijing Domestic Television Service, 27 June 1989, Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS-Daily Report China* 122 (1989): 8–10.

152. Francis Fukuyama: "The End of History?" 1989

Introduction

As the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev turned to free market reforms and dismantled its empire and armed forces, intellectuals, political philosophers, and diplomats tried to discern the shape of the post–Cold War world. One controversial effort to do so was an article by Francis Fukuyama, a youthful U.S. diplomat who was deputy director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. To preserve his anonymity Fukuyama wrote under the pseudonym "X," deliberately chosen to remind readers of the immensely influential 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" that laid out the Cold War strategy of containment and was published in *Foreign Affairs* by Policy Planning Staff Director George F. Kennan. Writing in the journal *The National Interest* in a fifteen-page article, subsequently expanded into a book, Fukuyama suggested that the world had come to "the end of history," a concept he derived from the philosopher George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Although relatively small-scale conflicts and terrorist actions might still occur, ideological and strategic battles between major states, notably the United States, the European powers, Russia, and China, were, he thought, at an end, as liberal democracy and free-market capitalism triumphed around the globe. Fukuyama's article was widely perceived as a celebration of the triumph of Western values in the Cold War, and during the 1990s many governments, particularly those of the United States and most of Europe, tended to accept its assumptions. Many political commentators, however, felt that Fukuyama's analysis was somewhat simplistic and postulated a very static international system, ignoring the possibility, for example, of future conflicts over scarce resources or other goods among major state actors.

Primary Source

[. . .]

The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable

systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants' markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of *Foreign Affairs*' yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run. To understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues concerning the nature of historical change.

I

The notion of the end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions. But the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

[. . .]

III

[. . .]

In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism, those of fascism and of communism. The former saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new "people" on the basis of national exclusiveness. Fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well. What destroyed fascism as an idea was not universal moral revulsion against it, since plenty of people were willing to endorse the idea as long as it seemed the wave of the future, but its lack of success. . . .

The ideological challenge mounted by the other great alternative to liberalism, communism, was far more serious. Marx, speaking Hegel's language, asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labor, and this contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West. As Kojève (among others) noted, the egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx. This is not to say that there are not rich people and poor people in the United States, or that the gap between them has not grown in recent years. But the root causes of economic inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our society, which remains fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the cultural and social characteristics of the groups that make it up, which are in turn the historical legacy of premodern conditions. Thus black poverty in the United States is not the inherent product of liberalism, but is rather the "legacy of slavery and racism" which persisted long after the formal abolition of slavery.

As a result of the receding of the class issue, the appeal of communism in the developed Western world, it is safe to say, is lower today than any time since the end of the First World War. . . .

One may argue that the socialist alternative was never terribly plausible for the North Atlantic world, and was

sustained for the last several decades primarily by its success outside of this region. But it is precisely in the non-European world that one is most struck by the occurrence of major ideological transformations. Surely the most remarkable changes have occurred in Asia. Due to the strength and adaptability of the indigenous cultures there, Asia became a battleground for a variety of imported Western ideologies early in this century. Liberalism in Asia was a very weak reed in the period after World War I; it is easy today to forget how gloomy Asia's political future looked as recently as ten or fifteen years ago. It is easy to forget as well how momentous the outcome of Asian ideological struggles seemed for world political development as a whole.

The first Asian alternative to liberalism to be decisively defeated was the fascist one represented by Imperial Japan. Japanese fascism (like its German version) was defeated by the force of American arms in the Pacific war, and liberal democracy was imposed on Japan by a victorious United States. Western capitalism and political liberalism when transplanted to Japan were adapted and transformed by the Japanese in such a way as to be scarcely recognizable. Many Americans are now aware that Japanese industrial organization is very different from that prevailing in the United States or Europe, and it is questionable what relationship the factional maneuvering that takes place with the governing Liberal Democratic Party bears to democracy. Nonetheless, the very fact that the essential elements of economic and political liberalism have been so successfully grafted onto uniquely Japanese traditions and institutions guarantees their survival in the long run. More important is the contribution that Japan has made in turn to world history by following in the footsteps of the United States to create a truly universal consumer culture that has become both a symbol and an underpinning of the universal homogenous state. V. S. Naipaul traveling in Khomeini's Iran shortly after the revolution noted the omnipresent signs advertising the products of Sony, Hitachi, and JVC, whose appeal remained virtually irresistible and gave the lie to the regime's pretensions of restoring a state based on the rule of the Shariah. Desire for access to the consumer culture, created in large measure by Japan, has played a crucial role in fostering the spread of economic liberalism throughout Asia, and hence in promoting political liberalism as well.

The economic success of the other newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia following on the example of Japan is by now a familiar story. What is important from a Hegelian standpoint is that political liberalism has been following economic liberalism, more slowly than many had hoped but with seeming inevitability. Here again we see the victory of the idea of the universal homogenous state. South Korea had developed into a modern, urbanized society with an increasingly large and well-educated middle class that could not possibly be isolated from the larger democratic trends around them. Under these circumstances it seemed intolerable to a large part of this population that it should be ruled by an anachronistic military regime while Japan, only a decade or so ahead in economic terms, had parliamentary institutions for over forty years. Even the former socialist regime in Burma, which for so many decades existed in dismal isolation from the larger trends dominating Asia, was buffeted in the past year by pressures to liberalize both its economy and political system. It is said that unhappiness with strongman Ne Win began when a senior Burmese officer went to Singapore for medical treatment and broke down crying when he saw how far socialist Burma had been left behind by its ASEAN neighbors.

But the power of the liberal idea would seem much less impressive if it had not infected the largest and oldest culture in Asia, China. The simple existence of communist China created an alternative pole of ideological attraction, and as such constituted a threat to liberalism. But the past fifteen years have seen an almost total discrediting of Marxism-Leninism as an economic system. Beginning with the famous third plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in 1978, the Chinese Communist party set about decollectivizing agriculture for the 800 million Chinese who still lived in the countryside. The role of the state in agriculture was reduced to that of a tax collector, while production of consumer goods was sharply increased in order to give peasants a taste of the universal homogenous state and thereby an incentive to work. The reform doubled Chinese grain output in only five years, and in the process created for Deng Xiaoping a solid political base

from which he was able to extend the reform to other parts of the economy. Economic Statistics do not begin to describe the dynamism, initiative, and openness evident in China since the reform began.

China could not now be described in any way as a liberal democracy. At present, no more than 20 percent of its economy has been marketized, and most importantly it continues to be ruled by a self-appointed Communist party which has given no hint of wanting to devolve power. Deng has made none of Gorbachev's promises regarding democratization of the political system and there is no Chinese equivalent of Stalin's ghost. The Chinese leadership has in fact been much more circumspect in criticizing Mao and Maoism than Gorbachev with respect to Brezhnev and Stalin, and the regime continues to pay lip service to Marxism-Leninism as its ideological underpinning. But anyone familiar with the outlook and behavior of the new technocratic elite now governing China knows that Marxism and ideological principle have become virtually irrelevant as guides to policy, and that bourgeois consumerism has a real meaning in that country for the first time since the revolution. The various slowdowns in the pace of reform, the campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and crackdowns on political dissent are more properly seen as tactical adjustments made in the process of managing what is an extraordinarily difficult political transition. By ducking the question of political reform while putting the economy on a new footing, Deng has managed to avoid the breakdown of authority that has accompanied Gorbachev's perestroika. Yet the pull of the liberal idea continues to be very strong as economic power devolves and the economy becomes more open to the outside world. There are currently over 20,000 Chinese students studying in the U.S. and other Western countries, almost all of them the children of the Chinese elite. It is hard to believe that when they return home to run the country they will be content for China to be the only country in Asia unaffected by the larger democratizing trend. The student demonstrations in Beijing that broke out first in December 1986 and recurred recently on the occasion of Hu Yao-bang's death were only the beginning of what will inevitably be mounting pressure for change in the political system as well.

What is important about China from the standpoint of world history is not the present state of the reform or even its future prospects. The central issue is the fact that the People's Republic of China can no longer act as a beacon for illiberal forces around the world, whether they be guerrillas in some Asian jungle or middle class students in Paris. Maoism, rather than being the pattern for Asia's future, became an anachronism, and it was the mainland Chinese who in fact were decisively influenced by the prosperity and dynamism of their overseas co-ethnics—the ironic ultimate victory of Taiwan.

Important as these changes in China have been, however, it is developments in the Soviet Union—the original "homeland of the world proletariat"—that have put the final nail in the coffin of the Marxist-Leninist alternative to liberal democracy. It should be clear that in terms of formal institutions, not much has changed in the four years since Gorbachev has come to power: free markets and the cooperative movement represent only a small part of the Soviet economy, which remains centrally planned; the political system is still dominated by the Communist party, which has only begun to democratize internally and to share power with other groups; the regime continues to assert that it is seeking only to modernize socialism and that its ideological basis remains Marxism-Leninism; and, finally, Gorbachev faces a potentially powerful conservative opposition that could undo many of the changes that have taken place to date. Moreover, it is hard to be too sanguine about the chances for success of Gorbachev's proposed reforms, either in the sphere of economics or politics. But my purpose here is not to analyze events in the short-term, or to make predictions for policy purposes, but to look at underlying trends in the sphere of ideology and consciousness. And in that respect, it is clear that an astounding transformation has occurred.

Émigrés from the Soviet Union have been reporting for at least the last generation now that virtually nobody in that country truly believed in Marxism-Leninism any longer, and that this was nowhere more true than in the Soviet elite, which continued to mouth Marxist slogans out of sheer cynicism. The corruption and decadence of the late Brezhnev-era Soviet state seemed to

matter little, however, for as long as the state itself refused to throw into question any of the fundamental principles underlying Soviet society, the system was capable of functioning adequately out of sheer inertia and could even muster some dynamism in the realm of foreign and defense policy. Marxism-Leninism was like a magical incantation which, however absurd and devoid of meaning, was the only common basis on which the elite could agree to rule Soviet society.

What has happened in the four years since Gorbachev's coming to power is a revolutionary assault on the most fundamental institutions and principles of Stalinism, and their replacement by other principles which do not amount to liberalism per se but whose only connecting thread is liberalism. This is most evident in the economic sphere, where the reform economists around Gorbachev have become steadily more radical in their support for free markets, to the point where some like Nikolai Shmelev do not mind being compared in public to Milton Friedman. There is a virtual consensus among the currently dominant school of Soviet economists now that central planning and the command system of allocation are the root cause of economic inefficiency, and that if the Soviet system is ever to heal itself, it must permit free and decentralized decision-making with respect to investment, labor, and prices. After a couple of initial years of ideological confusion, these principles have finally been incorporated into policy with the promulgation of new laws on enterprise autonomy, cooperatives, and finally in 1988 on lease arrangements and family farming. There are, of course, a number of fatal flaws in the current implementation of the reform, most notably the absence of a thoroughgoing price reform. But the problem is no longer a conceptual one: Gorbachev and his lieutenants seem to understand the economic logic of marketization well enough, but like the leaders of a Third World country facing the IMF, are afraid of the social consequences of ending consumer subsidies and other forms of dependence on the state sector.

[. . .]

The Soviet Union could in no way be described as a liberal or democratic country now, nor do I think that it is terribly likely that *perestroika* will succeed such that the label will be thinkable any time in the near future. But at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society. And in this respect I believe that something very important has happened in the Soviet Union in the past few years: the criticisms of the Soviet system sanctioned by Gorbachev have been so thorough and devastating that there is very little chance of going back to either Stalinism or Brezhnevism in any simple way. Gorbachev has finally permitted people to say what they had privately understood for many years, namely, that the magical incantations of Marxism-Leninism were nonsense, that Soviet socialism was not superior to the West in any respect but was in fact a monumental failure. The conservative opposition in the USSR, consisting both of simple workers afraid of unemployment and inflation and of party officials fearful of losing their jobs and privileges, is outspoken and may be strong enough to force Gorbachev's ouster in the next few years. But what both groups desire is tradition, order, and authority; they manifest no deep commitment to Marxism-Leninism, except insofar as they have invested much of their own lives in it. For authority to be restored in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev's demolition work, it must be on the basis of some new and vigorous ideology which has not yet appeared on the horizon.

If we admit for the moment that the fascist and communist challenges to liberalism are dead, are there any other ideological competitors left? Or put another way, are there contradictions in liberal society beyond that of class that are not resolvable? Two possibilities suggest themselves, those of religion and nationalism.

The rise of religious fundamentalism in recent years within the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim traditions has been widely noted. One is inclined to say that the revival of religion in some way attests to a broad unhappiness with the impersonality and spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies. Yet while the emptiness at the core of liberalism is most certainly a defect in the ideology—indeed, a flaw that one does not need the perspective of religion to recognize—it is not at all

clear that it is remediable through politics. Modern liberalism itself was historically a consequence of the weakness of religiously-based societies which, failing to agree on the nature of the good life, could not provide even the minimal preconditions of peace and stability. In the contemporary world only Islam has offered a theocratic state as a political alternative to both liberalism and communism. But the doctrine has little appeal for non-Muslims, and it is hard to believe that the movement will take on any universal significance. Other less organized religious impulses have been successfully satisfied within the sphere of personal life that is permitted in liberal societies.

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IV

What are the implications of the end of history for international relations? Clearly, the vast bulk of the Third World remains very much mired in history, and will be a terrain of conflict for many years to come. But let us focus for the time being on the larger and more developed states of the world who after all account for the greater part of world politics. Russia and China are not likely to join the developed nations of the West as liberal societies any time in the foreseeable future, but suppose for a moment that Marxism-Leninism ceases to be a factor driving the foreign policies of these states —a prospect which, if not yet here, the last few years have made a real possibility. How will the overall characteristics of a de-ideologized world differ from those of the one with which we are familiar at such a hypothetical juncture?

The most common answer is—not very much. For there is a very widespread belief among many observers of international relations that underneath the skin of ideology is a hard core of great power national interest that guarantees a fairly high level of competition and conflict between nations. Indeed, according to one academically popular school of international relations theory, conflict inheres in the international system as such, and to understand the prospects for conflict one must look at the shape of the system—for example, whether it is bipolar or multipolar—rather than at the specific character of the nations and regimes that constitute it. This school in effect applies a Hobbesian view of politics to international relations, and assumes that aggression and insecurity are universal characteristics of human societies rather than the product of specific historical circumstances.

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The developed states of the West do maintain defense establishments and in the postwar period have competed vigorously for influence to meet a worldwide communist threat. This behavior has been driven, however, by an external threat from states that possess overtly expansionist ideologies, and would not exist in their absence. . . .

The automatic assumption that Russia shorn of its expansionist communist ideology should pick up where the czars left off just prior to the Bolshevik Revolution is therefore a curious one. It assumes that the evolution of human consciousness has stood still in the meantime, and that the Soviets, while picking up currently fashionable ideas in the realm of economics, will return to foreign policy views a century out of date in the rest of Europe. This is certainly not what happened to China after it began its reform process. Chinese competitiveness and expansionism on the world scene have virtually disappeared: Beijing no longer sponsors Maoist insurgencies or tries to cultivate influence in distant African countries as it did in the 1960s. This is not to say that there are not troublesome aspects to contemporary Chinese foreign policy, such as the reckless sale of ballistic missile technology in the Middle East; and the PRC continues to manifest traditional great power behavior in its sponsorship of the Khmer Rouge against Vietnam. But the former is explained by commercial motives and the latter is a vestige of earlier ideologically-based rivalries. The new China far more resembles Gaullist France than pre-World War I Germany.

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The Soviet Union, then, is at a fork in the road: it can start down the path that was staked out by Western Europe forty-five years ago, a path that most of Asia has followed, or it can realize its own uniqueness and remain stuck in history. The choice it makes will be

highly important for us, given the Soviet Union's size and military strength, for that power will continue to preoccupy us and slow our realization that we have already emerged on the other side of history.

V

The passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from the Soviet Union will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance. For while there may be some isolated true believers left in places like Managua, Pyongyang, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, the fact that there is not a single large state in which it is a going concern undermines completely its pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history. And the death of this ideology means the growing "Common Marketization" of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.

This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se. For the world at that point would be divided between a part that was historical and a part that was post-historical. Conflict between states still in history, and between those states and those at the end of history, would still be possible. There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the post-historical world. Palestinians and Kurds, Sikhs and Tamils, Irish Catholics and Walloons, Armenians and Azeris, will continue to have their unresolved grievances. This implies that terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda. But large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.

Source: Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989). Reprinted by permission of International Creative Management, Inc. Copyright © 1989 by Francis Fukuyama.

153. Robert Darnton: "The Meanings of the Wall," 16 November 1989

Introduction

The foremost symbol of the Cold War division of Europe, the iron curtain that separated East from West on that continent, was the Berlin Wall. Constructed in 1961–1962, this heavily fortified barrier, fronted by a no-man's-land covered by machine guns and protected by barbed wire, forcibly prevented East Germans from escaping to the West. Over the years, hundreds were killed trying to cross the wall. Even after West German Chancellor Willy Brandt instituted his Ostpolitik measures in the early 1970s facilitating travel between East and West, only limited contacts were possible. As the Soviet Union relinquished its domination of Eastern Europe in 1989, large demonstrations occurred across the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) as the population demanded the right to cross over to the West and many East Germans fled to the West through Hungary. On the evening of 9 November 1989, Gunter Schabowski, head of East Berlin's Communist Party, announced that the Berlin Wall would be opened for private trips abroad. East and West Berliners flocked to the wall, and uncertain security guards

allowed them to cross unhindered and to climb on the wall itself. A carnival atmosphere took hold as strangers joined in celebrations with each other and even began to chip away chunks of the wall as souvenirs. The wall was never closed again and was eventually demolished, with only a short section remaining as a historical memento. Robert Darnton, a Western historian and journalist who was present, wrote an evocative and perceptive eyewitness account of the event.

Primary Source

On the morning after, November 10, when both Berlins woke up wondering whether the first flood through the Wall had been a dream, the West Berlin tabloid *Volksblatt* ran two headlines, shoulder to shoulder, on its front page: "The Wall Is Gone" and "Bonn Demands the Destruction of the Wall."

Both were right. The Wall is there and it is not there. On November 9, it cut through the heart of Berlin, a jagged wound in the middle of a great city, the Great Divide of the Cold War. On November 10, it had become a dance floor, a picture gallery, a bulletin board, a movie screen, a videocassette, a museum, and, as the woman who cleaned my office put it, "nothing but a heap of stone." The taking of the Wall, like the taking of the Bastille, transformed the world. No wonder that a day later, in Alexanderplatz, East Berlin, one conqueror of the Wall marched in a demonstration with a sign saying simply, "1789–1989." He had helped dismantle the central symbol around which the postwar world had taken shape in the minds of millions.

To witness symbolic transformation on such a scale is a rare opportunity, and it raises many questions. To begin with the most concrete: What happened between November 9 and 12, and what does it mean?

The destruction of the Wall began in the early evening of Thursday, November 9, soon after the first wave of East Berliners, or *Ossis,* as they are called by the West Berliners here, burst upon the West. One Ossi, a young man with a knapsack on his back, somehow hoisted himself up on the Wall directly across from the Brandenburg Gate. He sauntered along the top of it, swinging his arms casually at his sides, a perfect target for the bullets that had felled many other wall jumpers, like Peter Fechter, an eighteen-year-old construction worker, who was shot and left to bleed to death a few feet in front of Checkpoint Charlie on August 17, 1962. Now, twenty-seven years later, a new generation of border guards took aim at a new kind of target and fired—but only with power hoses and without much conviction. The conqueror of the Wall continued his promenade, soaked to the skin, until at last the guards gave up. Then he opened his knapsack and poured the water toward the East, in a gesture that seemed to say, "Good-bye to all that."

A few minutes later, hundreds of people, Ossis and Wessis alike, were on the Wall, embracing, dancing, exchanging flowers, drinking wine, helping up new "conquerors"—and chipping away at the Wall itself. By midnight, under a full moon and the glare of spotlights from the watchtowers in no man's land, a thousand figures swarmed over the Wall, hammering, chiseling, wearing its surface away like a colony of army ants. At the bottom, "conquerors" threw stones at its base or went at it with pickaxes. Long slits appeared, and the light showed through from the East, as if through the eyes of a jack-o'-lantern. On the top, at the center of the tumult, with the Brandenburg Gate looming in the background, one Ossi conducted the destruction with a sickle in one hand and a hammer in the other.

By Saturday, November 11, chunks of the wall were circulating through both Berlins. People exchanged them as souvenirs of what had already taken shape in the collective consciousness as a historical event: the end of the Cold War. A sidewalk entrepreneur sold bits of wall from a table on the Ku'damm (The Kurfürstendamm, West Berlin's elegant shopping avenue.): 20 DM for a piece of the past. At one point, an East Berliner walked by and objected, with a smile on his face: "You can't sell that. It's our Wall. It belongs to us."

Like any powerful symbol, the Wall has acquired many meanings, and they differ significantly from West to East. The Wall even looks different if you study it from one side and then the other. Seen from the West, it is a prison wall that encloses the East Berliners in totali-

tarianism. Tourists climb on observation towers and shudder deliciously at the spectacle: the monstrous, graffiti-covered concrete structure, the no man's land beyond it—which, until 1985, was mined and rigged with rifles that fired automatically at anyone who dashed across—the barbed wire, the dog patrols, the turrets with armed guards staring back through binoculars, and the second wall of windowless buildings on the far side of the deadly, desolate, space.

East Berliners see a different Wall. Theirs is painted in patterns of light and dark blue, clean, bright, and free of all graffiti. It shuts off the view of the repressive apparatus beyond it. If you lose your way or stray into outlying areas in East Berlin, you can drive along the wall for miles without noticing that it is something more than an ordinary part of the urban landscape.

[. . .]

Above all, the two populations of Berlin sought to make contact with one another. In exchanging hugs, drinks, and flowers, they performed a collective ritual of *Bruderschaft*. As the *Volksblatt* put it, "In the night when the gates opened, it seemed as though there were no more East Berliners and West Berliners. Everyone felt as though they belonged to a huge family, and everyone celebrated the festival accordingly."

To someone unfamiliar with Berlin, it may be hard to imagine how successfully the Wall had divided the city. Soon after 1961, when the Wall went up, the million or so inhabitants on the Western side and the 2 million or so on the Eastern began to lose contact. By 1989, a whole generation had come of age within the shadow of the Wall. Most of them never crossed it, even from West to East when that was allowed. They accepted the Wall as a fact of life, as something inexorable, built into the landscape—there when they were born and there when they died. They left it to the tourists, took it for granted, forgot about it, or simply stopped seeing it.

Before the fall, an old woman was interviewed on her balcony, which overlooked the Wall from the West. She spent hours every afternoon staring into no man's land. Why did she look so hard at the Wall, day after day? the reporter asked, hoping to find some expression of Berlin's divided personality. "Oh, I'm not looking at the Wall at all," she replied. "I watch the rabbits playing in no man's land." Many West Berliners did not see the Wall until it ceased to exist.

For the Wall enclosed the West Berliners even more thoroughly than it shut off their counterparts in the East. In 1961 it was perceived as a noose that would soon choke the life out of the western half of the city. But by 1989, West Berliners had come to regard the Wall as a source of support. Thanks to its presence, the government in Bonn poured billions into Berlin, subsidizing everything from the philharmonic orchestra to teen-age jazz groups. A whole population of underemployed intellectuals grew up around the Free University, which now has about 60,000 students. As residents of Berlin, they are exempt from the draft; they also can drink beer and talk politics in pubs throughout the night, for Berlin is the only city in the Federal Republic where the pubs are permitted to stay open past midnight, the only place where you can order breakfast in the afternoon. Many of these free-floating intellectuals became freeloaders. They lived off the Wall; and if it really falls, they may face a greater economic disaster than the Berliners in the East.

To Berliners, therefore, the Wall means something very different from what it means outside the city. But most of them realize that their local barrier is bound up with larger divisions, the Oder-Neisse line in particular and the general dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Having gone to bed one day in a world with clearly defined boundaries, they woke up the next in a world without firm national borders, without balanced power blocs, and even without obvious demarcations of time, because it suddenly seemed possible to produce a treaty ending World War II forty-four years after World War II had ended. They are living a truism of anthropology: the collapse of boundaries can be deeply disturbing, a source of renewal but also a threat to a whole worldview.

The mood remains euphoric, nonetheless. In East Berlin especially, the idea has spread that in conquering the Wall the people seized power. No one denies that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, but it has symbolic forms, too. The demonstrations in the streets

sapped the legitimacy of the regime. Combined with the hemorrhaging of the population across the borders, they brought the government down, without a shot fired.

[. . .]

We may never know the details of what happened inside the crumbling power structure of the GDR. But whatever produced the occasion, the force that broke through the Wall was there for all to see on the night of November 9. It was the people of East Berlin. They took the Wall as they had taken to the streets for the previous two months, with nothing but their convictions, their discipline, and the power of their numbers.

When they came streaming into West Berlin, they spoke the language of liberty, but they expressed themselves by gesture, not by high-flown rhetoric. They took possession of the Wall physically, by pouring through it, climbing on it, and chipping it apart. They did the same thing in West Berlin itself. They occupied space, swarming through the Ku'damm, filling the busses and pubs, parking their tiny Trabis on the noblest sidewalks, and returning triumphantly to the East with a flower for a girl friend or a toy for an infant.

It was a magical moment, the possession of a city by its people. On Thursday, November 9, under a full moon, between the shadow of the Reichstag and the menacing bulk of the Brandenburg Gate, the people of Berlin danced on their Wall, transforming the cruelest urban landscape into a scene of hilarity and hope, and ending a century of war.

Source: Robert Darnton, *Berlin Journal, 1989–1990* (New York: Norton, 1991), 74–86. © 1991 by Robert Darnton. Used by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

154. National Salvation Front Communiqués, Romania, December 1989

Introduction

As communist regimes around Eastern Europe collapsed via the ballot box, the trend quickly spread. In December 1989 a popular uprising began in Romania against the government of Nicolae Ceauşescu in Romania, a regime that even though anti-Soviet had also been extremely repressive. Romania had been able to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958 and had thereafter steered an independent course in foreign policy, developing close ties with Israel, the Arab countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). The government had also virtually eradicated illiteracy and developed an extremely effective educational system. Even so, after a period of prosperity in the 1960s and 1970, the dictatorial government became highly repressive, imposing economic austerity measures in an effort to repay foreign debts and developing a personality cult around Ceauşescu. As other East European states peacefully rejected communist rule, in mid-December 1989 fierce protests, riots, and strikes erupted in Romania that focused on the capital of Bucharest. The National Salvation Front was formed, and its leaders called for the ending of the communist monopoly of power; free elections; a new constitution; economic, commercial, and agricultural restructuring; the reorganization of education; and respect for human rights. Initially, the Ceauşescu government tried to use the military to repress the new opposition, but their efforts proved unavailing, and on 22 December the army declined to offer further opposition to demonstrators. Ceauşescu and his wife, Elena, fled the capital but within a day were captured, arrested, and put on trial. On 25 December the two were sentenced to death and executed by firing squad, the only communist leaders in Eastern Europe to come to a violent end during the 1989–1990 transfers of power.

Primary Source

December 22

Citizens, we are living in historic times. The Ceauşescu clan, which has led the country to disaster, was removed from power. All of us know and admit that the victory in which the whole country rejoices is the outcome of the spirit of sacrifice of the broad masses of all nationalities, particularly of our wonderful youth, who, with

their blood, restored to us the feeling of national dignity. This is also the great merit of those who for years on end have jeopardized their lives by protesting against the tyranny.

A new page is being opened in Romania's political and economic history. At this turning point, we decided to organize ourselves into the National Salvation Front, which itself relies on the Romanian Army and encompasses all of the country's healthy forces, regardless of nationality, and all organizations and groups who bravely rose to defend freedom and dignity in the years of totalitarian tyranny. The goal of the National Salvation Front is to establish democracy, liberty, and the Romanian people's dignity.

As of this moment, all power structures of the Ceaușescu clan have been dissolved. The government has been dismissed. The State Council and its institutions are ceasing their activity, all state power has been assumed by the Council of the National Salvation Front. The Higher Military Council, which coordinates all of the activity of the Army and the Ministry of Interior units, will be subordinated to the Council of the National Salvation Front.

All ministries and central bodies, in their current structure, will continue their normal activity, subordinating themselves to the National Salvation Front, in order to ensure the normal development of all economic and social life.

County, municipal, town, and communal councils of the National Salvation Front will be set up in the territory as local power bodies. The militia is called upon to ensure public order, together with the citizen's committees. These local bodies will take all necessary steps to ensure public supplies of food, electric power, heat, water, public transportation, medical assistance, and the entire trade network.

As a program, the Front proposes the following:
1. To abandon the leading role of a single party and to establish a democratic and pluralistic system of government. [applause from the people in the studio]

2. To organize free elections in April.

3. To separate the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers in the state and to elect all political leaders for one or two mandates, at the most. Nobody should claim power for life.

The Council of the National Salvation Front suggests that in the future the country should be called Romania. [cheers, applause, chants of "Romania"]

A drafting committee of the new constitution will start to operate at once.

4. To restructure the whole national economy in accordance with the criteria of profitability and efficiency. To eliminate the administrative, bureaucratic methods of centralized economic management and to promote free initiative and competence in the management of all economic sectors.

5. To restructure agriculture and to assist the small scale peasant production. To halt the destruction of villages.

6. To reorganize Romanian education in accordance with the current requirements. To reorganize the educational structure on democratic and humanistic bases. To eliminate ideological dogmas that have caused so much damage to the Romanian people, and to promote genuine values of humanity. To eliminate lies and imposture and to establish criteria of competence and justice in all areas of activity. To base the development of the national culture on a new foundation. To take the press, radio, and television from the hands of a despotic family and turn it over to the hands of the people.

7. To observe the rights and freedoms of national minorities and to ensure their full equality with those of the Romanians.

8. To reorganize all of the country's trade, proceeding on the basis of the requirements of primarily satisfying all of the daily needs of Romania's population. In this respect we will end the export of agricultural and foodstuffs, we will reduce the export of oil products, and we will give priority to satisfying the heating and electric power needs of the people.

9. The whole foreign policy of the country should serve the promotion of good-neighborliness, friendship, and peace in the world and should be integrated in the process of building a united Europe, a common home of all the people of this continent. We will observe Romania's international commitments, primarily those to the Warsaw Pact.

10. To promote a domestic and foreign policy subordinated to the needs and the interests of developing the human being. To ensure complete observance of human rights and freedoms, including the right to free movement.

11. By organizing ourselves within this front, we are firmly determined to do our utmost in order to reestablish a civil society in Romania and to guarantee the triumph of democracy, freedom, and dignity of all citizens of the country. . . .

December 24

The overthrow of the odious dictatorship of the Ceauşescu clan has added a last page to the bloody chronicle of the years of suffering endured by the Romanian people.

Déclassé and irresponsible elements, which remained faithful to the tyrant, have tried to continue the terrorist practices of the former regime by resorting to provocations, attacks against civilians, indiscriminately killing unarmed people, attacking public institutions, industrial enterprises, military targets, trade outlets, hospitals, and housing quarters.

The Romanian people have, once again, affirmed their tremendous moral energy unleashed by their desire for freedom.

The Army has done its duty and so have the majority of the workers in the Ministry of Interior.

The revolution has won.

To completely restore the situation and to ensure the tranquility needed for a normal life in our free society, the Council of the National Salvation Front has decided to adopt extraordinary measures, which are imperative under the current circumstances.

1. Complete and immediate cessation of firing throughout the country. Anyone violating this disposition will be guilty of a crime against the Romanian people and will be punished promptly and mercilessly. Not one more drop of blood should be shed.

At the same time, any acts of vandalism and of destruction, as well as personal revenge are illegal, thus staining the noble nature of our revolution. The guilt of the dictator and of his former lackeys before history and our laws, will be established by tribunals, which will decide with the greatest severity on an appropriate penalty for the action of destroying the country.

2. The Army is the only element authorized to possess arms, the firm arm defending the interests of the people. All those who, during these days, have come into the possession of arms and ammunition, regardless of the circumstances, have to urgently deliver them by Monday, 25 December at 1500 GMT at the latest.

Those who will not respect these provisions, will be guilty of seriously violating the laws and will be punished most severely.

3. The units of the Ministry of Interior will be merged with the units of the Ministry of the National Defense, which is to take over the single command of all troops and all weapons of our country.

The militia bodies and the firemen will preserve all their specific duties, which they have to exercise with great determination.

4. Management and all working people are called upon to ensure the protection of economic, trade, and medical units, and educational, scientific, and cultural establishments.

Romanian society has to operate normally with the dedicated contribution of each of us.

At the same time, we call on all co-nationals to support the bodies in charge of order in ensuring the integrity of buildings, embassies, and the immunity of diplomats.

5. The bodies of the new structures of democracy must urgently begin their activity of restoring the country by firmly setting themselves up and becoming immediately subordinated to the Council and adopting, together with it, the measures of a political, social, administrative, and economic order, all measures which are absolutely necessary in the first stages of the reconstruction work.

May the first free New Year bring to Romania, along with the joy of liberation, tranquility and calm which will permit us to assume all the responsibilities of the nation which is affirming its dignity.

The national consensus, the cooperation of the creative forces of our country and of all social categories, of any nationality, constitute a vital condition and the guarantee for fulfilling the basic targets of the revolutionary process in Romania.

Source: National Salvation Front, Bucharest Radio, 22 and 24 December 1989, Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS-Daily Report East Europe* (1989): 246.

155. Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Draft Platform, 13 February 1990

Introduction

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985 as a convinced communist who wished to reform and improve the existing Soviet system, not destroy it. A firm believer in Marxist-Leninism and the principles of the October 1917 Revolution, he perceived his policies as a means of strengthening and modernizing Soviet communism. Initially, he sought to work within the framework of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Continuous sniping and sabotage of his policies of economic reform (perestroika) and openness (glasnost) by Communist Party officials gradually led him to break with the party. As early as January 1987 he urged the democratization of the Communist Party, by which at that stage he meant merely the introduction of multicandidate elections for party positions. At the Nineteenth Party Conference of June 1988, the first to take place for forty-seven years, Gorbachev and his supporters insisted on introducing radical changes, including multicandidate elections and the separation of the government structure from party organizations at the regional level. In December 1988 the Supreme Soviet was restructured, and a new Congress of People's Deputies established as the country's top legislative body, with only one-third of its seats reserved for the CPSU. Initially dominated by conservatives, this also included an opposition liberal faction headed by Moscow communist leader Boris Yeltsin. Their demands included the repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, which guaranteed the Communist Party a "leading role" in the Soviet state. Gorbachev allied himself with the liberals, and in a platform intended for submission to the Twenty-eighth Party Congress the following July, the February 1990 CPSU Central Committee revoked this provision. The Communist Party's monopoly on power had now effectively been broken. While affirming continuing Russian commitment to the development of a market economy, the draft platform also promised extensive social reforms and benefits. Deep resentment of Gorbachev's reforms still characterized many of the communist old guard, however, as became apparent when the Twenty-eighth Party Congress rewrote the language of the Central Committee's draft, moderating its criticisms of the CPSU and diluting the force of its recommendations. The episode suggested that efforts to revitalize and modernize the CPSU from within were likely to end in ultimate failure.

Primary Source

[. . .]

I. What is the essence of perestroika, what should be resolutely discarded and what should be preserved in the Party's Ideological and political arsenal?

First of all, we are breaking with the authoritarian-bureaucratic system which is incompatible with socialist principles. Our ideal is a humane, democratic socialism.

Having embarked on the road of revolutionary changes, it is necessary to discard completely the fetters

of the past that hinder our movement towards this objective.

While reaffirming faithfulness to the creative spirit of the materialist world outlook and the dialectic methodology of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and being guided by it, we resolutely reject ideological blinkers, dogmatism and intolerance towards different views and ideas.

While adhering to the positions of the working class and all working people, we abandon the simplified class approach which opposes national and universal human values.

We denounce total state hegemony in public life and everything that engendered arbitrariness and lawlessness, unpunishable abuses of power and undeserved privileges.

We denounce a primitive view of socialist ownership, disregard for commodity-money relations and all forms and methods of administration and management that entail man's alienation, and prevent him from making use of his abilities and endowments.

We renounce the treatment of nature as an object for ruthless exploitation, an attitude we have inherited from the beginning of our industrialization.

We condemn negligence of the people's cultural and historical values, and of the country's accumulated intellectual capital.

We reject negative dogmatic stereotypes in our relations with other parties of the working people, including social-democratic parties, which contribute to the progressive development of states and nations.

We proceed from the premise that the objectively growing interdependence of states and the emerging integrity of the world, in which various societies interact while retaining their freedom of option, are a basic feature of a new epoch.

The Soviet Communist Party deems it fundamentally important to distinguish everything in our past that was engendered by Stalinism and by violations of socialist principles from what constitutes the Party's and the people's concrete contribution to their country and to all of mankind.

It is just as dangerous to idealize the past and to refuse to learn the complete and grim truth about tragic aspects of our history as to try to obliterate everything that is really great and valuable in our historical legacy. The continuity of the Soviet people's labor efforts and struggle must not be interrupted.

Socialist development is impossible without an ideal. And the latter, in turn, will lose all sense if people forget or neglect their history. Historic awareness, love of the homeland and patriotism, which is unacceptable in our conditions without internationalism, are symptoms of a nation's sound health and vitality.

The image of the future, even if it is only a few decades ahead, cannot be described exactly, in minute detail. But one thing is clear: it will be an absolutely different society that will develop in democratic conditions on the basis of powerful cultural and scientific-technological progress. It will be founded on the humanistic values of the peoples of our country and of all humankind. It will be a society that realizes the integrity of civilization and nature, in which man is history's end in itself. These features of the future social organization reflect the initial essence of the socialist idea, which has found its embodiment in the labor and efforts of peoples for social emancipation.

Immutable for us is our socialist option and our adherence to the October ideas: all power to the Soviets, factories to the workers, land to the peasants, peace to the peoples, free self-determination to the nations. We have inherited spiritual power and courage from older generations, their self-sacrifice for the sake of the Motherland. We cherish the sacred memory of the sacrifices they have made during the years of great sufferings.

We adhere to the idea of social justice. It permitted millions of people to rise up from historical nonexistence and it inspired them to deeds that turned our state into a mighty world power. The Soviet state played a decisive role in saving mankind from Fascist slavery and has become the mainstay of many peoples in their

struggle for national liberation. It has made an indispensable, unique contribution to world science, technology and culture.

The right to work, to pensions, free education and medical care and other social benefits that first appeared on Soviet soil have now become widespread benefits in any civilized society. To forget this means to disrespect the truth, disrespect those who have displayed lofty heroism and self-sacrifice in their passionate urge for the socialist ideal. Such are the basic points in perestroika's thinking and morality.

II. Man Is the Focus of Party Policy

The Party seeks to place man in the center of social development, providing him with worthy living and working conditions, guaranteeing him social justice, political liberty and possibilities for comprehensive development and spiritual fulfillment, and regards this as its main goal. This is exactly what should determine social progress.

The Soviet Communist Party stands for the earliest formulation of legal acts guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens. The recognition of personal liberty as the key and vital value and a volte-face to guarantee the entire complex of human rights are perestroika's most important accomplishment. Now it is necessary to consolidate these rights, to rest them on a solid material, legal and political foundation.

The Party will uphold:

—Reliable legislative protection of a citizen's person and honor, the safety of his home and property, the privacy of his correspondence and telephone conversations,
—Stronger guarantees to implement the right to work, including payment according to the quantity and quality of work done and its final results, the formation of a mechanism to maintain employment, training and re-training of personnel and adequate material support for those who are forced to change their trade, profession or place of work,
—The development and strengthening of the political rights of citizens: participation in running the affairs of society and the state, freedom of speech, the press, meetings and demonstrations and the formation of public organizations. Law and order and requirements of Soviet laws should be strictly observed,
—Freedom for creative activities and regard for talent as a national asset. Encouraging a multifaceted culture in every way, the Party will uphold humanistic criteria and, at the same time, protect society from pseudo-culture. A commercial attitude to culture is unacceptable to socialism,
—Man's free self-determination in the spiritual sphere, the freedom of conscience and religion. Without abandoning its world outlook, the Party will step up the dialogue between atheists and believers and pursue a policy that offers all churches the opportunity to freely operate within the law, contributing to mutual understanding between people,
—A higher role of the court of law in protecting civil rights, the establishment of public-state commissions exercising law-enforcement activities.

The CPSU gives priority to the adoption of laws in the near future on the press and other mass media, freedom of conscience and religious associations, public associations, the order of emigration from and immigration to the USSR, Soviet citizenship, languages of Soviet peoples and other legislative acts that will guarantee the political and personal rights of citizens.

The Party will persistently seek to strengthen and develop the economic and social rights of Soviet people and to raise their well-being. It will concentrate its efforts in this area on the following tasks:

—The drafting and legislative adoption of a statewide demographic policy applying to human reproduction and the regulation of migration,
—The implementation of the housing Program that was put forth by the 27th CPSU Congress and that aims to provide each Soviet family with a separate flat or an individual house by the year 2000. This aim requires an increase in the rate of and a substantial rise in the quality of housing construction, provided by State funds and the funds of enterprises, cooperatives, savings of

population and easy credits. It also necessitates stiffer public control over the distribution of flats, comprehensive development and architectural plans that reflect the needs of the inhabitants,

—The right to protect health by improving medical services, involving a considerable increase in appropriations for public health and the utmost mobilization of resources of enterprises, industries, republics and local Soviets for these purposes,

—Stronger guarantees to preserve the environment, rational use of natural resources, the adoption of a long-term state ecological program for the country, the union and autonomous republics as well as laws on environmental control, improvement of the structure and operation of bodies engaged in environmental protection,

—The development of the entire sphere of education, enlightenment and culture and an increase in the investments for these aims, the radical improvement of the quality of teaching and the training of specialists, increasing the prestige of teachers, the promotion of competitiveness among ideas and talents, overcoming the administrative approach in the intellectual sphere, and the monopoly of group interests, the preservation of our cultural and spiritual heritage and historical monuments, support for various social initiatives and donations in the interest of developing education and culture, broad and free exchange of spiritual values with foreign countries.

The strategy of perestroika is based upon the profound understanding of the role of science and mastering its results in order to achieve a qualitatively new state for our society.

The development and use of the country's creative potential should be based upon solid legislation. It is important to ensure the effective protection of intellectual property. The Party stands for the independence of higher educational establishments and academic and branch scientific institutions, for the diversity of their structures.

The CPSU economic policy pays special attention to the protection of those social strata and groups in the population that need primary help and support from society.

The CPSU stands for:

—Carrying out broad measures to improve the labor and housing conditions of women, including granting them the right to a reduced workday, work according to a convenient schedule, an increase in maternity leave, in leave for mothers of large families and for single mothers, paid by enterprises, setting additional subsidies for leaves and for health treatment, prioritizing the development of high quality goods production and services for women, their liberation from hard work that may harm their health. Within the framework of the political reform the Party will fight to promote the employment of women in the leading posts,

—The resolute improvement of child care, the allocation of more funds for the construction of children's institutions and the improvement of their work, and for expanded production of children's goods, the immediate implementation of measures to reduce infant mortality rates,

—The development and implementation of an effective youth policy, the opening of wide possibilities for implementing the capabilities and meeting the requirements of the younger generation, efforts to ensure its participation with full and equal rights in the political, economic and cultural life of society, the renewal of the youth movement, the young communist league, student and other organizations, support for their initiatives and for their growing desire for independence,

—The improvement of the positions of disabled people and war and labor veterans, the adoption of a new law on pensions and the development of a special program for the provision of all invalids, war and labor veterans and families of soldiers and officers who were killed with flats in the next five years, the implementation of resolutions on the improvement of medical services and the extension of the production of goods for veterans and invalids, the increase of pensions and allowances depending on the price growth, the granting of the right to working pensioners to receive

full wages irrespective of the amount of their pension.

Communists are convinced that citizens' rights and freedoms are inseparable from their civil duties. The Party will consistently work towards the establishment in society of respect for labor, law and order and of readiness to defend the socialist Motherland, towards the creation of legal and moral guarantees of such common human values as honesty and decency, kindness and mercy, moral self-control and conscientiousness, human dignity and freedom of choice.

The CPSU opposes all illegitimate privileges and benefits and advocates full openness on this issue. Communist Party membership or a leading post do not, in themselves, provide any advantages. Abuses of office must be eradicated.

III. For an Effective Planned Market Economy

The Party prioritizes the launching of effective work by legislative and executive bodies at all levels to improve the economic situation in the country.

The CPSU will help implement a series of measures, worked out by the Council of Ministers and approved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, to stabilize the consumer market, above all to eliminate the gap between the large amount of 'free' money and the degree to which it is matched by goods.

These measures should have an explicit social orientation and improve the economic position of low-income groups of the population, above all.

The availability of foodstuffs for the population remains the most acute problem. The CPSU advocates the priority development of the agrarian sector in order to accelerate an increase in the production of meat, milk, vegetables and other products of farming and livestock.

The solution of the food problem should rest on the development of all forms of economic management in agriculture. State-run, cooperative and individual farms and diverse forms of management, based on contract, leasing, family and other principles, should be given equal possibilities.

The strengthening of the material and technical basis of agricultural production, of the processing and storage of products and the lessening of their losses before they are sold remains a major area of work.

The creation of a social balance between the town and the country is a major task of perestroika. New possibilities will have to be created within a short period of time to provide villagers with comfortable dwellings, services and roads.

We continue to focus on efforts to increase the production of consumer goods. The CPSU will help implement a package of measures to help satiate the market.

The Party advocates an effective financial recovery program, including such measures as the encouragement of deposits in savings banks at increased interest rates, the development of the insurance business, the distribution of state loan bonds on advantageous terms, the selling of dwellings, advance payments by the population for durable goods they plan to buy in the future, and the selling of stocks and other securities.

More flexible economic instruments and quotas will be needed to prevent unfounded incomes and the issue of money in circulation in excess of the supply of goods.

The CPSU believes that the solution of current and future socio-economic problems is inseparably linked with the radical economic reform. The reform must replace the command-and-distributive system—characterized by monopoly, lack of initiative, wastefulness, mismanagement and disregard for consumers' interests—with a plan-market economy based on a diversity of property forms, competition between independent manufacturers, a developed finance system and on the powerful stimuli of personal and collective interest.

The economic reform has proven much more difficult than it was initially perceived. But we are fully determined not to allow a return to the forms of economic

management that discredited themselves and that led the country into stagnation and threw it behind developed countries.

Economic reform is unthinkable without a deep restructuring of the relations of property. The CPSU advocates a diversity of its forms. Their equal and sound competition is the economic basis of civil freedoms, of the freedom to choose the forms and methods in which a worker will work, and the guarantee of consumers' interests and rights.

Another important task is the transformation of state property into property that will be democratically controlled by the working people themselves on the basis of leasing, full cost-accounting, contracts, joint-stock and other modern forms. All of the forms will take into account the scale of production, specific features of regions and the degree to which integrating ties are developed.

The Party stands for the all-round promotion of the cooperative movement on a sound basis, for the strengthening of production cooperatives, including collective farms, and for the broadening of the sphere of activity of various forms of labor collective property, including sharing and joint-stock property.

The CPSU believes that the existence of labor's individual property, including ownership of the means of production, does not contradict the modern stage in the country's economic development.

The use of any form of property must rule out the worker's alienation from the means of production and the exploitation of man by man.

One of the most difficult aspects of the economic reform is to find an organic combination of plan and market methods to regulate economic activity.

Modern production is impossible without a centralized planned management. This essentially socialist principle of economic management has been adopted by many countries.

However, it is crucially important to determine the precise degree and methods of such management. Unlike in the past, when the plan attempted to encompass the entire process of production and distribution, there is now a need for a procedure in which planned, centralized economic management will be exercised through prices, taxes, interest rates, credits, payments, etc. Its sphere will be strictly defined by the nature of the strategic tasks.

These tasks include the implementation of major scientific, technical and structural programs, the development of infrastructure, comprehensive measures to protect the human environment and renew its resources, a policy for taxation and credit, and a guarantee of a stable monetary circulation.

Matters pertaining to the people's social security require centralized regulation.

The Party proceeds from the assumption that the country needs a single all-union market—full-fledged and regulated, which must become a permanently operating mechanism to achieve and maintain a balance between production possibilities and requirements, and a dynamic equilibrium between solvent demand and supply. This is also a condition for the incorporation of the Soviet economy into world economic relations and the transfer to a convertible rouble.

The creation of a full-fledged market economy requires the formation of markets of consumer products, capital goods, securities, investment, currencies and research and development, and an early reform of the financial, monetary and credit systems.

The restructuring of prices is a *sine qua non* condition for the market to start regulating the economy. The artificial price levels and proportions, the burden of ineffective subsidies for some and ruinous deductions from others provide false reference-points for economic management. They confound the assessment of management's effect, perpetuate scientific and technological backwardness and prevent the efficient utilization of the advantages of the international division of labor.

Competition between product manufacturers, including foreign firms, must become an important factor

regulating and restraining the growth of prices. Making competition a reality calls for legislative demonopolization of production, trade, credit services and insurance businesses.

The Party advocates a structural change of the economy in favor of the consumer sector, measures to curtail ineffective and capital-intensive production, and the revamping of the existing enterprises. There is a need to give more attention to implementing programs that rationally utilize nature and save resources, stocks, raw materials and labor inputs, as well as combat mismanagement.

The conversion of defense industries must become an organic component of the structural change. Based on their high skills and scientific and technological potential, it is possible to sharply increase the output of modern capital goods and consumer products. At the same time the necessary resources must be allocated for expanded reproduction, without which the economic development is bound to get caught in a dead end.

The Party will do its utmost to support efforts to speed up scientific and technological progress, which will be measured by its economic, ecological and social effectiveness and the prospects for its rapid introduction into all spheres of societal life. The provision of necessities for the powerful development of basic and applied research is another major concern of the state. More scope must be given to a variety of research activities and the dissemination of knowledge.

The protection of nature is the protection of man. Towards the close of the 20th Century, environmental protection has become a categoric imperative for preserving life on the earth. We must introduce world standards in this country and take an active part in international ecological cooperation.

The rapid industrial growth of the USSR, coupled with an attitude of neglect toward conservation measures, has led to grave pockets of ecological disaster. Urgent measures and large investments are required to rectify the situation. When deploying new industrial capacities, the Party deems it necessary to institutionalize a procedure to make a strict scientific assessment and to consider public concerns.

At the same time one cannot panic, allowing unfounded demands to close down enterprises that are vital to the country and without which it is impossible to meet the most elementary needs of the people. It will be impossible to tackle ecological problems and save nature without modern scientific, technological and industrial development.

The USSR's broader participation in the international division of labor and co-production is indispensable to its effective economic development. A reliable way to achieve this is to increase the competitiveness of Soviet goods and services, steadily enhance foreign-economic ties, including in terms of currency, independence of the enterprises, do away with the prevalence of raw materials in exports and revise the import structure.

Working to implement all of the listed measures, the Soviet Communist Party will carefully look after the interests of the working people and erect a reliable legal barrier against the shadow economy, corruption, speculation and people who claim a monopoly.

[. . .]

V. Towards a New Federation

The CPSU's Nationalities Policy at the Current Stage. The fate of perestroika and the future of the country depend to a great extent on the development of inter-ethnic relations.

We resolutely reject attempts to cross out the great and worthy achievements of our country due to the October Revolution—the consolidation and accession to statehood of many peoples from former colonial provinces of the Russian Empire, the overcoming of their backwardness, new values of inter-ethnic relations and sense of being equal members of a great world power. At the same time distortions of Lenin's nationalities policy brought immense suffering and loss to the peoples of our multi-ethnic state. Serious problems accumulated during objective migrational and demographic processes as well.

The way out of these difficulties, as the Party sees it, lies in the consistent implementation of economic and political reforms, in the resolute rejection of the Stalinist, essentially unitary, model of state structure, and in the complete and invariable implementation of the principle of federalism. Our approach to the development of nations and inter-ethnic relations was set out in the CPSU platform, "The Party's Nationalities Policy in Present-day Conditions". It rests on the following key principles: the unconditional observance of the rights of citizens of any nationality all over the country's territory, a real guarantee of the sovereignty of union republics and a new level of independence for all forms of national autonomy, and the preservation of the country's integrity as a federation of free and equal republics, voluntarily delegating part of their rights to the union in order to attain common goals.

Self-Determination of Nations. The principle of the self-determination of nations in a renewed Soviet federation presupposes the freedom of national-state entities to choose forms by which to structure life, institutions and symbols of statehood. Our ideal is not unification, but unity in diversity.

The Party reaffirms its commitment to Lenin's principle of the right of nations to self-determination, including secession, and favors the adoption of a law on a mechanism for the exercise of this right. At the same time we are convinced that the weakening and disruption of reciprocally diverse and interrelated ties could lead to negative consequences for all peoples, to say nothing about individual destinies—consequences that are very difficult to foresee.

The Union and Union Republics. The transformation of the Soviet Federation should be based on harmonizing inter-ethnic relations and establishing optimal links between union republics and the union as their common entity.

The CPSU believes it is necessary to promote the agreement principle of the structure of the Union. This would make it possible to reflect the considerable changes that have taken place and to execute new approaches to an entire range of problems involving nationalities and inter-ethnic relations.

The voluntary delegation of clearly defined functions to the responsibility of the union will help strengthen the status of the union republics as sovereign states with constitutional guarantees. The republics' real sovereignty is impossible without their economic independence. But the present-day economy cannot make do without the center operating at the macro-level. The center has no interests that differ from the vital interests of the republics and the peoples forming the federation. A clear delineation of the responsibilities of the union and the republics is required, including in planning, budget arrangement, taxation, crediting and price formation.

Direct contract ties between the enterprises of all republics and regions, forming a union-wide market, should become the economic foundation of integration processes, the renewal and consolidation of our federation.

The republics' relations with the center and among themselves must take proper account of their specifics —geographical location, historical development, formation of statehood, role in the country's pattern of production forces, character and level of economies, psychological frame of mind and customs of the peoples inhabiting their territories.

The Development of Autonomous Formation. The perfection of the Soviet Federative State presupposes that the sovereignty and rights of autonomous republics, autonomous regions and autonomous districts will be strengthened and broadened, that they will be given more opportunities to make independent decisions on major problems of economic, social and cultural life. The Party will devote untiring attention to this.

The Rights of Nations and the Rights of a Person. Due to migrational processes and deformations that have occurred during the preceding development period there is the danger that some peoples will lose their distinctive national traits while residing in their historical homelands. Perfectly warranted therefore are measures to protect the native language, cultural and ethnic features, the national spiritual values, the original way of life and every republic's demographic structure.

At the same time, such measures must not be carried out at the expense of the interests and rights of citizens of other nationalities inhabiting a republic. Racism, chauvinism and nationalism are incompatible with the principles of socialism, with our country's laws and with international standards. No nation, no matter how small it is, should forfeit its culture and language, its inimitable image and character which were formed over centuries. We favor granting compact national groups the possibilities to set up their public, educational, religious and other associations, to have cultural and information institutions, schools and places of worship.

Particular concern must be displayed at the state level for small nations, for their specific way of life and development. The Soviet Communist Party upholds the unconditional right of all peoples to use their native language freely, to declare it an official language within the limits of their autonomous national-state requirements, including the Soviet Union's foreign policy. It is an instrument for inter-ethnic communication. It is advisable to grant it the status of an official language throughout the country's territory.

Communists who are dedicated to internationalism equally value the interests of all the peoples of our country. The status of a Party, uniting people of all nationalities, allows and obliges us to use this political potential to settle inter-ethnic disputes and conflicts. And we intend to act in this manner.

VI. Towards the Peaceful Development of Mankind

New Thinking, New Foreign Policy. By starting perestroika and thereby initiating profound changes in the entire world situation, by determining what our country will be like as a result of our renovation, we have taken upon ourselves a huge responsibility to mankind. What the world will be like in the 21st Century depends on the success of perestroika in the USSR. In turn, the radical improvement of the international situation and the ushering in of a peaceful era in the world's development meet the vital interests of the Soviet people and contribute to perestroika's progress.

Foreign policy, based on new thinking, has already yielded positive results. The world is getting rid of the bonds of confrontation. The integrity of modern civilization is more clearly discernable now, calling for a new world policy. The "Cold War" has been stopped. The danger of a world military conflict has receded. A positive turn towards new relations has been made in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The first major steps have been taken towards practical disarmament. Dialogue and talks are becoming the principal form of international relations. Political methods are assuming priority in settling regional conflicts.

The Soviet Union's new thinking and new foreign policy have placed it at the forefront of efforts to build a safe and civilized world order. We stand for free sociopolitical options. This principle, in addition to the principle of balanced interests, must become universal during the coming epoch, must rid it of positions-of-strength policy and militarized thinking.

Our long-range foreign policy course comprises: a comprehensive range of mutually advantageous equitable relations and contacts with all the countries of the world, the renovation and development of cooperation with allied states and CMEA members, active participation in the European process, the construction of an 'All-European Home', activity in the Asian-Pacific region in order to turn it into a zone of peace and cooperation, all-out support for United Nations' efforts to implement the opportunities that have opened up before it, "good offices" in the political settlement of regional conflicts, solidarity with peoples and states defending their independence from any outside interference.

To demilitarize the world community, our course provides for: a complete ban on and the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, an end to nuclear tests everywhere, a ban on and liquidation of chemical weapons and their manufacture, a radical reduction in conventional arms and armed forces, moving towards eliminating the very possibility of offensive wars, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other states and the liquidation of military bases there, the prevention of the militarization of space, the reorganization of military alliances (pending their elimination) into defensive-political associations in the service of universal security and international stability, deep cuts in military

budgets and the conversion of defense industry, gradual progress towards reciprocal openness on the earth, at sea, in the sky and in outer space, and the effective control of military activity and compliance with treaties.

The Party is convinced that only a policy leading towards a historically irreversible era of peace for mankind accords with the genuine interests of the Soviet state now and in the future.

Towards a New Quality of International Cooperation. The destinies of peoples, given the unqualified sovereignty of the states in which they live, are intertwined more closely today than ever before. This places new demands on world politics. It is imperative to unite the efforts of the entire world community in order to solve mankind's global problems. It is only through concerted efforts that states can overcome hunger, misery, mass epidemics, drug addiction and international terrorism and halt the profound disparities developing in different parts of the world. Only concerted efforts can prevent an ecological disaster, the signs of which are already making themselves felt on all continents. Only the elimination of obstacles to scientific and technological exchanges and the creation of a genuinely world economy will provide the material basis for the peaceful development of civilization. Progress towards these objectives of the new epoch requires a drastically new level of international cooperation. Here the United Nations' role is irreplaceable. We also favor interaction with all progressive organizations on the local, continental, regional and international level.

The world community's viability lies in the variety of its modes of development and in its multi-faceted nature: ethnic, spiritual, social, political, geographical and cultural. It is within the mainstream of the overall, progressive movement of civilization—and we are convinced of this—that the ideas of socialism will be reborn and begin to gain an ever-growing influence. Although they differ from country to country, the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe are painfully overcoming the negative experience that emerged during socialism's struggle in the extremely unfavorable setting of the "Cold War" and without due account of the ethnic factor.

The changes that have occurred in East European countries have not changed our friendly attitude towards their peoples. The Party believes that the reforms begun there, like perestroika in the USSR, will create a more natural and firm basis for voluntary and mutually advantageous relations.

The Party is open to cooperation with the communist and workers', socialist and social-democratic, liberal and national-democratic parties, with all organizations and movements espousing peace, democracy and social progress.

Perestroika allowed the historical split in the socialist movement to heal and permitted the movement's revival as a world movement on a modern basis. One can foresee the prospect—and the Party welcomes it—of a consolidation of left forces in a search for a new world and social progress.

[. . .]

Source: "Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Platform," *Izvestiia*, 13 February 1990, Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 90-031, pp. 41–53.

156. NATO: The London Declaration, 6 July 1990

Introduction

As the Soviet Union relaxed its control over Eastern Europe and noncommunist governments came to power throughout the region, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) heads of state of the Western alliance met in London. Ascribing some credit to NATO for having "done much to bring about the new Europe," they stated their determination to keep the alliance in existence. While they intended that it should remain a purely defensive pact, no one, they warned, could predict the future, and threats might still arise. They stated their intention of

"extending . . . the hand of friendship" to their former Warsaw Pact adversaries to the East and invited its member states to "establish regular diplomatic liaison" with themselves. With nuclear and conventional arms control agreements already in place, NATO anticipated that it would field smaller but more effective forces. The NATO powers also suggested that they and the Soviet Union jointly eliminate all "nuclear artillery shells from Europe." They expected that in the future political rather than military cooperation would become their highest priority. Finally, they advocated an enhanced role for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), urging that body to hold regular conferences and consultative meetings in order to promote the spread of democracy, the rule of law, economic development, and environmental cooperation.

Primary Source

1. Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey towards a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.

3. The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

4. We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

5. We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.

6. The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non- aggression.

7. In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.

8. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.

9. We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

10. Military leaders from throughout Europe gathered earlier this year in Vienna to talk about their forces and doctrine. NATO proposes another such meeting this Autumn to promote common understanding. We intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on "Open Skies".

11. The significant presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence.

12. To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) along with the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a CFE Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with additional measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.

13. Our objective will be to conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We will seek through new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent. NATO's High Level Task Force will formulate a detailed position for these follow-on conventional arms control talks. We will make provisions as needed for different regions to redress disparities and to ensure that no one's security is harmed at any stage. Furthermore, we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities. This is an ambitious agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.

14. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

15. To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

16. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

17. New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.

18. Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

19. We approve the mandate given in Turnberry to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the Alliance to the new circumstances. It should report its conclusions as soon as possible.

20. In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "forward defence" where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.

21. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. We support a CSCE Summit later this year in Paris which would include the signature of a CFE agreement and would set new standards for the establishment, and preservation, of free societies. It should endorse, inter alia:

- CSCE principles on the right to free and fair elections;
- CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law;
- CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and
- CSCE cooperation on environmental protection.

22. We further propose that the CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalised to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. We recommend that CSCE governments establish:

- a programme for regular consultations among member governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;
- a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress toward a Europe whole and free;
- a small CSCE secretariat to coordinate these meetings and conferences;
- a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;
- a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchange of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member states; and

- a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states.

The sites of these new institutions should reflect the fact that the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe form part of the political structures of the new Europe.

23. Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.

Source: "Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (The London Declaration)," North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Basic Texts, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c900706a.htm.

157. Helmut Kohl and Mikhail Gorbachev: Press Conference on German Reunification, 16 July 1990

Introduction

At the end of World War II, the various Allied powers, including the Soviet Union, had found it impossible to agree on the status of Germany. All had originally stated that the country should be united under a single government, but once the Cold War took hold neither the Western powers nor the Soviets were prepared to risk the absorption of Germany, Europe's strongest state, in the rival camp. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the relaxation of Cold War tensions in 1989–1990 gave the question of Germany's future new saliency, as East and West Germans alike called for the country's reunification under one government. There was little question that should such an event transpire, the West German authorities would take over the East, where communist rule had never been popular. In March 1990 the East Germans elected a noncommunist government whose major mandate was to negotiate reunification with the West. Initially, the leaders of the World War II occupation powers—Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, all of whom had long memories of Germany's assertive behavior in the earlier twentieth century—were unenthusiastic, but pledges that a reunited Germany would remain part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and become more closely integrated in the European Union (EU) allayed the concerns of the Western leaders. On 1 July 1990 the two Germanies concluded an interim economic, social, and currency union. Russian objections still had to be countered. Meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1990 ten days after NATO had announced that it no longer regarded the Soviet Union as a threat, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl reached agreement that the two Germanies should be unified within a few months, after which the East German government would cease to exist. Over the next three to four years, Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East German soil. The new Germany was free to join any alliance it pleased and intended to remain in NATO, but no NATO forces would be stationed on former East German territory until the Soviet military personnel had left. Germany also pledged to reduce its army to 370,000 men and to refrain from producing or owning atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. In addition, Germany agreed to accept the post–World War II cession to Poland of much of its territory in the east. On 31 August 1990, representatives of the two Germanies signed the Unification Treaty, followed on 12 September 1990 by the Treaty of Final Settlement between the two Germanies and the four World War II occupying powers. The actual event took place on 3 October 1990.

Primary Source

Kohl Statement

[. . .]

Today I can state the following with satisfaction and in agreement with President Gorbachev:

- The unification of Germany encompasses the Federal Republic, the G.D.R. and Berlin.
- When unification is brought about, all the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers will end. With that, the unified Germany, at the point of its unification, receives its full and unrestricted sovereignty.

- The unified Germany may, in exercising its unrestricted sovereignty, decide freely and by itself if and which alliance it wants to be a member of. This complies with the C.S.C.E. Final Act. I have declared as the opinion of the West German Government that the unified Germany wants to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance, and I am certain that this also complies with the opinion of the Government of the G.D.R.
- The unified Germany concludes a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union for the organization of the troop withdrawal from the G.D.R., which shall be ended within three to four years. At the same time, a transition treaty about the consequences of the introduction of the Deutsche mark in the G.D.R. for this time period of three to four years shall be concluded with the Soviet Union.
- As long as Soviet troops will remain stationed on the territory of the G.D.R., NATO structures will not be expanded to this part of Germany. The immediate realization of Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty will stay untouched by this from the start. Non-integrated troops of the West German Army, which means troops of territorial defense, may be stationed on the territory of today's G.D.R. and in Berlin immediately after unification. For the duration of the presence of Soviet troops on former G.D.R. territory the troops of the three Western Powers shall, in our opinion, stay in Berlin. The Federal Government will ask the Western Powers for that and will arrange the stationing with the respective governments.
- The Federal Government declares its willingness to give a binding declaration in the current Vienna talks to reduce the army of a unified Germany within three to four years to a personnel strength of 370,000. The reduction shall start when the first Vienna agreement comes into effect.
- A unified Germany will refrain from production, holding or command of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and will remain a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This joint agreement is a good starting basis to conclude now in time and successfully the external aspects of German unification within the framework of the two-plus-four talks.

On my return I will make the necessary contacts with the G.D.R. Government, and I take it that the Government of the G.D.R. shares our perception. I will also deliver today's reports to the three Western Powers immediately. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will inform the three Western foreign ministers tomorrow.

At the end of this talk, may I thank you, Mr. President and you, Mrs. Gorbachev, for the great hospitality. This hospitality was essential for the understanding. I may say, the personal trust has grown further.

Gorbachev Statement

Chancellor Kohl has said a great deal about the great work we have done together, the work and the visit that I see as so important.

I want to give some concrete evaluations of some questions. First of all, I think that the work about such important and difficult points that we did does not only touch our two peoples, but all Europeans, and that it also touches the world public. . . .

We could work so fruitfully because, most of all, in the course of the past years we went our way. Our relations are already marked by a very high level of dialogue, and the meetings on highest levels, the telephone calls, the mutual visits have contributed to this intensive dialogue.

We have expected that there will be . . . changes, for example in the area of NATO. The Warsaw Pact has already, as you know, changed its doctrine at its last session. That was a challenge, a call to change the structures of the blocs, from military blocs to more political ones.

We have received a very important impulse from the conference in London, NATO's most recent conference, which brought very important positive steps, which were also understood as such by the socialist countries and other European countries.

If the . . . step of London had not been made, then it would have been difficult to make headway at our meeting. I want to characterize the two last days with

a German expression: we made realpolitik. We have taken as a basis today's reality, the significance for Europe and the world.

We have reached agreement over the fact that the NATO structure is not going to be expanded to the territory of the former G.D.R. And if on the basis of our agreement the Soviet troops will be withdrawn in a time frame of, let us say, three to four years, then we take it that after this time period this territory will also be part of a Germany that has full sovereignty. We take it that no other foreign troops appear there; here we have trust and are aware of the responsibility of this step.

Mr. Chancellor, it was you most of all who developed this idea at this meeting. We cannot talk yet about a unified Germany, it is still an idea yet, but an idea that I welcome. . . .

Source: "Excerpts From Kohl-Gorbachev News Conference on Germany and NATO," *New York Times*, 17 July 1990. Copyright © 1990 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.

158. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 1990

Introduction

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed in November 1990 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact states and came into force on 17 July 1992, as did the follow-up Concluding Act. The treaty was a companion to concurrent efforts by the Soviet Union and the United States to cut nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which resulted in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1988 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) of 1991 and 1993. All were part of the broader efforts once Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 to reduce Cold War tensions. The CFE Treaty was a legally binding agreement intended to accomplish balanced reductions in the armed forces of each side in the former Cold War. Neither of the two camps was permitted to possess more than 20,000 artillery pieces, 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. The treaty covered the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals. Within this area several subregions were established, and each grouping would be entitled to have equal numbers of the various weapons systems. No one single country could hold more than one-third of the total armaments covered by this agreement. Weapons in excess of these limits were to be destroyed within forty months of the agreement entering into force. Subsequent negotiations resulted in the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE-1A Agreement), which established manpower limits for certain types of forces, although not sea-based naval forces, internal security forces, or military personnel serving under United Nations (UN) commands. This agreement was signed in Helsinki on 6 July 1992. The CFE Treaty sought to establish military equilibrium between the two rival European camps at a lower level than had occurred in the past. The CFE Treaty was negotiated and signed under the auspices of the Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established under the Helsinki Accords. Two days after the CFE Treaty was signed, the CSCE formally declared that the Cold War had ended.

Primary Source

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in November 1990 by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact. There are 29 signatories. Its objective was to reduce the levels of conventional troops stationed in Europe, establishing equal ceilings for all nations between the Ural Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean regarding the armaments needed for launching a surprise attack or carrying out a large-scale military offensive.

Under the agreement, neither side in the former cold war alliance can possess more than:

- 20,000 artillery pieces
- 30,000 armored combat vehicles
- 20,000 tanks

- 6,800 combat aircraft
- 2,000 attack helicopters

The treaty also established ceilings for the amount of equipment that can be held by active units, setting the numbers at:

- 17,000 artillery pieces
- 27,300 armored combat vehicles
- 16,500 tanks

The two groups have consulted internally to determine how the reductions will be broken down by country. The treaty also limits the proportion of equipment that can be held by any one European country to one-third of the total for the entire continent, and sets limits by region.

Equipment in excess of the agreed amounts must be destroyed. Most of the destroyed equipment will be older and the United States will transfer some of its new equipment to its allies to meet requirements. The destruction must be completed by the end of the third year after the treaty agreement, with one-quarter being completed after one year and 60% after two years.

The CFE treaty has complex and groundbreaking verification provisions that call for on-site inspections, information exchanges, on-site destruction monitoring, and challenge inspections. The treaty does not have an end date and gives all participants the right to monitor the destruction process.

The CFE-1A talks are mandated in the CFE treaty and require participants to reach agreement on further measures aimed at increasing stability and security on the continent. The CFE-1A talks ended on July 6, 1992 and include a political commitment by signatories to limit (and in some cases reduce) the size of their conventional armed forces. All the participants set their own ceilings, which were not subject to negotiation. The CFE-1A treaty has provisions for full information exchanges on manpower, with verification linked to the inspection program of the CFE equipment evaluation program.

CFE-1A, which took effect on July 17, 1992, incorporates three stabilizing measures:

- A required 42-day notification period if any signatory plans to increase its personnel in any ground force unit by more than 1,000 and in any air force unit by more than 500
- A provision requiring 42-days notification if a nation plans to call up 35,000 or more reservists (excluding call ups for such emergencies as natural disasters)
- A provision that any personnel relocated to forces not under limitation remain subject to limitation for 12–24 months.

Source: "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe." 19 November 1990, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4781.htm.

159. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Paris, 21 November 1990

Introduction

The Committee on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) was established under the 1975 Helsinki Agreements to supervise their implementation and encourage further progress toward European harmony. At the time, it was generally expected that the Cold War would be a permanent feature of international relations. After Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union in 1985, he instituted conciliatory rather than competitive international policies, making unilateral cuts in Soviet forces, permitting the East European nations to establish noncommunist governments, and opening serious negotiations for mutual East-West reductions in both nuclear and conventional weapons that de-escalated Cold War tensions and effectively dismantled the Soviet empire. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1988, withdrew all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, the first time an entire class of nuclear weapons had been eliminated. The Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed in 1990 under CSCE auspices, required major cuts in armed forces of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact alliances. In a dramatic proof that the Cold War had ended on Western terms and "a new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity in Europe" had begun, the head of the signatory states issued a charter whereby they undertook "to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations." They expressed their respect for human rights, economic liberty, social justice, freedom, political pluralism, and environmental responsibility. They also stated their intention to settle disputes among themselves by peaceful means, affirmed their commitment to economic cooperation, and pledged themselves to combat terrorism. The declaration was striking evidence of the degree to which, despite its global ramifications, the center of the Cold War had always remained the European rivalries between the two power blocs centered on the United States and the Soviet Union.

Primary Source

A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity

We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our, relations will be founded on respect and co-operation.

[. . .]

Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law

We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations. In this endeavour, we will abide by the following:

Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government. Respect for them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State. Their observance and full exercise are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace.

Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections. Democracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and the rule of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each person.

Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will be above the law.

We affirm that, without discrimination, every individual has the right to

freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief,
freedom of expression,
freedom of association and peaceful assembly,
freedom of movement;

no one will be:

subject to arbitrary arrest or detention,
subject to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

everyone also has the right :

to know and act upon his rights,
to participate in free and fair elections,
to fair and public trial if charged with an offence,
to own property alone or in association and to exercise individual enterprise,
to enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights.

We affirm that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities will be protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.

We will ensure that everyone will enjoy recourse to effective remedies, national or international, against any violation of his rights.

Full respect for these precepts is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe.

Our States will co-operate and support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible.

Economic Liberty and Responsibility
Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity.

The free will of the individual, exercised in democracy and protected by the rule of law, forms the necessary basis for successful economic and social development. We will promote economic activity which respects and upholds human dignity.

Freedom and political pluralism are necessary elements in our common objective of developing market economies towards sustainable economic growth, prosperity, social justice, expanding employment and efficient use of economic resources. The success of the transition to market economy by countries making efforts to this effect is important and in the interest of us all. It will enable us to share a higher level of prosperity which is our common objective. We will co-operate to this end.

Preservation of the environment is a shared responsibility of all our nations. While supporting national and regional efforts in this field, we must also look to the pressing need for joint action on a wider scale.

Friendly Relations among Participating States
Now that a new era is dawning in Europe, we are determined to expand and strengthen friendly relations and co-operation among the States of Europe, the United States of America and Canada, and to promote friendship among our peoples.

To uphold and promote democracy, peace and unity in Europe, we solemnly pledge our full commitment to the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act. We affirm the continuing validity of the Ten Principles and our determination to put them into practice. All the Principles apply equally and unreservedly, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. They form the basis for our relations.

[. . .]

We are determined to enhance political consultation and to widen co-operation to solve economic, social, environmental, cultural and humanitarian problems. This common resolve and our growing interdependence will help to overcome the mistrust of decades, to increase stability and to build a united Europe.

We want Europe to be a source of peace, open to dialogue and to co-operation with other countries, welcoming exchanges and involved in the search for common responses to the challenges of the future.

Security
Friendly relations among us will benefit from the consolidation of democracy and improved security.

We welcome the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe by twenty-two participating States, which will lead to lower levels of armed forces. We endorse the adoption of a substantial new set of Confidence- and Security-building Measures which will lead to increased transparency and confidence among all participating States. These are important steps towards enhanced stability and security in Europe.

The unprecedented reduction in armed forces resulting from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, together with new approaches to security and cooperation within the CSCE process, will lead to a new perception of security in Europe and a new dimension in our relations. In this context we fully recognize the freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements.

Unity
Europe whole and free is calling for a new beginning. We invite our peoples to join in this great endeavour.

We note with great satisfaction the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990 and sincerely welcome the fact that the German people have united to become one State in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in

Europe and in full accord with their neighbours. The establishment of the national unity of Germany is an important contribution to a just and lasting order of peace for a united, democratic Europe aware of its responsibility for stability, peace and co-operation.

The participation of both North American and European States is a fundamental characteristic of the CSCE; it underlies its past achievements and is essential to the future of the CSCE process. An abiding adherence to shared values and our common heritage are the ties which bind us together. With all the rich diversity of our nations, we are united in our commitment to expand our co-operation in all fields. The challenges confronting us can only be met by common action, co-operation and solidarity.

The CSCE and the World

The destiny of our nations is linked to that of all other nations. We support fully the United Nations and the enhancement of its role in promoting international peace, security and justice. We reaffirm our commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and condemn all violations of these principles. We recognize with satisfaction the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing effectiveness, fostered by the improvement in relations among our States.

Aware of the dire needs of a great part of the world, we commit ourselves to solidarity with all other countries. Therefore, we issue a call from Paris today to all the nations of the world. We stand ready to join with any and all States in common efforts to protect and advance the community of fundamental human values.

Guidelines for the Future

Proceeding from our firm commitment to the full implementation of all CSCE principles and provisions, we now resolve to give a new impetus to a balanced and comprehensive development of our co-operation in order to address the needs and aspirations of our peoples.

Human Dimension

We declare our respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms to be irrevocable.

We will fully implement and build upon the provisions relating to the human dimension of the CSCE.

[. . .]

Determined to foster the rich contribution of national minorities to the life of our societies, we undertake further to improve their situation. We reaffirm our deep conviction that friendly relations among our peoples, as well as peace, justice, stability and democracy, require that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected and conditions for the promotion of that identity be created. We declare that questions related to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework. We further acknowledge that the rights of persons belonging to national minorities must be fully respected as part of universal human rights. Being aware of the urgent need for increased cooperation on, as well as better protection of, national minorities, we decide to convene a meeting of experts on national minorities to be held in Geneva from 1 to 19 July 1991.

We express our determination to combat all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, antisemitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds.

In accordance with our CSCE commitments, we stress that free movement and contacts among our citizens as well as the free flow of information and ideas are crucial for the maintenance and development of free societies and flourishing cultures. We welcome increased tourism and visits among our countries.

[. . .]

Security

[. . .]

We call for the earliest possible conclusion of the Convention on an effectively verifiable, global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and we intend to be original signatories to it.

We reaffirm the importance of the Open Skies initiative and call for the successful conclusion of the negotiations as soon as possible.

Although the threat of conflict in Europe has diminished, other dangers threaten the stability of our societies. We are determined to co-operate in defending democratic institutions against activities which violate the independence, sovereign equality or territorial integrity of the participating States. These include illegal activities involving outside pressure, coercion and subversion.

We unreservedly condemn, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism and express our determination to work for its eradication both bilaterally and through multilateral co-operation. We will also join together in combating illicit trafficking in drugs.

[. . .]

Economic Co-operation

We stress that economic co-operation based on market economy constitutes an essential element of our relations and will be instrumental in the construction of a prosperous and united Europe. Democratic institutions and economic liberty foster economic and social progress, as recognized in the Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation, the results of which we strongly support.

We underline that co-operation in the economic field, science and technology is now an important pillar of the CSCE. The participating States should periodically review progress and give new impulses in these fields.

We are convinced that our overall economic co-operation should be expanded, free enterprise encouraged and trade increased and diversified according to GATT rules. We will promote social justice and progress and further the welfare of our peoples. We recognize in this context the importance of effective policies to address the problem of unemployment.

We reaffirm the need to continue to support democratic countries in transition towards the establishment of market economy and the creation of the basis for self-sustained economic and social growth, as already undertaken by the Group of twenty-four countries. We further underline the necessity of their increased integration, involving the acceptance of disciplines as well as benefits, into the international economic and financial system.

We consider that increased emphasis on economic co-operation within the CSCE process should take into account the interests of developing participating States.

We recall the link between respect for and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and scientific progress. Co-operation in the field of science and technology will play an essential role in economic and social development. Therefore, it must evolve towards a greater sharing of appropriate scientific and technological information and knowledge with a view to overcoming the technological gap which exists among the participating States. We further encourage the participating States to work together in order to develop human potential and the spirit of free enterprise.

We are determined to give the necessary impetus to co-operation among our States in the fields of energy, transport and tourism for economic and social development. We welcome, in particular, practical steps to create optimal conditions for the economic and rational development of energy resources, with due regard for environmental considerations.

[. . .]

Environment

We recognize the urgent need to tackle the problems of the environment and the importance of individual and co-operative efforts in this area. We pledge to intensify our endeavours to protect and improve our environment in order to restore and maintain a sound ecological balance in air, water and soil. Therefore, we are determined to make full use of the CSCE as a framework for the formulation of common environmental commitments and objectives, and thus to pursue the work reflected in the Report of the Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment.

We emphasize the significant role of a well-informed society in enabling the public and individuals to take initiatives to improve the environment. To this end, we commit ourselves to promoting public awareness and education on the environment as well as the public

reporting of the environmental impact of policies, projects and programmes.

We attach priority to the introduction of clean and low-waste technology, being aware of the need to support countries which do not yet have their own means for appropriate measures.

We underline that environmental policies should be supported by appropriate legislative measures and administrative structures to ensure their effective implementation.

We stress the need for new measures providing for the systematic evaluation of compliance with the existing commitments and, moreover, for the development of more ambitious commitments with regard to notification and exchange of information about the state of the environment and potential environmental hazards. We also welcome the creation of the European Environment Agency (EEA).

We welcome the operational activities, problem-oriented studies and policy reviews in various existing international organizations engaged in the protection of the environment, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We emphasize the need for strengthening their co-operation and for their efficient co-ordination.

Culture

We recognize the essential contribution of our common European culture and our shared values in overcoming the division of the continent. Therefore, we underline our attachment to creative freedom and to the protection and promotion of our cultural and spiritual heritage, in all its richness and diversity.

In view of the recent changes in Europe, we stress the increased importance of the Cracow Symposium and we look forward to its consideration of guidelines for intensified cooperation in the field of culture. We invite the Council of Europe to contribute to this Symposium.

In order to promote greater familiarity amongst our peoples, we favour the establishment of cultural centres in cities of other participating States as well as increased cooperation in the audio-visual field and wider exchange in music, theatre, literature and the arts.

We resolve to make special efforts in our national policies to promote better understanding, in particular among young people, through cultural exchanges, co-operation in all fields of education and, more specifically, through teaching and training in the languages of other participating States. We intend to consider first results of this action at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992.

Migrant Workers

We recognize that the issues of migrant workers and their families legally residing in host countries have economic, cultural and social aspects as well as their human dimension.

We reaffirm that the protection and promotion of their rights, as well as the implementation of relevant international obligations, is our common concern.

Mediterranean

We consider that the fundamental political changes that have occurred in Europe have a positive relevance to the Mediterranean region. Thus, we will continue efforts to strengthen security and co-operation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe. We welcome the Report of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting on the Mediterranean, the results of which we all support.

We are concerned with the continuing tensions in the region, and renew our determination to intensify efforts towards finding just, viable and lasting solutions, through peaceful means, to outstanding crucial problems, based on respect for the principles of the Final Act.

We wish to promote favourable conditions for a harmonious development and diversification of relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States. Enhanced cooperation with these States will be pursued with the

aim of promoting economic and social development and thereby enhancing stability in the region. To this end, we will strive together with these countries towards a substantial narrowing of the prosperity gap between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours.

[. . .]

Source: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Charter of Paris for a New Europe," Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf.

160. Agreement on the Cessation of the Military Provisions of the Warsaw Pact, 25 February 1991

Introduction

The Warsaw Pact was an alliance whose raison d'être was the Soviet Union's desire to assure its own security by maintaining the nations of Eastern Europe, whose territory separated it from its West European opponents nations, as friendly satellites with their foreign policies subordinated to Soviet direction. In 1989 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided not just to grant the East European states greater autonomy but also decreed that should those nations wish to select noncommunist governments, the Soviet Union would decline to use military coercion to prevent this. Gorbachev's stance marked the reversal of the Brezhnev Doctrine, promulgated by Leonid Brezhnev in the wake of the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. It was also a total rejection of one of the fundamental guiding principles of Soviet foreign policy for more than four decades, that the East European nations would not be permitted to establish nonsocialist governments or even socialist administrations unsympathetic to the Soviet Union, which had governed Soviet interventions in East Berlin in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. Predictably, the Warsaw Pact military alliance was highly unpopular in most of its member states, regarded more as a means of subjugation than a guarantee of security. As noncommunist governments came to power throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990, pressures mounted to dismantle the alliance. Meeting in Budapest, Hungary, in February 1991, the foreign ministers of the member states agreed to dissolve the alliance effective 1 April 1991. Repudiating their past allegiance to the Soviet Union, the non-Soviet members then turned for protection to the West's rival North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Perceiving their new affiliation in part as a guarantee of their own security should a remilitarized Russia seek to regain its former dominance, in 1991 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO, followed in 2004 by Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as well as the newly independent Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had been incorporated in the Soviet Union during World War II. Russian leaders protested vigorously but failed to prevent NATO's eastward enlargement, a measure of their country's massive decline in status.

Primary Source

[. . .]

1. As of 31 March 1991, the following documents will cease to be in force:

—Protocol on the creation of a Unified Command for the Armed Forces of the member-states of the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance from 14 May 1955
—Statute of the Committee of Ministers of Defense of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact in peace time from 17 March 1969
—Statute of the Unified Armed Forces and Unified Command of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty in peace time from 17 March 1969
—Statute of the Military Council of the Unified Armed Forces of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty in peace time from 17 March 1969
—Statute of a common anti-aircraft defense system for the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty in peace time from 17 March 1969
—Statute of the Unified Armed Forces of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty and their leadership organs in war time from 18 March 1980

As well as all other documents adopted in connection with the above-mentioned acts, as implemented, altered, or amended.

In accordance with the foregoing, as of 31 March 1991 all military organs and structures created within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty—the Committee of Ministers of Defense, the Unified Command of the Unified Armed Forces, the Military Council of the UAF, the Staff and Committee on Technology of the UAF, the Military Scientific and Technical Council of the UAF, the Unified Air Defense System of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty—are abolished. In addition, all military activity conducted within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty is terminated.

2. In accordance with point 1, as of 31 March 1991 the activity of military personnel of national armies in the administrative organs of the Unified Armed Forces and in the apparatus of the agencies of the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces in the national ministries of defense is terminated, as is the payment of financial dues to the Unified Command.

3. The further handling of documents received by the ministries of defense of the member-states of the Unified Command of the Unified Armed Forces, as well as those received by the Unified Command from the ministries of defense, is to be determined by agreement between the Unified Command and the ministries of defense of the member-states. These documents are not to be transferred to third countries and are not to be divulged.

4. This protocol enters into force upon its signature.

[. . .]

Source: Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991* (Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press, 2005), 682–683.

161. George H. W. Bush: Address to Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict, 6 March 1991

Introduction

The ending of the Cold War meant that the guiding principle of American foreign policy could no longer, as it had been for more than four decades, be the strategy of containment of communism. The first major international crisis of the immediate post–Cold War period occurred in August 1990 when Saddam Hussein, the dictatorial leader of Iraq, annexed oil-rich Kuwait, a U.S. ally. With encouragement from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, President George H. W. Bush demanded that Iraq withdraw. When Hussein ignored this, under United Nations (UN) auspices Bush organized a coalition of U.S. allies, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers, Saudi Arabia, and Japan, to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Bush's efforts were facilitated by the Soviet Union and China, as both states refrained from using their veto power at the UN to sabotage this operation. Launched in early 1991, Operation DESERT STORM ended quickly and successfully, as Hussein's troops were swiftly driven from Kuwait and pursued into Iraqi territory. Bush and his advisors soon decided to halt the invasion of Iraq, as they did not wish to deal with the challenges that overthrowing Hussein was likely to bring in their train, and they therefore left the weakened dictator in power but subject to confining UN sanctions and restrictions. Addressing Congress shortly after the Persian Gulf War had ended, a triumphant Bush promised aid to the Middle East. He then proclaimed that the ending of the Cold War had made it possible for the UN to function as its founders had originally intended so that there was a "very real prospect of a new world order." This would, Bush stated, be a "world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations." He urged Congress to take swift and decisive action on economic problems, pollution, and crime to enable the country to fill its historic mission of implementing that new world order. Bush's speech was somewhat vague as to precisely what the new world order would encompass or how it would be organized. Critics charged that he envisaged that the United States could use its unrivaled military and economic might to dominate the new world order in its own interests.

Primary Source

Tonight, I come to this House to speak about the world—the world after war. The recent challenge could not have been clearer. Saddam Hussein was the villain; Kuwait, the victim. To the aid of this small country came nations from North America and Europe, from Asia and South America, from Africa and the Arab world, all united against aggression. Our uncommon coalition must now work in common purpose: to forge a future that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human nature.

Tonight in Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is crushed. His ability to threaten mass destruction is itself destroyed. His people have been lied to, denied the truth. And when his defeated legions come home, all Iraqis will see and feel the havoc he has wrought. And this I promise you: For all that Saddam has done to his own people, to the Kuwaitis, and to the entire world, Saddam and those around him are accountable.

All of us grieve for the victims of war, for the people of Kuwait and the suffering that scars the soul of that proud nation. We grieve for all our fallen soldiers and their families, for all the innocents caught up in this conflict. And, yes, we grieve for the people of Iraq, a people who have never been our enemy. My hope is that one day we will once again welcome them as friends into the community of nations. Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the liberation of Kuwait. So, tonight let me outline four key challenges to be met.

First, we must work together to create shared security arrangements in the region. Our friends and allies in the Middle East recognize that they will bear the bulk of the responsibility for regional security. But we want them to know that just as we stood with them to repel aggression, so now America stands ready to work with them to secure the peace. This does not mean stationing U.S. ground forces in the Arabian Peninsula, but it does mean American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces. It means maintaining a capable U.S. naval presence in the region, just as we have for over 40 years. Let it be clear: Our vital national interests depend on a stable and secure Gulf.

Second, we must act to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. It would be tragic if the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race. Iraq requires special vigilance. Until Iraq convinces the world of its peaceful intentions—that its leaders will not use new revenues to rearm and rebuild its menacing war machine—Iraq must not have access to the instruments of war.

And third, we must work to create new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East. On the night I announced Operation Desert Storm, I expressed my hope that out of the horrors of war might come new momentum for peace. We've learned in the modern age geography cannot guarantee security, and security does not come from military power alone.

All of us know the depth of bitterness that has made the dispute between Israel and its neighbors so painful and intractable. Yet, in the conflict just concluded, Israel and many of the Arab States have for the first time found themselves confronting the same aggressor. By now, it should be plain to all parties that peacemaking in the Middle East requires compromise. At the same time, peace brings real benefits to everyone. We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab States—and between Israelis and Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead absolutely nowhere. There can be no substitute for diplomacy.

A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin test of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict.

The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solutions to the problems in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in the Gulf must go forward with new vigor and determination. And I guarantee you: No one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will.

Fourth, we must foster economic development for the sake of peace and progress. The Persian Gulf and Middle East form a region rich in natural resources with a wealth of untapped human potential. Resources once squandered on military might must be redirected to more peaceful ends. We are already addressing the immediate economic consequences of Iraq's aggression. Now, the challenge is to reach higher, to foster economic freedom and prosperity for all the people of the region.

By meeting these four challenges we can build a framework for peace. I've asked Secretary of State Baker to go to the Middle East to begin the process. . . .

To all the challenges that confront this region of the world there is no single solution, no solely American answer. But we can make a difference. America will work tirelessly as a catalyst for positive change.

But we cannot lead a new world abroad if, at home, it's politics as usual on American defense and diplomacy. It's time to turn away from the temptation to protect unneeded weapons systems and obsolete bases. It's time to put an end to micromanagement of foreign and security assistance programs—micromanagement that humiliates our friends and allies and hamstrings our diplomacy. It's time to rise above the parochial and the pork barrel, to do what is necessary, what's right, and what will enable this nation to play the leadership role required of us.

The consequences of the conflict in the Gulf reach far beyond the confines of the Middle East. Twice before in this century, an entire world was convulsed by war. Twice this century, out of the horrors of war hope emerged for enduring peace. Twice before, those hopes proved to be a distant dream, beyond the grasp of man. Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict, and cold war.

Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which "the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong. . . ." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. And my fellow Americans, we passed that test. For the sake of our principles, for the sake of the Kuwaiti people, we stood our ground. Because the world would not look the other way, Ambassador al-Sabah, tonight Kuwait is free. And we're very happy about that.

Tonight, as our troops begin to come home, let us recognize that the hard work of freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars." Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission. Our success in the Gulf will shape not only the new world order we seek but our mission here at home.

In the war just ended, there were clear-cut objectives —timetables—and, above all, an overriding imperative to achieve results. We must bring that same sense of self-discipline, that same sense of urgency, to the way we meet challenges here at home. In my State of the Union Address and in my budget, I defined a comprehensive agenda to prepare for the next American century.

Our first priority is to get this economy rolling again. The fear and uncertainty caused by the Gulf crisis were understandable. But now that the war is over, oil prices are down, interest rates are down, and confidence is rightly coming back. Americans can move forward to lend, spend, and invest in this, the strongest economy on Earth.

We must also enact the legislation that is key to building a better America. For example, in 1990, we enacted an historic Clean Air Act. And now we've proposed a national energy strategy. We passed a child-care bill that put power in the hands of parents. And today, we're ready to do the same thing with our schools and expand choice in education. We passed a crime bill that made a useful start in fighting crime and drugs. This year, we're sending to Congress our comprehensive crime

package to finish the job. We passed the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act. And now we've sent forward our civil rights bill. We also passed the aviation bill. This year, we've sent up our new highway bill. And these are just a few of our pending proposals for reform and renewal.

So, tonight I call on the Congress to move forward aggressively on our domestic front. Let's begin with two initiatives we should be able to agree on quickly: transportation and crime. And then, let's build on success with those and enact the rest of our agenda. If our forces could win the ground war in 100 hours, then surely the Congress can pass this legislation in 100 days. Let that be a promise we make tonight to the American people.

When I spoke in this House about the state of our Union, I asked all of you: If we can selflessly confront evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be. In the time since then, the brave men and women of Desert Storm accomplished more than even they may realize. They set out to confront an enemy abroad, and in the process, they transformed a nation at home. Think of the way they went about their mission—with confidence and quiet pride. Think about their sense of duty, about all they taught us about our values, about ourselves.

We hear so often about our young people in turmoil—how our children fall short, how our schools fail us, how American products and American workers are second-class. Well, don't you believe it. The America we saw in Desert Storm was first-class talent. And they did it using America's state-of-the-art technology. We saw the excellence embodied in the Patriot missile and the patriots who made it work. And we saw soldiers who know about honor and bravery and duty and country and the world-shaking power of these simple words. There is something noble and majestic about the pride, about the patriotism that we feel tonight.

[. . .]

We went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just and right. We fought hard and, with others, we won the war. We lifted the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that many Americans had never even heard of, and we ask nothing in return.

We're coming home now—proud, confident, heads high. There is much that we must do, at home and abroad. And we will do it. We are Americans.

Source: George H. W. Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 218–222.

162. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, 31 July 1991

Introduction

An extension of the nuclear arms reduction treaties of SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (also known as START I) further limited the spread and development of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union. Negotiations for further arms control agreements began under President Ronald Reagan in 1982 but made little progress until Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet leader in 1985. START I was signed by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev on 31 July 1991 in the final days of the Cold War and just weeks before the fall of the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the failure of the successor states party to START I—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—to ratify this treaty until 1994 delayed its implementation, which was somewhat patchy due to the lack of Soviet funds for dismantling weapons scheduled for destruction. START I required each side to reduce its strategic offensive arms to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, 6,000 accountable warheads, and 4,900 ballistic missile warheads. The Soviet side was permitted 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were expected to become nonnuclear states by 2001 and did so, while Russia and the United States would cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by 30–40 percent, reductions that were anticipated to be made deeper by a subsequent START II Treaty. START I was expected to remain in force for fifteen years, with

the possibility of further five-year extensions. By December 2001, both Russia and the United States had cut their deployed warheads to 6,000 apiece, the START I level. Even before the treaty came into force, both sides began scrapping ICBMs and launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and launchers, and heavy bombers. The treaty was dramatic proof that the United States and the Soviet Union could cooperate on major strategic arms reductions.

Primary Source

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

ARTICLE II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments . . .

[. . .]

3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons.

ARTICLE IV

1. For ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 125.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base. Non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than:

(i) two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or

(ii) four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 35 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Thereafter, the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges shall not exceed 25.

2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 110. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 18.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at training facilities for ICBMs to no more than 40. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside a training facility.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 45 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 25, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20. Thereafter, the aggregate number of test launchers shall not exceed 40. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 20, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20.

(e) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Mobile training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 75.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 20.

4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed. Within this limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten, unless otherwise agreed.

(c) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space launch facility to no more than the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at that facility.

5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30.

6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two.

7. For static displays and ground trainers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of ICBMs and SLBMs placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of launch canisters placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, and the number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20. Such items placed on static display prior to signature of this Treaty shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers and former heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers to no more than five. Such items converted prior to signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 50.

9. With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms:

(a) Each Party shall locate non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; or space launch facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may also be in transit. Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based.

(b) Each Party shall locate non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may also be in transit.

(c) Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges, except that rail-mobile test launchers may conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range, provided that:
  (i) each such movement is completed no later than 30 days after it begins;
  (ii) each such movement begins and ends at the same test range and does not involve movement to any other facility;
  (iii) movements of no more than six rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are conducted in each calendar year; and
  (iv) no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers is located outside test ranges at any one time.

(d) A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of this Article. If a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three, and the number of such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three.

(e) Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM

base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(f) Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers.

10. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

[. . .]

ARTICLE V

1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type, or increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type;
(b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs;
(c) produce, test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(d) produce, test, or deploy additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, provided that the limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty are not exceeded;
(e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs;
(g) reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type.

3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM of a type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. A new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

5. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types.

6. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs.

7. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead.

8. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs.

9. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. All existing soft-site launchers not at test ranges or space launch facilities shall be eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol no later than 60 days after entry into force of this Treaty.

10. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed;
(b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

11. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

12. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles;
(b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type;
(c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it;
(d) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it.

14. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles.

15. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties.

16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.

17. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines.

18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices;
(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the

Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971;

(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit;
(d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);
(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

19. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more; equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments;
(b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an airplane with nuclear armaments;
(c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

20. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

21. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

22. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

23. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based.

24. Each Party undertakes not to convert:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;
(b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs;
(c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category;
(d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers.

25. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines.

26. Each Party undertakes not to locate railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars.

27. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and

support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

28. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory.

29. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base.

30. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for:

(a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages;
(b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters; and
(c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions.

ARTICLE VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

[. . .]

ARTICLE VII

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.

[. . .]

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

[. . .]

Source: "The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," 31 July 1991, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/toc.html.

163. The August 1991 Coup against Gorbachev

Introduction

By August 1991, internal opposition to Mikhail Gorbachev's rule had reached the boiling point. In the previous months, he had sought to assuage separatist sentiment among the various republics of the Soviet Union by drafting a new union act. Under its terms the constituent republics would have enjoyed genuine autonomy in a voluntary and democratic federation. The communist functionaries who still dominated the new Congress of People's Deputies already deeply resented what they saw as the destruction of their country's international standing, as Gorbachev allowed the former East European satellites to renounce communism, leave the Warsaw Pact, and turn toward the West. Major cuts in Soviet military forces and armaments and the ending of economic and military aid programs to Soviet clients around the world were to them still further evidence of national decline and humiliation. Internal difficulties were perhaps even more salient. Intensifying economic problems and falling living standards caused growing discontent among the Soviet people, many of whom began to look wistfully back to a more prosperous past. Communist officials pointed to rising crime rates, unemployment, and high inflation and deteriorating standards in health care, education, and housing as evidence of a national crisis that demanded strong action. In August 1991, while Gorbachev was on holiday in the Crimea, his vice president and other communist officials mounted a coup against his rule. Gorbachev was placed under house arrest, and the coup leaders demanded his resignation. The Moscow communist leader Boris Yeltsin, recently elected president of the Russian Republic and head of the liberal faction in the congress, responded immediately and forcefully. Climbing on a tank outside the assembly's building, on behalf of the government he exhorted both soldiers and the Moscow populace to resist Gorbachev's ouster, which he characterized as a "right-wing, reactionary, unconstitutional coup" to remove "the legally elected President of the country." Such methods, Yeltsin charged, were "unacceptable" and "discredited" the Soviet Union internationally. Championing the cause of democracy, he declared the coup "illegal" and demanded Gorbachev's release and return to Moscow to give him an opportunity to address the people. Yeltsin's bold stand won over the military and the people. Lacking support, the plotters crumbled and the coup fizzled out. After three days in captivity, Gorbachev was freed and came back to Moscow. Even so, the episode marked the end of his effectiveness as president. Yeltsin's undoubted courage had made him the hero of the hour, and Gorbachev was heavily dependent on him. With encouragement from Yeltsin, an old political opponent of Gorbachev, by the end of the year the Soviet Union itself had been dissolved. An embittered Gorbachev, who had hoped to maintain the constituent republics as a unified grouping, resigned, and Yeltsin became the first president of the new Russian Federation.

Primary Source

Appeal to the Soviet People, 18 August 1991

Fellow countrymen! Citizens of the Soviet Union! At this grave, critical hour for the fate of the fatherland and of our peoples, we appeal to you! A mortal danger threatens our great homeland! Far a number of reasons, the policy of reforms begun at the initiative of M. S. Gorbachev and conceived of as a means of ensuring the dynamic development of the country and the democratization of the life of society has reached an impasse. The initial enthusiasm and hopes have given way to unbelief, apathy and despair. The authorities at all levels have lost the trust of the population. In the life of society, political intrigue has supplanted concern for the fate of the fatherland and the citizen. Malicious mocking of all state institutions is being propagated. In essence, the country has become ungovernable.

Taking advantage of the liberties that have been granted and trampling the shoots of democracy, which have just emerged, extremist forces have come into being and embarked on a course aimed at the liquidation of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the state and the seizure of power at any cost. The results of the nationwide referendum on the unity of the fatherland have been trampled. The cynical exploitation of national feelings is only a screen for satisfying ambitions. These political adventurists are troubled neither by the current misfortunes of their peoples nor by their future troubles. In creating an atmosphere of

psychological and political terror and trying to hide behind the shield of the people's trust, they forget that the ties they are condemning and breaking were established on a basis of far broader popular support—support that, moreover, has undergone the test of history for many centuries. Today those who are essentially working toward the overthrow of the constitutional system should have to answer to mothers and fathers for the deaths of the many hundreds of victims in conflicts between nationalities. The crippled lives of more than half a million refugees are on their conscience. Because of them, tens of millions of Soviet people who only yesterday were living in a united family but today find themselves outcasts in their own homes have lost tranquility and the joy of life.

The people should decide what the social system should be like, but they are being deprived of this right.

Instead of showing concern for the security and well-being of every citizen and of society as a whole, the people who have acquired power frequently use it for interests that are alien to the people, as a means of unscrupulous self-assertion. The streams of words and mountains of statements and promises only underscore the scanty and wretched nature of their practical deeds. The inflation of power, more frightening than any other kind of inflation, is destroying our state and society. Every citizen feels growing uncertainty about tomorrow and deep concern for the future of his or her children.

The crisis of power has had a catastrophic effect on the economy. The chaotic, ungoverned slide toward a market has caused an explosion of selfishness—regional, departmental, group and personal. The war of laws and the encouragement of centrifugal tendencies have brought the destruction of the unified national-economic mechanism that took shape over decades. The result is a sharp falloff in the standard of living for the overwhelming majority of Soviet people and the flourishing of speculation and the shadow economy. It is high time to tell the people the truth: Unless urgent and resolute measures are taken to stabilize the economy, hunger and a new round of impoverishment are inevitable in the very near future, from which it is only one step to large-scale manifestations of spontaneous discontent, with destructive consequences. Only irresponsible people can set their hopes on some kind of help from abroad. No hand-outs are going to solve our problems; salvation is in our own hands. The time has come to measure the authority of every person or organization in terms of actual contributions to the restoration and development of the national economy.

[. . .]

An offensive against the rights of the working people is under way. The rights to work, education, health care, housing and recreation have been called in question.

Even people's basic personal safety is increasingly under threat. Crime is growing at a rapid rate and is becoming organized and politicized. The country is sinking into an abyss of violence and lawlessness. Never before in the country's history has the propaganda of sex and violence gained such wide scope, jeopardizing the health and lives of future generations. Millions of people are demanding that measures be taken against the octopus of crime and glaring immorality.

[. . .]

The State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR is fully aware of the depth of the crisis that has struck our country; it is assuming responsibility for the fate of the homeland, and it is fully resolved to take very serious measures to bring the state and society out of crisis as quickly as possible.

We promise to conduct a wide-ranging, nationwide discussion of the draft of a new Union Treaty. Everyone will have the right and opportunity to think about this highly important act in a calm atmosphere and to make up his mind about it, for the fate of the numerous peoples of our great homeland will depend on what the Union will be like.

We intend to immediately restore legality and law and order, to put an end to bloodshed, to declare a merciless war against the criminal world, and to eradicate shameful phenomena that discredit our society and degrade Soviet citizens. We will clean the criminal elements from the streets of our cities and put an end

to the highhandedness of the plunderers of public property.

We favor truly democratic processes and a consistent policy of reforms leading to the renewal of our homeland and to its economic and social prosperity, which will enable it to take a worthy place in the world community of nations.

[. . .]

In the process of developing a mixed national economy, we will support private enterprise, providing it with the necessary possibilities for developing production and the service sphere.

Our top-priority concern will be solving the food and housing problems. All available forces will be mobilized for the satisfaction of these very urgent requirements of the people.

We call on workers, peasants, the working intelligentsia and all Soviet people to restore labor discipline and order in the shortest possible time and to raise the level of production, so as then to move resolutely forward. Our life, the future of our children and grandchildren and the fate of the fatherland will depend on this.

We are a peace-loving country and will unswervingly observe all the commitments we have made. We have no claims against anyone. We want to live in peace and friendship with everyone, but we firmly state that no one will ever be allowed to encroach on our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Any attempts to talk to our country in the language of diktat, no matter where they come from, will be resolutely curbed.

For centuries, our multinational people have been filled with pride in their homeland; we have not been ashamed of our patriotic feelings, and we consider it natural and legitimate to raise present and future generations of citizens of our great power in this spirit.

To do nothing in this critical hour for the fate of the fatherland is to assume a grave responsibility for the tragic, truly unpredictable consequences. Everyone who cherishes our homeland, who wants to live and work in an atmosphere of tranquility and confidence, who does not accept a continuation of bloody conflicts between nationalities and who sees his fatherland as independent and prosperous in the future must make the only correct choice. We call on all true patriots and people of goodwill to put an end to this time of troubles.

We call on all citizens of the Soviet Union to recognize their duty to the homeland and provide every kind of support to the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR and to efforts to bring the country out of crisis.

Constructive proposals from public-political organizations, labor collectives and citizens will be gratefully accepted as a manifestation of their patriotic readiness to participate actively in the restoration of centuries-old friendship in the single family of fraternal peoples and in the revival of the fatherland.

—[signed] THE STATE COMMITTEE
FOR THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN
THE USSR.

Boris Yeltsin, 19 August 1991
To the Citizens of Russia

On the night of Aug. 18–19, 1991, the legally elected President of the country was removed from power.

Whatever reasons are used to justify this removal, what we are dealing with is a right-wing, reactionary, unconstitutional coup.

Despite all the difficulties and very grave trials that the people are experiencing, the democratic process in the country is assuming ever deeper dimensions and is becoming irreversible. The peoples of Russia are becoming the masters of their fate. The uncontrolled rights of unconstitutional bodies, including Party bodies, have been substantially restricted. The leadership of Russia has taken a resolute position on the Union Treaty, striving for the unity of the Soviet Union and the unity of Russia. Our position on this question made it possible to significantly accelerate the drafting

of this treaty, clear it with all the republics, and set a date for signing it—Aug. 20, 1991.

This development of events aroused the animosity of reactionary forces and drove them into irresponsible, adventurist attempts to solve very complicated political and economic problems by methods of force. There were earlier attempts to stage a coup.

We have believed and continue to believe that these methods of force are unacceptable. They discredit the USSR before the whole world, undermine our prestige in the world community, and return us to the era of the cold war and the Soviet Union's isolation from the world community.

All this compels us to declare the so-called committee that has come to power illegal. Accordingly, we declare all the decisions and orders of this committee illegal.

We are confident that bodies of local power will unswervingly follow constitutional laws and the decrees of the President of the Russian SFSR. We call on the citizens of Russia to give the putschists the response they deserve and to demand that the country be returned to normal constitutional development.

Certainly Gorbachev, the country's President, must be given an opportunity to speak to the people. We demand the immediate convening of an Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

We are absolutely certain that our fellow countrymen will not allow the highhandedness and lawlessness of the putschists, who have lost all shame and conscience, to become firmly established. We appeal to servicemen to display lofty civic spirit and not to take part in the reactionary coup.

Until these demands are fulfilled, we call for a general strike of unlimited duration. We have no doubt that the world community will make an objective assessment of this cynical attempt at a right-wing coup.

—[signed] Yeltsin, President of Russia; Silayev, Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; and Khasbulatov, acting Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Source: The State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR, "Appeal to the Soviet People," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 43(33) (1991): 4–5. Boris Yeltsin, "To the Citizens of Russia," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 43 (33) (1991): 6–7.

164. The Minsk Declarations (Dissolution of the Soviet Union), 8 December 1991

Introduction

By 1990 the readiness of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to allow the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe to reject communism and leave the Warsaw Pact had strengthened separatist forces within the Soviet Union itself. The Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had only been incorporated in the Soviet Union during World War II, were particularly outspoken in demanding autonomy or independence, but nationalist forces were also developing in various Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine. In January 1991 unrest in Lithuania, whose government had declared that the Soviet constitution was no longer valid there, led Gorbachev to order the Soviet military to replace the republic's government. At least 14 people were killed and another 600 injured, provoking protests from many Western states. Seeking to defuse the growing internal crisis, Gorbachev and his advisors proceeded to draw up a treaty of union that would have made the Soviet Union into a voluntary democratic federation whose members enjoyed economic free trade with each other. In August 1991 nationalist hard-liners within the Soviet leadership, who feared that this arrangement would lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union, mounted a coup against Gorbachev, then on holiday in the Crimea. Although Gorbachev's government survived, largely due to the intervention of Boris Yeltsin, elected two months earlier as president of the Russian Republic, Gorbachev's authority was fatally weakened. Yeltsin, who sought to implement sweeping economic reforms within Russia, regarded the Soviet Union as expendable, and during the fall the Russian

Republic gradually took over the Soviet ministries based in Moscow. After confidential negotiations, in early December 1991 Yeltsin met with the leaders of the republics of Ukraine and Belarus, and the three declared the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its replacement by a voluntary Commonwealth of Independent States. Membership in this organization was open to all former Soviet republics, and by the end of the month eleven states —Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan—had joined. On 30 December the signatories agreed to coordinate their military policies and to observe the arms control agreements concluded by the former Soviet Union. Gorbachev objected strongly but unavailingly to the dismantling of the Soviet Union, which he had hoped to preserve. On 24 December 1991, the Russian Federation took over the Soviet seat in the United Nations (UN). The following day, Gorbachev finally resigned his position as the last Soviet president, leaving Yeltsin in undisputed control as president of the Russian Federation, an outcome that had probably been one major underlying reason behind Yeltsin's move to break up the Soviet Union.

Primary Source

The Minsk Agreement
Signed by the heads of state of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine on December 8, 1991

PREAMBLE

We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine, as founder states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which signed the 1922 Union Treaty, further described as the high contracting parties, conclude that the USSR has ceased to exist as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality.

[. . .]

ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties form the Commonwealth of Independent States.

ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties guarantee their citizens equal rights and freedoms regardless of nationality or other distinctions. Each of the high contracting parties guarantees the citizens of the other parties, and also persons without citizenship that live on its territory, civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and freedoms in accordance with generally recognized international norms of human rights, regardless of national allegiance or other distinctions.

ARTICLE 3

The high contracting parties, desiring to promote the expression, preservation and development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious individuality of the national minorities resident on their territories, and that of the unique ethno-cultural regions that have come into being, take them under their protection.

ARTICLE 4

The high contracting parties will develop the equal and mutually beneficial co-operation of their peoples and states in the spheres of politics, the economy, culture, education, public health, protection of the environment, science and trade and in the humanitarian and other spheres, will promote the broad exchange of information and will conscientiously and unconditionally observe reciprocal obligations.

The parties consider it a necessity to conclude agreements on co-operation in the above spheres.

ARTICLE 5

The high contracting parties recognize and respect one another's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth.

They guarantee openness of borders, freedom of movement for citizens and of transmission of information within the Commonwealth.

ARTICLE 6

The member-states of the Commonwealth will co-operate in safeguarding international peace and security and in implementing effective measures for reducing weapons and military spending. They seek the elimination of all nuclear weapons and universal total disarmament under strict international control.

The parties will respect one another's aspiration to attain the status of a non-nuclear zone and a neutral state.

The member-states of the community will preserve and maintain under united command a common military-strategic space, including unified control over nuclear weapons, the procedure for implementing which is regulated by a special agreement.

They also jointly guarantee the necessary conditions for the stationing and functioning of and for material and social provision for the strategic armed forces. The parties contract to pursue a harmonized policy on questions of social protection and pension provision for members of the services and their families.

ARTICLE 7
The high contracting parties recognize that within the sphere of their activities, implemented on the equal basis through the common coordinating institutions of the Commonwealth, will be the following:

—co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy;
—co-operation in forming and developing the united economic area, the common European and Eurasian markets, in the area of customs policy;
—co-operation in developing transport and communication systems;
—co-operation in preservation of the environment, and participation in creating a comprehensive international system of ecological safety;
—migration policy issues;
—and fighting organized crime.

ARTICLE 8
The parties realize the planetary character of the Chernobyl catastrophe and pledge themselves to unite and co-ordinate their efforts in minimizing and overcoming its consequences.

To these ends they have decided to conclude a special agreement which will take consider [sic] the gravity of the consequences of this catastrophe.

ARTICLE 9
The disputes regarding interpretation and application of the norms of this agreement are to be solved by way of negotiations between the appropriate bodies, and when necessary, at the level of heads of the governments and states.

ARTICLE 10
Each of the high contracting parties reserved the right to suspend the validity of the present agreement or individual articles thereof, after informing the parties to the agreement of this a year in advance.

The clauses of the present agreement may be addended to or amended with the common consent of the high contracting parties.

ARTICLE 11
From the moment that the present agreement is signed, the norms of third states, including the former USSR, are not permitted to be implemented on the territories of the signatory states.

ARTICLE 12
The high contracting parties guarantee the fulfillment of the international obligations binding upon them from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR.

ARTICLE 13
The present agreement does not affect the obligations of the high contracting parties in regard to third states.

The present agreement is open for all member-states of the former USSR to join, and also for other states which share the goals and principles of the present agreement.

ARTICLE 14
The city of Minsk is the official location of the coordinating bodies of the Commonwealth.

The activities of bodies of the former USSR are discontinued on the territories of the member-states of the Commonwealth.

Agreement on Strategic Forces
Concluded between the 11 members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 30, 1991
PREAMBLE
Guided by the necessity for a coordinated and organized solution to issues in the sphere of the control of

the strategic forces and the single control over nuclear weapons, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Turkmenistan, the Republic of Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan, subsequently referred to as 'the member-states of the Commonwealth,' have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1
The term 'strategic forces' means: groupings, formations, units, institutions, the military training institutes for the strategic missile troops, for the air force, for the navy and for the air defenses; the directorates of the Space Command and of the airborne troops, and of strategic and operational intelligence, and the nuclear technical units and also the forces, equipment and other military facilities designed for the control and maintenance of the strategic forces of the former USSR (the schedule is to be determined for each state participating in the Commonwealth in a separate protocol).

ARTICLE 2
The member-states of the Commonwealth undertake to observe the international treaties of the former USSR, to pursue a coordinated policy in the area of international security, disarmament and arms control, and to participate in the preparation and implementation of programs for reductions in arms and armed forces. The member-states of the Commonwealth are immediately entering into negotiations with one another and also with other states which were formerly part of the USSR, but which have not joined the commonwealth, with the aim of ensuring guarantees and developing mechanisms for implementing the aforementioned treaties.

ARTICLE 3
The member-states of the Commonwealth recognize the need for joint command of strategic forces and for maintaining unified control of nuclear weapons, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, of the armed forces of the former USSR.

ARTICLE 4
Until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the decision on the need for their use is taken by the president of the Russian Federation in agreement with the heads of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Ukraine, and in consultation with the heads of the other member-states of the Commonwealth.

Until their destruction in full, nuclear weapons located on the territory of the Republic of Ukraine shall be under the control of the Combined Strategic Forces Command, with the aim that they not be used and be dismantled by the end of 1994, including tactical nuclear weapons by 1 July 1992.

The process of destruction of nuclear weapons located on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Ukraine shall take place with the participation of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine under the joint control of the Commonwealth states.

ARTICLE 5
The status of strategic forces and the procedure for service in them shall be defined in a special agreement.

ARTICLE 6
This agreement shall enter into force from the moment of its signing and shall be terminated by decision of the signatory states or the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth.

This agreement shall cease to apply to a signatory state from whose territory strategic forces or nuclear weapons are withdrawn.

Source: "The Minsk Agreement," The Library of Congress Country Studies, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarus/by_appnb.html. "Agreement on Strategic Forces," Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/START/documents/strategicforces91.htm.

165. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II, 3 January 1993

Introduction

Signed on 3 January 1993 by President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (also known as START II) was the most drastic arms reduction treaty to date, emphasizing that the Cold War had indeed come to an end with the fall of the Soviet Union two years earlier. Although the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on 26 January 1996, the Russian Duma did not give its assent until 14 April 2000. The treaty went into effect on 5 December 2001. START II was intended to eliminate all heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead (MIRVed) ICBMs. It also imposed cuts in the signatory powers' arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons by two-thirds from those they possessed when START talks began. When the first phase ended, each side was expected to have reduced its total stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons to 3,800–4,250, falling to 3,000–3,500 by the end of the second stage, of which none might be MIRVs. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were to be reduced to 1,700–1,750 for each side. Progress under this treaty was less swift than anticipated. In 1997 the first stage, initially expected to end in December 2001, was extended to December 2004, and the second state was extended from January 2003 to December 2007.

Primary Source

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

(a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;
(b) 1200, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
(c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMS, deployed SLBMS, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500.

4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

(a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower

number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750;
(b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
(c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.

6. Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31, 2000.

[. . .]

ARTICLE IV
[. . .]

7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMS. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS. The reorienting Party shall provide to the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.

8. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements:

(a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time;
(b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles;
(c) such heavy bombers shall be used only for nonnuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and
(d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

9. Each Party shall have the right to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role.

Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," 3 January 1993, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start2/st2intal.html.

166. Samuel P. Huntington: "The Clash of Civilizations," Summer 1973

Introduction

Once the Cold War had ended, political scientists and international relations specialists sought to discover what were likely to be the guiding principles of the post–Cold War world. In 1989 the youthful diplomat Francis Fukuyama suggested that history had effectively come to an end with the triumph of liberal democracy and market capitalism and that there would be no further major conflicts among big powers. In an article published in 1993 in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs* that he subsequently expanded into a book, Samuel P. Huntington, a Harvard political scientist, offered a far more pessimistic vision of the future international system, arguing that it would be dominated by a "clash of civilizations" between "the West and the rest." The most important "fault lines" in the world ran, he thought, along cultural lines. Whereas twentieth-century international conflicts had followed ideological differences, those of the next century would pit Western Judeo-Christian civilization against "Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist, or Orthodox cultures." Huntington believed that elites in non-Western countries no longer sought to adopt Western liberal values but were embracing their own civilizations' values. He foresaw non-Western states banding together to resist Western domination. Some critics charged that Huntington's categories were simplistic and that many of the differences he discerned corresponded to divisions between rich and poor states that the Cold War had temporarily masked. To many observers, however, the 11 September 2001 attacks by radical Islamic terrorists on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington and subsequent Muslim bombings in Madrid and London, together with President George W. Bush's declaration that the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy had become the "war on terror," seemed to confirm Huntington's prediction that rivalry between Islam and the West was likely to become the defining feature of the new international system.

Primary Source

[. . .]

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS

During the cold war the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.

Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with West-

ern, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In *A Study of History,* Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH

Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be . . . an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots

phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America.

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence.

[. . .]

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960 by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central

American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history—feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.

After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

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The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly predominates between the American and European subcivilizations of the West and between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.

CIVILIZATION RALLYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME

Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the post–Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen gradually emerging in the post–Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilizational rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future.

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Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious

leaders and the media have found it a potent means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

The west is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates international political and security institutions and with Japan international economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other to the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries. Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers. Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Western peoples, the IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."

Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the West's use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. After defeating the largest Arab army, the West did not hesitate to throw its weight around in the Arab world. The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.

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The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. (Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest," *The National Interest*, Summer 1992.) Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. The costs of this course, however, are high, and few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.

[. . .]

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization

will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like. If these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.

In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.

Source: Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72(3) (Summer 1993): 22–49.
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167. Lawrence E. Walsh: Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran-Contra Matters, 1993

Introduction

One of the most damaging episodes for U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the Iran-Contra scandal seized Americans' attention during 1985–1987. It was revealed that the Reagan administration had secretly negotiated the sale of arms to Iran in the hope of winning the return of American hostages held by the Iranians in Lebanon and in order to finance aid to the Contra rebels, who were fighting the Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. This action was in violation of the Boland Amendment, which prohibited aid to the Contras, and of stated U.S. policies not to negotiate with the Iranians. The matter was eventually turned over to Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, who submitted the final report of his investigation to the U.S. House of Representatives on 4 August 1993. One of the major questions that Walsh had to investigate was the degree of Reagan administration involvement. It was White House officials, rather than the State Department, who conceived and implemented these activities. Reagan initially claimed to have been unaware of them but nonetheless took full responsibility for them, while Vice President George H. W. Bush also stated that he himself had been "out of the loop" on the subject. National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, who had conceived the scheme as a means of improving relations with Iran and made a secret trip to Iran as part of the operation, tried but failed to commit suicide during the investigation. No hostages were freed as a result of these negotiations. McFarlane and his successor, John Poindexter, were both convicted of lying to Congress, but their sentences were overturned on appeal, as was that of Colonel Oliver North, a National Security Council (NSC) aide who had been heavily involved in the implementation of these schemes. Most of the other high-ranking officials whom Walsh indicted, including U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who had been accused of lying to and withholding information from Congress, were pardoned after Bush became president. The Iran-Contra scandal undoubtedly tarnished Reagan's second term in office, since the president had either deliberately misled the American people and broken various laws or else failed to exercise proper supervision over lower-level officials within his administration. In March 1987 Reagan spoke on national television, telling the American people that he regretted the situation and had been incorrect in stating earlier that the United States had not traded arms for hostages but that he believed his actions had been right. Reagan's approval ratings at one stage dropped to 46 percent but by the time he finished his presidency had rebounded to 63 percent. Some American politicians have since asserted that in the broader national interest they declined to pursue the Iran-Contra Affair as aggressively as might have been possible because they did not wish to bring down the first U.S. president to serve two uninterrupted terms in office since Dwight D. Eisenhower during the 1950s. The executive summary of the report prepared by Walsh was nonetheless a damning catalog of legal violations and abuses of power by a wide range of high-level Reagan administration officials.

Primary Source

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October and November 1986, two secret U.S. Government operations were publicly exposed, potentially implicating Reagan Administration officials in illegal activities. These operations were the provision of assistance to the military activities of the Nicaraguan contra rebels during an October 1984 to October 1986 prohibition on such aid, and the sale of U.S. arms to Iran in contravention of stated U.S. policy and in possible violation of arms-export controls. In late November 1986, Reagan Administration officials announced that some of the proceeds from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran had been diverted to the contras.

As a result of the exposure of these operations, Attorney General Edwin Meese III sought the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute possible crimes arising from them.

The Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appointed

Lawrence E. Walsh as Independent Counsel on December 19, 1986, and charged him with investigating:

(1) the direct or indirect sale, shipment, or transfer since in or about 1984 down to the present, of military arms, materiel, or funds to the government of Iran, officials of that government, persons, organizations or entities connected with or purporting to represent that government, or persons located in Iran;
(2) the direct or indirect sale, shipment, or transfer of military arms, materiel or funds to any government, entity, or person acting, or purporting to act as an intermediary in any transaction referred to above;
(3) the financing or funding of any direct or indirect sale, shipment or transfer referred to above;
(4) the diversion of proceeds from any transaction described above to or for any person, organization, foreign government, or any faction or body of insurgents in any foreign country, including, but not limited to Nicaragua;
(5) the provision or coordination of support for persons or entities engaged as military insurgents in armed conflict with the government of Nicaragua since 1984.

This is the final report of that investigation.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

The investigations and prosecutions have shown that high-ranking Administration officials violated laws and executive orders in the Iran/contra matter.

Independent Counsel concluded that:

the sales of arms to Iran contravened United States Government policy and may have violated the Arms Export Control Act;

the provision and coordination of support to the contras violated the Boland Amendment ban on aid to military activities in Nicaragua;

the policies behind both the Iran and contra operations were fully reviewed and developed at the highest levels of the Reagan Administration;

although there was little evidence of National Security Council level knowledge of most of the actual contra-support operations, there was no evidence that any NSC member dissented from the underlying policy of keeping the contras alive despite congressional limitations on contra support;

the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of, among others, President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, and national security advisers Robert C. McFarlane and John M. Poindexter; of these officials, only Weinberger and Shultz dissented from the policy decision, and Weinberger eventually acquiesced by ordering the Department of Defense to provide the necessary arms; and

large volumes of highly relevant, contemporaneously created documents were systematically and willfully withheld from investigators by several Reagan Administration officials.

Following the revelation of these operations in October and November 1986, Reagan Administration officials deliberately deceived the Congress and the public about the level and extent of official knowledge of and support for these operations.

In addition, Independent Counsel concluded that the off-the-books nature of the Iran and contra operations gave line-level personnel the opportunity to commit money crimes.

PROSECUTIONS

In the course of Independent Counsel's investigation, 14 persons were charged with criminal violations. There were two broad classes of crimes charged: Operational crimes, which largely concerned the illegal use of funds generated in the course of the operations, and "cover-up" crimes, which largely concerned false statements and obstructions after the revelation of the operations. Independent Counsel did not charge violations of the Arms Export Control Act or Boland Amendment. Although apparent violations of these statutes provided the impetus for the cover-up, they are not criminal statutes and do not contain any enforcement provisions.

All of the individuals charged were convicted, except for one CIA official whose case was dismissed on

national security grounds and two officials who received unprecedented pre-trial pardons by President Bush following his electoral defeat in 1992. Two of the convictions were reversed on appeal on constitutional grounds that in no way cast doubt on the factual guilt of the men convicted. The individuals charged and the disposition of their cases are:

(1) Robert C. McFarlane: pleaded guilty to four-counts of withholding information from Congress;
(2) Oliver L. North: convicted of altering and destroying documents, accepting an illegal gratuity, and aiding and abetting in the obstruction of Congress; conviction reversed on appeal;
(3) John M. Poindexter: convicted of conspiracy, false statements, destruction and removal of records, and obstruction of Congress; conviction reversed on appeal;
(4) Richard V. Secord: pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress;
(5) Albert Hakim: pleaded guilty to supplementing the salary of North;
(6) Thomas G. Clines: convicted of four counts of tax-related offenses for failing to report income from the operations;
(7) Carl R. Channell: pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States;
(8) Richard R. Miller: pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States;
(9) Clair E. George: convicted of false statements and perjury before Congress;
(10) Duane R. Clarridge: indicted on seven counts of perjury and false statements; pardoned before trial by President Bush;
(11) Alan D. Fiers, Jr.: pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress;
(12) Joseph F. Fernandez: indicted on four counts of obstruction and false statements; case dismissed when Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh refused to declassify information needed for his defense;
(13) Elliott Abrams: pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress;
(14) Caspar W. Weinberger: charged with four counts of false statements and perjury; pardoned before trial by President Bush.

At the time President Bush pardoned Weinberger and Clarridge, he also pardoned George, Fiers, Abrams, and McFarlane.

THE BASIC FACTS OF IRAN/CONTRA

The Iran/contra affair concerned two secret Reagan Administration policies whose operations were coordinated by National Security Council staff. The Iran operation involved efforts in 1985 and 1986 to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East through the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran, despite an embargo on such sales. The contra operations from 1984 through most of 1986 involved the secret governmental support of contra military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, despite congressional prohibition of this support.

The Iran and contra operations were merged when funds generated from the sale of weapons to Iran were diverted to support the contra effort in Nicaragua. Although this "diversion" may be the most dramatic aspect of Iran/contra, it is important to emphasize that both the Iran and contra operations, separately, violated United States policy and law. The ignorance of the "diversion" asserted by President Reagan and his Cabinet officers on the National Security Council in no way absolves them of responsibility for the underlying Iran and contra operations.

The secrecy concerning the Iran and contra activities was finally pierced by events that took place thousands of miles apart in the fall of 1986. The first occurred on October 5, 1986, when Nicaraguan government soldiers shot down an American cargo plane that was carrying military supplies to contra forces; the one surviving crew member, American Eugene Hasenfus, was taken into captivity and stated that he was employed by the CIA. A month after the Hasenfus shootdown, President Reagan's secret sale of U.S. arms to Iran was reported by a Lebanese publication on November 3. The joining of these two operations was made public on November 25, 1986, when Attorney General Meese announced that Justice Department officials had discovered that some of the proceeds from the Iran arms sales had been diverted to the contras.

When these operations ended, the exposure of the Iran/contra affair generated a new round of illegality.

Beginning with the testimony of Elliott Abrams and others in October 1986 and continuing through the public testimony of Caspar W. Weinberger on the last day of the congressional hearings in the summer of 1987, senior Reagan Administration officials engaged in a concerted effort to deceive Congress and the public about their knowledge of and support for the operations.

Independent Counsel has concluded that the President's most senior advisers and the Cabinet members on the National Security Council participated in the strategy to make National Security staff members McFarlane, Poindexter and North the scapegoats whose sacrifice would protect the Reagan Administration in its final two years. In an important sense, this strategy succeeded. Independent Counsel discovered much of the best evidence of the cover-up in the final year of active investigation, too late for most prosecutions.

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AGENCY SUPPORT OF THE OPERATIONS

Following the convictions of those who were most central to the Iran/contra operations, Independent Counsel's investigation focused on the supporting roles played by Government officials in other agencies and the supervisory roles of the NSC principals. The investigation showed that Administration officials who claimed initially that they had little knowledge about the Iran arms sales or the illegal contra-resupply operation North directed were much better informed than they professed to be. The Office of Independent Counsel obtained evidence that Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz and White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, among others, held back information that would have helped Congress obtain a much clearer view of the scope of the Iran/contra matter. Contemporaneous notes of Regan and Weinberger, and those dictated by Shultz, were withheld until they were obtained by Independent Counsel in 1991 and 1992.

THE WHITE HOUSE AND OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

As the White House section of this report describes in detail, the investigation found no credible evidence that President Reagan violated any criminal statute. The OIC could not prove that Reagan authorized or was aware of the diversion or that he had knowledge of the extent of North's control of the contra-resupply network. Nevertheless, he set the stage for the illegal activities of others by encouraging and, in general terms, ordering support of the contras during the October 1984 to October 1986 period when funds for the contras were cut off by the Boland Amendment, and in authorizing the sale of arms to Iran, in contravention of the U.S. embargo on such sales. The President's disregard for civil laws enacted to limit presidential actions abroad specifically the Boland Amendment, the Arms Export Control Act and congressional-notification requirements in covert-action laws created a climate in which some of the Government officers assigned to implement his policies felt emboldened to circumvent such laws.

President Reagan's directive to McFarlane to keep the contras alive "body and soul" during the Boland cutoff period was viewed by North, who was charged by McFarlane to carry out the directive, as an invitation to break the law. Similarly, President Reagan's decision in 1985 to authorize the sale of arms to Iran from Israeli stocks, despite warnings by Weinberger and Shultz that such transfers might violate the law, opened the way for Poindexter's subsequent decision to authorize the diversion. Poindexter told Congress that while he made the decision on his own and did not tell the President, he believed the President would have approved. North testified that he believed the President authorized it.

Independent Counsel's investigation did not develop evidence that proved that Vice President Bush violated any criminal statute. Contrary to his public pronouncements, however, he was fully aware of the Iran arms sales. Bush was regularly briefed, along with the President, on the Iran arms sales, and he participated in discussions to obtain third-country support for the contras. The OIC obtained no evidence that Bush was aware of the diversion. The OIC learned in December 1992 that Bush had failed to produce a diary containing contemporaneous notes relevant to Iran/contra, despite requests made in 1987 and again in early 1992 for the production of such material. Bush refused to be interviewed for a final time in light of evidence developed

in the latter stages of OIC's investigation, leaving unresolved a clear picture of his Iran/contra involvement. Bush's pardon of Weinberger on December 24, 1992 pre-empted a trial in which defense counsel indicated that they intended to call Bush as a witness.

The chapters on White House Chief of Staff Regan and Attorney General Edwin Meese III focus on their actions during the November 1986 period, as the President and his advisers sought to control the damage caused by the disclosure of the Iran arms sales. Regan in 1992 provided Independent Counsel with copies of notes showing that Poindexter and Meese attempted to create a false account of the 1985 arms sales from Israeli stocks, which they believed were illegal, in order to protect the President. Regan and the other senior advisers did not speak up to correct the false version of events. No final legal determination on the matter had been made. Regan said he did not want to be the one who broke the silence among the President's senior advisers, virtually all of whom knew the account was false.

The evidence indicates that Meese's November 1986 inquiry was more of a damage-control exercise than an effort to find the facts. He had private conversations with the President, the Vice President, Poindexter, Weinberger, Casey and Regan without taking notes. Even after learning of the diversion, Meese failed to secure records in NSC staff offices or take other prudent steps to protect potential evidence. And finally, in reporting to the President and his senior advisers, Meese gave a false account of what he had been told by stating that the President did not know about the 1985 HAWK shipments, which Meese said might have been illegal. The statute of limitations had run on November 1986 activities before OIC obtained its evidence. In 1992, Meese denied recollection of the statements attributed to him by the notes of Weinberger and Regan. He was unconvincing, but the passage of time would have been expected to raise a reasonable doubt of the intentional falsity of his denials if he had been prosecuted for his 1992 false statements.

THE ROLE OF CIA OFFICIALS

Director Casey's unswerving support of President Reagan's contra policies and of the Iran arms sales encouraged some CIA officials to go beyond legal restrictions in both operations. Casey was instrumental in pairing North with Secord as a contra-support team when the Boland Amendment in October 1984 forced the CIA to refrain from direct or indirect aid. He also supported the North-Secord combination in the Iran arms sales, despite deep reservations about Secord within the CIA hierarchy.

Casey's position on the contras prompted the chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force, Alan D. Fiers, Jr., to "dovetail" CIA activities with those of North's contra-resupply network, in violation of Boland restrictions. Casey's support for the NSC to direct the Iran arms sales and to use arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar and Secord in the operation, forced the CIA's Directorate of Operations to work with people it distrusted.

Following the Hasenfus shootdown in early October 1986, George and Fiers lied to Congress about U.S. Government involvement in contra resupply, to, as Fiers put it, "keep the spotlight off the White House." When the Iran arms sales became public in November 1986, three of Casey's key officers—George, Clarridge and Fiers—followed Casey's lead in misleading Congress.

Four CIA officials were charged with criminal offenses —George, the deputy director for operations and the third highest-ranking CIA official; Clarridge, chief of the European Division; Fiers; and Fernandez. George was convicted of two felony counts of false statements and perjury before Congress. Fiers pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress. The four counts of obstruction and false statements against Fernandez were dismissed when the Bush Administration refused to declassify information needed for his defense. Clarridge was awaiting trial on seven counts of perjury and false statements when he, George and Fiers were pardoned by President Bush.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

In 1990 and 1991, Independent Counsel received new documentary evidence in the form of handwritten notes suggesting that Secretary Shultz's congressional testimony painted a misleading and incorrect picture of his knowledge of the Iran arms sales. The subsequent

investigation focused on whether Shultz or other Department officials deliberately misled or withheld information from congressional or OIC investigators.

The key notes, taken by M. Charles Hill, Shultz's executive assistant, were nearly verbatim, contemporaneous accounts of Shultz's meetings within the department and Shultz's reports to Hill on meetings the secretary attended elsewhere. The Hill notes and similarly detailed notes by Nicholas Platt, the State Department's executive secretary, provided the OIC with a detailed account of Shultz's knowledge of the Iran arms sales. The most revealing of these notes were not provided to any Iran/contra investigation until 1990 and 1991. The notes show that—contrary to his early testimony that he was not aware of details of the 1985 arms transfers—Shultz knew that the shipments were planned and that they were delivered. Also in conflict with his congressional testimony was evidence that Shultz was aware of the 1986 shipments.

Independent Counsel concluded that Shultz's early testimony was incorrect, if not false, in significant respects, and misleading, if literally true, in others. When questioned about the discrepancies in 1992, Shultz did not dispute the accuracy of the Hill notes. He told OIC that he believed his testimony was accurate at the time and he insisted that if he had been provided with the notes earlier, he would have testified differently. Independent Counsel declined to prosecute because there was a reasonable doubt that Shultz's testimony was willfully false at the time it was delivered.

Independent Counsel concluded that Hill had willfully withheld relevant notes and prepared false testimony for Shultz in 1987. He declined to prosecute because Hill's claim of authorization to limit the production of his notes and the joint responsibility of Shultz for the resulting misleading testimony, would at trial have raised a reasonable doubt, after Independent Counsel had declined to prosecute Shultz.

Independent Counsel's initial focus on the State Department had centered on Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams' insistence to Congress and to the OIC that he was not aware of North's direction of the extensive contra-resupply network in 1985 and 1986. As assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Abrams chaired the Restricted Inter-Agency Group, or RIG, which coordinated U.S. policy in Central America. Although the OIC was skeptical about Abrams' testimony, there was insufficient evidence to proceed against him until additional documentary evidence inculpating him was discovered in 1990 and 1991, and until Fiers, who represented the CIA on the RIG, pleaded guilty in July 1991 to withholding information from Congress. Fiers provided evidence to support North's earlier testimony that Abrams was knowledgeable about North's contra-supply network. Abrams pleaded guilty in October 1991 to two counts of withholding information from Congress about secret Government efforts to support the contras, and about his solicitation of $10 million to aid the contras from the Sultan of Brunei.

SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Contrary to their testimony to the presidentially appointed Tower Commission and the Select Iran/contra Committees of Congress, Independent Counsel determined that Secretary Weinberger and his closest aides were consistently informed of proposed and actual arms shipments to Iran during 1985 and 1986. The key evidence was handwritten notes of Weinberger, which he deliberately withheld from Congress and the OIC until they were discovered by Independent Counsel in late 1991. The Weinberger daily diary notes and notes of significant White House and other meetings contained highly relevant, contemporaneous information that resolved many questions left unanswered in early investigations.

The notes demonstrated that Weinberger's early testimony that he had only vague and generalized information about Iran arms sales in 1985 was false, and that he in fact had detailed information on the proposed arms sales and the actual deliveries. The notes also revealed that Gen. Colin Powell, Weinberger's senior military aide, and Richard L. Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, also had detailed knowledge of the 1985 shipments from Israeli stocks. Armitage and Powell had testified that they did

not learn of the November 1985 HAWK missile shipment until 1986.

Weinberger's notes provided detailed accounts of high-level Administration meetings in November 1986 in which the President's senior advisers were provided with false accounts of the Iran arms sales to protect the President and themselves from the consequences of the possibly illegal 1985 shipments from Israeli stocks.

Weinberger's notes provided key evidence supporting the charges against him, including perjury and false statements in connection with his testimony regarding the arms sales, his denial of the existence of notes and his denial of knowledge of Saudi Arabia's multimillion dollar contribution to the contras. He was pardoned less than two weeks before trial by President Bush on December 24, 1992.

There was little evidence that Powell's early testimony regarding the 1985 shipments and Weinberger's notes was willfully false. Powell cooperated with the various Iran/contra investigations and, when his recollection was refreshed by Weinberger's notes, he readily conceded their accuracy. Independent Counsel declined to prosecute Armitage because the OIC's limited resources were focused on the case against Weinberger and because the evidence against Armitage, while substantial, did not reach the threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE REAGAN, BUSH AND CASEY SEGMENTS

The Independent Counsel Act requires a report as to persons not indicted as well as those indicted. Because of the large number of persons investigated, those discussed in individual sections of this report are limited to those as to whom there was a possibility of indictment. In addition there are separate sections on President Reagan and President Bush because, although criminal proceedings against them were always unlikely, they were important subjects of the investigation, and their activities were important to the action taken with respect to others.

CIA Director Casey is a special case. Because Casey was hospitalized with a fatal illness before Independent Counsel was appointed, no formal investigation of Casey was ever undertaken by the OIC. Casey was never able to give his account, and he was unable to respond to allegations of wrongdoing made about him by others, most prominently North, whose veracity is subject to serious question. Equally important, fundamental questions could not be answered regarding Casey's state of mind, the impact, if any, of his fatal illness on his conduct and his intent.

Under normal circumstances, a prosecutor would hesitate to comment on the conduct of an individual whose activities and actions were not subjected to rigorous investigation, which might exculpate that individual. Nevertheless, after serious deliberation, Independent Counsel concluded that it was in the public interest that this report expose as full and complete an account of the Iran/contra matter as possible. This simply could not be done without an account of the role of Director Casey.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This report concludes with Independent Counsel's observations and conclusions. He observes that the governmental problems presented by Iran/contra are not those of rogue operations, but rather those of Executive Branch efforts to evade congressional oversight. As this report documents, the competing roles of the attorney general—adviser to the President and top law-enforcement officer—come into irreconcilable conflict in the case of high-level Executive Branch wrongdoing. Independent Counsel concludes that congressional oversight alone cannot correct the deficiencies that result when an attorney general abandons the law-enforcement responsibilities of that office and undertakes, instead, to protect the President.

[. . .]

Source: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran-Contra Matters*, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). Also available at Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh.

168. Allen Ginsberg, Interview on the Counterculture and the Cold War

Introduction

One of the more striking features of the 1960s was the degree of interconnection among the various protest movements that developed during the decade. Their roots dated back at least to the 1950s, when a group of young American poets and writers known as the Beats, its most prominent members Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, William S. Burroughs, and Neal Cassady, emerged in New York and California. Dissatisfaction with what they considered to be their own country's stifling conformity led them to explore unorthodox art forms in literature, painting, sculpture, and music; turn to African and Asian culture; and test the boundaries of censorship. Ginsberg's 1957 poem *Howl,* for example, was the subject of a celebrated obscenity case. The Beats pioneered alternative lifestyles in the United States, experimenting with mind-altering drugs, investigating Eastern religions including Zen Buddhism, and bearing the banner of a sexual revolution that regarded heterosexual monogamy as only one option among many other less-conventional ways of life. As representatives of what they termed the counterculture, they questioned all accepted standards of morality and placed great emphasis on spontaneity, self-fulfillment, and attaining harmony with nature and the universe. The Beats rejected the pressures and demands that large corporate organizations placed on their employees, and ecological concerns for the environment often made them hostile to big business, or the Establishment, whose economic and cultural dominance in the United States they considered dehumanizing and dangerous. Several of the Beats, including Ginsberg, came from traditionally radical backgrounds, and they broke with the prevailing anticommunist Cold War orthodoxy of the 1950s, especially the manner in which the United States felt free to impose its will on other nations, such as Guatemala and Iran. During the 1960s, the Beats generally supported the civil rights movement and were particularly prominent in the anti–Vietnam War protests. For many young people in the 1960s, the Beats attained near iconic status. Their vocal advocacy of individual freedom and more relaxed and satisfying lifestyles appealed to many young people, and far broader social acceptance of nonconventional personal choices became a lasting legacy of the counterculture. Interviewed shortly before his death in connection with a much-publicized CNN television series on the Cold War, Ginsberg vividly recalled the origins of the counterculture and his involvement in the interrelated anti-Establishment campaigns of the 1960s.

Primary Source

INTERVIEWER: Could you tell me how you personally experienced the restrictive Cold War atmosphere that came through the Fifties?

ALLEN GINSBERG: Well, part of that atmosphere was the sort of anti-Communist hysteria of McCarthyism, but culminating in '53 or so, with the execution of the Rosenbergs. It was a little harsh. Whatever they did, it wasn't worth killing people, you know, killing them. I remember sending a wire to Eisenhower and saying: "No, that's the wrong thing." Drawing blood like that is the wrong thing, because it's ambiguous; and especially, there was one commentator on the air, called Fulton Lewis, who said that they smelt bad, and therefore should die. There was an element of anti-Semitism in it. But I remember very clearly on the radio, this guy Fulton Lewis saying they smelt bad. He was a friend of J. Edgar Hoover, who was this homosexual in the closet, who was blackmailing almost everybody.

But that year, '53, I was living with William Burroughs in New York, and he was conceiving the first routines of *Naked Lunch*, which were parodies of Cold War bureaucracy mentality and police state mentality. And I remember that year very vividly, that Mosaddeq was overthrown in Iran, in Persia, because it was suspected that he might be neutral, or left, though he wasn't, but he really wanted to nationalize the oilfields, which the Shah later did anyway. And I remember the CIA overthrew Mosaddeq, and he wept in court; and we've had karmic troubles and war troubles with Iran ever since. That was the seed of all the Middle Eastern catastrophe we're facing now.

[At the] same time, in 1953, the Arbenz government in Guatemala was overthrown, and I was much aware of that, despite the neutrality of the American papers and the lack of real reporting. The actual event was that Allen Dulles was running the CIA, I believe; John Foster Dulles was Eisenhower's Secretary of State; they both had relations to the . . . I think it was the Sullivan and Cromwell law firm. The Sullivan and Cromwell law firm were representing United Fruit, and so, for the United Fruit's interests we overthrew a democratically elected leader . . . Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. And that was followed by . . . well, what is it? . . . 30 years or 40 years of persecution of the Guatemalan indigenous peoples, with the death of 200,000 of them —at least so the *New York Times* says—particularly under the later leadership of General Ríos Montt, who turns out also to have been a disciple of Pat Robertson, the right-wing moralist, Bible-thumping Christ announcer, assuming for himself the morality and ethics of Jesus.

So many, many seeds of karmic horror: mass death, mass murder, were planted in those years, including, very consciously for me—I was quite aware of it—the refusal of John Foster Dulles to shake Zhou Enlai's hand at the Geneva Conference which ended the French war in Indochina, or was supposed to end it. Now the Americans had been sending France $40 million a year to pursue that war, and then the Americans cut off the funds, so the French didn't have funds. But as Bernard Fall points out, and many others, General Salan and others maintained the war through the proceeds of the opium sales in Chelon, the Chinese section of Saigon, and the war was funded for a while by them. Then, when the Americans finally took over, with a puppet president, Diem who had been cultivated in the Merinal Academy in the East Coast by Cardinal Spellman . . . another flaming faggot, who in disguise was a sort of a war dragon and one of the instigators of the Vietnam War . . . so Diem was a Catholic, and we had installed him as the puppet in a Buddhist country. So, when I arrived in Saigon in 1963, coming after several years in India, I was astounded to find that this Buddhist country was being run by a Catholic American puppet. And, in sitting down with David Halberstam and I think Charles Morer and Peter Arnett and others, who were reporting for the American newspapers, I got a completely different idea in the early Sixties, '63, May 30th '63 to . . . oh, June 10th or so . . . completely different idea of what was going on in the war than I'd had reading the papers abroad or in America. They all said that the war could not be won; there was no light at the end of the tunnel; and Ambassador Lodge's reports to the President were false, or hyperoptimistic and misleading; and that they were getting flak and criticism for reporting what they saw on the spot there. But to go back to the Fifties, what was . . . it felt like in the Fifties—given all these karmic violent errors that the CIA was making in Iran, in Latin America, the real problem was that none of this was clearly reported in the press. It was reported with apologies or with rationalizations or with the accusation that Arbenz was a communist, or that Mosaddeq was a communist. Mosaddeq was mocked, especially when he wept in court, with tears that were tears, and very tragic, both for America and Iran. And he was considered . . . you know, in *Time* magazine, which was sort of the standard party line, like the Stalinist party line, he was considered the . . . you know, some kind of jerk.

Of course, in those days Walt Whitman was considered a jerk, and William Carlos Williams was considered a jerk, and any sign of natural man was considered a jerk. The ideal, as you could find it in advertising in the loose organizations, was the man of distinction: actually, a sort of British-looking guy with a brush moustache and a tweed coat, in a club library, drinking—naturally—the favorite drug, the drug of choice of the Establishment. And this was considered and broadcast as . . . advertised as *the* American century. Well, you know, Burroughs and I and Kerouac had already been reading Oswald Spengler on the decline in the West and the cycles of civilizations, and found this proclamation of the American century a sort of faint echo of Hitler's insistence on his empire lasting 1,000 years, or the Roman Empire's neglect of the central cities. And we were thinking in terms of the fall of America, and a new vision and a new religiousness, really, a second religiousness, which Kerouac spoke of in the Fifties, and exemplified, say, with his introduction to Eastern thought into the American scene, from the beginning of the 1950s through his book *Mexico City Blues*, poems which were Buddhist-flavored, through his open portrait of Gary Snyder in *The Dharma Bum(s)*, the book

The Dharma Bums—a long-haired rucksack revolution, a rebellion within the cities against the prevailing war culture, and a cultivation of the countryside and the beginning of ecological considerations and ecological reconstruction.

So you had McCarthyism, you had a completely false set of values being presented in terms of morality, ethics and success: the man of distinction. You had to put down the most tender parts of American conscience, Whitman and Williams. You had the aggression of the closet queen J. Edgar Hoover and the alcoholic, intemperate Senator McCarthy working together. You had a stupid Post Master General, Arthur Somerfield, who presented the President, Eisenhower, with *Lady Chatterley's Lover* on his desk, with dirty words underlined; and it was reported, I think in *Time* or in *Newsweek,* that Eisenhower said, "Terrible—we can't have this!" And so there was censorship, particularly censorship of literature towards . . . it was not . . . like, unconsciously or inadvertently, the things that were censored were the anti-war, anti-*macho,* anti-imperial texts, whether the beginnings of Burroughs's *Naked Lunch* in the Fifties, Kerouac's *Visions of Cody,* which could not be printed in those days, *Lady Chatterley's Lover,* Henry Miller. So we had D. H. Lawrence banned, Catullus banned; the *Satyricon* and Petronius' *Arbiter* couldn't be printed completely in English, it had to be printed in Latin in the Modern Library editions.

So we had electoral censorship, literary censorship. You had a large-scale electoral censorship on a much more subtle, vast wave, with the CIA, bankrolling the Congress for Cultural Freedom and a number of literary magazines, like *Encounter, Truth,* (*We Won in?*) *Africa, Demonat,* and others. Stephen Spender, I remember, used to complain to me that he'd bring in articles critical of the American imperium in Latin America, and somehow Laski, or whoever was working with him, or Arnold Beichman, I don't know—somehow, when he left their office, they would . . . it was rejected and nothing but anti-Communist, anti-Russian screeds were there. Very good reporting in that aspect, very good, but on the other hand there was no balance in reporting the horrors of American imperial invasion and overthrow and CIA subversion—all over the world, actually—much less CIA invasion of the intellectual body politic, with the funding of the National Student Association, Congress for Cultural Freedom, all those magazines; even the Pen Club was tainted with that for a while. So there was this invasion of subsidy for a somewhat middle-right-wing party line. And the interesting thing is, most of those people that were working in the CIA, that worked that out, were ex-commies; they had the same Stalinist mentality: they just transferred it over to the right wing, and it prevails to this very day. But it was . . . ex-radicals, or even Marxists, who, disillusioned by the show trials of 1937 and the anti-Semitism of Stalin, went all the way over to the extreme right and began suppressing their understanding of the trouble with the American capitalism and imperialism, and didn't strike a good balance, as did a few intellectuals, like Irving Howe, an American who had explored the *World of Our Fathers,* Ian McGuint . . . the first-generation of Slavic, Russian and Jewish geniuses that rose out of the American soil after the great immigrations of 1895, which is part of my family too, because my mother came over from Russia in 1895.

So, to summarize: in the Fifties you had invasion of the intellectual world, subtly and secretly, by the CIA. You had invasion of political worlds in the Middle East, in Central America and Africa, I presume, and in Asia, again with secret police. I believe it was Wesley Fischel, the professor at East Lansing, Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin, who trained President Diem's secret police and brought them over intact to Saigon, under the auspices of the CIA, back in the early Fifties, when Diem was installed, '56 or so. You had a subversion of student activity and a blanketing of student protest. That's why you had the extreme rise of SDS, and later (Prairie Fire?) in the early Sixties, because normal student investigation and rebellion against the status quo had been suppressed by CIA funding of the National Student Association, with the presidents of the Student Association quite witting.

You had a literary atmosphere where there was censorship, where there was very little vigor, where an Eliotic conservative attitude was dominant in the academies, which excluded then Whitman as canon or Williams as canon or Minna Loy, or Louis Nightecker, or Cobracussi or Charles (unclear), or the whole imagist/objectivists' lineage which came into prominence in America in the

Fifties and transformed American poetry to open form. So you had a closed form in poetry, and a closed form of mind, is what it boils down to,

[. . .]

[. . .]
GINSBERG: What were the tenets or themes of the counter-culture, as I know them from the Forties and Fifties, meaning the beat group and some allied friends. [. . .]

First of all, open forum in poetry, rather than a closed forum. It's like when you split the atom, you get energy. So we were following Whitman and William Carlos Williams and the imagists and objectivists in technique, rather than the academic folks who were having a metronomic beat. That happened in painting, poetry, music and all the arts. And that involved candor and spontaneity, spontaneous composition, a classic thing from Tibet, Japan, China, not recognized here as classic because people weren't scholarly enough, so they thought it was some home-made spontaneous prosody, but it was the great tradition of Milarapa, the Tibetan poet.

Candor, arising from that, meaning if you're saying what's really on your mind spontaneously, you might say things that people would object to or censor. Thus Burroughs's *Naked Lunch*, which couldn't be printed in America until after many, many legal trials.

An interest in ecology and restoration of the planet, particularly on the part of Kerouac, who said "The earth is an Indian thing," or Gary Snyder who's a famous ecological poet, or Michael McLure whose specialty is in biology, or Philip Lamonti as a surrealist, using surrealist means to go back to the indigenous mind, so to speak.

Then there was also an interest in breaking the bonds of censorship, which we did, and being able to speak freely. There was an exuberance in art rather than any sort of a wet blanket, some sense of exuberance that . . . as Blake said, "exuberance is beauty", and even some visionary element. There was the introduction, along with that, of Eastern thought, Zen and Tibetan Buddhism, from the early Fifties on, through Kerouac and specifically through Gary Snyder, who was studying Chinese and Japanese in the early Fifties, and then went to study in a Zen monastery in Kyoto, where I joined him on that trip from India through Saigon to Kyoto to Vancouver. So meditation practice and exploration of the texture of consciousness was central, meaning exploration of our own aggression, and some way of relating to our own aggression rather than it run wild over the world as the American diplomacy was allowing: American fear, aggression dominance, *macho* delusion, to destroy other cultures.

We had a real strong interest in African American culture and in the arts of African American culture, which have never been fully recognized as the great American contribution to world culture. So, the entire program of Kerouac's writing is really related to the new sounds and the new rhythms of beebop, with Charlie Parker and Dizzy Gillespie and Thelonius Monk and other musicians whom he visited and heard directly in Harlem during the late Thirties, early Forties.

So there was an interest in both Asiatic culture and African American culture, *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* . . . so an expanding of the American horizon of what was canon, what was the canon: not merely the Judeo-Christian but also the Deists, Buddhists, and let us say animists or indigenous, worship of stocks and stones, as the Catholics would say, who came to America and burned all the Mayan goddesses, despising the pagan cultures. So we were actually checking out the pagan cultures, and finding a refinement, both artistic and intellectual, that we didn't have in Western culture, a Western culture based on some kind of either logical Aristotelian . . . a thing is either A or not A, or there's one single monotheist center, as distinct from the old hermetic tradition of Heraclitus through Blake and the Eastern tradition of no center, or emptiness, or *ku*, or *shrwinyatah*, that things are real but simultaneously no inherent permanent nature. That's a big intellectual distinction, and we were beginning to absorb that question through the Highest Perfect Wisdom sutra, which is chanted every morning in Zen and Tibetan rooms.

So there was a complete change of mind, and also a rediscovery of America itself and the indigenous land,

people, folk tales, folk music, urban folk arts like beebop and dozens, rather than a looking to Europe for sophisticated models only. . . .

. . . [O]h, I forgot the Sexual Revolution, gay liberation —yeah, you've got to add that in! So if you have complete change in view of the function and texture of consciousness, complete change in sexual tolerance, complete opening of artistic form, complete acceptance of human nature as is, as the fit subject matter, including the chaos of human nature, as your ground, naturally any young generation finds that exciting, 'cause they can reclaim their own bodies, their own speech and their own minds, they can use their own bodies, they can use their own speech, they can use their own minds, as the basis for their art or for their love-making or for their business. Naturally it caught on, because the whole older thing was censored, stultified, secret, secretive. The whole point of the Cold War, of the nuclear matter, was that it was all done in secrecy. From whatever proclivities they had in bed, through whatever proclivities they had in the war room of the White House or the Pentagon, through the creation of the single greatest political decision of the century: to make the bomb and drop it, you've to got realize it was all done undemocratically and in secret. And people had to hide their emotions sexually, hide their personal feelings, disguise themselves as men of distinction, and create a world-ravaging Frankenstein, the nature of which they could never put back in the bottle, or . . . to mix my metaphor, a genie that they couldn't put back in the bottle, or a Frankenstein that they couldn't stop, because we still don't know what to do with the wastes, the nuclear waste. So, boasting intelligence, they made a half-assed science that did not take into account its own results, and the complete equation was not resolved, yet they had the pride of billions and billions and billions and trillions of dollars of investment, trillions of dollars of war materials, secrecy, perquisites, pride, an incredible conspiracy of silence surrounding what was supposed to be a democratic nation. We were never consulted on the creation of the bomb; and people are so blind to the horror of that situation, they don't get it, that there was a dozen people in secret that took the decision that shakes the world, in what is supposed to be a democracy. This is Stalinism at its worst, or Hitlerism at its worst. People are not used to thinking of America or the West in these terms, but you really have to realistically look and see how we have poisoned the world.

There is the further problem that, because of conspicuous consumption, we are maybe more responsible for the garbage on the planet than anyone else, and for setting models of garbage . . . of disposable planets, so to speak.

[. . .]

. . . [O]ne other question we haven't covered, which was the introduction of the drugs which alter consciousness very slightly, like marijuana, which had a bad rep from the Government, but which actually, when one tried, one found that they were quite mild, like marijuana certainly. You know, I remember my first experience was that it made my vanilla ice cream with chocolate syrup Sunday delightful to eat, like a totem I'd never . . . an icon I'd never experienced before. And this was supposed to be the drug that sent Algerian dogs frothing at the mouth, mad. [Laughs] So actually, that was one reason that the US Government lost its authority, all the way up to the levitation of the Pentagon in 1967. [Laughs] It was simply that the authority of the "government" word was deconstructed, the authority of the Pentagon was deconstructed by one good-looking kid putting a flower in the barrel of the gun held by another good-looking kid in uniform. Everybody realized the Pentagon is an arbitrary authority. You know, it's like in Blake "old Nobodaddy". So . . . much less LSD, of which Blake might say "The eye, altering, alters all"—i.e. a change of consciousness that's experienced for, say, 8–10 hours, and that actually gives some perspective to the entire structure of social consciousness, the social arrangement, that you begin to see . . . X-ray, a little X-ray view of that; and particularly during a wartime, the realization of . . . people would get high, and I think that LSD was likely enough that psychedelics may have been a great catalyst to the anti-war movement. That was my guess at the time, and still is. So there's another element.

OK, so what did it feel like? It felt like we were walking around in a large mass hallucination, sustained by all the politicians, but particularly Lyndon Johnson and

later by Nixon, extremely, based on lies and secrecy, sustained by the media, who were not able to . . . or couldn't conceive that the whole structure of the United States mentality could be so wrong and so disastrous and so Earth-destroying, because they participated in primping it up all the time. So, in a sense it was a piece of cake. You know, [Laughs] all these madmen walking around in a dream, and all you had to do is make some common sense. You know, all I had to do is say was . . . say, "I'm putting my queer shoulder to the wheel," [Laughs] or, you know, "I here declare the end of the war—*I* here declare the end of the war." Lyndon Johnson never even declared it: he just sent soldiers over. OK, if he's going to have that chutzpah, that brass, OK, I can *un*declare it. And not only that: my word is going to outlast his. [Laughs] So it was sort of both a play, and at the same time a serious attempt to communicate to people, to transmit information that came from experience and self-knowledge, from wider travel, from maybe a deeper heart understanding, than was being displayed in the official media party line. And I'm using that word, "party line", with the overshadow echo of the Communist Party line. We definitely had a party line, *The Times* had a party line, and they've still got it.

[. . .]

So you had an establishment party line which, after all, is part of the power structure, and worse and worse from those days to this, as it gets more and more concentrated. But the beginning of that concentration of power in so few hands was back in the Fifties, when the networks and the few newspapers of record—*Times*, *Washington Post*—were in a state of what the Alcoholics Anonymous people would call "denial" of both scandal, error, and treason even.

[. . .]

Source: "Interview with Allen Ginsberg (8/11/96)," The National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-13/ginsberg1.html. Courtesy of CNN.

169. Daniel Ortega and Oscar Manuel Sobalvarro: Interviews with Sandinista and Contra Leaders

Introduction

In 1979, a leftist government came to power in Nicaragua after the overthrow of ruling strongman Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The youthful new president, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, had spent years in the Sandinista National Liberation Front (SNLF), the anti-Somoza urban guerrilla movement. Ortega was initially only one among a five-person junta established in 1979, but as representatives of other parties left this coalition he became de facto leader, winning a large majority in national elections called in 1984. The administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan denounced these as a sham and refused to recognize the new government, although outside observers thought them reasonably fair. As a young revolutionary, Ortega had already established a close relationship with Fidel Castro's communist government of Cuba, which sent 2,500 military and political advisors to assist the new government. When Reagan became president in 1981, his administration began to provide aid to anti-Sandinista Contra forces of Nicaraguan exiles, based in camps in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica, who waged civil war against the new regime, mounting various types of disruptive sabotage. Reagan also imposed economic sanctions and embargoes on the Sandinista government. Even though Nicaragua's population was only 4.5 million, the Reagan administration argued that the Sandinista regime represented a major communist threat to all of Latin America, providing Soviet and Cuban forces with another base in the Western Hemisphere. In 1987 Costa Rican President Óscar Arias Sánchez helped to negotiate a cease-fire agreement between the Contras and the SNLF under whose terms national elections were scheduled for 1990. The Sandinistas lost these elections probably in part because their conscription policies and suppression of human rights had made them unpopular, as had economic difficulties and infrastructural damage due to the impact of the U.S.-backed civil war and other sanctions.

Primary Source

Interview with Daniel Ortega, Sandinista Leader, Nicaraguan President (translated from Spanish)

On the origins of the Sandinista revolution:

We grew up in a situation where we didn't know what freedom or justice were, and therefore we didn't know what democracy was. . . . The people of Nicaragua were suffering oppression. This made us develop an awareness which eventually led us to commit ourselves to the struggle against the domination of the capitalists of our country in collusion with the U.S. government, i.e. imperialism. And that's why our struggle took on an anti-imperialist character.

One has to bear in mind that during my childhood and adolescence, I suffered the repression of the Somoza dictatorship in every way: economically, socially, as well as at the hands of the police—because if we went out on the street to play baseball, for example, the police would come and beat us up and put us in prison. There was nowhere for young people to play sports, and all we experienced was repression. I also became aware through the experience of my family, because my father had fought alongside Sandino and had been imprisoned by Somoza, and my mother was also anti-Somoza and had been sent to jail. And they used to tell all those stories. On the other hand, there were no civic channels through which one might try to achieve change in our country, so we came to the conclusion that the only way to overthrow the dictatorship was through armed struggle.

The Cuban Revolution hadn't triumphed yet. My idol was Sandino, and also Christ. I was brought up a Christian, but I regarded Christ as a rebel, a revolutionary, someone who had committed himself to the poor and the humble and never sided with the powerful. I had a Christian upbringing, so I would say that my main early influences were a combination of Christianity, which I saw as a spur to change, and Sandinism, represented by the resistance against the Yankee invasion. Later, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution was very influential, and Fidel, Che, and Camilo [Cienfuegos] became our main role models. There were also wars going on in Algeria and in Vietnam, which further encouraged us to believe that victory was possible.

On Latin American support for the Sandinistas:

[Cuba and Nicaragua] were close together and both suffered a dictatorship backed by the United States: there it was Batista, here it was Somoza. And there was a desire for profound change; I mean, not just replacing one dictatorship with another, or going from an iron dictatorship to a formal dictatorship within the framework of liberal politics: we wanted a more profound social change, a socialist change, and naturally that led us to identify with the Cuban Revolution.

[Visiting Cuba], I really felt transported to a country that was challenging imperialism, that was putting forward an alternative to capitalism. I mean, it was challenging world capitalism and also the heavy weight of international imperialism. And one came face to face with these very spiritual, moral people who had a great fighting spirit. That's what I felt when I went to Cuba for the first time. . . .

Before the triumph of the Revolution, we received aid primarily from Cuba. Cuba had always supported the Sandinista struggle. Later on, as we developed the struggle in our country, Cuba was able to give us much more support. When the governments of Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela, Omar Torrijos in Panama and Rodrigo Carazo in Costa Rica coincided in power, it became easier to bring in weapons from Havana through Panama, and then from Havana directly to Costa Rica, which of course assisted us greatly in overthrowing Somoza's dictatorship. . . .

On the Sandinistas' relationship with the United States:

[We took power] with great enthusiasm and a great desire to transform the country, but also with the worry that we would have to confront the United States, something which we regarded as inevitable. It's not that we fell into a kind of geopolitical fatalism with regard to the United States, but historically speaking the United States has been interfering in our country since the last century, and so we said, "The Yankees will inevitably interfere. If we try to become independent, the United States will intervene."

I would say that we tried to neutralize that confrontation with the United States, and around September of

'79 I went to the United Nations, and before that I visited Washington and had a meeting with President Carter. During the meeting with President Carter, we proposed the development of a new kind of relationship with the United States. During our exchange, [he said that] the American government was worried about the implications of the revolution and that the conservative sections of the United States perceived it as a threat. We insisted that this was an opportunity, as I said to Carter, for the United States to make good the historical damage they had inflicted on our country. Our national anthem still includes the words "Yankee, the enemy of humanity," and we said to him that the only way to abolish that line would be for the attitude of the imperialist powers to change throughout the world, and specifically towards Nicaragua. And then, in concrete terms, we asked President Carter for a certain amount of economic help, and for material support to build up a new army, because the old one had been wiped out. We needed weapons, because Nicaragua didn't manufacture any at the time, so we were asking them to help us in this respect. But they couldn't respond, because there was a public debate going on in the United States at that moment, and the conservatives were accusing Carter of opening the door to "communism," which was the word they used for these changes. It was up to the U.S. Congress to make these kinds of decisions, and the Congress did not want to approve such decisions.

[Our relationship with Cuba] was precisely the challenge —that the United States should respect our right to maintain friendly relations with whoever Nicaragua wanted. If the United States wanted to put conditions on Nicaragua's relations [with other countries], then it meant that we were starting off on the wrong foot, that the old imperialist attitude was still the same and there was nothing democratic about it at all, and that they were keeping up their dictatorial attitude throughout the world, supported by their economic and military power. So this meant that we started trying to find weapons in other parts of the world. Of course, the kind of support that Cuba could give us was very limited when it came to building up our army, since they didn't manufacture armaments in the quantities that we required. So we turned to Algeria and the Soviet Union for support. The first weapons that we received came from Algeria. Algeria identified very much with our struggle. We conducted a series of negotiations at the time, and the first reply we received came from Algeria. Then we began to receive support from other countries of the socialist community, and mainly from the Soviet Union. . . .

I remember perfectly well that when we began working in that direction, which we did quite openly, the U.S. government sent us an emissary, Mr. Thomas Enders, and I remember my conversation with him. He came to tell us very clearly that the United States was not going to allow a Soviet-Cuban communist bridgehead to be established in this continent. I said that we had a right to maintain relations with any other country, and that they should respect that right. And then he said that I should understand that they had the power to crush us, to which I replied that we were ready to fight and confront them even though they were a big power—that Sandino had already confronted them in the past and that we were ready to do so again if they tried to crush us.

On Soviet support for the Sandinista regime:
Well, first of all, we did not assume that others would fight on our behalf; we the Nicaraguans were ready to fight ourselves. What we asked for were weapons so that we could defend ourselves—that's what we asked of the Soviet Union, of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, of the Algerians, of the Vietnamese; and that's what we received so that we could arm the Nicaraguan people and defend ourselves in that war imposed on us by Ronald Reagan's Administration over a number of years.

[From the Soviet Union] we received rifles, which were still what our government most needed, because clearly, if the United States invaded us, we wouldn't be in a position to wage a mobile war with heavy armaments, so our defense would have to rely on our ability to develop popular resistance forces, guerrillas, throughout the country. So rifles were our main request, plus a few heavy armaments. Some tanks and helicopters arrived from the Soviet Union, but we never managed to get any MiG planes. We asked for planes so that we could use them in this war imposed on us by the United States, because with interceptor planes we could have

neutralized the Contras' aerial logistics from Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. But it seems that the United States put such heavy pressure on the Soviet Union, that even though the Soviets were willing and had already committed themselves in writing to send us MiG-21 planes and trained [our] pilots . . . they began procrastinating. And I even remember that in one of the exchanges we had with them, they said that the United States had threatened [them]—and I remember they even did it publicly during a visit to France, in the presence of President Mitterrand. We had explored the possibility of the French sending us Mirage [planes], and the French were willing; and when this became known, the Americans reacted by announcing publicly that they would not allow those armaments to enter Nicaragua and that they would bomb the Nicaraguan ports [if they arrived]. We asked the Soviets and the French to send the planes regardless, that we were willing to take the risk of Nicaragua being bombed. But in the end it wasn't possible for the planes to arrive in our country. There was an attempt, I remember, to send some smaller planes from Libya, and those planes got as far as Brazil, where they were intercepted and sent back to Libya.

I think that the Soviet Union was guided by a socialist agenda, and that this socialist agenda was in the minds of the Soviet leadership and Party members. There was a conviction that the socialist cause was a just one, and so wherever there were struggles against colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism, the Soviet Union would support those struggles and those causes, in the form of economic and military help. The economic assistance that the Soviet Union gave Nicaragua was invaluable.

On the Sandinistas' war with the Contras:

The fact is that the United States is behind what has happened in Nicaragua, and what they did was to promote a confrontation between Nicaraguans. And we already know how many millions of dollars and armaments they approved for the war in Nicaragua, and the things that were openly discussed in the U.S. Congress about our ports, the contempt of the United States for international law, for the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the decisions of the International Court of Justice, and so on. And of course, it was painful to have to accept that we were being confronted by another part of the Nicaraguan people, who were as poor as the Sandinistas who were defending the Revolution, but who acted as tools of an imperialist policy. . . .

This was a war that went beyond [Nicaragua], and without the United States the Contras would not have existed. Without the United States it would have been impossible for Somoza's former Guard to regroup, and it was they who started to organize the first counterrevolutionary units. Without the United States, there simply would not have been an armed uprising in our country. So I think it's very clear that external factors played a role in this matter, because I repeat, if I had had the resources to start fostering wars, I could have done so anywhere in the world—in the United States, for example: first stir people up and then provide them with the weapons to defend the rights they feel they have been denied. . . .

I would say that what was going on here was a confrontation with the United States. That was their discourse and that's how they trained [the Contras]. I mean, they trained them to make the same speech to the people as Somoza had made. Somoza set himself up as dictator of our country in the name of anticommunism and the fight against communism, and according to Somoza, Sandino was a communist, as he was in the eyes of the United States. So the training they gave the Contras—that whole manual the CIA prepared and all the rest of it—was aimed at exacerbating an already backward mentality, because a population with more than 60 percent illiteracy is obviously a backward population; and a good part of the Contras themselves come from this same section of the population.

Interview with Oscar Manuel Sobalvarro, Chief of Staff, "Contra" rebel army, Nicaragua (translated from Spanish)

On why he opposed the Sandinistas:

It was the repression carried out by the Sandinistas which forced me to take the decision to fight, in particular because we saw that Nicaragua's democracy was under threat. The Sandinistas promised democracy, but what we began to see a few months after their triumph was very different. . . .

My father is a peasant; his name is Justo Pastor Sobalvarro. He is a man of few means, hardworking, who serves his community. He used to grow coffee in the province of Jinotega, but his property was confiscated by the Sandinista regime. . . .

My father, who was a liberal, said to me: "I think that these people are communists." That's what Somoza used to say in his speeches, and my father—though he didn't support Somoza and was a great liberal—believed it. And being the age I was at the time—I was 19, very young—listening to my father say that every day influenced me, and I started thinking that yes, the Sandinistas were communists. And when they began to give signs that they were, I believed it, and that's what made me decide to fight against them, even though the idea of joining the military and taking up arms to fight against someone hadn't crossed my mind.

At the beginning of their government, the Sandinista Front promoted a literacy campaign, and this program included first and foremost the education of adults in the rural areas. And they sent student brigades to the mountains. These brigades included foreigners who were appointed coordinators of the groups. One of these coordinators came to our house, and this person turned out to be a Soviet, and in his speech he said that God didn't exist, that God was Fidel Castro, and that it was necessary to serve Fidel Castro; that the government of Nicaragua was at the disposal of Fidel Castro, and that it was necessary to serve the government, and all this kind of thing—which we the Nicaraguans weren't used to, because we've been very Catholic, especially my family. And I would say the Nicaraguans in general are very Catholic. And for someone to suddenly turn up and tell us that God doesn't exist really started putting a lot of doubts in our minds. . . .

There was a lot of hatred. Personally speaking, I was first and foremost affected physically by the Sandinista Front, because we were taken out of our homes and our families and threatened with being shot, and at that moment I began to build up a tremendous hatred against the Front's structures, and I felt the desire to fight against these people because they were doing a lot of damage. Just as they hurt me and my family personally, we also saw how they hurt other people, and we really had the desire and the morale to fight. . . .

[We didn't like the] systems which the Sandinista government implanted in Nicaragua, such as the control of private property, the political persecution of all those who didn't identify with the Sandinista regime, who didn't say "I'm a Sandinista." All this forced many Nicaraguans to fight against the Sandinistas, because, first of all, we weren't prepared to give up what was ours, our property. The Sandinistas came and confiscated our properties. All those who didn't agree with the Sandinista policies were subjected to confiscations and imprisonment, and their lives were threatened. Many were murdered just for disagreeing with the Sandinista Front. This sort of thing turned many Nicaraguan peasants against the Sandinistas and made them decide to fight [against them] militarily. . . .

On joining the Contras:
I started [fighting] on March 20, 1980, with hunting rifles. My purpose in fighting the Sandinista Front at that time was not to wage war against them but to convey to the Sandinista government the message that the peasants and many other Nicaraguans did not agree with [the introduction of] new things which were alien to the way of life that we knew, and that if what they were trying to do was to implant a totalitarian communist regime, well, we weren't going to agree to that. And that's how we began the struggle. Initially we were a group of 15 young men, and then it grew to 30, and I was one of the leaders and main promoters of the group. That's how the Contras were born: what were known as the MILPAS: Milicias Populares Anti-Sandinistas [Anti-Sandinista People's Militias].

As part of the struggle against the Sandinista regime, we started laying ambushes; and it was during one of these ambushes that we retrieved two Soviet rifles. And it then became necessary to show the world that the Sandinistas really were being supported and supplied by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The best way of showing it was to present the Soviet-made weapons to the public, so after we retrieved these weapons I decided to go to Honduras to ask for support to present the weapons. After some time, we managed to make contact with Commander Enrique Bermudez, known

as "Commander 380," and through him we showed the weapons to the U.S. government authorities who were in Honduras, and they were persuaded that the Sandinistas were indeed being supported and supplied by the Soviet countries. . . .

This, of course, was in 1981, almost a year after the struggle began. Initially, we had used pistols and hunting rifles, but by now we had war weapons which we had captured, and their number was gradually increasing.

On U.S. support for the Contras:
It was through some contacts with the U.S. government that we started to receive help—first of all through Argentine instructors, who trained us, and then the Americans became directly involved in giving us help. There were difficult moments, times when we were getting help, and then the U.S. Congress cut off the aid, so we had to renew the struggle to seek help. Some of our people who represented the political side of the resistance lobbied the U.S. Congress to try to get help to continue the war against the Sandinistas. However, we were always fighting against the Sandinistas, even without help from the U.S. government. . . .

I think that the support we received from the U.S. government wasn't aimed at us achieving a military victory in Nicaragua. I think we received help to pressurize the Sandinista government into making changes. And it was not just the pressure that we exerted as guerrillas, but there were also the interests of the neighboring countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras, who through the Esquipulas II agreement managed to get the Sandinistas to commit themselves to a process of democratization. And after these agreements, we became involved in negotiations with the Sandinistas. I also think that the Sandinistas were forced to negotiate not only because of the pressure exerted by the Central American countries, but because of the military pressure we exerted on them; because we were on top of them, gaining terrain every day, and they were unable to stop the guerrilla movement in Nicaragua through military force. So it was a combination of those two factors, and of course the [Sandinista] Front made mistakes—the Front made many more mistakes than we did as a resistance movement.

On Nicaragua's role in the Cold War:
There was a war going on in Nicaragua, there was a war going on in El Salvador, there was guerrilla warfare in Guatemala, there were small movements in Honduras —so naturally the big powers had a political interest in these events. We, as armed guerrilla groups, were an important factor in these big powers achieving their aims. . . .

The interests of the Soviet countries were to spread the guerrilla movements throughout Latin America, and so of course we were protecting, let's say, the interests of the Americans by preventing these subversive movements from going any further. And I think that we, the Nicaraguans, were a very important factor in preventing the guerrilla movement in El Salvador from consolidating itself and taking power . . . mainly because their strength depended on the support they received from the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and since we were confronting the Sandinistas directly, the Sandinistas didn't have time to help the Salvadoran guerrillas, as well as other guerrillas in Guatemala and so on. So in this sense we were an important factor, and this was shown by the fact that when the resistance was dismantled, the Salvadoran guerrilla movement had to be dismantled too because they no longer had any base from which to continue fighting. . . . And I think that at that very moment, the United States also achieved their aim of forestalling the emergence of any more guerrilla movements.

Source: "Daniel Ortega, Sandinista Leader, Nicaraguan President," CNN.com, http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/ortega/, Courtesy of CNN. "Oscar Manuel Sobalvarro, Chief of Staff, 'Contra' Rebel Army, Nicaragua," http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/sobalvarro/.

170. Mikhail Gorbachev: Perestroika and Glasnost

Introduction

In March 1985 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and his country's supreme leader, succeeding three elderly and ailing predecessors under whom economic, social, and international problems had slowly accumulated for well over a decade. From the late 1970s onward, all major Soviet economic indicators suddenly declined. The economic growth rate, 5.2 percent from 1966 to 1970, fell to 2.7 percent, and growth in industrial production, investment, productivity, and consumption also dropped, sometimes to negative or near-negative levels. Oil production leveled off, and from 1979 to 1982 Russia suffered droughts and poor harvests. Lagging modernization in such old industries as steel, combined with the tardy introduction of new technology such as computers, left the Soviet Union trailing the West. The nature of the Soviet economy and society discouraged individualist inventors and entrepreneurs whose efforts contributed to Western economic growth. From the early 1970s, Soviet living standards, health care, and life expectancy all declined, while infant mortality rose. When such problems appeared, serious systemic flaws in the Soviet command economy, including its autarkic nature and the consequent absence of independent institutions that could provide credit and capital, plus the nonexistence of fiscal economic incentives conspired to facilitate collapse rather than reform. Gorbachev, the first general secretary born since the 1917 Russian Revolution, was of a generation that laid far greater emphasis on freedom of thought and choice than his predecessors had done. A dedicated communist, he frequently referred to the lessons and thinking of the October Revolution and of the Soviet Union's founder, Vladimir Lenin, and stated that his policies were intended to implement these. Initially, Gorbachev hoped to reform the Soviet economy and society from within, strengthening communism through the twin policies of perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (openness). In practice, his reforms initially provoked yet further problems and helped to further weaken the Soviet Union, stirring up party opposition to his reforms. Glasnost largely meant freedom of speech, and glasnost-inspired criticism on occasion undercut the economic restructuring of perestroika and could be and was turned against Gorbachev himself. Reluctant to embrace a market economy outright or to inflict the pain incumbent on full-scale economic restructuring, he opted for half-measures, retaining much of the command economy structure of price supports and controls, which undercut the reforms he initiated. Although the 1988 Law on Cooperatives permitted private ownership of businesses, the Soviet Union also lacked the independent financial, banking, credit, and stock exchange facilities needed to underpin the development of a market economy. High inflation, shortages, strikes, and falling productivity were the immediate results of Gorbachev's economic reforms, and many ordinary Soviet citizens living on fixed incomes suffered from declining living standards, while a small elite of well-connected entrepreneurs were thought to be profiting massively from economic change. Seeking to reform the Soviet communist system, Gorbachev effectively destroyed it. His efforts to obtain major loans and economic assistance from the United States and Western-dominated international institutions were less fruitful than he and his advisors hoped. As his Western reputation grew, Gorbachev's domestic popularity plummeted, and in August 1991 a coup attempt almost overthrew him and effectively destroyed his political credibility. In December 1991 the Soviet Union itself was dissolved, and Gorbachev resigned as its president. In retirement, he reflected on his record in office.

Primary Source

There has been a continuing debate over when reform actually began in our country. Politicians and journalists have been trying to locate the exact point at which all our dramatic changes began. Some assert that reforms in Russia did not really begin until 1992.

The basis for reform was laid by Khrushchev. His break with the repressive policies of Stalinism was a heroic feat of civic action. Khrushchev also tried, though without much success, to make changes in the economy. Significant attempts were made within the framework of the so-called Kosygin reforms. Then came a long period of stagnation and a new attempt by Yuri Andropov to improve the situation in our society. An obvious sign that the times were ripe for change was the activity of the dissidents. They were suppressed and expelled from the country, but their moral stand and

their proposals for change (for example, the ideas of Andrei Sakharov) played a considerable role in creating the spiritual preconditions for perestroika.

[. . .]

Perestroika was born out of the realization that problems of internal development in our country were ripe, even overripe, for a solution. New approaches and types of action were needed to escape the downward spiral of crisis, to normalize life, and to make a breakthrough to qualitatively new frontiers. It can be said that to a certain extent perestroika was a result of a rethinking of the Soviet experience since October.

The vital need for change was dictated also by the following consideration. It was obvious that the whole world was entering a new stage of development—some call it the postindustrial age, some the information age. But the Soviet Union had not yet passed through the industrial stage. It was lagging further and further behind those processes that were making a renewal in the life of the world community possible. Not only was a leap forward in technology needed but fundamental change in the entire social and political process.

Of course it cannot be said that at the time we began perestroika we had everything thought out. In the early stages we all said, including myself, that perestroika was a continuation of the October revolution. Today I believe that that assertion contained a grain of truth but also an element of delusion.

The truth was that we were trying to carry out fundamental ideas that had been advanced by the October revolution but had not been realized: overcoming people's alienation from government and property, giving power to the people (and taking it away from the bureaucratic upper echelons), implanting democracy, and establishing true social justice.

The delusion was that at the time I, like most of us, assumed this could be accomplished by improving and refining the existing system. But as experience accumulated, it became clear that the crisis that had paralyzed the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s was systemic and not the result of isolated aberrations. The logic of how matters developed pointed to the need to penetrate the system to its very foundations and change it, not merely refine or perfect it. We were already talking about a gradual shift to a social market economy, to a democratic political system based on rule of law and the full guarantee of human rights.

This transition turned out to be extremely difficult and complicated, more complicated than it had seemed to us at first. Above all, this was because the totalitarian system possessed tremendous inertia. There was resistance from the party and government structures that constituted the solid internal framework of that system. The nomenklatura encouraged resistance. And this is understandable: Since it held the entire country in its hands, it would have to give up its unlimited power and privileges. Thus the entire perestroika era was filled with struggles—concealed at first and then more open, more fully exposed to public view—between the forces for change and those who opposed it, those who, especially after the first two years, simply began to sabotage change.

The complexity of the struggle stemmed from the fact that in 1985 the entire society—politically, ideologically, and spiritually—was still in the thrall of old customs and traditions. Great effort was required to overcome these traditions, as mentioned above. There was another factor. Destroying the old system would have been senseless if we did not simultaneously lay the foundations for a new life. And this was genuinely unexplored territory. The six-year perestroika era was a time filled with searching and discovery, gains and losses, breakthroughs in thought and action, as well as mistakes and oversights. The attempted coup in August 1991 interrupted perestroika. After that there were many developments, but they were along different lines, following different intentions. Still, in the relatively short span of six years we succeeded in doing a great deal. The reforms in China, incidentally, have been going on since 1974, and their most difficult problems still remain unsolved.

What specifically did we accomplish as a result of the stormy years of perestroika? The foundations of the totalitarian system were eliminated. Profound democratic changes were begun. Free general elections were

held for the first time, allowing real choice. Freedom of the press and a multiparty system were guaranteed. Representative bodies of government were established, and the first steps toward a separation of powers were taken. Human rights (previously in our country these were only "so-called," reference to them invariably made only in scornful quotation marks) now became an unassailable principle. And freedom of conscience was also established.

Movement began toward a multistructured, or mixed, economy providing equality of rights among all forms of property. Economic freedom was made into law. The spirit of enterprise began to gain strength, and processes of privatization and the formation of joint stock companies got under way. Within the framework of our new land law, the peasantry was reborn and private farmers made their appearance. Millions of hectares of land were turned over to both rural and urban inhabitants. The first privately owned banks also came on the scene. The different nationalities and peoples were given the freedom to choose their own course of development. Searching for a democratic way to reform our multinational state, to transform it from a unitary state in practice into a national federation, we reached the threshold at which a new union treaty was to be signed, based on the recognition of the sovereignty of each republic along with the preservation of a common economic, social, and legal space that was necessary for all, including a common defense establishment.

The changes within our country inevitably led to a shift in foreign policy. The new course of perestroika predetermined renunciation of stereotypes and the confrontational methods of the past. It allowed for a rethinking of the main parameters of state security and the ways to ensure it. I will return to this subject.

In other words, the foundations were laid for normal, democratic, and peaceful development of our country and its transformation into a normal member of the world community.

These are the decisive results of perestroika. Today, however, looking back through the prism of the past few years and taking into account the general trends of world development today, it seems insufficient to register these as the only results. Today it is evidently of special interest to state not only *what* was done but also *how* and *why* perestroika was able to achieve its results, and what its mistakes and miscalculations were.

Above all, *perestroika would have been simply impossible if there had not been a profound and critical reexamination not only of the problems confronting our country but a rethinking of all realities—both national and international.*

Previous conceptions of the world and its developmental trends and, correspondingly, of our country's place and role in the world were based, as we have said, on dogmas deeply rooted in our ideology, which essentially did not permit us to pursue a realistic policy. These conceptions had to be shattered and fundamentally new views worked out regarding our country's development and the surrounding world.

[. . .]

The practical work of perestroika was to *renounce stereotypical ideological thinking and the dogmas of the past. This required a fresh view of the world and of ourselves with no preconceptions, taking into account the challenges of the present and the already evident trends of the future in the third millennium.*

During perestroika, and often now as well, the initiators of perestroika have been criticized for the absence of a "clear plan" for change. The habit developed over decades of having an all-inclusive regimentation of life. But the events of the perestroika years and of the subsequent period have plainly demonstrated the following: *At times of profound, fundamental change in the foundations of social development it is not only senseless but impossible to expect some sort of previously worked out "model" or a clear-cut outline of the transformations that will take place. This does not mean, however, the absence of a definite goal for the reforms, a distinct conception of their content and the main direction of their development.*

All this was present in perestroika: a profound democratization of public life and a guarantee of freedom of social and political choice. These goals were proclaimed and frequently reaffirmed. This did not exclude but presupposed the necessity to change one's specific

reference points at each stage as matters proceeded and to engage in a constant search for optimal solutions.

An extremely important conclusion follows from the experience of perestroika: Even in a society formed under totalitarian conditions, democratic change is possible by *peaceful evolutionary means*. The problem of revolution and evolution, of the role and place of reforms in social development, is one of the eternal problems of history. In its inner content perestroika of course was a revolution. But in its form it was an evolutionary process, a process of reform.

[. . .]

From the very beginning of the changes our country's leadership assigned primary importance to open communication with the people, including direct disclosure in order to explain the new course. Without the citizens' understanding and support, without their participation, it would not have been possible to move from dead center. That is why we initiated the policies of perestroika and glasnost simultaneously.

Like perestroika itself, glasnost made its way with considerable difficulty. The nomenklatura on all levels, which regarded the strictest secrecy and protection of authorities from criticism from below as the holy of holies of the regime, opposed glasnost in every way they could, both openly and secretly, trampling its first shoots in the *local* press. Even among the most sincere supporters of perestroika, the tradition over many years of making everything a secret made itself felt. But it was precisely glasnost that awakened people from their social slumber, helped them overcome indifference and passivity and become aware of the stake they had in change and of its important implications for their lives. Glasnost helped us to explain and promote awareness of the new realities and the essence of our new political course. In short, without glasnost there would have been no perestroika.

The question of the relation between ends and means is one of the key aspects of politics and of political activity. If the means do not correspond to the ends, or, still worse, if the means contradict the ends, this will lead to setbacks and failure. The Soviet Union's experience is convincing evidence of this. When we began perestroika as a process of democratic change, we had to ensure that the means used to carry out these changes were also democratic.

In essence, glasnost became the means for drawing people into political activity, for including them in the creation of a new life, and this, above all, corresponded to the essence of perestroika. Glasnost not only created conditions for implementing the intended reforms but also made it possible to overcome attempts to sabotage the policy of change.

We are indebted to glasnost for a profound psychological transformation in the public consciousness toward democracy, freedom, and the humanist values of civilization. Incidentally, this was one of the guarantees that the fundamental gains of this period would be irreversible.

Perestroika confirmed once again that the normal, democratic development of society rules out universal secrecy as a method of administration. Democratic development presupposes glasnost—that is, openness, freedom of information for all citizens and freedom of expression by them of their political, religious, and other views and convictions, freedom of criticism in the fullest sense of the word.

Why, then, did perestroika not succeed in achieving all its goals? The answer primarily involves the question of "harmonization" between political and economic change.

The dominant democratic aspect of perestroika meant that the accent was inevitably placed on political reform. The dialectic of our development during those years was such that serious changes in the economic sphere proved to be impossible without emancipating society politically, without ensuring freedom—that is, breaking the political structures of totalitarianism. And this was accomplished. But economic change lagged behind political change, and we did not succeed in developing economic change to the full extent.

In recent years I have often had occasion to refute criticism to the effect that we should have begun with economic changes and held tightly to the political reins,

as was done in China. There was no lack of understanding of economics on our part, still less scorn or disregard for it. To dispute that line of criticism it is sufficient to examine the chronology of events of perestroika. From the very beginning most plenary sessions of our Central Committee were devoted precisely to restructuring the economy. This aspect of the process occupied nearly three-quarters of my time and effort as general secretary, as well as the work of my colleagues and our government agencies. However, the state monopoly ownership that prevailed in our economy for decades, the administrative-command system that had left its mark on our economic personnel and party leaders, most of whom had been trained in economic management, indeed the very character of our economic system which had been functioning over such a prolonged period—all these factors contributed to *incredibly powerful inertia*, which made the task of switching over onto new tracks, the tracks of a real market economy, tremendously difficult. Even if all our economic ideas and decisions during perestroika had been flawless (and I cannot say they were), that inertia would have been present.

Change had begun, but we were searching for an optimal way of making a peaceful transition from a totalitarian economy to a democratic one. The search was long and drawn out. Moods of disillusionment and disappointment, loss of faith in perestroika, dissatisfaction with the worsening material situation—all these forces began to rise among the people (although the material conditions at that time cannot be compared to those that resulted from the "shock therapy" of Gaidar and Yeltsin). Support for the reforms in our society grew distinctly weaker, and populist demagogues took advantage of this, promising to correct matters in the course of one year, which was sheer balderdash. But people wanted a quick change for the better. The society's dissatisfaction over market conditions was thoroughly exploited by the opponents of reform inside the CPSU.

Another factor that threatened perestroika was the delay in solving the nationalities question, transforming the USSR from an actual unitary state to a truly multinational federation and thus, in the *last* analysis, bringing the situation into correspondence with the relevant clauses of the Soviet constitution. Nationalist elements and the ruling circles in the [non-Russian] republics, deciding that the moment had come to weaken Control from the center, took advantage of this.

The negative processes began to gain strength after Yeltsin's group came to power in Russia and issued a declaration of sovereignty for the Russian Federation. The intention behind this was in fact to eliminate the union of republics (although nothing was said about that at the time). They were able to counter that destructive policy line with the line of preserving the union and reforming it fundamentally. By July 1991 the various republics had agreed on a new union treaty. The attempted coup by the opponents of reform thwarted the signing of that treaty. And although those opponents were defeated, the events of August 1991 gave a powerful impetus to the processes of disintegration, and the position of the central government of the Soviet Union was greatly undermined. The leadership of the Russian Republic took advantage of this. It had already been attempting constantly to assume the right to make decisions that would affect the entire union. Thus the process of estrangement and disunification among the republics was intensified, and all this resulted, in December 1991, in an agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to dissolve the USSR.

These are some of the lessons of perestroika. Of course I have only indicated the most important and fundamental ones. These lessons, it would seem, have a definite importance not only for historians. Today when the entire world is in flux, when the need for change has arisen in many countries as a result of the many new challenges of the approaching new century, any experience of change and reform takes on a significance that is not limited by national borders.

I can say this without fear of error: The experience of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy in my country, for all its uniqueness, contains much that may be of interest to democratic reformers in other countries. Especially if we keep in mind the intensified tendency toward decentralization and the rising new wave of nationalism. What about for Russia itself? What might be useful for its further development? The continuing crisis in Russia is explained in many respects by the fact that it departed from the evolutionary road

of reforms and yielded to the influence of the proponents of "shock therapy." It retreated from genuinely democratic standards in public life, scorned the social imperative, and failed to resolve the question of establishing proper federated relationships. We can be sure that the future of Russia as a democratic, peace-loving, humane country can be assured only if it continues to move along the path of genuinely democratic renewal, which was begun by perestroika—of course taking into account in the process all the new elements that have emerged.

In concluding this chapter let us once again recall October. The revolution of 1917 was victorious under the banner of ultrademocratic slogans. These slogans were not merely demagogic, not just a means of winning power. They expressed a profound basis for the transformation of our country, a country that used to be called the Russian empire. However, the Bolsheviks, and after them Stalin, demonstrated to their country and to the world in the most convincing way that democracy cannot be built on principles of hatred, hostility, or elimination of one part of society, or of the world, by another. Today in Russia, in the final analysis, we have come to understand democracy as a universal human value, and the task we face is not to end up once again in the position of serving as a "negative model."

Thoughts about perestroika naturally encompass the entire complex of problems of the new thinking, including, in foreign policy, the international aspect. The road to a new foreign policy was a long one.

[. . .]

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171. Mikhail Gorbachev: "The New Thinking"

Introduction

In March 1985 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev succeeded the elderly Konstantin Chernenko as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and top Soviet leader. Gorbachev, the first Soviet leader born after the Russian Revolution of 1917, sought to revitalize the Soviet Union both domestically and abroad. He was a dedicated communist who looked back to the October 1917 revolution and frequently cited the teachings of Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik founder of the Soviet Union. At home, Gorbachev introduced policies of perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (openness) that he hoped would strengthen Soviet communism, although ultimately they contributed to the socialist system's collapse. Although Western leaders at first found his overtures difficult to credit, Gorbachev also sought a genuine rapprochement with Western countries that he hoped would enable both Cold War antagonists and their allies to make major cuts in conventional and nuclear weapons. By the mid-1980s, the cost of maintaining an empire and acting as leader of the international communist camp was imposing heavy economic burdens on the Soviet Union. Military spending by then absorbed 13–14 percent (18 percent according to some figures) of gross national product as opposed to 10–12 percent in the early 1960s, diverting funds from domestic economic development. Most countries in Eastern Europe, the core of Soviet security concerns, still sullenly resented Soviet domination. Economic difficulties of the 1970s caused by rising petroleum prices further eroded Soviet popularity, as the Russians chose in 1982 to cut by 10 percent their oil shipments to East European allies, whose own economies also suffered from rigid autarky. Globally assertive Soviet foreign policies carried a high price tag, as Soviet clients throughout the world demonstrated insatiable appetites for economic and military aid, while expanding Russian overseas activities almost automatically triggered determined American responses in opposition, which in turn demanded further Soviet expenditures. The lengthy Afghan intervention, which lasted until 1989, embroiled Soviet troops in a costly and unwinnable guerrilla war that produced heavy casualties, an expensive and demoralizing entanglement that echoed previous American involvement in Vietnam. When Gorbachev assumed power, his counterpart in the United States was the staunchly anticommunist Republican President Ronald Reagan, who implemented a major arms buildup after 1980 and had announced his intention of undertaking

a vastly expensive program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, to build a satellite-mounted antimissile system in space. Fear of a costly arms race that would further strain the Soviet Union's fragile economy may well have been one of the motives impelling Gorbachev to improve relations with the West. In speeches at the time and in subsequent writings, he stressed less self-interested factors: that the world had become heavily interdependent, that diversity among nations had to be accepted, that nuclear weapons were so dangerous and destructive that they could not be used, and that "politics based on the use of force is doomed." International leaders habitually, of course, employed high-flown rhetoric on such subjects, often as a substitute for practical action. Gorbachev shrewdly noted that "because of the prevailing mistrust between East and West, only specific measures could contribute to establishing trust." American and European leaders were indeed initially wary of responding to Gorbachev's overtures, suspecting that these were only empty gestures designed to persuade the West to relax its guard. In Europe, where since the late 1970s the collapse of détente and the subsequent nuclear buildup had provoked public alarm and a determination to preserve the Pan-European gains of the previous two decades, Gorbachev quickly won great popularity. Margaret Thatcher, the hard-line British prime minister in whom Reagan found a political soul mate, urged her colleague to work with the Soviet leader, and Reagan was far readier than many of his advisors to trust Gorbachev. In 1987 the superpowers signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe and imposing strong verification procedures. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush, who succeeded Reagan, concluded in 1991 cut long-range weapons dramatically. In 1985 Gorbachev extended glasnost and perestroika to Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, hoping thereby to strengthen communism in those countries but in practice promoting rapidly accelerating East European criticism of communism. Although the Soviet hold on this once vital and unnegotiable security interest was increasingly precarious, in 1988 Gorbachev unilaterally reduced the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 and withdrew 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat units from Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union decided against intervention should these satellites choose to reject communism, institute free elections, and leave the Soviet empire, which by 1990 all had done. Symbolically, in 1989 the Berlin Wall was dismantled, and the following year the two Germanies united, retaining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership despite Soviet objections. The following year, the two European power blocs signed a Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, providing for mutual reductions in conventional armed forces on the part of both European blocs. On 1 April 1991 the Warsaw Pact itself was dissolved. Between 1989 and 1991, the Soviet Union also liquidated its expensive global commitments to revolutionary and quasi-revolutionary regimes and other clients in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Cuba, Vietnam, and elsewhere. A new rapprochement with China mirrored the warming of Soviet-Western relations and made it unnecessary to maintain large Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border. Gorbachev's policies made him a hero in the West, but to many Russians who took pride in their country's great-power status, the policies seemed an exercise in national humiliation, contributing to a coup attempt against him in August 1991 that, although ultimately unsuccessful, destroyed his authority. In December 1991 Gorbachev finally resigned as president of the now-defunct Soviet Union.

Primary Source

[. . .]

The need for a major reversal in world politics was subsequently repeated in discussions with other foreign leaders, including those of the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Japan, India, and China.

Perhaps of special interest was the meeting with U.S. Vice President George Bush and Secretary of State George Schultz, where we presented our views on Soviet foreign policy. I will quote several passages from that meeting:

> The Soviet Union will pursue an active and constructive policy based on an understanding of its role and responsibility as a great power. On the global level we see our task as that of promoting, in all our relations with other governments, the aim of creating a healthier international situation and of generating conditions for the expansion of international ties, cultural exchanges,

exchanges in the fields of science, technology, and so on.

We attribute great importance to our relations with the United States. We have no desire to achieve military superiority over the United States, and we have no intention of infringing on the valid interests of the United States. In our opinion, there are great possibilities for fruitful cooperation between us.

We must learn to construct international relations in the real world. The formulation of policy and its practical implementation in all likelihood will depend on how those realities are understood. . . . Every country has certain constant or permanent interests. Accordingly, in carrying out our foreign policy we must take into account the interests of each state. We cannot proceed on the basis that might makes right. . . . We cannot understand the present policy of the United States. It simply does not fit in with the concept of normal international relations.

A short while later, on April 10, 1985, as general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, I received a visit from Thomas ("Tip") O'Neill, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, and a meeting with him ensued. This meeting was along the same lines as the previous one, but with a greater degree of candor. In my effort to convey to the American congressman my views on the seriousness of the moment, the new possibilities emerging, and the terms and conditions that should be observed if these possibilities were to become a reality, I said the following:

> The relations between our countries are presently in a kind of ice age. We favor restoring Soviet-American relations to normal channels. At bottom, our position includes the understanding that a *fatal conflict of interest between our countries is not inevitable.* Further, we have a common interest —in avoiding nuclear war, in guaranteeing the security of both our countries, of preserving life itself for our respective peoples. . . . We do not wish to remake the United States in our own image, regardless of what we like or dislike about that nation. However, the United States should also not undertake the quixotic task of remaking the Soviet Union to suit its own tastes. That would just lead to war. . . . Many problems exist in the world—political, economic, and social—but there is a way out, namely, peaceful coexistence, the recognition that each nation has the right to live as it wishes. There is no other alternative. . . . We must build a bridge toward cooperation. But to build such a bridge, as everyone knows, construction must proceed from both sides.

In these two discussions—first with George Bush and George Schultz and then with Tip O'Neill—in addition to the kind of ideas the Soviet government had previously formulated, new ones were presented that had not been part of Soviet policy in the past. I am referring to the principle of balancing interests (and, accordingly, the renunciation of "zero-sum" diplomacy), that is, the need to search for mutually acceptable compromises, to recognize freedom of choice for each nation, and to acknowledge that any system is valid if chosen by the people.

The same principles were posed in meetings with Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl. Also touched on in these meetings were specific problems of bilateral and Europeanwide relations.

An important step in the conceptual development of our new views on foreign policy was taken at the April 1985 Central Committee plenum—the same plenum at which a presentation of forthcoming changes in our government's domestic policy were first set forth. To quote from the general secretary's report:

> We are in favor of proper, correct, smoothly functioning, and, if you will, civilized relations between states based on genuine respect for international legal norms. But one thing must be clear: Only if imperialism renounces any attempt to resolve by military means the historic dispute between our two social systems will we be successful in bringing international relations back into the channel of normal cooperation.

This was the general framework defining what we saw at the time as the limits of what was possible.

Later in the report two other points were singled out: First, "disputed questions and conflict situations must

be resolved by political means—that is our firm conviction"; and, second, "the CPSU, and the Soviet state, unalterably support the right of self-determination for all peoples, that is, the freedom to decide their own socioeconomic conditions and build their future without interference from the outside. To deny any nation this sovereign right is a hopeless task, doomed from the start."

This principle was universal in the renewed form of Soviet policy. It applied to all governments and states, including those belonging to the so-called socialist system. This was emphasized at two meetings that took place in 1985 with leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, one on March 13, the other on April 26. The following summarizes what was said at those meetings:

The relationship between allied countries [i.e., between the Soviet Union and its allies] had to be reshaped. Relations were to develop based on principles of independence, equality, and noninterference in one another's internal affairs. Each country was to bear responsibility for the decisions it made. In other words, and this point was emphasized, we were ending the so-called Brezhnev doctrine; we were turning a new page, leaving behind the old one on which were recorded episodes of the USSR's intervention in its allies' internal affairs.

Not all the leaders attending the Warsaw Pact meetings may have fully appreciated the meaning of what was said. After all, similar words had been spoken in the past, which had by no means prevented our troops from being sent, for example, into Czechoslovakia. But soon everyone realized we were talking about a serious and firm orientation.

On May 8, at a meeting celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism, another proposition was put forward signifying an important step toward expanding the framework of the new foreign policy. The following statement was made: "The only sensible solution today is to establish active cooperation among all governments in the interest of a peaceful future for all; it is the creation, utilization, and development of international mechanisms and institutions of such cooperation that would make it possible to find optimal correlations between national interests and the interests of humanity as a whole." The advancement of this thesis indicated that the USSR's concept of foreign policy, in contrast to that of the past, was beginning to move away from narrow class positions to include the new realities in the new world.

This theme was developed further during my visit to France, in discussions with President Mitterand and at meetings with parliamentarians, as evinced by the following statement made at that time:

> There is closer and closer interconnection and interdependence among countries and continents. This is an inevitable condition for the development of the world economy, for scientific and technical progress, for the accelerated exchange of information, and for the movement of people and goods on the earth's surface and even in outer space—in short, for the overall development of human civilization. Unfortunately the advances of civilization are by no means always used to promote the people's well-being. Scientific and technological achievements are too often used to create means of destruction, to produce and stockpile ever more terrifying weapons.
>
> Under these conditions Hamlet's question—To be, or not to be?—no longer confronts just the individual but challenges the human race as well. Indeed it is becoming a global question. There can only be one answer: Humanity and civilization must survive. But this can be ensured only by learning to live together, to get along side by side on this small planet, by mastering the difficult art of considering one another's interests.

In the person of Mitterand I had found a partner who took these questions seriously.

During the meeting with Mitterand our side advanced one more proposition that further developed the theme under discussion: "We think that in current circumstances it is especially important not to carry ideological disagreements, in imitation of certain medieval fanatics, into the realm of relations among states."

Based on all these ideas, and as a means of renewing international relations, a meeting was held in November

1985 between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan. Summarizing the results of this meeting, which was marked, above all, by progress on these very questions regarding human survival and a mutual recognition of the inadmissibility of nuclear war or a policy course aimed at achieving military supremacy, I said the following:

> Yes, I am convinced that at the present stage of international relations, which is characterized by greater interconnectedness among states, by their interdependence, a new policy is required. We believe that a new approach requires that the current policies of all states be nourished by the realities of today's world. This is an essential prerequisite for any state in constructing its foreign policy and will also contribute to improving the world situation.

[. . .]

Seeking to end the nuclear arms race, on July 30 we declared a moratorium on nuclear testing, to begin on August 6, 1985 (and this was extended several times). We appealed to the government of the United States to follow our example.

At the same time a message was sent to President Reagan proposing a substantial reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, which would of course be linked with the renunciation of a nuclear arms race in space.

On September 17 we published Soviet proposals to the United Nations concerning the basic directions and principles of international cooperation in the peaceful utilization and nonmilitarization of outer space.

The above is an incomplete list of initiatives taken during 1985. But it shows well enough that the proposals we introduced were quite specific, and their implementation was easily verifiable. These were realistic measures aimed at stopping the expansion of the nuclear arms race.

It should be noted that the measures taken by the Soviet leadership were in some cases unilateral, whereas at other times proposals were addressed equally to both sides. What was involved, then, was the desire to give material content to the idea of a renewal of international relations, based on the principle of equal security for both sides and freeing them both from a confrontational approach.

The idea was precisely for all to have equal security. For example, when the Soviet Union stopped taking countermeasures in response to U.S. actions in Europe, the level of security increased for the entire continent; at the same time no harm was done to the interests of the USSR itself, for at the time the USSR had superiority in medium-range missiles in Europe. All the appropriate measures were carefully worked out, of course, with the active participation of both our political and military leadership.

Were the new Soviet ideas and the corresponding practical measures assessed fairly in the West? The answer is yes and no. Western observers at the time noted that something new was apparent in the Soviet proposals, but they often regarded this as merely a propaganda maneuver.

The appraisal of the specific actions taken by the USSR was basically positive, but by no means was a symmetrical response made all at once. (True, the United States, beginning in late 1985, did in fact slow down its deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.) The cessation of nuclear testing on our part, which received a broad and positive response from most governments and world public opinion, was not reciprocated by the United States, which continued its testing.

Obviously hard work lay ahead and possibly for a long time. At a CPSU Central Committee plenum on October 15, 1985, taking into account the events that had transpired, we took note of increased "counteraction by the aggressive forces of imperialism in response to the positive changes in the world." These forces aspired to social revenge and, for that purpose, sought to maintain international tension.

In all meetings and discussions between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and representatives of Western governments, constructive ideas

were advanced but these were often accompanied by serious, specific, and sometimes quite sharp criticism of the foreign policy positions held by our negotiating partners—above all, the Americans. In all cases the observation was made that steps toward new world relations must be mutual; otherwise nothing would come of them.

At the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress in February–March 1986 a balance sheet was drawn on the work that had been accomplished. It was at this plenum that we first formulated the basic, general conclusions that would become the decisive framework of the new thinking. Nothing can diminish the importance of these first steps—both theoretical and practical—that were taken during 1985 toward promoting world cooperation. All this was a substantial prologue to the active and assertive promotion of the new principles and methods in world affairs.

The Conception (1985–1991)

As said above, the ideas of the new thinking were not fixed for all time. They constantly evolved. Three main phases in their development can be identified.

The first phase was connected, above all, with the position put forward at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress and the deepening of that position in the subsequent period. It was characterized by a theoretical-political analysis of major changes in the world that had taken place since World War II and by the political requirements those changes raised. The practical task was to search for a realistic way to end the Cold War and find a way out of the vicious circle of mistrust, hostility, and confrontation.

The second phase found expression, above all, in the speech by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1988, at a time when the first changes for the better in international affairs were becoming evident. This phase was marked by the advancement of major ideas having to do with prospects for planetwide development. We were no longer talking about "the struggle between two camps" but about the global interests of humanity, the principles of a new world order, and the urgent need for a future based on the codevelopment of all members of the international community.

The third phase was reached in 1990–91. It embodied the idea that changes in the realm of international relations alone were insufficient, that the future of humanity could be reliably assured only along the lines of a new paradigm of civilization itself, in a process in which a new form of civilization was emerging.

What are the basic postulates of the new thinking? Its starting point is the recognition that despite their dissimilarities all the nations of the world are interdependent. We speak of recognition because this interdependence, which is a form of unity or oneness, had been taking shape for decades. This dynamic had been studied by scientists and scholars outside the Soviet Union and was taken into account by Western foreign policy. As early as 1975, for example, Henry Kissinger declared that global interdependence had become a central factor of U.S. diplomacy. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, this viewpoint concerning interdependence was perceived as an "alien class" concept. Nonetheless interdependence was a tangible reality, impossible to disregard, and by the mid-1980s it had become the foremost tendency in world relations.

On the one hand, the internationalization of economic life, the mutual influence or reciprocal effect of political decisions taken by various nations, and the formation of an increasingly dense worldwide informational and cultural network—all this was creating an entirely new picture of the world. On the other hand, many complicated and acute global problems had accumulated —for example, problems of ecology, demography, raw materials, and energy sources—and were impossible to resolve within the framework of a single country or even region.

[. . .]

Albert Einstein was one of the first to speak of the necessity for new thinking in the nuclear age. But no one listened to his warnings. (In general, scientific conclusions usually go unheeded even today.) Yet the very first atomic bomb explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated that we had entered a new stage in

human history. For the first time in its history, the human race had weapons that could extinguish all life on earth. The Day of Judgment, instead of being a biblical allegory, could become a reality, a tragedy made by human hands. This realization was what dictated my statement as CPSU general secretary on January 15, 1986. The main point of that statement was the proposal that we move toward a nonnuclear world in the twenty-first century.

Deep reflection on the situation, on the possible consequences if weapons of mass destruction were used, forced us to draw three theoretical-political conclusions of prime importance.

The first was that the nature of modern weaponry leaves no country any hope of defending itself by purely military and technical means, not even if, for example, it created the most powerful defense system possible. The problem of guaranteeing security appears more and more clearly as a political problem that can and must be solved, above all, by political means. And political means imply negotiations—and still more negotiations. Negotiations presuppose patience, tolerance, and a consistent search for mutually acceptable compromises.

[. . .]

A second conclusion—actually a corollary of the first—is that politics based on the use of force is doomed.

Of course there are attempts to show that this is not so, that wars—even small ones—can still serve as a continuation of politics by other means and can produce definite results. But the experience of the entire era since World War II shows that not a single armed conflict has given its participants or, above all, its initiators any serious political dividends.

A peace based on positions of strength is internally unstable, no matter how one may argue the case. By its very nature, such a peace is based on confrontation, secret or open, on the constant danger of eruptions of fighting, the constant temptation to attempt to achieve one's aims through the use of force. This kind of peace is advantageous (if under present-day criteria such a thing can be considered an advantage) only to the arms manufacturers.

It is already true today and will especially be true in the future that the authority or prestige of a government, and its place in the international community, will increasingly be defined not by the size of its armies but by its civilized conduct, by its commitment to universal human interests, by the freedom and prosperity of its citizens, by its ability to preserve and enrich its uniqueness not at the expense of others but through honest and mutually advantageous cooperation with others.

We must be realists. The road to such a world will be long and difficult. Renunciation of the use of force in politics, renunciation of the practice of measuring the security of a country by its armed strength—these aims will not be achieved all at once.

With minimal agreement among nations, the field of operation for the politics of force can be limited or narrowed. Unsanctioned use of force on an international level would immediately be subjected to rigorous collective counteraction.

A third conclusion, which is a logical continuation of the first two, is that security under contemporary conditions (especially if we speak of the major nuclear powers) can only be mutual. Taking world relations as a whole, security can only be universal.

These were the considerations that inspired Soviet policy, leading us to advance a program in 1986 for creating a universal system of international security that would encompass not only military but also political, economic, and humanitarian fields.

The theory and methodology of the new thinking were based on the desire to combine military policy with a moral approach to world affairs. This is a highly complicated task; much has been said and written about it in the past as well as at the present time, but no solutions have yet been found. We cannot say that a full solution was achieved even in the perestroika era. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the basic international decisions made in that era did correspond to

principles of morality. Reflections on the essential problems of the modern world, the ways in which the world has been developing, and the principles of relations among nations gradually led us to the following conclusion: It is impossible to provide for and guarantee new horizons in the future by limiting oneself to the improvement of international relations—that is, the existing ties among nations. The ultimate solutions lie in the very basic elements of human existence, the deep-running processes that determine the life of the human community.

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Appendices

Rank Structures, Selected Cold War Militaries

All modern armies have two primary classes of soldier: officers and enlisted men. This distinction originated in the armies of ancient times. In the medieval period, the distinction was between knights and men at arms; that is, between nobility and commoners. Through the beginning of the twentieth century, the distinction between military officers and enlisted soldiers reflected the social class distinctions of society as a whole. An officer was, by definition, a gentleman. The breakdown in the old social order that began during World War I was likewise reflected in the world's armies. By the end of World War II, the distinction between officers and enlisted men had become far more a professional one than a social one.

Officers, who comprise 10–15 percent of modern armies, are further divided into three basic groups. Company-grade officers (lieutenants and captains) are responsible for the leadership of platoons and companies. Field-grade officers (majors and colonels) lead battalions and regiments. General officers command the higher military echelons and also coordinate the overall direction of an army and its military activities. It is the generals who answer directly to the political leadership of modern democracies. In some armies, the highest-level general officers hold the title of marshal. Navies also recognize three broad groups of officers, without necessarily using the army terms. In most militaries, generals and admirals are collectively called flag officers because each one has a personal flag bearing the insignia of his rank. Although women flag officers are not uncommon in the U.S. military today, the first one only appeared in the U.S. Army in the early 1970s. Female flag officers are still a rarity in most of the world's militaries.

Enlisted soldiers, sailors, and airmen are divided into two basic categories: enlisted men and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The term used for the NCO varies from army to army—for example, *Unteroffizier* in German or *sous officier* in French—but the meaning is universal. In any army, NCOs are the backbone of the organization. They are the ones responsible for training individual soldiers and for training and leading fire teams and squads. They hold key leadership positions in platoons and companies. At the higher levels, they assist staff officers in the planning and execution of operations.

In all armies, the larger majority of the enlisted ranks denote the distinctions within the NCO corps. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact militaries had the weakest and least professional NCO corps. The American, British, and Canadian militaries had by a wide margin the best NCO corps. The Vietnam War decimated the U.S. NCO corps, but it was painstakingly rebuilt in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, most American senior NCOs have some college education, and many have bachelor's or even master's degrees—something that would have been unthinkable as recently as the late 1950s.

NCOs include corporals, sergeants, and, in some armies, warrant officers. In most navies, the NCOs are called petty officers and, in some cases, warrant officers. Warrant officer is the most difficult to classify because its exact status varies from army to army. Most armies of the Cold War period followed the British model, in which warrant officers were the highest category of NCOs. In the U.S. military, by contrast, warrant officers were a distinct personnel class between officers and enlisted men. They were, and still are, considered to be specialist officers, highly skilled in a certain functional area (such as pilots), receiving pay equivalent to company-grade officers but without the full range of command authority and responsibilities.

In the U.S. military, warrant officers were, and still are, much closer to commissioned officers. In the British military warrant officers are clearly the most senior of the NCOs. Contrary to widely held popular belief, the rank of sergeant major does not exist in the British military. Rather, it is a position title—or an appointment, as the British call it—such as squad leader or company commander. The rank of the NCO holding the sergeant major position is always warrant officer, but he is always addressed by his position title of sergeant major. There is, then, no direct comparison between British and U.S. warrant officers, which partially explains the difficulty in correlating military ranks in any period of history.

The confusion between U.S. and British warrant officers causes problems to this day in many North American Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters. Most armies of the Cold War had warrant officers within the British model. Italy, Poland, Greece, and Romania are among the few countries that have warrant officers within the U.S. model. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had four grades of warrant officer during the Cold War period, although a fifth grade was added right as the Cold War was ending. The U.S. Air Force, on the other hand, discontinued warrant officers in 1959.

While the U.S. military officer rank structure remains today essentially the same as it was in World War II, enlisted rank structures were completely revised in the late 1950s. All the services added two more enlisted pay grades, bringing the total to nine. But while the air force and navy created two new ranks at the top of their enlisted structures, the army and the marine corps added one new rank to the top and another one to the bottom. The result has been a number of anomalies. For example, a master sergeant in the army and the marine corps is a pay grade E-8, while in the air force he is an E-7, or one rank lower. The same applied to the rank of staff sergeant, which in the army and marines corps is an E-6, while it is only an E-5 in the air force.

In the late 1950s, the U.S. Army also created specialist ranks for the pay grades E-4 through E-9. In theory, specialists were not NCOs, and despite their pay grades they ranked below corporal, the lowest NCO rank. It never worked out that way in practice. A specialist 5 was, for all practical purposes, treated as an NCO, although within a given pay grade, hard-stripe NCOs always took precedence over specialists. Because the line between specialists and NCOs continued to blur, the U.S. Army eliminated the ranks of specialist 8 and specialist 9 in the late 1960s. In the subsequent years the remaining specialist ranks were eliminated, one at a time from the top down. By the end of the Cold War, only specialist 4 remained. While a specialist 4 was definitely not an NCO, a corporal (also a pay grade E-4) definitely was.

Establishing rank equivalency among armies is an inexact science at best, as the confusion over warrant officers and sergeants major illustrates. Common sense would seem to dictate that two soldiers in different armies with the exact same rank titles would be essentially equivalent. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The rank of major general provides one of the best examples. British and U.S. major generals are essentially equivalent, but they are not the same as a Soviet or Warsaw Pact general major. In the U.S. Army, major general was and is the second of the general officer ranks, whereas in the Soviet Army it was the first. Rather than simply accepting rank titles at face value, a reasonably approximate rank equivalency can only be established by considering what the holder of that rank actually did.

The problem of rank equivalency is further compounded by the fact that all armies did not have the same number of ranks, whether for officers or enlisted personnel, and sometimes even the various militaries of the same country do not have the same number of ranks. Most armies had three ranks of company-grade officer, but the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies had four. The British Navy has no officer rank equivalent to the British Army's second lieutenant. The British Navy and the British Air Force have only one grade of warrant officer (senior NCO), but the British Army has two. The Canadian Army and Air Force, on the other hand, have three grades of warrant officer. The Norwegian military has only four enlisted ranks, the senior-most being only at the midlevel of the NATO rank-protocol list. At the most senior levels, countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and Poland have marshals, who rank above their four-star generals. As it did during World War II, however, the Soviet Army had three levels of marshal, as did the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). The People's Republic of China (PRC) had two. Officer candidates had their own separate rank structures in most armies. But the ranks of cadet, midshipman, aspirant, *fahnrich*, and so on were essentially temporary training ranks. Of the eleven distinct enlisted ranks, only the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) had all eleven. Of the fifteen possible officer ranks, only North Korea had all fifteen.

All air forces grew from their respective armies in the first part of the twentieth century. By the Cold War, almost all air forces were independent organizations. In many countries, the rank structures for both army and air force are identical, or nearly so. The British Air Force has an officer rank

structure parallel to that of the British Army but with completely different rank titles and insignia. The rank titles and insignia of U.S. Air Force officers are exactly the same as in the U.S. Army, while the enlisted rank structure is somewhat different, and the rank insignia are completely different.

Many countries during the Cold War, especially in NATO, had a fourth branch of service that may have technically been part of one of the three main services but was nonetheless distinctively separate in terms of operations, uniform, and rank structure. There were two basic types of such organizations—marines and military police. The marine corps of the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), and Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) were all nominally part of those countries' naval establishments. Their rank structures, and in most cases their rank insignia, were more similar to those countries' respective armies. France, Italy, Belgium, and West Germany all had national military police organizations that came under their respective ministries of defense. The German Bundesgrenzschutz (Border Police) were organized and equipped along military lines and had a specific combat role in time of war. The Bundesgrenzschutz passed to purely civilian control in 1994. The French Gendarmerie Nationale is actually a separate branch of the French military. For most of the Cold War, the Italian Carabiniere was a separate corps under the Italian Army, but after the Cold War it became a separate branch of the Italian military. As with the Bundesgrenzschutz, the Belgian Gendarmerie passed to purely civilian status in 1992.

The following tables represent an attempt to equate the various enlisted and officer ranks during the Cold War. In determining the level at which to place a given rank, the duties and responsibilities of the person holding that rank take precedence over the face value of the rank title. The tables do not include officer candidates or true warrant officers. Warrant officers as NCOs are included. Many armies also had special rank structures and designations for musicians, buglers, and pipers, which likewise are not included in the table. During the more than forty years of the Cold War period, most armies made various changes to their rank structures, and some even made complete overhauls more than once. In constructing these tables, the objective was to present a snapshot at about 1975. Even that level of precision was not completely possible. The result, then, are tables based on the best information available ranging from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.

The British Army, which describes itself as "a very tribal organization," had, and still has, a sometimes confusing number of variations on the enlisted ranks from regiment to regiment. In some cases, just the title of the rank varies, with the insignia remaining the same. Corporals and lance corporals in the British Artillery, for example, are called bombardiers and lance bombardiers. Other ranks, such as squadron quartermaster corporal, had a unique rank insignia and existed only in the Household Cavalry. For the most part, the British enlisted ranks shown in the tables are the most common.

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Army Forces Rank Comparison

	United States	**Soviet Union**	**United Kingdom**	**West Germany**	**France**
Officers	General of the Army	Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza	Field Marshal		Maréchal de France
		Glavnyi Marshal Roda Voisk			
		Marshal Roda Voisk			
	General	General Armii	General	General	Général d´Armée
	Lieutenant General	General Polkovink	Lieutanant-General	Generalleutnant	Général de Corps d´Armée
	Major General	General Leitenant	Major-General	Generalmajor	Général de Division
	Brigadier General	General Maior	Brigadier	Brigadegeneral	Général de Brigade
	Colonel	Polkovnik	Colonel	Oberst	Colonel
	Lieutenant Colonel	Podpolkovink	Lieutenant-Colonel	Oberstleutnant	Lieutenant-Colonel
	Major	Maior	Major	Major	Commandant
	Captain	Kapitan	Captain	Hauptmann	Capitaine
	First Lieutenant	Starshii Leitenant	Lieutenant	Oberleutnant	Lieutenant
		Lietenant			
	Second Lieutenant	Mladshii Leitenant	Second Lieutenant	Leutnant	Sous-Lieutenant
Enlisted	Command Sergeant	Starshina	Warrant Officer Class 1	Oberstabsfeldwebel	Major
	Major Sergeant				
	Major				
	First Sergeant	Starshii Serzhant	Warrant Officer Class 2	Stabsfeldwebel	Adjudant-Chef
	Master Sergeant				
				Hauptfeldwebel	
	Platoon Sergeant		Staff Sergeant	Oberfeldwebel	Adjudant
	Sergeant First Class				
	Specialist 7				
	Staff Sergeant Specialist 6	Serzhant	Sergeant	Feldwebel	Sergent-Chef
					Maréchal-des-Logis-Chef
	Sergeant Specialist 5	Mladshii Serzhant	Corporal Bombardier	Stabsunteroffizier	Sergent Maréchal-des-Logis
	Corporal Specialist 4		Lance Corporal	Unteroffizier	Caporal-Chef
			Lance Bombardier		Brigadier-Chef
	Private First Class	Efreitor		Hauptgefreiter	Caporal
					Brigadier
	Private (E-2)			Obergefreiter	Soldat de 1ère Classe
				Gefreiter	
	Private (E-1)	Ryadovi	Private Trooper	Soldat Grenadier	Soldat de 2ème Classe
			Gunner Sapper	Kannonier	

Army Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Italy	**Turkey**	**Belgium**	**Canada**	**Denmark**
Officers		Maresal			
	Generale di Corpo d´Armata con Incarichi Speciali	Orgeneral	Generaal	General	General
	Generale di Corpo d´Armata	Korgeneral	Luitenant-Generaal	Lieutenant-General	Generalløjtnant
	Generale di Divisione	Tümgeneral	Generaal-Majoor	Major-General	Generalmajor
	Generale di Brigata	Tuggeneral	Brigadegeneraal	Brigadier-General	Brigadegeneral
	Colonnello	Albay	Kolonel	Colonel	Oberst
	Tenente Colonnello	Yarbay	Luitenant-Kolonel	Lieutenant-Colonel	Oberstløjnant
	Maggiore	Binbasi	Majoor	Major	Major
	Capitano	Yüzbasi	Kapitein-Commandant	Captain	Kaptajn
	Tenente	Üstegman	Kapitein	Lieutenant	Premierløjtnant
			Luitenant		Løjtnant
	Sottotenente	Tegmen	Onderluitenant	Second Lieutenant	Sekondøjtnant
Enlisted	Sergente Maggiore	Astsubay Kidemli Bascavus	Adjudant-Chef	Command Warrant Officer	Seniorsergent af 1. Grad
				Chief Warrant Officer	
		Astsubay Bascavus	Adjudant	Master Warrant Officer	Seniorsergent af 2. Grad
		Astsubay Kidemli Ustcavus			
	Sergente	Astsubay Ustcavus	1ste Sergeant-Majoor	Warrant Officer	Oversergent
		Astsubay Kidemli Cavus	1ste Sergeant	Sergeant	Sergent
		Astsubay Cavus	Sergeant	Master Corporal	Korporal
	Caporal Maggiore	Cavus	Korporaal-Chef	Corporal	Overkonstabel af 1. Grad
		Onbasi	Korporaal	Trained Private	Overkonstabel af 2. Grad
	Caporale		1ste Soldaat	Basic Private	
	Soldato	Er	Soldat	Private Recruit	Konstabel

Army Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Greece	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal
Officers					Marechal
	Stratigos		Generaal	General	General
	Antistratigos		Luitenant-Generaal	Generalløytnant	Tenente-General
	Ypostratigos		Generaal-Majoor	Generalmajor	Major-General
	Taxiarchos		Brigade-Generaal	Oberst I	Brigadeiro-General
	Syntagmatarchis	Colonel	Kolonel	Oberst II	Coronel
	Antisyntagmatarchis	Lieutanant-Colonel	Luitenant-Kolonel	Oberstløytnant	Tenente-Coronel
	Tagmatarchis	Major	Majoor	Major	Major
	Lochagos	Capataine	Kapitein Ritmeester	Kaptein Rittmester	Capitão
	Ypolochagos	Premier Lieutenant	Eerste-Luitenant	Løytnant	Tenente
	Anthypolochagos	Lieutenant	Tweede-Luitenant	Fenrik	Alferes
Enlisted	Archilochias	Adjutant-Major	Adjudant-Onderofficier		Sargento-Mor
	Epilochias	Adjutant-Chef	Sergeant-Majoor Opperwachtmeester		Sargento-Chefe
					Sargento-Ajudante
	Lochias	Adjutant	Sergeant der 1e Klasse		Primeiro-Sargento
			Wachtmeester der 1e Klasse		
		Sergent-Chef	Sergeant Wachtmeester	Sersjant	Segundo-Sargento
	Decaneas	Premier Sergent	Korporaal der 1e Klasse	Korporal	Furriel
	Decaneas	Sergent	Korporaal	Visekorporal	Segundo-Furriel
	Ypodecaneas	Caporal-Chef	Soldaat der 1e Klasse	Primeiro-Cabo	
			Huzaar der 1e Klasse		
			Kanonier der 1e Klasse		
		Caporal			Segundo-Cabo
		Soldat de Première Classe			
	Stratiotis	Soldat	Soldaat	Menig	Soldado
		Huzaar			
		Kanonier			

Army Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Spain	**East Germany**	**Poland**	**Romania**	**Czechoslovakia**
Officers	Capitán General	Marschall der DDR	Marszalek Polski		
		Armeegeneral		General de Armata	Armádní Generál
	Teniente General	Generaloberst	General Broni	General Colonel	Generálplukovník
	General de División	Generalleutnant	General Dywizja	General Locotenent	Generálporucík
	General de Brigada	Generalmajor	General Brygady	General Maior	Generálmajor
	Coronel	Oberst	Pulkownik	Colonel	Plukovník
	Teniente Coronel	Oberstleutnant	Podpulkownik	Locotenent Colonel	Podplukovník
	Comandante	Major	Major	Maior	Major
	Capitán	Hauptmann	Kapitian	Capitan	Kapitán
	Teniente	Oberleutnant	Porucznik	Locotenent Maior	Nadporucík
	Alférez	Leutnant	Podporucznik	Locotenent	Porucík
	Subteniente	Unterleutnant	Chorazy	Sublocotenent	Podporucík
Enlisted	Brigada	Stabsfeldwebel	Starszy Sierzant Sztabowy	Plutonier Adjutant Sef	Nadpraporcík
		Oberfeldwebel	Sierzant Sztabowy	Plutonier Adjutant	Praporcík
				Plutonier Major	Podpraporcík
	Sargento Primero	Feldwebel	Starszy Sierzant	Plutonier	Nadrotmistr
	Sargento	Unterfeldwebel	Sierzant	Sergent Major	Rotmistr
	Cabo Primero	Unteroffizier	Plutonowy	Sergent	Rotný
	Cabo	Stabsgefreiter	Starszy Kapral	Caporal	Cetar
		Gefreiter	Kapral	Fruntas	Desátník
	Soldado Primero		Starszy Szeregowiec		Svobodník
	Soldado	Soldat	Szeregoweic	Soldat	Vojín

Army Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Bulgaria	**Hungary**	**Finland**	**Cuba**	**Israel**
Officers				Comandante en Jefe	
	Armeyski General	Hadseregtábornok	Kenraali	General de Ejército	
	General-Polkovnik	Vezérezredes	Kenraaliluutnantti	General de Cuerpo de Ejército	Rav Alúf
	General-Leytenant	Altábornagy	Kenraalimajuri	General de División	Alúf
	General-Mayor	Vezérörnagy	Prikaatikenraali	General de Brigada	Tat Alúf
	Polkovnik	Ezredes	Eversti	Coronel	Alúf Mishné
	Podpolknovik	Alezredes	Everstiluutnantti	Teniente Coronel	Sgan Alúf
	Mayor	Örnagy	Majuri	Mayor	Rav Séren
	Kapitan	Százados	Kapteeni	Capitán	Séren
	Starshi Leytenant	Föhadnagy	Yliluutnantti	Primer Teniente	Ségen
	Leytenant	Hadnagy	Luutnantti	Teniente	
	Mladshi Leytenant	Alhadnagy	Vänrikki	Subteniente	Ségen Mishné
Enlisted	Starshina	Főtörzsörmester	Sotilasmestari	Primer Sub-Oficial	Rav Nagád
	Starshi Serzhant	Törzsörmester	Vääpeli	Sub-Oficial	Rav Samál Bakhír
					Rav Samál Mitkadém
			Ylikersantti	Sargento de Primera	Rav Samál Rishón
	Serzhant	Örmester	Kersantti	Sargento de Segunda	Rav Samál
	Mladshi Serzhant	Szakaszvezetö	Alikersantti	Sargento de Tercera	Samál Rishón
		Tizedes	Korpraali		Samál
	Efreytor	Örvezetö		Soldado de Primera	Rav Turái
					Turái Rishón
	Rednik	Honvéd	Sotamies	Soldado	Turái

Army Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	People's Republic of China	North Korea	South Korea	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
Officers	Zhong Hua Ren Ming	Dae Wonsu	Wonsu		Thuong Tuong
	Gong He Guo Da				
	Yuan Shuai				
	Zhong Hua Ren Ming	Wonsu			
	Gong He Guo				
	Yuan Shuai				
		Chasu			
	Da Jiang	Daejang	Taejang	Dai Tuong	Dai Tuong
	Shang Jiang	Sangjang	Chungjang	Thuong Tuong	Trung Tuong
	Zhong Jiang	Jungjang	Sojang	Trung Tuong	Thieu Tuong
	Shao Jiang	Sojang	Chungjang	Thieu Tuong	Chuan Toung
	Da Xiao	Daechwa		Dai Ta	
	Shang Xiao	Sangchwa	Taeryong	Thuong Ta	Dai Ta
	Zhong Xiao	Jungjwa	Chungryong	Trung Ta	Trung Ta
	Shao Xiao	Sojwa	Soryong	Thieu Ta	Thieu Ta
	Shang Wei	Daewi	Taewi	Dai Uy	Dai Uy
	Zhong Wei	Sangwi	Chungwi	Thuong Uy	Trung Uy
		Jungwi		Trung Uy	
	Shao Wei	Sowi	Sowi	Thieu Uy	Thieu Uy
Enlisted		Teukmu Sangsa	Wonsa	Thuong Si	Thoung Si Nhat
		Sangsa	Sangsa		Thuong Si
	Shang Shi	Jungsa	Chungsa	Trung Si	Trung Si Nhat
		Hasa	Hasa		Trung Si
	Zhong Shi	Sangkeub	Byongjang	Ha Si	Ha Si Nhat
	Xia Shi	Jungkeub	Sangbyong		Ha Si
	Shang Den Bing	Hakeub	Ilbyong	Binh Nhat	Binh Nhat
			Yibyong		Binh Nhi
	Lei Bing	Jeonsa	Mudungbyong	Binh Nhi	Trung Dinh

Naval Forces Rank Comparison

	United States	**Soviet Union**	**United Kingdom**	**West Germany**	**France**
Officers	Fleet Admiral	Admiral Flota	Admiral of the Fleet		
		Sovetskogo Soyuza			
	Admiral	Admiral Flota	Admiral	Admiral	Amiral
	Vice Admiral	Admiral	Vice-Admiral	Vizeadmiral	Vice-Amiral d'Escadre
	Rear Admiral (Upper Half)	Vitse Admiral	Rear-Admiral	Konteradmiral	Vice-Amiral
	Rear Admiral (Lower Half)	Kontr Admiral	Commodore	Flotilenadmiral	Contre-Amiral
	Captain	Kapitan Prevogo Ramga	Captain	Kapitän zur See	Capitaine de Vaisseau
	Commander	Kapitan Vtrogo Ramga	Commander	Fregattenkapitän	Capitaine de Frégate
	Lieutenant Commander	Kapitan Tret'yego Ramga	Lieutenant-Commander	Korvettenkapitän	Capitaine de Corvette
	Lieutanant	Kapitan Leitenant	Lieutenant	Kapitänleutnanent	Lieutenant de Vaisseau
	Lieutenant (Junior Grade)	Leienant	Sub-Lieutenant	Oberleutnant zur See	Enseigne de Vaisseau de 1ere Classe
	Ensign	Mladshii Leitenant	Leutnant zur See	Enseigne de Vaisseau de 2eme Classe	
Enlisted	Master Chief Petty Officer	Starshina	Warrant Officer Class 1	Oberstabsbootsmann	Major
	Senior Chief Petty Officer	Glavnyy Starshina		Stabsbootsmann	Maître-Principal
				Hauptbootsmann	
	Chief Petty Officer		Chief Petty Officer	Oberbootsmann	Premier-Maître
	Petty Officer First Class	Starshina Pervoy Stat'I	Petty Officer	Bootsmann	Maître
	Petty Officer Second Class	Starshina Vtoroy Stat'I	Leading Rate	Obermaat	Second Maître
	Petty Officer Third Class			Maat	Quartier-Maître de 1ère Classe
	Seaman Airman Fireman	Starshiny Matros	Able Seaman	Hauptgefreiter	Quartier-Maître de 2ème Classe
	Seaman Apprentice			Obergefreiter	Maître-Brevet
	Airman Apprentice				
	Fireman Apprentice				
				Gefreiter	
	Seaman Recruit	Matros	Ordinary Seaman	Matrose	Matelot

Naval Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Italy	**Turkey**	**Belgium**	**Canada**	**Denmark**
Officers		Büyük Amiral			
	Ammiraglio di Squadra con Incarichi Speciali	Oramiral		Admiral	
	Ammiraglio di Squadra	Koramiral	Vice-Admiraal	Vice-Admiral	Admiral
	Ammiraglio di Divisione	Tümamiral	Divise-Admiraal	Rear Admiral	Viceadmiral
	Contrammiraglio	Tugamiral	Commodore	Commodore	Kontreadmiral
	Capitano di Vascello	Albay	Kapitein-ter-Zee	Captain	Kommandør
	Capitano di Fregata	Yarbay	Fregat-Kapitein	Commander	Kommandørkaptajn
	Captiano di Corvetta	Binbasi	Korvette-Kapitein	Lieutenant-Commander	Orlogskaptajn
	Tenente di Vascello	Yüzbasi	Luitenantter-Zee 1ste Klas	Lieutenant	Kaptajnløjtnant
	Sottoenente di Vascello	Üstegman	Luitenantter-Zee	Sub-Lieutenant	Premierløjtnant
			Vaandrigter-Zee		Løjtnant
	Guardiamarina	Tegmen	Vaandrigter-Zee 2de Klas	Acting Sub-Lieutenant	Sekondløjtnant
Enlisted	Secondo Capo	Astsubay Kidemli Bascavus	Oppermeester	Command Chief Petty Officer	Seniorsergent af 1. Grad
				Chief Petty Officer 1st Class	
		Astsubay Bascavus	Eerste Meester-Chef	Chief Petty Officer 2nd Class	Seniorsergent af 2. Grad
		Astsubay Kidemli Ustcavus			
	Sergente	Astsubay Ustcavus	Eerste Meester	Petty Officer 1st Class	Oversergent
		Astsubay Kidemli Cavus	Meester	Petty Officer 2nd Class	Sergent
		Astsubay Cavus	Tweede Meester	Master Seaman	Korporal
	Sottocapo	Cavus	Kwarter Meester	Leading Seaman	Overkonstabel af 1. Grad
		Onbasi	Eerste Matroos	Able Seaman	Overkonstabel af 2. Grad
	Comune di 1a Classe		Matroos Eerste Klasse	Ordinary Seaman	
	Comune di 2a Classe	Er	Matroos	Seaman	Konstabel

Naval Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Greece	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain
Officers		Admiraal			Capitán General
	Navarchos	Luitenant-Admiraal	Admiral	Almirante de Armada	
	Antinavarchos	Vice-Admiraal	Viseadmiral	Almirante	Almirante
	Yponavarchos	Schout-bij-Nacht	Kontradmiral	Vice-Almirante	Vice-Almirante
	Archipliachos	Commandeur	Kommandør	Contra-Almirante	Contra-Almirante
	Pliarchos	Kapitein der Zee	Kommandør Kaptein	Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra	Capitan de Navio
	Antipliarchos	Kapitein-Luitenant der Zee	Orlogskaptein	Capitão-de-Fragata	Captain de Fragata
	Plotarchos	Luitenant ter Zee der 1ste Klasse	Kapteinløytnant	Capitão-Tenente	Captain de Corbeta
	Ypopliarchos	Luitenant ter Zee der 2de Klasse (Oudste Categorie)	Løytnant	Primerio-Tenente	Teniente de Navio
	Anthypopliarchos	Luitenant ter Zee der 2de Klasse	Fenrik	Segundo-Tenente	Alférez de Navio
	Simaioforos	Luitenant ter Zee der 3de Klasse	Ustskrevet	Guarda-Marinha	Alférez de Fragata
Enlisted	Archikelefstis	Adjudant-Onderofficier		Sargento-Mor	Brigada
	Epikelefstis	Sergeant-Majoor		Sargento-Chefe	
				Sargento-Ajudante	Sargento Primero
	Kelefstis			Primeiro-Sargento	
		Sergeant	Kvartermester (Konstabel I Klasse)	Segundo-Sargento	Sargento
	Dokimos Kelefstis		Ledende Menig (Konstabel II Klasse)	Sub-Sargento	Cabo Mayor
		Korporaal	Menig 1 (Konstabel III Klasse)	Cabo	Cabo Primero
	Diopos	Matross der 1e Klasse		Marinheiro	Cabo
		Matross der 2e Klasse		Primerio Grumete	Mariniero Primero
	Naftis	Matross der 3e Klasse	Menig	Segundo Grumete	Mariniero

Naval Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	East Germany	Poland	Romania	Bulgaria	Finland
Officers	Flottenadmiral				Amiraali
	Admiral	Admiral	Amiral	Admiral	Vara-Amiraali
	Vizeadmiral	Wice Admiral	Vice-Amiral	Vitseadmiral	Kontra-Amiraali
	Konteradmiral	Kontra Admiral	Contraamiral	Kontraadmiral	Lippue-Amiraali
	Kapitän zur See	Komandor	Comandor	Kapitan I Rang	Kommodori
	Fregattenkapitän	Komandor Porucznik	Captain-Comandor	Kapitan II Rang	Komentaja
	Korvettenkapitän	Komandor Podporucznik	Locotenent-Comandor	Kapitan III Rang	Komantajakapteeni
	Kapitänleutnanent	Kapitan Marynarki	Capitan de Marina	Kapitan Leytenant	Kapteeniluutnantti
	Oberleutnant	Porucznik Marynarki	Locotenent Maior de Marina	Starshi Leytenant	Yliluutnantti
	Leutnant		Locotenent de Marina	Leytenant	Luutnantti
	Unterleutnant	Podporucznik Marynarki	Sublocotenent de Marina	Mladshi Leytenant	Aliluutnantti
Enlisted	Stabsobermeister	Starszy Bosman Sztabowy	Maistru Militar Principal	Michman	Sotilasmestari
	Obermeister	Bosman Sztabowy	Maistru Militar Classa I	Glaven Starshina	Pursimies
			Maistru Militar Classa II		
	Meister	Starszy Bosman	Maistru Militar Classa III		Ylikersantti
	Obermaat	Bosman	Maistru Militar Classa IV	Starshina I Stepen	Kersantti
	Maat	Plutonowy Bosmanmat	Sergent	Starshina II Stepen	Alikersantti
	Stabsgefreiter	Starszy Mat	Caporal		Ylimatruusi
	Obermatrose	Mat	Fruntas	Starshi Matro	
		Starszy Marynarz			
	Matrose	Marynarz	Marinar	Matros	Matruusi

Naval Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	People's Republic of China	North Korea	South Korea	North Vietnam	South Vietnam
Officers			Wonsu		
		Chasu			
		Daejang	Taejang		Dai Tuong
	Hai Jun Shang Jiang	Sangjang	Chungjang	Do Doc	Trung Tuong
	Hai Jun Zhong Jiang	Jungjang	Sojang	Pho Do Doc	Thieu Tuong
	Hai Jun Shao Jiang	Sojang	Chungjang	Chuan Do Doc	Chuan Toung
	Hai Jun Da Xiao	Daechwa		Dai Ta	
	Hai Jun Shang Xiao	Sangchwa	Taeryong	Thuong Ta	Dai Ta
	Hai Jun Zhong Xiao	Jungjwa	Chungryong	Trung Ta	Trung Ta
	Hai Jun Shao Xiao	Sojwa	Soryong	Thieu Ta	Thieu Ta
	Hai Jun Shang Wei	Daewi	Taewi	Dai Uy	Dai Uy
	Hai Jun Zhong Wei	Sangwi	Chungwi	Thuong Uy	Trung Uy
		Jungwi		Trung Uy	
	Hai Jun Shao Wei	Sowi	Sowi	Thieu Uy	Thieu Uy
Enlisted		Teukmu Sangsa	Wonsa	Thuong Si	Thoung Si Nhat
		Sangsa	Sangsa		Thuong Si
	Hai Jun Shang Shi	Jungsa	Chungsa	Trung Si	Trung Si Nhat
		Hasa	Hasa		Trung Si
	Hai Jun Zong Shi	Sangkeub	Byongjang	Ha Si	Ha Si Nhat
	Hai Jun Xia Shi	Jungkeub	Sangbyong		Ha Si
	Shang Den Bing	Hakeub	Ilbyong	Binh Nhat	Binh Nhat
			Yibyong		Binh Nhi
	hui Bing	Jeonsa	Mudungbyong	Binh Nhi	Trung Dinh

Naval Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Cuba	**Israel**
Officers	Almirante	
	Vicealmirante	Alúf
	Contraalmirante	Tat Alúf
	Captain de Navio	Alúf Mishné
	Capitan de Fragata	Sgan Alúf
	Captain de Corbeta	Rav Séren
	Teniente de Navio	Séren
	Teniente de Fragate	Ségen
	Teniente de Corbeta	
	Alfrez	Ségen Mishné
Enlisted	Primer Sub-Oficial	Rav Nagád
	Sub-Oficial	Rav Samál Bakhír
		Rav Samál Mitkadém
	Sargento de Primera	Rav Samál Rishón
	Sargento de Segunda	Rav Samál
	Sargento de Tercera	Samál Rishón
		Samál
	Marinero de Primera	Rav Turái
		Turái Rishón
	Marinero	Turái

Air Forces Rank Comparison

	United States	**Soviet Union**	**United Kingdom**	**West Germany**	**France**
Officers	General of the Air Force		Marshal of the RAF		Maréchal de France
		Glavniy Marshal Aviatsii			
		Marshal Aviatsii			
	General	General Armii	Air Chief Marshal	General	Général d´Armée Aérienne
	Lieutenant General	General Polkovink	Air Marshal	Generalleutnant	Général de Corps Aérienne
	Major General	General Leitenant	Air Vice Marshal	Generalmajor	Général de Division Aérienne
	Brigadier General	General Maior	Air Commodore	Brigadegeneral	Général de Brigade Aérienne
	Colonel	Polkovnik	Group Captain	Oberst	Colonel
	Lieutenant Colonel	Podpolkovink	Wing Commander	Oberstleutnant	Lieutenant-Colonel
	Major	Maior	Squadron Leader	Major	Commandant
	Captain	Kapitan	Flight Lieutenant	Hauptmann	Capitaine
	First Lieutenant	Starshii Leitenant	Flying Officer	Oberleutnant	Lieutenant
		Lietenant			
	Second Lieutenant	Mladshii Leitenant	Pilot Officer	Leutnant	Sous-Lieutenant
Enlisted	Chief Master Sergeant	Starshina	Warrant Officer Class 1	Oberstabsfeldwebel	Major
	Senior Master Sergeant	Starshii Serzhant		Stabsfeldwebel	Adjudant-Chef
				Hauptfeldwebel	
	Master Sergeant		Flight Sergeant Chief Technician	Oberfeldwebel	Adjudant
	Technical Sergeant	Serzhant	Sergeant	Feldwebel	Sergent-Chef
	Staff Sergeant	Mladshii Serzhant	Corporal	Stabsunteroffizier	Sergent
	Sergeant Senior Airman		Junior Technician	Unteroffizier	Caporal-Chef
	Airman First Class	Efreitor	Senior Aircraftsman	Hauptgefreiter	Caporal
	Airman		Leading Aircraftsman	Obergefreiter	Soldat de 1ère Classe
				Gefreiter	
	Airman Basic	Ryadovi	Aircraftsman	Flieger	Soldat de 2ème Classe

Air Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Italy	**Turkey**	**Belgium**	**Canada**	**Denmark**
Officers		Maresal			
	Generale di Squadra Aerea con Incarichi Speciali	Orgeneral		General	
	Generale di Squadra Aerea	Korgeneral	Luitenant-Generaal	Lieutenant-General	General
	Generale di Divisione Aerea	Tümgeneral	Generaal-Majoor	Major-General	Generalløjtnant
	Generale di Brigata Aerea	Tuggeneral	Brigadegeneraal	Brigadier-General	Generalmajor
	Colonnello	Albay	Kolonel	Colonel	Oberst
	Tenente Colonnello	Yarbay	Luitenant-Kolonel	Lieutenant-Colonel	Oberstløjnant
	Maggiore	Binbasi	Majoor	Major	Major
	Capitano	Yüzbasi	Kapitein-Commandant	Captain	Kaptajn
	Tenente	Üstegman	Kapitein	Lieutenant	Premierløjtnant
			Luitenant		Løjtnant
	Sottotenente	Tegmen	Onderluitenant	Second Lieutenant	Sekondløjtnant
Enlisted	Sergente Maggiore	Astsubay Kidemli Bascavus	Adjudant-Chef	Command Warrant Officer	Seniorsergent af 1. Grad
				Chief Warrant Officer	
		Astsubay Bascavus	Adjudant	Master Warrant Officer	Seniorsergent af 2. Grad
		Astsubay Kidemli Ustcavus			
	Sergente	Astsubay Ustcavus	1ste Sergeant-Majoor	Warrant Officer	Oversergent
		Astsubay Kidemli Cavus	1ste Sergeant	Sergeant	Sergent
	Astsubay Cavus	Sergeant	Master Corporal	Korporal	
	1ere Aviere	Cavus	Korporaal-Chef	Corporal	Overkonstabel af 1. Grad
		Onbasi	Korporaal	Trained Private	Overkonstabel af 2. Grad
	Aviere Scelto		1ste Soldaat	Basic Private	
	Aviere	Er	Soldat	Private Recruit	Konstabel

Air Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Greece	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain
Officers				Marechal	Capitán General
	Petrarchos	Generaal	General	General	
	Antipterarchos	Luitenant-Generaal	Generalløytnant	Tenente-General	Teniente General
	Ypopterarchos	Generaal-Majoor	Generalmajor	Major-General	General de División
	Taxiarchos	Commodore	Oberst I	Brigadeiro	General de Brigada
	Sminarchos	Kolonel	Oberst II	Coronel	Coronel
	Antisminarchos	Luitenant-Kolonel	Oberstløytnant	Tenente-Coronel	Teniente Coronel
	Episminagos	Majoor	Major	Major	Comandante
	Sminagos	Kapitein	Kaptein	Capitão	Capitán
	Yposminagos	Eerste-Luitenant	Løytnant	Tenente	Teniente
					Alférez
	Anthyposminagos	Tweede-Luitenant	Fenrik	Alferes	Subteniente
Enlisted	Archisminias	Adjudant-Onderofficier		Sargento-Mor	Brigada
	Episminias	Sergeant-Majoor		Sargento-Chefe	
				Sargento-Ajudante	
	Siminias	Sergeant der 1e Klasse		Primeiro-Sargento	Sargento Primero
		Sergeant	Sersjant	Segundo-Sargento	Sargento
	Efedrossminias	Korporaal der 1e Klasse	Korporal	Furriel	Cabo Primero
		Korporaal	Vingsoldat	Segundo-Furriel	Cabo
	Yposminias	Soldaat der 1e Klasse		Primeiro-Cabo	
				Segundo-Cabo	Soldado Primero
	Anthyposminias Smintis	Soldaat	Flysoldat	Soldado	Soldado

Air Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Est Germany	**Poland**	**Romania**	**Czechoslovakia**	**Bulgaria**
Officers	Armeegeneral		General Comandant	Armádní Generál	General
	Generaloberst	General Broni	General Colonel	Generálplukovník	General-Polkovnik
	Generalleutnant	General Dywizja	General Locotenent	Generálporucík	General-Leytenant
	Generalmajor	General Brygady	General de Escadra	Generálmajor	General-Mayor
	Oberst	Pulkownik	Comandor	Plukovník	Polkovnik
	Oberstleutnant	Podpulkownik	Captain-Comandor	Podplukovník	Podpolknovik
	Major	Major	Locotenent-Comandor	Major	Mayor
	Hauptmann	Kapitian	Capitan	Kapitán	Kapitan
	Oberleutnant	Porucznik	Locotenent Maior	Nadporucík	Starshi Leytenant
	Leutnant	Podporucznik	Locotenent	Porucík	Leytenant
	Unterleutnant	Chorazy	Sublocotenent	Podporucík	Mladshi Leytenant
Enlisted	Stabsfeldwebel	Starszy Sierzant Sztabowy	Plutoner Adjutant Sef	Nadpraporcík	Starshina
	Oberfeldwebel	Sierzant Sztabowy	Plutoner Adjutant	Praporcík	Starshi Serzhant
			Plutoner Major	Podpraporcík	
	Feldwebel	Starszy Sierzant	Plutoner	Nadrotmistr	
	Unterfeldwebel	Sierzant	Sergent Major	Rotmistr	Serzhant
	Unteroffizier	Plutonowy	Sergent	Rotný	Mladshi Serzhant
	Stabsgefreiter	Starszy Kapral	Caporal	Cetar	
	Gefreiter	Kapral	Fruntas	Desátník	Efreytor
		Starszy Szeregowiec		Svobodník	
	Flieger	Szeregoweic	Aviator	Vojín	Rednik

Air Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	Hungary	Finland	People's Republic of China	North Korea	South Korea
Officers					Wonsu
				Chasu	
	Hadseregtábornok	Kenraali	Kong Jun Da Jiang	Daejang	Taejang
	Vezérezredes	Kenraaliluutnantti	Kong Jun Shang Jiang	Sangjang	Chungjang
	Altábornagy	Kenraalimajuri	Kong Jun Zhong Jiang	Jungjang	Sojang
	Vezérörnagy	Prikaatikenraali	Kong Jun Shao Jiang	Sojang	Chungjang
			Kong Jun Da Xiao	Daechwa	
	Ezredes	Eversti	Kong Jun Shang Xiao	Sangchwa	Taeryong
	Alezredes	Everstiluutnantti	Kong Jun Zhong Xiao	Jungjwa	Chungryong
	Örnagy	Majuri	Kong Jun Shao Xiao	Sojwa	Soryong
	Százados	Kapteeni	Kong Jun Shang Wei	Daewi	Taewi
	Föhadnagy	Yliluutnantti	Kong Jun Zhong Wei	Sangwi	Chungwi
	Hadnagy	Luutnantti		Jungwi	
	Alhadnagy	Vänrikki	Kong Jun Shao Wei	Sowi	Sowi
Enlisted	Főtörzsörmester	Sotilasmestari		Teukmu Sangsa	Wonsa
	Törzsörmester	Vääpeli		Sangsa	Sangsa
		Ylikersantti	Kong Jun Shang Shi	Jungsa	Chungsa
	Örmester	Kersantti		Hasa	Hasa
	Szakaszvezető	Alikersantti	Kong Jun Zhong Shi	Sangkeub	Byongjang
	Tizedes	Korpraali	Kong Jun Xia Shi	Jungkeub	Sangbyong
	Örvezető		Shang Den Bing	Hakeub	Ilbyong
					Yibyong
	Honvéd	Sotamies	Lei Bing	Jeonsa	Mudungbyong

Air Forces Rank Comparison (continued)

	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	Cuba	Israel
Officers		Dai Tuong	General de Ejército	
	Thuong Tuong	Trung Tuong	General de Cuerpo de Ejército	
	Trung Tuong	Thieu Tuong	General de División	Alúf
	Thieu Tuong	Chuan Toung	General de Brigada	Tat Alúf
	Dai Ta			
	Thuong Ta	Dai Ta	Coronel	Alúf Mishné
	Trung Ta	Trung Ta	Teniente Coronel	Sgan Alúf
	Thieu Ta	Thieu Ta	Mayor	Rav Séren
	Dai Uy	Dai Uy	Capitán	Séren
	Thuong Uy	Trung Uy	Primer Teniente	Ségen
	Trung Uy		Teniente	
	Thieu Uy	Thieu Uy	Subteniente	Ségen Mishné
Enlisted	Thuong Si	Thoung Si Nhat	Primer Sub-Oficial	Rav Nagád
		Thuong Si	Sub-Oficial	Rav Samál Bakhír
				Rav Samál Mitkadém
	Trung Si	Trung Si Nhat	Sargento de Primera	Rav Samál Rishón
		Trung Si	Sargento de Segunda	Rav Samál
	Ha Si	Ha Si Nhat	Sargento de Tercera	Samál Rishón
		Ha Si		Samál
	Binh Nhat	Binh Nhat	Soldado de Primera	Rav Turái
		Binh Nhi		Turái Rishón
	Binh Nhi	Trung Dinh	Soldado	Turái

Special Branch Rank Comparison

	United States Marine Corps	**United Kingdom Royal Marines**	**West Germany Bundesgrenzschutz**	**France Gendarmerie Nationale**	**Italy Carabinieri**
Officers	General	General			
	Lieutenant General	Lieutanant-General		Général de Corps d´Armée	Generale di Corpo d´Armata
	Major General	Major-General	Generalmajor im BGS	Général de Division	Generale di Divisione
	Brigadier General	Brigadier	Brigadegeneral im BGS	Général de Brigade	Generale di Brigata
	Colonel	Colonel	Oberst im BGS	Colonel	Colonnello
	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant-Colonel	Oberstleutnant im BGS	Lieutenant-Colonel	Tenente Colonnello
	Major	Major	Major im BGS	Commandant	Maggiore
	Captain	Captain	Hauptmann im BGS	Capitaine	Capitano
	First Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Oberleutnant im BGS	Lieutenant	Tenente
	Second Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant	Leutnant im BGS	Sous-Lieutenant	Sottotenente
Enlisted	Sergeant Major Master Gunnery Sergeant	Warrant Officer Class 1	Oberstabsmeister im BGS	Major	Sergente Maggiore
	First Sergeant Master Sergeant	Warrant Officer Class 2	Stabsmeister im BGS	Adjudant-Chef	
			Hauptmeister im BGS		
	Gunnery Sergeant	Colour Sergeant	Obermeister im BGS	Adjudant	Sergente
	Staff Sergeant	Sergeant	Meister im BGS	Maréchal-des-Logis-Chef	
	Sergeant	Corporal	Hauptwachtmeister im BGS	Aspirant	
	Corporal	Lance Corporal	Oberwachtmeister im BGS	Maréchal-des-Logis	Caporal Maggiore
	Lance Corporal		Grenzhauptjäger im BGS	Brigadier-Chef	
	Private First Class		Grenzoberjäger im BGS	Brigadier	Caporale
			Grenztruppjäger im BGS		
	Private	Marine	Grenzjäger im BGS	Gendarme Adjoint	Soldato

Special Branch Rank Comparison (continued)

	Belgium Gendarmerie	**Netherlands Marine Corps**	**Spain Marine Corps**	**South Korea Marines**	**South Vietnam Marines**
Officers		Generaal		Taejang	
	Luitenant-Generaal	Luitenant-Generaal		Chungjang	Trung Tuong
	Generaal-Majoor	Generaal-Majoor	General de División	Sojang	Thieu Tuong
	Brigadegeneraal	Brigade-Generaal	General de Brigada	Chungjang	Chuan Toung
	Kolonel	Kolonel	Coronel	Taeryong	Dai Ta
	Luitenant-Kolonel	Luitenant-Kolonel	Teniente Coronel	Chungryong	Trung Ta
	Majoor	Majoor	Comandante	Soryong	Thieu Ta
	Kapitein-Commandant	Kapitein	Capitán	Taewi	Dai Uy
	Kapitein	Eerste-Luitenant	Teniente	Chungwi	Trung Uy
	Luitenant		Alférez		
	Onderluitenant	Tweede-Luitenant	Subteniente	Sowi	Thieu Uy
Enlisted	Adjudant-Chef	Adjudant-Onderofficier der Mariniers	Brigada	Wonsa	Thoung Si Nhat
	Adjudant	Sergeant-Majoor der Mariniers		Sangsa	Thuong Si
			Sargento Primero		
	1ste Opperwachtmeester			Chungsa	Trung Si Nhat
	Opperwachtmeester	Sergeant der Mariniers	Sargento	Hasa	Trung Si
	1ste Wachtmeester	Cabo Mayor	Byongjang	Ha Si Nhat	
	Wachtmeester	Korporaal der Mariniers	Cabo Primero	Sangbyong	Ha Si
	Brigadier	Marinier ders1e Klasse	Cabo	Ilbyong	Binh Nhat
			Soldato Primero	Yibyong	Binh Nhi
	Gendarme	Marinier der 2e Klasse	Soldato Mudungbyong	Trung Dinh	

Country Profiles

Belgium
Location: Western Europe
Capital: Brussels
Area (square miles): 11,787
Area (relative): about the size of Maryland

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	8,600,000	9,200,000	9,600,000	9,900,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	729.62	780.52	814.46	839.91
Armed Forces Personnel		110,000	110,000	110,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.20%	1.15%	1.11%
Military Spending as % of GNP		3.10%	2.90%	2.50%

Bulgaria
Location: Southeastern Europe
Capital: Sofia
Area (square miles): 42,822
Area (relative): slightly larger than Tennessee

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	7,300,000	7,900,000	8,500,000	9,000,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	170.47	184.48	198.50	210.17
Armed Forces Personnel		132,000	175,000	150,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.67%	2.06%	1.67%
Military Spending as % of GNP		5.3%	10.1%	11.9%

Canada
Location: Northern North America
Capital: Ottawa
Area (square miles): 3,849,670
Area (relative): slightly larger than the United States

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	14,000,000	18,300,000	21,700,000	27,400,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	3.64	4.75	5.64	7.12
Armed Forces Personnel		124,000	95,000	88,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.68%	0.44%	0.32%
Military Spending GNP		4.4%	2.4%	2.1%

Cuba
Location: Caribbean
Capital: Havana
Area (square miles): 42,803
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Pennsylvania

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	5,800,000	7,200,000	8,500,000	10,400,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	135.50	168.21	198.58	242.97
Armed Forces Personnel		270,000	140,000	297,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		3.75%	1.65%	2.86%
Military Spending as % of GNP		7.6%	4.9%	3.9%

Czechoslovakia
Location: Central Europe
Capital: Prague
Area (square miles): 49,383
Area (relative): slightly larger than twice the size of West Virginia

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	8,900,000	13,800,000	14,300,000	15,600,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	180.22	279.45	289.57	315.90
Armed Forces Personnel		310,000	222,000	175,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		2.25%	1.55%	1.12%
Military Spending as % of GNP		5.6%	6.6%	6.8%

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Location: Eastern Asia
Capital: Pyongyang
Area (square miles): 46,541
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Mississippi

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	9,500,000	10,900,000	13,900,000	19,700,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	204.12	234.20	298.66	423.28
Armed Forces Personnel		390,000	438,000	1,040,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		3.58%	3.15%	5.28%
Military Spending as % of GNP		11.3%	13.1%	20.0%

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) *
Location: Southeastern Asia
Capital: Hanoi
Area (square miles): 63,360
Area (relative): slightly more than twice the size of Maine

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	25,300,000	16,400,000	22,100,000	65,900,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	399.31	258.84	348.80	1040.09
Armed Forces Personnel		250,000	452,000	1,249,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.52%	2.05%	1.90%
Military Spending as % of GNP		15.9%	Unknown	Unknown

Denmark
Location: Northern Europe
Capital: Copenhagen
Area (square miles): 16,637
Area (relative): slightly less than twice the size of Massachusetts

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	4,300,000	4,700,000	4,900,000	5,100,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	258.46	282.50	294.52	306.55
Armed Forces Personnel		45,000	45,000	31,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.96%	0.92%	0.61%
Military Spending as % of GNP		2.6%	2.4%	2.2%

*Vietnam was divided between 1954 and 1975, after which it was united as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV).

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
Location: Central Europe
Capital: Bonn
Area (square miles): 96,019
Area (relative): slightly larger than Oregon

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	43,000,000	56,200,000	60,700,000	62,100,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	447.83	585.30	632.17	646.75
Armed Forces Personnel		350,000	510,000	503,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.62%	0.84%	0.81%
Military Spending as % of GNP		4.0%	3.3%	2.8%

Finland
Location: Northern Europe
Capital: Helsinki
Area (square miles): 130,560
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Montana

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	4,000,000	4,500,000	4,600,000	5,000,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	30.64	34.47	35.23	38.30
Armed Forces Personnel		48,000	40,000	39,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.07%	0.87%	0.78%
Military Spending as % of GNP		1.8%	1.5%	1.6%

France
Location: Western Europe
Capital: Paris
Area (square miles): 212,934
Area (relative): slightly less than twice the size of Colorado

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	41,800,000	46,200,000	50,800,000	56,400,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	196.30	216.97	238.57	264.87
Armed Forces Personnel		720,000	570,000	554,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.56%	1.12%	0.98%
Military Spending as % of GNP		6.2%	4.2%	3.7%

German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
Location: Central Europe
Capital: East Berlin
Area (square miles): 41,828
Area (relative): slightly larger than Tennessee

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	18,400,000	16,900,000	17,100,000	16,500,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	439.90	404.04	408.82	394.47
Armed Forces Personnel		139,000	202,000	262,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.82%	1.18%	1.59%
Military Spending as % of GNP		1.5%	6.9%	8.8%

Greece
Location: Southern Europe
Capital: Athens
Area (square miles): 50,950
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Alabama

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	7,600,000	8,400,000	8,800,000	10,000,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	149.17	164.87	172.72	196.27
Armed Forces Personnel		160,000	180,000	201,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.90%	2.05%	2.01%
Military Spending as % of GNP		4.2%	4.7%	5.8%

Hungary
Location: Central Europe
Capital: Budapest
Area (square miles): 35,919
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Indiana

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	9,300,000	10,000,000	10,300,000	10,400,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	258.92	278.40	286.76	289.54
Armed Forces Personnel		115,000	146,000	109,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.15%	1.42%	1.05%
Military Spending GNP		2.2%	7.4%	6.3%

Israel
Location: Middle East
Capital: Jerusalem (Tel Aviv)
Area (square miles): 8,019
Area (relative): slightly smaller than New Jersey

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	1,300,000	2,200,000	2,900,000	4,300,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	162.11	274.35	361.64	536.23
Armed Forces Personnel		63,000	105,000	191,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		2.86%	3.62%	4.44%
Military Spending as % of GNP		7.0%	25.2%	12.5%

Italy
Location: Southern Europe
Capital: Rome
Area (square miles): 116,320
Area (relative): slightly larger than Arizona

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	47,100,000	49,900,000	53,700,000	56,700,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	404.92	428.99	461.66	487.45
Armed Forces Personnel		470,000	435,000	506,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.94%	0.81%	0.89%
Military Spending as % of GNP		3.2%	2.7%	2.3%

Luxembourg
Location: Western Europe
Capital: Luxembourg
Area (square miles): 999
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Rhode Island

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	296,000	300,000	339,000	378,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	296.30	300.30	339.34	378.38
Armed Forces Personnel		6,000	1,000	1,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		2.00%	0.29%	0.26%
Military Spending as % of GNP		1.2%	0.8%	0.8%

Netherlands
Location: Western Europe
Capital: Amsterdam
Area (square miles): 15,768
Area (relative): slightly less than twice the size of New Jersey

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	10,100,000	11,600,000	13,000,000	14,800,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	640.54	735.67	824.45	938.61
Armed Forces Personnel		141,000	115,000	106,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.22%	0.88%	0.72%
Military Spending as % of GNP		4.4%	3.5%	2.8%

Norway
Location: Northern Europe
Capital: Oslo
Area (square miles): 125,050
Area (relative): slightly larger than New Mexico

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	3,300,000	3,600,000	3,900,000	4,200,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	26.39	28.79	31.19	33.59
Armed Forces Personnel		32,000	35,000	43,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.89%	0.90%	1.02%
Military Spending as % of GNP		3.3%	3.7%	3.4%

People's Republic of China
Location: Eastern Asia
Capital: Beijing
Area (square miles): 3,696,100
Area (relative): slightly smaller than the United States

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	562,600,000	701,000,000	820,400,000	1,130,700,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	152.21	189.66	221.96	305.92
Armed Forces Personnel		2,200,000	2,850,000	3,903,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.31%	0.35%	0.35%
Military Spending as % of GNP		7.1%	13.5%	3.4%

Poland
Location: Central Europe
Capital: Warsaw
Area (square miles): 124,807
Area (relative): slightly smaller than New Mexico

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	24,800,000	29,900,000	32,500,000	38,000,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	198.71	239.57	260.40	304.47
Armed Forces Personnel		305,000	314,000	350,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.02%	0.97%	0.92%
Military Spending as % of GNP		4.7%	7.6%	8.9%

Portugal
Location: Southwestern Europe
Capital: Lisbon
Area (square miles): 35,514
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Indiana

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	8,400,000	8,900,000	9,000,000	9,900,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	236.53	250.61	253.42	278.76
Armed Forces Personnel		75,000	230,000	104,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.84%	2.56%	1.05%
Military Spending as % of GNP		6.3%	6.5%	2.9%

Republic of Korea (South Korea)
Location: Eastern Asia
Capital: Seoul
Area (square miles): 38,324
Area (relative): slightly larger than Indiana

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	20,800,000	25,400,000	32,200,000	42,400,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	542.74	662.77	840.20	1106.36
Armed Forces Personnel		570,000	645,000	647,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		2.24%	2.00%	1.53%
Military Spending as % of GNP		4.8%	3.9%	4.1%

Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) *
Location: Southeastern Asia
Capital: Saigon
Area (square miles): 66,263
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Washington

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	N/A	14,500,000	18,300,000	N/A
Population Density (per sq mile)	N/A	218.82	276.17	N/A
Armed Forces Personnel		375,000	1,000,000	N/A
Armed Forces as % of Population		2.59%	5.46%	N/A
Military Spending as % of GNP		16.8%	16.3%	N/A

*Vietnam was divided between 1954 and 1975, after which it was united as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV).

Romania
Location: Southeastern Europe
Capital: Bucharest
Area (square miles): 92,042
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Oregon

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	16,300,000	18,600,000	20,300,000	22,900,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	177.09	202.08	220.55	248.80
Armed Forces Personnel		312,000	211,000	207,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.68%	1.04%	0.90%
Military Spending as % of GNP		3.1%	7.1%	6.1%

Soviet Union
Location: Asia and Eastern Europe
Capital: Moscow
Area (square miles): 8,649,538
Area (relative): slightly less than 2.5 times the size of the United States

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	201,300,000	218,100,000	241,700,000	288,700,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	23.27	25.22	27.94	33.38
Armed Forces Personnel		3,000,000	4,300,000	3,700,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.38%	1.78%	1.28%
Military Spending as % of GNP		15.8%	14.0%	11.5%

Spain
Location: Southwestern Europe
Capital: Madrid
Area (square miles): 195,363
Area (relative): slightly more than twice the size of Oregon

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	28,000,000	30,600,000	33,900,000	39,200,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	143.32	156.63	173.52	200.65
Armed Forces Personnel		345,000	365,000	277,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.13%	1.08%	0.71%
Military Spending as % of GNP		2.9%	3.1%	2.1%

Turkey
Location: Southeastern Europe and Southwestern Asia
Capital: Ankara
Area (square miles): 299,158
Area (relative): slightly larger than Texas

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	21,100,000	28,200,000	35,800,000	55,000,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	70.53	94.26	119.67	183.85
Armed Forces Personnel		400,000	540,000	780,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.42%	1.51%	1.42%
Military Spending as % of GNP		5.5%	4.2%	3.1%

United Kingdom
Location: Western Europe
Capital: London
Area (square miles): 94,548
Area (relative): slightly smaller than Oregon

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	50,100,000	52,800,000	55,600,000	57,300,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	529.89	558.45	588.06	606.04
Armed Forces Personnel		475,000	375,000	318,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		0.90%	0.67%	0.55%
Military Spending as % of GNP		4.2%	4.8%	4.1%

United States
Location: North America
Capital: Washington, D.C.
Area (square miles): 3,717,796
Area (relative): about half the size of Russia

	1950	1961	1970	1989
Population Estimate	152,300,000	183,800,000	205,000,000	247,300,000
Population Density (per sq mile)	729.62	780.52	814.46	839.91
Armed Forces Personnel		2,483,000	3,070,000	2,241,000
Armed Forces as % of Population		1.35%	1.50%	0.91%
Military Spending as % of GNP		9.2%	7.9%	5.6%

Cold War Chronology

February 1945

4–12 Yalta Conference—Big Three (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union) represented by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin

May 1945

8 V-E Day (end of World War II in Europe)

June 1945

26 United Nations (UN) founding conference ends with the promulgation of the UN Charter

July–August 1945

17–2 Potsdam Conference—Big Three represented by Harry Truman, Winston Churchill (replaced by Clement Attlee during the conference), and Josef Stalin

August 1945

14 V-J Day (end of World War II in the Pacific)

17 U.S. and Soviet officials agree on 38th Parallel as the boundary line between their occupation forces in Korea

September 1945

2 Ho Chi Minh proclaims in Hanoi the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam)

November 1945

17 Nationalist leader Sukarno declares the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) independent

27 U.S. General of the Army George C. Marshall begins his mission to China to try to mediate between the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) and Communist Party of China (CCP) factions

January 1946

10 UN General Assembly holds its first meeting; Trygve Lie of Norway becomes first UN secretary-general

19 Iran complains to the UN Security Council that the Soviet Union is meddling in internal Iranian affairs

31 An agreement is reached in China on a new governmental structure for the country

February 1946

9 Speech by Josef Stalin stating that capitalism and communism are "incompatible"

22 George Kennan issues the "Long Telegram," the basis for the containment policy of the United States

25 Chinese Nationalists and communists agree on a program to integrate their armed forces

March 1946

5 British statesman Winston Churchill delivers his "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech) at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri

25 Under pressure from the West, the Soviet Union announces that it will withdraw its troops from northern Iran

April 1946

18 With Marshall absent in the United States, Chinese Nationalist and communist forces clash in Manchuria

22 Merger of communist and socialist parties in Germany, creating the Socialist Unity Party (SED), in effect the new communist party

July 1946

12 The U.S. House of Representatives approves $3.75 billion loan to Great Britain

29 Opening of conference in Paris to conclude peace treaties with World War II cobelligerents of Germany

August 1946

The Nationalist and communist agreements in China collapses

September 1946

The Greek Civil War between the royalist British-backed government and Greek communist guerrillas begins

6 In an important speech in Stuttgart, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes declares the U.S. intention to restore the German economy and vows that U.S. forces will remain in Europe as long as other powers retain occupying forces there

17 In Zurich, Winston Churchill calls for the creation of a "United States of Europe"

November 1946

25 President Harry S. Truman establishes the Loyalty Commission (Presidential Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty)

December 1946

2 The United States and Britain agree to create Bizonia by combining their occupation zones in Germany

3 The Greek government complains to the UN Security Council that the neighboring communist states are providing military support to the communist insurgency

19 Viet Minh forces attack the French in Tonkin (northern Vietnam), beginning the Indochina War

January 1947

1 Bizonia officially created

8 Marshall, having failed to bridge the wide gulf between the Nationalists and communists, leaves China

February 1947

10 Peace treaties signed with German cobelligerents of World War II: Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania

21 British diplomats in Washington inform the U.S. State Department that Britain, hard-pressed financially, can no longer provide aid to Greece and Turkey

March 1947

4 Britain and France sign the Treaty of Dunkerque (Dunkirk) by which they pledge mutual aid in the event of a new war with Germany

12 In a speech to Congress, President Truman asks for $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey and outlines the policy that later comes to be known as the Truman Doctrine

21 Truman issues Executive Order 9835 calling for an investigation into the loyalty of all federal employees

May 1947

8 In a speech to the Delta Cotton Council in Mississippi that is in effect a trial balloon for the later Marshall Plan, U.S. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson discusses the economic plight of Europe and the U.S. stake in this

June 1947

5 In a speech at Harvard University, Marshall, now secretary of state, proposes an economic aid program for Europe that will later be known as the Marshall Plan

July 1947

"Sources of Soviet Conduct" by "X" (George Kennan) is published in *Foreign Affairs*

2 The Soviet Union rejects U.S. assistance under the Marshall Plan given the conditions attached, forcing its European satellites to follow suit

20 Fighting erupts in Indonesia between Dutch and nationalist forces, beginning a two-year war

26 Truman signs the National Security Act, which establishes the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

September 1947

2 Western Hemisphere states sign the Treaty of Rio, designed to establish inter-American solidarity against aggression

22–23 Communist delegates meeting in Poland establish the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)

October 1947

18 The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) begins an investigation of communism and the movie industry in Hollywood

December 1947

The Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and the communists resumes

February 1948

25 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia—after the collapse of a coalition government, President Edvard BeneΔ is pressured into appointing a government dominated by the communists

March 1948

10 Czechoslovak government authorities announce the death, allegedly by suicide, of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk (a 2004 Czech Republic government investigation concludes that he had been murdered)

17 Treaty of Brussels is signed by France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—forerunner to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

20 Soviet representatives walk out of the four-power Allied Control Council for Germany

April 1948

1 Soviet authorities in Germany impose restrictions on road and rail traffic from the Western zones of Germany into Berlin

2 The U.S. Congress establishes the Economic Cooperation Administration to oversee the Economic Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)

30 In Bogatá, Colombia, the United States and Latin American countries establish the Organization of American States (OAS)

June 1948

13 The U.S. Senate adopts the Vandenberg Resolution endorsing U.S. participation in regional defense organizations

18 The Western occupying powers introduce a new currency in their zones of Germany and Berlin

24 The Berlin Blockade begins when the Soviet Union halts all land and water traffic between the Western zones of Germany and West Berlin

26 The Berlin Airlift begins

28 Yugoslavia is expelled from the Cominform

August 1948

3 Whittaker Chambers testifies to HUAC that former State Department official Alger Hiss was a communist in the 1930s

November 1948

2 In one of the most stunning upsets in U.S. political history, Truman wins reelection as president over the favored Republican Party challenger Thomas E. Dewey

December 1948

5 Municipal elections held in the Western zones of Berlin

10 The UN General Assembly adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

January 1949

22 Communist forces capture Beijing in China

25 The Soviet Union announces the creation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the Soviet counterpart to the Marshal Plan, for its satellites of Eastern Europe

28 The UN Security Council orders the Netherlands to end military operations in Indonesia and grant it independence

February 1949

26 The government of the Netherlands agrees to grant independence to Indonesia

March 1949

25 Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong proclaims Beijing to be the capital of China

April 1949

4 NATO is established by twelve nations, including the United States

22 Nationalist forces abandon their capital of Nanjing (Nanking)

May 1949

5 Ten West European states form the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, France

8 The Western German parliament approves the Basic Law, in effect the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany)

12 The Soviet Union ends the Berlin Blockade

23 West Germany is established

25 Chinese communist forces occupy Shanghai

August 1949

24 North Atlantic Treaty goes into effect following its ratification by France

29 The Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb

October 1949

1 Mao proclaims the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC)

7 The German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) is established

January 1950

21 Hiss is convicted of perjury

31 Truman announces that the United States will proceed with the development of nuclear fusion (the hydrogen bomb)

February 1950

9 In a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, U.S. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy claims to have a list of 205 communist sympathizers working in the State Department

14 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow

April 1950

7 The National Security Council produces NSC-68, which calls for a massive military buildup

25 Truman approves NSC-68

May 1950

9 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposes creation of a European coal and steel community

June 1950

25 North Korean forces invade the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), beginning the Korean War

27 The UN Security Council passes a resolution sponsored by the United States calling for the defense of Korea

30 Truman approves the dispatch of U.S. ground forces to Korea

August 1950

11 In the course of a speech to the European Assembly in Strasbourg, Winston Churchill, still a private citizen, calls for the establishment of a European army, with West German participation

September 1950

15 Successful amphibious landing by American forces at Inchon, South Korea

October 1950

7 UN forces cross the 38th Parallel into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)

28 Chinese communist forces launch a major intervention in the Korean War

November 1950

25–26 Chinese communist forces carry out a massive offensive against UN forces in the Korean War

December 1950

15 Truman proclaims a state of national emergency

31 Chinese communist forces cross the 38th Parallel, invading South Korea

January 1951

4 Chinese communist forces capture Seoul

10 UN forces recapture Seoul and Inchon

March 1951

29 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are convicted of passing nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union and on 5 April receive the death sentence

April 1951

11 Truman dismisses General Douglas MacArthur as commander of UN forces in Korea, replacing him with General Matthew Ridgway

18 Delegates of West European states meeting in Paris establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)

May 1951

23 The PRC takes control of Tibet

25 Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, British Foreign Office officials, leave Britain—later it is revealed that they had spied for the Soviet Union

June 1951

23 Soviet UN delegate Jacob Malik proposes a cease-fire in Korea and the reestablishment of the status quo antebellum

July 1951

10 Armistice talks begin at Kaesong in Korea

September 1951

8 The Treaty of San Francisco is signed between the Allied powers, associated nations (forty-nine in all), and Japan and goes into effect on 28 April 1952

27 Iran takes control of the Anglo-Iranian oil refinery at Abadan

February 1952

23 NATO authorities announces a plan to create an army of fifty divisions within a year's time

March 1952

10 Stalin proposes a reunified and neutral Germany

July 1952

21 Egyptian military officers overthrow King Farouk

October 1952

3 In waters off Australia, Britain detonates its first atomic bomb

November 1952

1 The United States tests the world's first thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb)

March 1953

5 Stalin dies

6 Georgy Malenkov becomes Soviet premier and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

14 Malenkov is forced to relinquish leadership of the CPSU to Nikita Khrushchev

June 1953

17 Workers in East Berlin strike and riot against increases in work quotas and shortages of basic goods—the riots spread across East Germany and have to be put down by Soviet troops

19 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are executed despite widespread protests against their sentence

July 1953

27 The United States and North Korea sign an armistice, ending the fighting in Korea

August 1953

19 A CIA-sponsored coup overthrows the government of nationalist Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran

January 1954

12 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles enunciates the defense doctrine that will become known as massive retaliation

21 The United States launches the *Nautilus,* the world's first nuclear-powered submarine

March 1954

1 The United States explodes its first deliverable thermonuclear bomb on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific

13 The Battle of Dien Bien Phu opens in Indochina

April 1954

22 Opening of the Army-McCarthy Hearings in Washington, D.C.

26 Beginning of the Geneva Conference on Korea and on the war in Indochina

May 1954

7 Viet Minh forces defeat the French at Dien Bien Phu following a furious two-month-long battle

June 1954

27 A CIA-sponsored coup overthrows President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala

July 1954

21 The Indochina War ends with the signing of agreements in Geneva, although in order to comply with a deadline imposed by French Premier Mendès-France, the document is dated 20 July

August 1954

30 The French National Assembly rejects the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty

September 1954

3 The shelling of offshore Chinese islands in the Taiwan Strait until 1 May 1955 is initiated by the PRC

8 Establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with signing of documents in Manila

October 1954

3 In London, the Western Allies sign an agreement that will allow the rearmament of West Germany within NATO

December 1954

2 The U.S. Senate votes to censure Senator McCarthy

2 The United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan) sign a mutual defense treaty

February 1955

8 Malenkov resigns as premier of the Soviet Union and is replaced by Nikolai Bulganin, while Khrushchev emerges as the leader of the Soviet Union

24 Turkey and Iraq sign the Baghdad Pact

April 1955

5 Britain, Turkey, and Iraq sign the Baghdad Pact, and Iran and Pakistan join later in the year (after Iraq leaves in 1959, the name is changed to the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO)

May 1955

5 West Germany regains full sovereignty and joins NATO as a full member on 8 May

14 The Soviet Union and its satellites form the Warsaw Treaty Organization to counter NATO

15 The Western Allies and the Soviet Union sign the Austrian State Treaty, ending the occupation of Austria

June 1955

18 Summit meeting involving Khrushchev, Dwight Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, and Edgar Faure at Geneva

August 1955

4 The U-2 spy plane makes its first overflight of the Soviet Union

December 1955

1 The Western Allies declare that despite Soviet contentions to the contrary, Berlin remains an occupied city

9 The West German government announces the Hallstein Doctrine, indicating that West Germany will no longer maintain diplomatic relations with those states that recognize the East German government

February 1956

25 Khrushchev gives his so-called secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in which he denounces the "cult of personality built by Stalin," thus beginnings a campaign of de-Stalinization

June 1956

28 Workers riot in Pozna›, Poland, against poor economic conditions and communist rule

July 1956

26 Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, nationalizes the Suez Canal

October 1956

21 The Soviet Union accepts Wfladysflaw Gomuflka as the new leader of Poland

23 The Hungarian Revolution begins

26 Representatives of seventy nations sign a document creating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

29 The Suez Crisis begins, during which Israel, backed by Britain and France, attacks Egypt

November 1956

1 Imre Nagy announces that Hungary is leaving the Warsaw Treaty Organization

4 Soviet tanks enter Budapest to crush the Hungarian Revolution

December 1956

2 Fidel Castro and his followers land in Cuba and begin the Cuban Revolution

January 1957

5 President Eisenhower announces a new policy, later known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, that promises U.S. military aid to victims of aggression in the Middle East

March 1957

9 Eisenhower signs into law congressional legislation authorizing U.S. forces to come to the aid of Middle Eastern states

July 1957

3 Khrushchev defeats opposition to his rule and solidifies his position as leader of the Soviet Union

14 Coup in Iraq in which King Faisal and others are slain

October 1957

4 The Soviet Union launches *Sputnik I*, the world's first orbiting satellite

January 1958

1 The European Common Market and Atomic Energy Commission are established

13 British government announces that a Soviet attack on the West, regardless of the weapons employed, will evoke a British hydrogen bomb response

31 U.S. Army launches *Explorer I*, the first American artificial satellite

May 1958

Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), an attempt at rural industrialization and increased agricultural production that results in a massive famine and the deaths of perhaps as many as 30 million people, begins

July–October 1958

The United States sends troops under the Eisenhower Doctrine to protect Lebanon's pro-Western government

July 1958

29 Establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

August 1958

23 Renewed shelling of Jinmen and Mazu (part of the Republic of China) in the Taiwan Strait by the PRC

October 1958

4 Establishment of the French Fifth Republic

December 1958

14 The Western Allies reject the Soviet demand that they withdraw their soldiers from West Berlin

January 1959

1 Castro takes power in Cuba

March 1959

30 Release of earlier congressional testimony by U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke in which he announces the beginning of a shift in U.S. defense posture with a renewed emphasis on conventional forces to build up a capability to wage limited war

April 1959

4 The NATO Council announces its determination to maintain the status quo in West Berlin and the rights of all occupying powers to be there

July 1959

24 Vice President Richard Nixon and Khrushchev have the "Kitchen Debate" at a U.S. exhibition in Moscow

September 1959

15–27 Khrushchev becomes the first Soviet leader to visit the United States

December 1959

1 Signing of the agreement on the peaceful use of Antarctica, the first major postwar arms-control agreement

March 1960

17 Eisenhower approves a CIA plan calling for Cuban exiles to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro's regime

May 1960

5 Khrushchev announces that the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane on 1 May and captured the pilot, Francis Gary Powers

7 The U.S. government admits that the U-2 shot down over the Soviet Union had been on a surveillance mission

16 Eisenhower refuses to apologize for the U-2 flights, resulting in Khrushchev's departure from Paris and the collapse of the scheduled summit there

July 1960

Civil war breaks out in the Republic of the Congo, which had recently received independence from Belgium

September–October 1960

Khrushchev attends the UN General Assembly session, and Eisenhower does not offer to meet him

October 1960

19 The United States bans most trade with Cuba

December 1960

20 Establishment of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) by Vietnamese communists

January 1961

1 The United States breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba

April 1961

12 Major Yuri Gagarin of the Soviet Union becomes the first human to orbit Earth in space

17 Cuban exiles invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs

May 1961

5 Commander Alan Shepard becomes the first American in space

15 U.S. President John F. Kennedy declares in a speech to Congress that the United States should achieve a manned flight to the moon before the end of the decade

June 1961

3–4 Kennedy and Khrushchev hold a summit meeting in Vienna

July 1961

24 Kennedy warns the Soviet Union not to interfere with Western access to West Berlin

August 1961

13 East German authorities close their border with the West and begin construction of the Berlin Wall

October 1961

26–27 Confrontation in Berlin between U.S. and Soviet tanks

February 1962

7 The United States embargoes trade with Cuba

10 The United States swaps Soviet spy Colonel Rudolf Abel for U-2 pilot Powers

20 Lieutenant Colonel John H. Glenn Jr. becomes the first American to orbit Earth in space

July 1962

1 French rule ends in Algeria following a vote in that country in favor of independence

23 The neutrality of Laos is guaranteed by accords signed in Geneva

October 1962

14 Beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis with the discovery in a U-2 reconnaissance flight of the construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba

22 In a speech to the American people, Kennedy announces the presence of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba and declares a quarantine on the shipment to Cuba of offensive weapons

28 Khrushchev agrees to withdraw missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. guarantee not to invade the island

November 1962

20 Kennedy announces an end to the U.S. blockade of Cuba

June 1963

20 Establishment of a hotline between the White House and the Kremlin

26 Kennedy's speech at the Berlin Wall in which he declares, "Ich bin ein Berliner"

August 1963

5 The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union sign a partial nuclear test–ban treaty

August 1964

2 Attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin

7 The U.S. Congress passes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

October 1964

15 Leonid Brezhnev becomes first secretary of the CPSU, replacing Khrushchev

16 The PRC tests its first atomic bomb

February 1965

7 Communist forces in South Vietnam attack U.S. military installation at Pleiku

March 1965

8–9 U.S. Marines arrive in South Vietnam, the first U.S. combat troops sent there, charged with protecting U.S. bases

April 1965

28 U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson sends Marines to the Dominican Republic

September–October 1965

30–1 A communist coup is crushed by the Indonesian Army

March 1966

9 France withdraws from NATO's military command but remains part of the alliance

June 1967

6 The Six-Day War begins between Israel and Egypt, to include Syria and Jordan

23 Johnson meets with Premier Alexei Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey

October 1967

21 March on the Pentagon to protest the Vietnam War

January 1968

5 Alexander Dubček becomes leader of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party (CPCz), and the Prague Spring begins two months later, in March

30 The Tet Offensive begins in South Vietnam

May 1968

10–13 The United States and North Vietnam begin peace talks in Paris

July 1968

1 The United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

August 1968

20–21 Warsaw Pact troops end the Prague Spring by invading Czechoslovakia

November 1968

12 Brezhnev announces the Brezhnev Doctrine in which socialist states are obligated to aid a socialist state threatened by counter-revolutionary forces

March 1969

2 Clashes erupt between the Soviet Union and the PRC along the Ussuri River

June 1969

8 The Nixon Doctrine proclaims that Asian nations will have to defend themselves with their own soldiers in the future

November 1969

17 U.S. and Soviet negotiators begin the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

April 1970

30 Incursion by the United States and South Vietnam into Cambodia

August 1970

12 West Germany signs a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union

December 1970

7 West German–Polish Treaty recognizes the Oder-Neisse border

June 1971

13 The *New York Times* begins publishing the Pentagon Papers

July 1971

15 Nixon announces that he will visit the PRC in 1972

February 1972

21 Nixon begins his visit to the PRC

May 1972

26 Nixon and Kosygin sign the SALT I treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

June 1972

3 A four-power agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France resolves the Berlin issue

December 1972

21 The Basic Treaty establishes mutual relations between West Germany and East Germany

January 1973

27 A Vietnam peace agreement is signed

July 1973

3 The Helsinki Conference on European security begins

October 1973

6 Egyptian forces strike across the Suez Canal, beginning what is known as the October, Yom Kippur, or Ramadan War between Egyptian and Syrian forces against Israel

November 1973

7 Congress overrides Nixon's veto of the War Powers Act

June 1974

27 Summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev

November 1974

23–24 President Gerald Ford and Brezhnev agree on a draft for a SALT II treaty

April 1975

17 Cambodia falls to the Khmer Rouge, and a genocidal campaign soon begins

30 Fall of Saigon and end of the Vietnam War

August 1975

1 Leaders of thirty-five nations sign the Helsinki Accords

July 1976

2 North and South Vietnam are officially united

March 1977

17 President Jimmy Carter announces that human rights will be a major focus of U.S. foreign policy

December 1978

25 Vietnam invades Cambodia

January 1979

1 The United States and the PRC open diplomatic relations

June 1979

18 Carter and Brezhnev sign the SALT II treaty (never ratified)

July 1979

17 Marxist Sandinista guerrillas seize control in Nicaragua

November 1979

4 Radical Iranian students seize the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking seventy Americans hostage

December 1979

12 European members of NATO agree to deploy U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe

27 Soviet forces seize control of Afghanistan

January 1980

3 Carter withdraws the SALT II treaty from consideration by the Senate in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

23 Carter, in a statement that later becomes known as the Carter Doctrine—a reaffirmation of the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines and a partial repudiation of the Nixon Doctrine—announces that the United States will regard any Soviet aggression directed at the Persian Gulf as a threat to its vital interests

April 1980

7 The United States breaks off diplomatic relations with Iran

May 1980

4 President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, in power since 1945, dies

August 1980

31 Solidarity, led by Lech Wałęsa, signs an agreement with the Polish government that allows the establishment of the trade union movement

January 1981

20 American hostages held in Iran are freed

April 1981

1 The United States suspends aid to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua

October 1981

6 President Anwar Sadat of Egypt assassinated by Muslim fundamentalist military officers

December 1981

13 The Polish government declares martial law and arrests the leaders of Solidarity

June 1982

6 Israeli forces invade southern Lebanon in an attempt to end the terrorist activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

November 1982

10 Brezhnev dies

March 1983

9 President Ronald Reagan calls the Soviet Union an "evil empire"

23 Reagan announces support for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star Wars

April 1983

18 Arab terrorists set off a bomb at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing sixty-three people

September 1983

1 Soviet aircraft shoot down Korean passenger jet KAL 007 in Soviet airspace

October 1983

5 Wałęsa wins the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with Solidarity

23 Arab terrorists drive a truck full of explosives into a U.S. barracks in Lebanon, killing 241 Marines

25 Invasion of Grenada by U.S. and Caribbean contingents

November 1983

23 The Soviet Union responds to the U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe by walking out of the intermediate-range nuclear forces reduction talks in Geneva

May 1984

24 Congress bans further aid to the Contras in their struggle against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua

September 1984

26 The PRC and Britain sign an agreement on the transfer of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997

February 1985

6 Reagan announces U.S. support for all anti-communist rebels (freedom fighters) in a policy that later becomes known as the Reagan Doctrine

March 1985

11 Mikhail Gorbachev becomes general secretary of the CPSU

May 1985

20 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrest naval officer John Anthony Walker Jr. as a Soviet spy

November 1985

19–21 First summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev is held in Geneva

April 1986

26 A major nuclear accident occurs at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near Kiev in the Soviet Union

October 1986

11–12 Gorbachev and Reagan meet at Reykjavík, Iceland, for a second summit but fail to reach agreement on arms control

May 1987

5 Congress begins hearings on the Iran-Contra Affair

June 1987

14 Pope John Paul II makes his third papal visit to his native Poland and strongly endorses Solidarity

December 1987

8–10 Gorbachev and Reagan hold a summit in Washington, D.C., and sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe

May–June 1988

29–2 Reagan and Gorbachev hold a summit meeting in Moscow

December 1988

7 Gorbachev announces unilateral reductions in troop (100,000 men) and tank (10,000) strength in Europe in a speech to the UN General Assembly

January 1989

11 Hungary introduces political reforms

February 1989

15 Soviet troops leave Afghanistan

March 1989

26 The Soviet Union holds the first partially free elections in its history for the Congress of People's Deputies

May 1989

2 Hungary begins removing the barbed-wire fence along its border with Austria

June 1989

3–4 Chinese troops kill and injure thousands of prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square

4–18 Solidarity is victorious in Poland's first free election under communist rule

16 Imre Nagy, executed for his role in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, is reburied with honors

August 1989

24 Poland gets its first noncommunist premier since World War II

October 1989

9 Demonstrations in Leipzig begin an expanding series of protests against the East German government

18 Egon Krenz replaces Erich Honecker as head of the East German Communist Party

25 Gorbachev publicly rejects the Brezhnev Doctrine

November 1989

9 East Germany inadvertently opens the Berlin Wall

20 More than 200,000 people demonstrate in Prague against the Czechoslovak communist regime

24 Czechoslovak communist leader Milo Jake and his entire politburo resign

December 1989

2–3 President George H. W. Bush meets with Gorbachev at sea near Malta

25 A military tribunal tries and executes Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaułescu and his wife Elena

29 Václav Havel becomes Czechoslovakia's first noncommunist president since 1948

March 1990

11 Lithuania declares its independence from the Soviet Union

13 The Congress of People's Deputies repeals Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, depriving the CPSU of its legal monopoly on political power, and the CPSU's Central Committee agrees to the change two days later

May–June 1990

30–3 Bush and Gorbachev hold a summit meeting in Washington, D.C.

July 1990

16 Meeting between Helmut Kohl, chancellor of West Germany, and Gorbachev leads to an agreement allowing German unification

October 1990

3 Germany is officially united

15 Gorbachev is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize

November 1990

21 The thirty-four members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe sign the Charter of Paris, formally ending the Cold War

July 1991

1 The Warsaw Pact formally disbands

31 Bush and Gorbachev, meeting in Moscow, sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)

August 1991

19–21 Unsuccessful coup by Soviet Communist Party hard-liners

December 1991

25 Gorbachev resigns as leader of the Soviet Union

31 The Soviet Union is officially dissolved

Michael D. Richards and Spencer C. Tucker

How to Read a Primary Source

Reading information, like the reference content of this encyclopedia, is the bread and butter of the historian. Reading through a historian's analysis of a particular event, a reference entry from an encyclopedia, or the content directly from a government act each have value in determining the historical context of a period.

A good historian must develop the skills to determine what is a primary source of information and what is a secondary source. A secondary source is content that is written about a historical period and interprets the historical events. For example, reference materials such as this encyclopedia or a history textbook are secondary sources. A primary source is any source that is created within the historical period being studied. A song from the Beatles or treaties from the end of World War II are good examples of primary sources.

But why study a primary source? Historians are taught to "go to the source" and are more likely to go to the most original source available than to read through another historian's analysis of the material. Reaching into primary source materials gives the historian the closest source to the actual event as possible. But in dealing with all primary sources, like secondary sources, certain information should be gathered:

1. **What type of source is it?** Knowing exactly what type of source it is can be very useful in determining the validity of the primary source.

2. **Who is the author of the source?** Each source is created by someone. To guarantee the authenticity of the primary source, a historian will check the source and its author.

3. **When was the source created?** Ensure that the source was actually created within the time period being studied and was not created afterward as an analysis of it. Understanding the historical context of the source is very important in determining whether the source is a primary source or a secondary source.

4. **Where was the source created?** Make sure the source was created within the historical space being studied. In essence, is the source reporting on the event from a distance, or was the author actually experiencing it?

Once these basic facts have been determined for the source, a historian will look into the purpose of the primary source. All sources are created for a purpose—letters to friends are intended to inform, treaties are intended to set boundaries and limitations, fictional works are intended to entertain or teach. Ask the following questions about the primary source:

1. **Why was the source created?** The purpose of the source can give insight into whether or not the source is an accurate and unbiased portrayal of the information or if it has been editorialized.

2. **Who is the intended audience of the source?** A source that is created to tell a friend something will be very different than one that is intended to inform an enemy.

Once a historian has determined the facts of the source, and has a sense of its purpose and audience, the source can be placed within a historical context.

How to Read a Map

The ability to read and comprehend maps is a very important skill to acquire in historical study. Understanding the various components of a map and their importance is key to this skill.

What is the difference between a key and a scale? What is a compass rose? What is the distance between point A and point B? All of these questions are important if you want to read a map. But what is a map and how is it read? The answer appears to be very simple—but there are many different types of maps and not all of them have the same purpose.

Generally, a map is a visual representation of a particular location that shows the relationship between a set of features. These features can be physical, cultural, political, economic, or military. For example, a map that shows the events of the Tet Offensive might highlight where certain attacks by the Viet Cong occurred and when, in relation to other events of the Vietnam War.

To be able to understand how a map can show these features, it is necessary to understand the general elements of a map.

1. **Title** Just like the title of a book or magazine article, the title of a map should tell the reader the subject of the map. The best titles include not only the "what," but also the "where" and the "when" of the subject of the map. Titles are often very simple, but they give the reader a sense of the scope of the map.

2. **Orientation** As a general convention, all cartographers (mapmakers) place north at the top of each map. To reinforce this convention, or to point out when the convention has not been followed, a compass rose is added to a map to point to the North Pole (rather than true north).

3. **Scale** Maps generally have a small feature near one of the corners that shows the relative size of the map. The scale of the map shows the relationship between a particular length on the map (usually one inch) and the relative distance between features on the map. This allows the reader to determine distances between elements on the map. Some maps do not include a scale—these maps are described as "not written to scale," which means that distances between features on the map are not necessarily accurate.

4. **Legend (Key)** The legend or key of the map shows the reader the meaning of the symbols and colors used on the map. Many symbols are accepted and not shown on most legends, such as dots for cities and stars within circles for capital cities. By utilizing the symbols, colors, and shadings on a map, a cartographer can describe not only the physical features of a region, but also actions or changes.

5. **Grid (Coordinates)** Every map should show the relationship of the region shown in the map to the longitude meridians and latitude parallels of the globe. This allows the reader to place the region of the map (which may be very small) within the larger geographic context of the Earth.

Some maps use these features to show a geographic relationship between events and actions; others use them to display other information, such as economic or cultural changes over time and the relationship between

geography and these changes. For example, the refugee population of various nations can be shown using either a table that displays the information or a map, which would also show the relationship between the largest populations and their geographic locations.

Learning how to read a map and understanding how a map can display information can be a valuable historical tool for all students.

How to Read a Chart, Table, or Graph

Charts, tables, and graphs are all important visual ways to display statistical information. Organizing statistical information in a visual format is an excellent way to display relationships between statistics, represent changes over time, or show a large amount of information in a more confined and organized space than a paragraph. These visual representations show complex information in a simple, straightforward relationship.

To understand how a historian might use a chart, table, or graph, it is important to understand their basic components. The common components of a chart, table, or graph include:

1. **Title** Every chart, table, or graph should have a title that details the information that will be presented within it. Titles should not only explain briefly the relationship between the two or more components involved, but should also include a date or other chronological information to place the data in a historical context.

2. **Data** The information that makes up the chart, table, or graph is called the data. Whether this information is displayed in a pie chart, a relational table, or a line graph, it is the most important component of the visual display.

3. **Legend (Key)** The legend or key is the explanation of the visual design of the chart, table, or graph. If the visual design uses color or shading to denote a particular piece of information, the key will explain which color or shading represents which information.

Other components of charts, tables, and graphs are specific to the type of visual representation used. Here are some examples of specific types of charts, tables, or graphs and their components.

Pie Chart A pie chart is a very convenient way to show parts of something that make up a whole. By using various colors or shadings, a pie chart can show how much of the total a certain piece of information represents. For example, when looking at the total number of individuals in military service at a certain time, a pie chart can show how many were in the navy, air force, or army.

Statistical Table A statistical table is the clearest way to show information. It can be as simple as a two-column presentation of the presidents of the United States and their dates of service, or as complicated as a table showing the relationship between casualties during a conflict and the military budgets of various nations.

Bar Graph A bar graph is a type of graph that shows a relationship between two or more similar entities. The graph is most often placed on x- and y-axes, where the y-axis denotes the total number of what is being compared, and the x-axis lists the pieces of information that are being compared. For example, the x-axis of a bar graph might list the various groups involved in a conflict, and the y-axis might show the number of casualties. This graph would easily show the relationship between the number of casualties sustained by the various groups at a particular moment in time.

Line Graph A line graph is a type of graph that best shows changes in a particular piece of information over

time. The line graph is also placed on x- and y-axes, but here the x-axis usually shows a period of time and the y-axis shows the total number of what is being compared. Line graphs often show two or more pieces of information in comparison, with a different color or line style for each of the things being compared. for example, a line graph of the military expenditures of two nations over a period of time would make an effective line graph.

Understanding how to read the various types of charts, tables, and graphs will make comprehension of more difficult pieces of information much easier.

Glossary

4-F	Draft classification given to those individuals determined to be unfit for military service
AAM	air-to-air missile
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ABDA	American, British, Dutch, Australian
ABL	airborne laser
ABM	antiballistic missile
Abwehr	Military intelligence (German); Germany's military intelligence branch was the Abwehrabteilung, commonly known as the Abwehr.
ACAV	Armored cavalry assault vehicle; M113 armored personnel carrier modified with two additional 7.62-mm machine guns and shielding for its main .50-caliber machine gun.
ACCS	Air Command and Control System; also Airborne Command and Control Squadron
ACG	Air Commando Group
ACV	U.S. Navy designation for an auxiliary aircraft carrier
AEW	airborne early warning
AFB	Air Force Base
AFC	Armed Forces Council
AFDD	Air Force Doctrine Document
AFMC	Air Force Material Command
AFV	armored fighting vehicle
AGM	Missile-range instrumentation ship
AIRCENT	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AK-47	Russian-designed assault rifle, Automat Kalashnikov, manufactured throughout the communist bloc and considered to be one of the most successful infantry weapons of the twentieth century.
ALCS	airborne launch-control system
ALERT	Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater
amidship	The center part of the ship. This is both between the fore and aft sections and between the port and starboard sides.
amphibious warfare	Military activity that involves landing from ships, either directly or by means of landing craft or helicopters.
anyang hasham niko	Fractured American version of Korean-language *annyong hashimnigga* (hello).
AOR	area of responsibility

apartheid	Any system or practice that separates individuals within a nation by race or caste; specifically used in South Africa in the twentieth century.
APC	armored personnel carrier
APDS	armor-piercing discarding sabot
ARG/SLF	amphibious ready group/special landing force
ARM	antiradiation missile
arms race	Massive military buildup between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War era.
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARRS	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service
ARV	armored recovery vehicle
ASAT	antisatellite
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded in 1967 to oppose the threat of feared communist expansionism. Members include Brunei, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (admitted in July 1995).
ASM	air-to-surface missile
ASR	submarine rescue ship
ASROC	antisubmarine rocket
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ATF	Advanced Tactical Fighter
ATGM	antitank guided missile
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System, a mobile long-range radar surveillance and control center for air defense.
AWOL	absent without leave
Ba Muoi Ba	A Vietnamese brand of beer (Vietnamese for "33").
ballistics	The science of projectiles, divided into interior and exterior ballistics. Its aim is to improve the design of shells/projectiles so that increased accuracy and predictability are the result. It also deals with rockets and ballistic missiles.
Baltimore Four	The Baltimore Four, activists opposed to the Vietnam War, poured human and animal blood over the files of potential draftees in 1967 in the first-ever raid on a selective service office.
battle light	Red light between decks to aid in development of night vision.
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
beehive round	An explosive artillery shell delivering small nail-like projectiles rather than shrapnel.
Berlin occupation zones	At the end of World War II, the Allies (the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) divided Berlin, Germany, into zones that each country was to occupy.
Big Four	Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China
Big Three	Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain
bipolar world	The balance of power after World War II and during the Cold War, when half of the Northern Hemisphere was controlled by the United States and capitalist democracies and the other half by the Soviet Union and communist states.
blacklist	A list of persons who are under government suspicion for possible illegal activities.
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

boat people	After the Vietnam War, Vietnamese refugees by the hundreds and thousands fled their homeland on crowded fishing boats, makeshift vessels, and unseaworthy craft.
body count	The number of enemy killed, wounded, or captured during an operation.
brinkmanship	The action of escalation of a hazardous situation in an effort to force an opponent to back down.
bug out	To retreat rapidly and in panic without orders or authority when confronted with an advancing enemy and usually leaving all weapons and equipment behind; the opposite of an orderly, organized, and authorized withdrawal or relocation.
bush war	Bush wars, which are typically fought in the bush regions (wilderness areas replete with dense trees or shrubs and inhabited by people as well as wild animals) of Africa, are conflicts fought with guerrilla tactics.
CAC	Combined action company. Organized by the U.S. Marine Corps beginning in August 1965, the CACs were composed of a Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon, a Marine rifle squad, and a medical corpsman.
cai táng	Vietnamese practice of ancestor veneration. Traditionally, especially before 1954, about three to five years after they had been temporarily buried, the remains of a dead relative would be exhumed, washed with scented alcohol, and reburied in a permanent grave. The remains might even be moved to another grave, at a site believed to bring success and luck to the dead person's descendants.
CAS	close air support
Catonsville Nine	The Catonsville Nine, a group of religious antiwar activists, led a famous protest against the Vietnam War.
CBO	combined bomber offensive
CBU	cluster bomb unit
cease-fire	A cease-fire, which occurs during times of war, may involve a partial or temporary cessation of hostilities. A cease-fire can also involve a general armistice or a total cessation of all hostilities.
CGN	guided missile cruiser with nuclear power
chaplains	Military officers who tend to the spiritual, moral, and physical needs of troops in the field and in camp; pastors in uniform.
Charlie	One of the many slang names for Communist troops; military communications code word for the letter "C"; a shortened form of Victor Charlie (VC, for Viet Cong).
Checkpoint Charlie	Border crossing point between West and East Berlin during the period of the Cold War.
cheka	political police of Russia
chicken plate	Bulletproof breastplate worn by helicopter crews.
CHICOM	Chinese communist
CHNAVADVGRP	Chief, Naval Advisory Group Vietnam (U.S. Navy)
chogey	Slang term meaning to leave an area: "cut a chogey." Originally a Korean War term that was also used in Vietnam.
Christian Democrats	Espousing such Christian values as compassion and tolerance,

	Christian Democrats began to form political parties in Western Europe after World War II, particularly in Germany and Italy.
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps (U.S.)
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Central Intelligence Agency project that combined self-defense functions with economic programs to win the support of the civilian population. Carried out among Montagnards by U.S. Army Special Forces.
CinC	commander in chief
CINCFE	Commander in chief, Far East. Commander of U.S. forces in the Far East.
CINCMED	commander in chief of the Mediterranean
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Command. Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia.
CINCUNC	Commander in chief, United Nations Command. Commander of United Nations military forces in Korea.
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
civil affairs/ military government	Those activities of a commander that embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area (civil affairs) or occupied country or area (military government).
civilian control of the military	Civilian control of the military was established by the framers of the U.S. Constitution as an alternative to the British system in which the king alone controlled the military.
CLAA	U.S. Navy designation for an antiaircraft cruiser.
Claymore	U.S. M18 antipersonnel mine. Light, easily transported, and highly directional. Spraying more than 100 steel balls in a 40-degree arc, it could be hand-detonated or emplaced to fire electronically (command detonated).
clear and hold	Military operation used by U.S. and Republic of Vietnam troops in the pacification program in which troops encircled, captured, and searched an area, clearing it of communist forces; South Vietnamese troops then usually held the area.
containment	A primary strategy of the United States during the Cold War in which political, economic, and military force was used to prevent the spread of communism through the world.
CORDS	Civilian Operations and Revolutionary (later changed to Rural) Development Support. Organized all civilian agencies in Vietnam within the military chain of command. Successor to the Office of Civilian Operations (OCO).
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam (Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam). Communist military headquarters representing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) Lao Dong Party Central Committee in South Vietnam.
coup	Also known as a coup d'état, a coup is a sudden, decisive use of force in politics, especially in terms of a violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group, often assisted by the military.

court-martial	To subject to a military trial with a court consisting of a board of commissioned officers.
curtain fire	Artillery tactic of making a continuous wall of fire to seal off an area.
CVN	Aircraft carrier, nuclear propulsion.
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
death squads	Clandestine and usually irregular organizations, often paramilitary in nature, that carry out extrajudicial executions and other violent acts against clearly defined individuals or groups of people.
D.C. Nine	On 22 March 1969, nine members of the radical Catholic Left, most of whom were Catholic priests, staged a raid on Dow Chemical offices in Washington, D.C., to protest the Vietnam War.
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program	The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program was used during the Persian Gulf War to help aircrews know which targets were clear and which were obscured by clouds or other weather phenomena.
defense perimeter	A defense without an exposed flank, consisting of forces deployed along the perimeter of a defended area.
détente	The relaxation of tension between two superpowers, through the theory of mutually assured destruction.
Dirty War	A period of strict repression during Argentina's 1976–1983 military dictatorship in which the right-wing regime contained popular opposition by brutally striking out against all alleged subversives, including leftist rebels, students, workers, and union leaders.
disarmament	The removal or drastic reduction by nation-states of major weapons.
dislocation	The displacement of populations of people from one geographic location to another, most often caused by sudden and extreme situations of a political, military, and/or economic nature.
Distant Early Warning Line	The Distant Early Warning Line, also called the DEW Line, was a chain of radar stations in the Arctic region of North America that were built during the Cold War between 1954 and 1957.
DMSP	Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
DMZ	Demilitarized zone. For example, the 5-mile-wide buffer zone along the demarcation line, just below the 17th Parallel, that was established in the 1954 Geneva Accords to provisionally divide North and South Vietnam pending elections that were to have been held in 1956. According to the Geneva Accords, there were to be no military forces, supplies, or equipment within the zone during its temporary existence.
DOD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
donut dollies	Nickname for workers in the American Red Cross Supplemental Recreation Activities Overseas (SRAO) program in Vietnam that provided a variety of recreational activities for American troops. The women were so-named because they often dispensed donuts and coffee to the troops, especially in the field. The women also

	assisted in hospitals and provided games and conversation in the field.
door-gunner	Soldier who fired from the open door of a helicopter, a hazardous position usually filled by volunteers.
draft evasion	The most common form of protest against the draft, or compulsory military enrollment sanctioned by the government.
Eagle Flight Special	U.S. helicopter assault force used to observe communist positions, react to emergencies, and conduct raid and ambush missions.
economic warfare	Compelling an enemy to submit either by direct action against its economic basis or indirectly through blockade or boycott.
E&E	escape and evasion
electronic warfare	The use of the electromagnetic spectrum to gain knowledge of the presence and movement of an opposing force and also to deny any opposing force the use of that spectrum.
ER/ELINT	electronic reconnaissance/ intelligence
ESM	electronic support measures
espionage	Espionage, or the practice of spying to learn the secrets of other nations or organizations, has always been an important component of any military operation.
estimated position	Vessel's position advanced on the chart from a previous fixed or observed position.
ethics of war	Rules, principles, or virtues applied to warfare.
ethnic cleansing	A policy by which government, military, or guerrilla forces remove from their homes members of different ethnic communities considered to be enemies of the country.
EUSAK	Eighth U.S. Army in Korea
executive officer	The executive officer (XO) is the second in command of a vessel, squadron, etc.
FAC	Forward air controller. Low-flying spotter planes identified opposition positions and called the FAC, who in turn ordered air strikes against these positions.
fallout shelter	Structures developed to allow the users to survive a nuclear attack and its subsequent radioactive fallout.
FDC	fire direction center
FDO	fire direction officer
FEAF	Far East Air Force. Primary U.S. Air Force component serving in Korea during the Korean War.
FEC	Far East Command (today FECOM)
FECOM	Far East Command
firebase	A small artillery base used for patrol and to support ground operations, usually temporary.
firefight	A brief and violent exchange of small-arms fire between two opposing units, rather than combat action between two larger forces, during an assault.
first-strike capability	The ability of a country to launch an overwhelming surprise attack on another country.
FISCOORD	Fire support coordinator for artillery at company, battalion, or brigade level. Usually the senior artilleryman present who prepared fire plans and integrated all indirect-fire weapons.
five o'clock follies	Five o'clock follies was the derisive epithet appended by the media during the Vietnam War

	to daily media briefings by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Office of Information, at the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon.
flashback	A strong recurrence of memory, usually a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
flotilla	A grouping of warships, distinctive from a fleet by its smaller size.
Force Recon	The U.S. Marine Corps' elite reconnaissance element.
foreign aid	Foreign aid, the granting of assistance to other countries, may include donations of food or money, development loans, technical help, or military support.
fps	feet per second
fragging	Euphemism introduced during the Vietnam War to describe the intentional causing of friendly casualties from weapons in American hands.
freedom birds	Nickname given to the airplanes taking U.S. soldiers home after their tour of duty.
freedom schools	Freedom schools were established in the early and mid-1960s, particularly in Mississippi and Alabama, by young student civil rights activists to build awareness among African Americans as to what could be done about oppression.
friendly fire	Friendly fire describes the incidence of casualties incurred by military forces in active combat operations as a result of being fired upon by their own or allied forces.
FSB	fire support base
furlough	Any leave granted to a soldier by his superior. A soldier on furlough left his arms and accoutrements behind. He carried furlough papers detailing his leave dates, assignment, and return to duty date. Since photos were noticeably absent, such furlough papers gave a physical description of the man.
GHQ	general headquarters
glasnost	"Openness" in Russian. A policy developed by Mikhail Gorbachev of scaling back government secrecy and encouraging cooperation with the United States.
global positioning system (GPS)	A series of satellites that broadcast navigational signals by ultra-precise atomic clocks, providing accurate positioning.
GLONASS	Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
GPES	Ground proximity extraction system. A system whereby a long hook attached to cargo in a C-130 cargo plane would catch an arrest wire on the runway, pulling the cargo from the plane. Used during air resupply to land loads, as during the siege of Khe Sanh.
guerrilla	A type of limited warfare or a person who participates in guerrilla warfare.
gulag	A forced labor camp in the Soviet Union, often used for political prisoners.
hearts and minds	In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson said, "So we must be ready to fight in Vietnam, but the ultimate victory will depend on the hearts and minds of the people who actually live out there." The U.S. government tried to win the loyalty and trust

	of the Vietnamese through various pacification programs that included the provision of civic improvements and security from Viet Cong harassment with the objective of encouraging villagers to fight against the communists.
hegemony	The dominance of one nation over other nations, based on the dominant nation's transfer of core values and basic societal institutions, not through military conquest.
Hoa Lo Prison	The Hoa Lo Prison, nicknamed the Hanoi Hilton, was the best-known and most notorious of the camps or prisons housing U.S. prisoners of war in the Hanoi area.
hop tac	Vietnamese for "cooperation." Name of an unsuccessful 1964 pacification program concentrated around Saigon.
HQ	headquarters
HUD	head-up display
hull	Actual body of a vessel. Excludes superstructure, rigging, masts, and rudder.
HUMINT	human intelligence
hydrogen bomb	In 1950, the hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) was created under the direction of U.S. President Harry Truman in response to the growing threat of the cold war.
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICSC	International Commission for Supervision and Control. Established at the 1954 Geneva Conference to supervise implementation of the Geneva Accords, it consisted of delegates from three countries not involved in the conflict but nonetheless representing the different points of view: India (neutralist), Canada (Western), and Poland (communist). Later, Indonesia replaced India in a revamped version of the ICSC known as the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) mandated by the 1973 Paris Peace Accords.
IDSCS	Initial Defense Satellite Communications System
intelligence community	The intelligence community comprises the government agencies charged with gathering information (intelligence) about other countries' military abilities and general intentions in order to secure U.S. foreign policy goals.
international waters	All waters apart from nations' territorial waters.
Iron Curtain	A term popularized by Winston Churchill to describe the division between the Soviet Union and its related states and the countries of Western Europe.
Iron Triangle	Area between the Thi Tinh and Saigon Rivers dominated by the Viet Cong.
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
IRPCS	International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (or Colregs by U.S. Coast Guard); internationally agreed rules of the road, designed to ensure safety at sea. Applies to all vessels on the high seas.
IVS	International Voluntary Services. A private, nonprofit organization that served as a model for the Peace Corps and that first came to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in 1957.

	Funded primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), support also came from the RVN government during the early years. IVS workers were required to study Vietnamese and received instruction in Vietnamese culture. They signed up for a two-year stay in-country, with assignments at the village level ranging from agricultural development to the teaching of English. IVS saw its function as humanitarian and divorced from USAID political objectives. Saigon ceased approving IVS projects in 1971.
Japanese miracle	The extraordinary economic recovery and success of Japan shortly after the end of World War II.
jeep	quarter-ton truck (slang term for a general-purpose truck, or GP)
jet engine	An internal combustion engine in which hot exhaust gases generated by burning fuel combine with air, causing a rearward thrust of jet fluid and propelling an aircraft.
jihad	Islamic term that means "holy war."
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
junta	Rule by a group of military officers who came to national power through a military coup.
JUSPAO	Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office; created in 1965 to take charge of both relations with the news media and psychological warfare operations.
JUWTF	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force; composed of unconventional warfare personnel from the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Navy.
K rations	U.S. Army field rations
KCOMZ	Korean communications zone. In U.S. Army doctrine, a communications zone is the specified area behind the front lines where supply and administrative facilities could be established and operated to relieve the frontline commander of responsibility for functions not directly related to combat operations.
KGB	Komitet Gossudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Committee for State Security), the Soviet secret police.
KHz	kilohertz, or 1,000 cycles per second
KIA	killed in action
kibbutz	An agricultural settlement organized with collective principles, often in Israel.
Kit Carson scouts	Former Viet Cong or People's Army of Vietnam soldiers who were used as scouts by U.S. units.
KKK	Khmer Kampuchea Krom. Anti-communist faction, loosely allied with the Khmer Serai, seeking autonomy for Khmer Krom people living in the Mekong River Delta of South Vietnam in return for military services. During the 1960s, Khmer Krom soldiers made up numerous ethnic regular and irregular force battalions within the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).
laws of war	International laws, enforced sometimes by nations after war and sometimes by commanders in battle, governing both the decision to engage in war and the manner of its conduct,

	particularly the forms of violence used, the definition of combatants, the treatment of prisoners, and the treatment of neutrals and noncombatants.
lima sites	Primitive airstrips in Laos used by U.S. forces for covert actions.
LOCs	lines of communication
LOH	Light observation helicopter (pronounced LOOCH).
long-range torpedo	Homing torpedoes having speeds up to 75 knots and ranges between 40,000 and 60,000 yards; driven by electric batteries of hydrogen peroxide engines, they leave no wake.
LORAN	long-range electronic navigation
low-intensity conflict	A system of military engagement developed during the Cold War.
M-16	U.S. assault rifle. Incurred great controversy, as early models tended to jam in combat. Troops initially preferred the M14, a magazine-fed Garand-action, U.S. rifle issued from 1957 until 1967.
MACV-SOG	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group
MAD	mutual assured destruction
mad minute	Strategy used by U.S. forces in an effort to force or "trip" a Viet Cong or People's Army of Vietnam ambush or assault. Just prior to daybreak, all forces within a position would open fire into the area surrounding the position, utilizing all weapons.
martial law	Temporary military governance of a civilian population when the civil government has become unable to sustain order.
massive retaliation	As a result of the frustrating consequences of the Korean War, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to increase the production of nuclear weapons.
mayday	Internationally recognized radio distress signal; may be sent only in a case of imminent danger. From French *m'aidez* (help me).
Medevac	Acronym combining the words "medical" and "evacuation"; term applied to the movement of casualties from the battlefield to more secure locations for immediate medical attention.
MEO	middle-earth orbit
mercenaries	Hired professional soldiers who fight for a state or entity without regard to political interests or issues.
MGS	Mobile Ground System
MGT	Mobile Ground Terminal
MHC	minehunter, coastal
MHz	megahertz, or 1 million cycles per second
MIDAS	Missile Defense Alarm System
MiG Alley	A 6,500-square-mile airspace in northwestern Korea, site of the most intense jet aircraft combat throughout the war.
militarism	The view that military power and efficiency is the supreme ideal of the state.
military base	A variety of military installations can be considered military bases.
military justice	The military justice system, which is responsible for disciplining members of the armed forces, operates under a code of law that is separate from civilian law.
Military Sealift Command	The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is the U.S. Navy force dedicated to providing strategic mobility in support of wartime

	and peacetime national security objectives.
MIRACL	Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser
MIRV	multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
missile gap	The difference in the number of nuclear missiles between the Soviet Union and the United States.
mobilization	Mobilization, in war or national defense, is the organization of the armed forces of a nation for active military service in time of war or other national emergency.
Montagnard	French term for indigenous Vietnamese mountain people. Often shortened to "Yard."
mopping up	Mission assigned to troops following the first assault wave; their job was to clear pockets of enemy resistance bypassed earlier.
MOS	military occupational specialty
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile
mujahideen	guerrilla fighters, especially in Afghanistan and Iran
mutual assured destruction	The understanding that if one of the superpowers fired its nuclear arsenal at the other, the reciprocation would lead to the completion destruction of both countries.
NAG	Naval Advisory Group. Former U.S. Navy section in the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam (until May 1964). In April 1965 it became an operational naval command.
napalm	Made of gasoline thickened to a gel, napalm was used by the U.S. military during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War in bombs and flamethrowers.
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nautical mile	Unit of measurement at sea, equal to 6,076 feet.
NAVSTAR	Navigation Satellite Time and Ranging
NBAP	Night Bomber Aviation Regiment (Soviet Union)
NLF	National Liberation Front; officially National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV, Viet Cong).
Nobel Prize	The Nobel Foundation was established in 1900 and awarded its first annual prize in 1901.
no-fire line	U.S. fire-control measure. A designated point on a map beyond which no indirect-fire weapons or air assets could be employed without permission from the sector commander.
nonaligned movement	The nonaligned movement was initiated by many third world nations during the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to steer a course of neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union in the atmosphere of the Cold War. These countries felt that they had nothing to gain from entering direct alliances with either of the two superpowers, although they frequently courted both sides in attempts to gain greater amounts of economic and military assistance. The nonaligned movement first met at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, and international meetings were held periodically over the next two decades, but the neutral nations were never able to

	formulate any cohesive policies because of the wide variety of member countries. With the end of the Cold War, the nonaligned movement lost any importance that it once held in international affairs.
nonproliferation	Collective term used to describe efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction short of military means.
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
oa	Abbreviaton for "overall," used as a descriptor of the length of a vessel; thus, a ship that is 300 feet in length (oa) measures 300 feet from the front of the bow to the end of the stern.
occupied territories	Two of the four areas seized by Israel from Arab states in the Six-Day War in 1967.
paramilitary organizations	Unofficial groups organized along military lines yet lacking the traditional role or legitimization of conventional or genuine military organizations.
Patriot missile	Built for the U.S. government by Raytheon, the Patriot tactical air defense missile system became an overnight sensation during the Persian Gulf War for shooting down incoming Iraqi Scud missiles in Saudi Arabia and Israel.
PBR	river patrol boat
peaceful coexistence	An expression that describes the act of living together without hostility, peaceful coexistence is often a foreign policy goal of nations that wish to avoid war.
perestroika	"Restructuring" in Russian; an economic policy developed by Mikhail Gorbachev to rebuild the Soviet Union.
periscope	Prismatic telescope fitted on submarines and used to observe surface vessels and other objects while the submarine is submerged.
periscope depth	Submersion of a submarine so that only its periscope is above sea level.
pinko	Slang term meaning a communist sympathizer that came into usage after World War II. A communist would be called a red.
post-traumatic stress disorder	Term developed to describe and treat stress reactions in Vietnam War veterans.
POW	prisoner of war
procurement	The act of purchasing, procurement often refers to the government's purchasing of military equipment or other supplies.
propellants	Compounds used to move a projectile from the firing device to the target.
provost marshal	chief of military police
psychological operations	The use of psychology and propaganda by military units to persuade target audiences to adopt at least some of their views and possibly to modify their behavior.
PSYOPS	psychological warfare operations
PSYWAR	psychological warfare
punji stake	A sharpened bamboo stake covered with feces or poison and placed at the bottom of a pit, underwater, or along a trail to be stepped on by troops; an effective physical and psychological weapon.
PWO	Psychological warfare officers. U.S. Army officers attached to Eighth Army headquarters who decided on suitable psychological warfare targets.

rearmament	The process a nation undertakes to rebuild its arsenal of weapons that were exhausted during a time of war or other military action.
recon	Short for "reconnaissance." Small recon patrols were used to get information about enemy troop strengths, movements, etc.; also called recce.
rest camp	Rear area for recuperation and light duties; also a sort of holding area before soldiers left on leave.
restricted fire line	U.S. fire-control measure. A designated point on a map beyond which targets could be engaged only with indirect-fire weapons or air assets with permission from tactical headquarters or when direct contact was in progress.
revetment	A makeshift bulwark to brace trench walls, usually consisting of fascines or sand bags.
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RSFSR	Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, official title of Soviet Russia.
sabotage	The destruction of military equipment in order to hinder the defense of an enemy nation.
Saigon commando	Derogatory slang term given by combat troops to soldiers assigned to rear areas. Often soldiers assigned to these billets wore the popular boonie hats and camouflage uniforms denied to frontline forces.
salient	A military position that extends into the position of the enemy.
salvo	The simultaneous firing of a number of guns.
SAM	surface-to-air missile
sanctions	Activities taken against a nation by other nations to pressure them into a change of policy. There are political, economic, and military sanctions.
satellite state	A country that is under the domination or influence of another. The term was used to describe the status of the East European states during the Cold War.
SCAP	supreme commander, Allied powers (title given to General Douglas MacArthur as head of the occupation forces in Japan)
scorched earth policy	A policy of devastating all land and buildings while advancing or retreating in order to leave nothing available to the enemy.
Seabees	U.S. Navy construction battalion.
SEAL	Sea Air Land. Elite U.S. Navy unconventional warfare teams.
SFHQ	Special Forces Headquarters
shaped charge	An explosive charge that focused its energy in a particular direction.
shrapnel	An artillery shell containing metal balls fused to explode in the air above the enemy troops; shell fragments from an exploding shell.
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOG	Studies and Observations Group. Operating out of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, this organization carried out clandestine operations, such as road-watch teams in Laos, in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency.
SOP	standing operating procedure (order to be followed automatically in specified circumstances)

sortie	One flight by one aircraft.
SRBM	short-range ballistic missile
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam. North and South Vietnam reunified in 1975.
SSBN	ballistic missile submarine (nuclear).
SSN	nuclear submarine (attack)
Stavka	Russian Army Supreme Headquarters (general staff), equivalent to GHQ, OHL, and GQG in other armies
STC	Satellite Test Center
Stealth fighter	Military aircraft with unconventional shapes designed primarily to absorb incoming enemy radar beams and therefore reduce detection.
STOL	short takeoff and landing
SVAF	South Vietnamese Air Force
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TBM	tactical ballistic missile
TDY	Temporary duty; usually a six-month assignment.
teach-ins	Teach-ins, which combined protest with education, originated during the Vietnam War as a form of antiwar demonstration.
TEREC	tactical electronic reconnaissance sensor
TOA	time of arrival
toe poppers	Slang for communist antipersonnel mines designed to maim (break a foot or blow off toes).
TOT	time on target (artillery term)
tour of duty	The 365 days a soldier in the U.S. Army spent in Vietnam; for Marines the period was thirteen months.
TsAGI	Tsentral'nyi Aero-Gidrodinamicheskii Institut (Central Aerodynamics and Hydrodynamics Institute, Soviet Union)
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UCAV	uninhabited combat aerial vehicle
UDT	underwater demolition team (U.S.)
USO	United Service Organizations (U.S.)
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UXB	unexploded bomb
V/STOL	vertical/short takeoff and landing
Velvet Revolution	The intellectual-led revolt that took place in late 1989 in what was then Czechoslovakia and resulted in the ousting of the communist regime that had been in place since the end of World War II and the subsequent creation of a democratic system.
Victor Charlie	Military communications code words for VC (Viet Cong). (*See* Charlie)
Vietnamization	In 1970, President Richard Nixon used the process of Vietnamization, or the replacement of American troops with South Vietnamese troops, to transfer military responsibility to South Vietnam.
VSTOL	very short takeoff and landing
VTOL	vertical takeoff and landing
VVAW	Vietnam Veterans Against the War
wag the dog	An expression that can refer to a president's attempt to divert attention from an unpopular domestic situation by waging war or military attacks abroad.
war bride	A newly married or soon to be married woman whose husband or fiancé is serving in the military during wartime.
war crimes	Violations of the laws and customs of war entailing individual

	criminal responsibility directly under international law.
War on Poverty	The War on Poverty, a central component of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society program, aimed to reduce and eventually to eliminate poverty in the United States.
war reparations	The demands for restitution usually imposed by the victorious party as part of the peace negotiations at the end of a war.
WIA	wounded in action
Wise Men	A select group of senior advisors to President Lyndon Johnson.
Yankee Station	An operating area off the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea used by the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet Attack Carrier Strike Force (Task Force 77). Air strikes against North Vietnam were launched from Yankee Station; code name for the Gulf of Tonkin.
ZEL	zero-length launcher
zero day	Term applied to the date of an attack or a major operation.
zero hour	Term applied to the exact time of an attack, information to be kept as long as possible from the participating troops.

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Cold War Websites

Important Websites for Study of the Cold War

Cold War International History Project
www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409

The Cold War International History Project provides documents, news about the Cold War, information about upcoming conferences, and access to the archives of various countries that were important during the Cold War.

Cold War Museum
www.coldwar.org

The Cold War Museum provides access to news stories and commentary about the Cold War, documents, and a detailed timeline of many of the important events of the era.

Smithsonian Institution
www.si.edu

The Smithsonian Institution has numerous exhibitions about important periods of American history during the Cold War, from the space race to the Civil Rights sit-ins.

Cold War Files
coldwarfiles.org

Cold War Files has short biographies of many of the most important decision-makers during the Cold War, as well as downloadable versions of many of the most important documents of the period.

National Museum of the United States Air Force
www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/

This national museum provides detailed information about important aircraft during the Cold War, information about museum tours, and galleries of important people, weapons, and more.

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
www.reagan.utexas.edu

This presidential library is an exhaustive compilation of the public papers of President Ronald Reagan, in addition to the documents of his governorship and a gallery of Reagan memorabilia.

WWW-VL History: The Cold War History 1945–1991
gpweb.us

This website has hundreds of links to Cold War chronologies, documents, commentaries, images, and other resources.

National Security Archive
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

The National Security Archive has important documents, advisory board transcripts, collections of primary sources, and commentaries.

Central Intelligence Agency
www.cia.gov

The Central Intelligence Agency gives access to essays about the Cold War, intelligence papers, and commentary about Cold War events as they happened.

Open Society Archives
www.osa.ceu.hu

The Open Society Archives allows access to the Hungarian archives during the Cold War and links to the archives of many former Soviet countries.

U.S. Military Operations
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/coldwar-ops.htm

Provides information about many of the most important military operations during the Cold War in addition to a great deal of information about current U.S. conflicts.

Organization of American Historians
www.oah.org

The Organization of American Historians website gives free access to articles about the Cold War from their *OAH Magazine of History*.

United Nations
www.un.org

The United Nations website provides access to scholarly articles, transcripts of speeches to the United Nations, secretary-general reports, and more.

State Department
www.state.gov

The U.S. State Department gives access to presidential public speeches, daily briefings, and documents important to the Cold War era.

Categorical Index

Individuals

Abdullah, King of Jordan (1882–1951)
Abel, Rudolf (1903–1971)
Abrams, Creighton Williams (1914–1974)
Acheson, Dean Gooderham (1893–1971)
Adams, Gerard, Jr. (1948–)
Adenauer, Konrad (1876–1967)
Aideed, Mohamed Farah (1934–1996)
Albert II, King of Belgium (1934–)
Alia, Ramiz (1925–)
Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973)
Alsop, Joseph Wright (1910–1989)
Amin, Idi (1924?–2003)
Andreotti, Giulio (1919–)
Andropov, Yuri (1914–1984)
Antall, József (1932–1993)
Antonescu, Ion (1882–1946)
Aquino, Benigno, Jr. (1932–1983)
Aquino, Corazon (1933–)
Arafat, Yasir (1929–2004)
Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971)
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (1953–)
Assad, Hafez (1930–2000)
Attlee, Clement Richard, 1st Earl (1883–1967)
Aung San Suu Kyi (1945–)
Auriol, Vincent (1884–1966)
Ayub Khan, Muhammad (1907–1974)
Baker, James Addison, III (1930–)
Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio (1906–2002)
Ball, George Wildman (1909–1994)
Bandaranaike, Sirimavo (1916–2000)
Barre, Mohammed Siyad (1919?–1995)
Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio (1901–1973)
Baudouin, King of Belgium (1930–1993)
Beatrix, Queen of the Netherlands (1938–)
Begin, Menachem (1913–1992)
Benediktsson, Bjarni (1908–1970)
Beneš, Edvard (1884–1948)
Ben-Gurion, David (1886–1973)
Beran, Josef (1888–1969)
Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953)
Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984)
Berman, Jakub (1901–1984)
Betancourt, Rómulo (1908–1981)
Bevan, Aneurin (1897–1960)
Bevin, Ernest (1881–1951)
Bhumipol Adulyadej, King of Thailand (1927–)
Bhutto, Benazir (1953–)
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali (1928–1979)
Bidault, Georges (1899–1983)
Bierut, Boleslaw (1892–1956)
Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr. (1909–1994)
Blum, Léon (1872–1950)
Bo Yibo (1908–2007)
Bodnäraş, Emil (1904–1976)
Bohlen, Charles Eustis (1904–1974)
Bokassa, Jean-Bédel (1921–1996)
Bonner, Yelena Georgievna (1923–)
Bosch Gaviño, Juan (1909–2001)
Botha, Pieter Willem (1916–2006)
Botha, Roelof Frederik (1932–)
Bourguiba, Habib (1903–2000)
Bradley, Omar Nelson (1893–1981)

Brandt, Willy (1913–1992)
Brătianu, Gheorghe Ion (1898–1953)
Braun, Wernher von (1912–1977)
Brezhnev, Leonid (1906–1982)
Browder, Earl Russell (1891–1973)
Brown, Harold (1927–)
Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este (1898–1977)
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1928–)
Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich (1895–1975)
Bunche, Ralph Johnson (1904–1971)
Bundy, McGeorge (1919–1996)
Bundy, William Putnam (1917–2000)
Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy (1911–1963)
Bush, George Herbert Walker (1924–)
Byrnes, James Francis (1879–1972)
Caetano, Marcelo José das Neves (1906–1980)
Callaghan, James (1912–2005)
Camus, Albert (1913–1960)
Carlucci, Frank Charles (1930–)
Carrero Blanco, Luis (1903–1973)
Carrillo, Santiago (1915–)
Carter, James Earl, Jr. (1924–)
Casey, William Joseph, Jr. (1913–1987)
Castro, Fidel (1926–)
Catroux, Georges (1877–1969)
Cavaco Silva, Aníbal António (1939–)
Ceauşescu, Nicolae (1918–1989)
Chambers, Whittaker (1901–1961)
Chang, John Myon (1899–1966)
Chen Yi (1901–1972)
Cheney, Richard B. (1941–)
Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (1911–1985)
Chirac, Jacques (1932–)
Churchill, Winston (1874–1965)
Clark, Mark Wayne (1896–1984)
Clay, Lucius DuBignon (1897–1978)
Clayton, William Lockhart (1880–1966)
Clifford, Clark McAdams (1906–1998)
Cohn, Roy Marcus (1927–1986)
Cohn-Bendit, Daniel Marc (1945–)
Colby, William Egan (1920–1996)
Collins, Joseph Lawton (1896–1987)
Constantine II, King of Greece (1940–)
Cousins, Norman (1915–1990)
Couve de Murville, Jacques Maurice (1907–1999)
Craxi, Benedetto (1934–2000)
Cunhal, Álvaro (1913–2005)
Curcio, Renato (1941–)
Dalai Lama (1935–)
Debray, Régis (1940–)
De Gasperi, Alcide (1881–1954)
de Gaulle, Charles (1890–1970)
Demirel, Süleyman (1924–)
Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)
DePuy, William Eugene (1919–1992)
De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975)
Dewey, Thomas Edmund (1902–1971)
Dillon, Clarence Douglas (1909–2003)
Dimitrov, Georgi Mikhailovich (1892–1949)
Djilas, Milován (1911–1995)
Dobrynin, Anatoly Fyodorovich (1919–)
Doe, Samuel Kanyon (1951–1990)
Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander Frederick (1903–1995)
Drăghici, Alexandru (1913–1993)
Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992)
Duclos, Jacques (1896–1975)
Dulles, Allen Welsh (1893–1969)
Dulles, Eleanor Lansing (1895–1996)
Dulles, John Foster (1888–1959)
Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)
Duvalier, François (1907–1971)
Eanes, António (1935–)
Eden, Sir Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon (1897–1977)
Einstein, Albert (1879–1955)
Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890–1969)
Elizabeth II, Queen of Great Britain (1926–)
Ély, Paul (1897–1975)
Erhard, Ludwig (1897–1977)
Erlander, Tage (1901–1985)
Faber, Mient Jan (1940–)
Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia (1921–2005)
Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia (1905–1975)
Farouk II, King of Egypt (1920–1965)
Faure, Edgar Jean (1908–1988)
Fermi, Enrico (1901–1954)
Figl, Leopold (1902–1965)
Figueres, Ferrer José (1906–1990)
Fonda, Jane (1937–)
Foot, Michael (1913–)
Ford, Gerald Rudolph (1913–2006)
Forrestal, James Vincent (1892–1949)
Franco, Francisco (1892–1975)
Frei Montalva, Eduardo (1911–1982)
Fuchs, Klaus (1911–1988)

Fujiyama Aiichiro (1897–1985)
Fukuda Takeo (1905–1995)
Fulbright, James William (1905–1995)
Gagarin, Yuri (1934–1968)
Gaitskell, Hugh (1906–1963)
Galbraith, John Kenneth (1908–2006)
Gandhi, Indira (1917–1984)
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)
Gandhi, Rajiv (1944–1991)
Gavin, James Maurice (1907–1990)
Gehlen, Reinhard (1902–1979)
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich (1927–)
George VI, King of Great Britain (1895–1952)
Gerő, Ernő (Singer, Erno) (1898–1980)
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe (1901–1965)
Gierek, Edward (1913–2001)
Ginsberg, Allen (1926–1997)
Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry (1926–)
Glemp, Józef, Cardinal (1929–)
Glenn, John Herschel, Jr. (1921–)
Goldwater, Barry Morris (1909–1998)
Gomułka, Władyslaw (1905–1982)
González Márquez, Felipe (1942–)
Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich (1931–)
Gorshkov, Sergey Georgyevich (1910–1988)
Gottwald, Klement (1896–1953)
Gouzenko, Igor (1919–1982)
Gromyko, Andrey (1909–1989)
Grósz, Károly (1930–1996)
Grotewohl, Otto (1894–1964)
Groza, Petru (1884–1958)
Gruber, Karl (1909–1995)
Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto (1928–1967)
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr. (1924–)
Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia (1892–1975)
Hallstein, Walter (1901–1982)
Hammarskjöld, Dag (1905–1961)
Harriman, William Averell (1891–1986)
Hassan II, King of Morocco (1929–1999)
Hatoyama Ichirō (1883–1959)
Havel, Václav (1936–)
Hawke, Robert (1929–)
Healey, Denis (1917–)
Heath, Edward (1916–2005)
Heinemann, Gustav (1899–1976)
Helms, Richard McGarrah (1913–2002)
Herter, Christian Archibald (1895–1966)
Heseltine, Michael (1933–)
Heuss, Theodor (1884–1963)
Hiss, Alger (1904–1996)
Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)
Hoffman, Paul Gray (1891–1974)
Hoffmann, Heinz (1910–1985)
Holt, Harold Edward (1908–1967)
Honecker, Erich (1912–1994)
Hoover, John Edgar (1895–1972)
Hoxha, Enver (1908–1985)
Hua Guofeng (1921–)
Huang Hua (1913–)
Hull, Cordell (1871–1955)
Hurd, Douglas Richard (1930–)
Hurley, Patrick Jay (1883–1963)
Husák, Gustáv (1913–1991)
Hussein, Saddam (1937–)
Hussein I, King of Jordan (1935–1999)
Hu Yaobang (1915–1989)
Ikeda Hayato (1899–1965)
Iliescu, Ion (1930–)
Inönü, Ismet (1884–1973)
Ishibashi Tanzan (1884–1973)
Jagan, Cheddi (1918–1997)
Jakeš, Miloš (1922–)
Jaruzelski, Wojciech (1923–)
Ji Pengfei (1910–2000)
Jiang Jieshi (1887–1975)
Jiang Qing (1914–1991)
Jinnah, Mohamed Ali (1876–1948)
John XXIII, Pope (1881–1963)
John Paul II, Pope (1920–2005)
Johnson, Louis Arthur (1891–1966)
Johnson, Lyndon Baines (1908–1973)
Juan Carlos I, King of Spain (1938–)
Kádár, János (1912–1989)
Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich (1892–1991)
Kaifu Toshiki (1931–)
Kania, Stanisław (1927–)
Kaunda, Kenneth David (1924–)
Kekkonen, Urho (1900–1986)
Kelly, Petra Karin (1947–1992)
Kennan, George Frost (1904–2005)
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald (1917–1963)
Kennedy, Robert Francis (1925–1968)
Kenyatta, Jomo (1889?–1978)
Kerouac, Jean Louis (1922–1969)

Khomeini, Ruhollah (1900–1989)
Khrushchev, Nikita (1894–1971)
Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg (1904–1988)
Kim Dae Jung (1926–)
Kim Il Sung (1912–1994)
Kim Young Sam (1927–)
King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
Kinnock, Neil Gordon (1942–)
Kirkpatrick, Jeane Jordan (1926–2006)
Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987)
Kissinger, Henry (1923–)
Kohl, Helmut (1930–)
Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich (1906–1966)
Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich (1904–1980)
Kovács, Béla (1908–1959)
Kreisky, Bruno (1911–1990)
Krenz, Egon (1937–)
Kubitschek, Juscelino (1902–1976)
Laird, Melvin (1922–)
Landsbergis, Vytautas (1932–)
Lansdale, Edward Geary (1908–1987)
Lattimore, Owen (1900–1989)
Leahy, William Daniel (1875–1959)
Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe (1902–1947)
Le Duc Tho (1911–1990)
LeMay, Curtis Emerson (1906–1990)
Leopold III, King of Belgium (1901–1983)
Le Pen, Jean-Marie (1928–)
Li Peng (1928–)
Li Xiannian (1909–1992)
Liao Chengzhi (1908–1983)
Liberman, Evgenii Grigorevich (1897–1983)
Lie, Trygve (1896–1968)
Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich (1920–)
Li Guangyao
Lin Biao (1907–1971)
Lippmann, Walter (1889–1974)
Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969)
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. (1902–1985)
Lon Nol (1913–1985)
Lovett, Robert Abercrombie (1895–1986)
Luce, Clare Boothe (1903–1987)
Luce, Henry Robinson (1898–1967)
Lumumba, Patrice Emery (1925–1961)
Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich (1898–1976)
MacArthur, Douglas (1880–1964)
Maclean, Donald (1913–1983)
Macmillan, Maurice Harold (1894–1986)
Magsaysay, Ramon (1907–1957)
Maizère, Lothar de (1940–)
Makarios III, Archbishop (1913–1977)
Malan, Daniel François (1874–1959)
Malcolm X (1925–1965)
Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich (1902–1988)
Malik, Jacob Aleksandrovich (1906–1980)
Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich (1898–1967)
Malraux, Georges-André (1901–1976)
Mandela, Nelson (1918–)
Mann, Thomas C. (1912–1999)
Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil, Baron (1867–1951)
Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
Marcos, Ferdinand Edralin (1917–1989)
Markos, Vafiades (1906–1992)
Marshall, George Catlett (1880–1959)
Masaryk, Jan (1886–1948)
Massu, Jacques (1908–2002)
May, Allan Nunn (1911–2003)
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz (1927–)
McCarthy, Eugene Joseph (1916–2005)
McCarthy, Joseph Raymond (1908–1957)
McCloy, John Jay (1895–1989)
McGovern, George Stanley (1922–)
McNamara, Robert Strange (1916–)
Medvedev, Roy Aleksandrovich (1925–)
Medvedev, Zhores Aleksandrovich (1925–)
Meir, Golda (1898–1978)
Menderes, Adnan (1899–1961)
Mendès-France, Pierre (1907–1982)
Mengistu, Haile Mariam (1937–)
Menon, Vengalil Krishnan Krishna (1896–1974)
Menzies, Robert Gordon (1894–1978)
Michael I, King of Romania (1921–)
Miki Takeo (1907–1988)
Mikołajczyk, Stanisław (1901–1966)
Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich (1895–1978)
Milošević, Slobodan (1941–2006)
Mindszenty, József (1892–1975)
Mitterrand, François (1916–1996)
Mobutu, Sese Seko (1930–1997)
Modrow, Hans (1928–)
Mollet, Guy (1905–1975)
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich (1890–1986)
Monnet, Jean (1888–1979)
Moro, Aldo (1916–1978)

Mossadegh, Mohammed (1882–1967)
Mountbatten, Louis, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma (1900–1979)
Mugabe, Robert Gabriel (1924–)
Mulroney, Martin Brian (1939–)
Murphy, Robert Daniel (1894–1978)
Muskie, Edmund Sixtus (1914–1996)
Naguib, Mohammed (1901–1984)
Nagy, Ferenc (1903–1979)
Nagy, Imre (1896–1958)
Nakasone Yasuhiro (1918–)
Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)
Navarre, Henri (1898–1983)
Ne Win (1911–2002)
Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)
Németh, Miklós (1948–)
Nenni, Pietro (1891–1980)
Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963)
Nguyen Cao Ky (1930–)
Nguyen Van Thieu (1923–2001)
Niebuhr, Reinhold (1892–1971)
Nitze, Paul Henry (1907–2004)
Nixon, Richard Milhous (1913–1994)
Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)
Noriega, Manuel (1938–)
Norstad, Lauris (1907–1988)
Nosek, Václav (1892–1955)
Novotný, Antonín (1904–1975)
Nyerere, Julius Kambarage (1922–1999)
Obote, Apollo Milton (1924–2005)
Oppenheimer, Julius Robert (1904–1967)
Orwell, George (1903–1950)
Owen, David (1938–)
Özal, Turgut (1927–1993)
Paasikivi, Juho (1870–1956)
Paisley, Ian (1926–)
Palme, Olof (1927–1986)
Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi (1900–1990)
Papadopoulos, Georgios (1919–1999)
Papagos, Alexander (1883–1955)
Papandreou, Andreas Georgios (1919–1996)
Papandreou, Georgios (1888–1968)
Park Chung-hee (1917–1979)
Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich (1890–1960)
Pauker, Ana Rabinsohn (1893–1960)
Paul VI, Pope (1897–1978)
Pearson, Lester Bowles (1897–1972)
Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)
Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich (1919–1967)
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier (1920–)
Perón, Eva (1919–1952)
Perón, Juan Domingo (1895–1974)
Petrov, Vladimir Mikhailovich (1907–1991)
Pflimlin, Pierre (1907–2000)
Pham Van Dong (1906–2000)
Philby, Harold Adrian Russell (1912–1988)
Picasso, Pablo (1881–1973)
Pieck, Wilhelm (1876–1960)
Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto (1915–2006)
Pius XII, Pope (1876–1958)
Pleven, René Jean (1901–1993)
Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich (1903–1983)
Pol Pot (1928–1998)
Pompidou, Georges (1911–1974)
Powers, Francis Gary (1929–1977)
Qadhafi, Muammar (1942–)
Qian Qichen (1928–)
Qiao Guanhua (1913–1983)
Raab, Julius (1891–1964)
Rabin, Yitzhak (1922–1995)
Rahman, Tunku Abdul (1903–1990)
Rahman, Mujibur (1922–1975)
Rajk, László (1909–1949)
Rákosi, Mátyás (1892–1971)
Rapacki, Adam (1909–1970)
Reagan, Ronald Wilson (1911–2004)
Renner, Karl (1870–1950)
Reuter, Ernst (1889–1953)
Reza Pahlavi, Mohammad (1919–1980)
Rhee, Syngman (1875–1965)
Ridgway, Matthew Bunker (1895–1993)
Rochet, Waldeck (1905–1983)
Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich (1908–1979)
Rogers, William Pierce (1913–2001)
Roh Tae Woo (1932–)
Roosevelt, Eleanor (1884–1962)
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1882–1945)
Rosenberg, Julius (1918–1953)
Rumsfeld, Donald (1932–)
Rusk, Dean (1909–1994)
Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970)
Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr. (1897–1971)
Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich (1929–)
Sadat, Anwar (1918–1981)

Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989)
Salan, Raoul Albin-Louis (1899–1984)
Salazar, António de Oliveira (1889–1970)
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)
Satō Eisaku (1901–1975)
Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro (1934–2002)
Scheel, Walter (1919–)
Schlesinger, James Rodney (1929–)
Schmidt, Helmut (1918–)
Schriever, Bernard Adolf (1910–2005)
Schröder, Gerhard (1910–1989)
Schumacher, Kurt (1895–1952)
Schuman, Robert (1886–1963)
Schweitzer, Albert (1875–1965)
Shehu, Mehmet (1913–1981)
Sherman, Forrest Percival (1896–1951)
Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–)
Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887–1957)
Shultz, George Pratt (1920–)
Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)
Smith, Ian Douglas (1919–)
Smith, Walter Bedell (1895–1961)
Smuts, Jan Christian (1870–1950)
Soares, Mário (1924–)
Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich (1897–1968)
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr (1918–)
Somoza Debayle, Anastasio (1925–1980)
Somoza García, Anastasio (1896–1956)
Song Meiling (1897–2003)
Song Qingling (1892–1981)
Souvanna Phouma, Prince (1901–1984)
Souvannaphong, Prince (1909–1995)
Spaak, Paul-Henri (1899–1972)
Spinola, António de (1910–1996)
Stalin, Josef (1879–1953)
Stepinac, Aloysius, Archbishop (1898–1960)
Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr. (1900–1949)
Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II (1900–1965)
Stimson, Henry Lewis (1867–1950)
Stratemeyer, George Edward (1890–1969)
Strauss, Franz Josef (1915–1988)
Strijdom, Johannes Gerhadus (1893–1958)
Suárez González, Adolfo (1932–)
Suharto (1921–)
Sukarno (1901–1970)
Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich (1902–1982)
Svoboda, Ludvík (1895–1979)
Swiatlo, Józef (1915–1985)
Taft, Robert Alphonso (1889–1953)
Tanaka Kakuei (1918–1993)
Tanner, Väinö Alfred (1881–1966)
Taylor, Maxwell Davenport (1901–1987)
Teller, Edward (1908–2003)
Templer, Sir Gerald (1898–1979)
Thatcher, Margaret (1925–)
Thompson, Sir Robert (1916–1992)
Thorez, Maurice (1900–1964)
Tildy, Zoltán (1889–1961)
Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)
Todorov, Stanko (1920–1976)
Tökés, László (1952–)
Tomášek, František (1899–1992)
Touré, Ahmed Sékou (1922–1984)
Trudeau, Pierre (1919–2000)
Trujillo, Rafael Leónidas (1891–1961)
Truman, Harry S. (1884–1972)
Tuđman, Franjo (1922–1999)
U Nu (1907–1995)
U Thant (1909–1974)
Ulbricht, Walter (1893–1973)
Vance, Cyrus Roberts (1917–2002)
Vandenberg, Hoyt Sanford (1899–1954)
Van Fleet, James Alward (1892–1992)
Vo Nguyen Giap (1911–)
Vogel, Hans-Jochen (1926–)
Vorster, Balthazar Johannes (1915–1983)
Vranitzky, Franz (1937–)
Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuarevich (1883–1954)
Waldheim, Kurt (1918–2007)
Wałęsa, Lech (1943–)
Walker, Edwin Anderson (1909–1993)
Walker, John Anthony, Jr. (1937–)
Wallace, Henry Agard (1888–1965)
Wang Bingnan (1906–1988)
Weinberger, Caspar Willard (1917–2006)
Welch, Robert Henry Winborne, Jr. (1899–1985)
Westmoreland, William Childs (1914–2005)
Wheeler, Earle Gilmore (1908–1975)
White, Thomas Dresser (1902–1965)
Whitlam, Edward Gough (1916–)
Wilson, Charles Erwin (1890–1961)
Wilson, James Harold (1916–1995)
Wolf, Markus (1923–2006)
Wu Xiuquan (1908–1997)

Wu Xueqian (1921–)
Wyszyński, Stefan, Cardinal (1901–1981)
Yang Shangkun (1907–1998)
Yao Wenyuan (1931–2005)
Yeltsin, Boris (1931–2007)
Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967)
Zápotocky, Antonín (1884–1957)
Zhang Hanfu (1905–1972)
Zhang Wentian (1900–1976)
Zhao Ziyang (1919–2005)
Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich (1896–1948)
Zhivkov, Todor (1911–1998)
Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)
Zhu De (1886–1976)
Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich (1917–1974)
Zia ul Haq, Muhammad (1924–1988)
Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich (1902–1986)

Events

Afghanistan War (1979–1989)
Africa, Soviet Interventions in
Africa, U.S. Interventions in
Algerian War (1954–1962)
Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis (1951–1953)
Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1973)
Bandung Conference (18–24 April 1955)
Bay of Pigs (17 April 1961)
Beijing Meeting (21–27 February 1972)
Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949)
Berlin Crises (1958–1961)
Biafra War (1967–1970)
Bikini Island Atomic Tests
Cambodia), Vietnamese Occupation of (1978–1992)
Camp David Meeting (25–26 September 1959)
Chapultepec Conference (21 February–8 March 1945)
Chernobyl (26 April 1986)
Chinese Civil War (1945–1949)
Congo Civil War (1960–1965)
Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)
Cultural Revolution (1966–1969)
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of (13 March–7 May 1954)
Dirty War (1974–1983)
Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in
Double-Track Decision, NATO
East Berlin Uprising (16–17 June 1953)
Élysée Agreement (8 March 1949)
Entebbe Raid (3–4 July 1976)
Falklands War (1982)
Geneva Conference (1954)
Geneva Conference (1955)
Geneva Conference (1959)
Geneva Meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan (21–22 November 1985)
Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II (1945–1948)
Glassboro Summit (23–25 June 1967)
Governors Island Meeting, Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush (7 December 1988)
Greek Civil War (1946–1949)
Grenada Invasion (25 October 1983)
Guatemalan Intervention (1954)
Hungarian Revolution (1956)
Inchon Landing (15 September 1950)
India-Pakistan Wars (1947–1949, 1965, 1971)
Indochina War (1946–1954)
Iran-Contra Affair
Iran Hostage Crisis (4 November 1979–20 January 1981)
Iran-Iraq War (22 September 1980–20 August 1988)
Japan, Occupation after World War II
KAL Flight 007 (1 September 1983)
Kashmir Dispute
Kitchen Debate (24 July 1959)
Korean War (1950–1953)
Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in
Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)
Malta Meeting, Bush and Gorbachev (2–3 December 1989)
Mariel Boatlift (April-September 1980)
Marshall Mission to China (1945–1947)
McCarthy Hearings
MONGOOSE, Operation
Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon (22–30 May 1972)
Moscow Meeting, Gorbachev & Reagan (29 May–2 June 1988)
Moscow and Yalta Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon (27 June–3 July 1974)
Mozambique Civil War (1977–1992)
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (1973–1989)

My Lai Massacre (16 March 1968)
Nuclear Arms Race
Ogaden War (1977–1978)
Olympic Games and Politics
Panama, U.S. Invasion of (20 December 1989)
PAPERCLIP, Operation
Paris Conference (May 1960)
Persian Gulf War (17 January–28 February 1991)
Profumo Affair (1963)
Pueblo Incident (23 January 1968)
Revolt of the Admirals (1949)
Reykjavik Meeting (11–12 October 1986)
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on (1973–1990)
Sétif Uprising (8 May 1945)
"Sinews of Peace" Speech (March 1946)
Sino-Indian Border Confrontations (1959–1988)
Sino-Soviet Border Incident (2 March–11 September 1969)
Sino-Soviet Split (1956–1966)
Sino-Vietnamese War (17 February–5 March 1979)
Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference
Slánský Trial (1952)
South African Destabilization Campaign
Soviet-Yugoslav Split (1948)
Space Race
Spiegel Affair (1962)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Treaties
Suez Crisis (1956)
Taiwan Strait Crisis, First (1954–1955)
Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second (1958)
Tet Offensive (1968)
Tiananmen Square (4 June 1989)
Tonkin Gulf Incidents and Resolution (August 1964)
Twentieth Party Congress (February 1956)
U-2 Incident (May 1960)
U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union
Vienna Conference (3–4 June 1961)
Vietnam War (1957–1975)
Waldheim Affair (1986)
Washington Summit Meeting, Nixon and Brezhnev (16–25 June 1973)
Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev (7–10 December 1987)
Watergate (1972–1974)
Whisky on the Rocks Crisis (27 October 1981)
Woodstock (14–16 August 1969)
World War II, Allied Conferences
Yemen Civil War (1962–1972)

Organizations

African National Congress
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)
Alliance for Progress
Allied Control Council of Germany
Americans for Democratic Action
Asia, U.S. Armed Forces in
Atomic Energy Commission, United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, United States
Beatles
Black Panthers
British Commonwealth of Nations
Cambridge Five
Central Intelligence Agency
Charter 77
China, People's Republic of, Air Force
China, People's Republic of, Army
China, People's Republic of, Navy
China, Republic of, Armed Forces
Comecon (1949–1991)
Cominform (1947–1956)
Contadora Group
Contras
Council of Europe
Council on Foreign Relations (1919–)
Displaced Persons
Egypt, Armed Forces
Europe, U.S. Armed Froces in
European Coal and Steel Community
European Defense Community
European Economic Community
European Parliament
European Union
Federal Bureau of Investigation
France, Air Force
France, Army
France, Navy
Gensuikyō
German, Democratic Republic, Armed Forces
Germany, Federal Republic of, Armed Forces
Hollywood Ten

Hukbalahap
India, Armed Forces
International Monetary Fund
Iran, Armed Forces
Iraq, Armed Forces
Irish Republican Army
Israel, Armed Forces
Italy, Armed Forces
Japan, Armed Forces
John Birch Society
Khmer Rouge
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, Armed Forces
Korea, Republic of, Armed Forces
Latin America, Communist Parties in
Mau Mau
MI5
MI6
Middle East Regional Defense Organizations
Military-Industrial Complex
Monrovia Group
Multilateral Force, NATO
National Security Agency
North American Aerospace Defense Command
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, History of (1948–1990)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of
Office of Strategic Services
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
Organization of African Unity
Organization of American States
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Pakistan, Armed Forces
Palestine Liberation Organization
Peace Corps (1961–)
Poland, Armed Forces
Present Danger, Committee on the
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
RAND Corporation
Red Army Faction
Red Brigades
Refugees
Refuseniks
Roman Catholic Church
Sandinistas
Securitate
Shining Path
Sinn Féin
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
Soviet Union, Army Air Force
Soviet Union, Navy
Stasi
Strategic Air Command
Students for a Democratic Society
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
Sweden, Armed Forces
Turkey, Armed Forces
United Kingdom, Air Force
United Kingdom, Army
United Kingdom, Navy
United Nations
United States, Army
United States, Air Force
United States Information Agency
United States, Marine Corps
United States, Navy
Vatican Council II (1962–1965)
Viet Minh
Voice of America
Weathermen
Western European Union (23 October 1954)
World Bank
World Council of Churches
World Peace Council
Yugoslavia, Armed Forces

Places

Afghanistan
Africa
Albania
Algeria
Americas
Antarctica and Arctic
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan

Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Bessarabia
Bhutan
Bolivia
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burma
Cambodia
Canada
Chad
Checkpoint Charlie
Chile
China, People's Republic of
China, Republic of
Cold War Study Centers, Non-U.S.
Cold War Study Centers, U.S.
Colombia
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Republic of the
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cuba and Africa
Curzon Line
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Distant Early Warning (Line)
Dobruja
Dominican Republic
East Asia
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Europe, Eastern
Europe, Western
Faeroe Islands
Finland
France
Georgia
German Democratic Republic (1949–1991)
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana
Gibraltar
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guantánamo Naval Base
Guatemala
Gulags
Guyana
Haiti
Hardened Site
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland, Northern
Ireland, Republic of
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jinmen and Mazu
Jordan
Kaliningrad Oblast
Karelia
Kenya
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Republic of
Kurile Islands
Kuwait
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Malta
Mexico
Middle East
Moldavia (Moldova)
Mongolia

Morocco
Mozambique
Nagorno-Karabakh
Namibia
National Cold War Museum and Memorial
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Nuclear-Free Zones
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Porkkala
Portugal
Romania
Saar
Saudi Arabia
Scandinavia
School of the Americas (1946–)
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
South Asia
Southeast Asia
Soviet Union
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Tibet
Trieste
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vatican City
Venezuela
Vietnam
Western Sahara
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zimbabwe

Ideas and Movements

AirLand Battle
Anti-Americanism
Anticolonialism
Anti-Semitism
Arab Nationalism
Arms Control
Arms Sales, International
Atoms for Peace Proposal (8 December 1953)
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
Biological and Chemical Weapons and Warfare
Brainwashing
Bretton Woods System
Civil Defense
Civil Liberties in the United States
Communist Fronts
Communist Revolutionary Warfare
Constructive Engagement
Containment Policy
Cultural Exchange
Decolonization
Defections
Détente
Domino Theory
Drug Trafficking
Espionage
Eurocommunism
European Integration Movement
Existentialism
Failsafe
Film
First-Strike Capability
Flexible Response
Food for Peace Program (1954–)
Genocide

Germany, Federal Republic of, Rearmament and NATO
Glasnost
Human Rights
Intelligence Collection
Just War Theory
Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in
Launch on Warning
Literature
Madman Strategy
Market Socialism
McCarthyism
Military Balance (1945–1990)
Munich Analogy
Music
Mutual Assured Destruction
Nationalism
New Look Defense Policy
New Thinking Policy
Nomenklatura
Non-Aligned Movement
Nuclear Tests
Ostpolitik
Peace Movements
Peaceful Coexistence
Perestroika
Point Four Program (1949)
Prague Spring (1968)
Protest Movements
Race Relations, United States
Radical Islam
Religious Right, United States
Solidarity Movement
Swords to Ploughshares Movement
Tank Warfare
Territorial Changes after World War II
Terrorism
Triad
Vietnam War Protests

Technologies, Artifacts, and Objects

Air Burst
Aircraft
Aircraft Carriers
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)
Antiaircraft Guns and Missiles
ANZUS Pact (1 September 1951)
Artillery
Atomic Bomb
Austrian State Treaty (15 May 1955)
Berlin Wall (13 August 1961–9 November 1989)
Bogotá, Act of (13 September 1960)
Bombers, Strategic
Brady Plan (March 1989)
Brezhnev Doctrine
Brussels Treaty (1948)
Camp David Accords (September 1978)
Carter Doctrine (23 January 1980)
Colombo Plan
Communist Control Act (1954)
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (2 October 1986)
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990)
Declaration on Liberated Europe (February 1945)
Duck and Cover Drill
Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)
Explorer I (31 January 1958)
Fallout Shelters
Force de Frappe
Formosa Doctrine (1955)
Franco-German Friendship Treaty (22 January 1963)
Gaither Report (November 1957)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (January 1948)
Ground Burst
Hallstein Doctrine (1955–1970)
Harmel Report (December 1967)
Helsinki Final Act (1975)
Hot Line
Hydrogen Bomb
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (8 December 1987)
Internal Security Act (1950)
Lend-Lease
Machine Guns
Marshall Plan
Mines and Mine Warfare, Land
Mines and Mine Warfare, Sea
Missile Gap
Missiles, Antiballistic
Missiles, Cruise
Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic

Missiles, Pershing II
Missiles, Polaris
Missiles, Poseidon
Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Molotov Plan (1947)
Monnet Plan
Multiple Reentry Vehicles
Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.-Republic of China (December 1959)
MX Missile System
National Intelligence Estimate
National Security Act (26 July 1947)
National Security Council Report NSC-68
National Security Study Memorandum 39 (10 April 1969)
Neutron Bomb
Nixon Doctrine (3 November 1969)
Nobel Peace Prize
North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1 July 1968)
Nuclear Weapons, Tactical
Open Skies Proposal (21 July 1955)
Outer Space Treaty (10 October 1967)
Panama Canal Treaties (1977)
Paris Peace Conference and Treaties (29 July–15 October 1946)
Partial Test Ban Treaty (5 August 1963)
Pleven Plan (1950)
Missile
Rapacki Plan (1957)
Reagan Doctrine
Rio Pact (September 1947)
Republic of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty (1953)
Rome, Treaty of (25 March 1957)
San Francisco Peace Treaty (8 September 1951)
Schuman Plan
Sino-Soviet Treaty (14 February 1950)
Small Arms
Sputnik (4 October 1957)
Stockholm Document (1986)
Strategic Defense Initiative
Submarines
Tanks
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974)
Truman Doctrine (12 March 1947)
Truman Loyalty Program (1947)
United States Commander in Chief, Europe
United States–Japan Security Treaty (8 September 1951)
Vandenberg Resolution (11 June 1948)
VENONA Project
Warsaw Pact
Warships, Surface
World War II, Legacy of

Index

Abdullah (king of Jordan), **51,** 51(photo), 157
Abel, Rudolf, **52**
Abrams, Creighton Williams, **52–54,** 53(photo), 2146
Acheson, Dean Gooderham, **54–56,** 55(photo), 128, 1153, 2129(photo)
  "Crisis in Asia" speech, 2416–2423**Doc.**
  "Situation in the Far East, The," 2427–2431**Doc.**
Adams, Gerard, Jr., **57**
Adenauer, Konrad, **57–59,** 58(photo), 683, 686, 809–812, 811(photo), 890, 891
Afghanistan, **59–62,** 61(photo)
Afghanistan War (1979–1989), **62–66,** 63(map), 64(photo), 1336, 1867
Africa, **66–74,** 67(map), 70(photo), 73(photo)
  Soviet interventions in, **74–76,** 75(photo), 76(table)
  U.S. interventions in, **77–78**
African National Congress (ANC), **78–80,** 79(photo)
Aideed, Mohamed Farah, **80–81**
Air burst, **81–82**
Aircraft, **82–91,** 83(photo), 84(photo), 87(table), 89(photo)
  aerial espionage, 88
  British, 83–84, 87, 89
  civilian air transport, 89–90
  export of, 84–85
  French, 83
  helicopters, 90
  passenger airliners, 90
  refueling of long-distance bombers, 87
  Soviet, 86–87
  strategic bombers, 86, 87
  supersonic jets, 82–84
  tactical aircraft, 88–89
  U.S., 82, 87, 88, 89
  of the U.S. Navy, 84
  West European, 85–86
Aircraft carriers, **91–93,** 92(photo)
  British innovations to, 92
  classifications of, 93
AirLand Battle doctrine, **93–96,** 1623, 1624, 2147–2148
  background of, 93–94
  controversy surrounding, 95
  guiding force behind, 94–95
Akuffo, Frederick W., 825
Albania, **97–100,** 98(photo), 663, 665, 667, 927–928
  and the Cultural and Ideological Revolution in, 99
Albert II (king of Belgium), **100**
Alessandri, Jorge, 400
Alfonsin, Raul, 176
Algeria, **101–103,** 102(photo)
  Muslim population of, 103–104
Algerian War (1954–1962), **103–108,** 105(photo), 674–675, 1968
  and the Battle of Algiers, 105–106
  casualties of, 107
  causes of, 103–104
Algiers Accord (1975), 1009
Alia, Ramiz, **108**
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, **109**
Allende Gossens, Salvador, **109–111,** 110(photo), 400–401
  speech of to the United Nations (1972), 2661–2665**Doc.**
Alliance for Progress, **111–114,** 112(photo), 121, 920
  charter of, 2557–2561**Doc.**
Allied Control Council of Germany, **114–115**
Allison, Bob, 2209(photo)
Almond, Edward, 1155–1156
Alsop, Joseph Wright, **115–116**
Alvarado, Juan Velasco, 1626, 1626(photo)
"American Century, The" (Luce), 2329–2333**Doc.**
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), **116–118**
  members of, 116–117
Americas. *See* Latin America
Amin, Idi, **124–125,** 125(photo)
Andreotti, Giulio, **125–126,** 125(photo)
Andropov, Yuri, **127–128,** 127(photo), 880, 1891–1892
  memorandum to Brezhnev concerning Afghanistan, 2713–2714**Doc.**
Angleton, James Jesus, 650–651
Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis (1951–1953), **128–130,** 129(photo), 998–999
Angola, 501, 1441, 1442
Antall, József, **130–131**
Antarctica and Arctic, **131–133,** 132(photo)
  territorial claims to, 132–133
Antiaircraft guns and missiles, **134–137,** 135(photo), 136(photo)
  and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), 135–136
  use of during the Vietnam War, 136–137
Anti-Americanism, **137–139**
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), **139–141,** 139(photo), 1493, 1891, 1941–1942
Anticolonialism, **141–145,** 143(photo)
  Chinese role in, 144
  Soviet enthusiasm for, 144
  U.S. role in, 142–144
  and World War II, 142

Anti-Semitism, **145–148,** 146(photo), 839
Antonescu, Ion, **148–150,** 149(photo), 1741–1742
ANZUS Pact (1951), **150–151,** 214, 216, 625, 1526, 2461**Doc.**
Aquino, Benigno, Jr., **151–152**
Aquino, Corazon, **152–153,** 153(photo)
Arab-Israeli Wars (1948-1973), 147, **153–169,** 154(map of 1948 war), 156(photo), 158(table), 160(photo), 161(photo), 167(photo), 168(photo)
  1948 War, 153, 154(map), 155–158
  casualties of, 158(table)
  Sinai War (Suez Crisis [1956]), 158–161
  Six-Day War (1967), 161–164
  strength of forces involved in, 158(table)
  Yom Kippur War (1973), 164–167
Arab League, 104, 162, 1027, 1077, 1207, 1454, 1991
Arab nationalism, **169–172,** 171(photo), 615, 1208, 1454
  Baathism, 170
  Nasserism, 170
Arafat, Yasir, 148, **172–173,** 173(photo), 1334, 1501(photo), 1570(photo). *See also* Palestine Liberation Organization
Arana, Francisco, 871
Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán, **173–174,** 871, 872, 874–875, 876–877
Arévalo, Juan José, 871–872
Argentina, **174–177.** *See also* Dirty War; Falklands War
  economic collapse of (1982), 176
  guerrilla movements within, 176
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, **177–178,** 889
Armas, Carlos Castillo, 874
Armenia, **178–181,** 180(photo), 1431–1433
Armenian National Movement (ANM), 180
Arms control, **181–188,** 184(photo), 185(photo). *See also* Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968); Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Treaties
  bilateral (U.S./Soviet Union) agreements concerning, 186–187
  early examples of, 181–182
  modern theory of, 182–183
  multilateral efforts for, 183–184
  in the nuclear age, 183
  and nuclear-free zones, 186
  post–Cold War, 186–187
Arms sales, international, **188–190,** 189(photo), 190(table)
  decline of, 190
  justification of, 188
  and political crises for the United States, 189–190
  U.S. and Soviet, 188–189
Artillery, **190–199,** 191(table), 194(photo), 195(photo), 196(photo)
  ability of to fire nuclear rounds, 193–194
  accuracy of, 198
  aerial field artillery (AFA), 191
  and the antipersonnel round (APERS), 192–193
  artillery rockets, 195–196
  British, 192
  coastal, 191
  effect of computers and electronics on, 197–198
  and the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC), 197–198
  and Field Artillery Scatterable Mines (FASCAM), 193
  and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), 191
  and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 197
  Soviet, 192, 196–197
  U.S., 192, 193–195
Asia, U.S. armed forces in, **199–201,** 199(photo), 200(table)
Assad, Hafez, 167, **202–203,** 202(photo), 1992–1993
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), 987
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 988, 1051, 1874
Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal), 2078
Atlantic Charter (1941), 142, 1750, 2333–2334**Doc.**
Atomic bomb, **203–205,** 204(photo)
  acknowledgment of Soviet atomic bomb detonation by the United States, 2415–2416**Doc.**
Atomic Energy Act (1946), 959
Atomic Energy Commission, United Nations (UNAEC), **206–207**
Atomic Energy Commission, United States (USAEC), **207–208,** 959
Atoms for Peace Proposal (1953), **208–209,** 208(photo)
Attlee, Clement Richard, 129, **209–211,** 209(photo), 690, 1862, 2102–2103, 2104
  joint communiqué of with Truman concerning the Korean War, 2448–2450**Doc.**
Aung San Suu Kyi, **211–212,** 212(photo)
Auriol, Vincent, **212–213**
Austin, Hudson, 859
Australia, 150, **213–216,** 788. *See also* ANZUS Pact (1951)
  active role of in the Vietnam War, 215
Austria, **216–219,** 868–869
  domestic politics in, 218
  postwar Soviet activities in, 217–218
  U.S. support for, 217
Austrian State Treaty (1955), 218, **219–220**
Awami League, 978
Ayala, Julio Turbay, 458
Ayub Khan, Muhammad, **220–221,** 977–978, 1565
Azerbaijan, **221–224,** 222(photo), 1431–1433
  Soviet policy in, 223

Baez, Joan, 1420, 1421(photo)
Baghdad Pact (1955), 1012
Baker, James Addison, III, **225–226,** 225(photo)
Balaguer Ricart, Joaquín Antonio, **226–227,** 227(photo)
Balfour Declaration (1917), 1027
Ball, George Wildman, **227–228**
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), **228–229**
Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, **229–230,** 230(photo)
Bandung Conference (1955), **230–231**
Bangladesh, **231–233,** 1865
Bao Dai, 983, 2188, 2192
Barclay, Edwin, 1203
Barre, Mohammed Siyad, **233–234,** 234(photo), 1848, 1851
Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio, **234–235,** 499, 504
Baudouin (king of Belgium), **235–236,** 236(photo)
Bay of Pigs, **236–239,** 237(map), 238(photo), 649, 1312, 2550–2552**Doc.**
  aftermath of, 239
  failure of, 239
Beatles, **240–241,** 241(photo)
Beatrix (queen of the Netherlands), **241–242**
Begin, Menachem, **242–244,** 243(photo), 363(photo)
Beijing Meeting (Nixon and Mao Zedong [1972]), **244–246,** 245(photo)
Belarus, **246–249,** 247(photo), 2099
  division of, 246
  political change in, 248
  under Soviet rule, 247–248

Belgium, **249–251,** 673, 677
colonialism of, 250
political parties of, 249–250
Ben Bella, Mohamed, 101–102, 104, 107
Benediktsson, Bjarni, **251–252**
Beneš, Edvard, **252–254,** 253(photo)
Ben-Gurion, David, 155, 159, **254–255,** 254(photo), 1028
Bentley, Elizabeth, 645
Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich, **255–257,** 256(photo), 880, 1118
Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 88, **257–260,** 258(photo), 259(map), 672
Allied and Soviet statements concerning, 2398–2403**Doc.**
Berlin Crises, **260–263,** 262(photo), 505
Berlin Wall, **263–265,** 264(photo), 667, 816
Berlinguer, Enrico, **266–267**
Berman, Jakub, **267–268**
Bessarabia, 149, **268–169**
Betancourt, Rómulo, **269–270**
Bevin, Ernest, 209, 210, **270–271,** 271(photo), 807, 2102–2103, 2104
Bhumipol Adulyadej (king of Thailand), **271–273,** 272(photo)
Bhutan, **273–274**
Bhutto, Benazir, **276–277**
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, **276–277,** 979
Biafra War (1967–1970), **277–279,** 278(photo)
Bidault, Georges, **279–280,** 280(photo)
Bierut, Bolesław, **280–282,** 281(photo)
Bikini Island atomic tests, **282–283,** 282(photo), 1605
Biological and chemical weapons/warfare, **283–287,** 285(table), 286(photo)
British use of, 283, 284–285
Egyptian use of, 622
French use of, 283
history of, 283
nerve gas, 284
poison gas, 283–284
ricin, 285
smallpox, 286
Soviet use of, 286–287
U.S. use of, 286–287
VX gas, 284–285
Bissell, Richard Mervin, Jr., **287–288**
Bizonia, 808, 809
Black Panthers, **288–290,** 289(photo), 925
Blake, George, 647
Blum, Léon, **290–292**
Bo Yibo, **292–293**
Bodnăraş, Emil, **293–294**
Bogotá Act (1960), **294–295**
Bohlen, Charles Eustis, **295–297,** 296(photo), 485(photo)
Bokassa, Jean-Bédel, **297–298**
Boland Amendment, 1004, 1771
Bolivia, **298–299**
Bombers, strategic, **299–302,** 301(photo)
Bonner, Yelena Georgievna, **392–303**
Bosch Gaviño, Juan, **303–304**
Botha, Pieter Willem, 473, **304–306,** 305(photo), 1856, 1858
and the "Rubicon" speech, 1859
Botha, Roelof Frederik, **306–307**
Boumédienne, Houari, 102
Bourguiba, Habib, **307–308**
Bradley, Omar Nelson, **308–310,** 309(photo), 1157
Brady Plan, **310–311**
Brainwashing, **311–312**
Brandt, Willy, **312–314,** 313(photo), 678, 798–799, 812, 813–814, 814(photo), 1555(photo)
report of on the state of the nation (West Germany [1971]), 2651–2656**Doc.**
Brătianu, Gheorghe Ion, **314**
Braun, Wernher von, **315,** 315(photo)
Brazil, **316–319,** 317(photo)
development of a nuclear program in, 318
U.S. economic aid to, 317
Bretton Woods System, **319–322,** 320(photo), 997
Brezhnev, Leonid, 139(photo), 179, **322–324,** 323(photo), 553(photo), 862, 880, 1135(photo), 1401(photo), 1891, 2236(photo)
meetings with Nixon, 1400–1401, 1403–1404, 2235–2237
Brezhnev Doctrine, **324–325,** 1452, 1890, 2632–2634**Doc.**
Bricker Amendment, 2463**Doc.**
Britain. *See* United Kingdom
British Commonwealth of Nations, **326–328**
Browder, Earl Russell, **328–329**
Brown, Harold, **329–331,** 330(photo)
Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 117, 2479–2482**Doc.**
Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este, **331–332,** 331(photo)
Brunei, **332–333**
Brussels Treaty (1948), **333–334**
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, **334–335**
Bukovina, 149
Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich, **335–336,** 335(photo), 972(photo)
Bulgaria, **336–338,** 663, 664, 667, 2082
Bunche, Ralph Johnson, **338–339**
Bundy, McGeorge, **339–340,** 339(photo)
Bundy, William Putnam, **340–342**
Burgess, Guy Francis de Moncy, **342–343**
Burma, **343–346,** 345(photo)
Burnham, Forbes, 881, 882
Burundi, 787
Bush, George Herbert Walker, 140, 186, 195, **346–348,** 347(photo), 1005, 1204, 1336. *See also* Malta Meeting (Bush and Gorbachev [1989])
address to Congress on the cessation of the Persian Gulf conflict, 2808–2811**Doc.**
and the liberation of Kuwait, 348
press conference concerning Tiananmen Square, 2766–2769**Doc.**
Bush, George W., 140, 1142
Byrnes, James Francis, **348–350,** 349(photo), 808, 1592(photo)

Caetano, Marcelo Jose das Neves, **351–352**
Callaghan, James, **352–353**
Calley, William, 1429–1430
Cambodia, **353–356,** 355 (photo), 787–788, 1874–1875
and the Khmer Rouge, 1114–1115
under Pol Pot, 355–356, 1114–1115
under Sihanouk, 354–355
Cambodia, Vietnamese occupation of, 356, **357–360,** 358(map), 359(photo)
Cambridge Five, **360–362**
Camp David Accords (1978), **363–365,** 363(photo), 2695–2697**Doc.**
Camp David Meeting (1959), **365–367,** 366(photo)
Camp David Peace Treaty (1979), 2700–2701**Doc.**
Camus, Albert, **367–368,** 367(photo)
Canada, **367–371,** 370(photo)
Carlucci, Frank Charles, **371–372**
Caribbean Basin Initiative, 121
Carmichael, Stokely, black power speech of (1967), 2612–2618**Doc.**
Carrero Blanco, Luis, **372–373**
Carrillo, Santiago, **373–374**
Carter, James Earl, Jr., 363(photo), **374–376,** 375(photo), 422, 564, 658, 938, 1000, 1130, 1204, 1485. *See also* Camp David Accords (1978); Iran Hostage Crisis (1979–1981); Mariel Boatlift
address to the nation (1978), 2698–2700**Doc.**
address to the nation regarding hostage rescue attempt in Iran, 2718–2719**Doc.**
foreign policy of, 2133–2134

Carter, James Earl, Jr. (*continued*)
lack of public confidence in, 375
"national malaise" speech (1979), 2709–2713**Doc.**
policy regarding Cuba, 501
State of the Union Address (1980), 2714–2718**Doc.**
Carter Doctrine, **376–377**
Casey, William Joseph, Jr., **377–379,** 378(photo)
Castro, Fidel, 121, **379–381,** 360(photo), 499–502, 500(photo), 1889(photo). *See also* Bay of Pigs; Cuban Missile Crisis; Mariel Boatlift
attempts by the United States to assassinate, 1389–1391
Second Declaration of Havana (1962), 2564–2565**Doc.**
Cavaco Silva, Aníbal António, **381–382**
Ceauşescu, Nicolae, 665, 667–668, **382–383,** 383(photo), 967
Central American Peace Initiative, 1772
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 121, 130, **384–387,** 385(photo), 882, 906, 1004, 2133. *See also* Bay of Pigs
discrediting of, 650–651
and the drug trade in Southeast Asia, 582–584
operations of in Chile, 400
operations of in Guatemala, 174, 385, 873–876, 875(photo), 876–877, 2191–2493**Doc.**
operations of in Iran (Operation AJAX), 385, 999
operations of in Nicaragua, 1485, 2741–2742**Doc.**
role of in the Vietnam War, 386
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 1454
Cerezo, Vinicio, 873
Chad, **387–389**
Challe, Maurice, 106, 107
Chambers, Whittaker, 645, **389–390,** 389(photo), 912
Chang, John Myon, **390–391,** 1147
Chapultepec Conference (1945), **391–392**
Charter 77, **392–393,** 527, 528, 666
manifesto of, 2692–2695**Doc.**
Checkpoint Charlie, 262, **393–394**
Chen Yi, **394–395**
Cheney, Richard B., **395–396**
Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich, **396–397,** 397(photo)
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, **397–399,** 398(table), 398(photo), 2099, 2099(photo)
Chile, **399–400**
CIA operations in, 400
declaration of the principles of the government of (1985), 2671–2674**Doc.**
policy regarding Cuba, 400
China, People's Republic of (PRC), 101, 144, **401–409,** 402(photo), 406(photo), 408(photo), 1047, 1204, 1425–1427. *See also* East Asia; Jinmen and Mazu; Tiananmen Square protests
agriculture in, 407–408
air force of, **409–411**
army of (People's Liberation Army [PLA]), **411–415,** 413(photo)
and the Korean War, 412
organization of, 412
troop strength of, 411–412, 414
weapons of, 413–414
constitutions of, 405
and the Cultural Revolution, 406, **515–517,** 516(photo), 1276
domestic policies of, 402
good neighbor policy of, 403–404
and the Great Leap Forward, 407
and the Hundred Flowers movement, 405–406
joint communiqué of with the United States, 2656–2658**Doc.**
navy of, **415–418,** 416(photo)
normalization of relations with the United States, 404, 1704
policy regarding Taiwan, 404
relations with the Soviet Union, 402–403
Sino-Soviet border clashes, 2634–2636**Doc.**
Sino-Soviet split, 98, 403, 603, 1120, **1823–1827,** 1825(photo), 2587–2588**Doc.**
Tiananmen Square protests, 407
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Friendship with the Soviet Union, 2324–2325**Doc.**
China, Republic of (ROC, Taiwan), 404, **418–422,** 419(photo). *See also* Jinmen and Mazu; Taiwan Strait Crisis, First; Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second
armed forces of, **423–426,** 424(photo)
economic growth of, 421
Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States (1954), 2488–2491**Doc.**
relations with the United States, 420, 421–422
Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 2702–2704**Doc.**
Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), 402, 420, **426–429,** 427(map), 428(photo)
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 599, 600, 1061–1062
Chirac, Jacques, **430–431,** 430(photo), 745
Christian Democratic Union (CDU [West Germany]), 809–810, 812, 815
Chun Doo-hwan, 1148
Church Report (1975), 2683–2688**Doc.**
Churchill, Winston, **431–434,** 432(photo), 433(table), 850, 854, 2102
call for a Franco-British union, 688–689
and the Percentages Agreement (1944), 433, 2334–2337**Doc.**
political career of, 431–432
as prime minister, 432–434
"Sinews of Peace" speech, 433, 1812–1813, 2103, 2369–2370**Doc.**
Civil defense, **435–440,** 437(photo), 439(photo), 2130. *See also* Duck and cover drill
and the CONELRAD system, 438
fallout shelters, 438–439, 710–711, 2722–2723**Doc.**
in the Soviet Union, 435–436
in the United States, 436–438
Civil liberties in the United States, **440–442**
Civil Rights Act (1964), 2590–2596**Doc.**
Clark, Mark Wayne, **442–444,** 443(photo)
"Clash of Civilizations" (Huntington), 2828–2834**Doc.**
Clay, Lucius DuBignon, 262, **444–445,** 445(photo)
Clayton, William Lockhart, **445–446**
Clifford, Clark McAdams, **446–448,** 447(photo)
Cohn, Roy Marcus, **448–449,** 1216
Cohn-Bendit, Marc Daniel, **450**
Colby, William Egan, **450–452**
Cold War study centers, non-U.S., **452–453**
Cold War study centers, U.S., **453–455**
Collins, Joseph Lawton, **455–456,** 456(photo)
Colombia, **456–459,** 458(photo)
guerrilla movements in, 457
U.S. economic assistance to, 457–458
U.S. military aid to, 457
Colombo Plan, **459–461**
Comecon (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance), 97, **461–463,** 462(photo), 663

Cominform, **464–465**
announcement of the establishment of, 2383–2384**Doc.**
resolution of regarding Yugoslavia, 2393–2398**Doc.**
Communist Control Act (1954), **465–466**
Communist fronts, **466–468**
Communist Information Bureau. *See* Cominform
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), 931–932
Communist revolutionary warfare, **468–472,** 470(photo)
objective of, 468
orthodox form of, 469
stages of, 469–470
success of, 471
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986), **472–473,** 2745–2750**Doc.**
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE [1990]), 863, 2801–2807**Doc.**
Congo, Democratic Republic of the, **474–476,** 476(photo)
Congo, Republic of the, **476–478**
Congo Civil War (1960–1965), **479–480,** 479(photo)
Constantine II (king of Greece), **480–481,** 852
Constructive Engagement, **481–482**
Contadora Group, **482–483**
Containment Policy, **484–487,** 485(photo)
Contras, **487–488,** 1771
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990), **488–490,** 489(photo), 2800–2801**Doc.**
Costa Rica, **490–492**
Council of Europe, **492–493**
Council on Foreign Relations, **493–495**
Cousins, Norman, **495–496**
Couve de Murville, Jacques Maurice, **496–497**
Craxi, Benedetto, **497–498,** 497(photo)
Crocker, Chester, 1439, 1442
Cuba, 457, **498–502,** 499(photo), 500(photo), 1204, 1713. *See also* Bay of Pigs; Cuban Missile Crisis; Guantánamo Naval Base; Mariel Boatlift
aid of to Grenada, 858
foreign policy of, 501
human rights in, 501–502
relationship with the Soviet Union, 499–500, 1888–1889
under Batista, 499
under Castro, 499–500
U.S. influence in, 498–499
Cuba and Africa, **502–504,** 1442
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 500, **504–510,** 505(map), 506(photo), 507(photo), 650, 2570–2574**Doc.,** 2574–2577**Doc.**
Cultural exchange programs, **510–514,** 513(photo)
Cultural Revolution, 406, **515–517,** 516(photo), 929, 1276
Cunhal, Alvaro, **517–518**
Curcio, Renato, **518–519**
Curzon Line, **519–521**
Cyprus, **521–524,** 522(photo), 853, 1249–1250, 2081
Czechoslovakia, **524–528,** 527(photo), 664–665, 900–901, 952–953. *See also* Charter 77
liberalization in, 527–528
Prague Spring movement, 526, 665–666, 1667–1670
Soviet invasion of (1968), 526

Dalai Lama, **529–530,** 529(photo)
Dálnoki, Miklós Béla, 946
Davies, John Paton, 951
Davis, Miles, 1418, 1419–1420
Debray, Régis, **530–531**
Debré, Michel, 734
de Castries, Christian, 558–559
Declaration on Liberated Europe (1945), **531–532,** 2337–2339**Doc.**
Decolonization, **532–539,** 533(table), 535(photo)
Defections, **539–541,** 540(photo)
De Gasperi, Alcide, **541–542,** 541(photo), 1038
De Gaulle, Charles, 101, **542–544,** 543(photo), 675, 685, 686, 742(photo), 1031. *See also* Algerian War
denouncement of the Algiers putsch, 2552–2554**Doc.**
European policy of, 743
and the Fifth Republic, 742–743
foreign policy of, 743
nuclear deterrence policy of, 734
speech of on the state of Europe (1964), 2596–2599**Doc.**
de Klerk, F. W., 473, 1856, 1859–1860
Delors, Jacques, 679
Delteil, Henri, 780(photo)
Demirel, Süleyman, **544–545**
Deng Xiaoping, **545–547,** 546(photo)
on building socialism with Chinese characteristics, 2743–2745**Doc.**
speech to commanders of martial law forces, 2769–2773**Doc.**
Denmark, **547–550,** 1779, 1780
Danish-U.S. relations concerning Greenland, 857
domestic policies of, 548–549
economic strength of, 548
position of in NATO, 548, 549
DePuy, William Eugene, 94, **550–551**
Détente, **551–554,** 553(photo), 736, 1039
development of, 551–552
Ford's commitment to, 553–554
Nixon's commitment to, 552–553
De Valera, Eamon, **554–556,** 555(photo), 1020–1021, 1022
Dewey, Thomas Edmund, **556–557,** 556(photo)
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of (1954), **557–560,** 557(table), 558(photo)
casualties of, 559
French miscalculations during, 558–559
Dillon, Clarence Douglas, **560–561**
Dimitrov, Georgi Mikhailovich, **561–562,** 562(photo)
Dirty War (1974–1983), **562–565,** 564(photo)
number of murders committed during, 563
Displaced persons, **565–567,** 566(photo)
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, **567–568**
Djilas, Milován, **568–569**
Dobruja, **569–570**
Dobrynin, Anatoly Fyodorovich, **570–572**
Doe, Samuel Kanyon, **572–573,** 572(photo), 1204–1205
Dominican Republic, **573–575**
U.S. interventions in, **575–577,** 576(photo)
Domino theory, **578–579**
Donovan, William J., 384
letter to Harold D. Smith, 2355–2357**Doc.**
Double-Track Decision, NATO, **579**
Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander Frederick, **580–581**
Doyle, James E., 117(photo)
Drăghici, Alexandru, **581**
Drug trafficking, **582–585,** 584(photo)
Dubček, Alexander, **585–586,** 586(photo), 665, 1890, 2227
Duck and cover drill, **586–587,** 587(photo)
Duclos, Jacques, **587–589,** 588(photo)
Dulles, Allen Welsh, 174, **589–590,** 589(photo)
Dulles, John Foster, 174, **591–593,** 592(photo), 734, 1047, 1337, 1967, 2105
and "brinkmanship," 591
"The Cost of Peace" speech (1956), 2506–2511**Doc.**

Dulles, John Foster (*continued*)
relations of with Britain and France, 592–593
relationship with Eisenhower, 591–592
speech on the concept of massive nuclear retaliation, 2473–2475**Doc.**
Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), 2118
Dutschke, Rudi, **594**
Duvalier, François, **594–595,** 889, 889(photo)
Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 888–889
Dylan, Bob, 1420, 1421(photo)

Eanes, António, **597**
East Asia, **598–607,** 600(photo), 606(photo)
from V-J Day to June 1950, 598–600
from June 1950 to mid-1969, 600–604
from 1969 to 1991, 604–607
East Berlin Uprising (1953), **607–609,** 608(photo)
East Timor, **610–611,** 611(photo), 788
Echeverría, Luis, 1325–1326, 1326(photo)
Ecuador, 612–613
Eden, Sir Anthony, **613–614,** 614(photo), 851, 1029, 2105
Egypt, **614–618,** 616(photo), 887, 1029, 1030, 1965, 1966. *See also* Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1973); Camp David Accords; Suez Crisis
and the "Arab Cold War," 617
armed forces of, 616–617, **618–623,** 619(map [Sinai Campaign, 1956]), 620(photo)
aircraft of, 622
development and use of biological weapons by, 622
naval vessels of, 622
officer training, 621
organization of, 621
and the relationship with the Soviet Union, 620–622
and the War of Attrition (1967–1970), 621
Islamic fundamentalism of, 617
Einstein, Albert, 203, **623–624,** 623(photo)
and the Einstein-Russell appeal, 2500–2501**Doc.**
Eisenhower, Dwight David, 88, 143, 208(photo), 363(photo), 479, **624–628,** 625(photo), 626(table), 710, 728, 734, 1967, 2105. *See also* Gaither Report; Military Industrial Complex
"Atoms for Peace" speech (1953), 208–209, 626, 2122, 2471–2473**Doc.**
cautiousness of, 627
farewell address of, (1961), 2546–2548**Doc.**
on the military-industrial complex, 628, 2636–2639**Doc.**
on military spending, 729
and the Open Skies Proposal, 626, 1542–1543
and Operation PLUTO, 237
post–World War II military career of, 625
relations with Japan, 1050
reliance of on covert operations, 627
and the "Row of Dominoes" press conference (1954), 2475–2477**Doc.**
speech of concerning the U-2 incident (1960), 2539–2542**Doc.**
as supreme commander of NATO, 625
Eisenhower Doctrine, **629–630,** 2519–2523**Doc.**
Elizabeth II (queen of England), **630–631,** 631(photo)
El Salvador, **631–634,** 633(photo)
civil war in, 632
peasant uprising in, 632
Ély, Paul, **634–635,** 634(photo)
Élysée Agreement (1949), **636**
"End of History, The" (Fukuyama), 2773–2779**Doc.**
Engels, Friedrich, 1736–1737
Entebbe Raid, **636–638**
Equal Rights Amendment (1972), 2659**Doc.**
Erhard, Ludwig, **638–639,** 638(photo), 809, 810, 812
Eritrea, **639–641,** 887
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 640
Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), 641
Erlander, Tage, **641–642**
Espionage, **642–655,** 643(photo), 644(table), 646(photo), 649(photo), 650(photo), 654(photo). *See also* Intelligence collection
aerial espionage, 991–992
crisis years (1960–1975), 649–652
and the Berlin standoff, 649–650
Operation MONGOOSE, 649
Soviet involvement in Asia, the Middle East, and the third world, 651–652
Soviet involvement in the United Kingdom and Europe, 652
electronic intelligence (ELINT), 991
human intelligence (HUMINT), 642, 652
intelligence failures (1976–1991), 652–654
Operation RYAN and Star Wars, 653
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Poland, 652–653
spies, defectors, and double agents, 653–654
major intelligence agencies, 642
in the developing world, 645
Soviet Union, 644–645
United Kingdom and Canada, 643–644
U.S., 642–643
Western-allied agencies, 644
post-1991 legacy of, 654–655
signals intelligence (SIGINT), 991
spy scandals, defectors, and covert operations (1945–1960), 645–649
aerial reconnaissance, 648, 650
Berlin Tunnel and George Blake, 647
Cambridge Five, 646–647
covert operations, 648
hollow coins, 649
intelligence failure in Korea, 647
mole hunts, 648
Operation VENONA, 645–646
Soviet involvement in Europe and North America, 647–648
technical intelligence (TECHINT), 642, 647, 652
Estonia, **655–657**
Ethiopia, **657–659,** 658(photo), 886–887, 1965. *See also* Ogaden War
Eurocommunism, **660–661**
Europe, Eastern, **661–668,** 662(map), 664(photo), 666(photo)
cultural unification of, 663
de-Stalinization in, 665
economic restructuring in, 663
freedom of from Soviet control, 666–668
indirect subsidization of by the Soviet Union, 663–663
political control of by the Soviet Union, 664
Europe, U.S. armed forces in, **668–671,** 669(table), 670(photo)
compared to Warsaw Pact forces, 670–671
as a consequence of World War II, 668–669
deployment of under the Truman administration, 669

missile deployment by, 670
primacy of in U.S. military policy, 669–670
Europe, Western, **671–679,** 674(photo), 677(photo), 678(photo)
art and pop culture movements in, 676–677
challenges of after World War II, 671–672
culture of, 673–674
creation of separate German republics in, 672
music and film in, 676
and the occupation of Berlin, 672
philosophical movements in, 675–676
rebuilding of, 673
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 683
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 250, **680–681,** 683, 691–692, 810, 890
European Defense Community (EDC), **681–682,** 683, 810
and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 685, 692
current members of, 687
and the Empty Chair Crisis, 686–687
expansion of, 687
support of the United States for, 684
tariff policy of, 684
European Economic Community (EEC), **683–688,** 684(photo), 708, 744, 810
European Integration Movement, **688–693,** 689(photo). *See also* European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
current challenges faced by, 692–693
and the planning versus competition debate, 692
political and economic integration, 690, 691
European Nuclear Disarmament (END), appeal for, 2720–2722**Doc.**
European Parliament, **693–694**
European Union (EU), **695–697,** 695(photo)
Existentialism, **697–698**
Explorer I, **698–699**

Faber, Mient Jan, **701–702**
Faeroe Islands, **702–703**
Fahd (king of Saudi Arabia), **703–704,** 703(photo)
Failsafe, **704**
Faisal (king of Saudi Arabia), **705–706,** 705(photo)
Falklands War (1982), 564–565, 677, **706–710,** 707(map), 708(photo), 2042
Fallout shelters, 438–439, **710–711**
instructions for building, 2722–2723**Doc.**
Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN), 632
Farouk II (king of Egypt), **711–712**
Faulkner, William, 1218
Faure, Edgar Jean, **712–713**
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 290, **713–716,** 714(photo), 2133
Fermi, Enrico, 203, **716–718,** 717
Figl, Leopold, 219, **718–719,** 868
Figueres Ferrer, José, **719–720**
Film, **720–725,** 721(table), 722(photo), 723(photo)
depiction of Russians in, 721
European films, 723–724
film noir, 722
propaganda films, 721–722
Russian cinema, 724
science fiction films, 722–723
Final Solution. *See* Holocaust
Finland, **725–727,** 1778, 1779**.** *See also* Karelia
as a trading partner of the Soviet Union, 726–727
First-strike capability, **727–728**
Fleming, Ian, 1219, 1220
Flexible response, **728–730**
Foco political theory, 877
Fonda, Jane, **730–731**
Food for Peace Program, **731–732**
Foot, Michael, **733**
Force de Frappe, **733–735**
Ford, Gerald Rudolph, 610, **735–737,** 736(photo)
foreign policy of, 736
goals of as president, 736
pardoning of Nixon, 736
Formosa Doctrine (1955), **737–738**
Forrestal, James Vincent, 484, **738–739,** 739(photo)
France, 672–673, 685, **739–746,** 742(photo), 744(photo), 1330, 1869–1870. *See also* Algerian War (1954–1962); Dien Bien Phu, Battle of; Force de Frappe; Indochina War: Suez Crisis
air force of, 746–748, 47(photo)
army of, 749–752, 750(photo)
deployment of through French colonies, 751
as a colonizer, 101, 477, 741
formation and policies of the Fourth Republic, 740–742
French Foreign Legion, 749
navy of, 752–754
political turmoil in, 674–675
student protests in (1968), 743, 2628–2629**Doc.**
Franco, Francisco, **754–756,** 755(photo), 1915–1916
Franco-German Friendship Treaty (1963), **756–758**
Free Democratic Party (FDP), 809, 814, 815
Freedom of Information Act (1966), 2605–2609**Doc.**
Frei Montalva, Eduardo, **758–759,** 758(photo)
French Equatorial Africa (FEA), 477–478
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), 101, 104–107
Fuchs, Klaus, **759–760,** 760(photo)
Fujiyama, Aiichirō, **760–761,** 760(photo)
Fukuda Takeo, **761–762,** 1051–1052
Fulbright, James William, **762–764,** 763(photo)

Gagarin, Yuri, **765–766,** 765(photo)
Gaither Report, **766–767**
Gaitskell, Hugh, **767–768**
Galbraith, John Kenneth, **768–769,** 768(photo)
Galtieri, Leopoldo, 708
Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 794–795
Gandhi, Indira, **769–771,** 770(photo), 972(photo), 971–973, 978
political comeback of, 973
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, **771–773,** 772(photo)
Gandhi, Rajiv, **773–774,** 973
García, Romeo Lucas, 872
Gavin, James Maurice, **774–775**
Gehlen, Reinhard, **775–776**
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT [1948]), **776–779,** 777(photo)
Geneva Conference (1954), **779–780,** 780(photo)
declaration concerning the restoration of peace in Indochina, 2482–2484**Doc.**
Geneva Conference (1955), **781–782**
Geneva Conference (1959), **782–783**
Geneva Convention, statement on the treatment of prisoners of war, 2409–2415**Doc.**
Geneva Meeting (Gorbachev and Reagan [1985]),**783–785,** 784(photo)

Genocide, **785–789,** 787(photo)
in Biafra, 786–787
in Burundi, 787
in Cambodia, 787–788
definition of, 786
in East Timor, 788
in Pakistan, 787
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, **789–790,** 789(photo)
Gensuikyō, **790–791**
George VI (king of England), **791–792,** 792(photo)
Georgia, **792–795,** 794(photo)
nationalist movements in, 794
political activism in, 793
German Communist Party (KPD), 864, 865
German Democratic Party (SPD), 796
German Democratic Republic (GDR), 260–261, 663, 664, 665, 667, 776, **795–800,** 796(photo), 807
armed forces of, 800–802
collapse of, 799–800
construction of the Berlin Wall in, 798
domestic policies of under Ulbricht, 797–798
formation of, 795–797
and the Ministry for State Security (Stasi), 797, 1929–1931
opening of relations with West Germany, 798–799
Germany, Allied Occupation after World War II (1945–1948), **803–807,** 803(photo), 804(map)
and currency reform, 806
disagreements among the Allies concerning, 805–806
division of into two Germanys, 806–807
establishment of the zones of occupation within Berlin, 805
establishment of the zones of occupation within Germany, 803, 805
Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG), 663, 672, 678, 775, **807–816,** 809(photo), 811(photo), 814(photo). *See also* Germany, Federal Republic of, rearmament and NATO; Ostpolitik
armed forces of, 816–819, 817(photo)
compensation by to victims of Nazi persecution, 811–812
economic miracle of, 810–811
formation of, 808–809
and rearmament, 674, 810
and the repaying of foreign debt, 811
role of in international relations, 815
and the status of Berlin, 812
Germany, Federal Republic of, rearmament and NATO, **820–821**
Gerő, Ernő, **821–822,** 940, 941, 942
Ghana, **822–825,** 823(photo)
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 665, **825–827,** 826(photo), 1742–1743
Gibraltar, **827–828**
Gierek, Edward, **828–829,** 829(photo)
Ginsberg, Allen, **830–831**
interview with concerning the counterculture and the Cold War, 2842–2847**Doc.**
Giscard d'Éstaing, Valéry, 743, 744, 745, **831–832,** 832(photo)
Gizenga, Antoine, 479–480
Glasnost, *222*, 666, **833**
Glassboro Summit (1967), **834–835**
Glemp, Jozef (cardinal), **835**
Glenn, John Herschel, Jr., **836–837,** 836(photo)
Gold, Harry, 645–646
Goldwater, Barry Morris, **837–838,** 837(photo), 2636–2369**Doc.**
defeat of by Lyndon B. Johnson, 837
Gomułka, Władysław, **838–840,** 839(photo), 1651–1652
as head of the Polish Communist Party, 839
González Márquez, Felipe, **840–841**
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 180, 181, 186, 223, 784(photo), 833(photo), **841–844,** 842(map), 843(photo), 864, 1473(photo), 1704, 1892–1893, 2107, 2124. *See also* Malta Meeting (Bush and Gorbachev [1989])
attempted coup against (1991), 843–844, 2819–2822**Doc.**
as a driving force behind the end of the Cold War, 843
foreign policy successes of, 843
and glasnost, *222*, 666, 833, 842, 2853–2858**Doc.**
granting of freedoms to the media, 842
meetings with Reagan, 1402–1403, 1725–1726, 2237–2239
New Thinking policy of, 1472–1474, 1473(photo), 2858–2865**Doc.**
and perestroika, *222*, 666, 842–843, 1615–1616, 2853–2858**Doc.**
press conference of on German reunification, 2798–2800**Doc.**
reforms of, 666, 667, 843–844, 938
rise of through the Communist Party hierarchy, 841–842
statement on Afghanistan (1988), 2756–2758**Doc.**
Gorshkov, Sergey Georgyevich, **844–845**
Gottwald, Klement, 664–665, **846,** 846(photo)
Gouzenko, Igor, 645, **847–848**
Governors Island Meeting, Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush (Gorbachev/Reagan [1988]), **848–849**
Gowon, Yakubu, 277
Great Depression, 119
Greece, 99, 178–179, 481–482, 690, **849–854,** 855(map), 853(photo), 1582–1586, 2078, 2079. *See also* Cyprus; Greek Civil War (1946–1949)
migration of Greeks abroad, 851
resistance of communist groups to German occupation of, 850
U.S. economic aid to, 851, 1453
Greek Civil War (1946–1949), 484, 851, **854–856,** 855(photo)
Greek Communist Party (KKE), 854, 855
Greene, Graham, 1219–1220
Greenglass, David, 646
Greenland, **856–858**
strategic importance of, 857
U.S.-Danish relations regarding, 857
Grenada, **858–859**
Grenada Invasion (1983), **859–861,** 859(map), 860(photo)
casualties of, 861
causes of, 859
diplomatic efforts proceeding, 859–860
legacy of, 861
Gromyko, Andrey, **861–863,** 862
reputation of as a cunning negotiator, 862
Grósz, Károly, 666–667, **863–864**
Grotewohl, Otto, **864–865,** 865(photo)
Ground burst, **866**
Groves, Leslie, 203
Groza, Petru, **866–868**
complexity of his personality and politics, 867
Gruber, Karl, **868–869**
Guantánamo Naval Base, **869–871,** 870(photo)
Guatemala, 173–174, 385, **871–873**
Guatemalan Intervention (1954), 385, **873–876,** 875(photo)
Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto, 499, 616(photo), **876–878,** 876(photo)
Gulags, **878–881,** 879(photo)
reorganization of, 880
victims of, 878
Guomindang (GMD), 1061–1062
Guyana, **881–883**
Guzmán, Jacobo Arbenz, 121

Habibie, Bachruddin Jusuf, 988–989
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr., 708–709, **885–886,** 885(photo)
  as commander of NATO forces, 886
  as secretary of state under Reagan, 886
Haile Selassie (emperor of Ethiopia), **886–888**
Haiti, **888–890,** 889(photo)
  under Aristide, 889
  U.S. invasion of, 888
Hallstein, Walter, **890–891**
Hallstein Doctrine, **891–892**
Halperin, Morton, 182
Hammarskjöld, Dag, **892–893,** 893(photo), 915, 1982
  conflict of with Khrushchev, 893
Hammett, Dashiell, 1216
Hampton, Fred, 290
Hansen, H. C., 857
Hanssen, Robert, 654
Hardened sites, **893–894**
Harmel Report (1967), **894–895**
Harriman, William Averell, **895–897,** 896(photo)
  and the Paris Peace talks, 896
  political appointments of under Truman, 896
Hassan II (king of Morocco), **897–898,** 898(photo)
Hatoyama Ichirō, **899–900**
Havel, Václav, 392, 393, **900–901,** 901(photo)
Hawke, Robert, **901–902**
Hayden, Tom, 1954
Healey, Denis, **902–903**
Heath, Edward, **904,** 2106
Heinemann, Gustav, **905**
Hellman, Lilian, 1216, 1216(photo)
Helms, Richard McGarrah, **906–907**
Helsinki Agreements (1975), 2681–2682**Doc.**
Helsinki Final Act (1975), 863, 900, **907–908,** 937–938
Hemingway, Ernest, 1218
Henderson, Loy, letter of concerning the coup in Iran (1953), 2466–2469**Doc.**
Herter, Christian Archibald, **908–909,** 909(photo), 1078(photo)
Herzl, Theodore, 145
Heseltine, Michael, **909–910**
Heuss, Theodor, **910–911**
HIGHJUMP, Operation, 131
Hiss, Alger, **911–912,** 925
Hitler, Adolf, 755, 878
Hobbes, Thomas, 935
Ho Chi Minh, 749, **912–914,** 913(photo), 2186(photo). *See also* Indochina War; Vietnam; Vietnam War
  activities during World War II, 913
  Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 2361–2362**Doc.**
Hodge, John R., 1145
Hoffman, Paul Gray, **914–915**
Hoffmann, Heinz, **916**
Hollywood Ten, **916–918,** 917(photo)
Holocaust (the Final Solution), 149, 936, 1027, 1331
Holt, Harold Edward, **919**
Honduras, **919–921**
  strategic value of to the United States, 920
Honecker, Erich, 667, 798–800, **921–922,** 922(photo)
Hong Kong, **922–924**
  strategic value of to the United States, 923–924
  value of to the PRC, 923
Hoover, John Edgar, 714–715, **924–926,** 925(photo)
  anticommunist crusade of, 924–925
  relationship with Johnson, 925
  relationship with Kennedy, 925
Ho-Sainteny Agreement, 980–981, 2188
Hotline, **926–927**
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), 720, 916–918, 1216–1218
Hoxha, Enver, 97–98, 99, 667, **927–929,** 928(photo)
Hua Guofeng, **929–930**
Huang Hua, **930–931**
Hukbalahap, **931–932**
Hull, Cordell, **932–934,** 933(photo)
Human rights, **934–939,** 937(photo)
  in the Cold War, 936–937
  definition of, 935
  in the framework of World War II, 935–936
  and the French Revolution, 935
  and the Soviet Union, 937–938
  United Nations as a proponent of, 936–937
  universal human rights philosophy, 935
Hungarian Revolution (1956), 127, **939–945,** 940(map), 942(photo), 944(photo), 2513–2515**Doc.**
  changes in Soviet policy as a result of, 944–945
  declaration of the Soviet Union concerning, 2515–2516**Doc.**
  demands of the protesters, 941
  and the discontent among intellectuals, 940
  effects of on Eastern Europe, 944
  failure of, 943–944
  origins of, 940
  Soviet response to, 941–942
Hungary, 664, 665, **945–950,** 947(photo), 1461–1462. *See also* Hungarian Revolution
  economic crisis in, 948
  and the Fifteen Point Program, 948–949
  and "Goulash Communism," 949
  and the New Course reform program, 948
  post–war elections in, 946
  transformation of to a Western-style democracy, 949
Hungarian Workers' Party (MDP), 946, 947
Hunt, Michael H., 143
Hurd, Douglas Richard, **950–951**
Hurley, Patrick Jay, 402, 420, **951–952**
Husák, Gustáv, **952–953,** 953(photo)
Hussein, Saddam, **954–955,** 954(photo), 1013, 1014, 1169, 1336
  atrocities committed by, 955
  decision to invade Kuwait, 1014–1015
  fear of Iran's fundamentalism, 954
  promotion of economic development under, 954
  test of his leadership, 1014
Hussein I (king of Jordan), **956–958,** 957(photo), 1077–1079, 1078(photo)
  as a moderating force in the Middle East, 956
  as a proponent of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, 957
  reasons of for beginning the Iran-Iraq War, 1009–1010
Hu Yaobang, **958–959**
Hydrogen bomb, **959–961,** 960(photo)

Ibarra, José Velasco, 612
Iceland, **963–965,** 964(photo), 1780
  importance of to the United States, 963
  reduced strategic role of after the end of the Cold War, 964–965
  U.S. presence in, 963–964
Ikeda Hayato, **965–966,** 1050
Iliescu, Ion, **966–968**
Inchon landing (Operation CHROMITE), **968–970,** 968(photo)
  difficulty of, 969
  planning for, 969
India, **970–974,** 972(photo), 1865–1866. *See also* India-Pakistan Wars
  armed forces of, 974–976
  economic development in, 971

India (*continued*)
non-aligned position of in the Cold War, 971
and the partition with Pakistan, 970–971, 976–977
problems of with radical Sikhs, 973
resistance of to British rule, 970
India-Pakistan Wars (1947–1949, 1965, 1971), **976–980,** 976(photo)
casualties of, 976
East Pakistan/West Pakistan dispute, 978–979
and Kashmir, 971, 977–978, 1095–1098, 1096(photo)
naval battles during, 979
Pakistani air attacks during, 978
partition as cause of, 976–977
strength of Indian forces, 979
and UN mediation in, 977
Indochina War (1946–1954), **980–985,** 981(map), 982(photo), 2482–2484**Doc.** *See also* Dien Bien Phu, Battle of
casualties of, 984–985
collapse of the Ho-Sainteny Agreement, 981
and the creation of the State of Vietnam (SV), 983
French motives during, 981
U.S. policy concerning, 983–984
Indonesia, 143, 215, 610, 788, **985–989**
armed forces of, 988
Dutch colonial control of, 986
foreign policy of under Sukarno, 988
independence of from the Netherlands, 986–987
Japanese invasion of, 985–986
Inönü, Ismet, **989–990,** 990(photo), 2078, 2080
Intelligence collection, **990–992**
and aerial reconnaissance by satellites, 991–992
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987), **993–995,** 994(table), 1704, 2753–2756**Doc.**
Internal Security Act (1950), 466, **995–996**
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 208
International Monetary Fund (IMF), **996–997,** 1970–1971
Iran, **998–1001.** *See also* Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Henderson, Loy, letter of concerning the coup in Iran; Iran-Contra Affair; Iran Hostage Crisis; Iran-Iraq War; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Reza Pahlavi, Mohammad (Shah of Iran)
armed forces of, 1001–1003, 1002(photo)
causes of the Iranian Revolution, 1000
relations with the Soviet Union, 998
relations with the United Kingdom, 998–999
Iran-Contra Affair, 189–190, **1004–1005**
Walsh Report (1993) concerning, 2835–2841**Doc.**
Iran Hostage Crisis (1979–1981), **1005–1008,** 1006(photo), 2133–2134
causes of, 1005–1006
Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 1000, 1003, **1009–1011,** 1009(photo), 1010(table)
attrition phase of, 1010, 1011
incidents during involving the United States, 1011
casualties of, 1011
Iraq, **1011–1015,** 1013(photo), 1336. *See also* Iran-Iraq War
and the Arab-Israeli War (1948), 1016
armed forces of, 1015–1017, 1016(photo)
strength of, 1017
and the coup of 1958, 1012–1013
and the coup of 1968, 1013
independence of from the United Kingdom, 1012
and the invasion of Kuwait, 1014–1015
Mutual Cooperation Pact with Turkey (1955), 2493–2495**Doc.**
post–World War II, 1012
Ireland, Northern, **1018–1020**
and the Good Friday Agreement (1998), 1019
post–war economic problems in, 1018–1019
role of during World War II, 1018
Ireland, Republic of, **1020–1022**
and NATO, 1021
neutrality of, 1020–1021
support of U.S. policies by, 1021–1022
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 1019, **1022–1024,** 1023, 2031. *See also* Sinn Féin
open challenge of to the British Crown,1022
refusal of to disarm, 1024
strong leadership of, 1023
Ishibashi Tanzan, **1024–1025**
Israel, 147, 171, **1025–1032,** 1026(map), 1028(photo), 1029(photo), 1077, 1331–1332, 1333, 1336. *See also* Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1973); Camp David Accords
armed forces of, 1032–1037, 1033(photo), 1034(map)
major wars of, 1033, 1035
and nuclear weapons, 1032–1033
special operations of, 1036
strength of before the Yom Kippur War (1973), 1035–1036
domestic organization of, 1030
founding of, 1025, 1027
independence proclamation of, 1028
Jewish migration into Palestine during and after World War II, 1027
major political parties of, 1030–1031
navy of, 1036–1037
and the partitioning of Palestine to form Israel, 1027
Soviet and U.S. interests in, 1028, 1029
Italy, 673, 677, **1037–1040,** 1039(photo)
anticommunism of during the 1950s, 1039
armed forces of, 1040–1042
domestic politics of (1970s), 1039–1040
economic growth of, 1039
and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), 1037–1038
relations with the United States, 1038–1039
Soviet interest in, 1038
terrorism in, 1039–1040
Italian Communist party (PCI), 1037–1038, 1039–1040
Italian Socialist party (PSI), 1039

Jagan, Cheddi, 881–882, **1043–1044**
Jakeš, Miloš, **1044–1045**
Japan, 985–986, **1046–1053,** 1048(photo), 1140, 1167–1168, 2152–2153
armed forces of, 1053–1056, 1054(photo)
as a bulwark against communism in Southeast Asia, 1046–1047
minimalist stance of toward international affairs, 602–603
occupation of after World War II by the United States, 598–599, 1046, 1056–1058
relations with the Soviet Union, 1048–1049
strained relationship with the United States, 603, 1051
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1951), 2462–2463**Doc.**
Jaruzelski, Wojciech, **1059–1060,** 1059(photo), 1654–1655, 2228
declaration of martial law by, 2729–2730**Doc.**
Jews, 149. *See also* Anti-semitism; Holocaust; Israel
Ji Pengfei, **1060–1061**
Jiang Jieshi, 418–419, 421, 426, 582, 599, 951, **1061–1063,** 1062(photo)
statements on the situation in China (1945), 2239–2342**Doc.**

Jiang Jingguo, 420, 421
Jiang Qing, **1063–1064**
Jinmen and Mazu, **1064–1066**
Jinnah, Mohamed Ali, 976, 977, **1066–1067,** 1066(photo), 1564–1565, 1564(photo), 1862–1863
John Birch Society, **1067–1068**
John XXIII (pope), **1068–1069,** 1738–1739
John Paul II (pope), **1070–1072,** 1070(photo), 1739–1740, 2174
Johnson, Louis Arthur, **1072–1073**
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 118, 729, **1073–1077,** 1074(photo), 1075(table), 1271, 1271(photo), 1333, 2132, 2145
  announcement that he would not seek reelection (1968), 2618–2619**Doc.**
  decision of not to run for president a second term, 1076
  domestic policies of (the "Great Society"), 1074
  foreign policy issues during his administration, 1075–1076
  "Peace without Conquest" address (1965), 2600–2605**Doc.**
  political career of, 1074
  and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 2058–2060, 2060(photo)
  and the Vietnam War, 1075, 1076
Jordan, **1077–1079,** 1078(photo). *See also* Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1973)
Juan Carlos I (king of Spain), **1080–1081,** 1080(photo), 1915, 1916
Just war theory, **1081–103**

Kádár, János, 665, 666, 863, 942, 943, 944, 945, 948–949, **1085–1086,** 1085(photo)
Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich, **1086–1087**
Kaifu Toshiki, **1087–1088**
KAL Flight 007 (1983), **1088–1091,** 1090(photo)
Kaliningrad Oblast, **1091–1092**
Kania, Stanisław, **1092–1093,** 1093(photo)
Karamanlis, Konstantinos, 851–852, 853–854
Karelia, **1093–1095**
Kashmir Dispute, **1095–1098,** 1096(photo)
Kaufman, Irving, statement concerning the Rosenberg trial, 2452–2453**Doc.**
Kaunda, Kenneth David, **1098–1099**
Kekkonen, Urho, 726, **1099–1100**
Kelly, Petra Karin, **1100–1101**
Kennan, George Frost, 484–485, 485(photo), **1101–1104,** 1102(photo)
  Containment Doctrine of, 2364–2369**Doc.**
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 685–686, 710, 729, 881–882, 920, **1104–1107,** 1105(photo), 1596(photo), 1870, 2123, 2132, 2145, 2183(photo). *See also* Bay of Pigs; Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Vienna Conference (1961)
  address of concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion, 2550–2552**Doc.**
  assassination of, 1106
  commencement address at American University (1963), 2577–2581**Doc.**
  and the creation of the Peace Corps, 2548–2549**Doc.**
  Cuban Missile Crisis speech (1962), 2574–2577**Doc.**
  discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis with his staff, 2570–2574**Doc.**
  "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech (1963), 2581–2582**Doc.**
  inaugural address of (1961), 2561–2564**Doc.**
  message to Congress concerning space race, 2554–2556**Doc.**
  poor health of, 1104
  and the presidential race of 1960, 1104–1105
  service of in World War II, 1104
Kennedy, Robert Francis, **1107–1108,** 1108(photo)
  assassination of, 1108
Kenya, **1108–1111.** *See also* Mau Mau
Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), 1110
Kenyan African National Union (KANU), 1110
Kenyatta, Jomo, 535(photo), 1109, **1111–1112,** 1111(photo)
Kerouac, Jean Louis, **1112–1113**
Khmer Rouge, **1114–1115,** 1874–1875, 2190, 2677–2681**Doc.**
Khomeini, Ruhollah, 954, 1000, 1001, 1009, **1115–1117,** 1116(photo)
  speech on the Khurdad 15 Uprising (1979), 2704–2705**Doc.**
Khrushchev, Nikita, 98, 363(photo), 500, 500(photo), 601, 626, 812, 893, 972(photo), 1106, **1117–1121,** 1118(photo), 1135(photo), 1825(photo), 1889(photo), 2122, 2183(photo). *See also* Berlin Crises; Cuban Missile Crisis; Hungarian Revolution; Kitchen Debate (Nixon/Khrushchev [1959]); Sino-Soviet split; Vienna Conference (1961)
  "Cult of Personality" speech (1956), 2502–2506**Doc.**
  on decolonization, 2542–2545**Doc.**
  de-Stalinization policy of, 928, 1119, 1120, 1888
  foreign policy of, 1119–1120
  "On Peaceful Coexistence" speech (1959), 2528–2533**Doc.**
  personal view of Kennedy, 506
  policy of toward other socialist states, 1120
  recognition of Cuba by, 1888–1889
  report of the *London Times* on the "We Will Bury You" speech, 2517–2519**Doc.**
  service of in World War II, 1118
  Virgin Lands program of, 1118
Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg, 812–813, **1121–1122**
Kim Dae Jung, **1122–1123,** 1123(photo), 1147
Kim Il Sung, **1123–1125,** 1124(photo), 1140–1142
Kim Jong Il, 1142
Kim Young Sam, **1125–1126,** 1126(photo)
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 925, **1126–1128,** 1127(photo)
  "I Have a Dream" speech (1963), 2584–2587**Doc.**
  "I See the Promised Land" speech (1968), 2624–2628**Doc.**
Kinnock, Neil Gordon, **1128–1129**
Kirkpatrick, Jeane Jordan, **1129–1131,** 1130(photo), 2123
Kishi Nobusuke, 1049–1050, **1131–1132,** 1132(photo)
Kissinger, Henry, 404, 610, **1132–1135,** 1134(photo), 2308, 2309
  abilities of, 1133
  policies of under Ford, 1134
  policies of under Nixon, 1133–1134
  weaknesses of, 1133
Kitchen Debate (Nixon/Khrushchev [1959]), **1135–1136,** 1135(photo), 2523–2528**Doc.**
Kohl, Helmut, 677, 815, **1136–1138,** 1137(photo)
  press conference of on German reunification, 2798–2800**Doc.**
Koivisto, Mauno, 727
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), **1138–1140**

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (DPRK, North Korea), 605–607, **1140–1143,** 1141(photo). *See also* Korean War
armed forces of, 1143–1145, 1143(photo)
casualties suffered by in the Korean War, 1141, 1143
formation of, 1140–1141
hostility of toward the United States, 1141–1142
and the philosophy of *Juche* (self-reliance), 1142
Korea, Republic of (ROK, South Korea), **1145–1149,** 1148(photo). *See also* Korean War
armed forces of, 1149–1151
domestic politics of, 1147–1148
guerrilla insurgency in, 1146
and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States (1953), 1147, 2469–2471**Doc.**
Korean War (1950–1953), 91, 669, 1075(table), **1151–1160,** 1152(map), 1153(table), 1156(photo), 1159(photo), 1887, 2070, 2079, 2129, 2448–2450**Doc.**
Armistice Agreement (1953), 2464–2466**Doc.**
casualties of, 1153(table), 1159
China and, 1156–1157
Chinese offensive on New Year's Day, 1158
fighting in the Pusan Perimeter, 1155
initial U.S. military response to the invasion of South Korea, 1154
and the landing at Inchon, 968–970, 968(photo), 1155
legacy of, 1159–1160
role of airpower in, 2137–2138
strength of North Korean forces, 1153
strength of South Korean forces, 1153
tank warfare during, 2003–2004
United Nations military support for South Korea, 1154–1155
unpreparedness of U.S. forces for, 1154, 1155
Korolev, Sergei Pavlovich, **1160–1162**
Kosovo, 2291–2292
Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 139, 1075, **1162–1163,** 1163(photo)
Kovács, Béla, **1163–1164**
Kovaljov, Sergei, 938
Kreisky, Bruno, **1164–1165**
Krenz, Egon, 800, 922, **1165–1166**
Kubitschek, Juscelino, **1166–1167**
Kurile Islands, **1167–1168**
Kuwait, 348, 1014–1015, **1168–1170,** 1170(photo)
Laird, Melvin, **1171–1172,** 1171(photo), 2146
Landsbergis, Vytautas, **1172–1173**
Lansdale, Edward Geary, **1173–1174**
Lansky, Meyer, 582
Laos, **1174–1177,** 1175(photo), 1871, 2038, 2199
bombing of (Operation BARREL ROLL), 1177
U.S. economic and social aid to, 1175–1176
Lardner, Ring, 1217–1218
Latin America, **118–124,** 119(table), 120(photo), 123(photo)
communist insurgencies in, 120
communist parties in, 1178–1179
economic relations with the United States, 121–122
and the Good Neighbor policy, 119–120, 121
and the illicit drug trade, 122–123
immigrants from to North America, 123
popular liberation movements in, 1179–1181, 1182(photo)
population of (1945), 118
U.S. investment in, 119
Lattimore, Owen, **1182–1183,** 1183(photo)
Latvia, **1184–1185**
Launch on Warning (LoW), **1185–1186**
Leahy, William Daniel, **1186–1187,** 1187(photo)
Lebanon, **1188–1189,** 1469
U.S. interventions in, 1189–1192, 1190(photo)
Le Carré, John, 1219, 1220
Leclerc, Jacques-Philippe, **1192–1193**
Le Duc Tho, **1193–1194**
LeMay, Curtis Emerson, 87, **1194–1196,** 1195(photo)
Lend-Lease program, **1196–1197,** 1197(photo)
Lenin, Vladimir, 141, 1926
Leopold III (king of Belgium), 249, 477, **1197–1198**
Le Pen, Jean-Marie, **1198–1199**
Li Guangyao, **1199–1200,** 1200(photo)
Li Peng, **1200–1201**
Li Xiannian, **1201–1202**
Liao Chengzhi, **1202–1203**
Liberia, **1203–1205**
rebel groups in, 1204–1205
Liberman, Evgenii Grigorevich, **1205–1206**
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 973, 1864, 1924–1925, 2031
Libya, **1206–1210,** 1207(map), 1209(photo), 1704, 1965
Arab nationalism in, 1208
formation of the Kingdom of Libya, 1207
under Qadhafi, 1208–1210
Lie, Trygve, **1210–1212,** 1211(photo)
Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich, **1212–1213**
Lin Biao, **1213–1214**
Lippmann, Walter, **1214–1215**
Literature, **1215–1223,** 1216(photo), 1217(table), 1218(photo), 1223(photo)
anti-communist, 1219
and Christianity, 1221
European, 1221–1222
influence of on American thought, 1218–1219
influence of communism on, 1215–1217
Russian, 1222–1223
science fiction, 1220–1221
spy thrillers, 1219–1220
Lithuania, **1224–1225**
Liu Shaoqi, **1226**
Locke, John, 935
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 896, **1226–1228,** 1227(photo)
Lon Nol, 1114, **1228–1229,** 1229(photo)
Lovett, Robert Abercrombie, 485(photo), **1229–1231,** 1230(photo)
Luce, Clare Boothe, **1231–1232,** 1231(photo)
Luce, Henry Robinson, **1232–1233,** 2329–2333**Doc.**
Luciano, Charles, 582
Lumumba, Patrice Emery, 479, 479(photo), **1233–1235,** 1234(photo)
Luxembourg, 250, 673, **1235–1236**
Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich, **1236–1237**

MacArthur, Douglas, 899, **1239–1241,** 1240(photo), 2070. *See also* Inchon landing; Korean War
political ambitions of, 1240
post-recall speech to Congress, 2457–2460**Doc.**
statement by Truman relieving MacArthur of his command, 2453–2457**Doc.**
Machine guns, **1241–1244,** 1242(photo)
categorization of by caliber, 1241–1243
cooling of, 1241
Soviet military doctrine concerning, 1243
and the Stoner 63 system, 1244
Maclean, Donald, **1244–1245**
Macmillan, Maurice Harold, **1245–1247,** 1246(photo), 2105–2106
"Winds of Change" speech (1960), 2534–2536**Doc.**

Madman strategy, **1247**
Magsaysay, Ramon, **1248**
Maizière, Lothar de, **1249**
Makarios III (archbishop of Cyprus), 521, 522, 523, 852, **1249–1251,** 1250(photo)
Malan, Daniel François, **1251–1252**
Malay Federation, 1873–1874
Malayan Emergency, **1252–1254,** 1253(photo)
Malaysia, 215, **1254–1260,** 1256(map), 1258(photo). *See also* Malayan Emergency
  counterinsurgency movements in, 1257–1258
  nationalism in, 1255
  restoration of Dutch rule in after World War II, 1257
  secessionist movements in, 1259
Malcolm X , **1260–1261,** 1260(photo)
Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich, 1118–1119, **1261–1262**
Maléter, Pál, 943
Malik, Jacob Aleksandrovich, 1158, **1262–1263,** 1263(photo)
Malinovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich, **1263–1265**
Malraux, Georges-André, **1265–1266,** 1265(photo)
Malta, **1266–1267**
Malta Meeting (Bush and Gorbachev [1989]), **1267–1268**
Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), 135–136, 191
Mandela, Nelson, **1269–1271,** 1270(photo), 1857, 1860
Mann, Thomas C., **1271–1272,** 1271(photo)
Mannerheim, Carl Gustav Emil, Baron, **1273**
Mao Zedong, 99, 402, 402(photo), 406–407, 468, 469, **1274–1277,** 1274(photo), 1825(photo). *See also* Chinese Civil War; Cultural Revolution; East Asia
  announcement of the death of, 2688–2691**Doc.**
  and the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, 1276
  economic policy of, 1275
  and the Great Leap Forward, 1275–1276
  as head of the Chinese Communist Party, 1274–1275
  Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong (The Little Red Book), 2588–2590**Doc.**
  statements on the situation in China (1945), 2239–2342**Doc.**
  telegram exchange with Stalin, 2446–2447**Doc.**
  "U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger" speech (1956), 2511–2513**Doc.**
Marcos, Ferdinand Edralin, **1277–1278,** 1278(photo)
Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 657, 658–659, 658(photo)
Mariel Boatlift (1980), **1278–1280,** 1279(photo)
Market Socialism, **1281–1282**
Markos, Vafiades, **1282–1283**
Markov, Georgi, 285
Marshall, George Catlett, 210, **1283–1286,** 1285(photo), 2069
  and the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan, 1284–1285
  "For the Common Defense," 2357–2361**Doc.**
  mission of to China, 1284, 1286–1287
  service of in World War I and World War II, 1284
Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program), 210, 741, 806, 1285, **1288–1293,** 1288(photo), 1289(map), 1290(table), 1292(photo)
  and the advancement of European integration, 1293
  cost of, 1292
  purpose of, 1288–1289
  remarks by Marshall concerning, 2378–2380**Doc.**
  Soviet non-participation in, 1290–1291
  and the United Kingdom, 2104
Martí, Augustin Farabundo, 632
Marx, Karl, 1736
Masaryk, Jan, **1294–1295**
Massu, Jacques, 105–106, 107, **1295–1296**
Mau Mau, **1296–1298,** 1297(photo)
May, Allan Nunn, 645, **1298–1299**
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, **1299–1300**
McCarran, Patrick A., 995, 996
McCarthy, Eugene Joseph, 467, 952, 1216, **130–1301,** 1301(photo)
  speech of on the spread of communism in the United States, 2425–2426**Doc.**
McCarthy, Joseph Raymond, 995, **1302–1304,** 1302(photo), 2129–2130
  censure of by the U.S. Senate, 2487–2488**Doc.**
McCarthy-Army Hearings (1954), **1304–1306,** 1305(photo), 2477–2479**Doc.**
McCarthyism, 449, 466, 467–468, 995, **1307–1308,** 2132
McCloy, John Jay, **1308–1310,** 1309(photo)
McFarlane, Robert, 1004, 1005
McGovern, George Stanley, **1310–1311,** 1311(photo)
McNamara, Robert Strange, 505, 729, **1311–1314,** 1312(photo), 2145
  endorsement of the Bay of Pigs invasion, 1312
  and U.S. policy in the Vietnam War, 1312–1313
"Meanings of the Wall, The" (Darnton), 2779–2782**Doc.**
Medvedev, Roy Aleksandrovich, **1314–1315**
Medvedev, Zhores Aleksandrovich, **1315–1316**
Meese, Edwin, 1004–1005
Meir, Golda, 1029, **1316–1317,** 1316(photo)
Menderes, Adnan, **1317–1318**
Mendès-France, Pierre, **1318–1320,** 1319(photo)
Mengistu, Haile Mariam, **1320–1321**
Menon, Vengalil Krishnan Krishna, **1321–1323,** 1322(photo)
Menzies, Robert Gordon, **1323–1324**
Mexico, **1324–1327,** 1326(photo)
  disagreements of with U.S. Cold War policy, 1324, 1325–1326
  economic ties of with the United States, 1324, 1327
MI5, **1327–1328**
MI6, **1328–1329**
Michael I (king of Romania), **1329–1330,** 1329(photo)
Middle East, **1330–1337,** 1334(photo), 1336(photo). *See also* Arab-Israeli Wars; Iranian Revolution; *specifically listed individual Middle Eastern nations*
  British and French mandates in after World War I, 1330–1331
  importance of to the Allies in World War II, 1331
Middle East Regional Defense Organizations, **1337–1339**
Miki Takeo, **1339–1340,** 1339(photo)
Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, **1340–1341**
Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, **1341–1343,** 1342(photo)
Military balance (1945–1990), **1343–1348,** 1345(photo), 1347(photo)
Military-Industrial Complex, **1348–1351,** 1349(photo), 1350(table)
Miller, Arthur, 1217, 1218, 1218(photo)
Miller, Walter M., Jr., 1220–1221
Milošević, Slobodan, **1351–1352,** 1351(photo), 2291

Mindszenty, József, 942, 943, 947, **1353–1354**
Mines and mine warfare, land, **1354–1358,** 1356(photo), 1357(photo)
Mines and mine warfare, sea, **1358–1360,** 1359(photo)
Minsk Declarations (1991), 2822–2825**Doc.**
Missiles, 670, 1361(photo). *See also* Antiaircraft guns and missiles
  air-launched cruise missiles, 1947
  antiballistic missiles, 1363–1364, 1525, 1941–1942
  cruise missiles, 1364–1366, 1365(photo)
  intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 961, 1366–1368, 1367(photo), 1523, 1942, 1943, 1947, 2139
  intermediate-range-ballistic (IRBMs), 1039, 1368–1370, 1369(photo), 1512, 1523
  Jericho I and Jericho mobile missiles, 1032–1033
  medium-range ballistic missiles, 1523
  Minuteman III missiles, 1523(photo)
  missile gap, 1360–1363
  multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 1414–1415, 1415(photo), 1525–1526, 1947
  MX missile system, 1427–1429, 1428(photo)
  Pershing II missiles, 670, 993, 1370–1372, 1371(photo), 1945
  Polaris missiles, 1372–1373, 1372(photo)
  Poseidon missiles, 1373–1374
  Soviet S-class missiles, 993
  submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 135, 961, 1374–1376, 1375(photo), 1943
  submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), 1943
  surface-to-air missiles (SAM), 134, 135, 137, 191
Mitterrand, François, 677, 745, **1377–1379,** 1377(photo)
Mobutu Sese Seko, 474–476, 476(photo), 479–480, **1379–1380,** 1379(photo)
Modrow, Hans, 922, **1380–1381**
Moldavia (Moldova), **1381–1382**
Mollet, Guy, 683, **1382–1384,** 1383(photo), 1968
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, 149, **1384–1386,** 1385(photo)
Molotov Plan (1947), **1386–1387**
Mongolia, **1387–1389**
MONGOOSE, Operation, **1389–1391**
Monnet, Jean, 890, **1391–1392,** 1392(photo)
Monnet Plan, **1392–1394**
Monroe Doctrine (1823), 119
Monrovia Group, **1394–1396**
Morales, Villeda, 920
Moro, Aldo, **1396–1397,** 1396(photo)
Morocco, 897–898, **1397–1400,** 1399(photo)
Moscow Meeting (Brezhnev and Nixon (1972), **1400–1401,** 1401(photo)
Moscow Meeting (Gorbachev and Reagan [1988]), **1402–1403**
Moscow and Yalta Meeting (Brezhnev and Nixon (1974), **1403–1404**
Mossadegh, Mohammed, 128, 129–130, 998–999, **1405–1406,** 1405(photo), 1454–1455
Mountbatten, Louis, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma, **1406–1407,** 1406(photo), 1564(photo), 1862
Mozambique, **1407–1409**
Mozambique Civil War (1977–1992), **1409–1411**
Mubarak, Hosni, 618
Mugabe, Robert Gabriel, **1411–1412,** 2310, 2311
Mulroney, Martin Brian, **1412–1413,** 1412(photo)
Munich Analogy, **1416**
Murphy, Robert Daniel, **1417–1418,** 1417(photo)
Music, **1418–1422,** 1419(table), 1421(photo)
  African American musicians, 1420–1421
  big band, 1418
  classical, 1419
  country, 1419
  disco, 1421
  hard rock, 1421
  jazz, 1418, 1419–1420
  Latin, 1419
  punk, 1421
  rap, 1421–1422
  rock and roll, 1418, 1420
Muskie, Edmund Sixtus, **1422–1423**
Muslim League (ML), 640
Mussolini, Benito, 755
Mutual assured destruction (MAD), 87, **1423–1424,** 1424(photo)
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) Talks (1973–1989), **1424–1425**
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA [Japan/United States, 1954]), 1048
Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.–Republic of China (1954), **1425–1427**
MX Missile System. *See* Missiles, MX missile system
My Lai Massacre (1968), **1429–1430**

Nagorno-Karabakh, 222, 223, **1431–1433,** 1432(photo)
Naguib, Mohammed, **1433–1434,** 1434(photo)
Nagy, Ferenc, 946, **1434–1435**
Nagy, Imre, 665, 864, 939–940, 941, 948, **1435–1436,** 1436(photo)
  final message of to the Hungarian people, 2517**Doc.**
  policies of, 942–943
Nakasone Yasuhiro, **1437–1438,** 1437(photo)
Namibia, **1438–1442,** 1441(photo)
  and apartheid, 1439–1440
  struggle of for independence, 1440–1441
  UN support for, 1440
Narayan, Jayaprakash, 972
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 162, 170, 615–617, 616(photo), 1029, 1077, **1442–1444,** 1443(photo), 1775. *See also* Suez Crisis
National Cold War Museum and Memorial, **1444–1445**
National Intelligence Estimate, **1445–1446**
National Security Act (1947), **1446–1447,** 2380–2383**Doc.**
National Security Agency (NSA), 485, **1447–1449,** 1448(photo)
National Security Council Report NSC-68, 485, 486, 766, **1449–1451,** 2128, 2431–2445**Doc.**
National Security Study Memorandum 39 (1969), **1451–1452**
Nationalism, **1552–1456,** 1453(photo), 1455(photo). *See also* Arab nationalism
  in Algeria, 1455
  in Latin America, 1454
  Soviet policy toward, 1452, 1453
  U.S. policy toward, 1453
  in Vietnam, 1453–1454
Navarre, Henri, **1457**
Ne Win, **1458–1459,** 1459(photo)
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 972(photo), 970, 971, **1459–1461,** 1460(photo), 1863, 1865
Németh, Miklós, **1461–1462**
Nenni, Pietro, **1462–1463**
Nepal, **1463–1465,** 1464(photo)
Netherlands, 250, 673, 986–987, **1466–1469,** 1466(photo)
  economic resurgence of after World War II, 1466–1467
  naval buildup in, 1468

Neutron bomb, **1469–1471**
New Look defense policy, **1471–1472**
New Thinking policy, **1472–1474,** 1473(photo), 2858–2865**Doc.**
New Zealand, 150, **1474–1476.** *See also* ANZUS Pact (1951)
Newton, Huey P., 288–289
  murder of, 290
Ngo Dinh Diem, 470, 635, **1476–1478,** 1477(photo), 2188, 2192–2194
Nguyen Cao Ky, **1479–1480,** 1479(photo)
Nguyen Van Thieu, **1480–1481,** 1480(photo), 2194
Nicaragua, 487–488, 1004–1005, **1482–1486,** 1483(map), 1484(photo). *See also* Contras; Sandinistas
  mining of Nicaraguan harbors by the CIA, 2741–2742**Doc.**
  under Somoza, 1482–1483
Niebuhr, Reinhold, **1486–1487**
Nigeria, 277–279, **1487–1490,** 1489(photo)
Nitze, Paul Henry, **1490–1491,** 1491(photo)
Nixon, Richard Milhous, 139(photo), 553(photo), 1051, 1135(photo), 1401(photo), **1491–1494,** 1493(photo), 1982, 2132, 2236(photo). *See also* Kitchen Debate (Nixon/Khrushchev [1959]); Vietnam War; Watergate scandal
  and the ending of the Vietnam War, 1492
  and the Madman strategy, 1247
  meetings with Brezhnev, 1400–1401, 1403–1404, 1493, 2235–2237
  normalization of relations with China, 404, 1492
  resignation statement of, 2674–2677**Doc.**
  "Vietnamization" speech (1969), 2645–2650**Doc.**
  and the Watergate scandal, 1493
Nixon Doctrine, 1492, **1494–1496**
Nkomo, Joshua, 2308, 2310
Nkrumah, Kwame, 823–824, **1496–1497**
Nobel Peace Prize, **1497–1499,** 1497(photo), 1498(table)
Nomenklatura, **1499–1500**
Non-Aligned Movement, **1500–1503,** 1501(photo)
Noriega, Manuel, **1504–1505,** 1504(photo)
Norstad, Lauris, **1505–1507,** 1506(photo)
North, Oliver, 1004–1005
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), 228, 229, **1507–1509,** 1507(photo)
North Atlantic Treaty (1949), **1509–1510,** 2407–2409**Doc.**
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 188, 219, 485, 810, 1021, 1424–1425, **1510–1514,** 1512(table), 1515(photo), 1515(photo), 1909–1910, 2104, 2105. *See also* AirLand Battle doctrine; Germany, Federal Republic of, rearmament and NATO; Harmel Report; Military balance
  and the bombing of Serbia, 2291
  and the Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), 1512
  French withdrawal from, 1511
  London Declaration of (1990), 2794–2798**Doc.**
  Multilateral Force (MLF) of, 1413–1414
  origins and formation of, 1514–1516
  primary tasks of, 1510–1511
  Southern European Task Force (SETAF) of, 1039
Norway, **1516–1518,** 1518(photo), 1779, 1780
Nosek, Václav, **1520**
Novotný, Antonín, **1520–1522,** 1521(photo)
Nuclear arms race, **1522–1526,** 1523(photo), 1524(map), 1525(table)
Nuclear-Free Zones, **1526**
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), 183, 184, **1527–1528,** 2630–2632**Doc.**
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Partial Test Ban Treaty [PTBT, 1963]), 1530, 2582–2584**Doc.**
Nuclear tests, **1528–1530,** 1528(photo)
Nuclear weapons, tactical, **1530–1533,** 1531(photo)
Nyerere, Julius Kambarage, **1533–1534,** 1534(photo)

Obote, Apollo Milton, **1535–1536**
Odets, Clifford, 1217
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), **1536–1537**
Ogaden War (1977–1978), **1537–1539,** 1537(photo)
Olympic Games, politics of, **1539–1542,** 1539(table),1541(photo)
On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), 993
Open Skies Proposal (1955), **1542–1543**
Oppenheimer, Julius Robert, 203, 959, **1543–1545,** 1544(photo)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 691
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 690–691, **1545–1546**
Organization of African Unity (OAU), **1546–1548,** 1547(photo)
Organization of American States (OAS), 120, 457, 875, **1548–1550**
  charter of, 875, 2387–2391**Doc.**
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 904, **1550–1552,** 1776
Ortega, Daniel, 1772
  interview with, 2847–2852**Doc.**
Orwell, George, 1218, **1552–1553**
Oslo Accords (1993), 172
Ostpolitik, 813, 815, **1554–1556,** 1555(photo)
Outer Space Treaty (1967), **1557–1558,** 2610–2612**Doc.**
Owen, David, **1558**
Özal, Turgut, **1559,** 1559(photo)

Paasikivi, Juho, **1561–1562**
Paisley, Ian, **1562–1563**
Pakistan, **1563–1567,** 1564(photo), 1865, 1866
  armed forces of, **1567–1569,** 1568(photo)
  dispute with India over Kashmir, 1095–1098, 1096(photo), 1565
  and the partition with India, 970–971, 976–977
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 147, 148, 162, 172–173, 1333, 1336, **1569–1571,** 1571(photo), 2032–2033
Palestine/Palestinians, 155, 157, 1027, 1331. *See also* Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palme, Olof, **1571–1572,** 1572(photo), 1982
Panama, **1572–1575,** 1574(photo)
  U.S. invasion of (1989), 122, 123(photo), 1575–1578, 1575(table), 1576(map), 1577(photo)
Panama Canal Treaties (1977), **1578–1581,** 1579(photo)
Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi, **1581–1582**
Papadopoulos, Georgios, 852, **1582–1583,** 1583
Papagos, Alexander, **1583–1584**
Papandreou, Andreas Georgios, 852, **1584–1585**
Papandreou, Georgios, 850–851, **1586**
PAPERCLIP, Operation, **1587–1588**
Paraguay, **1588–1589,** 1589(photo)
Paris Conference (1960), **1590–1591**
Paris Peace Accords (1973), 2665–2668**Doc.**

Paris Peace Conference and Treaties (1946), **1591–1593,** 1592(photo)
Park Chung Hee, 1147–1148, **1593–1595**
Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), 961, **1595–1597,** 1596(photo)
Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich, **1597–1598**
Pauker, Ana Rabinsohn, **1598–1600,** 1599(photo)
Paul II (king of Greece), 850, 852
Paul VI (pope), **1600–1601,** 1600(photo), 1739
Peace Corps, **1601–1604,** 1602(photo), 1603(table), 2548–2549**Doc.**
Peace movements, **1604–1609,** 1607(photo), 1608(photo)
  antinuclear campaigns of the 1980s, 1607–1608
  in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1605
  in Japan, 1605
  of scientists, 1605
  in the United Kingdom, 1606
  in the United States, 1605, 1606
  Vietnam War protests, 1606–1607
Peaceful coexistence, **1609–1611**
Pearson, Lester Bowles, **1611–1612,** 1612(photo)
Peng Dehuai, **1612–1613,** 1613(photo)
Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich, 650, 650(photo), **1613–1615**
Perestroika, 222, 666, **1615–1616**
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, **1616–1617**
Perón, Eva, **1617–1618,** 1618(photo)
Perón, Juan Domingo, 175, 562, 563, **1618–1619,** 1619(photo)
Persian Gulf War (1991), **1620–1625.** 1620(photo), 1621(map), 1622(map), 1624(table)
  air campaign of, 1622
  armored warfare during, 1623–1624
  casualties of, 1624
  cause of, 1620
  coalition forces involved in, 1622
  land campaign of, 1623
  strength of Iraqi forces, 1620, 1622
Peru, **1625–1627,** 1626(photo). *See also* Shining Path
Petőfi, Sándor, 940, 941
Petrov, Vladimir Mikhailovich, **1627–1628**
Pflimlin, Pierre, **1628–1629**
Pham Van Dong, **1629–1630,** 1629(photo)
Philby, Harold Adrian Russell, **1630–1631,** 1631(photo)
Philippines, 931–932, **1631–1635,** 1873
  and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), 1633, 1634
  relations with China, 1633
  spread of Liberation Theology in, 1632
  under Aquino, 1633–1635
  under Marcos, 1633
Picasso, Pablo, **1636–1637**
Pieck, Wilhelm, **1637–1638,** 1637(photo)
Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto, **1638–1640,** 1639(photo)
Pitts, Earl, 654
Pius XI (pope), 1738
Pius XII (pope), **1640–1641,** 1641(photo), 1738
Plastiras, Nikolaos, 851
Pleven, René Jean, **1641–1642,** 1642(photo)
Pleven Plan (1950), **1643–1634**
Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich, **1644–1645,** 1645(photo)
Poindexter, John, 1005
Point Four Program (1949), **1645–1646**
Pol Pot, 355–356, 1114, 1115, **1646–1647,** 1647(photo)
Poland, 667, **1648–1656,** 1651(photo), 1653(photo), 1655(photo), 1704
  antagonism of toward the Soviet Union, 1648
  armed forces of, 1656–1658
  during World War II, 1648–1649
  Jewish deaths in, 1649
  Poznań riots in, 1650–1651
  and the Solidarity movement, 666, 1652–1654, **1844–1846**
  under Soviet control, 1650–1655
Pompidou, Georges, 743–744, **1658–1661,** 1659(photo)
Pontecorvo, Bruno, 646
Porkkala, **1661–1662**
Port Huron Manifesto (1962), 1954, 2566–2570**Doc.**
Portugal, 677, **1662–1665,** 1663(photo)
  and the Carnation Revolution, 1664
  decolonization in, 1664
  postrevolution politics in, 1664–1665
Potsdam Conference (1945), 862, 2350–2354**Doc.**
Powers, Francis Gary, 88, 648, 991, **1666–1667,** 1667(photo)
Prague Spring (1968), **1667–1670,** 1669(photo), 2227, 2620–2624**Doc.**
Present Danger, Committee on the, **1670–1672**
Profumo Affair (1963), **1672–1674**
Protest movements, **1674–1676,** 1675(photo)
Pueblo Incident, **1676–1669,** 1677(photo)

Qadhafi, Muammar, 1208–1210, **1681–1682**
Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 1012–1013
Qian Qichen, **1683,** 1683(photo)
Qiao Guanhua, **1684**
Qutb, Sayyid, 1689–1690

Raab, Julius, 869, **1685–1686**
Rabin, Yitzhak, 162, 172, **1686–1687,** 1686(photo)
Race relations, United States, **1687–1688**
Radical Islam, **1689–1692,** 1690(photo)
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, **1692–1694,** 1692(photo)
Rahman, Mujibur, **1694–1695**
Rahman, Tunku Abdul, **1695–1696,** 1696(photo)
Rajk, László, 946, 947, **1696–1697,** 1697(photo)
Rákosi, Mátyás, 939–940, 946, 948, **1697–1698**
  excesses of, 947
Rand, Ayn, 1219
RAND Corporation, **1698–1699**
Rapacki, Adam, **1699–1701**
Rapacki Plan (1957), **1701–1702**
Rawlings, Jerry John, 825
Reagan, Ronald Wilson, 122, 472, 486, 708, 784(photo), 1131, 1204, 1346, 1485, **1702–1706,** 1702(photo), 1705(photo), 1892, 2107, 2123. *See also* Constructive Engagement; Contras; Iran-Contra Affair; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
  address to the nation on events in Lebanon and Grenada (1983), 2735–2739**Doc.**
  address to the nation on national security (1983), 2733–2735**Doc.**
  address to the nation on nuclear weapons (1983), 2739–2741**Doc.**
  and the arms race with the Soviet Union, 1703
  cautiousness of, 1703–1704
  criticism of Carter, 1008
  "evil empire" speech of (1983), 2730–2733**Doc.**
  friendship of with Thatcher, 2041, 2107(photo)
  meetings with Gorbachev, 1402–1403, 1725–1726, 2237–2239
  nuclear weapons buildup under, 2134
  policy regarding human rights, 938
  policy regarding Namibia, 1429
  policy regarding South Africa, 481–482
  pragmatism of, 1703
  remarks on East-West relations (1987), 2751–2753**Doc.**
Reagan Doctrine, **1706–1707**

Red Army faction, **1708–1710,** 1709(photo)
Red Brigades, **1710–1711**
Refugees (displaced persons [DP]), **1711–1716,** 1712(photo), 1714(photo)
  definition of, 1712, 1713
  from Cuba, 1713
  from the Hungarian Revolution, 1712, 1713
  number of post–World War II refugees, 1712–1713
  post–Cold War refugees, 1715
  U.S. assistance for, 1712–1713, 1714
  from the Vietnam War, 1714
Refuseniks, **1716–1717**
Religious right, United States, **1717–1719,** 1718(photo)
Renner, Karl, 217, 219, 868, **1719–1720**
Republic of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty (1953), **1720–1721**
Reuter, Ernst, **1721–1722**
Revolt of the Admirals (1949), **1722–1724,** 1723(photo)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 457, 458
Reykjavík Meeting (Reagan/Gorbachev [1986]), **1725–1726**
Reza Pahlavi, Mohammad (Shah of Iran), 998, 999, 1000, 1001–1003, 1002(photo), 1007, 1008, 1009, **1726–1727,** 1726(photo)
Rhee, Syngman, **1727–1728,** 1728(photo)
Ridgway, Matthew Bunker, 1157–1158, **1728–1729,** 1728(photo)
Rio Pact (1947), 120, **1730–1731,** 2384–2386**Doc.**
Robinson, Jackie, 2209(photo)
Rochet, Waldeck, **1732–1733,** 1732(photo)
Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich, **1733–1734**
Rockefeller Report on the Americas (1969), 2639–2645
Rogers, William Pierce, 165, 1133, **1734–1735,** 1734(photo)
Roh Tae Woo, **1735–1736**
Roman Catholic Church, 947, **1736–1740,** 1737(photo). *See also* Ireland, Northern; Vatican City; Vatican Council II; *specific individually listed popes*
Romania, 148–149, 663, 664, 665, 667–668, 1598–1599, **1740–1745,** 1741(photo), 1744(photo), 2226, 2227–2228
  collectivization of agriculture in, 1742
  and the dictatorship of King Carol II, 1740–1741
  during World War II, 1741–1742
  industrialization in, 1742
  National Salvation Front Communiqués (1989), 2782–2785**Doc.**
  under Ceauşescu, 1743–1744
  under Soviet occupation, 1742
Romanian Communist Party (RCP), 966, 967
Rome, Treaty of (1957), **1745–1746**
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 116, 117(photo), **1746–1748,** 1747(photo)
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 142, 933, **1748–1751,** 1749(photo), 2127
  economic and military growth of the United States during his presidency, 1750–1751
  Good Neighbor policy of, 119–120, 121
  and the Grand Alliance, 1749–1750
  Lend-Lease program of, 1196–1197, 1197(table)
Rosenberg, Ethel, 646, 1752, 1752(photo)
Rosenberg, Julius, 645–646, **1751–1752,** 1752(photo), 2452–2453**Doc.**
Rumsfeld, Donald, **1753–1754**
Rusk, Dean, 239, **1754–1756,** 1755(photo)
Russell, Bertrand, **1756–1757,** 1756(photo)
  and the Einstein-Russell appeal, 2500–2501**Doc.**
Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr., **1757–1758**
Ryzhkov, Nikolai Ivanovich, **1758–1759**

Saar, **1761–1762**
Sadat, Anwar, 165, 166, 363(photo), 617, 1029, 1030, 1334–1335, **1762–1764,** 1763(photo). *See also* Camp David Accords
  assassination of, 1763
Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich, 179, **1764–1765,** 1764(photo)
Salan, Raoul Albin-Louis, **1765–1767**
Salazar, António de Oliveira, **1767–1768,** 1767(photo)
San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), **1768–1769**
Sandinistas, **1769–1772,** 1770(photo)
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 674(photo), **1772–1773**
Satō Eisaku, 1050–1051, **1773–1774**
Saudi Arabia, **1774–1777,** 1776(photo)
  and the oil embargo of the United States (1973), 1775–1776
Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro, 73(photo), **1777–1778**
Scandinavia, **1778–1783,** 1781(photo), 1782(photo)
  economic strength of, 1782–1783
  inter-Scandinavian cooperation, 1780–1781
  nonalignment policy of, 1779–1780
Scheel, Walter, **1784**
Schelling, Thomas, 182
Schlesinger, James Rodney, **1784–1786**
Schmidt, Helmut, 678, 814–815, **1786–1788,** 1786(photo)
School of the Americas, **1788–1789**
Schriever, Bernard Adolf, **1789–1790**
Schröder, Gerhard, **1790–1791,** 1791(photo)
Schumacher, Kurt, **1791–1793**
Schuman, Robert, **1793–1794,** 1793(photo)
Schuman Plan, **1794–1795**
Schwarzkopf, Norman, 1622–1623, 1624
Schweitzer, Albert, **1795–1796**
Seale, Bobby, 288–289
Securitate, **1796–1797**
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on, **1798–1799**
Selassie, Haile, 657, 658
Service, John Stewart, 951, **1800–1801,** 1800(photo)
Sétif Uprising, **1801–1802**
Sharansky, Natan, 146
Sharon, Ariel, 159–160
Shehu, Mehmet, 97, 98, 99, **1803**
Sherman, Forrest Percival, **1804–1805**
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 793, **1805–1806,** 1806(photo)
Shigemitsu Mamoru, **1806–1807**
Shining Path, **1807–1809**
Shivkov, Todor, 667
Shoup, David M., 870(photo)
Shultz, George Pratt, **1809–1811,** 1809(photo)
Sihanouk, Norodom, 354–355, **1811–1812,** 1812(photo)
Simhoni, Assaf, 160
"Sinews of Peace" speech, **1812–1814,** 2369–2370**Doc.**
Singapore, **1814–1816,** 1815(photo)
Sinn Féin, 1022, 1024, **1817–1819,** 1818(photo)
Sino-Indian border confrontations, **1820–1821**
Sino-Soviet border incident (1969), **1821–1823,** 1822(photo)
Sino-Soviet split, 98, 403, 603, 1120, **1823–1827,** 1825(photo), 2587–2588**Doc.**
Sino-Soviet Treaty (1950), **1827–1828**
Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), **1828–1832,** 1829(table), 1830(map), 1831(photo)
Sirhan, Sirhan B., 1108

Skybolt Affair and Nassau Conference, **1832–1833**
Slánský trial, **1834–1835**
Slovak Communist Party (SCP), 952, 953
Small arms, **1835–1838,** 1836(photo), 1837(photo)
Smith, Ian Douglas, **1838–1839,** 2308, 2310
Smith, Walter Bedell, **1839–1841,** 1840(photo)
Smuts, Jan Christian, **1841–1842**
Soares, Mário, 1665, **1842–1843,** 1842(photo)
Sobalvarro, Oscar Manuel, interview with, 2842–2852**Doc.**
Social Democratic Party (SPD), 809, 813, 814–815
Socialist Unity Party (SED [East Germany]), 796–797, 798, 799, 800
Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich, **1843–1844**
Solidarity Movement, 666, **1844–1846,** 1845(photo)
  and the Gdańsk Accords (1980), 2724–2729**Doc.**
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 1223, **1846–1848**
Somalia, **1848–1851,** 1850(photo). *See also* Ogaden War
Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, **1851–1852**
Somoza García, Anastasio, 1769–1771, **1852–1853,** 1853(photo)
Song Meiling, **1853–1854**
Song Qingling, **1854–1855**
Sophoulis, Themistoklis, 851
South Africa, 472–473, **1855–1860,** 1856(photo), 2041
  and the Sharpville incident, 1856–1857
  and the Soweto uprising, 1857
  and stages of the apartheid era, 1856
  under Verwoerd, 1856–1857
  under Vorster, 1857
South African destabilization campaign, **1860–1862**
South Asia, **1862–1868,** 1863(photo), 1866(photo)
  and the partition of India, 1862–1864
  and the problem of Bangladesh, 1865
  tensions between India and China, 1865–1866
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), 1439, 1441–1443
Southeast Asia, **1869–1876,** 1869(photo), 1871(photo), 1875(photo). *See also* Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); Vietnam War
  decolonization in, 1872–1874
  French presence in, 1869–1870
  and the Malay Federation, 1873–1874
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (1954), 2484–2487**Doc.**
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 188, 214–215, 625, 987, **1876–1880,** 1877(photo), 1878(map)
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, **1880–1881**
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, **1881–1882**
Souvannaphong, Prince of Laos, **1882–1884,** 1883(photo)
Soviet Union, 148, 278–279, 978, 979, 998, 1167–1168, 1333–1334, **1884–1894,** 1885(photo), 1887(map), 1889(photo), 1890(photo), 1893(photo). *See also* Afghanistan War; Antiaircraft guns and missiles; Cominform; East Asia; Gulags; Hungarian Revolution; Karelia; Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB); Military balance; Prague Spring; Sino-Soviet split; Space race
  and anticolonialism, 144
  army of, 1894–1898, 1895(photo)
  army air force of, 1898–1903, 1900(photo), 1901(photo)
  challenges to in Asia, 1886–1887
  defense of Egypt by, 164–165
  dissolution of, 1893, 2822–2825**Doc.**
  and the division of Germany, 1886
  draft platform of the Communist Party Central Committee (1990), 2785–2794**Doc.**
  and human rights, 937–938
  and KAL Flight 007 (1983), 1088–1091
  navy of, 1903–1907, 1905(photo), 1906(photo)
  number of casualties suffered by in World War II, 1885, 1928
  policy of in Azerbaijan, 223
  and the recognition of Cuba, 1888–1889
  repression of religion in, 1737–1738
  Sino-Soviet border clashes, 2634–2636**Doc.**
  Soviet-Sino split, 98, 403, 603, 1120, **1823–1827,** 1825(photo), 2587–2588**Doc.**
  Soviet-U.S. relations, 1889–1891
  Soviet-Yugoslav split, 665, 1907–1908
  statement of concerning the U-2 incident, 2536–2539**Doc.**
  Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Friendship with China, 2324–2325**Doc.**
Spaak, Paul-Henri, **1908–1910,** 1909
Space race, **1910–1914,** 1911(photo), 1913(photo)
Spain, 677, 754–756, **1914–1918,** 1916(photo)
  overseas colonies of, 1915–1916
  under Franco, 1915, 1916
  under González, 1917–1918
  under Suárez, 1916, 1917
Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE), 840, 841
Spiegel affair, **1918–1919**
Spinola, António de, **1919–1921,** 1920(photo)
Sputnik, **1921–1923,** 1922(photo)
Sri Lanka, **1923–1925,** 1925(photo)
Stalin, Josef, 178, 218, 247, 467, 484, 850, 854, 1887–1888, **1926–1929,** 1927(photo), 2068, 2069. *See also* Gulags
  "Conflict is Inevitable" speech, 2363–2364**Doc.**
  and the "Doctors' Plot," 1928–1929
  domestic policies of, 1884–1885
  economic policies of, 1926–1927
  foreign policies of, 1885–1886, 1927
  nuclear policy of, 1928
  post–World War II goals of, 1884
  reply to Churchill, 2370–2373**Doc.**
  support of North Korea by, 1154
  telegram exchange with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 2446–2447**Doc.**
Star Wars. *See* Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Starry, Donn A., 94, 2147
Stasi, 797, **1929–1931**
Stepinac, Aloysius (archbishop), **1931–1932**
Stettinius, Edward Reilly, Jr., **1932–1933,** 1932(photo)
Stevenson, Adlai Ewing, II, **1933–1935,** 1934(photo), 2122
Stimson, Henry Lewis, **1935–1936,** 1936(photo)
Stockholm Document (1986), **1937–1938**
Stoner, Eugene, 1244
Stoph, Willi, 814(photo), 921
Strategic Air Command (SAC), 87, **1938–1940,** 1939(photo)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Treaties, 184, 1891, **1940–1945,** 1944(photo)
  Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), 1941–1942
  SALT I Treaty (1972), 184, 1493, 1942–1943, 2659–2651**Doc.**
  SALT II Treaty (1979), 1943–1944, 2706–2709**Doc.**

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Treaties, **1945–1946**
START I Treaty (1991), 184, 185, 1946, 2811–2818**Doc.**
START II Treaty (1993), 184, 1947–1948, 2826–2827**Doc.**
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 140, 486, 1346, 1703, 170, 1892, **1949–1951,** 1949(photo), 2134
Strategy and Arms Control (Halperin and Schelling), 182–183
Stratemeyer, George Edward, **1951–1952**
Strauss, Franz Josef, **1952–1954,** 1953(photo)
Strauss, Lewis, 959
Stroessner, Alfredo, 1588–1589, 1589(photo)
Structuralism, 675
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), **1954–1956,** 1955(photo). *See also* Weathermen
Suárez González, Adolfo, **1956–1957**
Submarines, 992, **1957–1963,** 1959(photo), 1962(photo)
attack and cruise missile submarines, 1960–1962
ballistic missile submarines, 1958–1960
British, 1962
French, 1962–1963
Soviet, 1958, 1959–1960, 1962
U.S., 1959, 1960
Sudan, **1963–1966,** 1963(photo)
nationalist movements in, 1964
Suez Crisis (1956), 158–161, 1333, **1966–1973,** 1967(map), 1970(photo), 1971(photo)
aftermath of, 1972
British attacks on Egypt, 1970–1971
British and French opposition to Nasser, 1968
Israeli invasion of Egypt due to, 1969–1970
origins of, 1967
Suharto, 610, 611, 987–988, **1973–1974,** 1973(photo)
Sukarno, 986–987, **1974–1977,** 1975(photo)
speech of at the Bandung Conference (1955), 2495–2497**Doc.**
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), **1977–1978**
Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich, **1978–1979,** 1979(photo)
Svoboda, Ludvík, **1979–1980**
Sweden, 1780, 1783, **1980–1983**
alignment with the West, 1982
armed forces of, 1983–1985
and the "Nordic balance," 1981
relations with the Soviet Union, 1981–1982
Światło, Józef, **1985–1987,** 1986(photo)
Switzerland, **1987–1990,** 1988(photo)
and the concept of armed neutrality, 1988
economic strength of, 1988–1989
neutrality of (the Bindschedler Doctrine), 1987
Swords to Ploughshares Movement, **1990–1991**
Syria, 887, 1079, 1333, 1334, 1335, **1991–1993,** 1992(photo). *See also* Arab-Israeli Wars (1948–1973)
Szilard, Leo, 203

Taft, Robert Alphonso, **1995–1997,** 1996(photo)
Taiwan. *See* China, Republic of (ROC, Taiwan)
Taiwan Strait Crisis, First (1954–1955), **1997–1998**
Taiwan Strait Crisis, Second (1958), 602, **1998–2001,** 1999(photo), 2000(map)
Tanaka Kakuei, **2001–2002**
Tank warfare, **2002–2007**
and the development of armored personnel carriers (APCs), 2002
during the Indochina War, 2004
during the Korean War, 2003–2004
during the Vietnam War, 2004–2005
Soviet strategy of, 2003
U.S. strategy of, 2003
use of in the Middle East, 2005–2007
Tanks, **2007–2018,** 2009(photo), 2011(photo), 2012(photo), 2014(photo)
British, 2008
Chinese, 2017
French, 2008
Indian and Pakistani, 2016–1017
Iranian, 2016
Israeli, 2016
Japanese, 2017
U.S., 2009–2012
Soviet, 2012–2015
West German, 2009
Tanner, Väinö Alfred, **2018–2019**
Tanzania, **2019–2021,** 2020(photo)
Taylor, Charles, 1204
Taylor, Maxwell Davenport, 728–729, **2021–2023,** 2022(photo)
Tehran Declaration (1943), 998
Teller, Edward, 959, **2023–2024,** 2003(photo)
Templer, Sir Gerald, **2024–2025**
Terrorism, 168(photo), 187, **2028–2033,** 2029(photo), 2030(table), 2032(photo). *See also* Irish Republican Army (IRA); Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and ethnonational separatists, 2031
impact of during the Cold War, 2029
in Italy, 1039–1040
in Japan, 2030
Latin American revolutionaries, 2030
in the Middle East, 2031–2033
terrorist groups in Europe, 2029–2030
Tet Offensive (1968). *See* Vietnam War, Tet Offensive
Thailand, **2037–2040,** 2039(photo)
cooperation with U.S. intelligence operations, 2037–2038, 2039
problems of with Laos, 2038
U.S. economic aid to, 2037
Thatcher, Margaret, 677, **2040–2043,** 2041(photo), 2106–2107
domestic policy of, 2042
foreign policy of, 2041–2042
friendship of with Reagan, 2041, 2107(photo)
Thompson, Hugh, 1430
Thompson, Sir Robert, 471, 1258, **2043–2044**
Thorez, Maurice, **2044–2046,** 2045(photo)
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBN [1974]),**2046–2047**
Thule Air Base, 857
Tiananmen Square protests, **2047–2049,** 2048(photo), 2764–2766**Doc.**
reaction to by the United States, 2766–2769**Doc.**
Tibet, **2049–2051,** 2050(photo)
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 640–641, 659
Tildy, Zoltán, 946, **2051–2052**
Tito, Josip Broz, 9, 665, 1453, **2052–2055,** 2053(photo)
despotic rule of in Yugoslavia, 2053–2054
and the formation of the National Front, 2053
service of during World War II, 2052–2053
Todorov, Stanko, **2055–2056**
Tökés, László, 667, **2056–2057**
Tolbert, William, Jr., 1204
Tomášek, František, **2057–2058,** 2057(photo)
Tonkin Gulf Incidents and Resolution (1964), **2058–2060,** 2060(photo), 2599–2600**Doc.**
Torrijos, Omar, 1579(photo), 1580

Touré, Ahmed Sékou, **2060–2062,** 2061(photo)
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Japan/United States [1960]), 1050
Triad, **2062–2063**
Trieste, **2063–2065,** 2064(photo)
Trudeau, Pierre, **2065–2067,** 2066(photo)
Trujillo, Rafael Leónidas, **2067–2068,** 2067(photo)
Truman, Harry S., 129, 485(photo), 591, 669, 710, 855, 1146, 1751, **2068–2070,** 2069(photo), 2128–2129. *See also* Containment policy; Korean War; Marshall Plan; Revolt of the Admirals
  authorization of for the development of the hydrogen bomb, 959–960
  decision of to employ the atomic bomb against Japan, 204, 2068
  declaration of a national emergency, 2451–2452**Doc.**
  and the development of the hydrogen bomb, 2070
  diary entries of concerning the Potsdam Conference (1945), 2350–2354**Doc.**
  impulsiveness of, 2068
  joint communiqué of with Attlee concerning the Korean War, 2448–2450**Doc.**
  recognition of the state of Israel by, 2391–2392**Doc.**
  statement relieving MacArthur of his command, 2453–2457**Doc.**
  telegram to Jiang Jieshi, 2354–2355**Doc.**
Truman Doctrine (1947), 484, 690, 1154, 1332, 1453, 2069, **2070–2072,** 2373–2375**Doc.**
Truman Loyalty Program (1947), **2073–2074,** 2375–2378**Doc.**
Tubman, William, 1203–1204
Tuđman, Franjo, **2074–2075**
Tunisia, **2075–2077,** 2076(photo)
Turkey, 178–179, 484, 989–990, **2077–2083,** 2079(photo), 2080(photo). *See also* Cyprus
  armed forces of, 2083–2085, 2083(photo)
  coups by the military in, 2079–2080, 2081–2082
  dispute with Bulgaria, 2082
  foreign debt of, 2081
  industrial development in, 2079
  and the Korean War, 2079
  and the Kurds, 2082
  Mutual Cooperation Pact with Iraq (1955), 2493–2495**Doc.**
  U.S. economic aid to, 851, 1453, 2081
Twentieth Party Congress (1956), **2085–2086**

U Nu, **2087–2088**
U Thant, **2088–2089,** 2089(photo), 2123
U-2 Incident, **2089–2092,** 2090(photo), 2536–2539**Doc.,** 2539–2542**Doc.**
U-2 overflights
  of Cuba, 507, 508
  of the Soviet Union, 2092–2095, 2093(photo)
Uganda, **2095–2097**
Ukraine, **2097–2100,** 2099(photo)
  and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, 2099
  economic recovery of, 2098
  under Stalin, 2097–2098
Ulam, Stanislaw, 960
Ulbricht, Walter, 261, 796, 797, 798, 921, **2100–2102,** 2102(photo)
Ulbricht Doctrine, 891
Ulster Defense Association, 1019
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 1019
United Arab Republic (UAR), 1077
United Europe Movement (UEM), 689
United Kingdom, 277–278, 672, 675, 744, 855, 1109, 1296, **2102–2108,** 2104(photo), 2107(photo). *See also* Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis; Falklands War; Hong Kong; Ireland, Northern; Ireland, Republic of; Irish Republican (IRA); Suez Crisis; Thatcher, Margaret
  air force of (Royal Air Force [RAF]), 2109–2111
  army of, 2111–2114, 2112(photo), 2113(table)
  colonial empire of, 2103
  differences of with the United States over Asian policy, 2104–2105
  economic and social problems of (1970s), 2106
  importance of the Suez Canal to, 615
  and Malaysia, 1255, 1258
  mandates of in the Middle East after World War I, 1330–1331
  and the Marshall Plan, 2104
  navy of (Royal Navy [RN]), 2114–2117, 2116(photo)
  post–World War II policy of toward the Soviet Union, 2102–2103
  withdrawal of from Palestine (1948), 1027–1028
United Nations, 160, 162, 479, 934, 954–955, 977, 979, 1027, 1146, **2117–2126,** 2118(photo), 2119(table), 2121(photo), 2125(photo), 2308. *See also* Korean War; World Bank
  and the admission of China, 2121
  declining influence of, 2123
  and the Korean War, 2121–2222
  mandates and responsibilities of, 2120
  membership increase of, 2123
  origins of, 2117–2118
  peacekeeping operations of, 2122
  United Nations Charter, 2343–2350**Doc.**
  United Nations Conference on Disarmament, 186
  United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNCG), 785–786
  United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 1440, 2120, 2124
  United Nations General Assembly, 2119, 2121, 2122–2123
  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1712–1715
  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1469
  United Nations International Refugee Organization (UNIRO), 1712
  United Nations Security Council, 708, 875, 986, 1331, 2118
  United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, 957
  United Nations World Food Program, 1440
  and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2403–2407**Doc.**
United States, 150, 278, 944, 1011, 1425–1427, **2126–2135,** 2129(photo), 2131(photo), 2133(photo), 2134(photo). *See also* Asia, U.S. armed forces in; Containment policy; East Asia; Grenada Invasion; Guantánamo Naval Base; Korean War; Military balance; Space race; Triad; Vietnam War
  acknowledgment of Soviet atomic bomb detonation, 2415–2416**Doc.**
  and the aftermath of the Cold War, 2134–2135
  air force of, 2136–2143, 2137(map), 2138(photo)2141(photo), 2142(photo)
  army of, 2143–2148, 2145(table),
  and civil defense measures, 2130
  and the development of the thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb, 2128
  economic power and influence of after World War II, 2127
  effect of World War I and World War II on, 2126–2127

and the Great Depression, 2127
human rights policies of, 936, 937–939
image of abroad, 2130–2132
and the Indochina War, 983–984
influence of the Cold War on American culture and society, 2130, 2132
joint communiqué of with China (PRC), 2656–2658**Doc.**
as the leader of the anticommunist nations, 2128, 2132
marines corps of, 2153–2155**,** 2154(photo)
Mutual Defense Treaty (1953) with South Korea, 1147, 2469–2471**Doc.**
navy of, 2155–2160, 2157(photo),
occupation of Japan by after World War II, 598–599, 1046, 1056–1058
Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 2702–2704**Doc.**
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1951), 2462–2463**Doc.**
U.S.-Soviet relations, 1889–1891, 2128, 2133–2135
United States, 1723–1724, 1723(photo)
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 94
United States Commander in Chief, Europe, **2148–2149**
United States Information Agency (USIA), **2149–2152,** 2150(photo)
United States–Japan Security Treaty (1951), **2152–2153**
Uruguay, **2160–2162,** 2161(photo)

Vance, Cyrus Roberts, **2163–2165,** 2164(photo)
Vandenberg, Hoyt Sanford, **2165–2167,** 2166(photo)
Vandenberg Resolution (1948), **2167–2168,** 2168(photo), 2392–2393**Doc.**
Van Fleet, James Alward, 1158, **2168–2170,** 2169(photo)
Vatican City, **2170–2175,** 2171(photo)
activism of in Poland, 2174
challenges of communism to, 2171–2173
as a city-state, 2170
diplomatic relations with China, 2173–2174
Vatican Council II (1962–1965), **2175–2177**
Venezuela, **2177–2181,** 2179(photo)
Venona Project, 645–646, 991, **2181–2182**
Vienna Conference (1961), **2182–2184,** 2183(photo)
Viet Minh, 913–914, **2184–2185**. *See also* Indochina War
Vietnam, 1869–1871, **2186–2192,** 2186(photo), 2187(map). *See also* Vietnam War
control of South Vietnam by Diem, 2188
economic problems of North Vietnam, 2189
Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 2361–2362**Doc.**
and the free market economy, 2190–2191
and the independence of North Vietnam, 2188
invasion of Cambodia by, 2190
nationalism in, 2186
political purges in after the Vietnam War, 2189
Vietnam War (1957–1975), 92, 386, 470(photo), 1871–1872, 2132, 2145–2146, **2192–2201,** 2193(photo), 2194(table), 2196(photo), 2197(map), 2200(photo). *See also* My Lai Massacre; Paris Peace Accords (1973); Sino-Vietnamese War
artillery use during, 192–193
bombing of North Vietnam (Operation ROLLING THUNDER, Operation LINEBACKER), 136, 1075, 2139, 2195, 2199
casualties of, 2194(table), 2195, 2198
conduct of the war under Nixon, 2199–2200
costs of, 2133
and the counterinsurgency Operation PHOENIX, 2199
disillusionment with the war, 2198–2199
and the Easter Offensive, 2199
expansion of the war under Johnson, 2196
and the fall of Saigon, 2200–2201
and the invasion of Laos, 2199
protests against the war, 2201–2204, 2203(photo)
role of Australia in, 215
role of espionage in, 650
role of the Kennedy administration in, 2193–2194
tank warfare during, 2004–2005
Tet offensive (1968), 2033–2037, 2034(map), 2035(photo), 2198
and the Tonkin Gulf incident (1964) **2058–2060,** 2060(photo), 2195
use of antiaircraft missiles by North Vietnam in, 136–137
U.S. troop levels during, 2196
Vo Nguyen Giap, 468–469, 558, 559, 914, 981, 983–984, 2193, 2198, **2205–2207,** 2206(photo)
Vogel, Hans-Jochen, **2207–2208**
Voice of America (VOA), **2208–2209,** 2209(photo)
Vorster, Balthazar Johannes, 1856, 1857, 1858, **2209–2210,** 2310
Vranitzky, Franz, **2210–2212,** 2211(photo)
Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuarevich, **2212–2213,** 2212(photo)

Waldheim, Kurt, **2215–2216,** 2215(photo)
Waldheim affair (1986), **2216–2218**
Wałęsa, Lech, 666(photo), 2209, **2218–2220,** 2219(photo). *See also* Poland
Walker, Edwin Anderson, **2220–2221**
Walker, John Anthony, Jr., **2221–2222,** 2222(photo)
Walker, Walton, 1155, 1729
Wallace, Henry Agard, **2222–2224,** 2223(photo)
Walsh Report (1993), 2835–2841**Doc.**
Walter, Francis, 996
Wang Bingnan, **2224–2225**
War Powers Act (1973), 2669–2670**Doc.**
Warsaw Pact (1955), 1424–1425, **2225–2229,** 2225(photo), 2227(photo), 2228(table), 2498–2500**Doc.**
cessation of the military provisions of, 2807–2808**Doc.**
as a political instrument of the Cold War, 2226
discontent among members of, 2226–2228
and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 839, 2227–2228
and the Solidarity Crisis in Poland, 2228
strength of its military forces in Europe, 670–671
Warships, surface, **2229–2235,** 2231(photo), 2233(photo)
battleships, 2230
cruisers, 2230–2231
destroyers, 2232
and the development of naval weaponry, 2232–2234
and mine warfare, 2234
Washington Summit Meeting, Nixon and Brezhnev (1973), **2235–2237,** 2236(photo)
Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev (1987), 2237–2239

Watergate scandal, **2239–2242,** *2241*(photo)
Weathermen, **2243–2244**
Weinberger, Caspar, 1004, 1005, **2244–2245,** *2244*(photo)
Welch, Robert Henry Winborne, Jr., **2245–2246**
Western European Union, **2246–2248**
Western Sahara, **2248–2249**
Westmoreland, William Childs, *2195*, *2196*, **2249–2250,** *2249*(photo)
Wheeler, Earle Gilmore, **2251–2252,** *2251*(photo)
Whisky on the Rocks Crisis (1981), **2252–2253**
White, Thomas Dresser, **2253–2254**
Whitlam, Edward Gough, **2254–2255,** *2255*(photo)
Williams, William Appleman, 142
Wilson, Charles Erwin, **2255–2256**
Wilson, Harold, *277–278*
Wolf, Markus, **2256–2257**
Woodstock, **2257–2258,** *2258*(photo)
World Bank, **2259–2261,** *2260*(photo)
World Council of Churches (WCC), **2262–2263**
World Peace Council (WPC), **2263–2264**
World War II
  Allied conferences concerning, *2264–2269*, *2265*(photo), *2266*(table)
  effect of on the United States, *2126–2127*
  legacy of, *2269–2273*, *2272*(photo)
  territorial changes following, *2025–2028*, *2025*(photo)
Wu Xiuquan, **2273**
Wu Xueqian, **2274**
Wyszyński, Stefan (cardinal), **2274–2276,** *2275*(photo)

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad, 978, 1565–1566, **2277–2278**
Yalta Conference (1945), 1750, *2119*, *2265*(photo), *862*. *See also* Declaration on Liberated Europe (1945)
Yang Shangkun, **2278**
Yao Wenyuan, **2279–2280**
Yarring, Gunnar, 165
Yeltsin, Boris, **2280–2282,** *2280*(photo)
Yemen, 1775, **2282–2285**
Yemen Civil War (*1962–1972*), **2285–2286**
Yergin, Daniel, 1751, **2287–2288,** *2287*(photo)
Yoshida Shigeru, 1047–1048
Yoshida Doctrine, 1048
Yugoslavia, 97, 99, **2288–2292**. *See also* Tito, Josip Broz
  armed forces of, *2292–2294*
  collapse of, *2290–2291*
  Cominform resolution regarding, *2393–2398***Doc.**
  Communist Party of, *2289*, *2290*
  economic crisis in, *2290*
  NATO air strikes against, *2291–2292*
  Soviet-Yugoslav split, 665, *2289*

Zabotin, Nicolai, 645
Zambia, *2309*
Zápotocký, Antonín, **2295–2296**
Zhang Hanfu, **2296–2297**
Zhang Wentian, **2297–2298**
Zhao Ziyang, **2298–2299,** *2298*(photo)
  documents of concerning student protests, *2759–2764***Doc.**
Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich, **2299–2300**
Zhivkov, Todor, **2300–2301**
Zhou Enlai, *402*, 406, **2302–2304,** *2302*(photo)
  telegram exchange with Stalin, *2446–2447***Doc.**
Zhu De, **2304–2305**
Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich, **2305–2307,** *2306*(photo)
Zia ul Haq, Muhammad, 1566, **2307–2308,** *2307*(photo)
Zimbabwe, **2308–2312,** *2309*(photo)
  U.S. policy toward, *2308–2309*
Zionism, 145–147, 1027, 1208, 1331
Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich, **2312–2313**